RADC Reliability Engineers Toolkit PDF

RADC
RELIABILITY
ENGINEER'S
TOOLKIT
An application oriented
guide for the
practicing reliability engineer
Systems Reliability and Engineering Division

Rome Air Development Center
RADC RELIABILITY
ENGINEER'S TOOLKIT
JULY 1988
An Application Oriented
Guide for the
Practicing Reliability Engineer
Systems Reliability and Engineering Division

Air Force Systems Command (AFSC)
Griffiss Air Force Base, NY 13441-5700
QUICK REFERENCE
Quick Reference Application Index

HowDciL..?
• Develop Quantitative Requirements
Reliability (R) 13
Maintainability (M)... 19
Testability(T)... 22
• Tailor R&M Task Requirements 26
• Develop a Contract Data Requirements List 28
• Specify Information to Be Included in Proposals 30
• Estimate Reliability Program Cost 31
• Evaluate Contractor Proposals 33
• Specify Part Stress Derating 41
• Determine the Limitations of Common Cooling Techniques . 46
• Understand Basic Parts Control 48
• Identify Key R&M&T Topics for Evaluation at Design Reviews 53
• Evaluate Contractor's Method of Managing Critical Items 59
• Understand R&M&T Analysis Types and Purposes 63
• Understand Reliability Prediction Methods 66
• Understand Maintainability Prediction Methods 67
• Understand Testability Analysis Methods 70
• Evaluate a Reliability Prediction Report . 71
• Evaluate Existing Reliability Data. 72
• Evaluate a Maintainability/Testability Analysis Report 73
• Evaluate a Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analyses
(FMECA) Report 74
• Approximate the Reliability of Redundant Configurations 75
• Perform a Quick (Parts Count) Reliability Prediction 79
• Adjust Reliability Data for Different Conditions 91
• Develop an Environmental Stress Screening (ESS) Program 97-100
• Select a Reliability Qualification Test 102
• Select a Maintainability Qualification Test 104
• Select a Testability Demonstration Test 105
RADC RELIABILITY ENGINEER'S TOOLKIT 1

QUICK REFERENCE
• Understand Key Points of a Failure Reporting and Corrective

Action System (FRACAS) 106
• Evaluate a Contractor's Failure Reporting System 107
• Evaluate a Reliability Demonstration Test Plan .. 108
• Evaluate a Reliability Demonstration Test Procedure 112
• Evaluate a Maintainability Test Plan and Procedure . 113
• Participate in R&M Testing 115
• Evaluate R&M Demonstration Test Reports 116
For More Help AppendHces

How Do I . . . ?
• Translate User Needs to R&M Requirements A-1
• Develop SOW and Specification Requirements (Example) A-9
• Understand the Basics of Warranties A-19
• Develop Design Guidelines (Example) A-29
- Select a MIL-HDBK-781 Test Plan A-43
• Calculate Confidence Intervals A-47
• Calculate the Probability of Failure Occurrence A-52
• Understand Reliability Growth Testing A-61
• Select a MIL-STD-471 Test Plan A-69
• Find More R&M Data A-75
- Obtain R&M Training A-83
• Obtain R&M Periodicals A-89
• Become Aware of R&M Symposia and Workshops A-90
• Become Aware of R&M Specifications, Standards, Handbooks and
RADC Technical Reports A-93
• Know Who Air Force R&M Focal Points Are A-107
• Understand Common Acronyms A-111
RADC RELIABILITY ENGINEER'S TOOLKIT

RADC RELIABILITY TOOLKIT 3
6 RADC RELIABILITY TOOLKIT 3
INTRODUCTION
This TOOLKIT is intended for use by a practicing reliability and maintainability

(R&M) engineer. Emphasis is placed on his role in the various R&M activities of an
electronic systems development program. The TOOLKIT is not intended to be a
complete tutorial or technical treatment of the R&M discipline but rather a
compendium of useful R&M reference information to be used in everyday practice.
The format of the TOOLKIT has been designed for easy reference. Five main
sections are laid out to follow the normal time sequence of a
whicMTtheûty^ an^^scritresThe R&M engineer's role in the

key activities of that process. Because the processes (
s of certain steps in a particular process may be by reference to a
of the "how to" of the R&M engineer's activities have been

the form of figures, tables, and step-by-step procedures as opposed to
of text. Appendices are included to give a greater depth of
to some of the topics as well as to present additional useful
The TOOLKIT also includes a "Quick Reference Application Index" which can be
I to quickly refer the R&M engineer to the portion of a section that.
z questions, A quicK reterence r o r More Help Appendices index is\
included tor tne more in-deptn topics of tne appendices.
TOOLKIT 7
8 TOOLKIT
INTRODUCTION
The R&M 2000 process includes 21 Building Blocks as follows:
• Source Selection
Allocation and Prediction • Environmental Stress

Qrrooninn
Computer Aided Tools
These building blocks are derived from examining successful programs; they
This TOOLKIT, although not structured to address the R&M 2000 building blocks
per se, addresses the practical application of proven reliability and maintainability
techniques that results in meeting the R&M 2000 objectives.

Section R
How do I develop and specify the right RELIABILITY &

MAINTAINABILITY requirements?
R&M Engineer's Role:
Develop Quantitative Requirements

R1 Reliability 13
R2 Maintainability 19
R3 Testability 22
Develop R & M Task Requirements

R4 Program Phase Terminology 24
R5 R&M Task Application/Priority 26
R6 Specify Contract D a t a Requirements 28
R7 Specify Information for Proposals 30
R8 E s t i m a t e Reliability Program Cost 31
SI Develop Proposal Evaluation Criteria 33
Appendix 2 Example R & M Program Tasks A-9

Requirement development is critical to program success. MlL-STDs CErsraot
be blindly applied. Requirements must be taiSorodtothe individual program
situation considering the foiiowing:
» Operation Environment
- Other Contract Provisions (incentives, warranties, etc.)

• Oft-The-Shelf Versus Neurly Designed Hardware
MIL-STD-470 "Maintainability Program for Systems and Equipment"

MIL-STD-721 "Definition of Terms for Reliability and Maintainability"
MIL-STD-785 "Reliability Program for Systems and Equipment Development
and Production"
MIL-STD-2165 "Testability Programs for Electronic Systems and Equipment"
DOD 5010.12-L "Acquisition Management Systems and Data Requirements
Control List" (complete Data Item Description listing)
AFR 800-2 "Acquisition Program Management"
AFR 800-18 "Air Force Reliability and Maintainability Program"
RADC-TR-87-50 "R&M Program Cost Drivers"
"RADC Program Managers Guide to Reliability and
Maintainability" Slide Rule (order directly from RADC/RBE,
Griffiss AFB NY 13441-5700)
12 RADC RELIABILITY ENGINEER'S TOOLKIT

REQUIREMENTS—TOPIC R1
Topic R1» Quantitative Reliability Requirements

Scope of Requirements:
Reliability parameters expressed by operational users and ones specified in
contractual documents take many forms. Tables R1 -1 and R1 -2 identify the
characteristics of reliability parameters.
Table R1-1: Logistics (Basic) and Mission

Reliability Characteristics
Logistics (Basic) Reliability Mission Reliability
• Measure of system's ability to operate • Measure of system's ability to

without logistics support. complete mission.
• Recognize effects of all occurrences • Consider only failures that cause
that demand support without regard to mission abort.
effect on mission.
• Improved by redundancy.
• Degraded by redundancy.
• Usually higher than logistics
• Usually equal to or lower than mission reliability.
reliability.
Table R1-2: Operational and Contractual Reliability

Characteristics
Contractual Reliability Operational Reliability
• Used to define, measure and evaluate • Used to describe reliability

contractor's program. performance when operated in
planned environment.
• Derived from operational needs.
• Not used for contract reliability
• Selected such that achieving them
requirements (requires translation).
allows projected satisfaction of
operational reliability. • Used to describe needed level of
reliability performance.
• Expressed in inherent values.
• Include combined effects of item
• Account only for failure events subject design, quality, installation
to contractor control. environment, maintenance policy,
• Include only design and manufacturing repair, etc.
characteristics.

Table R1-2 (continued)

Contractual Reliability Operational Reliability
• Typical terms: • Typical terms:

• MTBF (mean-time-between-faili • MTBM (mean-time-between-
maintenance)
• Mission MTBF (sometimes also
called MTBCF) • MTBD (mean-time-between-
demand)
• MTBR (mean-time-between-
removal)
• MTBCF (mean-time-between-
critical-failure)
Operational Constraints:
• Mission Crmcaniy
• Availability Constraints
• Self-Sufficiency Constraints
• Attended/Unattended Operation
• Operational Environment
• Use of Off-the-shelf or Newly Designed Equipment
How to Develop Requirements:

Figure R1-1 defines the general reliability requirement development process. Key
points to recognize from this process are:
1. User requirements can be expressed in a variety of forms that include

combinations of mission and logistics reliability, or they may combine reliability
with maintainability in the form of availability. Conversion to commonly used
operational terms such as mean-time-between-maintenance (MTBM) and
mean-time-between-critical-failure (MTBCF) must be made from terms such as
operational availability (A0), and break-rate, etc., to enable translation to
parameters which can be specified in contracts.
An example is:
= MTBM
A
° MTBM + MDT
(Solve for MTBM using mean downtime (MDT) which includes the actual repair
time plus logistics delay time.)

