70. Padilla v.

CA, 260 SCRA 155

TITLE ROBIN CARIÑO PADILLA, accused-appellant, vs. COURT

OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellees.

GR NUMBER G.R. No. 121917

DATE July 31, 1996

PONENTE FRANCISCO, J.

NATURE/ PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

KEYWORDS/ Court of Appeals/ Aspects of the Right to Bail / Third
DIVISION Division

FACTS Appellant, Robin C. Padilla was charged with violation of

P.D. No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms
punishable by reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion
perpetua.

Pending trial, appellant was released on bail. Thereafter,

appellant was convicted and meted an indeterminate
penalty of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal to 21 years of reclusion perpetua.

He appealed to public respondent Court of Appeals, but

judgment was rendered affirming his conviction.
Respondent court cancelled his bailbond and ordered his
arrest for confinement at the New Bilibid Prison.
Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied.

Dissatisfied, appellant filed a petition for review on

certiorari with an application for bail praying, among
others, to be allowed to post bail. In his subsequent
pleading, appellant moved for the separate resolution of
his bail application.

ISSUE(S) 1. W/N the appellant is entitled to bail?

RULING(S) 1. No. Bail is either a matter of right, or of discretion. It

is a matter of right when the offense charged is not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail
becomes a matter of discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than
twenty 20 years then bail is a matter of discretion
except when any of the enumerated circumstances
under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present
then bail shall be denied. But when the accused is
 charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
and evidence of guilt is strong, bail shall be denied, as
it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion. If the
evidence, however, is not strong bail becomes a
matter of right.
In this case, appellant was convicted of a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua. Applying the
aforequoted rule, we find appellant not entitled to bail
as his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of
his guilt is strong.
And contrary to appellant’s asseveration, a summary
hearing for his bail application for the sole purpose of
determining whether or not evidence is strong is
unnecessary. Indeed, the extensive trial before the
lower court and the appeal before respondent court
are more than sufficient in accomplishing the purpose
for which a summary hearing for bail application is
designed.

Note:

Rule 114, Section 5.

(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstances of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped
from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated
the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on
probation, parole, or under conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case
indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of
the appeal, the accused may commit another crime.

CONCLUSION ACCORDINGLY, the cancellation of appellant’s bailbond

by public respondent court is AFFIRMED and the instant
application for bail is DENIED for lack of merit.