See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/256439080

On Assessment of Existing Offshore Structures

Conference Paper · January 2002

CITATIONS READS
2 479

2 authors:

Gerhard Ersdal Ivar Langen

University of Stavanger (UiS) University of Stavanger (UiS)
37 PUBLICATIONS   207 CITATIONS    34 PUBLICATIONS   105 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

Ageing Structures View project

OMAE2011-49959 View project

All content following this page was uploaded by Gerhard Ersdal on 04 July 2014.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

 On Assessment of Existing Offshore Structures
Gerhard Ersdal
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate and Stavanger University College
Stavanger, Norway

Ivar Langen
Stavanger University College
Stavanger, Norway

assessment procedures are proposed. A few of these will be discussed

ABSTRACT in the following text.

The methods normally used for assessment of existing offshore
structures are based on design level check, ultimate strength check or
on a probabilistic approach. There are arguments against all these
methods. Design level analysis are claimed to be very conservative, as
after some years of experience the knowledge of the structure are
increased compared with design. Ultimate strength analysis are claimed
to cover only a small part of the hazards that should be analysed. The
probabilistic approach is claimed to be model dependent and to give
inconsistent results between analysis groups, as the subjective choices
of the analyst are of significant importance. It is also claimed that there
is no reasonable target reliability in a reliability approach, but that this
has to be established in each case dependant on the methods and
models that are used. The probabilistic approach is tending towards a
Risk approach, but is claimed to not fully appreciate all the possible
hazards for an offshore structure.
This paper describes procedures for safety assessment of existing
offshore structures as described in ISO 13819-1 (ISO 1995), API
RP2A-WSD (API 2001), ISO/DIS 13822 (ISO 2000) and
ISO/CD19902 (ISO 2001). The procedures are presented and discussed
as how they are capable of being measured against a goal of even and
acceptable risk for the society.
KEY WORDS: Structures, Safety Assessment, Regulations,
Standards, Structural analysis, push-over analysis, Reliability analysis.
INTRODUCTION
Assessment of existing structures is performed in order to extend
service life of the facility, as new methods of production and new
discoveries may give life extension of fields. Also addition of more
equipment and more personnel, and deterioration and damage of the
structure may lead to a need for assessment. The use of the existing
installations will in many cases, even with major upgrading of the
present condition, be preferable from an economic point of view
compared to installing new installations. An assessment of existing
installation for possible extension of lifetime should prove that the risk
of structural failure is acceptable. In order to achieve this, several
In order to evaluate the risk of structural failure, it is of importance to
analyse the possible structural failure scenarios, and what are the
defences and barriers against these scenarios. This is discussed in
Ersdal (2002), and the main conclusions are given here. The question of
acceptable low risk is also important, but this is not further discussed in
this paper.
In general terms the existing assessment procedures consist of the
following steps:
- Platform identification (when should assessment be initiated)
- Information review (Design, fabrication, installation and
operation history)
- Screening (major damages, major changes, deviations from
design)
- Analysis of the structure (design analysis, ultimate strength
analysis or probabilistic analysis)
- Acceptable as is, modification needed or abandonment.
The different methods of analysis of the structures are the main purpose
of this paper, but the other items will also be described.
The most general accepted standard for offshore structures are the ISO
13819-1 “Petroleum and natural gas industries – Offshore Structures –
Part 1: General Requirements”. This standard gives general design
rules and general rules for assessment of existing structures. The
Norwegian regulations (NPD 2001) refer to NORSOK N-001
(NORSOK 2000) for structural design, which again refer to ISO 13819-
1 for assessment of existing structures. However, ISO 13819-1 is a
rather general standard, not very specific on how to perform
assessment. The standard gives some indications that Design Code
format, Reserve Strength Ratio format and a probabilistic format is
acceptable. More details are given in other standards, like API RP2A-
WSD (API 2001), ISO/DIS 13822 (ISO 2000) and ISO/CD19902 (ISO
2001). Procedures are also proposed in different papers and by other
organizations, but these will not be reviewed in detail here.
Most procedures for assessment of existing fixed offshore structures
describe a method that is somewhat more relaxed compared to design
codes. They typically use deterministic Design Code format (equal to

