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Handbooks of Sociology and Social

Research
Series Editor
John DeLamater , University of Wisconsin , MADISON , Wisconsin ,
USA
E ach of these Handbooks survey the fi eld in a critical manner, evaluating
theoretical models in light of the best available empirical evidence.
Distinctively sociological approaches are highlighted by means of explicit
comparison to perspectives characterizing related disciplines such as
psychology, psychiatry, and anthropology. These seminal works seek to
record where the fi eld has been, to identify its current location, and to plot
its course for the future. If you are interested in submitting a proposal for this
series, please contact the series editor, John DeLamater:
delamate@ssc.wisc.edu .

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/6055


S eth A brutyn
Editor

H andbook of
Contemporary
Sociological Theory

Editor
Seth Abrutyn
Department of Sociology
The University of Memphis
Memphis , Tennessee , USA

ISSN 1389-6903
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research
ISBN 978-3-319-32248-3 ISBN 978-3-319-
32250-6 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32250-6
Library of Congress Control Number: 2016941062

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016


T his work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or
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The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG Switzerland
In loving memory of my Mom,
Alie
Foreword

In recent decades, large handbooks and even larger encyclopedias on


virtually all topics have proliferated in the academic world. Part of this trend
is to be explained by the proliferation of knowledge in an ever-more
specialized intellectual ecosystem; there is now a market for summaries and
reviews because it is virtually impossible to keep up in the ever-expanding
subfi elds within disciplines, to say nothing of new disciplines that continue
to emerge. The penetration of the World Wide Web has only accelerated
these trends. Yet, if truth be told, another reason that so many handbooks are
being published is that it is still one of the few types of books that libraries
still feel compelled to buy, although the goose that has been laying this
golden egg—
i.e., academics willing to write chapters for a little cost and libraries all-too-
willing to buy them––may itself be subject to the forces of publishing
evolution: the overproduction of handbooks leading to increasing density and
competition in a limited resource niche. Indeed, it is entirely conceivable that
publishers will soon need to produce Meta-Handbooks to consolidate the
knowledge in the proliferating handbooks, or alternatively, the Goose will
simply go extinct and be replaced by something more like Wikipedia-type
reviews.
F ifteen years ago, when I was asked to edit the fi rst Handbook of
Sociological Theory , handbooks were only beginning to proliferate. At the
time, I was reluctant to take on all of the work because, as I have learned,
editing books often resembles trying to herd cats to a deadline in a particular
format. As it turned out, this fi rst Handbook of Sociological Theory was
surprisingly easy because virtually everyone delivered their chapter on time,
in the right format, and spot-on in terms of its content. Indeed, I was so
impressed that I edited several more books, which did not quite replicate my
experience with the fi rst Handbook of Sociological Theory . And so, when
I was approached to edit another Handbook of Sociological Theory , I
demurred because the potential amount of work involved but, also, because I
felt that a different approach was required. The book should be edited by a
younger, rising theorists with a different set of eyes and with a less ossifi ed
mind, and it is for this reason that Seth Abrutyn was selected to edit the
volume; and the differences between the fi rst and this second handbook are
so clearly evident. This book has a better mix of scholars at different stages
of their careers; and the book is more focused on key issues and topics rather
than being overly encyclopedic. It is, I think, a much tighter and focused book
than the one that I edited, even though so many prominent scholars wrote
chapters that became
vii
viii Foreword

necessary “read’s” by theorists. I like the whole thrust of the organization in


this new Handbook of Sociological Theory: Re-thinking and bringing into
the twenty-fi rst century classical questions (Part I); rethinking the never-
ending macro-micro debate in ways that, in my view, obviate the debate and
demonstrate how far sociology has come in resolving the issues (Part II);
demonstrating that sociologists do indeed have a coherent view of the basic
properties of the social universe (Part III); delineating new forms of micro
sociology and the constraints imposed on the micro universe (Part IV); and
outlining new models of social change that update those of the past (Part VI).
In reading over the specifi c chapters that Seth Abrutyn reviews in his
introduction, including the two chapters that I contributed, there is a very
different feel in this handbook. For example, in writing about the macro and
meso basis of the micro-social order, I knew that I would be in dialogue with
Edward Lawler and his team (Shane Thye and Jeongkoo Yoon), and they
appeared to have felt the same way. The result is a much more powerful set
of theoretical argument than each of the chapters alone, and one in which we
all are trying to address each others’ work. Add to his, chapters on networks
and fi elds to rethinking the macro-macro linkage, and the whole section
demonstrates how far sociology has come. Indeed, I have recently taken to
arguing that sociology is the most mature science when it comes to resolving
its micro-macro “gap” problems; and I am prepared to defend this, even when
the most mature sciences, biology and physics, are considered.
What also emerges in all of the sections is this: The chapters review
arguments, to be sure, but they each also try to explain something. This may
seem rather odd compliment for a theory volume but, in fact, so much
theoretical sociology does not explain how anything operates. It does not tell
us how and why a process and set of processes operate and unfold; rather, too
much theoretical sociology is locked into foundational, ontological,
epistemological, and other debates that are, in essence, never ending. I have
often derisively called this “talk about talk”—which has earned me a few
friends—but the fact is that too many sociologists, and particularly those who
see themselves as theorists, do not believe that a science of the social universe
is possible, or even desirable. They criticize positivism, proclaim as
“pretentious” efforts to develop sociological laws and models of fundamental
social processes, and otherwise debunk those who think that there is nothing
fundamentally different about the social universe compared to the biotic and
physicochemical universes.
S omehow the facts that humans have big brains (totally explicable in
terms of biological theory) and, hence, can develop language and culture
makes the human universe unique and out of reach of science. Nothing could
be further from the truth, and many of the chapters clearly demonstrate that
such is the case. The social world of humans is, of course, a different domain
of the universe, but it is one that I am confi dent will be seen as universal
across the galaxies, if and when we humans are ever able to contact other life
forms with intelligence, language, and culture. I would argue that the same
laws and models that we develop here on earth for human beings and their
patterns of social organization will look much the same across the universe—
which, to some, may seem preposterous. But if we believe that human social
Foreword ix

organization reveals generic and universal properties that can be explained


by theories and models, just like those in physics, then why should social
organization created by intelligent, culture-using animals be so different
elsewhere in the universe.
I do not want to get too carried away here, but the point is clear: theory
should explain why and how humans behave, interact, and organize
themselves in all times and places. And while there will always be a
“historically” unique aspect to how any given pattern of social organization
came to exist, its actual operation can be explained by abstract laws and
models. Historical explanations are a very legitimate mode of explanation,
and they often yield insights that allow for more nomothetic explanations to
be developed—as has been the case with physics where the history of the
universe is best explained by the abstract principles of physics. The same is
true of any biotic system, or geological system, and so why would we think
that such could not be the case for human social systems? And while the case
is often made that humans have “agency,” and thus the very nature of the
universe can be changed, agentic behaviors themselves are understandable by
abstract laws and models; and, moreover, agency cannot change the laws of
social organization. Indeed, agency is often crushed by the reality of social
organization whose dynamics change agents often assume they can obviate.
Indeed, failed agency is a very good indicator that more fundamental forces
are in play, and that perhaps it is a good idea to fi gure out what these are and
to understand their dynamics so that agents do not make the same mistakes
over and over again.
Not all who have contributed to this volume will agree with my advocacy,
of course, but this handbook provides a very good look at the potential for
scientifi c explanation in sociology. There is less mushing abound in the
quagmire of old philosophical debates, relativism, and constructivism; rather,
there is more of a feel that scholars can roll up their sleeves and explain how
the social world operates. Since the late 1950s, sociology has faced a crisis
of confi dence, masked by a shrill of unfounded overconfi dence that the
social world is not amenable to scientifi c explanations about generic and
universal processes in all times and places that humans have organized. There
has been a kind of smug cynicism about sociology’s assumed failings to
explain very much with science. Yet, in fact, if we look back to theoretical
sociology 50 years ago, about the time that I became a professional
sociologist, the progress in theoretical sociology has been unbelievably rapid.
Sociology can explain far more of the social universe than it could back then,
and it is now poised to explain even more. And, as much as one book can,
this handbook offers a sense for what can be done in the future.
W hen I entered graduate school in the mid-1960s, there was a real sense
that sociology had arrived at the table of science. Sociology would be able to
develop testable theories, formally stated, that could explain the operative
dynamics of the social universe. Indeed, confi dence among some was so
great that we were required to read the plethora of “theory construction”
books and articles that began to appear in both sociology and philosophy. I
always thought that these were incredibly boring—ironical, I guess, because
I now write much of this boring formal theory. But my objection to such
books is the implicit view the “instructions for constructing theories” where
very
x Foreword

much like methods textbooks or manual for statistical modeling. But, in fact,
theorizing is a creative activity of having insights into the nature and
operation of some fundamental social process; formalizing the theory is “mop
up work” of trying to fi nd a way to state the relationships among the forces
in play in a parsimonious way. Formalization, itself, is not theorizing; having
insights in the forces driving the social universe is theorizing. So, while there
is a little formal theorizing in this handbook, it is fi lled with insights into
how the social universe operates. Others can build upon these ideas, and once
they are well developed, it becomes possible to express them more
formally—but, again, that is not what is most important. Ideas over formats
and formalization are what will drive sociological theorizing; and this
handbook is fi lled with such ideas.
Finally, I have a dream—most likely never to be realized but a dream
nonetheless—that Handbooks of Sociological Theory will someday in the
near future never be necessary because our discipline’s introductory
textbooks would, like those in physics, outline most of the basic principles.
Gone would be discussion of our classical fi gures, cartoons, boxes full of
color and not much else, diagrams for the sake of graphics, and all of the fl
uff that is now in a sociology textbook. Physics textbooks have adopted much
of this look, but it is not fl uff in the manner of sociology textbooks. It is a
sincere effort to communicate basic principles, and this is what sociology
books of the future should look like. Biology textbooks also have that “four
color look” (and expense) but if one reads them closely, this “look” focuses
on explaining on generic biological processes. In my dream, there would be
no theory handbooks; rather, handbook s in sociology would be about the
rapidly accumulating knowledge in subfi elds where empirical research,
theoretically informed, could be assembled for a quick review. And such
handbooks might be needed every year because a fi eld where data is collected
to assess theories advance rapidly. In some ways, the very need for a
Handbook of Sociological Theory like this one in 2016 tells us that we still
have ways to go in separating theory as a goal of science as opposed to social
theory that debunks science; that tells us once again the stories of St. Marx,
St. Weber, St. Durkheim, and other canonized fi gures in whose shadows we
still stand; that drags in old philosophical debates; and that expresses
relativistic, constructivist, and sophistic views about sociology.
The chapters in this book give me some hope that we can avoid a fate
dominated by critics. And so, let us dedicate this Handbook of Sociological
Theory and the others that will be necessary in the near future to obviating, in
the future, the need for such Handbooks of Sociological Theory . We should
look and work for a day when there would be such wide consensus about
explanations of how the social universe operates that our introductory
textbooks would tell much of the basic theoretical story. Perhaps sociology
would have fewer interested students, but they would be students with
theoretical knowledge that would be useful in making the social world a better
place for all.

Institute for Theoretical Social Science Jonathan H. Turner


Santa Barbara , CA , USA
Acknowledgements

I would like to fi rst extend a warm thank you to each of the contributors to
this volume. You all made the challenge of managing an editorship such as
this much easier, and the handbook is a testament to your expertise and the
care you put into your respective chapters. In addition, I would like to thank
Jonathan Turner, my grad school advisor, good friend, and confi dant, for
opening doors and giving constant encouragement, advice, and support.
Additionally, Jon, Steve Brint, Sandy Maryanski, Chris Chase-Dunn, Jan
Stets, and Peter Burke were all instrumental in shaping my eclectic taste in
theory, as well as shaping the theorist I have become, and thus have much to
do with the vision of this handbook. I also have to thank my collaborator and
close colleague, Anna S. Mueller, for tolerating (and encouraging) my forays
into the theoretical ether; my graduate theory seminar students who have
allowed me to use the class as a laboratory for my ideas; the sociology
department at Memphis for being supportive and excellent colleagues; and,
fi nally, my graduate assistant, Taylor M. Binnix, who was instrumental in
helping format and proof these chapters. Finally, my wife, Danielle Morad
Abrutyn, and son Asa Jonas, deserve a huge thank you: they have done
nothing but, inspire me, and encourage and support all of my academic
endeavors, including this handbook.

xi
Contents

1 Introduction ................................................................................... 1
Seth Abrutyn

Part I Classical Questions Contemporalized

2 Integrating and Disintegrating Dynamics


in Human Societies ........................................................................ 19
Jonathan H. Turner

3 Power in Organizational Society: Macro, Meso and Micro ...... 43


Yingyao Wang and Simone Polillo

4 Action in Society: Refl exively Conceptualizing Activities ......... 63


Andreas Glaeser
5 Interactionism: Meaning and Self as Process ............................. 85
Iddo Tavory
6 Cultural Theory ............................................................................ 99
Omar Lizardo

Part II Rethinking the Macro-Micro Link

7 The Macro and Meso Basis of the Micro Social Order ............. 123
Jonathan H. Turner

8 The Problem of Social Order in Nested Group Structures ....... 149


Edward J. Lawler , Shane R. Thye , and Jeongkoo Yoon

9 Social Networks and Relational Sociology .................................. 167


Nick Crossley

10 Varieties of Sociological Field Theory ......................................... 185


Daniel N. Kluttz and Neil Fligstein

xiii
xiv Contents

Part III A Coherent Social Universe

11 Institutional Spheres: The Macro- Structure


and Culture of Social Life ............................................................ 207 Seth
Abrutyn

12 Stratifi cation .................................................................................. 229 Katja M. Guenther ,


Matthew C. Mahutga , and Panu Suppatkul
13 The Concept of Community as Theoretical Ground: Contention and Compatibility
Across Levels of Analysis and Standpoints of Social Processes ........................ 247 Michael
D. Irwin
14 Organizations as Sites and Drivers of Social Action .................. 269
Walter W. Powell and Christof Brandtner
15 Small Groups: Refl ections of and Building
Blocks for Social Structure ........................................................... 293 Stephen
Benard and Trenton D. Mize
16 The Theories of Status Characteristics
and Expectation States ................................................................. 321 Murray
Webster Jr. and Lisa Slattery Walker
17 The Self .......................................................................................... 343 Alicia D. Cast and
Jan E. Stets

Part IV Constraints on Experience


18 Microsociologies: Social Exchange, Trust, Justice,
and Legitimacy .............................................................................. 369 Michael
J. Carter
19 Ethnomethodology and Social Phenomenology ......................... 387 Jason Turowetz ,
Matthew M. Hollander , and Douglas W. Maynard
20 Theory in Sociology of Emotions ................................................. 411 Emi A. Weed and
Lynn Smith-Lovin
21 Sociology as the Study of Morality .............................................. 435 Kevin McCaffree
22 Forgetting to Remember: The Present Neglect and Future Prospects of Collective
Memory
in Sociological Theory................................................................... 457 Christina
Simko
23 Intersectionality ............................................................................. 477
Zandria Felice Robinson
Contents xv

Part V Modes of Change


24 Social Evolution ............................................................................. 503
Richard Machalek and Michael W. Martin
25 Reimagining Collective Behavior................................................. 527 Justin Van Ness and
Erika Summers-Effl er

26 Theorizing Social Movements ...................................................... 547 Dana M. Moss and


David A. Snow

Index ...................................................................................................... 571


Contributors

Seth Abrutyn Department of Sociology , University of Memphis ,


Memphis , TN , USA
Stephen Benard Department of Sociology, Indiana University ,
Bloomington , IN , USA
Christof Brandtner Stanford University , Stanford , CA , USA
Michael J. Carter Sociology Department , California State University ,
Northridge , Northridge, CA , USA
Alicia D. Cast D epartment of Sociology, University of California, S anta
Barbara , Santa Barbara, CA , USA
Nick Crossley University of Manchester , Manchester , UK
Neil Fligstein University of California , Berkeley , CA , USA
Andreas Glaeser Department of Sociology, The University of Chicago ,
Chicago , IL , USA
Katja M. Guenther University of California , Riverside , Riverside, CA
, USA
Matthew M. Hollander Department of Sociology , University of
Wisconsin-
Madison , Madison , WI , USA
Michael D. Irwin Duquesne University , Pittsburgh , PA , USA
Daniel N. Kluttz University of California , Berkeley , CA , USA
Edward J. Lawler Cornell University , Ithaca , NY , USA
Omar Lizardo Department of Sociology , University of Notre Dame ,
Notre
Dame , IN , USA
Richard Machalek University of Wyoming , Laramie , WY , USA
Matthew C. Mahutga University of California , Riverside , Riverside,
CA ,
USA
Michael W. Martin Adams State University , Alamosa , CO , USA
Douglas W. Maynard Department of Sociology , University of
Wisconsin- Madison , Madison , WI , USA
xvii
xviii Contributors

Kevin McCaffree Department of Sociology , Indiana-Purdue University , Fort


Wayne , IN , USA
Trenton D. Mize Department of Sociology, Indiana University , Bloomington
, IN , USA
Dana M. Moss University of Pittsburgh , Pennsylvania , PA , USA
Simone Polillo The Department of Sociology , University of Virginia , Charlottesville ,
VA , USA
Walter W. Powell Stanford University , Stanford , CA , USA
Zandria Felice Robinson Rhodes College , Memphis , TN , USA
Christina Simko Department of Anthropology and Sociology, Williams College ,
Williamstown , MA , USA
Lynn Smith-Lovin Department of Sociology , Duke University , Durham ,
NC , USA
David A. Snow University of California , Irvine , CA , USA
Jan E. Stets Department of Sociology, University of California , Riverside ,
Riverside, CA , USA
Erika Summers-Effl er University of Notre Dame , Notre Dame , IN , USA
Panu Suppatkul University of California , Riverside , Riverside, CA , USA
Iddo Tavory New York University , New York , NY , USA
Shane R. Thye University of South Carolina , Columbia , SC , USA
Jonathan H. Turner Department of Sociology , University of California , Santa
Barbara , CA , USA
Jason Turowetz Department of Sociology , University of Wisconsin-
Madison , Madison , WI , USA
Justin Van Ness University of Notre Dame , Notre Dame , IN , USA
Lisa Slattery Walker Department of Sociology, University of North Carolina ,
Charlotte, Charlotte , NC , USA
Yingyao Wang The Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs , Brown
University , Providence , RI , USA
Murray Webster Jr. Department of Sociology, University of North
Carolina , Charlotte, Charlotte , NC , USA
Emi A. Weed Department of Sociology , Duke University , Durham , NC ,
USA
Jeongkoo Yoon Ewha Women’s University , Seoul , South Korea
Department of Sociology , University of Memphis ,
Introduction Memphis , TN , USA e-mail: sbbrutyn@memphis.edu

Seth Abrutyn 1

1.1 Orienting Ourselves importantly, they absolve themselves of having to


learn what it means to theorize , and how to
For several years, I mused “Who now reads contribute to a common goal of cumulative
Parsons” as a sort of ironic twist of Parsons’ knowledge and language. And so, what theory is
famous opening line in the Structure of Social and how much a sociologist actually reads varies
Action asking the same question of Herbert wildly. For the most part, as this essay will show,
Spencer’s work. Perhaps it is time to revise this what the student reads is as much a function of
question, to ask “who now reads theory?” On the the arbitrary decisions the professor makes, the
one hand, this question is preposterous in that textbook he or she may employ, and the biases
every sociology major and graduate student has to installed by his or her former advisor and/or
read some theory on the road to matriculation; department culture; while active scholars read
there are several folks, such as myself, who label what is new in their area and perhaps re-visit the
themselves a theorist; and, nearly all work seminal theoretical treatises occasionally.
submitted for review and accepted for publication Compounding this, are the endless debates about
requires a modicum of theoretical import. On the what theory is or isn’t (Turner 1985 ; Collins
other hand, because theory is treated as a distinct 1988 ; Alexander 1990 ; Abend 2008) , the
course, apart from methods and statistics, and philosophy of science surrounding epistemology
because we continue to advertise positions for and ontology that pose as theory, and meta-
theory professorships, theory remains a de facto theoretical discourse revolving around
specialization; as a specialization, it can be potentially unimportant and, perhaps, unsolvable
rightfully ignored by those specializing in “dilemmas” like the macro-micro link (Knorr-
substantive areas. As Lizardo ( 2014 ) has argued, Cetina 1981 ; Lenski
the “theorist” as we all came to know him or her 1988 ; Fine 1991 ; Collins 1994 ).
is dead, yet many sociologists continue to imagine This essay, and especially this Handbook,
the armchair, ivory tower theorist as real. In doing does not focus on these issues, though they are the
so, they dissociate themselves from having to backdrop upon which the various chapters and
learn theory as a theorist presumably once did. threads tying them together are built. Instead, this
More Handbook turns away from these debates,
tempting as they may be, and presents a vision of
a more coherent theoretical world, and a more
S. Abrutyn () optimistic sense of what is possible. The art, craft,

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 1


S. Abrutyn (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary Sociological Theory,
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32250-6_1
2 S. Abrutyn

and practice of theorizing can be the most be working together, not just on the specifi c case or
rewarding experience a sociologist has, but substantive problem that brings notoriety, but on the
the discipline’s paradoxical reverence and common endeavor of building a language and
simultaneous distaste for theorists, the conceptual world that makes cooperation, interaction,
crystallized discipline- wide pedagogy, and as well as debate and confl ict more fruitful. To be sure,
the residuals from past practices and beliefs I celebrate eclectic and diverse theoretical traditions; I
have erected artifi cial barriers that deter was drawn to graduate work by a master’s level theory
people from embracing theory at the level course in which we had freedom over our coursework.
that might best serve sociology and its Marcuse was the fi rst seductive theorist for me. Yet, I
contribution to knowledge, policy, and have also come to recognize the need for a coherent
everyday experience. These barriers are, at language and, as I have seen from the reaction of
least, weakened, by the chapters presented students exhausted from being presented one vision of
herein. Indeed, many of the authors are not social reality after another from one class to the next, a
self-identifi ed theorists, but their command relatively coherent view of the social universe. It’s not
over bodies of knowledge reveal that theory that we know everything, but we know quite a bit and
remains the central backbone of the it is time theorists and sociologists stopped acting as
sociological imagination. though we do not. We know, as Collins ( 1975 ) noted
B efore elucidating the challenges and four decades ago, a lot about stratifi cation and
opportunities present, some defi nitional work is organization; we know a lot about power across levels
in order. To begin, I believe sociology is a science of social reality, as well as status, identity, and roles.
and, as such, is rooted in theories that guide Having a fi rm theoretical grounding does not deter
research problems , make sense of data , are from novel, creative methods; from studying
tested using the scientifi c method (regardless of understudied populations; from discovering new
the specifi c analytic strategy), and provide ways principles, or modifying old ones. Rather, it provides a
of talking , thinking , understanding , and , community of scholars the foundation for pursuing
ultimately , explaining the world . I realize that these very endeavors because it provides us with a fi
there are many types and kinds of theories, and rmer understanding of the gaps in knowledge, of the
while I see no need to stake out fi rm ground that fuzzy areas that have been less attended to, and,
propositional, formal analytic theorizing or ultimately, a road map for pursuing social research.
modeling is the only kind of theorizing, I do
believe that not everything a scholar calls theory
is theory; critical theory, for instance, is not really
1.2 Three Challenges
theory in the sense that it cannot be tested, but
rather offers normative comparisons between M any of the classic statements on theory and its
parts of the real world and an idealized world that challenges have focused on the political,
may or may not be possible or desirable. Hence, provincial, and ideological dilemmas preventing
theories require some degree of abstraction, or our discipline from coalescing and from theory
conceptual distance from their subject; they must becoming a site of some basic agreement. Having
be operationalizable, though how we spent 5 years in academia as a professor, I am
operationalize them may not always be readily prepared to chalk these up to constants and deal
apparent; they must be used to either understand with the environment as constructed. Hence,
or, even better, explain a phenomenon, process, or there are pragmatic challenges that I believe can
other sociological object of study; and, fi nally, be more easily overcome without treading too
theories that transcend time and space are often deeply into the ideological or political battles
superior to those that do not, which calls attention (perhaps that is naïve). In a perfect world, of
to sociology’s continued need for historical and course, sociologists would be a community or a
comparative work. society —the American Sociological Society, as
Finally, theory and theories should be it was once called—and not an association ; for
cumulative, which means that sociologists should Weber ( 1978 :40–1), the former is based on “a
subjective feeling of the parties…that they
belong
4 S. Abrutyn

together,” whereas the former “rests on rationally beyond? What constitutes classical? Pre-1960?
motivated adjustment of interests.” But, perhaps Pre-1980?
we are more like the actors in a Bourdieuian fi eld It is arbitrary either way, and invites arbitrary
than in a Marxian primitive communist society: decision making that elevates one fl avor of the
tenure requirements, individual professional period over another: this month it will be DuBois,
goals, elite networks and schools, ego, and the and then next month it will be Sorokin. But, while
growing scarcity of valued resources fl owing to, we spend time looking for the founders of this or
within, and out from higher education lead to the that, for inclusivity, for some unmined theorist
objectifi cation of sociological relationships. who we can write fi ve or six papers about, we are
Ironically, however, sociological theory explains not resolving the pedagogical problem and,
what has happened: between Collins’ ( 1998 ) law ultimately, how we socialize students into what
of small numbers, and, concomitantly, Spencer’s theory is. I cannot tell you how many times I have
(1874 –1896) law of differentiation, Durkheim’s taught Durkheim or Marx and because they do not
( 1893) law of specialization, and the pressure for formalize their propositions and their works are
effective integrative mechanisms, the state of sprawling, students lose the connection between
sociology can be easily explained. But, I digress. theory and research. There is not enough time to
In the following three section, I consider three walk a student through Durkheim’s suicide, and
interrelated challenges: the time crunch; the the evolution of the sociology of suicide
slavish adherence principle; and the conceptual throughout the course of the twentieth and
crunch. twenty-fi rst century! Not if I need to also lecture
on Marx, Weber, DuBois, Martineau, Simmel,
Mead, Cooley, and Spencer; and, what about
1.2.1 The Time Crunch Comte, Park, Sumner, Wirth, Thomas,
Znaniecki? Or, if you want to go really deep, what
Elsewhere, I have commented on what I deem the about Tarde, Le Bon, Sorokin, de
‘time crunch’ (Abrutyn 2013 ; Carter 2013 ). In Tocqueville, ad infi nitum ?
short, sociological theory as currently taught and In some ways, this is a function of path
conceptualized, sedimented in textbook after dependency: textbooks have been written for
textbook, and contested as well is facing its own several decades now based on these two classes.
internal temporal pressures. Two hundred fi fty These textbooks are involved in an arms race
years of theorists and theory can no longer be focused mainly on presentation and form, but also
adequately taught in two courses (Classic/ the content matter; the former two, however,
Contemporary), or worse, in a single blended constrain the latter. The one creative space an
course. The desire to add more and more minority author has in updating their classical textbook is
theorists to the classical canon, for example, the “discovery” of some long lost theorist or,
further presses against the constraints of time, better, social/ moral philosopher that other
while the unending march of time adds new textbook authors have neglected. As if sociology
sociological theorists, forces us to make choices students didn’t have to learn enough names, now
about old theorists and their viability, makes it they must tangle with Nietzsche and Ibn Khaldun.
diffi cult to know “all” theory, and raises implicit One could just as easy go back to Plato or Pliny
unanswered questions about what the heck we are the Elder, or better yet, the unnamed author(s) of
even teaching! If there is any challenge that the Epic of Gilgamesh to fi nd recurring ideas that
should be signaling we are doing this all wrong, found their way into sociological theory! To be
this is it. sure, there is value in noting the intellectual
In 1960, classical/contemporary classes made heritage of a theorist, as Coser’s ( 1977 ) classic
sense: pre-Parsons fi t the former and Parsons and text did with Durkheim, and Comte/Saint
beyond fi t the latter. Today, what constitutes Simon/Diderot/ Condorcet, but there is also a
contemporary? Post 1970? 1990? 2000s and point where the principles of the theorist are lost
1 Introduction 5

in the vagaries of the philosophical statements ofensures that few sociologists have the time to read
so and so. Who cares? And, more importantly, it all, and that most become versed in more than a
how is this theory? Indeed, if Durkheim’s small subsection of an already small subsection,
theoretical statements are only understandable and come to rely on textbooks—which are
within the context of his intellectual milieu, then
already designed for the lowest common
they are not worth teaching in a science of society;
denominator—for quick reviews, refreshers, or
if they transcend time and space, or at least somerehashing. The consequence is what I call the
principles transcend time and space, then perhaps slavish adherence principle, or the tendency for
we should get on with the business of teaching sociologists in their work and in their reviews of
those statements and leaving the rest out? The others work to believe that: “if [insert your
confl ict, for instance, between town and country favorite theorist here] wrote “X,” then any
that underscores Marx’s discussion of the attempt to update, revise, reinterpret, or
inherent problems in the division of labor and thesynthesize “X” is a violation of all that is holy.
uneven distribution of economic power can be This axiom is especially true of the classics,
found in Ibn Khaldun, but not surprisingly, also in
which are jealously guarded by folks who identify
several Mesopotamian texts that were written as Marxists or as Durkheimians. However, it
from an urban perspective, though still highlight remains true of Bourdieuians and Foucaltians,
the logic of this divide. So, where do we stop? and the like. There are numerous fl aws that this
Because, there are several ethnographies on non- axiom rests on. First, nearly every theorist—
literate philosophers (Radin 1927 [1955]) that arethough not all—that is worshipped, is worshipped
also worth mining if we are indeed interested in precisely because their body of work is sprawling,
going backwards. fi lled with contradictions, and vague in defi
In other ways, this is more an indictment of nition. Like the Bible, one can fi nd their favorite
the discipline’s inability to create even the mostquotes for “habitus” and write an article or a book
modest scopes around theory or theorizing. about this conceptualization. (If this fi rst fl aw
Perhaps it is radical to suggest that theories andsounds like a violation of the principle, then the
reader is aware of the biggest weakness with
not theorists be taught. From here, it is a short step
slavish adherence).
to saying theory is about scientifi c research, and
not cult of the personality or deep exegesis of S econd, there is a larger set of sociologists
one’s favorite theorist. The methods people who read Durkheim’s Division of Labor or
employ are less important than the rigor Suicide , or the German Ideology , or whatever,
surrounding the methods. It is not theory, for 10, 15, or 20 years ago. Time rarely permits us to
instance, to debate whether a method achieves re-read the classics or much theory once we
what it sets out to achieve; it is theory that guides
become professors, because we are busy keeping
the selection of methods as well as their creation.
up with the fi eld we work in and the latest
It is an entirely different task to debate the merits
research. Consequently, our understanding of a
of this method or that. Regardless of where one theory or a concept is crystallized in our graduate
falls ideologically, we can agree on one thing: the
school or early professorial days, and the essence
time crunch is real and needs fi xing. It is often becomes obscured by our specialized focus
untenable to imagine another decade of theorizing or by the inevitable decay of memory. Yet, many
and few changes to how we conceptualize the remain insistent that theorist X said theory A or
pedagogical dissemination of theory. defi ned concept B, regardless of its factuality, but
insistent on the fact that their interpretation,
correct or incorrect, is fact and, thus, the theory
1.2.2 The Slavish Adherence Principle cannot be altered. Finally, many sociologists
remember the co-opted version of a theory.
B esides these pedagogical problems, the size and Merton’s ( 1938 ) famous paper on anomie drew
density of theoretical knowledge available his conceptualization from one section of
6 S. Abrutyn

Durkheim’s ( 1897 [1951]) Suicide . Since then, also assert functional theories, as they try to
many have employed explicitly or implicitly the elucidate the mechanisms that sustain economic
Mertonian structural functional conception of power relations. In fact, it is hard to not be a
anomie in testing Durkheim’s hypotheses. Thus, functionalist as a theorist, because part of
the concept is rarely defi ned precisely, is often theorizing is pointing out how the social universe
rooted in someone else’s interpretation, 1 and, looks and why it tends to continue to look that
unfortunately, becomes arbitrary in analysis. For way (e.g., Bourdieu’s structured structures and
instance, a recent paper by Hoffman and Bearman structuring structures). Nevertheless, Durkheim
(2015 ) treats the defi nition and has the label. How then do we fi t in the rest of his
operationalization of anomie as taken for granted, career post 1893? How do we make sense of the
barely reviewing the debates surrounding its shift towards emotions in The Rules , throughout
meaning, ignoring Durkheim’s own words, all Suicide , and in full force in The Elementary
while making important empirical claims about Forms ? Even the most cursory read of these
anomie vis-à-vis the consequences of media works would force the reader to question just how
exposure; claims that, if true, would call into functionalist he is; especially compared to, say,
question guidelines media outlets use in reporting Parsons or Merton. In fact, he gradually became a
celebrity suicides. social psychologist who, despite rejecting all of
Slavish adherence also kills the sociological his rival Tarde’s ideas, came to embrace ideas like
imagination. It hermetically seals sociological emotional contagion and group identity, and small
theory, and erects provincial boundaries that scale interaction rituals.
make sense, to some degree, for folks protecting A second example can be culled from Suicide
their hard fought positions in the discipline, subfi , which I have already begun referring to above.
eld, or substantive area. The number of reviews I Nearly all sociology of suicide over the last 100
have received that continue to adhere to years has, understandably, been Durkheimian
Durkheim’s fourfold typology, golden (Stack 2000 ; Wray et al. 2011 ). Except, it hasn’t
equilibrium of integration/regulation, and macro- really been. As noted above, it generally adheres
level orientation is truly confounding. (Yet, it slavishly to the common interpretations of
does make some sense when we consider the time Durkheim: there are four types of suicide, two of
crunch discussion above: there simply isn’t which (egoism/anomic) are present in modernity,
enough time to digest all the different theories and two of which (altruism/fatalism) are relics of
theorists available). Without beating a dead horse, traditional, ascriptive societies. Therefore, we
let’s look a little closer at Durkheim and how should only study the former two, because the
some of his works are portrayed slavishly by the others ones cannot possibly be located in
discipline. modernity. In terms of altruism, until recently
First, there is the frame we bracket his work (Abrutyn and Mueller 2015 ), a review found
in: Durkheim is usually presented to only one empirical article (Leenaars 2004 ). One
undergraduates and graduate students alike as a must reply to the slavish adherents: how can a
structural functionalist. To be sure, in the opening theory be generalizable when two of its main
salvos of the Division of Labor , he speaks like concepts are denied applicability by its founder,
an organicist, and yes he believed the social body and when they remain understudied? Of course,
to be greater than its parts. And, we can admit that Durkheim could not have cared that much about
he was constantly seeking to understand what at least one of the two “traditional” forms of
mechanisms functioned to generate solidarity. suicide, fatalism, as it was hastily analyzed in a
But, is functionalism really a bad word? Marxists single paragraph, in a single footnote ( 1897

1
In this case, Merton, who had a very different idea than
Durkheim did (Hilbert 1989 ), but in other cases, it is
one’s mentor’s interpretation.
1 Introduction 7

[1951]:276), never to be discussed by Durkheim O ne of the casualties of the crunch are good,
again. How can we even slavishly adhere to a clear concepts. Take role for instance: a concept
fourfold model when its progenitor was not fully that stood for the generalized behavioral
committed to the model?! repertoires and expectation-sets that people
T he larger point is such: what is gained by meeting certain criteria could occupy is rarely
not isolating the principles of suicide or rituals, referred to in contemporary parlance. For some it
and moving on from Durkheim’s sociocultural is too functionalist, being connected to Parsons
milieu? Again, if the principles cannot be and Merton; for others, it isn’t cultural enough or
extracted from the nineteenth century, then the lacks agency; and for others, it is too deterministic
theory is not worth keeping and then why are we and structural. Yet, the arguments against role
teaching Durkheim besides the fact that he rests less on empirical grounds that verify or cast
established the discipline? Clearly, his work has doubt on the concept’s effects on behavior and
something timeless that inspires contemporary attitudes, and more on parochial positions,
sociologists. Thus, we do not need to debate who advisor or department preferences, and the pursuit
belongs in the canon and who does not; we need of sociological fame. A perfectly useful and
to extract the ideas, and move them forward with empirical valid concept is denied its value on non-
the various methodological tools we have. scientifi c grounds. The same problems plague
However, we cannot move on until we arrive at a seminal concepts like anomie and class, to name
point where “power,” “anomie,” or the basic two.
dynamics of organizations or stratifi cation are It remains frustrating that sociology has
presented as sociological knowledge . avoided some type of common socialization
beyond everyone knowing Durkheim, Weber, and
Marx! The fact that this is the baseline for
1.2.3 The Conceptual Crunch becoming a sociologist speaks directly to a
constellation of problems surrounding theory
The conceptual crunch refers to a set of itself. And, while I am not trying to advance a
interrelated dilemmas surrounding theory. First, political position, I am merely speaking a social
because of the size of theory and the way we teach fact: communities that do not share a common
it, many scholars invent neologisms for concepts language, have a hard time sharing a modicum of
or processes already extant. Sometimes it is common reality. Moreover, it supports the (false)
because the scholar, such as Bourdieu and idea that sociology does not have any laws or
habitus, believes extant concepts are inadequate; scientifi c value to solving problems. Indeed, the
these maneuvers are not the best for clarity and chapters of this book demonstrate, throughout,
shared theoretical language, but they are at least common threads that tie sociology together as a
defensible. But, often new concepts are the discipline and community of scholars. These
hallmark of young professors trying to create their threads are sometimes made explicit, but other
own theory for professional reasons. Second, times implicit. The reader is invited to consider
some concepts are rejected, not on their empirical the way the social world can be envisioned. In the
or theoretical validity and utility, but for following section, I lay out the organization of the
ideological or political reasons—could one book and, briefl y, the content of each of the three
imagine a physicist deciding to call “atoms” major sections; each section, ultimately,
something else because he or she did not like the presenting a slightly different pedagogical
term concept or felt they had a “better” metaphor? strategy for teaching a course in sociological
Third, many of our most cherished concepts have theory.
resisted defi nition, yet continue to be used as if
they do have some semblance of shared
meaning—e.g., institution (see Chap. 11 ) or self
(see Chap. 17 ).
8 S. Abrutyn

1.3 An Overview their own, helping make the volume coherent,


consistent, and convergent. Below, I briefl y
The fi rst handbook of theory is a testament to the consider each section and the vision behind it, as
sheer diversity and eclectic nature of sociological well as the realization made possible by the
theory (Turner 2001 ). Nearly two decades old, contributors.
most of the perspectives remain used today in
various subfi elds across the discipline. Thus, my
vision for this companion, stand-alone volume, 1.3.1 Classic Questions
was under two distinct pressures: to be unique
from the former volume and, as opposed to The late-great Israeli sociologist, Shmuel
having authors simply review the theoretical Eisenstadt ( 1985 , 1987) argued that the entire
terrain, offer something penetrating and more sociological practice was anchored in three basic
advanced than is often assumed of handbooks. To questions or problems: integration (Durkheim
resolve the fi rst pressure, my emphasis from the 1893 , 1915 [1995])—or, what mechanisms
onset was on commonalities and convergence . bring/ hold individuals and groups together,
The fi rst handbook is notable in its encyclopedic regulation (Marx 1845 –6 [1972]; Weber 1978
form, whereas I wanted this handbook to present )—or, what mechanisms allow individuals and
the instructor, the student, and the academic with groups to control and coordinate the behavior of
a way or set of ways for organizing the social other individuals and groups, and legitimation
universe and the practice of sociology. To that (Weber 1920 [2002], 1946) —or, how is shared
effect, the reader is presented with three major meaning constructed and maintained. In terms of
delineations: (1) questions that have been explicit the Handbook, the fi rst section is devoted to these
and implicit to sociological theorizing since three questions (Chaps. 2 , 3 , 4, and 5) and a
Comte (and before), but which look and feel fourth question that is implicit in classical
different in contemporary sociology today sociology, but has become a central question
(Chaps. 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , and 6 ); (2) a vision of the since at least the 1970s as the cultural
social universe constructed by the various levels anthropologies of folks like Geertz ( 1972) ,
of social reality sociologists focus on (Chaps. 7 , Douglas ( 1970 ), and Turner ( 1974 ) became
8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , and 17 increasingly relevant to challenging the rather fl
); and, fi nally, a set of substantive phenomena, at cultural version of Parsonsian ( 1951 )
distinct to be sure, but interrelated in their deep sociology.
inextricable link to the classics (many of which T hus, Chaps. 2 and 3 focus on integration and
have been long forgotten) and for their tendency regulation, respectively. Both draw from the
towards the cutting edges of sociology (Chaps. traditional well of references, but chart more
18 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 , and 26 ). holistic, unique views on the problem. In Chap. 2
The second contribution of the handbook was , Turner posits a general theory of integration,
truly out of my hands, and was the responsibility drawing from structuralism, social psychology,
of the author(s) of each chapter. To that effect, I evolutionary biology, and the sociology of
am greatly indebted to each author for accepting emotions. Integration, or the lack there of, has
the challenge of balancing a review-like long been cited as a source of various social
expectation with breaking new ground. Several of problems—e.g., Durkheim’s Suicide ; an
the chapters present radically unique argument that has received plenty of empirical
perspectives, while others synthesize often support (Umberson and Montez 2010 ; Thoits
disparate, far-fl ung traditions; however, all of 2011 ). In Turner’s framework, gone are the old
them offer fresh, authoritative statements about functionalist tropes, replaced by many of the
the social world. What was most rewarding for me important advances in neuroscience and social
was that the authors, in several cases, accidentally psychology. This chapter is followed by Yingyao
weaved threads from other chapters throughout and Pollilo’s (Chap. 3 ) treatment of regulation.
1 Introduction 9

A sophisticated review of the winding threads of In short, this section offers a new pedagogical
Marxian and Weberian theory unfolds into a direction for theory courses: organizing weeks
fascinating consideration of organizational power and readings by major theoretical dilemmas.
as the central site of coordination and control in Integration, for instance, remains as relevant to
modernity. Hence, while the authors consider the theorizing and empirical research today as it did
macro- and micro-level dynamics, it is at the for Comte or Durkheim. The fi rst cluster of
meso-level that the true force of power, in readings, then, could be centered on the problem
modernity, is unleashed, along with the of integration, fl eshing out the various ways it is
contradictions between distributive power studied across levels of social reality. Processes
(domination) and social or collective power. and research at the meso-level look at social
Chapters 4 and 5 turn our attention to the capital (Portes 1998 , 2014) , organizational
problem of legitimation, fi rst in action and then segmentation (Hannan and Freeman 1977 ),
in interaction. In Glaeser’s discussion of action, isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) , and
new theoretical ground is staked out on a very old embedded fi elds (Chap. 9; also, Fligstein and
topic: what is social action? The problem of McAdam 2012 ) are all interested in integration;
meaning emerges in the work of Marx, Durkheim, likewise, many dynamics at the micro-level, such
and most explicitly in Weber as they contend with as rituals and emotions (Chap. 20; also, Collins
the “ghost,” or perhaps specter, of the great 2004 ; Lawler et al. 2009 ) and exchange (Chap.
utilitarian tradition of Smith and Bentham, but 18 ; also, Cook et al. 2006) , continue to look hard
Glaeser’s work extends far beyond these old at integration as a process (as well as the
debates, offering a processual, comprehensive consequences for too much or too little).
action theory. Tavory’s examination of Likewise, regulation (and, more often, power)
interaction is no less inspired: while careful to remain central to sociological research (Reed
hew closely to the road mapped out by symbolic 2013 ), as does the question of action (Swidler
interactionists, Tavory’s Chap. 5 moves into 1986; Emirbayer and Mische 1998 ; Vaisey
newer horizons, pushing for more processual 2009 ), interaction and meaning making (Chap.
notions of interaction and self. Confronting 19 ; also, Stryker 2008 ; Burke and Stets 2009 ),
critiques from different sources, Tavory considers and, of course, cultural processes (Lizardo 2006
the most recent push for inter-situational analyses. ; Pugh 2009 ; Abrutyn and Mueller 2015 ).
Finally, in Chap. 6 , Lizardo’s work
challenges the reader, and the discipline: (1) is
culture really something the classical theorists 1.3.2 Levels of Social Reality
like Weber and Durkheim thought of, or is it a
Parsonian creation and (2) what is the future for F resh out of graduate school, the fi rst two theory
the concept and assorted constellation of elements courses I taught tried to build a coherent
orbiting it in sociology? Lizardo presents a careful sociological world for the students by way of
analysis of the classics, in particular Durkheim starting at the macro-level and working down to
and Weber, and elucidates how “culture” is the organizational level. Then, the class shifted to
largely alien to their work, and is really added the micro-level and built back up, ending with
post hoc by Parsons. Lizardo does not leave us theories of groups and organizational life. Nearly
with a defi nitive answer to the second question, impossible to do in a 14-week class, this
though his essay cogently argues that Durkheim, pedagogical strategy did get positive reviews:
and even Bourdieu, presents sociologists with most specifi cally, students expressed happiness
examples of how to theorize without the culture that a coherent social world emerged over the
concept, and thus provocatively implies, perhaps, course of the class as opposed to the eclecticism
culture is less useful a concept than modern of substantive courses that move from one level
sociology often assumes. to the next, one theory to the next, and with little
commitment to a “this is how sociologists
10 S. Abrutyn

generally see the world” type of orientation. The the seemingly wide chasm between the lived,
advantage to this method is clear. Each level or everyday experience and the invisible social
the different phenomena at each level, are structure that so fascinated the young Durkheim.
embedded and thus have equivalencies to those In this section, the reader is presented with four
higher-order levels pressing against them; chapters—two that explicitly deal with the
however, each level reveals distinct, emergent problem (the fi rst starting from the top-down
properties and dynamics that force us to study (Chap. 7) and the second from the bottom-up
each one as distinct and as linked to the above (Chap. 8 )), and two that offer alternative ways
and below. Second, while the levels themselves of dealing with the presumed chasm (Chaps. 9
deserve analysis, the interlinkages between them and 10 ).
are of equal importance. How encounters and In charting a link from the macro to the micro,
corporate units interact, for instance, matters Turner ( 2010a , b , 2011 ) argues that emotions
because it is in the fl ow between the two that are, ultimately, the thread that runs through the
microdynamics produce, reproduce, and alter the entire system; a point cogently made by Lawler,
meso-level and, conversely, it is the meso-level Thye, and Joon in their exposition of the links fl
that constrains and facilitate the production and owing up from the micro to the macro; and,
reproduction of encounters. Perhaps not radical, itimportantly, the conclusion that Durkheim ( 1915
remains important to develop common ways of [1995]) eventually reached: emotional forces
talking about what sociologists study that matters generated in palpable, recurring interaction
to creating a society and not an association of continually remade the group while temporarily
sociologists. charging the batteries of those participants and,
Ultimately, this approach allows students to even, those in the audience. The juxtaposition of
see the diversity of sociological research, and the two chapters, and the authors’ awareness of
come to understand both the reasons why some each other, presents a unique chance to see how
scholars are drawn to historical research and two opposed positions (top-down and bottom-up)
others qualitative ethnographies, as well as how often reach similar conclusions about the social
both strategies require some semblance of a social world. Macrosociology, which was once the
world fi lled within nested or embedded levels. It center of the sociological world, is presented from
is true, we don’t often talk about the social worldthe point of view of a theorist whose career has
this way, and there are always radical positions onincreasingly sought to integrate neuroscience into
both sides (micro and macro) asserting the non- sociology, and it thus sensitive to the macro-
existence of the other, but, the goal of theory is to
micro links. Lawler and his colleagues, for their
provide the student with different tools to deal part, begin within the exchange tradition which
with different research problems. Providing a set has structural assumptions built in, and thus the
of vantage points is as important as the formal andmacro already looms over their theorizing. In the
substantive aspects of the theories themselves. end, the reader comes to realize that both
approaches can complement each other, rather
The next set of sections is devoted to this sort
of pedagogic approach, beginning with a than be dichotomous positions.
subsection on macro-micro linkages (Chaps. 7 , The alternatives, as I see them, are found in fi
8 , 9 , and 10 ) and followed by a subsection that eld theory and in the network/relational approach
considers the major social units across each level that is both a methodological and theoretical
of social reality (Chaps. 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , perspective. To be sure, fi elds are meso- level
16 , and 17 ). units of analysis, as are networks, and could just
as well be placed in the following subsection, yet
1.3.2.1 Rethinking the Macro- there is some logic behind seeing them as
Micro Link alternatives to more traditional macro-micro
The fi rst subsection takes up a question that had solutions. They both turn away from the overly
gained prominence in the 1980s: how can we link abstract macro accounts, preferring either real
1 Introduction 11

nodal connections or embedded arenas fi lled with 1.3.2.2 From Top to Bottom
real groups competing against each other. That is, T he second subsection explore the three major
neither gives primacy to the individual or the über levels of analysis, and the principles units of
macro sphere that acts as an environment for social reality we study at each level. At the macro-
collective action. Instead, they have a sort of level, we fi nd institutional spheres (Chap. 11)
Simmelian approach focused on the and stratifi cation systems (Chap. 12) ; at the
relationships—exchange-based, competitive, or meso, communities (Chap. 13 ), organizations
confl ict- oriented—and the structure of these (Chap. 14) , and categoric units (Chap. 15 ); and,
relationships. Where they perhaps differ most, is at the micro, small groups (Chap. 16 ) and the self
in their natural affi nities with other subfi elds— (Chap. 17 ). While each chapter focuses on the
and, thus, the theoretical traditions they are most specifi c phenomenon of interest, they each work
comfortable borrowing from to explain the social to contextualize the phenomenon within the
world. On the one hand, network theory easily higher and lower levels of social reality.
borrows from social psychology, either from the Furthermore, each chapter takes serious the way
exchange traditions (Coleman 1988 ; Cook et al. sociologists try to study the unit of analysis,
2006 ) or from identity-based concepts exploring how theory and research work together
(Pescosolido 2006 ; Thoits 2011 ). On the other as opposed to the traditional pedagogy of teaching
hand, fi eld theory is far more comfortable with theory and methods as a separate set of ideas and
culture and structure intermingling (Bourdieu skills.
1992 , 1993 ) then network theory is (Emirbayer My own take on institutions draws from
and Goodwin 1994 ). classical sociologists and anthropologists who
One fi nal note, Fligstein and McAdam’s talked about the world as divided into major
(2012 ) strategic action fi elds has been, in my social spheres like religion, law, or kinship.
perspective, a major advance in fi eld theory in Chapter 11 presents these types of discussions in
that they consciously sought to expand traditional a fresh light, drawing on ecological and
fi eld analyses by adding social movements evolutionary theory to explore how macro-
theory. Theorizing is a process of building upon structural and cultural spheres shape the everyday
existing literatures; rather than reinventing the reality we all encounter. Conversely, in Chap. 12
wheel, it is the essence of extending, , Guenther and her colleagues take on the macro-
synthesizing, and making robust (Turner 2010a , level dynamics of stratifi cation. Exploring a
b ; Abrutyn and Mueller 2015) . Network theory range of empirical and theoretical studies, this
is perhaps ready for that type of revolutionary chapter presents the tools that sociologists use to
theorizing. Cultural sociologies have already explore inequalities within nations,
begun to interact (Lizardo 2006 ), and my work comparatively across nations, and between
with Mueller (Abrutyn and Mueller 2014 ; clusters of nations.
Mueller and Abrutyn 2015 ) has advocated for Chapters 13 and 14 provide close
expanding the social psychological “vocabulary” examinations of two key corporate units:
of network applications to include emotions. Both communities and organizations. Communities
areas seem to me exciting sites of opportunities have always been essential to theory; de
and challenges, and have already made major Tocqueville, Töennies, Durkheim, and then later
inroads in offering new strategies of seeing the the Chicago school’s urban ecology and a signifi
macro-micro link. Hence, in a theory course that cant proportion of sociological ethnographies.
begins with this question, the actual art of Irwin presents a sophisticated review and
theorizing instead of the process of learning theoretical exposition of what community is, and
theorists could make for an exciting and engaging the potential it has for theorizing about social
classroom. organization and action. Irwin’s inspired writing
challenges sociology to embrace a concept that
has been repeatedly deemed moribund, but which
12 S. Abrutyn

continues to show resilience. In Chap. 14, Powell 1955 ; Berger 1958 ), small groups have become
and Brandtner offer a wholly original synthesis of peripheralized despite their continued importance
the organization literature, presenting a new to understanding the social world and empirical
pathway for integrating advances in other research (Berger et al. 1998 ; Benard 2012 ; Fine
disciplines. Organizations, then, become both 2012 ). Indeed, it is in small groups that vast
things and forces for Powell and Brandtner; sites majority of our lives are spent, as they mediate our
in which informal groups and selves are produced experiences in organizations and communities,
and reproduced daily, and forces of change in institutions and stratifi cation systems. Thus, the
communities and institutional spheres. What self is our personal anchor to the social world
makes these two chapters so important—as well while small groups are the social anchor to the
as Chaps. 9 (fi elds) and 10 (networks)—is that larger universe. Integration, regulation, and
the meso-level is the site in which the everyday legitimation cannot be understood without
meets the abstract, invisible forces that facilitate considering the anchors that are most visible and
and constrain reality. Threads of integration, known to each person, and thus, these chapters tie
regulation, legitimation, and culture abound, as do the entire section together, and in many ways,
the questions of macro-micro linkages. These serve as a fulcrum to the next major section in
same questions continue to be relevant in Chap. which we offer a third strategy to teaching
15, where Webster and Walker consider the other sociological theory.
side of the meso-level: categoric units (e.g., sex, 1.3.3 Theorizing the Social World
race, age) and inequality. A sprawling and erudite
review, is followed by a close consideration of the The fi nal section of the book takes a third
empirical foundations of a cluster of theoretical approach to the sociological endeavor that breaks
traditions that consider how certain status sociology into different thematic areas—two of
characteristics affect the functioning of various which are presented herein. To be sure, many of
types of groups that we all fi nd ourselves in; how the chapters of the Handbook could fi t into this
these characteristics come to have that effect; and space, but these chapters (and their substance)
how that shapes the experiences of people across tend to be less abstract than those in the fi rst
categories. Like its companion chapters, Webster cluster (Chaps. 2 , 3 , 4 , 5, and 6) and, in
and Walker’s chapter presents important ideas many cases, cut across various levels of analysis
that explicitly spillover into Chap. 16 (small instead of being rooted in one or the other.
groups) and Chap. 18 (microsociologies), but
which also touch on numerous other chapters 1.3.3.1 Constraints on the Lived
including that of regulation (Chap. 3) and the self Experience
(Chap. 17 ). This section considers many of the questions
F inally, the micro-level is represented by a raised in Chaps. 2 , 3 , 4 , 5, and 6, but does
chapter on groups and one on the self. In the latter, not interrogate them explicitly or as the focus of
Cast and Stets ambitiously present a synthetic the chapter. Instead, they present the reader with
look at the self both as a micro-level phenomenon, the varieties of social forces constraining the way
and a thing embedded in various other levels of we experience the reality in which we are
social reality. To talk about the self, as even Mead embedded. Picking up where Chaps. 17 on the
clearly emphasized, the larger environments must self, as well as 15 on small groups and 16 on
be considered too; though, we often lose sight of categoric units left off, the fi rst chapter of this
the other levels of reality. Cast and Stets push us section (Chap. 18 ) further explores the
to consider the many layers that the self interacts microdynamics of social life. In this chapter,
with to become our anchor in the social world. In Carter pushes sociologists to revisit the once
Chap. 16 , Benard and Mize present a fresh, porous borders between social and psychological
comprehensive take on small groups. Once the social psychology, pulling theoretical strands that
center of the sociological world (Bales and Slater supplement insights drawn from various areas of
1 Introduction 13

contemporary microsociology that take Halbwachs ( 1992 ), this chapter urges readers to
attribution and evaluation as the central consider how the past is a social creation; how it
mechanism or process from which theoretical becomes exterior and constraining in monuments
explanations emerge. Chapter 19 offers a fresh and other physical spaces, temporal
take on the fi eld of ethnomethodology. Often differentiation, sedimented interaction and ritual,
marginalized in contemporary sociology, or and so on. Memory is the cutting edge, as it draws
perhaps forgotten in some ways, this chapter the Durkheimian sense of integration into
reminds the reader of the roots beyond Garfi dialogue with the Weberian notion of regulation
nkel’s groundbreaking work, but quickly turns and legitimation: that is, memory is both a force
towards the perspective and method’s footprint in of cohesion and shared meaning, as well as
contemporary research. Like the chapters on something individuals and groups strive to control
communities and small groups, this chapter for those very same reasons. In Chap. 22 , we turn
reminds sociologists that this area is not frozen, towards, again, an older area of sociology that had
and instead of teaching ethnomethodology as lost favor for several decades because of Parsons
“Garfi nkel’s theory” or in breaching “fl at” treatment: the sociology of morality.
experiments, Turowetz and his colleagues press Recent years has seen an explosion of research on
us to consider the active research that continues morality (Hitlin and Vaisey 2013 ), ranging from
to provide insights into the construction of cultural-cognitive studies (Vaisey 2009 ) to social
meaning and action. psychological inquiries (Stets and Carter 2012 ) .
F inally, complementing both of these chapters McCaffree pivots quickly from the roots of the
is an exposition on the sociology of emotions sociology of morality to both consider the many
(Chap. 20 ). What distinguishes Weed and Smith- angles sociologists exploit to examine morality,
Lovin’s chapter from most discussions of but also offers a compelling new theoretical take
emotions is its careful division and clear on how we can go about studying morality social
elucidation of the three dominant strands of scientifi cally. Finally, in Chap. 23 , Robinson
emotions in social psychology today: the offers a much needed essay on intersectionality.
performative- dramaturgical strand built on Not simply content with the conventional ways
Goffman and, most prominently, Hochschild’s intersectionality is taught and mobilized in
seminal text; the symbolic interactionist tradition research, this chapter pushes new ground, trying
(Kemper 1978 ; cf. Shott 1979 ) that has found to add new items to the agenda in the study of
its expression across a variety of theoretically- inequality, stratifi cation, and various subfi elds
driven research programs like Affect Control like race and gender. Like the previous chapters
Theory, Identity Control Theory, and Status on memory and morality, this chapter sits on the
Expectations States Theory; and, the interaction frontiers of where sociology has been moving,
ritual tradition (Collins 2004 ; Summers-Effl er and brings an essential perspective to how lived
2004 ). Finding the points of convergence, this experience is constrained by those in structurally
chapter collapses many of the unnecessary and culturally disadvantaged positions.
distinctions across these different perspectives,
promoting the commonalities that link the study 1.3.3.2 Modes of Change
of emotions. In short, a pathway for a more T he last three chapters of the Handbook fi ttingly
integrative study of emotions is posited. explore one of the most important and compelling
T he next cluster of chapters follows in the aspects of sociology: change. Here, three
theme of exterior constraints on the lived important modes of change, found across all of
experience. In Chap. 21, Simko explores a very the classical sociologists, also present the
old idea that has somehow been forgotten, frontiers of sociological research, cross-cutting
ironically, or simply undertheorized: collective most of the chapters above, and bringing insights
memory. Drawing from Durkheim’s Elementary from other disciplines. First, Machalek and
Forms and, especially, his forgotten student Martin begin this section by delineating the
14 S. Abrutyn

diverse and ever-growing area of evolutionary proverbial well to show how social psychology,
sociology. Once a mainstay of sociological emotions, and culture have become important
theory—found in Comte, Marx, Spencer, elements integrated into the classic ways
Durkheim, and even Weber—evolutionary theory sociologists have theorized and researched social
has undergone a renaissance in the last two movements. In short, a set of chapters explore the
decades or so. Neuroscience, cognitive science, basic theme of change highlighting the cutting
archaeology, history, and anthropology have edge, synthetic work being done.
found their way into these theories, as have the
most up-to-date fi ndings in genetics and
evolutionary biology. Evolutionary sociology
1.4 Conclusion
runs along several different tracks: general
theories that refl ect the classics, but are far more Ultimately, the discipline is due for a paradigm
cautious in their construction; gene-culture shift. If theory is a specialization, then we need to
interaction; neuroscience and the evolution of the resuscitate and support theorists in journals,
brain; group-level selection; and neo-Darwinian professorial appointments, and in training; if
theorizing. theory is the backbone of a social science, then we
I n Chaps. 25 and 26, we present the reader need to begin to teach theory as set of principles
with two complimentary chapters: the fi rst on that sociologists can deploy in developing
collective behavior and the second on social research. This Handbook is one small step
movements. In the latter, Moss and Snow deftly forward, inspired by the desire to unite
delineate the massive body of literature on social sociologists under a common umbrella that does
movements, offering original insights into the not dissuade c reativity, the pursuit of
dynamics of social movements. In the former, understudied problems, or the continued
Van Ness and Summers-Effl er revisit another development of theory. Rather, a society or
subfi eld that was once central to sociological community instead of an association is more
inquiry, but which has fallen out of favor to some likely to cooperate in an effort to push sociology
degree. Of course, the study of social movements into the twenty-fi rst century and make our
was historically embedded in the study of discipline one that is consulted when politicians,
collective behavior, but since the 1960s, social economic leaders, community organizers, and the
movements have become a distinct and vibrant like have problems they need help solving.
area in
its own right. Hence, like the juxtaposition of
macro-micro approaches (Chaps. 7 and 8 ), these
two chapters round the Handbook out by offering References
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1 Introduction 15

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Part I
Classical Questions
Contemporalized
Integrating and Disintegrating 2
Dynamics in Human Societies
Jonathan H. Turner
J. H. Turner ()
Department of Sociology , University of
California , Santa Barbara , CA , USA e-mail:
jturner@soc.ucsb.edu
organization and the potential of these
mechanisms to stave off , or to accelerate , the
inevitable disintegration of all patterns of social
organization . And so, whether integration is
2.1 Approaching the Analysis achieved by open markets or high levels of
of Integration in Societies coercion and stratifi cation, it is nonetheless
integration by the above defi nition. The point of
T he concept of integration has long been both an this chapter is to outline the various forms that
implicit and explicit concern of all sociological integration takes and the degree to which
theorists. Yet, despite this provenance, integration particular forms generate pressures for continued
is a topic that has been subject to criticism integration or for disintegration. In the long run,
because evaluative considerations of what is disintegration is the fate of societies and their
“good” or “pathological” in a society. For constituent sociocultural formations; the issue
example, Marxists see the modes of integration of then is what modes of integration stave off for
a societal formations as fi lled with contradictions how long the inevitable entropy inherent in the
and basically as a “necessary evil” in an historical social universe. For theorizing about human
process leading to a “better” form of integration societies to be complete, it becomes essential to
as these contradictions lead to confl ict and understand both the negative entropic and
reform. Early functionalists such as Auguste entropic forces working on human societies.
Comte, Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim and, A s I will argue, integration and disintegration
more recently, Talcott Parsons have tended to operate at all three fundamental levels of human
analyze social structures in terms of meeting social organization: (1) the micro universe of
functional needs for integration, thereby interaction in face-to-face encounters, (2) the
converting existing structural and cultural meso world of [a] corporate units (groups,
arrangements into implicit statements that the organizations, and communities) revealing
status quo is “functional” for a society. Such divisions of labor and [b] categoric units built
analyses deliberately or inadvertently moralize from social distinctions based upon criteria such
what should be a more neutral conception of as ethnicity, religion, gender, and age that become
integration. For my purposes here, I see that bases for moral evaluations of members of
integration as simply the modes and mechanisms subpopulations in a society, and (3) the macro
by which social units and the social activities in systems of (a) institutional domains and (b)
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 19
S. Abrutyn (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary Sociological Theory,
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32250-6_2
and between them are coordinated into coherent stratifi cation systems as these become the pillars
patterns of social of (c) societal and (d) inter-societal systems.
20 J.H. Turner

Integration is simply the way in which micro, organization. As with the micro-level interaction
meso, and macro social formations are laced rituals, horizontal integrative processes operate
together, but this process is complicated by the among also meso-level units. Corporate units
fact that integration operates not only between differentially distribute resources to persons,
levels of social organization but within each of which partially determines their categoric unit
these three levels. Thus, there are complex causal memberships—at a minimum their social class.
relations among the micro, meso, and macro bases Conversely, members of categoric units are
of integration and, as will become evident, located in positions within the divisions of labor
disintegration as well (Turner 2010a) . All of the of corporate units. And the dynamics revolving
processes by which such connections are around these horizontal connections within the
generated and sustained constitute the subject meso level are important to integration not only at
matter of integration as a fundamental force in this level but also at both the micro and macro
the social universe, while the operation of these levels. Macro structures and cultures are built
forces are also the explanation for the from meso-level structures, while the corporate
disintegrative potential in all sociocultural and categoric units of the meso-level constrain
formations. what transpires in micro encounters.
Another way to view integration is as Reciprocally, dynamics of encounters affect the
connections among the “parts” of the social dynamics of integration at the meso level and, at
universe; and the outline below of the three levels times, even the macro level of social organization.
of social reality suggests what these part are: The arrows moving within and across levels of
individual persons, encounters of individuals in social organization portrayed in Fig. 2.1 are
face-to-face interaction, corporate units (groups, intended to denote these paths of connection and
organizations, and communities) organizing potential disconnection; and while the processes
encounters, categoric units of persons denoted as are complicated, a general theory of integration
distinctive and evaluated in terms of their and disintegration can, it is hoped, make
perceived distinctiveness that constrain what understanding of these connections much simpler
transpires in encounters, institutional domains than it may seem at fi rst glance. How and where
built up from corporate units, stratifi cation do we get started? I think the best place to start is
systems built around categoric- unit distinctions, at the macro level, particularly the societal level
and societies as well as inter-societal systems of social organization; from there we can move up
arising from institutional domains and systems of and down the levels of the fi gure and begin to fi
stratifi cation. ll in the picture of dynamic processes of
To conceptualize integration and also integration and disintegration in human societies.
disintegration at the same time, it is necessary to
recognize that these parts are connected
horizontally within each level of social reality and
2.2 The Macrodynamics of
vertically across the micro, meso, and macro
levels of the social universe and that Integration
disintegration occurs when these horizontal and
vertical linkages break down. For example, at the A s outlined above, the macro-level universe is
micro level, when persons enter encounters, composed of inter-societal systems and societies
horizontal processes revolving around interaction that are built from institutional domains and
rituals (Collins 2004 ; Turner 2002 ) and other stratifi cation systems which, in turn, are built
interpersonal dynamics operate to integrate respectively from meso-level corporate and
chains of interaction over time and space. At the categoric units (Turner 2010a ). The dynamics of
same time, encounters are embedded in corporate integration at the macro level of social reality can
and categoric units at the meso level and; in turn, best be understood by the nature of sociocultural
these meso-level units are embedded in macro-
level formations, thus assuring the operation of
vertical integrative process across levels of social
2 Integrating and Disintegrating Dynamics in Human Societies 21

Fig. 2.1 Levels of social reality (5) corporate-unit belief and normative
systems,
(6) categoric-unit status belief and
f ormations that organize corporate units and normative systems, and (7) expectation states in
categoric units into institutional domains and micro-level encounters. Let me begin with an
stratifi cation systems. There are well-studied outline of the structural mechanisms of
structural mechanisms by which the macro level integration.
of social reality is generated and sustained,
including (Turner 2010a) : (1) segmentation, (2)
differentiation, (3) interdependencies, (4) 2.2.1 Structural Mechanisms of
segregation, (5) domination and stratifi cation,
Integration
and (6) intersections. While culture is always part
of these social structural mechanisms, there are
2.2.1.1 Segmentation
still distinctive cultural mechanisms revolving
Emile Durkheim ([1893] 1963 ) originally
around 2010
conceptualized the process of segmentation as
(Turner 2010a , b ): (1) values, (2) generalized
“mechanism solidarity” (in juxtaposition to
symbolic media, (3) ideologies, (4) meta-
“organic solidarity)—a distinctions that he had
ideologies,
dropped from his sociology by 1896 in favor of
22 J.H. Turner

discovering the dynamics of integration common sectors converge in their structure and culture,
to both simple and complex societies (Durkheim thereby integrating the sector while, at the same
[1912] 1984 ). Segmentation is the process of time, having suffi cient similarities to corporate
producing and reproducing similar corporate units in at least some other institutional domains
units, revealing (a) high levels of structural and sectors in these domains to promote some
(regular) equivalence in the network structures of structural and cultural equivalences across larger
these corporate units (Freeman et al. 1989 ) and swaths of the macro realm. And so, even as high
(b) high levels of cultural equivalence in that levels of differentiation among corporate units are
individuals are guided by the same sets of cultural used to build diverse institutional domains—e.g.,
codes—values, ideologies, meta-ideologies, economy, polity, education, science, religions,
beliefs, norms, and expectation states. Under etc.—the continuing segmentation of generic
these conditions, individuals at locations in types of corporate units within and between
similar corporate units experience the social institutional domains operates as a powerful
universe in equivalent ways, and thus develop integrative force.
common orientations because they stand in the S egmentation does, however, eventually
same relationships to all other positions in the generate disintegrative pressures because there
corporate unit and its culture. When human are limitations in how far structural and cultural
societies fi rst began to grow, segmentation was equivalences can link together large numbers of
the principle mechanisms of integration, as new diverse corporate units and individuals in these
hunter-gather bands and, later, new community units. If only segmentation is possible, a society
structures were spun off of the old, with each new and inter-societal system cannot become very
structure revealing the same basic network forms large because segmentation cannot integrate large
and systems of culture. and diverse (by categoric unit memberships)
Segmentation always continues to operate as populations, without the addition of new
an integrative mechanisms even as societies integrative mechanisms.
differentiate new kinds of corporate and categoric
units. For example, Weber’s ([1922] 1968 : 956– 2.2.1.2 Differentiation
1004) famous typology on “bureaucracy” is, in As Herbert Spencer ( [1874–96] 1898 ) phrased
essence, an argument about segmentation. Even the matter, growth in the social mass –whether in
bureaucratic structures that evolve in different organic or super-organic bodies—will eventually
institutional domains evidence some equivalence require a more complex skeleton to support the
in their structure and culture. Businesses, schools, larger mass. That is, structural and cultural
churches, government agencies, science differentiation is a function of the size and rate of
organizations, sports teams, and so on are, at a growth of populations organized into societies
fundamental level, very similar structurally, and inter-societal systems. Differentiation
revealing some cultural equivalences promoting involves the creation of new types of corporate
integration, even as persons engage in very units, revealing divisions of labor, organized to
different kinds of institutional activities. The purse diverse goals within and between
result is that individuals diversely situated in institutional domains. While, as emphasized
seemingly different structures experience a above, some degree of segmentation is retained
common structural and cultural environment, during differentiation, the process of
such as relations of authority and similar norms differentiation still divides up labor and functions
for impersonality, goal directness, and effi ciency. so that larger-scale tasks can be performed to
Moreover, segmentation also operates to sustain a population. If a population grows but
distinguish axes of differentiation so that those cannot differentiate new types of corporate units
corporate units in the same institutional domain to build out diverse institutional domains to solve
all reveal higher levels of cultural and structural adaptive problems, a society will disintegrate for
equivalence. Thus, even as institutional sectors a lack of ability to produce, reproduce, and
differentiate, the corporate units within these regulate its members.
2 Integrating and Disintegrating Dynamics in Human Societies 23

D ifferentiation, however, generates new types used in exchange distribution. And, these
of integrative problems of how to manage and mechanism all increase the volume, velocity, and
coordinate relations among differentiated scope of exchanges, while at the same time
corporate units and between corporate units and increasing the disintegrative potential in markets
categoric units. And these integrative problems and, indeed, all economic exchanges (Braudel
can be aggravated by confl icts of interests, 1977 ; Collins
hardening boundaries and divergent cultures of 1990; Turner 1995, 2010a) .
corporate units with sectors of an institutional
domain or among domains, and increases in In addition to these more economic
inequalities among class and other categoric units. exchanges, the expansion of markets and market
Thus, differentiation very rapidly generates new infrastructures generate quasi markets , thereby
integrative problems that, in turn, generate increasing the number of social relationships in
selection pressures for new mechanisms forging societies revealing a market-like quality (Simmel
interdependencies among differentiated units. [1907] 1979 ; Turner 1995 , 2010a ). Quasi
markets are, in some ways, a form of loose
2.2.1.3 Interdependencies segmentation because they mimic the basic
I nterdependencies among corporate units reveal structure of market exchanges but are not
a number of distinctive forms, including (Turner generally explicitly economic. For example,
2010a) : (a) exchange, (b) embedding and memberships in voluntary corporate units—
inclusion, (c) overlap, and (d) mobility. Each of clubs, churches, sports teams, etc.—take on an
these is examined below. exchange character, with the corporate unit
“marketing” it resources to potential members
E xchanges Corporate units form many levels and with members joining the corporate unit for
and types of exchange relations with each other non-economic resources, such as religiosity, fun,
and with incumbents in their respective divisions companionship and love, loyalty, commitments,
of labor. At the macro level, exchanges cannot and philanthropy, aesthethics, competition,
become extensive without markets and quasi prestige, etc. (Hechter 1987 ). Money may
markets (Simmel [1907] 1979 ; Weber [1922] become part of this exchange if dues, fees, and
1968 : 635–40; Braudel [1979] 1982, 1977; other “price” considerations enter. But, when we
Turner 1995 , 2010a) . Markets institutionalize speak of a marriage or “dating market,” money is
the exchange of one resource for another, not the explicit medium of exchange (Abrutyn
typically after some negotiation over the 2015) , although such markets can be usurped by
respective values of the resources possessed by more economic forces, as is the case in the dating
the actors. Such exchanges are often “economic” market that is increasingly regulated by corporate
because they involve the fl ow of a generalized units providing match-making services for a fee.
resource like money among corporate units and Indeed, as critical theorists like Jurgen Habermas
between corporate units and members of ([1973] 1976 ) have argued, cold symbolic media
categoric units who are incumbent in corporate- like money and power may “colonize” social
unit divisions of labor. In turn, increases in the relationships, with quasi markets being especially
scope, volume, and types of exchanges force the vulnerable because they already have many
elaboration of distributive infrastructures for properties of economic markets.
moving people, resources, and information across The expansion of economic markets and quasi
territorial and sociocultural spaces, thereby markets dramatically alters that nature of social
providing a new mechanisms of integration. Also, relationships in societies, as Geog Simmel
exchanges generate further integrative ([1907]1979 ) was the fi rst to fully explore.
mechanisms, coinage of money, regulation of Relations become more instrumental, and
money supplies, formation of credit, and individuals begin to have more choice in the
differentiation of markets for exchanges of resources, including friendships and group affi
equities and other systems for amassing capital liations, that they seek. As individuals give up
24 J.H. Turner

resources—time, energy, commitments, money— highly differentiated structures become more


they generally do so because they experience an integrated.
increase in their sense of value, which generates
commitments to the macro-level system of E mbedding thus generates structural
market- mediated relations and its institutional inclusion, but such inclusions also generate their
supports that allow for a sense of “profi t” to be own disintegrative pressures. One is rigidity
realized in each successive exchange in a market across wide sectors of institutional domains that
or quasi market. Thus, exchanges not only makes them unable to respond to new
generate commitments among exchange partners, environmental exigencies. Another is the
whether individuals or corporate units, they lead problems that always come with complexity of
individuals to form commitments to social structure: poor coordination, fraud,
macrostructural systems like institutions and exploitation, abuse of authority, and ineffi
societies as a whole that have enabled them to ciencies—all of which can become sources of
experience an increase in utilities or profi ts from tension and, hence, institutional if not societal and
exchange activities (Lawler and Yoon 1996 ; intersocietal disintegration.
Lawler et al. 2009 ; Lawler 2001 ).
But exchange also generates disintegrative Overlaps T he divisions of labor of diverse
pressures. Inherent in all markets—whether corporate units sometimes overlap within
economic or quasi markets—are de-stabilizing institutional domains, with the result that the
forces, such as infl ation or defl ation, fraud and network structure and culture of corporate units
manipulation, oscillations in supplies and become more integrated across a larger set of
demands, exploitation of the disadvantaged, positions and members incumbent in these
increases in inequalities, pyramiding of meta- positions. If members are from diverse categoric
markets where the medium of exchange (e.g., units, overlaps also generates intersections, which
money) in a lower market becomes the as I will analyze later, are a critical mechanism
commodity exchange in higher-level (e.g., money integrating societies. And the more individuals,
market), speculative markets (equity and futures per se, interact, but especially individuals from
markets) that are subject of fraud, and over- diverse and differentially-evaluated categoric
speculation and collapse. The result is that units, the less salient will categoric-unit
exchanges force the elaboration of another key memberships or different locations in divisions of
integrative mechanisms: the consolidation and labor become (Blau 1977 , 1994 ; Turner 2002 ,
centralization of power—to be examined shortly. 2010b ), and hence the more integrated will be the
overlapping corporate units, and the greater will
Embedding and Inclusion Social structures and be the positive emotions that individuals feel for
their cultures typically become embedded, with the overlapping corporate units.
smaller units lodged inside of ever-larger
corporate units within an institutional domain. In Overlaps can, however, consolidate members
this way, there is a kind of meta-coordination of of categoric-unit memberships when each of the
the divisions of labor of corporate units, their overlapping units reveals high levels of
cultures, and their exchange relations, all of which homogeneity of memberships, which reduces
reduce the disintegrative potential of rates of inter categoric-unit interaction.
differentiation and exchanges as integrative Moreover, if overlaps reinforce hierarchies in the
mechanisms. When there are network ties and divisions of labor, with one unit dominating over
relations of authority across embedded structures, the other, then the tensions associated with
when the same generalized symbolic media are hierarchy will increase the potential for
employed, and when these media have been used disintegration (see later discussions of hierarchy
to form institutional ideologies that in turn and domination).
regulate the formation of beliefs and norms, Mobility Mobility across corporate unit within
and between institutional domains increases
2 Integrating and Disintegrating Dynamics in Human Societies 25

integration by virtue of increasing the connections transition from one culture and/or social structure
among individuals across sociocultural space. to another, without activating disintegrative
Individuals bring the culture of one unit to the relations with those who have been segregated.
other, and out of the blending of cultures Yet, segregation per se will typically
(ideologies, beliefs, norms, expectations) cultural generates disintegrative pressures over the long
similarities across a larger swath of corporate-unit run because separation of corporate units or
positions increases, and hence, so does cultural subpopulations, or both, almost always involves
integration. Moreover, to the extent that mobility the use of power and domination to impose and
also brings members of different categoric units maintain the separation; and once imposed, the
together and increases their rates of interaction, distribution of resources often becomes ever-
inequalities in the evaluation of categoric-unit more unequal. And if segregation of corporate
memberships decline, thereby making units and subpopulations are consolidated, this
connections less stressful. And, as stress is consolidation of parameters marking status
reduced, positive emotional arousal increases and locations (in divisions of labor) with diffuse status
reduces tensions associated with inequalities. characteristics of incumbents in categoric units
generally works to increase tensions between (a)
H owever, mobility has the ironic consequence corporate units, (b) divisions within them, and (c)
of sometimes increasing the sense of relative members of valued and devalued categoric units.
deprivation among those who are not mobile but W hile such systems can promote integration
who must observe the mobility of others (Merton (that is, regularized patters of relationships) for
1968 ). Those left behind can be stigmatized by considerable periods of time, segregation in the
the ideologies of the domains in which they are end will increase tensions and the potential for
incumbent in corporate units, thereby increasing disintegrative confl icts because segregation is
their negative emotions and potential for confl ict typically part of a larger pattern of inequality and
with, or at least resentment of, those who have stratifi cation in a society or inter-societal system
been mobile. And, if those left behind are that is created and sustained by domination.
disproportionately members of devalued
categoric units, while those who have been 2.2.1.5 Domination and Stratifi cation
mobility are members of more valorized categoric Max Weber’s ([1922] 1968 : 212–299) analysis
units, then the tensions among members of of domination is perhaps the strongest part of his
categoric units in a society will increase, thereby sociology because it views inequalities and stratifi
raising the potential for disintegration. cation as part of a larger process by which power
is mobilized to control and regulate; and in so
2.2.1.4 Segregation doing, domination provides a central mechanisms
T he opposite of interdependencies is segregation. of macrostructural integration. As populations
When corporate units and members of categoric grow and differentiate, polity and law as
units are consistently separated in space and time, institutional domains differentiate and begin to
segregation exists and, for a time, can promote consolidate power. Other domains can also do so,
integration by separating corporate and categoric as is the case with religion and, at times, with
units that engage in incompatible activities and/or powerful economic actors. Consolidation of
have histories of confl ict and other disintegrative power occurs along four bases (Mann 1986 ;
relations. There are almost always entrance and Turner 1995 , 2010a) : (1) physical coercion, (2)
exit rules (Luhmann 1982 ) for entering and administrative control, (3) manipulation of
leaving corporate units that have been segregated. incentives, and (4) use of cultural symbols. And,
There will also be highly ritualized forms of depending upon the particular combination of
interaction among members of populations that bases mobilized, the resulting system of
have been separated but, still, must have some ties domination will vary. Domination is also part of
to each other (Goffman 1967) . Entrance/exit the broader stratifi cation system in which
rules and rituals enable actors to make the corporate units in various institutional domains
26 J.H. Turner

distribute resources unequally by virtue of ict, with the outcome of confl ict never leading to
whether or not they allow individuals to become a new and stronger system of domination.
incumbent in the corporate units of differentiated
institutional domains and, if admitted, where they 2.2.1.6 Intersections
can become incumbent in the division of labor Peter Blau’s ( 1977 , 1994 ) last major theorizing
and where they can be mobile within and across on macrostructures argued that high rates of
corporate units. interaction among diverse types of individuals at
Inequality and stratifi cation created by different locations of social structures promotes
domination can promote integration, even under integration. He emphasized that individuals,
conditions of very high inequality. Indeed, where when viewed from a macro-level perspective, can
inequality is great, where domination is extensive be arrayed as a series of distributions among
and extends to all social relations within and subpopulations distinguished by what he termed
between corporate units and members of “parameters.” There are two types of parameters:
categoric units, and where social strata (class and Graduated parameters mark individuals location
other hierarchical divisions) are consolidated with with respect to markers that vary by degree—e.g.
memberships in valued and devalued categoric amount of income, levels of wealth, years of
units, integration can be high—albeit in a most education, age, etc. Nominal parameters mark
oppressive manner. Highly stratifi ed societies are individuals as members of a discrete social
integrated but they also possess high potential for category that is distinct from other categories, or
tension and confl ict in the longer run, but they what I am labeling categoric units . The key to
can persist for considerable periods of time across integration, Blau argued, is intersection whereby
large expanses of territory. individuals with high and low locations on
I n contrast, high degrees of integration will be graduated parameters and membership marked by
likely when domination is less pronounced. high and low evaluations of nominal parameters
Under this condition of lower domination, have opportunities to interact: the higher the
intersection of memberships of categoric units in intersection and rates of interaction among people
divisions of labor of corporate units will be located in different places on graduated and
higher. And high levels of intersection creates less nominal parameters, the more integrated will be a
bounded classes that, in turn, encourage upward society.
mobility across the class system. Thus, societies Conversely, the more consolidated are
revealing lower levels of dominations have parameters, whereby rates of contact and
greater fl exibility to deal with tensions and confl interaction across graduated and nominal
icts as they arise. Domination and stratifi cation parameters are low, the less integrated will the
systems between these two extremes of very high society be. I would add the caveat that such
and low domination are the mostly likely to reveal consolidations is almost always part of a system
immediate disintegrative potential (Turner 2010a of domination and stratifi cation and, hence, by
: 186–90). Typically, inequality is high and my defi nition, such a system can be highly
consolidation of resource-distributing corporate integrated, at least for a time. But, I think that
units with high and low evaluations of Blau is essentially correct that intersection of
memberships in categoric units is also high. Yet, parameters promotes considerable mobility and at
at the same time, the consolidation of the time chaos, but it does not lead to the building up
coercive, administrative, symbolic bases of power of tensions and hostility among subpopulations
is weak, and the lack of material resources makes compared to societies where consolidation of
consolidation of a material incentive base of parameters causes the accumulation of tensions
power unviable. Under these conditions and hostilities between subpopulations defi ned
mobilization for confl ict by those denied by their categoric-unit memberships. With
opportunities to secure valued resources becomes intersection, tensions can be resolved and confl
ever-more likely (Turner 2013 : 337–74). Indeed, icts can be frequent and institutionalized by law,
such systems may be in constant cycles of confl thereby promoting a fl exible system of
2 Integrating and Disintegrating Dynamics in Human Societies 27

integration, whereas consolidation produces a Webster and Foschi 1988 for literatures on
more rigid system held together by (a) high levels expectation states).
of coercive power, especially around its C ultural integration increases in a society
administrative base, (b) high levels of resource when there is consistency among the cultural
inequality, (c) low rates of mobility, and (d) systems outlined above. If texts (e.g., histories,
segregation of individuals and families at philosophies, stories, folklore, etc.) are consistent
divergent points of salient graduated and nominal with each other and with technologies, values, and
parameters. ideologies, they provide a fi rmer cultural
platform for the development of beliefs, norms,
2.2.1.7 Cultural Integration and expectation states at the meso and micro
A t the macro level of organization texts (written levels of social organization. In contrast, if these
and oral), technologies (knowledge about how to cultural systems reveal contradictions and
manipulate the environment), values (general inconsistencies, integration by culture will be
moral imperatives), ideologies (moral much weaker. When cultural systems are
imperatives for specifi c institutional domains, embedded inside each other, with less
and meta - ideologies (moral imperative encompassing moral codes lodged inside of, and
combining ideologies from several institutional even derived from, more generalized cultural
domains) are the most important elements of codes, then another level of cultural integration is
culture when analyzing integration. Ideologies achieved. Ideologies, then, are derived from texts,
and meta- ideologies provide, respectively, the technologies, and values; and in turn, meta-
moral tenets for beliefs of corporate-unit culture ideologies are built up from ideologies so derived,
and status beliefs about members of categoric then beliefs in corporate-unit culture and status
units operating as the meso-level of social beliefs about members of categoric units follow
organization. units tend to be lodged within a from ideologies and meta-ideologies that regulate
particular institutional domain. At times, meta- and legitimate actions with institutional domains
ideologies can also be involved in corporate units and moral evaluations of those at different places
within the set of domains generating a meta- in the class system of a society. Then, if normative
ideology. And so, the culture of any given systems are taken from the moral codings of
corporate unit will be highly constrained by the beliefs (and ideologies and meta-ideologies at the
elements of ideologies and, at times, meta- macro level), then expectation states on
ideologies of the domain(s) in which it is individuals will be clear, allowing interactions at
embedded. Meta-ideologies legitimate the the micro level to proceed smoothly.
inequalities of the stratifi cation system in a C onsistency, embedding, and successive
society. Status beliefs at the meso level social derivation of lower- from higher- level moral
organization are derived by meta-ideologies, and codings thus increase integration, even when they
these beliefs specify the moral worth and other legitimate structural arrangements in institutional
characteristics of members of categoric units. In domains that generate tension-producing
turn, normative expectations on incumbents in the inequalities in the stratifi cation system and the
divisions of labor in corporate units and on differential moral evaluation of members of
members of categoric units are drawn from the categoric units. Yet, under such circumstances,
dominant beliefs of corporate-unit culture and the the underlying tensions created by inequalities
status beliefs about the moral worth and will work to increase potential pressures for
characteristics of members of various categoric disintegration at a social structural level. And, as
units. These normative expectations then social structural level tensions increase, these can
determine the specifi c expectation states on work to undermine the level of integration
individuals in locations in the divisions of labor provided by culture as ideologies, meta-
and on members of categoric units during the ideologies, beliefs, and expectation states are
course of encounters of face-to-face interaction at called into question by mobilization for structural
the micro-level of social organization (see (and now cultural as well) confl ict (Turner 2013
28 J.H. Turner

: 337–74; Snow and Soule 2010; Goodwin and A nd, when these dynamics unfold for
Jasper 2006 ; Goodwin et al. 2000 , 2004 ). dominant institutions, then meta-ideologies
T he last element of note are the dynamics across these institutional domains form and add
revolving around generalized symbolic media of further legitimization to the inequalities in the
exchange (see Table 7.1 Chap. 7 and Table 11.2 stratifi cation system. Such meta-ideologies
in Chap. 11) . As actors develop corporate units moralize a larger social space: many diverse types
to deal with adaptive problems, they begin to of corporate units in multiple institutional
build culture through discourse about what they domains and potentially multiple hierarchies
are trying to do (Abrutyn 2009 , 2014 , 2015 ; (e.g., class, ethnic, gender, religious) in the stratifi
Abrutyn and Turner 2011) . This discourse is cation system. Meta-ideologies are particularly
almost always moral, arguing that a particular likely to form when the generalized symbolic
way of doing things is the most likely to be media distributed by corporate units in diverse
successful. Emerging from such discourse is the domains are exchanged across institutional
ideology of an institutional domain; and this domains, leading to their persistent circulation.
ideology legitimates and justifi es the way For example, money from the economy fl ows
corporate units in a domain act and interact to through most corporate units in virtually all
form both the structure and cultural of a domain. institutional domains in complex societies, as
These generalized media also can become the does authority to corporate units that has been
valued resource that corporate units distribute franchised out by polity and law, as does learning
unequally to members in different corporate units and knowledge across domains such as economy,
and at different locations in the divisions of labor polity, law, education, and science. The more
of any given corporate unit. Cultural integration generalized symbolic media circulate and the
increases when there is consensus over the more widely they are distributed to incumbents in
appropriateness of a given generalized symbolic corporate units and in categoric units, the more
medium as a topic for discourse, textconstruction, likely are multiple systems of meta-ideologies to
exchange, and distribution because its moral form in a society and provide a basis for
tenets are used to construct a coherent ideology, integration by legitimating inter-institutional
the elements of which are consistent with each activities, by legitimating inequalities and stratifi
other and over which there is consensus. The cation, and by providing positive utilities and
result is that actors see and orient to their rewards for individuals to receive these media as
environment with a common culture that valued resources that lead them, in turn, to
legitimates their actions and, often, provides develop commitments to corporate units, to
valued resources that bring reinforcement. Thus, institutional domains rewarding them with these
money , authority/ power, sacredness- piety, media, and even to systems of inequality making
love- loyalty , imperative coordination/ justice, up the stratifi cation system in a society.
aesthetics, learning, knowledge, competition , This complex of cultural integration can
etc. are all inherently rewarding, and if sustain a society for long periods of time, but the
individuals agree on the ideologies built from the very interdependencies among cultural elements
symbolic part of these medium and can also and between these elements and structural
receive acceptable shares of the resource part of formations makes integration vulnerable,
these media (that is, money, authority, especially if there are high degrees of inequality
love/loyalty, etc.), they will experience positive in the distribution of symbolic media as valued
emotions and make positive attributions to both resources and if the moral meanings of some
an institutional domain and the elements of the generalized symbolic media are not consistent
stratifi cation system created by the inequality with each other (e.g., explanations from science
distribution of valued resources to individuals at in terms of verifi ed knowledge vs. explanations
different locations in the divisions of labor of from texts about the sacred/supernatural from
corporate units and in different categoric units. religion). And so, if consistency in moral tenets of
symbolic media is low, then ideologies and meta-
2 Integrating and Disintegrating Dynamics in Human Societies 29

ideologies may come into confl ict with each proximal bias emphasizes the fact that positive
other and with other cultural elements such as (a) emotional fl ows tend to circulate in local
texts, technologies, and values at the macro level encounters and, hence, stay at the micro level.
of social organization, (b) beliefs and status Emotions that generate micro commitments can,
beliefs as they generate normative systems at the and often do, generate solidarities and sentiments
meso level, and (c) expectation states at the micro among individuals in encounters; and often these
level. positive sentiments can emerge among
Thus, cultural integration in societies is individuals who view meso and macro structures
always problematic because, once structural (and their cultures) in negative terms, thereby
differentiation occurs, sustaining common texts sustaining micro level integration at the cost of
and values, ideologies and meta-ideologies, macro-level integration. And so, if this proximal
beliefs and status beliefs, normative expectations bias is not broken, allowing positive emotions to
for incumbents in divisions of labor of corporate fl ow outward beyond the local encounter to meso
units and for members in categoric units, and on- and macro structures, the commitments to the
the- ground expectations states for individuals in meso and macro levels of reality so necessary for
encounters all can become more diffi cult. societal integration cannot emerge.
Consistency among, embedding of less inclusive Moreover, the problems of breaking the
codes in more inclusive codes, and deriving moral proximal bias to positive emotions are aggravated
codes down this ladder of embedding is not easily by the distal bias for negative emotions which,
assured, per se, and often becomes doubly Lawler ( 2001) argues, tend to move away from
problematic if cultural codes cause societies with local encounters outward toward meso and macro
high levels of inequality and stratifi cation to structures, thus reducing the ability for
emerge, thereby setting up potential disintegrative commitments to form and, indeed, encouraging
pressures from the unequal distribution of the distancing emotions like alienation from, or even
very symbolic media from which cultural hostility toward, meso and macro structures and
integration is sustained. their cultures. This distal bias, I argue, is fed by
the activation of defense mechanisms protecting
persons in local encounters and activating
attributions toward safer, less immediate
2.3 The Microdynamics of
structures and their cultures (Turner 2002 , 2007
Integration , 2010b ).
T hus, the basic problem on micro-level
T he macro-level dynamics of integration revolve integration revolves around the dual problems of
around structural and cultural systems that give overcoming both the proximal and distal biases of
direction and constraint to both individual and positive and negative emotions. If positive
collective actions at the meso- and micro-levels of emotions remain local, and negative emotions
the social universe. Before examining the meso consistently target meso and macro structures and
level in more detail, it is useful to skip down to their cultures, then the potential power of
the micro dynamics of societal integration at the emotions to integrate and connect all three levels
level of encounters before turning to meso-level of the social universe is not realized, causing only
corporate and categoric units. The micro level of micro-level integrations among chains of
social organization generates, or fails to do so, encounters and small corporate units like groups.
commitments among individuals to meso and And often, as noted above, these encounters and
macro structures and their cultures (Turner 2002 groups sustain their local focus by viewing other
, 2007 , 2010b ). These commitments are groups in negative emotional terms, thus
generated by the arousal of positive emotions that promoting confl ict among groups. Gang violence
are able to break what Edward Lawler ( 2001 ) has would be a good example of how micro solidarity
characterized as the proximal bias inherent in of the gang is sustained by positive emotions
emotional arousal in encounters. This concept of aroused by interactions within the gang,
30 J.H. Turner

reinforced by negative emotional reactions that they have met expectations and that they have
toward rival gangs. A social universe built from received positive sanctioning from others in a
rival gangs will be disintegrated across all three situation.
levels of social reality, whereas an integrated B ut more is involved; individuals must
society evidences connections within and across consistently experience this sense of meeting
all three levels of reality. How, then, are these expectations and receiving positive sanctions in
connections created and sustained in the presence encounters iterated over time and in encounters
of the proximal and distal biases of, respectively, across a large number of different types of
positive and negative emotions? Some of my corporate units (groups, organizations, and
answer is given in Chap. 7 of this volume; let’s communities) embedded in many differentiated
consider some of these arguments. institutional domains and across memberships in
diverse categoric units (Turner 2002 , 2007) .
Thus, solidarity at the level of the encounter and
2.3.1 Basic Conditions of Emotion across domains of reality is not a “one shot”
Arousal process, but a consistent experience of meeting
expectations in iterated in encounters across
H umans are wired to be highly emotional corporate units lodged in diverse institutional
(Turner 2000 , 2002 , 2007 , 2010b ); and domains in a society and across encounters where
emotions are aroused under two basic conditions: categoric unit memberships have been salient and
(1) expectations and (2) sanctions. When expectations for treatment and sanctions have
expectations for what should occur in a situation activated positive emotions. It is the repetition of
are met, individuals experience mild to these positive emotional experiences across many
potentially more intense positive emotions, contexts that activates positive emotions to the
whereas when expectations are not realized, the point where they can break the hold of the
opposite is the case, thereby activating the distal proximal bias, and move out from the encounter
bias that generally takes negative emotions away and, thereby, target meso-level and macro-level
from the local encounter and targets more remote structures and their cultures. Persistent positive
objects that will not disrupt the encounter and, at emotional arousal in many diverse contexts
the same time, will protect individuals from allows individuals to perceived the source of
negative feelings about themselves. When positive emotional as emanating from the
individuals experience positive sanctions, or structure and culture of meso and macro social
approving responses from others, they experience units. And as these positive emotions build up,
positive emotions, whereas when they experience their arousal dampens the effects of the distal bias
negative sanctions, they experience such negative inhering in negative emotional arousal.
emotions as anger, fear, shame, guilt, and In this way individuals develop commitments
humiliation, thus activating external attributions to meso and macro structures, seeing them as
as a defense mechanism to protect both self and responsible for their ability to meet expectations
viability of the local encounter. Thus, I argue that and receive positive sanctions. And, the more
the cognitive-emotional machinery driving the individuals who can have these experiences and
distal bias to negative emotions is, fi rst, the more often they can have them across many
repression of negative emotions toward self, different types of encounters embedded in
second, their transmutation into safer emotions different types of corporate units within diverse
like anger and alienation, and, third, activation of institutional domains, the greater will be their
external attributions that push negative emotions commitments of a population to all levels of
outward onto safer objects, away from self and social structure and culture outlined in Figs. 7.1
the local encounter (Turner 2007 ). For there to and 7.3 . What conditions, then, allow people to
be integration within and across levels of social meet expectations and receive positive sanctions
reality, it is necessary for individuals to perceive from others?
2 Integrating and Disintegrating Dynamics in Human Societies 31

2.3.2 The Distribution of embedding are not present, individuals are likely
Generalized Symbolic to behave in ways that, to some degree, make
Media them feel like they have not met expectations and,
moreover, that they have failed in the eyes of
I n general, the distribution of generalized others who are perceived to be sanctioning them
sym-bolic media will be highly salient in almost negatively.
all encounters because these are not just symbolic As noted above, when the parameters marking
codings forming moralities (and derived individuals as members of differentially valued
expectation states), they are often the valued categoric units are highly consolidated, meeting
resource distributed unequally by corporate units expectations that will arouse positive emotions
(Abrutyn 2015 ). When people can consistently can be diffi cult and avoiding the sense of being
meet expectations for receipt of generalized negatively sanctioned can be hard to avoid. For
symbolic media across many institutional example, if ethnicity in a society is highly
domains, they will typically experience positive correlated with social class memberships, with
emotions, even if their expectations are members of devalued ethnic subpopulations over-
comparatively low. But, when these expectations represented in lower classes and with members of
are not realized, the negative emotional arousal other, more-valued ethnic subpopulations
will be intense and will contribute considerably to incumbent in middle-to-higher social classes,
the potential undermining of the system of stratifi then interactions among these different ethnic
cation, and particularly so, if there are high levels groups will often be diffi cult because they will
of intersection among social class and non-class sustain low and high evaluations, and force those
memberships in categoric units. who are less valued to meet expectations that
stigmatize them and, in so doing, that make it
seem like they are being negatively sanctioned by
2.3.3 Meeting Expectations higher-status individuals. Under these conditions,
and Receiving Positive even meeting expectations can be humiliating and
Sanctions shame-provoking, thereby arousing negative
emotions that must often be repressed. Given that
W hen expectations are clear, non-contradictory, consolidation also typically involves
consistent, and successively embedded from the consolidation of members of higher- and lower-
most general (texts and values, for example) to ranked members of different categoric units with
increasingly specifi c moral codes (i.e., particular corporate units, such as neighborhoods,
ideologies, meta-ideologies, beliefs in corporate schools, workplaces, and even churches, some of
units and status beliefs for categoric, norms and the stigma of inter-categoric unit interactions can
situational expectations), it is likely that be mitigated by intra -categoric unit interactions
individuals will, fi rst of all, hold realistic where individuals can meet intra- categoric and
expectations. Secondly, they will be able to corporate-unit expectations and feel as if others
behave in ways that allows them to meet these are approving of them in giving off positive
expectations for self and to facilitate others’ responses to behaviors. Still, segregation as a
capacity to meet the expectations. macro-level integrative mechanism (as it
When expectations are met, the positive generates high rates of intra-categoric unit
emotions aroused feel like positive sanctions, but interaction at the micro level or reality) can only
it is also necessary for persons to perceive that go so far because people know they are devalued
others are actively signaling approval of their in the broader society, and as a consequence, they
behaviors. Thus, the clarity of expectations, as experience the sting of such an evaluation when
this clarity follows from the conditions forced to interact as subordinates with those in
enumerated above, is also critical to meeting higher- ranking positions in divisions of labor and
feelings of being positively sanction by others. with those in more highly valued, even valorized,
And, when clarity, consistency, and successive categoric units.
32 J.H. Turner

D omination and other integrative mechanisms emotional fl ow, with the latter being more
like segregation and even interdependencies can, gratifying (Ridgeway 1994 ; Turner 2002) . This
therefore, make retreat to consolidated and dynamic mitigates some of the negative processes
segregated “safe heavens” unfulfi lling. Hence, unleashed by consolidation of parameters, as
high levels of inequality and discrimination discussed above, but does not obviate them. And
against members of categoric unit sustaining so, the corrosive emotional effect of prolonged
inequality will, eventually, arouse large pools of inequalities across many diverse situations on
negative emotions—anger, fear, shame, people trapped in consolidated devaluated
humiliation, sadness, alienation, and unhappiness categoric units will gradually increase the
in general— among subpopulations where at least potential for disintegrative confl ict, as negative
some of their interactions in encounters are not emotions build up to the point where individuals
gratifying. become ever-more willing to engage in confl ict.
Thus, like any other valued resource in a
society, positive and negative emotions are
distributed unequally (Turner 2014 ); and when 2.3.4 Transactional Needs and Their
negative emotions are disproportionately Effects on Meeting
consolidated with lower class and other devalued
Expectations and Receiving
memberships in non-class categoric units,
integration will be under duress, eventually Positive Sanctions
shifting into mobilization by members of
devalued categoric units against the existing Many expectations come from what I have
system of integration in various forms of intra- or labeled transactional needs (Turner 1987 , 2002
even inter-society confl ict. , 2007 , 2010b) , which are motive states that
S till, at the micro level, even interactions arouse and direct the behaviors of all humans.
among unequals—whether the inequality stems These are, I believe, hard-wired into human
from different locations in the divisions of labor, neuroanatomy, with sociocultural elaborations;
memberships in evaluated categoric units, or both and in virtually every micro-levels encounter,
(in the case of consolidation)—have a tendency these transactional needs establish expectations
for unequals to honor expectations states. Higher for how a person should be treated by others. If
status persons will be allowed to initiate more talk others treat a person as expected, then the person
and action and will be given deference by lower will experience positive emotions just as this
status persons; and lower status persons will often person would from expectations from any other
sanction their fellow lower-status members who source. When not treated as expected by the
challenge the micro system of inequality arousal of need states, the failure to do so will
(imposed by the meso, and ultimately, macro arouse negative emotions, per se, but with a
levels of social organization). For, to challenge super-charging effect from a sense of being
the inequality invites negative emotional arousal sanctioned by others. This failure to meet
by higher-status persons and hence negative expectations arising from need states will thus
sanctions that carry the power to make lower-s almost always be seen as a negative sanction by
tatus members of groups feel even more negative others, thus doubling up on the person’s negative
emotions. In return for acceptance of the status emotional arousal. And, if large numbers of
order, then, higher-status persons treat those in individuals in devalued categoric units must
lower positions with respect and dignity, thereby consistently fail in meeting their transactional
arousing positive emotions within the encounter needs, the pool of negative emotional arousal will
(Ridgeway 1994) . Of course, if a higher-status c onsolidate with class and other devalued
person fails to honor this implicit bargain, the categoric memberships.
tension in the encounter will increase, but most While people may lower their expectations
people, most of the time, implicitly realize what when consistently not realized, such is more diffi
is at stake: constant tension or mild positive cult to do for expectations generated by
2 Integrating and Disintegrating Dynamics in Human Societies 33

transactional needs that are part of the person ’ s 1. Verifi cation of identities : needs to verify one or
sense of who and what they are , above and more of the four basic identities that individuals present
in all encounters
beyond their
memberships in categoric units. Hence, even as
people come to accept a certain consistent level of (a) Core - identity : the conceptions and emotions
that individuals have about themselves as persons
failure in meeting needs, the corrosive effects of that they carry to most encounters
negative emotional arousal, often accompanied
by repression, further stock the pool of nega-
(b) Social - identity : the conception that
tive emotions that can undermine societal individuals have of themselves by virtual of their
integration. membership in categoric units which, depending
Table 2.1 lists the universal transactional upon the situation, will vary in salience to self and
needs that drive the behaviors of individuals in others; when salient, individuals seek to have others
verify their social identity
virtually every encounter of interpersonal
behavior (Turner 1987 , 1988 , 2002 , 2007 ,
2010b ). These needs vary in the relative power, (c) Group - identity : the conception that
individuals have about their incumbency in corporate
as is captured in the rank-ordering implied by the
units (groups, organizations, and communities)
list in Table 2.1 . and/or their identifi cation with the members,
As the ranking in the table denotes, verifi structure, and culture of a corporate unit; when
cation of various levels of i dentity is the most individuals have a strong sense of identifi cation with
a corporate unit, they seek to have others verify this
powerful transactional need; and the ranking of
identity
these various types of selves (from core-self down
through social-, group-, and role-identities)
indicate their relative power to arouse negative or (d) Role - identity : the conception that
individuals have about themselves as role players,
positive emotions. The second most powerful particularly roles embedded in corporate units nested
need is, I believe, the need to feel that one has in institutional domains; the more a role-identity is
gained a profi t in exchanges of resources— both lodged in a domain, the more likely will individuals
intrinsic and extrinsic—with others. Human need to have this identity verifi ed by others
calculations of profi t are determined by the value
of resources received for those given up as costs 2. Making a profi t the exchange of resources
and investments (accumulated costs), evaluated : needs to feel that the receipt of resources by persons
in encounters exceeds their costs and investments in
against various cultural standards of fairness and securing these resources and that their shares of
justice. The third most powerful need is one that I resources are just compared to (a) the shares that others
have added in recent work, and it emphasizes receive in the situation and (b) reference points that are
achieving a sense of effi cacy in interaction, or the used to establish what is a just share
sense that one has some control over what will
occur and what the outcomes will be. The fourth 3. Effi cacy : needs to feel that one is in control
need is a need for group inclusion, or the sense of the situation and has the individual capacity and
opportunity to direct ones own conduct, despite
that one is sociocultural constraints
part of the ongoing fl ow of the interaction. The fi
fth is a sense of trust that depends up the
4. Group inclusion : needs to feel that one is a
predictability of self and others respective actions,
part of the ongoing fl ow of interaction in an encounter;
the ability to fall into what Collins ( 2004 ) and the more focused is the encounter, the more
rhythmic synchronization in talk and body powerful is this need
movements, and the sense that others are being
sincere and respective to self. These fi ve trans- 5. Trust : needs to feel that others’ are
Table 2.1 Transactional needs generating expectation predictable, sincere, respective of self, and capable of
states rhythmic sustaining synchronization
34 J.H. Turner

