Omnibus election code
The deceased, disqualified or withdrawn candidate
BP 881
Sec. 69-nuisance candidate.
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. – (if there is falsity
in coc as stipulated here);
Sec. 80. Election campaign or partisan political activity outside
campaign period.
EXCEPTION TO 2ND PLACER DOCT.
1. If the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified and
2. The electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of the candidate’s
disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate. (Grego v. COMELEC, G. R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997)
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest
in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court
guilty of, or found by the Commission of having
(a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or
corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions;
(b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;
(c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by
this Code;
(d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections
89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or
(e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v,
and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office.
F. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign
country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code,
unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws.
Premature campaigning
• It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or
candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage
in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during
the campaign period. (Sec. 80, B.P. 881).
• . The law is clear as daylight — any election offense that may be
committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be
committed before the start of the campaign period. (Penera v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 181613, Nov. 25, 2009);
• Two remedies available for questioning the qualifications of
the candidate: Distinction between the two proceedings
under Section 78 and Section 253 under B.P. 881, thereof (1)
Before elections under Section 78 and (2) After elections
under Section 253(p QW).
SUBSTITUTION.
If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official
candidate of a political party:
(1) dies,
(2) withdraws or is
(3) disqualified for any cause—
a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a
certificate of candidacy not later than mid‐day of election day to replace the
candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified.
Note: However, no substitution shall be allowed for any independent
candidate
REQUISITES
• GR:
– 1. The substitute must belong to the same party
– 2.
must have duly file a valid certificate of candidacy.
(Ibid.)
• XPN: This does not include those cases where the certificate of
candidacy of the person to be substituted had been denied due
course and canceled under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code. While the law enumerated the occasion where a candidate
may be validly substituted, there is no mention of the case where
a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification but also by
denial and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy
• Substitution can only take place on the first day of campaign
period until not later than mid‐ day of election day. (COMELEC
Reso. No. 9140)
1. Yellow and orange case:
Yellow and orange are vice presidential candidates, yellow won
the election. Orange subsequently filed an mr before the PET who
granted it and declared orange the winner.
a) Aggrieved YELLOW FILED A PETITION FOR
CERTIRARI.
Does SC have jurisdiction to rule on the petition for
certiorari on the decision of the PET?
R:NO.
L: Sec. 2(1793)- The Presidential Electoral
Tribunal shall hear and decide in banc all
presidential election contests brought under
this Act and the concurrence of at least
seven members of the Tribunal shall be
necessary for a final decision thereon.
Sec. 3 (2)
The party who, in the judgment, has been
declared elected, shall have the right to
assume the office as soon as the judgment
becomes final which shall be ten days after
promulgation. The promulgation shall be
made on a date previously fixed, of which
notice shall be served in advance upon the
parties or their attorneys, personally or by
registered mail or by telegraph. No motion
shall be entertained for the reopening of a
case but only for the reconsideration of a
decision under the evidence already of
record, No party may file more than one
motion for reconsideration, copy of which
shall be served upon the adverse party who
shall answer it within five days after the
receipt thereof. Any petition for
reconsideration shall be resolved within ten
days after it is submitted for resolution. As
soon as a decision becomes final, a copy
thereof shall be furnished both houses of the
Congress.
b) Would your answer be the same if they are senatorial
candidates and it was the SET who issued the assailed
ruling?
R: no, sc has jurisdiction;
L: Decisions and resolutions of the Tribunal may be
questioned before the Supreme Court via a Petition for
Certiorari.
c) What is the composition of the PET?
REPUBLIC ACT No. 1793- ACT CONSTITUTING AN
INDEPENDENT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

Section 1. There shall be an independent Presidential
Electoral Tribunal to be composed of eleven members
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the
president-elect and the vice-president-elect of the
Philippines. It shall be composed of the Chief Justice
and the other ten members of the Supreme Court. The
Chief Justice shall be its chairman. If on account of
illness, absence, or incapacity upon any of the grounds
mentioned in section one, Rule one hundred and
twenty-six of the Rules of Court, of any member of the
Tribunal, or whenever, by reason of temporary
disability of any member thereof, or vacancies
occurring therein the requisite number of members of
the Tribunal necessary to constitute a quorum or to
render a judgment in any given contest, as hereafter
provided, is not present, or for any other good reason
for the early disposal of the contest, the Chief Justice
may designate any retired justice or justices of the
Supreme Court as may be necessary, to sit temporarily
as Member of the Tribunal, in order to form a quorum
or until a judgment in said contest is
reached: Provided, however, That if no retired justices
of the Supreme Court are available or the number
available is not sufficient, justices of the Court of
Appeals and retired justices of the Court of Appeals
may be designated to act as Member of the Tribunal.