Paper No. 2002-JSC-379 Ersdal 1

the original requirements or based a reduced load level), probability Table 1: Assessment versus design, Kallaby et al (1994) and Moan and
approach or a Reserve Strength Ratio (RSR) format. Vårdal (2001)
Design criteria Assessment criteria
A reasonable goal could be to have an existing structure of the same Environment Forecast from existing As criteria for “new “
level of safety as a newly designed structure, assuming that a structure data collection platform, with inclusion of
designed according to standards and regulation has the appropriate recent data collection and
safety level. Hence, one could argue that the same design code should use of:
be used in assessment of existing structures. However, there are some - current state of the art
differences in the knowledge about an existing structure and a structure review
in design phase. The knowledge about the structure is increased and the - experience from adjacent
accuracy of the analysis could be improved compared with the design fields
analysis. Also, the life extension time for the structure will in most - hindcasting from actual
cases be less than the initial design life. field sea-states
Loading Conservative Conservative evaluation
The conservatism included in standards and regulation in order to take evaluation from from as-built records and use
care of uncertainties (material selection, fabrication methods, etc) at the proposed use of of recent survey info on:
design stage may be excluded. The regulations also tends to use very structure - marine growth
simplified formulations for utility, capacity etc under the assumption - appurtenances
that the formulas should be easy to use rather than the most exact - removals / additions
formulation. These differences are discussed in Kallaby et al (1994) - topsides weight control
and Moan and Vårdal (2001), and a summary of these discussions is - wind areas
shown in Table 1. Foundation Forecast from site As criteria for “new”
investigation and platform with inclusion of:
Most of these items could be claimed to be up-dated information that laboratory testing of - current state-of-the-art
should normally be included in an assessment situation. If the up-dated soils review
information gives a positive result with regards to the safety of the - experience form adjacent
structure, this should be accounted for. In other situations, the fields
information may indicate a reduced safety of the structure, which - post-drive foundation
should also be accounted for. If this information and updated analyses
calculations result in a structure complying with the design code - scour survey and
standard, it should be accepted as fit for purpose. maintenance
Structural Topology and The structural dimension are
Most procedures claims that a lower acceptance criteria can be used for model dimensions may be fixed and known.
assessment of existing structure compared to design, e.g. lower load changed. In-service inspection may be
factors or Reserve Strength Ratio criteria. Moan and Vårdal (2001) No service inspection applied.
conclude based on Table 1 that in design “High uncertainty requires a available.
large safety margin”, but in an assessment situation “Reduced Conservative
uncertainty and a reduced safety margin may be applied”. This is modelling using global
probably the main assumption for accepting lower design values in an percentages to cover
assessment of an existing structure compared to a new structure. In our not-finalized details
opinion, if lower acceptance criteria should be allowed it must be based and simple geometric
on the reasoning that the epistemic uncertainties are reduced after some assumptions.
years of experience, and that e.g. 10 years of experience prove to some Stress The time for analysis is The quality of the analysis is
extent that the structure is in the “lucky” end of the strength analysis critical. critical. Sufficient time for
distribution. For a structure where the risk of failure is dominated by Strict compliance with model tests, removing of
the fatigue failure modes, the “no detection of a propagating crack” code of practice and conservatism where
after 10 years of service will be a indicator of improved reliability. But regulatory documents. possible, redundancy studies
for a structure that is dominated by other failure modes, this may not be to determine ultimate
the case. For instance a structure that is dominated by failure due to strength of structure and
wave in-deck will not benefit from the same information unless the foundation, sensitivity
structure has experienced severe weather. studies on various
parameters to improve
Other ways of reducing the risk of a structure are to introduce risk confidence levels.
prevention and mitigation procedures, e.g. by inspection and Results Structure has members Structure has some stresses
maintenance program, strengthening of structure or evacuation and joints with up to yield stress, but some
procedures. acceptable utilization. assessment standards allow
for some yielding if the
structure has proven strength
and redundancy.