6. Facticity : needs to feel that, for the purposes all— encounters. This bias thus assures some
of the present interaction, individuals share a common degree of integration at the micro level, and if
inter-subjectivity, that matters in the situation are as
they seem, and that the situation has an obdurate suffi ciently consistent over encounters and across
character situations, the positive emotions generated can
break the hold of proximal bias and begin to form
commitments to meso and macro structures and
their cultures in a society.
actional needs are the most powerful, and they Yet, when people consistently do not meet the
have the greatest effect on, fi rst, establishing expectations arising from their transactional
expectations in a situation and on, secondly, the needs across encounters in an array of corporate
intensity of the emotional reaction, whether units in different institutional domains, the
positive or negative, for success or failure in negative emotions will be particularly painful
meeting expectations and perceiving that others because need states are internal to the individual
are positively or negatively sanctioning a person. and, as noted earlier, are part of a person’s basic
The sixth need for facticity will arouse highly sense of who they are and how they should be
negative emotions when not met, as when treated. So, failing to meet even lowered
individuals do not achieve the sense that they are expectations (from past readjustment downward
experiencing the situation in the same manner, but of these expectations) arouses not only emotions
it is not as powerful as the other need states; and like shame, alienation, and withdrawal from
when the sense of facticit y is achieved, it does not commitments to macrostructures but also
arouse strong positive emotions. proactive emotions like anger and needs for
People in most encounters, even those among vengeance to strike out at the source of this
unequals, are typically trying to meet each others failure. The distal bias and the use of external
transactional needs because, to fail to do so, will attributions toward meso and macrostructures
breach an encounter and often arouse intense will increase disaffection from social structures,
negative emotions, especially if an identity or and rapidly erode commitments to all levels of
sense of profi t is denied by others. Not only are social reality, except those that continue to offer
the expectations not realized, but others are likely some chance of meeting expectations.
to be seen as responsible, thus fi lling the
encounter with negative emotions that are diffi
cult for all to endure. And so, if individuals can 2.4 Mesodynamics of
understand the nature of expectations arising from Integration
these needs—and people are very adept at reading
these expectations in the gestures of others—they T he macro and micro levels of reality meet in the
will do so, if they possibly can. And if they cannot meso level, composed of corporate and categoric
get a fi rm initial reading about each other’s units. Almost every encounter is embedded in a
expectations, they will tread “interpersonal” corporate unit revealing a division of labor and
water and stay in a highly ritualized mode of several categoric units composed of persons who
conduct until they have a better sense of which are placed into variously evaluated social
identity is most salient in the situation, which categories. Corporate units are the building blocks
resources are in play in exchanges, what will of institutional domains, but once these domains
make others feel a sense of effi cacy, what is are formed, corporate units are also the conduits
involved in securing a sense of being part of the by which the culture and structure of the macro
action, and what is necessary to communicate a realm makes its down and imposes
sense of trust. This positive bias to most expectations—derived from societal-level values,
interactions is part of the proximal bias; and it is institutional ideologies and the symbolic media
one reason why people are able to experience used to develop these ideologies, meta-
positive emotions in most—but, obviously, not ideologies, corporate units beliefs, norms of the
2 Integrating and Disintegrating Dynamics in Human Societies 35

division of labor of corporate units and, fi nally, structural fi elds generated by the structure of the
expectations states derived from these norms that stratifi cation system and the meta-ideology
will guide interaction in micro encounters. legitimating this system. Let me fi rst take on the
Categoric units are the building blocks of the fi elds and niches of corporate units.
macro realm, via their effects on the formation of
a system of stratifi cation in society, whereby
social strata or classes are, to various degrees, 2.4.1 Fields and Niches Among
consolidated with memberships in non-class Corporate Units
categoric units, such as ethnicity/race, religious
affi liation, gender, age, national origins, and the The institutional domains in which corporate
like. Stratifi cation systems are created by the units are embedded constitute, on the one hand, a
unequal distribution of the generalized symbolic set of resource niches in which corporate units
media summarized in Table 11.2 as valued seek resources necessary to function, and on the
resources and legitimated by the meta-ideologies other, a cultural and structural fi eld. The
that form from the circulation of generalized emergence of organizational ecology (e.g.,
symbolic media across sets of institutional Hannan and Freeman 1977 , 1989 ) changed the
domains. As such, the meta-ideologies of the way organizations and, potentially, corporate
stratifi cation system set up status beliefs and units more generally are analyzed, whereas, the
expectations states for individuals in encounters so-called “new institutionalism” (Powell and
who are members of diverse categoric units that DiMaggio 1991 ; Friedland and Alford 1991 ;
are typically differentially evaluated in terms of Fligstein and McAdam 2012) ) did the same but
their moral worth. in a less useful way than organizational ecology.
When the conditions outlined for macro-level In the new institutionalism, the fi eld of any given
integration are in place, then the structures of the organization is other organizations, which is
macro and meso realms are well integrated, and if certainly true but misses the critical point that
the culture associated with these structures is also other organizations are part of emergent
well connected in the patterned outlined above, institutional domains with their own macro-level
beliefs and norms at the meso level provide clear structures and cultures that are sustained by the
expectation states for micro level behaviors macro modes of integration examined earlier. Let
among individuals in encounters. Conversely, if me fi rst examine what organizational ecology
there are gaps, inconsistencies, failures to embed adds to a view of integrative dynamics in
or if integration is achieve by segregation and societies, and then turn to the notion of fi eld
consolidations within and between corporate and emerging from the new institutionalism.
categoric units, then expectations may be
somewhat clear but they are likely to generate 2.4.1.1 The Ecology of Corporate Units
negative emotions at the level of the encounter. In When attention shifts to the ecology of corporate
so doing, they erode integration by reducing units, instead of just organizations, the ideas of
commitments of persons to meso and the macro both urban and organizational ecology become
structures and cultures built up from meso relevant (Turner 2015 ; Irwin 2015 ), as does a
structures. These dynamics have been discussed more micro view of groups as seeking resource
in the sections on macro and micro integration, niches. Macro-level dynamics of integration
but they can be given additional focus by viewing organize the environments of corporate units,
corporate units as operating within cultural and once they have been built up into institutional
structural fi elds generated by the institutional domains that distribute resources generating
domains in which they are lodged and the modes stratifi cation as a macro-level system. These
of integrating corporate units with and across environments can be seen as distributions of
institutional domains. Similarly, focus is achieved various types of resources—demographic,
by examining the dynamics of consolidation and material, cultural, and structural—needed to
intersection of categoric units in cultural and
36 J.H. Turner

sustain the operation of a corporate unit. One by increasing positive emotional arousal and
generalization is that when institutional domains commitments to macro structures and their
are integrated by differentiation and cultures and, thus, increasing micro-level
interdependencies, the number of resource niches integration of macro structures and their cultures.
dramatically increases, especially as markets and Differentiation and dynamism of resource-
other distributive infrastructures move resources seeking corporate units also increases integration
across institutional domains. And, as the number by encouraging such institutional domains as
of resource niches increases, the greater will be polity and law to rely upon (a) material incentives
the pressures for further differentiation within and (thereby creating new resource niches) more than
between the corporate units in diverse coercive or administrative power, which will
institutional domains; and hence, the greater will decrease resources available to corporate units,
be the number of c orporate units organizing a and (b) more on positivistic law than
population. As this number increases, selection traditionalism and rigid systems (e.g., religious)
pressures build for further mechanisms of macro- of moral codes to direct corporate-unit activities.
level integration outlined earlier relying more The result is that tensions and confl icts among
upon interdependencies more than domination, corporate units can be negotiated and resolved in
and for more equitable distribution of generalized various political and legal forums without
symbolic media as resources within the system of resorting to coercive domination. Moreover,
stratifi cation. And as differentiation among when an arena of politics and positivistic law exist
corporate unit increases, so will the level of as regulatory mechanisms of integration
intersection among members of diverse categoric (Luhmann 1982 ), competition among corporate
units across the divisions of labor of corporate units will be less likely to evolve into open and
units in a greater number of institutional domains. potentially violent confl ict that would increase
A related set of generalizations arise from a the disintegrative potential in a society.
view of corporate units as seeking diverse Thus, integrated ecosystems at the societal
resources in niches, in which the competition for level require internal capacities to regulate
resources is regulated by markets and quasi competition for resources. Markets represent one
markets. Organizations in particular, but other mechanisms for doing so, but the co-evolution of
corporate units as well, will compete not just for a polity relying more on incentives than coercion
clients, members, and incumbents but also the and a legal system built around the capacity to
additional resources that they may bring to an adjust legal codes and contracts to new conditions
organization (sales receipts, dues, positive (positivistic law) decrease the likelihood that
feelings, learning, knowledge, loyalty, regulated competition in markets will evolve into
competitiveness, etc.). The result will be that coercive dynamics revolving around strategies
generalized symbolic media will tend to fl ow employing violent confl ict to gain access to
across different corporate units within and across resources.
institutional domains, providing a basis for Yet, as resource niches become too densely
integration; and if this integration is built up by population by corporate units, they can fail
intersections between corporate and categoric (Hannan and Freeman 1977) , thereby also failing
units, these intersections will reduce tensions to meet the expectations of their incumbents.
associated with inequalities and, thereby, increase Moreover, systems regulated by markets, even
integration. Further, as both differentiation and those with political and legal controls, are
resource- seeking efforts of corporate units inherently unstable, often resulting in
encourage recruitment of clients, customers, contractions of the number of corporate units in
members, and incumbents, individuals in a resource niches, and thus, causing once again a
society will have access to more generalized failure of individuals to meet expectations for
symbolic media as resources across diverse resources. The result is that even in systems where
resource-seeking and resource-giving corporate domination is low-key and revolves around
units across diverse institutional domains, thereby manipulation of material incentive and
2 Integrating and Disintegrating Dynamics in Human Societies 37

positivistic law are vulnerable to the vagaries of confi guration mechanisms that emerge provide
competition in resource niches, which can structural templates for corporate units to built up
increase disintegrative pressures at all levels of their structures so as to be able to fi t into patterns
social organization. of interdependencies generated by these
mechanisms. If, for example, exchange becomes
2.4.1.2 Structural and Cultural Fields a dominant mechanism for creating and
The new institutionalism tended to see the fi elds sustaining interdependencies, then corporate units
of organizations as revealing such properties as will develop structures designed to use market
“logics” that directed the activities of forces to secure resources and build up their
organizations in their environments. While there structures, and they will develop culture codes
is a certain vagueness to terms like “logics,” I viewing competition for resources as an
interpret the underlying idea in the following way: acceptable mode of conduct. Conversely, let us
the integration of macro structures and their say that domination becomes the central
cultures generate cultural and structural mechanisms for ordering relations in a society,
environments to which not only organizations, coupled with high levels of inequality and
but also all other types of corporate units must segregation among members of different
adapt. The modes and mechanisms of structural categoric units. The emerging system of
integration at the macro level of social relationships among corporate units, and the
organization provide create and sustain a system culture that they develop, will be very different
of relationships among corporate units (and than one based upon market forces guiding
categoric units as well) to which any given exchanges among corporate units. All existing
corporate unit must adapt, and in many cases also and emergent corporate units in such a system
adopt as part of its structure and culture. will need to organize themselves so as to fi t into
Similarly, the cultural systems of moral coding this template or, if one prefers, “logic” of social
(see Fig. 7 .3 in Chap. 7) attached to institutional organization at the macro level.
domains and the stratifi cation system provide a
set of highly moralized instructions in their
ideologies and meta-ideologies to all corporate Cultural Fields There are always idiosyncratic
units; and in so doing, this system of moral elements to the cultural systems that emerge as
codings provides beliefs, norms, and expectations societies evolve; these elements are shaped by the
directing incumbents in the divisions of labor of unique features of a population’s history, its
corporate units and for members in categoric geographical location, and its previous modes of
units. Let me now elaborate on both structural and integration. Still, there are certain general classes
cultural fi elds as integrative mechanisms. of cultural systems operating in all societies. All
societies reveal value systems, all evidence
Structural Fields A structural fi eld is created by ideologies of existing institutional domains, all
the macro-level integration on corporate units as reveal meta-ideologies legitimating the stratifi
institutional domains evolve. For example, if cation system and evaluations of members of
segmentation is the dominant mechanism of categoric units, all generate belief system derived
integration, existing structures and their cultures from ideologies and meta-ideologies governing
provide both organizational templates and the operation of corporate and categoric unit
systems of moral codings that, in essence, need to dynamics, and all impose micro-level
be copied. Segmentation always generates expectations states at the level of the encounter
structural and cultural fi elds, even as other drawn from these meso-level belief systems.
mechanisms become more prominent. For Thus, cultural fi elds will always reveal a pattern
instance, as differentiation increases and, in turn, or logic based upon these invariant dimensions of
as differentiation forces the evolution of new how culture structures itself in relation to social
mechanisms of integration revolving around structures, and vice versa.
building up interdependencies, the particular
38 J.H. Turner

The cultural fi eld of any corporate or than one that does not have such a history or one
categoric unit is thus composed of the general that has a history of external trade relations rather
value premises of the society, the ideologies and than warfare with it neighbors. But, the point here
meta- ideologies that evolve to legitimate is not so much the prediction but the realization
activities in institutional domains, the beliefs that, for whatever reason, the particular confi
shaping corporate- unit culture derived from guration of mechanism of integration that evolve
ideologies and the status beliefs drawn from meta- in a society at the macro level will shape the confi
ideologies shaping the evaluation of members of guration of the cultural fi elds that evolve, and
categoric, and the expectations states in local vice versa. And so, in trying to understand how
encounters constrained by these belief systems. cultural fi elds integrate societies, it is necessary
The content of any of these of moral codings will, to understand how they were used during the
of course, varying by virtue of unique empirical period when new kinds of corporate units were
and h istorical events (which cannot be so easily forming and beginning to build up (a) new and
theorized) and by the particular confi guration of diverse institutional domains and (b) a stratifi
institutional domains that exists and the modes cation system composed of categoric units created
and mechanisms by which these domains and the by the unequal distribution of generalized
stratifi cation system are integrated. Once we symbolic media as resources by these new
know these structural fi elds that have been corporate units.
created, it becomes possible to determine the By viewing cultural fi elds in this way, we can
structure of the cultural fi elds, and vice versa. For see their effect on meso-level integration.
example, if religion becomes a dominant Corporate and categoric units are always being
institutional domain and consolidates coercive forced to adapt to the more macro-level cultural
power and uses this power as a mean of systems—values, ideologies, and meta-
domination, the ideology of religion and the meta- ideologies (as well as texts and technologies)—
ideology that is built around religion will become and as they do so, they implicitly seek to
the cultural fi eld to which all corporate and incorporate the logic or the commands of these
categoric units must adapt and adopt. Present day moral codes. And to the degree that the belief
Iran offers a good illustration of such a cultural fi systems evolve around corporate units within
eld. In contrast, if the institutional revolves institutional domains and around status
around economic trade with other populations and differences among members of categoric units are
within a society, the cultural fi eld that evolves consistent with, and follow from, the ideologies,
will be very different because it is more likely to meta-ideologies, and general values of the macro
be created to justify exchange as a dominant realm, they promote integration at the meso level
mechanism of integration revolving around because they present a coherent cultural fi eld. As
interdependencies, and the ideology of this they do so, they increase the likelihood that
domain will be the center of meta-ideologies from expectations at the micro level will be clear and,
other institutional domains that are used to thereby, realized at least to some degree, thus
legitimate the stratifi cation system, and vice promoting integration at the micro level. And, as
versa. This cultural fi eld will then shape the beliefs and expectations states at the meso and
evolution and modes of integration among micro level reproduce the cultural fi eld and the
corporate units that evolve in this society. The structural arrangement that it legitimates, these fi
emergence of capitalism, as described by Weber elds thus reproduce the structures and cultures of
([1905] 1930) and Braudel (1977 ) provide a the macro realm, thereby promoting integration.
good illustration such fi elds. The differences T he converse is true if there are dramatic
between these fi elds cannot always be predicted, discontinuities and inconsistencies in the moral
but a reasonable hypothesis would be that a codes of the macro realm, or if beliefs are not
population with a history of confl ict with derived from existing ideologies and meta-
neighboring populations would produce a cultural ideologies but, instead, are evolving on-the-
fi eld built more around ideologies of domination ground as actors seeks to justify new types of
2 Integrating and Disintegrating Dynamics in Human Societies 39

sociocultural formations. Such a system will not across corporate units in more institutional
be integrated and will be likely to experience domains, and up the hierarchical divisions of
dramatic change, as ideologies of existing labor in these units, there are typically
institutional systems come into confl ict with new subpopulations that are over- represented in lower
ones that are evolving or with new types of social classes and that are subject to prejudicial
corporate units challenging the existing “logics” status beliefs, even in societies with moral codes
of the fi elds in which corporate units had emphasizing equality among persons and/or
heretofore operated. equalities of opportunity. Consolidation at the
2.4.2 Intersection and meso level limits rates of interaction between
Consolidation members of valued and devalued categoric units
at the micro level and, if interaction occurs, it is
Among Categoric Units
structured around inequalities in status,
T o the extent that structural and cultural fi elds, differential stigma imposed by status beliefs and
as well as competition for resources by corporate expectation states drawn from meta-ideologies,
units in various resource niches, increase rates of and often open discrimination. Thus, the
discrimination against members of devalued persistence of consolidation in human societies
categoric units, they promote consolidation of assures that there will always be powerful
parameters marking categoric unit memberships disintegrative pressures working against those
with differential rates of access to resource- promoting integration.
distributing corporate units, with varying rates of Intersection of memberships of variously
mobility up the divisions of labor of such valued categoric units across all types of
corporate units and, in so doing, with over- or corporate units in all institutional domains, and
under- representation members of categoric units mobility up and down the divisions of labor of
in the hierarchy of classes in a society. When these units, increases rates of interaction at the
domination and segregation are prominent micro level will all work to reduce the salience of
mechanisms of integration at the macro level of status beliefs at the meso level which, in turn,
social organization, consolidation is most likely reduces the power of beliefs that legitimate
and severe, but all societies evidence some degree discrimination. Intersection becomes more likely
of consolidation of memberships in categoric in societies using differentiation and
units with locations in divisions of labor of interdependencies as macro-level mechanisms of
corporate units, even those relying upon integration, and very high rates of intersection
interdependencies regulated by polities relying reduce the power of stigmatizing and prejudicial
heavily on the material incentive base of power status beliefs, which in turn make discrimination
and by positivistic law. Consolidation also occurs, and segregation less acceptable and more diffi
as is evident in societies like the United States, cult to legitimate with prejudicial beliefs pulled
that evidence egalitarian tenets in value premises from meta-ideologies, thereby changing the
and most institutional ideologies and meta- cultural and structural fi elds of all meso-level
ideologies. Thus, consolidation is a powerful corporate units.
force in all human societies, beginning with the The result is increased integration of a society,
emergence of advanced horticultural forms albeit sometimes chaotic because of the constant
during societal evolution and continuing well into play of confl icting interests and the normal
the post-industrial age and, no doubt, into the problems with markets regulating corporate-unit
future. Thus, all societies reveal disintegrative competition in resource niches. But this kind of
potential from consolidation, and the higher is the chaos occurs in systems that are more fl exible
level of consolidation, the greater is this potential. and thus able to adapt to more frequent but less
E ven in societies with high rates of severe disintegrative forces, particularly when
intersection, which increase mobility among compared to societies where coercive domination
members of variously evaluated categoric units is the master form of integration. Societies that
effectively use domination may appear less
40 J.H. Turner

chaotic on the surface but the underlying tensions distinct levels of social reality, and then, across
arising from inequalities, discrimination and levels of reality, we place ourselves in a position
segregation, and consolidation of membership in to develop a more robust theory. This chapter
categoric unit with access to resource- represents my best effort to pull together what are
distribution corporate units bode for often confl icting strains of theorizing over the
disintegrative problems in the future. The breakup last 100 years and place them in one, reasonably
of Yugoslavia or the forced dismantling of the coherent, framework for understanding the
Husain regime in Iraq document what happens dynamics of the social universe. What emerges is
when cracks in the system of domination appear. a composite, but a composite of ideas that are
2.5 Conclusion linked conceptually. The result is at a minimum
the beginnings of a more robust and unifi ed
In this chapter, I have phrased the arguments in theory of integration in human societies.
the terminology that I have used in recent
decades. But the ideas come from all over
sociology and from thinkers in both classical and
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Power in Organizational Society: 3
Macro, Meso and Micro

Yingyao Wang and Simone Polillo

3.1 Introduction S. Polillo


The Department of Sociology , University of
Virginia , Charlottesville , VA , USA e-mail:
What makes the status quo persistent in the face Sp4ft@virginia.edu
of confl ict and inequality, and by the same token,
rationalization, giving rise to new forms of
why social change tends to be rare in spite of
authority (rational-legal authority) and social
pervasive injustice, are perennial problems in
control (formal organization, bureaucracy). With
social theory. The classical founders of
the spread of rationalization, Weber suggested,
sociology— Marx, Weber, and Durkheim—all
social confl ict would become increasingly
attempted to grasp the shifting foundations of
institutionalized, attenuated, and ultimately
social order, and the emergence of new forms of
neutralized as the “iron cage” of passionless
confl ict, in the context of rapid industrialization.
bureaucracy tightened its grip. Durkheim was the
Each of them, of course, focused a different
most optimistic among the three—though of
theoretical lens on these problems, each
course he was very attuned to what he called the
foregrounding different institutional arenas: the
anomic effects of industrialization. He argued
economy (Marx), politics and organizations
that the most radical change was in the nature of
(Weber) and culture/religion (Durkheim). Marx
the division of labor. Unlike in “mechanically”
highlighted the revolutionary nature of the
integrated societies, where the division of labor
capitalist system, and identifi ed the dialectic
was shallow, and face-to-face, religious rituals
between the rapidly changing forces of
were suffi cient for the reproduction of a stable
production and the slower moving relations of
normative order, in complex modern society the
production as a source of temporary stability—a
division of labor exhibited unprecedented levels
stability that in the long run would give way to
of interdependence and specialization. This
revolution. Weber identifi ed a different
called forth a new form of solidarity, “organic”
determinant of social order, that he believed
solidarity as he called it, which would
extended far beyond the economic realm: the
normatively integrate society through values of
intensifi cation of
individual dignity, autonomy, and fairness.
T he legacy of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim
Y. Wang () remains relevant to contemporary discussions of
The Watson Institute for International and Public the nature and sources of stability and control in
Affairs , Brown University , Providence , RI , modern society, though the terms of the debate
USA e-mail: yingyao_wang@brown.edu have interpenetrated in new ways. On the one

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 43


S. Abrutyn (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary Sociological Theory,
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32250-6_3
Y. Wang and S. Polillo

hand, contemporary discussion no longer refl ects discussion differently, in terms of levels of
a simplistic tripartite distinction of the three analysis. We depart from Weber’s thesis that
theorists on the basis of the institutional arena rationalization and increased, organization-based
they prioritized (the economy for Marx, control are two defi ning features of
organizational politics for Weber, and contemporary society. In one respect, we move
culture/religion for Durkheim). Nevertheless, on beyond older theories of power that would tend
the other hand, as discussions of control, to defi ne it in terms of coercion, meant to
regulation, and power have crystallized into “overcome resistance (of the power subject) in
modern institutional analysis, different ways of achieving a desired objective or results.” (Pfeffer
combining insights from Marx, Weber, and 1981: 2). For if power is as ubiquitous and as
Durkheim have led to distinctive approaches coervice a phenomenon as these scholarly works
within that general framework. acknowledge, we should be living in a dim world,
Marx and Weber have been built upon in what suffering from ceaseless emotional distress and
W. Richard Scott ( 2001 ) identifi es as the physical constrains. This is an exaggerated
“regulative pillar” of modern institutional scenario once squared with our actual
analysis: a tradition that emphasizes the ways that experiences with power.
rules and laws reproduce power systems through More recent scholarship has gone beyond the
the coercive imposition of organizational enterprise of conceptualization to probe the
mandates and standards. A second way Marx and dimensions (Reed 2013 ), forms (Poggi 2001 ),
Weber have been jointly drawn from, with or sources (Mann 2012a , b , c , d ) of power.
substantial borrowings from Durkheim as well, is In categorizing the workings of power, these lines
by focusing on what Scott dubs the “normative of research suggest that power is plural and
pillar” of institutions: the ways in which norms largely “context and relationship specifi c”
and values invest social life with meanings that in (Pfeffer 1981 : 3). Therefore power is a concept
turn embody prescriptions, evaluations, and which we should treat as “sensitizing device” that
obligations. Control, from this perspective, is a orients us to “certain forms and contents in a
function of individuals internalizing, and acting social relationship” (Bacharach and Lawler 1980
on the basis of, normative orientations. A third : 15) or a form of causality (Reed 2013 ).
tradition is more squarely Durkhemeian, with This chapter is written in the same spirit of
strong Weberian infl uence as well. In line with explaining power in terms of how forms and
Durkheim, it foregrounds the “cognitive- contents of power are constructed. We are
cultural” dimension of institutions, namely, the interested in understanding how power operates,
shared conceptions and schemas that help instead of what power is (in this respect, see
individuals constitute a meaningful social reality. Foucault 1980 ). Unlike Foucault, we do so by
Following Weber, this tradition emphasizes the focusing on different levels of observation and
disciplinary effect of such systems of cultural analysis—respectively the macro, meso, and
regulation. Cutting across these three pillars of micro levels. Scale matters as it affects the forms
institutional analysis is a shared recognition that and nature of power. We argue that most existing
modern social order is to a large extent an research implicitly imagines power either as a
organizational accomplishment. By the same macro phenomenon shaping large-scale social
token, the regulative, normative, and cultural- outcomes or as a parameter of micro-level
cognitive dimensions are pillars of institutional relations. What it neglects is the meso-level of
analysis because they highlight how, under what power relations, manifested and heavily
conditions, and to what extent the attributes and regulated in formal organizations. Distinct from
relational properties of organizations contribute interpersonal or intra- small-g roup relations,
to the persistence of the status quo. formal organizations are bounded entities that
In this chapter, we zero in on power as a form have clearly prescribed rules governing the
of regulation. While we are attentive to all three pattern of interactions among organizational
dimensions of institutions, and their effect on members, and thus possess formal structures. As
power, regulation and control, we organize our organizations permeate our social lives, this
Organizational Society: Macro, Meso and Micro 45

“organizational society” enables a twin goal, or atheory (Bourdieu 1980 , 1984 , 1988 , 1996a ,
“paradox:” organizational members are “freer b ). The term “fi eld,” which Bourdieu derives
from coercion through the power of command of from the physics of electromagnetic forces, refers
superiors than most people have been, yet men in to “a confi guration of objective relations
positions of power today probably exercise more between positions.” (Bourdieu and Wacquant
control than any tyrant ever has” (Blau and 1992 : 97) Fields impose causal forces on actors
Schenherr 1971 : 347). who reside within them, forces that are mediated
This chapter sets to synthesize the by the positions they occupy within those fi elds.
mechanisms of how this has been achieved. By The specifi c expression and measurement of
drawing attention to the distinctive forms and power is capital, with its amount proportional to
natures of power relations at this meso-level, ourpositions and its types specifi c to fi elds.
end goal is to extend power analysis from the According to Bourdieu, capital varies in volume
macro and micro-level to analytical interactions and can also be of different types, e.g. social,
among all three levels of analyses. Power fl ows economic, cultural, or symbolic capital; different
both upwards and downwards, so that the types of capital can be converted to one another.
interaction and conversion of different forms of On account of the logic of conversion, power in
power at different levels can generate new sets ofBourdieusian theory is the generalized medium
of exchange in fi elds, similar in this respect to
emergent and interstitial structures and relations.
Mann’s conceptualization.
B ourdieu’s notions of power and fi eld are
macro-oriented in that Bourdieusian fi elds, fi rst,
3.2 The Macro Approach to
ontologically and causally precede individual
Power actions, and second, they produce macro-
outcomes. Chief among these outcomes is the
From a macro perspective, power is a force that formation of social classes, political elites, and
shapes large-scale social formations and
the bureaucracy. The logic of specifi c fi elds also
outcomes. This force derives from macro
determines the value and the exchange rates
conceptual entities such as spheres of action, fi
between different types of capital. Bourdieu’s
elds or institutions (Abrutyn 2013a ).
theory is therefore a full-fl edged macro-meso
Michael Mann’s voluminous works of the theory. The operation of forces in fi elds shapes
“history of power” are a prominent example of
the general “topology” and distribution of social
this macro approach to power (Mann 2012a , b ,
spaces by clustering those who occupy similar
c , d ). According to Mann, the constellations of
positions in the fi elds and generating hierarchies
four sources of power—ideological, economic,
and oppositions among these clusters. Social
military, and political, coterminous with four classes, formed within a fi eld in this fashion, can
kinds of human needs and spheres of actions, form alliances with their counterparts across fi
determine the structures of societies in human
elds, generating oft-unforeseen social
history. The force of power is causal: power
repercussions that go well beyond class
triggers large- scale historical transformations.
formation. Recent scholarship, for instance, sets
Different sources of power, imagined as out to illuminate how interactions across fi elds,
independent causal chains, can join each other in involving multi- layered confl icts, and requiring
different constellations and sequences, and
geographical, administrative coordination,
produce emergent social entities, such as nation
generate large-scale change (Gorski 2013 ). For
states, and mobilize new actors, such as social
example, as nineteenth- century German offi
classes. Nations and classes are examples of
cials left the bureaucratic fi eld in the metropole
macro-outcomes to which Mann’s historical to manage German colonies, they carried over
analysis draws attention.
and localized existing power struggles among
The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu also
them. Colonial offi cials also vied with one other
perceives power as the exertion of forces. He
on the amount of “ethnographic capital” they
borrows this analytical architecture from fi eld
would hold, which in return fed back into, and
Y. Wang and S. Polillo

intensifi ed, status competition at home coincidence that the authors who are most
(Steinmetz 2007 ). explicit in their theorizing of power, such as
Institutional theory shares much with Michael Mann ( 2012a , b , c , d ), Shmuel N.
Bourdieu, but instead of fi elds, institutional Eisenstadt
theorists attribute the source of power to another (1993 ) , Pierre Bourdieu ( 1994 , 2015) , and
high-order entity—institutions. Institutions are James Scott ( 1999 , are also meticulous scholars
“macro-level structural and cultural spheres or of pro) cesses of political centralization, state
domains in which actors, resources, and authority formation, and governance. According to
systems are distributed in bounded ecological Eisenstadt, in early periods, power and the state
space” (Abrutyn 2013b) . Major examples of were almost synonymous for good empirical
institutions are the market, the state, the reasons. The formation of the “polity” is the
corporation, the profession, religion, and the effect of power itself (Eisenstadt 1995; Abrutyn
family. Institutions are powerful in that they and Lawrence 2010 ). The emergence of polities
impose overarching “institutional logics” from kinship organizations was initiated by a
(Thornton et al. 2012 ). Institutional logics are group of non-kin-based leaders who specialized
the “socially constructed, historical patterns of in power possession and generation, using
material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, whatever means happened to be available to
and rules” which inform and compel actors to them. As polities formed, power became a
“produce and reproduce material subsistence, generalized means of control, and then a
organize time and space, and provide meaning to commodity. Whoever was interested in gaining
their social reality” (Thornton and Ocasio 1999 : power, and capable of holding on to it, could bid
804). Empirically, the point where actors cease to for it. This new trend built up a perpetual sense of
bear the infl uence of such institutional logic is uncertainty among rulers, who responded by
the point where institutions reach their seeking to stabilize their relationship with the
boundaries. Identifying the intensity and ruled. “Society”, in its opposition to the political
boundaries of such institutional power, is a task center, was called into existence in this fashion.
similar to that of delineating the boundaries of S tate-driven projects of making societies
distinct institutions. Various institutional more “legible,” whereby political and
theorists describe these “institutional logics” in administrative elites would construct policy on
different terms and languages. But they all agree the basis of their perception of society, turned out
that institutions have the capacity to steer to be catastrophic for local traditions and local
individuals to act in a concerted and predictable knowledge. As James Scott highlights, the recent
fashion. This often occurs in the context of century of human history has seen no shortage of
dramatic events that capture the attention of a modernist, technocratic, and destructive
wide public: power can then be considered programs that are a direct consequence of states
“performative” (Reed 2013) , in the sense of “formatting” society and using those maps as
being attached to an organizational capacity to blueprints for political control. Scott thus draws
control how events, facts, and ideas are presented our attention to a unique type of epistemic power
to, and perceived by, a larger audience. Power that the state possesses in the enterprise of
carries an emergent status: it exists prior to, other “seeing like a state.” This proposition is a useful
than in the midst of, any concrete courses of complement and necessary caveat to Weber’s
actions, in macro social entities (Thornton and emphasis on rationalization and Eisenstadt’s
Ocasio 2008 ). focus on centralization: it emphasizes how
By imagining power as a set of causal forces political control rests on a capacity to gather
shaping societies, macro understandings of information, and how the very process of
power render analytically legible some otherwise information-gathering is never politically neutral.
unobservable macro entities. This scholarly This strand of research on state formation
approach to power as a macro-phenomenon grounds empirically the analysis of the formation
pivots on an understanding of the rise of the most and institutionalization of power as a macro
important macro-entities of all—the state. It is no phenomenon. To an unprecedented scale, states
Organizational Society: Macro, Meso and Micro 47

have consolidated and expanded over vast swaths relationship will be in a position to carry out his
of territories. Geographical expansion has gone own will despite resistance” (Weber 1947 )
hand in hand with macro-social maneuvering on Similarly, Lukes concisely states the Weberian
the part of state builders, in their efforts to position as “A exercises power over B when A
establish a manageable relationship with an affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests”
increasingly differentiating society. Over time, (Lukes 2005: 34). Other power theorists
state-builders either isolated or incorporated downplay the resistance component in defi ning
different social groups into the orbit of political power but consistently portray power in terms of
decision-making. Sustaining the mammoth A–B relations. For example, Dahl posits that “A
institution of the state ultimate rests on the has power over B to the extent that he can get B
production of “long-range trust and meaning,” to do something which B would not otherwise
which gets built into the exercise of power and do” (Dahl 1957 : 202–203). Likewise, according
gears political arrangements towards “broader to Bell, Walker and Willer, power is “A’s
institutional goals and promises,” (Eisenstadt capacity to create change in B’s activity based in
1995 : 360–161) such as economic development, A’s control of sanctions.” (Bell et al. 2000 ).
administrative rationality and nation building. Social psychology and exchange theory have
The macro approach touches on the genesis of generated some of the most important insights on
power and also constitutes a wellspring for how power works at the level of micro-
research on the grand evolution of the nature of interactions. Focusing on the giving and
power to the present. receiving of valued resources, and often framing
exchanges in terms of cost, benefi ts, and
marginal utility—terms imported from
economics— this perspective is broadly
3.3 The Micro Approach to
concerned with an expectation of reciprocity that
Power builds up from repeated exchanges, and of the
implications of such expectations when the
Another strand of social theory examines power
exchange takes place in a situation of power
in micro settings. Micro settings refer to small-
imbalance. Thus Blau ( 1964 ) argues that over
scale social interactions ranging from ego-
time, exchanges of resources produce a
environment relationships, to dyadic interactions normative expectation that current levels of
and small-group dynamics. A small scope of
exchange will be sustained over time. Power is
inquiry is not the sole reason that we call it the
exercised through dramaturgical means, when
micro-approach to power. A micro perspective to
individuals enhance or even exaggerate the value
power also assumes that the presence of power,
of the resources they can bring to an exchange,
the state of being constrained and controlled, is manipulating perception and setting up
empirically actualized in direct contacts and expectations that validate this infl ated value
small-scale interactions, which makes a relational
down the line. More generally, power derives
measurement of power relations the most
from the fact the more individuals control
desirable. Conceptualizing power in terms of
resources that are indispensable, hard to procure
micro-settings is empirically intuitive, from alternative sources, and diffi cult to seize by
theoretically parsimonious, and has great force, the more they can demand compliance: a
validity.
surplus amount of allegiance that resource-poor
A relational understanding of power has
partners must offer to compensate for their weak
inspired and underpinned many of the classical
bargaining position. Over time, Blau argues,
defi nitions of power. In these defi nitions, power
escalating demands for compliance generate
is manifested in the dynamics of dyadic resentment towards perceived violation of norms
relationships, driven by asymmetrical possession
of reciprocity, thereby causing confl ict.
of resources, capacities or benefi ts. For example,
Emerson ( 1962 , 1964 ) similarly posits that
Weber famously defi nes power as “the
power is a function of resource dependence, and
probability that one actor within a social
it is especially salient when it is diffi cult for p
Y. Wang and S. Polillo

artners to the exchange to fi nd alternative ways networks under study in this tradition have
of obtaining those resources, and especially when become considerably large and appear “macro”
those resources are valuable. Power is used when in scale, the theoretical assumption about the
partners to the exchange jockey for better access source and distribution of power in networks is
to resources and better terms of exchange, in turn consistent with the micro approach under
causing a power imbalance that motivates their discussion. In stricter versions of the theory,
counterparts to engage in actions that reduce network ties almost invariably imply direct
dependence, actions that Emerson calls contacts between agents (in a tradition that
“balancing acts.” Cook and Emerson ( 1978) harkens back to classical studies of the diffusion
extend this argument by focusing on of innovations, such as Coleman et al. 1966 ). A
“commitment” between exchange partners, the different tradition draws from role theory and
tendency of partners to remain in an exchange specifi es power in terms of “structural
even when they could potentially get better terms equivalence,” similarities in patterns of relations
or better resources from others. Commitment is without implying direct contacts between
possible because, functioning as a long-term individuals. Throughout the studies, the power of
expectation that exchanges will continue over network positions is not conceived as an attribute
time, it lowers transaction costs, reduces derived from preexisting macro-entities. Instead,
uncertainty, and, more important to our it is a certain kind of leverage and a range of
discussion, decreases the likelihood of power choices built into constellations of relationships
being exercised. and patterns of interactions among individual
As a third party is introduced, a dyad becomes entities. The network notion of power tends to be
a triad. George Simmel offers an infl uential micro also because the transmission of such
thesis on how triads, and small group dynamics power, such as in the form of information,
by extension, qualitatively transforms power resource or reputation is via an on-the-ground
relations, therefore enriching our understanding construction of relationships.
of the relational sources of power. Simmel The last instance of micro settings is small
explains that the third party can gain tremendous groups. Dalh’s celebrated study of power in
leverage through maneuvering the relationship community politics illustrates this category (Dalh
between the two alters, for instance, by balancing 1961) . In his examination of the power structure
them against each other, or monopolizing in New Haven, he developed a pluralist view of
information fl ows between them. In both cases, power in which power exercise is a competitive
the third parties derive power from certain process in which different interest groups vied for
structural positions without necessarily control over decisions. Dalh’s theorization of
possessing resources of their own (Simmel and power has been discussed in several works; few
Wolff 1964 ). have dubbed it “micro.” We group his study
S immel’s thinking on social relations and together with other micro approaches on account
power keeps inspiring research on social of the way he introduced actors as independent
networks. One of the latter’s core analytical individual entities, and of the way he approached
mission has been to identify structural positions power as relational and interactional dynamics.
in networks and explain how these positions can Additionally, he also isolated a range of historical
generate power. Particularly infl uential in this and institutional factors and narrowed down the
regard is Burt’s work on brokerage through the focus to particular instances of decision-making
exploitation of “structural holes,” network settings where confl icts were the most visible
positions that allow individuals to uniquely and observable and power relations could be
connect (“bridge”) social clusters that would not directly measurable by decision outcomes. These
otherwise communicate (Burt 1992) . Structural epistemological and methodological aspects set
holes, argues Burt, afford individuals access to his study apart from the macro-approach to power
unique information, which individuals are then we have described.
able to recombine in new ways that gives them A n important critique to Dahl’s pluralist
leverage and advantage. Although the social model of decision-making can be derived from
Organizational Society: Macro, Meso and Micro 49

Ridgeway and Berger ( 1986 )’s model of power immediate environment within which power is
and prestige orders in small-group settings. experienced, challenged, and reformatted
Ridgeway and Berger argue that small groups, collectively (Tuner 2012 : 25). This is the
especially those focused on the accomplishment environment of formal organizations.
of a task, develop local understandings and F ormal organizations are omnipresent, but the
expectations of one another’s capacity to analysis of power has not been a prominent issue
meaningfully contribute to the task at hand. But in organization studies (Pfeffer 1981 : 9–10). The
they do not do so in a vacuum, as their vast majority of us are associated with formal
expectations are based on more diffuse organizations in one way or another, by either
understandings of whose status and whose power working for them, learning in them, or relying on
should be rewarded, regardless of the relevance them for goods or services. Examples of
of status attributes to the task at hand. Group organizations are numerous. Corporations,
activities therefore tend to reproduce social parties, schools, clubs, professional associations,
hierarchies and reinforce social inequality, in and international organizations are organizations
contrast with Dahl’s more optimistic view that devoted to economic, political, educational,
group’s mere access to decision-making arenas is recreational, professional, or normative purposes.
a hallmark and safeguard of democracy. This meso-level reality is not just an analytical
construct. It is such an ingrained part of our
empirical routines that we tend to take our
organizational environment for granted. Power,
3.4 Introducing the Meso-Level
as is routinized in careers, budgets, the divisions
The micro and macro notions of power do not of labor, and all other standard operating
exhaust the range of experiences we have with procedures and rules, paradoxically remains
power. We don’t constantly live in dyadic confl hidden in plain sight. In organized purposeful
icts. Our exchanges with society certainly go settings, the line between being compelled to do
beyond small group arrangements. We follow something and being capable of doing something
instructions and obey authorities, even when can be blurry and confl ated. Uncovering how
orders come from those whom we don’t have power operates, hides, and transfers in
prior contacts with. Power will be felt most organizations is therefore a necessary scholarly
strongly in observable confl icts at the level of exercise, especially if we aim to develop a fuller
interpersonal relations. Yet power exists across a understanding of how our intentions, behaviors,
variety of social forms. We are compelled to act and beliefs are regulated in organizational
in certain ways by more distant forces. The society.
macro-approach to power has strengthened our W hat are organizations and what are their key
ability to map out these structural forces. features? One of the most widely accepted defi
However, important questions remain. A nitions of formal organizations is offered by W.
particularly intriguing one has to do with the Richard Scott. Organizations are “collectivities
reach of power relations. For example, those who oriented to the pursuit of relatively specifi c goals
live in times of rapid social changes, or at the and exhibiting relatively highly formalized social
epicenter of a structure undergoing structures.” (Scott 1992: 23) To elaborate, these
transformation, will feel the impact of power collectivities organize social lives such that they
formation and redistribution most directly. But sustain long-term visions, aggregate courses of
the rest of the population will be affected by action, and give our existences collective
power relations only through several degrees of purposes independent of individual choices.
mediation. What micro and macro notions of Internally, organizations bear formalized
power leave unexplored, in short, is the meso- structures, of which hierarchies and
level architecture that regularizes micro- specialization through an internal division of
exchanges, bears the brunt of macro labor are two most prominent features. One
transformation, and constitutes the more should not underrate the extent to which formal
structures construct our social realities, a point to
Y. Wang and S. Polillo

which we will return later. For now, it should leave corporations and can establish its
suffi ce to say that formalization entails the relationship with corporations through various
abstraction of a large amount of concrete data so resources invested in them without having to
that further social action can be governed by that participate physically.
abstraction without having to “go behind it” W hile Coleman argues that the rise of
(Stinchcombe 2001) . Formal organizations corporate society increased the total sum of
arrange society by abstraction; they designate power in societies and therefore expanded
roles and positions, and regularize patterns of freedom and liberty, other authors offer mixed
interactions. Organizations inscribe these assessments. The classical author on
designations in binding charts, procedures, and bureaucracy, Max Weber, on the one hand,
rules so that goals, positions, roles, and patterns celebrates the effectiveness with which
of interactions outlive individual participants. In bureaucratic organizations rationalized capitalist
this sense, organizations, once created, achieve production and the administration of the state.
an emergent reality of their own. We enter an According to Weber, formal authority, in
organization expecting to accept the combination with specialized professional
organizational reality as it is and “socialize” into knowledge inscribed in bureaucratic positions,
it (Wanous et al. 1984 ; Hall 1987 ). provides an unprecedented legitimate foundation
to domination and ruling. One the other hand,
Weber alerts us to the dehumanizing effect of
3.4.1 A Brief History of the these “iron-cages.” Bureaucratic machines can
Emergence of thrive for the mere sake of reproducing
themselves (Weber 1978 ). This is the “bad” kind
Organizational Society
of formalism that Stinchcombe also refers to, a
formalism that does not serve substantial
Before we delve deeper into the question of how
purposes and prevents others from making
power operates in organizations, a brief history
improvements to the abstraction on which
on the emergency of organizational society will
successful formalization rests (Stinchcombe
be instructive. Various authors have refl ected on
2001) . Put more succinctly, both authors
how the ascendance of organizations have
highlight the very real possibility that formal
revolutionized pre-modern social structures and
organizations generate a new form of oppressive,
changed the power balance between different
even callous control.
segments of the populations. James Coleman
In the fi rst half of the twentieth century, the
(1974 ) provides a revealing account on the rise
rise of big corporations and the intensifi ed
of corporate actors that changed the distribution
bureaucratization of all spheres of lives prompted
of power in societies. This gradual movement
new waves of refl ection on how organizations
commenced from the “incorporation” of
have reconfi gured political and economic power.
churches, landed communities, and kings as these
Michels observes that how incumbents of
entities acquired the status of unifi ed actors with
powerful organizational structures would become
rights to own, contract, engage in transactions,
more interested in investing in the reproduction
and collectively embody honor and authority.
of the structure per se rather than in pursing the
The corporate form taken by these social entities
goals that the organization was originally set up
eventually spread to all sorts of associations, and
to achieve (Michels 1959 ). Michels focuses on
engulfed also those originally non-purposive
political organizations, but this same process can
social units in which persons were born such as
be observed in the conglomeration movement, a
the family, the village and the nation. According
historical phase in which corporations begin
to Coleman, this layer of “intermediary entities”
pursuing growth strategies through diversifi
emerged between the state and individuals and
cation and vertical integration. John Galbraith
created much more fl exible social structures and
argues that, as large corporations extended the
mobile persons than those in traditional societies
scope of their activities, they became threats to
(Coleman 1974: 31). Natural persons can join or
effi ciency: as price and wages could be
Organizational Society: Macro, Meso and Micro 51

determined through internal planning instead of answer to organizational goals, organizations


competition, a Michelsian dynamic set in ( 1959 have to go through a risky process of wrestling
). Corporations, put differently, began exercising with employees’ existing identities and bonding
market power, a point Galbraith makes in the a group of strangers including with other
context of a larger argument that economic organizations. Stinchcombe suggests that after a
organizations can pursue control and growth at certain threshold, the attenuation of social and
the expense of earnings and effi ciency—an cognitive discrepancies paves the way for
argument that in turn is heavily indebted to routinization. This point echoes March and
Veblen ( 1934 ). In the production realm, modern Simon’s argument and generates tremendous
technologies such as the assembly line and the insights for our understanding of individual-
practices associated with “scientifi c organization relationships.
management” created a deep cleavage between O rganizational forms have continued to
workers and the managerial class. Clegg has an evolve in the past half a century. Organization
insightful account of how these new workplace scholars have drawn our attention to at least two
relations, with their new routines and their push directions of development. First of all, it is harder
towards specialization, facilitated the production for organizations to be self-sustaining: an
of predictable and compliant agency. This causal increasing amount of organizational decisions
process of forming collective dispositions of the must address inter-organizational concerns. With
employees, Clegg argues, paved the “foundation intensifi ed market competition, faster turnover
of organization power” (Clegg 2009 ). of products, and more volatile technological and
I n parallel to these critiques of large fi nancial markets, incumbents fi nd themselves
organizations, an array of authors emerged as the in constant battles with challengers; both also
foundational generation of organization have to react to regulatory attempts of
researchers, focused on a mission to dissolve the government units and a broader array of
myth of “scientifi c management” and to stakeholders. This type of “strategic action fi eld”
understand the organizational causes of its rewards the kind of “social skills” that can secure
imperfections. Infl uentially, James March and cooperation from other organizations and forge a
Herbert Simon delved into the decision-making new form of collective identity (Fligstein and
process in organizations from a perspective of McAdam 2012 ). Secondly, scholars also affi rm
human cognition. They found that individuals in that soft power and a culturally based type of
organizations are subject to bounded rationalities legitimacy have gained more importance in
in processing information, elaborating programs, soliciting individual compliance. This is not to
and evaluating outcomes. Cognitive limitation say that reward and punishment have ceased to be
drives the tendency for organizations to routinize the bread and butter of organizational sanctions,
and places a sunk cost on organizational but “soft power” is assuming a stronger role in
innovation (March and Simon 1958 ). Still shaping both the body and souls of
another strand of the literature, heralded by “organizational men” (and women) (William and
Stinchcombe’s famous 1965 essay, surveys the Nocera 2002; Clegg 2009 ). Organizations are
“relation of society outside organizations to the perceived as being capable of developing
internal life of organizations” ( 1965 : 142). personas and embodying “organizational
Stinchcombe suggests that social structure, cultures,” which employees internalize as their
comprising “groups, institutions, laws, own values (see esp. Selznick 2010) .
population characteristics, and sets of social Organization ethnographers disclose that even
relations that form the environments of the blue-collar workers engaging the most tedious
organization” ( 1965: 142) leave imprints on the job fi nd the moral meaning in their work
forms and power relations within the (Burawoy 1982 ; Lamont 2002 ) . Norms,
organizations and affect their survival rates. identities, and moral standards can be both
Newly founded organizations in particular suffer homegrown and imported.
from a “liability of newness” in that for social Organizational practices and forms are perceived
roles and relations to settle into stable patterns to legitimate simply because other organizations,
Y. Wang and S. Polillo

especially the leading ones, are pursuing them as First, organized collectivities are not simply
well. Either way, individual compliance the sum of individuals’ preexisting wills and
originates not from beliefs in the inherent effi actions; organizations generate the kind of
ciency of certain organizational structures or institutional surplus that reduces the cost of
production arrangements, but from cultural collective action. Both eminent features of
consensuses and fads (DiMaggio and Powell organizational structure—hierarchy and the
1983 ). division of labor— have this function.
O verall, these refl ections on the evolution of Hierarchies streamline fl ows of orders and
organizational power provide historical information and reasonably narrow down the
background to our understanding of their orientation of participants to their direct
contemporary variations. They also call for superiors. Divisions of labor encourage patterns
systematic efforts at taking stock of the forms of of specialization and in general can reduce the
power specifi c to formal organizations. Let’s cost of training, while creating stronger
reiterate here that this task is possible because, commitment from those who accumulate human
regardless of the variations in technologies and capital specifi c to the organization. Hierarchical
management styles, formal organizations share power can certainly be constraining; just as
common characteristics and undertake similar specialization is also a source of alienation.
activities, such as settings goals, designing Nevertheless, formal organizations are expected
bureaucratic structures, delegating authorities, to “get things done” by channeling individuals
securing stable personnel, utilizing expertise, and into clearly designated duties and overcoming
identifying organizational boundaries. intractable collective action problems that any
Theoretical expositions on organization and group efforts might encounter. Individuals,
power are scattered in organization studies and irrespective of the extent to which they personally
are rarely placed in organic conversations with agree with the actions organizations take,
existing studies of power. Our synthesis below potentially benefi t from the collective gains that
draws inspirations on existing research but also organizations make possible.
attempts to sharpen and articulate the distinctive S econd, in most legal contexts, organizations
operation of power at the meso-level. have the juridical status of persons, so they enjoy
rights just as natural persons would but are
immune to certain punishments applicable to
3.4.2 Empowering Organizations natural persons. The meso-level reality indeed
has a legal infrastructure. Organizations as
W e argue that organizations intersect with power persons enjoy limited responsibilities and only
in two major ways: First, organizations serve as receive fi nancial rather than corporeal
vehicles to power. Second, organizations shape punishments. You certainly cannot ask an
the nature of power by making it invisible and organization to serve prison terms. On the other
multiplying the sources from which power hand, organizations are allowed to conduct many
springs. In this section, we focus on the fi rst activities that natural persons carry out. They can
proposition—the “empowering” aspect of buy, sell, invest, donate, or even vote. Presently
organizations, while the next section is devoted this empowering effect of organizations is an
to elaborating our second point. international norm. The existence of robust and
Humans are purposive beings. Power is a diverse organizations is perceived as a sign of
means to achieve those purposes, however strong and healthy civil societies. The absence of
construed. Organizations are a regularized form them, by contrast, indicates that power is
of such means. Through coordination, monopolized and centralized in society, probably
organizations can achieve much more than a mere by single or oligarchic entities.
aggregation of individuals could. This supra- B oth means, erecting formalized routines and
individual power of organizations has two conferring legal existences to them, enable
implications. organizations to operate on a long-range horizon,
and towards relatively long term objectives.
Organizational Society: Macro, Meso and Micro 53

Long- term goals compel trust building and organizations transform power dynamics into
suspend short-term domination. Organized means-end problems calling for practical
methods of obtaining and exercising power also solutions. As Rueschemeyer (1986 ) has most
appear much less conspicuous than one-time use powerfully argued, organizations fi nd legitimacy
of coercive method. They take on evolutionary in their pursuit of effi ciency through endless
and routinized features, with attention divided specialization, but in doing so they hide the truth
among staged goals and numerous small tasks. of effi ciency: that is it not universally valid
criterion independent of the interests of those
who decide whose goals should be effi ciently
3.4.3 The Nature of Power in pursued.
Organizations First , organizations formalize power
relationship into positions and ranks ; positions
O rganizations are effective means to pursue and ranks stabilize expectations and embody
power; they also shape the nature of power itself. organization - specifi c norms and values .
The same features—organizational hierarchies Except for organizations in the midst of formative
and routines—that are ostensibly means to effi and transformative times (as highlighted by
ciency also exert power internally on Stinchcombe 1965 ), organizational positions
organizational members. Theoretically, power is and ranks are independent of the idiosyncrasies
hierarchical and concentrated in organizations. of their occupants. They create stable
The pyramid organizational structures are direct expectations about the scope of their duties, the
refl ections of hierarchical power relations. For structure of rewards, and the schedule of
this reason, Michels warned against the promotions. Weber uses this point to illustrate the
oligarchic tendency of bureaucratic power merit of bureaucracy in achieving effi ciency and
(Michels 1959 ). Along the same lines, impartiality. We are interested in reconnecting
Rueschemeyer discusses the “disproportionate formal ordering with the discussion of power.
power” found in organizations, that is, how Managing expectations by virtue of creating
power concentrated in the hands of individuals career ladders plays an instrumental role in
and groups with similar interest and preferences translating power into regulations. Patterns of
is amplifi ed when mobilized through expectations minimize the contingent exercise of
organizational means, partly because coercion. With rules and procedures in place,
organizations justify themselves thorough claims individuals do not have to negotiate their benefi
to higher effi ciency (Rueschemeyer 1986 : 46). ts with organizations individually so that they
But if hierarchical power were so equivocal reduce possible discretions. Signing onto these
and inescapable, organizations would be career expectations amounts to signing onto a
repressive and emotionally violent environments, social contract in which personal freedom is
constantly threatening the viability of their traded with life security, so that voluntarily, “the
organizational mandates. In reality, these are social control of one’s behavior by others
aberrant instances rather than the norm. We join becomes an expected part of organizational life”
organization theorists who submit that power is (Pfeffer 1981: 5). Positions and ranks are also
diffuse in organizations, rather than concentrated building blocks of the system of organizational
(Bacharach and Lawler 1980 ; Bell et al. 2010 ). norms and values. Sociologists, despite their
It is not simply that power does not cause disagreements on how norms and values are
tremendous disruptions in organizations because formed, concur that norms and values play an
it is based on consent, rather than coercion, or indispensible role in holding society together and
that, as March and Simon put it, because power stabilizing social interactions. Organizations are
seems “natural,” since “hierarchical ordering fi ts the meso-venues where norms are deployed and
more general cultural norms for describing social contextualized.
relations in terms of domination and Second , power is highly depersonalized in
subordination” (1993: 3). Rather, formal organizations , which also tend to generate
depersonalized confl icts. Authority is codifi ed
Y. Wang and S. Polillo

in formalized rights and privileges, attached to personalized confl icts are usually discouraged
the hierarchy of jobs in organizations. Positional and stigmatized in organizations.
authorities do not derive from, or die with Third , power in organization is
personal power. Organizational rules and differentiated and generative. Differentiation
procedures are distributed to new recruits prior to reduces the number of losers and sometimes
their active duties so that he or she will be assured renders the question of winning or losing entirely
that rewards and punishment will have an meaningless. Externally, organizations stratify
impersonal nature. When a CEO gives his or her society into “membership society” and
employee a routine order, the employee would subcultures in which “members” of these
not be personally offended as he or she communities are not readily comparable on a
understands that the order is made on behalf of an single dimension or along a continuum.
organization and the same order would be made Internally, power in organizations creates
to anyone who were at his or her post. Those in differences through the following means—the
power certainly carry their personal motives and division of labor, the delegation of authorities,
interests. Such personal power, however, is often and entitlement—where each renders power no
mistaken as impartiality in the eyes of the longer a zero-sum game but rather the effect of a
powerless. It is because the powerful think and multivariate structure of incentives. Division of
act in terms of positions (those of corporations labor in organizational settings generates
and public offi ces) and their personal interests multiple lines of authority and within them
tend to align with organizational ones multiple tracks of mobility. This helps reduce
(Rueschemeyer 1986 : 48). confl icts and dependence as participants will not
D epersonalizing power is a process in which be subject to only one dimension of competition.
the source of power is removed from its means Delegation transfers authority to subordinates.
(Coleman 1974: 37–39). In relatively large Subordinates are agents who possess more local
organizations, even the most authoritarian information than their principals and can
commands at the very power center have to be withhold such information to bargain with their
dispersed throughout myriads of lines and orders superiors. Entitlement is another activity of
and legitimated through layers of superior- expanding, if not infl ating, the supply of power
subordinate relationships. It is undeniable that at in organizations without offending the status quo.
the very apex of the hierarchy, political struggles With differentiation, delegation and entitlement.
can be fi erce and shot through with “family and Overall, precisely because of the generative
patronage relations” (Rueschemeyer 1986 : 63). nature of divided labor and its readiness to be
Employees at various points of distances with the mistaken as refl ective of human nature or
power center however do not see and experience professionalization, Rueschemeyer calls for
these struggles directly. Hierarchy acts as a buffer exercising a power analysis to uncover the
to “politics at the top.” process of division of labor, by investigating the
Depersonalized power by no means prevents political and economic institutions that supported
all confl icts from rising. Confl icts are the very division of labor, the resources mobilized to
“power-full” moments where the intention of sustain it, and the special needs they meet ( 1986
exerting power is revealed, stakes are acted upon ).
and challenging coalitions are formed. However, Lastly , power sources in organizations are
depersonalized power likely goes hand in hand diversifi ed , creating multiple ways to control
with depersonalized confl icts. That is, many uncertainty. Power in organizations springs from
intra-organizational confl icts stem from multiple sources. We often equate power with
“structural” problems, problems, that is, that resources, but what counts as resources in
inhere to formal organizational structures and organizations is specifi c to the organizational
that inevitably contain contradictions of context, as the micro-approach to power well
responsibilities, overlapping jurisdictions, and understands. Resources can be measured by the
goal misalignments. While structural confl icts control over the number of personnel and fi
are tolerated or even institutionalized, nancial resources, the range of the jurisdiction, or
Organizational Society: Macro, Meso and Micro 55

the position of ranking, all of which is most important forms of output in organizations,
imperfectly commensurate with but largely refl have to fl ow through the chains and relationships
ected in pay structures. Other types of sources of of real people. Organizational legitimacy
power are less measurable but nevertheless likewise has both legal and relational
consequential. These resources include titles, components. It is legally supported but also has
reputations, information, knowledge, etc. The to be observed and endorsed by organizational
power of this array of resource, we argue, comes members and their mutual acknowledgement of
from their effi cacy in generating or resolving each other’s endorsement for that matter. These
uncertainty, since uncertainty is the common processes of enacting rules and decisions in
enemy of organizational routines. This power in interpersonal relationships have opened room for
relation to uncertainty can counter-intuitively power dynamics in small and informal settings.
afford occupants at non- central locations a great We will discuss various scenarios in the
amount of leverage. For example, line workers following space, built on illustrations of existing
can create enormous disturbance of routines by studies as well as our suggestions for future
striking. Small group leaders can be instrumental research.
in appeasing confl icts and retrieve organizational F irst of all, it is common to observe that
solidarity by force of reputation. Lower level individuals acquire personal power not
organizational members have power because attributable to organizational authorization and
they possess a unique set of information, e.g. unique to these individuals. One source of such
contacts with clients, or familiarity with the personal power is charisma. Weber defi nes
production process, that is hard to be replaced and charisma as power legitimized on the basis of a
taken away. Experts’ power also ultimately lies leader’s exceptional personal qualities or the
in their indispensible solutions to uncertainties demonstration of extraordinary insight and
and crises (Barnes 1988) . In a word, accomplishment, which inspire loyalty and
organizational aversion to uncertainty produces obedience from followers (Weber 2004 ).
power that cannot be deduced purely from Charisma facilitates effective leadership. The
hierarchical power. With multiple sources of conventional understanding is that charisma,
power crosscutting, balancing and offsetting each once routinized, gives away to another type of
other, the diversifi ed source of power generates authority—rational-legal authority in Weber’s
a more complicated picture of power distribution account. However, historical and contemporary
than an organizational chart would predict, which attempts to create “charismatic organizations”
makes the study of power in organizations all the challenge this characterization of charismatic
more intriguing and challenging. individuals and bureaucratic organizations as
incompatible (Teiwes 1984 ). Mao’s Cultural
Revolution called for the rebels to embody and
spread his personal charisma until it became the
3.5 Connecting the Micro with
institutional feature of the state bureaucracy.
the Meso Level Analysis of Although the movement ultimately failed
Power catastrophically, the fact that it carried on for
nearly a decade offered a rare chance for
Power in organizations subordinates researchers to investigates the possibility of
interpersonal relationships to the mandates of personifi cation of power at the organizational
rules and impersonalized authorities. In many level. One reason charismatic authority can be
circumstances, micro-power in the form of sustained for long periods of time lies in the
personal power, dyadic confl icts and small group dramaturgical nature of power: as argued by Blau
dynamics can also exist and assert their infl uence ( 1956 ) among others, individuals have incentive
in spite of formal structures. This is because to exaggerate the value of the resources they can
formal rules are after all enacted in myriads of bring to an exchange, because those perceived
behavioral patterns and relationships of initial advantages constitute sources of long-term
exchanges and transactions. Decisions, one of the leverage as expectations about levels of exchange
Y. Wang and S. Polillo

stabilize. Successfully manipulating the The relationship between informal and formal
perception of one’s contribution can therefore power in organizations is an unceasingly
have long-term implications. fascinating research topic. Unfortunately, the
D yadic relationships and small exchange current artifi cial separation between network
networks are the fabrics of organizations. These analysis and organization studies as two subfi
small groups are bounded by direct and frequent elds has slowed the study of the cross-
contacts. Close contacts increase the odds that fertilization of power resided in networks and
local power dynamics will take root independent organizations. Informal networks can block, co-
of global organizational structures. Non- exist or even facilitate the exercise of formal
organizationally- sanctioned traits of individuals, power. Formal organizations can domesticate,
such as strong personalities, or status acquired coopt, or develop out of informal networks
outside of organizations, will likely interfere with (Adams 2007 ). To study the translation between
organizationally sanctioned transactions between network power and organizational power, we
organizational members. The mere fact that some might need to look for common units of analysis.
individuals might be stuck in a long-term “Position” is an excellent choice, since positions
relationship creates a strategic opportunity for are anchors of power in both networks and
personalizing it by altering or circumscribing organizations. The question then becomes how
formal organizational rules, as research on the positional power that derives from structural
durability of commitment in exchange suggests positions in exchange networks differs from the
(see Cook and Emerson 1978 ). Favors and one that is embedded in organizational
personally felt obligations can then be utilized hierarchies and divisions of labor. Are they
towards formal organizational goals. For mutually reinforcing or contradictory?
example, in the most commonplace dyads of In extreme cases, when informal groupings
organizations—superior/ subordinate and coalitions dominate the institutional
relationship, order-giving-and- taking rarely landscape of formal organizations, power
characterizes the full range of any struggles in these organizations might well
organizationally sanctioned relationship. Bosses resemble some kind of free-style bargaining
are often keen to suspend exercise of their formal describe by the pluralist model (Bacharach and
power, or go out of their way to do a favor for Lawler 1980 ). In these cases, our imagery for
their subordinates beyond any of their offi cial the ways power is exercised in organizations is
duties. Discretion in terms of when to act and less like a fl ow of commands and more like an
what do compels subordinates to increase exchange of information, resources, and power
compliance (Blau 1956) and develop a feeling among different blocks by way of both formal
of long term obligation (Emerson 1962 ). and informal means.
Subordinates will chose to work more diligently. O verall, the interaction between the micro
The exercise of personalized and patrimonial level and meso level power is probably the most
power can become a tacit pillar of organizational intense in times of uncertainty. Founding stages,
authority. Japanese corporations are understood moments of crisis or periods organizational
to thrive on this patrimonial work culture (Rohlen reforms are times pregnant with uncertainty.
1979 ). Since organizational structure themselves are
Power dynamics in small groups also intersect sediments of historical struggles, they carry
with formal power. Membership in small groups imprints of informal infl uence from these
will allow individuals to defer to, or in other cases sensitive periods and will continue to change as
ignore, formal organizational boundaries, more uncertainties strike (Johnson 2007 ).
between positions, subunits, or even ranks. In
opposition to the sanctioned organizational
groupings, these groups are referred to as
“informal” groups, with some of them taking on
“clique”-like features, with heavily policed
boundaries and strong ties among the members.
Organizational Society: Macro, Meso and Micro 57

3.6 Connecting the Macro with but the exchange value of their resources to other
the Meso Level Analysis of types of power, e.g. reputation, confi dence,
honor, knowledge, which can all be stored and
Power capitalized in the future. Symbolic power is
inherently a fi eld-level property as it exists only
As group actions increasingly take place in
in the perception of other organizations.
organizational and institutionalized domains,
An organizational bid for symbolic power is
organizations become the major constituents of
often an attempt to shape broader ideological
macro-entities. Previously loosely connected
structures. Macro-institutions persist through infl
macro-entities, such as fi elds and markets can
uence, technology, and ideology rather than
also grow their own organizational sinews and
coercive power. Symbolic power can act as a
cannot be discussed without referring to their
generalized medium of exchange, a convertible
organizational infrastructure. The connection
central currency in institutions. On account of
between the meso- and macro-level reality is
such convertibility, power at the macro level can
tightened and their interface enlarged. This
be very multi-dimensional and open to
leaves us with considerable empirical
contestation. Isaac Reed offers an extremely
opportunities to examine how organizational and
insightful reinterpretation of power as taking
inter- organizational power affect macro forces
causal effect on different dimensions: relational,
and how such macro forces in turn impose
discursive, and performative (Reed 2013 ). These
adaptive pressures on organizational actions
dimensions connect macro- and micro-level
(Turner 2010).
processes by foregrounding meso-level
Macro-level operation of power hinges on the
dynamics: as Reed suggests, gaining power is not
growth of inter-organizational relations.
only about striving for better and larger
Organizations that share similar goals or employ
resources, it is also about uttering discourses and
similar technologies tend to develop a system of
performing creative events for the purposes of
mutual recognition and exchanges among
building environmental pressures to one’s
themselves. An institutional sphere, alternatively
advantage. Successful discursive and
termed “organizational fi eld,” or “industrial
performative actions can enhance the status even
sector” in various literatures (Powell and
of materially disadvantaged organizations. To
DiMaggio 1991) , can develop out of such
this effect, Carpenter ( 2010 ) shows how the U.S.
mutual recognition, exchange, and associations
Food and Drug Administration gained and
of organizations. Institutional spheres tend to
maintained unparalleled reputation and power (in
develop explicit institutional architectures of
the context of a historic distrust towards
their own, such as annual conventions,
government agencies) by skillfully
professional associations, industrial standards or
communicating with multiple audiences.
even legitimating bodies. Power at the
I nter-organizational relationships bring out
institutional level is not a simple aggregation of
emergent power dynamics at the macro level.
power of each organization. The distribution of
Such relationships go beyond exchanges of
power at the institutional level does not always
products, resources, and technologies. Inter-
directly refl ect resource distribution at the
organizational transactions can be an organic part
organizational level. The mightiest organization,
of social production, taking place through
measured by either its size or capital might well
movements of people, the diffusion of
have the power to lead pricing or set industrial
organizational forms, and the traffi c of ideas.
standards. Scholars have also found that
These inter- organizational movements facilitate
institutions disproportionally reward those
large-scale social and cultural formation and
organizational actors that are blessed with
integration.
symbolic power, such as regulators, professional
Inter-organizational exchanges do not always
associations, or rating agencies (DiMaggio and
transpire on smooth and peaceful terms.
Powell 1983 ). These organizations can
Organizations can be incompatible in terms of
determine, not the value of material resources,
their goals, values, and technological standards.
Y. Wang and S. Polillo

Inter-organizational incompatibility halts structures affect social inequality can be much


cooperation and exchanges. In some cases, less discernible and harder to detect (Tilly 1999
however, ostensible inter-organizational ).
incompatibility also unexpectedly creates In conclusion, power does not simply spill
strategic positions for power brokers and over from organizational containers to their
opportunities for mutual learning and innovation environments. Power coalesces, transforms and
(Padgett and Powell translates at interstitial organizational spaces, that
2012 ). in turn shape the nature of power at the macro-
In organizational societies, macro entities are level. To connect the meso- and macro-level
increasingly institutionalized, even turning into analysis of power requires using an
organizations themselves. The state is a prime organizational lens to give more concrete
example. Previous discussions of the state characterizations of macro forces. The blurry
characterize the power of the state as omnipresent boundary between macro and meso
and ideological, radiating from an entities/categories also calls for analytical
undifferentiated center. What has not been interpenetration. Macro studies of political power
emphasized suffi ciently is the fact that the state and social inequality should attend to their
has a highly elaborate organizational edifi ce of organizational causes. All in all, macro-entities
its own, with its authority and power divided are made of organizations; how power is formed
among ministries, commissions and departments. in organizations and at inter-organizational
It is possible that each department might be more spaces affects power at the macro level.
committed to developing its constituencies in
societies rather than contributing to the
bureaucratic unity of the state as a whole.
3.7 Conclusions
Therefore, what appears to be an administrative
decision from a coherent state can be a product of Power is notoriously hard to defi ne, observe and
inter-organizational struggles, or a parochial analyze because it is mediated and regulated.
view of a particularly powerful department. Macro theories of power treat it as a causal force
These possibilities point to the explanatory that originates within differentiated social
necessity of unpacking any macro- entity into its spheres, a power that institutions channel into
organizational constituents. A minimum more general frameworks within which this force
knowledge of power relations among these can be contained and regulated. Micro-level
constituent organizations is essential to assessing theories, by contrast, understand power as
the source and determinants of how power leverage which individuals gain by virtue of
operates at the macro level. occupying particular positions within social
Macro-categories, such as gender, class and relationships and networks. We have argued that,
race, intersect with occupational and professional in our present social world, it is organizations that
categories of organizations as well (Stainback et mediate and regulate power. Organization-
al. 2010) . Bureaucratic organizations allegedly mediated power is embodied in authorities (such
have a social leveling effect as they tend to recruit as the state, or professional associations),
and promote on the basis of qualifi cations and dispersed in the division of labor among various
performance. In organizations, classifi cations “parties,” jobs, and positions, and organized into
are removed from intrinsic personal collective purposes that privilege routinization
characteristics and rest on the dimension of and trust building.
occupations, titles, and professions. Still, I n this chapter, we zeroed in on the
organizational routines can reproduce social organizational level of power dynamics, a level
inequality in a systematic fashion. Occupational that is more aggregate and abstract than
differentiation often maps onto gender, class, and interpersonal relations but more concrete than the
race boundaries. Precisely because power is diffusive notion of power held by macro-theory.
hidden and bureaucracies hold meritocratic Organizations embody and make rules and
façades, how organizationally produced power
Organizational Society: Macro, Meso and Micro 59

routines. We sought to reveal how rules, routines, division of labor, by contrast, rests on coercive
and differentiation obscure the potential for authority in the workplace through deskilling, or
discretion in rule making. Instead, the operation the breaking down of production into simple,
of power in organizations follows a plural, mindless steps. The manufacturing division of
generative, and depersonalized logic so much so labor increases the power of those who already
that it tends to reduce the perception of are in a position of authority, while it deprives the
domination. With the interstitial spaces and powerless of even the most basic form of
incompatible logics organizations also produce, control—control over their labor. Rueschemeyer
they create expectations for the exercise of one’s reminds us that the two types always
creativity and leverage. interpenetrate empirically. As hierarchical
The second goal of the paper is to link the organizations multiply, for instance, the
meso-approach to power with examinations of experience of the powerless will deteriorate, but
power at the macro-level of social formations and individuals with the skills and capital to navigate
the micro-level of exchanges. We argued that organizational politics will thrive precisely as
even though power at each level acquires authority tightens its grip. Competing sources of
distinctive structural and symbolic features, legitimacy and control tend to also generate a
exchanges, translations, and conversions of space for new classes of experts invested with the
power across the different levels of social units power to assess and rank (DiMaggio and Powell
generates new types of social, institutional, and 1983; see also Espeland and Sauder 2007) .
ideological formations that can not be reduced to What this implies for power in the age of
power originating from any given level alone. At corporate downsizing is that power as effi cacy
these emergent spaces between individual will multiply at the very interstices of
decision- makings, meso-regulations, and macro- organizational boundaries just as power as
institutions, informalities can be an important coercive control intensifi es within organizational
source of power and the powerless can excel by boundaries. States become more punitive just as
exploiting structural positions. This chapter thus allegedly free markets expand (Harcourt 2011 ).
concludes that regulatory power at the meso-level There is tension and contradiction between these
is both empowering and dominating. two trends, which becomes unsustainable when
Does our focus on organizations as a matrix organizations are no longer able to meet their
of power leave out dynamics that affect people legitimizing criteria of effi ciency in production
outside of organizations? Given the retreat of and delivery of goods and services. When power
what Davis ( 2009) felicitously calls “corporate turns from generative to destructive,
feudalism”—the golden age of organized organizations regain the upper hand. We believe
capitalism in the US where a generalized that organizational power will remain the defi
expectation of stability and affl uence motivated ning feature of the twenty-fi rst century.
the emerging middle class to join corporate
ranks—it may seem anachronistic to emphasize
the organized nature of power in a time of post-
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Action in Society: Refl
exively
4
Conceptualizing Activities
Andreas Glaeser property and contract (Schiavone 2012 )),
Christianity (notably ideas about person specifi c

A. Glaeser ()
Department of Sociology , The University of
Chicago , Chicago , IL , USA e-mail:
aglaeser@uchicago.edu
judgment, grace, and the import of free will in
4.1 Sovereignty, Rational Action, theodicy (Siedentop 2014 ; Dumont 1983 )),
and the Puzzles of Modernity natural rights philosophy (above all the concept of
personal freedom rights), the Enlightenment
The concept of action transmitted by the (especially understandings of reason as personal
Europeanoid tradition into the nineteenth century power, as well as of self-emancipation as goal
presupposes a principally autonomous actor (Schneewind 1998 )) and fi nally of empiricism
whose actions are guided by the lights of reason and early scientism (with its nominalistic
at the prompting of his or her own free will (Seigel tencencies to see only the particular and
2005 ; Taylor 1989 ; Mauss 1938 ). That there is individual as real (Daston and Gallison 2010 ).
nothing “natural” about this understanding can be I n the wake of the Religious Wars of the
demonstrated, for example, by analyzing the ways sixteenth and seventeenth centuries this
Archaic Greek or Ancient Hebrew texts present historically forged notion of willed, individual,
causes and consequences, motives and and rational action became the foil on which to
responsibilities for action. Both of these ancient understand the emergence and maintenance of
Mediterranean bodies of writing invariably large scale social orders which until then were
emphasize the role of the community and that of seen as divinely chartered. The motivating
supernatural powers in stipulating, guiding and circumstances prompting this move were
taking responsibility for action. Since the thoroughly political. The fact that in most of these
Europeanoid tradition self-consciously builds on religious wars no side could simply vanquish the
these traditions, it follows that the notion of the other, the contenders needed to come to a
free willing, autonomous, and rational actor is the negotiated peace agreement i nvolving some form
consequence of a long historical development. of toleration. 2 This made it more plausible to
More specifi cally, it results from the combined think of order as a consciously sought human
effects of ideas and practices deriving from achievement—even where it was seen as divinely
Roman Law (in particular the notions of personal enabled. 3 Accordingly, contract theory (Hobbes

2 3
E xamples are the Peace of Augsburg of 1555, the Edict What Parsons ( 1937 )
of Nantes of 1598, and in a different constellation the characterizes as a universal
English Act of Toleration of 1688. Historically, such problem of social order has thus
agreements were echoing medieval efforts of the church, very specifi c historical roots,
of the emperor, and of cities to create systems of which is to say it gets thematized
adjudication with centralized monopolies of violence in as a problem only in particular
lieu of the feuding rights of nobles. Perhaps the most historically specifi c circumstances.
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland
famous one of these is2016
the Old Swiss Confederacy of 1291. 63
S. Abrutyn (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary Sociological Theory,
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32250-6_4
A. Glaeser

1651 ; Locke 1689a ; Rousseau 1762 ) proposed triggered a search for models of personal and
to understand societies and states as the social life which gave sensations, feelings and
intentional product of rational action. In communal belonging a much greater role, leading
accordance with this view, states were seen as to the celebration of authenticity (rather than
governed by the will of sovereigns, divine and calculation) as favored modality of social
secular; and history became the narration of the relationships on all scales. This holistic critique
deeds of great men (embodying sovereignty rather found expression in literature and philosophy, 4
than the unfolding of Providence). The successful but also in experimentation with new forms of
revolutions in England, the United States and social association from literary salons to religious
France lent credibility to the individual revival movements. Holism received unexpected
actor/contract model of self and society. but also confounding nourishment in the descent
A t the same time, and once more prompted by of the French revolution into terror, dictatorship,
the splitting of the church (and thus authority), the and restauration. Further corroboration for supra-
notion of rationality favored by philosophers rational holistic understandings of social life was
began to move in the direction of formalization . provided by the seemingly authorless, unwilled,
In other words it began to shift towards logics of and in its consequences chaotic, self-accelerating
operations and away from the discovery and social transformations of the nineteenth century
articulation of substantive norms, motives, and with all the unspeakable human misery they
goals. As faith had become in principle open to produced in their wake. 5 Both human activities
conversion, norms, motives and goals were seen and society appeared to a growing number of
increasingly as a matter of conscience-induced theorists ever less like the result of deliberation,
choice and as such simply personal (Luther 1520 reason and will, and ever more like the result of
; Spinoza 1677 ; Locke 1689b ). That is to say uncontrollable and yet probably law- governed
while there was growing awareness that any kind processes. These were seen as unleashing
of agreement on substance may be elusive, hope “forces” akin to those of nature in their
emerged that agreements on formal aspects of inevitability, scope, and might. The call of the
reason were still possible. The beginning moment was, then, one for a naturalization of the
industrial revolution and the expansion of perspectives on human beings and social life and
commerce in the 18th and its virtual explosion in thus to make sense of the experience that the
the nineteenth century contributed further to the individual human appears entirely powerless in
formalization of the concept of rational action face of society and that therefore any assumption
(Weber 1920a) which through the idea of self- of individual autonomy is simply preposterous. 6
regulating markets created a second model for This ancient sentiment of helplessness that
association through rational action. previously led people to join mystery cults,
Other historical developments, however, embrace Stoic philosophy, or take refuge in piety
began to raise serious doubts about the rational found an entirely modern expression in the drive
action model and its expansion into explaining for a science to fi nd new routes to overcome it.
social orders. The stifl ing over-regulated, The new times required new concepts. Before
calculating and isolating atmosphere of absolutist discussing the activity concepts (or their studious
court life and society (Reddy 2001; Elias 1969 ) avoidance) deemed appropriate for the

4 6
What I call here holism was articulated in different This shift in concerns and attention can be nicely brought
countries at around the same time in different ways, to to the fore by contrasting graphical depictions of supreme
different extents, and with different emphasis, which came power and sovereignty. Whereas medieval and early
to be known under different names. Paradigmatic Renaissance images show the Christian divinity in the
examples are Sentimentalism in England and guise of an old man who as heavenly puppeteer holds the
Romanticism (with a precursor in “Sturm und Drang”) in strings of his own creation, the frontispiece of Hobbes’
Germany. Importantly, both were simultaneously literary Leviathan shows the sovereign state made up of all
and philosophical movements.
5
Earlier critics were Vico ( 1744 ; Herder 1784 –1991)
and the Romantics after them.
n Society: Refl exively Conceptualizing Activities 65

modernizing world, however, I want to disrupt my emic and etic notions of activity have to be
historical narrative to discuss criteria to adjudicate carefully differentiated from each other and a
the adequacy of activity concepts. I want to do so plurality of such concepts has to be considered. 7
because the theories discussed in what follows all Therefore, and this is the fi rst criterion for a good
still have contemporary resonance. sociological activity concept for our time:

1. Sociological activity concepts need to be such


that they can integrate a possibly diverse set of
4.2 Thinking About Appropriate
emic notions of action into a multidimensional
Activity Concepts etic analysis. One could also say then need to
be loadable.
E ven this very brief introduction makes it quite
clear that the ways in which actors and actions are This suggests further, that the social sciences
understood vary culturally and historically in must generate two kinds of activity concepts.
rather profound ways. Moreover, these They need particular ones to model historically
understandings appear to be deeply intertwined specifi c and where needed domain specifi c
with other central aspect of a culture such as activity concepts. They also require general
notions of self, intentionality, agency, culpability, concepts that can be used to compare local
and in fact politics. As such they appear as a understandings of acting and the differences they
constitutive aspect of the institutional fabric of a make for the institutional fabric within which
particular time that is shaped in part at least by the people live while also supporting an analysis of
very activity concepts in use. 6 Moreover, the how people move over time (or across domains)
moral tone with which activity concepts are from one set of emic concepts of acting to another.
imbued and the vigor with which they are argued
The import of activity concepts for social life
against alternatives suggests that there are often
also requires that scholars think about how they
not one but several activity notions in play in any
are part of a historically specifi c culture and how
social context. Those articulated by intellectuals
their etic musings can become ideologies
may also not be the (often not so explicitly
supporting or undermining particular emic
formulated) ones guiding the actions of other
understandings of activities with all the
people of which there may be once more a
institutional consequences this move may entail.
plurality. Far from serving merely as tools of the
From this consideration follows a second criterion
intellectual
for a social-scientifi cally adequate activity
concept namely:
citizens together in front of the beautiful order they have
created together and govern through him in scepter and 2. Activity concepts need to enable critical refl
sword. Nineteenth century depictions are much less fl
ection on their own limits while remaining
attering. Daumier for example shows Louis Philippe the
“citizen king” chained by his own obesity to the throne open to change.
where he is force-fed the goods of the kingdom while he is
at the same time endlessly defecating laws keeping his S uch openness requires that theories are taken
brown-nosing underlings busy. to operate as metaphors which can be more or less
6
T his does by no means imply, of course, that the emic
appropriate in lighting up those aspects of reality
notion of activity is in any sense true. It simply means that
their employment does have an effect on the course ofthat a researcher is interested in (Glaeser 2015) .
activities. This immediately raises the question what our
trade refl ecting on social life, then, explicit and interests in creating concepts to analyze social life
implicit activity concepts are a linchpin of that are or ought to be, for as Weber ( 1904 ) has
social life scholars want to study. For that reason, pointed out, self-consciously perspectival concept

7
E mic refers to the study of a cultural phenomenon based phenomenon by applying general, external for example
on its specifi c, internal elements and their functioning, in academic frames.
short local use, whereas etic refers to the study of cultural
A. Glaeser

formation is the only chance we have to get to a In other words, action concepts need to
meaningful social science in the fi rst place. 8 provide useful guidance in the world. Some
Historically, the aim has often been to generate philosophers of science (e.g. Vaihinger 1922 ) but
impulses and in more ambitious cases even goals also many practicing social scientists (e.g.
and guidance for politics. The third criterion is Friedman 1953) have argued strongly in favor of
therefore: the predictive power of a social scientifi c model
as a master criterion of goodness that could be
3. Sociological activity concepts need to be interpreted to guarantee both political and ontic
politically fecund. fecundity. The advantage of this criterion would
be that the problematic notion of correspondence
Putting it in this way raises the question how evoking some similitude between conceptual edifi
activity concepts can become politically relevant. ces and world could be safely discarded. Yet,
Since politics is, according to the criteria prediction has proved to be a most elusive goal,
presented here, best understood as any intentional attainable, if at all, only in the most rarifi ed
activity to establish, alter, or maintain institutions circumstances. 9 Worse, perhaps, even where it
(Glaeser 2011 , 2015) , that is to say since as an works it offers only a narrow range of politically
activity politics is both motivated and enabled by relevant information. Prediction tells at best what
the possibility of alternative states of the world, state to expect, not how to intervene successfully
politically fecund activity concepts need to be in the world to get to a particular state. The only
linkable to imaginaries which can generate such viable measure for ontic fecundity is the concept’s
alternatives. Moreover, since institutions as the quality as a metaphor highlighting relevant
proper object of politics are, again to keep with features of the world to orient and guide action
the criteria presented here, most fruitfully successfully.
understood as self-similar replications of action- M etatheoretically speaking, the four criteria
reaction webs (Glaeser 2014 and below Sect. 4.4) together imply a signifi cant departure from the
, politically fecund concepts must show how scientifi c pretentions that have carried large parts
activities can form institutions. And fi nally, since of the social sciences for far too long (Glaeser
institutions exist in the coordination of the 2015 ). Substantively speaking, these criteria in
activities of often very many people politically the very least imply a renewed search for
fecund concepts need to show how the activities integrating models of social analysis that can help
of others including very many others can be infl to overcome the fragmentation of the social
uenced in desirable directions. This, however, is sciences into subject-hyphenated domain
to say that politicians need reliable guidance for specialties and paired oppositions of research
their activities in the world which translates perspectives such as the positive and normative,
directly into the fi nal demand of a suitable action micro-macro, structural-cultural, individual-
concept: social, diachronic- synchronic etc. What is needed
is a framework that allows the exploration of
4. Sociological activity concepts must be onti- connections across such compartmentalization
cally fecund. and beyond these oppositions. The urgent
political questions of our time such as growing

8
Historically, efforts to theorize social life emerged at the some distant place. Yet the political purpose of such
interstices between cognitive and political interests. In writing, often the other as an example to emulate (or to
some cases the political element is more obviously in the avoid), self-discovery, calls for help, preservation or
foreground, as with Machiavelli’s Prince , Hobbes’ transformation etc. are everywhere shining through the
Leviathan , Smith’s W ealth of Nations , or with Marx and prefaces, styles, and rhetorical structures of these texts.
Engels’ Communist Manifesto . In other cases, say 9
Not surprisingly it is rarely used as a criterion to discard
Mommsen’s Roman History , or Malinowski’s beloved concepts notably by its strongest proponents in
Argonauts the description of the lives of people at some economics.
other time and place may make it appear as if social
inquiry was a content-neutral purveyor of facts of life at
n Society: Refl exively Conceptualizing Activities 67

domestic and international inequality, political the activities giving rise to it, and social activity
stalemate, and global political, economic and theorists conceiving action itself as social. All
natural reconfi gurations such as climate change three groups of theoretical traditions have striven
require precisely a modality of analysis suitable to to grow out of their philosophical roots to attain
fathom the temporal depth and to survey the the status of an empirical social science (which
spatial scope of a wide-range of interconnections. ended up meaning different things in each case).
11
We need concepts to defetishize institutional
formations to show whose contributions and
manners of contributing are most signifi cant in
maintaining these formations to enable ourselves 4.3.1 Individualism
politically.
Utilitarian rationalism (Bentham 1823 ; Mill
1863 ) became the dominant form of
4.3 Action in Modern Social individualism during the nineteenth century and
has maintained this position ever since. 12 In
Thought maintaining the idea of the autonomous individual
as basis of its models, it has remained heir to
The actual course of the French Revolution and
traditional notions of rational action. Yet, it has
the rapid transformations of western European
sought scientifi c rigor by radicalizing the
societies during the nineteenth century prompted
Enlightenment tendency to formalize reason in
a complete rethinking of social life and with it a
terms of algorithmic, machine-like operations in
complete reconceptualization of the traditional
the direction of the optimal pursuit of advantage
Europeanoid notion of action. Befi tting what
(Menger 1871; Jevons 1871) . Eventually this
became gradually known through this process as
search has led to the adoption and continuous refi
modernity, the result was a plurality of models
nement of systems of mathematical representation
beholden to incompatible ontologies and
(e.g. infi nitesimal calculus, set theory, game
epistemologies. 10 For the purposes of
theory) which make its users look every bit as
distinguishing modern activity concepts I will
scientifi c as engineers or theoretical physicists.
present their conceptual development in stylized
Resolute formalization has stripped reason of its
form as a tree with two major ontological
previously glorifi ed capabilities to discover and
branching points. The fi rst corresponds to the
judge truth, justice, and beauty. 13 Motives, ends,
split between individualists who keep the
and values are seen in these formalized models as
traditional notion of the basic autonomy of
matters of private tastes and choices that are,
persons, and communalists who work under the
where not explicitly stated, taken to be “revealed”
assumption of a fundamental, indissoluble
in action (Samuelson 1938 ). Understood as
sociality of human beings. I will then show how
preferences, they are viewed if not as irrational,
the communal branch splits once more into
then certainly as extra-rational, and as such
structuralists who propose to study society as an
outside of the purview of proper scientifi c
emergent phenomenon that is autonomous from

10
The use of the term modern as adjective reaches back undertaken. The analysis of action for the sake of making
into the Renaissance to denote perceptible temporal it better (more ethical or less sinful) gave way to an inter-
breaks with the past. As a noun and further solidifi ed into est in understanding it as a feature of the world as it is.
the term modernity it begins to become an epochal marker Only with this shift did action become an object of
during the Enlightenment to reach the signifi cance we theoretization in its own right.
attribute to it today in the second half of the nineteenth 12
The label utilitarian rationalism is not common in the
century. As a contrasting term it always implies plurality. literature. I use it to emphasize its pronounced differences
The degree of plurality and fragmentation of authority with traditional models of rational action and contract
then comes to be mapped onto “early modern”, “modern” while also marking its tendency to engage in a priori
as well as more recently onto the “post-modern”. reasoning.
11
This implies a decisive shift in the overarching project 13
Advantage of course garnered the attention it did
from within which the conceptualization of action was because the calculus developed here was immensely use-
A. Glaeser

inquiry. In disemboweling reason of its directing politics. Unlike much action-distant


substantive capabilities, utilitarian rationalism sociological macro theory, the fi rm grounding of
completely breaks with the traditional utilitarian rationalism in a theory of action enables
Europeanoid models of rational action. it to make action recommendations. The second
F or utilitarian rationalists, the social is the reason for its political fecundity lies in the fact
result of aggregated individual actions. Where that if politicians want to allocate scarce resources
these are mediated by free markets the outcome of in an effi cient fashion over competing targets
this mediation is also thought to show socially with differential impact on the overall goal, it
optimal characteristics. The market has therefore offers excellent tools of reasoning through this
replaced contract as the central integrating process. And fi nally, effi ciency has become a
imaginary of this model. paramount historically specifi c criterion for
S o how does utilitarian rationalism fare vis-à- judging action itself.
vis the criteria of goodness I have spelled out in O ntologically speaking, the action model of
the last section? The most important point to note utilitarian rationalism is, owing to its commitment
is that utilitarian rationalism operates with a to ontological individualism, quite barren. It has
monothetic model of action which it deems if not no credibility as reasonably good guide for how
as universally valid then certainly as the best people actually act in general. The historical and
available approximation for how humans in fact culturally comparative, as well as psychological-
act. This monism has a number of consequences. e xperimental evidence speaks against it as much
First, emic action concepts are either treated as as the following three theoretical arguments
forms of false consciousness or they are simply aiming to demonstrate the fundamental sociality
deemed irrelevant. Second, monothetic models of internal life above all of reason itself. Reason
obliterate any space for critical refl ections about has two main dimensions. Its basis is the capacity
the performative consequences of the posited of human beings to be object and subject at the
action model. In other words, there is no room for same time, that is to be a self. Humans acquire
what has been called self-refl exivity in the social both, the general capacity and the particular form
sciences (Marcus and Fischer 1986 ; Wacquant of self-hood by i nternalizing their relations to
and Bourdieu 1992 ). Third, monothetic action others (Mead 1934; Vygotsky 1986; Stern 1985
concepts completely obliterate the existential ). The second dimension of reason is to make
tensions created by the co-existence of a oneself object of oneself in a systematic fashion
multiplicity of action logics (Weber 1922 ). which is to say to do so in a rule governed way.
Fourth, for the same reason monothetic action The capacity to follow rules mentally, however,
concepts reduce the evaluation and thus meaning as Wittgenstein’s private language argument
of action to a single dimension. Thus they forfeit makes clear (1953) is con-
important insights into the dynamics of social life. tingent on a self’s embeddedness in a community
of interpretation in which to follow this rule is a
ful fi rst in justifying and later also in conducting business.
practice. Finally, refl ection has to take place in
The possibility to formalize the pursuit of advantage, that some structured symbolic medium such as
is pure scientifi c form mattered as well. There were, ordinary language or mathematics, which is
needless to say, efforts to formalize the pursuit of truth and likewise socially derived and requires social
justice as well. Yet these have not gone nearly as far as the relations for its upkeep.
pursuit of advantage now dubbed “utility”.
T his said, the utilitarian rationalists’ model of
In spite of all criticisms, it has to be recognized
action is relevant as an etic theory of action
that utilitarian rationalism has become politically
wherever something like utility maximization is
fecund in a number of different ways. The most
the desired outcome. It is relevant as an emic
important of these is that utilitarian rationalism
theory precisely where the model has become
proposes with the idea of positive and negative
performatively relevant because people actually
incentives a very powerful but simple model to
use it consciously or have become habituated to
shape the behavior of people thus offering a
work in accord with it. That is to say because it
seemingly universally applicable means of
has been politically so fecund and because in the
n Society: Refl exively Conceptualizing Activities 69

meantime generations of managers have been are hierarchically nested in such a way that the
trained in its image and workers are supposed to more complex higher layers are materially
follow it down to their sports activities and even grounded in the lower ones. The layers are
eating habits it is of considerable import as an separated by thresholds of emergence through
emic model. which new laws come into effect which must
become the object of specialized sciences if
progress is to be made in capturing the
4.3.2 Communalism 14 phenomena as they really are. The most complex
layer of reality, social life, forms the top-most
For communalists not individuality but sociality layer of being and accordingly requires its own
has become the basic assumption about human science, sociology.
life, if one that has been conceived as varying in E mile Durkheim ( 1895) has adapted this
form phylogenetically and historically, model to justify his design for a truly scientifi c
ontogenetically and biographically. In fact, sociology. He is much concerned, therefore, with
individuality has been understood by establishing the autonomy of sociology as a
communalists as a particular modality of discipline, and does so in two related steps. The fi
organizing the relations between human beings rst is to delineate the proper object for
and as such the result of a particular historical sociological research which he designates as
development (e.g. Simmel 1908 ; Durkheim social facts. Working on the paradigm of
1893 ). Due to this shift in fundamental sanctioned norms he characterizes them as
ontological assumptions, sociologies felt exerting force on individual humans as well as by
compelled to break completely with traditional their diffusion, that is their independence from
rational action and contract models. This break individual acts and modes of thinking which can
came in two main varieties, as structuralism for that reason also not simply be willed away (
feeling compelled to abandon any grounding of 1895 ). In Durkheim’s view, these social facts
social analysis in activity concepts, and as a emerge from individual activities as objective
diverse group of approaches which continued to characteristics of the world through social
see activity concepts as central and which I will organization which can be studied with regards to
call here for want of a better term social activity its particular objective structure. Knowledge of
theorists. this structure renders an investigation of the
underlying individual actions superfl uous; worse,
4.3.2.1 Emergent Social Facts: Sociology attention to action would be as distracting and
Without Activity misleading as attempting to study the evolution of
life by aiming to grasp it at the molecular level. 15
Concepts
Ancillary to this object defi nition is an effort to
The scholar who has for the longest time been
differentiate that new science of social facts,
credited with the honor of having invented the
sociology, from that older science of individuals
term sociology, Auguste Comte ( 1844 ),
and their actions, psychology. The result of this
developed over the second quarter of the
procedure is a stark contrast between an
nineteenth century a rather infl uential model that
individualistically conceived psychology and a
mapped his understanding of a stratifi ed reality
communally framed sociology.
onto a system of sciences each addressing itself to
one of these strata. For Comte the layers of reality

14
Proponents of individualism typically denigrate in the debate I want to avoid such name calling not least
communal perspectives as collectivist playing on not so because all well-established models discussed in what
subtle associations with fascism and socialism. follows have value if typically in a domain much smaller
Conversely, communalists of either of the two stripes of than the one imagined by their authors.
15
discussed below often reciprocate by calling the opposing This is of course precisely what is done in biology
perspective atomism with likewise not so subtle overtones today—a valuable lesson in the half-time of naturalistic
of confusing the study of social life with the study of dead metaphors.
matter. Although I am in some sense clearly taking sides
A. Glaeser

The second step is taken with the development make do without an action concept are often
of methods to measure social facts empirically. called structuralist or structure functionalist in
This meant turning away from individual actions direct reference to Durkheim’s example. Of
toward observable manifestations of social facts. course from the vantage point of the Comte-
Among them are large scale institutions (notably Durkheim theory this is only an apparent paradox
the law and religion), forms of social which disappears as soon as the fact of emergence
organization, or otherwise statistical averages is taken seriously.
minimizing the adulterating effect of an attention T here are, however, two fundamental
to individuals and their idiosyncratic choices. problems with the argument of emergence in
From a study of such indicators of social fact social life. First, it posits the independent pre-
Durkheim is then deriving what in his eyes are existence of the elements from which something
laws of macro-social development the most is said to emerge. For the social world
prominent of which is his assertion that societies emergentists must argue, therefore, that the social
evolve from simple to more complex forms emerges from individual activities. However, as I
passing on their way through distinct modes of have already argued in the last section, the social
social organization, and mental composition of as it is most fruitfully understood today, has no
people. pre-social to emerge from. 17 As far as sociality is
D urkheim’s sociology is not entirely without concerned, all that happens is that its forms
attention to activities. At the center of his analysis change both ontogenetically and biographically as
lies an interest in rituals through which both the children move from their entanglements in
social ties of people and their individual life smaller (e.g. dyadic) relationships to the mastery
energy are renewed in the experience of actions, of larger (e.g. triadic and onward) and more
feelings and thoughts shared in each other’s co- complexly structured groupings of humans. Much
presence ( 1893 ; 1912). These moments of the same holds historically as many sociologist
“effervescence,” and the order they create are have pointed out, and perhaps even
existentially meaningful in Durkheim’s phylogenetically as evolutionary anthropologists
understanding of social life because they perform and linguists are beginning to speculate
the transcendence of individuality towards the (Tomasello 2014 ). In other words with the social
point of origin of all human life: society. And it is sciences the use of the term emergence in the
this contrast between power inducing collective Comte-Durkheim sense of a “strong” emergence
embeddedness and individual isolation that for is ontically quite problematic.
Durkheim becomes the contrast between the T he second fundamental problem with
sacred and the profane, the source code of all emergence is that it treats the process of emerging
signifi cation and meaning. Indeed here and in his more or less as a black box. Apart from general
ethics specifying his own categorical imperative hints (Durkheim 1895) and a few thought
to live a life in perfect attunement to the need of experiments (Archer 1995) which are cited time
one’s society at its present stage of development, and again in the literature, there is no systematic
lie the roots of Durkheim’s vision of sociology as attempt to theorize the process of emergence. Its
a positive religion in Comte’s sense. 16 invocation has therefore something mystifying.
The Durkheimian vision of a sociology Rather than pointing to possibilities for political
beyond activities is chiefl y responsible for the intervention, it effectively obscures processes and
paradoxical situation with which I started this it posits the existence of doubtful entities such as
chapter. The large segments of the discipline that a base line of general sharing—Durkheim’s

16 17
T he fruitful tradition of looking at nationalisms, notably The emergentists much quoted examples from nature
the American one as a “civic religion” (Bellah 1968) has cannot serve as proper analogies here. While natural
taken off from here and it has contributed to scientists can for example observe elements and their
communitarian thought the only successful normative properties independently of the molecules of which they
school of social thought in which American sociology can be a part, the same is not true in society.
after World War II was represented with important
scholars such as Bellah.
n Society: Refl exively Conceptualizing Activities 71

collective conscience enabling a fundamental 1832) set an example for the idea of historically
level of mechanical solidarity—for the existence changing forms of sociality which are confi
of viable political communities. It is therefore a guring and being confi gured by the actions of
politically highly problematic concept. people. He also conceives forms of sociality as
E mergentists (e.g. Bhaskar 1979; Archer et entangled in a dialectical relationship with
al. 1998 ; Sawyer 2005 ; Elder-Vass 2010 ) often changing forms of peoplehood characterized by
present their own paradigm as the only alternative the differentiation and growth of mental
to individualism. Yet, the sociological capacities. Hegel thus systematically reinterprets
phenomena they point to in order to make their as historical achievements and relationally confi
case for emergence remain unpersuasive because gured the very characteristics of humans that
they can be explained without either taking Enlightenment thinkers have attributed to them as
recourse to the concept of emergence or by fi xed, inalienable patrimony, while insisting that
relapsing into the individualist reductions favored these changing characteristics of humans entail
by utilitarian rationalists. There is indeed a third changing possibilities for organizing social life.
possibility, namely making sense of social life Ontologically speaking, then, Hegel opposes
dialectically that is by taking recourse to traditional nominalism by showing how
processes of co- constitution in which parts and individuals are abstractions from the dialectical
whole get reconfi gured together—if often processes that constitute them. At the same time
through a confl ict ridden process of adjustments. he opposes traditional realism by historicizing the
Indeed, the three arguments about the social forms concepts take. In the Phenomenology ’ s
constitution of inner life I have provided in the last account of human development of which the
section do exactly that. If humans are master-slave dialectic is but the best known part,
fundamentally social in the sense in which these he argues, for example, that self-consciousness,
theories think sociality, then action is never the very basis for rational thinking, is attainable
individual rational action, but the socially only in the recognition of others. Since property
embedded action of a person whose very rights are for Hegel the crucible of recognition,
rationality is produced and reproduced through this leads to violence and subjugation. In general
institutionalized social relations. But this also Hegel assumes that intentional actions inevitably
means that we can think of what sociologists like lead to failures or resis-
to call structure as fully grounded in activities
without having to add to it some mysterious
emergent properties. People and their modalities
court, but only oxygen in something else. It would be
of acting simply change with the social andpointless then to be puzzled by the fact that the properties
of oxygen and hydrogen would not “add up” to form those
cultural environment, the institutions and
of water, simply because nobody had ever seen oxygen and
structures. 18 hydrogen and carbon by itself. At the level of biology: yes
4.3.2.2 Social Activity Concepts humans are made of cells, but these cells operate
While the radical political and social differently from mono-cellular beings in spite of very
many structural similarities. Humans emerge no more from
transformations during the long nineteenth
fl agellates than society from individuals.
century prompted and in a sense even demanded tance in the sense that they all entail what we now
a fresh conceptualization of action and social life, call unintended consequences in nature and
the quickly loosening immediate grip of society. Thus, the struggle for recognition does
Christianity freed the social imagination and not lead to the anticipated death of one of the
made it more plausible for scholars to develop a contenders, but to domination; and once more
whole range of social activity concepts. Hegel contrary to the intention, domination stunts the
plays a crucial role as an inspiration for theorists master, but forces the slave to transcend himself
of social action. His Phenomenology of Spirit and to develop and fi nally overcome domination
(1807) and later his Philosophy of Right (1818–