Table R1-3: Typical Reliability Values

Radar Systems MTBF (Hours)
Ground Rotating Search Radar 75-175
Large Fixed Phase Array Radar 3-6
Tactical Ground Mobile Radar 25-75
Airborne Fighter Fire Control Radar 50-200
Airborne Search Radar 300-500
Airborne Identification Radar 200-2,000
Airborne Navigation Radar . 300-4,500
Communications Equipment MTBF (Hours)
Ground Radio 5,000-20,000 "
Portable Ground Radio 1,000-3,000
Airborne Radio 500-10,000
Ground Jammer.. 500-2,000
Computer Equipment MTBF (Hours)

Ground Computer 1,000-5,000
Ground Monochrome Display 15,000-25,000
Ground Color Display 2,500-7,500
Ground Hard Disk Drive 5,000-20,000
Ground Tape Storage Unit 2,500-5,000
Ground Printer 2,000-8,000
Ground Modem 20,000-50,000
Miscellaneous Equipment MTBF (Hours)
Airborne Countermeasures System 50-300
Airborne Power Supply 2,000-20,000
Ground Power Supply 10,000-50,000

Detailed Process
vSimilar
Equipment
Data
Check Requirements
for Realism
System
Constraints
Contractual
Requirements
Figure R1-1: Quantitative Reliability Requirement Development Process

Topic R2; Quantitative MalntalnablSItf Requirements

Unique maintainability parameters need to be specified for three basic levels
of repair:
• Organizational Level—Repair at the system location. Usually involves
replacing plug-in modules and other items with relatively short isolation and
replacement times.
• Intermediate Level—Repair at an intermediate shop facility which has more
extensive capabilities to repair lower hardware indenture levels.
• Depot Level—Highly specialized repair facility capable of making repairs at ail
hardware indenture levels. Sometimes the original equipment manufacturer.
Recent Air Force policy has promoted the concept of two level maintenance in
place of the traditional three level system. Under this concept the classification is:
• On-equipment—Maintenance actions accomplished on complete end items.
• Off-equipment—In-shop maintenance actions performed on removed
components.
Parameters which need to be specified vary with the level of repair being
considered. Key maintainability parameters include:
• Mean time to repair (MTTR)—Average time required to bring system from a
failed state to an operational state. Strictly design dependent. Assumes
maintenance personnel and spares are on hand (i.e., does not include logistics
delay time). MTTR is used interchangeably with mean corrective maintenance
time (Met).
• Mean maintenance manhours (M-MMH)—Total manpower per year
(expressed in manhours) required to keep the system operating (not including
logistics delay time).
• Mean time to restore system (MTTRS)—The average time it takes to restore
a system from a failed state to an operable state, including logistics delay time
(MTTRS = logistics delay time + MTTR). Logistics delay time includes all time
to obtain spares and personnel to start the repair.
• Preventive maintenance (PM)—Preventive maintenance. Time associated
with the performance of all required preventive maintenance. Usually expressed
in terms of hours per year.
Basic maintainability requirements are determined through an analysis of user

operational constraints. Operational constraints include:
• Operating hours per unit calendar time and/or per mission.
• Downtime, maintenance time, or availability constraints.

DESIGN—TOPIC D2
RADC TOOLKIT
Table R2-1: Typical Maintainability Values
Depot
MTTR .5-1.5 hr . 5 - 3 hr 1 - 4 hr
M-MMH Note 1 Note 1 Note 1
MTTRS 1 - 8 hrs (Note 2) NA NA
PM 2 - 1 5 hr/yr NA NA
1 • M-MMH depends on the number of repair visits to be made, the MTTR for each repair visit and the number of
maintenance personnel required for each visit. Typical calculations of the mean maintenance manhours per year
include:
a. Immediate maintenance of a continuously operated system: M-MMH = (8760 hr/yr)/(MTBF) x (MTTR) x

(maintenance personnel per repair) + (PM hours per year) (Maintenance personnel).
b. Delayed maintenance of a fault tolerant system: M-MMH = (number of expected repair visits) x (time for each
visit) x (maintenance personnel per visit) + (PM hours per year) (maintenance personnel).
c. Maintenance of a continuously operated redundant system allowed to operate until failure. M-MMH = (8760 hr/
yr)/(MTBCF) x (time for each visit) x (maintenance personnel per visit) + (PM hours per year) (Maintenance
personnel).
Time for each visit is the number of repairs to be made times the MTTR for each repair if repairs are made in series.
2. For unique systems that are highly redundant, MTTRS may be specified as the switch time.

Topic R3: QyaotiMcv® Testability Fl@qyir©m®rsts

Parameters that need to be specified for each repair level:
• Fault Detection—A process which discovers the existence of faults.
• Fault Isolation—Where a fault is known to exist, a process which identifies the
location of that fault.
• False Alarms—An indication of a fault where no fault exists such as operator
error, transient condition, BIT design deficiency.
Parameters are sometimes expressed in the form of rates or fractions such as:
• Fraction of Faults Detected (FFD)—The quantity of faults detected by on-
board test divided by the quantity of all faults detected by other means
(including manual).
• Fraction of Faults Isolated (FFI)—The fraction of on-board test detected faults
correctly isolated to the replacable unit.
• False Alarm Rate (FAR)—The frequency of occurrence of false alarms.
Scope of Diagnostics:
• Integrated—Use of built-in-test (BIT) which operates on demand or
automatically.
• External—Special purpose test equipment that must be connected by a
maintenance technician.
• Manual—Testing that requires the use of technical manuals, troubleshooting
procedures and general purpose test equipment (e.g., voltmeter) by a
maintenance technician.
How to Develop Requirements:

The best guidance available is to provide a range of typical values usually applied
for each parameter.

Table R3-1: Typical Testability Values
-100
100
100 Depot
(BIT)
95-100 Depot
Eight or less modules 95-100 All

Three or less modules 90-95 All
One module 80-90 All
larms 1000-5000 hours between alarm

RADC RELIABILITY I d TOOLKIT
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• R&M&T Design Reviews R R R R R R • DI-R-7080 & 7104
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• Failure Reporting & Corrective Action E3 E4 E5 E1 E1 E2 E1 E1 E1 • DI-R-7041
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• Failure Review Board O O O • Incl in DI-R-7080
• Subcontractor Control R R R R R R E3 E3 E3 • Incl in DI-R-7080
Design & Analysis Tasks
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• Part Selection and Control E1 E1 E1 • DIM ISC 80071
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DESIGN—TOPIC D6
RADC RELIABILITY TOOLKIT

DESIGN—TOPIC D7
TOOLKIT
Topic R8: Reliability Program Cost Estimation
R&M Program Plan Number of MIL-STD-785/4701

required (NOT) 2.73 (NOT)2 4 22
FRACAS Duration of FRACAS i

in months (DO!) 8.25 (DOI)2 2.5
(1) Modeling and Allocation

4.05 (MAC)2 (NOU)
MAC
1 Series System
2 Simple Redundancy
(2) Number of Items in Allocation 7 445

s (NOU)
(1) Level of Detail 4.54 (LOD)2 (RF)2

(POC)
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1 Prediction Exists
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3 Full MIL-HDBK-217
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(2) Report f
RF
1 Internal Report
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(3)
POC
4 0-25
3 26-50
2 51-75
1 76-100
FMEA Number of unique items requiring 17.79 (NOI) 3 206

FMEA (NOI)
equipment level I
NOI = Number of circuit cards for
piece part and circuit level FMEA's
RADC RELIABILITY ENGINEER S TOOLKIT 31

Section S
What's my role in the SOURCE SELECTION process and what criteria
TOOLKIT
The criteria far ©valuation of contractor proposals has to match the
requirements specified in the Request for Proposal (RFPJ, Contractors must
be scored by comparing their proposals to the criteria, not to each other.
R&M are generally evaluated as parts of the technical area. The total source
selection process lodudes other nontechnic&f areas. Recent AF policy lias
emphasized the importance of R&M in the source selection process.
For More Information

AFR 70-15 "Source Selection Policy and Procedures"
AFR 70-30 "Streamlined Source Selection Procedures"

SOURCE SELECTION—TOPIC S1
Topic 81: Proposal Evaluation for Reliability and
1. Does the
ho contractor show understanding of the
T in the effort?
2. Does the contractor show a firm understanding of R&M&l
methodology, and.
3. Does the contractor indicate understanding of the role of
4. Does the contractor

5. Does the
iT
! in light of the scope of the overall program?
nee of R&M&T personnel assigned to the
, and the number of
the scope of the overall program?
3. Does the R&M&T group have adequate stature and authority in th.
organizational framework of the program (e.g., they should not fall
control of the design group)?
> and higher i

5. Does the R&M&T manager have adequate control over R&M&T for
> and'
6. Is the testability diagnostics function integrated into the R&M program?
4. Are system design reviews (internal and external) required regularly?

7.
TOOLKIT
Section D
What is my role in developing design requirements and in the DESIGN

PROCESS of a development program?
Select Design Requirements

D1 Part Stress Derating 41
D2 Thermal Design Limitations 46
D3 Parts Control 48
Evaluate Design
D4 Review Quests ons 53
D5 Reliability Critical Items 59
Appendix4 Example Design Guidelines A-29

Proven design approaches are critical to system R&M success. For many
programs the government requires that certain approaches be used (such
as aparticularfevef of part stress derating). Other programs allow the
contractor to develop and use his own design criteria as Song as ills end
product design meets the government requirements or Is subject to
provisions of product performance agreements (guarantees^ warranties,
etc.), Regardless of the situation, the R&Rfi engineer must actively evaluate
the contractor design progress.

MIL-STD-883 "Test Methods and Procedures for Microelectronics"
MtL-STD-965 "Parts Control Program"
MIL-STD-1521 "Technical Reviews and Audits for Systems, Equipments,
and Computer Software"
MIL-HDBK-251 "Reliability/Design Thermal Applications"
MIL-HDBK-338 "Electronic Reliability Design Handbook"
MIL-M-38510 "Microcircuits, General Specification for"
MIL-S-19500 "Semiconductor Devices, General Specification for'
AFSC Pamphlet 800-27 "Parts Derating Guidelines"
RADC-TR-82-172 "RADC Thermal Guide for Reliability Engineers"

DESIGN—TOPIC D1

DESIGN—TOPIC D1
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DESIGN—TOPIC D2
Topic D2: Thermal Design Limitations

One of the important variables in system reliability is temperature. Therefore, the
thermal design of a system must be planned and evaluated. Full discussion of this
topic is beyond the scope of this document but it is important to point out to a
reliability engineer what limitations there are for common thermal design
approaches. Tables D2-1 and D2-2 summarize the most common cooling
techniques for electronics and their limitations.
D2-1: Cooling Techniques Limitations (Per Unit Volume)
0-300* Free
300*-1000 Forced
in physical design
j of 300W/ft 3 if box is poorly

A 9" x 5" printed circuit board using free convection cooling
I to about 22.5 watts.

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DESIGN—TOPIC D4
Table D4-2 (continued)
Do preliminary plans for ESS meet X X Temperature and random vibration

the required needs? are the most effective screens. At
module level, perform 20 to 40
temperature cycles per module. At
higher levels, perform 4 to 12 cycles.
(See RADC-TR-82-87, Stress
Screening of Electronic Hardware
and DOD-HDBK-344, Environmental
Stress Screening of Electronic
Equipment and Topics T1-T3 for
guidance.)
Note: For an exhaustive design checklist see MIL-HDBK-338, Chapter 7.