Paper No. 2002-JSC-379 Ersdal 2

ASSESSMENT PROCESS PROPOSED IN API RP 2A WSD
The API RP 2A WSD is the most commonly used standard for design
of fixed offshore structures in the United States. The standard is also
used in countries outside US, but is not commonly used in Norway.
However, the standard is of interest as it is the only one of the generally
used offshore standards that has taken into account assessment of
existing structures to a detailed level.
Application of the API standard
The standard is stated to be applicable only for the assessment of
platforms, which were designed in accordance with 20th or earlier
editions of the same API standard. Structures designed after the 21st
edition, should be assessed in accordance with the criteria originally
used for the design. By this clause API is limiting the possibility for
using assessment of existing structure to minimize the structural cost by
building a platform intended to have extra modules, but not fully
designed for these additional modules, and then adding them later in an
assessment program under reduced criteria.
The API procedure
A flow chart of a general procedure is shown in Figure 1. The API RP
2A gives two different approaches, on some stages, one for the Gulf of
Mexico and another for other US areas. Only the “other US areas” part
of the procedure is included, as this seems to be the most general
approach.
Platform selection / Needs for assessment
API requires an assessment of an existing platform if one of the
following indicators exists:
- Addition of personnel
- Addition of facility
- Increased loading
- Inadequate deck height
- Damage found during inspection
Categorization
If a platform (structure) is selected for an assessment, it should be
categorized with respect to human life safety (manned-non-evacuated,
manned-evacuated, unmanned) and consequence of failure (high
consequence or low consequence).
Condition assessment
When the platform (structure) is identified for assessment, a survey
program should be performed to verify the platforms condition.
Updating of drawings should, if necessary, be performed in this phase.
The following questions should be asked:
- Is platform damaged?
- Is deck height inadequate?
- Has loading increased?
- Is platform unmanned and with low consequence?
If “No” can be answered to all these questions, the platform (structure)
can be accepted as it is, and further assessment is not necessary.
Analysis Check
There are two potential sequential analysis checks:
1: Design level analysis.
The design level analysis si regarded to be a simpler and more
conservative check. Design level analysis procedures are similar to
those used for new platform design, including the application of all
safety factors, the use of characteristic rather than mean yield stress,
etc.
Paper No. 2002-JSC-379 Ersdal
Lateral environmental load may be reduced to 85% of the 100-year
condition for high consequence platforms, and to 50% for low
consequence platforms.
2: Ultimate strength analysis
Ultimate strength analysis is regarded to be a complex and less
conservative check.
Reserve strength Ratio (RSR) is defined as the ratio of platforms
ultimate lateral load carrying capacity to its 100-year environmental
condition lateral loading.
A RSR of 1.6 is required for high consequence platforms, and 0.8 for
low consequence platforms.
In addition, the following are regarded as acceptable alternative
assessment procedures subjected to some limitations:
- Assessment of similar platforms by comparison
- Assessment through the use of explicit probabilities of failure
- Assessment based on prior exposure, surviving actual exposure to
an event that is known with confidence to have been either as severe or
more severe than the applicable ultimate strength criteria based on
exposure category.
ASSESSMENT PROCESS PROPOSED IN ISO/CD 19902
ISO 19902 is also so far only a draft standard, and changes in this
standard might occur in the final version. Earlier versions of this ISO
standard have been based on API. This paper review the draft E, issued
in June 2001.
The standard states that it is the owners responsibility to maintain and
demonstrate fitness for purpose of the platform, for its specific site
conditions and operating conditions.
The goal should be to demonstrate that the probability of a structural
failure that leads to an unacceptable consequence is acceptably small.
The acceptable risk level should be defined by statutory requirements,
industry practices in the considered region, or by owner’s corporate
policy, whichever is more onerous.
Application of the draft ISO 19902 standard
The standard is intended for application to existing jacket platform
substructures, but could also be used for topside structures.
However, so far no regulations are giving reference to this standard, as
it still is a draft standard.
The ISO 19902 procedure
A flow chart of a general procedure is shown in Figure 1.
Platform assessment indicators triggered / Needs for assessment?
An existing platform should undergo an assessment to demonstrate
fitness for purpose if one or more of the following conditions exist:
- Exceedance of intended design life.
- Damage or detoriation of a primary structural component.
Minor damage may be accepted, but the cumulative effects of
damage should be documented and accounted for in a global
resistance assessment.
- Changes from the original design or from previous
assessment basis:
o Addition of personnel or facilities;
o Modification of facilities;
o More onerous environmental criteria;
3
 o More onerous component or foundation resistance
criteria;
o Physical changes to the platform’s design basis,
e.g. scour or subsidence;
o Inadequate air gap.
Screening criteria
Screening criteria should be developed for the exposure levels of
structures being considered, taking into account the remaining service
life, structural condition monitoring records, long term environment,
degree of confidence in modelling assumptions, sensitivity to analysis
assumptions, redundancy and collapse behaviour and structural
deformation (with particular consideration to potential escalation events
and impairments of lifesaving equipment, escape routes, and temporary
refuges). Screening criteria may be developed based on the following
methods:
- Explicitly calculated probabilities of failure
- Risk based structural Reserve Strength Ratios (RSR)
- Comparison with similar platforms
- Based on prior exposure.
However, fulfilment of the strength criteria’s given in the standard is
the primary recommended method.
Platform condition assessment
Sufficient information must be collected to allow for an engineering
assessment of the platform’s overall structural integrity. Information of
the platform’s structural condition and facilities, with particular
attention to data that cannot be explicitly verified (e.g. pile penetration),
should be collected. General inspection of topside, underwater, splash
zone and foundation should be performed, and decision on whether