18
T o say it with the natural metaphors of the from the oxygen in carbondioxide. It is as if there was no
emergentists: It is as if the oxygen in water was different oxygen tout
A. Glaeser

etc. Failure and resistance, however, lead human embedded in a wider system of social forms. Yet
beings to form better concepts about the world the main failures, forms of resistance and confl
and themselves. The formation of these concepts icts (i.e. “contradictions”) are no longer lodged
is wrapped up in an ongoing process of revision between mind and world, but between material
because they need to be adjusted constantly to the interests and within systemic institutional
effects that humans have brought about through incompatibilities. And as in Hegel there is in
their past intentions formed on the basis of these Marx’ theory the positing of an inevitable
concepts. This “history of spirit” as a history of development towards a secular paradise; yet it is
concepts, of social forms, of social organization, no longer achieved by state bureaucrats (as a
will continue to unfold until ideas and world are universal class) acting in the interests of all, but
perfectly aligned and humans have thus realized by a proletariat universalized by generalized
their potential in harmony between their exploitation and suffering which enables them to
universality and their particularity. In the launch a world revolution.
Hegelian world action assumes basic subjective M arx’s theorization of activities is grounded
meaning because it is driven by intentions, it is in a reinterpretation of the notion of praxis. For
existentially meaningful as a step, however the ancient Greeks, praxis was an integrated and
minute, in a process of human self-liberation and organized set of activities such as shoe-making or
in its highest form move in the objective drama of lyre-playing that was systematically connected to
self- unfolding sprit in the history of the World. particular forms of knowing. 19 During the
Marx honed his skills in historical and Enlightenment praxis was juxtaposed to theory as
dialectical reasoning in the encounter with Hegel, modality of engaging with the world, and by
and even where Marx’ language begins to shed its emphasizing practice Marx thus signals both his
Hegelian sound in his later writings, the methods movement from a focus on ideas to one on
remain with him. Yet, in Marx’ mind Hegel’s material production and with it a turn away from
work suffered from two fatal conceits. First n aturalized conceptions of intentional action to
among these is Hegel’s insistence that history had socially preconfi gured activities ( 1845 ; Marx
already reached the point where reason had come and Engels 1846 ). The early Marx distinguishes
into its own by having reshaped the world in its between free activity and determinate activity
image (Marcuse 1941 ; Avineri 1968 ). Yet, the where the former marks only the end point of
dramatic situation of the working classes in historical development in communism, the latter
Europe indicated that the present order could not the form of human activities take on the path to
possibly be anywhere near the realization of the fi nal proletarian revolution. Indeed, Marx
human potential that Hegel had assumed. Second, analyzes determinate activities as standardized
Marx accused Hegel and his followers of forms of operating that integrate knowledge,
misunderstanding human beings as principally specifi c locations where they are performed etc.
idea Most importantly, however, he shows through a
driven whereas in his mind they needed to be discussion of the historicity of the division of
primarily understood as material beings in need to labor, of ownership, of family relations, of forms
produce their own livelihood for survival. of commerce, and of government, how a wide
Following Hegel, he took a deep interest in labor, variety of practices are interdependent and
but now understood not as a vehicle to intellectual presuppose each other across society with a
growth, but as a material necessity. Activities in particular mode of production at its center.
the world assume a much greater role in Marx’ Modalities of producing knowledge, raising
theory and concept formation takes a back-seat as children, or doing politics are in this sense
a super-structural phenomenon. The dialectic that dependent on modalities of running commerce,
unfolds in his theory is still one of self and other laboring in factories and managing them under

19
Aristotle ( 322BCEa , b ) gave praxis the added specifi completely for its own sake. As central as this distinction
c meaning of a set of activities that is not undertaken for is to Aristotelian practical philosophy, it is specifi c to him
the sake of something else that is what he calls poiesis, but and his school.
n Society: Refl exively Conceptualizing Activities 73

conditions of changing markets and ever new understanding how increasing requirements for
technologies. coordination in lengthening action chains can be
Closely related to the notion of praxis/practice met institutionally. His answer is that this is
is that of habitus/habit. Like its cousin’s its possible only to the degree that control becomes
theoretization began in ancient Greece, where it internalized. In other words, Elias provides us
designated the mental disposition corresponding with a way to investigate the co-constituting
to practices. 20 Yet, with all the individualizing relationships between institutional arrangements
tendencies I have mentioned above, habit came to on a larger scale and their presuppositions in the
be side-tracked as an important component of psychological makeup of the persons carrying
theorizing actions. Worse, perhaps, it appeared as these institutions. Equipped with this dialectical
old- fashioned, anti-modern, as that which resists imaginary, Elias directs our attention to what he
reason. 21 This changed dramatically in the late calls “mechanisms of interweaving” that is
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Growing everything that brings human beings into the
psychological empiricism (e.g. James 1890 ), but range of each other’s activities allowing on the
even more so a changing social threat scenario one hand lengthening chains of interaction
cultivated in contemporary imaginaries placed requiring on the other new tools of coordination.
23
danger to society no longer in the pigheaded
farmer resisting scientifi c innovation and P ierre Bourdieu ( 1972; 1986) follows Elias
democratic responsibility (as the Enlightenment in seizing upon habitus as the mediating link
did), but in the rootless, dissipated individual (e.g. between the personal and the social. Yet, while
Durkheim 1897 ; Thomas 1923). In American Elias’ animating questions pertains to large scale
pragmatism, especially in the work of Dewey historical transformations, Bourdieu’s centers
(1922 ) habit is both the vehicle to reintroduce the around the reproduction of class boundaries. To
sociality of action as well a means to eclipse the answer his questions he suggested a productive
signifi cance of will and rational planning. 22 set of metaphors that described habitus shaped in
Norbert Elias ( 1935 ) brings signifi cant the struggle for status (“symbolic capital”) in
innovations to the concept of habitus by which the contestants have to differentiate
understanding it as a response to particular themselves along several dimensions from other
institutional confi gurations. At the same time contestants. Habitus is both the result of this
Elias sees in habitus the means for the structural struggle and its animating principle. As among the
continuation of these confi gurations. In particular Greeks, Bourdieusian habitus conveys know how
Elias employs habitus to come to an for practices. 24 And it does so—Bourdieu is in

20
T he ancient Greeks saw good habits as a basis for good established and through the reappropriation of Aristotle’s
practice and as such of virtuous behavior. Accordingly, practical philosophy in the thirteenth century, habit once
habits became the target of educational efforts. Yet, the more played a signifi cant, if secondary, role notably in
Greeks also saw that these habits are the results of the work of Thomas Aquinas. Subsequent revolutionary
practices as much as of direct instruction. Although movements kept to Augustine rather than Aquinas.
22
manifesting themselves as characteristics of persons, Dewey even collapses will into habit.
then, the Greeks saw habits as the result of a social 23
Elias is concerned here with processes of colocation
process of instruction as well as of experience, of (e.g. urbanization) or connection (e.g. trade) following
repeatedly acting in social context (Aristotle 322BCEa). political centralization and expansion as much as in
Politically good habits were seen as the basis of a stable sociotechnological means of coordination (e.g. money,
and reliable social order (Aristotle 322BCEb). standardization, clocks).
21
It appears that habit was generally suspect to thinkers 24
E lias too was concerned about the habitus generating
aspiring to effect changes. Missionizing Christianity is, powers of status competition. Yet, in his work it works as
unsurprisingly, not interested in habit. In the work of only one kind of interweaving mechanisms among many
Augustine, and this is very signifi cant for the place of others. The similarities in both accounts are as interesting
habit in Europeanoid social thought after the as their respective differences. Suffi ce it to say here that
Reformation, will and choice are emphasized and habit no Elias’ concept is wide enough to see that cooperation is as
longer plays a roles as a signifi cant theoretical concept. powerful a generator of habitus as competition. Bourdieu
Of course there are sound theological reasons for this on the other hand adds a Cartesian precision and level of
preference as well. Yet, with Christianity fi rmly self-refl ective theorizing which is absent in Elias. This
A. Glaeser

agreement here with previous habitus theorists— dovetail and how objects fi t into interaction.
in form of tacit, embodied knowing which is hard Exchange is a good example for how Simmel
to penetrate for critical refl ection. reasons about these matters and how the notion of
The notions of practice and habitus belong interaction can be usefully deployed to better
together; they form two sides of the same coin. understand social processes of co-constitution (
The problem with this approach is that most 1900 ). Possession, a form of interaction with
practices do not only build on tacit knowledge, objects shapes both, the thing and its proprietor.
habitus, but they are often shot through with In giving up a possession in exchange for
forms of deliberation making use of explicit something else the two objects in play obtain
theories ranging in their degree of sophistication value. All components of this form of interaction
and explicit awareness from sayings to elaborate can become objectifi ed in repeated exchange;
theories. Yet, it is also important in this context to both proprietors are set in relation to each other;
point out with Wittgenstein’s private language and so as are the goods. Now consider how
argument that systematic reasoning (which bringing in money changes the entire character of
inevitably is a form of rule following) needs to be the exchange and all that participates in it.
grounded in practices. Moreover, it is clear that A very important dimension of the Simmelian
praxis/habits as highly institutionalized forms of theory of interaction is provided by his
activity cannot stand on their own and require transcendental refl ections on the conditions for
more basic activity concepts to account for their the possibility of interaction to take place in the fi
genesis. rst place. In keeping with Kantian language he
Georg Simmel begins a completely new strand calls the conditions aprioris ( 1908 ) and points to
of thinking with the physical sciences inspired three necessary aspects of what I would prefer to
notion of interaction ( Wechselwirkung ) ( 1908 ). call a social imaginary. The fi rst is typifi cation
He introduces this term as a metatheoretical of self, other, and situation, the second is an
activity concept to think through a wide variety of awareness that the types employed fail to exhaust
dialectical, co-constituting social processes. The reality, and the third is a kind of general trust that
basic imaginary behind the notion of interaction there is a workable place for the interaction in
casts two people acting towards each other in some vaguely conceived larger social whole. 25
mutual orientation. Examples discussed in detail Simmel’s concept of interaction bore
by Simmel are exchange ( 1900 ), competition and extraordinary fruit in the work of George Herbert
other forms of confl ict, as well as subordination Mead’s theory of self-formation discussed above
and super-ordination ( 1908 ). Interaction for and through him (as well as directly) on the
Simmel has especially two intertwining symbolic interactionism (Blumer 1962 ) of the
characteristics. It is “sociating”, that is to say that second Chicago school.
it produces particular forms of social relations The theory of dialogue as developed by Martin
which mediate the fl ow of effects in either Buber ( 1923 ) and signifi cantly expanded by
direction; it also more or less subtly transforms Mikhail Bakhtin ( 1929 ; 1938/1939) offers
both interacting parties. Moreover, Simmel important depth to the notion of interaction. 26
envisions how several kinds of interactions can First it emphasizes the import of the emotive and

depth is particularly useful where Bourdieu provides to affect attunement and since they do not simply subside it
tools to study the self-normalizing tendencies of fi elds is clear that Simmel’s notion of interaction is
and the symbolic violence they exert on participants fundamentally incomplete even for adult interaction.
26
(1990). B akhtin systematically builds on Buber (Friedman
25
These three aprioris are not reconcilable with 2001 ) . At this point it is unclear to me, however, whether
caretakerinfant interaction (e.g. Stern 1984) because they either Buber or Bakhtin had actually read Simmel’s
presuppose a fully developed self with linguistic abilities. apposite texts and whether they saw themselves
As such they fail as aprioris in the sense intended by developing his notion of interaction further. In a certain
Simmel. However, the Simmelian aprioris can be sense Simmel’s work was prolifi c but was often received
interpreted fruitfully as dimensions of a social imaginary in a piecemeal fashion.
for fully symbolized social interactions. Yet, since early
developmental interactional forms make much use of
n Society: Refl exively Conceptualizing Activities 75

cognitive attitude with which the other is Europeanoid notions of rationality but he allows
encountered. As dialogic thinkers show, these for the integration of habitus and emotions into a
attitudes have dramatic consequences for thoroughly pluralistic, if you will multi-voiced, or
processes of self- development of both polyphonic analysis of action. It is almost
participants as well as for the course of the secondary in this regard that he has failed to grasp
interaction. In particular Buber distinguishes the ways in which precisely the affective and the
between completely open and closed traditional modalities of acting can be experiences
(objectifying) relationships which Bakhtin labels as profoundly meaningful.
dialogic and monologic. 27 Second, the theory of Unfortunately Weber’s own efforts at
dialogue opens an important normative developing a methodology to use his scheme have
perspective on social interaction. Beyond remained sketchy at best. Worse, perhaps, Weber
reiterating that most of what we call ethics lies in created very unfortunate misunderstandings by
the manner of engaging with others it produces an recommending instrumental rationality as the
attractive positive vision of what ethical primary measuring device against which actual
interaction should look like. performance should be measured as deviation. 29
Max Weber ( 1922 ) is the inventor of the very Taking Weber as a starting point, few have done
term social action and made it, in his famous defi more than Alfred Schütz ( 1932 ; Schütz and
nition of sociology, the proper object of Luckmann 1984 ) to elucidate both meaning in
sociological research. Action becomes social for action and the challenges to understanding
Weber when it is oriented in its intended meaning subjective meanings. Critical of Weber’s
toward the actions of others. According to Weber understanding of motives as preceding action,
understanding the subjective meaning imbued in Schütz draws attention to the temporal
the action is tantamount to understanding the constitution of meaning during, in, and through
action in its causes and effects, sociology the process of acting itself.
becomes a discipline engaged in a double S tarting in the late 1930s, the terms social
resolution hermeneutics: that of the actor and that action and theory of action became closely
of the wider context of actions. 28 To help with associated with Talcott Parsons ( 1937 ;
this task Weber develops an ideal typical respectively Parsons and Shils 1951 ) and his
framework to reconstruct the subjective meaning school. Parsons, more than anybody else after
of actions that urges its user to differentiate Weber, saw in action the very building block of
between means- ends rational, value-rational, the social and then also of the psychological and
affective, and traditional motives for action. One fi nally of the organismic world ( 1978) . Yet he
of the great strengths of this approach is its effort did not share Weber’s hermeneutic approach to
to think together different modalities of acting, the social sciences instead endorsing Durkheim’s
different action logics if you will, fathoming the scientistic vision. Not surprisingly, then, Parsons
possibility of ambiguities, ambivalences and even very self- consciously saw his work as integrating
contradictions. Not only does Weber’s framework a signifi cantly enriched version of Durkheim’s
make more room again for pre-nineteenth century functionalism and Weber’s focus on action. The

27
F eminism and postcolonial theory (Fabian 1983 ) have connected with it. The point Weber is making is simply
drawn signifi cantly on a dialogic imaginary. On the that no matter what the actor may have thought he or she
monologic/objectifying end of these attitutes there has was doing, their intended meaning matters to understand
been something of a common thematic focus and the particular course of action they have taken as other
intensive cross-fertilization of ideas emerging from meanings would have putatively led to other actions.
dialogism, a reinvigorated interest in Hegel’s notion of 29
I n the lack of a more sophisticated understanding of
recognition (Honneth 1992) a postmarxian Lukacs ( meaning comes to the fore one of the lacunae of Weber’s
1923 ) inspired interest in processes of objectifi cation otherwise so stunning erudition: the complete absence of
(Honneth 2005 ) and a Freud inspired line thinking of linguistic knowledge of either the classical historical
processes of fetishization (Kaplan 2006 ; Böhme 2006 ). school of linguistics, of the synchronic linguistics of
28
T his of course includes the possibility that that the Saussure or of Peirce’s semiotics.
interpretation given to an action by a sociologist may
deviate signifi cantly from the meaning the actor may have
A. Glaeser

hallmark of Parsons’ approach is considering as acting to achieve a particular effect however


action at the crossroads of what he defi nes as elusive its actual attainment may be, and that in
systems, namely the social system, the cultural fact the combination of a particular speech act,
system, the behavioral system and the personality following a particular set of rules whereby a
system. Any concrete action is for Parsons at the ‘scertain set of signs are deployed, and its
same time understandable as the expression of subsequent uptake by others prompted by the very
these systems’ interaction as well as a functional decoding of these signs, may produce, where
operation within these systems aiming to either successful, the very thing the speech act intended.
adapt the systems to the environment, and/or to Austin labeled the successful conjuncture of
set the systems’ goals (or target values); to either speech intentions and uptake performativity.
coherently harmonize and integrate the system Three core ideas are present in all of these
and/or to latently maintain the system as a theoretical departures: addressivity, the
structure. Parsons thus furnishes the aspiring deployment of signs in action, and a decoding of
analyst with a systematic way to think about these signs in evaluative reaction. In short,
action in various kinds of contexts (Alexander successful performance leads to performativity. 30
1988 ).
T he last social activity concept I want to 4.3.2.3 Weaknesses and Strengths of
dis-cuss briefl y is performance and with it the Established Social Action
related notion of performativity. It is perhaps not Theories
surprising that these concept emerged only after The notions of praxis/practice, habitus/habit,
WWII when the experience of mass mediation in interaction, social action, and performance all
cinema, radio and press photography had already contribute signifi cant components to the
become mundane. The extensive use of mass communal coproduction of seemingly individual
media for propaganda in commerce and politics activities. Yet, it is unclear how these concepts
both in authoritarian and liberal-democratic can be thought together. How would we get from
governance signifi cantly contributed to the social action and interactions to practices? Worse
development of these concepts (Bernays 1928 ; perhaps, how would we get to institutions, and to
Lippmann 1926 ; Dewey 1927 ). The concepts that level of analysis that is usually at play when
of performance and performativity were scholars invoke the term social structure? Or how
developed to in the intersection of several do we understand from within these concepts the
theoretical innovations. There was Goffman’s ( dynamics, the historical transformations of the
1956 ) employment of theatrical metaphors to forms of practices, habitus, interactions and social
describe the efforts of actors to steer the actions? There is nothing in the Simmelian theory
perception of their actions by others in the right of interaction, for example, that explains how
direction. At the same time, the “new rhetoric” local interactions congeal into a transposable form
(Burke 1950; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca while detailing something like the conditions for
1952 ) recovered, once more, the ancient idea that the form’s reproduction. The Bourdieusian
speaking is addressed to particular audiences and notions of practice and habitus are well articulated
crafted in relation to them. Wittgenstein-inspired for multidimensional processes of status
speech act theory (Austin 1962 ; Searle 1969 ), competition taking place within what he calls fi
fi nally argued the two closely related points that elds. However, the theory offers next to nothing
speaking can be very often fruitfully understood by way of expanding these notions to other kinds

30
The tracing of ideas is of course an endless business. An remembered them for a younger American audience, yet
alternative but crucially incomplete line of reasoning without the important layer of a mediating semiotics to
unfolds from Kant’s epistemology (together with Aristotle then feed into Merton’s notion of self-fulfi lling prophecy
and Plato the terminus a quo par excellence), to again sens linquitics. These ideas have since then been
Durkheim’s (1907, 1912) pioneering work on the recycled a number of times (e.g., Butler, Mckenzie). I have
importance of socially derived categories operating as highlighted the rhetorical strand here because the
systems of classifying the world; then came the acquisition symbolic mediation matters here centrally.
of these ideas by W. I. Thomas (1928) who thus
n Society: Refl exively Conceptualizing Activities 77

of social processes and institutional arrangements, years (2011, 2014) and will discuss it now in the
thus leaving the question of the emergence and fi nal section of this chapter.
transformation of fi eld logics and their wider
integration into social life mostly unclear.
Parsons’ action theory offers an integrative
4.4 Action-Reaction Effect
framework that in spite of its enormous reach,
remains fi xated on systems’ maintaining and Sequences
integrating processes and is of little use in
understanding contradictory pluralities of action It is the aim of this section to craft a general,
logics as well as the temporal dynamics of loadable, refl exive, and politically as well as
institutionalization and deinstitutionalization. ontically fecund concept of action that can draw
The notions of performance and on what is best in extant activitiy concepts while
creating a roadmap for empirical research. It
performativity open up an imaginary that points
proceeds from a basic, consequently processualist
in fruitful directions to remedy some of the
and dialectical account of social life. 31 It assumes
problems inherent in other activity concepts.
that the social exists in the complex fl ow of
Performance brings back the idea of a double
mediation in the nexus between actors: a primary actions prompting each other in multiply
intersecting and spatially and temporally
mediation through some symbolic medium and
differentiated ways. Within this model, any action
then a secondary medium ranging from stages to
is reaction to a number of temporally prior actions
TV channels through which primary mediation
of self and others while at the same time giving
can become effectively disseminated. Yet,
phenomena of both primary and secondary rise to a multiplicity of other actions by self and
others. 32 One particularly nasty problem of
mediation are much wider than envisioned in
performance theory. Performativity in turn conceptualizing activities, namely fi nding proper
boundaries demarcating an action, is immediately
focuses our attention on the dialectical interplay
addressed by this formulation, as any activity can
of activities and their transformation of reality,
become something determinate only in the
without, however, providing a satisfying answer
reaction by
on how this transformation works.
others. 33
In sum, while each concept offers a useful p
artial perspective, none of them offers much that I t is important to keep in mind that both the
would allow for their mutual integration into a antecedent and consequent actions can have
more comprehensive framework and thus they fall taken/ could take place at faraway places and
short of the criteria enumarated in part two of this distant times. If so, their effects need to be
chapter. What is needed, then, is a metatheoretical projectively articulated with the help of socio-
activity concept that can show any of the social technological means of storage and transportation
activity concepts discussed as special cases of a for things, and memory and communication for
more general framework, while making up the ideas. Under certain circumstances actions and
gaps I have just pointed to, especially the gaps in reactions are repeated in a self- similar manner
internal plurality, scalability and historicity while over a certain stretch of time possibly even by a
doing the very best possible to avoid blackboxing. changing cast of participating actors. If this is the
I have developed such a concept over the last case, they have become regularized and common
parlance nominalizes (and by implication

31
I have elaborated the following sketch of the model in mechanistic response. Reactions can be eminently
much greater detail in Glaeser 2011 where I also put it to creative, like the clever repartee in a dialogue. Indeed,
use in interpreting a major “macro-structural” creativity lies in what is made of the available pieces in the
transformation. I have traced the historical roots of this immediate present or in the more distant past, not in a
model in the hermeneutic tradition of social thought in divine creation ex nihilio. And these pieces are even as
Glaeser 2014 . memories, understandings etc. ultimately traceable to
32
T o avoid misunderstandings: Reaction does not mean actions, past and present. When Arendt ( 1958) leaning on
reactive. Neither does it imply any other kind of Augustine (395) describes creativity as a capacity for new
beginnings I
A. Glaeser

objectifi es) such a complex of intersecting, self- stable. The ordering of activities suggested by
similar action-reaction chains as an institution. understanding is fi rst of all a process, an open-
Institutionalized webs of action-reaction ended fl ow of differentiation and integration that
sequences vary in scope, complexity and temporal may originally fl ow from nothing more than
staying power from family rituals to the papacy. acting itself. And yet, where orderings in action
So here is a very simple and in principle become validated in agreement with other human
researchable way of seeing structure as activity beings (I call this form of validation recognition),
and activity as structured. The question is now where they are confi rmed or disconfi rmed in the
how that self-sameness, how that stability comes ex post assessment of action success (here I speak
about? of corroboration), or where they fi t in or are
A n answer to the question of institution compatible with already objectifi ed
formation emerges by fi rst wondering how understandings (that is when they begin to
reactions pick up and respond to antecedent resonate), they congeal into more rigid, at the far
actions and how the concrete temporal form of end even objectifi ed forms. Thus, understand ing
acting itself comes to be ordered. And here the (continuous verb) becomes an understanding
answer is through the mediation of consciously or (gerund) which as memorized exemplar or
unconsciously employed understandings which abstracted schema hence forth allows for its
are discursive, emotive, and/ or sensory decontextualized application, which is nothing
(including kinesthetic) modalities of other than what we more commonly call learning.
differentiating and integrating the world. 34 A nd yet once more an answer to the question
Through understanding, antecedent actions obtain of institutionalization seems to be simply pushed
relevant specifi city and perlocutionary force, for backward to another level of analysis. And indeed
example so it is, because we now have to puzzle how
validations can become regularized. And here the
answer can only be that they must issue from
would respond that what looks like the ability to start institutionalized sources. Recognitions for
something new is better understood as the jiu-jitsu-like art example may come forth from a constant source,
to alter trajectories thanks to the artful triangulation of
vectors pointing in all sorts of directions.
say the stable character of a friend who reliably
33
See Glaeser 2011, introductory chapter for an praises the same sorts of behavior/understandings
extended example. The reasoning here is analogous to and disparages others with the same constancy.
Bakhtin’s delimination of meaning units in speech But that is to say that the friend is an institution in
(Bakhtin 1953 ). the sense in which it is defi ned here, and one is
34
Subjective means here merely employed by this
thus forced to admit that there is no ending to this
actor. Understanding therefore does not imply truth in any
objective sense of that word. process, that there is no stopping point, just
when a gesture registers as threat rather than a seemingly infi nite deferment. And indeed I have
greeting, a speech as a call for revolution rather called this endless deferment institutiosis, in
than a mere description of grievances etc. The adapting the Peirceian concept of semiosis to
simultaneous use of a number of understandings institutional analysis. What gives society stability
of several modes can then provide orientation, then, are either loops, that is recursive patters or,
direction, and where necessary the means for more importantly, the very inertia caused by the
coordinating and justifying courses of action. In friction involved in the interplay of so many
other words understandings can systematically processes which are diffi cult to orchestrate at will
guide, that is structure, activities because they by any one participant.
themselves are structured. The two notions of projective articulation and
Evidently, then, stable reactions can be of institutions are the central link between what
thought of as prompted and guided by the primary goes traditionally for micro-analysis and for
mediation of constant understandings. Hence, the macroanalysis. Both of these notions can be
next step in solving the puzzle of employed systematically to think through the fl
institutionalization is to wonder how ow of action effects temporally from sources to
understandings as self/world mediators become consequences, as well as spatially to their
n Society: Refl exively Conceptualizing Activities 79

distribution between people and institutional T hese deliberations immediately shed light on
domains. If one wants to use these terms at all, the notorious issue of structure and agency. If
macro and micro thus become mere labels for agency is the capability to act, than besides the
more or less temporally, spatially and domain physical preconditions of time, space and energy,
dispersed action effects. 33 the capability to perform particular actions is
The mundanely observed fact that actions of dependent on particular actualized understandings
one and the same person seem to follow different of the actor, as well as of the actualized
logics in different contexts as well as the understandings of others whose participation is
discrpancy that may occur between the actors own necessary to complete the act (Austin 1962 ). In
understanding of her actions and the other words, anybody’s capability to act is deeply
understanding that an observer suspects is enmeshed with the institutionalized activities of
underlying the actual also appear in a new light. others. Conversely, any institution exists in
The understandings through which we operate do repeatedly enabled action and thus agency. The
not only have an ordering dimension but also opposition between agency and structure is
carry with them an accent of validity which therefore entirely misleading. 35
distinguishes them into those that are actualized The problem of agency articulated in this
because they appear valid enough for us to act manner leads to a fresh consideration of power
upon and those which do not. Continuously and politics. From the perspective of consequent
validated understandings become naturalized; we processualism, politics is a very particular and
forget that we could understand differently which socially most signifi cant form of activity,
is to say that we literally embody these namely, as I have already indicated above, the
understandings. Now, since validation is intentional effort to form, maintain or alter
situationally variant simply because different institutions of various spatial and temporal depths
people present in different situations differentially and import. Since institutions are formed by
validate understandings, because the space minimally two but potentially millions of people
resonates with some understandings more than constituting the targeted institution through their
with others and because different situations afford actions, the e licitation of support from others is
different possibilities for corroborating the central axis around which politics revolves.
understandings in action, while different contexts And that axis has two poles. The fi rst is rhetoric
may actualize different understandings hence that is the style and content of addressing others
making us act differently. The upshot of this idea in speech and other kinds of performances to join
is that we can live quite well and in many modern in the political project. Apart from naked coercion
circumstances need to live with contradictory there is no politics, big and small, without rhetoric
understandings which become actualized (Burke 1950 ). 36 The second pole of the political
differentially, leading quite “naturally” to axis is organization. It comes into play simply
different action patterns in different contexts. 34 because the elicitation of participation in the

33
F rom the perspective of the consequently processualist experiments on cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957;
model presented here it is therefore highly misleading to Petty and Cacioppo 1981) . Dissonances can only occur if
speak of micro and macro as “levels”. It makes no sense two contexts actualize the same profi les of
to talk, as Coleman ( 1990 ) does of “social conditions” understandings. As such the model also provides the
causing the micro- phenomenon of frustration. What resources to think through the “tensions” ( Spannungen )
causes frustration are the concrete actions of concrete Weber ( 1920a , b ) thematizes as a major driver of
others, if potentially many of them and repeatedly, for innovation in institution formation and ideas.
example competing with ego for few goods, creating price 35
F or further critiques of this opposition see Bourdieu
hikes, etc. that is the level of action-reaction effects is (1972 , 1980 ) and Sewell ( 2005 ).
never left. To say this is of course not to argue that 36
It is no accident, therefore, that the art of rhetoric as a
everything is “micro” which would totally overlook the self-conscious practice bloomed fi rst in participatory
fact that even single actions can be the consequence of a politics of the ancient Greek poleis and in Republican
wide variety of spatially and temporally dispersed actions. Rome. Accordingly within the Europeanoid tradition
34
This model therefore allows for a much more nuanced Aristotle’s On Rheotoric and Cicero’s Orator have
approach to the vexing ambiguity in the results of become the defi ning texts.
A. Glaeser

constitution of institutions on a larger scale requirements is indeed a constitutive aspect of


requires many helping hands making use of power.
techniques of projective articulation which need
to be coordinated and focused to yield the desired
institution forming effect. The hitch is, that
4.5 Conclusion
organizations themselves are institutions, and a
very particular kind at that. What distinguishes The aim to create a unitary, monothetic and
them from other institutions is that they have
universal theory of action for the social sciences
become self-conscious through a dedicated staff is highly misguided both in terms of describing
of people maintaining and or directing them. 37
and analyzing social life under particular
P ower is the ability to succeed in politics. That circumstances as well as for political efforts other
is to say power is potentiated agency; beyond the than blatantly ideological uses. As the brief
ability to act it includes the ability to deliver on historical introduction has shown, different
intentions. This can happen by a whole spectrum historical con-
of different ways structured by the degree to stellations characterized by different institutional
which the involvement of others proceeds arrangements and existential, political and
dialogically such that they become in fact fully economic problematiques have given rise to
equal co-politicians, or monologically by different activity concepts which highlight
subjecting others to some form of control (Glaeser different aspect of human action at the expense of
2013). 38 Power is constituted in different ways in others. In retrospect these are not simply false if
different situations. Indeed, different kinds of replaced in the course of time by a newer one.
institution- forming projects require different Instead they are merely superseded by new
capabilities and forms of control. 39 Money is concepts answering to new constellations of
power only if money can buy the kinds of actions institutional arrangements, problems, and
required for the institutionalizing project under intentions. Moreover, the pleading tone with
consideration. Neither is knowledge per se power. which changing conceptualizations of action are
Indeed it is important to note, that under certain introduced and defended indicates that in activity
circumstances knowledge may even be concepts are often argued against other more or
detrimental to the exercise of power, for example less explicit action logics that is against a plurality
if it raises doubts thus undermining the trust in of understandings in play within a local context.
understandings that enable acting (Glaeser 2011 If the search for a substantively rich, unitary
). However, situationally specifi c knowledge can and monothetic activity concept valid for human
become political knowledge, where it enables an beings in all historically extant social confi
imagination of alternative states, provides gurations is misguided at least for those purposes
understandings concerning the action-reaction traditionally avowed in the social sciences, we
effect chains central to the particular institution should instead look for a metatheoretical activity
politically targeted, and where it involves concept which is confi gurable in many different
knowledge about how to mobilize the people that ways, and that can work as a formidable search
need to participate in carrying that institution. tool to develop culturally and historically
Knowledge satisfying all three of these sensitive notions of action for specifi c domains
of social life while satisfying the four criteria of

37
This has very interesting consequences. As institutions fi rst generation encompasses Lenin ( 1902 ), Michels (
organizations require a self-politics to maintain them for 1911 ). and Weber ( 1922 ).
the purposes of engaging in target politics. That creates 38
C ontrol efforts can have rather interesting ironic effect
all sorts of interesting problems concerning the in that they produce the illusion of power while actually
relationship between both kinds of politics. Many of the undermining it.
problems and frustrations commonly seen in politics are 39
F or a discussion of the ironies such control efforts can
closely related to confl icts between target politics and self produce see Glaeser 2013.
politics. Pioneers in the fi eld of political organization had
to wait for mass-modernity to appear. The most important
n Society: Refl exively Conceptualizing Activities 81

appropriateness which I have discussed begun this Bakhtin, M. (1929 [1984]). Problems of Dostoevsky’s
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Interactionism: Meaning and Self 5
as Process
I. Tavory ()
New York University , New York , NY , USA
Iddo Tavory e-mail: iddo.tavory@nyu.edu
philosophy. From its very inception in the work
of Charles S. Peirce in the late nineteenth century,
pragmatists argued that meanings were in
constant fl ux. Rather than the frozen picture of
European semiotics (de Saussure [1916] 1986 ),
the American tradition saw that meanings are
shaped within actual situations, as actors navigate
the challenges of the day to day. Thus, Peirce’s
5.1 Introduction work already prefi gures two of the most
important loci of interactionist theory: the
It is a sociological truism that human reality is
ongoing fl ux of meaning in ordinary pragmatic
shaped socially. While biology surely plays a role
action, and way that the situation shapes such
in our development and the capacities we have,
ongoing action.
such capacities are molded by the human world
But even more important than Peirce was the
we live in. As Berger and Luckmann ( 1967 )
work of G. H. Mead, a Chicago philosopher
once put it, there is no natural “human world” the
whose posthumous ( 1934 ) series of lectures
way that we can think about the world of mice,
Mind Self and Society infl uenced a generation of
bees or zebras. People are shaped by meaning,
sociologists that fashioned interactionism as a
and this meaning is socially constructed. That
discrete intellectual project. Mead’s lectures
much we know. But what does it mean to say that
centered around the social sources and
people, and meanings, are socially constructed?
development of the human self. As Mead argued,
The core insight of symbolic interactionism
humans come to have a distinct notion of their
lies in a deceptively simple point: that both
selves (which cats, for example, just don’t have)
meanings and selves are made through
through the refl exive incorporation of others’
interaction: in the ordinary back and forth of
perspectives. We are not only socialized into
social intercourse with others. What makes this
society, but become humans through it. Without
insight radical is thus not so much its assumption
others, there cannot be a self.
that the human world is socially constructed
T his process, for Mead, is dynamic. We
(what sociologist would argue with that?), but the
constantly act and see our actions through the
insight that the meanings into which we are
lenses of our socialized self. It is in this back and
inculcated are constantly negotiated in
forth of action and refl exivity that human
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 85
S. Abrutyn (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary Sociological Theory,
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32250-6_5
interaction. Rather than a “social” that stands existence comes into being and through which we
outside and beyond us, meanings are constantly shape our world. In this, Mead’s philosophy gave
being shaped and reshaped in concrete situational theoretical meat to an infl uential idea that an
settings. early Chicago sociologist, Charles Horton
The philosophical roots of this interactional Cooley (1902 ), has called “the looking glass
tradition lie in the pragmatist school of American self”—that the way we understand ourselves is
I. Tavory

always mediated by the way we think others focus on what actually happens in it. That is, the
understand us. unit of analysis in interactionism is what Blumer
As a sociological perspective, however, the (following another one of his teachers,
study of interaction needed to move beyond Robert Park) called “the collective act.”
philosophical abstractions and into the realm of Interaction deals with relations, not so much with
the empirical. The person who is credited with attributes.
doing so, and who coined the term “Symbolic C losely related, a second tenet that emerges
Interactionism” was Herbert Blumer, a Chicago- from the interactionist defi nition above is the
trained sociologist who was Mead’s student and importance of the situation. People negotiate
research assistant, and who took over his course meaning not in the abstract, but in actual concrete
on Social Psychology when Mead became too ill situations. In this, Blumer was harkening back to
to teach (see Huebner 2014 ). the early work of D.S. Thomas and W. I.
Blumer became, both intellectually and Thomas’ (1928 ), the only sociologists who
organizationally, the most important fi gure in the presented something that others recognized as “a
development of interactionism. First, in training theorem”—“If men [sic] defi ne situations as real,
cohorts of students at Chicago—where he and his they are real in their consequences.” The
colleague Everett C. Hughes made an indelible situation, then, is the key arena for interactionists.
impression upon students such as Erving The third is the assumption that works its way
Goffman, Anselm Strauss, Howard Becker, Fred into the “symbolic” part of symbolic
Davis and others. Later, he also built up the interactionism. Based on Mead, but also drawing
department of sociology at Berkeley, which, on the work of German sociologist Georg
again, was to become an important intellectual Simmel, Blumer assumed that the relevant facets
center. of communication and self were symbolic—that
But perhaps the main force of Blumer’s is, meanings turned into words. Rather than the
symbolic interactionist insight was its theoretical kind of conversation of gestures that most
simplicity. Blumer ( 1937 , 1969: 2) set up three animals are able to enact, the kinds of meanings
tenets of interactionism. First, that “human that Blumer stressed were those that could be
beings act toward things on the basis of the turned into words. The realm of embodiment and
meanings that the things have for them”; second, emotion did not fi gure prominently in this vision
that the “meaning of such things is derived from, of interactionism.
or arises out of, the social interaction that one has L astly, there is no simple link between
with one’s fellows”; and last, that “meanings are method and theory (Meltzer et al. 1973 ).
handled in, and modifi ed through, an interpretive Interactionism received different interpretations,
process used by the person in dealing with the from postmodernist renditions in which all reality
things he encounters.” And there you have it, the is fl uid (Denzin 1992 ) and selves endlessly
tenets of interactionism, from which a deluge of shifting and protean (Lifton 1993 ), to a positivist
research has subsequently emerged. rendering that used a 20-question personality
But, simple as it sounds, there are a few questionnaire to work through the formation of
important assumptions and assertions that work selves (Kuhn 1964) , and social psychological
their way into this defi nition. Assumptions that, experimentation (e.g. Stets and Burke 2000 ;
as I will show throughout this chapter, set up both Heise 1986 ). And yet, in the main, theory in this
interactionism’s incredible strength, but also its case did select for a method. Following Blumer,
moments of blindness. most interactionists agree that if we are interested
First, the symbolic interactionist approach in the ways in which people collectively make
that Blumer crafted centers on interaction as a meaning in interaction in concrete situations,
medium that lies between people. And though then it would be a good idea to look at what these
this may sound obvious (after all, this is what interactional moments look like. If we try to take
interaction implies), it means that rather than shortcuts through statistical analysis of survey
looking at the personal characteristics of people responses, or even through interviews, we would
who enter interaction, it is more important to lose the processual nature of meaning. We will
onism: Meaning and Self as Process 87

take frozen refl ections, and substitute them for “naturally” deviant. That is, that there is
the fl uid realm of emergent meaning. something wrong about them, either
Interactionism, then, became identifi ed with psychologically, or, who knows, perhaps even
ethnographic methods. If you want to understand biologically.
the situation, you had better be there. B ut if we take an interactionist perspective,
the contours of the question radically change.
Instead of asking about what these people “are”
we ask about the process in which they are defi
5.2 Research Projects
ned in such a way. Rather than thinking about
deviance and deviants as natural objects, we
While the precepts above provide a general
think about it as an interactionally emergent
theoretical orientation to symbolic
“career”—not something that naturally happens,
interactionism, the proof is in the pudding. What
but something that is negotiated; rather than a
made interactionism into a prominent intellectual
state of being, it become re-conceptualized as an
position were the research projects that it
accomplishment.
engendered. And although there is a vast number
One of the best examples of this form of
of interactionist- inspired empirical projects, we
research is Howard Becker’s ( 1953 ) early and
can identify three important paradigmatic
celebrated paper on “Becoming a Marijuana
research traditions: one focused on patterned
User.” In an era in which smoking pot was seen
transformations of self, one on the patterning of
as a dangerous criminal activity done by
situational outcomes, and one on the emergence
depraved individuals, Becker fl ipped the
and ongoing construction of collectives.
question. Rather than asking about personal
characteristics, he asked how people become
successful pot smokers. His answer, based on
5.2.1 Patterns of Self: research with Jazz musicians and quite a bit of
“Becoming a…” introspection, was that in order to become a
smoker one needs to learn three things. The
Perhaps the best known interactionist research successful pothead needs to learn the techniques
tradition centers on the construction of (e.g. how long to keep the smoke in; how to roll
recognizable social characters—things like “the a joint); they then need to learn to recognize the
criminal,” “the pothead” or “the bureaucrat.” physical effects as the effects of the drug (e.g.
Here, we start from G. H. Mead’s idea that the you aren’t just very hungry, you have the
self develops socially, as we learn to take on the munchies; you aren’t simply confused, you’re
perspective of the group we take part in. Seen high); and one needs to learn that these physical
from this perspective, the self is best thought of effects are actually enjoyable—which isn’t
as an ongoing process. Since the groups we take completely obvious since the effects themselves
part in are constantly changing, the self is never are ambiguous.
completely congealed. We are never “fi nished” Each of these phases (especially in pre-
products, always in the process of becoming. The internet days) needed to be interactionally
sociological project that emerges out of this negotiated. Smokers learn to smoke from
insight asks how we then end up with social someone, learn about the effects, and are told not
types: with people who do not only do certain to “stress it” and let themselves enjoy the
things, but that also, we think, are certain things. sensations. In Becker’s telling, becoming a
To understand why this was a radical research pothead is an interactionally emergent
project it is useful to think about “deviance,” the accomplishment.
array of unsanctioned behaviors and social types. This form of sociological explanation has not
Take, for example, teenage delinquents. One way only intellectual, but also political stakes. Think
to think about delinquency—say, vandalism, back, for example, on the example of the
some violence and light drug use—is that the “juvenile delinquent.” Interactional sociology
people who engage in these activities are (under the banner of “labeling theory”, see
I. Tavory

Becker 1963 ) argued that becoming a juvenile the recurrent problems of interactionism, to
delinquent was not so much about the acts, but which we will return below: where do stable
about how they were interactionally interpreted patterns come from? If we assume that meanings
and labeled. Thus, when the author of this chapter are fl uid and made in specifi c situations, how
was caught once upon a time defacing his whole can we explain the recurrence of recognizable
high school with Graffi ti, he was told off, given outcomes? Why do things tend to happen in
a brush, and told to re-paint the school. He never predictable ways?
became a “delinquent.” It was considered a In order to answer this question through an
youthful folly more than anything else. But, of interactional perspective, interactional
course, in many schools—especially in researchers needed to make a few simplifying
disadvantaged neighborhoods—the police would assumptions. First, as true pragmatists, they
immediately be assume that people are practical problem-solvers.
involved, a criminal record opened, and a defi They usually enter situations with a general idea
nition of the actor as “delinquent” would emerge. of what they want to happen in it. On the other
The vague “primary deviance” (the actual act) hand, for both organizational and historical
would turn into a defi nition of the person (see reasons, the situations are already constructed in
Lemert 1967 ). The passage from an action to a ways that predate the actors. Given the
defi nition of self is socially negotiated. management of these two constraints,
Of course, it is not only “deviants” who interactionists show, actors land upon predictable
solidify their identity in interaction. After he was emergent solutions that give these situation their
done with Marijuana users Howard Becker’s recurrent character (Rock 1979 ).
(Becker et al. 1961 ) next project took him, and A classic example of this interactionist
a bunch of colleagues, to a medical school. As research project can be seen in the work of Fred
part of their study they found something that may Davis, one of Herbert Blumer’s students at
not surprise students reading this text: that Chicago. In one of his early articles, Davis shows
becoming a student is also a negotiated how the interaction between taxi drivers and their
accomplishment. Students, as they show, often clients take on a predictable form. The
came into the school truly wanting to learn. pragmatics of the situation are quite simple: the
However, they soon found out that what matters taxi driver needs to know what “kind of” client
for their future residency is mostly their grades, they have. If it is a newcomer to town, they might
not how much they challenged themselves be able to make an extra buck by taking them for
intellectually. Talking to each other about ways a longer ride than is necessary. The interaction is
to “game the system,” they quickly shift their also very short, and probably never repeated. We
group perspective. Rather than focusing on what don’t usually get the same taxi driver again and
most interested them, they focused on courses again. The client, on the other hand, fi nds herself
that would assure them better grades—courses in a fl eeting interaction with a person with whom
and professors known as “easy As.” Becoming a they are in close proximity, but will probably
student, although far from a deviant identity, is a never see again. And this, too, gives rise to
processual accomplishment. predictable interactional patterns.
5.2.2 Situational Patterns: On the driver’s side, as Davis shows, the
Institutional Constraints and situation comes to mean that they—like others in
businesses that depend on fl eeting interactions—
Actors’ Pragmatics
end up with a system of classifi cation that uses
The second important line of search that superfi cial traits of the clients to guide their
emerged through interactionism focuses on the interaction. This is true for drivers, but also for
waiters, air hosts, and other such professions. For
situation itself. Rather than taking the emergence
and patterned transformation of selves as its point clients, it was the fl eeting nature of the
interaction that was of utmost importance. On the
of departure, it asks how the interactional
dynamics of specifi c situations are patterned. In one hand, the pragmatics of the situation is such
doing so, this line of research addresses one of that they might tell the driver secrets that they
onism: Meaning and Self as Process 89

would perhaps not divulge to even their closest “becoming a…” project outlined above,
friends. On the other hand, they can engage in interactionists tend to be cautious about assuming
behaviors that they would never engage in with such attitudes. It isn’t that attitudes don’t exist,
someone they would have more than a fl eeting but that there are important elements of the
interaction with: making out with a partner, or situation that give rise to forms of classifi cation
changing clothes. These two negotiated even when the people involved in enacting the
reactions—extreme intimacy and complete classifi cation do not use racial stereotypes.
disregard—as Davis shows, stem from the same In a fi rst example, Phil Goodman shows how
institutional structure: that the interaction is so fl offi cers who process inmates end up assigning
eeting that the driver can be seen as a “non- them to predefi ned racial groups. As the offi cers
person.” work with documents they need to fi ll, they need
A second, and a bit more morbid, example to know where to house the inmates. Thus,
comes from the research of death and dying. As ethnicity becomes omni-relevant as a way to
Glaser and Strauss argued in a series of organize people’s lives in interaction. See the
publications ( 1964 , 1965 ), people who had following conversation (Goodman 2008 : 759):
terminal illness in America faced predictable Offi cer: Race?
circumstances. Doctors, at that time, were not Inmate: Portuguese.
obligated to inform patients of their condition. Offi cer: Portuguese? [pause] You mean
And, obviously, they had quite a bit of White?
information, whereas the patient had very little to Inmate: Nah, I’m Portuguese,
go on. As they show, since doctors wanted to not White.
make their treatment as smooth as possible, they Offi cer: Sure, but who do you house
wanted to avoid a conversation in which they with?
confronted their patients regarding their Inmate: Usually with the “Others.”
impending death. What it amounted to was a Offi cer: We don’t fuck with that here.
coalition of caretakers hiding the situation from It’s just Black, White, or
the patients. Doctors, nurses, but also often the Hispanic.
families of patients, colluded to create a “closed Inmate: Well, I’m Portuguese.
awareness context,” in which the patient was not Second offi cer, looking on the
aware of their situations although everyone else whole time: Put him with the
around them knew they were dying. As Glaser Negros, then [“Negro”
and Strauss then showed, as the hospitalization pronounced in Spanish].
and the disease progressed, the parties engaged in
Inmate: What?!
a delicate choreography of awareness contexts—
Second offi cer: Oh, now you’re serious, huh.
in some situations, the reality of impending death So you want to house with the
would be revealed, but in most cases it wouldn’t. Whites, do you?
And, as not to destroy the fabric of the situation,
Inmate: Fine, with the Whites.
patients who strongly suspected that they were
Offi cer: OK, with the Whites it is.
going to die kept on performing, thus creating a
What is going here? Are the offi cers simply
predictable situation in which all parties know of
racist? The answer, in an interactional vein, is not
the coming death, but where they all keep a
so simple. The offi cers have a practical aim: they
pretense of an optimistic diagnosis.
need to process people as quickly as possible.
S ometimes, the institutional structure is
After all, there is a long line to prison, especially
manifested even more concretely, physically
in California, where Goodman conducted his
inscribed in the situation. To see how this works,
research. In order to process inmates they need to
we can take the case of racial classifi cation, one
fi ll in a form that says where inmates should be
of the most pernicious recurrences of our times.
housed. At some point, probably because of inter-
How does such classifi cation emerge
g ang confl ict in prison (but maybe also because
interactionally? Shouldn’t we trace it back to
they held racial stereotypes), someone decided
people’s attitudes and stereotypes? As in the
that inmates should be housed according to their
I. Tavory

race. This decision was then codifi ed into a group cultures, what he called an “idioculture.”
seemingly small detail of the situation—a box The insight fueling this agenda is that in order to
that needs to be checked. But this little box understand any collectivity, we need to
powerfully channels and shapes the meanings understand how they come to develop and share
that people can craft. In the example above, the a symbolic universe. The image that emerges
inmate doesn’t want to be put into a box, he is through Fine’s work is that of a bottom-up
Portuguese, an “other” in his own self-defi nition. process of emergence. As people hang out
But in the California prison, there are no “others.” together over an extended period of time they
And so he must decide between the given begin to share a history, a set of memories, shared
categories. And although he might be able to future projects, jokes, and even linguistic terms.
assign himself into multiple categories, the offi A collectivity, in this reading, is made of the
cer pressures him to self classify. Without anyone congealed set of meanings and ties within small
in the situation being racist, a racist outcome aggregations of people. The social world writ
emerges. large, in this reading, is the sum of these small
Similarly, Kameo and Whalen ( 2015 ) show groups and their relationships.
that because 911 call-takers need to send the T o understand the utility of this notion, think
police a form that includes the suspect’s race, the of the smallest idiocultural unit—the one that
operative ends up putting pressure on the caller emerges between two people, say a dating
to identify the “race” of the suspect, even when couple. After a while, the couple does not only
the caller didn’t use racial classifi cations as part share jokes and stories (the common refrain “you
of their description. Race becomes salient should have been there…” may be the fi rst sign
through interaction, as the pragmatics of the of an emerging idioculture), but also ways of
situation— here codifi ed in forms—propels the being together, and even new terms and
dispatcher to pressure the caller to make race into shorthand expressions that are completely
a salient marker of personhood. opaque to others (see also Bernstein 1964 ). And,
In sum, the “situational pragmatics” project like the model of the couple, we can begin
sets out to show how recurrent patterns are built thinking of cliques, of the idioculture that
up from the situation. It is not that the wider congeals when people are engaged in shared
social structure doesn’t matter. The wider work or leisure activities (Fine’s fi rst noted
historical and institutional context sets up the example of idioculture- construction was the
kinds of constraints and affordances of the little-league baseball team).
situation. But once set up, outcomes tend to I mportantly, this way to interactionally
become uncannily similar. The world is made theorize collectivities is slightly suspicious of
predictable one situation at a time. any talk of “Society” or of “Culture” if they are
5.2.3 Patterns of Collectivity thought of in an all-encompassing sense.
Meanings do congeal, and aren’t completely
W hereas the fi rst stream of research outlined malleable once they are set. Yet they congeal in
above begins with the self and the second is specifi c and concrete interactional contexts. The
primarily about the patterning of situations, the study of small groups, in this reading, is the study
third is primarily about the emergence of of society in miniature (Stolte et al. 2001 ).
collective life in the process. That is, even if we The second stream of research, spearheaded
know something about how selves arise, and how by writers such as Tamotsu Shibutani, Anselm
situations are structured, we may understand Strauss and Howard Becker (all students of
relatively little about how groups take shape. Blumer from his Chicago days) takes a different
And, for sociologists, this is obviously an approach. Rather than beginning with the small
important question. group, it starts with the social organization of
B y and large, there are two interactionist activity— with the collective act. As Shibutani (
attempts to answer this question. The fi rst, led by 1955) put it in an early and infl uential article, a
sociologist Gary Alan Fine (see, e.g. 1979 , 1998 social world is “a universe of regularized mutual
, 2012 ), focuses on the emergence of small response.” That is, it is a plurality of actors
onism: Meaning and Self as Process 91

organized around a shared activity, where the sociologists, the focus on the situation seemed to
actions of one set of actors in this world affects, induce blindness to questions of power and
and is expected to affect, others who are engaged inequality. In being locked in an “occasionalist
in different aspects of the same activity (see also illusion” as Bourdieu ( 1977: 81) once called it,
Strauss 1978 ). interactionists (so the argument goes) ignored the
The image emerging here is perhaps more weight of structural injustice. In other words,
amenable to a macro-oriented approach. If the since Blumer’s defi nition of interactionism
idiocultural approach imagines a world made of places its emphasis on what occurs within
the intersection and emergence of a multitude of situations, we could forget both that (a) situations
small groups, the social worlds perspective are already set up in uneven ways, and that; (b)
imagines the world as made of a multitude of actors’ ability to navigate these situations may
actors, through whose actions specifi c arenas of not be evenly distributed.
activity emerge. It is a visualization that looks a Closely connected to this critique is what
lot more like a network-image than like the theorists used to think of as “the micro-macro
budding idiocultures of Fine’s analysis. This is problem.” As interactionists think about concrete
still, however, a deeply interactionist vision. The situations, they seem to necessarily think of
focus is on the concrete activity and the ways micro-contexts of action. What of larger
actors practically affect each other’s actions, and structures that are the bread and butter of
therefore the way to circumscribe the activity is sociology— what of the state? What of world
quite different than the way we usually do so. capitalism? This micro-macro critique also had
Thus, for example, Becker’s ( 1982a ) Art an additional correlate: that interactionism is
Worlds takes a social worlds perspective to the largely blind to culture. In its focus on the
study of art. In doing so, Becker makes a construction of meaning in the interactional
deceptively simple point. Usually when people context, it seems to overlook widely shared sets
think about art worlds they imagine a world made of meanings and ways of doing things. For many
by the artists, sometimes the consumers of art. research questions, so the argument goes, specifi
But as Becker begins with the collective act of c situations are little more than instantiations of
art, a different set of protagonists emerges—these wider patterns of meaning. Looking at the
include the artists, but also include the people situation, then, is looking at precisely the wrong
who install the art in the museum, those who place.
make and sell the canvases and paints, the guards Lastly, critiques have also arisen from other
and cashiers at the museum, etc. By beginning micro-sociological traditions, with some
with the concrete activity, then, a social worlds phenomenologically- inclined sociologists of the
perspective gives one a very different view of life body being wary of what seems to be a deep
than if we would think about them as “fi elds” or cognitive bias in interactionism. The gist of the
“professions.” Rather than the rarefi ed few, we argument here is that the symbolic in symbolic
must, as Becker puts it ( 1982a : 34) incorporate interactionism elevates deliberation and language
“all the people whose activities are necessary to as the key sites where meanings are made. What,
the production of the characteristic works which however, of emotion? What of embodiment?
that world, and perhaps others as well, defi ne as Should sociologists only study purposeful
art.” meaningful action, or should they also take
careful stock of pre-conceptual, embodied,
behaviors that also tend to be socially patterned?
I would like to propose that although
5.3 Interactionism: Challenges
interactionism has its share of problems, critics
and Developments have been usually barking at the wrong tree.
Thus, to take the set of studies already outlined
Like all intellectual traditions, Interactionism above, it already becomes clear that the research
has had its challenges. These can be parsed out traditions that stem from interactionism are far
into different clusters. First, for many from blind to the ways in which the situation is
I. Tavory

set up. That 911-call dispatchers need to fi ll in a environment, however, Stuart shows how the
box that tells the police what is the suspect’s race interactional situation is set up in predictable
is crucial; that doctors hold the information and ways. In a poignant move, Stuart shows that this
the patient none at all sets up the entire research form of intense policing results in men and
program on awareness contexts in dying. When women on the street policing each other’s
laws that mandate disclosure were set the actions. As Stuart writes:
situation deeply changed. Power, in the The constant threat of police interference forced
interactionist tradition, comes from the uneven the vendors to adopt the gaze of the police and to
institutionalization of situations. act as surrogate offi cers, thus engendering a
Of course, a critic can argue that it is crucial perverse mode of privatized enforcement that
undermined the commonly theorized benefi ts of
for sociologists to trace how unequal situational informal control, undercut the possibilities for
footing developed in just these ways. But, rehabilitation, and worsened the social and
interactionists could retort, this is simply not the economic marginalization of Skid Row residents.
project they outlined for themselves. (p. 190)
Interactionism never claimed that power did not
I n effect, Stuart depicts an interactionist
exist on a macro-level, or that tracing the history
mechanism: one of the unforeseen effects of
of power relations wasn’t important. What it said
intensive policing is that people who constantly
was that meaning-making in the situation cannot
get stopped, frisked and arrested, begin to “see
be completely reduced to these structures, and
like a cop.” That is, as a result of the back and
that to understand both stability and change in
forth between police and Skid Row, citizens
macro- regimes requires a close attention to the
change the defi nition of the situation and assume
ways in which people make and reshape meaning
the perceptive schemas of police offi cers.
in the actual world. In fact, there is a
Because this reaction is modeled after
provocative—and humanistic—theory of power
repeatedly-observed police actions, residents
at play in interactionism. While the situation may
integrate the contextual aspects typical of police
be unevenly set, the capacities of actors is treated
modus operandi: if police offi cers stop someone
as equal. It is for this reason that interactionists
in your vicinity, they are likely to also ticket you
are loath to put much emphasis on actors’
for some infraction, real or imagined. Here, then,
ingrained bodily habits or culture.
emerges a second part of the mechanism Stuart
In fact, most ethnographers who draw on
describes, where some men and women begin to
interactionism today combine research on the
themselves enact modes of “third party policing”
macro-organizational, legal and economic setting
in order to keep their environment safe from
of the situation, and the actual interaction they
police presence.
observe—as, in fact, did the early proponents of
T he irony is not only that third party policing
the Chicago school of sociology from which
emerges from fear rather than a spirit of
interactionism emerged. This, for example, is the
collaboration, but also that these men and women
research strategy used in Forrest Stuart’s ( 2016 )
react to perceived infractions. Thus, for example,
book, Down, Out and Under Arrest . The book
since white men (unless they are extremely
traces the social effects of zero-tolerance policing
disheveled) seem out of place, residents police
on the inhabitants of Skid Row, a Los Angeles
them away; since women are assumed to be sex-
downtown area that has become the place of last
workers, a few men forcefully removed a man
resort for people when they’re down on their
from Skid Row who was trying to keep his drug
luck. Stuart documents an intensive form of
addicted wife with him. When policing the
policing in which people are at risk for arrest for
perceived perceptions of the police, the men on
minor infractions and violations (sitting on the
the street ended up replicating some of the most
sidewalk, jaywalking).
repressive and unjust forms of such policing.
Setting the stage, Stuart delves deeply into the
S tuart’s work, like that of other leading
historical emergence of Skid Row as well as the
interactionist ethnographers (e.g. Jerolmack
legal structure that underlies the situations he
2009 ; Lee 2016 ; Timmermans 1999) , moves
describes. Once he sets up the macro-
between the situation and the larger social
onism: Meaning and Self as Process 93

context. It shows both how interactions are incorporate elements of emotion and embodied
shaped by the macro-processes they are behavior into their explanation without making
embedded in, but also why it is crucial to look at them any less interactionist in the process.
the interactional situation in order to understand
these macro-contexts. Although the way Skid
Row citizens interactionally negotiate the 5.3.1 The Tricky Problem of Culture
meaning of their situation may make sense in
hindsight, it is only through paying attention to B ut not all questions are so easily answerable.
the situation that some of the most problematic Both the question of embodiment and the
aspects of the policing of Skid Row came to the question of macro-structures contain features that
fore. In sum, then, there is little in interactionism are far trickier to approach from an interactionist
to hinder a macro-analysis of power. Just the perspective. The problem in both cases is quite
opposite seems to be the case, as an analysis of similar—though coming at it from opposite ends.
the macro-structure on its own would be blind If we think about the macro-patterning of the
some of its the most nefarious effects. social world as the multiplication of structurally
Much like the problem of macro-structures pre-set situations, we may be able to capture
and power, aspects of the problem of the body some elements of power, but we will miss more
and emotion were somewhat overblown. This is subtle forms of discursive power (Lukes 1974) .
both because, as researchers such as Arlie In other worlds, by assuming that the only
Hochschild ( 1979 ) and Susan Shott ( 1979 ) element that skews situations in predictable ways
have shown, we learn how to feel in certain is structural, we miss the whole realm of ideology
situations, and these feelings-rules are mediated and discourse. More generally (and less power-
by interaction (see also Barbalet 2009) . But, centered) we miss the sharedness of culture, as it
more importantly, research into the process of sets people’s anticipations of what they can
embodiment has shown that emotions very often expect in a given situation, and how to go about
emerge interactionally. Thus, for example, as muddling through it.
Jack Katz ( 1999 ) shows in how emotions work O n the other end of culture, the most
, laughter emerges as people align their bodies generative sociological projects that emphasize
and selves to others. To show that, Katz has embodiment argue that what makes the body and
videotaped people going to fun-house mirrors. emotion so salient is that it precedes the situation
Rather than fi nding that people laugh as they see and shapes the way that selves are molded over
themselves distorted, he fi nds that people time. Thus, for example, Bourdieu’s (e.g. 1977 ,
laughed much more when they walked together. 2000 ) notion of habitus focuses on the way in
And, by analyzing the videos in painstaking which both our bodies, tastes and modes of
detail, he showed that in order for laughter to perception and cognition are shaped by the
emerge, people walking together took great pains conditions of existence in which we grow up.
to position themselves so that they saw the same Thus, in any actual situation, we are enacting
thing. It was when people were together, and schemas of action and perception that we arrived
managed to sustain a shared perceptual vantage with. The challenge that this position implies is
point, that they laughed. that interactionism seems to assume that people
What we get out of these studies, then, is a generally come into the situation with the same
corrective to some of the usual critiques leveled capacities and embodied ways of enacting their
against interactionism. By taking the pre- selves. If we problematize this assumption, some
structured nature of the situation into account, aspects of symbolic interactionism may be
interactionists (both in social psychology and in treading on shaky ground.
ethnography) have been able to incorporate the T hese criticisms are not new, and classical
larger macro-context—including contexts of interactionists were well aware of the problem of
racism or poverty. By looking closely at feeling culture. And yet, there was something a little too
rules and at the actual processual production of facile about their initial responses to this
emotion, interactionists have been able to challenge. Thus for example, Howard Becker
I. Tavory

tried to provide an interactionist’s account of acknowledge. People don’t go to the dictionary


culture by arguing ( 1982b ) that culture was the or to the nearest sociologist to check whether
set of pre- given expectations that actors brought what they are doing is “civic.” This, for Eliasoph
with them into interaction. Taking Jazz musicians and Lichterman, is where interaction becomes
as his example, he argued that we can compare crucial. As people interact with each other, they
“culture” to the shared repertoire of songs and invest meaning in general cultural concepts. And
expected variations that musicians come armed although there may be a certain family
with. It’s an important part of the situation, no resemblance between the different ways in which
doubt, but the more important aspect of the action groups breath practical meaning into culture, the
is the kind of improvisations and unexpected actual practices they enact are different at every
variations that happen when musicians actually given case, as actors face different practical
work together. In a different vein, Sheldon problems and different group dynamics.
Stryker ( 1980) , the most important architect of T his position may sound a lot like Fine’s
symbolic interactionist social psychology, “idiocultural” perspective describes above, but
attempted to come to terms with larger cultural there are important theoretical differences
considerations by producing a structuralist between the two. For Fine, the most interesting
variety of interactionism. In his version, the dynamic is the emergence, from the bottom up,
theorist takes the position of actors seriously, as of local forms of meanings. For Eliasoph and
each position entails different signifi cant others, Lichterman, the most interesting location is the
and thus different conceptions of self. medium between the interaction and the wider
These attempts, however, fall short of taking culture.
either culture or people’s embodied positions A complementary attempt to tie wider notions
seriously. For Becker, that people come into the of culture to interactionism takes a different
situation with a repertoire of action seems too route. Rather than thinking about the availability
taken for granted. Rather than thinking about the of general cultural tropes that actors then mold
complex relationship between the cultural anew, the new generation of interactionists are
repertoire that people come armed with and what increasingly trying to see how actors biographies
happens in the situation, he relegates culture to a and notions of the future shape the way they
background characteristic. For Stryker, selves are interact. In order to do so, these theorists need to
structurally located as individuals are socialized account for actors’ ingrained habits, and see how
to appreciate a different “generalized other” (G. actors’ locations shape the interaction. This, as
H. Mead’s term for the internalization of the we will see, forces us to relax quite a lot of the
social as such), but the mechanism for such situational purism of some early interactionists.
different locations is purely cognitive, and a But it does so without losing sight of the creative
theory of the interaction of shared culture and potential of the situation as a locus of meaning-
interaction is lacking. making.
T o answer these challenges, recent T o understand the direction taken by these
interactionists have moved in two theorists it is useful to think about the notion of
complementary directions. Thus, Eliasoph and time. For classical interactionists, the most
Lichterman ( 2003 ) locate this meeting point in relevant temporality is that of the situation.
the notion of “group style.” As they put it, Although they may trace the history that set up
cultural meanings (such, for example, as “civic the situation in a particular way, once the stage is
action”) are ever present. They are a resource that set the unfolding of the narrative arc of the
both constrains and enables social action across a situation is their primary focus. But if we want to
wide variety of settings. We all know what civic understand how people operate within a wider
action means, at least “sort of.” However, it is this culture, and why social worlds are structured in
“sort of” that provides a clue to the relationship predictable ways, it isn’t enough to look at this
between culture and interaction. What something situational unfolding. In any particular situation,
like “civic action” actually means is more people orient themselves towards other
ambiguous than cultural theorists often temporalities. They are shaped by their pasts
onism: Meaning and Self as Process 95

through habits of thought and action—often situation in relation to the situation they expect to
deeply ingrained in their very bodies—and they fi nd themselves in later. So, from the point of
are anticipating and coordinating their futures. view of actors’, the focus only on the here and
Since actors extend in time, the situation cannot now of the situation misses much of what makes
be understood without such extensions. it what it is. This, then, is all the more true for the
One current direction, inspired by the work of study of social worlds: focusing on specifi c
Jack Katz, lies in the notion of biography. As situations and aggregating them into a social
Michael DeLand ( frth ) has recently argued, in world, as do writers in the classic social worlds
order to understand a social situation, and tradition outlined above, ignores the rhythms and
especially a recurring social scene, we need to patterns of situations and interaction.
understand where the interaction fi ts in the I n an ethnography of an Orthodox Jewish
biographies of actors. The very same activity—in neighborhood, Tavory ( 2016 ) argues that being
his example, playing pickup basketball at a local an orthodox Jew in that neighborhood was not
park—is very different depending on whether simply a matter of belief or affi liation. As i
going to the park is a recurring part of one’s mportant as these individual projects were, r
everyday life, or whether it is something we do esidents needed to practically learn how to expect
every now and then; whether it is defi nes our the rhythms of their social world. These included
identity in important ways, or considered an the obvious—the recurring moments of
appendage to other activities. A scene, in this synagogue life and religious observances, the
reading, can be understood as the predictable structured demands of their children’s schools—
intertwining of actors’ biographies, and their but also included a host of other predictable
pragmatic and existential concerns. rhythms. Thus, for example, Orthodox residents
R ather than holding the situation as the most learned to expect comments on the street (usually
important element for interactional analysis, it is just questions about their Orthodoxy, but also the
the situation as it fi ts into actors’ longer terms rarer anti-Semitic incidents), and had to learn
textures of life. To understand a party, for how to transition between their work in the
example, is not only to understand what happens nonJewish world around them to their seemingly
in the situation, but also at what point of the life insular Orthodox life at home. To understand
course of actors it appears. A party held when both the way in which Orthodox residents’
participants just turned 21 is going to be identities were constructed, and the way the
markedly different than a party held two years social world operated as a whole, the researcher
later, when drinking is less of a novelty. The needs to be attentive to the ways these rhythms of
tenor of a party will depend on how the specifi c situations defi ned both actors and situations.
situation fi ts the trajectories of actors—whether Thinking between situations allows the
it is something they do every Friday? Every day? researcher to think about wider temporal
Almost never? horizons, and about the anticipations and skills
Taking a similar tack, the author of this that people bring into each situation. Paying
chapter and others (Snyder 2016 ; Tavory 2016 attention to the rhythm of situations, as Snyder (
; Tavory and Eliasoph 2013; Trouille and 2016 ) shows, allow as to gain purchase on what
Tavory frth ) have argued that in order to it means, for example, to experience
understand both actors and social worlds unemployment in the aftermath of the 2008
sociologists need to think inter-situationally. economic crisis. As he shows, the shock of
That is, not only within the situation, but in the unemployment in a changing world occurred not
predictable rhythms of situations that make up only the moment of termination, but as situation
the social world. Simply put, we can’t completely after situation shows the job seeker that the world
understand what happens within a situation as an they knew seems to have disappeared. As they
isolated incident, since people live not only in the meet others who send CV after CV in vain, and
present situation, but also implicitly compare this their own effort increasingly seems unmoored
situation to other situations that they have from the new economic reality, they realize what
experienced, as well as implicitly locating this it means to live in unsettled times. It is in the
I. Tavory

concatenation of situations and as people try to social settings; exchange theorists have looked at
make sense of them together and piece negotiate the interactional situations through the lenses of
the meaning of their world and their own rational choice; ethnomethodologists and
identities that the social world is made. conversation analysts have been theorizing and
The recent emphases on inter-situational observing the ongoing emergence of taken for
analysis, futures, rhythms and biographies thus granted social structures in everyday life.
attempts to inject a more complex temporality Still, interactionism remains an important
into the situation. Although the situation, and the theoretical locus. By focusing on the situation, on
interactions of actors within it, is still extremely the collective act and on the malleability of
important, extending the temporality of actors meaning in interaction, interactionists were able
allows us to better theorize their expectations of to think about both creativity and the patterning
the situation, their proclivity to act and interpret of the social world in ways that other theorists
their world in certain ways, and the way that both simply could not. Rather than assuming that
change and the etching of identities occur over actors acted rationally, they could see how actors
time. Combined with the theorization of the practically made sense of their world within the
notion of “group styles,” as the negotiation of situation; rather than focusing on actors’
shared available tropes and their interactional performances, they looked to the way meaning
negotiation, it doubly locates the situation in its interactionally emerged. And by remaining with
cultural environment—both “from above” in the the concreteness of the social, interactionism was
form of shared culture, and “from below” in the able to show the dizzying possibilities of
shape of actors own complex biographies and everyday life, as well as its predictable patterns.
anticipated futures. L ike all important theoretical accounts of the
social, interactionism also attracted quite a bit of
criticism. These ranged from arguing that it was
blind to power and to macro-structures, not being
5.4 So Where Does This All Leave
attentive enough to the body, or pointing out that
Us? it was insensitive to the workings of culture. As
this chapter makes clear, some of these criticisms
Once upon a time, when fi rst year students were based on a misreading of the interactionist
walked into an intro class in sociology, they project, but others did point to important
learned that there were three paradigms in problems in early interactionists’ approach to the
sociology—confl ict paradigm (Marx was the social world.
hero, or villain, depending on instructor), In response, interactionists over the past two
structural functionalism (with Parsons taking the decades developed different ways to think about
lead), and interactionism. These days are no the social world in ways that acknowledged the
more. It is questionable if this was ever the true place of shared meaning and of temporality in a
lay of the land, but even if it was, as sociology fuller way. They did so, however, without letting
developed it has fractured into multiple parties, go of the crucial importance of concrete social
and the battles lines are not as intensely drawn. situation, and the ways that actors make their
Interactionism, as others have observed (Fine worlds together in them. It is this promise of
1993 ) has enriched the imagination of interactionism that still makes it so exciting and
sociologists throughout the discipline, but radical as a theoretical perspective.
became less and less of a well- defi ned paradigm.
Interactionism is also not alone in focusing on
the realm of everyday life. As other chapters in
this volume show, other research traditions have References
mined these grounds. Erving Goffman was
B arbalet, J. (2009). Pragmatism and symbolic
crucially infl uenced by early interactionism, but interactionism. In B. S. Turner (Ed.), The new Blackwell
went on to craft a more dramaturgical perspective companion to social theory (pp. 199–217). Oxford:
that focused on actors’ ongoing performance in Blackwell. Becker, H. S. (1953). Becoming a marijuana
user. American Journal of Sociology, 59 (3), 235–242.
onism: Meaning and Self as Process 97

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Sociological Methods & Research.
Cultural Theory 6
Omar Lizardo O. Lizardo ()
Department of Sociology , University of Notre
Dame , Notre Dame , IN , USA e-mail:
olizardo@nd.edu
et al. 2015) , culture and inequality studies (e.g.
Small et al. 2010 ), and even traditionally
“positivist” subfi elds such as demography
(Bachrach 2014 ). Articles and books dealing
with cultural analysis have become fi eld-wide
citation classics (e.g. Swidler 1986 ; Bellah et al.
1985 ; Lamont 1992 ; Sewell 1992 ; DiMaggio
6.1 Introduction 1997 ; Lareau 2011 ), handbooks on cultural
sociology continue to be published at a rapid pace
Long abandoned by anthropologists as a (e.g. Bennett and Frow 2008 ; Hall et al. 2010 ;
foundational concept (e.g. Abu-Lughod 1991) , Alexander et al. 2012 ), and contemporary
the last two decades have seen a virtual explosion debates on foundational issues on the theory of
of interest in culture among sociologists, not only action, the basic parameters of social
as a “topic” of analysis (the “sociology of explanation, and the foundations of social order
culture”) but most importantly as a “resource” for take place largely under the umbrella of “cultural
general sociological explanation (“cultural theory” and “cultural analysis” (e.g. Reed 2011 ;
sociology”). This is exemplifi ed by the fact that, Vaisey 2009 ; Swidler 2001 ; Patterson 2014 ;
while beginning as a relatively small and largely Alexander 2003 ).
peripheral intellectual movement in the mid G iven this, it is uncontroversial to propose
1980s, today the American Sociological that the “concept of culture” has joined the
Association’s “Section on Culture” is decidedly couplet of “structure” and “agency” as one of
central, boasting one of the largest rates of contemporary sociology’s foundational notions.
membership especially graduate student Yet, just like those other foundational ideas, the
members. Intellectually, cultural sociologists (or concept is beset with ambiguity and vagueness
sociologists of culture for that matter) can (Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952; Stocking 1966)
proclaim with confi dence that their work stands , as well as lingering doubts as to its analytical
“at the crossroads of the discipline” (Jacobs and import and exact relation to other foundational
Spillman 2005 ), helping to inform the work of notions in social theory such as “social structure”
social scientists working across essentially every and “agency” (Alexander 2003 ; Sewell 1999 ;
substantive fi eld of research. This includes social Patterson 2014 ; Archer 1995) . As a result,
science history (e.g. Bonnell and Hunt 1999 ), while both “culture and structure” and “culture in
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 99
S. Abrutyn (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary Sociological Theory,
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32250-6_6
cognitive sociology (e.g. DiMaggio 1997 ), the action” debates continue to rage, there does not
sociology of religion (e.g. Smilde 2007) , seem to be any immediate resolution to these
organizational studies (e.g. Weber and Dacin perennial problems in sight (e.g. Vaisey 2009 ;
2011) , social movement theory (e.g. Polletta Alexander 2003 ; Sewell 2005 ). This
2008 ), economic sociology (e.g. Bandelj unsatisfactory détente acquires more
importance, when we consider the fact that the
basic theoretical debates in the discipline in the
O. Lizardo

American scene—e.g. those inaugurated by (e.g. Parsons 1951 ; Swidler 1995 ) is an


Parsons’s ( 1937 ) problematic interpretation of a anachronism of consequential import. In this
selection of European thinkers—now take place sense, contemporary cultural theory inherits a
largely under the auspices of “cultural theory” post-classical problematic which has no strict
and not “theory” in its unqualifi ed form (Swidler analogue in the classics. Given this, my argument
1995 ). is that it makes little exegetical or analytical
Whether the culture concept or cultural sense to project a “concept of culture” to such
sociology as a general analytic approach is up to pre-cultural theorists Marx, Weber, and
this task remains to be seen. What is not in doubt Durkheim (or even the early Parsons!). Instead,
is that continuing progress (or possible we should go back to the drawing board and
resolutions) to contemporary theoretical dissociate the classics from the contemporary
impasses will depend on whether “culture” has culture concept. All the same, they may also
the potential to serve as such a unifying meta- provide a model for how to do social theory
concept. The basic argument in this chapter is without relying on that concept as a central line
that the contemporary version of the culture of support.
concept in sociology is simply not the sort of The rest of the chapter is organized as
analytic resource that is up to this task and that follows. In the next section I outline the
“cultural theory” as currently confi gured will conceptual armamentarium deployed by Marx,
not make headway on the relevant analytical Weber, and Durkheim to deal with theoretical
issues. The reason for this is that the concept of issues that have now been retroactively (and
culture in contemporary sociology melds (in anachronistically) remapped as central problems
somewhat anachronistic ways) both basic in cultural theory. The basic argument is that
concerns inherited from the classics and post- none of the classics had anything close to what
classical issues inherited from the incorporation can be called a “concept of culture” because they
of the modern (“analytical”) concept of culture did not need one to deal with the analytical issues
developed in anthropology into this classical that preoccupied them. I will then argue that it is
tradition by Talcott Parsons. 40 As such, the status the fi gure that marks the transition from
of cultural sociology as a meta-fi eld unifying “classical” to “contemporary” sociological
other areas of substantive inquiry in the theory namely, Talcott Parsons, who recasts the
discipline will remain problematic, even as classics as “cultural theorists” status nascendi
“cultural theory” will continue to serve as a stand thus retroactively recruiting them to deal with
in for “theory” in the general sense. basic problems that emerge from his own (failed)
A n important, if often unremarked issue, is attempt to link his
that the “modern” culture concept had no strict own version of the anthropological concept of
conceptual analogue among the sociological culture to theoretical issues in action theory and
classics (here I restrict my defi nition of normativist functionalism. We will see that
“classics” to the standard canon of Marx, Weber, Parsons’s primary analytic concern in regards to
Durkheim). This means that many of the issues cultural theory has to do mainly with the
that preoccupy contemporary cultural theorists mechanisms of how persons become
only have superfi cial similarity to those that “encultured,” which for Parsons is essentially a
preoccupied Marx, Weber, and Durkheim; this resolution to an unfi nished chapter in his own
also means that the retroactive recasting of the interpretation of Durkheim. Parsons coupled his
sociological classics as budding cultural theorists solution ( 41 enculturation as “internalization”)

40
By the “analytical” concept of culture I mean what used functionalism, the denial of a hierarchy among “cultures,”
to be called the “anthropological” concept (when that and the emphasis on the determinism of inherited
discipline had full ownership of it) and like that concept traditions over conscious reasoning in the shaping of
it should be contrasted with the “classical” or “humanist” conduct (see Stocking 1966 : 868).
(Arnoldian) culture concept along the usual dimensions 41
.2 The Sociological Classics as
of the denial of absolutism in favor of relativism, the
denial of “progressivism” in favor of homeostatic
Pre-cultural Theorists
Theory 101

with a conception of the “cultural system” as a systematizer), and later on Margaret Mead (the
systematic ensemble of ideal elements. Clifford popularizer). 42 That means that none of the
Geertz for his part, takes up the remnants of sociological classics operated with anything like
Weber’s “meaning” problematic, but does so the modern culture concept yet they undoubtedly
from within the constraints of a Parsonian (via dealt with the “central problems in social theory”
Kroeber and Kluckhohn) conceptualization of (Giddens 1979) . Accordingly, we may conclude
culture as (external) “system” or “pattern.” This that the culture concept is not necessary for such
is the way in which this particular problem a task, a claim supported by the fact that the
continues to be formulated in contemporary discipline from which sociologists got the
cultural analysis. concept in the fi rst place (Anthropology)
In the fourth section, I will review some of the continues to plug along after having renounced it
basic issues in contemporary cultural analysis. as essentialist and reductive (Abu-Lughod 1991
We will see that contemporary cultural theorists ), and one of the major thinkers in twentieth
essentially divide themselves into analytic camps century Sociology, Pierre Bourdieu, largely
depending on their stance vis a vis the Parsonian conducted his work without ever making
model of enculturation, such that acceptance or analytic use of the notion (although of course he
rejection of a conception of culture as either took it up as “topic” of analysis). 43 How then
“internal” to the actor or as part of the external were the classics ever able to manage without a
environment becomes correlative to acceptance modern culture concept? The answer is that both
or rejection of a conception of the nature of used cognate notions available from their native
culture as either systematic or fragmented intellectual traditions (Levine 1995 ). What were
(respectively). A third group of contemporary these?
cultural sociologists abandons the Parsonian
problematic of enculturation and internalization
in favor of a return to the “problem of meaning” 6.2.1 The Germanic Tradition
as a defi ning issue for sociological explanation
more generally. This group however, remains In the case of Marx and Weber, the concept that
wedded to a Parsonian conception of culture as performed the analytic task is that of ideas ( idee,
systematic, although reinforced with a more vorstellung ) inherited from the Kantian-
contemporary formulation of systematicity taken Fichtean- Hegelian tradition of German Idealism
from structural linguistics. I close by outlining in Philosophy. Marx and Weber thus drew on a
the implications of this situation for the future of “German” (in Levine’s 1995 sense) sociological
the “concept of culture” as a central analytic tradition in which the “cognitive element” of
resource in sociology. action (Warner 1978) was largely thought of in
tieth century, itself being an invention of terms of “ideas.” The German tradition came in
American anthropologists (themselves reacting two brands; the fi rst one came from the Hegelian
against what they saw as an unduly austere obsession with the “motor forces” of history and
British functionalism); most centrally Franz Boas basically dealt with a controversy in the so-called
(the innovator), his student Alfred Kroeber (the Philosophy of History as to which one of the two

42
Given its current status as a central analytic See Stocking ( 1966 ) for the defi nitive historical
construct, it might seem impossible to imagine treatment of the central role of Boas in crafting the modern
analytical culture concept; see Kuper ( 1999) for a wider
how one can get a conceptual bearing on the ranging study linking the culture concept to interacting but
central analytic issues of social theory, such as analytically autonomous traditions in England, France,
understanding the nature of action or explicating and Germany; for a lexicographic analysis of the concept
the nature and origins of social change and as used in standard (non-academic) discourse see Goddard
( 2005 ) and Sewell ( 2005 : 169–172) does a masterly job
reproduction without a culture concept. Yet, it is of disambiguating the folk and analytic conceptions of
well known that the contemporary analytic culture.
“concept of culture” did not exist until well into 43
For more details on Bourdieu as a “non-cultural” or at
the twen- least “post-cultural” theorist see Lizardo ( 2011 ).
O. Lizardo

set of forces was most important in accounting priori methodological presumption (somewhat
patterns of historical and social change usually muddily articulated by Max Weber) that there
conceptualized in teleological “evolutionary” (in were no emergent macro-social “forces” (either
the pre-Darwinian “telos of history” sense) “material” or “ideal”), that “society” as an
terms. organismic whole was a spurious analytic unit,
The second fl avor is (Neo)Kantian and has a and that the Hegelian “debate” in the Philosophy
more direct concern with the battle between ideal of History (of which Marx and Engels’s
and material forces within the individual in historical materialism was viewed as an entry)
determining conduct and not as macro-social was just a useless conceptual muddle. It was only
“forces” or “factors” in historical societies. In the in the twentieth century recuperation of this
(neo) Kantian version of the tradition, ideas are debate by Parsons that problems of action theory
thought of as subjective conceptions of the world were again linked up to “macrosocial” issues, in
held by actors, which may or may not accurately so-called structural-functionalism.
refl ect its objective features. Accordingly, ideas
are seen as the creative, “active” elements
determining action via relations of non- 6.2.2 Marx and Engels’s “Big” Idea
Newtonian, intentional (fi nal) causality,
counterposed against external “deterministic” The problematic that was most poignant in the
elements that push people around via relations of early nineteenth century and that was thus the one
physical (inclusive of the bodily instincts), effi inherited by Marx and dealt with primarily in the
cient causation. Ideas were thus thought of as a collaborative writings with Engels from the mid
possible driver of action along with other forces, 1840s to the late 1850s 44 was the Hegelian
most importantly instinctual (biological) and “macrosocial” one (essentially the middle
environmental determinants (which we may refer “sociological” period between the philosophical
to as “material” for short). In this respect, this anthropology of the early 1840s and the “political
tradition linked “cultural analysis” (with this economy” writings of the 1860s). The so- called
term being used in an admittedly anachronistic “materialist conception of history” of Marx and
way) with the problematic of “action theory” Engels essentially boils down, in between
(another anachronism as this term does not withering satire of the so-called Young
become prevalent until after Parsons). Hegelians, Proudhon, utopian socialists or
The distinction between the “societal” and whoever stood in their way, to arguing that at the
“individual” version of the German “idealist” macrosocial level “ideal” factors as
tradition is important because these two debates conceptualized by philosophers of history up to
tend to be run together and continue to be confl that stage did not matter for explaining historical
ated in contemporary “cultural” analysis. change as much as the “material” factors of
Conceptually however, they are thoroughly classical political economy (essentially land,
independent and rely on very different premises. labor, and capital, which “technology” being the
The Hegelian debate deals with (to use a modern most important part of the latter). Note that what
term) “emergent” factors at the level of “societ- counts as “ideal factors” in this tradition is
ies” conceived in quasi-organismic terms as essentially mostly the intellectual outputs of
coherent wholes. The Kantian debate deals with symbol producing elites, inclusive of political
action at the level of the individual. Most of the theory, theology and popular religious doctrines,
arguments regarding the Hegelian debate over but also “philosophies of history” or even the
ideas operated with either no or very rudimentary “philosophies” peddled by the “Young
references to a theory of action; the Kantian Hegelians.” 45
version, on the other hand, operated from an a

44
These include, most importantly, the set of notes that Manifesto” (1848) and the programmatic “Preface to a
came to be known as “The German Ideology” (fi nished Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy” (1859).
approx. 1846) but also the fi rst part of the “Communist 45
Sometimes this distinction is lost because Marx and
Engels’s historical materialism is interpreted as making
Theory 103

However, Marx and Engels also counted which they attempted to move to the empirical
“technical” ideas such as the ideas produced by terrain of “science,” (understood mainly as
the classical political economists (e.g. Malthus, classical political economy) the former is a neo-
Smith and Ricardo) and even radical movement Kantian concerned with proto-phenomenological
actors (such as syndicalists like Proudhon and issues of the existential determinants of human
anarchists such as Bakunin) as “ideas.” Note that action as it pertains to the generation of unique
from the point of view of modern “cultural historical complexes at given conjunctures
theory” this conception of “ideas” would be (Weber 1946a , b ). While the solution of these
considered radically limited as it ignores the neo-Kantian concerns had implications for our
schemas, practices, beliefs and normative understandings of the origins and trajectory of
commitments of the folk and essentially these unique historical complexes (such as
everything that is not ordered into some expert “rational capitalism”). These had no real
“system” either “scientifi c” or “political.” Yet, ontological status (existing only as nominal
this makes perfect sense for Marx and Engels, as “ideal types”), and Weber never saw himself
their primary goal had nothing to do with culture theorizing about them as such at a macrosocial
as some generic “dimension” of society but with level.
the role of certain “ideological” (meaning A ttempts to recast Weber as a macrosocial
systematized and possibly distorting) belief theorist in the realist mode hinge on extremely
systems in directing social change. Their point partial (and exegetically indefensible) readings
was that rather than directing change, of some of the least reliable of his “writings” in
transformations at the level of the English (such as the lectures known as General
“infrastructure” ( unterbau ) happen fi rst, and the Economic History or excerpts from Economy
“ideologues” emerge at the level of the and Society) that downplay the bulk of the work
superstructure ( überbau) to justify those that was actually published in Weber’s lifetime
changes by crafting ideas into ideology. The key and that he gave his living editorial approval to
issue is that Marx and Engels never talk about (essentially the writings known as The Economic
anything that would be recognized as “culture” Ethics of the World Religions [ EEWR ]). They
today at the level of individual action. also ignore Weber’s explicit pronouncements in
the methodological writings that pure holistic
analysis was a non-starter both substantively and
6.2.3 Max Weber’s Little Ideas theoretically. As such, there is nothing wrong
with Weberian inspired macrosociology (e.g.
The theorist who would move the German Collins 1986) as long as it is understood to be a
debate over ideas to the level of the individual fundamental deviation from Weber’s own line of
was Max Weber. Rivers of ink have been spilled thinking. This has implication for modern
on the issue of whether there is a direct line of debates in cultural theory. For instance, while it
continuity between the theoretical tradition is perfectly legitimate to claim Weber as a pre-
initiated by Marx and Engels and that of Max Parsonian forerunner of “culture in action”
Weber. The position taken here is that the debates (Swidler 1986 ), it is madness to think
preponderance of evidence suggests a radical that Weber prefi gured (macro) debates about
incommensurability (in the Kuhnian sense) “culture and structure” at the “societal” level.
between Weber and the Marx/Engels’s project. As fi rst noted by Parsons, Weber’s
In essence, while the latter were radical “reverse- fundamental concern was precisely with “the role
Hegelians” concerned primarily with evolutionist of ideas in social action” (Parsons 1938 ) and this
issues that began in the philosophy of history and approach is distilled in the two “theoretical”

statements about the balance between ideal and material taken standalone “classes” or “groups” as their referent.
“forces” at the level of group of individuals or even It was in fact Max Weber (especially in the writings on
individual themselves and not historical societies. Yet, religion) who moved the debate to this level. Most of the
there is little evidence that Marx or Engels cared about ideal versus material interest debate in sociology is thus a
classes (or individuals) in this sense or predicated theories purely Weberian and not a Marxian debate.
O. Lizardo

essays in EEWR . 46 In this respect, Weber know thanks to the pioneering (and painstaking)
targets the historical materialists only work of such scholars as Stephen Turner, W. F.
secondarily. More directly located in his line of Pickering, Warren Schmaus, Sue Stedman-Jones,
fi re were all sort of instinctual psychologies Anne Rawls, Robert Alun-Jones and others, that
(such as Nietzsche’s proto- Freudianism), Durkheim actually belonged to a non-German-
environmentalism, generic motive theories of the idealist tradition of French Neo-Kantianism ,
origins of historical complexes (such as which combined a set of problematics that while
Sombart’s “acquisitive motive” account), and derived from the French reception of Kant in the
other assorted biologisms prominent at the time. early to mid nineteenth century, featured a set of
Because he was working at the level of individual solutions actually derived from Aristotelian,
action, Weber is able to develop something pretty Thomist, and personalist conceptions
close to a modern action-theoretic perspective on autochthonous to the French tradition (Schmaus
the role of “culture” in social action as long as we 2004 ). These conceptual approaches have little
understand that the Weberian notion of “ideas” is if nothing to do (in a substantive sense if not in
semantically much more restrictive than the allusive sense) with German neo-Kantianism.
modern concept of culture. Weber does this by The French Neo-Kantian tradition,
arguing that “ideas” as historically constructed systematized by such thinkers as Renouvier,
conceptions characteristic of given persons (or in Maine De Biran, and Victor Cousin, rejected the
the aggregate groups) have an independent effect Kantian problematic of ideas, derided Kant’s
on conduct, and that this was noted precisely in departure from the Humean skeptical argument
those historical cases in which we see persons as to the problematic origin of general categories
essentially override, instincts, biology, generic as a non- starter, and even questioned the whole
motives and environmental pressures (all swept notion that “ideas” could be different from or
under the rug of “material interests”) in order to “independent” from a “non-ideal” objective
fulfi ll an “ideal interest” (Weber 1946a ). reality. Instead, these thinkers, beginning with
Renouvier, developed an ontology of
representations ( représentations ) in which the
6.2.4 Emile Durkheim’s dualistic tendencies typical of the German
Représentations tradition (in which ideas and material forces fi
ght it out to determine action or history) is
One of the most disastrous bits of classical renounced in favor of a “naturalistic” conception
exegeses enacted by Parsons ( 1937) concerns in which représentations exist in the same
his classifi cation of Durkheim as an natural plane as objects in the world (thus
(inconsistent) member of a tradition of Parsons, in his mangled interpretation of
(German?) “idealism.” 47 We know now,
especially after the effl orescence of
Durkheimian studies in the 1990s, that this These claims can only be made sense of by accepting
characterization—still repeated as late as Parsons’s idiopathic (and exegetically obsolete)
understanding of the term “idealism” to encompass any
Alexander ( 1982) —is patently non-sensical as human being who considers the mental component
there is an even deeper Kuhnian important for explaining action.
incommensurability gulf separating Durkheim Durkheim, confused good old fashioned
from any representative of the German idealist Aristotelian naturalism with the German
tradition (properly called because it derives its
preoccupations from German Idealism). We also

46
These are the “Social Psychology of the World 47
D urkheim was an inconsistent member of the idealist
Religions” (1946 a, serving as the “introduction” or category because, according to the now thoroughly
Eilentung ) to the collection and the interlude or discredited “two Durkheims” argument in Structure , he
“intermediate refl ections” ( zwischenbrachtungen ) begins his career as an idealist (in Division ) but ends it
known in English as “Religious Rejections of the World by going “clean over” into “idealism” in Elementary
and their Directions” ( 1946b ). Forms .
Theory 105

bugaboo of “materialism”). 48 Contra the German “solved” the problem as follows: While Wundt
tradition, French thinkers did not see the and the nascent science of German scientifi c
causality pertaining to représentations as psychology (and even German “social
different from material or effi cient causality psychology”) would be concerned with
(Turner 1984 ), thought that persons became “individual representations” ( représentations
epistemically acquainted with concrete (e.g. individuelles ) as their natural object, the “new”
“perceptual”) représentations in the same way French science of Sociology was going to re-
that they became acquainted with “abstract” (e.g. direct the same scientifi c bravado to a set of
“categorical”) ones (Schmaus 2004 ), and natural objects that had yet to be dealt with in the
asserted that représentations in this sense could same vein: collective representations (
not fail (unless under pathological conditions) to représentations collectives ). The only thing left
match reality, since représentations (like to do (e.g. Durkheim 1893 ) was to write an anti-
persons and their consciousness) were natural philosophical manifesto proclaiming the
objects and thus an integral part of that very same existence and causal preponderance (in relation
reality (Stedman-Jones 2001 ; see the essays to représentations individuelles ) of this novel
collected in Pickering 2000 ). scientifi c object, and their analytic resistance to
T his representationalist ontology is adopted armchair (read classical philosophical)
wholesale by Durkheim who sees in this concept introspective methods. Collective
the key to the founding of a new “special” science representations are “things” (and thus a “natural
(actually a “special psychology”) of a particular kind” in modern parlance) just like chairs, pains,
kind of object. Because représentations were a atoms, and chickens, and can be studied with the
natural object (as opposed to “ideas” which same methods and using the same old concepts
Kantians held to be non-naturalistic), they could of causation.
form the foundation of a plain-old science (in the I t is hard to overstate, in light of recent
same sense as Physics and Biology) and there discoveries in Durkheim scholarship, how
was no need to go through all of the tortured incredibly alien is Durkheim’s original
hand-wringing (productive of mostly unreadable conceptual apparatus (Rawls 2005 ),
texts) that German neo-Kantians participating in methodological approach (Schmaus 1994 ), and
the methodenstreit had to go through in set of epistemic and ontological commitments
questioning whether scientifi c methods were (Stedman-Jones 2001 ) from contemporary
proper or not for such non-naturalistic entities as “germanic” cultural sociology in the United
ideas. Instead, having travelled to the laboratories States. Most importantly, how alien is the
of Wilhelm Wundt as a young representative of naturalistic conception of représentations
the best that the French intelligentsia had to offer (Pickering 2000 ) from the (germanic!) Boasian-
after the national humiliation suffered during the Parsonian “concept of culture” that c ontinues (to
Franco-Prussian war, Durkheim had seen paraphrase a germanic theorist) to weigh heavily
concrete institutional proof that représentations upon the brains of living American sociologists.
could be studied scientifi cally, naturalistically, F or instance, it is clear that neither the
and objectively. standard “culture versus structure” nor “culture
F rom the point of view of the nascent science in action” debate fi t the Durkheimian
of sociology, the issue had nothing to do with problematic
scientifi c method (as with the German neo- because the notion of représentations is not
Kantian tradition) and everything to do with commensurable (once again in the Kuhnian
scientifi c object . Durkheim noted that what sense) with any modern conception of the culture
sociologists were lacking was not a special concept. To wit, (the “early”) Durkheim was a
method but a special “thing” to study. Durkheim “monist” organicist for whom the issue was not,

48
In what follows, I use the conventional tactic in modern the term is not semantically equivalent to the English
Durkheimian studies of using the untranslated term word “representation” which is beset by Germanic (e.g.
représentations to refer to the original French notion, as Kantian) hangups not applicable to the French notion.
O. Lizardo

as it was for the dualist organicism of the middle- German “ideal/materialist” frame. All modern
period Marx or modern “culture and structure” Durkheim scholars now reject this formulation
theorists (e.g. Archer 1995 ), whether there was along with associated non-problems such a the
one “factor” (e.g. the material or “social”) that (non-materialist) meaning of “thing” in
was preponderant upon another factor (the ideal). Durkheim’s defi nition of social facts, along with
Interpreting Durkheim in a “germanic” mode (as the related non-shift from “materialism” to
do Parsons and Alexander) leads to bizarre “idealism” (Schmaus 2004) . In the 1970s there
notions such as “Durkheimian materialism” or was an entire anti-functionalist movement
the even crazier idea of the “paradigm shift” from designed to free Max Weber from the cage of
the “materialism” of Division to the “idealism” normativist functionalism (e.g “de- Parsonizing
of Elementary Forms (Schmaus 1994 ). Weber”). Yet a movement to “de- Parsonize
F or Durkheim, the primary analytic issue was Durkheim” (e.g. Stedman-Jones 2001 ) has only
whether the whole “social” organism composed been enacted recently among a small cadre of
primarily of social facts (inclusive of person to specialty Durkheim scholars having little impact
person bonds, institutional facts, traditions, and on social and cultural theory writ large. But this
mores) conceived as représentations collectives matters, because it is my contention that modern
, held together as a unity or not. This is the sort cultural theory is the unholy offspring of
of formulation that Weber would have rejected as Parsons’s conceptual mixture of German neo-K
non-sensical mysticism. At this level, the issue antian and post-Hegelian hangups concerning
was whether different sets of collective “the role of ideas in social action” and the
representations fi t together or not. At the level of “balance” between “cultural” and “material”
the individual Durkheim does not face the action- forces at the social level with Durkheim’s (as we
theoretical problematic of whether “ideal” saw above absolutely incommensurable)
factors were most important than “material” conceptual apparatus. The result is a
factors in determining conduct. For Durkheim “Germanized Durkheim”; an analytically
all action had to be driven by représentations , incoherent conceptual “monster” (in Douglas’s
(the notion of action without representations is 1966 sense) that continues to play havoc on the
patently non-sensical from the point of view of theoretical imagination of modern cultural
the Aristotelian neo-Kantianism under which theorists.
Durkheim was reared). The key issue is thus, P arsons’s conceptual monster emerges in two
which kind of representation is preponderant in steps. From the point of view of modern cultural
determining action; représentations theory the key conceptual moves occur in two
individuelles or représentations collectives . distinct periods; the “action-theoretic” period of
According to Durkheim’s “dualist” conception of “the early essays” and Structure (1935–1938)
the individual, when the social organism is whole where Parsons still operates with a pre-cultural
and healthy action is driven (unproblematically) vocabulary steeped in the nineteenth century
by the appropriate (for that social type) set of germanic neo-Kantian tradition (e.g.
collective representations although these must be voluntarism, ideas, materialism, positivism). At
of suffi cient strength and carry enough authority this stage, the “anthropological” (analytic)
to subjugate the dissipative force of individual concept of culture is absent; what we have
(and thus eogistic, evanescent) representations. instead are the twin germanic concepts of “ideas”
(Parsons 1938 ) and “values” ( 1935; including
ultimate values). The second period is the so-
called “middle period” of normativist
6.3 Enter “Culture”: Talcott
functionalism proper culminating in the
Parsons publication of The Social System ( 1951 ), and
most importantly for cultural theorists the book
A s alluded to above, the biggest theoretical co-authored with Parsons and Shils ( Towards a
disaster in modern social theory consists of General Theory of Action
Parsons’s shoehorning of Durkheim into a
Theory 107

(1951 )) and the collection of essays, mostly fully equipped with a modern (analytic) culture
written from the late 1940s to the late 1950s, concept (Kuper 1999) . 50
known as Social Structure and Personality ( W here did Parsons get an analytic version of
1964 ). This period is key because it is here that the culture concept? The short answer, is that he
Parsons becomes acquainted with various fl got it from the anthropologists in particular via
edgling versions of the “analytical” culture the infl uence of Clyde Kluckhohn (the leading,
concept fl oating around in American because he was the only, cultural anthropologist
anthropology since at least 1911 (Stocking 1966; at Harvard) and the professional link to one of
Bidney 1967) and uses them to develop his Franz Boas’s most infl uential student: Alfred
own, and ultimately decisive for us, version of Kroeber. The infl uence of Clyde Kluckhohn’s
the culture concept (Parsons 1972 ; Kroeber and notion of culture as “pattern” and Alfred
Parsons 1958 ). Kroeber’s neo-Spencerian conceptualization of
culture as “superorganic” on Parsons’s thinking
on this score, the equally important infl uence
6.3.1 Parsons Invents “Culture” that Talcott Parsons had on anthropological defi
nitions of the culture concept, as well as the
W e have seen that the classics, in particular famous disciplinary turf-splitting “deal” enacted
Weber and Durkheim, did not have a concept that by the two doyens of American social science—
maps onto the “modern” (anthropological) such that Anthropology got to keep the “cultural
concept of culture; as such, it is an analytical and system” and sociology got “the social system”
exegetical mistake (as well as an embarrassing (e.g. Parsons and Kroeber 1958)—is an unwritten
anachronism) to treat the classics as budding chapter in the history of sociology (but see Kuper
“cultural theorists.” However, this is done 1999 coming to bat for anthropology). For
regularly by both cultural analysts (e.g. Swidler instance, it is clear that Kroeber and Kluckhohn
1995 ) and by everybody who has been tasked (1952 ) were spurred to clarify systematize, and
with writing a “classics” question for a qualifying update the Tylor-Boas analytic culture concept
exam on “culture” in a contemporary graduate right after Parsons began to make use of his own
program in sociology (myself) in the United (ultimately decisive) twist on this very notion
States. How did we get to this sad point? The (e.g. Parsons 1951 ) as one of the central
answer is that the classics became “cultural concepts of the middle-period functionalist
theorists” because Talcott Parsons re-read them scheme (with the other two being the “social” and
as such. The story of how this happened is messy, “personality” systems). As Kuper has noted, this
because everybody focuses on the “rewriting” of is hugely important because the culture concept
the classics that Parsons enacted in Structure of did not emerge from anthropology as a result of
Social Action ( 1937) when Parsons still did not an internal conceptual need within the discipline.
have access to the modern culture concept. Instead, “it was Parsons who created the need for
Everybody forgets, however, that Parsons kept a modern, social scientifi c conception of culture,
rewriting and re-i nterpreting the classics and who persuaded the leading anthropologists of
throughout his entire career. 49 This was the United States that their discipline could fl
especially true during the highly active (both ourish only if they took culture in his sense as
theoretically and in terms of institution building) their particular specialty” ( 1999 : 68).
middle period that saw the publication of The It is also clear that at that time the disciplinary
Social System ( 1951 ) and various mid-career identity and intellectual coherence of the
theoretical essays ( 1964) , when Parsons was sociological and anthropological projects hung of