DESIGN—TOPIC D5
Topic D§: CriffcsK Item CfreckiM
Has the contractor developed formal • Policies should be

; and procedures for
i and control? and
Are the procedures implemented at - The program has to start early so
the initial design stage and do they that safety related items can be
continue through final
period?
Are periodic reviews planned to • Reviews at SRR, PDR, and CDR
s the list and controls? must be •
Has an FMEA been performed on • Failure modes need to be
I item? so that control procedures can be
included • Features such as
shouldl
Does the contractor's control plan • Development of a list of critical
s or minimize the reliability is only half the:
risk? such as
As a minimum, are the following
on
Single sources for parts
Stringent tolerances for

or
Single

Section A
What R&M ANALYSES should be required and how should

they be evaluated?
R&M Engineer's Role
A1 Select Appropriate Analyses 63

A2 Reliability Prediction Methods 66
A3 Maintainability Prediction Methods 67
A4 Testability Analyses 70
R6 Specify Contract Data Requirements 28
Evaluate Deliverables and Analyze R & M

A5 Reliability Analysis Checklist 71
A6 Use of Existing Reliability Data 72
A7 Maintainability/Testability Analysis Checklist 73
A8 FMECA Analysis Checklist 74
A9 Redundancy Equations 75
A10 Parts Count Reliability Prediction 79
A11 Reliability Adjustment Factors 91
RADC RELIABILITY ENGINEER S TOOLKIT 61

Reliability amd maintainability analyses are a necessary part of most
development programs. They provide a means of determining how well the
design is progressing towards meeting the program's goals and
requirements. They also provide means of evaluating the impact of
important design decisions such as cooling approaches, classes of part
qualify being used, and areas of fault tolerance- In order for the government
to receive the outputs of contractor performed analyses, appropriate
contract deliverable data Items must be required.

M1L-STD-756 "Reliability Modeling and Prediction"
MfL-STD-1629 "Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode, Effects and
Criticality Analysis"
MIL-HDBK-217 "Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment"
MIL-HDBK-472 "Maintainability Prediction"
RADC-TR-82-179 "Sneak Analysis Application Guidelines"
RADC-TR-87-55 "Predictors of Organizational-Level Testability Attributes'
RADC-TR-77-287 "A Redundancy Notebook"
62 RADC REUABHJTY ENGINEER'S TOOLKIT

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ANALYSIS TOPIC A5
Topic A6: Use of Existing Reliability Data
theseitemsmakingûseof avaHable fteld and/or test failure data the only practical
way to estimate their reliability. If this situation exists, the following table
summarizes the information that is desired.
Table A6-1 - Use of Existina Reliability Data

74
ANALYSIS TOPIC A9
Topic A9: R e d u n d a n c y E q u a t i o n s
Many military electronic systems readiness and availability requirements exceed
the level of reliability to which a serial chain system can be practically designed.
Use of high quality parts, a sound thermal design and extensive stress derating
may not be enough. Fault tolerance, or the ability of a system design to tolerate a
failure or degradation without system failure, is required. The most common form
of fault tolerance is redundancy where additional, usually identical, units are added
to a system in parallel with the other units. Because this situation is very common,
the reliability equations for common redundancy situations are included below.'
The following represents a sample list of specific redundancy relationships which
define failure rate as a function of the specific type of redundancy employed. For a
more comprehensive treatment of redundancy concepts and the reliability
improvements achievable through their applications see RADOTR-77-287, "A
Redundancy Notebook."

ANALYSIS TOPIC A9
All units are active on-line with equal unit

failure rates, (n - q ) / n required for
A.
(n-q-1)!(n)"
£ 1T
Two active on-line units

failure and repair rates. One of
required for
( ^ ( j i b ) + (n* + |X B )(X A + XB) XA2 + V + XAXB
One standby off-line unit with n active on-

line units required for success. Off-line
spare assumed to have a failure rate of
zero. On-line unil
Ec uati
* °n3 n[n\ + (1 -P)|x]A. Equations nX
Xn/n+1 =
" n. + n(P + 1)\ P+T
\ A = 50 x 10 -6
XB = 180 X10" 6
1/M c t = 1
= (50 x 10 6)(180 x 1Q-6) [(1 + 1) + (50 x 10~6 +180 x 10 e)]

(1)(1) + (1+1)(50x10- 6 + 180x10" 6 )
X1/2 = 1.8 x10~ 8 f/hour=.018 f/106 hours
TOOLKIT 117
ANALYSIS TOPIC A9
Example 3:
Determine the effective failure rate for 8 of 10 identical units required with no repair.
The failure rate of a single unit is 60 f/106 hours.
Substituting the following values into Equation 4:

n = 10
q = 2
k = 60 x 10 -6
6
,
A.(10-2)/10 _ 60x 10 7"
1
1=10-2
T
I
60x10"®
^8/10 =
1 + 1+ J_
8 9 10
\8/10 = 1.79x10" 4 f/hour= 179 f/106 hours
Having two redundant units improves the system failure rate from 480 f/106 hours
(8 units required x 60 f/106 hours each) to 179 f/106 hours.
78 RADC RELIABILITY ENGINEER S TOOLKIT

Topic A10: Parts Count
A standard technique for
. The technique has a "built-in" assumption of;

which allows prediction in the conceptual stage or i
estimation of the part types and quantities. This:
MIL-HDBK-217 technique for four of the i
xed (G f ), Airborne Inhabited Cargo (AIC) and Airborne
• (A U F ). All failure rates in the following tables are in terms of
; per million hours.
i can be
NAg^Q,
ite (failures/106 hrs)

\ Gi = generic failure rate for the ith generic part type (failures/106 hrs)
irQi = quality factor for the ith generic part type
N, = quantity of the ith generic part type
n = number of <

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Temperature Conversion Factors

For each 10°C decrease in part ambient temperature multiply the system
series MTBF by 1.25 and for each 10 C increase multiply by 0.8.
Example 1 (Quality Adjustment):

An equipment has been designed using "typical military" part quality levels and
has an MTBF of 400 hours. What would the expected reliability be if all "vendor
equivalent" quality parts were substituted?
Solution: 400 hours x .2 = 80 hours.
Example 2 (Environmental Adjustment):
An equipment designed for use in a Ground Mobile environment has an MTBF of
100 hours. What would be the equipment's expected MTBF if operated in a Ground
Benign environment?
Solution: 100 hours x 7 = 700 hours.
Example 3 (Temperature Adjustment):
An equipment has an MTBF of 60 hours with its current cooling supply. A potential
reallotment of cooling air would decrease the equipment average part ambient
temperature by 12°C. How would the equipment MTBF change?
Solution: 60 hours x 1.25 x 12°C/10°C = 90 hours.

Section T
What are the types of R&M TESTING and how do I structure an

effective test program?
Develop a Tailored Test Program

T1 ESS Process 97
T2 ESS Placement 98
13 "R&M 2000" ESS 99
T4 RGT and RQT Application 101
Demonstration Plan Selection
T5 Reliability 102
T6 Maintainability 104
T7 Testability 105
Review Plans/Procedures
T8 Review FRACAS 106
T9 Reliability Demonstration Plan Checklist 108
T10 Reliability Test Procedure Checklist 112
T11 Maintainability Test Plan Checklist 113
T12 R & M Test Participation Criteria 115
T13 Review R & M Demonstration Reports 116

A well tailored reliability and maintainability program contains several
farms of testing- Depending on the program constraints, a program should
be invoked to mature the designed in reliability as well as to determine
whether the contract quantitative reliability and maintainability
requirements have been achieved prior to a commitment to production. A1S
forms of testing ( E n v i r o n m e n t Stress Screening (ESS), Reliability Growth,
Reliability Demonstration) mustfoetailored to fit specific program
constraints. Test plans amd procedures must be evaluated to ensure proper
test implementation, Test participation depends on the program situation
but test reports must be carefully evaluated by the government.
For More information

MIL-STD-471 "Maintainability Verification/Demonstration/Evaluation"
MIL-STD-781 "Reliability Testing for Engineering Development,
Qualification and Production"
MIL-HDBK-781 "Reliability Test Methods, Plans, and Environments for
Engineering Development, Qualification, and Production"
DOD-HDBK-344 "Environmental Stress Screening of Electronic Equipment'
MIL-HDBK-189 "Reliability Growth Management"
RADC-TR-84-25 "Reliability/Maintainability Operational Parameter
Translation" (Volumes I and II)
RADC-TR-86-241 "Built-in-Test Verification Techniques"

TESTING—TOPIC T1
Topic 11: ESS Process

Environmental Stress Screening (ESS) has been the subject of many recent
studies. RADC's position has been that no one set of generic screens is best for
every situation. Determination of the optimum screens for a particular product, built
by a particular manufacturer, at a given time is an iterative process. Procedures for
planning for and controlling the screening process are contained in DOD-HDBK-
344 (USAF) Environmental Stress Screening of Electronic Equipment. The
process can be depicted as shown below:
F i g u r e T1-1: ESS P r o c e s s

TESTING—TOPIC T2
Topic T2« ESS Placement
Level of
Cost per flaw precipitated is Test detection efficiency is

lowest (unpowered screens) relatively low.
Small size permits batch Test equipment cost for
screening. screens is high.
Low thermal mass;
high rates of temperature
Temperature range
Relatively easy to power and • Thermal mass precludes high

monitor performance during rates of change or requires
costly
Higher test detection Cost per flaw significantly
efficiency than assembly higher than assembly level.
lo\/ol
ICVUI.
Temperature range reduced
Assembly interconnectior from
(e.g., wiring backplane) ai
All potential sources of flaws Difficult and costly to test at

temperature extremes.
Unit interoperability flaws Mass precludes use of
detected. effective vibration screens or
makes use costly.
High test detection efficiency
Cost per flaw is highest.