more detailed inspections and possible soil borings is necessary, should
be performed based on engineering judgement.
The following information should be made available:
- General information (original and current owner, original and
current platform use and function, location, water depth,
orientation, platform type (caisson, tripod, 4-6-8 leg, etc),
number of wells and risers, production rate, manning level,
performance during past extreme environmental events.
- Original design (design contractor, design date, design
drawings, material specifications, design code used and
edition, environmental criteria (wind, wave, current, seismic,
ice, etc), deck clearance elevation, operation criteria (deck
loading and equipment arrangement), soil data, number, size
and design penetration of piles and conductors,
appurtenances).
- Construction (fabrication and installation contractors, date of
installation, as built drawings, fabrication, welding and
construction specifications, material traceability records, pile
and conductor driving records, pile grouting records)
- Platform history (environmental loading history, operation
loading history, accidental loads, survey and maintenance
records, repairs (descriptions, analysis drawings and dates),
modifications (descriptions, analysis drawings and dates)).
- Present condition (all decks – actual size, location, elevation,
loading and equipment arrangement, field measured air gap,
production and storage inventory, appurtenances – current
list, sizes and location, wells – numbers, size and location of
existing conductors, recent surveys.
Action assessment
Metocean data required for assessment is stated to be the same as for
design, except that the current air gap and allowance for any future
subsidence, within the design life, should be determined. The deck
Paper No. 2002-JSC-379 Ersdal
height should be checked for potential inundation as this may limit the
overall structural reliability. The asymmetry of the wave crest versus
wave height should also be considered. Other loadings should be
considered as for design.
Resistance assessment
In general, the assessment of structural components is to be performed
in accordance with the design analysis clauses of the ISO19902
standard, taking into account the current condition or future intended
condition, accounting for any damage, repair, scour, modifications, or
other factors that may affect the structural performance or integrity.
Two optional methods are offered:
- Design level analysis: All appropriate partial action and
resistance factors are to be applied. If all components within
the structure, and foundation, are assessed to have utilization
less than or equal to unity, the structure is to be considered to
be fit for purpose.
- Ultimate strength analysis: An ultimate strength analysis can
be used in order to demonstrate that a platform has adequate
strength and stability to withstand a significant overload.
Local overstress and potential local damages are accepted,
but total collapse or excessive / damaging deformations is to
be avoided.
A simplified ultimate strength analysis, called linear elastic redundancy
analysis, is also proposed. If a member or joint do not have utilization
equal to or lower than unity, this member can be removed from the
structural model. If it is demonstrated that the load redistribution can be
accommodated without causing further components to exceed their
maximum utilization, the structure is considered fit for purpose.
ASSESSMENT PROCESS PROPOSED IN ISO/DIS 13822
ISO 13822 is so far only a draft international standard, and changes in
this standard might occur in the final version. This paper review the
draft issued in 2000. The two standards mentioned previously are both
mainly based on reserve strength analysis and design analysis, while
this is mainly a pure reliability based assessment standard.
Application of the ISO 13822 standard
The standard is intended for application to the assessment of any type
of existing structure that was originally designed, analysed and
specified based on accepted engineering principles and/or design rules,
as well as structures constructed on basis of good workmanship,
historic experience and accepted professional practice.
The ISO 13822 procedure
A flow chart of a general procedure is shown in a flow diagram in
Figure 1.
Request / Needs for an assessment
The assessment may be initiated under the following circumstances:
- an anticipated change in use or extension of design working
life;
- a reliability check as required by authorities, insurance
companies, owners etc.
- structural detoriation due to time dependent actions (e.g.
corrosion, fatigue)
- structural damage by accidental actions
Specification of assessment objectives
The objective of the assessment shall be specified in terms of future
performance required for the structure in an agreement with owner,
4
authorities and the assessing engineer. The required future performance
shall be specified in the utilisation plan and safety plan.
Scenarios
Scenarios related to a change in structural conditions or actions should
be specified in the safety plan in order to identify possible critical
situations for the structure.
Preliminary assessment
Preliminary assessment is described to contain the following activities:
- Study of documents and other evidence. These documents
should be verified with respect to correctness and in
particular whether documents were updated after previous
interventions to the structure. Other evidence, such as the
occurrence of significant environmental or seismic actions,
large actions, change in soil conditions, corrosion, and
misuse of the structure, must be recorded and documented.
- Preliminary inspection. Identify the structural system and
possible damage of the structure by visual observation with
simple tools.
- Preliminary checks. The preliminary checks should identify
the critical deficiencies related to the future safety and
serviceability of the structure with a view to focusing
resources on these aspects in subsequent assessment. Based
on these results, it is then judged whether a further
investigation is necessary or not.
- Decisions on immediate actions. If the preliminary inspection
clearly indicates that the structure is in a dangerous condition,
it is necessary to reduce the danger with respect to public
safety.
- Recommendations for detailed assessment. The preliminary
inspection may clearly show the specific deficiencies of the
structure, or that the structure is reliable for its intended use
over the remaining working life, in which case a detailed
assessment is not required. If there is uncertainty in the
actions, action effects or properties of the structure, a detailed
assessment should be recommended.
Detailed assessment
Detailed assessment should include the following activities:
- Detailed documentary search and review. Drawings,
specifications, structural calculations, construction records,
inspection and maintenance records, details of modifications,
regulations, code of practice which were used for