49
As we have seen, it is important to note that Parsons Kluckhohn the leading anthropologist at Harvard, and via
kept trying to demonstrate the existence of various Kluckhohn, Berkeley’s Alfred Kroeber who received the
“convergence theses” after 1937, including the even more fi rst PhD in anthropology awarded at Columbia by Franz
fantastic (and ridiculous) “Freud/Durkheim” convergence Boas.
thesis around the issue of “cultural internalization.”
50
Of most immediate direct infl uence was Clyde
O. Lizardo

the balance of this defi nitional contest, which culture becomes equivalent to the “social
was precisely what lay behind the famous heritage” essentially everything from beliefs,
Kroeber/ Parsons “truce” (Kroeber and Parsons values, morals, and technology that is not given
1958 ), one that was no truce at all but essentially by the human biological constitution is learned
the capitulation on the part of Kroeber to give by novices and is preserved and transmitted from
“society” the sociologists (something that would generation to generation.
have been, and was, unthinkable for a B ut the funny thing is that even though Boas
Malinowski or a Radcliffe-Brown) and keep the developed this concept in early writings before
desiccated 1920, most anthropologists did not take notice.
Parsonian version of “culture” as an idealist Instead, a variety of defi nitions, counter- defi
symbol system made up of “patterns” for the nitions, and redefi nitions of culture began to
anthropologists. The culture concept is thus as accrete during the 40 separating Boas’s early
American as apple pie and an inherent (not writings from Kroeber and Kluckhohn’s
accidental) outgrowth of normativist emergency intervention as a reaction to the
functionalism. Parsonian incursion (so much so that they were
The career of the analytic concept of culture able to collect about 164 of these in 1952). It is
within anthropology has been written on obvious that no anthropologist during this period
extensively both during the heyday of thought that anything big for the professional
functionalism (e.g. Kroeber and Kluckhohn status of anthropology actually rode on coming
1952 ; Bidney 1967 ) during the immediate post- up with a “crisp” consensual defi nition of the
functionalist period (e.g. Stocking 1966 ) and culture concept and that was an entirely correct
more recently (e.g. Kuper 1999 ) and as such it perception. For once Boas vanquished the
is relatively not very obscure, although it is clear bugaboo of racialist biologism, his particular
that most cultural sociologists are blissfully version of the culture concept seem to have done
ignorant about it. However, there is no doubt that its knowledge-political job and people felt free to
there had been an “analytic” concept of culture ignore and develop their own twists on the idea.
available to anthropologists since at least the Accordingly, other anthropological writers with
1870s, when Tylor defi ned the concept in a suffi their own partial and concrete interests began to
ciently “value-free” way as to serve the relevant propose other ideas about what culture might or
scientifi c purposes. Yet, Tylor’s formulation might not be some (like Sapir and the early
remained inherently tied to ethnocentric views of Kroeber) even harking back to “normative” or
cultural evolution that saw something like “humanistic” notions of culture. Lines of division
Victorian era England as the pinnacle of (and here I rely on Bidney 1967) began to form
civilization (with “Australians” at the bottom and those who remained loyal to Boas’s more
the “Chinese” in between). As such Tylor’s naturalistic “social heritage” notion (which
famous “complex whole” rendering of the culture includes artifacts, buildings, habits, techniques,
concept, in spite of the largely inaccurate mores, and essentially everything that is learned
hagiography enacted by Kroeber and Kluckhohn and “man-made”) from those who thought of
( 1952 ) remained indelibly tied to nineteenth culture as more restrictive terms as referring
century (racist) version concept. It was in fact exclusively to non-material, non- naturalistic
Kroeber’s teacher Franz Boas, himself drawing ideal or conceptual elements.
on his upbringing in a (liberal, not racist) version Most importantly, there were those who
of the germanic tradition, who developed thought of culture not as a set of contents (either
something like the modern (fully relativist) material or ideal) but as a pattern (later on
culture concept and who used it to vanquish the referred to as cybernetic “program” by both
last remnants of ethnocentric evolutionism and Parsons and Geertz) abstracted out from the
racialism still extant in the American fi eld. This social behavior of persons (importantly
begat the American version of (what later came Kluckhohn was of this persuasion, but both Ruth
to be known as) cultural anthropology and then Benedict and Margaret Mead provide popular
known as “ethnology” (Stocking 1966 ). In Boas, versions of this story). This “pattern” was akin to
Theory 109

a set of general recipes or abstract guidelines for notion that the elements of “culture” were ideal
how to behave but did not reduce to particular (cultural) objects linked to one another to form a
bits of behavior or even the symbols via which system (Parsons 1951 ; Parsons and Shils 1951
they are expressed. Patterns could be typed and ); this system contained both the content via
classifi ed, and therefore the job of the cultural which persons expressed their values and
anthropologist was to uncover these and possibly constructed their beliefs and the (following
come up with exhaustive list of variants across Kluckhohn) more generalized “patterns” via
the world’s “cultures.” At the time, most which they organized their actions. The cultural
anthropologists linked their defi nitions of culture system was thus a Kroeberian superorganic
to the Kroeberian ( 1917 ) notion of the addendum to both persons and society, hovering
“superorganic” (even if they were critical of the above them while at the same time serving as the
details Kroeber’s particular formulation they all storehouse of the system of ultimate values that
liked the autonomist implications) in which gave persons their motivations and provided the
“culture” was thought to constitute its own necessary order to systems of social interaction.
51
emergent level analytically and ontological
separate from the biological individual and acting In this way, what was for the anthropologists
back on persons to constrain their behavior. a substantive proposal used for the pragmatic
I t is from these idea bits that Parsons built up purpose of arguing against racialist and
his own version of the concept of culture in the “primitive mentality” theories (e.g. Boas 1911 )
1940s and 1950s. In contrast to the became for Parsons a full-fl edged analytic
anthropologists, Parsons understood full well the abstraction used— for the fi rst time—as a
knowledge- political implications of nailing macro-level repository for all of the Germanic
down a culture concept, for he was engaged in his elements that had received separate treatment
own bit of empire making at Harvard at the time. previously (ideas, values, beliefs). It is at this
These were the years (1946 to be exact) when point that Parsons fi rst develops the
Parsons leveraged an outside offer to fi nally take essentializing assumption (Biernacki 2000 ) with
down rug down from under Sorokin in respect to culture as an analytic category
Sociology. This would be done by agreeing to installing it as a fundamental component of the
lead the formation of the “Social Relations” full functionalist systems ontology. In Parsons’s
department that would include a group of like- hands, culture thus goes from a relatively non-
minded psychologists and sociologists along committal concept used to refer to certain
with Clyde Kluckhohn in anthropology. Because habitual modes of acting, feeling, and believing
the department was to be a combination of along with the requisite set of material objects
sociology, anthropology, and psychology, each and know how used by persons to get by in the
of the branches (in good Durkhemian fashion) world (as in the Boasian/Malinowskian t
was to have its own radition) to a set of “substantialized ideal
“object.” To sociology would go “the social objects” (cultural objects) existing in their own
system” to psychology “the personality system” ideal world (in a cultural realm?), expressed in
and to anthropology “the cultural system” cultural symbols, communicated via symbolic
(Parsons media, and towards which persons may be
1951 ). “oriented” in the same way that they orient
Working analytical defi nitions of society and themselves in relation to tables, cats, and other
personality were already there, but Parsons noted people. Culture (while still “expressive” of
that no such neat defi nition existed for “culture”
and that meant that he needed to provide one. To
construct his defi nition, Parsons combined the

51
The full defi nition, fi rst previewed in T he Social symbolicmeaningful systems.” Culture in this sense serves
System and then fully brought out to the world in the as a “factor” in the “shaping of human behavior and the
famous “truce” paper with Kroeber is “transmitted and artifacts produced through behavior” (Kroeber and
created content and patterns of values, ideas and other Parsons 1958 : 583).
O. Lizardo

underlying sentiments and value patterns) is now level via the theory of “internalization,” a
part of the “furniture” of the world. pseudo- Freudian concept that Parsons not only
devised whole cloth but which he later went on
to claim Durkheim had also come up with
6.3.2 Culturalizing the Classics independently from “Freud.” Parsons goes on to
propose the implausible notion that because
P arsons basic conceit was that while this Durkheim and Freud had “converged” on the
particular concept “culture” could of course not same (bizarre) notion that therefore the
be found in any of the classics, they somehow convergence spoke (in a perfect circle) to the
had intuited something pretty close to it except scientifi c validity of the notion. The foundational
that they did not have the right words for it. In Parsonian moves
Parsons’s (fantastic) proposal, “Comte and (essentially defi ning the basic set of problems of
Spencer, and Weber and Durkheim spoke of modern cultural theory) have had disastrous
society as meaning essentially the same thing conceptual consequences.
Tylor meant by culture” (Kroeber and Parsons In essence, middle-period Parsons replaces
1958: 583). This is a statement that is radically Weber’s nineteenth century focus on “ideas”
ludicrous in its brazen anachronism and (even if he earlier endorsed it; see Parsons 1938
completely inaccurate in every word. We know ) and Durkheim’s focus on “representations” in
now for a fact that what Tylor meant by culture favor of a hyper-infl ated and hypostatized
had little to do with what Boas meant by culture, version of the culture concept. But we have also
which had even less to do with what Parsons seen that Parsons’s concept was not the
meant by culture. Regardless, for Parsons, given anthropologists’s concept; it was an idealist
that the classics had a concept of culture (except abstraction that separated culture from “society”
that it was “society” and except that they really (or social structure) as a sui generis entity. Not
did not) then it was perfectly fi ne to simply even Kluckhohn was ready to go that far for it
project, his own invented notion of culture as implied that anthropology was no longer in the
behaviorally relevant symbolic patterns business of studying society (although clearly
transmitted from generation to generation to Kroeber was willing to play).
Durkheim and Weber without remainder. By F inally we have also seen that while basic
culturalizing the classics, Parsons is able to elements from which Parsons cobbled together
“demonstrate” that Durkheim and Weber his version of the concept seems deceptively
“converge” once again (but the 1950s harmless and all were available in Parsons’s
convergence argument is not quite the same as milieu ; but together they generate a powerful
the 1930s one) because it turns out that they were conceptual monster. In the Parsonian recasting of
talking about two sides of the same coin: the modern anthropological concept, culture
objective culture (existing as “patterns” in a becomes a “superorganic” system of ideal
superorganic system) and subjective culture elements (but most importantly beliefs, norms,
(existing as internalized norms, values, and ideas and values) expressed in signifi cant symbols and
about the world inside the person). communicated via symbolic media (e.g.
T he key move in this “middle” period is language) that act to constrain (following
therefore the integration of Parsons’s twist on the Parsons favorite recourse to cybernetic
anthropological concept of culture into the early metaphors) via a top-down “pattern maintaining”
action-theoretical problematic (essentially process both action (for agents) and patterns of
swapping the nineteenth century germanic notion interaction (for social systems) (Parsons 1951 ).
of “ideas” for the his notion of culture), the
incorporation of Kroeber’s ( 1917 ) notion of
“superorganic” culture pattern into the
functionalist macro-sociology, and the proposal
that the (Weberian) action-theoretical level could
be joined to the (Durkheimian) macro-social
Theory 111

52Under the middle-period scheme, Durkheim’s while correct in spirit, is actually summarily
concern with “collective representations” now incorrect in the most consequential details. The
comes to be recast as a concern with problem is that by focusing on “values” as the
(institutionalized) elements of the “cultural central element that is allegedly internalized, it
system,” thus taking care of culture’s public, ignores a fundamental shift in Parsons’s thinking,
external side. Weber’s concern with subjective one that is crucially involved in his incorporation
“ideas” then gets recast into a concern with the of the anthropological theory of culture into the
subjective (internalized) elements of the same normativist- functionalist scheme.
pseudo-Durkheimian cultural system. As we saw above, the Parsons of the 1930s
Durkheim fi xes Weber by providing him (up an including the so-called “early essays”
with a theory explaining why cultural (esp. 1935 , 1938) and the uber-classic
worldviews come to acquire validity and Structure of Social Action , is still operating with
authority, and Weber fi xes Durkheim by a “pre- cultural” vocabulary one that still tethers
providing him with a theory explaining how him more or less directly to two nineteenth
external culture comes to acquire subjectively century germanic sources, one the germanic
binding forms for the actor and comes to be cultural vocabulary of “ideas” (e.g. 1938 ) and
directly implicated in driving and motivating the Americanized neo-Kantian vocabulary of
action. 53 Properly anthropologized, the classics “values” (e.g. 1935 ). Both of these terms appear
now provide justifi cation for a “culturalist in Structure , and provide the fi rst attempt to
functionalism” that is “cultural” through and “update” the nineteenth century classics for
through, in which “culture” had an external order Parsons’s twentieth century theoretical concerns.
(in terms of the patterning of symbolic elements Because the Germanic language of ideas and
in the cultural system) and an internal order (in values was already closer to Weber (and Parsons
terms of the patterning of internalized norms and for biographical and intellectual reasons was at
value orientations in the personality). The this point just an American broker for the
Parsonian problem of external patterning is taken transatlantic importation of the Germanic
up by Geertz and yields the modern problematic tradition into sociology) Weber does not come
of “interpretation” around the (fuzzy) notion of off too badly in Structure . As we have already
“cultural system” (Geertz 1973 ). The problem seen, the theorist that gets absolutely mangled is
of internal patterning was taken up by Parsons’s Durkheim, because Parsons has to retrofi t the
more directly (in the middle period work) and awkward vocabulary of “ideas” to a theorist for
resulted in the unwieldy edifi ce of “socialization whom this was a meaningless concept.
theory” in normativist functionalism. Let us take H owever, the more important point is that
a closer look at this, as it is important for the there is a fundamental shift in Parsons’s
overall story. vocabulary post-structure, so that the classical
theory of internalization does not reduce to a
“value internalization” account. Instead, the
6.3.3 Classical Socialization Theory little-discussed Freud/Durkheim convergence
(that it was even more exegetically preposterous
T extbook introductions to normativist as the Weber/ Durkheim convergence at the
functionalism usually propose that Parsons center of Structure is not important) comes to
thought that social order was accomplished via play a key role. In this
“socialization” whereby this process reduces to respect, few contemporary theorists actually
the “internalization of values.” This account, comprehend the radicality of Parsons’s proposal

52
O n the quite non-sensical—in Wittgenstein’s sense— Weberian analysis of the various steps between religious
status of the very idea that something like “culture” as commitment and obligations in the fi eld of social action,
conceived in the analytic sense can “constrain” see Martin especially in what he called the profane sphere, but the
(2015 , Chap. 2 ). congruence with Weber s analysis is quite clear” (Parsons
53 1972 : 259).
As Parsons acknowledges in his last published
statement in this regard, “Durkheim did not work out a
O. Lizardo

at this “middle period” stage, because they still essentially a “Parsonian” theory of enculturation
confuse the Parsonian model of enculturation even if the adjective Parsonian has come to
with the value internalization account and (wrongly) be limited to the “value
dismiss it as a “special” and not a “general” internalization” account.
proposal. The key is to realize that Parsons came Accordingly, the Parsonian theory of culture
to realize that both “values” and the broader and cognition is (discouragingly) hard to
“conceptual schemes” through which social distinguish from contemporary approaches,
actors come to know and classify the entire especially in presuming the wholesale
world of objects, agents, and situations internalization of entire conceptual schemes by
(essentially what we moderns use the term socialized actors. For instance, Jeffrey Alexander
“culture” to refer to) have to be internalized. chides post- functionalist confl ict theory for
Thus, any theory that presupposes that persons failing to emphasize “…the power of the
internalize the basic categories with which they symbolic to shape interactions from within, as
make sense of the world from the external normative precepts or narratives that carry
environment is still essentially consonant with a internalized moral force ” (Alexander 2003 : 16;
“Parsonian” model. italics added; see also pp. 152–153 of the same
Parsons only tweak on Freud consists in his book on the internalization of cultural codes).
chiding him for not having a (“Durkheimian”) Eviatar Zerubavel for his part notes, that when it
theory of cognitive socialization. According to comes to the “logic of classifi cation,” by the age
Parsons Freud’s mistake was precisely to think of three a child has already “ internalized
that only normative standards externally (e.g. conventional outlines of the category ‘birthday
culturally) specifi ed and thus internalized within present’ enough to know that, if someone
the personality as the “Superego” but that the suggests that she bring lima beans as a present he
organism does need to internalize a cognitive must be kidding” ( 1999 : 77, our italics).
apparatus with which to make sense of the object- T hese so-called “contemporary” accounts are
environment, relying instead on a pre-social, simply not conceptually distinguishable in any
naturally given (and thus always veridical) way from the culturalized Parsonianism of the
system of perception and cognition. For Parsons, middle period (which goes to tell you that just
(as for most sociologists of culture) this is because somebody writes something today it
mistake. In Parsonese, Freud, “failed to take does not make contemporary). Thus, rather than
explicitly into account the fact that the frame of being some sort of ancient holdover from
reference in terms of which objects are cognized, functionalism, a model pretty close to Parsons’s
and therefore adapted to, is cultural and thus Durkheimian Freudianism continues to be used
cannot be taken for granted as given, but must be by contemporary theorists, whenever those
internalized” (Parsons 1964 : 23). theorists wish to make a case for enculturation as
One ironic consequence of not recognizing a form of mental modifi cation via experience.
that Parsons’s theory changes dramatically once There do exist a family of contemporary
the early language of “ideas” and “values” is proposals that is truly “post-functionalist” in the
junked and the theory goes “full cultural” is that sense of recasting the question of culture in
even though contemporary cultural sociologists action away from issues of “internalization,” this
are quick to reject the Parsonian value- leads us to a consideration of “contemporary”
internalization account, they continue to abide by cultural theory.
the Parsonian model of cognitive socialization. In
essence, most sociologists continue to believe
that people share cultural contents (e.g.
worldviews and beliefs) because they internalize
those contents from the larger culture. Any
theory that presupposes that persons introject the
basic categories with which they make sense of
the world from the external environment is still
Theory 113

6.4 Contemporary Cultural motivational makeup of the actor. This


Theory: Fighting the internalization mechanism, as a particularly
powerful variant of the learning process, arranges
Parsonian Ghost in the cultural elements according to a gradient of
Machine “cultural depth.” Cultural elements that are
deeply internalized are more crucial in
From this account, it is easy to see that the determining an actor’s subjective stances
culturalized functionalism of the middle-period towards a wide range of objects across an equally
Parsons provides a skeleton key to understand wide range of settings and situations than
contemporary cultural theory. The classic text is elements towards which the actor only owes
Swidler (1986 ) who essentially uses sound “shallow” allegiance.
pragmatist sensibilities to develop a “negative” C ontemporary cultural theory can be read as
(in the photographic sense) theoretical system in a repeated attempt to relax the stipulation that
which the two basic premises of culturalized cultural power derives from “deep
functionalism are denied. In Swidler there is no internalization” (Swidler 1986 ; Sewell 1992) .
“internal” cultural order (because actors don’t The guiding observation is that individuals do not
“deeply internalize” any culture) nor is there any seem to possess the highly coherent, overly
“external” cultural order because culture does complex and elaborately structured codes,
not exist outside of people’s heads in the form of ideologies or value systems that the classical
tightly structured systems. Instead, actors are theory expects they should possess (Martin 2010
only lightly touched by culture (learning what ). Instead of regular demonstrations of the
they need ignoring the rest) and draw on possession of coherent cultural systems on the
disorganized external cultural elements in part of “socialized” agents what these newer
expedient ways. We may refer to this “negative” “toolkit” theories suggest (and what the empirical
of culturalized functionalism as the “cultural evidence appears to support) is that persons do
fragmentation” model. This account is essentially not (and cognitively cannot) internalize highly
hegemonic in contemporary cultural analysis and structured symbolic systems in the ways that
heterodox positions today (e.g. Vaisey 2009 ; classical socialization accounts portray. These
Alexander 2003) can only be understood within cultural systems are simply too “cognitively
the context of this hegemony. A good entry into complex” to be deeply internalized; people
this debate thus is the quasi-functionalist simply wouldn’t be able to remember or keep
problematic of “cultural depth” opened up by straight all of the relevant (logical or socio-l
Swidler ( 1986) and repeatedly revisited by ogical) linkages (Martin 2010) .
subsequent cultural theorists (e.g. Sewell 1992 ; Instead, as Swidler ( 2001 ) has pointed out,
Patterson 2014 ). much coherence is actually offl oaded outside of
the social agent and into the external world of
established institutional arrangements, objectifi
6.4.1 The Problem of “cultural depth” ed cultural codes and current relational
commitments. That is, “cultural meanings are
A s we have seen, Between the 1930s and 1950s, organized and brought to bear at the collective
it was the synthetic work of Parsons (Parsons and social, not the individual level” (Swidler
1937 , 1951 ; Parsons and Shils 1951 ) that 2008: 279), and gain whatever minimal
provided the fi rst fully developed account of coherence they can obtain “out of our minds”
how some cultural elements acquire the capacity through concrete contextual mechanisms-instead
to become signifi cant in their capacity to direct of “inside” them. However, this is not a return to
action. Parsons’s centerpiece proposal was that functionalism because external culture is also
some cultural elements come to play a more unstructured, acquiring whatever “coherence” it
signifi cant role in action because they are subject has via extra-cultural (political, economic,
to an internalization process whereby they come institutional) means (Sewell 2005 ).
to form an integral part of the cognitive and
O. Lizardo

T his view of internal and external culture as possible through external structuration. The
“fragmented,” “contradictory,” “weakly specifi c form in which external structuration
bounded” and “contested” has become the de mechanisms are theorized is less important than
facto standard in contemporary discussions in the agreement on this basic point. For instance,
cultural sociology (e.g. Sewell 2005 : 169–172), Sewell ( 2005 : 172– 174) points to mechanisms
cognitive sociology (e.g. DiMaggio 1997 ) and of power and constraint as the source of external
“post-cultural” anthropology (e.g. Hannerz structuration. Through the systematic
1996) , the latter of whom have thoroughly “organization of difference” by powerful
rejected the “myth of cultural integration” institutional actors (and counter-m ovements)
(Archer 1985) inherited from culturalist cultures can become (quasi) coherent. DiMaggio
functionalism. Contemporary cultural theory ( 1997 : 274), drawing on research from the
thus relies primarily on an unquestioned cognitive sciences (broadly defi ned), argues that
conception of cultural fragmentation. What is the “sources of stability in our beliefs and
distinctive about the cultural fragmentation representations” should not be sought in the
model in relation to its Parsonian counterpart is structure of our minds but rather in “cues
(a) its primary empirical motivation (the failure embedded in the physical and social
of persons to display highly structured environment” (see also Shepherd 2011 ).
ideologies), (b) its rejection of any form of a The point to keep in mind is that coherence
positive account of subjective modifi cation of does not exist “inside of people’s heads” but
the actor via cultural transmission, and (c) its instead is offl oaded towards “the efforts of
theorization of the “power” of culture as located central institutions and the acts of organized
“outside of the head” of the actor. resistance to such institutions” (Sewell 2005 :
A s Swidler noted in her classic paper, “[p] 174). From this perspective, persons do not need
eople do not build lines of action from scratch, to internalize highly coherent sets of classifi
choosing actions one at a time as effi cient means catory structures and “value systems” in order for
to given ends. Instead, they construct chains of their action to be “systematic” since a lot of the
action beginning with at least some pre- “systematicity” and regularity in human action
fabricated links” ( 1986 : 276). This implies a actually lies outside, in the world of objectifi ed
critique of socialization models that operate via institutions and situational contexts (Swidler
the “psychological modifi cation” of actors: 2001 ). In the contemporary conception, culture
“[c]ulture does not infl uence how groups is not possessed in a “deep” way, but rather in a
organize action via enduring psychological “shallow,” disorganized fashion that requires
proclivities implanted in individuals by their structuring and support from the external social
socialization. Instead, publicly available environment to produce coherent judgments.
meanings facilitate certain patterns of action,
making them readily available, while
discouraging others” (Swidler 1986 : 283). What 6.4.2 Reactions to the (Over) reaction
is appealing about the fragmentation formulation
is that we get to keep the phenomenon of interest If the cultural fragmentation reaction against
(e.g. occasionally systematic patterns of action) culturalist functionalism is the contemporary
without relying on the doubtful assumption than orthodoxy, then it is easy to predict the shape that
an entire model of the social world or a whole the heterodoxy has to take (Patterson 2014 ).
system of values or logically organized Either one tries to bring back some semblance of
conceptual scheme has to be internalized by theorizing the “internal” order of culture as
social agent (Martin 2010 ). embodied in actors (Vaisey 2009) or one tries to
Contemporary cultural theorists are thus bring back a conception of the strong external
nearly unanimous in proposing a common patterning of culture. This fi rst route has been
mechanism that accounts for how “coherence is followed by contemporary cultural theorists who
possible” when the norm is that culture tends draw on post (or non)functionalist theoretical
toward incoherence; cultural coherence is traditions (e.g. practice theory) to develop a
Theory 115

conception of internalization that is not subject to a close cousin of it and emerges from the same
Swidlerian objections. set of problematics inherited from Parsons.
T he rising appeal of Vaisey’s ( 2009 ) Recall that Parsons’s main contribution was
appropriation of the discursive/practical to develop a culture concept that made robust
consciousness distinction (Giddens 1979 ), and assumptions about the makeup, nature, of culture
his importation of “dual process” models from as a macro-level ontological category. These
moral psychology, in order to suggest that culture were ideas that a lot of anthropologists had
can be internalized in both weakly and strongly played around with (inclusive of the more
patterned ways can be traced to this. In the same brilliant Boas students such as Sapir and
way, revivals of “strong external patterning” of Kroeber) but which none had systematically laid
the “superorganic” element of culture such as out (Kuper 1999 ). It is Parsons that comes clean
Alexander (2003 ) or Reed ( 2011 ) attempt to and offers the notion of the “cultural system” as
conceptualize this patterning without relying on a scientifi c object of study. However, it was an
the problematic (quasi-organicist) conception of upstart student in the department of social
culture as a “system.” Instead, these analysts relations, Clifford Geertz, who runs away with
have attempted to revive neo-Saussurean the culture notion of “cultural system” and
conceptions of patterning as ordered sets of actually cashes in on the analytic potential of
binary codes, which license strong theoretical Parsons revolutionary notion. In a series of
proclamations as to the coherence of culture, and essays written primarily in the 1960s (collected
justify an “interpretative” (textualist) approach to in 1973 in the classic Interpretation of Cultures)
cultural explanation. This is of course a , Geertz is able to formulate both an
methodological approach that was advocated by evolutionary/naturalistic foundation for the
Geertz ( 1973 ) but which was not quite culture concept and a non-naturalistic,
compatible with the Parsonian notion of the “interpretative” methodological manifesto that
“cultural system” that he was conceptually stuck Geertz seduced everybody into thinking that it
with (at least in the core essays written in the followed from that foundation. Geertz’s approach
1960s). Today these heterodox conceptions of was masterful in the knowledge political sense;
both the internal and external order of culture for Geertz sees Parsons “gift” of culture to
compete against still hegemonic fragmentation anthropology and ups the ante by taking this gift
ideas for explanatory hegemony. and using it to argue into irrelevance the other
two denizens of the Parsonian systems ontology
(personality and society).
6.4.3 Whatever Happened to Geertz thus squares the Germanic circle by
separating ontology from methodology or more
the Cultural System?
accurately by using ontology to justify
A ccordingly, a contradictory aspect of methodology. Not surprisingly, this
contemporary cultural theory in American “methodology” is nothing but good old fashioned
sociology is that while some version of the “interpretation” ( verstehen ) updated with nods
fragmentation model is usually the fi rst thing to (for Geertz) contemporary anti-naturalistic
cultural sociologists trot out of their toolkit when arguments in the philosophy of action (Gilbert
trying to explain something, there has been a Ryle) and hermeneutics (Ricoeur). In this way,
simultaneous movement to see strong patterning Geertz becomes the conduit via which a host of
in cultural systems at a “deep level” and to see Parsonian problematics (and associated issues
cultural fragmentation as a surface mirage. These from the Kantian/ Hegelian Germanic legacy that
“strong program” sociologists, tend point to Parsons only provide pseudo-solutions to) have
culture as the fundamental dimension of social been passed along to modern cultural theorists in
reality and link a methodological interpretivism essentially pristine forms. How did he do it?
to a substantive conception of culture as a Geertz basically used a loophole in the
“system of signs.” This approach, seemingly Parsonian charter. For while Parsons was content
antithetical to the fragmentation idea, is actually to defi ne a new object of study for anthropology
O. Lizardo

and even give clues as to its ontological notion that culture is a program, like a computer
constitution, he said little about how to study. program or a code like the genetic code) with the
The hint, left hanging by Parsons for Geertz to most specifi c of humanistic particularities is the
take, was that while an ontology of systems key to Geertz’s counter-charter; and in this sense
emphasizing the cold scientifi c language of the nod to culture as a naturalistic phenomenon
homeostasis, pre- requisites, cybernetic control, that emerges in evolution as an external control
and so on was appropriate for the more system (in the form of programs or models) for
“physical,” or “material” (or biological) of the human behavior is only a sideshow (as in the
three systems (society and personality) given the much overhyped essay “The Growth of Culture
symbolic nature of culture its “systemness” was and the Evolution of Mind”; see e.g. Sewell 1997
not to be conceived in the same physicalist terms. ). For what Geertz was after was the foundations
Instead, the cultural system was held together by for an analytic approach to cultural analysis that
meaningful links and its mysteries could only be justifi ed a purely non-naturalistic understanding
cracked by mixing a scientistic language that of the sources of human action. The naturalistic
conceived of the cultural system as a sort of fact that persons are born incomplete and depend
“program” or “code” (similar to the genetic code; on cultural programming to become “fully
Parsons 1972 ) with a humanistic language that formed,” leads to an anti-naturalistic conclusion:
cracked that code by relying on the deep that these foundational meanings can only be
interpretation of meaningful action. grasped via hermeneutic methods and not by
T he classic text here is the early essay on the uncovering psychological needs, biological
“The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the underpinnings, or appeals to the functional
Concept of Man” (Geertz 1973 : 33–54; prerequisites of social systems (Kuper 1999 ).
originally published in 1965). Here Geertz takes For Geertz, the most important thing is that
on Parsons indirectly by attacking Kluckhohn’s people necessarily become entangled in and
attempt to pursue a sort of Parsonian external “web of meanings” to give pattern and
“psychological anthropology” aimed at meaning to their actions; both the social and
uncovering and typologizing universal cultural personality system are just the formless clay
patterns across societies. Geertz’s point is upon which the form giving powers of the
simple: culture does not exist in dessicated cross- cultural system work to produce the phenomena
cultural generalities tied to the empty available for analytic inspection (see Reed 2011
generalizations of psychological science, but in for an update on this argument). While cultural
the irreducibly unique confi guration that theorists tend to read the Geertzian “web of
produce the uniqueness of each cultural display meanings” aphorism as a nod to Weber, it is
in explicit symbolism. These confi gurations important to understand that this is actually a nod
(which may include the shaping of a person’s to Parsons’s “culturalized” Weber and that
most intimate desires and worldviews) can only Geertz understood both the ontological existence
be described not catalogued; it is thus in the sum of this cultural web and people’s entanglement in
total of these time and place specifi c confi it in a quite substantive (rather than a heuristic)
gurations of cultural elements that “generality” sense. In this last respect, if Geertz’s is supposed
will be found in the anthropological project. to have provided an early preview of the “strong
While it is true that in theory nature of culture program” in cultural analysis (Alexander 2008)
can be described as a Parsonian/Kluckhohnian , then it is clear that contemporary versions of this
“pattern,” “program,” or “code,” culture does not approach are a direct outgrowth of the Parsonian
present itself to the analyst in this form; its notion of culture. It is thus no wonder that is
concrete reality can only be ascertained in the precisely such “recovering functionalists” (e.g.
specifi c symbolic manifestations by which it Alexander 2003 ) who have gone farthest in
shapes even the most exotic patterns of behavior reviving a neo-Parsonian notion of culture as
and action. both an autonomous (substantive) “realm” with
This attempt to bring together the most an internal structure modelled after language
abstract of naturalistic generalities (e.g. the (replacing talk about “programs” with neo-
Theory 117

Saussurean talk of “semiotic codes” but keeping idiosyncratic but ultimately agenda-setting
the underlying Parsonian defi nition essentially rendering of the anthropological culture concept.
the same) designed to give “order and meaning” The fragmentation model that has become
to individual and collective action. standard in contemporary cultural theory is for all
All of this is of much more than purely intents and purposes a “negative image” of the
historical interest; for the Parsonian ghost mid-twentieth century Parsonian concoction and
continues to haunt the sociological appropriation more recent reactions to the (over)reaction boil
of the cultural concept via the massive infl uence down to trying to “bring back” some of the
that the Geertzian infl ection has had on Parsonian goodies unfairly dismissed by the
practitioners of this approach especially in hegemonic model (e.g. values, internalized
sociological “cultural studies” (Alexander 2003 culture, strong external structuration) (Patterson
; Reed 2011 ) and “cultural history” (Sewell 2014 ).
1997 ). As Biernacki ( 2000 ) notes, two In addition, contemporary attempts to bring
foundational assumptions of culture as a robust dimension of reality and as key
Parsons’s idiosyncratic rendering of the culture in the explanation of social action are unwitting
concept (which he blames Geertz for) continue to prey of Geertz’s radicalization of the Parsonian
haunt us to this very day. The fi rst assumption rendering and his (successful) knowledge-
(“the essentializing premise”) is the ontological political attempt to undercut the Parsons-Kroeber
rendering of the cultural system as an addendum compromise by making what would been only
to the social and material world manifested as an one element of the culture- personality- society
assemblage of signs and signifying objects and triad the overarching factor that swallowed up the
actions. The second assumption (“the other two. Analysts peddling hermeneutic
formalizing premise”) is the endowment of this approaches to cultural analysis are unwitting
hypostatized cultural system with an endogenous scions of Geertz’s radical move to remove
capacity to generate “meaning” and signifi cation naturalism from cultural theory by
via the internal interplay of signs only in isolation acknowledging the naturalist essence of culture
from action, cognition, and social structure. Both but disallowing access to cultural explanation via
of these Biernacki traces to Geertz but as we have naturalist methods in the same breath (Geertz
seen, Geertz only clarifi ed features of the culture 1973) . In all, every single one of the problems of
concept that were already explicit in Parsons’s contemporary cultural theory, from those related
radical rendering. 54 Accordingly, when “[c] to enculturation, to the relationship of culture and
ultural historians and sociologists followed action, to those of analytical method and the
Geertz in reifying the concept of a sign system as ontological nature of “culture” as a dimension of
a naturally given dimension of…reality” social reality are problems generated by the mid-
(Biernacki 2000 : 294) they were actually twentieth century Parsonian intervention.
following Parsons without realizing it. Insofar as middle-period functionalism
became the model for what “theory” and
“theoretical discourse” looks like for
sociologists, and insofar as it is Parsons who fi rst
6.5 Conclusion formulates and subsequently defi nes the “hard”
problems in social theory, it is no wonder that
Contemporary cultural theory is, in its essential
“cultural theory” has essentially become the
aspects, an offshoot of culturalist functionalism.
stand-in for theory in general in the discipline, at
Because of this lineage, it is also ineluctably
least among (institutionally) young sociologists
tethered conceptually, thematically, and
who do empirical research. But what if the
ideologically to Parsons’s (long known to be
“theoretical” problems that cultural theorists are
misleading) appropriation of the classics and his

54
Parsons himself ( 1972 ) was quite open to
conceptualization the structure of the cultural system
using methods from linguistics.
O. Lizardo

grappling with are “iatrogenic,” self-generated most mangled by the Parsonian germanization). I
by the (anachronistic) Parsonian am not talking about the “culturalized” Durkheim
“culturalization” of the classics in the fi rst place? of those who want to recruit him for a project of
We have seen that there is little exegetical (germanic, and now obsolete) “cultural studies”
warrant to consider the classics as “cultural (e.g. Alexander 1990 ). I am talking about the
theorists” as neither Marx, Weber, nor Durkheim real Durkheim that has been unearthed and saved
traffi cked in notions that have a one-to-one from intellectual oblivion in the recent exegetical
match with the modern “culture concept.” and historical intellectual work alluded to above.
Surprisingly (to some), this implies that it is This Durkheim sees what people now call
possible to do social theory and attend to its cultural phenomena from a naturalistic
various conundra without a culture concept as perspective and avoids the germanic imbroglio of
we conceive of it. In fact, it can be argued that the conceptualizing culture in non-naturalistic terms
reason why we seem to go around and around the (thus leading the “method battles”). In fact, this
same Parsonian issues is that, in spite of their Durkheim points to a coherent post-cultural
self-perceptions, most cultural theorists have not landscape in which most of the so-called
actually moved that far away from culturalist “cultural” phenomena that are thought to be only
functionalism (as we saw above in the case of accessible via non-naturalistic methods (e.g.
cognitive internalization). In fact, it is even more textual analysis, hermeneutics, phenomenology,
surprising (given the intellectual history) that the etc.) may yield to naturalistic approaches.
culture concept itself is seldom tagged by F urthermore, this “new” old Durkheim, as
sociologists as an inherently functionalist some perspicacious analysts have noted (e.g.
concept (even though the intellectual history in Schmaus 2004 ; Turner 2007 ), is closer to the
anthropology says it is; see Kuper 1999 ). naturalistic spirit of what has been called
Regardless, there is no question that the culture “cognitive science” while avoiding the sort of
concept is as closely tied to functionalism as such tail- chasing neo-Kantian problematics that come
now “dead” notions such as “latent pattern from banishing the cultural and the mental to an
maintenance,” “need dispositions,” and incoherent nether-region outside of the natural
“functional prerequisites.” It is also very likely world (Sperber 1995 ). It is no wonder that it is
that the culture concept, due to its indelible link the most recent sociological heir of the French
to functionalism, currently functions as a strand of naturalistic rationalism (Pierre
theoretical trojan horse smuggling other Bourdieu) who has provided us with the only
Parsonian (pseudo) issues into the contemporary other coherent theoretical program in sociology
scene. These “problems” then become the core that does not make use of the “culture” concept
dividing lines of theoretical argumentation and for analytic purposes (Lizardo 2011 ).
position-takings among cultural theorists. In spite of what the future may hold, it is
I ronically, the classics provide models of how becoming increasingly clear that “cultural
one may be able to have a post-cultural social theory” is the only intellectual site in which this
theory. For instance, Warner ( 1970) , in a now future will be resolved if only for the simple
largely forgotten paper, convincingly argued that reason that it is the only subfi eld in
the whole of Weberian sociology can be made contemporary sociology within which the “big
sense of using (a properly refurbished version of) questions” get asked by empirically oriented
the germanic notion of “ideas” and the new scholars. These analysts however, must begin to
fangled notion of “models” (a notion that seriously grapple with the spotty intellectual
ironically has been revived in current “post- genealogy of their favorite conceptual tools,
cultural” cognitive anthropology (c.f. Shore since it may be time for us, as Weick ( 1996)
1996) ). Recent calls to treat “ideas” seriously are once noted in a different context, to drop those
consistent with a postcultural revival of the tools and try to run to the safest space.
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Part II
Rethinking the Macro-Micro
Link
The Macro and Meso Basis 7 of the
Micro Social Order
Jonathan H. Turner
J. H. Turner ()
Department of Sociology , University of
California , Santa Barbara , CA , USA e-mail:
jturner@soc.ucsb.edu
In this chapter, my charge is to outline one
half of the problem: connecting the levels of
social reality theoretically, beginning with the
macro realm. A complete explanation of the
7.1 Introduction micro-macro problem warrants both a bottom-up
and top-down explanation, but sometimes it is
The Holy Grail of theoretical explanations is to useful to focus on one direction—in my case
explain connections among all levels of reality in here, the top-down explanation from macro to
the universe studied by a science. For a long time, meso to micro levels of the social universe. I have
anti-scientist critics of sociological theory used often termed as “macro chauvinists” those who
the “failure” to close the micro-macro “gap” in perform such an exercise because they often
theorizing about the social universe as “proof” assert that this is the only, or at least the most
that scientifi c theory about the social world is not important, way of explaining the social world. I
possible—conveniently ignoring the fact that no also label as “micro chauvinists” those who say
science has been fully successful, including the opposite. My effort in this chapter begins with
physics, in so doing. In the last two decades, the recognition that I am telling only part of the
however, this criticism rings very hollow because story , although I will turn to some of the key
theoretical sociology has closed this gap; and I microdynamics that complete the story at the end
will make what may initially seem like an of the chapter.
extreme statement: Of all of the sciences,
sociology is the furthest along in theoretically
linking the micro, meso, macro realms of the
7.2 A Simple Conceptual Scheme
social universe. Sociology has less of a problem
than biology, economics, and physics in this Figure 7.1 represents an outline of the
regard, even though sociologists often consider conceptual scheme that I have been using for
explanatory theory in sociology to be inadequate. over a decade to get a handle on the fundamental
In a number of places, I have offered my properties at each level of social organization.
explanation (Turner 2002 , 2007 , 2010a , b ; This scheme explains nothing about dynamics,
2013a , Turner 2013b ) of the theoretical but it does lay out the levels of social reality that
connections among levels of social reality, while need to be explained, while the arrows in the fi
others have presented very convergent views gure denote the areas where key dynamics make
(e.g., Lawler et al. 2009 ). the connections within and between levels of
reality
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 123
S. Abrutyn (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary Sociological Theory,
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32250-6_7
124 J.H. Turner

Fig. 7.1 Levels of social reality 7.2.1 Levels of Social Reality

As is evident, the scheme is organized around


three levels of social reality: (1) the macro realm
of inter-societal systems, societies, institutional
delineated in the scheme. Too often scholars as domains, and stratifi cation systems, (2) the meso
diverse as Talcott Parsons and Anthony Giddens realm of corporate units and what I term
see such schemes as explanatory, but in fact, the categoric units, and (3) the micro realm of
theoretical explanation is not to be found in a focused and unfocused encounters among
system of categories but, rather, in abstract individuals.
models and abstract principles explaining the
dynamics within and between the levels denoted
in the scheme. Conceptual schemes are only the
starting point, not the endpoint, of an
explanation.
7 The Macro and Meso Basis of the Micro Social Order 125

As is evident in Fig. 7.1 , I have added at the constrain what transpires at any given level and
micro level of reality behaviors as these are between any two levels of reality; and my charge
affected by biologically based behavioral in this chapter is to explain how this constraint
propensities of humans as evolved species of ape; operates.
and while I have done a great deal of work at this
level (e.g., 2013a, b; 2014a, b; 2015a; b ;
Turner and Maryanski 2012, 2013, 2015) , I 7.2.2 Embedding
will confi ne myself in this chapter to terrain that
is more familiar and comfortable for most T his explanation is greatly facilitated by the fact
sociologists. Thus, the most micro-level unit of that micro levels of reality are embedded in the
sociology for my purposes will be what Erving meso, and that meso levels of reality are
Goffman ( 1961, 1983 ) termed focused (face- embedded in the macro. Embedding generates
to-face) and unfocused (face avoidance) conduits by which the more and the less inclusive
encounters, while the most macro level is inter- structures affect each other. Smaller structures
societal system but for reasons of space I will and their cultures will always be constrained by
emphasize societies and the institutional domains the more inclusive structures and their culture in
and stratifi cations from which inter-societal which they are lodged. Of course, as the building
systems are ultimately built. The meso level, blocks of larger structures, the smaller always
which mediates between the macro and micro, is have the potential to change the structure and
composed of corporate units (i.e., groups, operation of those larger-scale units in which
organizations, communities) revealing a division they are embedded—which is, of course, the
of labor to pursue variously defi ned goals and bottom-u p side of my story in this chapter. The
categoric units composed of members defi ned fact that the social universe is built around micro
by traits or characteristics (e.g., gender, class, structures embedded in meso structures, and
ethnicity, age, religious affi liation, national meso structures lodged in macro structures does,
origins, etc.). A top-down theory, then, must however, greatly facilitate explanation of social
explain how the dynamics of the macro realm reality from a top-down perspective. Still, as the
affect the meso realm which, in turn, affects the arrows in Fig. 7.1 indicate, there are also
micro realm of encounters. There are, of course, important relations occurring within each level;
reciprocal affects from the micro to meso to that is, focused and unfocused encounters infl
macro, but these will be underemphasized uence each other, as do corporate and categoric
because of the charge given to me in writing this units, or institutional domains and stratifi cation
chapter. systems. Moreover, these within-level dynamics
It is certainly true that this conceptualization are often mediated by the effects between the
of levels of reality is a set of analytical structures and their cultures at different levels of
distinctions, but it is also how reality actually social organization—which, of course, adds
unfolds empirically. Interacting humans create, complications to the explanations.
reproduce, and often change the basic corporate
units organizing their activities—in groups,
organizations, and communities—and as they do
7.2.3 Structure and Culture
so, they may also change institutional domains,
stratifi cation systems, societies, or even inter- Since Marx’s distinction between substructure
societal systems. Similarly interacting (the “real” driving structure) and superstructure
individuals create social defi nitions of individual (the derivative structure and culture), sociologists
differences, codifying these in labels and have had a tendency to visualize structure and
evaluative beliefs that are used, in part, to form culture as “two different things” that have to be
stratifi cation systems and, hence, societies and snapped together like Lego blocks. Indeed,
inter-societal systems. Once meso and macro sociology seems to wax and wane between
units are in place, however, they always periods when culture or structure is given
126 J.H. Turner

priority. The advent of confl ict sociology in the (and this is why I insert biology and behavior at
1960s gave emphasis to structure, whereas the the bottom of Fig. 7.1 ). One cannot explain all
new “strong program” in cultural sociology over of meso and macro reality by humans’ biological
the last two decades does the opposite (e.g., capacities and propensities, but understanding
Alexander and Smith 2001) . In my view, it is how these drive the micro realm would, if I were
not useful to slice and dice structure and culture engaged in a bottom up explanation, will help
in this way, and then put them back together. Any explain how and why humans created the meso
defi nition of social structure must include and macro realms in the manner that they are now
references to the symbol systems inhering in this constituted. Thus, evolutionary sociology must
structure, and vice versa. Here, the analytical be part of our theorizing at all levels of social
separation of culture and structure is just that— reality—despite the reservations of many
an analytical distinction that gives us a vantage theorists and sociologists more generally.
point for examining structure and culture. Yet,
we must put them back together again when
theorizing because they are mutually
7.3 The Macro Level of Social
constitutive. Flowing across and down the
conduits of embedded structures are symbols Reality
that, fi rst of all, make structures possible and
meaningful and that, secondly, that drive many of For most of human existence, social life was
the dynamic properties of social reality within lived out in smaller sociocultural formations: (a)
and across levels of social organization. group-level corporate units (nuclear kinships
units embedded in hunting and gathering band)
and (b) basic categoric units denoting gender and
age differences. The beginning of a macro realm
7.2.4 Evolution of the Social Universe became evident as soon as bands began to see
themselves as part of a larger “people” or
T he cosmos of stars evolved from something—
population living in a given territory, but these
once thought to be a big bang, but now with some
were only loose cultural constructions with
doubts and proposed alternative scenarios. The
variable sociocultural networks. But the potential
social universe also evolved from something—
was there, and it was periodically used to create
the agency and actions of individual persons
exchange networks and alliances among
trying to adapt to environments. Thus, part of the
members of one set of bands with another set.
explanation of the macro universe will involve an
And, once humans began to settle down into new
“origins” story of how humans created the levels
types of corporate units, such as communities and
of social reality outlined in Fig. 7.1 , but we do
then organizations (in kin-based complex
not need to get too involved here. But in
organizations structured around descent rules),
understanding how meso and then macro reality
the meso realm expanded and could then be used
evolved, we will gain insight into some of the
to build up a more macro realm. Then, around
dynamics that, like the forces of the physical
10,000 years ago, the scale and complexity of
universe, bind the social universe together. I have
human societies began to grow at an increasing
tried to tell this evolutionary story in more detail
rate, leading to the evolution of the macro realm.
(e.g., Turner 2010a ), but here my point is only
to touch upon evolutionary processes as they
provide useful information for developing
explanatory theory. The same, by the way, would 7.3.1 Selection Pressures and the
be true if I were starting from the micro level: I Formation of Macro Reality
would want to know how humans evolved as a
species and how this evolution determined their Sociological theorizing has been reluctant to
capacities and behavioral propensities that set employ the notion of selection as a driving force
into motion the building up of the social universe because of its connection to Social Darwinism
7 The Macro and Meso Basis of the Micro Social Order 127

and even evolutionary theory more generally. population and the units organizing their
With a few notable exceptions (Runciman 2015 activities to develop sociocultural formations to
; Abrutyn 2013a , b ; Carneiro 2015 ), selection deal with these problem. The fault lines are rather
is not explicitly analyzed but, nonetheless, has familiar: production (of resources needed to
implicitly been part of much theoretical sustain life and sociocultural formations),
sociology. As I have argued, natural selection reproduction (of persons and structures
operates at both the biological and sociocultural organizing their activities), regulation and
levels of reality, but selection at the biological coordination (with power, interdependencies,
level is different than that at the sociocultural and culture), and distribution (through material
level. Herbert Spencer ([1874–1896] 1898) had infrastructures and eventually markets).
the most complete model of selection dynamics Unfortunately, these fault lines got converted by
among early sociologists who have, in essence, subsequent theorists into functional needs or
built upon his insights. Unfortunately, Spencer’s requisites; and while Spencer also emphasized
ideas were converted into functional analysis that functions, he always remembered the selectionist
de- emphasized the selectionist argument. For argument implicit in functionalism but ignored
Spencer, persons and the corporate units by modern-day functionalists. Sociocultural
organizing their activities seek to adapt and formations represent a response to adaptive
adjust to their physical, biotic, and sociocultural problems in production, reproduction, regulation
environments; and as populations grow, they are (coordination, control, and integration of social
forced to use their capacities for agency to create structures and their cultures), and distribution. If
new types of social structures and cultural new sociocultural formations prove adaptive,
systems to do so. Figure 7.2 outlines the basic they are retained in the morphology of a society,
argument developed by Spencer. whereas if they do not, a population can die out,
As populations get larger, they are disintegrate into a simpler form, or be conquered
increasingly under pressure to differentiate new by a more adapted population.
types of sociocultural formations, or suffer the For Spencer and most subsequent
disintegrative consequences. Spencer also sociologists, institutional domains evolve in
emphasized that there are certain universal fault response to these selection pressures by forcing
lines along which adaptive problems develop and individual and collective actors to create new

Fig. 7.2 Spencer’s model of selection on, and differentiation of, societies
begin to increase the pressure on members of a types of c orporate units and new confi gurations
128 J.H. Turner

of relations among such units that can resolve— categoric units from which institutions and
for a time—the adaptive problems generating stratifi cation systems are built.
selection pressures (see Chap. 11 for more
details on institutional domains). Institutions are
thus congeries of corporate units responding to 7.3.2 Properties of the Macro Realm
the pressures from these universal fault lines; and
of Reality
as they do so, they generate a core set of
corporate units and a relatively common culture. Before turning to dynamics of the macro realm
As Spencer emphasized, the fi rst societies were as these affect meso and micro reality, it is
very small and simple, meeting all selection necessary to outline some critical properties of
pressures with nuclear kinship units organized the macro realm as it is formed in response to
into bands. With population growth, however, selection pressures. By breaking reality apart for
selection pressures increased, forcing analysis, the nature of these properties and the
populations to develop new kinds of corporate dynamics that inhere in them can be better
units for dealing with intensifying adaptive understood, as long as we remember to put them
problems. Once this process of institutional back together again. Accordingly, I will begin
differentiation was initiated, it became the with culture and then isolate some of the key
template for addressing subsequent adaptive dynamics inhering in these properties of the
problems, with the result that virtually all macro realm when viewed as a distinctive level
societies in the world today reveal a more of sociocultural formation that exerts powerful
complex set of differentiated institutional effects on the meso and, through the meso, the
domains: kinship, religion, polity, economy, law, micro level of social reality.
education, medicine, science, arts, sport, and
perhaps a few others (Turner 1972, 1997,
7.3.2.1 Cultural Properties of
2003, 2010a; Abrutyn 2009, 2013b) . These
the Macro Realm
domains are built from corporate units (groups
W hen engaged in general theorizing, we need to
embedded in organizations located within
embrace a “weak” rather than “strong program”
communities); and societies are, in part, the sum
when examining culture. We need to remain
total of institutional domains organizing the
detached from the specifi c empirical and
activities of members of a population.
historical contexts in which culture is produced
As Fig. 7.1 outlines, valued resources are
and reproduced in order to examine the
distributed unequally by corporate units within
fundamental and universal properties of culture
institutional domains; and thus, stratifi cation
of the macro realm as they constrain meso and
increases along a number of fronts as institutional
micro-level social dynamics. This goes against
domains differentiate. Thus, institutional
the grain in today’s revival of cultural sociology
domains directly provide the structural and
(See Chap. 6 ), but something has been lost in
cultural backbone of a society and, indirectly,
much recent theorizing that needs to be
they create the other, less-steady pillar of
recaptured. Surprisingly, perhaps, we need to go
societies: systems of stratifi cation that can, for a
back to functional theory—for all of its obvious
time, integrate a population and thus facilitate
fl aws— to see what was thrown out with the
regulation but that, over the long run, generate
bathwater in the rush to kill off functional
tension and confl ict that lead to social change in
analysis.
all societies (see discussion in Chap. 2 on
integration and disintegration). The properties 7.3.2.2 The Ordering of Cultural Elements
and dynamics of societies, therefore, are very I n Fig. 7.3 , I have outlined elements of culture
much determined by macro- level sociocultural that I believe are most important in
formations—i.e., institutional domains and understanding macro to micro dynamics. I have
stratifi cation systems—from which they are arranged these hierarchically, with the arrows
constructed, and of course, the corporate and denoting the infl uence of one level of culture on
7 The Macro and Meso Basis of the Micro Social Order 129

another. True, this fi gure looks something like texts, high or low levels of technology, and
Talcott Parsons’ long forgotten, or rejected, highly charged or lower-key moral codes exert
“cybernetic hierarchy of control,” but its only pressures on members of a society and the
similarity to Parsons’ formulation is the corporate units organizing their activities. This
recognition that like social structures, cultural infl uence results in the development of more
systems are embedded in each other. specifi c codings—ideologies, meta-ideologies,
The culture of any society reveals texts (oral beliefs, and normative
and/or written), technologies (or information
about how to manipulate the environment), and

Fig. 7.3 Elements of micro-level culture as they constrain meso- and micro-level culture
values (highly abstract moral codes on rights and
wrongs). All of these basic elements have large
effects on how the macro world becomes
organized; and often, this societal-level
organization is infl uenced by connections to
other societies, where texts, technologies, and the
ideologies of other societies penetrate the culture
of a particular society. Thus, complex or simple
130 J.H. Turner

expectations—that are at least partially composite ideology. As noted above, I term these
consistent with higher-level moral codes and inter-institutional cultural formations meta -
compatible with existing technologies. This ideologies ; and the meta-ideology of the
constraint is greatest when there is a high degree dominant institutional domains in a society—say,
of consensus on value premises (about economy, polity, education, science—reconciles
right/wrong, good/bad, elements in each of the respective ideologies of
appropriate/inappropriate), when these codes these institutional domains, but these meta-
reveal high degrees of internal consistency in ideologies do something even more important:
their mandates, when they embody both offi cial they legitimate the unequal distribution of valued
and more general cultural texts, and when they resources by corporate units within institutional
allow for the implementation of technological domains—in the example here, the unequal
knowledge. distribution of money by the economy, power by
the polity, learning by education, and verifi ed
The Importance of Ideologies and Meta- knowledge by science (see discussion and Table
ideologies The most important cultural codes 7.1 for a listing of symbolic media as valued
below these higher-order and abstract codings in resources). Thus, those who possess higher levels
a society’s culture are ideologies and meta - of these valued resources are seen as “deserving,”
ideologies . Ideologies translate value premises while those not receiving large shares of these
into more specifi c moral codings for what is resources are seen as “undeserving.” As a
right/wrong, good/bad, and consequence, beliefs valorize the moral worth of
appropriate/inappropriate within a particular those with resources, and conversely, stigmatize
institutional domain, such as kinship, economy, those who do not possess resource shares. Stratifi
polity, law, religion, or education. They, in cation systems are thus built up from the unequal
essence, translate the highly abstract value distribution of valued resources that are
premises into more specifi c sets of moral distributed unequally by the divisions of labor in
instructions about conduct and action within any corporate units within institutional domains; and
given domain. In turn, ideologies constrain the this inequality is legitimated by the ideologies
beliefs that emerge in corporate-unit cultures and within each domain and, even more importantly,
the normative expectations for incumbents at by the meta-ideology that combines and
different locations in the division of labor of reconciles the individual ideologies of
corporate units; and consequently, these differentiated domains. And, like the ideologies
normative beliefs and expectations constrain the of variously autonomous institutional domains,
situational expectation states of individuals in this meta-ideology constrains the formation of
micro-level encounters. beliefs in the culture of corporate units and the
Meta-ideologies are blended composite of the status beliefs about those placed in social
ideologies from dominant institutional domains, categories and receiving different shares of
and like ideologies more generally, they translate valued resources.
abstract value premises and texts into more
specifi c moral premises within and between The Importance of Generalized Symbolic Media
institutional domains. Like ideologies, meta- of Exchange Ideologies and meta-ideologies are
ideologies provide the more immediate and built up from generalized symbolic media of
specifi c moral imperatives for meso-level exchange . As entrepreneurs seek to form
sociocultural formations. corporate units capable of responding to selection
pressures, they begin to employ terms of
A s societies become more complex, the discourse to explain and justify what they are
corporate units within diverse institutional doing; and as some of these actors become the
domains interact in often complex ways; and as dominant or core players in an evolving
these interactions occur, the respective ideologies institutional domain, this use of a particular
of several domains are mixed together to form a generalized symbolic medium is increasingly
7 The Macro and Meso Basis of the Micro Social Order 131

used by others (Turner 2010 a , c ; Abrutyn money is increasingly used to expand economic
2013a , b ; 2015 ; Abrutyn and trade, it is not only the medium by which such
Table 7.1 G eneralized symbolic media of institutional trade occurs in emerging markets, its ability to
domains symbolize value also makes it a moral symbol
Kinship Love/loyalty , or the use of intense that is incorporated into, for example, the
positive affective states to forge and mark ideology of capitalism emphasizing that profi ts
commitments to others and groups of
others and accumulation of capital are right, proper, and
moral, thereby moralizing and justifying
Economy Money , or the denotation of exchange
value for objects, actions, and services by
capitalist behaviors and actions. Similarly, as
the metrics inhering in money power is increasingly used to consolidate control
of other institutional domains in an emerging
Polity Power , or the capacity to control the
actions of other actors polity, it is not only the resource used to do so,
but its mobilization is justifi ed by the symbolic
Law Imperative coordination/justice , or the
capacity to adjudicate social relations and
nature of power—that a moral good that is
render judgments about justice, fairness, needed to establish control and order in a society.
and appropriateness of actions
Religion Sacredness/Piety , or the commitment to Generalized symbolic media of exchange
beliefs about forces and entities inhabiting thus have several unique properties (Turner
a non-observable supernatural realm and 2010b , c , 2014b ). They are (a) the terms of
the propensity to explain events and
conditions by references to these sacred
discourse within an evolving institutional
forces and beings domains; (b) they are the resource that is used to
justify the organization of corporate units to deal
Education Learning , or the commitment to
acquiring and passing on knowledge with selection pressures; (c) they can often be the
actual valued resource that is unequally
Science Knowledge , or the invocation of
standards for gaining verifi ed knowledge
distributed within and institutional system and
about all dimensions of the social, biotic, thereby one of the resources that leads to the
and physico-chemical universes formation of a stratifi cation system in a society;
Medicine Health , or the concern about and and (d) they are the moral codes that are used to
commitment to sustaining the normal form ideologies and meta-ideologies that
functioning of the human body constrain all meso and micro level social
Sport Competitiveness , or the defi nition of processes.
games that produce winners and losers by In addition to these properties, generalized
virtue of the respective efforts of players symbolic media are often reifi ed as “totemized”
Arts Aesthetics , or the commitment to make objects of worship toward which ritualized
and evaluate objects and performances by appeals are often made. For example, people do
standards of beauty and pleasure that they
indeed “worship” money and power; and such
give observers
as also the case for other generalized symbolic
Note: These and other generalized symbolic media are
employed in discourse among actors, in articulating media such as love - loyalty in family and
themes, and in developing ideologies about what should kinship, imperative coordination and justice in
and ought to transpire in an institutional domain. They tend law, learning in education, sacredness - piety in
to circulate within a domain, but all of the symbolic media religion, verifi ed knowledge in science,
can circulate in other domains, although some media are competition in sport, and aesthetics in arts. As
more likely to do so than others
symbols of morality and as valued resources,
generalized symbolic media can become totems
Turner 2011) . What eventually emerges is an of worship, thereby reifying them and giving
ideology specifying the moral correctness of a them even more moral power to constrain the
particular line of conduct by individuals and emergence of beliefs, normative expectations,
corporate-unit organizing individuals’ activities and expectations states in meso- and micro-level
within an institutional domain. For example, as sociocultural formations.
132 J.H. Turner

To some degree these properties of domains; and because most corporate units
generalized symbolic media were recognized by evidence hierarchical divisions of labor, this
Gorg Simmel ([1907] 1990) in his early analysis distribution of resources is unequal. The unequal
of money, and by more recent theorists such as distribution of generalized symbolic media and
Talcott Parsons ( 1963a ; b ) and Nicklas other valued resources like prestige and positive
Luhmann (1982 ). Even more recent theorists emotions determine the structure and culture of
(Turner 2010a , 2013b; Abrutyn and Turner the stratifi cation system (2008, 2014). The
2011 ) have extended the analysis of generalized degree of stratifi cation in a society is a positive
symbolic media because they are the basis of and cumulative function of (Turner 1986 ): (1)
those cultural coding systems—ideologies and the degree of inequality in the distribution of
meta- valued resources, (2) the degree to which confi
ideologies—that constrain the formation of gurations of resource shares of persons and
cultural codes and expectations at the meso and families converge, thereby forming a distinctive
micro levels of social organization. And, from an stratum within the overall stratifi cation system,
evolutionary perspective, generalized symbolic (3) the linearity and clarity of ranked-ordering of
media evolved in response to selection pressures strata by the respective total resource shares of
as actors seek to cope with adaptive problems resource of their members, (4) the level of
arising from selection pressures, and to justify homogeneity in culture and lifestyles of members
and legitimate their solutions to these problems. of distinctive strata, (5) the extent to which meta-
Thus, in a sense, generalized symbolic media ideologies valorize or stigmatize members in
arise at a more micro and meso level in history, high and low social strata, (6) the degree of
but once institutionalized they become external correlation between membership in strata and
constraints on the culture of these meso- and other categoric-unit memberships, and (7) the
micro-level social structures. pervasiveness of restrictions on mobility of
persons and families across strata.
7.3.2.3 Structural Properties and
Dynamics of the Macro Inter-societal Structural Properties and
Realm Dynamics When societies are embedded in
The macro realm consists of societies, variously inter-societal systems, it is typically through
embedded in inter-societal systems or, particular institutional domains, such as the
alternatively, in confl ict with other societies. The economy (in trade), polity (political alliances),
nature of inter-societal relations affects the religion (common religious beliefs and
structure and culture of institutional domains structures), education (exchanges of students),
within a society. Societal structures are built on kinship (migrations of families), or science
two basic pillars: (a) Institutional domains (coordination of searches for knowledge), and at
resolving adaptive problems (see Chap. 11 ) and times through locations in stratifi cation systems.
(b) stratifi cation systems (see Chap. 12) Thus, much of the infl uence of inter-societal
revealing distinctive strata as a consequence of systems fi lters into a society through
the unequal distribution of resources by corporate connections among institutions, which, in turn,
units within institutional domains. have large effects on the evolution of the stratifi
I nstitutional domains are congeries of cation system in a society. And, as corporate and
corporate units integrated by structural relations categoric units are, respectively, embedded in
with each other and culture (see my discussion on institutions and stratifi cation systems, the effects
integration in Chap. 2 in this volume) that, as of intersocietal embeddedness eventually fi lter
noted above, have evolved to solve adaptive down through meso structures to micro-level
problems facing populations. Each institutional encounters.
domain distributes through its constituent
corporate units its own distinctive generalized It is, of course, an empirical/historical
symbolic media and, often, the media of other question about such embedding in an inter-
7 The Macro and Meso Basis of the Micro Social Order 133

societal system, but the more embedded is a polity, and at times other domains such as k
society in such a system, the more the nature of inship, religion, education, science, and sport.
the embedding affects the institutional systems Yet, the direct effects on individuals at the micro
and the resulting stratifi cation system of a realm of social reality of these inter-societal
society. If the embedding involves domination by relations will generally be highly constrained and
another society, or its converse, the effects will mediated by the properties and dynamics of
work primarily through political domains as institutional domains as they determine the
these infl uence unbalanced economic dynamics of the stratifi cation system within a
exchanges. If the embedding is mutual and particular society. Thus, analysis at the micro
among more or less equal societies, then the level is somewhat simplifi ed by this fact. For
embedding will be more economic and cultural, example, if society is at war, polity will centralize
revolving around exchanges of symbols and power and use this power to regulate other
material products as well as high rates of mobility institutional domains and, hence, corporate and
among societies. In these more equal inter- categoric units at the meso level and, encounters
societal relations meta-ideologies are more likely at the micro level. The effects of war on
to involve the dominant institutional domains of inequality will similarly be mediated by
different societies. constraints on corporate units within institutional
domains and how these affect stratifi cation
Societal Properties and Dynamics The dynamics and the meta-ideologies legitimating
dynamics of societies at the macro level revolve these dynamics. Similarly, the migration into a
around (a) the patterns of differentiation among society of members of a new religion will affect
institutional domains, (b) the unequal distribution the internal dynamics of religion as an
of valued resources, including generalized institutional domain, the meta-ideology of
symbolic media, by corporate units within religion, and perhaps a new, differentially
domains, (c) the degree of stratifi cation evaluated categoric unit based upon religious affi
emerging from this unequal distribution and (d) liation and modal location of its members in the
the extent to which memberships in categoric class system. It is these effects at the level of
units is correlated with class locations in the institutional domains and stratifi cation that will,
stratifi cation system. The ideologies and meta- as I will outline below, have the greatest impact
ideologies are formed from the circulation of on micro- level social processes.
generalized symbolic media across domains and A dditionally, inequalities always generate
legitimate, with varying degrees of success, the tensions in societies, and when inequalities are
inequalities of the stratifi cation system. In associated with categoric unit memberships,
general, these meta-ideologies denote the moral these tensions can become more intense. In either
worth of individuals and families by virtue of case, inequalities often lead to the mobilization
their class locations, with those at upper-, of subpopulations for confl ict; and as confl ict
middle-, and lower-class locations having high, unfolds, challenges to meta-ideologies
medium, and lower moral evaluations. Moreover, legitimating inequalities will increase, as will
to the extent that class locations are correlated challenges to discriminatory practices of
with categoric-unit memberships, evaluations of corporate units in key resource-distributing
categoric units will follow their location in the domains. And, confl ict often begins at the micro
class system, although there can be additional level as emotions among individuals in
evaluations beyond the class system based upon encounters and corporate units are aroused
other criteria arising from the history of because of discrimination against their
categoric-unit members in a society. memberships in categoric units; and as
mobilization around grievances ensues, changes
If a society is part of an inter-societal system in the structure and culture of institutional
or if it is in confl ict with other societies, these domains and the profi le and culture of the class
relationships will always involve economy and system occur, thereby altering the dynamics at
134 J.H. Turner

the micro level of social organization. Even if a defi ned by locations in the stratifi cation system.
social movement or episode of confl ict fails to These status beliefs generally get their power
alter discriminatory patterns that fuel from the meta-ideologies legitimating the stratifi
resentments over inequalities, micro level cation system of a society because once
interactions at the level of encounters may be individuals are defi ned as distinctive and
altered because, once challenges to the members of a category, they are often treated
institutional order occur, new ideologies come differentially and thus over-represented at
into play and begin to circulate across domains; particular points in the class system of a society.
and as new ideas circulate, they have effects on And once a correlation exists between class
the beliefs and expectations that guide location and categoric-unit memberships, the
interactions at the micro level. All of these effects meta-ideology legitimating the stratifi cation
are, however, mediated by the meso level of system becomes the moral codings that are drawn
social reality. upon to formulate status beliefs about, and
evaluations of, members of categoric units. Not
all status beliefs are connected to the stratifi
cation system, but those beliefs carrying moral
7.4 The Meso Realm of Social power to judge and evaluate members of
Reality categoric units almost always invoke implicitly
the moral standards of meta-ideologies.
7.4.1 The Cultural Beliefs of Cultural beliefs typically fl ow down to
Corporate and Categoric corporate units from institutional domains,
Units whereas beliefs about members of categoric
units—sometimes referred to as status beliefs in
7.4.1.1 Beliefs in Corporate Units the social psychological literature (e.g., Webster
Within any corporate unit, a culture specifi c to and Foschi 1988 ; Berger et al. 1977; Berger
that unit can typically be found, especially if the and Zelditch 1993 ) disproportionately come
unit endures for a time and is embedded in from the meta- ideology legitimating the stratifi
institutional systems. This corporate-unit culture cation system. Encounters embedded in
is constrained by the institution within which it is corporate and categoric units are, and
lodged and, potentially, by several institutional subsequently, directed by expectation states that
domains in which it may also be partially are derived from of these status that are often
embedded—thereby invoking meta-ideologies. generated “on the ground” as encounters are
The moral codes of these ideologies and meta- iterated over time. Beliefs from corporate and
ideologies provide the moral force of corporate- categoric units, as well as the expectation states
unit culture, while the specifi c history, that they engender, are very much infl uenced by
technologies employed, division of labor, the structure of the meso realm because it is along
distributions of authority, and goals of the the conduits provided by patterned relationships
organization provide other cultural beliefs that fi within and between structures that culture
ll in around these moral codes. In this manner travels, much like transmission wires in older
beliefs remain isomorphic with what is actually forms of wired communication. The analogy to a
occurring in the corporate unit, but these beliefs more wireless network is also appropriate,
are almost always moralized by ideologies and because at times ideologies and the beliefs that
meta-ideologies. they generate are free fl oating and are picked up
in key structural “hot spots” where density of
7.4.1.2 Beliefs About Categoric Units interaction is high. Thus, to understand how
A s the literature in social psychology on status culture fl ows to the encounter from meso and
beliefs documents, members of categoric units often macro levels of social reality requires that
(see Chap. 16 ) are almost always defi ned and we examine structure relations of corporate and
evaluated by beliefs about their relative worth as categoric unit to, on the one hand, build up macro
7 The Macro and Meso Basis of the Micro Social Order 135

structures and their cultures and, on the other, the moral underpinnings for lower-order cultural.
constrain the structure and culture of focused and In so doing, the greater will be the clarity of,
unfocused encounters. consensus over, and power of the expectations
derived from beliefs in corporate units on micro-
level interpersonal behavior.
7.4.2 The Structure of Corporate and For categoric units, embedding is sometimes
less linear. Meta-ideologies legitimating the
Categoric Units
stratifi cation system establish moral evaluations
C ultural beliefs vary along a number of for members of different social classes, with such
dimensions, the most important being (a) the evaluations moving from high levels of stigma
clarity of, (b) the consensus over, and (c) the for those in the lowest classes to less stigma, if
regulatory power of these beliefs. In turn, if any, for those in higher classes, unless there
meso-level cultural beliefs are clear, widely held, exists open class confl ict in a society in which
and authoritative, the expectations on individuals case the moral order of the upper classes in
at the micro level of social organization will also general is under assault. Memberships in identifi
reveal these properties. The question then able categoric units are often correlated with
becomes what structural properties and dynamics class locations in the stratifi cation system, and
increase clarity, consensus, and authoritative infl the more that such is the case, the more status
uence on meso-level beliefs. Some of the most beliefs will be additive, if not multiplicative, with
important for a top-down theory of the micro the combined evaluation of class and categoric
order are explored below. unit. However, categoric-unit memberships often
reveal an alternative scale of evaluation of moral
worth from the ideologies of particular
7.4.2.1 Successive Embedding
institutional domains. For example, membership
I n general, the more embedded are micro-level
in a stigmatized religion within a society can
structures in meso structures, and meso in macro
lower evaluations of persons and families,
structures, the more integrated is a society and the
regardless of their class position. The same can
more likely are expectations at the level of the
be true also of highly stigmatized ethnic
encounter to be derived from the ideologies and
subpopulations (for various historical reasons not
meta-ideologies legitimating, respectively, the
wholly related to class). But, if members of these
particular institutional domains in which an
categoric units are over-representative in lower
encounter is embedded (via corporate units) and
social classes, then the effect of this double
the system of stratifi cation. At the level of
stigma is more multiplicative than additive. And,
corporate units, there can be additional
if stigmatized memberships in categoric units are
successive embedding because groups are often
correlated with higher class locations, some of
embedded in organizations and because
the prestige of these higher locations is deducted
organizations are located in communities and in
by virtue of other moral standards. For instance,
a particular institutional domain, such as polity,
Jews in Europe and even in the United States are
economy, kinship, religion, law, education, etc.
among the most successful of religious/ethnic
And so, the more there is successive embedding
subpopulations economically but some of the
of (a) encounters in groups, (b) groups in
prestige that normally would be associated with
organizations, and (c) organizations in
upper-middle and upper-class locations is lost
communities and institutional domains, the more
because of prejudicial beliefs about Jews. These
readily will the culture of the larger units fl ow
intersectional dynamics will be discussed in more
down to the level of the encounter and constrain
detail in the next section and in Chap. 2 as well.
the fl ow of interaction. Moreover, because
S ince class locations are the outcome of status
embedding imposes structural constraints on
locations in resource-distributing corporate units
culture, this structural embedding increases the
(e.g., organizations), with evaluations of people
likelihood that higher- order cultural formations
in lower, middle, and higher locations in
like ideologies and meta-ideologies will provide
136 J.H. Turner

divisions of labor of organizations generally devalued categoric units across all social classes
correlating with their class locations. However, a approximates their proportion of the total
number of factors can distort this correlation. population will the moral codes, derived by meta-
One is the particular corporate units from which ideologies that stigmatize members of a categoric
individuals gain their resources. For example, a unit, begin to decline. For example, as women
higher-level employee in an educational have moved into positions in divisions of labor
bureaucracy will not earn as much income and, once held only by men and once they are more
hence, occupy the same class position as a high- proportionately distributed across class levels,
level incumbent in law or economy; and so under the less stigmatizing are the status beliefs
these conditions, there can be a complex directed at them. There may still remain status
interplay between prestige associated with beliefs that distinguish men from women, but
locations in divisions of labor and class positions. these will carry increasingly less moral
The same might be true of an established artist or evaluation. The same is true of members of ethnic
musician and a higher- class lawyer or business minorities as they gain access to mobility across
executive. Again, I will explore the complexity class lines.
of consolidation and intersection of status A s implied above, the converse of this
shortly, as well as in Chap. 2. Yet, even with generalization is also true: The more membership
these complexities, what is remarkable is that at in categoric units is correlated with high,
the level of encounters, individuals are usually medium, and low positions in hierarchical
able to sort sets of expectations out during the divisions of labor in corporate units and with
course of the encounter, or even before the distinctive locations in horizontal divisions of
encounter because they have had previous labor, the more salient will the evaluative content
experience with reconciling class locations with of status beliefs become. And, the more likely
markers of prestige in the divisions of labor in will the evaluative content of status beliefs about
various types of organizations in diverse memberships in categoric units affect the beliefs
institutional domains, since many domains offer about status locations in divisions of labor. As
highly valued resources that do not always status beliefs about categoric unit have this
translate into more money and higher class effect, the power of status beliefs increases
locations. within any given corporate unit, as well as in all
situational encounters in the broader society.
7.4.2.2 Consolidation and Intersection Thus, while the distribution of resources
An important property of corporate and within corporate units in institutional domains
categoric units that sets into motion important determines the basic structure of the stratifi
dynamics is the degree of consolidation or cation system, the distribution of categoric-unit
intersection of memberships in categoric units memberships across divisions of labor also has
with locations in the divisions of labor in large effects on the culture of corporate and
corporate units (Blau 1977 ; Turner 2002) . If categoric units. When distributions consolidate
the distribution of members across both memberships in categoric units to particular
horizontal and vertical divisions of labor in types and levels of locations in corporate units,
corporate units is proportionate to their numbers categoric- unit memberships and status beliefs
in the general population, and if this about locations in divisions of labor consolidate
proportionate distribution occurs across a wide and harden (Turner 2002 ); and as a result, a
variety of corporate units in a large number of society becomes more stratifi ed. Conversely,
institutional domains, then the salience of status when high rates of intersection between
beliefs about categoric unit members declines, memberships in categoric units and status
and beliefs about individuals are derived from locations in corporate units exists, the salience
their status in the division of labor (rather than and evaluative tenor of status beliefs about
status beliefs about categoric-unit memberships). categoric-unit memberships decline, relative to
Thus, only when the distribution of members of locational status; and as a result, a society
7 The Macro and Meso Basis of the Micro Social Order 137

becomes less stratifi ed since resources in general and low (in authority, pay, prestige) locations in
are distributed more proportionately across the division of labor, normative expectations will
members of categoric units. Class as a categoric always carry additional evaluative content—
unit, however, may persist even as resources are whether stigmatizing or valorizing—of status
distributed across other categoric units, but once beliefs and expectation states for members of
some intersection of categoric- unit memberships categoric units. In fact, if the correlation is very
and diverse locations in divisions of labor occurs, high between locations in divisions of labor and
social mobility in a society is likely to increase, categoric-unit memberships, normative
with class memberships becoming less distinct, expectations at different levels of a corporate unit
except perhaps at the very top and bottom of the will be heavily infl uenced by expectation states
stratifi cation system. tied to categoric-unit memberships. Conversely,
In sum, then, (1) the number of distinctive if membership in diverse categoric units does not
categoric units, (2) the degree to which they are correlate with locations in the division of labor
differentially evaluated, and (3) the degree of and, hence, intersects with these locations, then
their consolidation or intersection with locations the salience of expectation states arising from
in corporate units will have large effects on the categoric unit membership will decline relative to
situational expectations on individuals in micro- normative expectations inhering in status
level encounters—as I outline below. Moreover, locations within the division of labor of corporate
the degree to which categoric-unit membership is units. Thus, under conditions of high
correlated or uncorrelated with social class and intersection, the default expectations become
with locations in the division of labor will have those of the corporate rather than categoric unit.
large effects on the level of integration in a Mobility of members of stigmatized categoric
society across micro, meso, and macro levels of units begins with mobility up divisions of labor
reality (see Chap. 2 ). in corporate units, and the more mobility there is
across a wide range of corporate units in diverse
institutional domains, the less salient will be
expectations states attached to diffuse status
7.5 The Micro Level of Social characteristics for the mobile members of
Reality categoric units. The converse, however, is also
true: lack of mobility up a hierarchical division
7.5.1 The Culture of Situational of labor in corporate unit will make even more
Expectations in Micro-level salient the evaluations attached to categoric-unit
Encounters memberships, particularly those who must
endure stigmatized status beliefs in lower-level
Virtually all encounters, both focused and positions of the division of labor.
unfocused, are embedded in corporate and When the corporate-unit in which focused
categoric units. Hence, the culture of these units and unfocused encounters occur is ambiguous,
sets up normative expectations for individuals. individuals will initially rely upon status beliefs
For corporate units, there will always be and expectation states tied to categoric-unit
normative expectations tied to their location in memberships, but this reliance will generally be
the division of labor, while for members of tempered by highly ritualized interpersonal
categoric units, what are termed expectation diplomacy so as to avoid hostility and potential
states in the social psychology literature (e.g., confl ict. Thus, expectations from corporate units
Berger and Webster 2006 ; Berger and Zelditch and categoric units interact in complex ways, but
2002 ; Ridgeway 2001 ; Ridgeway and Correll as a general rule, when embedding of an
2004 ; Ridgeway and Erickson 2000 ) will follow encounter in categoric units or locations in
from status beliefs, ultimately tied to the stratifi divisions of labor in meso-level units is not clear,
cation system. And, to the degree that categoric- the status with the most clarity will generally
unit memberships correlated with high, medium, become the default reference point in
138 J.H. Turner

determining initial expectations for micro-level consistent basis with, respectively, higher and
behaviors. But these expectations can change lower positions in divisions of labor across
with more information about categoric-unit resource-bestowing institutional domains, then
status or locational status in the divisions of labor the effects of diffuse and locational status are
of corporate units. consolidated and hence more infl uential. The
If categoric unit memberships remain salient opposite is the case with intersection; increasing
and are correlated with divisions of labor in intersections of locational status with diffuse
corporate units, then divisions in the stratifi status characteristics decreases the infl uence of
cation system will persist and increase the status beliefs, especially as intersections come
salience of status beliefs and expectation states. from upwardly mobile of previously devalued
As categoric unit memberships increasingly members of categoric units into new, more
intersect with positions in a broad range of resource- giving positions in corporate units.
corporate units in an equally diverse number of Evaluation of diffuse status becomes more
institutional domains, then the general salience of problematic (due to shifting status beliefs), with
status beliefs and expectation states in all the result that people in encounters will generally
interactions among members of a population will use locational status, if relevant, as the default
decline, and if the location in a corporate unit is position and invoke expectations states for
known, the normative expectations attached to differentiated positions in the divisions of labor
places in the division of labor will become the of corporate units rather than expectations
dominant expectations at the micro level. If the derived from diffuse status characteristics. If
corporate unit locations of participants in an neither locational or diffuse status are clear, then
encounter are not known, but the salience of individuals will need to do considerable
categoric-unit membership has declined in interpersonal work “on the ground” to create or
general, then individuals will need to use tact to discover relevant expectation states for guiding
create new situational expectations to guide the fl their conduct.
ow of the interaction—often a very stressful
process but the price to be paid for a reduction in 7.5.2.2 The Nature of the Corporate Units
stratifi cation at the macro level of social There have been just three basic types of
organization. corporate units invented by humans: groups,
organizations, and communities. These units
vary in the explicitness and formality of their
7.5.2 The Structural Properties of respective divisions of labor, with organizations
Micro Reality the most likely to evidence explicit vertical and
horizontal divisions of labor. Thus, expectation
The basic building blocks of social structures are states will be more explicit, clear, agreed upon,
status along with associated roles and and authoritative in organizations than in either
expectations. Thus, the nature of how status is groups or communities. Such is particularly
organized at the level of the encounter has likely to be the case if an organization has explicit
considerable effect on how expectations affect goals, and the division of labor is set up to meet
the actions and interactions of individuals. Some these goals. Of course, if a group is embedded in
of these key organizational properties of status an organization, then the expectations guiding
are reviewed below. the division of labor will be very evident to all;
but over time, groups tend to develop a more
7.5.2.1 The Nature of Status informal and relaxed set of expectations states,
T he most important dimension of status is unless those in authority push them on
whether it is tied to corporate units or categoric subordinates, in which case subordinates may
units ( diffuse status characteristics ). As noted develop their own unique subculture and
earlier, when high and low moral evaluations of expectation states (often dedicated to resistance
diffuse status characteristics are correlated on a against authority). In communities, if the
7 The Macro and Meso Basis of the Micro Social Order 139

encounter is part of one of the organizations that between these two poles. Focused encounters
make up a community (e.g., police, medical offi almost always force some judgment of relative
ces, schools, churches, etc.), then the status, if only to determine its relevance to the
expectations inhering in the division of labor of situational expectations that are in play.
the organization in which an encounter is Unfocused encounters are intended to avoid face
embedded will be operative. At other times, in engagement, but this does not mean that
less focused encounters in public, expectations individuals do not assess diffuse and locational
will be ambiguous or will have to evolve if an status of others as they monitor each others’
encounter becomes focused, especially so if the movements in space. There will almost always be
encounter is iterated over time. expectations as to the appropriate demeanor in
7.5.2.3 Boundary Markers and Rituals space; and so, individuals will monitor to
The more bounded is a corporate unit in physical determine if such proper demeanor is being
space, with explicit entrance and exit rules and practiced (Goffman 1963 , 1971 ). If there is
rituals (such as entering a Catholic church or a deviation from what is expected, the situation
lecture hall), the more explicit will be expectation will be monitored more carefully to determine if
states (Luhmann 1982 ). And, the more this deviation poses a threat to the public order.
conscious will individuals be of their respective Naturally, those wishing to assert their status,
status locations which, in general, will dominate especially where higher- status others are not in a
over diffuse status characteristics in establishing position to sanction deviations, can often be a
expectations states in encounters. means for chronically lower status persons to
gain some sense of effi cacy and esteem by
Situational Ecology forcing higher status people to give way or
U nfocused encounters occur in an ecology that retreat. Societies with high levels of inequality
carries cultural meanings for partitions, props, and with low-levels of monitoring of public
use spaces, and other physical properties. These places by forces of social control will often see
meanings will almost always carry rights and lower-status persons and groups using unfocused
privileges associated with status. For example, in encounters as a means to gain some increase in
the segregated south in the United States, status, or to release hostilities against higher
benches, drinking fountains, and partitions were status persons and families. And again, it should
all arrayed to mark the diffuse status not be surprising that when larger-scale uprisings
characteristics of blacks and whites; and thus, it over inequality begin in a society, they often
was not surprising that the mid-twentieth century begin with violations of expectations about
civil rights movement began and often unfocused encounters in public places. But, most
challenged the traditional meanings of situational of the time, individuals and groups of individuals
ecology (e.g., sit- ins at lunch counters and tend to abide by the expectations of places where
refusals to go to the back of a bus). But, more encounters are to be unfocused.
generally and less oppressively, situational
ecology often carries more benign meanings. Whether by intent or accident, encounters in
Sometimes these increase the salience of status places where unfocus is normatively expected,
but often they do just the opposite: they become but suddenly become focused lead stereotypical
places where status considerations are relaxed, as apologies or, alternatively, greeting rituals to
is the case when highly diverse persons sit on signal a basic willingness to abide by
public park benches, or use playground expectations of a more focused encounter.
equipment, or gather on the edge of a public Moreover, some situations that are normally
fountain. unfocused can be become situationally focused
among strangers in close proximity, such as
standing in line outside an Apple store on launch
Nature of the Encounter Encounters are either day for a new product or just standing in line to
focused or unfocused, although they can fl ow enter a movie or sport activity. These local
140 J.H. Turner

breaking of expectations for unfocus are almost 7.6.1 Meeting the Expectations
always highly animated in very ritualized ways States Generated by
as individuals, without status cues about
Transactional Needs
locations in organizations and without salience of
categoric unit expectations, work to sustain a In Table 7.2 , I posit what I see as universal
positive emotional fl ow and, thereby, avoid
transactional needs that individuals seek to meet
breaching the focus. Thus, most of the time when in every encounter. These needs are arrayed in
unfocus is breached by accident rather than by
their order of salience in most encounters; and
intent, individuals will work very hard to prevent thus, verifi cation of various levels of self or
a breach of the focused encounter in order to identity is
avoid the confl ict that also accompanies
the most powerful need that individuals must
breaches of focused encounters.
meet (Burke and Stets 2009 ; Tajfel and Turner
1986), followed by perceptions of receiving a
“profi t” in exchanges of resources with others.
7.6 Motivational and Emotional Experiencing a sense of effi cacy, group
Dynamics in Encounters inclusion, trust, and facticity are also important
needs.
E ncounters are episodes of interaction among Table 7.2 T ransactional needs generating expectation
individuals, but I have yet to address fully how states
individuals respond to the structural locations 1. Verifi cation of identities : needs to verify one or
that they occupy in encounters and the more of the four basic identities that individuals
present in all encounters
expectations that fi lter down form the macro
through the (a) Core - identity : the conceptions and
emotions that individuals have about themselves as
meso to micro levels of social reality. Humans persons that they carry to most encounters
are always motivated, and they react to the
cultural expectations that constrain them and the
(b) Social - identity : the conception that
resources that they can derive from status individuals have of themselves by virtual of their
locations in corporate units. And, their reactions membership in categoric units which, depending
determine how an encounter will proceed. But, upon the situation, will vary in salience to self and
more is also involved: people’s emotional others; when salient, individuals seek to have others
verify their social identity
reactions to what transpires at the level of the
encounter will also have large effects on the
viability of all those structures and their cultures (c) Group - identity : the conception that
that are built from encounters—which, in individuals have about their incumbency in corporate
units (groups, organizations, and communities)
essence, means all of the social structures and and/or their identifi cation with the members,
cultures of a society. The meso and macro levels structure, and culture of a corporate unit; when
of reality do, indeed, constrain interaction at the individuals have a strong sense of identifi cation
micro level, but the reverse is also true: motivated with a corporate unit, they seek to have others verify
this identity
and emotional humans determine just how viable
an encounter is to be and, thus, how viable social
structures at all levels of human social (d) Role - identity : the conception that
individuals have about themselves as role players,
organization are to be.
particularly roles embedded in corporate units nested
in institutional domains; the more a role-identity is
lodged in a domain, the more likely will individuals
need to have this identity verifi ed by others

2. Making a profi t the exchange of resources


: needs to feel that the receipt of resources by persons
in encounters exceeds their costs and investments in
7 The Macro and Meso Basis of the Micro Social Order 141

securing these resources and that their shares of Even when individuals can meet expectations
resources are just compared to (a) the shares that others of the situation that have fi ltered down from
receive in the situation and (b) reference points that are
used to establish what is a just share macro to meso to micro encounters, the failure to
meet expectations generated by transactional
needs will arouse negative emotions (Kemper
3. Effi cacy : needs to feel that one is in control
of the situation and has the individual capacity and
1978b; Kemper and Collins 1990) . If negative
opportunity to direct ones own conduct, despite emotions are aroused, the most likely defense
sociocultural constraints mechanisms to be activated is attribution as to
who or what has caused these negative feelings.
4. Group inclusion : needs to feel that one is a Attribution operates under both conditions of
part of the ongoing fl ow of interaction in an encounter; repression and transmutation, or non-repression
and the more focused is the encounter, the more and cognitive awareness of the painful emotions
powerful is this need being experienced. Furthermore, as Edward
Lawler ( 2001 ; see Chap. 8) argued, negative
5. Trust : needs to feel that others’ are emotions reveal a distal bias and are pushed out
predictable, sincere, respective of self, and capable of beyond the encounter to local corporate unit,
rhythmic sustaining synchronization
members of categoric units, or even further to
institutional domains and the stratifi cation
6. Facticity : needs to feel that, for the purposes system. People tend not to make self or
of the present interaction, individuals share a common
attributions to immediate others because, to do
inter-subjectivity, that matters in the situation are as
they seem, and that the situation has an obdurate so, breaches the encounter and invites negative
character sanctions from others and hence more negative
emotional arousal. Only when others in the local
situation cannot fi ght back, as is the case with
domestic abusers, will individuals make local
In general, individuals make an implicit attributions for their feelings. The cumulative
calculation of whether or not, as well as to what result of this process is that negative emotions
degree, these needs can be realized within the tend to target meso and macro structures, as well
expectations attached to status, both locational in as their cultures, in ways that de-legitimate
corporate units and diffuse status characteristics institutional domains and the stratifi cation
for members of categoric units. There is both an system. Thus, a society in which there is
absolute need to meet these needs that generates persistent negative arousal in a wide variety of
one level of expectations, which in turn, is qualifi encounters across a large number of corporate
ed by implicit calculations of what is actually units embedded in institutional domains will be
possible. The emerging meta- expectation states potentially unstable as a result of large pools of
become the ones that will guide a person through negative emotions among members of the
an encounter. Meeting this composite set of population (Turner 2010c , 2014a , b ); if,
expectations for each need state leads to positive meeting expectations imposed by micro-level
emotional arousal at relative low levels, such as culture from corporate and categoric units is diffi
satisfaction, contentment, pleasure, whereas not cult or imposes further degradations on
meeting these needs immediately generates more individuals, then negative emotional arousal and
intense negative emotions, such as shame if self its targeting of more remote structures will be
is on the line and/or guilt if the situation was defi that much more intense.
ned as highly moral (Turner 2002 , 2007 , 2010b In general, then, failure to meet expectations
). These emotions can be repressed, but they will of any sort causes negative emotional arousal.
transmute, respectively, into such emotions as The confl agration of situational expectations fi
diffuse anger and diffuse anxiety, thereby ltering down via status to situational expectations
increasing the sense of negative emotional states and expectations derived from the relative
arousal. power and salience of transitional needs
142 J.H. Turner

represents one of the key dimensions generating of the stratifi cation system that generates
emotional arousal among humans. And so, as inequalities in a society. As these processes of
noted above, failure to meet expectations will legitimation and commitment develop, the
activate negative emotions, often made more ideologies and meta-ideologies of
complex by the activation of defense macrostructures gain in power and salience.
mechanisms that will also activate attribution Consequently, the culture of macrostructures will
processes and thereby the distal bias inherent in fi lter down to meso-level beliefs about locational
negative emotional arousal. In contrast, when and diffuse status characteristics and to sets of
expectations are realized, individuals will clear and powerful expectation states at the level
experience positive emotions but, unlike negative of the encounter. In this way, microdynamics
emotions, these reveal a proximal bias, as reproduce social structures and their cultures, and
individuals make self-attributions or display as they do so, they also reinforce the culture of
positive feelings to those in the local e ncounter. structures at all levels of social organization,
The result is that positive emotions have a thereby intensifying the power and clarity of
tendency to stay local, charging of the positive expectation states operating at the micro level of
emotional fl ow in interaction rituals in social organization.
encounters (Collins 2004 ; Lawler 2001 ). The
problem that emerges here is that if positive
emotions stay local and negative emotions are 7.6.2 Receiving Positive or Negative
pushed outward toward macrostructures and their
Sanctions
culture, how does a society hold together? What
forces break the centripetal hold of the proximate Beyond the multiple sources of expectation
bias and thereby allow positive emotions to fl ow states, the second major dimension affecting
outward and legitimate macrostructures, while emotional arousal is sanctioning. Positive
generating commitments to these structures and sanctions have the same effect as meeting
their culture? expectations, and the more these sanctions
My answer to this question is that when revolve around positive sanctions for self and
expectation states associated with status and, identities, the greater will be the emotional
even more importantly, with meeting arousal and the more will positive emotions fl ow
transactional needs are (1) consistently realized through an encounter. Conversely, negative
(2) across a wide variety of encounters embedded sanctions have the same effect as failures to meet
in corporate units in (3) a large set of diverse expectations, from whatever source. Negative
institutional domains, positive emotions begin to sanctions generate negative emotions that
fi lter out to macrostructures via the structural activate defense mechanisms and the external
paths provided by successive embedding of bias driven by attribution dynamics. Thus,
encounters in groups, groups in organizations, societies in which there is a considerable amount
organizations in communities, and organizations of punishment generating anger and shame will
in resource- giving institutional domains that, in generally produce large pools of negative
turn, are embedded in societal and even inter- emotional arousal among subpopulations and, as
societal systems. In particular, I would argue that a consequence, make a society less stable. High
meeting needs for self verifi cation, exchange levels of differentiation of authority in corporate
payoffs, and effi cacy dramatically increase the units, large numbers of people in stigmatized
likelihood that the hold of the proximal bias will categoric units; and high levels of resource
be broken and, as a result, positive emotions will inequality as a result of discrimination denying
begin to legitimate institutional domains and access to resource-bestowing corporate units or
their culture as well as the society as a whole. to positions in these corporate units for large
People will develop commitments to the micro, numbers of persons across a wide spectrum of
meso, and macro structures that have rewarded institutional domains will all increase the rate of
them, and this even includes the meta-ideology negative sanctioning in a society. Even when
7 The Macro and Meso Basis of the Micro Social Order 143

people have come to expect this fate, the transactional needs, and for raised expectations
sanctions themselves arouse negative emotions for receipt of positive sanctions. When these
that, if suffi ciently widespread and intense, can suddenly do not occur, as might be the case, for
cause confl ict and change in a society. example in the United States, with dramatically
In contrast, positive emotions when increasing levels of wealth and income
experienced in many encounters embedded in inequality, the middle classes may suddenly
corporate units across a wide range of experience spikes in negative emotions (Turner
institutional domains will have the same effects 2014); and while their commitments to existing
as meeting expectation states in breaking the hold institutional arrangements from past experiences
of the proximal bias and leading to legitimation may delay their mobilization for confl ict, these
of, and commitment to, macrostructures and their individuals have resources (some money,
cultures. Indeed, meeting expectations can organizational affi liations, experience in social
double up and often be viewed as a positive movements organizing various causes, and
sanction, thereby increasing the pressure to break historically high rates of voting) to effectively
out of the centripetal pull of the proximal bias. mobilize once they begin to withdraw
Additionally, the consequence will be much the commitments to at least some aspect of the
same as meeting expectations, especially institutional order (Turner 2014).
expectations for self-verifi cation and positive
exchange payoffs because sanctions from others
are always taken “personally” and seen from the
7.7 Comparing Top-Down with
identities being brought to bear by a person in an
encounter. Positive sanctioning will thereby Bottom-Up Explanations
increase the power of the culture in macro and
meso structures and hence the expectation states F or over a decade now, my efforts to build
on individuals in micro-level encounters. Once general theory have been shadowed and, more
the proximal bias is broken, microdynamics importantly, informed by the work of Edward
become more likely to reproduce the meso and Lawler and his colleagues ( 1992 , 2001 ),
macro structures, along with their cultures, that particularly S. Thye and Y. Yoon ( 2000 , 2008 ,
constrain interactions in encounters. Conversely, 2009 , 2013 , 2014 ). Lawler’s approach has
if large segments of the population fail to meet evolved from experimental psychological
expectations or do so only under conditions of experiments drawing primarily from Richard
high rates of negative sanctioning, then Emerson’s ( 1972 ) seminal insights on exchange
reproduction of the structure and culture of meso networks and power dependence relations,
and macro structures becomes increasingly whereas as my work has always been purely
problematic, with social control at the level of the theoretical in the often discredited “grand
encounter revolving around constraint and theorizing” tradition. Curiously, our work has
punishment which, in the long run, will only add increasingly converged over the last 15 years in
fuel to the distal bias of negative emotions and our respective efforts to explain the connections
de- legitimate meso and macro structures and, among micro, meso, and macro levels of social
thereby, encourage mobilization for confl ict by reality. Since Lawler, Thye, and Yoon devoted a
those persistently experiencing negative section comparing our respective theories, let me
emotions. do the same from my perspective. There is little
I ronically, there is a vulnerability built in that I disagree with in their portrayal of my
societies where expectations and receipt of approach, although there are a couple of
positive sanctions have consistently been met misunderstandings that I can resolve here. The
over time in the corporate units of wide variety of similarities in our approaches, especially when
institutional domains. The vulnerability resides taking the bottom-up perspective of Lawler’s,
in raised expectations for meeting situational Thye’s, and Yoon’s chapter are more important
expectation states, especially those from than our minor differences: Micro interactions
144 J.H. Turner

generate the emotions and feelings that can be I would agree that if there are high degrees of
valenced as positive and negative; such emotions authority imposed from macro to meso to micro,
are the glue that binds societies together or the this excessive control along with punitive aspects
explosive fuel that tears them apart; attributions of any authority structure will arouse negative
for positive and negative emotional experiences emotions, even as local encounters produce some
are a critical dynamic of the social universe; these positive emotions. Thus, they are correct that the
attributions are biased with positive emotions nature of the embedding is critical in determining
revealing a proximal bias of staying in the local whether or not encounters can break the proximal
encounter or group whereas negative emotions bias and allow positive emotions can migrate out,
evidence a distal bias of targeting meso and fi rst, to meso and, then, to macro structures and
macrostructures; and the basic dilemma of the their cultures. High levels of inequality,
social order is how the distal bias for negative consolidations of parameters marking categoric
emotions can be overcome by breaking the units, and high levels of authoritative control all
centripetal force of the proximal bias and thereby work against breaking the proximal bias and, in
allowing positive emotions to fl ow outward fact, increase the likelihood that the distal bias of
toward meso and macro structures and their negative emotions will de-legitimate meso and
respective cultures. macro sociocultural formations. Moreover, the
The differences in our respective approaches positive emotions arising from encounters at the
revolves around the mechanism by which the micro level will often mobilize positive emotions
proximal bias is broken, although some of these in support of ever-more negative portrayals of
are not large differences and, in fact, are highly meso structures which, in turn, increases the
complementary. As I have emphasized in this likelihood of confl ict in the system on
chapter, clarity of expectations is one important domination.
mechanism because it increases the likelihood But embedding across multiple levels of
that individuals will hold realistic expectations social reality does not need to involve long
that they can meet and, at the same time, receive chains of domination, as in a Soviet-style
positive sanctions from others. Lawler, Thye and society. Encounters are embedded in groups,
Yoon argue that emotions are always generated which can have varying degrees of autonomy
in interaction, regardless of clarity of from other groups and the larger meso-level
expectations and that a sense of effi cacy and corporate unit in which they are embedded.
shared control and responsibility are probably Similarly, corporate units can have autonomy
more important in generating positive emotions from other like units and institutional domains in
than clarity of expectations. Moreover, which they are embedded. They importance of
successive embedding of social structures— embedding is that it places encounters within a
encounters in groups, groups in organizations, delimited culture, within specifi c institutional
organizations in communities, organizations in domains dealing with delimited range of adaptive
institutional domains, etc.—implies hierarchies problems in a society, and within meso-level
of authority than can undermine the forces that corporate and categoric units where expectations
they posit—productive exchange, effi cacy, and are also more delimited and hence clear. The
shared control and autonomy—to generate more these connections involve authority in a
positive emotions. For them, positive emotions larger, society-wide system of domination, there
arise from the nature of shared control, effi cacy, more true is Lawler’s, Thye’s, and Yoon’s
and support of higher-level meso structures portrayal: clarity at a very high cost of excessive
within which interactions are played out. I do not control, which only aggravates the distal bias (see
disagree with their portrayal of the effects of effi Chap. 10 where I outline the disintegrative
cacy and shared control/ autonomy, but I do need effects of integration based upon a system on
to qualify their portrayal of embedding as domination). And so, they are correct in
equivalent to hierarchies of authority. emphasizing that encounters must involve
meeting the transactional needs outlined in Table
7 The Macro and Meso Basis of the Micro Social Order 145