TESTING—TOPIC T3
Topic 13: " m m 2000" ESS
Screen Type, Parameter Assemblies (Printed Equipment or Unit

and Conditions Wiring Assemblies) (SRU)* (LRU/LRM)
Temperature Range From - 54°C to +85°C From - 54°C to +71°C

(Minimum) (See Notel)
Temperature Rate of 30°C/Minute (Chamber 5°C (Chamber Air Temp)
Change (Minimum) Air Temp)
(See Note 2)
Temperature Dwell Until Stabilization Until Stabilization
Duration (See Note 3)
Temperature Cycles 25 10
(Minimum)
Power On/Equipment No (See Note 5)
Operating
Equipment Monitoring No (See Note 6)
Electrical Testing After Yes (At Ambient Yes (At Ambient
Screen Temperature) Temperature)
Acceleration Level (See Note 8) 6 G rms

Frequency Limits 50-1000 Hz
Axes Stimulated Serially or 2 (minimum)
Concurrently (See Note 9)
Duration of Vibration
(Minimum)
• Axes stimulated serially 10 Minutes/Axis
• Axes stimulated 10 Minutes
concurrently
Power On/Equipment (See Note 5)
Equipment Monitoring (See Note 6)
Piece Parts: Begin the manufacturing and repair process with 100 defects per million or
less (see note 10).
* SRU—Shop Replaceable Unit LRM—Line Replaceable Module
LRU—Line Replaceable Unit

RADC RELIABILITY
-TOPIC T4
RADC TOOLKIT
TESTING—TOPIC T5

TESTING—TOPIC T6
Topic 16: Maintainability Demonstration Plan Selection

TESTING—TOPIC T17
Topic T7: Testability Demonstration Plan Selection
Fixed sample Calendar time No effect on Same as that Provides for

size type tests much less than sample size required for producer's
that required number. maintainability ' risks of 10%.
for reliability
forr demonstrationi. Provides
demonstration. consumer
Time required assurance that
is proportional designs with
to sample size. significant
May vary deviations from
dependingi oon n specified
program. values willII be
Preset Risks Risks inversely

(consumer and proportional to
producer). sample size
(1 — consumer used.
risk = confidence)
confidence).
1. Sample size dependent on total number of sample A.10.4 of

MIL-STD-471 A.
2. Demonstration facility must have for insertion of simulated

TESTING—TOPIC T8
Topic 18; FRACAS {Failure Reporting And Corrective

.Action System)
Early elimination of failure trends is a major contributor to reliability growth and
attaining the needed operational reliability. To be effective, a closed loop
coordinated process must be implemented by the system/equipment contractor. A
description of the major events and the participant's actions is shown below.
| Failure or Malfunction Operators: Identify a problem, call for maintenance,

the incident.
Corrects the problem, logs the failure.
Quality:
Failure Report Generates the failure report with supporting data
(time, place, equipment, item, etc.)
Quality: Insures completeness and assigns a travel tag for
the failed item for audit control.
Data Logged") R&M: Log all tl and
forms, classify the (inherent, induced,
false alarm).
Failure Review R&M: Determine failure trends (i.e., several
the same or similar part).
Design: Review operating procedures for error.
Failure Analysis R&M: Decide which parts will be destructively analyzed.
Physics of Failure: Perform failure analysis to determine the cause of
' (i.e., part or <
Quality: inspect incoming test data tor tne part.
Failure Correction Design: Redesign hardware, if necessary.
New part or new test procedure.
Quality: Evaluate incoming test procedures, inspect
redesigned nardware.
Post Data Review R&M: Close the loop by collecting and evaluating post
Figure T8-1: Failure Reporting System Flow Diagram

TESTING—TOPIC T8
Table T8-1: FRACAS Evaluation Checklist
General Closed loop (i.e., reported, analyzed, corrected i
Overall control by one group or function.

Audit trail (
Travel tags for;
Fast turn-around for <
Failure Report
Surrounding conditions noted.
Operating 1
Perform if three or
Perform if unit is less than half of predicted.
should
induced or
Collated by week and month by unit.

Compared to
Correction data collected for \

TESTING—TOPIC T9
Topic 19: Reliability Demonstration Test Plan Checklist*
Purpose and Scope

General description of all tests to be performed.
of system layout during

numbers of units to be
of te
General description of 1
Security of test area.
Security of test equipment and records.
Test (ESS).
of units to be
of allowafc
Description of MIL-HDBK-781 test plan showing accept, reject and
List of
and schedule of test reports to be
Test Schedule
Number of test hours per day.

of test days per week,
of thermal cycle,
of thermal survey.
Description of vibration survey.
Description of unit under test mounting method.
List of all

TESTING—TOPIC T9
TESTING—TOPIC T9
TESTING—TOPIC T9

112 RADC RELIABILITY TOOLKIT
-TOPIC T11

TESTING—TOPIC T11
114 RADC RELIABILITY

TESTING—TOPIC T12
Topic- T12: Reliability and Malntaiviablllty Test

Participation (Government)
Depends on:
Availability of program resources to support on-site personnel.
How important R&M are to program
Availability and capability of other government on-site personnel (i.e., Defense
Contract Administrative Service (DCAS), Air Force Plant Representative Office
(AFPRO), Naval Plant Representative Office (NAVPRO), etc.).
Confidence in and credibility of contractor.
All test plans and procedures must be approved.

must be made among government personnel with
covering the test and incident reporting procedures.
Units under test including serial numbers should be documented.
Test equipment including serial numbers should be documented.
Working fire alarms, heat sensors and overvoltage alarms should be used.
Trial survey runs should be made per the approved test plan.
Approved test plans and procedures must be available and strictly

Equipment must not be tampered with.
Test logs must be accurately and comprehensively
Appropriate government personnel must be kept informed
Only authorized personnel should be allowed in area (a list should be posted)

Test logs, data sheets, and failure reports should be readily available for
government review.
Units under test should be sealed to prevent tampering or unauthorized
A schedule of inspections and visits should be maintained.
No repairs or replacements should be made without a government
Government representatives must take part in failure review process.
Failed items should have "travel tags" on them.
Technical orders should be used for

TESTING—TOPIC T13
TOOLKIT 117
Appendix 1
Operational Parameter Translation
OPERATIONAL PARAMETER TRANSLATION
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Appendix 2
Example R&M Requirement Paragraphs
quirements
The use of the latest versions and
„ „ J Urtrt^JkrtAl^ AUai I U L„
ana nanaoooKs snouia oe
When specifying an MTBF; it should be the "upper test MTBF (0oy as

MIL-STD-781. When sspecifying MTBCFi the i
The minimum performance i

I be met for full mission capability of the (system name) system is defined as
(specify full mission capability).
R.1.5
developed by the contractor for use by
the reauired levels
' For more
See Topic D1 for
land
duration,
s rise should be

TOOLKIT
EXAMPLE R&M REQUIREMENT PARAGRAPHS
maintained PPSL shall be submitted in accordance with the CDRL. Amendments

to the PPSL as a result of such requests, after procuring activity approval, shall be
supplied to the contractor by the Program Contracting Officer not more often than
once every 30 days.
Guidance: The level of detail of the FMECA must be specified (e.g., part, circuit
card, etc.). The closer the program is to full scale engineering development, the
greater the level of detail needed.
R.2.9 Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA). The
contractor shall perform a limited FMECA to the level to identify design
weaknesses and deficiencies. Potential failure modes shall be identified and
evaluated to determine their effects on mission success. Critical failures shall be
investigated to determine possible design improvements and elimination means.
MIL-STD-785, Task 204 shall be used as a guide.
Guidance: Reliability critical items should be required where it's anticipated that
the design will make use of custom VLSI, hybrids, microwave hybrids and other
high technology nonstandard devices. See Topic D5 for a critical item checklist.
R.2.10 Reliability Critical Items. Task number 208 of MIL-STD-785 applies.
The contractor shall prepare a list of critical items and present this list at all formal
reviews, critical items snail include, items naving limited operating lite or sneit lite,
items difficult to procure or manufacture, items with unsatisfactory operating
history, items of new technology with little reliability data, single source items, parts
exceeding derating limits, and items causing single points of failure.
analyze the ettects ot storage, handling and transportation on the system reliability.
compliance wstn the quantitative reliability requirements in accordance with MIL-

STD-785 Task 302. Test plans and reports shall be developed and submitted.
R.2.13 Reliability Development/Growth Test Test plans that show data
tracking growth, testing methods and data collection procedures shall be
developed and submitted for the Growth Test Program.
Guidance; When specifying ESS, the level (circuit card, module, assembly, etc.)
at which the screening is to be performed must be specified. Different levels of
screening should be performed at different hardware assembly levels. See R&M
2000 guidelines in Section T for recommended screening as a function of
hardware assembly level.
applies. A burn-in test of (specify the number of hours or temperature cycles)

at temperature and vibration level extremes shall be performed at the
level. At least (hours/cycles) of failure free operation shall be
experienced before termination of the burn-in test for each unit. DOD-HDBK-344,
ESS of Electronic Equipment, shall be used as a guide.

RADC TOOLKIT A-17
EXAMPLE R&M REQUIREMENT PARAGRAPHS
construction and configuration of the FSD design. Linkages with MIL-STD-2165

Task 201 to relate testability/diagnostic design characteristics to maintainability
parameters shall be provided.
M.2.6 Maintainability Prediction. The contractor shall predict maintainability
figures of merit using Procedure V of MIL-HDBK-472 (Notice 1) at the on-
equipment level. MIL-STD-470A, Task 203 shall be used as a guide.
M.2.7 Maintainability/Testability Design Criteria. The contractor shall develop
design criteria to be used in the design process to achieve the specified
maintainability and testability requirements. In addition, a design analysis showing
failure modes, failure rates, ease of access, modularity and the capability to
achieve the fault detection/isolation requirement shall be provided. RADC-TR-74-
308 "Maintainability Engineering Design Handbook," RADC-TR-82-189 "RADC
Testability Notebook," Task 202 of MIL-STD-2165 and Task 206 of MIL-STD-470A
shall be used as a guide.
Guidance: Maintainability demonstration reports are only necessary if a
maintainability test is specified in the maintainability specification requirements.
M 2 8 Maintainability/Testability Demonstration. A Test plan and test report
shall be submitted by the contractor. Task 301 of MIL-STD-470A and Task 301 of
MIL-STD-2165 shall be used as guides.
A-18 RADC RELIABILITY ENGINEER'S TOOLKIT

Appendix 3
Warranties
A-19
WARRANTIES
Carlucci Initiatives, to improve and streamline the acquisition process. They

included warranties as one means of achieving desired levels of system reliability
and maintainability. Congressional interest in warranty as a means of ensuring
acceptable field performance started with the passage of Public Law 98-212, which
was part of the 1984 Defense Appropriations Act, mandating that warranties be
included in the production contract.
3.3 Current Warrantf Law

The Defense Procurement Reform Act (Public Law 98-525), effective January
1985, established Title 10, Section 2403, of the United States Code, entitled "Major
Weapon Systems: Contractor Guarantees." The law requires that the prime
contractor for a production weapon system provide written guarantees, starting
with procurements after 1 January 1985. Table 3.1 summarizes the essential
features of the law.
Table 3.1: Summary of 1985 Warranty Law
Coverage Weapon Systems Used in combat missions; unit cost is <_

than $100,000, or total procurement exceeds
$10,000,000.
Prime contractor Party that enters into direct agreement with
US to furnish part or all of weapon system.
Design and manufacturing Item meets structural and engineering plans
requirements and manufacturing particulars.
Defects in materials and Item is free from such defects at the time it is
workmanship delivered to the government.
I performance 3 or maintenance and
requirements reliability characteristics of item are
necessary for fulfilling the military
requirements.
Exclusions GFRGFE.GFM Items provided to the contractor by the
government.
f Assistant Secretary of Defense or Assistant
not Secretary of the Military Department is
cost-effective lowest authority for granting waiver; prior
notification to House and Senate
committees required for major weapon
system.
Air Force policy documents indicate that the Air Force will require a warranty plan
for each procurement documenting the responsibilities, decisions, taskings and
strategies for warranties. Table 3.2 lists offices that have been designated Air
Force warranty focal points.