constructing the structure, topography and subsoil conditions
should be reviewed.
- Detailed inspection and material testing. Dimensions of the
structure and characteristic values of material properties
should be determined from documents of from detailed
inspection and material testing.
- Determination of actions. Principles for determining actions
should be in accordance with ISO 2394 (ISO 1998) for
ultimate limit state and service limit state including fatigue.
- Determination of properties of the structure. Testing on the
structure may be used to measure properties of the structure
and/or to predict a load bearing capacity when other
approaches such as detailed structural analysis or inspection
alone do not provide clear indication or have failed to
demonstrate adequate structural reliability.
- Structural analysis. Principles for structural analysis should
be in accordance with ISO 2394 (ISO 1998). The detoriation
of an existing structure should be taken into consideration.
- Verification.
Verification of an existing structure should normally be
Paper No. 2002-JSC-379 Ersdal
carried out to ensure a target reliability level that represents
the required level of structural performance.
Results of assessment
- A report form the assessment should be issued, including
scope of assessment, conclusions with regards to the scope,
sufficient or insufficient reliability, description of structure,
investigations, analysis, verification, discussion of evidence,
review of intervention options, conclusions and
recommendations for interventions, inspection and
maintenance plan and documented information.
- Conceptual design of construction interventions. If the
structural safety or serviceability is shown to be inadequate,
the results of the assessment should be used to recommend
construction interventions for repair, rehabilitation, or
upgrading of the structure.
- Control of risk. An alternative approach to the structure
intervention, which may be appropriate in some
circumstances, is to control or modify the risk by imposing
load restrictions, altering aspects of the use of the structure,
and implementing monitoring and control regime.
Judgement and decision
The client in collaboration with the relevant authority should make the
final decision on interventions, based on engineering judgement and the
recommendations in the report and considering all the information
available.
Assessment based on satisfactory past performance
ISO 13822 also opens for an assessment based on satisfactory past
performance, stating that a structure may be considered safe to resist
actions other than accidental actions provided:
- careful inspection does not reveal any evidence of significant
damage, distress or detoriation;
- the structural system is reviewed, including investigation of
critical details and checking them for stress transfer;
- the structure has demonstrated satisfactory performance for a
sufficiently long period of time for extreme actions due to use
and environmental effects to have occurred;
- there have been no changes for a sufficiently long period of
time that could significantly increase the actions on the
structure or affect its durability, and no such changes are
anticipated.
Very few offshore structures have experienced the environmental
conditions that the current design codes require, so this method is not
relevant in most cases, and will be disregarded in the following
discussion.
THE SAFETY OF AN OFFSHORE STRUCTURE
In order to assess an existing offshore structure it is important to
evaluate failure scenarios and the possible defences against these
failure scenarios. Ersdal (2002) have performed a quantitative
assessment of the failure paths, defences and barriers (risk contributors)
for fixed offshore installation. The following defences and barriers
influencing the safety of a fixed offshore structure are identified:
- Air gap.
- Load capacity versus environmental loading
- Fatigue capacity versus environmental loading
- Reserve strength and ductility
- Residual strength and residual fatigue capacity
- Evacuation of personnel ahead of storm
- Environmental loading reducing measures, including wave
5
 reducing measures
- Subsidence monitoring
- Inspection methods and intervals including first year
inspection
- Maintenance, repair and strengthening
- Quality in the design, fabrication, installation and operation
of the installation, ensured by experience transfer,
qualification of personnel, quality assurance, verification,
updated regulations and standards, model tests and full scale
tests etc.
- Corrosion protection (anodes, painting, coating etc.)
- Material selection.
- Evacuation equipment and efficiency under large tilt
- Progressing total collapse should allow for evacuation
The main barriers for a fixed offshore steel structure are in general
measurable by using results from standard structural calculations. Air
gap should be measured after installation, and monitored if the
installation is exposed to subsidence. Load capacity versus
environmental loading is illustrated by utilization factors in design
analysis, and fatigue capacity versus environmental loading can be
illustrated by fatigue damage usually calculated in fatigue design
analysis. Reserve strength may be modelled by a Reserve Strength
Ratio (RSR), and residual strength by a Residual Resistance Factor
(RSR analysis with individual members damaged, often-called RRF ).
These factors are also commonly used in probabilistic analysis
(structural reliability analysis) in order to establish a probability of
failure. Also a measure of residual fatigue capacity could be
established, but this is not usually performed by standard methods.
The inspection methods and the interval between inspections and
performed maintenance are generally known, but can in some cases be
hard to trace back in time. The effect of inspections can be modelled in
a probabilistic analysis, and hence the effect of inspection intervals and
inspection method (by the POD curve) are quantified by a change in
probability of failure
The rest of the list is not quantifiable in the same manner. The quality
in design, fabrication and installation is probably hard to trace back,
and even if the information is well known, no model for establishing
the influence on the structural safety.
The manning situation, evacuation equipment and efficiency and the
expected time available for evacuation is consequence related, and will
not be dealt with in detail here.
DISCUSSION OF THE ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES
A reasonable goal for regulators on behalf of the society is to create a
regulation that ensures an acceptable and equal level of safety. The
generation of a risk target that is consistent from one project to another
is in some extent achieved for the operations of an offshore installation,
including gas leakage, fire, explosions, boat collisions etc. A procedure
for assessment of an existing structure should ensure that the
contribution from structural failure to the total risk for an offshore