7.2, which all converge with the propositions that broken, I have a much more robust conception of
Lawler et al. develop on mechanisms on non- how this process works. In complex societies,
separability of actions, joint responsibilities, individuals engage in hundreds and indeed
share autonomy, group-level focus. thousands of encounters in a surprisingly short
I am subsuming much of their analysis under period of time in a wide variety of groups, lodged
motivational need states, basic to humans. inside of a wide variety of corporate units and
Encounters must verify self, at any or all of the categoric units, in at least 8–12 institutional
four levels portrayed (including both group or domains, and within various strata of the larger
corporate-unit identities and social or categoric- stratifi cation system. As I argued earlier, the key
unit identities); encounters must yield profi table to the positive emotional arousal that breaks the
exchange payoffs where profi ts exceed costs and proximal bias is not experiencing positive
investments, measured against cultural standards emotions in a delimited set of groups and
of justice and fairness; encounters must allow corporate units in one or two institutional
people to achieve a sense of effi cacy (an ideas domains, but experiencing positive emotions (1)
that, once again, I began to include in my t consistently across (2) many groups (3) lodged in
heorizing about the time Lawler et al. began to many organizations across (4) multiple
draw out the meso and macro implications of institutional domains for extended periods of
their theory); encounters must allow people to their life course. Under these four conditions,
feel a sense of group inclusion, which perhaps I positive emotions—fi rst here and then there—
should be broadened to include their emphasis on break the hold of the proximal bias and begin to
shared control and autonomy; and encounters send positive emotions to corporate units and
must generate a sense of trust or feelings that the then to most institutional domains and most
actions of others are predictable, that these sectors of the stratifi cation system, thereby
actions lead to interaction rituals (Collins 2004 ) legitimating macrostructures and their cultures.
that arouse positive emotions about the My theory is not about particular encounters in a
encounter, that people are sincere and respectful particular organization, although the dynamics
of self and, perhaps I should add, that increase that both Lawler et al. and I outline are relevant,
individuals’ positive orientations to the group- but my goal is to explain how positive emotions
level structures in which an encounter is become the force integrating the three levels of
embedded. the social universe, as portrayed in Fig. 7.1 . This
Thus, what Lawler, Thye, and Yoon is the same goal as Lawler, Thye, and Yoon, but
characterize as mechanisms are, for me, motive they are coming at the issue of commitment (for
states that come from individuals (Turner 2002 , me, one mechanisms of integration) from a micro
2007 , 2010b) ; they are, in my view, hard-wired perspective; I am coming at it as a general
biologically; and they are present in each and theorist and, in this chapter, as a macro-level
every encounter; and if they can be realized, these theorist. Our differences are still surprisingly
need states will lead to positive emotional minor; and I do not fi nd any really large
arousal, even under structural conditions of disagreements— although they might not buy
meso-level constraint. Perhaps the positive into my more psychoanalytic views of emotions
emotions aroused under constraint may not break (not examined here)—in our theories. My
the proximal bias, but they will make the micro emphasis on expectations and sanctions as
level world of encounters more gratifying and generic emotion-arousing mechanisms actually
forestall their rejection of the meso and macro encompasses many of the concepts that they
worlds constraining their options. employ. I use these ideas because they are also
A fi nal clarifi cation along these lines is also very well documented dynamics from the
in order. When I argue that embedding of the experimental literature in social psychology as
micro in meso, and the meso in the macro, well as in other theories of emotions (e.g.,
provides conduits by which positive emotions Kemper 1978a ), but there is probably room to
can travel outward when the proximal bias is expand these in ways that incorporates the
146 J.H. Turner

mechanisms outlined by Lawler, Thye, and or less viable. As long as this feedback reinforces
Yoon. We are almost at the same place with commitments to the structures and cultures of the
overlapping theories which, to me, means that we meso and macro realm, a top-down analysis
are all on the right track because we started at offers a great deal of explanatory power of what
such divergent places and have, it appears, is likely to transpire in the micro universe. But,
arrived a pretty much the same place. once feedback is driven by negative emotions,
then the power of macro and meso structures and
cultures declines, and confl ict and disintegration
of a society become more likely—until, if
7.8 Conclusion
possible, a new macro and meso order is built up
again.
Humans are born into ongoing patterns of social
T here are now large literatures on social
relations in societies. Each newborn begins to
movement organizations; and it is at this meso
acquire the behavioral capacities that enable
level that micro-level emotions congeal into
them to role take with varieties of others in
organized efforts to change the institutional
organized contexts and within common culture.
structures and cultures of a society. If social
Thus, from a biographical standpoint, it is the
movements are not possible in a society (because
person that must fi rst learn how to navigate in
of repression by the state), then more
the expectations of micro, meso, and eventually
revolutionary protests will eventually begin to
macrostructures and, only later, become part of
erupt; the key to sustaining a society, therefore,
encounters that can reproduce or change meso
is the capacities of persons to meet expectations
and, perhaps eventually macrostructures and
from all sources on a consistent basis across a
their cultures. Much depends upon the ratio of
wide variety of corporate units in diverse
positive to negative emotional arousal that
institutional domains. Only in this way can the
individuals experience at the level of the
macro-to- meso-to-micro forces outlined in this
encounters in meso units across a range of
chapter be effective; when these forces fail,
institutional domains. As such, a top-down
analysis must shift to how the negative emotions
perspective from macro and micro encounters
generated at the level of the encounter begin to
gives us a good look at what all humans must do.
erode commitments to the structures and culture
Together with the ability to meet or the failure to
of the macro realm and to arouse persons to
meet expectations states derived from ideologies
mobilize into various types of organizations to
and meta- ideologies of institutional stratifi
change the structure and culture of particular
cation systems, expectations generated by
institutional domains and perhaps the whole
transactional needs, coupled with sanctioning
society. In short, a top- down analysis tells us
experiences, set into motion complicated
only one half of the story about how societies
emotional dynamics that either reproduce and
remain integrated, but unlike most other sciences,
thereby reinforce the power of expectation states
sociology also has the ability to outline the
and the macro-level cultural beliefs generating
bottom-up dynamics that allow sociology, as
these states, or alternatively, undermine the
much or more than any other science, to have
culture (i.e., ideologies, meta- ideologies, status
theories explaining the relations among all levels
beliefs, and corporate unit beliefs) of meso and
of the social universe. Lawler’s, Thye’s, and
macrostructures. As withdrawal of legitimacy
Yoon’s theory demonstrates how far sociology
proceeds, the expectations at the level of micro-
has come and, I hope, so does mine. Sociology is
level encounters become less coherent,
close to doing what no other science has done:
consensual, and powerful—thereby disrupting
explain all levels of its operative universe
encounters even more and causing negative
theoretically.
emotional arousal.
U ltimately, the forces of the micro realm of
the social universe are constantly feeding back to
the meso and macro realms, making them more
7 The Macro and Meso Basis of the Micro Social Order 147

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Littlefi eld.
The Problem of Social Order 8 in Nested
Group Structures

Edward J. Lawler , Shane R. Thye ,


and Jeongkoo Yoon University of South Carolina , Columbia , SC , USA e-
mail: srthye@sc.edu
J. Yoon
Ewha Womans University , Seoul , South Korea e-
mail: jkyoon@ewha.ac.kr
people form to local groups and the larger ones
that often encompass them.
M ultiple group commitments pose issues of
choice, priority, and identity for individuals and
8.1 Introduction
the groups, organizations, or communities of
People tend to form commitments to multiple which they are members. In this paper we
social objects, including activities (volunteer theorize “nested group commitments” which can
work), specifi c behaviors (exercise), other be construed as a particular form or manifestation
people (family and friends), careers of the multiple commitment phenomenon
(professions), neighborhoods or communities, (Lawler 1992 ; Lawler et al. 2009 ). Nested
organizations, and to nations in which they are commitments can occur in contexts where people
citizens. Commitments organize action and interact with others in a local or immediate group
interaction and make it possible for people to (i.e., a proximal group) that is nested within a
individually or collectively produce outcomes of larger more removed group, organization, or
value to them and to their groups, communities, community (i.e., a distal group). A decentralized
or organizations. The social world of the twenty- or loosely- coupled organizational structure
fi rst century, however, is often characterized as exemplifi es a context where nested
a fragmented world in which people and commitments can be problematic (Orton and
organizations have multiple, often confl icting, Weick 1990 ). Nested commitments accentuate
commitments, and also a world in which problems of coordination in a complex
commitments to groups and organizations are in differentiated organization and make social
decline (see Putnam 2000 ). The focus of this dilemmas even more diffi cult to resolve.
paper is the multiple commitments that F or example, the problem of nested
commitments tends to be integral to the daily
experience of central administrators in
universities, political leaders in federalist
A uthorship is alphabetical. This paper is based on a political structures, and managers in loosely-
program of research that was supported by fi ve grants coupled organizations. If members form stronger
from the National Science Foundation. commitments to a local unit or proximal group
E. J. Lawler () (e.g., an academic department) than to the larger
Cornell University , Ithaca , NY , USA e- unit or distal group (e.g., the university), this
mail: ejl3@cornell.edu makes it harder for the larger unit to mobilize
S .R . T hye collective efforts on behalf of its overarching

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 149


S. Abrutyn (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary Sociological Theory,
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32250-6_8
E.J. Lawler et al.

goals or to sustain them over time. In this paper to smaller more immediate groups instead of to
we theorize the conditions under which people larger groups at the scale of concern to Hobbes
develop stronger or weaker commitments to the and his contemporaries; ( ii) the idea that person-
local immediate group versus the larger group to-g roup ties are more stable and resilient if they
within which it is nested and, relatedly when are affective (emotional) rather than purely
these multiple, nested commitments are mutually transactional in form as Hobbes and others
reinforcing or in tension. presume (e.g., Hechter 1987; Coleman 1990) ;
Our theorizing is cast in highly abstract, and ( iii ) the idea that transactional ties, under
fundamental terms such that it might be applied some conditions, evolve into affective ties (e.g.,
to a wide variety of specifi c contexts. It bears on Lawler et al. 2014 ). The locus or scope of the
questions such as: How and when faculty group unit is important as is the form of the
members develop stronger commitments to their prevailing person- to- group tie. Overall, these
university than their department? When ideas complicate but also deepen the analysis of
employees develop stronger commitments to a the generic problems of social order posed by
larger corporation than to their local Hobbes and contemporary rational choice
organizational subunit? When citizens have (Hechter 1987 ; Coleman 1990 ) and social
stronger commitments to their ethnic dilemma theorists (Fehr and Gintis 2007 ). Our
communities than to their larger nation-state? purpose is to take up this theoretical task,
Our aim is to identify common underlying building upon a longstanding program of theory
conditions and processes that operate across very and research that has produced a substantial
different organizational contexts where a local evidentiary basis for these ideas (e.g., Lawler et
group is nested within a larger, more al. 2014; Thye et al. 2014 for recent reviews).
encompassing group. The proximal group is the T he central theme in this program of research
locus of core activities (i.e., interaction, is that emotions and emotional ties to groups are
performance, production) whereas the distal the foundation for stable, resilient social orders.
group is the locus of higher level governing Groups that are a context for repeated
activities (i.e., strategy, management, experiences of positive emotions are likely to be
administration). the strongest and most affective objects of
A broad orienting premise for us is that commitment. We posit that commitments emerge
“nested commitments” are an important, yet and are sustained through a “bottom up” process
unrecognized, dimension of the Hobbesian in which people who are engaged in task
problem of social order. In the Hobbesian interactions experience positive emotions and
framework the problem is primarily about feelings. These individual feelings, in turn, shape
individual-level orientations and behavioral the form and strength of person-to-group ties or
propensities (cutthroat competition, mutual commitments (see also Turner 2007 , 2014) . We
avarice, and hostility), and the capacities of argue that people in interaction tend to attribute
central organizational governance systems to positive (individual) emotions to their local
control these behaviors. People ostensibly are immediate group and negative emotions to the
prepared to cede control to central authority in larger, more removed or distal group (Lawler
exchange for the normative regulation and 1992 ; Lawler et al. 2009) ; this is a fundamental
security this authority provides. A person-to- reason that larger groups confront problems of
group transaction or exchange, therefore, is the fragmentation and balkanization. Despite this
prospective solution to the problem of social tendency it makes sense that if the larger more
order. Much of the contemporary work on removed group is the primary facilitator of the
rational-choice and social dilemma solutions to positive emotions, then the larger group unit
problems of coordination and cooperation echoes rather than the local group could conceivably
the Hobbesian solution. become a stronger object of commitment. The
We move beyond this Hobbesian framing by distal group or organization might counteract
introducing three new ideas: ( i ) the idea that balkanization tendencies in this way. We theorize
people may form stronger and more resilient ties some of the basic contingencies or conditions
blem of Social Order in Nested Group Structures 151

under which nested-group commitments of established orders, seemingly inviolate and


undermine or enhance social order at the smaller permanent, self-destructing unexpectedly and
or larger levels. then being reconstructed or reconstituted in a
different institutional form. The abrupt and
unexpected demise of communism in Eastern
Europe is a recent historical example.
8.2 Theoretical Orientation
Yet, while social orders are inherently fragile,
they are not equally so. It is reasonable to suspect
T his section presents orienting ideas and
that some social orders have more potential than
elaborates the backdrop for this paper, starting
others to decline, self-destruct, or otherwise
with the concept of social order.
change radically in a short period of time. One
might conceive of many historical and
institutional reasons why order in some groups
8.2.1 Concept of Social Order are highly resilient while others are incredibly
fragile. We propose that the form of social tie
Social orders are defi ned here in simple terms between people (members) and their group units
as repetitive, regular, or predictable patterns of (organization, community, or nation) is a key
behavior and interaction in groups, organizations, differentiating property of more resilient versus
communities, and the like (e.g., see Berger and more fragile groups or organizations. Group ties
Luckmann 1966 ; Collins 1981 ; Wrong 1995 ) are more fragile if based solely on instrumental
. Repetitive interactions in local settings congeal (individual) benefi ts to members, which is the
into regularities but also refl ect the impact of primary focus of Hobbes and social dilemma
existing macro-level organizations and theorists. With such ties, members commit to a
institutions. Repeated social interactions group only as long as that fl ow of individual
constitute the micro-foundation of macro social benefi ts continue to outweigh those of
orders in the sense that order cannot exist or be alternatives. Continuation of benefi t fl ow is
sustained without affi rmation by individuals and never certain because it requires group level
their concomitant social interaction processes. resources that may wax and wane, and groups of
Macro structures and cultures likely frame social whatever scale exercise only limited control over
interactions at the micro level but those their environments. Thus, instrumentally-based
interactions represent independent, “agent like” person-to- group ties are likely to be brittle in the
forces that undergird the framing force of macro- face of limited or varying resources. A second
level organizational and institutional patterns. form of group tie is affective or emotional. An
We argue that emotions drive this force (see also affective tie is a “gut level” positive feeling about
Turner the group or organization. The tie entails
2007 , 2014 ). additional, larger meaning to people beyond the
This simple, micro-based concept of social instrumental benefi ts they receive as members.
order is founded on the notion that a semblance The group affi liation itself is meaningful,
of social order is necessary for people to navigate intrinsically pleasurable, and often self-
their social worlds, deal with uncertainties in enhancing. Such affective- emotional group ties
their lives, and produce collective goods, are non-instrumental in the sense that the group
services, or other benefi ts to individuals. Yet, is an end in itself, not just a means to an end as is
social orders can take many different forms, the case with an instrumental tie.
unexpectedly change, and often are contested
8.2.2 Emotions and Social Order
implicitly if not explicitly (Rawls 2010 ). People
impose order and act to affi rm and reproduce it
T he overall implication is clear: Groups that
in order to make their lives predictable but it is a
generate and sustain the commitment of members
sociological truism that any social order is
( employees , citizens ) through instrumental
tenuous and fragile. What is socially constructed
incentives are more fragile and less stable than
can be socially unraveled or reconstructed in a
groups that generate and sustain the commitment
new form. In fact, history is replete with instances
E.J. Lawler et al.

of members through affective ties . Affective ties et al. 2000 ) specifi es an endogenous emotional
lead members to stay and support the group even process through which repeated (instrumental)
if benefi ts decline signifi cantly because the exchanges produce affective commitments to a
intrinsic feelings about membership have relational or group unit. The implication is that
compensatory effects. The contrast of the proximal bias is grounded in the emotional
instrumental and affective ties is probably as old byproducts of repeated interactions among actors
as the discipline of sociology itself (e.g., see in the local unit. The Affect Theory of Social
Weber 1968 ; Parsons 1947 ), and it is central to Exchange (Lawler, 2001 ; Lawler et al. 2008 )
research on organizational commitments in keys on the nature of the task or task structure in
business organizations (see Mathieu and Zajac social exchange contexts. It indicates that the
1990 ). However, the interrelationships of more joint a social exchange task, the more likely
instrumental and affective commitments, as well it is to foster a sense of shared responsibility
as the social- interaction foundations of these, among those accomplishing it; a sense of shared
have not received much attention (see Johnson et responsibility, in turn, promotes social unit
al. 2009 ). attributions of individual feelings from the task
Over the past two decades we have developed interaction. Affective group commitments,
four complementary theories about the bases, therefore, are strongest to groups in which tasks
interrelationships, and consequences of such are accomplished jointly with others. Social
commitments. The common focus is on how and Commitments Theory (Lawler et al. 2009 )
when instrumental ties become affective or generalizes the above three theories into a
expressive over time in the context of repeated broader explanation regarding the role of
interactions around joint tasks. The four theories affective group commitments in the problem of
are: nested-group theory (Lawler 1992 ); social order. The proximal bias is weaker here
relational cohesion theory (Lawler and Yoon because jointness and a sense of shared
1993 , 1996 , 1998; Thye et al. 2002) ; an affect responsibility can be generated not only in the
theory of social exchange (Lawler 2001 ; Lawler local, immediate unit, but also the larger more
et al. 2008 ); and the theory of social distal unit. The locus of shared responsibility is
commitments (Lawler et al. 2009; Thye et al. contingent on how jointly the task is structured,
2015 ). The common focus of these theories is to how collectively it is framed, and whether that
understand how emotional aspects of micro-level framing is by leaders (managers) of the proximal
interactions can generate non-instrumental, or distal group.
affectively-imbued ties to a group, whether it is a
small, local one or a broader more encompassing
one. Here, we selectively draw upon elements of 8.2.3 Research Evidence
these theories to build a deeper more
comprehensive understanding of the nested- There is substantial empirical evidence on key
group problem. principles of the four theories. Most of the
Each of the four theories has a distinct evidence is from laboratory experiments in which
emphasis. Nested - group theory (Lawler 1992 ) subjects repeatedly engage in an exchange task
fi rst proposed the proximal-group bias in with the same others over time (see Lawler and
attributions of emotions (positive and negative), Yoon 1996; Lawler et al. 2008) . In this context,
indicating that people attribute positive emotions we measure the frequency of exchange, self-
and experiences to local (proximal) groups and reported emotions (pleasure-satisfaction and
negative emotions and experiences to the larger interest/excitement), as well as perceptions of
more encompassing (distal) groups. The main cohesion and behavioral commitments (see
hypothesis is that people develop stronger Lawler and Yoon 1996 for the experimental
affective ties to those groups that provide them a context and measures). Only one study set out to
greater sense of effi cacy and control, and this is directly test the nested-group formulation
most commonly the local group. Relational (Mueller and Lawler 1999) , but several bits of
cohesion theory (Lawler and Yoon 1996 ; Lawler evidence from experimental research on the other
blem of Social Order in Nested Group Structures 153

theories can be interpreted in terms of the nested- not occur. Under these conditions, networks
group commitment problem. This cumulative are transformed into perceived group entities
empirical foundation sets the stage for our and thus there are group ties to both the
theoretical analysis of the nested-group problem relational and more encompassing network
to follow. Four relevant points that can be unit (Thye et al. 2011 ).
extracted from the research. 4. When two or more people undertake joint
tasks, they tend to perceive a shared
1. The most direct evidence for the nested group responsibility and, when this occurs, positive
theory comes from a survey study of work feelings from the task interaction are
attitudes in a decentralized (school system) attributed to the group in which the task is
and centralized (military) organization, both accomplished. The result of social unit
with nested subunits: schools (proximal) in a attributions of individual emotion is affective
school district (distal), and a medical center ties to the group unit (Lawler et al. 2008 ,
(proximal) in the air force (distal) (Mueller 2009; Thye et al. 2015 ). Tasks that generate
and Lawler 1999 ). The study indicates that greater sense of shared responsibility lead to
commitments to the local unit were stronger stronger affective group ties. This research,
in the decentralized than in the centralized however, dealt only with a single immediate
organization. The locus of control and group (the local or proximal unit). One might
autonomy over work conditions was hypothesize that if a sense of shared
associated with the locus of organizational responsibility is produced at a distal group
commitments. Work conditions controlled level, as well as the proximal level, the result
locally affect commitments to that local should be a positive relationship between
organizational unit, whereas those controlled commitments to the local and larger unit. An
by the larger unit shape commitments to that important question is when or under what
larger unit. Importantly, the locus of conditions are commitments at the local level
commitment corresponds with the locus of in competition with those at the larger level
control (Mueller and Lawler 1999 ). (i.e., a zero sum relation) or positively related
2. Turning to our experimental research on (i.e., mutually supportive)?
dyads, networks, and small groups, when
people repeatedly exchange things of value, A s a whole, these theories suggest that in
they experience positive emotions and these analyzing nested-group contexts, three
feelings, in turn, generate commitment conditions warrant careful attention: ( i )
behaviors such as the propensity to ( i ) stay in autonomy and control at the local and larger
the relation, ( ii ) give unilateral benefi ts or group level; ( ii ) the frequency or density of
gifts to others in the group, and ( iii ) interactions within and outside the local unit; ( iii)
cooperate with members in a social dilemma the jointness of the task structure and locus of
(Lawler and Yoon 1996; Lawler et al. 2000 shared responsibility.
). Evidence clearly indicates that positive A fourth condition is added by theoretical work
emotions mediate the impact of repetitive of Jon Turner ( 2007 ) on the proximal bias: ( iv )
exchange on relational or group ties. the degree that the proximal group unit is
3. Relational ties with such an emotional foun- embedded in the distal group unit. We introduce
dation tend to fragment networks of exchange Turner’s notion here and then return to it later.
around “pockets of cohesion,” based on Jon Turner’s “sociological theory of emotion”
frequent exchanges and resulting positive (Turner 2007 ) argues that emotions and
emotions; ties are to the local proximal emotional processes are the ultimate foundation
exchange relation not the larger more distal for macro social orders. These emotions originate
network (Lawler and Yoon 1998 ). Yet, if in micro level social “encounters.” The strength
networks are high in density and consist and resilience of a macro order is contingent on
primarily of equal power relations, this micro level encounters that produce positive
breakdown around pockets of cohesion does emotions, and also the spread of those feelings to
E.J. Lawler et al.

larger groups, organizations, or communities. are likely to interpret the source of these positive
The key obstacle is the proximal bias: people tend feelings and, in the process, attribute them to a
to attribute positive feelings from encounters to source such as themselves, others, or relevant
local, micro level units and attribute negative social units. Third, interpretations of control are
events and feelings to larger (meso or macro) based on the source and balance of “enabling”
social units. Turner argues that the social- and “constraining’ dimensions of social structure
embeddedness of local-unit encounters within the (Giddens 1984 ). All things being equal, groups
larger unit can counteract the proximal bias, by that “enable” actions or interactions are objects
generating stronger interconnections between for positive feelings whereas those that
behavior in the local group and the larger, distal “constrain” actions and interactions are objects
institutional or organizational grouping. Social for negative emotions. Broadly, this is a way that
embeddedness, therefore, may determine “freedom” can promote affective ties to a group.
whether emotion attributions stay local or spread Nested group theory (Lawler 1992 ) aims to
to larger units. This has important implications identify structural conditions under which
for the nested- group component of the individuals’ emotion attributions target local
Hobbesian problem of social order and we will (proximal) groups or overarching (distal) units in
compare our approach to Turner’s shortly. which these are nested. The theoretical argument
centers on the degree of control (or autonomy)
people have in the situation and where they
believe that control comes from. In a work
8.3 Theoretical Mechanisms
organization, local autonomy and control may be
high or low, and such conditions may stem from
I n this section we compare different theoretical
the talents and experiences of individuals in the
formulations for the problem of nested-group
local unit, collaborative relations in that unit, the
commitments. The focus is to identify
past success of the unit, or the value of the
commonalities and sharpen the conditions,
proximal group to the larger distal group. To the
mechanisms, or processes that underlie nested
degree that members of the local group are high
group commitments, including those explicit in
in choice, autonomy, and control, more positive
Lawler ( 1992 ) and Turner ( 2007 ) as well as
feelings are likely to result from task activity and
those implicit in other work (e.g., Lawler and
these feelings, in turn, are more likely to be
Yoon 1996 ; Lawler 2001 ; Lawler et al. 2009)
attributed to that proximal group than to the distal
. We emphasize four specifi c conditions or
group. One important consequence is stronger
processes: ( i ) autonomy and control; ( ii )
affective commitments to the local group and
interaction frequency; ( iii ) jointness of the task
greater willingness to sacrifi ce on behalf of it.
structure; and ( iv ) structural interconnections of
Conversely, if members of the local group are
proximal and distal groups.
low in choice, autonomy, and control, negative
8.3.1 Autonomy and Control feelings ensue and these, in turn, are more likely
to be attributed to the distal than the proximal
The fi rst formulation of the nested group
group. In this manner, structures and perceptions
problem (Lawler 1992 ) treated the sense of
of control are the key condition determining
control as the key explanation for social unit
whether positive or negative emotions occur and
attributions of individual feelings. Sense of
also whether these are attributed to proximal or
control is conceived as perceptions of how much
distal groups (See Lawler 1992 ; Lawler et al.
impact, self- determination, or effi cacy people
2009 ; Thye and Yoon 2015 ).
have in a situation (White 1959; Deci 1975) .
T he theory posits a strong tendency for people
The logic here is based on three ideas. First, when
to attribute positive events, experiences, and
people experience a sense of individual control or
emotions to their most local, immediate groups.
effi cacy, they tend to feel positive emotions or
The rationale is that this is where people interact
feelings (e.g., feeling good, satisfi ed, excited).
and defi ne the situation, and these defi nitions
This idea has substantial empirical support in
tend to favor the local, proximal group. In
psychology (see Westcott 1988) . Second, people
blem of Social Order in Nested Group Structures 155

contrast, people tend to attribute negative events, internalized and negative emotions externalized,
experiences, and feelings to a removed, but these processes simultaneously tend to
overarching, or distal group (e.g., university, weaken order at higher meso or macro levels.
corporation, community), and these perceptions Turner ( 2007 ) proposes an important qualifi
also emerge from interactions in the local group. cation of the proximal bias for positive emotions.
Attributions of negative emotion to the larger Positive emotions can “externalize” and
group may be a source of cohesion and solidarity essentially spread to larger (distal) group units if
in the local group. Overall, the proximal bias for people are involved in multiple social
positive emotions and distal bias for negative interactions (encounters) in multiple groups
emotions captures the fundamental problem of within that larger, distal group unit. This means
order in nested group structures. that the proximal bias is likely to be stronger if
Lawler ( 1992) and Turner ( 2007) offer members interact primarily in only one local
different but complementary explanations for the (proximal) group and the boundaries among local
proximal/distal biases in positive/negative groups in the larger organization are not crossed
emotion attributions. It is instructive to consider or bridged regularly. A more fl uid or permeable
these closely. Lawler ( 1992 ) reasons that local group structure, therefore, is important to
proximal groups are the locus of interactions with mitigate excessively strong commitments to local
others, and perceptions of control are likely to be groups and facilitate the spread of positive
developed or socially constructed in these emotions from repeated micro level encounters in
proximal contexts or situations. Local groups multiple groups to meso- or macro-level groups
essentially have an “interaction advantage” in (see Turner 2007) . Commitments to proximal
shaping social defi nitions of control in the and distal groups may not be inversely related if
situation (See Collins 1981 for a similar idea); emotions spread upward in this sort of way.
and they are likely to take responsibility for
positive indications of control and resulting
feelings, while blaming larger, more distant 8.3.2 Interaction Frequency
groups for constraints or limits on control. These
interpretations and attributions are often revealed B oth Lawler ( 1992) and Turner ( 2007 ) aim to
in negative or pejorative comments and attitudes ground macro phenomena in micro-level
by employees toward “higher ups,” corporate encounters or interactions (see also Collins 1981
headquarters, and central administrators. Those ). Emotions that can forge affective ties to larger
more distant structural levels, offi ces, or social units emerge here. Thus, it is important to
individuals often are perceived as clueless, consider how this happens – that is, what are the
unaware, or mindless when it comes to what is mechanisms that generate emotions in the fi rst
necessary for the core work of the organization place and then lead people to interpret them in
which is accomplished at the local group level collective, group-based terms. This boils down to
(for an interesting explanation for why this occurs a question of “social emergence.” The theory of
see Dunning 2015 ). relational cohesion (Lawler and Yoon 1993 ,
Turner ( 2007) pushes the logic of this 1996) takes up this question for social exchange
argument in several interesting ways. He contexts.
elaborates the nested group problem by explicitly Social exchanges occur because people can
theorizing that proximal and distal biases protect receive something they value by giving
the local groups which people are dependent on something in return (Homans 1961 ; Emerson
and regularly interact within ( i) by 1972 ). By defi nition, social exchange is purely
“internalizing” positive emotions within the local instrumental as are the relations that emerge from
group and thereby building cohesion and repeated exchanges by the same persons. Lawler
solidarity and ( ii ) by “externalizing” negative and Yoon ( 1996) , however, develop and test a
emotions and blaming larger units or groups. He theory that indicates otherwise; repeated
implies that the micro social orders are stronger exchanges even if instrumentally-driven have
to the degree that positive emotions are unintended social byproducts. The byproducts
E.J. Lawler et al.

might entail a reduction of uncertainty from effect this “spread” is not unlike that theorized by
exchanging with the same others or the Turner ( 2007 ), but occurs for different
emergence of trust (Kollock 1994 ; Cook et al. theoretical reasons. In this case the effects are
2005 ). Lawler and Yoon ( 1996 ) propose that stronger in networks that promote equal power
mild positive, everyday emotions (e.g., uplift, relations and those with greater network density.
pleasure, satisfaction, and excitement) are a The overall point is that relational cohesion
distinct class of byproduct with a distinct effect research points to an interaction-to-emotion-to-
on exchange relations. These emotions create cohesion mechanism for nested group
affective ties to the relation itself. commitments and suggests some conditions
A n exchange relation is defi ned as a pattern under which there are positive rather than
of repeated exchange by the same actors over negative effects on ties to larger, more
time (Emerson 1972 ). The theory of relational encompassing social units. The salience of the
cohesion indicates that repeated exchanges build relevant unit – dyad or network – is central to
expressive, non-instrumental relations that these emotion-infused processes.
people are motivated to sustain and nurture. This Turner’s ( 2007 ) theory also suggests that
occurs through an emotional process: repeated positive emotions constitute the fundamental link
exchanges generate positive emotions and these between repeated interactions (termed
emotions in turn produce relational cohesion, defi encounters) and integrative ties to larger social
ned as perceptions of the relation as a unifying units. He argues more specifi cally that social
social object in the situation. Through the encounters produce positive emotions if they fulfi
cohesion effects of positive emotion, the relation ll or confi rm expectations of the actors. Fulfi
takes on a “life of its own,” becoming salient as llment of expectations leads to expressions of
an object for actors; and emotions from exchange gratitude and positive sanctions back and forth
are associated with that object. among those in the encounter; and positive affect
R elational cohesion theory and research does tends to build across encounters. Thus, confi
not address the nested-group problem directly, rmation of expectations plays the same role as
but it does contribute in a couple of ways (Lawler exchange frequency does in relational cohesion
and Yoon 1996 , 1998 ; Lawler et al. 2000; theory. Turner ( 2007 ) uses the “clarity of
Thye et al. 2011 , 2014 ). First, it elaborates why expectations” to explain how and when emotions
local units become available and salient targets at the micro level spread to larger, more
for individual emotions and feelings, specifi encompassing units.
cally, because positive emotions generated by
repeated interactions make the local unit salient.
To the degree that interactions of members in an 8.3.3 Tasks and Shared Responsibility
organization are organized in and around local
group units, stronger ties may develop to those The Affect Theory of Social Exchange (Lawler
local groups than to the overarching larger group 2001; Lawler et al. 2008) focuses in on the
through the emotion-to-cohesion process. structure of social exchange “tasks,” arguing
Horizontal differentiation in an organization may distinct structures have differential effects on
generate such effects. Second, relational group ties (cohesion, commitment, and
cohesion theory examines exchange in dyads or solidarity). Social Commitments Theory (Lawler
triads without making any predictions for higher et al. 2009 , 2014 ) generalizes and applies
level units. A study by Thye et al. ( 2011 ), principles of the affect theory to how social
however, demonstrates micro-to-macro effects in interactions bear on problems of social order.
the following form: relational cohesion in dyads Here we highlight the broader formulations and
(micro level) within a network has positive the new social mechanism offered by social
effects on perceptions of connectedness and commitments theory. The orienting assumption is
group-ness at the network level. At the network that social interactions inherently entail one or
level people perceive a connection even to those more tasks, implicitly or explicitly; but, tasks as
that they do not exchange or interact with. In such receive very little attention in sociological
blem of Social Order in Nested Group Structures 157

analyses of structure and interaction. Social Having a nice meal at a restaurant is likely to
interactions are organized around tasks and, foster positive feelings regardless of whether a
therefore, these can help to understand the person has dinner alone or with a group of
interrelationships of social structure and social friends. However, having dinner with a group of
interaction. Many others (e.g., Homans 1950; friends may lead them to attribute positive
Collins 1981 , 2004 ; Wrong 1995 ; Berger and feelings from the meal in part to the friendship
Luckmann 1966 ) have theorized how micro group itself, especially if they repeatedly go to
level social interactions bear on macro dinner together. The result is a stronger and more
phenomena, but none have seriously considered affective tie to the friendship group. This is the
the role of the interaction task itself. central proposition of the theory. Importantly, it
A task is defi ned as a set of behaviors that is general enough to apply to work groups or
enact methods and procedures (means) for teams in a work organization, local chapters of an
producing a desired result (goal, outcome). The environmental group, departments in a
methods, procedures, and goals have exogenous university, or regional offi ces in a corporation.
(objective) and endogenous (subjective) The individual-collective dimension of a task
components; together they focus the attention and bears on the degree that group members perceive
behavior of participants. On an objective level, a shared responsibility, not only for whether it is
tasks are a component of social structures; they successfully accomplished, but also for the
frame and shape how and why people interact in procedures (means) or processes for undertaking
pursuit of instrumental ends in a concrete it. The sense of shared responsibility tends to
situation; on a subjective level, elements of a task emerge from the process of interacting around the
are cognitively defi nable or interpretable in task. Repeated interactions that promote a sense
varied ways and these defi nitions are socially of shared responsibility foster social unit
constructed (see Lawler et al. 2014) . Tasks may attributions of positive emotions from the task
be structured in terms of individual or collective activity which, in turn, increase the affective
behaviors, and the same task may be socially defi commitment to the group. The sense of shared
ned in terms of individual behaviors and responsibility therefore is a contingency
responsibilities or in terms of collective or joint (moderator) for social unit attributions, whereas
behaviors and responsibilities. Collective social unit attributions are how (mediator) joint
outcomes, for example, may stem from the mere tasks engender the formation or strengthening of
aggregation of individual behaviors (e.g., sales affective commitments to the group. Logically
totals in an offi ce or retail department) or from a the argument specifi es a moderator (perceptions
combined set of behaviors that generate a of shared responsibility) for a mediator (social
distinctive joint product (e.g., a team of authors unit attributions) of the task-to-commitment
who collaboratively produce a book). This process.
individual- collective responsibility dimension of R epeated social interactions are central to this
tasks is fundamental to social commitments process, but individual emotions may be felt but
theory. not expressed in ways visible to others. There are
S ocial commitments theory posits that social at least two ways people in interaction infl uence
interactions in nested group contexts entail tasks and magnify each other’s felt emotion. The fi rst
likely to vary along an individual-collective way is through emotional contagion, that is, the
responsibility dimension, i.e., how joint or mere tendency of people to read subtle behavioral
individual is the task activity (Lawler et al. 2009 cues, synchronize their behaviors, and in the
). Tasks, objectively structured or subjectively process feel what others are feeling at the
defi ned as joint efforts, are a stimulus for social moment (see Hatfi eld et al. 1993) . Emotions
unit attributions of emotion. If people undertake readily spread across individuals in face to face
a task collectively or jointly with others and that settings or where there is “bodily co-presence,”
task activity generates positive feelings, they are and this is one reason work teams often have
likely to attribute those emotions in part to the collective affective or emotional tones (Bartel
relevant group unit. Consider a simple example. and Saavedra 2000 ; Barsade 2002 ). Social
E.J. Lawler et al.

commitments theory indicates that the sense of control or autonomy. Third, the larger, more
shared responsibility and emotional contagion encompassing and removed group is likely to
are reciprocally related, each accentuating the have greater capacity to shape perceptions of
other and in the process generating cycles of responsibility in non-zero sum, collective terms
positive feeling (See Lawler et al. 2009 ). The than to shape perceptions of control in such
second mode of mutual infl uence stems from the terms. Control and autonomy have an underlying
possibility that those experiencing a given zero-sum structural basis that is not inherently
emotion infer that others like them in the same present for shared responsibility. The
situation are experiencing the same feelings, i.e., organizational design of roles and tasks, as well
inferences of common emotions. Joint tasks as communications from leaders have the
make salient the common focus and activity of capacity to extend a sense of shared responsibility
those interacting and thus are likely to enhance or “we are all in this together” perceptions
inferences of common emotions. An important beyond the proximal group by embedding joint
implication is that even in purely virtual tasks at the local level into broader or larger
interactions without bodily co- presence, people organizational tasks and responsibilities. For
mutually infer others are experiencing the same such reasons, joint tasks and a sense of shared
feelings and this boosts perceptions of shared responsibility may prevail in the context of highly
responsibility and the likelihood of social unit variable levels of local control and autonomy.
attributions (Lawler et al. 2014 ). In sum, either Thus, in theorizing conditions for proximal or
emotional contagion or emotional inferences are distal group ties, nested group theory (Lawler
suffi cient to strengthen the impact of joint tasks, 1992 ) and social commitments theory (Lawler et
perceptions of shared responsibility, and social al. 2009) key on different structures and
unit attributions on affective group commitments. processes. Nested group theory asks: Where is
Emotional contagion effects are limited to the locus of control and autonomy? With stronger
contexts of “bodily co- presence” or face-to-face local control and autonomy, proximal groups will
interaction, but emotional inferences can have become the prime objects of commitment, and
similar effects in the absence of bodily co- the larger distal groups face serious obstacles to
presence (see Lawler et al. 2013 ). collective mobilization around larger group
The nested group problem is touched on in the goals. It is not clear how these obstacles can be
affect theory of social exchange but social overcome except through potentially costly
commitments theory develops it further than instrumental means (e.g., selective incentives)
Lawler ( 1992 ). The main points implied by that build instrumental rather than affective
social commitments theory are as follows. First, commitments to the distal group. In contrast,
the strength of affective ties to proximal and social commitments theory asks: Where is the
distal group depends on the locus of shared locus of a sense of shared responsibility? Joint
responsibility, not the locus of autonomy and tasks and perceptions of shared responsibility
control. This shifts the basis of a proximal bias. If may exist simultaneously in both proximal and
joint tasks are enacted and accomplished in local distal groups. To the degree that organizational
groups, ties to those local units should be stronger structures or leaders defi ne tasks as joint and
than those to the larger, more distal unit, even if promote a sense of shared responsibility at the
the locus of control is the distal unit. Second, larger, distal group level, this should mitigate the
while tasks are enacted locally, they may be nested group problem and make the distal unit a
designed and framed by either proximal or distal stronger object of affective commitment. An
groups. If designed and framed locally, then the understanding how and when proximal and distal
locus of control and locus of responsibility commitments complement and mutually support
converge at the proximal group level, and ties to one another is an important but neglected issue in
the local group should be strongest here. If tasks research on organizational commitments (see for
are designed and framed by the distal group, the an exception Johnson et al. 2009 ).
local group could generate a strong a sense of T o summarize, the current formulation of
shared responsibility even with little sense of social commitments theory (see Lawler et al.
blem of Social Order in Nested Group Structures 159

2009 ) predicts that affective group commitments connections, distal groups produce greater
are strongest if group members perceive both ( i ) “clarity of expectations” for people in proximal
a high degree of autonomy and control and ( ii ) level social encounters (interactions). Recall that
joint tasks that promote shared responsibility. for Turner, social encounters (micro level) arouse
The proximal bias remains but it can be mitigated positive emotions when people confi rm their
or overturned if local joint tasks are subsumed expectations in those encounters or groups.
within or tied directly to joint tasks at the larger Embeddedness, by increasing the clarity of
group level. There is, nevertheless, an important expectations, improves the prospects for
gap or unanswered question in the theory. At the satisfying (expectation-confi rming) encounters
local proximal level, low control and autonomy that make people feel good and weakens the
may combine with joint tasks and a strong sense proximal bias. Macro level organizations and
of shared responsibility. For this condition nested institutions are the primary source of clear
group and social commitment theories make expectations, and the spread of micro level
contradictory predictions based on different positive emotions upward to the micro level
mechanisms. One way to address this problem is occurs in this context.
to more explicitly theorize the nature and degree Thus, “clarity of expectations” mediates the
of interconnections between proximal and distal impact of structural embeddedness on positive
groups in the group, organization, or society (see emotions in micro level encounters. Implied is
Turner 2007 ). the notion that the clarity of expectations is a
8.3.4 Interconnections of Proximal macro-to-micro (“top down”) process, and confi
and Distal Groups rming expectations in encounters initiates a
micro-to-macro (“bottom up”) process. The
What structural properties are likely to promote bottom up process is contingent on positive
or weaken the proximal bias for affective emotions from multiple encounters in multiple
commitment? We consider two that have been local groups within the same meso
analyzed elsewhere: social embeddedness (organizational) or macro (institutional or
(Turner 2007 ) and the degree that the distal categorical) group. In sum, there are two primary
group supports the local group (Thye and Yoon structural conditions for the micro-to-macro
forthcoming). Each is discussed in turn below. spread of emotions in Turner’s (2007 ) argument:
For Jon Turner “social-embeddedness” is a ( i ) The local unit is tightly embedded in the
fundamental structural condition under which distal unit, meaning that the distal unit conveys
positive emotions in micro (proximal) encounters clear expectations for behavior in local units, and
spread outward and upward to larger group units ( ii ) members interact with others in multiple
(meso and macro); and, conversely, macro/meso local units, and experience positive emotions
forces penetrate and permeate the local through across such unites (Turner 2007 ,
ideologies and norms, and other shared cultural 2014 ). 55
elements. When positive emotions spread, the T hye and Yoon ( 2015 ) take a different
proximal bias is weakened or eliminated. The approach by using and adapting theory and
tighter the structural connections between research on “perceived organizational support”
proximal groups and distal – meso or macro – (POS). They set out to test and further specify
group units, the more likely are micro-based nested-group theory (Lawler 1992 ).
emotions to have such meso- or macro-level Organizational support refers to the degree that
effects. Tighter connections, however, also imply an organization values its members’
tighter control from the distal unit and thus less contributions and cares about their individual
autonomy and control at the local level. The well-being (Eisenberger et al. 1986 ). It is a
theoretical rationale is that with tighter perceptual phenomenon with a structural

55
Important to note is that emotions from confi rming connected to or embedded in meso (organizational) level
expectations at the micro level have a moral component organizations, but the meso level units also are tightly
to the degree that, not only is the micro level tightly embedded in macro level institutions and culture.
E.J. Lawler et al.

foundation, but generally treated in perception and analyzed to fully understand how these are
terms by research on organizations (see intertwined.
Eisenberger et al. 1986 ). In brief, the research
indicates that if employees perceive
organizational support in these ways (i.e., valuing 8.3.5 Comparing Our Approach to
and caring), they reciprocate with attitudes and
Jon Turner’s
behaviors that benefi t the organization. The
employee-employer relationship is conceived as There are important similarities and differences
an exchange of valued goods or outcomes, and in between our theorizing and that of Turner ( 2007
this context Thye and Yoon ( 2015 ) analyze the ). The following ideas represent key similarities.
identity (or self-defi nitional) implications of First, micro level social interactions at the
perceived organizational support. The main person- to-p erson level are the ultimate source of
hypothesis is that if employees perceive emotions and feelings, albeit positive or negative.
organizational support, the organizational Second, positive emotions constitute the
identity becomes more salient and meaningful to fundamental glue or social adhesive that hold
them, and they “re-categorize” self in terms of not together
only the local unit but also the larger, distal unit. groups, organizations, communities, and
This then counteracts the proximal bias posited societies; whereas negative emotions threaten to
by the nested group theory, and by extension, weaken tear apart social units. Third, the impact
Turner’s ( 2007 ) analysis. of positive emotion is contingent on the kinds of
Thye and Yoon ( 2015 ) tested this hypothesis attributions (e.g., to people, to units, to which
in a survey of teams within a large electric units) that people make in the course of
company in South Korea. Teams were the local, interpreting their emotions and feelings. Finally,
proximal unit and the larger company was the people are more likely to attribute positive
distal unit. The survey measured job satisfaction emotions to proximal social objects (self, other,
(positive feelings about the job), perceived group) and negative emotions to more removed
organizational support, affective commitment, or larger social objects (organizations,
and various job characteristics (autonomy, communities, nations). The latter poses a
variety, etc.) as well as other controls. There are fundamental threat to the stability of those larger
two fi ndings of particular relevance to the nested units.
group problem. First, job satisfaction had a T here also are key differences between out
stronger impact on commitment to the team than theorizing and that of Turner, primarily regarding
to the company, a fi nding generally consistent the emotion-generating mechanism and the social
with nested group theory and Turner’s ( 2007 ) context for it. Turner deploys “clarity of
proximal bias. Second, the predicted interaction expectations” as the central emotion-generating
effect of team commitment and perceived mechanism in his theoretical analysis. When
organizational support confi rmed the study’s people confi rm expectations they feel good and
main hypothesis: team commitment had a reward each other and this strengthens further
stronger positive effect on organizational those positive feelings. In our research program,
commitment when employees perceived greater interactions generate emotions regardless of how
organizational support for employees. This study clear expectations are or whether they are
extends nested group theory by suggesting a necessarily fulfi lled. Positive emotions stem
general strategy for organizations to overcome from social interaction, task structure, how well
the nested group problem and also by pointing to individuals work together, and what sort of
the role of group identities. The overall message collective impact such interactions produce.
to be taken from both Turner (2007 ) and Thye Expectations are not necessarily explicit or clear,
and Yoon ( 2015) is that both ( i ) structural and in fact, people may perceive greater control and
( ii ) cognitive interconnections of proximal and shared responsibility under conditions of
distal groups must be taken into consideration ambiguity. One implication or hypothesis,
developed in our general theory (Lawler et al.
blem of Social Order in Nested Group Structures 161

2009 Chapter 7), is that network- : based how distal groups or organizations overcome it.
organizations tend to generate affective A second concerns the role of identities in the ties
commitments whereas hierarchy-based to proximal and distal groups. The more
organizations tend to generate instrumental encompassing distal group may provide
commitments because of a greater sense of shared individuals a broader context of meaning for
responsibility in fl atter network structures enacting roles and identities than the more
(Lawler et al. 2009 ). In contrast, Turner’s immediate local group. One condition for this is
clarity-of- expectations mechanism seems to that the self- enhancing effects of a group identity
suggest that hierarchical organizations generate are stronger for the more encompassing distal
stronger affective ties because the expectations group (e.g., a nation) than a smaller proximal unit
are likely to be clearer in this context. (e.g., a neighborhood). A third concerns the role
T here is also a subtle difference in the primary of dense interactions in a single local group
social objects to which emotions are attributed. versus more varied interactions across multiple
For Turner ( 2007 ) the proximal bias entails local groups in a larger social unit. There are
positive emotions being attributed to social good reasons to posit that a proximal bias will be
objects within the group – i.e., to self or others – stronger in the single-group case; and if it is
not explicitly to the group itself as an object, countered, the locally-based feelings may forge a
although the group benefi ts from these internal stronger affective tie to distal organizations than
attributions of emotion within the group. By where group ties diffuse across multiple local
implication, attributions to the group occur groups. Interaction in multiple groups may
through attributions of emotion to self and/or generate more diffuse or looser local or proximal
other(s). We presume that the group is a distinct ties, but they also broaden the range or variety of
and salient social object, and social unit positive emotional experiences within a larger,
attributions are directly made to the group itself. distal unit (Turner 2007 ). Below we suggest
Moreover, in Turner’s theory, emotions spread some ways to resolve the control-responsibility
upward to meso or macro units to the degree that and s ingle-m ultiple group issues and build in a
positive emotions are produced across a variety stronger role for identities.
of encounters in a variety of local groups within
the same overarching meso or macro entities. In
our theory, the spread of emotions only requires
8.4 Developing a New Theoretical
repeated social interaction in a single local group
where people demonstrate a capacity to work Formulation
together. If the local task is undertaken or enacted
jointly with others and it fosters a sense of shared This section does not present a new theory but
responsibility among those doing it, conditions instead an outline or sketch of a few ideas to
are established for social attributions to proximal, explain the strength and interconnections of
distal, or both types of social units. proximal and distal group ties. The purpose is to
H aving reviewed these approaches to the look more closely at the nature of person-to-
nested group problem, there are several group ties and further specify the conditions
unanswered questions that suggest the need for where a proximal bias is stronger or weaker. We
more theoretical work. One concerns the role of assume a nested group context in which the distal
control- autonomy (Lawler 1992 ) and shared- group has an oversight/governing role and the
responsibility (Lawler et al. 2009 ) as the basis proximal group is the locus of the core tasks or
for a proximal bias and also for understanding activities of the distal group. 56 In this context

56
This defi nes the scope of the nested group context as ect the organization’s larger mission, charter, goals, or
one in which the membership and activities of proximal strategies. Group memberships are also interconnected
and distal group are structurally interconnected. Core because to be a member of the local group is by defi nition
activities might be teaching in an educational also to be a member of the more encompassing or distal
organization, production in a factory, customer service in group. It is not possible to join the local group without
a retail organization; these locally enacted activities refl joining the larger group.
E.J. Lawler et al.

proximal and distal ties have the capacity to The nested-group problem of social order,
generate commitment behaviors, such as staying therefore, boils down to whether or when group
(low exit rates or turnover), prosocial behaviors ties have an affective, non-instrumental
(donations to the organization, informally component, and whether or when the affective
helping others), and citizenship behaviors component is stronger at one level than at
(involvement in or sacrifi ce of time for the another.
group). These behaviors are directed at local
(proximal) or larger encompassing (distal)
groups contingent on the strength and resilience 8.4.1 The Argument
of group ties.
S everal ideas motivate and orient a new T he fundamental nature of affective and
theoretical effort, all of which are implied by instrumental person-to-unit bonds have
previous sections of this paper. implications for the structural and cognitive
interconnections between proximal and distal
1. When people have purely instrumental ties to groups. Theories of
others and relevant groups (proximal and group formation are instructive because they tend
distal), social order is highly problematic to fall into non-instrumental and instrumental
because of social dilemmas and exit options. categories. The non-instrumental class of theories
This is the classic situation assumed by indicates that groups are based on homophily or
Hobbes and, more recently, rational choice social similarities (Tajfel and Turner 1986 ;
approaches to cooperation and social order McPherson et al. 2001 ). Common or shared
(Hechter 1987 ; Fehr and Gintas 2007 ). identities are a unifying thread binding people to
2. Affective ties to local, proximal groups make groups. The rationale is that people tend to
it easier for social dilemma problems to be associate with and form ties with people like
solved at the micro level, but in the process themselves. This could be due to their own
they generate a fragmented or federated social preferences or to their structural opportunities for
order with weaker ties to macro group entities interaction (Blau 1977 ). In comparison, the
than to local entities. This fragmentation is instrumental class of group-formation theories
driven by either the control-autonomy or the indicates that groups are based on the rational
shared-responsibility mechanisms. choices people make about where they receive
3. Macro social orders become stronger and the greatest individual benefi ts or rewards
more resilient if ( i ) affective ties to macro (Hechter 1987 ). People are profi t maximizers
units are strong and those to micro units are and they join groups that are important to their
weak; or if ( ii ) there are mutually-supportive individual rewards, in particular, where they
affective ties at micro and macro levels. The benefi t from joint or collective services or goods
former ( i ) will obtain if the distal, removed that they cannot access alone. In sum, groups are
group or organization is more salient as the instrumental objects if they mediate valued
primary locus of control-autonomy or the individual rewards or collective outcomes or
primary locus of members’ sense of shared- goods that are the source of those individual
responsibility than local units. 57 The latter ( ii rewards or benefi ts (see Hechter 1987 ).
) will obtain if there are tight interconnections The social identity tradition demonstrates that
between micro level structures or task social categories, even those that have little value
activities and macro level structures and or extrinsic meaning, are suffi cient to generate
strategic- level tasks (Turner 2007 ). perceptions of being in a group and promote
positive behaviors toward other members (Tajfel
and Turner 1986 ). One rationale for such

57
As an example, this might occur where local units are simultaneously in several different work groups, teams, or
not well-defi ned or fl uid, those who work together are projects.
spread out geographically, and/or people participate
blem of Social Order in Nested Group Structures 163

common identity effects is that being with similar motivation for group- oriented behavior (Burke
others or being in the same social category is self- and Stets 2009 ). 58
defi ning. Social categories and groups shape G iven this logic the implication for nested
how people defi ne themselves and also how group contexts is clear. A distal bias for positive
others defi ne them, and these self-other defi emotions should be present if the larger, removed
nitions are manifest in behavior and interaction. group is more self-defi ning than the local,
If a group becomes an important part of how immediate group. This is quite plausible for distal
people defi ne themselves, the ties to that group group units that are high in status, reputation, or
becomes at least partly non-instrumental. The brand-recognition. Examples might be a faculty
result is that positive qualities of the group member for whom their university (e.g., Harvard,
become positive qualities of self. Cornell, UC-Berkeley, Stanford) is more self-
This simple characterization of instrumental defi ning than their college or departmental unit,
and non-instrumental ties suggests two or an employee who defi nes self primarily with
conditions for strong person-to-group ties: ( i ) reference to a corporation’s name (e.g., Goldman
whether or to what degree the group identity is Sachs, IBM, Apple, Google) rather than their
self- defi ning for members, that is, the group team, department, or division within that
identity is an important aspect of “who they are” corporation. A self-defi ning larger group is more
or “how they view themselves;” and ( ii ) whether likely to be subject to the distal bias. Thus, the
the group mediates the access of people to degree that proximal or distal groups are self-defi
collective goods that are the basis for valued ning may determine the target of social unit
individual rewards, i.e., the group is a source of attributions either by shaping perceptions of
collective effi cacy. Identities entail shared control or the sense of shared responsibility. If
meanings about self, role, and group positive defi nitions of self are based on self-effi
membership, whereas, collective goods are the cacy in the situation, perceived control and
most unique instrumental benefi t of group autonomy will be most important, but if positive
members and an indicator of collective effi cacy. defi nitions are based on collective effi cacy,
Each dimension is elaborated, in turn below. shared responsibility will be most important.
Group ties are symbolic and expressive Finally, if proximal and distal group identities are
because groups can be an important marker for highly interwoven, affective ties or commitments
how a person defi nes themselves and how others to each should be mutually supportive and
also defi ne them. These self-other defi nitions are positively associated (see Thye and Yoon 2005 ;
shared meanings and often affectively imbued Yoon and Thye 2002 ).
(Burke and Stets 2009 ; MacKinnon and Heise Turning to the second condition, groups are of
2010 ). If the group is a context in which a person instrumental value especially if they generate
verifi es or affi rms a self-defi nition in social collective or joint goods that individuals cannot
interaction with others, it makes sense that they generate alone or in other groups or groupings
would intrinsically value the group membership (Hechter 1987 ). This implies that groups may be
and treat the group as an end in itself. A group a source of collective effi cacy. Repeated
membership has self-enhancing effects as long as generation of collective goods should promote
the group identity is an important part of how beliefs in the “collective effi cacy” of a group unit
people defi ne themselves. The implication is that because members become more confi dent that
people form stronger affective ties or that “together they can make things happen” and
commitments to groups within which they affi rm have an impact not possible or likely by
and verify important self-defi nitions. Identity themselves. Recall that the logic of nested group
verifi cation, therefore, is the principle theory (Lawler 1992) stipulates that the
experience of individual self-effi cacy is one

58
Some separation of group and personal identity remains cult memberships). The self-defi ning link between person
except in extreme cases where the group and personal and group is variable.
identities are so intertwined as to be inseparable (e.g., in
E.J. Lawler et al.

reason local control and autonomy is so important 8.5 Conclusion


to affective group ties or commitments. It seems
reasonable to infer then that if a group mediates T he problem of person-to-group ties in the
access to collective goods and these goods are context of nested groups is ubiquitous in the
instrumental to individuals, perceptions of self- contemporary world. A key issue for small
effi cacy are likely to be intertwined with businesses, organizations, large corporations,
perceptions of collective effi cacy. Beliefs in the radical social movements, or even nation states is
collective effi cacy of the group should make it how to foster and encourage group membership,
more likely that joints tasks generate a sense of prosocial behavior, sacrifi ce, and commitment to
shared responsibility. the agenda of larger, more distant and removed,
M ore work is needed to fl esh out these ideas, social units. The theory and research, presented
but a tentative conclusion is implied: either here, suggest that strong commitments to larger
proximal or distal groups may be strong objects units occur, but only to the degree that certain
of commitment contingent on the degree that they structural and cognitive social conditions are
( a ) are self - defi ning and ( b ) generate beliefs realized. If left unchecked, primary or
in a group ’ s collective effi cacy . The confl uence fundamental interaction processes tend to
of both conditions generates the strongest and promote commitment and stable orders in more
most resilient social orders local or proximal groups while inhibiting or
The self-defi ning property of a group is an weakening ties to larger, distal groups. This is
exogenous condition that strengthens the sense of termed the “proximal bias” in commitment
shared responsibility and social unit attributions formation. In this paper we have reviewed and
of emotions that occur. People will do much more identifi ed several s ociological mechanisms that
for groups that are central to how they defi ne promote person-tounit bonds from the micro-to-
themselves, in part because the fate of those self- macro levels. These can explain the source of the
defi nitions are wrapped up with the fate of the proximal bias but also how larger social units
group, i.e., self and group are more tightly overcome it.
interconnected. What is positive and enhancing T here are three primary micro-social
for the group is positive and enhancing for self mechanisms that come to the foreground in our
and vice versa. Similarly, what is negative or theoretical analysis. First, when the sense of
diminishing for one is negative or diminishing for control is tied to the proximate unit, rather than
the other. the more distal unit, it is likely that any positive
I n contrast, beliefs in collective effi cacy feelings experienced from social interactions are
represent an endogenous condition that requires attributed to and form the basis for stronger
repeated production of collective goods with affective ties to the more local, nested unit
instrumental value to members. Such beliefs are (Lawler 1992 ). The locus of control creates a
trans-situational interpretations of situational structural and cognitive push for positive
experiences of shared responsibility and they emotions to be attributed locally, and negative
bear on the group’s generalized capacity to emotions to be attributed to and blamed on the
produce goods of value to individuals. Stronger more distal units. Second, Turner ( 2007 ) identifi
beliefs in collective effi cacy should produce es a different social mechanism for the proximal
stronger person-to-group ties but the nature of bias – specifi cally, if social encounters confi rm
these ties is primarily instrumental, unless the expectations , then they produce positive
group is also self-defi ning. The main principles emotions and stronger ties to local groups. Third,
of social commitments theory help to account for the theory of social commitments (Lawler et al.
beliefs in collective effi cacy, whereas self- defi 2009 ) asserts that ties to proximal and distal
ning group identities accentuate positive social units depend on the locus of perceptions
emotions and likelihood of social unit of shared responsibility . A proximal bias is likely
attributions. if local unit generates a sense of shared
responsibility, but if interactions are framed and
guided by a distal group, affective ties to it will
blem of Social Order in Nested Group Structures 165

be stronger. We theorize that the structural Dunning, D. (2015). On identifying human capital:
interconnections of local and larger units Flawed knowledge leads to faulty judgements of
expertise by individuals and groups. In S. R. Thye & E.
determine the prospects for strong ties to larger J. Lawler (Eds.), Advances in group processes, 32 .
units and these can be understood in terms of the London: Emerald Press.
above three mechanisms. Eisenberger, R., Hungtington, R., Hutchison, S., & Sowa,
In closing, the complex, multi-faceted D. (1986). Perceived organizational support. Journal
structures of the modern world almost guarantee of Applied Psychology, 71 , 500–507.
E merson, R. (1972). Exchange theory part II: Exchange
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select theories from micro-sociology to analyze (pp. 58–87). Boston: Houghton-Miffl in.
how, and under what conditions, these problems Fehr, E., & Gintis, H. (2007). Human motivation and
of social order are likely to be mitigated by local social cooperation: Experimental and analytical
foundations. Annual Review of Sociology, 33 , 43–64.
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Hechter, M. (1987). Principles of group solidarity .
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Johnson, R. E., Groff, K. W., & Taing, M. U. (2009).
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Social Networks and Relational 9
Sociology
N. Crossley ()
University of Manchester , Manchester , UK e-
Nick Crossley mail: nick.crossley@manchester.ac.uk
fi ed ‘society’, replacing a focus upon actors and
their relations with a focus upon systems and
their institutionalized ‘parts’; secondly, to
various forms of individualism which sought to
bring the actor back into focus but gave insuffi
cient attention and weight to the interactions, ties
and networks in which actors are both formed and
embedded. The purpose of my own call for
9.1 Introduction relational sociology is to tackle these theoretical
blind alleys and bring interactions, ties and
In recent years a number of writers, myself
networks back into focus.
included, have made the case for a ‘relational’
T his is not only a matter of theory. In a series
approach to sociology (Crossley 2011 , 2013 ,
of important publications Andrew Abbott ( 1997
2015a , b; Depelteau and Powell 2013a , b ;
, 2001 ) has pointed to the mismatch between
Donati 2011 ; Emirbayer 1997 ; Mische 2011 ).
sociological theory, on one side, and research
In my own case, which I elaborate here, relational
methods and methodologies on the other. The
sociology posits that the basic focus of sociology
main discrepancy, for him, is that sociological
should be interaction, ties and networks between
theory stresses the importance of the actor and
social (human and corporate) actors. The social
her actions, whereas our research methods
world is not a mere aggregate of actors, from this
typically focus upon variables. It is not actors
point of view, but rather entails their connection.
who act and interact in much sociological
Furthermore, though interaction, ties and
research, he notes, but rather variables, a problem
networks presuppose actors involved in them the
which we must redress. I agree and wish to
actor is as much the product as the producer of
develop this argument. A relational rethink in
these structures from the relational perspective.
sociology cannot be restricted to theory. It must
These ideas are not new. One can identify
extend to methodology and methods. If we
approximations of them in the work of many of
theorize the social world in relational terms then
sociology’s founding thinkers, including
we must analyze it in those terms too. Currently,
Durkheim, Simmel, Marx and Mead. Indeed, I
in most cases, we do not. The survey methods
draw upon these thinkers in my version of
which Abbott criticizes, and which are involved
relational sociology. It is my contention,
in a large proportion of our research, utilize
however, that the insights of these thinkers were
statistical models which require a random sample
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 167
S. Abrutyn (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary Sociological Theory,
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32250-6_9
forgotten, to some extent, in the second half of of unconnected respondents (case-wise
the twentieth century, as sociologists turned, fi independence). They design relations out of
rstly, to a variety of forms of holism which consideration. This is clearly problematic from
hypostatized and rei- the perspective of relational sociology. And our
N. Crossley

other main method of sociological research, Having argued for the importance of the actor in
analysis of qualitative interviews, is seldom his earlier works (Parsons 1937) , moreover,
much better. It is very often focused upon the Parsons (1951 ) shifted them out of focus in his
experiences and perceptions of ‘the individual’, later, more holistic works. Actors were assumed
again failing to consider interaction, ties, but only as incumbents of roles and it was the
networks and, by default, rendering experiences roles, along with norms and other
and perceptions as properties of the individual institutionalized ‘social facts’ that comprised the
rather than interactional accomplishments and ‘parts’ of the systems he sought to analyze.
positions (see Billig 1991 ). Relational sociology During the 1960s functionalism’s dominance
must address this. It must employ and develop began to wane. It was subject to extensive
ways of analyzing interaction, ties and challenges. In some cases, however, most notably
interactions. certain varieties of Neo-Marxism which
A number of methods do already exist. In my themselves achieved a degree of dominance
work to date I have focused upon one such within the discipline, the primacy of the whole
method, social network analysis (SNA). In this and this same way of theorizing it were retained.
chapter I refl ect upon this methodological Marxists adopted their own version of functional
choice, showing how SNA facilitates genuinely explanation, explaining social institutions by
relational work in sociology. showing that and how they serve capitalism and
The largest part of the chapter will be an referring morphology and changes in society’s
elaboration and justifi cation of these opening ‘superstructure’ to the needs of its ‘economic
remarks. I begin by refl ecting upon the base’. Furthermore, the Marxist approach to
holism/individualism debate. I then discuss the history was, as Karl Popper ( 2002) observed,
key concepts of relational sociology, considering ‘historicist’; referencing ‘laws’ and a telos to
how networks, in particular, can be researched by which the process of social life would inevitably
way of SNA. Having done this, however, I turn succumb (see also MerleauPonty’s ( 1973 )
to two further dualisms which have troubled critique). In the work of Althusser (1969 ) in
sociology in recent years: structure/agency and particular, moreover, the apparent break marking
micro/ macro. Whilst these dualisms point to Marx’s later work, where (according to
issues which relational sociologists will always Althusser) all reference to ‘man’ was removed in
need to be sensitive to, it is my contention that the favor of such structural concepts as ‘mode of
approach is well prepared to deal with them and production’ and ‘social formation’, was
I explain how. celebrated. Althusserian Marxism, like Parsonian
functionalism, removed human actors from the
picture, identifying institutions as the relevant
parts of the capitalist system for analysis and
9.2 Holism and Individualism
critique (although Althusser ( 1971 ) later
During the 1940s and 1950s functionalism, a reintroduced ‘the subject’ in his theory of
variety of holism, was the dominant paradigm ideology).
within sociology and Talcott Parsons ( 1951 ) was I am simplifying but this way of thinking
its key point of reference. Notwithstanding about ‘wholes’ persists within sociology and it is
Parsons’ own reticence regarding the problematic deeply problematic. The concept of ‘functions’ is
teleological form of ‘functional explanations’ legitimate and often useful but the problems of
(advocated, for example, by Radcliffe-Brown functional explanation are well-documented
1952 ), and that of Merton ( 1957 ), whom he (Hollis 1994) , even, in some cases, by writers
cites approvingly, ‘social facts’ were explained from within the functionalist camp (esp. Merton
by reference to the functions which they serve 1957 ) . To explain a social fact, such as a role,
within social systems. The ‘parts’ of the system norm or convention by reference to the function
were explained by reference to the whole and which it serves within a system, especially when
more specifi cally its ‘functional pre-requisites’. any reference to the actor who executes it is
etworks and Relational Sociology 169

removed, is to explain it by reference to its effect. where they have a means of making decisions
The causal arrow runs backwards, effect which are irreducible to those of their members,
becoming cause, without any explanation being and of acting upon those decisions. An economic
offered as to how such a counter-intuitive chain fi rm, for example, typically has a means of
of events is possible. And a similar problem is making decisions (e.g. a ballot of shareholders),
evident in relation to historicism; the end of which are then binding upon its members, who
history, its telos, is identifi ed as the cause of are both empowered and compelled to execute
those actions which bring it about –again without this decision. The decisions of such corporate
any explanation of how such ‘backwards actors can be shown to be irreducible to those of
causation’ is possible. their human participants, Hindess argues,
The whole is hypostatized and reifi ed in this because different procedures of collective
form of holism. It is not only more than the sum decision making (e.g. different voting systems)
of its parts but more than the sum of their give different outputs for the same individual
relations too; a metaphysical essence separate inputs. In addition, the actions of a corporate
from and determining both parts and their actor are often irreducible to those of the human
relations. Society is not constituted through the actors who staff it in virtue of its legal status,
interaction and ties of its members but is rather power and resources. Only a national government
something ‘above’ or ‘behind’ such praxes, can declare war or a state of emergency, for
steering them. The sociological holist, or at least example, and only a trade union can call a strike.
this type of holist, commits what Gilbert Ryle ( The human individuals who act on the corporate
1949 ) calls a ‘category error’, imagining a actor’s behalf in such cases act in the name of the
separate substance of ‘society’ behind all corporate actor, drawing upon its (not their
manifestations of it, which explains those individual) resources and its (not their individual)
manifestations. Society is conceived as a thing, a legal status.
substance. Relational sociology offers an A focus upon actors and their causal powers
alternative to this. Before I outline the relational is important and affords a robust response and
approach, however, I want to briefl y consider the rebuttal to those forms of holism which invoke
other side of this coin. ‘society’ or ‘the system’ as a mysterious ordering
A number of Parsons’ critics called for ‘men’ principle of social life. However, this position is
(sic) to be brought back into sociological theory, often couched in terms of individualism, and this
arguing that ‘systems’ and the ‘social facts’ is problematic.
which form their parts do not do anything and In some cases individualism is ontological.
possess no causal power; that they are mere The theorist claims that social facts and practices
patterns of human activity, done by social actors are merely shorthand ways of referring to the
(Homans 1973 ; Wrong 1961 ). Actors ‘do’ the actions of individuals. For the ontological
social world and everything in it from this individualist ‘there is no such thing as society,
perspective. They, not systems or social facts, only individuals …’, 59 to cite ex-British Prime
have causal powers and should be the focus of our Minister, Margaret Thatcher. Or rather society is
analysis. a mere aggregate of individuals. Many
I n some versions of this argument ‘actor’ sociological advocates claim to be
means ‘human actor’. Other versions, however, methodological rather than ontological
admit of ‘corporate actors’, such as trade unions, individualists, however. What this means is not
political parties, economic fi rms and national always clear but I will suggest two variants.
governments (Coleman 1990 ; Axelrod 1997 ). In some cases it means that the sociologist
Hindess ( 1988 ) offers a good argument in favor acknowledges the existence of ‘emergent
of the idea of corporate actors, suggesting that a properties’ in social life; that is to say, they accept
collective of human actors form a corporate actor the existence of ‘social facts’ which can only

59
Actually she said ‘… individuals and families …’ but The quote is from an interview in Women ’ s Own
her politics was a clear manifestation of this individualism. magazine 31/10/87.
N. Crossley

exist in the context of collective life and which biologically, within the womb of their mother;
are irreducible to individuals or aggregates of and then emerges into the world helpless and
individuals; but they maintain that such dependent upon others for many years. At birth
properties must be oriented to by individuals to they possess very few of the properties of ‘the
enjoy any effect and that sociology should social actor’ and they only acquire these
therefore remain focused upon individual actors. properties as a consequence of interaction with
Max Weber others. Through social interaction the human
(1978 ) falls into this camp. He recognizes that organism acquires language and thereby a
the social world comprises various emergent capacity for refl ective thought; a sense of
phenomena as well as social actors and that social self/other and identity; tastes and preferences; a
actors orient to such phenomena in their decisions moral sense; and many of the ‘body techniques’
and actions. However, such phenomena only necessary for getting by, to name only the most
affect social life in virtue of the choices and obvious. It becomes a social actor and the process
actions that individuals adopt towards them, from of becoming is unending. Actors are continually
his perspective, and he therefore focuses upon reshaped by the interactions and relations in
those choices and actions. which they participate. They are always active in
T he second approach, characterized by James such interactions and relations, from the very
Coleman ( 1990 ), amongst others (e.g. Laver beginning, never mere passive recipients of a
1997 ), adopts much the same stance but pushes culture thrust upon them, but who and what they
the position further by seeking individual level are is shaped and reshaped in interaction in ways
explanations for emergent phenomena. Coleman often unintended by them. There is no social actor
accepts that human behavior is affected by before or outside of the social world. The two
norms, for example, but argues that sociology emerge together.
must explain the origin and maintenance of This process of becoming is also a process of
norms; a task which, he insists, entails a focus individuation in which the actor takes on a
upon individual actors and their motivations. distinct identity and becomes aware of herself as
Individuals pre-exist the social world, from this a distinct and unique being. Consciousness of self
point of view, and to explain the social world, arises against a backdrop of consciousness of ‘not
which is the job of the sociologist, we must self’. And as Mead ( 1967) and Merleau- Ponty
therefore begin with individuals (see also Laver ( 1962 ), both important philosophers for
1997 ). relational sociology, argue, consciousness of self
T he individualist position is fl awed on a presupposes consciousness of the consciousness
number of grounds. Firstly, its tendency to of the other. I become conscious of myself by
abstract individuals from society, in some cases becoming conscious of the other’s consciousness
invoking a pre-social ‘state of nature’, in order to of me. Furthermore, consciousness, in these
explain society is artifi cial and fl ies in the face philosophical traditions (which inform relational
of much evidence. In phylogenetic terms we sociology), is conceived not as an ‘inner realm’,
know that our primate ancestors lived in groups separate from the world, but rather as a tie
and that group living was amongst the selection connecting the individual to the world. To be
pressures which shaped our evolution into human conscious of something or someone is to connect
beings. We were social, living with and in- with them.
relation-to others, before we were human and our The social actor, on this account, is an
biological evolution, qua humans, was shaped by emergent property of social interaction and
this. No less importantly, however, relations. We become who and what we are by
ontogenetically our biology is only a starting way of our involvement in social worlds; that is,
point as far as ‘the social actor’ assumed in much in networks, ties and interactions with others.
sociological theory, including individualistic And our capacity to engage in such interactions
theories, is concerned. The human actor is an is rooted in our earlier history of interaction and
outcome of sexual relations; takes shape, its formative effects.
etworks and Relational Sociology 171

A further, no less serious problem with gravity nor electricity can be directly perceived,
individualism is that it treats social actions as for example. We only perceive them indirectly,
discrete, failing to give proper consideration to by way of their effects (e.g. falling bodies or
interaction and interdependency between actors. illuminated light bulbs). However, nobody would
The social world is not an aggregate of dispute their existence or importance. If we can
individuals and their actions but rather arises demonstrate the effect of relational phenomena,
from interaction, relations and the it follows, then it is legitimate to infer their
interdependence of human actions and thoughts. existence, whether or not we can directly observe
Interestingly, some ‘methodological them. This is the task of relational sociology – to
individualists’ acknowledge this point, which I now turn.
incorporating interaction and interdependency in
their work by way of game theory (which
assumes that actors make decisions on the basis
9.3 Networks, Interactions and
of how they observe and/or anticipate others will
act and which, correspondingly, models the Ties
interdependence of individual decisions and its
H uman interaction is unobservable in strict
aggregate effects) and even, in some cases, social
empiricist terms. Actor i can be perceived to act.
network analysis (which, like game theory,
Likewise actor j. But the effect of each upon the
focuses upon interdependence) (Coleman 1990;
other is not directly perceived unless it involves
Hedström 2005 ). In my view such thinkers are
physical contact and causation, and even then
individualists in name only and have, in practice,
empiricist conceptions of causality struggle with
crossed over to a relational perspective – albeit a
the idea of connection. 2 To ‘observe’ interaction
fairly minimal relationalism which would benefi
is to infer that i acted as she did in response to j
t from further embellishment. Neither their
. Such inferences would not be contentious in
ontological nor their methodological inventories
most cases, however, and it is this mutual
are reducible to ‘individuals’, since they
affecting that characterizes and allows us to speak
acknowledge, at both levels, the signifi cance of
of social interaction: i affects j and her actions;
interaction and, in some cases, ties and networks.
j affects i and her actions. Each is affected by and
I n what follows I elaborate upon the
stimulates the other in an irreducible circuit
fundamental concepts of relational sociology: i.e.
which takes on a life of its own, drawing its
interaction, ties and networks. Before I do,
participants along with it. Gadamer captures this
however, I will briefl y address a potential
with respect to conversation:
obstacle to the acceptance of relational thought in
sociology: namely, a residual empiricism which The way one word follows another, with the
conversation taking its own twists and reaching its
resists the idea that relational phenomena are real.
own conclusion may be conducted in some way,
Empiricism identifi es the real with the but the partners conversing are far less the leaders
perceptible and this generally favors of it than the led. No one knows what will come out
individualism. Human beings, qua bodies, can be of a conversation. (Gadamer 1989 , 383)
seen, heard, touched etc. and their existence is
therefore obvious. Relations, by contrast, cannot
be directly perceived and, to the empiricist frame
2
of mind, this renders their existence questionable. As critique of empiricist accounts of causation have
On a strictly empirical level the social world is an noted, the tendency to conceptualize causation as a
succession of two events (constant conjuncture) avoids
aggregate of biologically individuated beings and
reference to any connection between them (Keat and Urry
the popularity of individualism in social and 1975 ).
political thought, I suggest, stems from this.
Against such empiricism, however, we should Likewise Merleau-Ponty:
remind ourselves of the role of ‘unobservables’ …my words and those of my interlocutor are
in other sciences (Keat and Urry 1975 ). Neither called forth by the state of the discussion, and they
are inserted into a shared operation of which
N. Crossley

neither of us is the creator … the objection which knowing the effect which past has upon present,
my interlocutor raises to what I say draws from me their anticipation of future interaction shapes
thoughts which [surprise me]. (Merleau-Ponty
their engagement in the present. Inappropriate
1962 : 353)
behavior now, even if it cannot be punished now,
might be punished in future interactions.
I nteraction is a whole greater than the sum of the
T ies and interactions are mutually affecting.
individual actors involved in it, a system, but in
Interactions, past and future, shape ties, and ties
contrast to Parsonian and Althusserian systems,
shape interaction. Furthermore, the actor assumes
actors remain its central drivers. The direction
an identity, which may be specifi c to that tie, and
which the interaction takes is entirely contingent
the way in which they interact is shaped, in some
upon the responses of those party to it but those
part, by that identity. As actors move from one
party to it are transformed by it and can neither
interaction to another they ‘switch’ identities, to
foresee nor control the direction which it takes.
borrow a term from Mische and White ( 1998 ),
We cannot abstract the actor from interaction, as
and their patterns of interaction change
the individualist would like, nor the system from
accordingly. Indeed, they may switch within
its actors, as the holist prefers. We must work
what, from the outside, appears to be the same
relationally.
interaction: a boss-to-worker interaction
Note the processual nature of this conception.
becoming a father-to- son or friend-to-friend
Interaction is a process and social life, as the
interaction, for example, with a consequent shift
culmination of interaction, is too therefore. The
in the properties and dynamics of the interaction.
quotations from Gadamer and Merleau-Ponty
The conventions and identities which shape
suggest change and unpredictability. This is true
ties and interactions are not built from scratch in
of social life in some places, some of the time, but
each case. They are carried across from previous
not everywhere and always. Interaction can
relationships and vicariously, from the observed
reproduce patterns across time. Even where this
experiences of others. Indeed, actors enjoy access
is the case, however, ‘the system’ is still dynamic.
to a cultural stock of ‘types’ which they can
There is no social world outside of interaction
employ, albeit often with a degree of individual
and whatever stability can be observed is an
tailoring, to make sense of new and unfamiliar
outcome of continuously on-going interaction.
encounters (Schutz 1972 ).
Some interactions are ‘one-shot’. Parties
My conception of interaction is akin to what
meet, having never met before and with little
Dewey and Bentley ( 1949 ) call ‘transaction’, a
prospect of meeting again in the future. Many,
concept which they contrast with ‘interaction’.
however, including most of those which are
Parties to a ‘transaction’, as Dewey and Bentley
personally and/or sociologically most important,
conceptualize this distinction, are at least partly
are not. Actors engage on numerous occasions,
constituted by it whereas interaction occurs
building a shared history and entering interaction
between otherwise independent entities. I prefer
with the (often tacit) expectation that they will
to stick with the term ‘interaction’, even though
meet again. In such cases actors are tied. At its
what I mean by it concurs with their
most basic a social tie is a sedimented
‘transactions’ because the term ‘transaction’ has
interaction history embellished by the anticipated
a strong economic connotation, which is
likelihood of future interaction .
unhelpful, and because most other writers whom
L ike interaction, ties are not empirically
I draw upon do not make the distinction and, like
observable but can be inferred from their effects.
me, use ‘interaction’ in a way which overlaps
Through repeated interaction actors co-produce
with what Dewey and Bentley call ‘transaction’.
shared, habitual interaction repertoires involving
conventions, identities, understandings, trust etc.,
which afford them a rapport. What happens in
interaction is affected by this sedimented
collective history. They interact differently
because they ‘know’ one another. Furthermore,
etworks and Relational Sociology 173

9.3.1 Interdependence and Power 9.3.2 From Dyads to Triads and


Networks
I n many cases actors’ ties also involve
interdependence. Goods and resources are A focus upon dyadic ties, i – j, is, for many
exchanged and each comes to rely upon the other purposes, inadequate. Ties are usually embedded
for those goods and resources. This may sound in wider networks which mediate their signifi
economistic but I see it as a means of recognizing cance and effects. Actors enjoy multiple ties and,
the meaningfulness of ties and the attraction as Simmel’s ( 1902 ) refl ections upon ‘the third’
involved. Although some ties are involuntary suggest, the pattern of ties within which any
actors generally select those with whom they single tie is embedded will often modify its
repeatedly interact. The reasons for their effect. Where different alters exert competing infl
selections may be cynical and economistic (e.g. uence, for example, they may cancel one another
‘because she’s loaded and buys me things’) but out or inculcate a more cosmopolitan outlook on
they often centre upon perceived personal behalf of the actor, who learns to see the world
qualities or qualities of a tie, built up over time, from a variety of standpoints. Conversely, when
which make the other attractive: e.g. ‘we have a singing from the same hymn sheet they may
laugh’, ‘we understand and value each other’, ‘we reinforce one another. To give another example,
have shared interests to talk about’. These dependency in any one relation will be affected
qualities are the goods to which I am referring, at by other relations which potentially afford the
least as much as material goods, and they are actor access to the same goods or resources: i’ s
important because they make ties intelligible, dependence upon j may be lessened by their tie
furnishing a reason for the repeated contact to k if k affords them many of the same goods as
between those involved. j.
I nterdependence is important because it Furthermore, this is affected by ties (or their
creates a balance of power (Elias 1978 ; Mohl absence) between actors’ alters. If i ‘brokers’
1997 ). Each needs the other and this affords the between j and k this puts him in a different
other a lever by which to affect their behavior, position, with different opportunities and
albeit perhaps sometimes unwittingly (Mohl constraints, to a situation where each of the three
1997 ). From romantic relations, through knows the others (see Fig. 9.1 ). A broker is often
employment, to the ties between a colonial power rewarded for serving as a conduit of innovations
and its colony, the (often tacit) threat that desired and resources, for example (Burt 1992 , 2005 ).
goods could be withdrawn motivates compliance In addition, as sexual health campaigns remind
with the (perceived) wishes of the other, making us, i ’s relation with j is also an indirect tie to j
social ties relations of power. ’s alters, indirectly exposing her to whatever
Levels of interdependence and (im)balance goods (or bads) j ’s alters have. Rather than focus
vary. The pleasant conversation afforded by a upon dyads, therefore, we need to focus upon
casual acquaintance can easily be found networks, remembering of course that networks
elsewhere, for example, making the mutual hold are always in-process as a consequence of the
of acquaintances relatively weak. Financial interactions between their nodes. New ties form.
dependence, by contrast, can create a strong hold. Old ties change and sometimes break etc.
Likewise, where the exchange involved in casual
acquaintance is often evenly balanced, each
having the same hold over the other, fi nancial
exchanges are often imbalanced, with one party
having more of a hold over the other. These
variations are important and we are often only
interested in power relations where they are
strong and imbalanced. To reiterate, however,
power balances are ubiquitous in social ties.
N. Crossley

Fig. 9.1 Brokerage and closure too. At the very least, social worlds are structured
by:
1. Conventions : which are generated through
interaction, diffuse through networks, evolve
in subsequent interaction and which both
facilitate coordination of the interactions
constitutive of the world and serve to
9.4 Social Worlds and the Social
distinguish it from others worlds (where other
World conventions are in evidence).
2. Resources: which are mobilized and
The social world, as conceived by the relational exchanged in interaction and unevenly
sociologist, is a vast and complex network; a distributed across networks, generating power
network which is:
imbalances and confl icts of interest.
1. Multiplex: pairs of actors are tied in multiple
different ways.
2. Multi - Modal : a network not only of human 9.5 Analyzing Networks
actors but also corporate actors (e.g. fi rms,
governments etc.), places, events and other I suggested at the outset of this chapter that
node types. relational sociology is not only a theoretical but
3. Multi - Leveled: certain nodes and networks also a methodological program in sociology.
are nested within others. Relational sociology requires relational
4. Dynamic : a network which is constantly methodologies. One such methodology is social
evolving. network analysis (SNA). SNA affords a means of
exploring patterns of ties empirically, studying
This begs questions of scale which I return to. actors- in-r elation and capturing social worlds
Presently, however, note that, like most not as mere aggregates of actors but rather as
sociologists, relational sociologists recognize relational ‘wholes’. Furthermore, it allows us to
that the social world, writ large, is subdivided empirically measure network properties and

into smaller social worlds, centered upon investigate their effects. This is not the place to
particular shared foci of interest, and much offer a detailed introduction to SNA, nor to tackle
analysis, in practice, is focused upon one or more the complex issues of multiplexity, multi-
of these worlds. modality etc. referred to above. However, it
My chief concern in this chapter is with the would be
network element of these worlds. It is important John 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 Jane 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
to note, however, that other elements are in play Jake 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
etworks and Relational Sociology 175

Sue 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 Martin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Paul 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 Charlie 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
Gill 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 Bud 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Fred 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 Diana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Errol 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 Nina 0 0 Fig. 9.2 An adjacency matrix
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 Raj 0 0 0 0 00000000000000000000000000000
0 1 0 1 0 0000000000000001000000001000
Kirk 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00000010010000000100
Billie 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Nick 0 0 0 0 0 00000010000011100000
0 0 0 0 Frank 0 00001000000100000000010011000
0 0 0 0 0 0011010000000001000001000000
0 0 0 00100000000000000000000
Nisha 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Sarah 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
instructive to give a brief overview, showing how multiple types of tie or interaction, of course, in
the approach might inform relational sociology. which case we can have multiple matrices, each
I begin with two basic elements of the capturing a different tie.
approach: graphs and adjacency matrices. The Note that I have left the diagonal of the matrix
left-hand column of the matrix in Fig. 9.2 lists all in Fig. 9.2, which captures a node’s relation to
of the actors involved in a particular context of itself, blank. For some purposes it may be
interest. The top row repeats this list. Each actor, meaningful to ask if a node enjoys a tie to their
therefore, has both a row and column, and the self (a refl exive tie), and SNA can allow for this.
presence of a tie between any two of them can be In many cases, however, it is not meaningful and
captured by placing a number in the cell where we ignore the diagonal.
one’s row meets the other’s column. In the simple
case a 1 represents the presence of a tie and a 0
its absence. If we have measured tie strength or
counted the number of interactions between two
actors, however, then we may use whatever range
of values is required.
T he matrix has two cells for each pair of
actors, one on either side of the diagonal which
runs from the top left to the bottom right of the
matrix. There is a cell where John’s row
intersects Jane’s column, for example, and one
where her row intersects his column. This allows
us to capture direction in ties. Perhaps we are
interested in relations of liking and though John
likes Jane she does not like him. If so we can put
a 1 where his row intersects her column
(indicating his liking for her) and a 0 where her
row intersects his column (indicating the absence
of any liking for him by her). Some relations are
undirected, however, such that we would record
the same information in each cell. If John plays
tennis with Jane, for example, then Jane
necessarily plays tennis with John, or rather they
play tennis together. We might be interested in
N. Crossley

An adjacency matrix facilitates mathematical components (some networks may have more than
manipulation of relational data. The same one component and some only one).
information can be recorded in the form of a The existence of distinct components might
graph, however, where, in the simple case, actors be of interest to us if we are interested in the fl
are represented by shapes (vertices) and ties by ow of goods or ‘bads’ (e.g. viruses) through a

Bud Fred
Billie
Charlie
Nisha
Sarah Nina Gill
Frank
Errol

Kirk
Raj

Nick
Martin

Jake
Diana

Jane

John Paul
Sue

Fig. 9.3 A network graph (visualizing the relations recorded in Fig. 9.2 )
connecting lines (edges) (see Fig. 9.3 ) (this network because goods cannot fl ow where there
graph has been drawn and all network mesures is no path.
derived using Ucinet software (Borgatti et al. Belonging to a discrete component therefore may
2002 )). A graph makes both the structure of a afford a node safety from wider dangers.
network and the position of specifi c nodes within Conversely, it may cut them off from important
it more immediately apparent, and it affords a resources, including new ideas, innovations and
more intuitive way of explaining certain network information. Similarly, if we were interested in
properties (at least for smaller networks). In what collective action we would not expect any
follows I will briefl y describe a number of these coordination or solidarity between members of
properties, for illustrative purposes, subdividing discrete components because they lack the
them into three levels: the whole network, necessary contact. Furthermore, we would expect
subgroups and individual nodes. to fi nd different emergent cultures across
components as the relations of mutual infl uence
generative of culture do not traverse them.
9.5.1 The Whole Network Even within the main component, however,
and certainly for the network as a whole, we can
Looking fi rstly at the whole network we see see that only a fraction of the number of
immediately that there is a break in it, with a connections that could exist actually do. There
cluster of nodes to the bottom of the plot whose are 20 nodes in this network and therefore 20 ×
members each have a path connecting them to 19/2 = 190 pairs of actors. Assuming that ties are
one another but no path connecting them to the undirected there are therefore 190 potential ties.
rest of the network (all other nodes are connected Empirically, however, we only have 27 ties. This
to one another by a path). We express this by gives us a network density of 27/190 = 0.14.
saying that the network comprises two
etworks and Relational Sociology 177

Density is important for various reasons. To of methods for identifying these positions and
return to the above examples: higher density has analyzing the structure which they jointly form.
been shown both to speed up the rate at which A nother way of looking at subgroups in SNA
goods/bads diffuse through a network (Valente is to focus upon attributes and identities which
1995 ), and to cultivate trust, solidarity and are exogenous to network structure but shape it.
incentive systems which, in turn, increase the There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that
likelihood of collective action (Coleman 1990 ; actors are more likely to form ties to others of a
Crossley 2015a ). similar status, such as race or social class (‘status
9.5.2 Subgroups homophily’), for example, or to others who share
salient values and/or tastes (‘value homophily’)
There are many different ways of identifying (Lazarsfeld and Merton 1964; McPherson et al.
subgroups within a network, each based upon 2001 ). It can be diffi cult to disentangle
different principles and appropriate for different ‘selection’ from ‘infl uence’ in some cases; are
purposes. Components are one example but our contacts similar to us because we have
sometimes we fi nd dense patches within a selected them on this basis or because our
network whose members are not absolutely cut interactions have made us more alike? Both
off and yet which form clear clusters. The factors are in play much of the time but certain
discovery and verifi cation of such clusters, longitudinal methods in SNA allow us to capture
which SNA techniques enable, may be important their relative weighting in particular cases, and it
because the relatively high density of interaction can be instructive to explore whether such
and thus mutual infl uence within them and low endogenous groupings as those discussed in the
density (and thus low infl uence) between them above paragraph map onto these exogenous
will encourage the formation of different divisions. Does ethnicity or income affect social
emergent cultures. Moreover, the connections mixing and consequent group formation, for
between them may encourage comparison and example. Such issues have considerable signifi
thereby the formation of distinct collective cance beyond sociology and SNA affords means
identities, competition, perhaps even confl ict. and measures for exploring them.
Cohesive clustering in networks facilitates
collective action and the formation of effective
social groups. 9.5.3 Node Level Properties
Components and density are measures of
cohesion. They allow us to measure how Beyond subgroups SNA also affords various
cohesive a network is and to identify cohesive measures for exploring the individual position of
subgroups within it. Another way of thinking particular nodes within a network. There are, for
about subgroups, however, is to focus upon nodes example, a range of different methods for
who occupy an equivalent position within a measuring and comparing the centrality of
network, irrespective of cohesion. Middle individual nodes within a network, each refl
managers in an organization may occupy a ecting a different conception of what it is to be
similar position, for example, mediating between central and thus being more or less appropriate to
the shop-fl oor and upper management, without different projects; and there are a range of
necessarily enjoying any connection to one methods for exploring the opportunities which
another. They are in a similar position but do not particular nodes might enjoy for brokerage and
form a cohesive group. Such positions are the benefi ts it affords (Burt 1992 , 2005 ).
important and interesting, sociologically, because Several of these measures may be aggregated,
they typically afford similar opportunities and moreover, in ways which afford us a perspective
constraints to all who occupy them, thereby upon the whole network. For purposes of
shaping their interactions. SNA affords a number illustration consider degree centrality .
N. Crossley

I n this context ‘degree’ means the number of Errol and Charlie (three degrees). The shortest of
ties which any individual node has. In a these paths is referred to as the ‘geodesic
friendship network a node who has three friends distance’ between the nodes involved and it is
has a degree of 3, and the node with the most this path- length, in particular, that is often of
friends has the highest degree. They are the most interest in SNA because, all things being
most degree central node in the network. This can equal, it is the quickest route through which
be an advantage: having a lot of friends brings a goods (and bads) can travel and involves the least
lot of benefi ts. It involves costs and constraints, likelihood of them being ‘damaged’ in transit.
however, as maintaining ties requires time and S ometimes we may be interested in the
energy, and friends will tend to ask favors (which geodesic distances between particular nodes or
are diffi cult to refuse) and make demands. each individual node’s total distance from all
Enjoying a high centrality is not always a benefi others in their component. Often, however, we
t, therefore, but it exposes a node to different are interested in the distribution of geodesic
opportunities and constraints to less central nodes distances in a network or their average. Amongst
and we would expect this to make a difference. other things, this tells us how likely it is that
Furthermore, we may be interested in the impact information and instructions will pass quickly
of exogenous resources and statuses upon through the network, facilitating coordination.
centrality. Are men, on average, more central I have only scratched at the surface of SNA
than women in a particular network, for example, here. My intention has been to illustrate how the
and therefore advantaged within it? ties, interactions and networks which comprise
Building upon this, we can average degree for the conceptual core of relational sociology can be
the whole network, thus enabling comparisons methodologically incorporated and empirically
across networks ( average degree is a closely explored. Many other measures, covering other
related measure to density ), and we can explore properties, exist and, beyond these descriptive
the distribution of degree in order to assess how ( measures, there are many methods for both
degree ) centralized a network is. A skewed statistically modeling network structure
distribution in which a small number of nodes are (including dynamic changes over time) and
involved in a high proportion of all ties reveals exploring the signifi cance of exogenous
that the network is centered upon those nodes. attributes and identities (both as factors which
This points to inequalities in the network but also affect and factors which are affected by network
perhaps to an enhanced opportunity for patterns) (Borgatti et al. 2013; Lusher et al.
coordination of activities (Oliver and Marwell 2013; Scott 2000 ; Snijders et al. 2010 ;
1993 ), since the central nodes are in a position to Wasserman and Faust 1994 ). Furthermore, SNA
centralize information and distribute orders. is not the only relational method one might use
A s a fi nal illustration of measurable network and many studies will mix methods. The process
properties I will briefl y discuss geodesic of interaction might be analyzed by way of
distances , a concept I return to later. Any two conversation analysis, for example, or indeed
nodes within a component have a path modeled by way of game theory, and the access
(comprising ties and nodes) connecting them. In to interaction and ties afforded by both
Fig. 9.3 , for example, there is a path between participant observation and archival analysis
Frank and Gill via Sarah, Nina and the three ties often makes them good methods for relational-
between them. Paths are measured in ties or sociological research. SNA is an important
‘degrees’, as they are called in this context, so we relational method, however, and hopefully this
say that Frank and Gill are at three degrees of brief introduction has been suffi cient to give
separation. There are often several paths between some inphenomena, however, and innumerable
the same two nodes. For example, Gill and Fred studiesdication of this. With that said I want to
are directly connected (one degree) but there is conclude this chapter by considering where
also a more circuitous path between them via relational sociology stands in relation to two
etworks and Relational Sociology 179

thorny dualisms which have dogged sociology in affords them and might respond in different ways
recent years: (1) structure and agency, and (2) to the same constraints. Agents work within and
micro and macro. around structure. It does not determine their
action.
T hese criticisms are important and inform
relational sociology. We must be attentive to
9.6 Structure and Agency
culture, which, as shared, is itself relational (see
T he relational position involves both agency and Crossley 2015a , b ), and we must avoid
structure. Network nodes are typically social deterministic readings of the effect of network
actors, locked in relations and interactions with properties, recognizing the ways in which actors
others which affect them, but also loci of decision negotiate them. I am not convinced that there is a
and action and therefore agents all the same. great deal more to be said, theoretically, about
Structure fi gures by way of the conventions structure and agency, however, and would
actors observe (and both co-create and modify in suggest that, beyond these general theoretical
interaction), the uneven distribution of resources considerations, the issue is empirical. The
(including status) and power imbalances between structure/agency debate arose in some part from
them but more importantly, for present purposes, the theoretical divide between holists and
in the form of network structure which, I have individualists which I discussed above. Holists
suggested, generates both opportunities and exclude actors and thus agency from their
constraints for those involved in it. The question account. Individualists exclude structure.
of structure and agency, in this context, concerns However, when a theory includes both agency
the relative weight that we accord to each. and structure, as relational sociology does, and
T his is a live issue, as attested by a number of the question becomes one of relative weighting,
critiques of SNA published in recent years, both we cannot answer that question in theory and
by network analysts themselves and others cannot expect the same answer for every
(Crossley 2010; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994 situation. Structure is more constraining in some
; Knox et al. 2006 ; Mische 2003 ). ‘Old school’ contexts and at some times than others. Both
network analysis stands accused of positing a structure and agency are important in every
deterministic interpretation of networks which context but their relative weight will shift
attributes fi xed effects to particular network between contexts and it is the job of the
properties and suggests that incumbents of sociologist to determine the weighting in the
particular positions in a network are constrained specifi c contexts they are researching.
to play certain roles within it. These criticisms are
partly focused upon the neglect of culture in
much SNA and also partly methodological. 9.7 Micro and Macro
Network effects and dynamics are mediated by
meanings, identities, actors’ understandings and There is yet another dualism that relational
thus by culture, it is argued, none of which is sociology is required to tackle, however; namely,
necessarily captured in formal network analysis. the micro-macro divide. As I understand it, the
The critics therefore call for a mixed method micro-macro debate focuses upon scale.
approach to SNA which brings qualitative data Sociology might focus upon the details of a few
regarding these cultural elements to bear. The seconds of conversation between two people or
debate is also about agency, however. Meanings, upon matters of world history, begging the
identities, understandings etc. are negotiated in question of how such foci are linked and whether
interaction, for example, as are opportunities and the principles governing one are relevant to the
constraints. Actors can fail to take the other. This is a potentially very complex issue
opportunities which their network position and I cannot do complete justice to it here. It is
N. Crossley

important, however, to say something about macro-cosmic. But they are interactions between
context and something about scale. I begin with actors all the same. The ‘world system’ or ‘global
the former. social order’ is not a mysterious force affecting
T he link between micro and macro is not our lives from without but rather a network, albeit
always as diffi cult to envisage as it initially a hugely complex network, involving millions of
sounds. The events which turn the wheels of actors, both human and corporate, and the various
world history, affecting large numbers of people, (often unequal) ties between them, and as such it
are sometimes, in themselves, relatively ‘small’. can be analyzed by way of SNA (Smith and
As I write, for example, the Greek Parliament has White 1992; Snyder and Kick 1979 ). The social
just agreed, very reluctantly, to pass a number of macro-cosm may involve ‘bigger’ actors and/or
‘austerity laws’ demanded by the European more actors (see below) but it is no different in
Union in return for a (third) fi nancial bailout, kind to its constituent micro-cosms.
involving billions of Euros, in an effort to protect In the Greek example social movements and
their country from economic disaster and their protests also played a role. They put
possible exit from the Eurozone. This is an event pressure on the Greek government and sent a
of global signifi cance with huge implications, signal to other European politicians. Social
especially in Greece but across Europe and, to movements do not fi t my defi nition of corporate
some extent, the world. With the exception of the actors because they generally have no means of
huge crowds of protestors who gathered outside making decisions or enforcing their own
the Greek Parliament when the decision was resolutions (Offe 1985) , even if some of the
being made, and who I return to below, however, ‘social movement organizations’ within them do.
most of the decisions shaping and steering this Movements are relational phenomena, however,
situation were made in interactions between a and innumerable studies have pointed both to
relatively small number of people over a their network character and to the role of pre-
relatively short period of time. Greek politicians existing networks in their formation and
sat face-t o-f ace and debated. Similarly, the mobilization (Crossley 2007 ; Crossley and
demands of ‘the European Union’ were decided Krinsky 2015; Diani and McAdam
by a small number of European politicians over a 2003 ).
few days, face-to-face in various committee I t isn’t always possible to pin the twists and
rooms, and relayed directly to the Greek Prime turns of history down to particular interactions.
Minister. Certain trends and dynamics cannot be localized
Any analysis of these interactions would have in this way. The relational approach is still the
to understand their context: the various pressures best way of making sense of such dynamics,
upon those involved, the stakes involved, and so however. Complexity theory in the natural
on. However, this moment in global history was sciences and the agent-based models employed
decided through face-to-face interaction which, therein provide a useful reference point for
whatever its particularities, assumed much the thinking about these issues (Watts 1999 ;
same form as any other human interaction. This Barabási 2003; Newman et al. 2006) . In
is not atypical. As the individualists recognize, it complex systems, which are usually conceived of
is actors who do things and make things happen as networks involving interaction between
in the social world. All sociological phenomena millions of nodes, the multiplication of
can and should be tracked back. interactions and intervention of cascade,
T he Greek government is a corporate actor, feedback and other such mechanisms generate
involving irreducible mechanisms of decision fascinating organizational forms and dynamics
making and implementation. Likewise the akin to those sometimes observed by
European Union. The decisions made by and sociologists. These dynamics and forms are often
between these corporate actors often affect extremely impressive; everything happens ‘as if’
millions of people. They are global in their reach; by grand design. Unlike the sociological holists
etworks and Relational Sociology 181

discussed above, however, complexity scientists and dynamic) network. This idea sometimes
are able to show by way of their models that such attracts resistance because sociologists are
emergent forms are indeed emergent, that is, inclined to believe that the scale of national and
generated from the bottom up by way of international societies is so big that ‘something
interactions and their concatenations, and not else’, something other than interaction, ties and
inevitable outcomes of history’s grand plan. networks are at work. The work of the complexity
Complex systems are networks and their theorists suggests that this need not be so and that
emergent organization can be analyzed as such. a network model of society is plausible.
We might not be able to graph such networks What the complexity theorists overlook in
very clearly, given their size, but we can analyze their use of Milgram, however, is his focus upon
them using SNA and related methods. social division. Milgram conceived of social
Interaction, ties and networks remain the bedrock structure as a network. His research was focused,
of our understanding of what is going on. in some part, upon the basic properties of such
The focus on networks in complexity theory networks, not least average geodesics. However,
has also led to an interesting exchange with social he was also interested in the impact of status
science. Emergent effects in complex systems are differentials upon network structure. His work
sometimes diffi cult to comprehend because it is suggested that this could be considerable,
diffi cult to imagine how order could emerge particular in relation to race. His methodology
between such a large number of nodes (millions). involved asking people to mail a package to
Surely, complexity theorists puzzled, geodesic others whom they knew, with the ultimate aim of
distances would be too long to facilitate any delivering the package to a target individual who
signifi cant transfer of energy or information? In was not directly known to those involved at the
puzzling this question complexity theorists start of the experiment. The study suggested that
stumbled across work by social psychologist, packages often traversed geographical space with
Stanley Milgram ( 1967 ), which suggested that relative ease and speed but that, where they were
any two citizens picked at random from the US required to cross a racial divide, the process often
population, are, on average, separated by only six stalled. Participants enjoyed good relations with
ties (‘six degrees of separation’). This so-called others of their own race across the country, in
‘small world’ phenomena was intriguing to the other words, but few such relations with members
complexity physicists because it rendered the of other racial groups even in their own town.
idea of mutual infl uence between nodes in a Ties were shaped by status and more especially
network of millions far more plausible. ethnic homophily. I mention this here to
Geodesics need not be very long even in huge demonstrate that and how relational sociology
networks; in which case, infl uence and allows us to begin to think about and research
coordination across such networks is plausible. such social divisions, on a macro-level. Social
This prompted complexity theorists both to divisions, from a relational point of view,
conduct a variety of studies looking for ‘small manifest in patterns of connection (and lack of
world’ examples in the natural world, which they connection) within a population and those
found in abundance, and to solve the patterns of connection are empirically analyzable
mathematical problem posed by Milgram’s work: using SNA (see also Blau 1974 , 1977 ).
namely, how can nodes in a network of millions Status homophily is an example of what I
be linked by such short geodesics? They came up described early as ‘cohesive subgroups’. Actors
with two possibilities, both of which work who share a particular status tend to gravitate
(mathematically), and have been demonstrated towards one another. Actors with different
empirically and in simulations. More important statuses do not. They may even actively avoid
for our purposes, however, is the support that it one another. As noted earlier, however, this is not
lends to my idea, introduced above, that the social the only way in which nodes might cluster. Nodes
world is a (multiplex, multi-modal, multileveled can be clustered where they occupy ‘equivalent’
N. Crossley

positions in a network, as defi ned in SNA and (relational) sociology. Structure is not ‘above’ or
measured by a number of dedicated clustering ‘behind’ actors, from this perspective, however.
algorithms. A good example of this It lies between them. Furthermore, it does not
‘blockmodeling’ in action is Peter Bearman’s ( determine action. How actors respond to
1993 ) analysis of kinship networks and elite situations depends upon cultural processes,
structures in Norfolk (England) prior to the including dialogue and debate; and structure, in
(1642–1651) civil war. The details of the study any case, only affords opportunities and
are not strictly relevant here but it is important to constraints which actors work around. There is
note, fi rstly, that Bearman uses blockmodeling both agency and structure in relational sociology.
to render a very large network intelligible and to Quite how much agency and structure enter into
track both hierarchy and changes in hierarchy any given situation depends upon the situation,
within English society; secondly, that he identifi however. The relational sociologist must look at
es changes in this network which played an the interplay and relative weighting of structure
important role in the precipitation of the civil war. and agency in any particular situation.
Again here SNA proves a useful tool for T alk of interaction, ties and networks perhaps
exploring ‘macro’ processes and events, and suggests a focus upon the social micro-cosm.
again the keys to understanding those processes Relational sociology is well-suited to analyze the
and events are shown to be networks, ties and micro-cosm but not only the micro-cosm. Macro-
interactions. social life is open to relational analysis too. More
9.8 Conclusion to the point, it is a key claim of the relational
sociologist that, whilst further mechanisms may
Sociological theory in the latter half of the be evident and a wide range of relational-analytic
twentieth century became caught in a dualism methods required, the dynamics and organization
involving two equally problematic tendencies: a of the social macro-cosm are generated from the
top down holism which removed social actors bottom up, through interaction, ties and
from consideration, treating ‘society’ and networks, much as happens in the micro-cosm.
‘history’ as greater than both their parts and the Indeed, any distinction between micro and macro
relations between those parts; and a form of is unhelpful. It makes more sense to think of a
individualism which effectively reduced society continuum of scale along which different
to an aggregate of self-contained social actors. relational processes can be located.
Relational sociology is based upon a critique of
these ideas and posits an alternative to them,
focused upon the key concepts: interaction, ties
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Varieties of Sociological Field 10 Theory
Daniel N. Kluttz and Neil Fligstein