WARRANTIES
Table 3.2: Air Force Warranty Focal Points
Office Address Telephone Number
Warranty Contracting HQ USAF/RDCS (202) 697-6400

Pentagon
Washington DC 20330
Warranty Administration HQ USAF/LEYE (202) 697-0311
Pentagon
Washington DC 20330
Air Force Systems Command HQ AFSC/PLE (301)981-4076
Andrews AFB DC 20334
Air Force Logistics Command HQ AFLC/MMA (513) 257-7119
Wright-Patterson AFB OH 45433
Warranty Data Base and Product Performance (513) 255-5459
Consulting Agreement Center
Wright-Patterson AFB OH 45433
3-5 Product Performance Agreement Center (PPAC)

The Air Force PPAC was established in 1982 to assist Air Force activities involved
in the acquisition of defense systems and their components in selecting,
structuring, pricing, negotiating and implementing effective Product Performance
Agreements (PPAs) and related business arrangements. To promote the use of
PPAs in Air Force procurements pursuant to 10 USC 2403, and to promote
effective application and management of PPAs at all levels, the PPAC currently
performs the following functions:
• Serves as the central repository of Air Force PPA-related data.
• Analyzes the effectiveness of existing and proposed PPAs.
• Develops improved contract clauses and related concepts.
• Provides technical assistance to Air Force activities in selecting, tailoring,
pricing, negotiating and administering appropriate agreements.
• Formulates proposed policy guidance for HQ USAF consideration concerning
application of PPAs to Air Force acquisitions.
3.6 Warranty Classifications

A number of warranty classification schemes have been developed to describe
alternatives available to procurement activities. The usual classification scheme
distinguishes between assurance and incentive forms of warranties. Table 3.3
compares the characteristics of these two types.
RADC RELIABILITY ENGINEER'S TOOLKIT A-23

A-24 RADC RELIABILITY TOOLKIT A-31
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RADC RELIABILITY 1 > TOOLKIT

WARRANTIES
3.8 Contractor Reliability Motivations

Reliability is one of the principal system performance parameters that the warranty
law addresses. Reliability differs from quality in the sense that it pertains to the
long-term performance of the system—or, the mean time between system failures.
Contractors generally have a positive attitude toward quality. Quality audits are
normally performed on all submitted products and rejections result in added
expense and reduced profit. Reliability, on the other hand, is more elusive: it
cannot be measured easily, and, in some respects, it does not offer immediate,
positive motivations to a contractor. In fact, one can argue, perhaps cynically, that
without a warranty, failures of a deployed system mean more profit to a contractor if
the contractor is providing maintenance or spares. In addition, if reliability is a
serious problem, the same contractor is probably tasked to develop a fix and to
retrofit existing systems. Figure 3.1 illustrates contractor profit motivation with
a warranty.
Mean Time Between Failures
Figure 3.1: Contractor Profit Motivation—Warranty
3.9 Other Warranty Motivations

There are other motivations, besides reliability, that can be associated with a
warranty. The warranty commitment forces the contractor to think seriously beyond
just having the product accepted. Being involved throughout the warranty period
may cause the contractor to be concerned with maintenance, diagnostics, training,
data and other logistics and support factors. As an example, warranties have been

Appendix 4
Example Design Guidelines
TOOLKIT A-29
to include
only and don't apply to
cooling system (ECS) should

circuit junction temperature of
Under'
at least 50°C
should be made of
can be by
The s rise from any junction to

! heat sink should be 25°C. The
; to the heat sink should be no qreater than 15°C. To
; should be
Re datic design tools that perform com

should be jce this result. A thermal finite
to produce
be used to
I Re datk of
can be by
or by infrared photography.
t and board materials should be:

;of expansion (TCE).
; should be selected for TCE compatibility with the attached printed wiring
board. TCE mismatch results in waroaae of <
; and:

EXAMPLE DESIGN GUIDELINES
Hardware demonstration should be conducted early in

the development phase toD verify simulation results through
throu insertion of faults using
gram, firmware, and microcode.
currently available versions of the operational program,
(4)
Design Guideline: During normal operation, the module should continuously
monitor itself through a background diagnostic test. The background diagnostic
If the failure is confirmed, the module should become immediately
: System design simulation tools should be used to

verify operation of the BIT These tools should include fault simulations,
I simulation.
Hardware demonstration should be conducted early in
the development phase to verify simulation results through insertion of faults using
gram, firmware, and microcode.
currently available versions of the operational program,
Hardware demonstration may be performed by physically inserting faults in a
module or by instrumenting a module to allow insertion of faults through <
(1) Mechanical Insertion/Extraction-induced:

Design Guideline: Each module should withstand, without damage or
separation, a minimum force equal to at least 100 pounds on insertion and four
ounces per contact on extraction. Additionally, the backplane for the assembly
should withstand the same forces at all module positions applied repeatedly in any
sequence with any combination of modules present or missing.
Analysis Recommendation: A mechanical loads analysis should be performed
to verify compliance with the mechanical requirements.
The total computed force should be applied to:
module insertion and extraction. The force should be applied in 2 seconds and
maintained for 15 seconds.
(2) Insertion/Extraction Durability.

Design Guideline: Modules should be capable of withstanding 500 cycles of
mating and unmating with no degradation of module performance. The module
should also be capable of withstanding 500 cycles of lateral displacement to
simulate the use of thermal clamping devices. The backplane of the module's host
assembly should be capable of withstanding 500 of the same cycles on each of its
module positions.
to veruy compliance with the mechanical requirements.

Design Guideline: The module should be capable of withstanding a 6 inch-pound
torque applied in 2 seconds and maintained for 15 seconds in both directions along
the header in a direction perpendicular to the plane of the header without
detrimental effect to the mechanical or electrical properties of the module.
to verify compliance with the mechanical requirements.
Test Recommendation: The required torque should be applied in 2 seconds and
maintained for 15 seconds. During the time the torque is applied, the module
should be rigidly supported within a zone between the interface plane and 0.5 inch
above the interface panel.

(6)
Guideline: Module retention techniques must be carefully des
) the insertion mechanism, required connector insertion force,
, and extraction mechanism. Conventional electronics have required
The connector-to-module interface should be
and 1
Recommendation: Tolerance review should be performed early in
Recommendation: Demonstration testing can be performed easily during
in the module, the keying pins should meet the

Each keying pin should'
torque of 20 inch-ounces
pullout force of 9 pounds
pushout force of 40 pounds
load of 10 pounds
; Recommendation: A mechanical loads analysis should be performed
A-36 RADC RELIABILITY TOOLKIT

(4)
Design Guideline: When thermal limiting is no longer capable of maintaining
internal temperature at an acceptable level, the power supply should automatically
shut down. Operation should not resume until the power supply is reset.
Temperature sense circuits should remain active during shut down.
Analysis Recommendation: Compliance with the specified operation should be
verified throughout the design process.
Test Recommendation: Specified operation of the protective device should be
induced by application of the anomalous condition protected against. Correct
operation of the protective device should be observed. Normal specified power
supply operation should be verified after removal of the anomalous condition.
(5) Power Supply Status Reporting.

Design Guideline: There should be an interface on each power supply module
that will allow data communication between the power supply and a CPU located
on a separate module. Each power supply module will be addressed individually.
The data and control lines should interface to the power supply module through the
backplane connector. The following power supply parameters should be read by
the CPU:
• overcurrent status
• overvoltage status
• thermal limiting mode
• thermal shutdown
• percentage of full output power
The following commands should be issued by the CPU to the power supply
module:
of full output power required

Compliance with the
1 operation of the protective device (i.e.,
monitoring mechanism and control)) should be induced by application of the
anomalous condition protected against. Correct operation of the protective device
should be observed. Normal specified power supply operation should be verified
after removal of the anomalous condition.
(6) Power Supply Input Protection.

Design Guideline: The power supply should automatically shut down if the input
voltage is not within the specified allowable range, and at any time when the

control circuits in the power supply do not have adequate voltage to regulate the
outputs. This should include the time during normal start-up when generators are
not producing their normal output voltage.
Test Recommendation: Specified operation of the protective device should be
induced by application of the anomalous condition protected against. Correct
operation of the protective device should be observed. Normal specified power
supply operation should be verified after removal of the anomalous condition.
(7) Backplace Conditions.

Design Guideline: A sufficient number of connector pins should be paralleled so
that no backplane connector pin carries more than 5 amps of current.
Test Recommendation: Not applicable.
(8) M-of-N Power Supply Redundancy

Design Guideline: The quantity of power supplies for a system of functional
i lements should be determined to allow uninterrupted operation if one of the
power supplies fails. When all power supplies are functional, they should share the
system ioaa equally by operating at reduced output. If the system power
requirement is less than that available from one power supply, redundancy should
not be used unless a critical function is involved.
Analysis Recommendation: Compliance should be verified by electrical loads
analysis.
Test Recommendation: Not applicable.
(9) Current Sharing

Design Guideline The power supplies should be constructed so that units which
have the same output voltage may operate in parallel. The design should be such
that power supply failures will not cause degradation of parallel power supplies.
Each power supply should provide its proportional share ( ± 10%) of the total
electric load required at the configured output voltage.
verified as a part of the design process.
Test Recommendation: A demonstration should be conducted under load to
verify that the parallel power supplies power up and power down in unison. Failure
and reset of one of the power supplies should be simulated or induced to
demonstrate proper operation of the remaining units through the transition.