2. PMP case:
Can a major political party who fielded candidates for
leislative districts join the party list system?
Political parties can participate in partly-list elections provided they
register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in
legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not,
that field candidates in legislative district elections can participate in
party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a
coalition.(ATONG PAGLAUM VS. COMELEC, 2013)
3. CAYAT case: can a second placer to a winning candidate who
was disqualified due to conviction for acts of lasciviousness,
be proclaimed the winner?
There is no doubt as to the propriety of Palilengs proclamation for two basic
reasons.
First, the COMELEC First Divisions Resolution of 12 April
2004 cancelling Cayats certificate of candidacy due
to disqualification became final and executory on 17 April
2004[21] when Cayatfailed to pay the prescribed filing fee. Thus, Palileng was
the only candidate for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet in the 10 May
2004 elections. Twentythree days before election day, Cayat was
already disqualified by final judgment to run for Mayor in the 10 May
2004 elections. As the only candidate, Palileng was not a second placer. On the
contrary, Palileng was the sole and only placer, second to none. The doctrine on
the rejection of the second placer, which triggers the rule on succession, does not
apply in the present case because Palileng is not a second-placer but the only placer.
Consequently, Palilengs proclamation as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet is beyond
question.
Second, there are specific requirements for the application of the doctrine on the
rejection of the second placer. The doctrine will apply in Bayacsans favor,
regardless of his intervention in the present case, if two conditions concur: (1) the
decision on Cayats disqualification remained pending on election day, 10 May
2004, resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates for Buguias, Benguetin
the elections; and (2) the decision on Cayats disqualification became final
only after the elections.
Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC,[22] which enunciates the doctrine on the rejection of the
second placer, does not apply to the present case because in Labo there was no final
judgment of disqualification before the elections. The doctrine on the rejection of
the second placer was applied in Labo and a host of other cases[23] because the
judgment declaring the candidates disqualification in Labo and the other
cases[24] had not become final before the elections. To repeat, Labo and the other
cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer have one common
essential condition the disqualification of the candidate had not become final
before the elections. This essential condition does not exist in the present case.
The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final
judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not
be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law.Section 6 of Republic Act No.
6646, The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, states:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who
has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared
by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added)
Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is
when the disqualification becomes final before the elections, which is the situation
covered in the first sentence of Section 6. The second is when the disqualification
becomes final after the elections, which is the situation covered in the second
sentence of Section 6.
The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms
Law governing the first situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final
judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall
not be counted. The Resolution disqualifying Cayat became final on 17 April
2004, way before the 10 May 2004 elections. Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast
in Cayats favor are stray. Cayat was never a candidate in the 10 May 2004
elections. Palilengs proclamation is proper because he was the sole and only
candidate, second to none.
4. JOEL MIRANDA SUBSTITUTION CASE: Can a candidate whose the
certificate of candidacy had been denied due course and cancelled
under Section 78 of the Code be validly substituted?
While there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a registered or
accredited political party may substitute for a candidate of the same party who had
been disqualified for any cause, this does not include those cases where the
certificate of candidacy of the person to be substituted had been denied due course
and cancelled under Section 78 of the Code.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. While the law enumerated the
occasions where a candidate may be validly substituted, there is no mention of the
case where a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial
and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. Under the foregoing rule, there can
be no valid substitution for the latter case, much in the same way that a nuisance
candidate whose certificate of candidacy is denied due course and/or cancelled may
not be substituted. If the intent of the lawmakers were otherwise, they could have
so easily and conveniently included those persons whose certificates of candidacy
have been denied due course and/or cancelled under the provisions of Section 78
of the Code.
More importantly, under the express provisions of Section 77 of the Code,
not just any person, but only an official candidate of a registered or accredited
political party may be substituted. In Bautista vs. Comelec (G.R. No. 133840,
November 13, 1998) this Court explicitly ruled that a cancelled certificate does
not give rise to a valid candidacy (p.13).