10.1 Introduction p aying particular attention to the infl uences of


Max Weber and Kurt Lewin but also
The explanation of social action in sociological phenomenology and symbolic interactionism.
theory has traditionally focused on either macro- We next provide an overview of three of the most
or micro-level analyses. Field theory offers an developed elaborations of fi eld theory from the
alternative view of social life. It is concerned with last half-century – Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of fi
how a set of actors orienting their actions to one elds (1992), the neo-institutional approach to
another do so in a meso-level social order. Field “organizational fi elds” (DiMaggio and Powell
theory implies that there is something at stake in 1983 ), and the model of “strategic action fi elds”
such an order, that there are rules g overning the recently proposed by Fligstein and McAdam (
order, that actors have positions and resources, 2012 ). We follow these overviews with a more
and that actors have an understanding of the order detailed examination of how each of these
that allows them to interpret the actions of others theories addresses two of the most fundamental
and frame a response. Fields, once formed, are problems in sociological theory: (1) how social fi
the arenas where the sociological game of elds emerge, reproduce, and change, and (2) how
jockeying for position constantly plays out. to conceive of agency and actors.
O ur purpose in this chapter is to review W e spend the bulk of our essay discussing key
contemporary fi eld theory as articulated in three differences between the three approaches on
major theoretical statements in sociology. 1 We these issues. Although there are some
begin with a brief description of the core tenets of commonalities across the varieties of fi eld
any contemporary sociological fi eld theory. We theory, there are also some clear differences of
then discuss fi eld theory’s intellectual roots, opinion. Drawing its model of social action from
Berger and Luckmann ( 1967 ) and
1 phenomenology,
We only review theories that explicitly invoke the fi eld
concept. There are a great many perspectives in sociology foundational neo-institutional theory downplays
that appear compatible with fi eld theory, for example, the exercise of power in fi elds and offers us a
network analysis (White 1992) and the institutional logics view of actors who tend towards habit and
perspective (Thornton et al. 2012 ). But these perspectives conformity in their actions and rely on cues from
eschew fi eld as a central concept and are not discussed in
the fi eld to legitimate their actions. In contrast,
this chapter.
Bourdieu’s theory emphasizes the role of power
D. N. Kluttz () • N. Fligstein in fi eld construction and focuses on how the
University of California, Berkeley ,
Berkeley , CA , USA
structuring of the fi eld gives more powerful
e-mail: dkluttz@berkeley.edu; fl igst@berkeley.edu actors the tools by which to consistently win the
game. He develops a sophisticated model of
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 185
S. Abrutyn (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary Sociological Theory,
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32250-6_10
D.N. Kluttz and N. Fligstein

action predicated on “habitus,” which is a


concept to explain how people form cultural
frames that inform their ability to interpret the 10.2 Common Themes in Field
actions of others. While there are clear affi nities Theories
between the model of actors in Bourdieu and
classic neo- institutional theory, Bourdieu’s The main idea in fi eld theory is that most of
model focuses more on how actors use their social life occurs in arenas where actors take one
existing cognitive frames to engage in strategic another into account in their actions. These
yet socially structured action. interactions occur where something is at stake.
On the questions of fi eld emergence and But fi elds also imply a stable order, one that
change, Bourdieu and neo-institutional theory allows for the reproduction of the actors and their
focus mostly on the reproducibility of fi eld social positions over time. This general
structure as the outcome of social action. formulation of a fi eld is sometimes described as
Fligstein and McAdam ( 2012 ) theorize a meso-level social order. The term “meso” refers
emergence and change more explicitly and offer to the fact that actors are taking each other into
the most fl uid and political view of fi eld account in framing actions within some
dynamics. They suggest that even stable fi elds theoretically or empirically defi ned social arena.
are constantly undergoing change, as contestation This means that the explanation of social action
over all aspects of the fi eld is part of the ongoing is done in the context of the fi eld. This does not
fi eld project. Fligstein and McAdam advance the mean that all actors are individuals. Instead, fi eld
idea that fi elds are embedded in systems of fi elds theory conceives of actors as including
that greatly infl uence the ability of actors to individuals, groups, subunits of organizations,
create and reproduce stable worlds. They also organizations, fi rms, and states. Examples of
provide insight into fi eld emergence and meso-level social orders made up of both
transformation by viewing these as situations in individual and collective actors include groups of
which all aspects of fi eld formation are up for individuals who work in an offi ce and cooperate
grabs. Finally, they develop the evocative over a task, subunits of organizations that vie for
concept of social skill to explain how actors infl organizational resources, fi rms that compete
uence, dominate, or cooperate with others to with one another to dominate a market, and states
produce and sustain meso-level social order. that come together to negotiate treaties. The
We clarify these differences of opinion to primary unit of analysis is neither a macro-social
suggest two future lines of work. First, it is process that contains some underlying structural
possible that each of these perspectives captures logic operating independently of actors (e.g.,
something plausible about how the world works. social class) nor is it a micro-social process that
What is left unspecifi ed is the scope conditions focuses on the idiosyncratic preferences and
under which one or the other of these perspectives motivations of individual actors.
should be deployed. Second, it may turn out that F ield theorists share a spatial, relational
one of these perspectives in fact offers a better approach to understanding how actors interact
empirical way to make sense of mesolevel social with one another. Actors are located in a social
orders. Establishing their differences allows space (the fi eld), which is a socially constructed
scholars to construct tests by which the validity arena in which actors are oriented toward one
of one or the other of these perspectives can be another over a common practice, institution,
established. The promise of fi eld theory is its issue, or goal. Being oriented toward one another,
potential to explain interactions in a wide variety fi eld actors frame their actions and identities vis-
of social settings. It offers a set of conceptual à -v is one another (i.e., relationally). Actors
tools that can be deployed for many of the most within a fi eld recognize (if not always follow)
important sociological questions. Progress will shared meanings, rules, and norms that guide
be made only by sharpening our understanding of their interactions. Fields structure actors’
the differences in fi eld theories in order to better interests and infl uence them to think and act in
understand how they can be profi tably used. accordance with the rules and expectations of the
es of Sociological Field Theory 187

fi eld. Nevertheless, fi eld actors have the agentic


discussed here, most notably Ernst Cassirer, Karl
capacity (again, to varying degrees depending on Mannheim, and Friedrich
the version of the theory) to accumulate resourcesFürstenberg.
and/or seek advantages vis-à-vis others. Such Max Weber argued that social relationships
resources and advantages can include legitimacy, require meaningful action between two or more
the accumulation of various forms of capital in actors whose actions are based on an awareness
order to exert power over others, and the buildingof and orientation to the other (Weber 1978 : 28–
of political coalitions to further collective 30). Weber also took the position that social
interests. relationships can scale up to higher levels (e.g.,
Field theorists use the fi eld construct to make
organizations, associations, etc.) and become a
sense of how and why social orders can be social order that encompasses a multitude of
reproduced. But they have increasingly become actors. A social order can simultaneously be its
interested in how fi elds emerge and are own complex of meaning and part of a broader
transformed. Underlying this formulation is the complex of meaning. Weber identifi ed a small
idea that a fi eld is an ongoing game-like arena, number of orders present in every society: legal,
where actors have to understand what others are social, economic, political, and religious. He
doing in order to frame their action. This has thought that something different is at stake in
caused fi eld theorists to consider agency and each order and the struggles over a particular
action and to develop sociological views of how order could only be interpreted from the
cognition works, focusing on issues of culture, perspective of groups vying for advantage in that
framing, identity, habit, and socialization. order ( 1978) . For example, honor or status is at
Finally, while the role of actors varies across stake in the social order, power in the political
formulations of fi eld theories, such theories order, the saving of souls in the religious order,
explicitly reject rational actor models and instead
and economic advantage in the economic order.
rely on phenomenology and symbolic Weber argued that power in one order could bring
interactionism to understand what actors do about power in another. So, for example,
under varying fi eld conditions. economic success could spill over to social honor
or esteem. However, Weber also thought that the
relationship between orders was the product of
history. For example, in a theocracy, the religious
10.3 Classical Roots of
order could dominate the political and economic
Contemporary order. With his emphasis on the symbolic in
Sociological Field Theory addition to the material dimension of relations,
Weber was of fundamental importance to fi eld
W e trace the classical roots of contemporary theorists’ conceptions of fi elds as socially
sociological fi eld theory to two primary infl constructed arenas of action.
uences, Max Weber and Kurt Lewin. Then we As a social psychologist with a background in
briefl y discuss how phenomenology and Gestalt psychology, it was Kurt Lewin who most
symbolic interactionism have provided the directly transferred the ideas of fi eld theory from
foundations of fi eld theories’ models of action. the physical sciences into the social sciences.
We direct the reader to Mey ( 1972) and Martin Lewin applied Gestalt concepts of perception –
( 2003 ) for more detailed accounts of the that stimuli are not perceived as individual parts
classical foundations of fi eld theory that draw but by their relation to the whole fi eld of
from many more theoretical lines of inquiry. In perception – to social psychology and, in
particular, Martin (2003 ) provides a concise particular, human motivation and how social
review of fi eld theory’s roots in the physical situations infl uence cognition (Mohr 2005) .
sciences (particularly classical electro- Lewin ( 1951 : 240) also developed formal
magnetism), the contributions of the Gestalt models to represent fi elds, which he defi ned as
school of psychology apart from Lewin, and the the “totality of coexisting facts which are
contributions of other intellectual ancestors not conceived of as mutually interdependent,” and
D.N. Kluttz and N. Fligstein

the life space, defi ned as “the person and the Reality ( 1967) for their model of actors (Powell
psychological environment as it exists for him” ( and DiMaggio 1991) . Berger and Luckmann
1951 : 57). drew their inspiration from Alfred Schutz, a
For Lewin, the individual’s sociologist who was trained in phenomenology.
phenomenological apprehension of the world Berger and Luckmann argued that the world is a
could be simultaneously infl uenced by the fi eld social construction. It requires effort for this to
environment and his/ her navigation of the life emerge, effort that implied institutionalization
space. The life space is made up of regions of and legitimation. Like the habitus for Bourdieu,
experience, the meaning of each being defi ned an existing social world gets internalized via
by its relations to other regions. And because socialization.
one’s apprehension of a fi eld also infl uences the C ompared to the neo-institutional elaboration
fi eld itself, the effects of one on the other are of organizational fi elds, Fligstein and McAdam
reciprocal. Individual behavior, then, could be (2012 ) draw more heavily on Mead’s ( 1934 )
explained only by considering the totality of the symbolic interactionism. Symbolic
interaction between the individual’s navigation of interactionism is a perspective grounded in
the life space and the environment. Although American pragmatist philosophy (Menand 2001
Lewin has been criticized for, among other ). It bears many resemblances to phenomenology,
things, his ultimately unworkable topological viewing the social world as a construction and
formalizations (see Martin 2003: 18–19), his socialization as the main way in which that world
explicit use of the fi eld metaphor and his is inculcated in individuals. But Mead’s symbolic
emphasis on the co-constitution of fi elds and interactionism also proposes that one of the main
actors served as an important foundation on goals of social action is for actors to help shape
which contemporary sociological fi eld theories and create their worlds. At the core of interaction
were built. is the idea that we have identities that we share
Field theorists have used a variety of sources with others. These identities provide the basis for
to construct their model of the actor. For example, our cooperation with others. Bourdieu also cites
Bourdieu’s notion of habitus has many sources – symbolic interaction as a source for his view of
some in philosophy like Husserl, Heidegger, and social action. Because he was interested in how
Merleau-Ponty as well as sociologists who were power was actually experienced in interaction, he
philosophically inclined and infl uenced by saw symbolic interaction as a way to frame how
phenomenology, like Mauss and Elias. 2 Mauss ( the less powerful accepted their fate in interaction
1973 [1934]) defi ned habitus as those aspects of with the more powerful.
culture that are anchored in the body or daily
practices of individuals, groups, societies, and
nations. It includes the totality of learned habits,
10.4 Contemporary Elaborations
bodily skills, styles, tastes, and other forms of
non-discursive knowledge that might be said to of Sociological Field Theory
“go without
10.4.1 Bourdieu’s Field Theory
2
Crossley ( 2004 ) provides a lengthy discussion of Pierre Bourdieu is the contemporary sociologist
Merleau-Ponty’s deep infl uences on Bourdieu’s
most often associated with fi eld theory. Bourdieu
theoretical framework. Interestingly, it was also through
MerleauPonty’s work that Bourdieu fi rst encountered deployed the idea of fi eld as part of a more
Weber (Bourdieu et al. 2011 : 112). complex theoretical framework that included two
saying” for a specifi c group. Elias used the other major concepts, capital and habitus (see
habitus concept to make sense of the changes in generally Bourdieu 1977 , 1986 ; Bourdieu and
personality he detailed in The Civilizing Process Wacquant 1992 ). For Bourdieu, social life takes
(1939). place in fi elds. Fields are arenas of struggle, and
Neo-institutionalists rely heavily on Berger Bourdieu frequently uses the game metaphor to
and Luckmann’s The Social Construction of describe how action takes place in fi elds. In fi
es of Sociological Field Theory 189

elds, players occupy positions relative to one life course and interacts within different fi elds.
another but have a shared sense of the socially Because an actor’s habitus- generated
constructed, centralized framework of meaning, perceptions and strategies lead to practices, they
or what is at stake in the fi eld. Bourdieu’s fi elds have real impacts on capital allocations and fi eld
are relatively autonomous, meaning each tends to structure. The habitus of actors is both constituted
have its own logic (or “rules of the game”) and by and constitutive of the social structure of the fi
history. Players compete with one another for eld.
resources, status, and, most fundamentally, over Bourdieu uses these concepts of fi eld, capital,
the very defi nition of the “rules of the game” that and habitus to understand why, in general, fi elds’
govern fi eld relations. Relations within structures of dominance tend to be reproduced.
Bourdieu’s fi elds are mostly hierarchical, with Given a fi eld that contains a set of rules and
dominant individuals or groups imposing their players with fi xed capital, the “game” will
power over dominated groups as a result of their generally be rigged. Actors will perceive what
ability to control the fi eld, what is at stake, and others are doing and respond to their actions by
what counts as rules and resources. deploying their capital in such a way as to
T he main source of power for dominant actors preserve their current position as much as
is the capital that they bring to the fi eld. Actors possible. In this way, both dominant and
within a fi eld are endowed with physical (or dominated actors play the game to the best of
economic), social, human, and cultural capital their abilities, but in doing so tend to reproduce
(Bourdieu 1986 , 1989 : 17). 60 One’s position in their fi eld positions. The refl exive fi eld-capital-
a fi eld is defi ned by the volume and form of habitus relation gives Bourdieu powerful
capital one possesses. Those with similar theoretical leverage to include both agency and
volumes and forms of capital tend to cluster in structure in his explanation of social order.
similar positions in a fi eld. Actors within a fi eld Bourdieu himself suggests that it gives him the
wield capital in order to improve or maintain their ability to reject what he sees as false antimonies
fi eld positions. A fi eld is thus the site where between objectivism and subjectivism (Bourdieu
actors carry out and reproduce power relations and Wacquant 1992) .
over others based on their capital endowments.
Habitus is the “strategy-generating principle”
that enables actors to apprehend, navigate, and 10.4.2 Neo-institutional Theory of
act in the social world (Bourdieu 1977 : 78; see Fields
also Bourdieu 1990 : 53). 61 It is subjective in that
it represents the bundle of cognitive and S cholars across disciplines, most notably
evaluative capacities that make up one’s sociology, political science, and economics, have
perceptions, judgments, tastes, and strategies for developed substantial lines of inquiry, many
actions. But habitus is not simply produced or sharing affi nities with fi eld-based approaches,
employed subjectively. It is a highly structured under the broad umbrella of “new
system of dispositions. Strategies and actions institutionalism” (for reviews, see Hall and
generated by habitus are not products of Taylor 1996 ; Fligstein 2008 ). In order to avoid
motivations for future goals so much as products confusion, and in the interest of space, when we
of past experience (Bourdieu 1977 : 72). Habitus discuss “neo-
is internalized via (mostly early) socialization. institutional” theories of fi elds, we limit our
But habitus is neither wholly static nor discussions to neo-institutional theory in
deterministic. It can change as one traverses the organizational sociology. Even within

60
All of these forms of capital, when perceived or 61
F or an extended discussion of Bourdieu’s habitus, see
recognized by others as legitimate, confer symbolic Lizardo ( 2004 ).
capital (akin to prestige or honor) and thus the ability to
exercise symbolic power over others (Bourdieu 1986 ,
1989 ).
D.N. Kluttz and N. Fligstein

sociological neo-institutional organizational once they are part of an organizational fi eld, are
scholarship, there is considerable variation in usually driven more by institutional concerns
approaches, emphases, and analytical techniques (e.g., legitimacy) than by other factors, such as
(Powell and DiMaggio 1991 ; Scott 2013 ). We competition. Institutions, defi ned as “social
focus here on classic neo-institutional patterns that, when chronically reproduced, owe
formulations of organizational fi elds (DiMaggio their survival to relatively self-activating social
and Powell 1983 ), fi rst contextualizing when processes (Jepperson 1991: 145),” confer
and why neo-institutional scholars developed the legitimacy. Over the course of
concept then explaining the essential institutionalization, such self- sustaining patterns
characteristics of organizational fi elds. become more legitimate and stable, eliciting
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, neo- shared meanings and providing cultural models
institutional sociologists began explicitly for organizing and acting (Zucker 1977;
incorporating fi eld-based principles to theorize Suchman 1995; Berger and Luckmann
the connection between organizations and their 1967 ).
environments. Departing from organizational A s a fi eld undergoes structuration (see
ecologists (e.g., Hannan and Freeman 1977a , b Giddens 1979 ), organizations within the fi eld
), whose fundamental motivating question was to tend to become isomorphic, meaning that they
examine why organizations within populations become more similar. They do this because the
differ from one another, neo-institutional imperative of an institutionalized fi eld is to
scholars asked why organizations within fi elds appear legitimate (Suchman 1995 ). For
tend to exhibit similar forms, practices, or neoinstitutional scholars, legitimacy is “a
cultures. Although others employed similar generalized perception or assumption that the
constructs such as “institutional environment” actions of an entity are desirable, proper or
(Meyer and Rowan 1977 ) and “societal sector” appropriate within some socially constructed
(Scott and Meyer 1983 ), “organizational fi eld” system of norms, values, beliefs, and defi nitions”
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983 ) is the most widely (Suchman 1995 : 574). Mechanisms of
accepted term used to denote an environment isomorphism include coercive force from
made up of organizations that interact around a authorities or resource dependencies, normative
given issue and affect one another via sanctioning from experts or professional
institutional processes. associations, and mimetic pressure to copy what
D iMaggio and Powell ( 1983: 148) defi ne an others are doing, particularly during times of
organizational fi eld as “those organizations that, uncertainty (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott
in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of 2013 ). Regardless of the mechanism, as
institutional life: key suppliers, resource and something becomes increasingly
product consumers, regulatory agencies, and institutionalized, it takes on an increasingly rule-
other organizations that produce similar services like or taken-for-granted status. Thus, it becomes
or products.” Theirs is a broad defi nition of fi increasingly legitimate in the eyes of the fi eld
elds, encompassing “the totality of relevant actors, which serves to reinforce and accelerate
actors” in an “institutionally defi ned” arena of its being followed and reproduced by
organizations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983 : organizations in the fi eld.
148). Their account of organizational fi elds
draws primarily on phenomenology (Berger and
Luckmann 1967 , the structuration theory of 10.4.3 Strategic Action Fields
Anthony )
Giddens ( 1979 ), and network-based ideas of The most recent elaboration of fi eld theory is the
connectedness (Laumann et al. 1978 ) and theory of strategic action fi elds proposed by
structural equivalence (White et al. 1976 ). Fligstein and McAdam ( 2012 ). Fligstein and
For DiMaggio and Powell ( 1983 ), the answer McAdam work to synthesize neo-institutionalist
to the question of why organizations within fi insights about fi elds as being driven by actors
elds tend to look the same is that organizations, who live in murky worlds and seek legitimacy
es of Sociological Field Theory 191

with Bourdieu’s ideas about contestation within there is more consensual perception of
fi elds that refl ect mainly the power of dominant opportunities and constraints in highly settled
actors. Fligstein and McAdam ( 2012 : 9) thus SAFs, actors constantly jockey for position even
defi ne a “strategic action fi eld” (hereinafter in settled fi elds. Contention is highest when
SAF) as “a constructed meso-level social order in SAFs are unsettled, most often when a fi eld is
which actors (who can be individual or emerging or when a fi eld undergoes crisis.
collective) are attuned to and interact with one Similar to Bourdieu’s fi elds, SAF
another on the basis of shared (which is not to say membership is structured along
consensual) understandings about the purposes of incumbent/challenger dynamics, with actors
the fi eld, relationships to others in the fi eld possessing varying resource endowments and
(including who has power and why), and the rules vying for advantage. Incumbents claim a
governing legitimate action in the fi eld.” As with disproportionate share of the material and
the prior two versions of fi eld theory discussed symbolic resources in the fi eld, and their
above, the theory of SAFs places utmost interests and views tend to be disproportionately
importance on understanding how actors, who refl ected in the rules and organization of the fi
occupy positions within a socially constructed eld. Challengers usually conform to the
order, relate to one another within that space. prevailing order of the fi eld by taking what the
SAFs are socially constructed in that (1) system gives them, but they can also usually
membership is based more on subjective than any articulate an alternative vision of the fi eld.
objective criteria, (2) boundaries of the fi eld can Importantly, although SAFs have incumbents and
shift based on the defi nition of the situation and challengers who always compete, SAFs are not
the issue at stake, and (3) fi elds turn on shared necessarily marked by extreme hierarchy and
understandings fashioned over time by members confl ict. SAFs can also have coalitions and
of the fi eld (Fligstein and McAdam 2012 : 12– cooperation. Fligstein and McAdam suggest that
13). These shared understandings are of four the higher the degree of inequality in the
kinds. First, actors share a sense of what is at distribution of initial resources at fi eld
stake in the fi eld (a shared sense of what actors formation, the more likely the fi eld will be
are vying for or the central issue around which the organized hierarchically, with incumbents
fi eld revolves). Second, actors have a shared exerting their dominance over challengers.
sense of the positions of others in the SAF (a Fligstein and McAdam introduce an
recognition of which actors in the fi eld have important new actor to their fi elds – “internal
more or less power and who occupies which governance units.” These actors, often present
roles). Third, they have a shared understanding of within SAFs, generally serve to maintain order
the “rules” that guide what is considered within the fi eld. In practice, they usually serve to
legitimate action in the fi eld. Finally, actors in reinforce the position of the incumbents in the fi
certain positions within the fi eld share eld, whether it be to stabilize a fi eld settlement,
interpretative frames (these frames vary within respond to crises in order to produce stability, or
the fi eld but are shared by actors in similar act as a liaison to other fi elds (Fligstein and
locations). McAdam 2012 : 94–96). Examples of internal
Importantly, Fligstein and McAdam propose governance units include certifi cation boards set
that the degree of consensus and contention up by professional organizations in a newly
internal to a fi eld is constantly changing. formed SAF, the World Bank, which often
Bracketing a description of how SAFs disproportionately serves the interests of more
themselves emerge and change for now (we developed economies, and a trade association that
discuss this in Sect. 10.6.3 ), the degree of lobbies on an industry’s behalf.
consensus in a SAF depends on the degree to F ligstein and McAdam ( 2012: 34–56) also
which a fi eld is settled. Contrary to a neo- propose a novel micro-foundation of action based
institutional account of highly institutionalized on collective meaning-making and
organizational fi elds, SAFs are rarely organized belongingness. This foundation is what they term
around a taken-for-granted “reality.” Although the “existential function of the social” – the
D.N. Kluttz and N. Fligstein

profoundly human need to create meaningful on the low end and actors in SAFs on the high
social worlds and feelings of belongingness. In end.)
order to build political coalitions, forge identities, In Bourdieu’s words, agents are “bearers of
and fashion interests in service of that need, capitals and, depending on their trajectory and on
actors in SAFs use “social skill” (Fligstein 2001 the position they occupy on the fi eld … they have
) to appeal to shared meanings and empathetically a propensity to orient themselves actively either
relate to others so as to induce cooperation and toward the preservation of the distribution of
engage in collective action. capital or toward the subversion of this
Another novel contribution of the theory of distribution” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992 :
SAFs is its deep conceptualization of inter-fi eld 108–109). Indeed, his fi eld actors do have their
relations. Instead of attempting to explain only own goals and do act to further their own interests
the internal dynamics of fi elds, Fligstein and vis-à-vis others in the fi eld. Thus, actors in his fi
McAdam ( 2012: 59) conceive of fi elds as elds do act strategically and engage in meaningful
embedded in complex, multi-dimensional webs action.
of dependence with other fi elds. Such linkages N evertheless, actors in Bourdieu’s theory are
most often result from resource dependencies or not particularly refl ective nor are they very
from formal legal or bureaucratic authority. capable of going against the constraining
These ties are also multi-dimensional. First, like structural forces of the fi eld. The “rules of the
a Russian doll, fi elds can be nested hierarchicallygame” and what is at stake in the fi eld are a
within broader fi elds, meaning that the nested fi product of social structure and are tacitly agreed
eld is highly dependent on the broader fi eld. upon by members of the fi eld (what Bourdieu
Second, fi elds can also be linked via calls the illusio ). Field actors’ interests are defi
interdependencies, meaning that the fi elds are ned by their position in the fi eld (i.e., their capital
roughly equally dependent. Third, fi elds can be endowment) and the historical trajectory that led
tied to any number of other fi elds. Of course, a fithem to the fi eld (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:
eld need not be connected to another fi eld at all. 117). Most fi eld actors “know their place,” and
The extent of dependency and quantity of ties can if they engage in competition with others, they
have implications for fi eld emergence, stability, are more likely to compete with those who are
and change, which we discuss later in the chapter. closest to them in social space than try to change
the underlying social order (Bourdieu 1984 ).
Moreover, the habitus, which Bourdieu
invokes to account for subjectivity and agency, is
10.5 Agency and Actors
itself an embodied , structured set of dispositions
that operates somewhere below the level of
10.5.1 Bourdieu’s Field Theory
consciousness. It is socially structured as a
Bourdieu’s theoretical project has a complicated function of one’s fi eld position, and it is passed
relationship with agency and actors. Although we on to subsequent generations through mostly
are sympathetic to the diffi culty of trying to non- conscious relations and processes of cultural
account for structure and agency within social fi transmission. Habitus tends to be durable and, if
elds, we contend that Bourdieu’s theory of fi elds it does change, tends to align (or correspond) with
is more deterministic than he was willing to one’s fi eld position and the fi eld’s particular
admit. Ours is not an oversimplifi ed, oft-repeated logic.
charge of determinism and, as we discuss below, T rue, Bourdieu’s actors do have the ability to
Bourdieu’s account of agency, via the habitus, is transpose their habitus to other fi elds, but even
richer than classic statements in neo-institutional here, the habitus tends to correspond to that of
theory. (If we were to rank the three theories we homologous positions in other fi elds. Indeed,
discuss based on the agency they accord to fi eld Bourdieu’s individuals tend to become embedded
actors, we would place Bourdieu’s actors within habitus classes, “the system of
somewhere between neo-institutional fi eld actors dispositions (partially) common to all products of
the same structures” (Bourdieu 1977 : 85). Thus,
es of Sociological Field Theory 193

habitus, and as a consequence actors themselves, and DiMaggio and Powell ( 1983) lacks an
will usually operate to reproduce the very adequate theory of agency, power, and confl ict.
structures from which it arises (Bourdieu 1977 : DiMaggio ( 1988 ) posits the idea of an
78; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992 : 121–22). 62 institutional entrepreneur because he is trying to
make sense of how a fi eld comes into existence
or experiences dramatic transformation. He
10.5.2 Neo-institutional Field Theory suggests institutional entrepreneurship occurs
when someone (or some group) comes along and
Classic neo-institutional accounts of fi gures out how to do something new and is able
organizational fi elds provide a rich account of to convince others to go along with them. For
institutional persistence and constraint on actors, DiMaggio ( 1988 ), institutional entrepreneurs are
but they under-theorize how actors who are especially important early on in the
subject to institutional effects could nevertheless institutionalization process, when organizational
enact agency to affect those institutions. Neo- fi elds are being constructed. Then, as
institutional scholars identifi ed this problem institutionalization takes hold, fi eld participants
relatively early on (see DiMaggio 1988 ; usually settle down to playing their part as actors
DiMaggio and Powell 1991) . Others have who operate mostly by habit or by watching and
termed it the ‘paradox of embedded agency’ imitating others.
inherent in neo- institutional theory. That is, if Scholarly interest in institutional
action in a fi eld is constrained by the entrepreneurship has grown considerably since
prescriptive, taken-for-granted scripts and rules DiMaggio’s ( 1988) formulation, particularly
of the institution in which actors are embedded, among organizational sociologists and
then how can actors conceive of, contest, and management scholars. Neoinstitutionalists have
enact endogenous change to a fi eld (see Battilana conducted numerous empirical studies across
2006)? domains and made important theoretical
R esponding to this criticism, a second wave advances on the concept (for recent reviews, see
of neo-institutionalists began to develop a Garud et al.’s ( 2007) introduction to a journal
literature on actors with the agency to initiate issue on institutional entrepreneurship; Hardy
institutional change. The earliest and most and Maguire 2008 ; Battilana et al. 2009 ).
developed idea of actors and agency within fi elds However, we take the position that institutional
is the concept of institutional entrepreneurship entrepreneurship has become a concept so all-
(DiMaggio 1988 , 1991) . In general, an encompassing with regard to agency and change
institutional entrepreneur is some actor (whether that it is not the most useful concept to employ to
individual or collective) who initiates and theorize agency within and across fi elds. As
participates in change to an institution. Suddaby ( 2010 : 15) noted of the current state of
Although DiMaggio ( 1988 ) is frequently the literature: “Any change, however slight, is
cited as inspiration for the idea of institutional now ‘institutional’ and any change agent is an
entrepreneurs, its main argument is that the neo- ‘institutional entrepreneur.’”
institutional theory of Meyer and Rowan ( 1977 ) Indeed, as contemporary neoinstitutional
scholars have pointed out (e.g., Powell and

62
This point should not be overstated. For Bourdieu, condition (see our discussion of crisis below), Bourdieu
although habitus tends to align with the logic and does not systematically theorize the causes or
expectations of the fi eld, it is not necessarily a perfect consequences of such hysteresis. Why and when do some
alignment. The extent to which it does align is a matter of experience the disjuncture when others align? Why might
degree. Bourdieu’s concept of “hysteresis,” for example, some experience the disjuncture when, at other moments
accounts for situations in which one’s habitus becomes of fi eld succession, they can align? Under what
mismatched or lags behind the logic of a fi eld (Bourdieu conditions does hysteresis lead to active efforts to hold on
2000 :160– 161). This is exemplifi ed in the character of to the misaligned habitus? When might it lead to efforts
Don Quixote, whose antiquated knightly disposition no to change the logic of a fi eld rather than adapt the habitus
longer fi ts in his contemporary world. However, other to fi t the different logic? For a similar critique, see
than a vague nod to crisis as a possible necessary Burawoy and Von Holdt ( 2012 :38–39).
D.N. Kluttz and N. Fligstein

Colyvas 2008: 277; Lawrence et al. 2011 : 52), theoretical development, as it incorporates
the institutional entrepreneurship literature now Fligstein’s ( 2001) concept of “social skill” into
tends to replace the actors of foundational neo- their theory of action and therefore provides a
institutional theory – over-socialized and with new, more systematic way to think about agency,
relatively little refl exivity and agency – with actors, and fi eld relations. Strategic action is “the
actors who seem to have prescient views about attempt by social actors to create and maintain
new possible worlds, the motivation to contest stable social worlds by securing the cooperation
institutional arrangements, and the power to enact of others” (Fligstein and McAdam 2012 : 17).
change. In addition, institutional The primary micro-level mechanism through
entrepreneurship’s focus on divergent which fi elds are constructed, transformed, and
institutional change has resulted in a tendency to even maintained is “social skill,” which is the
confl ate agency with wholesale fi eld-level cognitive capacity for reading people and
change. Consequently, there is a selection bias in environments, framing lines of action, and
the institutional entrepreneurship literature of mobilizing people in the service of broader
analyzing only situations in which contestation conceptions of the world and of themselves
leads to change (Denrell and Kovács 2008) . This (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 17). Some are
produces a strange conception of institutional endowed with greater social skill than others and
agency: actors are thought of as agentic only are thus more likely than others, all else being
when they “successfully” form new fi elds or equal (which of course, in reality, is hardly the
change existing ones, and only a few such actors case), to realize their interests and exert control
really matter for fi eld-level change. This idea fl vis-à-vis others in a fi eld. 63
ies in the face of common- sense experience, T his may beg the question of why social skill
where we see people acting strategically all of the is so important as a driver of fi eld relations. In
time. other words, if social skill is the mechanism for
Finally, institutional entrepreneurship’s stepping into the shoes of the other and
overly heroic view of actors tends to shift focus mobilizing collective action, what is the
away from fi elds and avoid questions such as motivation for doing so? Like Bourdieu, Fligstein
what alternative paths fi elds might take, why and McAdam recognize that actors pursue their
entrepreneurs choose the strategies of fi eld interests in the name of power. Indeed, SAFs are
contestation that they do, and what fi eld-building organized along incumbent/challenger
projects are likely to win and lose. In essence, we dimensions and are sites of struggles for power
submit that despite its substantial theoretical and infl uence. However, their answer is not
development over the last three decades, the simply that actors draw on social skill in the
concept of institutional entrepreneur lacks an pursuit of material
adequate conceptualization of fi elds that would self-interest. 64
explain structural conditions enabling agency Fligstein and McAdam provide a second,
within and across different types of fi elds and deeper motivation that is deeply rooted in our
during different stages of a fi eld’s existence. evolutionary psychology – the basic human need
to fashion a meaningful world for oneself and to
engage in collective action. They call this the
10.5.3 Strategic Action Fields “existential function of the social.” They argue
that even the exercise of power and confl ict with
Fligstein and McAdam’s addition of “strategic others are often manifestations of the more
action” to the term “fi elds” is an important fundamental pursuit of collective meaning-

63 64
It remains an empirical question as to the distribution of H ere, they join Bourdieu in his critique of Marxist
social skill in given fi elds or across the population. materialist conceptions of interaction. Like Bourdieu, they
Fligstein and McAdam ( 2012: 17) only offer an argue that interests themselves only have meaning because
unsupported speculation that social skill could be they are socially constructed and thus have symbolic
distributed normally across the population. meaning to fi eld participants.
es of Sociological Field Theory 195

making, identity, and belongingness. the overly heroic correctives proposed by


Innumerable examples of this abound. To list a theories of institutional entrepreneurship.
few of the more extreme ones, the various Importantly, however, Fligstein and McAdam
religious crusades and wars waged throughout ( 2012: 109–110) do not reject outright the idea
history were fundamentally about identity (“I am of institutional entrepreneurs. Instead, they
a Christian; I am a holy warrior.”) and meaning- situate the role of institutional entrepreneur
making and belongingness (“This is a battle within the broader SAF environment and theorize
between good (us) vs. evil (them)). However that in the moment of fi eld emergence or
repulsive Nazism is from a moral standpoint to transformation when things are more or less up
most in society, there is no question that Hitler for grabs, such actors may emerge to help create
was a supremely skilled social actor who could a fi eld. Institutional entrepreneur is thus a role
frame unambiguous that highly skilled social actors can play in
“truths” in ways that valorized the lives of unorganized social space to help produce a fi eld.
believers and serviced his interest in attaining They do so by convincing others to accept their
power. Of course, the focus on intersubjectivity, own cultural conception (via an appeal that
collaborative meaning-making, identity, and resonates with others’ identities or meaning),
collective mobilization does not mean that power fashion political coalitions of disparate groups,
relations, confl ict, preferences, and the pursuit of and establish new institutions around which a fi
those preferences (whether or not to the exclusion eld is ordered. If a fi eld is in a more settled state,
of others pursuing theirs) are not characteristic of incumbents, who set the rules of the game and
SAFs. The point is that social skill is deployed for exert their power to reproduce the social order,
both kinds of pursuits. are more likely to thwart attempts by an
T he dual motivations in SAFs of the pursuit institutional entrepreneur to usurp the established
of material interests and the existential function fi eld order. That said, actors even in settled SAFs
of the social represent a key point of departure are able to construct alternative understandings of
from neo-institutional and Bourdieu’s the dominant fi eld order and can act strategically
explanations of what drives fi eld relations. For to identify with others and engage in collective
neo- institutionalists, the basic driver of action action.
within institutionalized organizational fi elds is The theory of SAFs also differs from
the concern for legitimacy (Suchman 1995 ). Bourdieu’s in its conception of actors and
Whether through coercive force, normative infl agency. For Bourdieu, fi elds are sites of confl ict,
uence, or mimetic pressure to follow others in striving, and the pursuit of one’s interests over
times of uncertainty, organizational fi eld actors another’s. True, Bourdieu recognizes that what
tend to act similarly in order to appear legitimate one’s interests are and how they are pursued are
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983) . Fligstein and outcomes of social dynamics; they correspond to
McAdam agree with neo-institutional theorists the one’s position in the fi eld, one’s own habitus,
that fi eld actors tend to cohere in their actions, and one’s unique allocation of forms of capital.
but instead of arguing that this is due to a mostly But the defi ning features of internal fi eld
unrefl ective concern for legitimacy, they posit relations for Bourdieu are no doubt confl ict and
this is due to the existential function of the social. domination. The theory of SAFs shares
By combining symbolic interactionist approaches Bourdieu’s conception of fi elds as sites of
to empathetic understanding and identity (Mead struggle between incumbents and challengers
1934 ; Goffman 1974 ) with social movement over resources and the ability to defi ne the “rules
theory’s insights into framing processes as a path of the game,” but it goes further to make room for
to c ollective action (e.g., Snow et al. 1986 ; the crucial micro- foundations of meaning,
Snow and Benford 1988) , Fligstein and identity, cooperation, and collective action that
McAdam provide an answer to the ‘paradox of are pursued by socially skilled actors. Actors can
embedded agency’ that has plagued neo- both engage in struggle and fashion cooperative
institutional accounts while managing to avoid coalitions. Fligstein and McAdam ( 2012 ) thus
D.N. Kluttz and N. Fligstein

present a more agentic actor than the other two compared to the other accounts, the theory of
theories of fi elds discussed here. SAFs provides the most comprehensive,
Finally, the theory of SAFs differs from both systematic conceptualization of fi eld emergence,
neo-institutional and Bourdieusian accounts of fi stability, and change. As with the prior section,
eld actors in that it explicitly accounts for we develop these arguments by fi rst analyzing
individuals and collectivities as fi eld actors and how Bourdieu and neo-institutional theorists deal
expressly theorizes each of their roles within their with the issue then juxtaposing those accounts
fi elds. Neo-institutional fi eld theory, being born against the theory of SAFs.
out of organizational theory, tends to focus on
organizations as the actors within a fi eld space.
As such, neo-institutional accounts of 10.6.1 Bourdieu’s Field Theory
organizational fi elds care very little about
individuals’ positions in fi elds and must abstract Bourdieu’s theory of fi elds is primarily one of
up to the organizational level when explaining an social stability and reproduction. This is
“actor’s” subjective orientations, strategies for intentional, as it is Bourdieu’s goal to understand
obtaining legitimacy, struggles for resources, etc. and solve the agent-structure problem by positing
Although we take no issue with this abstraction how both actors (whether consciously or
(we very much view organizations as actors in unconsciously) and structures correspond to one
social space), we recognize that it is less intuitive another and are complicit in the reproduction of
to think only of organizations as social actors in social order. For Bourdieu, although fi elds are
a fi eld. Bourdieu’s theory of fi elds, on the other the sites of constant struggle and competition
hand, deals primarily with individuals as fi eld between the dominant and dominated, the social
actors and locates dispositions and practices order ultimately tends to be reproduced. True, it
primarily in individuals’ trajectories through is not uncommon for groups to succeed their prior
social space. 65 The consequences for the theory equivalent group in terms of their place in the
of SAF’s fl exibility in scaling up or down is non- social order; this is what Bourdieu calls the
trivial, as it forces Fligstein and McAdam ( 2012) “order of successions.” (Bourdieu 1984 : 163).
to develop a more general, yet still workable, The key here, however, is that relations between
theory of relations between fi eld actors, no groups in a fi eld (i.e., the social distance between
matter whether they are individuals or them) remain mostly unchanged.
organizations. Bourdieu touches upon the conditions for how
fi eld logics could change when he mentions
crisis as a necessary, but not suffi cient, condition
for the questioning of doxa. Doxa is the
10.6 Field Emergence, Stability,
undiscussed, taken-for-granted aspect of the
and Change social world. Within it are those systems of
classifi cation, traditions, and rules for interaction
We turn now to a discussion of how each theory
that are so legitimate and ingrained that they are
deals with fi eld-level emergence, stability, and
taken for granted as self-evident ‘truths’ about the
change. In short, Fligstein and McAdam’s theory
world (Bourdieu 1977 : 169). 66 Crisis can lead
of SAFs depicts fi elds as more changeable than
to the arbitrariness of the doxa being revealed to
neo-institutional fi eld theory or Bourdieu’s
fi eld actors’ consciousness and thereby fi nding
theory of fi elds. Moreover, we argue that,
its way into the universe of discourse, where

65
We acknowledge that Bourdieu did not solely study fi 66
We note the affi nities between Bourdieu’s doxa and a
elds in which individuals were the primary participants. highly objectivated and internalized social reality, as defi
For example, he identifi es fi rms as the key players in the ned by Berger and Luckmann ( 1967 ), or a highly
economic fi eld and speaks of the importance of their institutionalized social institution (Meyer and Rowan
interactions with the state (Bourdieu 2005 ). He also links 1977 ; Jepperson 1991 ).
elite universities, corporations, and the state to the fi eld
of power (Bourdieu 1996a ).
es of Sociological Field Theory 197

orthodox and heterodox opinions can be fi eld emergence and change. The majority of
expressed and contested. However, Bourdieu neo- institutional research on organizational fi
does not systematically theorize what brings elds since DiMaggio and Powell’s ( 1983 )
about such moments of crisis, nor does he seminal article has pertained to how isomorphism
explicitly theorize the additional condition(s) among organizations occurs after an
besides crisis that result in a critical discourse. organizational fi eld exists and, relatedly, how fi
E ven when the doxa is brought into the elds are stable and reproducible. In our view,
universe of discourse, such questioning does not then, the neo- institutional formulation of fi eld
necessarily lead to challengers displacing the theory has accounted for fi eld stability and fi eld
dominant class at the top of the fi eld hierarchy. reproduction quite well. However, from the
Indeed, challengers with heterodox views of the outset, it lacked a systematic theory of fi eld
world rarely displace the dominant group, who emergence and divergent fi eld-level
work to preserve the “offi cial” ways of thinking transformation. 67 A new generation of neo-
and speaking about the world and who aim to institutional scholars has partly corrected for
censor heterodox views. Finally, and most these limitations by proposing that institutional
importantly, on the rare occasions that change can occur by way of institutional
challengers do manage to displace incumbents as entrepreneurship, but, as we have argued, this is
the dominant actors in a fi eld (e.g., Bourdieu less a systematic theory of fi eld change and more
1996b ), they tend to do so by using, and therefore a thinly veiled “heroic man” theory of change that
reproducing, the underlying “rules of the game” does not link entrepreneur-led change to broader
on which the fi eld is based. For example, in fi eld conditions.
Bourdieu’s studies of the fi elds of cultural T he under-development of theories of fi eld
production (e.g., art, literature, theatre), one of emergence and divergent change can be traced
the most fundamental principles of these fi elds, back to DiMaggio and Powell’s ( 1983 ) all-too-
especially for the dominant, is an outward brief discussion of the formation of an
indifference to or disavowal of the profi t motive. organizational fi eld (or in their words, how it is
Not coincidentally, the best strategy for that a set of organizations come to be
challenger groups to unseat the dominant cultural “institutionally defi ned”). Using Giddens’s (
producers within the fi eld is to disavow the 1979) terminology, they propose that a set of
commercial and promote their own activities and organizations comes to be a fi eld through a
products as “purer” art than that of the dominant process of “structuration:” (1) interaction among
group. In doing so, however, the fundamental organizations involved in some area of social life
logic of the fi eld only gets reinforced. “Thus,” increases, (2) hierarchies and coalitions develop,
Bourdieu writes, “[challengers’] revolutions are (3) the amount of information with which fi eld
only ever partial ones, which displace the members must contend increases, and (4)
censorships and transgress the conventions but do awareness among fi eld members that they are
so in the name of the same underlying principles” involved in a common enterprise develops.
(Bourdieu 1993 : 83–84). However, the remaining focus of their article
centers around institutional isomorphism in an
already-existing organizational fi eld and, as a
10.6.2 Neo-institutional Field Theory corollary, how actors follow rules or scripts,
either consciously by imitation or coercion or
Although recent efforts by institutional scholars unconsciously by tacit agreement (Jepperson
have improved the situation, the neo-institutional 1991) .
theory of organizational fi elds continues to lack O f course, we do not mean to say that n eo-i
a well-developed and empirically tested theory of nstitutional literature has failed to elaborate any

67
Neo-institutional scholars have provided a wealth of
theoretical and empirical insights into convergent change
(i.e., isomorphism) once a fi eld exists.
D.N. Kluttz and N. Fligstein

other concepts of fi eld emergence and change et al. 2005 ). Because of that, what we may still
after DiMaggio’s ( 1988 , 1991 ) seminal works label neo-institutional studies have increasingly
on institutional entrepreneurship. Indeed, since incorporated ideas from social movement theory
that time, several subfi elds within the n eo-i and have more directly linked institutional
nstitutionalist literature have developed lines of emergence to fi eld emergence (Rao et al. 2000
inquiry that account for the possibility of ; Lounsbury et al. 2003 ; Morrill 2006 ). An
institutional contestation and change. Examples exemplar of this line of scholarship is Morrill’s (
include the continued development of the 2006 ) analysis of the “interstitial emergence” of
aforementioned institutional entrepreneurship the court-based alternative dispute resolution fi
literature as well as the institutional work eld. 68 The key to the institutionalization of
(Lawrence et al. 2009 ) and institutional logics alternative dispute resolution was the innovation
(Thornton et al. 2012) perspectives. There has of practices, mobilization of resources, and
also been a concurrent increase in empirical championing of ideas by networks of actors who
studies of institutional change (for reviews, see were located in overlapping fi elds. Their ideas
Clemens and Cook 1999; Schneiberg and and practices gained legitimacy because they
Clemens 2006 : 217– 220). However, we resonated with different players across
maintain that a fi eld theory of fi eld emergence overlapping fi elds. As we discuss below, the
and divergent fi eld change, cast specifi cally importance of fi eld linkages and borders to the
within the classic neo-institutionalist framework emergence of new fi elds is an insight developed
of organizational fi elds, is underdeveloped further in the theory of SAFs.
compared to its theories of fi eld stability and
isomorphic fi eld change.
One particularly promising avenue for 10.6.3 Strategic Action Fields
correcting this weakness, however, has been the
integration of social movement theory with neo- Of the three contemporary fi eld theories
institutional theories of organizations. A few discussed here, the theory of SAFs provides the
sociologists have bridged social movements and clearest yet most nuanced conceptualization of fi
organizational analysis for decades (Zald and eld emergence, stability, and change (see
Ash 1966 ; see Zald and McCarthy 1987 ). Fligstein and McAdam 2012 : 84–113; Fligstein
Moreover, some of the classic works in the social 2013 ). Not only does it depict SAFs as sites of
movement literature took fi eld-like approaches constant internal change due to confl ict and
even if they did not cite fi eld theories at the time. jockeying for position (similar to Bourdieu’s fi
For example, McCarthy and Zald ( 1973 ) elds), it also sees entire fi eld structures,
developed a multi-leveled approach to social especially at certain points in their evolution, as
movement organizations and theorized meso- being more subject to change than the other two
level “social movement industries” (McCarthy theories. We discuss each of these issues in this
and section.
Zald 1973 ), which are like fi elds of social SAFs emerge through a process akin to a
movement organizations oriented to the same social movement. An emerging fi eld is a socially
general social issue. Additionally, McAdam ( constructed arena in which two or more actors
1999 ) took a fi eld-like analytic strategy by orient their actions toward one another but have
situating the American civil rights movement not yet constructed a stable order with routinized
within the broader political and economic patterns of relations and commonly shared rules
environments in which it was embedded and the for interaction. Similar to Morrill’s ( 2006 )
institutions that fostered black protest. interstitial emergence thesis, SAFs begin to form
Since the early 2000s, however, we have typically after some kind of exogenous change,
witnessed an increase in such scholarship (Davis more often than not in nearby proximate fi elds.

Morrill borrows the term “interstitial emergence” from


68

Mann ( 1986 ).
es of Sociological Field Theory 199

This happens through “emergent mobilization,” a the social order absent an exogenous shock to the
social movement-like process in which actors fi eld.
begin fashioning new lines of interaction and However, not all SAFs are highly settled. In
shared understandings after (1) collectively the theory of SAFs, settlement is a matter of
attributing a threat or opportunity, (2) degree. As the degree of settlement decreases,
appropriating organizational resources needed to SAFs become increasingly subject to change.
mobilize and sustain resources, and (3) SAFs are subject to two distinct kinds of fi eld-
collectively engaging in innovative action that level change: (1) continuous piecemeal change,
leads to sustained interaction in previously the more common situation in which change is
unorganized social space (McAdam 1999 ; gradual and due to internal struggles and
McAdam et al. 2001 ). jockeying for position, and (2) revolutionary
A s it is at every stage in the life of a SAF, change, in which a new fi eld emerges in
social skill is vitally important here, as actors unorganized social space and/or displaces
fashion the shared understandings that we another fi eld. Both kinds of change occur, but
discussed in our overview of the theory of SAFs. under different conditions.
The state can also facilitate fi eld emergence Change is constantly occurring within SAFs
through processes such as licensing, passing/ because actors constantly jockey for position
repealing laws, and the awarding of government within fi elds, whether through cooperation with
contracts. Internal governance units, also allies or confl ict with adversaries. Actors can
discussed earlier, can further encourage stability. occasionally shift strategies, forge subtle new
Actors organize the structure of their emerging fi alliances, and make small gains or losses in their
eld along a continuum of cooperation and position relative to others. However, from a fi
coalition on one end and hierarchy and eld- wide perspective, these are usually
differences in power on the other. Whether an piecemeal changes because incumbent fi eld
emerging fi eld will become a stable, actors, who have access to relatively more
reproducible fi eld depends, in part, on how it gets resources and control the “rules of the game” in a
organized; as one moves toward either extreme of SAF, can usually reinforce their positions and
this continuum of fi eld organization, the therefore reproduce the fi eld order. Fligstein and
likelihood of stability increases because both McAdam ( 2012 : 103) do note, however, that
extremes imply clear role structures for the these gradual incremental changes, even if they
actors. usually result in overall fi eld reproduction, can
A fi eld becomes settled when its actors have have aggregate effects. Eventually, they can
a general consensus regarding fi eld rules and undermine the social order to a ‘tipping point’
cultural norms. Like highly institutionalized and begin the process of emergent mobilization
organizational fi elds, highly settled SAFs discussed above or to ‘episodes of contention,’ in
typically get reproduced. Because incumbents which the shared understandings on which fi elds
and challengers continue to engage in confl ict are based become in fl ux and result in periods of
even in settled SAFs, however, they share more sustained contentious interaction among fi eld
similarities to Bourdieu’s fi elds. Incumbents in actors. Change is more possible in both situations
such a settled fi eld will have an interest in than in settled fi elds.
maintaining fi eld stability. They will also have The more common sources of transformative
the resources to exercise power over challengers fi eld change, however, come from outside of the
and will enjoy the benefi t of the rules of the fi fi eld. First, fi elds may be transformed by
eld, which they likely constructed, being slanted invading groups that had not previously been
in their favor. Perhaps even more importantly, active players in the focal fi eld. These outsiders
because actors in settled fi elds are more likely will not be as bound by the conventional rules and
than those in unsettled fi elds to share common understandings of the fi eld as challengers who
understandings and have similar conceptions of had already been fi eld players. The success of
possible alternatives, even challengers in these fi outsiders at altering the fi eld order may depend
elds usually will not mount serious challenges to on many factors, including their strength prior to
D.N. Kluttz and N. Fligstein

invasion, the proximity (in social space) of their


former fi eld to the target fi eld, and their social 12
A s we noted in our overview of the theory of SAFs, fi
skill in forging allies and mobilizing defectors. eld dependencies can be based on legal or bureaucratic
Second, transformative change can be due to authority and on resource dependencies (Pfeffer and
large-scale, macro-level events that disrupt Salancik 1978 ).
numerous fi eld linkages and lead to crises. These pendent fi eld relations can also buffer against
often, but not always, involve the state. Examples change to the focal fi eld (Fligstein and McAdam
include economic depressions, wars, and regime 2012 : 59–61). This is because that fi eld can
change. count on the reciprocal legitimacy benefi ts and
T he third and fi nal exogenous source of resource fl ows that it shares with related fi elds
transformative change for SAFs emanates from to resist change from within. Fligstein and
Fligstein and McAdam’s emphasis on inter-fi eld McAdam
linkages. The effects of a fi eld’s relations with (2012 : 61) cite Bourdieu’s ( 1996a) study of
other fi elds traditionally have been under- elite universities, corporations, and the state in
theorized, as fi eld-level studies tend to examine France as an example of how fi elds depend on
only the internal dynamics of a focal fi eld or else one another to reproduce their positions – elite
capture the structure of external fi eld relations universities depend on the state and elite
without developing a general theoretical corporations to hire their graduates into
framework for fi eld interrelations. Bourdieu, for prestigious jobs, and the state and corporations
example, stated: “I believe indeed that there are depend on the credentialing process that elite
no trans-historic laws of the relations between fi universities provide. We note, however, that
elds, that we must investigate each historical case Bourdieu’s interdependencies here ultimately
separately” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992 : 109) serve to reproduce order in an even-higher, more
(emphasis in original). However, for Fligstein abstract fi eld (the “fi eld of power”); his is not a
and McAdam ( 2012: 18, 59, 100–101), fi elds direct account of interdependencies buffering
are not isolated social systems; they stand in against change within a focal fi eld.
relation to other fi elds in a broader social space. In conclusion, Fligstein and McAdam ( 2012
These relations play a key role in whether a fi eld ) provide a more detailed, systematic account of
will change or remain stable. The authors fi eld emergence and divergent change than neo-
conceptualize fi eld-to-fi eld linkages mostly institutional theorists of organizational fi elds.
based on the extent to which fi elds are dependent They are also much clearer than Bourdieu on the
or interdependent with other fi elds in social conditions under which fi eld change can occur.
space. Whereas Bourdieu really only points to rare times
Because fi elds are often tied, via of crisis, in which the doxa may be revealed and
dependencies or interdependencies, to other fi questioned by the dominated members of a fi eld
elds, a destabilizing change in one fi eld is “like (as discussed above), Fligstein and McAdam (
a stone thrown in a still pond, sending ripples 2012) elaborate a clearer and more elegant
outward to all proximate fi elds” (Fligstein and framework for the mechanisms of fi eld stability
McAdam 2011 : 9). Usually, such a ripple is not and change.
so disruptive as to lead to an episode of
contention within a fi eld. But dependent fi eld
relationships yield unequal power relations and 10.7 Discussion and Conclusion
unidirectional infl uence by the dominant fi eld,
making a fi eld particularly susceptible to change I n this essay, we have pursued two goals. First,
when there is rupture or crisis in the fi eld on we have tried to show that a general notion of a fi
which it depends. 12 eld can be gleaned from the work of neo-
I n contrast to the idea of dependent fi eld institutionalists in organizational theory,
relations leading to change to a focal fi eld, Bourdieu, and Fligstein and McAdam’s theory of
interde- SAFs. The consensus emphasizes the nature of fi
es of Sociological Field Theory 201

elds as meso-level social orders populated with operates to make better sense of the world. Our
actors who take one another into account in their ability to specify the mechanisms by which these
actions. Second, while these ideal-typical concepts actually operate need to be clarifi ed.
versions of fi eld theories have many agreements, This is certainly also an empirical question. So,
they differ markedly in terms of how they for example, fi guring out how to tell if a
understand the role of actors, power, consensus, particular fi eld is more driven by legitimacy,
and the dynamics of fi elds. power and dominance, or identify and
In order to make progress on understanding cooperation, is a diffi cult question that we have
the signifi cance of these disagreements, our little experience attempting to answer
basic message is that these differences should be empirically.
confronted and explored not just theoretically, Field theory also can occupy an ambiguous
but empirically. Scholars should then be refl epistemological status. On the one hand, fi eld
exive about how to revise theory in light of the theorists may assume that fi elds are real, they can
differences. Instead of treating these ideas as be measured, and their effects discerned. This
separate schools of thought about fi elds, we would imply a more positivist or realist approach
should place them more directly in conversation to fi elds that would emphasize common
with one another by examining which way of structures and mechanisms that researchers could
thinking about fi elds makes more sense in certain look for and model across settings. But, one can
kinds of situations. also view fi eld theory as a set of concepts, ideal
I t is useful to consider how to proceed to types that help researchers make sense of some
adjudicate these differences of opinion. What historical situation. Here, analysts deploy the
should be done next is both conceptual and sparse ideas of which fi eld theory consists to help
empirical. The concepts of fi eld theory have been them put a structure onto empirical materials, be
fl eshed out in an abstract manner. The degree to they historical, ethnographic, or quantitative. We
which they differ needs to be made more explicit are comfortable with either version of fi eld
in order for them to be empirically useful. At the theory. But some scholars will fi nd it diffi cult to
same time, while we have many studies that take seriously those who opt for one or the other
employ fi eld theory in one form or another, we view of fi elds.
have very little general sense of how to produce Field theory also makes very general claims
measurement and comparability in observation in about its empirical scope. Given our view that
order to evaluate the conceptual disagreements. one can observe fi elds in most of organized
So, for example, Bourdieu’s social life, it is necessary to consider what fi eld
Distinction (1984) remains one of the few theory does and does not apply to. Indeed, one
comprehensive fi eld-level studies of social life. can see fi eld theory as a nascent attempt at a
But the issues it raises have simply not been general theory of society. Although Bourdieu
addressed consistently from a specifi cally fi eld- tried to maintain his perspective was not such a
theoretic point of view. Instead, scholars have theory, it is diffi cult given the wide-ranging
picked and chosen aspects of Bourdieu’s character of his work and the myriad topics he
framework and ignored the general issue of the investigated not to see fi eld theory in this way.
degree to which such a fi eld of cultural The theory of SAFs is a useful model because it
production exists and how stable it may be across builds upon not only the other fi eld theories
time and place (Sallaz and Zavisca 2007 ). discussed in this chapter but also incorporates
Moreover, scholars should clarify whether or other lines of inquiry like social movement
not the disagreements between fi eld theories is a theory, social psychology, and identity theory to
matter of specifying more clearly the possible create a novel and general theory of action and
scope conditions of each of these perspectives or structure.
of their fundamental incompatibility. Again, this Another way to test the generalizability of fi
issue is both conceptual and empirical. From a eld theory is to engage other perspectives that
conceptual point of view, it may be that there are posit meso-level processes but do not use the fi
conditions where one or the other perspective eld idea. We have only mentioned network
D.N. Kluttz and N. Fligstein

analysis and the institutional logics perspectives. how fi eld theory and the institutional logics
But there are others. For example, population perspective are complementary.
ecology in organizational theory, with its In conclusion, fi eld theory is one of the most
conception of constructed organizational general theoretical accomplishments of the past
populations, shares affi nities with fi eld theory 40 years in sociology. Although the
(see Haveman and Kluttz 2015 ). Additionally, complementarities between versions of fi eld
much of the work done on policy domains and theories outnumber the differences, we should
policy entrepreneurs in sociology and political allow for recombination and synthesis in order to
science could also fi t into the fi eld perspective build on those complementarities and reconcile
(e.g., Kingdon 1984 ; Laumann and Knoke 1987 the differences. In doing so, we can avoid the
). theory fragmentation that has characterized
T here are two logical possibilities here. First, sociological subfi elds over the last several
fi eld theory might aid other perspectives by decades and continue our path toward a
providing them with a well-conceived concept of comprehensive, contemporary theory of fi elds.
a meso-level social arena that would make such As we hope we have shown, we are closer now to
theories richer. Situating one’s analysis of the such a theory than ever before.
social world at this meso-level has distinct
advantages. To say that action and meaning
occurs in fi elds – social orders made up of
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Part III
A Coherent Social
Universe
Institutional Spheres: The Macro- 11
Structure and Culture of Social Life
Seth Abrutyn
S. Abrutyn ()
Department of Sociology , University of
Memphis , Memphis , TN , USA e-mail:
sbbrutyn@memphis.edu
lower-level units of analysis other chapters in this
handbook consider: the self (Chap. 17 );
corporate units like groups, organizations, and
communities (Chaps. 13 , 14 , and 15 ); and
11.1 Introduction congeries of corporate units, like fi elds (Chap.
10 ). They do not act in the Parsonsian sense of
S ince Parsons’ grand theory fell in disrepute, systems needing things and doing things. Rather,
sociologists have spilled much ink cautioning they are constructs that occupy real space and
against reifying aspects of the social world that thus have real consequences. Moreover, spheres
are invisible, macro, and perhaps invented by are not static, but processual; they vary in terms
sociologists. Yet, as Fine notes, “People reify of their infl uence across time and space (Turner
their life worlds, and do not, for the most part, 2003 ); they have ecological dynamics associated
think like interpretivist microsociologists” with their level of autonomy and the degree to
(1991:169). To be sure, Fine is thinking about which an actor fi nds herself close to the
collectives like the government or “big business” institutional core (Abrutyn 2014b :68–98); but,
as the abstractions people assign exteriority to, ultimately, they shape the everyday reality of
and not larger, more abstract spheres of social signifi cant proportions of the population (1)
reality. However, people routinely talk about cognitively as we develop identities embedded
“law,” “religion,” and the “economy” as things within relationships embedded within encounters
that act upon them and which others, especially embedded within corporate units that present
elites, can act on (or use for their benefi t). actors with macro- level elements (see Chap. 6)
Indeed, even studies of small-scale societies ; (2) situationally when a person enters a
demonstrate that nonliterate peoples cognitively courtroom for the fi rst time in her life or when
distinguish between the beliefs and practices, one goes to the mall on Black Friday; and (3)
underlying value-orientations and norms, and ritualistically when people anticipate and
physical, temporal, social, and symbolic spaces frequent religious services on a regular basis or
of different spheres of reality like law and when students take fi nals every year at the same
religion (Malinowski 1959 ). These spheres, or
time with the same preparatory lead up.
what I term institutional spheres , are the macro-
T he following essay is organized as such: fi
level structural and cultural spheres that delineate
rst, we explore the various usages of the term
the most central aspects of social life. Embedded
“institution” in sociology, arguing that there is
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 207
S. Abrutyn (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary Sociological Theory,
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32250-6_11
within them are the various both an historical basis for thinking about them
208 S. Abrutyn

as spheres and practical reasons for doing so. The number of uses—many of which stem
Second, the major elements of institutions are from the new institutionalist school that is largely
elucidated, focusing particularly on the concerned with organizations (cf. Powell and
evolutionary, ecological, and entrepreneurial DiMaggio 1991 ; Nee 2005 )—is dizzying. That
dynamics of institutional spheres. Third, and fi is, if the presidency, the handshake, Harvard, and
nal, we consider the “frontiers” of institutional sexism are all institutions (cf. Jepperson 1991 :
analysis. In particular, the temporal and symbolic 144), then one must logically ask what is not an
spaces of institutional domains seem ripe for institution? Or, perhaps the real question is, “are
major advances, while the physical and social the differences in these phenomena more
dimensions remain important and in need of important than their similarities?” Besides the
further consideration. criticism surrounding the integration of
colloquial vagaries with social scientifi c
precision, we might raise several other issues
with the new institutionalism. First, a close
11.2 The Many Varieties
examination of the new institutionalist tradition
I have commented elsewhere that the concept reveals a focus on organizations with mostly
institution is one of the most commonly used taken for granted consideration of what the
concepts in sociology, yet is perhaps one of the institution is, often pointing to an underexamined
vaguest and least precisely defi ned (Abrutyn environment in which organizations do things
2009b , 2014b ). An exhaustive review is not (Sutton et al. 1994 ; Sutton and Dobbin 1996 ;
necessary, though it is worth noting the most Edelman and Suchman 1997) . Second, like a lot
common usages before moving on. Colloquially, of contemporary sociology, there is an ahistorical
an institution often refers to an enduring bias. Alford and Friedland’s ( 1985 ) work, for
organization or association (e.g., Harvard; a example, is rooted in modernity and things like
research center), a long-standing member of said the “state” or “capitalism,” which do not have
organization (e.g., a professor whose existence is one-to-one comparisons in other times, unless we
synonymous with the department) or a formal take an overly simplistic Marxian view of polity
position (e.g., the Presidency); it may also refer or economy. Third, and closely related, neo-
to an enduring custom (e.g., the handshake) or institutionalists have been criticized for
law. Early social scientists, and many today, used overemphasizing convergence and isomorphism,
it to refer to enduring, patterned actions (e.g., while ignoring the tremendous variation in
marriage) or legal relations (e.g., private “state” or “capitalism.” At times, the John Meyer
property), while those like Spencer used it both “school” seems to assume rationality is the
to refer to broader spheres of social structure like master process and all organizations, regardless
religion or law as well as the interrelated of local custom or broader inequalities in the
components that shaped social action. More world-system, easily conform in lockstep to the
recently, a loosely coupled group of scholars and basic pattern (Boli et al. 1985 ; Thomas et al.
scholarship, new or neo - institutionalists, use 1987) . And thus it might be tempting to scrap the
it in several divergent ways: cultural myths and term itself, yet Durkheim ( 1895 [1982]:45) once
patterns that generate isomorphism (Meyer and described sociology as the “science of
Rowan 1977 ; DiMaggio and Powell 1983 ); institutions,” which both speaks to the centrality
“rules of the game” that govern economic of the concept and the necessity in more precisely
organizations (North 2005) ; forces of broad defi ning it.
social control with varying levels of normative, However, rather than try and reinvent the
regulative, and cognitive-cultural mechanisms wheel, or even challenge the status quo, this essay
(Scott 2001) ; or, broad organizational forms of avoids the term institution to some degree, and its
modernity like “capitalism,” “the State,” or the verb form institutionalization, for a more precise
“church” (Friedland and Alford 1991 ). concept: institutional sphere or domain . Doing
so affords us several ways to leverage greater
swaths of sociological theory and research. First,
it allows us to rescue aspects of
210 S. Abrutyn

functionalism and its close cousins (Shils 1975 ; and space institutional spheres, and what may be
Eisenstadt 1964 , 1980; Turner 2003 ; Luhmann called a society’s institutional complex (or the
2012 ) that may shed insights when consider in total confi guration of institutional spheres), vary
new light. Second, it moves us away from in terms of their level of differentiation and, more
“system” language that overemphasizes importantly, autonomy (Abrutyn 2009b ).
similarities across levels of social reality so that D ifferentiation occurs along four axes, the fi
we can talk about meaningful differences, as well rst three of which are common whereas the fourth
as employ wide ranging explanatory frames like is directly related to autonomy: physical,
networks or social psychology. Third, and temporal, social, and symbolic. By physical, we
perhaps most importantly, we can move beyond are referring to the act of carving up geographic
the vague cultural theories of Parsons and space and setting it aside for activities related to
functionalism (see Chap. 6 ) and offer a robust an institutional sphere; as well as stratifying
cultural theory to better balance the structural access to these spaces. This may include
dimensions of institutions. This alone allows us buildings, monuments, statues, and the like.
to leverage the institutional logics perspective Temporal differentiation refers to the act of
(Thornton et al. 2012 ) as well as revisit Weber’s setting aside distinct time for activities, as well as
( 1946 ) social psychological work on hierarchicalizing how time shapes action, goals,
worldviews, ideas, and interests surrounding and decisions. Temporal differentiation may
social orders. Fourth, we can introduce and resolve space limitations in so far as a space
embed the notion of history and evolutionary serves as an arena for two or more institutions,
processes to underscore the ubiquity of but only during certain times. Social
institutional spheres, highlight some of the differentiation involves the creation of new roles
processes of change, and fi nd the points of and status distinctions linked to the emergence of
sociocultural and historic specifi city that lend new groups, categories, and organizational units.
discrete texture to time and place. The earliest form of this may be the growth of
patri- and matrilines that signify a person’s
kinship position, descent, and inheritance (Levi-
Strauss 1969 ). Finally, symbolic differentiation
11.3 Institutional Spheres
refers to the concomitant generalization and
In essence, institutional spheres are the macro- particularization of culture. On the one hand,
level structural and cultural milieus in which generalization proceeds as space, time, and social
most lower-order phenomena (e.g., fi elds; relations grow complex and differentiated, as one
organizations; encounters) are organized and mechanism of bringing all of these disparate
connected (Turner 2010 ). Though one can pieces together (Alexander 1988 ). On the other
imagine a limitless number of potential spheres, hand, each disparate unit can come to “claim” a
ethnographic, historical, and sociological part of the broader culture as signifying
analyses point to a select set of domains that may something unique about it.
be deemed institutions. In nearly every society, Thus, returning to institutional spheres, each
we fi nd kinship (Fox 1967 ), political (Johnson sphere in a given society varies in terms of its
and Earle 2000) , religious (Radin 1937 [1957]), level of physical, temporal, social, and symbolic
economic (Sahlins 1972 ), and legal spheres differentiation. The greater is the degree to which
(Malinowski 1959 ); as well as, arguably, each type of differentiation is higher, the greater
education (Turner 2003 ) and, perhaps, military is the degree to which the institutional sphere will
(Collins 1986 ). In modern societies medicine be distinguishable by a signifi cant proportion of
(Starr 1982 ), science (Abrutyn 2009a ), art the population vis-à-vis other institutions. Put
(Luhmann 2000 ), and possibly media and/or another way, as polity becomes distinct from
sport (Abrutyn 2014b ) join this list. Across time kinship around 5,000 years ago, the Palace and
other public spaces become distinct from kinship
11 Institutional Spheres: The Macro-Structure and Culture of Social Life 211

buildings in size and scale—and, to some degree, logic , or symbols and practices that give
function; public holidays and rituals are likewise “meaning to [actors] daily activity, organize time
distinct from local, familial rituals; kin relations and space, and reproduce [actor’s] lives and
and relations between subject and king become experiences” (Thornton et al. 2012 :2), comes to
cognitively and materially consequential; and, fi mold the shape and texture of religion vis-à-vis
nally, the polity usurps certain symbols that come kinship or economy. “How autonomous” is an
to signify power and force as opposed to loyalty empirical question revolving around historical
and love found in the family (Abrutyn 2015b) . factors, a given sphere’s relationship to other
Differentiation, however, does not necessarily spheres, and the ease with which resources
mean autonomy, as the Palace in Mesopotamian (people, generalized media, etc.) fl ow across one
society was often conceptualized as a kinship sphere to the other signifying the circulation of
domain, but one whose function mattered more intra-institutional meanings to other spheres.
than the ordinary house—e.g., the king’s What matters, for now, is that societies are
principal function was to uphold the secular and characterized by institutional spheres having
sacred order (Yoffee 2005) . But autonomy greater or lesser autonomy; and which ones are
cannot emerge without increasing levels of all more autonomous (as well as how many have
four types of differentiation; especially symbolic. become relatively autonomous) matters for
B y autonomy, we mean the process by which understanding the underlying ethos of a given
institutional spheres become discrete cultural group of people as well as why cultural realities
spaces in so far as the physical, temporal, social, as expressed in micro-level processes like
and symbolic elements come to orient most identities vary across time and space.
people’s emotions, attitudes, and actions towards
the institutional sphere’s cultural system and
source of authority (Abrutyn 2014b ). 69 On your 11.3.1 Evolutionary Institutionalism
way to work, driving by a church, for instance,
comes to signify a distinct set of actors, actions, A n evolutionary analysis is essential to
attitudes and values, goals and preferences, and theorizing about institutional domains and their
temporal dimensions. Even if an individual does structural and cultural components; as well as
not belong to the church or the broader religion, what I call institutional ecology (see below). That
she can orient herself towards that building as if is, institutions cannot be divorced from the long
it is a microcosm of the religious sphere; and, as narrative of human history and the varieties of
we shall see, the closer the actor is to the religious societal arrangements. Moreover, as Turner (
sphere, the more salient the meanings of the 2003 )
church will be when she drives past it. Hence, has asserted, neo-evolutionary thought provides
autonomy matters because institutional spheres us with the foundations for rehabilitating the
come to penetrate the everyday lived experience functionalist trope of needs or requisites in ways
of signifi cant portions of the population such that that illuminate why humans construct macro-
they come to cognitively understand religion as level spaces and why there are delimited numbers
separate—in the abstract and ideal—from polity of institutional spheres (Abrutyn 2013a , b ,
or economy (Abrutyn 2014a ); or, in the 2015a ). Thus, an evolutionary perspective sheds
language of some institutional scholars, a unique

69
The concept of autonomy is borrowed from Niklas discrete cultural systems that increase the probability that
Luhmann’s ( 2012) neo-system’s theory. While an actor or set of actions will orient their emotions,
Luhmann saw the system autonomy as tantamount to attitudes, and actions when physically or cognitively near
closure and, thus, a solution to the problem of the institutional sphere. Hence why physical, temporal,
differentiation, our conceptualization moves away from social, and symbolic space matters: all four of these
closure to a more Weberian, social phenomenological dimensions can make salient one institutional sphere’s
perspective: autonomy means spheres become relatively cultural reality vis-à-vis others.
212 S. Abrutyn

light on why the structure and culture of ect past solutions, but remain capable of being
institutional spheres look the way they do. recombined, forgotten and rediscovered, and
In the following section, we consider what manipulated in previously unforeseen ways.
institutional evolution is by examining (a) the They are macro in so far as they contain large
material exigencies commonly driving societal inventories of cultural elements that few, if any
evolution, (b) the universal human concerns that one person, can know or access. However, these
motivate humans, individually and collectively, libraries of culture are grafted onto physical,
try to solve problems around under the pressure temporal, social, and symbolic spaces that are
of one or more of these material exigencies, and embodied in a series of encounters (more or less
(c) the role institutional entrepreneurs play in micro). Unlike libraries, institutional spheres are
evolution. Before exploring these three main structural spaces with real positions refl ective of
topics, a brief elucidation of my view on power and authority, stratifi cation patterns
sociocultural evolution is in order. unique to the sphere and also indicative of
broader societal patterns, and resource fl ows
11.3.1.1 Sociocultural Evolution (Abrutyn 2014b :147–171). Thus, they do not
E volutionary thought and/or concepts have been serve as passive sites of storage, but also as
a staple in sociology since Marx, Spencer, and arenas of competition and confl ict that further
Durkheim, as well as many other now-forgotten fuel sociocultural evolution. If they are macro in
sociologists. Much of this thinking occurred that they contain numerous elements beyond the
before the modern synthesis of Darwinian natural control of any one person, they are also macro in
selection and Mendelian genetics (cf. Mayr so far as they contain series of embedded sites of
2001 ), and before the types of empirical data contestation—in many ways, like Fligstein and
necessary to draw good inferences were readily McAdam’s ( 2011 ) notion of embedded fi elds of
available. For many early sociologists, evolution strategic action (see also Chap. 10) —as well as
implicitly or explicitly meant progressive gradual numerous structural connections like divisions of
change that unfolded primarily at the macro-level labor, patterns of exchange, and the like that
in terms of time and space. It both fi t the crude tenuously link various levels of social reality as
efforts at societal classifi cation (e.g., savages- well as these embedded sites of contestation.
barbarians- civilized societies), and the growing Because they are macro and collective and
social scientifi c efforts to understand colonized highly complex in their substance, institutions do
peoples. Hence, many of the criticisms of not evolve based on Darwinian principles—
Eurocentrism were at least partially valid. In the though, like all things attached to the biotic
1960s, evolutionism returned in the form of stage world, institutions can be wiped out along with a
models that sought to learn from the past (Bellah society in the face of massive environmental
1964 ; Lenski 1966 ; Parsons 1966 ). These too change. To draw, then, from Turner ( 2010 ),
failed to use evolutionary principles and were institutional spheres refl ect two of our very own
more about discerning developmental stages and theorists’ models of evolution: Spencerian and
less about theorizing about sociocultural Durkheimian . The gist of Spencer’s model
evolution (Blute 2010 ). In the last 25 years, neo- challenges purist Darwinian thinking because it
evolutionary theories have grown exponentially does not rely on competition between species or
(for a review, see Chap. 24 ). traits or whatever is the unit of selection. Instead,
F or our purposes, we are interested primarily he posited that societies were always at risk of
in how institutions evolve, with autonomy being collapse or conquest because environmental
the principal dimension along which we can exigencies were not so much a constant, but an
measure institutional evolution. Like libraries, inherent risk of population growth and density;
institutional spheres become warehouses of under “normal” conditions, existing structural
material and symbolic elements which are (and I would argue cultural) solutions could be
sometimes combined into extant patterns that refl mobilized to resolve exigencies, but often times
11 Institutional Spheres: The Macro-Structure and Culture of Social Life 213

these were not suffi cient and a society faced a benefi t (cf. Chaps. 25 and 26 ; also, Abrutyn
“choice”: either create new structural (and/or and Van Ness 2015 ).
cultural) arrangements to resolve the problems or In short, evolutionary processes are real in
risk breaking down. 70 Spencerian evolutionary sociology. Though our focus is on how and why
processes, then, operate by purposive, directed institutions evolve, there are plenty of other
efforts of people in the face of real (and I would levels of evolution under which other principles
add, perceived) problems. As we shall see below, apply (Blute 2010 ). By moving towards
I believe Spencerian evolution also requires Spencerian and Durkheimian processes,
thinking about the link between macro- however, we gain several advantages to strict
exigencies and micro-level exigencies, which Darwinian accounts. First, we are freed from
often goes unexamined and assumed. using biological concepts as metaphors for
Durkheimian selection processes are more sociocultural evolution when they are not really
similar to Darwinian. In essence, Durkheim saw one- to- one fi ts. Second, they open the door to
competition between individuals or groups for thinking about who, that is what actual persons,
position and resources as the driving force of are affecting evolution; as well as when, why, and
sociocultural evolution: some individuals or how. Third, we can bury unidirectional and
groups would prove more “fi t” for a niche or unilinear stage models for good, acknowledging
position, while others would create new that evolution is not necessary progressive in
specializations, carve out new niches, or die. This terms of growing complexity or differentiation,
model is more of an ecological evolutionism that but in fact, evolution may mean different things
has been developed extensively by human across cases. While Bellah ( 1964) , for instance,
ecologists (Hawley 1986 ) and organizational considers the Protestant reformation a moment of
ecologists (Hannan and Freeman 1977 ). Like increasing complexity, I would characterize this
Darwinian processes, competition over resources transformative event as a moment of simplifi
and specialization are key components; unlike cation when comparing the organizational,
Darwinian processes, Durkheim acknowledges material, and symbolic elements of Protestantism
that culture has the capacity to overcome the to Catholicism. Likewise, institutional evolution
biotic world, expand resource bases, and reduce may be the process by which one or more
confl icts— and thus, like Spencer’s model, institutions grow in autonomy, or it may refl ect
humans can and do act purposively and the changing levels of autonomy across a series
creatively. Moreover, as strategic action fi eld of institutions including the loss of autonomy in
theorists (Fligstein and McAdams 2011 )—who, some cases. Finally, as Abrutyn and Lawrence (
admittedly, are not evolutionists—would add: 2010 ) have argued elsewhere, evolution though
competitions, their outcomes, and thereby often gradual and slow, is sometimes rapid
potential evolutionary change, are not always qualitative transformation; it often depends on
blind and directionless from a Durkheimian the case, the historical scale one is interested in,
perspective, but do involve strategizing, and how we relativize temporality. We turn, now,
purposive actors working to improve their to the basic material exigencies that seem
position, protect their power, destroy their ubiquitous to all societies.
opponents, and, under other circumstances,
increase the collective’s (or some segment of it)

70
First, by “choice” I do not believe Spencer literally saw new structures and/or cultures or collapse. His model was
societies as making choices. He was aware that recursive, and when solutions were not found or were
supraorganisms, like societies, are not like organisms unsuccessfully implemented, rather than collapse,
because they have myriad “central nervous system” and exigencies likely became amplifi ed or intensifi ed or new
therefore choices require quotations. Second, Spencer exigencies emerged (Turner 2010 ).
was not naïve to think the process was as simple as create
214 S. Abrutyn

11.3.1.2 The Material Exigencies whether from simple to compound (Spencer


O ne of the principal critiques of structural- 1897 ), mechanical to organic (Durkheim 1893 ),
functionalism is that it relies too heavily on needs or archaic to modern (Bellah 1964 ).
or requisites for societal equilibria (Parsons 1951 Yet, in spite of these criticisms, macro-level
); moreover, these needs are often conceptualized sociology must be able to explain and contend
as social or collective needs, which imply a with macro-level material exigencies (Hawley
supraconsciousness. Herbert Spencer, for 1986 ; Lenski 1966; Turner 2010) . That is, we
instance, famously argued that all societies had to cannot turn a blind-eye to ubiquitous exigencies
deal with three basic adaptive problems (Turner like population growth or density, resource
1985 ): operation (production of resources and scarcity, or heterogeneity that have relatively
reproduction of people); distribution; and, predictable outcomes. Nor can we adopt the
regulation (controlling and coordinating functionalist perspective that often whitewashes
differentiated social units). While other (1) the purposive efforts to deal with these
functionalists would provide their own lists, the pressures—or, to deal with the secondary
basic argument was the same: as societies grow problems that people perceive like threats to a
larger, social equilibria are upset; in part, new person or group’s standard of living, (2) the
structures with discrete functions emerge to deal proposed solutions that are sometimes benefi cial
with imbalance, but also cause new imbalances to one group vis-à-vis others, and (3) the
that are ultimately reduced by new integrative maladaptive consequences of short-sighted
mechanisms. In short, structural differentiation is solutions. One solution Turner ( 2003 ) has
always the master process in functionalism, with offered is to focus, instead, on selection
emphasis either on the process of differentiation pressures , or the types of generic forces that,
and its consequences (e.g., Spencer) or on the when present, press against a social unit’s extant
integrative mechanisms that bring differentiated structure and culture in ways that lead to change;
society back into harmony (e.g., Durkheim). whether coerced, unintentional, or intentional.
Several problems emerge with structural- Though an exhaustive list of selection pressures
functional logic. First, there is a sense of would be preferable, for our purposes we can
inevitability and conservativism in most provide several exogenous and endogenous
functionalisms. Durkheim, well aware of the examples: population growth or rapid decline;
competition and confl ict found in modern, urban population and social density; material, human,
differentiated societies, incessantly searched for and/or symbolic resource scarcity; heterogeneity,
the lynchpin that balanced society; Parsons ( stratifi cation, and inequality; external threats or
1951) , a worse offender, propagated a version of internal confl ict; ecological degradation or
functionalism that led to studies legitimating climatic disasters. What links these examples
inequality as “healthy” for society (Davis and together are several key aspects: (1) they all have
Moore 1945 ). Second, most “solutions” to the the potential to threaten the survival of a given
problem of integration were weak or social unit; (2) they can appear, in variable size,
underdeveloped cultural solutions: for Durkheim, scale, and magnitude, across all levels of social
it was ritual and collective effervescence; Parsons reality; (3) they all have short- and long-run
settled on universal value-patterns; and for structural and cultural solutions that are just as
Merton, it was norms. In all of these cases, the likely to fail or create new secondary pressures,
outlines of a truly cultural solution to the problem as succeed; (4) more often than not, solutions
of integration is present, yet in functionalism include reconfi guring the physical, temporal,
always put structure ahead of culture. Third, there social, or symbolic spaces in directions of either
is little room for multi- linear, multi-directional, greater or lesser differentiation.
contingent social change. Structural
differentiation generally proceeds in a
“progressive” direction (cf. Parsons 1966 ),
11 Institutional Spheres: The Macro-Structure and Culture of Social Life 215

11.3.1.3 Universal Human Concerns allow resolution; existing power structures may
Despite the importance of these exigencies in work in opposition to efforts to innovate;
explaining sociocultural evolution and individuals or groups may fail to perceive the
institutional change, it is far less common— problem, or simply misperceived the problem or
especially before scientifi c inquiry became its solutions; fi nally, solutions have no
distinct from r eligious, legal, and philosophic guarantees over the short, medium, or long haul.
epistemologies—for people to feel macro-level Third, some ubiquitous concerns remain
exigencies. That is, not many people undifferentiated in many human societies, confl
conceptualize their discomfort and pursuit of ated or synthesized with other more “important”
individual or collective solutions as coming from, ones. That is, cultural variation is, in part, a
say, “too much population!” Rather, these macro- product of the historical and sociocultural
level exigencies tend to exacerbate concerns that contingent nature of selection: one group may
appear to be ubiquitous to humans in both time defi ne justice as salient under the same exact
and space (Abrutyn 2014b) . Admittedly, pressures as another that defi nes sacredness and
sociologists tend to balk at lists that involve loyalty to be most relevant. How these concerns
universals, but several caveats should put these are grafted onto institutional spheres is what
fears in abeyance. First, by ubiquitous, I mean gives every society or social unit its unique
that any mentally, physically, and genetically texture and timbre.
“normal” human is capable of feeling these That being said, there are a limited number of
concerns are salient to their well-being. How they concerns and when these concerns become
are made salient, however, is an empirical salient, and the production, distribution, and
question: for instance, it could be a direct feeling, access to their solutions become monopolized by
cultivated from the person’s actual experiences a specialized group, institutional spheres can
just as much as it could be a feeling derived from become autonomous. That is, institutional
a signifi cant or prestigious other’s infl uence. spheres come to be the central locus for dealing
The point is that some concerns are universal, with one or more human concerns. Table 11.1
and under the right conditions can be made to feel offers a list of autonomous institutional spheres
problematic and in need of correction. Second, and the concerns often embedded within them. Of
just because a concern is made salient does not course, this fact does not necessarily lead to the
mean individuals or groups will or can resolve the functionalist or old evolutionary notion that
assumed problem. Technology or culture may not structures and cultures are adaptive. Rather,
Table 11.1 Ubiquitous human concerns and institutions often involved in their resolution
Biological reproduction Kinship, polity
Cultural reproduction Kinship, education, polity, religion, science
Security Polity, kinship
Communication with the supernatural Religion, polity, art
Confl ict resolution/justice/fairness Law, kinship, polity
Knowledge of the biotic/social world Science, education, religion, polity, economy,
art
Subsistence Economy, polity, kinship, science, medicine
Transportation/communication tech. Polity, economy, science, media
Distinction/status Polity, economy, sport, religion, art, education
Moral order Kinship, religion, law, polity
Socioemotional anchorage Kinship, religion, art
Health Medicine, kinship, religion
Note: This list is not defi nitive, but rather suggestive. Other concerns can become salient and, therefore, ubiquitous
216 S. Abrutyn

institutional spheres are dominated by collectives seeking to generalize power across social units
who monopolize access to the goods and services and monopolize its production and distribution
associated with dealing with one or more within the political core—and thereby
concerns, and under most circumstances, these expropriating it from local kin relations— power
rights and privileges are unevenly distributed. An becomes problematic more frequently and more
institution’s autonomy, then, does not depend on complexly (Abrutyn 2013a ). For instance, on a
objective adaptivity but instead on whether it cognitive, micro/meso-level, political autonomy
penetrates the lives and experiences of a signifi and the monopolization of power meant political
cant proportion of the population, while allowing goals become perceived as “different from other
the group and its cultural assemblage to persist types of goals or from goals of other spheres [in
over an indefi nite period of time. The greater this so far as their] formation, pursuit, and
penetration, (1) the greater the legitimacy granted implementation became largely independent of
to those monopolizing the institution’s core, (2) other groups, and were governed mostly by
the greater the subjective belief that the political criteria and by consideration of political
institution “correctly” distributes and produces s exigency” (Eisenstadt 1963 :19). The same point
olutions, and (3) the greater the likelihood that can be made about religion and the production
individuals and collectives will orient their and distribution of goods and services associated
emotions, attitudes, and actions—under the right with concerns like sacredness / piety during the
conditions (which are elucidated in detail Axial Age (Abrutyn 2014a , 2015a ); law and
below)—towards the cultural and authority confl ict resolution / justice during the Gregorian
system(s) of the institutional core (and the Reformation (Abrutyn 2009b ); or, health and
specialists who are granted the right to impose a medicine during the early twentieth century
legitimate vision of reality). Note, some of these (Starr 1982 ).
concerns are ubiquitous in so far as there are
biological and, especially, neurological 11.3.1.4 Institutional
foundations for them. A strong sense of justice, Entrepreneurship
for example, is found in both our primate kin and Currently underexplored, a signifi cant question
across all human brains (Gospic et al. 2011) — that faces evolutionary accounts is how the
and, thereby, shapes the microdynamics macro-level processes are “translated” into the
constraining our everyday experience of social lived experience of people, motivating them to
reality (Chap. 18) . The specifi c cultural innovate and invent new organizational,
framework varies, to be sure, but the salience of symbolic, or technological elements of culture.
justice as a human concern appears everywhere, One possible answer to this dilemma may derive
with the earliest expression being in relatively from the transformation of exigencies into real or
distinct legal mechanisms (Hoebel 1973 ), but perceived threats to individual or groups of
sometimes being grafted onto other concerns like individuals’ standards of living. That is, in the
sacredness, loyalty, and power . face of objective or subjective relative
A further note, whose full exploration is deprivation, actors are motivated to identify the
beyond the scope of this chapter, is the fact that source of threat and resolve it by eradicating the
widespread sense of salience is often historically threat, adapting to it, stemming it, etc. However,
phased (for more, see Abrutyn 2009a , 2014a , this perspective avoids the possibility of
2015a ). Thus, while power is a concern across purposive innovation where no perceived threat
all social units across all times and places, its or exigency is present. Innovation for the sake of
institutionalization and, therefore, widespread innovation as well as out of self-interest or
salience, only occurs when roles like chiefs collective benefi t must be considered plausible
become differentiated. Its scale and magnitude sources of new cultural traits that, once present,
continues to increase as polity becomes can either spread by way of typical mechanisms
autonomous. That is, when chiefs become kings
11 Institutional Spheres: The Macro-Structure and Culture of Social Life 217

such as propinquity, prestige- biases, or and too much of the latter invites organizational
conformity (Abrutyn and Mueller 2014 ) or from and movement disasters.
being imposed from above by power elites F inally, there are different types of
(Abrutyn and Van Ness 2015 ). In both cases— entrepreneurs and projects based on their own
reaction to threat or innovative agency—the originating position. DiMaggio ( 1988) , for
primary driving force can be characterized as instance, borrowed the term from Eisenstadt to
collective specialized actors who may best be discuss how existing organizational fi elds adapt
called institutional entrepreneurs . or are modifi ed by purposive innovation. A more
Entrepreneurs are Eisenstadt’s ( 1964 , 1980 Durkheimian, gradualist model of “reform” and
) interpretation of Weber’s charismatic carrier quantitative growth underscores this model, as
groups . They are entrepreneurial in so far as they entrepreneurs work from within the existing
embark on high-risk/high-reward projects that institutional sphere. Eisenstadt ( 1964 , 1980 ),
can lead to, in the most extreme cases, their death. conversely, pictured a different embedded
When truly successful, they are capable of entrepreneur: authorized by more powerful
reconfi guring the physical, temporal, social, and individuals to resolve pressing problems, they
symbolic space and carving out distinct could leverage their success and monopoly over
autonomous institutional spheres that encompass organizational, technological, and symbolic
those differentiated dimensions of space secrets to balance power differentials between
(Abrutyn 2014b ; Abrutyn and Van Ness 2015) their entrepreneurial unit and the extant power
. From Weber, Eisenstadt saw these groups as elite. To these two, I have added the “marginal”
evolutionary when they are capable of entrepreneurs, or those who begin to modify
convincing others that their project and the very institutional reality from a distant position from
grounds of their group’s existence is rooted in the the core; a process that seems to have occurred in
fundamental social, moral, and cosmic order (cf. some Axial Age ( c . 1000–100 BCE) religio-
introduction in Weber 1968) . It was their cultural movements (Humphreys 1975 ; Abrutyn
charismatic “fervor” that became the force 2014a ,
driving qualitative transformation. I ( 2014b) 2015a ); and, in addition, the liaison , or the
have added to this that the fundamental grounds entrepreneur whose position is at the overlap
were rooted not in vague notions of moral order, between two or more autonomous institutional
but rather linked to one or more human concerns spheres and can draw from both in new, creative
in that they became the producers and distributors ways (Abrutyn 2014b ). More on these different
of goods and services associated with substantive types of entrepreneurs will be said shortly. For
or ultimate ends. As the purveyors of these goods now, we turn to the ecological dynamics of
and services, like priests dispensing grace or institutions so that elucidating entrepreneurs and
politicians transforming raw power into their positions will be anchored in something
delimited authority, they are given the right to much more concrete.
carve up institutional space. Bourdieu ( 1989) ,
for instance, recognized the ability to appropriate
social and symbolic space and differentiate it 11.3.2 Institutional Ecology
however one group sees fi t as the ultimate form and the Dynamics of
of symbolic power and violence. Groups, Institutional Space
however, also carve up physical and temporal
space. What makes entrepreneurship tricky, One of the oldest problems macrosociology has
however, is the fact that entrepreneurial projects wrestled with is how macro level forces are
are often both self- and collectively-oriented; fi translated into micro-level dynamics (for more,
nding a balance between the two diametrically see Chaps. 7 and 8) . Parsons ( 1951) , for
opposed goal structures matters for success, as instance, posited a model (AGIL) that supposedly
too much of the former loses potential members
218 S. Abrutyn

worked at all levels of reality, capturing the four one ( or more ) discrete institutional cores form
basic needs individuals, groups, and societies . 71 The core is a physical and cognitive
were required to fi nd structural solutions to. In dimension of macro-reality. On the one hand,
this section we explore the way institutional with greater autonomy comes the increasing
domains organize ecological space and the likelihood that physical space—including
ecological dynamics across levels of social buildings, pathways, and even people lodged
reality. Conceptualizing ecological space allows temporarily or full-time in these spaces—will
us to move away from the abstraction present in become distinguishable from other types of
Parsons or Luhmann, and take purchase of the physical space. At fi rst, physical space becomes
way macro-reality, through real physical , differentiated temporally, such as the public
temporal , social , and symbolic space comes to “square” of a chiefdom serving as the daily
facilitate and constrain emotions, actions, and meeting ground and, during the holiest of days,
attitudes. Taking as my departure point, Shils’ ( the sacred center once cleansed. Eventually,
1975 ) long- forgotten functionalist ecology, it is however, residential zones become bounded vis-
possible to visualize how institutional spheres à-vis politico-legal zones (e.g., downtown areas
become a ctualized in everyday reality without with courthouses, town halls, jails, and police
reducing the macro to the micro or vice versa. In stations); and, within a given institutional sphere,
addition, this strategy further bolsters the role of multiple cores can take up different or
entrepreneurs who, as we shall see below, overlapping space such as an economic sphere
become the “fulcrum” between the macro and subdividing into commercial and industrial
micro worlds; a strategy that Turner ( 2011 ) has zones. These spaces are real and macro in their
long advocated for but which he has not fully totality, scale, size, and ability to impose cultural
elucidated in terms of actual groups doing real orientations on those passing through as well as
things. those who spend much of their day working or
11.3.2.1 Macro Ecology acting within them. And, so, the core or cores
I n trying to think about the macro-micro link, become important not because they do not exist
Shils ( 1975) argued that societies have a in abstract reality; rather we are embedded in the
“center” that penetrates, in varying degrees, the core when we enter a courthouse, a church, a
environment surrounding it. Inside the core are college campus or building, or a home.
the principal institutions (polity; economy; On the other hand, the core is not something
cultural), authority system, and values, which only salient in physical reality. A lawyer can
emanated outward into the “mass” society. imagine and practice her courtroom role-
Besides the functionalist assumption of performance at home, while chance encounters at
consensus and stability, Shils’ model assumes a a grocery store between a parishioner and his
single core, offers only vague descriptions of priest thrust both into an ephemeral religious
what the center consists of, and has little encounter that is detached from the physical
explanation as to how and why the core form and routine location(s). Hence, humans spend time in
whether it changes over time. However, I ( 2013c these places, can see them in real time and in
, 2014b) have made clear that this metaphor can their minds, and, as such, can reify religion or
work for understanding institutional autonomy, polity in ideal typical physical locations (e.g.,
evolution, and macro- micro linkage. Jerusalem or Washington D.C. respectively).
W e begin with a simple proposition: the These reifi cations and the actual “microcosms”
greater is the degree to which an institution is we inhabit like houses or churches extend ,
autonomous , the greater is the degree to which cognitively, our orientation, encounters we

71
T he “core” metaphor is preferable to center if only domains are produced and distributed. Hence, there can
because a core does not assume centrality, but rather an be more than one core, and cores do not have to be
essential space from which key elements of institutional harmoniously integrated or coupled.
11 Institutional Spheres: The Macro-Structure and Culture of Social Life 219

engage in, and groups or other collectives we than the judge and, indeed, jurists and lawyers.
perform tasks within. By “extend,” I mean they Finally, symbolic markers emerge to carve up the
enlarge the circumference, in Kenneth Burke’s ( physical, temporal, and social spaces and make
1989 ) terminology, or widen the frame, in them meaningfully discrete. Building
Goffman’s parlance, by which we label our self, architecture, for instance, stereotype the
sift through emotion/ feeling rules, choose lines expectations, activities, and attitudes inherent in
of action and order preferences, and defi ne the a physical location; “totems” like a status of blind
situation. lady justice, a cross, or Latin phrasing cue
In addition to these “locational” or “spatial” appropriate role transitions; calendars and other
elements, an autonomous core also implies means of demarcating time allow us to anticipate
differentiated temporal, social, and symbolic institutional rituals; and, various identity kits like
Example of
autonomous institutional sphere

Police HQ-
Local Jail District
Atty.

Law:
Fed./State Law Offices
Courthouse
Bail Bonds

Law Offices

Law Schools

space. For instance, working hours get split apart white lab coats, tweed jackets with elbow
from family time; political holidays can be carved patches, black robes, or business suits stereotype
out vis-à-vis religious ones; and, decisions made role expectations and obligations, as well as
in hierarchical space can shape the sequences of signify the social milieu in which a person has
action in lower-order spaces. In addition, fi elds, entered. Thus, the core is active in physical and
organizations, groups, and role/status positions temporal space, as well as social and symbolic
become increasingly distinct from each other. In space. More autonomy means more discreteness.
the home, we expect people to be in kinship roles, Likewise, surrounding any given institutional
even though work does not clearly end at the core is its environment. The environment and
threshold of the doorway; when entering a actors located throughout the environment are
courtroom, all other roles are temporally governed by the rule of proximity : the greater is
constrained, while we immediately assume a the degree of institutional autonomy and the
status far lower closer is the degree to which a person, group, of
cluster of groups (e.g., fi eld; niche; sector) is
220 S. Abrutyn

located vis-à-vis an institutional core, the greater


is the degree to which the core exerts centripetal
force—that is, draws actors into the orbit of the
rules and resources and divisions of labor of the
core (e.g., Fig. 11.1) . The environment, like the
core, is real. It is composed of the various meso-
level spaces sociologists often study to avoid the
abstraction of macrosociology: fi elds (Bourdieu
1993 ; Fligstein and McAdam 2011 ) or niches
(Hannan and Freeman 1977 ). Some of these
meso-level spaces are located within the core, but
not all. Figure 11.1 presents an example of an
autonomous institutional sphere, its core, and the
surrounding environment. Here we see an
autonomous legal sphere found in many urban
spaces. The core is constituted by the federal
and/or state courthouse that is often located in a
downtown area. It is both real in the sense that it
physically and symbolically marks the legal
zone, and cognitive in the sense that it often
blends stereotyped architecture (e.g., huge
columns) with local fl ourishes that serve to both
mark the generalized and specifi c elements of the
core. Support and liaison actors pockmark the
physical landscape near the courthouse. A police
headquarters and local jail is often close, as are
numerous law offi ces,
11 Institutional Spheres: The Macro-Structure and Culture of Social Life 221

bailbondsmen, and, likely, a city hall or city offi overlapping social relationships; conversely, on
ce for the district attorney. Actors entering this the other hand, legislation shapes court dockets,
zone are inundated with legal symbols cueing the President nominates judges that the Senate
their actions and attitudes. And while there are must approve, and some Congress persons were
numerous non-l egal organizations like judges. Similar connections can be drawn
restaurants, cafes, convenient stores, apartments, between the police (who are an extension of the
and the like, these are invisible during legal hours executive offi ce), the district attorney (who work
as they are fi lled with legal actors talking “shop” for the state or justice department), and law offi
or taking a temporary break from their offi cial ces which are regulated by federal law and where
roles. many politicians come from or return to upon
T o be sure, no institutional space, no matter retirement or lost elections.
how autonomous, is an island unto itself. Figure The rest of Fig. 11.2 is focused on the other
11.2 presents a complex, yet simplifi ed, version institutional linkages. Bailbondsmen and lawyers
of the legal example extended beyond its act as liaisons between the legal sphere and the
institutional boundaries. Beginning with the kinship sphere; helping shepherd normal people
institutional core, we see double-sided arrows through the labyrinthine legal sphere; law offi
extending towards every space in the ces,
environment, denoting the fl ow of human,
material, and symbolic (e.g., information)
resources; additionally, many of these have their
own connections with each other as resource fl
ows across units. Some of these units, especially
those on the top-right of the legal environment,
have direct ties to the political sphere, including,
in some cases, the core itself. The legal core, on
the one hand, tests legislation, makes decisions
that Congress must react to, and also has

Political
Sphere:
PoliceHQ E.g.,
- District Congress
LocalJail Atty.