installation is at an acceptable level.
The most obvious choice for establishing quantitative probabilities of
failure is to use a structural reliability analysis, taking into account the
variability of the nature, uncertainties in load, uncertainties in
capacities and often inspections, maintenance, reserve strength and air-
gap. However, it has been stated in several cases (Melchers 2001,
Kvitrud et al 2001) that the structural reliability analysis does not give a
value for the probability of failure that is comparable with the
Paper No. 2002-JSC-379 Ersdal
experienced frequency of incidents, and that the gross errors are
contributing with 80 – 90 % of the errors, or even more for the most
serious cases. Also methods and parameters are still based on
subjective choice. Due to the problems with the method, structural
reliability analysis will give a bias in the failure probabilities, and it
should not be accepted to use a structural reliability analysis alone to
evaluate the quantitative risk of an offshore structure.
In order to give an overview, the different standards and methods
available can be summarized as follows:
API RP 2A WSD (API 2000) allows for:
- Assessment by design check using reduced lateral loading
- Assessment by Reserve Strength Ratio (RSR) check
- Assessment by comparison
- Assessment through the use of explicit probabilities of failure
- Assessment based on experience (equal or more severe than
design loading)
The two first methods seem to be recommended, but all five methods
are given as options.
ISO/CD 19902 (ISO 2001) allows for:
- Assessment by design level analysis
- Assessment by ultimate strength analysis
- Assessment by explicitly calculated probabilities of failure
- Assessment by risk based structural Reserve Strength Ratios
(RSR)
- Assessment by comparison with similar platforms
- Assessment by prior exposure.
ISO/DIS 13822 (ISO 2000) allows for:
- Assessment by design check
- Assessment through checking against a target reliability level
- Assessment based on satisfactory past performance.
The three regarded standards more or less allows for using most
available methods. Due to this, the different methods are discussed
rather than the individual standard.
Design Code format
The safety of a structure is usually regarded to be implicit acceptable in
a structure designed after a recommended design code. This is based on
the fact that most design codes are developed over years, and factors of
safety have been set to a reasonable level based on the society’s
acceptance of risk. Later these load factors have been calibrated
through reliability analysis, but the basis for the reliability target level
is the same historic level.
However, design codes are claimed to be very conservative, as after
some years of experience the knowledge of the structure is increased
compared with design. So, according to such an argument , it would be
appropriate to ask why this increased knowledge should be disregarded,
and why the structure should once again be evaluated as if there were
no information available about the final product. It might also be
appropriate to ask to what extent you can use this improved knowledge
to achieve an improved analysis. The information may make it possible
to perform more accurate analysis, but design analysis could still be the
option. The “no detection of propagating cracks” finding, will give
reason to update the reliability with regards to fatigue. The same could
be the case for measured foundation behaviour, but other failure modes
are not equally easy to update.
The list of defences and barriers against failure of a offshore structure
given previously, includes quite a few subjects that a design code
6
analysis do not take into account in an assessment situation. Among
others the inspection level and results, reserve strength, residual
strength and gross errors which all may contribute to the total risk of a
offshore structure.
Design Code format based on a reduced load level
Standards accepting a reduced load level, accepts lowering the historic
safety level, or believes that an existing structure is more reliable than a
planned structure. The belief in an increased reliability of an existing
structure must be based on the experience, and that the structure has
survived some years. If the structure has been exposed to a load level
equal to or more severe than the design load level, this might be a
reasonable idea, but it is questionable whether a structure that has only
been exposed to low loading, compared to design loading, can be
argued to have proven its reliability. After some years of experience,
the fatigue failures may be visible, but other weaknesses may not show
until a high loading is applied to the structure. Especially with regards
to Gross Errors, the history seems to tell us that these errors are not
necessarily exposed in the first few years. As the distribution of
strength has high and low values, some installations must have the low
values. A reasonable question with regards to strength against overload
will then be: Could the structure still be in the “unlucky” part of the
strength distribution, even after 10 years of experience?
The epistemic uncertainties (statistical and model uncertainties) related
to e.g. shape parameter, wave load on deck, capacity, wave force on
jacket can be reduced based on knowledge acquired through
measurement, operation and inspection.
Aleatory (inherent) uncertainties, however, related to e.g wave height
and current speed, cannot be reduced in an assessment compared to
design phase.
With regards to the list of important contributors to the safety of an
offshore structure, the discussion here will be as for design code check.
Reserve Strength Ratio (RSR) format.
A Reserve Strength Ratio analysis alone will not cover possible failure
modes as fatigue and wave-in-deck. It is reasonable to assume that the
RSR values correlates relatively well with the failure probability of a
structure, when overload due to wind, waves and current are the
dominating failure mode.
A fundamental requirement in structural analysis is that the calculations
should be on the conservative side. According to the lower bound
theorem of plasticity, an external load in equilibrium with the
distribution of internal stresses, which nowhere exceeds the acceptable
plastic stresses in material, is less or equal to the collapse load, if
ductility is acceptable (Chakrabarty, 1987). Normally this is checked by
using a linear elastic analysis, giving statically admissible forces,
followed by a code check of stresses according to accepted standards,
and the use of ductile material. A method typically used for pushover
analysis, including geometric stiffness and plastic hinges, will also give
a solution according to the lower bound theorem. This solution is less
conservative than the linear elastic solution. However, even if this
improved solution is acceptable within the lower bound theorem of
plasticity, it will lower the safety margins towards collapse. The