 A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a
candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed any certificate of
candidacy at all can not, by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all.
The law clearly provides:
SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy No person shall be eligible for any elective
public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period
fixed herein. (miranda vs abaya, 1999);
5. What is the effect of a death of a party in an election protest?
Should it warrant the dismissal of the protest?
SEC. 5. Election protest. - A petition contesting the election or returns of an elective
municipal or barangay official shall be filed with the proper regional trial court or
municipal trial court by any candidate who was voted for the same office and
who received the second or third highest number of votes or, in a multi-slot
position, was among the next four candidates following the last-ranked winner
duly proclaimed, as reflected in the official results of the election contained in the
Statement of Votes By Precinct. The party filing the protest shall be designated as
the protestant; the adverse party shall be known as the protestee.
Poe v. Arroyo. The Court as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal held
therein:
Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the
Rules of Court. This rule allows substitution by a legal
representative. It can be gleaned from the citation of this rule
that movant/intervenor seeks to appear before this Tribunal as
the legal representative/substitute of the late protestant
prescribed by said Section 16. However, in our application of
this rule to an election contest, we have every time ruled that
a public office is personal to the public officer and not a
property transmissible to the heirs upon death. Thus, we
consistently rejected substitution by the widow or the heirs in
election contests where the protestant dies during the
pendency of the protest. In Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias, we
recognized substitution upon the death of the protestee but
denied substitution by the widow or heirs since they are not
the real parties in interest. Similarly, in the later case of De
la Victoria v. Commission on Elections, we struck down the
claim of the surviving spouse and children of the protestee to
the contested office for the same reason. Even in analogous
cases before other electoral tribunals, involving substitution
by the widow of a deceased protestant, in cases where the
widow is not a real party in interest, we denied substitution by
the wife or heirs.
This is not to say that death of the protestant
necessarily abates the pending action. We have held as early
as Vda. de De Mesa (1966) that while the right to a public
office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an
election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the
protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either
would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest
proceedings. Hence, we have allowed substitution and
intervention but only by a real party in interest. A real party
in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by
the judgment, and the party who is entitled to the avails of the
suit. In Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias and Lomugdang v.
Javier, we permitted substitution by the vice-mayor since the
vice-mayor is a real party in interest considering that if the
protest succeeds and the protestee is unseated, the vice-mayor
succeeds to the office of the mayor that becomes vacant if the
one duly elected cannot assume office. In contrast, herein
movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, herself denies any claim to the
august office of President. Thus, given the circumstances of
this case, we can conclude that protestant's widow is not a real
party in interest to this election protest.
6. Does GO bong go violate sec. 80. Of the OEC?
• Sec. 80- It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a
voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to
engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity
except during the campaign period;
•
• When the applicable provisions of RA 8436, as amended by RA
9369, are read together, these provisions of law do not consider
Penera a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots,
until the start of the campaign period.
•
• However, it is no longer enough to merely file a certificate of
candidacy for a person to be considered a candidate because "any
person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing]
period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the
campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy."
Any person may thus file a certificate of candidacy on any day
within the prescribed period for filing a certificate of candidacy
yet that person shall be considered a candidate, for purposes of
determining one’s possible violations of election laws, only during
the campaign period. Indeed, there is no "election campaign" or
"partisan political activity" designed to promote the election or
defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to public office
simply because there is no "candidate" to speak of prior to the
start of the campaign period.
• The law is clear as daylight — any election offense that may be
committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be
committed before the start of the campaign period. (Penera v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 181613, Nov. 25, 2009);
7. JURISDICTION OF HRET AND COMELEC.
Once a winning candidate has been 1. proclaimed, 2. taken his
oath and 3. assumed office as a member of the House of
Representatives, the jurisdiction of the Comelec over election
contests relating to his election, returns and qualifications
ENDS and the HRET own jurisdiction BEGINS.
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed,
taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives,
the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns,
and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.8 It follows then
that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its
jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The party
questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding
before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case
involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter's
election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word "sole" in Section 17, Article
VI of the Constitution and in Section 2509 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity
of the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating to its
members.10
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court
to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of
the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen
on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties
or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (LIMKAICHONG
VS COMELEC 2009)