Law:
Fed./State Law
Bail Courthouse Offices
Bonds

The
Law
Kinship
Offices
Sphere

Law
Schools
Religious
Sphere Educational
Sphere
Economic
Sphere

Fig. 11.2 Example of autonomous institutional sphere in institutional context


222 S. Abrutyn

of course, also do the same for religious and level of habituation, normative commitment, and
economic actors, though in many cases, the salience of their institutional identity.
individual organizations have their own lawyers Second, being closer and routinely subject to
on retainer or entire legal departments devoted to the institutional core’s structural and cultural
interacting with the legal core. Law schools also reality increases the likelihood that our feelings,
act as liaisons, and key traffi ckers of human and thoughts, and actions will increasingly become
symbolic resource mobility. Linking the aligned with those prescribed by entrepreneurs or
educational sphere to the legal sphere, law the cultural system we internalize (Abrutyn
schools produce lawyers for law offi ces and 2014b ; Abrutyn and Mueller 2015 ). At the
district attorneys; judges who have been social psychological level, this means that our
professionalized within a legal sphere (who, like self is more likely to merge with the role/status-
high profi le lawyers, often return to their alma position we fi nd ourselves within the
mater or some other prestigious school to teach institutional sphere because of the intensive and
later in their careers); and, of course, are shaped extensive commitments, as well as the recurring
by federal laws for higher education, but also rewards and punishments we earn (Turner 1978
which produce clerks, campaign advisors, ). As such, our institution-specifi c role-identity
interns, and the like for politicians. To be sure, is more likely to be (a) prominent (McCall and
this model oversimplifi es the much more Simmons 1978 ), (b) salient (Stryker 1980 ), (c)
complex social reality, and necessarily omits socioemotionally anchored to individuals,
numerous “arrows” or resource fl ows for the groups, and even systems (Chap. 8 ; also, Lawler
sake of parsimony, while also highlighting the et al. 2009 ), (d) restricted in its access to
complex interplay between autonomous alternative institutional cores, (e) governed by
institutional spheres. institution-specifi c status beliefs (see Chap. 16 )
rooted in the institution- specifi c status hierarchy
11.3.2.2 Micro Reality (Abrutyn 2014b ), and, fi nally, (f) the central
A t its most basic level, this briefest of ecological identity by which we measure our global self-
accounts matters at the micro-level. We can esteem, effi cacy, and worth (see Chap. 17 ).
present several different propositions capturing T hird, there is no need to turn to a Parsonsian
how and why it manifests or translates into (1951 ) view of the self and action that
everyday, phenomenological reality (Abrutyn overemphasizes structure and underemphasizes
2014b ). First, being physically and/or culture. Indeed, the divisions of labor and other
cognitively closer to an autonomous institutional structural mechanisms of control are essential to
core means that actors are more likely to inhabit understanding certain dynamics of core-
relationships, groups, and networks in which environment ecology. Yet, I ( 2015b ; also 2014b
institution-specifi c roles and status positions will :121–146) have argued elsewhere that we can
be routinely activated by intensive and/or return to and rehabilitate the concept generalized
extensive ties within institution- specifi c symbolic media fi rst present in Simmel’s ( 1907)
encounters; institution-specifi c resources act as work on money and most prominent in Parsons’
means and ends of interaction patterns in said ( 1963 ) systems theory to explain how culture
encounters; and, external mechanisms of control from the core comes to be an independent force
are visible, known, and easily administered. In in institutional life. Media are, in essence, the
short, the rule of proximity predicts probabilities symbolic and material resources that denote
with which actors will be repeatedly subject to institutional value and which constrain and
the people, resources (as both things to pursue facilitate feeling, thinking, and doing by acting as
and things that are used in everyday life), and both means and ends deemed appropriate.
rules (both in terms of agents of control and Primarily, media manifest themselves in three
sanctions) of a given institution and thus, their ways: as (a) language and, more specifi cally, in
the form of themes of discourse (Luhmann 2012
11 Institutional Spheres: The Macro-Structure and Culture of Social Life 223

) as well as the “forms” of actual talk (Abrutyn and worth from academic settings will be more
and Turner 2011 ) governing institutional likely to orient her emotions, attitudes, and
communication; (b) the normative and cognitive- actions to the educational-scientifi c spheres on a
cultural framework and routines of social daily basis, while a legal actor will be more
exchange—e.g., instrumental vs. moral; and (c) oriented towards the legal sphere. The more
as external referents of value (Abrutyn 2015b) , access to a particular generalized medium a
or the objects that signify to the possessor, user, person has access to, the more “fl uent” and
pursuant, and audience the competence (Goffman active he or she will be in the institution’s cultural
1967 ), authenticity (Alexander 2004 ), and reality. Table 11.2 provides a list of common
status (Bourdieu 1991 ) institutionally media and the institutional spheres they generally
prescribed. Taken together, these three axes circulate within.
allow for the embodiment of the macro-level into In many ways, this approach has strong
daily routines, mundane and ceremonial parallels to the institutional logic perspective
Table 11.2 Generalized symbolic media of institutionalized domains
Kinship Love / loyalty : language and external objects facilitating and constraining actions, exchanges, and
communication rooted in positive affective states that build and denote commitments to others
Economy Money : language and external objects related to actions, exchanges, and communication
regarding the production and distribution of goods and services
Polity Power : language and external objects facilitating and constraining actions, exchanges, and
communication oriented towards making, enforcing, and securing assent for collective binding
decisions and controlling emotions, actions, and attitudes of others
Law Justice / confl ict resolution : language and external objects facilitating and constraining actions,
exchanges, and communication oriented towards mediating impersonal social relationships and
invoking norms of fairness and morality
Religion Sacredness / piety : language and external objects related to actions, exchanges, and
communication with a non-observable supernatural realm
Education Learning / intelligence : language and external objects related to actions, exchanges, and
communication regarding the acquisition and transmission of material and cultural knowledge
Science Applied knowledge / truth : language and external objects related to actions, exchanges, and
communication founded on standards for gaining and using verifi ed knowledge about all
dimensions of the social, biotic, and physio-chemical universes
Medicine Health : language and external objects related to actions, exchanges, and communication rooted in
the concern about the commitment to sustaining the normal functioning of the body and mind
Sport Competitiveness : language and external objects related to actions, exchanges, and
communication embedded in regulated confl icts that produce winners and losers based on
respective efforts of teams and players
Art Beauty : language and external objects related to actions, exchanges, and communication founded
on standards for gaining and using knowledge about beauty, affect, and pleasure
Note: These and other generalized symbolic media are employed in discourse among actors, in articulating themes,
and in developing ideologies about what should and ought to transpire in an institutional domain. They tend to circulate
within a domain, but all of the symbolic media can circulate in other domains, although some media are more likely to
do so than others
performances and rituals, and general encounters. (Thornton et al. 2012 ), but we add several key
Moreover, as Goffman’s body of work suggests, wrinkles. First, while institutional logics remains
as actors work to be better performers they rooted in the systems of modernity like
increasingly become attached and committed to capitalism, church, and state (Friedland and
their roles as well as the situational spaces that Alford 1991 ; Thornton et al. 2012) , I take an
allow them to “shine” the most. Hence, a evolutionary and historical view of economy,
professor who derives much of her self-esteem religion, and polity. Second, the model presented
224 S. Abrutyn

above remains committed to seeing institutions as


real beyond just the beliefs and practices that
folks adopt, conceptualizing their external
presence in
11 Institutional Spheres: The Macro-Structure and Culture of Social Life 225

physical, temporal, social, and symbolic space. is driven by the routinization of charisma. Third,
Third, as external referents or objects media entrepreneurship does not come from nothing; it
allow us to recognize a very key aspect of culture: refl ects relatively predictable patterns of
tangible things are as important as internalized ecological dynamics and how interests compete
values, embodied practices, or habituated norms and confl ict with each other based on
because they are “out there” and can be touched, positioning. Three particular sets of locations and
tasted, smelled, and seen. Humans are visual entrepreneurs warrant our attention and deserve
creatures and use objects to understand the more systematic empirical elucidation.
universe. Culture externalized means culture that
can be hoarded, pursued relentlessly, used deftly 11.3.3.1 Secondary Entrepreneurs
or clumsily, and sacralized into the totems W eber’s ideal type of bureaucracy rests on the
Durkheim saw as so essential to group life. tacit assumption of bounded rationality, stability,
and taken for granted authority; characteristics
reinforced by Michels’ ( 1911 [1962]) “iron rule
11.3.3 Meso-Level Entrepreneurs of oligarchy” and the tendency towards
conservativism in bureaucracy and organization.
W e are now in a position to return to the concept Yet, contrary to these idyllic visions, history is
of entrepreneurship. Like most things in life, the littered with examples of “secondary”
macro and micro levels of social reality become entrepreneurs, or actors close to the core—such
realized in meso-level social units like groups, as the district attorney’s offi ce in Fig. 11.1
networks, and so forth. More specifi cally, it is at above—whose primary function is to interact
the meso-level within the ecological dynamics with non-core actors and core actors, facilitating
described above, that institutional change occurs. the fl ow of resources both directions (Eisenstadt
Some basic principles underscore this assertion. 1980) . Thus, on the one hand these actors serve
First, once autonomous, institutional spheres are to support and reinforce the core and its
subject to external and internal exigencies no entrepreneurs, yet on the other hand some
different from any other group. While fascinating institutional dynamics of
institutional spheres are by no means self- contestation, confl ict, and change are rooted in
contained environments, the actors who derive secondary elites.
the majority of their material and symbolic Rueschemeyer ( 1986 ), for instance, cogently
resources become subject to the same types of argued that most political change and instability
pressures associated with resource scarcity or came from secondary actors, as bureaucratic
challenges and threats to power and legitimacy. units do not always march in lockstep with their
Entrepreneurs who carve out cores gain privilege superiors; the latter of which come to depend on
and power and, like any interest group, work hard the former, and thus cede some power and
to protect and, in many cases, expand their infl authority. Moreover, secondary actors develop
uence over the institutional environment and goals that transcend simple support: as a distinct
across institutional boundaries (Abrutyn and Van corporate unit, they too become interested in
Ness 2015 ). Second, while Weber’s charismatic survival as well as expansion of their infl uence.
authority has been identifi ed with individual Hence, these ancillary goals are not always
traits, he ( 1968 ) was clear that the lasting commensurate with effi ciency or productivity.
consequences of an individual’s impact on social Furthermore, their unique position encourages
structure and/or culture came not from the the development of new worldviews, as well as
individual, but from the charismatic group positions them to resolve major or minor
charged with either propagating his ideas or problems to further their interests (DiMaggio
succeeding him—see, for instance, Akhenaten’s 1988 ), or because extant elites authorize them to
failed monotheistic revolution in the mid-second resolve these problems and, therefore, increase
millennium BCE; institutional change, therefore, their dependency on the secondary actors
226 S. Abrutyn

(Abrutyn 2014a ). for the rise of the peculiar forms of western


11.3.3.2 Interstitial Liaisons polity, religion, and economy that sociologists
Arguably, the position with the greatest potential have spent so much time studying (Abrutyn
for future research is that of the liaison —see, for 2009b , 2014b ). Yet, they are also often stuck
instance, lawyers and law schools in Figs. 11.1 between two worlds, with little leverage, trying
and 11.2 . In Luhmann’s ( 2004 ) phenomenal to protect their interests, and thus, acting
work on the legal system, he argued that modern conservatively. In Timmermans’ ( 2006 )
autonomous law resolved a key problem: by ethnography of medical examiners, he brilliantly
slowing down the adjudication of confl icts showed how the intersection of medicine
between parties, law used temporal (especially, the fi eld deeply overlapping with
differentiation to reduce the immediate passions science) and law constrained the decisions and
on injustice and subject them to the thoughts of liaisons dealing with suspicious
rationalization found in procedural, formal deaths.
justice. Reading this, I realized that lawyers were
ideal types of liaisons. On the one hand, lawyers 11.3.3.3 Margins, Outsiders, and
in autonomous legal spheres are professionalized Radicalism
and trained to be legal actors (Carlin 1980 ). As T hough Eisenstadt ( 1984) rarely framed his
such, they “serve” the interest of the legal core in thoughts on the Axial Age this way, he implied
that they feel, think, and act in pursuit of justice throughout his analysis that many of the religio-
and confl ict resolution (Abrutyn 2009 b) . On cultural entrepreneurs of the Axial Age emerged
the other hand, many lawyers serve the interests on the margins of existing cores (see also
of non-legal actors, such as those who are either Humphreys 1975; Abrutyn 2014a, 2015a) . In
on retainer for particular religious or economic some cases, it was physical marginality, such as
actors or, even more extreme, those who spend the Israelite prophets, priests, and scribes vis-à-
their careers serving a specifi c corporation vis the Assyrian, Babylonian, and Persian
(Dobbin and Sutton 1998 ). Hence, they are the empires they were subjected to. Here,
actual collectives translating the problems and transportation and communication technologies
confl icts non-legal actors have into legal limited the literal reach of each empire, despite
discourse in order to transform these religious or political entrepreneurial strategies meant to
economic problems into legal problems that can mitigate these limitations. On the margins,
be subjected to formal, procedural rationality and monitoring and sanctioning is costly, and very
then they re-translate them into religious or often is the reason kings and empires collapse. In
economic language—that is, they explain the these relatively autonomous spaces, creativity is
pragmatic impact judicial decisions have. both an intrinsic activity born of fewer constraints
Liaisons, like secondary entrepreneurs, can as well as driven by threats from the distant core
become powerful forces of change or stasis. to restrict innovation and impose reality from
Because of their unique location, and ability to without. But, Eisenstadt also shows how actors
appeal to actors across varied institutional like the Confucian literati and the
spheres, they can leverage their positions to BuddhistBrahmanic heterodoxy in India refl
innovate and carve out their own institutional ected cognitive marginality. That is, distance
space. Legal entrepreneurs during the Gregorian wasn’t so much physical, but was far more about
Reformation and leading up to the Protestant groups seeing the core as “alien” to a new set of
Reformation, played the Church and the various organizational, symbolic, and normative frames
other classes (royal; aristocratic; urban; of reality. In the modern world economy, we see
mercantile) against each other, and became an these same types of marginal entrepreneurs in the
indispensable fulcrum with which these groups various forms of religious radicalism across
struggled against each other (Berman 1983 ). As regions and across religions (Almond et al. 2003
such, they may be as responsible, if not more so,
11 Institutional Spheres: The Macro-Structure and Culture of Social Life 227

) . In this case, the core is the modern the visitor; and, surrounded by walls that
worldsystem and it is a relatively autonomous presented physical and cognitive barriers. Joyce
polity and economy imposing “universal” culture (2000 :71–2) remarks,
and exploitative structure on local cultures in B y creating different kinds of space within sites,
ways alien to traditional forms of kinship and the continuing elaboration of monumental
religion. Hence, the dominant counter- architecture served to create spatial arenas with
restricted access, a constantly visible form of
ideologies, across cases, is a religio-kin exclusivity [that had the double function of
traditionalism focused on particularism and effecting] the patterns of habitual movement of all
fundamental values. Other examples of marginal the inhabitants of the site, stratifying space and
actors can be found in Collins’ ( 1981) hence the people who were allowed access to
different space, creating and marking centers and
geopolitical theory of “marcher” states or Chase-
peripheries [and] permanently inscribed a small
Dunn and Hall’s ( 1997) similar idea of number of fi gures as actors linking the natural and
peripheral conquerors—both cases highlight the supernatural world.
freedom to innovate militarily, organizationally,
and symbolically in ways that make them swifter P hysical space, then, becomes infused with
and stronger against city-states and empires that meanings associated with patterns of behavior,
are too big to change rapidly. role performances, temporal distinctions,
activities and beliefs, and power/prestige
differentials. To be sure, we often take for
granted space, but it undoubtedly organizes
11.4 Institutional Spheres in Four reality for us, and often demarcates institutional
Dimensional Space space. This is especially clear when consider the
physical construction of small towns where
B esides further exploring and using institutional space blurs together—e.g., city hall
entrepreneurs as means of introducing is next to the courthouse, the main church, and
evolutionary accounts to historical methods, the main street—and big cities where zones or
cutting edge of institutional analysis fi nds itself districts emerge that differentiate the institutional
in the four dimensional space—physical, activities (Abrutyn 2014b ).
temporal, social, and symbolic—that have
become central to understanding how macro-
level reality presents itself to people and affects 11.4.2 Temporal Reality
their lives. Indeed, it is within each of these four
dimensions that institutions make important Sociologists have been slower to think about
cross-cutting linkages to other levels of analysis social structure in temporal terms, though clearly
and substantive fi elds. some have in abstract ways (Luhmann 2004 ). In
short, temporality becomes important in three
sorts of ways: (1) for compartmentalizing
11.4.1 Physical Reality activities and orientations to reduce the
complexity of role performances; (2) for
Archaeologists have long recognized the sedimenting previous encounters into ritualized
importance of space and place, both in terms of interactions that both reduce the need to produce
size, scale, and differentiation; and place matters culture completely anew and impose a sense of
for political economy and, therefore, reverberates structure that guides interactions (Goffman 1967
across other institutional spheres (Logan and ); and (3) as authoritative decisions made by one
Molotch 1988) . Palaces were very often set upon segment of institutional life reverberate and
a hill; built much larger and adorned with gaudier shape the reality of others. In each of these ways,
architecture than normal houses; surrounded by time aids in the realization and manifestation of
large courtyards to intensify the scale vis-à-vis macro-level space. Sometimes it is in the cues
228 S. Abrutyn

that signal we are to reframe our identity Parsons in Simmel’s ( 1907 ) work on money
performance to match the expectations of others, transforming the economy and economic
while other times it in the strain and confl icts that relations and Mauss’ ( 1967 ) and Levi- Strauss’
arise over the interstices of temporal institutional ( 1969) respective work on non-economic media
boundaries—e.g., when, not where, does the of exchange. As noted above (see Table 11.2) , I
economic institution (e.g., work) end and the have added numerous media to account for the
kinship institution begin? These are not number of autonomous institutional spheres. Like
individually based confl icts, though each person logics, media are vehicles of culture; unlike
may experience them uniquely. logics, media “circulate” along the many
Rather, they become known sites of contestation, structural connections, are unevenly distributed
resistance, and struggle. Of the four dimensions, like Bourdieuian capital, and are not merely
however, temporality demands the most future “cognitive” things, but linguistic (themes; texts)
research. (Luhmann 1995 ) and present in physical objects
that act as referents of value (Abrutyn 2014 b ,
2015b ). The latter is a major difference between
11.4.3 Social Reality the functionalist and the institutional logics
program, and my own read on institutional
C onversely, the institutional differentiation of spheres. In part, as value adheres in actual
social space has been well documented, ranging objects, the institution and commitment to the
from research on role differentiation (Freidson role- identity and status position one accesses the
1962) , group differentiation (Merton 1967) , institution become powerful forces: objects are
organizational differentiation (Blau 1970 ), and tangible, can be touched, hoarded, gazed
categoric differentiation (cf. Chap. 16 of this longingly, monopolized, and provide sensual
volume). Moreover, the division of labor is pleasure in their ownership and use. Money is not
central to the classics. If there is any frontier here, just a medium that regulates exchanges, then, it is
is fi nding ways to empirically link the macro- also a language embedded in texts, themes of
level to the level of identity, self, and status. discourse, strategies mobilized in speech and
Social psychology assumes this link exists (; Fine performance and a set of objects—coins, cars,
1991 ; Burke 2006 ), while some of my work on etc. It can be displayed or relegated to special
ecology explicitly highlights potential testable places and rituals that reinforce its importance to
propositions that could bring the two into closer the person’s identity and, perhaps, global self.
dialogue. Same with love , sacredness , and knowledge —
all of these media can be transformed into
referents of value which are signs to the owner
11.4.4 Symbolic Reality and the audience of the person’s institutional self,
their status, the expectations one might have of
O ne of the more exciting areas of institutional them, the obligations they have for themselves,
research is in the cultural and symbolic aspects of and so forth.
institutions that Parsons’ left quite fl at and
unsatisfactory. The institutional logics
perspective, for example, has worked to create
11.5 Conclusion
ways of measuring specifi c logics, such as love
and the way it shapes the practices and beliefs of T he study of institutions has a long, rich history
real people (Friedland et al. 2014) . The idea of
with sociology, and has become increasingly
a “logic,” has its roots in the concept generalized
important to political science (Evans 1995 ) and
symbolic media ; a concept, unfortunately and
economics (North 1990 , 2005; Nee 2005 ).
unfairly, linked to Parsonsian ( 1963 ) Yet, like culture (see Chap. 6 in this volume), it
functionalism. Its use, as noted above, predates
11 Institutional Spheres: The Macro-Structure and Culture of Social Life 229

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Stratification 12
Katja M. Guenther*, Matthew C. Mahutga*,
and Panu Suppatkul 8QLYHUVLW\RI&DOLIRUQLD5LYHUVLGH
5LYHUVLGH&$86$
e-mail: katja.guenther@ucr.edu; matthew.mahutga@
ucr.edu; psupp001@ucr.edu
Some sociological conventions reserve the
term “inequality” for explanations that evoke
ascriptive social categories of people (e.g., race
and gender) to explain unequal distributions of (or
access to) resources. Other conventions similarly
reserve the term “stratification” to describe
12.1 Introduction explanations for unequal distributions that focus
upon various notions of class, which includes
The study of social inequalities has been central
studies of class hierarchy, inter-generational
to the discipline of sociology since its beginnings.
mobility, occupational prestige and wages, etc. It
Sociology emerged after the Enlightenment era
is increasingly apparent that contemporary
and during the upheavals of the industrial
sociological examinations are eroding this
revolution in Europe and the United States, which
conceptual distinction between “inequality” and
together drew attention to social cleavages and
“stratification” by developing explanations at the
the capacity to analyze them. Karl Marx and Max
intersection of class with race and gender
Weber, whose social theories were central to the
inequalities. For example, the newer American
emergence of sociology, were both deeply
Sociological
interested in class inequalities, and W. E. B.
Association section on Inequality, Poverty and
DuBois, one of the most influential early
Mobility includes members who focus on
American sociologists, sought to draw attention
multiple and overlapping explanations that could
to racial inequalities. Most generally, inequality
include race, gender, and class, as well as
and stratification refer to the unequal distribution
organizational and institutional processes
of or access to resources or social goods in a
transcending each of these categories.
society. Such goods most centrally include
Theories of stratification can be categorized in
income and wealth, but also less tangible, yet also
many ways, but the most core difference between
important, goods like power and status. Inequality
theories is whether a theory seeks to understand
directly affects every aspect of our lives: our
inequality at the macro level or at the micro level.
health, educational opportunities, workplaces,
In this chapter, we focus on macro theories—
families, and safety. It thus should be no surprise
including theories of global inequality—while
that the study of inequality continues to be so
attending to how they inform our understanding
important to sociologists.
of micro processes. We begin with a review of
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 229
S. Abrutyn (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary Sociological Theory,
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32250-6_12
theories of stratification between and within
countries. The between-country question asks
*Author contributed equally with all other contributors.
why some countries are so much richer than
K.M. Guenther (*‡ 0&0DKXWJD others, the answers to which vary from
P. Suppatkul
K.M. Guenther et al.

circumstantial differences in the timing of major however, large material inequalities across
technological advances to the enrichment of some countries are relatively new. As recently as the
nations at the expense of others through early
historically varying forms of coercion. The VHYHQWHHQWKFHQWXU\&(WKHGLIIH
within-country question—the one most addressed UHQFHLQZHDOWK between the “richest” and
by sociological approaches to stratification— “poorest” countries of the world was probably no
instead asks why some people are rich, while greater than 3:1 (Jolly 2006). However, beginning
others struggle to survive, given their national in the early 1800s, the world witnessed what has
context. As we describe below, these answers been referred to as the “great divergence”—the
vary from those that treat inequality as the rapid expansion in material prosperity among a
outcome of political and economic processes to very small subset of the world’s population.
those that focus instead upon categorical The great divergence has been explained in
attributes like class, gender, and race or the types two distinct ways: 1) the geographical
of institutions that prevail in a given country. concentration of technological advancements
We conclude by identifying what we see as key associated with the industrial revolution among a
problems to be addressed in the sociology of handful of Western European countries, and 2)
stratification. First, there is a divide between the colonization of most of the non-European
those who contend that contemporary patterns of world by Western European powers. We consider
stratification are the result of the historical each of these in turn, as these two explanations in
accumulation of patterned deprivations, and those some ways foreshadow theories of stratification
who argue instead that stratification results from more generally.
behavior that is patterned by discriminatory ideas. There is no denying that the timing of the great
Second, we suggest that perhaps a grand divergence coincides roughly with the industrial
sociological theory of stratification with revolution. And there is little doubt that the
endogenously determined macro and micro industrial revolution mattered for the great
dynamics is both overly ambitious and divergence: if Great Britain doubles the
unnecessary. Instead, sociologists may make productivity of its labor force and everyone else
better progress by focusing on the ways in which does not, ceteris paribus, Great Britain will grow
the stratifying effect of macro-level dynamics are faster than everyone else. That is, the industrial
conditional upon stratification processes at the revolution contributed to the great divergence
micro level, and on the ways in which micro-level through technology that increased rapidly the
dynamics are in turn conditional on aggregate productivity of economic activity in places where
levels of material inequality. it occurred. Because these technological
advancements were spatially concentrated, first in
Great Britain, then in other parts of Western
Europe, and only much later spread to European
12.2 The Wealth and Poverty of
colonies, the European continent experienced an
Nations extended period of much more rapid economic
growth.
In the twenty-first century, the vast majority of all
To see how the aiding of labor with capital can
of the material (i.e., income) inequality in the
dramatically boost productivity and thereby
world lies between countries. Studies examining
QDWLRQDOLQFRPHFRQVLGHUWKHQRZ
data from the 1950s through the 1990s, for
FODVVLF´&REE Douglas” production
example, find that between country inequality
function:
accounts for somewhere in the range of 65–86 %
of all world income inequality, though these Y AL K= β α (12.1)
statistics are hotly contested (see Berry et al.
In (12.1), Yis national output, A is technology, K
1991; Goesling 2001; Korzeniewicz and Moran
is capital and L is labor. β and α are “elasticity”
1997; Milanovic 2002; Schultz 1998; Theil 1979;
coefficients (weights) determined by the
Whalley 1979). From a historical perspective,
ation 235

sophistication of available technology. To see abroad, continued to boost the growth of Western
how this affects per capita national income Europe at least through the period of
(proxied by per worker output), we can decolonization in the post WWII period.
manipulate (12.1) algebraically by dividing by &RORQL]DWLRQDOVRPDWWHUHGIR
labor throughout: UWKHJUHDWGLYHUgence in how it affected
development among colonies and former
Y = A1−β αβK − (12.2) colonies. Nevertheless, what matters from the
large and rich literature on colonization for our
L L L
discussion here is that colonization was an active
What is clear from Eq. 12.2 is that, holding the
form of stratification, insofar as the
supply of labor constant, per-worker national
developmental trajectories of colonies were
income increases multiplicatively with an
heavily influenced by the direct action of
increase in technology, and it does so by
colonizers. The long list of deleterious effects of
increasing the productivity of labor. Thus, the
colonization includes mechanisms such as the
concentration of technology emerging from the
establishment of outward-oriented economies
industrial revolution in Western Europe can go a
(Bunker 1985&KDVH'XQQ1998), the
long way in explaining the great divergence.
inculcation of dependent trade relations between
However, we also know that industrialization
colonies and colonizers (Galtung 1971), the
did not occur in a vacuum. One of the earliest
imposition of colonial institutions (Lange et al.
observers—and critics—of industrial capitalism
2006), cultural destruction, and the creation and
in Great Britain, Karl Marx, argued that the
maintenance of a native elite with interests tied to
British industrial capitalist must be understood
colonial administrators, among others. Processes
not as a product of the slow accumulation of
such as these not only hindered the development
wealth through frugality and hard work (e.g.,
of good governance institutions from within, but
Weber 1930 [2001]), but rather as a benefactor of
also represented forms of exploitation whereby
force and plunder:
economic relations between colonizer and colony
The discovery of gold and silver in America, the
enhanced the former at the expense of the latter
extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines
of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the (Hochschild 1999).
conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning After the end of formal colonization, many
of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting suggest that Western states and capitalists engage
of black-skins, signalised the rosy dawn of the era in neo-colonialism by reasserting their control via
of capitalist production (Marx 1867 [1967]: 751).
indirect ways that include a disproportionate
influence on transnational governance institutions
Marx’s point in this quote and in the chapter in
like the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
which it appears is threefold. First, the capitalist
World Bank (WB) and the World Trade
mode of production would not have been possible
Organization (WTO) (Milanovic 2005), by
absent an accumulation of capital that occurred
HQJDJLQJ LQ IRUHLJQ GLUHFW
before the capitalist mode of production. Second,
LQYHVWPHQW&KDVH
the political success of industrial capitalism was
Dunn 1975), and by military aggression. Early
financed by colonization. Third, historically,
analysts of economic globalization very much
colonization expanded in lock step with the
analyzed it through the lens of neo-colonialism,
advance of industrial capitalism.
but changes in the trajectory of between-country
&RORQL]DWLRQ WKXV PDWWHUV IRU
inequality have problematized that lens.
WKH JUHDW GLYHUgence in two important
While between-country inequality remains
respects. First, colonization may have created a
“high” by historical standards, the last few
pre-existing level of wealth in Great Britain that
decades have witnessed a declining trend in
made the industrial revolution possible, financed
EHWZHHQFRXQWU\ LQHTXDOLW\
the political ascendance of the industrial capitalist
&ODUN 2011;
in Great Britain, and, by facilitating the import of
cheap intermediate inputs and expanding markets
K.M. Guenther et al.

Firebaugh 2003; c.f. Milanovic 2005; Dowrick States, is the increasing concentration of wealth
and Akmal 2005). While some point to this trend among a very small percentage of the population.
to draw inferences about the efficacy of Societies divided into the “have a lots” and the
international institutions (e.g., UN development “have nots” raise a number of important
goals) or the international dynamics of the world theoretical questions, including why income
capitalist system (Korzienwicz and Moran 1997 inequality is so persistent across generations,
c.f. Firebaugh 2000), the underlying driver of the what the consequences of inequality are for
declining trend belies such inferences. This is individuals, groups, and societies, and what role,
because measured levels of between-country if any, states can play in reducing income
inequality are driven by two components: average inequalities. Figure 12.1 displays the Gini
income differences between countries and coefficient of income inequality among 14
population size. Two of the fastest growing advanced capitalist country from 1960 to 2010.
counWULHVRYHUWKHODVWVHYHUDO The Gini coefficient is a statistical measure of
GHFDGHVDUH&KLQDDQG income distribution within a country; a value of 0
India, which together account for roughly 36 % of indicates equality and a value of 1 complete
the world’s population. Because the declining inequality. As a basis for comparison, Fig. 12.1
trend in between-country inequality is driven by also reports the average Gini for this group. These
&KLQD DQG ,QGLD·V UDSLG HFRQRPLF data come from Fred Solt’s Standardized World
JURZWK DQG Income Inequality Database (SWIID) (Solt
EHFDXVH&KLQDDQG,QGLD·VUDSLGHF 2009). What is clear from a casual inspection of
RQRPLFJURZWK is exceptional vis-à-vis the Fig. 12.1 is both that income inequality generally
rest of the less- developed world, one cannot draw began to rise during the 1980s after a period of
much in the way of theoretical insight from the decline, but also that the level of inequality is
trend. Indeed, much higher in some countries than others.
UHFHQWHYLGHQFHVXJJHVWVWKDWLI In what follows, we consider explanations for
&KLQDDQG,QGLD maintain their trajectories both the rising trend in inequality commonly
of rapid economic growth, between-country observed among advanced capitalist countries
inequality will rise again (Hung and Kucinskas since the 1980s, as well as explanations for the
2011). Paralleling the declining trend in between- large inequality differences that remain between
country inequality, however, is a rising trend in these countries. That is, we consider inequality
within country inequality, a subject to which we increasing processes that are common to all these
now turn. countries, as well as inequality reducing
processes that are more common in some of them
than others.
12.3 Within Country Inequality 12.3.1

General Theories

If one begins with the thought experiment that all


of the income inequality in the world can be
decomposed into a component that lies between
countries and a component that lies within
countries, it’s easy to see that most inequality in
the world lies between countries. However, a
transition occurred since the late twentieth
century, namely a marked rise in within-country
stratification. Particularly notable in some
western industrialized nations, such as the United
ation 237

12.3.2 Economic Development, agriculture and industry contributes a dwindling


the Kuznets Curve, and amount of variation to the whole income
the “Great U-turn” distribution. The dynamic relationship between
development and inequality hypothesized by
Perhaps the most well-known theory about the Kuznets is displayed in Fig. 12.2, which depicts a
causes of income inequality within countries rising and then falling inequality trend over the
comes from work done by Simon Kuznets during course of development.
the 1950s. Kuznets (1955) set out to theorize the Sociological inequality theorists have added
relationship between income inequality and two components to the basic Kuznets model.
economic development. What was central to Beginning with Nielsen (1994), sociologists
Kuznets’ understanding was that labor force began to recognize that the demographic
migrations from agriculture to industry over the transition is also a prominent social change over
course of development is the key driver of the the course of economic development. A
level of inequality. In agrarian (i.e., less combination of factors including low survival
developed) societies, the majority of the labor probabilities, declining death rates, high demand
force works in the agricultural sector, where for household and agricultural labor, a low status
wages are low and uniform. During the period of for women, etc., combine to produce rapid

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010


Australia Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Japan Netherlands
New United United
Norway Sweden Switzerland Average
Zealand Kingdom States

Fig. 12.1 Income inequality trends among advanced capitalist countries


industrialization, however, the labor force population growth in less developed countries. In
gradually migrates from agriculture to industry turn, rapid population growth expands the young,
(or manufacturing), where wages are much non-earning members of the population, who
higher. This creates a wage gap between the occupy the low end of the income distribution. As
agricultural and industrial sectors that increases countries develop, the demand for household and
inequality proportionately to the share of the labor agricultural labor declines, whereas the status of
force in each sector. After a certain point, women, the proportion of the population living in
inequality begins to fall as the percentage of the cities, and access to contraception generally
population residing in the industrial sector increase. In combination, these and other factors
becomes large enough that the wage gap between slow population growth and thereby shrink the
K.M. Guenther et al.

proportion of the population occupying the low- threshold at which income inequality should
end of the income distribution. The second added decline, why was inequality increasing in so
factor is the spread of education, which tends to many cases? While the answers are varied,
reduce the wage premium for skilled workers. several have received the bulk of scholarly
That is, as educational skills become less scarce, attention.
the financial rewards associated with skills
decline.
There is much empirical support for this 12.3.3 Globalization, Skill Biased
general theory of the relationship between income Technological Change, and
inequality and economic development. This Skill-Wage Premiums
includes the observation of a non-linear u shaped
relationship between measures of economic One pair of (potentially competing) explanations
development (e.g., GDP per capita) and income place the changing fortunes of skilled and
inequality, where middle-income countries have unskilled workers at the center of the analysis.
the highest level of inequality. This also includes The first draws from economic theories of

Fig. 12.2 The Kuznets curve


Low Economic Development High
cross-sectional and panel-levels studies showing international trade. Adrian Wood (1994)
that the percent of the labor force in agriculture employed the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model of
lowers income inequality, “sector dualism” (a trade to suggest that economic globalization
measure of the dispersion of wages between the should increase inequality in rich countries. The
agriculture and manufacturing sectors) increases theory postulates that international trade reduces
inequality, population growth increases the price of economic inputs to that which
inequality and secondary education enrollments prevails in countries for which the input is most
reduce inequality (e.g., Nielsen 1994; Nielsen and abundant. Wood argued that this basic insight has
Alderson 1997; Alderson and Nielsen 1999; c.f. implications for inequality because unskilled
Alderson and Nielsen 2002). labor is relatively abundant in the global South,
Thus, while this general theory of the while high skill labor is abundant in the global
relationship between economic development and North. Thus, if trade increases between the North
income inequality is not without critics, the and the South, one would expect the demand for
Kuznets curve created something of a paradox for unskilled labor to fall, and the demand for skilled
scholars of inequality among advanced capitalist labor to rise in the North (Wood 1994). The
countries after the 1980s. Succinctly, if all of changing demand for skilled and unskilled labor
these countries had passed the developmental will then manifest itself in changing wage
ation 239

premiums (declining for unskilled; rising for distribution of income between labor and capital,
skilled), and thereby rising inequality. or between the super-rich and the rest. In Capital
The second theoretical perspective also in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Picketty
suggests that the increasing within-country (2013) argues that rising inequality is an inherent
inequality is explicable in terms of inversely feature of capitalism. While the thesis resonates
changing wage premiums to skilled and unskilled with classic Marxism, it is much more informed
labor, but that rising trade between the North andby traditional economic thought than anything
the South is not the cause (or primary cause). else. He suggests that it is incorrect to presume
that income inequality follows a natural course.
Instead, this explanation suggests that skill-biased
technological change—i.e., the introduction of 5DWKHU ´LQVWLWXWLRQV DQG
technological fixes that reduce the demand for SROLFLHV WKDW VRFLHWLHV choose to
unskilled labor—has been the major driver of the adopt” determine whether inequality rise or falls
changing fortunes of the skilled and unskilled (Picketty and Saez 2014: 842–843).
(e.g., Katz and Autor 1999). In this formulation, The more rapid increase in income inequality in
low-skilled labor is not substituted by the United States than continental Europe despite
comparable labor from poorer countries, but comparable rates of technological change and
rather by machinery and computing. educational expansion constitutes a puzzle in
The relative importance of North/South trade need of explanation. According to Picketty,
and skill-biased technological change for the risewhat’s unique about the US case is the
in income inequality among Northern countries exceptional rise in executive compensation,
which he attributes to US tax policy and social
has been particularly difficult to determine. First,
it is clear that both processes are happening norms about inequities that glorify the super-rich.
simultaneously, which creates identification The other key explanation locating rising
problems for observational studies. Second, some inequality in a growing rift between labor and
suggest that the two processes are related. On onecapital is the ascendance of finance capital.
hand, labor-saving technological change and Giovani Arrighi (1994) was among the first
offshoring are complimentary strategies by which sociologists to theorize finance (also see Krippner
to reduce the overall share of labor in output and2011). His argument was that “financialization,”
thereby increase profitability. Theories of defined as an increase in the returns to finance
inequality for which antagonistic class relations relative to the returns to fixed capital investment,
reside at the center of the analysis view these asis a repeating “signal crisis” in the historical
two sides of the same coin. On the other, some development of capitalism. Economic expansions
suggest at least some of the labor saving begin with (product or process) innovations in the
technological changes is caused by rising core of the world-economy. As these innovations
North/South trade. Here, labor-saving
diffuse throughout the world-system, the rate of
technological change is a competitive response by return on fixed capital investments begins to fall,
a subset of Northern manufacturing firms to the which causes capital to shift into speculative
offshoring behavior of their rivals (Wood 1998). endeavors.
Subsequent analyses focus upon the effect that
financialization has on income inequality in the
12.3.4 The Accumulation of Wealth United States. In a series of papers, Ken-Hou Lin
and the Ascendance of and Donald Tomaskovic-Devey argue that
Finance Capital financialization matters for US income inequality
because it erodes the reliance of capital on, and
While the twin theories of the globalization of thereby the bargaining power of, labor in the
production and labor-saving technological United States. According to this perspective, the
change focus on the distribution of income within rise in income inequality in the United States is
the working class to explain the rise of income driven at least in part by the effect of
inequality since the 1980s, others focus on the financialization on the labor share of income (Lin
K.M. Guenther et al.

and Tomaskovic-Devey 2013; Tomaskovic- server because the former occupation requires a
Devey and Lin 2011). higher
OHYHORIVNLOODQGHGXFDWLRQ&RQÁ
LFWSHUVSHFWLYHV focus instead on which
class an individual is born into as a key predictor
12.4 Class, Gender, and Race 12.4.1 C
of their education, occupation, and, ultimately,
wealth attainment. Low socioeconomic class is
lass Inequality
associated with access to low quality schools and
Thus far, we’ve discussed theories of income low educational attainment, for example.
inequality within countries that are “general” in Someone born into a lower- income family and
so far as they explain inequality with systematic community with no experience applying to or
relationships among variables like skills, attending college, let alone graduate school, is
occupational characteristics, and structural thus more likely to become a restaurant server
changes to the economy without considering the than a heart surgeon. Thus, if skill acquisition is a
extent to which the process by which citizens major driver of income inequality, and is also
attain skills, occupy different occupational patterned by the socio-economic status at birth,
niches, or experience structural changes to the then we must look beyond economic theories of
economy might vary systematically across income inequality to fully understand the
subcategories. However, core sociological dynamics of income inequality within a society.
traditions hold that stratification occurs along That is, income inequality is not merely the
three primary axes: class, gender, and race. Marx outcome of economic processes, but is also
conceptualized social classes as defined by the inherently social.
relationships of groups to the means of economic Indeed, other conceptualizations of class
production, and his emphasis on class conflict consider cultural forms of class reproduction that
remains an important intellectual root of the are embedded in the social structure. Sociologists
conflict perspectives on class stratification. have long recognized that markers of social
Weberian notions of social class treat groups of class—cultural tastes, social networks,
people with similar income, wealth, status, and institutional affiliations, etc.—are transmitted
levels of education as occupants of the same within classes over time through both formal
social class. In the US and other capitalist processes (e.g., schooling, clubs and associations)
societies, social class, or socio- economic status, and informal processes (e.g., cultural
is a key predictor of life chances, and the study of discrimination) (Bourdieu 1984). Thus, the type
mobility—or the movement of people between of cultural capital, or non-economic assets,
classes, whether up or down—is the core area in members of a group possess shape life chances
contemporary stratification studies. The because cultural capital facilitates access to
likelihood of significant upward mobility is quite material forms of capital (Granovetter 1973).
small both within and across generations, even in Those at the top of the power structure, who head
wealthy nations. government, cultural, and philanthropic
Economic theories of income inequality hold organizations and whose contributions help fuel
that some jobs require specialized skills and are campaigns, are the power elite &:0LOOV2000
higher value positions, and therefore yield higher [1956]; Domhoff 2007 [1967]). They create
rates of remuneration. Some suggest that mechanisms of exclusion to people from lower
inequality can actually play a positive role in classes and develop ideologies supporting
society, insofar as high-skill/high-status jobs stratification to legitimate the social order
provide incentives for individuals to complete (Gramsci 1971; Mahutga and Stepan-Norris
necessary training and education and take on 2015).
these important jobs (Davis and Moore 1945). In the United States, the American Dream
Following this logic, for example, a heart surgeon ideology—the belief that anyone can attain a
earns more and has higher status than a restaurant higher class status than the one they were born in
ation 241

to if they only work hard enough—is a prime the logical outcomes of sex differences, but these
example of an ideology that supports perspectives have been largely abandoned in
stratification because it holds individuals, rather favor of those that offer more nuanced
than the social structures they were born in to, understandings of gender stratification. Such
responsible for their own outcomes. The reality is nuance is necessary to untangle the complexities
that lower class Americans are unlikely to achieve of why gender inequality remains so intractable;
a class status higher than their parents, and people this is particularly perplexing in nations like the
born in to the middle classes in the 2000s may United States where women make up nearly half
even be at significant risk for experiencing of the paid work force and graduate from college
downward mobility (Newman 1999; Neckerman at higher rates than men.
and Torch 2007). At the micro level, processes of Marxist feminist theories of gender
class- based inequality mean that individuals born stratification view women’s subordinate social
into higher class households have better life status as directly tied to the rise of capitalism and
chances than those born into lower class private property. Friedrich Engels (2010 [1884])
households. wrote about how the nuclear family emerged as a
Individuals encounter the mechanisms of class tool to promote men’s control over women’s
reproduction, including families, communities, reproductive capacities and their labor in the
and schools, at every turn, which limits capitalist system, laying a groundwork for future
possibilities for changing their class position. feminist theories linking capitalism to women’s
exploitation. Later expansions of Marxist
feminism retained an interest in the relationship
12.4.2 Gender Inequality between economic power, sexual politics, and
women’s political power and status (Blumberg
Theorizing gender differences in wealth, income, 1984). Given the apparent linkages between
power, and status are central areas in stratification women’s economic exploitation and their low
studies. Joan Wallach Scott (1988) identifies two status in the household, sociological theory and
key dimensions of gender when she states that, research on gender inequality has especially
“Gender is a constitutive element of social focused on gender in the workplace.
relationships based on perceived differences Understanding the wage gap—which in turn
between the sexes…a primary way of signifying helps explain women’s overrepresentation among
power” (42). Gender thus refers not only to the poor and low income people, as well as their more
social relations that divide individuals and groups limited wealth accumulation—has been a core
into differentiated gender statuses, but also to the goal for stratification scholars interested in
consequences of those differences for a system of gender inequalities. Since the gap in wages
inequality. The most frequent consequence is that contributes to the gender gap in wealth, status,
men enjoy a status superior to that of women and and power, the wage gap may be an underlying
thus have greater access to power and resources. problem. The primary group of theories that seek
Women’s formal political rights and economic to explain the emergence and the persistence of
participation have swelled globally over the last the wage gap focus on occupational sex
century, yet substantial gender gaps exist in segregation, or the clustering of women and men
wealth and income, even in countries where into different occupations or into different jobs
women and men ostensibly enjoy similar rights. within the same occupations. Such theories
In the United States and globally, women are generally fall into several overlapping categories.
more likely to live in poverty than are men, are Social psychological and behavioral perspectives
paid less, assume greater responsibility for emphasize the status expectations and the
household management and child care, and amass internalization of social norms and gender
less wealth than men. Functionalist sociological stereotypes (including through gender
theories and neoclassical economic theories both socialization) as effecting women’s and men’s
attempted to explain away these inequalities as
K.M. Guenther et al.

RFFXSDWLRQDOSUHIHUHQFHVDQGEHK essentialist notions that women and men are


DYLRUV5LGJHZD\ simply fulfilling “natural” talents and toward
DQG&RUUHOO2004). Men, for example, enjoy social and structural explanations. Key theoretical
greater rewards in the workplace because their insights that have emerged from this sea change
colleagues perceive them as more competent and include attention to gender stereotypes at both the
committed. Institutional perspectives consider the level of individuals and institutions, recognition
implications of organizational practices for that unintentional discrimination is often central
gender inequalities; such theories also sometimes to maintaining occupational sex segregation and
incorporate cultural perspectives that focus on the wage gap, and a collective effort to develop
how cultural gendertyping of work and theoretical and empirical works that offer
occupations shapes wages and workplace possible pathways for reducing gender
opportunities (Bielby 2000; Britton 2000). Such stratification. Feminists have also noted how the
theories suggest that women and men are pushed devaluing of feminized occupations points to the
into gender-typed occupations and work cultures persistence of sexist ideologies about gender and
reinforce boundaries, especially to keep women work; that is, when a job that once was done
out of workplaces dominated by men, mainly by men becomes one done mainly by
VXFKDVVWRFNEURNHUV5RWK2006; women, the occupation loses status and
Williams 1995). compensation for the work shrinks (the inverse is
Feminist theories, which can cut across social also true) (England 1992; England et al. 2000,
psychological and institutional perspectives, view 2001; Levanon et al. 2009). Sexist belief systems
sex segregation and the wage gap as maintaining also reinforce the idea that women and men are
men’s privilege over women (Acker 1992; naturally better suited to some occupations, but
5LVPDQ2004; Williams 1992). That is, sex the cross-national variation in the gender-typing
segregation and the mechanisms used to maintain of jobs reveals that occupational sex segregation
it, such as the glass ceiling, hostile work is socially
environments, and other elements of gendered conVWUXFWHG&KDUOHVDQG*UXVN\20
organizations, are tools that protect men’s status 04).
and SULYLOHJH 5HFHQW UHVHDUFK
VKRZLQJ WKH ZRUNplace benefits of
transmen’s transitions support theories pointing 12.4.3 Racial Inequality
to the importance of status as male for
occupational success (Schilt 2006). Feminists are Stratification also occurs along racial lines.
particularly concerned with women’s economic Globally, those nations and regions with
equality for at least two key reasons. One is predominantly white populations tend to be
because feminist theories generally hold that wealthier and have better access to resources than
money enhances power, such that women’s status those with predominantly non-white populations.
in the family will only improve as her economic In much of the industrialized world, racial
power increases. A second is because of the inequalities are persistent, and, like gender
reality that in industrialized nations, women are inequalities, are slow to change even though
overrepresented among people living in poverty: racial and ethnic minorities have formal legal
in the United States, an estimated five million rights.
more women than men live in poverty. In the In the United States, African-Americans
developing world, poverty strikes women and experience particularly pronounced disadvantage,
men more equally, but investments in women’s especially when compared to whites. Empirical
education are particularly effective in reducing research consistently establishes yawning gaps
poverty. between blacks and whites in the United States in
Since the 1970s, feminist perspectives have terms of income, wealth, education, and health
significantly influenced the study of gender and longevity. Between 1980 and 2009, for
stratification, which have moved away from example, blacks made a varying relative wage of
ation 243

57.6–67.5 cents for every white dollar. Over the hold jobs that offer subsistence wages. Wilson’s
same period, the relative wage of Hispanic perspective thus ultimately asserts that class
Americans varied from 63.9 % to 75.5 % of trumps race as an obstacle to upward mobility, a
whites, and Asian Americans earned a relative perspective captured in the title of his book The
wage varying from 114 % to 127 % of whites. Declining Significance of Race (1980).
After an increasing relative wage from 1980 to Split labor market theory also deemphasizes
2000, the trend for all three groups stalled in the race-ethnicity in favor of other factors that
2000s, as did the average wage of whites (US contribute to wage differentials and inter-group
&HQVXV%XUHDX2012). antagonisms (Bonacich 1972). A split labor
Historically-oriented perspectives recognize market contains at least two groups of workers
the legacies of slavery and the legal codification whose price of labor differs for the same work, or
of discrimination in the United States (e.g., Oliver would differ if they did the same work. However,
and Shapiro 2005 [1995]), which limited Bonacich argues that the price of labor is not a
opportunities for black Americans through the response to the ethnicity of those entering the
1960s, when civil rights legislation offered new labor market per se. Instead, a price differential
protections against discrimination. Legal results from differences in resources and motives,
changes, however, have not afforded blacks the which are often correlates of ethnicity. All else
same opportunities as whites; African-Americans equal, employers will prefer the lower wage (i.e.,
lag in the intergenerational transmission of non-white) workers, which then generates
wealth, are disproportionately clustered in the antagonism with the higher-wage white workers.
low-wage labor market, and most often live in The ensuing conflict tries to eliminate the split-
racially segregated neighborhoods where schools labor market, as more powerful, higher-wage
are poor and where social networks and other workers engage in exclusion movements
resources that support upward mobility are (attempts to expel lower-priced workers from a
absent. fixed geographical space) or to erect a caste
In the mid-twentieth century, a “culture of system (attempt to exclude lower-priced workers
poverty” theory dominated social science from a particular type of work). Thus, ethnic
theoUL]LQJ DERXW UDFLDO niches emerge at least in part as a consequence of
LQHTXDOLWLHV &KDPSLRQHG across a limited opportunities, and become self-
range of academic disciplines and among reinforcing over time.
policymakers (e.g., the Moynihan report of 1965), Theories stressing the power of racism and
this theory held that poor communities respond to discrimination counter that racially-specific
structural poverty and systemic exclusion by barriers, including institutional mechanisms that
developing behaviors and norms that ultimately restrict blacks from accessing equal opportunities
inhibit their ability to escape poverty. Widely and rewards, remain key for understanding the
criticized for blaming the poor for their racial gap in income and wealth. Joe Feagin
disadvantage, competing theories alternately (1991) for example, holds that discrimination
emphasize the structural obstacles to upward remains central to the lived experiences of
mobility for low income blacks, or focus on African-Americans at the micro level, even as
structural and individual racism as the primary structural racism—configured as residential and
explanation for the continued persistence of racial occupational ghettoization—dominates the
inequality in the US. macro level. Sometimes micro-level
One key example of the structural approach is discrimination is obscured by race-neutral
William Julius Wilson’s controversial argument language, such as employer emphasis on “soft
that poor blacks in the United States are skills,” or interpersonal skills that are seen as
disadvantaged by their social and economic particularly important in the service economy and
isolation, which is itself an outcome of shifts in which employers see blacks as less likely to
the labor market that have reduced opportunities possess than whites (Moss and Tilly 2001).
for people with lower educational attainment to Devah Pager and colleagues (2009), for example,
K.M. Guenther et al.

have documented how black men seeking entry- for individuals and groups in society. The
level jobs experience a substantial race penalty; intersectionality approach critiques additive
employers prefer to hire even whites with felony approaches to oppression that conceptualize
convictions before hiring blacks. Many gender, race, and class as descripWLYH
employers are oblivious to their own racial bias, YDULDEOHV DWWDFKHG WR
and/or use race-neutral language. However, rather LQGLYLGXDOV &ROOLQV
than interpreting race-neutral language as (2005) describes intersectionality theory as “two
evidence of an absence of racism, critical race types of relationships: the interconnectedness of
theories argue that color-blind racism simply ideas and the social structures in which they
enables perpetrators of discrimination to deny occur, and the intersecting hierarchies of gender,
their racist actions (Bonilla-Silva 2003; Moss and race, economic, class, sexuality, and ethnicity” (p.
Tilly 2001). 5). She argues that all groups possess varying
Wealth inequalities are perpetuated through amount of penalty and privilege in one
the gap in the intergenerational transmission in historically created system. For example, white
wealth (Oliver and Shapiro 2005 [1995]). women are penalized by their gender but
Because African-American families historically privileged by their race. To date, intersectionality
were blocked from the major pathways to wealth theory has not been integrated into quantitative
accumulation, such as home ownership and well- analyses of inequalities, other than through
paid jobs, they have yet to amass wealth that can interaction YDULDEOHV IRU DQ
be passed down generation to generation. The H[FHSWLRQ VHH 0F&DOO
persistence of residential segregation, which 2005). However, ethnographers and qualitative s
pushes blacks into neighborhoods with lower ociologists have used intersectionality theory to
property values, weaker public services, and illuminate the significance of multiple axes of
constant contact with poorer blacks, also inequality (e.g., Bettie 2002; Ferguson 2000).
continues the cycle of the non-accumulation of Intersectionality theory offers scholars of
wealth. inequalities the opportunity to engage critically
5DFLDO LQHTXDOLWLHV SHUVLVW with how class, race, and gender intersect to
WKHQ QRW MXVW because of individual- shape life chances and life stories; future research
level prejudices, but also because of how race will hopefully engage more deeply with
structures all aspects of social life in the US. For intersectionality.
blacks, the consequences include lower incomes
and less wealth, residential segregation, and
shorter life expectancies. For whites, the results
12.5 (De)stratifying Institutions
are unearned advantages or privileges (McIntosh
1988). Lipsitz (1988) refers to the possessive In this section, we review sociological theories of
investment in whiteness by which whites stratification in which institutions occupy the
maintain a system that protects their assets center of the analytical space. One of the most
(whether cultural or material) by limiting important institutions in this regard is the state.
opportunities for upward mobility and resource Theories of the welfare state seek to understand
accumulation among non-whites. the causes and consequences of state
5DFHDOVRRSHUDWHVLQFRQMXQFW interventions in social inequalities, including
LRQZLWKFODVV and gender to shape various
inequality. Intersectionality theory, first IRUPVRIUHGLVWULEXWLRQ5HGLVWUL
introduced conceptually by legal VFKRODU EXWLRQFDQWDNH many forms, including
.LPEHUOH &UHQVKDZ1991) and later social programs like unemployment insurance,
HODERUDWHGE\VRFLRORJLVW&ROOLQ retirement and health care benefits, family
V1990), offers a powerful theoretical framework benefits, educational assistance, food stamps, and
for understanding how race, class, and gender progressive tax systems. Because many of these
intersect to shape the experience of inequalities social programs have progressive qualification
ation 245

requirements attached to them, they amount to a SDUH ZHOIDUH UHJLPHV ZLWKLQ


direct transfer income from wealthy to poorer W\SHV2·&RQQRU et al. 1999; Sainsbury
individuals or families. In short, welfare states 1999). Most simply, a welfare regime may be
modify the effects of social or market forces on understood as “patterns across a number of policy
their citizens in order to achieve greater equality areas,” and within comparative welfare state
(Orloff 1996). studies usually includes the full range of domestic
Early theories of the welfare state viewed policy interventions as well as broader patterns of
welfare policy development as an outcome of provisioning and
industrialization: as nations industrialized and regXODWLRQ2·&RQQRUHWDO1999: 12).
urbanized, welfare states emerged to protect Esping-Andersen’s original typology classifies
citizens from the market. However, social welfare regimes along three dimensions, namely
scientists soon recognized the importance of relations between the state and the market,
political processes for shaping welfare policy, and stratification, and social rights. Liberal welfare
began to focus on understanding variations across regimes seek to keep market forces sovereign.
welfare states. Power resource theory emphasizes Such regimes tend to practice free-market
comparative welfare state studies, highlighting liberalism, and are characterized by modest
the market modifying force of welfare states and means- tested benefits and limited universal
their capacity to mitigate class inequality benefits and social insurance plans. Generally
(Esping-Andersen 1990). Power resource theory speaking, liberal welfare regimes offer their
asserts that class alliances determine the citizens few alternatives to relying on the market.
expansion of modern welfare states. This The United States, the United Kingdom, and
perspective thus established politics—and Australia are frequent examples of this type of
political configurations of class power—as a welfare regime
major force behind welfare state evolution and W\SH&RQVHUYDWLYHZHOIDUHUHJLPH
policy-making. Furthermore, power resource VDWWDFKULJKWV to class and status, and
theory introduced decommodification, or the operate on the principle of subsidiarity, such that
degree to which social rights allow individuals to the state only intervenes with transfers and
meet their living standards independent of pure services when the family’s ability to care for its
market forces, as members is exhausted. These regimes highlight
DQDQDO\WLFFRQFHSW5DWKHUWKDQY the importance of the traditional two-parent
LHZLQJZHOIDUH state evolution as a by- family, as reflected in social policies that support
product of industrialization and capitalist marriage and women’s reliance on a male
expansion, power-resource theory recognizes the breadwinner. Several continental European
importance of class configurations and politics in countries, such as Germany, Austria, and Italy,
shaping welfare states, thereby combining are identified as representing the conservative
elements of earlier non- Marxist political welfare regime type. Finally, social democratic
approaches and of structural regimes provide universal benefits that are
0DU[LVWDSSURDFKHVWRWKHZHOIDU intended to equalize the disparities between
HVWDWH5HVHDUFK classes. Such states, which include the
XVLQJ3RZHU5HVRXUFHWKHRU\WRH[S Scandinavian states, socialize family costs, and
ODLQLQHTXDOity is vibrant and ongoing the state often serves as a substitute to a male
(Huber and Stephens 2014). breadwinner by providing high levels of support
Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s (1990) Three for single mothers.
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism has been an Feminist scholars mobilized and modified
especially influential component of this Esping-Andersen’s framework to consider the
perspective. Esping-Andersen advocates for a set ways in which welfare regimes regulate gender
of typologies that may be used to compare via the state, the market, and the family
welfare regimes across types and which have 2·&RQQRUHWDO1999). Including family in
been used to com- theories of the welfare state illuminates a core site
K.M. Guenther et al.

of state regulation that has been a flash point for continuation of inequalities of class, gender, and
feminist state theory. Feminist state theory, race.
pioneered by American and British Marxist In addition to welfare states, there are other
feminists in the 1970s, views women as types of national institutions that matter for the
simultaneously oppressed by both capitalism and distribution of income. Wage coordination among
patriarchy (Hartmann 1979). With its strong labor, capital and sometimes the state also stands
emphasis on capitalism as the determining force out as prominent in this regard (Kenworthy 2001;
behind the state’s actions and policies, dual Wallerstein 1999; Alderson and Nielsen 2002;
systems theory asserts that the state guides &KHFFKL DQG *DUFLD3HQDORVD 2010;
changes in the family and women’s domestic Mahler
behavior based on capitalism’s needs. According 2004). Examples of wage coordination include
to this perspective, women’s labor, both inside industry-level wage bargaining through formal
and outside of the home, is manipulated by the relations between capital, peak labor
state to serve capitalism’s interests at a given confederations (Austria) or large unions from
historical point. Women thus became party to the influential industries (Germany), between
social reproduction of both class and gender. employer confederations and large firms (Japan
The state is implicated in the oppression of and Switzerland), or by government imposition of
women because it supports a specific household wage schedules or freezes (e.g., Belgium,
structure, namely the two-parent or “nuclear” Denmark and the Netherlands) (Katzenstein
family, a structure that relies on male wages and 1985; Traxler 1999). On one hand, countries with
female domestic labor (Eisenstein 1983). By strong corporatist, wage-setting institutions have
keeping welfare payments low, and by limiting strong labor unions, which tend to increase wages
women’s employment opportunities to low-wage for both union and non-union members. Indeed,
jobs, the state in essence forces women to find a the declining rates of unionization in the United
male breadwinner. The state is also implicated in States have subjected workers to stagnant wages
the creation of public patriarchy. The state does and limited workplace protections vis-à-vis
not serve as the indirect oppressor of women via workers in other developed countries, which in
the nuclear family, but rather renders women turn helps explain why the United States has the
dependent on the state itself. In line with this highest levels of income inequality among
perspective, social welfare programs are analyzed developed nations and the greatest rise in
for their tendency to make women dependent on inequality (along with the UK) between 1975 and
men as collectively embodied in the state. In 2000 (Neckerman and Torche 2007).
essence, the state takes on the role of a husband, Wage-coordination itself reduces inequality
both as provider and as controlling patriarch. As within the working class, as well as the income
such, the state becomes the manager of women’s gap between labor and capital. In terms of the
dependence (Mink 1990). former, wage coordination dampens the link from
Both power resource theory and feminist state wages to variance in the demands for particular
theory draw attention to how welfare regimes can sub-sets of workers because wages are
maintain and reproduce inequalities. That is, determined through collective bargaining, which
although the stated goal of welfare states is to has been shown to benefit low-skill workers
protect citizens from the market and reduce disproportionately (Wallerstein 1999). In terms of
stratification, welfare states also have hidden the income gap between labor and capital, wage-
agendas that reinforce the status quo of coordination shifts some workplace authority
inequality. from capital to labor, and fosters collective
&RPSDUDWLYHUHVHDUFKUHYHDOVW identity among differentiated workers
KDWWKHUHSURGXFtion of inequalities (Wallerstein 1999). Thus, it provides an
varies across welfare states, but is consistently institutional source of bargaining power that
present. Even as they purport to reduce tends to increase the labor share of income in
inequalities, welfare states support the countries with strong corporatist institutions. As a
ation 247

product of both these mechanisms, a negative ways in which the stratifying effect of macro-
association between wage-coordination level dynamics are conditional upon stratification
institutions and income inequality has been a processes at the micro level, and on the ways in
persistent finding in the comparative political which micro-level dynamics are in turn
economy literature (Alderson and Nielsen 2002; conditional on aggregate levels of material
Bradley et al. 2003; &KHFFKL DQG inequality, appears to be a fruitful path for future
*DUFLD3HxDORVD 2010; Pontusson et al. theory and research. For example, as articulated
2002; Wallerstein 1999). above, general theories of within-country
inequality link stratification outcomes to the
distribution of skills and occupations as they are
impacted by changes in economic organization at
12.6 C onclusions
the global and national levels, but are silent with
Sociological theories of stratification have guided respect to the sociological process by which skills
social scientists towards deeper and more and occupations are distributed; attending to this
nuanced understandings of social inequality. The latter point will enrich our understanding of the
topic remains gripping precisely because reproduction of inequalities.
inequalities appear to be intractable, even as their
form changes across historical periods. Given the
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The Concept of Community 13
as Theoretical Ground: Contention
and Compatibility Across Levels
1966) describes the effort as a ‘singularly
of Analysis and (fruitless exercise’. Stacey,

Standpoints of
M. D. Irwin ()
Social Duquesne University , Pittsburgh , PA , USA e-
mail: irwinm@duq.edu
Processes Pahl and many others had come to see the
promise of community studies as a sociological
Michael D. Irwin method and empirical endeavor rather than as a
foundational movement to develop a theory of a
sociological phenomenon (Bell and Newby 2012
; Day 2006 ).
13.1 Introduction: Community as a Within the community studies arena this
failure seemed to undercut the foundation for
Theoretical Linkage
theoretical discourse on community. “One of the
F orty years ago community sociologists were main problems concerning the study of
community is that it has little or no substantive
widely expressing frustration with the concept of
sociological theory of its own. … Thus we cannot
community. In summarizing 200 years of
sociological work on the subject, in 1974 Bell draw upon a body of theory of the community—
and Newby seemed to have admitted defeat. “Yet rather we must fall back upon a list of individuals
out of community studies, there has never who have written about the concept of
community itself” (Bell and Newby 2012, p. 3).
developed a theory of community, nor even a
If no defi nite theoretical body of work on
satisfactory defi nition of what community is”
(Bell and Newby 2012 , l. 795). Such a defi nition community emerged during this time period, the
seemed unachievable “It should be apparent by list of individuals writing about community
now that it is impossible to give the sociological continued to accumulate. A practical regard for
community as concept and as an object of
defi nition of community” (Bell and Newby 2012
analysis would remain the mainstay of
, l. 788). Likewise Cohen ( 1985 ) states “Over
the years (community) has proved to be highly sociological study in the latter twentieth century.
resistant to satisfactory defi nition in From that empirical literature a common
anthropology and sociology, perhaps for the constellation of characteristics emerged.
simple reason that all defi nitions contain or According to Bruhn ( 2005 ) the concept of
imply theories, and the theory of community has community involves (1) locality (2) a sense of
been very contentious” (p. 8–9). Refl ecting a place and (3) a sense of community. Similarly
generalized sentiment Stacey declared “It is Flora and Flora (2013 ) situate the concept of
doubtful whether the concept ‘community’ refers community in locality but stress the importance
to a useful abstraction” and characterized the of a locally bounded social system containing
search for a cohesive theory of community as locally oriented organizations. Elias ( 2012 )
sociological ephemera (Stacey 2012, p. 13). Pahl shifts the orientation from individuals to

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 247


S. Abrutyn (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary Sociological Theory,
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32250-6_13
M.D. Irwin

residence thus stressing the notions of spatial role for space and place in community
proximity as a characteristic of community. association? Has locality lost its associational
Similarly McClay ( 2014 ) emphasizes both the force or has it simply been transformed?
tangible and intangible resources of place as well Contemporary works by Auge ( 2008 ), Bauman
as the pervasive importance of community as ( 2001 , 2013 ), Bellah et al.
place: “There is no evading the fact that we (1992 , 1996) , Florida ( 2004 , 2005 ),
human beings have a profound need for Fukuyama ( 1995 , 1999 ), Putnam et al. ( 1993
‘thereness,’ for visible and tangible things that , 2000 ), and others concerned with the
persist and endure, and thereby serve to anchor relationship between individuals and social life
our memories in something more substantial than elevated the importance of community as concept
our thoughts and emotions” (p. 2). Notably, and moved community theory to the center of
despite very different basic theoretical sociological interest. Their works on social
assumptions, these defi nitions yield a common capital, civic engagement, trust and meaning
core of issues involving community. As Keller ( were infused with discussions of community that
2003 ) notes, despite major differences in basic recalled the 19th theoretical treatment of
theoretical assumptions there are constant community by de Tocqueville, Tönnies,
elements that theorists use to describe Durkheim, Marx, Simmel, and Weber. Why?
community. “These include physical properties, T he concept of community has been used
such as land and boundaries, to cultural and social since Greek times to situate individuals in a larger
properties” (p. 266). Beyond agreements on these social context. Linking the experiential world of
very general dimensions, however, the discipline the individual to the abstraction of society and
had never coalesced around deeper theoretical culture has been an enduring analytic and
issues. As Day ( 2006 ) states “At every level, it theoretical problem in sociology and related
does appear community is contested, and disciplines (Cresswell 2015 ; Nisbet 1966 ;
contestable. There is disagreement about its Keller 2003 ). Society, however infl uential on
essential meaning, and endless argument about daily lives, is not readily perceived as an object
what it signifi es in terms of entitlements and or as context by individuals. And if these lines of
responsibilities, and for whom” (p. 245). Bruhn ( infl uence lack experiential reality, then the
2005) echoes this assessment noting “The word processes by which individuals are integrated into
‘community,’ much like the word ‘culture,’ has society and culture are equally indefi nite. The
been used so freely in the lay and scientifi c concept of community provides a theoretical
literature that it is often assumed that everyone counter to this ambiguity that is at once abstract
understands it and is in agreement about its and concrete.
importance. Yet, while the defi nitions of both H owever, theorizing community necessarily
words can vary substantially, they seem to be as confronts two issues: the problem of locality and
protected as if they were totems” (l. 469). the problem of association. The problem of
If community as a concept had limited association includes the nature of association
common ground across perspectives, community among individuals and the relationship of
as an important conceptual element permeated community both to individuals and to society at
theoretical approaches in social science in the late large. The nature of association has long been
20th century. Technological developments in contrasted as either originating in social structure
infrastructure and globalization of economic and culture or originating with individual
relations transformed the spatial limitations of recognition of common advantages and identity.
interaction while shifts in the basis for affi liation This problem of association also involves the role
among individuals created a new nexus of that community plays in linking individuals to the
association that raised deep questions about the broader social and cultural milieu. Here
nature of community in the twenty-fi rst century. community may be seen as simply a microcosm
Is the concept of community still meaningful in of society or as a conceptually separate social
an age of transcendent individualism? Is there a form. The two aspects, community as a source or
oncept of Community as Theoretical Ground: Contention and Compatibility… 249

consequence of association, and the role of 13.2 Community, Association, and


community as a mediator between individuals Locality: Historical
and society, are interrelated issues.
Antecedents
The problem of locality of community
involves the degree to which community is
13.2.1 Problems of Association:
bounded in space by either cultural or material
factors. The social and physical character of Individuals, Community,
community is used in social theories to refer to and Society
the tangible social and cultural milieu that is part
of daily individual experience. Characterization T he nature of association and attachment in
of this community milieu is problematic. This communities falls into two basic positions:
problem of locality confronts the importance of individuals associate in communities because of
spatial cohesion as opposed to social cohesion common interests and individual association
associated with community. This is often arises from the nature of community culture and
contrasted in terms of space vs. place and structure (Kirkpatrick 2008; Keller 2003;
overlaps with positions on community’s material Nisbet 1966 , 2014 ; Gans 2015 ). The former
character vs its symbolic character (Cresswell notion is found in classic Greek formulations and
2015 , l. 1236–1237). also in the utilitarian theories of the
This chapter explores these two concepts, Enlightenment. It views individuals as
association and locality. It begins by tracing their fundamentally atomistic, self- contained and
history in formulations of community, from the separate entities that may come together or
Greeks through Medieval Christianity up to the separate as circumstances dictate. It is founded on
Age of Enlightenment. Here community is a premise of individual autonomy where social
variously formulated as contractual convenience commonality is based on some form of
or as organic whole; as territorially organized or enlightened self-interest. It is this commonality of
culturally determined. Each approach implies a interests that creates community (and society)
different relationship between community and through recognition of either personal gain or the
society. Each has implications for the conception achievement of communal ends through social
of communal association and the role of culture association. This contractual association may be
and of space. The traces of these ideas are identifi based on maximizing self-interest or it may be
ed in classic sociological treatises on community based upon transcendent interests beyond
and tracked into early twentieth century individual maximization. The former is found in
sociology. In the latter half of the twentieth the social philosophy of the utilitarians where
century signifi cant divisions in sociology’s boundaries on individual behavior are accepted in
conceptualization of community developed that expectation that others will do the same. With this
resulted in the fragmentation of community as a expected reciprocity individual interests are
theoretical object, as discussed above. In maximized. In this latter conception community
contemporary work theoretical diversity has association is a social contract, yet one not based
continued to typify conceptions of community. upon expectations of reciprocity and the common
Yet, synthesis has become emblematic of new good is the motivation for the social contract
approaches to community. In the early twenty-fi (Benn 1982) . Characterized as an atomistic and
rst century conceptualizations of community contractual, this notion of community association
reconsider the relationships between organic and runs through community theory from Plato
contractual elements of community and re- through Putnam (Kirkpatrick 2008 ).
conceptualize connections between spatial forces A second perspective stresses the existence of
and the culture of place. Here the problems of community as organic and holistic. Community
association and locality are being addressed in creates individual attachments and, as it does,
new ways, but these works also revisit enduring individual interests. This notion, found in early
issues in the conceptualization of community. Christian theology (Augustine and Aquinas), in
M.D. Irwin

sociology (Hegelian/Marxian, Tönnies, polis had a contractual basis of association, yet


Durkheim, Cooley) and in philosophy (Hegel, one based on communal rather than individual
Whitehead, systems theorists) (Kirkpatrick ends. Social integration lies most especially in the
2008) . Where atomistic/contractual assumptions cultural ideals of community. Community, as an
highlight individual autonomy, association in ideal, played two important integrating roles:
organically conceived notions of community linking an autonomous local people to a wider
tends toward the notion of individuals fi lling worldview – the cultural traditions, religion, and
socially proscribed roles and behaviors (Benn philosophical perspectives of a more extensive
1982 ). Greek cultural system and (b) forging collective
N isbet proposes a very clear statement of bonds among individuals that moderate local
community as an organic and holistic aspect of tension between individual ambition and
social organization. “Community is founded on collective needs (Keller 2003) . These wider
man conceived in his wholeness rather than in cultural links were forged through religious
one or another of the roles, taken separately, that ceremony, community festivals and other civic
he may hold in a social order … it achieves fulfi activity while individual affi liation was achieved
llment in the submergence of individual will that through laws and norms. “[G]roup goals and
is not possible in unions of mere convenience or loyalty to the totality were to be put above
rational assent” ( 1966, p. 46). Community is, in individual striving for wealth and fame. The
the organic view, the center of the communal. highest honors were according to those who put
Here the basic unit is the social group, not the the common good above individual gain” (Keller
individual. The sum total of community structure 2003 , p. 20).
and culture are taken to be cohesive. Remove any While linkages between the individual,
part and the communal glue weakens (Carroll community and society were clearly emphasized
2014 , l. 4779). For Nisbet and others in this vein, in the writings of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, it
this is not to deny volitional aspects of is community that plays the preeminent role
individualism. Yet they do posit an essential (Cresswell 2015 ). Community is somewhat
tendency among individuals toward community autonomous from larger culture and it is
engagement, for “the yearning for a feeling of community that shapes the contractual
participation, for a sense of belonging, for a cause connection among individuals on a daily basis
larger than one’s own individual purposes and a (Keller 2003 ). Notably this contractual bonding
group to call one’s own” (Douthat 2014 , l. 59). was not simply an expression of enlightened self-
interest, but a mechanism for enhancing
individual natural faculties and common goals
13.2.2 Greek Conception: Community (Kirkpatrick 2008 , p. 14). As Keller states “For
for Common Plato, virtue rather than happiness was the path to
Good and Locality as Place an integrated life and virtue was rooted in
communal well-being (Keller 2003 , p. 287).
Keller ( 2003) argues that “It was the Greeks In this sense community is the mechanism for
who were the fi rst to work out the complex links individual self-actualization. The community
between the individual and community” (p. 20) provides a basis for individual rational and
and in seeing community as an integrating force philosophical common interest. The shared
with the larger sociocultural system. The commonality of this interest is of location, “Both
utilitarian conception of community as atomistic ‘politics’ and ‘ethics’ go back to Greek words that
affi liation is often the foil of the more organic signify place: polis and ethea, ‘city-states’ and
idea. However, the classic Greek conception of ‘habitats’ respectively. The very word ‘society’
ideal community provided a somewhat different stems from socius, signifying ‘sharing’ – and
take on affi liated interests among individuals sharing is done in a common place” (Casey 1997
(Minar and Greer 1969) . For the Greeks, the , p. xiv). It is for this reason that community as
place predominates Greek thought. Society, like
oncept of Community as Theoretical Ground: Contention and Compatibility… 251

space, is everywhere, yet nowhere in particular. the connections binding individuals together
Community without spatial identity on the earth transcend individual interests (Keller 2003 ).
lacks commonality. Augustine melds this ideal together with Cicero’s
It is this spatial commonality of place that concept of the economic commonwealth to a
solidifi es Greek culture and philosophy. conception of a common spiritual good that
Community of place becomes the basis of the transcends spatial boundaries and creates a
contractual aspect of social organization. It had community of the faithful (Keller 2003 ).
an individual centered and contractual Building on the Augustinian concept of a
formulation of individual relationship to universal community, Aquinas argues that such
community, albeit one immersed in culture and communities rise based upon this common
meaning. Individuals were immersed in spiritual good and: “infused the notion of
community and through it society. Yet, community as organism, an idea derived from
community is an ongoing agreement among Augustinian thought, added as an additional
individuals. The weight of infl uence is from ingredient of community the pursuit of the
individuals up. The polis is only loosely coupled common good” (Keller 2003 , p. 38).
to larger culture. Community is the primary Individuals are mutually bound together by
sociocultural mechanism linking individuals to community although each person maintains
larger society and affi liation among individuals identity and independent action. These bonds are
is derived from notions of a common good. not ones of self-interest but refl ect “a notion of
Community is contractual but not in the sense mutuality in which one person seeks out another
posited later by utilitarian thinkers. Delanty and in some sense lives for it and not itself”
(2009 ) argues that this is the fi rst of two modern(Kirkpatrick 2008 , p. 105). It is the overarching
ideas of community “the human order of the polis spiritual principles that bind individuals to this
and the universal order of the cosmos. These universal community rather than the overlapping
traditions – one particularistic and the other interests that emerge from the individuals
universalistic – correspond approximately to the themselves. In this, the ideal is the community
Greek and Christian traditions … Where the that exists prior to and apart from the individuals.
Greeks gave priority to the polis as the domain of Communal cohesion among individuals is shaped
community, Christian thought stressed the by this universal recognition of a greater, trans-
universal community as a communion with the individual ideal.
sacred” The concept of community arising from the
(pp. 5–6). monastic conception of affi liations is organic, sui
generis, deriving essential meaning as a
mechanism linking individuals to the larger
13.2.3 Medieval Christian (religious) culture. The monastic notion of
Conceptions: Community community is one based on the power of ideals
as Organic and Universal and culture. This holistic notion of community
would later return in early sociological writings
T he conceptual alternative to the polis is found of Comte, Durkheim and Cooley (among others),
in the monastic community and in the early but with the advent of the Enlightenment, an
writings of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. organic conception would be set aside. The
Where the polis is local, territorial, concerned utilitarian basis of community was found in
with the immediate and daily actions of its mutual self-interest (Minar and Greer 1969 ).
members, the monastic community is organic,
holistic and embedded in a specifi c shared
ideology. A position in space and territoriality is
the least important dimension of community.
Instead, the normative order transcends space and
M.D. Irwin

13.2.3.1 The Age of Enlightenment: individual association was organized. However,


Community as Contract for with that ascendancy, the common goals linking
Individual Good individuals together would disappear. “What de
In this conception the basis of sociality lies Tocqueville feared was that this increasing
exclusively in the protection of individual isolation and sense of self- suffi ciency would
property. Community plays a minimal role in actually create the conditions for a more powerful
these formations (Keller 2003 ; Minar and Greer and dominant state.
1969 ). For Hobbes community is seen as largely Individualism might lead to the destruction of the
an antiquated social convenience. Locke retains virtue of public life and ‘apathy toward the public
the notion of community but sees it as a weal’…” (Kirkpatrick 2008 , pp. 35–36).
regrettable local association for protection when Community for de Tocqueville, especially as
general social law fails (Kirkpatrick 2008 ). it creates cohesion, was the most critical issue in
Contractual and atomistic, this conception would societal development. “Among the laws that rule
provide a much more narrow idea of association human societies there is one which seems to be
than that of the polis. It is one based on individual more precise and clear than all others. If men are
good rather than common good. “Both [Locke] to remain civilized or to become so, the art of
and Hobbes believed the purpose of society as associating together must grow and improve in
such was to protect individual interest, primarily the same ratio in which the equality of conditions
property. This seemed far more self-evident to is increased” (Vol 2, p. 110). This art of
them than any claim that persons entered in to association lay with community, not society, if
society because it in any sense a fulfi llment of for no other reason than society was distant
their nature or because sociability is intrinsically abstraction for most. “It is diffi cult to draw a man
enjoyable and an end in itself” (Kirkpatrick 2008 out of his own circle to interest him in the destiny
, p. 28). Here utilitarian contractualism parts ways of the state, because he does not clearly
with the transcendent social contract of the understand the infl uence the destiny of the state
Greeks. Community and society extend no can have upon his own lot” (Vol 2, p. 104).
further than individual self-interest dictates. This Community provided material and cultural
notion was extended to politics and law immediacy that created cohesion. The issues of
(Bentham), markets (Smith), and governance the local community engage the individual in an
(Rousseau). The utilitarian social philosophers immediate recognition of common interests. “But
rejected the medieval organic model of if it is proposed to make a road cross the end of
community. Individual affi liation arises from his estate, he will see at glance that there is a
individual self-interest. Largely, they also reject connection between his small public affairs and
the premises of the community oriented affi his greatest private affairs; and he will discover,
liation of Greek thought. without it being shown to him, the close ties that
De Tocqueville ( 1994 ) offers a singular unites private to general interest” (Vol. 2, p. 104).
exception. De Tocqueville clearly viewed In the local community de Tocqueville fi nds the
association as atomistic and contractual utilitarian tendencies to be countered by
(Kirkpatrick 2008) . However, he painted a transcendent interests in the common good. Here,
contrast between the self- interested aspect of this what the Greeks found unproblematic about
contract and transcendent common values linking community, de Tocqueville highlights as a
individuals – self-interest rightly conceived. This critical problem of community Self-interest may
contrast in social association is also a contrast be rightly understood, or not. A contract of
between the role of community and of society. In common purpose may triumph, or not.
American individualism he saw pecuniary self- This is “how an enlightened regard for
interested motivation creating a trend away from themselves constantly prompts them to assist one
community association for the common good. another and inclines them willingly to sacrifi ce a
With this trend comes the ascendancy of larger portion of their time and property to the welfare
society as the mechanism around which of the state” (Vol. 2, p. 122). Yet de Tocqueville
oncept of Community as Theoretical Ground: Contention and Compatibility… 253

also places this transcendent interest in the


cohesion brought about by the “constant habit of
kindness and an established repudiation of 13.3 Community, Association and
disinterestedness.” It is the local cultural identity Locality: Development in
“which leads a great number of citizens to value Sociology
the affection of their neighbors and of their
kindred, [and] perpetually brings men together 13.3.1 Classic Sociology: From
and forces them to help one another in spite of the Community to Society
propensities that sever them” (Vol 2, 104).
Common conditions and common affection are De Tocqueville aside, the reaction to the
the contextual conditions forming contractual utilitarian concept of community sets the
association, rather than pure self-interest. Critical foundation of discussion for subsequent social
to the formation of this mutuality among science and philosophy (Kirkpatrick 2008;
community members are the public associations Keller 2003, Nisbet 1966 ) . Nisbet in particular
that typify the local community. argues that the contemporary view of community
De Tocqueville places the two types of and alienation is found in the philosophical
contractual association in opposition to one conservative’s view. They saw loss of
another: society and individual self-interest vs. institutional traditions as leading to alienation
community and transcendent interests. This (Keller 2003 ; Nisbet 2014) . Their response to
approach represents a break with the the self-interested autonomy of the
characterizations of association and community Enlightenment was to return to the organic, social
underlying utilitarian thought. Instead his individual of Augustine (Nisbet 1966) . In part
formulation of community recalls the Greek this refl ects a nostalgia for the disappearing
notions of contractual association for higher communities of the medieval age (Bell and
purposes. This becomes de Tocqueville’s Newby 1975) , but it is also a reaction to the rise
analytic quest. Can community moderate of political thought that prioritizes the national
society? Can the common weal triumph over self- political state. “The idea of the abstract,
interest? As Keller states of de Tocqueville impersonal, and purely legal state is challenged
“Crucial here is that individuals think it is to their by the theories resting on the assumed priority of
interest to link themselves to others. But how to community, tradition, and status” (Nisbet 1966,
plant the same thought into a thousand minds at p. 51). Social, moral, epistemological and
the same moment?” (Keller 2003 , p. 230). De metaphysical attacks in philosophy by Hegel,
Tocqueville thought the answer lay in part in the Bradley and Bergson mounted against the
local press but also in the proliferation of atomistic perspective, especially as it centered on
associations that created a shared identity in the self-interest. It is in this light that sociological
community. For him, this was by no means an treatises of the period should be understood
assured outcome. To the extent that community (Kirkpatrick 2008 ; Keller 2003) .
triumphed, individuals would fi nd meaning in U sing community as a central organizing
shared identity and in sharing common goals. To concept, Durkheim rejected the notion that self-
the extent that society triumphed individuals interest was the foundation of social cohesion,
would isolate themselves and only associate substituting common beliefs and sentiments – the
according to the expedience of individual gain. collective conscience (Keller 2003 ). This
This view of community association as a process conception parallels Comte’s idea of the moral
would re-emerge with Tönnies ( 1887) . community (Nisbet 1966 ). Both see society
However, for Tönnies this transition would be simply as community written large. It is from
more profound. He would conceive this as a both community and society that all phenomenon
change in the essential nature of association, in above the purely physiological is derived. The
the movement from the organic to the contractual. transition from mechanical to organic association
in no way refl ected a loss of the communal
M.D. Irwin

origins of attachment and affi liation. Rather this (Kirkpatrick 2008) . Those elements of
was a change from one type of community association would not develop in community but
attachment; local, immediate, sentimental, to ultimately they would in communist society.
another type of attachment; less bounded by Tönnies, unlike Marx, begins with the
locality and similarity. In analyzing the shift to historical preeminence of community over
organic solidarity “Durkheim was gratifi ed to society. Unlike Durkheim, he did see the
conclude that, far from community transition from community to society as a
disintegrating, society was becoming one big fundamental shift from individuals as embedded
community” (Bell and Newby 1975, p. 23). His social beings to individual autonomy, from the
concern was that the emergence of organic holistic to the atomistic. With this shift comes the
solidarity might be threatened by a readiness to loss of community as a mechanism for organizing
cooperate on behalf of common purposes (Day association. Tönnies stresses Gemeinschaft as
2006) . This could lead to greater anomie. typifi ed by cherished modes of community
However, this transition, for Durkheim, should association (love, loyalty, honor, friendship) all
not be mistaken for a shift to an atomistic of which are superseded by utilitarian ‘society’
character for association. Association in the the Gesellschaft of atomistic individualism and
organic society remains embedded in the association based on divisions (Nisbet 1966 ).
common culture, the collective conscience of This is seen as a shift from a natural, organic
society (Keller 2003 ). The social system remains character of local association, one based on
the force shaping individual attachment and shared history, traditions, and affective social
association, not individual volition. This connections to one of impersonal rationality. As
conception is holistic with individual behavior Day ( 2006 ) characterizes Tönnies, “Community
shaped conditions by the divisions of organic stands for real ties of interdependence and
society rather than the communal mechanic emotion between people who form part of an
solidarity of community. What does change is the organic, bounded, entity, often linked to place or
role that community plays. Rather than the territory. ‘Association’ refers to exchanges
immediate mediator of larger culture, community among individuals who engage in essentially
is subsumed as a component of the larger division boundaryless, contractual relationships; the ties
of labor. Community becomes society. between them are merely convenient” (p. 6).
For Marx, community never differentiated Tönnies argues that modernization brings with it
from society. Like Durkheim, he rejects the a shift to contractualism.
utilitarian notions of association in favor of an T his shift is one from individual association
organic conception (Kirkpatrick 2008 ). embedded in community itself to one of
Individual association is shaped by society. association arising from the individual and based
Unlike Durkheim, community is relegated to a solely on mutual self-interest. In Gemeinschaft
secondary role in shaping association. Both in his community binds individuals together through
critique of pre- socialist society and in his reciprocity, history, and shared culture. While
prospective communist society, Marx turns away Tönnies provided a central role for individual
from localism in favor of a communal association volition in this attachment, in community this
at the societal level (Nisbet 1966 ). The volition is directed by the culture of place (
importance of community lies in its historically Wesenwille ) and is therefore of the community.
specifi c role in mediating socioeconomic In Gesellschaft society, that community is lost
relationship. Community is simply the most local and with it the primacy of place. Kurwille
characterization of society (Nisbet 1966 ). Here (purposive-rational) volition predominates and is
community is simply a spatial node of larger of the individual. Thus contractualism comes to
society. Those elements of community characterize association in Gesellschaft society.
association highlighted by his contemporaries, Rudolf Heberle highlights this point in his
cooperation, mutuality and affection had little preface to Community and Society (2002).
place in Marx’s treatment of community
oncept of Community as Theoretical Ground: Contention and Compatibility… 255

Tönnies showed that Aristotle and Hobbes were society operates through communal moral
both right. Each had focused on different aspects of consensus and
social life: Man was indeed by his very nature a
social being who would unfold his essence only by Durkheim, in his methodology, prioritizes
living in communities of kinship, space community (in the sense of community of beliefs
(neighborhood), and spirit, but who was also and sentiments) as the mechanism through which
capable of forming and, at certain stages in history, society infl uences individual behavior (Nisbet
compelled to form new kinds of associations by
agreements – associations which could be 1966 ).
understood as instruments for the attainment of Simmel parallels Durkheim’s interest in
certain ends – whereas those ‘older’ communities institutions and associations, but at a micro level.
were taken as ends in themselves and therefore A critique of utilitarian individualism, Simmel’s
could not be understood by a utilitarian approach.
(2002, p. x )
view of society was one of individual
contributions that aggregate up to society,
although not necessarily on a contractual basis.
T his point is echoed by Delanty ( 2009) “there
Simmel puts autonomy into the forefront of
is no doubt that Tönnies tended to polarize these
sociological concern. “The deepest problems of
terms, seeing community as encompassing
modern life derive from-the claim of the
tradition and society as modernity, and both
individual to preserve the autonomy and
interlocked in a ‘tragic confl ict’…” (p. 21). This
individuality of his existence in the face of
theoretical synthesis is consequential, given that
overwhelming social forces, of historical
Tönnies’ typology continued to infl uence
heritage, of external culture, and of the technique
sociologists throughout the twentieth century.
of life.” His Metropolis and Mental Life is
Rather than positing an essential character to
concerned with the transition from cohesive
association and community, Tönnies and
traditional community to de-socialized
subsequent work in this vein recognized the
anonymous life (Nisbet 1966 , 95–97).
transitional nature of community and of
B y the end of the nineteenth century the
association.
concept of community was established in these
T önnies, like Weber, treated community as
two traditions. The organic notion viewed
typology although not in the empirical sense. For
community as the ultimate cause of individual
both, types of community represented types of
association through the infl uence of immediate
association. This theme is picked up by
norms, values and local goals. Community exists
Simmel ( 1971) and Weber ( 1958) (especially
sui generis, as either the mediator between
in his traditional vs rational types of authority,
individuals and society (as with the monasitic
social action oriented to (1) interpersonal ends,
vision), or as the immediate and primary
(2) absolute value-ends, (3) emotional/affectual
mechanism shaping individual association (as
states, and (4) tradition and convention – as well
with the Conservative reaction to the
as the transition from non-rational to rational
Enlightenment). However, in this conception, the
society) and later by Cooley 2008 ) (in his
immediate infl uences of community were being
primary vs s econdary types of associations) and
subsumed in organic society. Community may
Durkheim ( 1964) (mechanical vs organic
exist as a social entity but increasingly the
solidarity).
character of community was dominated by the
Notably these thinkers focus on a transition in
character of society. With this, the importance of
general association rather than explicitly
community as place correspondingly is de-
assigning the concept of ‘community’ to either.
emphasized. Association no longer is seen as
For Weber the communal is the antithesis of
organized in space as communities of place. With
rational associative solidarity. With a shift to the
that change, the organic bonding elements of
rational associative comes an increase in
association no longer have a particularly spatial
atomistic isolation of the modern individual. In
identity. Society creates attachment and society is
Durkheim however, this transition remains
territorially pervasive.
fundamentally determined by society. Here
M.D. Irwin

Contractualist approaches viewed community something to the common life that no one else can
as shaped by loosely amalgamated individual contribute” (Cooley 2008 , l. 527–531). Cooley
association aggregated up to form common rejected the atomistic notion of individuals,
mechanisms that either enhanced self-interest, as asserting that human develop led to an ever-
in the utilitarian approaches, or shared goals and widening association, based on primary group
ideals, as with the Greek classic notion of the ideals, that would expand from the family to the
polis. In the latter, locality reigned supreme in local community, to the nation, and fi nally to the
that the transmission of interests were local, face-world community (Coser 1977 ). Likewise Wirth
to- face and immediate. Society and culture were (1948 ) argued community association might not
fi ltered through community. For the utilitarians, be limited by locality, but could be extended
such localism was simply the remnant of an globally. Wirth and Cooley developed a notion of
earlier era. Contractual association was transcendent association based upon primary
reorganized across commonalities thatgroup ideals. These connections had their origins
transcended locality. Neither ideals nor goals in the local community yet community was not a
were contained within any particular community. necessary element linking individuals together.
Individual interests had universalized and the The organic nature of social organization
local community disappears as a recognizable extended to society and societies. In this
theater of common interest. conception community association, in the sense
Thus for both groups the foundational of primary group affi liation, could create a global
position of community’s role in relation to community. This approach retains the rejection of
association had shifted. The immediacy and contractualism and the holistic notion of
proximity of social relations were of less European sociology, yet excises the role of
importance. The universality of associations community (Kirkpatrick 2008 ). Here Tönnies’
became the problem of interest. For Durkheim, Gemeinschaft relations are extended to society at
Marx, Simmel and Weber, the importance of large. Society becomes community.
community gives way to society as the primary If some schools of American sociological
aspect of social o rganization linking individuals. thought treated changes in community
As Day ( 2006 ) states “It is not necessarily the association as a disappearing element in social
case that the classic sociologists wholeheartedly life, others focused on the changing relationship
endorsed community as a value, or an end in between community and society. A concern with
itself. On the contrary, it can be argued that in the relationship between community and society
general they welcomed social progress and becomes one of the predominant interests
development …” (p. 10). Certainly this is the case whether of an organic or contractual orientation.
with early American theories of community and This is seen early on in the works of MacIver
society. (1917 ). While explicitly rejecting an organic
view of community MacIver sees community and
society as part of a continuum of the social
13.3.2 Community and Theory in the interaction (Kirkpatrick 2008 ). He argues that
Early Twentieth Century society provide a vague and incoherent sense of
one’s association to others, “[It] is the small
D rawing from Durkheim and Simmel, Wirth and intense community within which the life of the
Cooley built their notions of community and ordinary individual is lived, a tiny nucleus of
association on an organic view of social common life with a sometimes larger, sometimes
relationships, “[T]he relation between society smaller and always varying fringe” (p. 7). For
and the individual as an organic relation. That is, MacIver there is a constant tension between
we see that the individual is not separable from community and society, with local community
the human whole… And, on the other hand, the encompassing individuals’ notions of shared fate
social whole is in some degree dependent upon and interdependence. It is community that links
each individual, because each contributes the individual to larger society. However
oncept of Community as Theoretical Ground: Contention and Compatibility… 257

MacIver thought that community itself is modernization as transforming the town into the
subordinate to the character of larger society city, creating new kinds of social relations and
(Minar and Greer 1969 ). presenting new challenges for community”
Human ecology builds a community centered (Delanty 2009 , p. 39).
theory, one that highlights the role that One implication of this change was the
community plays in creating society. Drawing separation of community as an ecological force
from both Durkheim and from biology, human binding together individuals towards a common
ecologists developed an organic and holistic material support, and community as attachments,
approach that parallels Cooley and Wirth. For sentiments and emotional commonality. As
them, however community becomes the focal Delanty ( 2009) states “it might be said that these
point. It is the holistic, unit character of studies tend to see community as something
communities that Park, Burgess, McKenzie and preserved in the locality while being under threat
others treat both society and community as a in the wider city. An interpretation might be that
material whole, based on spatial and organization the city has become absorbed into the
interdependence. This is not however a purely Gesellschaft of society, while Gemeinschaft is
spatial notion of community and was concerned preserved in the vestiges of locality” (p. 40). The
instead with the borders and boundaries of group ecological community contained many
processes, culture and association (Irwin 2015 ). communities of attachment and shaped such
It assumes that community proscribes the communities. Much of the work of early human
conditions for individual association “… for ecology was dedicated to the study of the
every individual, interdependence with other relationship between these two types of
human beings is imperative. It is indispensable to communities.
life. … Interdependence is the irreducible From Wirth ( 1938 ) on, community studies in
connotation of sociality” (Hawley 1986 , p. 6). this vein focused on the relationship between
Not that Hawley bases this interdependence on an material structures of the ecological community
assumption of rationality, like the utilitarians, but and cultural processes in these communities of
only as a material condition creating association. attachment (Wirth 1928 ; Lynd and Lynd 1929 ;
Community explains individual association. “The Park et al. 1984 ; Zorbaugh 1929 ; Whyte 1955
question to be asked in an ecological approach is ; Redfi eld 1955 ; Frazier 1957 ; Warner and
not why persons do what they do, but under what Lunt 1941 ; Hollingshead 1949 ). Here
conditions do given actions occur” (Hawley community attachment was considered to be an
1986, p. 6). This approach emphasized both the outcome of the organic whole of the ecological
organic nature of community and social nature of community. Individual attachment arose from the
individuals. processes and interrelationships between the
In this, human ecology rejected the utilitarian, whole (the metropolitan community) and its parts
contractual foundations human association (neighborhoods and local districts). Thus
instead applying sociological notions of cohesion individual association was, in this view, shaped
and embeddedness in group processes (Irwin and by the ecological community. Further, society
Kasarda 1994 ). Community is both the building was seen as constituted by the interrelationships
block for larger society and the boundary within among these ecological communities (McKenzie
which social life takes place (Gans 2015 ; Park 1967 ; Hawley
et al. 1984 ; Hawley 1950 , 1986 ; McKenzie 1950 ).
1967 ). With boundaries set by spatial
constraints, by economic division of labor and by
the demographic structures of cities, the
ecological community was seen as setting the
limits and possibilities for association. For the
early Chicago school ecologists “One tendency
was to see urbanization, industrialization and
M.D. Irwin

13.4 The Post WWII Division in division of labor among communities and related
Community Sociology issues (Berry and Kasarda 1977 ; Hauser and
Schnore 1965 ; Schnore 1965 ; Zimmer and
I n the post-WWII era, Chicago School Hawley 1968 ; Frisbie and Poston 1978 ). The
scholarship split along these two lines, with the processes by which this took place at the micro-
cultural elements of community attachment seen level were less emphasized than the macro-level
as a separate issue from the development of the structures which resulted.
ecological issues of community (Irwin 2015 ; For the second Chicago School (the
Saunders 1986 ). With very few exceptions intellectual extension of the Chicago community
(Kasarda and Janowitz 1974 ) the whole/part studies school) and for related work elsewhere in
relationships became of less importance and with community studies, the focus was on people at
that change, the role and theoretical orientation of the local community level, and the institutions,
community shifted. The two approaches came to processes and patterns of attachment that create
be regarded as separate enterprises with association. Without positing community as sui
neoclassical human ecology pursuing the generis, their analyses shifted solely to the
structural aspects of community and the second culture, history, institutions and local meaning
Chicago School pursuing the processes and that encourage affi liation. This line of work
elements of community attachment (Gans 2015 became associated with the careful explication of
). This created a division between scholars that social interaction within communities. The focus
emphasized the material elements that constitute highlighted people, not communities themselves
community as an object of study vs those who (Gans 2015 ). Scholars in this vein explored
study the culture and ideology binding types of local communities, differences in affi
individuals together within community. More liation among these communities, individual
than a split in focus, this becomes a split between attachment and meaning within communities and
an organic and contractual conception of the social problems of these communities (Hunter
community. 1953 , 1974 ; Gans 1962 , 1967 ; Wellman 1979
For neoclassical human ecology individual ; Suttles 1972 ; Bell and Newby 1975 ). These
attachment was relatively unproblematic and scholars emphasized community as a social
taken as a postulate of the organic nature of the contract although they rejected utilitarian notions
ecological community (Hawley 1986 ). The role of self- interest as the primary motivating factor
of place is conceptually straightforward. in association. Here community was studied from
Community is coterminous with the territory of the point of view of its members. Despite very
community. Space, territory and place are distinctive approaches, both lines of scholarship
inseparable concepts. The focus falls upon a) the retained the early human ecological notion that
social and spatial interrelationships among community was the critical linkage to society.
ecological communities and b) the implications This was seen either as a linking mechanism to
of these macro relationships for societal broader society (as in the second Chicago School)
processes (Hawley 1971 ). or as the structural building blocks of society at
In many ways society is viewed as arising large (as in neo-classical human ecology).
from and built upon community. Work in this In the 1970s and 1980s scholars working in
area focused on the communities themselves to Marxian traditions focused on the ways that
the exclusion of micro-level social interaction. society created community. This new urban
Association among individuals was derived from school reoriented this community centered
their position in the community, an organic understanding of places to one which situated
formulation. The socio-spatial organization of community in larger society. Place is seen as a
community was studied as an integrated system. microcosm of larger social forces. The new urban
Scholarship in this approach pursued issues of approach retained the organic and materialist
community interdependence, social morphology, assumptions outlined by Marx. Society was a
system which determined the character and
oncept of Community as Theoretical Ground: Contention and Compatibility… 259

nature of social association, of social institutions of space as the central dimension of capitalist
and especially of community. Impactful in society. Here he sees his work as linking Marxian
sociology, geography and urban planning, the and post-modern approaches. His concept of third
new urban approach highlighted the rise of global spaces extends the idea of space as (1) a material
capitalism as the context in which places develop. condition and (2) as a symbolic construction.
Space more than place is conceptually ascendant Third space is the expression of space as lived
in this point of view. Castells brings this issue experience that combines the abstract and
front and center (Castells 1996 , 2000 ; Susser concrete dimensions into one (Latham 2012 ),
2002 ). implying that community is epiphenomenal of
For Castells ( 1996 ) globalization and new these other, more important elements, since the
technology gave rise to the reorganization of experience of community varies by all three
space. Noting that social fl ows always have a dimensions. Thus in Postmodern Geographies
spatial component, Castells argues that society is (Soja 1989 ), different routes taken at different
reorganizing space, from a space of places to a times through Los Angeles lead to distinct
space of fl ows. The space of fl ows is not based communities, such as the post-Fordist industrial
on propinquity but refers to the networks of fi metropolis, the globalized cosmopolis, the fractal
nance, production, communication and power city shattered by social divisions, and others, each
across the landscape. While these may come occupying the same place.
together in space, place and community are seen The organization of space as intrinsic to
as epiphenomenal of these fl ows. “…[T]he space capitalism (or any other social form) and the
of fl ows does include a territorial dimension, as material implications of space as a social product
it requires a technological infrastructure that are pervasive themes in new urban sociology.
operates from certain locations, and as it connects These are foundational concepts to the work of
functions and people located in specifi c places” Logan & Molotch ( 1987 ), Harvey ( 1989 ),
(Castells 1996 , p. 14). Place is a function of Massey ( 1994 ), Gottdiener ( 1985 ) and many
spatial organization, but one that shifts with the others. The organic nature of society, especially
lines of power, production and technology. Place in its capitalistic form, and the material
is always an outcome of spatially based networks, implications of space as a social product parallel
which are themselves products of society. human ecology as both Hawley ( 1984) and
Although Castells differs with Lefebvre on the Smith ( 1995) have noted. They fi nd
importance of place, both see place and space as commonality in the material foundation of
ultimately linked to society. In this sense, community, in the organic nature of macro social
community is simply the local manifestation of organization and in a rejection of contractual
society. foundations for community organization. There
For Lefebvre ( 1991 ) place as a lived, tangible are of course, many fundamental differences
territory is the center of space as experienced in between the two approaches. Most pertinent here
everyday life. Locality, as lived space, involves is that, unlike neoclassical ecology, the new
different experiences for individuals according to urban sociology views community as a
their position in society. That is, the experience microcosm of society. Community is a
of community is itself shaped by larger social consequence of forces of production and for
forces. Thus the lived experience of place is also contemporary community these are national and
an experience of space as a product of capitalist global forces. Although community may provide
society. For Lefebvre “ideas about regions, media a basis for organization and resistance to these
images of cities and perceptions of ‘good forces, ultimately the nature of community
neighbourhoods’ are other aspects of this space follows from the structure of society.
which is necessarily produced by each society” The commutarian approach, following the
(Shields 2012 , p. 284). traditions of de Tocqueville and the ancient
B uilding on the work of Lefebvre space, Soja Greeks, sees communities arising from common
(1989 , 1996 , 2010) explores the implications goals, common purpose, and shared ideology
M.D. Irwin