Appendix 5
Reliability Demonstration Testing
TOOLKIT A-41
true MTBF is 750
b. There is a 20
500 hours irisk).
c. The lower test MTBF (6,) is 500 hours (750/1.5).
d. The duration of the test is 10,750 hours (21.5 x 500).
If the design goal MTBF (80) for a:

as 750 hours and IIDis chosen, the following:
a. There is a 20 of true MTBF is 750

hours risk).
b. There is a 20 of true MTBF is
500 risk).
c. The I test MTBF (0,) is 500 hours (750/1.5).
RADC RELIABILITY I
RELIABILITY DEMONSTRATION TESTING
d. The minimum time to an accept decision is 2095 hours (4.19 x 500).

e. The expected time to an accept decision is 5700 hours (11.4 x 500). (Expected
time to decision based on assumption of a true MTBF equal to 0O.)
f. The maximum time to reach an accept decision is 10950 hours (21.9 x 500).

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RADC RELIABILITY I > TOOLKIT

5.3.1
5.3.1.1 Two-Sided Confidence Level for a Test Terminated On a Failure. Two-
sided confidence levels are calculated if it is desired to put both upper and lower
bounds on a point estimate MTBF (0).
5.3.1.1.1 Failure Terminated (Two-Sided) Example: A reliability demonstration
test is terminated at the seventh failure which occurs at 820 hours total test time.
What are the two-sided 80 percent confidence limits?
Solution: C = 7
§ = 820/7 = 117.14
Confidence = 1 — risk = 1 — a = .8
a = 1 - .8 = .2
2 / 7> 117.14 2 x 7 > 117.14

From Table 5.3: — =£ 0 =£
X |1:2j,2x7 X .2,2x7
... . 1639.96 A 1639.96

Simplifying: — ^ 0 —-
X .9, 14 X .1, 14
From Table 5.4: x 2 9 , M = 21.1 x21,M = 7.79
Calculating the Confidence Limits: ^ ^ f f ^ ^ ^ ^
777 ^ 6^ 210.5
There is an 80 percent probability that the true MTBF, 0, is between 77.7 hours and
210.5 hours.
5.3.1.2 One-Sided Confidence Level for a Test Terminated on a Failure. A
majority of confidence level calculations are concerned only with determining
whether a minimum level of MTBF has been exceeded with a certain level of
confidence. This is without regard to what the upper bound may be.
5.3.1.2.1 Failure Terminated (One-Sided) Example: A reliabilil
test is terminated at 820 hours total test time after the occurrence of the
failure. What is the one-sided lower 80 percent confidence limit?
Solution: C = 7
0 = 117.14
Confidence - 1 - risk = 1 - a = .8
a - 0.2
T u. rr o n 2x7x117.14
From Table 5.3: 0 ^ —
X (1 .2), 2 x 7

o- j.r - A 1639.96
Simplifying: 0 ^ —-
X .8, 14
From Table 5.4: x2 8,14 = 18.2
Calculating the lower confidence level: 0 ^ 1639

18 2
96 = 90.1
There is an 80 percent probability that the true MTBF, 0, is at least 90.1 hours.
5.3.2 Time Terminated Tests: The procedure for calculating either one sided or
two sided confidence intervals for a time terminated test is analogous to the
procedure just presented for the failure terminated cases.
5.4 Poisson Distribution. The Poisson distribution is useful in calculating the
probability that a certain number of failures will occur over a certain length of time
for systems exhibiting exponential failure distributions (i.e., non-redundant
systems). The Poisson model can be stated as follows: '
PM - S F
Where: P(r) = probability of exactly r failures occurring
k = the true failure rate per hour (i.e., the failure rate which would be
exhibited over an infinite period)
t = the test time
r = the number of failure occurrences
e = 2.71828...,
! = factorial symbol (e.g., 4! = 4 x 3 x 2 x 1 = 24, 0! = 1,1! = 1)
The probability of exactly 0 failures results in the exponential form of this
distribution which is used to calculate the probability of success for a given period
of time (i.e., P(0) = e~xt). The probability of more than one failure occurring is the
sum of the probabilities of individual failures occurring. For example, the probability
of two or less failures occurring is P(0) + P(1) + P(2). Table 5.5 is a tabulation of
exact probabilities used to find the probability of an exact number of failures
occurring. Table 5.6 is a tabulation of cumulative probabilities used to find the
probability of a specific number of failures, or less, occurring.

5.4.1 Poisson Example 1: If the true MTBF of a system is 200 hours and a
reliability demonstration test is conducted for 1000 hours, what is the probability of
accepting tne system if three or less failures are allowed?
= 5
Solution: Expected number of failures = Xt = T T ^ F =
From Table 5.6. the probability of three or less tailures (probability of acceptance)
given that five are expected is .265. Theretore. there is only a 26.5 percent chance
that this system will be accepted it subjected to this test.
5.4.2 Poisson Example 2: A system has an MTBF of 50 hours. What is the
probability of two or more failures during a 10 hour mission?
= =
Solution: Expected number of failures = y^fgp
The probability of two or more failures is one minus the probability of one or less .
failures. From Table 5.6. P(r^1) when .2 are expected is .962.
P(r^2) = 1 - P(nsM)
1 - .982 - .018
Therefore, there is a very remote chance (1.8 percent) that a system with a 50 hour
MTBF will experience two or more tailures during a 10 hour mission.
5.4.3 Poisson Example 3: A system has an MTBF ot 50 hours. What is the
probability of experiencing two failures during a 10 hour mission?
Solution: Expected number of tailures = ,,-rLr- = ^ = .2

M I BP 50
From Table 5.5. the probability of experiencing exactly two failures when .2 are
expected is .017 or 1.7 percent. It should be noted that the probability ot
experiencing two or more failures, as determined in the last example, can also be
determined from this table by adding P(r = 2) + P(r = 3) when .2 are expected

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Appendix 6
Reliability Growth Testing

RELIABILITY GROWTH TESTING
would De inappropriate but FRACAS should still be implemented. The other

extreme is a developmental program applying technology that challenges the
state-of-the-art. In this situation a much greater amount of design flexibility to
correct unforeseen problems exists. Because the technology is so new and
challenging, it can be expected that a greater number of unforeseen problems will
be surfaced by growth testing. All programs can benefit from testing to find
reliability problems and correcting them prior to deployment, but the number of
problems likely to be corrected and the cost effectiveness of fixing them is greater
for designs which are more complex and challenging to the state-of-the-art.
How does the applicability of reliability growth testing vary with the
following points of a development program?
(1) Complexity of equipment and challenge to state-of-the-art?
The more complex or challenging the equipment design is, the more likely
there will be unforeseen reliability problems which can be surfaced by a growth
program. However, depending on the operational scenario, the number of
equipments to be deployed and the maintenance concept, there may be a high
LCC payoff in using a reliability growth program to fine tune a relatively simple
design to maximize its reliability. This would apply in situations where the
equipments have extremely high usage rates and LCC is highly sensitive to
MTBF.
(2) Operational environment?

All other factors being equal, the more severe the environment, the higher the
payoff from growth testing. This is because severe environments are more
likely to inflict unforeseen stress associated reliability problems that need to be
corrected.
(3) Quantity of equipment to be produced?
The greater the quantities of equipment, the more impact on LCC by reliability
improvement through a reliability growth effort.
!
What reliability growth model(s) should be used? .
The model to be used, as MIL-HDBK-189 says, is the simplest one that does the
job. Certainly, the Duane is most common, probably with the AMSAA (Army
Materiel Systems Analysis Activity) second. They both have advantages; the
Duane being simple with parameters having an easily recognizable physical
interpretation, and the AMSAA having rigorous statistical procedures associated
with it. MIL-HDBK-189 suggests the Duane for planning and the AMSAA for
assessment and tracking. When an RQT is required, the RGT should be planned
and tracked using the Duane model; otherwise, the AMSAA model is
recommended for tracking because it allows for the calculation of confidence limits
around the data.
Should there be an accept/reject criteria?
The purpose of reliability growth testing is to uncover failures and take corrective
actions to prevent their recurrence. Having an accept/reject criteria is a negative
contractor incentive towards this purpose. Monitoring the contractor's progress

and loosely defined thresholds are needed but placing accept/reject criteria, or
using a growth test as a demonstration, defeat the purpose of running them. A
degree of progress monitoring is necessary even when the contractor knows that
following the reliability growth test he will be held accountable by a final RQT. Tight
thresholds make the test an RQT in disguise. Reliability growth can be incentivized
but shouldn't be. To reward a contractor for meeting a certain threshold in a shorter
time or by indicating "if the RGT results are good, the RQT will be waived," the
contractor's incentive to "find and fix" is diminished. The growth test's primary
purpose is to improve the design, not to evaluate the design.
What is the relationship between an RQT and RGT?
The RQT is an "accounting task" used to measure the reliability of a fixed design
configuration. It has the benefit of holding the contractor accountable some day
down the road from his initial design process. As such, he is encouraged to
seriously carry out the other design related reliability tasks. The RGT is an
"engineering task" designed to improve the design reliability. It recognizes that the
drawing board design of a complex system cannot be perfect from a reliability point
of view and allocates the necessary time to fine tune the design by finding
problems and designing them out. Monitoring, tracking and assessing the resulting
data gives insight into the efficiency of the process and provides nonliability
persons with a tool for evaluating the development's reliability status and for
reallocating resources when necessary. The forms of testing serve very different
purposes and complement each other in development of systems and equipments.
An RGT is not a substitute for an RQT, or other reliability design tasks.
How much validity/confidence should be placed on the numerical results of
RGT?
Associating a hard reliability estimate from a growth process, while mathematically
practical, has the tone of an assessment process rather than an improvement
process, especially if an RQT assessment will not follow the RGT. In an ideal
situation, where contractors are not driven by profit motives, a reliability growth test
could serve as an improvement and assessment vehicle. Since this is not the real
world, the best that can be done if meaningful quantitative results are needed
without an RQT, is to closely monitor the contractor RGT Use of the AMSAA model
provides the necessary statistical procedures for associating confidence levels
with reliability results. In doing so, closer control over the operating conditions and
failure determinations of the RGT must be exercised than if the test is for
improvement purposes only. A better approach is to use a less closely controlled
growth test as an improvement technique (or a structured extension of FRACAS,
with greater emphasis on corrective action) to fine tune the design as insurance of
an accept decision in an RQT. With this approach, monitoring an improvement
trend is more appropriate than development of hard reliability estimates. Then use
a closely controlled RQT to determine acceptance and predict operational results.
6.3 Duane Model. Because the Duane model is the one most commonly used, it
will be further explained. The model assumes that the plot of MTBF versus time is
a straight line when plotted on log-log paper. The main advantage of this model is
that it is easy to use. The disadvantage of the model is it assumes that a fix is
incorporated immediately after a failure occurs (before further test time is

MTBFr
i MTBF MTBF, =
1 - a
d. Test Time T = [(MTBF,) (K) (1
The instantaneous MTBF is the model's mathemîcal representation of the MTBF

Table 6.1 RGT Planning Considerations
roughly twice the number of test hours.