established safety factors are developed based on linear analysis
methods, and these safety factors cannot necessarily be adapted to non-
linear solutions, if the goal is an even level of safety.
Probabilistic approach.
The probabilistic approach, based on structural reliability analysis, is to
some extent discussed in the beginning of this section. The same
Paper No. 2002-JSC-379 Ersdal
subjective choices that gives a bias of the failure probability, will also
give inconsistent results between analysis groups, as these subjective
choices of the analyst are of significant importance. It is also claimed
that there is no general applicable target reliability in a reliability
approach, but this have to be established in each case dependent on the
methods and models that are used (Moan 1999, p 195).
ISO/DIS 13822 gives ISO 2394 “General Principles on reliability for
structures” (ISO 1998) as a reference for procedures on reliability
analysis and target reliability levels. This ISO standard does not
describe models and methods for the reliability analysis, and target
reliability is not necessarily established with methods that are
consistent with the reliability analysis. API (2000) gives very general
guidance on the use of reliability analysis, only stating that the failure
probabilities should be properly derived, and the acceptance criteria
used should be satisfactorily sustained.
A structural reliability analysis will normally be used in situation where
the design code analysis check is not satisfied or the code is not
adequate. The purpose of the structural reliability analysis is then to
demonstrate that there are some reasonable arguments for a lower
safety level that is implicit in the design code check. This must again be
based on a belief that an existing structure is more reliable than a
planned structure. A discussion on this topic is given in the previous
“Design code based on a reduced load level” section.
CONCLUSIONS
Different methods for assessment of existing structures have been
presented and discussed. A list of defences and barriers to obtain
structural safety has been presented. If one accepts this list of defences
and barriers, existing assessment procedures can be claimed to be
looking at only parts of the problem. E.g. methods based on reserve
strength ratio do formally only check the reserve strength of a structure.
In some cases, but not necessarily all, the method also account for wave
in deck and fatigue. The remaining defences and barriers are usually
not covered in a reasonable manner. Structural reliability methods
typically account for capacity versus loading, but may also include
inspection, maintenance, reserve strength and air gap. Using standard
regulation for design of new structures in assessment of existing
structures does not better cover gross error, but this method has proven
to give safe structures together with rather strict procedures for
inspection, maintenance and repair. However, the results may be
unnecessary conservative.
The problem of gross errors in design, fabrication, installation or
operation is not accounted for in any of these procedures. This failure
mode is difficult to handle in such procedures, but inspection may give
some evidence that the gross errors likely to lead to fatigue damage, is
less likely after some years of operation.
API (2000) states, “In engineering practise, it is widely recognised that
although an existing structure does not meet the present-day design
standards, the structure may still be adequate or serviceable. Examples
of this not only include fixed offshore structures, but also buildings,
bridges, dams, and onshore processing plants. The application of
reduced criteria for assessing existing facilities is also recognized in
risk management literature, justified on both cost-benefit and societal
grounds”. For a fixed structure where fatigue is the main and most
probable failure mode, the “no propagating crack” finding may give
evidence that the structure is in the “lucky end” of the distribution, and
that the structure may still be adequate or serviceable. For structures
where other failure modes are dominating the risk picture, this
conclusion is harder to accept. The probability of gross error could be
7
claimed to be reduced after some years of successful operation, but it Conference, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia, December 1999, in
could also be claimed that the information on gross errors are not likely “Application of Statistics and probability”, Melchers and Stewart
to be visible until the error occur. What kind of gross errors can we (eds), Balkena, Rotterdam, 2000
expect to be visible in a structure that has been exposed to e.g. a 10 Moan, T. and Vårdal, O.T. (2001). ”Reliability-based requalification of
years storm. Or phrased differently: Does the evidence that a structure existing offshore platforms”, Proceeding of PRADS, 2001, Vol 2, pp
have survived a 10-year storm give evidence on no gross error? 939-945, Balkema, Rotterdam, 2001
NORSOK (2000). ”NORSOK N-001 Structural Design”, Rev.3, NTS,
The most promising method, in the authors view, is a probabilistic Norway, 2000
method based on structural reliability analysis. The standards for ISO (1995) “ISO 13819-1 Petroleum and natural gas industries –
assessing existing structures based on structural reliability methods are Offshore structures – Part 1: General requirements”, ISO 1995
not sufficiently mature at present time, as the reliability approach are ISO (1998) ISO 2394 “General principles on reliability for structures”,
not consistent with the derivation of the reliability target levels. ISO 1998
ISO (2000) “ ISO/DIS 13822 Bases for design of structures –
A procedure for probabilistic assessment of existing structures should Assessment of existing structures”, ISO 2000
give guidance to the methods and models used for the reliability ISO (2001) “ISO/CD 19902 Design of fixed steel jackets”, Draft E,
analysis. These should not necessarily be the best ones, but as long as June 2001
one agree on a set, this makes it more consistent. The reliability
analysis could also be calibrated against a structure with the same
Platform selection
probability distributions as one intends to use for the actual case. The Needs for
calibration structure must be acceptable according to regulations, and assessment
the result of the reliability analysis of this calibration structure should
set the target for the failure probability.
Specification for
Further work is necessary for clarifying a number of issues related to future use
codes for reassessment. Among these are:
- The correlation between RSR and failure probability
Risk categorization
- The dependence of the RSR on wave, wind and current and
condition Screening criteria
- Inclusion of other failure modes as wave in deck, fatigue etc.
- Evaluation of the sensitivity of the reliability analysis to
subjective choices.
- Development of recommended models and parameters in Condition
uncertainty modelling Assessment
- How to deal with Gross error