• A minimum test length o f e predicted MTBF should always be
used (if the Duane Model less time). Literature commonly
quotes typical test lengths of from 5 to 25 times the predicted MTBF
• For large MTBF systems (e.g., greater than 1000 hours), the
MMAAAH^JiliiAMSnM M âl
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6.4 Prediction of Reliability Growth Expected. It is possible to estimate the

increase in reliability that can be expected for an equipment undergoing a reliability
growth development program. The methodology to do this is documented in
RADC-TR-86-148 "Reliability Growth Prediction."
\ p = MIL-HDBK-217 predicted equipment failure rate (failures per hour).

Fm = Equipment maturity factor. Estimated as the percentage of the design which
is new.
K, = Number of failures in the equipment prior to test.
K, = 3 0 , 0 0 0 x F m x Xp
Fa = Test acceleration factor, based on the degree to which the test environment
cycle represents the operational environmental cycle.
F _ TOPERAT|ONAL _ Length of operational life

Fa
" Ttest - Length of test cycle
a. Calculate the equipment MTBF prior to test, MTBF(o):
MTBF(o) . [a. +
b. Calculate the equipment MTBF after "t" hours of growth testing:
MTBF(t) 1
( F ^ (Xp) + K ^ e - *

X 100
c. Percent MTBF Improvement = ^ j B F ( o )
6.4.3 Example:
To illustrate application of the reliability growth prediction procedure, consider the
following hypothetical example of an avionics equipment to be subjected to
reliability growth testing during full-scale development. The following assumptions
are made:
• 40 percent of the equipment is new design; the remainder is comprised of
mature, off-the-shelf items.
• The MIL-HDBK-217 MTBF prediction is 300 hours (Xp = 1/300).
• An RGT program is to be conducted during which 3000 hours will be
accumulated on the equipment.
• The operational cycle for the equipment is a ten-hour aircraft mission.
• The test profile eliminates the period of operation in a relatively benign
environment (e.g., the cruise portion of the mission) resulting in a test cycle of
two hours.
The predicted number of failures in the equipment prior to testing is:
K1 = 30.000 x (0.4) x (1/300) = 40
The initial MTBF is:
MTBF(o) = [1/300 + 0 0005(40)] = 156 hours
The test acceleration factor is:
FA - 10/2 = 5
The rate of surfacing failures during the test is:
K2 = (0.0005/6.5) x 5 = 0.0003846
Tne equipment MTBF after incorporation of corrective actions to eliminate those

failures identified in the RGT program is:
0 0003846 x 3000
MTBF(3000) = 5/(5 x 1/300 + 40 x 0.0003846 e ) - 232 hours
Hence, the predicted reliability growth is from an initial MTBF of 156 hours to an
improved MTBF of 232 hours, approximately a 50 percent improvement.

Appendix 7
Maintainability/Testability
Demonstration Testing

MAINTAINABILITY/TESTABILITY DEMONSTRATION TESTING
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Appendix 8
Reliability and Maintainability
Data Sources
RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITYEDUCATO
I NSOURCES
8.1 Reliability Analysis Center (RAC)

RAC is a Department of Defense Information Analysis Center sponsored by the
Defense Logistics Agency, managed by the Rome Air Development Center
(RADC), and currently operated at RADC by IIT Research Institute (IITRI). RAC is
chartered to collect, analyze and disseminate reliability information pertaining to
electronic systems and parts used therein. The present scope includes integrated
circuits, hybrids, discrete semiconductors, microwave devices, opto-electronics
and nonelectronic parts employed in military, space and commercial applications.
Data is collected on a continuous basis from a broad range of sources, including
testing laboratories, device and equipment manufacturers, government
laboratories and equipment users (government and non-government). Automatic
distribution lists, voluntary data submittals and field failure reporting systems
supplement an intensive data solicitation program.
Reliability data and analysis documents covering most of the device types
mentioned above are available from the RAC. Also, RAC provides reliability
consulting, training, technical and bibliographic inquiry services.
For Further Technical Assistance and Information on Available RAC

Services, Contact:
Reliability Analysis Center
PO Box 4700
Rome NY 13440-8200
Technical Inquiries: (315) 330-9933
Non-Technical Inquiries: (315) 330-4151
Autovon: 587-4151
All Other Requests Should Be Directed to:

RBE/Preston R. MacDiarmid
Griffiss AFB NY 13441-5700
Telephone: (315) 330-7095
Autovon: 587-7095
8.2 Government Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP)

The GIDEP program is a cooperative activity between government and industry
participants for the purpose of compiling and exchanging technical data. It
provides an on-line menu driven means for searching for desired information.
There are several separate data banks which contain R&M related information:
Data Bank Content

Engineering Test reports, nonstandard part
justification data, failure analysis data,
manufacturing processes.

I NSOURCES
• Data Sources
Aircraft Modification Performance Tracking (AMPTS)

AFLC/MME (Perry French)
Autovon: 787-7886
SA-ALC/MMEAI (Herb Cheesman)
Autovon: 945-4225
D041
AFLC/MMRS (Sandra Kirby)
Autovon: 787-3460
AFLC/MME (Perry French)

Autovon: 787-7886
i MAJCON On-Line Aerospace Vehicle
AFLC (Elizabeth Hayes)
Autovon: 787-7705
G311: Aerospace Vehicle, Inventory and Utilization
HQ USAF (Mr. Robinson)
Autovon: 227-5405
G021: Quality and
AFLC/QAA (Jerry Swanson)
; (Jan Howell)
Autovon: 527-3066
CDS: F-16 Central
Dynamics Research (Vern Vutech)
AFLC LOC/TLPO (Robert DeSauty)
Autovon: 787-5646
i Logically Analyzed and Produced (MILAP)
Langley AFB VA (Sgt Young)
WR-^cfMik^Creasy) 1
Robins AFB GA
(Avionics)
NAMSO (Manny Pierucci)
(717) 790-2031
(Ships)
NAMSO (Larry Costelac)
(717) 790-7225

I NSOURCES
NALDA: Naval Aviation Logistics Data Analysis (AMPAS)

NALC Dept NAM031 (Chuck Carnobas)
(800) 624-6621
NALDA: Naval Aviation Logistics Data Analysis (FOJ)
NALC Dept NAM031 (Chuck Carnobas)
(800) 624-6621
QDEAS: Quality Deficiency Evaluation and
Navair (Norman Clark)
(202) 422-4520
Aircraft
NAVAIR or NAC
Autovon: 724-7284
(FAN)
AMCCOM (Robert Miller)
(309) 782-2421
Part of FAN
(EPR)
Part of FAN
Quality of
Part of FAN
(SDC)
Part of FAN
Test Incidei (TIR)
Part of FAN
RADC RELIABILITY ENGINEER S TOOLKIT

Appendix 9
Reliability and Maintainability
Education Sources
A-81
9.1 R&M Education Sources
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RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY EDUCATION SOURCES
Scope: Provides an in-depth explanation of the principles, procedures and

techniques of engineering design which can be used to ensure the
development of reliable and maintainable systems. Design related
subjects include derating, stress analysis, failure modes effect and
criticality analysis, sneak circuit analysis, testability and accessibility.
Achieving R&M through test-analyze-and-fix, combined environment
reliability testing, and environmental stress screening are studied.
The course also includes contracting for R&M through discussions of
requirements development, contractual documentation, source
selection and post contract tasks. Case problems and workshops are
used extensively throughout the course to enable the student to
apply the theory explained in the classroom.
Course Title: Reliability, QMT 372 (AF)

Length: 15 Class Days
Scope: Includes a study of the statistical distributions used in reliability
including the binomial, Poisson, normal, exponential and Weibull;
reliability allocation and prediction techniques; test plans, O.C.
curves and the use of military standards; data analysis and the
construction and interpretation of confidence intervals; applications
of mathematical models; reliability program management; and
current problems of reliability. The participants spend the last week
applying these principles and techniques to life cycle costing in a
reliability management simulation exercise.
Course Title: Mathematical Statistics and Probability, QMT 577 (AF)

Scope: An educational program in graduate level mathematical statistics,
probability theory, and computer programming. Course includes
material on discrete and continuous random variables and their
probability distributions, multivariate probability distributions,
estimation, hypothesis testing, and order statistics.
Course Title: Reliability and Maintainability Research and Applications,

QMT 578 (AF)
Scope: Includes material on the acquisition process, life cycle costing, data
management, military standards and handbooks for reliability and
maintainability, simulation, models, reliability and maintainability
management and quality control. Students are required to do
research on an R&M program and spend 5 days on a simulation
exercise performing tasks that they will be required to do as R&M
engineers.

Course Title: Reliability Theory, QMT 579 (AF)

Scope: A graduate level course with primary emphasis on probabilistic
engineering design, stress strength analysis, Bayesian methods,
Weibull applications, estimation, dynamic reliability models, decision
theory, simulation, and recent developments in reliability and
maintainability. Several typical examples will be presented and
discussed to illustrate how the course material can be applied.
Army Offerings:
U.S. Army Management Engineering Training Activity (AMETA)
Director, AMXOM/PMR
Rock Island IL 61299-7040
Autovon: 793-4041
Commercial: 309-782-4041
These courses are primarily for DoD personnel but if certified as beneficial to the
DoD, contractor personnel may attend on a space available basis.
Course Title: Reliability and Maintainability Orientation Seminar, 8A-F30 (JT)

Length: 21/2 Days
Scope: The course provides an overview of the R&M activities associated
with each of the life cycle phases for systems/equipment. It is a non-
technical course based on DoD Directive 5000.40. DoD R&M
concepts and definitions, engineering activities, accounting activities
appropriate for sound decision making, and management activities
are discussed along with the relationship of reliability, availability and
maintainability to factors such as cost and logistics support.
Interrelationships between R&M, and disciplines such as
configuration management, system engineering, logistics, and
procurement are portrayed. Throughout the course emphasis is
placed on successful accomplishment of Governmental R&M
functions as distinguished from contract responsibilities.
Course Title: Workshop in Reliability & Maintainability Program

Management, 7A-F28 (JT)
Length: 21/2 Days
Scope: Each workshop will examine high visibility topics which are of current
interest to the R&M program manager. The format and content of the
workshop will be flexible but will address topics with the goal of
developing solutions to problems of immediate interest and concern.
Presentations will be made by AM ETA faculty and recognized
individuals from Government, industry, and the academic community.
Attendees should be prepared for active participation in discussions
of R&M applications for maximum benefits from the workshop.

Course Title: Special Topics in Quality and Reliability, AMETA-45

Length: 1 - 5 Days
Scope: Course content is flexible and may include modules selected from
current AM ETA course offerings, or the course content can be
specially developed material for a particular situation or group of
attendees. The type of educational format can be varied to fit the
subjects selected and learning objectives of the class. The course
configuration will be based upon mutual agreement between AM ETA
and the requesting organization.
Course Title: Design for Reliability and Maintainability, AMETA-118

Length: 1 Week
Scope: The course is offered as three separate 40 hour modules. All
modules consider design from an "engineering" perspective and
minimize the use of statistical approaches. Module A presents topics
associated with basic reliability techniques, Module B presents basic
maintainability techniques, and Module C presents specialized
design techniques. Topics covered in each module are:
Module DRM (A), "Basic Reliability Design"—(1) Overview of
the Concept of Designing for Reliability; (2) Reliability Modeling,
Allocation and Prediction; (3) Failures Modes, Effects and Criticality
Analysis (FMECA), Fault-tree Analysis, Cause-Consequence
Diagrams; (4) Design Techniques (Operating and Stress); (5) Effects
of Functional Testing, Storage, Handling; and (6) Design Review.
Module DRM (B), "Basic Maintainability Design"—(1) Overview
of Maintainability Design Concepts; (2) Maintainability Modeling,
Allocation, and Prediction; (3) Equipment Design Guidelines; (4)
Automated Diagnostics (BIT, BITE, ATE); and (5) Design for
Testability.
Module DRM (C), "Specialized Reliability Design"—(1)
Introduction to Specialized Reliability Design, (2) Sneak Circuit
Analysis, (3) Environmental Stress Analysis, (4) Thermal/Reliability
Design & Analysis Techniques, (5) Tolerance Analysis, and (6)
Additional Special Reliability Design Subjects—Electrostatic
Discharge Control & Software Considerations.
Course Title: Software Reliability Test and Evaluation, AMETA-120

Length: 1 Week
Scope: The enrollee will be exposed to material that provides the basis for
exploring such software topics as: software terminology and general
applications, DoD acquisition policy, the development process,
engineering methods, management and planning, MIL-STD-
52779A, content and analysis of SQA plans, reviews and audits, and
future trends. Throughout the course, emphasis is placed on

successful implementation of Governmental reliability and quality

software development programs. Exercises and case studies are
designed to give students an opportunity to respond to actual
situations.
Course Title: Reliability and Maintainability Engineering Management,

AMETA-101
Length: 2 Weeks
Scope: This is a core course in the R&M fundamentals which are necessary
to support the development of program requirements and the
administration and control of R&M programs throughout the life
cycle. Content stresses Government R&M responsibilities in the
areas of establishing and overseeing major programs. Coverage will
review DoD R&M programs and policies, address tailoring of R&M
program requirements, discuss roles and relationships of functional
groups, and identify system life cycle activities having significant
impact on R&M. In addition, R&M engineering and accounting tasks,
practices and techniques will be discussed to suggest when, how
and why they should be applied in a given program.
Course Title: Production Reliability Assurance, AMETA-100

Length: 2 Weeks
Scope: Topical coverage includes an introduction to and a brief history of
reliability; DoD reliability policy and definitions; reliability assurance
in the production process; control and improvement of processes;
the importance of activities such as quality assurance, systems
engineering, and configuration management; probabilistic and non-
. probabilistic testing; and management and control of production
reliability programs. Coverage addresses Government and
contractor efforts required to assure product and replacement part
reliability in both new manufacture and rebuild activities. Formal
assessment is made of the enrollee's mastery of the course content.
Course Title: Reliability and Maintainability Requirements, Testing and

Evaluation, AMETA-122 . -
Length: 2 Weeks
Scope: Content of the course will include modules that present, consistent
terminology for R&M concepts and relationships, the methods for
determining system level R&M testing, and how to conduct R&M test
evaluations. State-of-the-art methodologies will be presented in
lecture and practical exercises.
Course Title: Reliability and Maintainability Testing, 8A-F27 (JT)

Length: 2 Weeks

Scope: Testing concepts and definitions, testing and screening methods,

R&M tests trom military standards and handbooks, and selection and
application of specific testing and screening methods, including
shock, vibration, and temperature as stress parameters are
addressed. System level testing is not addressed in this course.
Course Title: Quality and Reliability Assurance Intern Program, AMETA-4

Length: 26 Weeks
Scope: This is a 3-year (maximum) training program structured in three
phases. Phase I consists of formal classroom training conducted at
AMETA (26 weeks). Phase II consists of OJT involving rotational
assignments at the interns PDL (66 weeks). Phase III consists of
specialized OJT at the PDL (64 weeks).
Course Title: Army R&M Requirements, AMETA-121

Length: 2 Weeks
Scope: This course will address the development, optimization, evaluation
and review of system R&M characteristics. It will also address the
establishment and testing of user relevant operational R&M
requirements. (These are Minimum Acceptable Value (MAV)
requirements.) This course will not cover the engineering methods
that are used to determine Best Operational Capability (BOC)
The University of Arizona has long offered a Master of Science degree with a
reliability engineering option. They also conduct an annual five day Reliability
Engineering and Management Institute, provide short courses and video taped
instruction. Contact Dr. Dimitri Kececioglu, Aerospace and Mechanical
Engineering Department, Bldg 16, Rm 200B, University of Arizona, Tucson AZ
85721.
The University of Maryland has offered a Master of Science in Reliability
Engineering since the fall of 1986. They also provide video taped instruction.
Contact Dr. Marvin L. Roush, Center for Reliability Engineering, Chemical and
Nuclear Engineering Building, University of Maryland, College Park MD 20742.
The New Jersey Institute of Technology has a long standing graduate program in
reliability engineering. Contact Raj Misra, PhD, Professor of Electrical Engineering
and Reliability, NJIT, Newark NJ 07102, (201)596-3511.
Individual courses on R&M subjects have been included in the curricula of many
schools, including Pennsylvania State University, VPI, USC5 Virginia Tech, SMU
and Syracuse University. There are probably many more.

Appendix 10
R&M Specifications, Standards,
Handbooks and RADC
Technical Reports
TOOLKIT A-93
TOOLKIT
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Appendix 11
Major Air Force R&M Focal Points
MAJOR AIR FORCE R&M FOCAL POINTS
Air Force R&M Focal Points

Appendix 12
Acronyms
A-111
ATE
ATF
ATG
ATP
Ai
BCC
C
C-ROM
C3
C3CM
C3I
CA
CAD
CAE
CAM
CAS
CAT
CB
CCB
RADC • TOOLKIT
RADC RELIABILITY
ACRONYMS
A-96 RADC RELIABILITY TOOLKIT

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RADC

Systems Reliability and Engineering Division

Systems Reliability and Engineering Division

Quick Reference Application Index

RADC RELIABILITY ENGINEER'S TOOLKIT 1

• Understand Key Points of a Failure Reporting and Corrective

For More Help AppendHces

RADC RELIABILITY ENGINEER'S TOOLKIT

This TOOLKIT is intended for use by a practicing reliability and maintainability

whicMTthe^uty^ an^^scritresThe R&M engineer's role in the

of the "how to" of the R&M engineer's activities have been

The R&M 2000 process includes 21 Building Blocks as follows:

Allocation and Prediction • Environmental Stress

Computer Aided Tools

RADC RELIABILITY TOOLKIT 9

How do I develop and specify the right RELIABILITY &

R&M Engineer's Role:

Develop Quantitative Requirements

Develop R & M Task Requirements

R6 Specify Contract D a t a Requirements 28

R7 Specify Information for Proposals 30

R8 E s t i m a t e Reliability Program Cost 31

SI Develop Proposal Evaluation Criteria 33

Appendix 2 Example R & M Program Tasks A-9

RADC RELIABILITY ENGINEER'S TOOLKIT 11

- Other Contract Provisions (incentives, warranties, etc.)

MIL-STD-470 "Maintainability Program for Systems and Equipment"

12 RADC RELIABILITY ENGINEER'S TOOLKIT

Topic R1» Quantitative Reliability Requirements

Table R1-1: Logistics (Basic) and Mission

• Measure of system's ability to operate • Measure of system's ability to

Table R1-2: Operational and Contractual Reliability

• Used to define, measure and evaluate • Used to describe reliability

RADC RELIABILITY ENGINEER'S TOOLKIT 13

Table R1-2 (continued)

• Typical terms: • Typical terms:

How to Develop Requirements:

1. User requirements can be expressed in a variety of forms that include

14 RADC RELIABILITY ENGINEER'S TOOLKIT

Table R1-3: Typical Reliability Values

Computer Equipment MTBF (Hours)

16 RADC RELIABILITY ENGINEER'S TOOLKIT

Figure R1-1: Quantitative Reliability Requirement Development Process

RADC RELIABILITY ENGINEER'S TOOLKIT 17

Topic R2; Quantitative MalntalnablSItf Requirements

Basic maintainability requirements are determined through an analysis of user

RADC RELIABILITY ENGINEER'S TOOLKIT

Table R2-1: Typical Maintainability Values

a. Immediate maintenance of a continuously operated system: M-MMH = (8760 hr/yr)/(MTBF) x (MTTR) x

RADC RELIABILITY ENGINEER'S TOOLKIT 21

Topic R3: QyaotiMcv® Testability Fl@qyir©m®rsts

How to Develop Requirements:

22 RADC RELIABILITY ENGINEER'S TOOLKIT

Table R3-1: Typical Testability Values

Eight or less modules 95-100 All

RADC RELIABILITY ENGINEER'S TOOLKIT 23

Program Surveillance and Control Tasks

• Thermal Management & Analysis R E3 E3 E2 E2 E2 • Incl in DI-R-7095

RADC RELIABILITY ENGINEER'S TOOLKIT

RADC RELIABILITY TOOLKIT

Topic R8: Reliability Program Cost Estimation

R&M Program Plan Number of MIL-STD-785/4701

FRACAS Duration of FRACAS i