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Analysis:
The authors would like to thank John Dalsgaard-Sørensen, Sverre - Action assessment
- Resistance assessment Periodical
Haver and Arne Kvitrud for valuable discussions. This work is a part of inspection and
- Design Level analysis
a PhD study financed by Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. - Ultimate strength analysis maintenance
and / or
REFERENCES - Assessment by comparison
- Assessment by probabilities of failure
- Assessment based on prior experience
API RP-2A WSD (2000). “Recommended Practice for Planning, design
and constructing fixed offshore platforms – Working Stress Design”,
API Recommended practice 2A-WSD, Twenty-first edition,
December 2000 Passes
Yes
Chakrabarty, J. (1987). “Theory of Plasticity”, McGraw-Hill Criteria?
International, New York, 1987
Ersdal, G (2002). “Safety of fixed offshore structures, failure paths and
barriers”, OMAE2002-28609, International conference on Offshore No
Mechanics and Arctic Engineering - OMAE 2002, Oslo 2002.
Kallaby, J. and O’Connor P.E. (1994). “An integrated approach for Intervention
underwater survey and damage assessment of offshore Platforms”,
OTC 7487, Offshore Technology Conference Proceedings, Houston,
May 1994
Kvitrud, A, Ersdal, G, Leonardsen R.L. (2001). “On the risk of Construction
Operation
- Repair
structures on the Norwegian continental shelf” Eleventh International - Upgrade
- Monitoring
Offshore and Polar Engineering Conference (ISOPE 2001), - Change in use
- Demolition
Stavanger, Norway, June 17-22, 2001
Melchers, R.E. (2001). “Assessment of existing structures – approaches
and research needs”, Journal of structural engineering, April 2001
Moan, T, Vårdal, O.T. and Johannesen, J.M (1999). “Probabilistic
inspection planning of fixed offshore structures“, ICASP 8 Figure 1: General Assessment procedure

Paper No. 2002-JSC-379 Ersdal 8

View publication stats