(Bellah et al. 1992 , 1996; Etzioni 1993 , 1995 that it took a both a ‘hard’ utilitarian shape and a
, 1996) . Community arises as a contractual ‘soft’ expressive form. One focused on the
obligation for the greater good. Commutarianism bottom line, the other on feelings…” (p. viii). The
explicitly recalls de Tocqueville’s contrast choice between these two lies with their moral
between self-i nterest and common interest as a and social conception of community more than
basis for community association. Like de the material or structural conditions.
Tocqueville they clearly acknowledge T his distinguishes their approach from that
community association can be typifi ed by either later developed by Putnam. As Bellah typifi es
form of contract. However, this work highlights the central argument of Habits of the Heart “The
the problems of self- interested individualism as argument for the decline in social capital was
opposed to the development of the common essentially a cultural analysis, more about
good. Community is the ground where this language than behavior” (p. xvii). However they
opposition is engaged. acknowledge the role the more institutional
Etzioni for instance contrasts the problems of arguments put forward by Putnam. “We believe
persons acting as free agents as opposed to the culture and language of individualism infl
communal action based on common identities uence these trends but there are also structural
and purposes. As Bruhn ( 2005 ) typifi es Etzioni reasons for them…” (p. xvii). In this they situate
“It is the challenge of communitarians to pull community cultural changes in community
people together from the extremes of autonomy institutional arrangements lauded by de
and antagonism to a middle zone of mutuality by Tocqueville and the loss of these arrangements
relying on community pressure and individual lamented by Putnam ( 2000 ), Putnam et al. ( 1993
morality. Communitarian thinking basically , 2003 ).
involves a return to ‘we-ness’ in our society, in P utnam’s analysis focuses on the
our social institutions, and in our social interrelationships among social institutions, civic
relationships” (l. 673). Similarly Delanty ( 2009) engagement, and organizational performance.
says of Etzioni’s work, “His advocation of Some institutions, according to Putnam, promote
community may be seen as an American reaction “horizontal ties” that cut across diverse groups,
to the dominance of rational choice and neo- link together isolated institutions (thereby
liberalism in the 1980s. … Community entails enhancing their effectiveness) and foster trust and
voice – a ‘moral voice’ – and social responsibility civic involvement in the local population. The
rests on personal responsibility” (p. 68). collective elements of social capital, in this
Bellah and colleagues ( 1992 , 1996 ) also perspective, are found in the complex of
follow this neo-Tocquevillean theme however community institutions acting together as a
they highlight the importance of community system. Local government, informal institutions,
based institutions and culture. For Bellah and community associations, and economic
colleagues the language of individualism and its enterprises interact to enhance civic welfare, and
impact on the nature of community association is the benefi ts of this social capital accrue. In this
especially important. They center their work on sense benefi ts accrue to the system of
both the moral voice discussed by Etzioni and on institutions, not the institutions themselves. The
the role that community plays in creating this benefi cial outcomes too tend to be seen as public
voice. In their analysis they argue that in goods that are structural characteristics of
contemporary communities a culture of community, such as decreased inequality, less
coherence, based on traditions, memory of place, poverty and other aggregate social welfare
and common identity is in contention with the a outcomes. In this social capital and its benefi ts
culture of separatism (Bellah et al. 1996 ). This are not reducible below the community level. The
is clearly a battle for contractual cohesion based benefi ts of social capital (both economic and
on the greater good vs one based on limited social welfare) accrue to communities. The
individual self-interest. In exploring the nature of benefi ts to social capital are collective gains.
community cohesion, Bellah et al note “We found Better government, local economic growth and
oncept of Community as Theoretical Ground: Contention and Compatibility… 261

civic welfare are outcomes shared within the abstract spaces in the mind, they also try to
collectivity, not owned by individuals. However, embody their feelings, images, and thoughts in
individuals rightly understand that this general tangible material” (p. 17).
good is shared among individuals. It is a lesson Place becomes the meanings attached to
that is founded in community and from there space, especially in its symbols such as
extends to society at large. monuments, characteristics buildings and other
In the works of Putnam, Bellah and Etzioni, icons of community. It is this meaning through
contractualism is moderated by a sense of the symbols of community that roots individuals
community as sui generis. Pre-existing local to place. “Abstract space, lacking signifi cance
institutions and a culture of civic engagement other than strangeness, becomes concrete place,
create collective local identity that is the fi lled with meaning” (p. 199). For Tuan, this
foundation of the communitarian notion of phenomenology of place was of central
community. It is also a perspective that looks at importance. Yet his concern lay less in the
the interaction between the material and cultural implications of this phenomenology and more in
elements of community. The cultural elements “the emotional and intimate engagement of
associated with community identity and the people, culture, environment and place”
structural elements of social capital are, in (Rodaway 2012, p. 427). This concern with
practice, intertwined. Thus, while association is meanings and attachment permeates most of the
based upon contractualism for the public good, subsequent literature in the phenomenological
community has an organic quality to it that approach to community.
supersedes the individual contract. These A nother recurring theme is the problem of
elements are not strictly born from individual hyper-individualism associated with the loss of
agreements, they also shape such agreements. place in a globalizing society. Auge’s ( 2008 )
The proliferation of civic organizations in a concept of ‘non-place’, those elements of space
community creates a sense of community purpose devoid of common culture, exemplifi es this idea.
and identity. At the same time general norms “If a place can be defi ned as relational, historical,
encouraging civic participation encourage the and concerned with identity, then a space which
formation of civic organizations. cannot be defi ned as relational, historical or
This intertwining of cultural and material concerned with identity will be a non-place” (p.
bases of community is also found in 78). His non-places are spaces devoid of the
phenomenological approaches albeit with an traditional cultural characteristics of community
entirely different emphasis. Cresswell ( 2015) that create meaningful and continuous social
differentiates the phenomenological approach as association (Merriman 2012) . Instead they exist
one focused on the deeper elements of human as spatial nodes of accumulation and
association. consumption that are bondless and self-serving.
This approach is not particularly interested in the A person entering the space of non-place is
unique attributes of particular places nor is it relieved of his usual determinants. He becomes no
primarily concerned with the kinds of social forces more than what he does or experiences in the role
that are involved in the construction of particular of passenger, customer, or driver … The space of
places. Rather it seeks to defi ne the essence of non- place creates neither singular identity nor
human existence as one that is necessarily and relations; only solitude, and similitude. There is no
importantly ‘in-place.’ This approach is less room for history unless it has been transformed into
concerned with ‘places’ and more interested in an element of spectacle, usually in allusive texts.
‘Place’ (l. 1439). (Auge
2008 , p. 103)
This work has an abiding concern on the
internalization of community into individual’s A uge sees non-places in ascendancy and
identity. Here the perception of space becomes as meaningful association among individuals in
important as place in understanding community. decline. Here Auge points to the loss of the social
As Tuan ( 2014 ) states “Human beings not only contractualism of community, much in the
discern geometric patterns in nature and create traditions of Töennies. However in his view, if
M.D. Irwin

identity becomes devoid of sociality, then even form, and investment with meaning which he sees
the minimal contractualism of the utilitarians is as inseparable elements (p. 463–466). His defi
lost. “Place and non-place are rather like opposed nition (following Soja 1989 , 1996 ) brings
polarities: the fi rst is never completely erased, together both the material and symbolic ideas
the second never totally completed… But non- arguing that “Places are doubly constructed: most
places are the real measure of our time” (p. 79). are built or in some way physically carved out.
A similar concern is expressed by Certeau They are also interpreted, narrated, perceived,
(1984 ) . As Crang ( 2012) explains “he sees felt, understood and imagined.” Although
tactics transforming the places designed by rejecting a simple spatial measure of place he
hegemonic powers and envisioned as the neat and argues that the context of place is of overriding
orderly realm of the concept city, into unruly importance in shaping social life and in mediating
spaces; that is, he sees practices as spatialising between society/culture and the individual.
places” (p. 108). This loss of place in the midst of Gieryn argues that although community and
globalization is also a theme presented in place are not necessarily coterminous, the
Bauman (2001 , 2013 ). Arguing that a global physical, cultural and material conditions of place
community is developing, place now becomes set the foundations for community. “But is there
more associated with all of humanity, at least for a ‘place effect’ as well? … Enough studies
those who are geo-mobile. Contrasting this suggest that the design and serial construction of
‘glocalization’ with localization, Bauman notes places is at the same time the execution of
that failure to reorient to the global community community…” (p. 477). In this sense place is the
leaves some caught in local space just as the necessary, if not suffi cient basis for community
foundations of association shift. Locality no formation and the continuation of community. He
longer is community. As Clarke ( 2012 ) says concludes that “… place matters for politics, and
“Globalisation, Bauman maintains, is best identity, history and futures, inequality and
thought of as glocalisation – which implies more community” (p. 482). The important elements of
than deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation community are all associated with place. Without
occurring simultaneously, or the reassertion of place, community lacks social cohesion, without
place in the midst of space– time compression. It place community lacks identifi cation, without
implies a worldwide restratifi cation of society place community lacks history. Not all places are
based on freedom of movement (or lack thereof)” communities yet most of what Gieryn fi nds
(p. 51). important about place are elements we would
13.5 Reintegrating the Material commonly associate with community. Without
and Ideal; Space and Place community, place loses its essential impact.
“Space is what place becomes when the unique
One major issue in these foundational ideas lay gathering of things, meanings and value are
in the relative importance of space vs. place. sucked out … place is space fi lled up by people,
Locality is an ambivalent concept in the post practices, objects and representations” (p. 465).
WWII treatment of community. It is recognized Gieryn does reject space as a factor creating
as a critical factor in attachment, commonality community.
and association, and yet its material existence in Logan’s ( 2012 ) rejoinder, A Place for Space
space provides theoretical discomfort. Space is , rescues the spatial aspect critiqued in Gieryn.
often seen as devoid of culture and the Logan points out that spatial relations are
territoriality of place often is seen as themselves social relations. Simply the socio-
epiphenomenal of cultural attachments. cultural patterns of place have spatial referents.
T his is clearly seen in Gieryn’s ( 2000 ) “In fact, places are not only geographically
treatise, A Space for Place in Sociology. He located and material as Gieryn ( 2000) points out,
argues that place has three necessary and suffi but they are also spatial, and their spatiality gives
cient conditions; geographic location, material rise to fruitful questions” (p. 509). Logan argues
that “There is an implicit spatial reference in
oncept of Community as Theoretical Ground: Contention and Compatibility… 263

almost all studies of places” (p. 508). Logan notes postmodern takes recapitulate the original
that social relations have spatial locations and Aristotelian view that space is not distinct from
that the relative location of social activities of place. “… if place became increasingly lost in
vital for understanding the causes and space after the demise of the classical era, in the
consequences of social activity. Distance and twentieth century we stand witness to a third
proximity, access and segregation, are all spatial peripteia: space is now becoming absorbed into
referents that are cause and consequence of place…” (p. 340). Although Casey’s interest is in
stratifi cation and affi liation. Sometimes cause the philosophical implications of place and space,
and sometimes consequence, these spatial his work is integrated in sociological literature by
patterns are inextricably bound to the character of Kolb ( 2008 ).
social interaction. Kolb synthesizes these ideas in both
This tension in the emphasis of place and postmodern and Marxian theory to explore the
space is not new. Casey ( 1993 , 1997 ) outlines territorial basis for community. Place is seen as
the philosophical history of space and place the essence of community and is defi ned both by
arguing that space was transcendent over place its normative character (recalling organic
following Newton and Kant. He argues that traditions) and by intentional unity
contemporary postmodernism returns to the (contractualism). That is, place exists
original Aristotelian formulation that place is the independently of the individual by benefi t of its
preeminent concept. He anchors this idea in the location within spatially and normatively
material conditions of individuals as inextricably connected social organization: “to experience a
place bound and the primacy of the experience of place is to encounter an expanse of space as
place in shaping human perception. The dialectic manifesting a web of social possibilities and
between place and perception makes individuals norms” (p. 33). This notion of community then
“not only in place but of place” (Casey 1997 exists independently of any individual actor yet
:322). Casey associates place with both meaning encompasses the mechanism (possibilities) for
and location. “A place is more of an event than a cooperative actions for any individual to achieve
thing to be assimilated to known categories. As social action. “A place opens a landscape of
an event, if it is unique, idiolocal. Its peculiarity action possibilities set in a spatial landscape” (p.
calls not for assumption into the already known 35).
… but for the imaginative constitution for terms In Kolb’s formulation then, individual
respecting idiolocality” (p. 329). Here participation in community is an autonomous
community as place infl uences individuals and it decision, but one required for effective action (p.
also takes on the meanings and characteristics of 39).
its constituent population. This leads Casey to Community is the vehicle of action, but these
view culture and place as inextricably intertwined vehicles come in many models. Each community
and propose to put culture back in place – to has its own structures, culture, history, and
reunite the division between a therefore character for action. Individuals, in
behavioral/material view and a symbolic view. engaging in community, accept (or at least
C asey’s assertion is that place re-emerges as a participate) in the mechanism of that place.
central philosophical concept following centuries Individual autonomy is limited by the social and
relegation to a type of space. He argues that in the spatial character of place. Here, as with the
early modern era space is rethought as place and commutarian approaches, organic and
that this comes to fruition in post-modern contractual conceptions of community
thought. Bachelard reimagines place as a psychic, association are synthesized, as are material and
non-spatial entity; Foucault, Deleuze and symbolic bases of community. This is not to say
Guattari rethink space as heterogeneous places of that, in Kolb’s view, places are autonomous from
power and social differentiation; Derrida larger society.
examines how building coverts space to places. The structure of place never exists on its own: it
The outcome is that these contemporary results from larger social processes and decisions
M.D. Irwin

received into local processes of interpretation and other places. These systematic linkages among
embodiment. … Local interpretation keeps places across space are the material causal
normative and physical structures fl exible, and it
keeps larger causal and political processes from constraints on place action and community
forcing every detail in a place. On the other hand, normative order. “Lefebvre’s discussion
outside processes provide resources and keep local emphasizes how places, in the sense that I
interpretive processes from closing in on propose, come linked to one another and
themselves.
(p. 45)
intertwined with causal systems that infl uence
social norms. … Systematic effects constrain
A s with the new urban approaches, possibilities” (p. 39).
place/community links individuals to society. This recalls the integration of material space
Place fi lters meaning from society and allows and culture that defi ned early human ecology,
local variation yet links the local to the larger however, more full develops the normative order
processes and culture of society. of place. Like the classical ecologists, the
Thus while community limits individual material spatial conditions set constraints on
autonomy it allows heterogeneity of cultural possibilities. Also like the ecologists
interpretation and social action. This strikes a community (as place) becomes a vehicle for
balance between the social deterministic nature of individuals to act. However, Kolb and Lefebvre
individuals proposed by some of the classic include more room for elements of confl ict and a
theorists (Cooley, Marx, Durkheim) and the self- greater role for norms in this process than an was
interested autonomy of the utilitarians but one not ever made in ecological approaches. Describing
solely predicated on inter-individual how local normative order reinforce bias and
commitment. Neither purely an aggregation of make oppressive ideology seems natural, Kolb
the individuals within it nor exclusively a states “Places are not the single origin of
microcosm of society, community becomes a oppression, but they spread it over space and
normative and structural mechanism that people” (p. 39). Also unlike the ecologists, Kolb
mediates and attaches individual and society that and Lefebvre take society as a social dimension
exists in situ as place. that exists separately from community whereas
Kolb’s analysis (drawing on Lefebvre 1991 ) ecologists treat the ecological community and
also attempts to integrate spatial and symbolic interrelations among these communities as the
aspects of community. In discussing his approach foundation of society. On a phenomenological
to place he lays out the relationship between level, place mediates between culture and the
spatially based concepts and place (which he individual. “… as places gather bodies in their
takes to be the normative order associated with midst in deeply enculturated ways, so cultures
community). His typology of concepts is at once conjoin bodies in concrete circumstances of
spatial and social. ‘Areas’ are expanses of space, implacement” (p. 348).
‘locations’ are events associated with area, Kolb’s conception of community synthesizes
‘locales’ emerge when perceived meanings are much of the new urban sociology and
associated with locations with perceived phenomenological approaches to bring back
meanings. ‘Places’ bring these socio-spatial interrelations between the material and normative
concepts together as a meaningful social unit. aspects of community as well as the micro level
“Places in the sense I propose is an extended processes of association in line with macrolevel
location consisting of one or more expanses of community aspects of space and place.
space where social norms of action defi ne signifi Incorporating these elements together requires a
cant areas and transitions for activities. Places are formulation of community as involving
permeated by social norms offering possibilities networks, connections and social fi elds that
for action” (p. 32). overlap. Unlike the more unidimensional
K olb, like Lefebvre, highlights the spatial concepts of place, community involves
dimension shaping place though economic, complexity. “By complexity I mean interacting
environmental and technological connections to multiplicities. A complex place will have
oncept of Community as Theoretical Ground: Contention and Compatibility… 265

multiple roles, forces, norms, processes, internal society at large, however, they see this as a
spatial divisions and external links to other places phenomenon generated by individual interests
and to the processes that bring together multiple coming together in space. However they also
forces and systems” (p. 54). This conception of incorporate elements of network and community
community involves both the phenomenology of structure, which they see as equally important
personal awareness, linking individuals together factors shaping these social fi elds (p. 5). This
within a community, and also larger structural synthesis integrates contractual and structural
forces that contain and shape this approaches (Diani 2003; Gould 2003) .
phenomenology. Here the macrolevel and Working
microlevel integration of community forces are from different traditions, these conceptions of
once again merged as was classical human place parallel Kolb’s notion of community as
ecology before its schism. Community is both multilevel complexity. The notion of social fi elds
action and structure, both emerging from persons situates the social movements literature directly
and from social forces. However, the in the central questions of community – the nature
contemporary melding of these levels, of space of association among individuals, the role that
and place, and of organic and contractual communities play in linking individuals to
community solidarity comes as much from society, the spatial character of place and the
grounded empirical studies as theoretical cultural character of place.
tradition.
S ocial movements literature is one such arena
for this blending of these elements. Not explicitly
13.6 Conclusion: Community as
directed at community, work by Fligstein and
McAdam ( 2011 , 2012 ) nevertheless directly Theoretical Linkage in the
address these issues in their formulation of Twenty-First Century
strategic action fi elds (see, also, Chap. 9 ). In
applying their approach Irwin and Pischke ( 2016 At the beginning of the twenty-fi rst century the
) argue “In their work, these authors have moved central questions of sociology orbit around the
the study of social movements into the realm of concept of community. The issues associated
networks and tied these networks to space, with community as a concept remain open,
geography and community” (p. 205). Here, unresolved and refl ective of different theoretical
particular attention is paid to inter-areal orientations and of the varieties of sociological
interactions and the overlapping of institutional issues. However, community as a concept has
infl uences in space. become more, rather than less important in
studying these issues. Globalization, re-
First, the theory rests on a view that sees strategic
action fi elds, which can be defi ned as mesolevel localization, the rise of hyper-individualism, the
social orders, as the basic structural building block perpetuation of inequality, the emergence of new
of modern political/organizational life in the social divisions and the social actions that counter
economy, civil society, and the state. Second, we these trends have all incorporated community as
see any given fi eld as embedded in a broader
environment consisting of countless proximate or
a central organizing concept. This is because the
distal fi elds as well as states, which are themselves concept of community is one that addresses the
organized as intricate systems of strategic action fi essential nature of association, of cultural
elds. cohesion, and of the territorial cohesion of
(McAdam and Fligstein 2012 , p. 3)
individuals. As this chapter has outlined, social
Where these come together, communities have a theory has long relied on the concept of
greater capacity for grassroots based social action community to link these issues together. What is
(McAdam and Boudet 2012) . The approach new in the twenty- fi rst century is the synthesis
highlights the coalescence of movements in of once antithetical dimensions of community.
space, much like the new urban school. Rather Rather than positing an essential character to
than conceiving these networks as emerging from community, approaches are exploring the
M.D. Irwin

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Organizations as Sites and Drivers 14 of
Social Action

Walter W. Powell and Christof Brandtner

14.1 Introduction W. W. Powell () • C. Brandtner


Stanford University , Stanford , CA , USA e -mail:
woodyp@stanford.edu; cbrandtner@stanford.ed
Organizations generate power, employment,
The sociology of organizations has a
prestige, identity, contacts, and income. A
distinguished pedigree, tracing back to Max
person’s life chances are shaped by the kinds of
Weber and Robert Michels, and running through
organizations he or she is associated with, and
such luminaries as Peter Blau, Michel Crozier,
how well or poorly those organizations perform
Alvin Gouldner, Robert Merton, and Phillip
strongly affects the distribution of wealth in
Selznick. Collectively, these scholars produced
society. Friendships are formed in organizations,
touchstone portraits of twentieth-century
and biographies molded by organizational affi
organizational life. The 1970s and 1980s
liations. Organizations are tools for shaping the
welcomed new theoretical perspectives with the
world. And the gains that accrue from improving
writings of Michael Hannan, John Meyer, Charles
organizational performance and learning from
Perrow, and
successes can be enormous, just as the failures of
Richard Scott. Today, however, the study of
organizations can damage lives and communities.
organizations has migrated out of sociology
Both success and failure change the probabilities
departments and into professional schools of
that certain courses of action will occur.
business, government, education, and law. This
O rganizations are rarely powerful enough to
development has brought ideas into a wider orbit
simply dictate outcomes, in part because they are
and led to more engagement with the world of
simultaneously both sites and drivers of action. As
practice, but it also comes at a cost. Core areas of
sites, organizations are the arena in which debates
sociology have lost contact with, and enrichment
occur, struggles take place, and identities are
by, an organizational perspective. Our goal in this
formed. As drivers, organizations alter the odds
chapter is to re-establish those links and re-
that certain things get done. The leaders of
connect with processes that shape and stamp the
organizations navigate particular paths, represent
lives of people in organizations and reproduce
interests, and signal the importance of certain
larger patterns in society. We intend the chapter
views. We use this dual imagery of sites and
to be of interest to sociologists in general, and we
drivers to organize our discussion of the literature.
hope that it stimulates organizations researchers
to ask questions outside the confi nes of their subfi
elds.
W.W. Powell and C. Brandtner

14.1.1 Sites and Drivers distinction between the internal and external
world of organizations is hard to make. Many
We defi ne an organization broadly as a organizational activities also cross the boundaries
purposeful collective of people, operating with of the organization at some point. For instance, a
formal press release is drafted, circulated, and authorized
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 269
S. Abrutyn (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary Sociological Theory,
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32250-6_14
structures and perceived boundaries that both by people internally before eventually
distinguish it and its members from the wider representing the organization to its external
environment and draw a distinction between audiences. On the other hand, many products—
members and external stakeholders. from cars to medical drugs to apps—go through
Organizations are made up of individuals extensive market research with potential clients
pursuing a common goal, such as producing a outside the organization before the assembly lines
good or service or advocating for some cause. start moving. This feature of organizations is
Organizations usually also display a certain level particularly evident in the following section on
of formality, such as being registered with the networks. Consequently, organizations have
government and having documented rules and signifi cance for sociological theory from both
regulations. In this sense, organizations form the perspectives: as sites of social action and as
social context in which people work, volunteer, or drivers of it.
lead. This view of organizations underlies most Our goal in this chapter is to illuminate the
economic and behavioral theories of fi rms, which processes through which these recursive relations
are interested in understanding the day-to-day occur. To do so, we introduce important
events of organizations, such as deciding between properties of organizations as nouns, and the
making or buying a component part of the fi nal processes and causal mechanisms of
product, improving the motivation of employees, organizational life as verbs.
or determining what inhibits or stimulates careers.
O rganizations can also be seen as discrete
entities that are exposed to a social environment 14.1.2 Verbs and Nouns
of their own; market institutions, the state, the
professions, and society at large constrain and M ost overview essays, as well as textbooks, on
enable organizations in fulfi lling their mission. the sociology of organizations start with the
From this ‘open systems’ point of view, the viewpoint that it is a fi eld typifi ed by contrasting
individual actions of people are less important theories and lines of research. The ‘theory-group’
than what they amount to on the organizational approach to surveying the literature has persisted
level. The open-systems view emphasizes for several decades. This pedagogical strategy has
different social processes: people are busy provided students of organizations with a good
responding to and negotiating external pressures, deal of insight, as well as notable texts by Charles
as well as entering into transactions and Perrow ( 1972 ) and Richard Scott ( 2013 ). A
collaborations with other organizations and number of handbook-type chapters also survey
individuals. Consequently, theories associated the fi eld by making stops along the way at various
with organizations as an open system attempt to theory communities.
measure the implementation and diffusion of We think the time is right to try a different
organizational practices, competition and approach. Rather than emphasize differences
collaboration between organizations, and the among rival theoretical perspectives, we want to
comparative status, power, and prestige of stress commonalities. Moreover, in lieu of
organizations. examining the literature at a high level of
A s the boundaries between organizations and abstraction and discussing only disembodied
their environment, and sometimes even between things referred to as organizations, we want to
two organizations, are often porous, a clear-cut bring the varied world of organizations to life.
zations as Sites and Drivers of Social Action 271

Contemporary studies have been conducted in attended to by scholars of varied theoretical


hospitals, restaurants, social movements, biotech orientations. These include (1) discrimination and
fi rms, investment banks, call centers, and formalization, (2) institutionalization and
factories. But this rich diversity is elided in most imprinting, (3) socializing and mobilization, and
reviews, which focus only on particular (4) learning and access. Using these phenomena
theoretical approaches that deal with highly as the lens through which to view the fi eld has
general statements about organizations. several distinct advantages. One, we will show
Table 14.1 Organizations as sites and drivers of social action
Organizations Primary Organizations as sites of Organizations as drivers of
as… Mechanisms outcome social action social action

Equalizers and Discrimination and Inequality Rissing and Castilla ( 2014 ) Kalev ( 2014 )
stratifi ers formalization
Castilla and Benard ( 2010 ) Rivera ( 2012 )
Fernandez ( 2001 )
Standardizers Institutionalization Persistence Hallett ( 2010 ) Phillips ( 2005 )
and monuments and imprinting
Turco ( 2012 ) Johnson ( 2007 )
Espeland and Sauder ( 2016
)
Sharkey and Bromley ( 2014
)
Movers and Socializing and Change McPherson and Sauder Bidwell and Briscoe ( 2010 )
shakers mobilization (2013 )
Bechky ( 2006 ) Briscoe and Kellogg ( 2011 )
Okhuysen ( 2005 ) Hwang and Powell ( 2009 )
Small ( 2009 ) Chen ( 2009 )
Networks and Learning and Fernandez et al. ( 2000 ) Whittington et al. ( 2009 )
wirings access Embeddedness and
Owen-Smith and Powell
(2004 )
Burt ( 1992 ) and ( 2004 ) Fleming and Sorenson
(2001 )
Kellogg ( 2010 )
Macaulay ( 1963 )
O ur attention is directed toward processes that that these ideas come from multiple theories and
occur in different kinds of organizations. We that this attention unites rather than fractures the
emphasize that organizations are the locus where fi eld. Two, we discuss the varied methods that
many of the critical activities of modern society have been used to study these phenomena and
take place. Organizations compete, collaborate, again highlight the complementarities of different
create, coordinate, and control much of approaches. Three, we describe the kinds of
contemporary life. Consequently, it is not organizational settings in which these phenomena
surprising that the sociology of organizations have been studied, illustrating the wide purchase
spills over into related subfi elds, including public of organizational research. We summarize the
administration, medicine and public health, processes we cover in Table 14.1 .
education, industrial engineering, business Our approach to reviewing the organizational
history, and international business. theory literature was iterative. We started
We posit a handful of critical processes, or inductively by looking at the core themes of
mechanisms, that we argue are at the center of organizational theory articles published in major
contemporary organizational research and are journals over the past 25 years, using methods
W.W. Powell and C. Brandtner

from computational linguistics. The emerging services as a vehicle for upward mobility for
themes refl ected the fi eld’s conventional racial and ethnic minorities, and perceive
theoretical perspective, as well as the types of corporations as the manifestation of meritocracy.
organizations studied. Thus Weberian bureaucracy, in theory, is the
T hese topic models, or linguistic clusters, were backbone of democracy and fairness.
dominated by nouns and adjectives rather than T hat promise has often been belied by reality,
verbs, and they obscured the mechanisms however. Organizations are also the locus of
associated with the various perspectives. various mechanisms of stratifi cation. Firms, in p
Following the recent turn in social theory to focus articular, contribute to unequal income
on mechanisms (Hedström 2005 ; Hedström and distribution and social hierarchy, through steps
Bearman 2009; Padgett and Powell 2012 ), we ranging from hiring to wage negotiations, gender
chose to focus on processes that cut across and racial segregation of jobs, promotions, and fi
research schools. Although each of the eight ring.
dynamics that are at the center of the chapter is Organizations reinforce gender and racial
useful for predicting multiple outcomes, we posit hierarchies, even when their clients are diverse,
four primary outcomes associated with the and such biases can inhibit the kinds of clients and
mechanisms: inequality, persistence and order, employees that are subsequently attracted to
change and disorder, and networks and relations. companies. A 2015 survey by Page Mill
Because we see these attributes as central to Publishing of 257 US venture capital fi rms
sociological inquiry at large, we structured the identifi ed a total of only 403 women involved in
chapter in accordance with the four outcomes. We the industry. Women are less likely to apply for
are mindful of the theoretical origins of these jobs at venture fi rms with no female employees,
mechanisms, but draw largely on recent, and female entrepreneurs are less likely to
empirical research about a variety of approach all-male fi rms for funding. Similarly, a
organizational forms to illustrate the processes. 2014 survey by the National Association for Law
Placement revealed that only 5.6 % of US lawyers
who hold top leadership positions at law fi rms are
non-white. And fewer than 2 % of law fi rm
14.2 Organizations as Equalizers
partners are African-American. Black lawyers
and Stratifi ers operate in a profession that is one of the country’s
least racially diverse (Rhode 2015 ), despite
O rganizations are often considered the great growing demands from clients to see more
equalizers of modern civilization. Weber, one of
diversity.
the founding fathers of contemporary sociological
B aron and Bielby ( 1980) depicted the
theory, described the ideal-typical organizational
organization of work as a primary mechanism of
form—bureaucracy—as a champion of both
socio- economic stratifi cation, in both how
reliability and equality. By adhering to the rules
workers are stratifi ed inside organizations and
of law and merit, corporate and public
how organizations are stratifi ed in the market: “If
administrations could level social differences.
fi rms are indeed ‘where the action is,’ then social
Even though bureaucratic organizations are often
scientists interested in the structure of social
complicated by informal relationships among
inequality should fi nd the vast literature on
colleagues (Blau 1955 ), infl uences that are often
complex organizations illuminating” (Baron and
antagonistic to hierarchical structures (Dalton
Bielby 1980 , 748).
1959 ) , administrative arbitrariness is limited by
C ontemporary empirical research has
both the primacy of expertise and the
demon-strated that organizations from all walks
impersonality of the offi ce. Despite the
of life, from daycare centers to research
shortcomings of bureaucracy, equality is one of
universities, contribute to the way society is
the core promises of complex organizations
stratifi ed. Two particular organizational
today. Many people regard universities as
processes through which organizations shape
escalators to social mobility, see the armed
societal outcomes are formalization and
zations as Sites and Drivers of Social Action 273

discrimination . Formalization (e.g., the 14.2.1 Organizations as Sites of


introduction of written rules of conduct, Inequality
normative codes of ethics, or policies) obviously
has important implications for social outcomes. If Typically, organizational practices are not
hiring, for instance, is regulated by formal criteria intended to introduce bias against particular
and overseen by labor unions, organizations can groups of people, but they may have that
be assumed to lead to a leveling of social unintended effect. As one illustration, Castilla and
hierarchies (Perrow 1972 ). Equal employment Benard ( 2010 ) fi nd evidence for ‘the paradox of
opportunity (EEO) legislation, for example, is meritocracy.’ The authors asked MBA students to
meant to restrain discrimination in the labor reward the performance of fi ctitious employees
market by targeting organizations (Dobbin 2009 and then randomly manipulated the descriptions
), and workplace policies aim to reduce work-life of the corporate setting. Study subjects who made
confl icts, for instance by improving employees’ decisions on behalf of fi rms with more
schedule control (Kelly et al. 2011 ). meritocratic corporate values tended to distribute
Discrimination, in turn, may play out on the rewards based on gender rather than on talent and
individual level. One example is racial d performance. The authors speculate that ‘moral
iscrimination among police, which has been credentials’ stemming from a formal commitment
shown to be a result of implicit biases against to meritocracy may have enabled prejudiced
African- American men (Eberhardt et al. 2004 ; behavior. Their fi nding shows that “gender and
Saperstein et al. 2014 ). Another is the baseball fi racial inequality persist in spite of management’s
eld, where umpires favor white over black efforts to promote meritocracy or even because of
pitchers in spite of high levels of scrutiny from such meritocratic efforts” (Castilla and Benard
players, fans, and commentators (Kim and King 2010 : 544).
2014 ). But once sorting and exclusion become B iased behavior in organizations is by no
organizational practices, they can reproduce and means limited to salary, but can even affect where
persist regardless of the intent or interest of any of people can work. United States Department of
the individuals involved. In organizations, Labor agents consistently discriminate against
institutionalized discriminatory practices produce Latin American green card applicants and favor
persistent and ever-increasing inequality through applicants of Asian descent (Rissing and Castilla
the process of accumulative advantage, which 2014 ). The authors fi nd that this bias is much
Merton ( 1968 ) famously described as the smaller in a quasi-random set of audited cases, in
Matthew Effect: high-status actors stay on top which more performance information is available
because they are rewarded disproportionally for to the agents. This fi nding suggests that the bias
their good performance. As a result, those at the against some applicant groups is not the result of
apex of a social order pull further away from those the agents’ own preferences regarding certain
in the middle or at the bottom. Once a hierarchy— ethnicities, but more likely the outcome of
one of the constitutive elements of a statistical bias introduced by a lack of
bureaucracy—exists, the status order can information. DoL agents, Rissing and Castilla
exacerbate societal segregation. This is true for conclude, unlawfully—but also unknowingly—
individuals in organizations as well as for use nationality as a proxy for performance in the
organizations themselves. Sharkey ( 2014 ), for absence of more detailed information. In this case,
instance, shows that investors judge fi rms in the organization of the application process gives
higher-status industries less harshly than those of rise to opportunities for discrimination that would
lower rank when the fi rms restate their earnings be absent if agents had access to more detailed
because of some form of wrongdoing. information. Rissing and Castilla’s study is a good
example of how larger societal trends such as
prejudice against immigrants from certain
nationalities, which are usually believed to
operate at the individual level of analysis, shape
social outcomes through organizations.
W.W. Powell and C. Brandtner

Sterling ( 2015 ) sought to understand how downsizing on workforce diversity, managers are
variation in social position can shape workplace drivers of larger social inequity.
opportunities. She studied the infl uence of Rivera ( 2012 ) studied how employers made
individuals’ social connections at the time of decisions about new hires based on fi t; she
organizational entry on the subsequent formation conducted extensive interviews and observations
of ties within the workplace. In a study of new in investment banks, law fi rms, and consulting fi
business and law professionals, she found that rms. She fi nds that behind the closed doors of
individuals with an initial advantage in social ties hiring committees, skills sorting—hiring based on
formed more extensive networks post entry than competence—is frequently supplemented by
those without such an advantage. But when there cultural matching—hiring based on cultural
was clear evidence about the accomplishments of similarity. Such homophily occurs not only
new hires, network formation was moderated by because formal evaluation criteria emphasize fi t
ability. between employee and company, but also because
Another illustrative case is Fernandez’s ( 2001 decision- makers evaluate performance through a
) quasi-experimental study of a food processing fi cultural lens that they are familiar with and
rm before and after a retooling. The study therefore prefer candidates from the same social
investigates the black box of technological backgrounds. Those doing the hiring establish an
changes that underlie skill-based bias emotional connection with culturally similar
explanations of wage inequality (Autor et al. applicants. “Whether someone rock climbs, plays
1988 ; Card and DiNardo 2002 ). By studying one the cello, or enjoys fi lm noir may seem trivial to
organization in unusual detail, Fernandez outsiders, but these leisure pursuits were crucial
illuminates how an endogenous technological for assessing whether someone was a cultural fi t”
shift leads to wage inequality, rather than treating (Rivera 2012 : 1009). Through homophily, even
technological change as a residual variable that highly formalized hiring procedures can
may be due to self-selection. Even though reproduce social segregation.
Fernandez links increases in wage inequality to Organizational procedures and bureaucratic
the increased complexity of tasks, a result formalization are therefore not a guaranteed
consistent with skill- based wage bias, he fi nds remedy for inequalities. Kalev ( 2014) , in a
that the actual reason for increasing inequality is mixed- methods study of 327 fi rms from 1980 to
organizational turnover. There are signifi cant 2002, investigated how formal rules and
wage differences between stayers and leavers: managerial accountability affect gender and racial
high-wage stayers (mostly electricians) received a inequality in light of corporate downsizing. She fi
wage increase, whereas low-wage leavers were nds that some forms of formalization—
replaced with even-lower-wage entrants. In this particularly restricting layoffs to people with
case, bureaucratic structures—unionization and a certain lengths of tenure and in certain
seniority- based pay scale—rendered the stayers positions—in fact exacerbate the effects of
better off. downsizing on workforce diversity because recent
hires are more likely to be women and minorities.
In contrast, layoff rules that are based on
14.2.2 Organizations as Drivers of performance evaluations improve the prospects of
Inequality black and female managers. Moreover, both
managerial discretion and reviews by an external
P articularism is not always purged through attorney can offset the negative effect of formal
organizational structures; inequalities following rules on the diversity of employees. In short,
from discrimination are a problem in hiring and fi “organizational structures and institutional
ring alike. In some cases, such as Rivera’s ( 2012 dynamics, coupled with executives’
, 2015) study of cultural matching in the hiring accountability and agency, play an i mportant part
process in elite professional fi rms and Kalev’s in shaping inequality” (Kalev 2014 : 129).
(2014 ) research on the effects of corporate
zations as Sites and Drivers of Social Action 275

14.3 Organizations as realities arbitrarily is a fundamental assumption of


Standardizers and the population ecology paradigm in
organizational theory. For organizations, such
Monuments inertia, or diffi culty in changing, has internal as
well as external causes (Hannan and Freeman
T he social forces that give rise to social
1984 ). Sunk costs, political contention, and habits
arrangements are often different from those that
restrict change inside organizations, and
hold them in place (Stinchcombe 1968). Yet
regulative and economic trade barriers as well as
organizational dynamics are important for both:
social norms lock whole industries within
as much as organizations can determine and
powerful constraints.
create societal outcomes, they can solidify social
Inertial forces are particularly important for
relationships and standardize practices.
the reproduction of social orders because
I n fact, rigid organizations can be inadvertent
organizations are strongly infl uenced by the
anchors of the status quo. The role of
social context at the time of their founding.
organizations in the reproduction and stability of
Society leaves deep marks on organizations.
social settings and practices is particularly central
Through such imprinting, social arrangements can
to institutional theory. In that research program,
subsequently become extraordinarily persistent
the taken-for-grantedness of certain behaviors is
(Stinchcombe 1965 ). Stinchcombe illustrated his
seen as the source of persistence of culture and
classic argument about the enduring infl uence of
structure (DiMaggio and Powell 1983 ). Zucker (
the social context at the time of an organization’s
1977 ) cites “some sort of establishment of
founding by showing that the labor supply at the
relative permanence of a distinctly social sort” as
founding of various fi rms—from farms to
the primary characteristic of institutions; her view
construction companies—deeply affected how
of institutionalization highlights that
they were staffed much later. This observation
institutionalization is both a property variable (the
applies equally to modern-day organizations such
fact that something is considered real) and a
as Silicon Valley start-ups. In a study of 100
process (that meanings and taken-for-grantedness
technology ventures in California, Baron et al. (
of actions change). Taken-for-granted norms are
1999 ) show that the founder’s premises about
a strong form of conservation; for example, most
employment relations are a better predictor of the
people do not even consider questioning the fact
current organizational model than the views of the
that they have to go to work in the morning, and
current CEO, even after the founder’s departure.
going to work requires no justifi cation vis-à-vis
Taken together, institutionalization and
others (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Colyvas and
imprinting are the fabric that weaves together and
Powell 2006) . But what is considered ‘normal’
reproduces societal relations, for both good and
also depends heavily on core sociological
ill. Organizations help to crystallize a status quo
categories, such as class, race, or gender. For
by copying wages, quotas, and policies from
instance, women are evaluated less favorably
purportedly successful role models and relying on
when they take on stereotypically masculine jobs
routines that invoke the authority of tradition.
or work above-average hours because of
Organizations also create standards for what is
prescriptive norms about how women ought to
considered normal, such as how much more a
behave; and in some areas the working class
CEO can earn than his or her employees, or to the
might be expected to work two or even three jobs
degree to which citizens can participate in the
to make a living (Heilman 2001 ; Ely et al. 2011
formation of public policies.
). Such norms limit people’s range of action and
create realities and routines that are diffi cult to
disrupt.
At the same time, the rigidity of social 14.3.1 Organizations as Sites of
hierarchies is directly linked to the fact that social Persistence
structure can hold people and organizations in
place. Organizations’ limited ability to alter their Institutionalization (and de-institutionalization)
is not a uniquely organizational process, but it
W.W. Powell and C. Brandtner

frequently becomes manifest in organizational ultimately alter the legitimacy of reform


practices and routines. Practices initially adopted endeavors. What began as reform momentum
out of contingent circumstances or for sensible ended up in a morass of ambiguity and frustration.
political or economic reasons can enter the Turco’s ethnographic investigation into
standard repertoire of organizations, regardless of Motherhood Inc., a for-profi t company that
their specifi c champions or function (Tolbert and provides services to young mothers, illustrates
Zucker 1983 ; Colyvas and Powell 2006 ). The that institutional processes also constrain change
idea of institutionalization—and especially through organizational culture. As the fi rm’s
decoupling of ceremonial structures and actual CEO put it, its business model was built on the
practices—may explain why many reforms hardly fact that mothers’ “stress is lucrative” (Turco
change the daily activities in organizations 2012 : 390). She also observes decoupling
(Meyer and Rowan 1977 ; Bidwell 2001 ; Hallett between commercial practices—the marketing
2010 ). and sales of products to a vulnerable target
T he similarity of structures across group—and the euphemistic discourse
organizations and over time is not just a result of surrounding the business. By posing as the
the invisible hand of culture: myths about what ‘trusted advisor’ to young mothers, Motherhood
behavior is proper and rational can be refl ected in Inc. could gain public legitimacy for fi lling the
such mundane things as people’s professional supportive role of friends and family with ‘child
education, the criteria of performance evaluation, development professionals’—for a price. But the
codes of ethics, or even binding laws (Scott 2013) sugarcoating trickled down into organization
. Institutionalized ideas can travel far and wide, culture and was co-opted by lower-level
despite (or because of) vague labels such as employees. In turn, this led to increasing
‘managerial reform’, ‘accountability’, or resistance to the fi rm’s perceived ruthless profi t-
‘sustainability’ (Czarniawska-Joerges and Sevón making, surprisingly from the company’s own
1996 ; Bromley and Meyer 2015 ). But empirical employees. In one case, an employee even told a
research has shown that institutional myths are customer not to “waste money on [the company’s]
not merely hot air. In various cases they can products” and to buy a swaddle blanket at a box
become manifest in organizations. store instead (Turco 2012 : 397). Events like this
I nstitutionalized myths may constrain change one undercut the company’s profi tability and
by becoming incarnate in individuals and ultimately led to layoffs and business failure.
organizational culture. An apt example is Hallett’s and Turco’s studies show that
Hallett’s ( 2010 ) ethnographic study of teachers’ institutional myths and discourse can constrain
compliance with accountability reforms at a organizations and ultimately restrict societal
public elementary school. Hallett ( 2010: 53) change, be it the push for classroom
observes a dynamic that he calls recoupling, accountability in education or market- taking
“creating tight couplings where loose couplings services intruding into the personal realm of
were once in place.” Put simply, the ceremonial motherhood.
accountability structures that enhance public T he power of institutional myths to create
legitimacy can become manifest in the daily tangible constraints for organizations and
practices of the people inhabiting organizations. ultimately lead to the standardization of structures
In this case, the hiring and managerial approach and practices is apparent not only in micro-level
of a determined school principal transformed a studies. The phenomenon of rankings, ratings,
previously ceremonial commitment to and awards and how they standardize
accountability into a new classroom reality. The organizational behavior to fi t institutionalized
disruption of teachers’ autonomy and routines led understandings of performance has been widely
to uncertainty, turmoil, and even political studied (Timmermans and Epstein 2010) .
mobilization. By focusing on the local, micro- Espeland and Sauder ( 2016 ), drawing on a series
level dynamics of accountability reform in of interviews with offi cials in law schools
schools, Hallett shows that recoupling of throughout the United States, demonstrate that
institutionalized myths can create resistance and U.S. News and World Report rankings have
zations as Sites and Drivers of Social Action 277

introduced and materialized standards for law genealogies of gender hierarchies in fi rms. Why
schools that have astonishing behavioral effects. does workplace discrimination—and inequality at
Law school offi cials, despite widespread large—change so little? Using longitudinal data
skepticism about the utility and methods of the on established law fi rms and their offspring
rankings, react to evaluations by resorting to ‘progeny fi rms’ in Silicon Valley, Phillips ( 2005
similar admission practices, pushing students to ) fi nds that many newly founded fi rms copy the
enter private practice over public service because gender hierarchy of existing fi rms. They do so as
of higher starting salaries, and re-classifying founders import workplace routines, including fl
students to appear in a better light. Rankings alter exible work schedules and part-time employment,
how legal education is perceived through both from their previous employers to their new
coercion and seduction (Sauder and Espeland companies. Such copying can be both positive and
2009) . Bromley and Sharkey ( 2014) , in a study negative. For example, having worked alongside
of US fi rms’ responses to ratings of high-status women in previous positions tends to
environmental performance, fi nd not only that improve the views of new founders about the
rankings have direct effects on organizations; fi legitimacy of female leaders. Compared to newly
rms whose peers are ranked also tend to reduce founded fi rms, organizations with parental ties to
their emissions of toxic pollutants in certain Silicon Valley law fi rms with established female
contexts. Firms in highly regulated industries leadership are more likely to have women in
decrease their emissions as more of their peers are partnership positions.
rated, even if they are not evaluated themselves. Johnson’s ( 2007 , 2008 ) analysis of the
These two studies, and a host of related research, famous Paris Opera vividly illustrates the power
suggest that rankings and ratings can have direct of persistence. Johnson develops a theory of
and indirect effects on the behavior of cultural entrepreneurship in order to unpack the
organizations, leading to new standards of mechanisms that underlie the observation that
environmental or educational management that organizations refl ect the social, economic, and
are dictated neither by the law nor by market technological context of their creation. Her
dynamics. argument highlights that this process of
imprinting involves critically thinking people
activating and recombining the resources
14.3.2 Organizations as Drivers of available at the time. Her description of how the
Persistence poet Pierre Perrin founded the Paris Opera in the
seventeenth century illuminates the resilience of
A s the studies above illustrate, social reform is history. Drawing on organizational models
often inhibited and shaped by how people and available at the time of Louis XIV, Perrin was
practices inside organizations represent larger able to secure funding for the foundation of an
social trends. A different perspective on the fi xity opera modeled after the prestigious royal
of social orders sees organizations as carriers of academies, with elements of a commercial
practices through time and space instead. As theater. But the Opera also persisted after the
Marquis and Tilcsik ( 2013 ) point out, French Revolution. Thus, as a second step,
organizations (as well as organizational imprinting also includes the reproduction of
collectives, building blocks of organizations, and historical elements at a later time, which implies
individuals) can go through various sensitive that inertia and related dynamics can “reproduce
periods that make them particularly susceptible to the organizational status quo” (Johnson 2007 :
infl uences of the organizational environment. In 121). The opera’s properties of a commercial
light of the many inertial forces that prevent theater, for example, helped it survive the French
organizations from changing at the discretion of revolution, when the royal academies were
policy makers and managers, organizations can abolished. Throughout the process, the political
become monuments (or museums) of the past. goals of the authorities and stakeholders were as
One insightful study of the tenacity of social important for the outcome as the creative
relations is Phillips’s ecological account of the recombination of established organizational
W.W. Powell and C. Brandtner

forms by the cultural entrepreneur, Perrin. This monetary exchanges. The organization
century-old mélange of zeitgeist and interests still coordinates various complex tasks, from
shapes French culture and the panorama of Paris recruiting and training volunteers to dealing with
today, a reminder that social history undergirds permits, media inquiries, and the police, and
contemporary society. leaves no trace once the festival is over.
14.4 Organizations as Movers and Organizations can also have unintended positive
Shakers consequences on social life. Small’s ( 2009 )
study of a childcare center in New York City
I n the previous section, we argued that illustrates the important ramifi cations of
organizations often constrain societal change. But mundane tasks, ranging from children’s birthday
organizations can also be ‘movers and shakers’ of celebrations to fi eld trips, on the creation of social
society. In myriad ways, organizations can enable capital. The encounters between parents, Small fi
social change and enhance people’s life chances. nds, lead to unexpected and rewarding social ties,
On the micro- and meso-level, organizations help and thus unanticipated network gains accrue from
to perform tasks that invigorate and advance common experiences at schools and daycare
society. People in organizations coordinate the centers.
creation and enforcement of rules and regulation, I n contrast to the rigidity of ideal-type
be it under the roof of parliaments, the courts, or bureaucracy, Small’s and Chen’s cases illustrate
police departments (McPherson and Sauder the versatility of organizations in catalyzing,
2013 ). Complex tasks exceeding the capability supporting, and maintaining robust action in
of any single person, from producing movies full society. It would be misguided to portray
of special effects to the creation of ever-smaller organizations only as the guardians of the status
semi-conductors, are performed in organizations. quo. Societal progress is a frequent goal and
On the macro-level, too, movement and fl uidity regular outcome of action in and around
characterize organizations. Ventures—both organizations—whether intended or not.
business start-ups and social enterprises—seek to Organizations can act as catalysts of change on
disrupt the status quo and to create innovation and various levels of analysis. Within organizations,
change. Countless organizations, especially mundane social processes—such as socialization
though not exclusively nonprofi ts, are explicitly into roles and the routines of problem-solving—
dedicated to improving social mobility and allow for the coordination of complex and diffi
facilitating exchanges across nations, cultures, cult tasks (Rerup and Feldman 2011 ; Winter
social classes, and generations. 2013 ). Organizational routines are both
Organizations can make the social generative, in that they make complex activities
manageable. In contrast to our previous possible, and performative, inasmuch as they
discussion of formalization as a mechanism enable responses to emergencies (Feldman and
through which organizations can reproduce Pentland 2003) . Consider the delicate interplay
inequalities, changing society does not among surgical teams or in hospital emergency
necessarily require the introduction of new rooms; all these coordinated efforts are made
bureaucratic rules or purposive structures. Chen ( possible because of socialization into routines
2009) provides a vivid account of an organization (Edmondson et al. 2001 ). Nevertheless, fumbles
that manages to coordinate without creating order: with patient handoffs between medical shifts are,
the Burning Man organization (BMO) as an sadly, a leading cause of death in hospitals, and
enabler of chaos. Burning Man is an arts festival they indicate defi cient routines (Cohen and
with almost 50,000 annual guests in the Black Hilligoss 2010 ; Vogus and Hilligoss 2015 ).
Rock Desert in Nevada. Over the course of 10 Organizations are also involved in the
years, Chen observed the growth and change of mobilization of change. This is true not only in the
this volunteer organization that accomplishes the important but exceptional cases of activists
seemingly impossible. BMO manages an anti- targeting and infl uencing fi rms with protests and
commercial, quasi-anarchic festival and sells boycotts (McDonnell et al. 2015 ; Bartley and
tickets for an event that operates strictly without Child 2014 ; King and Soule 2007 ). Social
zations as Sites and Drivers of Social Action 279

movement organizations create opportunities for that temporary organizations can be structured
the invention of new technologies and solutions to through “enduring, structured role systems whose
social problems, as illustrated in studies of the nuances are organized in situ.” Even though the fi
creation of consumer watchdogs (Rao 1998 ), co- lm crew works on a set for only a few days and
operatives (Schneiberg et al. 2008 ), wind energy does not necessarily undergo any formal training,
(Sine and Lee 2009 ), and soft drinks (Hiatt et al. the work gets done consistently and layoffs are
2009 ) . On a more mundane level, the movement rare. Bechky argues that roles, not swift trust or
of people between organizations and the ideas formal rules, allow coordinating complex tasks.
they carry around in the course of their careers are Socialization into roles as diverse as electricians
a major source of change and its diffusion in (called gaffers) and cameramen commonly occurs
society. through everyday interactions, such as reinforcing
appropriate behavior by saying thank you, making
a joke to lower-status workers, and giving polite
14.4.1 Organizations as Sites of feedback.
Change Okhuysen ( 2005 ) studied Special Weapons
and Tactics (SWAT) police teams and found that
One important organizational process that their professional, coordinated behavior is largely
enables action in organizations is coordination, based on behavioral routines. SWAT teams are
that is, a set of interactions that allows the deployed in situations in which highly concerted
completion of a larger task (Okhuysen and action is required. For members of a special unit,
Bechky 2009 ). Organizational theorists have organizational arrangements at various levels
long been preoccupied with coordination introduce “sets of actions by individuals that
problems. Coase’s (1937 ) famous essay on the make up a larger unit of performance that repeats
nature of the fi rm contends that the very existence over time” (Okhuysen 2005 : 140). Routines,
of bureaucracy is tied to the cost advantages of such as how to enter a building dynamically, are
coordinating economic changes within fi rms introduced through a common ‘basic school’
rather than through the market. Chandler’s ( 1977 training at the beginning of the career, adapted in
) seminal explanation of the rise of professional the context of each specifi c SWAT group, and
managers in the United States argued that then continuously rehearsed in the group to
technological change required more sophisticated refresh the core knowledge. In addition,
coordination of tasks and people within capitalist specialized schools allow members to learn new
enterprises. Organizational sociologists have practices, such as controlling crowds or handling
criticized these arguments for their limited explosives, to introduce them to the group.
understanding of organizational environments, Okhuysen also observes that SWAT team
the role of bounded rationality, and social network members organize the routines in bundles of
effects coherent practice and hierarchies of more or less
(Granovetter 1985 ; Scott 2013 ). Nevertheless, preferred routines. His research highlights that the
sociologists concur that the coordination of social complex interrelated tasks that defi ne
action is a central organizational task. coordination can be completed only if individuals
Organizations and their participants can create learn a common core of routines and practice
order out of chaos and render diffi cult situations them collectively. But at the same time, for
manageable, by providing rules and infrastructure routines to really grease the wheels, “the group
for challenging situations and problems and by must also rely on individual members to use their
establishing a basis for members’ socialization experience to initiate change or to help maintain
into specifi c roles. the repertoire as an ongoing activity” (Okhuysen
R esearch on organizations as diverse as fi lm 2005 : 162).
crews and police teams vividly illustrates the There are obviously many other mechanisms
social processes that enable the coordination of through which organizations coordinate work,
highly complex tasks. Bechky ( 2006: 4), in a divide tasks, and allocate resources. The core
comparative ethnography of four fi lm sets, shows insight of the Carnegie School (March and Simon
W.W. Powell and C. Brandtner

1958 ; Cyert and March 1963) is that through Rosenfeld 2003; O’Mahony and Bechky 2006 ).
routines, standard operating procedures, and For studying social outcomes, organizations
rules, organizations can accomplish complex matter because of the simple fact that they employ
actions and even respond “on the fl y” to new all kinds of diverse people, who in turn move
situations and challenges. By managing between organizations frequently. People move
coordination, organizations enable change as up and down career ladders inside and between
much as they constrain it; in so doing, they create organizations and bring along ideas and skills,
social capital, facilitate and perform the law, and transferring standards and practices; in so doing
produce and curate culture. they can even generate novelty (Powell et al.
2012 ).
To understand the wide-ranging effects of
14.4.2 Organizations as Drivers of careers on societal outcomes—at the individual as
Change well as the organizational level—consider
Bidwell and Briscoe’s ( 2010) study of the careers
Change is by no means an endogenous process of information technology workers. The authors
that occurs only inside organizations; social confl investigate the way people move between jobs
icts, power struggles, and technological over the course of their lives. They fi nd that the
innovations occur outside organizations as well. sequence of employers is life-changing: most
Debates on the external determinants of change in people move from large, generalist organizations
organizations are rich in both theoretical insights early in their careers to smaller workplaces that
and empirical evidence. Among the often require more specialized knowledge. In other
discussed mechanisms of change are learning words, people do not arbitrarily move across jobs;
from others (March 1991 ), the creation of their careers follow a structured progression, in
resource dependencies (Pfeffer and Salancik which workers transpose the skills required in one
1978) , the adoption of societally recognized position to other organizations that build on those
templates (Meyer and Rowan 1977 ), and skills. Inter-organizational career ladders thus
selection pressures stemming from competition have “important consequences for both fi rms and
for resources (Hannan and Freeman 1989 ). workers” (Bidwell and Briscoe 2010 : 1034).
T hese various theoretical traditions have T he effect on workers’ life chances throughout
generated a rich understanding of the trans- and their careers is a contested issue within
inter-organizational dynamics that produce a organizational theory. In line with our discussion
heterogeneous landscape of organizations and above about the constraints that organizations
lead to large-scale shifts in how society pursues create, some jobs lock people into specifi c
its goals. Such macro-organizational research is positions. For feature fi lm actors, having a
sometimes diffi cult to connect with micro- “simple, focused identity,” that is, being
sociological theories, in part because people’s renowned for appearing in a certain genre, can be
behaviors are treated as only secondary to that of benefi cial for securing future work. But
organizations. As one illustration, a core feature typecasting also limits actors’ opportunities
of studies of institutional change is the travel of outside the genre they are known for and
ideas: numerous empirical studies deal with the effectively constrains their career paths
diffusion of organizational practices and (Zuckerman et al. 2003 ). Another illustration is
structures (for an early review, see Strang and found in Briscoe and Kellogg’s ( 2011 )
Soule 1998 ), the ensuing isomorphism of longitudinal study of family-friendly, reduced-
organizational form and content (Strang and hours programs in a law fi rm. The authors fi nd
Meyer 1993 ), and the variety that results from that an initial assignment with a powerful
heterogeneous local translations and editing of supervisor makes it easier for workers later to use
global ideas (Sahlin and Wedlin 2008 ). work-family programs and more generally
A related mechanism of change in and across improves their subsequent career outcomes.
organizations is the mobility of people throughout S uch career dynamics also have important
their careers (Stewman and Konda 1983 ; implications for the industries and sectors in
zations as Sites and Drivers of Social Action 281

which organizations are situated. One the one applied these both inside organizations and to
hand, organizations can benefi t economically inter-organizational relationships. Attempts at
from the skill and creativity of workers who join quantifi cation refl ect efforts to depict properties
them, as brain drain can pose severe problems for of both nodes and relationships; these include
management (Wang 2015 ). On the other hand, social processes such as infl uence, centrality,
core sociological outcomes can be affected by prestige, awareness, and leverage, as well as
workers’ mobility. One example mentioned above concepts including distance, centrality,
is Fernandez’s ( 2001 ) study of a plant retooling cohesiveness, equivalence, and density. These
in which worker turnover was a major various indicators portray how networks permeate
determinant of internal income inequality. organizational life and refl ect our core contention
Another case, from the nonprofi t sector, involves that organizations are both venues for action and
managerial practices in public charities, which drivers of social and economic relations. When
Hwang and Powell ( 2009 ) show are driven by we analyze how networks infl uence
the hiring of increasingly professional executives. organizations, the relationships can be portrayed
Nonprofi t leaders recently trained in professional at multiple levels. As sites of action, organizations
schools are more likely to introduce rational host networks of people whose decisions are
methods—from strategic planning to quantitative affected by their relations to people in other
performance evaluation—than long-tenured organizations. As drivers, organizations
nonprofi t executives or passionate activists constitute and shape large inter-organizational
(Hwang and Powell 2009 ; Suarez 2010 ). The networks that are usually perceived as
managers exiting and entering charities thus communities—including industries,
contribute to transforming how civil society is organizational fi elds, and cities.
coordinated. Through their roles in both
structuring and managing careers, organizations
embody and abet change in people’s lives and 14.5.1 Organizations as Sites of
social structures. Social Relations

O rganizations are rife with interpersonal


14.5 Organizations as Networks and networks; this realm of interaction refl ects the
informal life of organizations that is, at times, at
Wirings
odds with the formal hierarchy (Dalton 1959 ).
Sometimes the formal and informal are aligned,
Networks are ubiquitous in organizations; they fl
for example in the case of mentoring networks.
ow through and across organizations so
Friendship networks may even provide the fuel
extensively that efforts to classify their features
that makes the formal system run. But the formal
have been challenging. Viewed in its most
elemental form, a network is simply a node and a and the informal can be misaligned, and they may
then become a seedbed for discontent or
tie. Nodes can be persons, groups, organizations,
resistance.
or technological artifacts such as webpages, or
even more abstract entities such as ideas or Inside organizations, networks infl uence
concepts. Ties are simply the relationships among hiring selection, perceptions of performance, and
the nodes. These relationships can take many compensation and promotion. We have long
forms, including friendship, advice, mentoring, or known that employees often fi nd jobs through
the exchange of resources or information. The acquaintances, the classic weak-tie network that
social ties in and between organizations affect was famously studied by Granovetter ( 1974 ) in
numerous outcomes of primary sociological his analysis of job-hunting by middle-class
signifi cance, including the creation and professionals in Newton, Mass. Indeed, weak-tie
distribution of ideas, resources, status, and power. insights are now used by organizations in all
manner of ways, from formal job-referral systems
Researchers have developed numerous tools
in which the referrers are paid bonuses, to
to try to capture the importance of networks and
automobile maker Tesla’s use of referrals for new
W.W. Powell and C. Brandtner

car sales and rewards to loyal early purchasers. The social relations among people inside
Fernandez et al. ( 2000 ) analyzed employee organizations not only shape professional
referrals at a call center within a large bank and mobility, they also enable and constrain
found that employee referrals not only were cost organizational behavior. Classic research in
effective, but resulted in a richer applicant pool. organizational theory (Gouldner 1954) and a
Burt ( 1992 ) has shown that employees whose foundational work in economic sociology
networks span disconnected parts of (Macaulay 1963 ) demonstrate that even highly
organizations—that is, “bridge a structural purposive economic exchanges are enmeshed in
hole”—are promoted faster than those with more and driven by social networks. Organizational and
limited ties. In subsequent work, others have economic actions result from a complex
shown that such brokerage networks work lamination of motivations and meanings that
differently for men and women and minority participants draw from the various relations in
groups (Ibarra 1992 ). More generally, Burt ( which they participate.
2004 ) has shown that employees who are located I n a study of auto dealers, Macaulay ( 1963 )
in positions that enable them to bridge ideas from found that businessmen often disregard the legal
different units can capitalize on their positions to rights and responsibilities inherent in contracts in
propose better ideas. favor of more social means of dealmaking and
Internally, organizations can be more or less dispute resolution. Networks shaped how
porous. Some organizations have relational businessmen approached transactions. As one of
spaces where members from various ranks and his respondents commented, “You don’t read
departments can mix freely, undeterred by formal legalistic contract clauses to each other if you ever
role differentiation (Kellogg 2010 ). want to do business again. One doesn’t run to the
Organizations can be structured more like a lawyers if he wants to stay in business because
network than a hierarchy; this has long been a one must behave decently” (Macaulay 1963 : 61).
common practice in the construction, fi lm, and Lawyers should be excluded, not because they are
fashion industries, where projects come together personal strangers, but because they view the
on a short-term, temporary basis. Many activities, same relationship through a different lens, which
from fashion to computers, are created in fast explains why they fi nd the businessman’s
product cycles, where speed and timing are urgent approach “startling.” As Macaulay noted, where
concerns (Uzzi 1996 ). In such cases, a group of businessmen see orders that can legitimately be
people act as the project organizers and work with cancelled, lawyers view the violation of contracts
others from the outside on teams of relatively as having strongly negative consequences.
short duration. The relationships may become T he meaning of a relationship and the actions
repeated games, as has been shown in the case of appropriate to it depend on the character of the
particular genres of fi lms where directors, parties to the tie and their broader professional
writers, and actors come together on a project, milieus. Put differently, car dealerships promote a
disperse, and return to work with one another on relational view suggesting that the parties will
a later project (Faulkner and Anderson 1987 ). solve problems as they arise; lawyers, on the other
Similarly, in the electronics sector, the model of hand, see their fi rms’ role as drafting contracts
contractors who design equipment but outsource that anticipate problems. The relational view, as
the making of the parts is commonplace. There opposed to a transactional one, eases the cost of
are also manufacturers, sometimes critically doing business, enhances fl exibility, and offers
referred to as “box stuffers,” who outsource many support during lean times (Dore 1983 ).
stages of the production process, performing only 14.5.2 Organizations as Drivers and
some high- level integration work (Sturgeon Constituents of Networks
2002 ). Dell Computer is a classic example. And
recent efforts at open innovation have created new O rganizations are also connected through
models, such as the confederacy represented by networks. Inter-organizational relations range
Wikipedia or crowd-funding forms such as from dyadic relations, such as research
Kickstarter (Von Krogh and Von Hippel 2006 ). partnerships, supplier relations, and joint
zations as Sites and Drivers of Social Action 283

ventures, to multi- party research consortia and organizational form and mindsets of the
industry associations. Such linkages are respective participants.
particularly common in knowledge-intensive Each region developed distinctive patterns of
industries, where access to new ideas is critical collaboration that stamped their trajectory of
and the sources of expertise are dispersed (Powell innovation. Where universities dominated, as in
et al. 1996 ). Inter- organizational relations can Boston, a focus on discovery that favored
also be linked to persons, as is the case with openness and information sharing prevailed, and
interlocking boards of directors (Palmer et al. membership alone suffi ced to increase rates of
1986 ). Several decades of research have focused innovation. In contrast, when for-profi t
on the degree of linkage among corporate elites, organizations were core players in the network,
asking how integrated are the large fi rms, such as more ‘closed,’ proprietary approaches dominated;
the South Korean chaebol , that dominate the thus a central network position was essential to
economies of their countries (Mizruchi 1996) . It extract benefi ts (Owen-Smith and Powell 2004
turns out that many organizational linkages are ). In addition to altering how organizations garner
deeply dependent on personal relations; corporate advantage from their networks, the different
executives are asked onto boards more because approaches associated with the disparate partners
boards recruit individuals than they do the shaped strategies for innovation, the kinds of
companies that the individuals represent. Leading connections the organizations pursued, and the
executives fi nd such positions both strategically markets they sought to serve.
valuable for the view of the business horizon they T here are two notable differences between the
afford and highly remunerative (Useem 1984 ). Bay Area and Boston clusters. The former is
One application of inter-organizational larger, both organizationally and geographically,
networks is to the conception of networks as with many more biotech fi rms, several major
industrial districts—geographically concentrated universities, including Stanford and the
regions in which relations among fi rms are so Universities of California (UC) at Berkeley and at
densely interwoven that the locus of innovation is San Francisco (UCSF), and numerous venture
found more in the overall network than in the capital fi rms. The Boston network, although
individual constituents (Marshall 1890 ; Piore denser and somewhat smaller and more
and Sabel 1984 ; Saxenian 1994 ). geographically compact, had many more public
To illustrate this phenomenon, we draw on research organizations, including MIT, Harvard,
prior work on the emergence of biotechnology Massachusetts General Hospital, Dana Farber
districts in the United States (Owen-Smith and Cancer Center, and Brigham and Women’s
Powell 2004 ; Whittington et al. 2009 ). We Hospital, among others. The Boston area had
discuss the Boston and San Francisco Bay Area many fewer venture capital fi rms in the 1970s and
biotech clusters, the two most densely populated 1980s; VCs arrived much later. Neither region
scientifi c and commercial clusters in the United housed a large multi- national pharmaceutical
States. Both these two regional communities are corporation during the period from the 1970s
highly productive, but one (Boston) is anchored in through the 1990s, so both regions were free from
a network that grew from public-sector origins. the dominance of an “800-pound gorilla” (Padgett
The other community (SF Bay) is clustered and Powell 2012 :
around a network that emerged from venture 439). Both clusters had structurally cohesive
capital initiatives. The different anchor tenants— networks, but they differed in their organizational
the highly central organizations that have access demography.
to various other players and broker between The Boston network grew from its origins in
them—in these two technical communities result the public sector, and public science formed the
in divergent approaches to innovation. Both anchor for subsequent commercial application
clusters are successful, and networks are (Owen-Smith and Powell 2004 ; Porter et al. 2005
fundamental in both, but the types of success and ) . Because the Boston biotechnology community
the ways in which relations matter vary with the was linked by initial connections to public
research organizations, this cluster manifested an
W.W. Powell and C. Brandtner

open trajectory. By contrast, the Bay Area was sense that the people inside organizations are
infl uenced by a host of factors: the prospecting simultaneously embedded in both work and
and matchmaking work of venture capitalists, the personal relations, sometimes to such an extent
multidisciplinary science of the UCSF medical that it is diffi cult to disentangle the two. And
school, and pioneering efforts at technology organizations both learn and access resources
transfer at Stanford University (Colyvas and and new knowledge through their inter-
Powell 2006 ; Popp Berman 2012 ; Powell and organizational relations. These sources of ideas
Sandholtz 2012 ). The San Francisco Bay Area and relationships also defi ne what organizations
evolved out of a more entrepreneurial orientation do, as they are infl uenced by the actions of their
than Boston’s. Both the Boston and Bay Area peers. In so doing, networks shape how
clusters were catalyzed by a non-biotech organizations come to regard themselves and
organizational form, but these different forms left conceive of their goals.
distinctive relational imprints on the respective
clusters.
The two clusters also differed in how they
14.6 Implications
produced knowledge and the products they
developed. We compared the patent citation T he studies reviewed in this chapter combine
networks of biotech fi rms in the two clusters insights from a wide variety of recent research on
(Owen-Smith and Powell 2006 ). The results different types of organizations across sectors,
suggest that Boston biotechs more routinely geography, and time periods. The authors we have
engaged in exploratory search, which typically discussed study schools, jazz producers, SWAT
yields a few very-high- impact patents at the teams, maternity counselors, wind power,
expense of numerous innovations with lower than corporate foundations, art festivals, social
average future effects (Fleming and Sorenson movement organizations, drug courts, childcare
2001 ). In contrast, the dominant Bay Area centers, breweries, soft drink producers,
patenting strategy had a more directed environmental rating agencies, the fi lm industry,
‘exploitation’ design, as one might expect of the civil service, call centers, government
companies supported by investor networks that bureaus, biotech fi rms, and law and investment fi
demand demonstrated progress. Companies that rms.
pursue exploitative strategies generally develop
numerous related improvements on established
components of their in- house research. Boston
14.6.1 Organizations Refl ect and
area companies were much more reliant on
citations to prior art generated by universities and Remake Society
public research organizations than were Bay Area
companies, which relied more on citations to their Organizations matter for the study of society in
own prior art. As for medicines, many Boston- two fundamental ways. First, organizations refl
based fi rms have focused on orphan drugs, as one ect social structure . Society tailors organizations
might have expected of companies that were in many meaningful ways: the professions and the
enmeshed in networks dominated by universities state, labor market structures, cultural fads, and
and hospitals. In contrast, Bay Area biotech fi rms political movements and ideologies all leave their
pursued medicines for larger markets in which the mark on organizational practices and structures.
potential patient populations run into the millions, Various processes, from imprinting to
and for which there was likely to be stiff product isomorphism, make organizations an effi gy of
competition. This high-risk, high-reward strategy society. In Perrow’s (1972: 4) apt language,
refl ected the imprint of the venture capital people “track all kinds of mud from the rest of
mindset. their lives with them into the organization, and
they have all kinds of interests that are
This extended illustration underscores the dual
independent of the organization.” On the other
effects of networks, both within and across
hand, even though organizations are frequent sites
organizations. Networks are constitutive in the
zations as Sites and Drivers of Social Action 285

of larger societal processes, organizations also Two luminaries of organizational research


forge and remake society . Once an organization have made the argument that we live in an
has been founded that capably performs a certain organizational society more succinctly. Nobel
task or represents some interest, structural laureate Herbert Simon ( 1991: 42) averred that
dynamics such as inertia and institutionalization “the economies of modern industrialized society
enable such interests and tasks to persist. can more appropriately be labeled organizational
The effect that organizations—be they public economies than market economies,” and
agencies, business fi rms, or civil society organizational sociologist Charles Perrow (1972:
groups— have on society is quite profound. They vii) made the striking claim that “all important
are responsible for hiring and fi ring people, for social processes either have their origin in formal
paying and promoting them, for giving them voice organizations or are strongly mediated by them.”
and instilling loyal membership, and even for
provoking resistance. Organizations facilitate
innovation, sort people through careers, 14.6.2 Organizational Dynamics at
reproduce stratifi cation and solidify Multiple Levels of Analysis
discrimination, and determine the reputation and
power of certain individuals. Organizations Distinguishing among the different levels
matter because they are monuments of times past through which social relations shape
as well as sculptors of the future. organizational behavior and by which
Indeed, extending Stinchcombe ( 1965 ), one organizations alter social ties can be challenging.
might argue that generations and society are Networks spill over both within and across
shaped by the kinds of organizations that are organizations, and an ostensibly internal relation
predominant in an era. Consider the post–World can easily become an external affi liation as
War II era, which some have termed Pax careers and organizations develop over time
Americana , running from the 1950s to the 1980s. (Padgett and Powell 2012 ). Similarly, for inter-
This period was characterized by the dominance organizational relations, what makes for an
of large corporations, with stable internal labor attractive partner is an obvious question, and here
markets, and good middle-class and skilled blue- having prior knowledge of and experience with a
collar jobs. This era of US manufacturing specifi c partnership eases external relations
dominance meant that employment futures were (Rosenkopf et al. 2001 ). The propensity to form
relatively secure for those who worked for such an alliance, or create a regional cluster, depends
companies, and the larger society, from housing on the parties sharing mutual interests. Such prior
to shopping malls, was molded by these relations are more likely forged by individuals
organizational dynamics. than by corporate entities.
The postwar organizational regime split apart Sorenson and Rogan ( 2014 ) argue that three
at the seams in the face of global competition and factors enhance the likelihood that individuals are
the quest for cheap overseas labor, ushering in the the key to inter-organizational affi liations: (1) the
end of long-term employment and creating a new extent to which the needed resources, such as tacit
period of downward mobility and rising knowledge, belong to individuals rather than
inequality. In contrast, today we live in the age of organizations; (2) the extent to which
the lean start-up, with work futures precarious and indebtedness and gratitude are owed to persons
the distribution of rewards highly skewed. But the rather than formal organizations; and (3) the
model of disruption that is the hallmark of Silicon degree of emotional attachment associated with a
Valley start-ups has become an enviable symbol linkage. Thus interpersonal relations are often the
worldwide for its innovative capabilities, even if glue that binds inter-organizational relations. In
its rewards do not generate stable employment for this sense, organizations are the conduits through
large numbers of workers. Thus one can view which interpersonal relations are actualized.
both social history and social change through the How society affects organizations and vice
lens of organizational models. versa is also often a dynamic process. Viewing
organizations as sites and drivers of social action
W.W. Powell and C. Brandtner

does not imply that these two dimensions can, or (2014 ) shows that it was neither a common
should, always be separated. The relationship language nor perceived cultural similarities that
between organizations and society is rarely a one- led to the emergence of the Latino category, as
way street. Spanish-speaking Haitians are left out whereas
Organizations may intervene in the regulation non-Spanish-speaking Mexicans are included.
and structuring of their own institutional Instead, she fi nds that a fi eld-spanning
environment or resource space. Corporations, for combination of pan-ethnicity activists,
instance, not only are infl uenced by public government bureaucrats, and media executives
opinion, but can themselves alter public opinion was responsible for creating a new identity
by lobbying, contributing to electoral politics, or category over the decades from the late 1960s to
supporting grassroots efforts (Walker and Rea the 1990s.
2014 ). In her study of historically black colleges Another compelling historical example of the
in the United States, Wooten ( 2015 ) shows that infl uence of organizational context is Phillips’s (
the organizational development and resource 2011 , 2013) comprehensive study of the role of
access of black colleges was constrained by producers and places for predicting the success of
American social and educational policy. One of jazz music. Why are some pieces of music,
her fi ndings is that the legitimacy-building particularly those recorded in peripheral places
accreditation of the foundation-supported United and with elements hard to categorize, rerecorded
Negro College Fund in the 1950s and 1960s many times in later years? Phillips argues that the
favored organizational structures that maintained appeal of ‘authentic outsiders’ explains the
the discrimination against blacks in US society. evolution of this cultural market. He fi nds that
Similarly, rankings and ratings are important jazz from cities that were more disconnected from
touchstones for organizations ranging from law other jazz-producing cities was more likely to
schools to companies, but how that information is enter the jazz canon than jazz from cities central
implemented and used is subject to organizational to the jazz music industry. The studies by Mora
involvement, as is the creation of rankings and and Phillips illuminate how culture and ethnicity
ratings itself (Espeland and Sauder 2016 ). are shaped by organizations.
Although organizational perspectives have
many theoretical applications, their actual use
may be limited. One problem is that data tend to 14.6.3 Conclusion
be biased toward formal models of organization.
Quantitative studies of civil society, for instance, M any accounts of organizational performance,
are frequently limited to organizations formally whether in schools, hospitals, or fi rms, are unable
registered as 501(c)(3)s, and studies of to explain why one unit has positive outcomes and
unemployment, crime, and inequality often rely another middling success. For example, why do
on the comprehensiveness of administrative data. hospitals vary in their rates of Caesarian births,
More informal arrangements—such as even within the same county, or why do charter
movements, casual groups, or temporary schools do better than public schools in low-
projects—are sometimes systematically excluded income, non-white urban areas, but produce little
from organizational data. difference in student performance in suburban
Another limitation is that the importance of school districts? Learning from the “bright spots”
organizational dynamics is often revealed only in among hospitals, schools, manufacturing plants,
retrospect. Some exemplary studies of race, or government bureaus, and understanding how
ethnicity, and culture applying an organizational these successes might be spread, could be
lens are historical. One such study shows that immensely valuable, but researchers often
organizational dynamics shape the politics of struggle to explain variation, both within
ethnic categories. Why, despite their different organizations and between organizations that are,
country of origin, skin color, and social class, did roughly speaking, comparable.
Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, and Cubans end up The challenge for researchers who study
under the umbrella label of ‘Hispanic’? Mora schools, hospitals, or employee productivity is to
zations as Sites and Drivers of Social Action 287

understand how organizational factors dictate Autor, D., Katz, L. F., & Krueger, A. B. (1988).
health, educational, and labor outcomes. Part of Computing inequality: Have computers changed the
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chosen for ‘treatment’ differ in important ways back in: Stratifi cation, segmentation, and the
from the larger population. But an equally vexing organization of work. American Sociological Review,
problem is determining the appropriate level of 45 (5), 737–765.
Baron, J. N., Hannan, M. T., & Burton, M. D. (1999).
organizational analysis. For schooling, is it the Building the iron cage: Determinants of managerial
classroom, the grade level, the school, the intensity in the early years of organizations. American
neighborhood, or the district? We contend that a Sociological Review, 64 (4), 527–547.
number of subfi elds in sociology—medicine, B artley, T., & Child, C. (2014). Shaming the corporation:
The social production of targets and the anti-
education, law, and stratifi cation, to name only
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Small Groups: Refl ections 15 of and
Building Blocks for Social Structure

Stephen Benard and Trenton D. Mize

15.1 Introduction S. Benard () • T. D. Mize


Department of Sociology , Indiana University ,
Bloomington , IN , USA e-mail:
O ur lives are tightly bound up in small groups. sbenard@indiana.edu; tmize@indiana.edu
From our families, friends and peer groups, to conceptual hub from which a number of
athletic teams, voluntary associations, and work theoretical spokes radiate. 72
units, small groups constitute much of the fabric Our overarching argument is that small groups
of our daily lives. In these groups we develop and are important to the study of social life in part
shed identities, infl uence and are infl uenced by because they serve as building blocks of society,
others, exercise power and are subject to the by offering settings in which rudimentary forms
exercise of power, and shape and are shaped by of social structure can emerge. Small groups serve
the social norms and micro-cultures of these as settings in which individuals learn to construct
groups. Not surprisingly, small groups have long and interact in formal and informal hierarchies,
fascinated sociologists, psychologists, and other create, follow, deviate from, and perhaps enforce
social scientists, and the literature is large enough social norms, develop group boundaries and learn
to have been reviewed many times from a variety to conceive of the group as a social object apart
of perspectives (e.g. Burke 2006 ; Fine 2012 ; from its members, and where they develop and
Kelly et al. 2013; Levine and Moreland 1990; disseminate bits of culture. As such, we organize
McGrath et al. 2000) . This interest peaked our chapter around fi ve structure-p roducing
around mid-century (Steiner 1974 ), although social processes: status, power, identity, infl
substantial work on small groups continues uence and social norms, and group cultures, and
(Burke 2006 ; Fine 2012 ; Levine and Moreland illustrate how these processes operate in small
1990) . Like individuals or organizations, small groups. Because the literature on small groups is
groups are a unit of analysis that invite study from so extensive, space constraints lead most reviews
a broad range of perspectives, and have relevance to concentrate on a particular dimension of this
for diverse substantive questions. As a result, literature, and our review is no exception. In our
there is no single theory of small groups. focus on structure-producing mechanisms, we
Instead, small groups can be thought of as a omit topics such as how groups form, what
attracts members to groups, or the ecologies of
groups (e.g. Levine and Moreland 1990 ). Our
aim in this chapter is to provide an accurate

72
We thank John DeLamater and Seth Abrutyn for
suggesting the “hub and spoke” metaphor.

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 293


S. Abrutyn (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary Sociological Theory,
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32250-6_15
293 S. Benard and T.D. Mize

discussion of key ideas and fi ndings, rather than of culture and identity emerge in initially minimal
a comprehensive account of each subfi eld; much groups. We begin with a general overview of
excellent work was necessarily omitted. It is also small groups as a source of structure, before
important to note that most of the work we discuss moving on to discuss specifi c structure-
here has been conducted in a western cultural producing mechanisms: status, power, identity,
context; researchers have suggested that some infl uence and social norms, and culture.
social psychological processes work differently in
other cultural contexts (e.g. Zhong et al. 2006 ).
We focus in this chapter on the sociology of
small groups, although we draw on research from
15.2 Small Groups as Self-
other fi elds, including psychology, Organizing, Emergent
organizational behavior, and economics. Modern Structure
small groups research in sociology generally
focuses on how social structure and culture infl H ow do groups organize and accomplish desired
uence group interaction and behavior, and in turn goals? Why do some individuals attain positions
how these behaviors infl uence social structure of power and infl uence within groups, while
(Thoits 1995 ). From a sociological perspective, other individuals fi nd themselves on the margins?
many macro-l evel factors can be best understood Questions such as these have been addressed by
by observing them at an interactional level. For small groups researchers at least since the
instance, while race, gender, and socioeconomic midtwentieth century. Although small groups
status are structural factors, their effects on often refl ect the structure of society, they also
individuals take place in part through work to create structures. Robert Freed Bales and
interpersonal and intergroup interaction (Cohen colleagues ( 1951 ) found that when small groups
1982 ; Ridgeway 1997 ). It is this emphasis on of individuals worked together on a task,
structural factors that distinguishes modern small consistent patterns emerged. In particular, certain
groups research in sociology from the individuals tended to dominate the group
“psychological social psychology” research that discussion while others largely remained silent.
House outlined almost 40 years ago (House 1977 Interestingly, these patterns developed among
; Oishi et al. 2009; Stryker 1980 ). That said, groups of similar individuals (same sex, race, and
these boundaries are porous and there is education level). Therefore, even in the absence
substantial overlap across disciplines. As a result, of easily observable cues about social status or
while we focus on the sociological literature, we ability, certain individuals gained greater infl
draw on work in allied fi elds when it is relevant uence and visibility in the group. Those who
for understanding problems of interest to attained the highest ranks of the group tended to
sociologists. speak more and to address the whole group, while
While defi nitions of the term “group” vary, those of lowest rank tended to address only one
many researchers agree that at a minimum, groups individual at a time, usually the highest ranking
include three or more individuals “interacting individual.
with a common purpose” (Kelly et al. 2013: T he level of inequality within the groups was
413). This more minimal defi nition is common in rather striking. Figure 15.1 displays the percent
the experimental literature, which often focuses of the total number of remarks made to the group
on groups created in a lab and observed under by each group member, for different size groups.
controlled conditions (e.g. to see how individuals For example, in a four-person group (middle fi
work together to solve problems). Other scholars, gure in left column) we would expect each
particularly those who study groups in the fi eld, individual to contribute 25 % of the total remarks
prefer more comprehensive defi nitions that given complete equality. Instead, the highest
specify a shared sense of culture, commitment, ranking individual tends to make roughly 50 % of
and identity among group members (Fine 2012) . the total remarks for the entire group while the
We include research taking a minimal as well as lowest ranking individual tends to provide only
a more comprehensive view of groups in this about 10 % of the remarks. In addition, the nature
chapter. This line is not always clear-cut: aspects
of the remarks varied based on one’s status r
anking. Those of higher rank gave more opin-
15 Small Groups: Refl ections of and Building Blocks for Social Structure 295

Fig. 15.1 P ercent of the total number of remarks made to the group by each group member, by group size (Bales et al.
1951 , Chart 1) formed that closely matched the status order of
society.
Specifi cally, men and those with higher status
ions while those of lower rank agreed more
occupations dominated jury deliberations and were
often (Bales et al. 1951) . Thus, even in groups
more likely to be selected as a jury foreman
of similar individuals, status hierarchies form
(Strodtbeck et al. 1957 ).
and structure interaction.
This tendency towards order, structure, and
Strodtbeck and colleagues ( 1957) built on
hierarchy appears to develop early in the life of
the fi ndings of Bales to examine how groups use
groups. In his classic “Robber’s Cave
observable characteristics of individuals to
Experiment”, Sherif and colleagues ( 1961 )
create status hierarchies. In observing mock jury
recruited well-adjusted middle-class boys to a
deliberations, they found that status hierarchies
summer camp. He then sorted the boys into two
296 S. Benard and T.D. Mize

groups randomly. Almost immediately, leaders states of an attribute – such as gender or race –
emerged in each group and clear hierarchies sometimes carry different expectations for
formed. This fi nding is similar to the fi ndings of performance (see, also, Chap. 16) . As a result,
Bales: both illustrate that groups tend to have one those who possess a more advantaged state of
or a few infl uential and outspoken individuals, the attribute more easily attain status and infl
with most others falling much lower in the status uence in groups. For example, men are often
hierarchy and rarely being heard. expected to perform more competently than
women on stereotypically male tasks, and
accordingly groups are more likely to follow the
suggestion of a man rather than a woman on
15.3 Status such tasks, net of the actual competence of the
man or woman on the task in question (e.g.
As both Bales et al. (1951) and Sherif et al’s
Thomas-Hunt and Phillips 2004 ; Kalkhoff et al.
(1961 ) studies demonstrate, groups tend to
2008 ).
form status hierarchies quickly, with certain
Two types of characteristics impact someone’s
individuals attaining more infl uential positions
status within a group: specifi c and diffuse. Specifi
that refl ect their status within a group. These
c status characteristics refer to attributes of an
early studies led to a tremendous amount of
individual that carry specifi c and relevant
work on the concept of status in groups.
assumptions of competence for the task at hand
Sociologists defi ne status as an individual’s
(Berger et al. 1972 ; Berger and Webster 2006 ).
position in a group’s hierarchy of “evaluation,
For example, someone’s score on a standardized
infl uence, and participation” (Correll and
math test would infl uence their specifi c status for
Ridgeway 2003 : 29) while psychologists defi
a group task involving math skills. In many ways,
ne status similarly as “… an individual’s
the link between specifi c status characteristics and
prominence, respect, and infl uence in the eyes
status in groups are clear: it is not surprising that
of others” (Anderson and Kilduff 2009b : 295).
group members known to have scored well on a test
Expectation states theory offered an
of math ability are assumed to be better performers
early and still-infl uential explanation for these
on math-related tasks. Diffuse status
patterns. The theory argued that when group
characteristics, in contrast, refer to characteristics
members see a need to work together
that affect expectations for performance in a broad
(“collective orientation”) in order to accomplish
range of situations, regardless of their relevance to
a particular task (“task orientation”), they will
a specifi c task (Berger et al. 1972 ; Berger and
attempt to determine which group members are
Webster 2006) . Race has been shown to affect
likely to have the most helpful contributions
interaction, with individuals often expecting
towards this goal. Those individuals who are
minorities to perform worse in a broad range of
seen to have more to contribute – because they
situations, producing racial inequality in groups
are perceived to be more skilled, competent, or
(Cohen 1982; Goar 2007; Goar and Sell 2005) .
motivated to help the group – will attain greater
Gender also acts a diffuse status characteristic,
status in the group. They will see their opinions
with women assumed to be generally less
given more weight, will be granted more
competent, regardless of gender’s relevance to the
opportunities to speak, participate more often in
task at hand (Correll and Ridgeway 2003 ;
group discussions, and their contributions to the
Ridgeway and Correll 2004 ; Pugh and Wahrman
group will be viewed more positively than those
1983 ; Smith-Lovin and Brody 1989 ; Thomas-
of lower-status group members (Correll and
Hunt and Phillips 2004 ).
Ridgeway 2003 ).
Importantly, these status-based performance
Berger and colleagues ( 1972 ) further
expectations derive from widespread cultural
argued that characteristics of individuals are
beliefs and are not necessarily associated with
partially responsible for the observed power and
actual differences in competence or ability (Berger
prestige orders that form in groups. Their theory
and Webster 2006 ). Status beliefs further operate
of status characteristics proposed that certain
at an unconscious level and affect individuals even
15 Small Groups: Refl ections of and Building Blocks for Social Structure 297

if they do not consciously endorse them (Ridgeway Several types of interventions have been shown
et al. 1998 ; Correll and Ridgeway 2003 ). Years to effectively reduce status effects, particularly in
of experimental research has shown that regards to gender discrimination. Women can
individuals draw on these macro- level cultural attain relatively high status positions in groups
beliefs in interaction, leading to disadvantages for when they demonstrate group-oriented motivation;
racial minorities, women, less educated but not when they demonstrate more self-centered
individuals, less attractive individuals, and sexual motivations. In contrast, men can attain high status
minorities to name a few (Cohen regardless of their motivation (Ridgeway 1982) .
1982 ; Goar and Sell 2005; Kalkhoff et al. Settings in which women are known to succeed can
2008 ; Webster and Driskell 1983 ; Webster et also reduce status effects. Lucas ( 2003 ) shows that
al. 1998 ; Correll and Ridgeway 2003; Lucas creating an organizational setting where women
and Phelan were known to be successful leaders led to women
2012 ). leaders being given equal infl uence to men leaders.
T hese status hierarchies can be self-fulfi Goar and Sell ( 2005 ) fi nd that task groups show
lling: if someone is perceived as having little to less racial inequality in participation when they
offer the group, they will receive fewer believe they are trying to solve a complex task for
opportunities to speak, and their opinions will be which no one group member is likely to have a
given less weight, reinforcing the perception complete solution. Importantly, these interventions
that they have little to offer. Lower-status should apply to any disadvantaging status
individuals are also often held to stricter characteristic. That is, the examples are not limited
standards, meaning that they must offer greater to gender or race, but the interventions instead help
evidence of ability in order to be viewed as overcome status disadvantages, regardless of their
equally competent as higher-status individuals source.
(Foschi et al. 1994; Foschi 1996 ; Wenneras Other research shows that increased motivation
and Wold 1997; see Foschi 2000 for a review). to avoid stereotyping can help decrease stereotyped
Similarly, individuals may shift the standards of judgments of groups such as women and minorities
evaluation to match the qualifi cations of a (e.g. Devine et al. 2002 ). That is, when individuals
preferred individual, rather than using consistent put greater effort and care into thinking through
standards (Norton et al. 2004 ). their decisions, they are less likely to rely on
stereotypical judgments that disadvantage lower
status groups. Correspondingly, individuals rely on
15.3.1 Overcoming Disadvantaging stereotypes to a greater extent when they lack the
motivation to examine their thoughts or behaviors
Status Beliefs
closely, such as when they are angry (Bodenhausen
et al. 1994 ), tired (Bodenhausen 1990) , or when
An individual’s status in a group refl ects not
their self-view has been threatened by criticism
only their actual performance, but also
(Sinclair and Kunda 2000 ). Similarly, settings that
perceptions of their performance, potentially fi
encourage individuals to think through their
ltered through stereotypes and other cognitive
decisions more carefully – such as when
distortions. As a result, status imperfectly refl
individuals expect they will have to explain their
ects actual competence and can disadvantage
judgments to others – reduce stereotyping (e.g.
otherwise deserving individuals. These errors in
Foschi 1996 ; see Lerner and Tetlock 1999 for a
status judgments can also impair group
review). Further, asking individuals to commit to a
performance, by leading groups to overweight
specifi c, transparent standard of evaluation limits
the input of less competent group members and
the likelihood that individuals will apply different
underweight the input of more-competent group
standards to different group members (Norton et al.
members (Thomas-Hunt and Phillips 2004 ).
2004 ).
Correcting misperceptions of competence is
therefore benefi cial for both groups and
individuals.
298 S. Benard and T.D. Mize

15.3.2 Status Construction Theory groups, including confi dence (Kennedy et al.
2013 ), extraversion (Anderson et al. 2001) ,
How do status beliefs develop? Ridgeway ( trait dominance (Anderson and Kilduff 2009a)
2006 ) proposes that we attach diffuse status ; generosity (Flynn
beliefs to particular categories (e.g. gender and 2003 ; Flynn et al. 2006 ), sharing expertise
race) when it is easy to observe the different (Cheng et al. 2013 ), and self-sacrifi ce for the
resources held by members of these groups, but group (Willer 2009 ).
diffi cult to observe the processes and behaviors Although those of higher status receive more
through which these resources were acquired. respect and infl uence, not all individuals are able
For example, in many organizations men to claim or even desire higher status. Anderson and
disproportionately hold high status positions. colleagues ( 2006 ) fi nd that people dislike
These high status men’s gender is easily individuals who do not accurately perceive their
observable, while the circumstances that led to own status. In particular, those that overestimate
them obtaining these positions are harder to their own status (have overly-fl attering views of
ascertain. Over time, individuals attach status themselves) are disliked compared to individuals
value to those higher in the status hierarchy, and who accurately perceive their own status. In
attribute their differential position to the contrast, those who are self-effacing (view
characteristics of the individuals (Ridgeway themselves as lower in status than they truly are)
2006) . Thus, in situations where high status are particularly well liked by others.
individuals such as men enact more high status B erger and colleagues’ ( 1972) original
behaviors (e.g., assertiveness) and are given formulation of status characteristics theory referred
more deference, individuals attribute greater to status as the “power and prestige order” while
status value to the category of “men” as their Anderson emphasizes the “…prominence, respect,
gender is easily observable, while men’s and infl uence” an individual has in a group
structurally advantaged positions are more (Anderson et al. 2006 , Anderson and Kilduff
likely to go unnoticed. Empirical tests of status 2009b) . In an empirical test, Anderson and
construction theory have generally supported its colleagues ( 2012 ) show that what sociologists
basic propositions. Both men and women treat generally refer to as status has both a rank and a
others unequally on the basis of established respect dimension. All individuals desire respect
status distinctions. However, men are more and would like to be valued; however not all
likely to act on emerging status distinctions – individuals desire high rank within a group’s
with women more cautious about using new hierarchy. Put in status characteristics theory
distinctions as reasons to guide their behavior terms: not all individuals appear to want the
(Ridgeway et al. 2009 ; see also Brashears 2008 “power” part of status, but all individuals desire the
for a cross-national test in support of the theory). “prestige” aspect.

15.3.3 Further Developments in 15.4 Power


Status Research
A lthough status characteristics theory occasionally
In recent years, status research has continued to uses the term “power” to refer to one’s place in a
develop in new directions. Although status status hierarchy, for the most part sociologists use
characteristics theory developed within the terms “power” and “status” to refer to different
sociology, much new work in psychology and aspects of how people relate to one another in
organizational behavior contributes to this body groups. While status underlies situations in which
of work by drawing on and extending we choose to follow another person because we
sociological theories and conceptions of status. respect their competence or motivation to help the
This work has identifi ed a number of factors group, power underlies situations in which we
that increase or decrease an individual’s status in have to follow another person because they can
15 Small Groups: Refl ections of and Building Blocks for Social Structure 299

compel us to do so. In this section, we discuss the traditions (e.g. Emerson 1962 , 1964 , 1976 ;
sources of power as well as the experience of see Cook et al. 2006 for a review).
power – how having or lacking power shapes our The key insight of power-dependence theory is
thoughts, feelings, and behavior. that power is relational. This means that no
Many sociologists study power from the individual is inherently powerful; instead,
perspective of exchange theory (e.g. Homans individuals are powerful to the extent that they hold
1951 [ 1992]; Blau 1964; Emerson 1976; see power over others. Emerson argued that power
Cook and Rice 2003 for a review). Exchange stems from dependence, such that A has infl uence
theory argues that in a wide range of social over B to the extent that B is dependent on A in
interactions, people exchange material and non- order to reach goals that are important to B. In turn,
material resources in an effort to reach their dependence stems from two sources. The fi rst of
goals (e.g. money, gratitude, social status, see these is the availability of alternative means of
Blau 1964 ). This process is obvious in formal reaching one’s goals. To the extent that B can fi nd
negotiations over cars, houses, or an other individuals who will help her or him reach a
employment contracts, but also occurs valued goal, B is less dependent on A, and A will
informally in many settings. Couples explicitly have less infl uence over B. For example, workers
or implicitly negotiate where to eat for dinner, are less likely to put up with abusive supervisors
who does the housework, and whose career when they plan to change jobs in the near future,
receives priority. Social exchange is not always while those who do not expect to be able to leave
negotiated; indeed, people often reciprocally their job tend to tolerate more abuse (Tepper et al.
exchange resources with no explicit promise of 2009 ).
repayment (Molm 2010 ). For example, friends The second source of dependence is
might give each other birthday gifts, rides to the motivational investment. To the extent that B is
airport, or social support as needed. The concept motivationally invested, or in other words strongly
of power helps us understand why social cares about a goal that A can help B to reach, A will
exchanges sometimes favor one party over hold more infl uence over B. This is sometimes
another, and how these imbalances shape our referred to as the “principle of least interest”; in
thoughts, feelings, and behavior. Research on romantic relationships, the partner with less
power also helps us understand the quality of our emotional attachment to the relationship tends to
interpersonal relationships: while exchange in have more power (Sprecher et al. 2006 ).
unequal-power relationships can be exploitative, E merson’s conception of dependence as a
exchange in equal-power relationships tends to source of power leads to a number of interesting
produce trust, commitment, and solidarity. insights. One is that the distribution of power
across exchange partners predicts the likelihood
that they will develop a cohesive, trusting,
15.4.1 Dependence and Power committed relationship. The distribution of power
in a relationship is not necessarily zero-sum:
I nformally, we can think of power as one relationships can be high or low in total power .
person’s capacity to get what they want in a When A and B are equally and highly dependent
social exchange, regardless of the wishes of the on one another, the relationship is high in total
other person. Emerson ( 1962: 32) offered a power; when neither depends on the other, the
more formal defi nition: “[t]he power of actor A relationship is low in total power. High total power
over actor B is the amount of resistance on the relationships are expected to be cohesive, because
part of B which can be potentially overcome by both partners depend on one another and should be
A.” This defi nition forms the starting point for less likely to leave the relationship. Accordingly,
Emerson’s power - dependence theory , which experimental work fi nds lower levels of confl ict
has played an important role in shaping in high total power relationships than unequal
sociological research on power, particular power relationships (Lawler et al. 1988 ). Further,
within the group process and small group work on the theory of relational cohesion fi nds that
individuals in high total power relationships tend to
300 S. Benard and T.D. Mize

see their relationships as more cohesive and to be and deference. The logic is that the high status
more committed to those relationships (see Chap. person enjoys being treated in this way, and is
8; also, Lawler and Yoon 1993 , 1996 , 1998 ; thus less likely to take steps that would end the
Lawler et al. 2000 ). Similarly, a fi eld study of car relationship. Individuals can also be constrained
dealers and their suppliers found that the in their use of power by their commitment to the
partnerships that were highly and equally relationship, or by social norms prescribing
interdependent had more committed relationships fairness (Cook and Emerson 1978 ).
than those that were not (Kumar et al. 1995 ). The insight that power derives from
W ithin equal power relationships, a number dependence has motivated decades of systematic
of other factors affect the partners’ levels of research to map out precisely how power and
trust, cohesion, and commitment. These include dependence are related. This has led to the
the form of exchange (i.e. negotiated, reciprocal, development of a family of network exchange
generalized, or productive; Lawler et al. 2008 ; theories , which take Emerson’s insights and
Molm et al. 2007 ) and the extent to which the examine how they operate in increasingly complex
relationship is perceived as competitive versus social networks (e.g. Bienenstock and Bonacich
cooperative (Kuwabara 2011) . At least one 1992 ; Cook and Emerson 1978 ; Cook and
study fi nds greater cohesion in triads than Yamagishi 1992 ; Friedkin 1992 ; Heckathorn
dyads, perhaps due to lower levels of uncertainty 1983 ; Markovsky et al. 1988; Markovsky 1992
and confl ict in triads (Yoon et al. 2013) . ). These theories differ in their formal or
Rational choice theories also predict that, as mathematical methods for predicting when and
individuals are more dependent on the group, how individuals will use power, and substantial
they will accept more extensive obligations on debate has occurred around the best method for
behalf of the group and will be less likely to exit predicting power in networks (e.g. Willer 1992 ).
(Hechter 1988 ). Nevertheless, these research programs concur on
A second set of insights from power- Emerson’s primary argument that power derives
dependence theory concerns how individuals from dependence. This body of work consistently
can balance power in a network (Emerson 1962 fi nds that our location in a social network –
). Individuals often fi nd low power positions including the number of alternative exchange
uncomfortable and seek to tilt the power partners we have, and the value of those
imbalance more to their favor. By identifying relationships to us – shapes our dependence on
dependence as the source of power, the theory others and correspondingly shapes how much
provides a road map to equalizing power power we hold. This extends beyond our direct
relations. Because power is based in part on the connections: individuals with the same number of
availability of alternatives, one can equalize alternative exchange partners may not be equally
power by increasing their own alternatives or powerful if the partners to whom they are
limiting their partner’s alternatives. A dissatisfi connected differ in power (Cook and Emerson
ed employee may apply for other jobs, 1978 ).
broadening their range of alternatives (Tepper To illustrate, Fig. 15.2 shows two exchange
2009), and weaker parties in many settings form networks based on those studied in Cook and
coalitions to prevent higher power actors from Emerson ( 1978 ), but simplifi ed for this example.
using a “divide and conquer” strategy (Emerson In this fi gure, the lettered boxes represent
1964 ; Simpson and Macy 2001) . In addition, individuals, and the lines represent connections
because power is also based on one’s indicating that those actors can exchange with one
motivational investment in a goal, one can another. This could represent, for example, a
balance power by reducing one’s own network of acquaintances who trade help and
motivational investment, or by increasing their information. In both networks, the central actor is
partner’s motivational investment. Emerson (
1962 ) suggests that low power individuals can
increase a higher-power partner’s motivational
investment by treating that person with respect
15 Small Groups: Refl ections of and Building Blocks for Social Structure 301

direct with strangers, more fl irtatious, and more


likely to take action even when it is unclear if
that action is allowed (Galinsky et al. 2003 ).
Similarly, powerful individuals may feel less
constrained to follow social norms (Bargh et al.
1995 ). As a result, holding power can magnify
an individual’s existing tendencies, such that
communally-oriented individuals behave in
more prosocial ways when they hold power, but
Fig. 15.2 Unbalanced and balanced exchange networks self-interested individuals behave in more selfi
– simplifi ed fi gure based on Fig. 15.2 in Cook and sh ways (Chen et al. 2001 ).
Emerson Nevertheless, much research suggests that
(1978 )
power can lead individuals in groups to behave in
ways that fellow group members may fi nd off-
connected to three other actors. But in the putting, abrasive, or exploitative. High power
unbalanced network (left panel), each B has only individuals tend to be less concerned with having a
A to rely on for help or information, while A can “smooth and pleasant” working relationship,
rely on three individuals. In this network, the Bs compared to their low power partners (Copeland
depend on A more than the reverse, and so A is 1994: 273). Powerful group members are more
more powerful than the Bs. In contrast, in the likely to express their true feelings (Anderson and
balanced network (right panel), each person has Berdahl 2002 ), to see their partners as means to
three potential exchange partners, and so all an end (Gruenfeld et al. 2008 ), and to focus on
actors are equally dependent. These processes their own versus their partner’s perspective
become increasingly subtle in more complex (Galinsky et al. 2006 ). Perhaps not surprisingly,
networks. powerful individuals overestimate their partner’s
positive emotions, while more cautious low power
individuals overestimate their partner’s negative
emotions (Anderson and Berdahl 2002 ). Further,
15.4.2 The Experience of Power
group leaders sometimes withhold useful
information from the group or exaggerate external
People have long speculated about how power
threats to suppress competition for their position
affects the person wielding it. It is easy to fi nd
(Barclay and Benard 2013 ; Maner and Mead 2010
anecdotal examples in support of Lord Acton’s
).
famous aphorism that “power corrupts, and
absolute power corrupts absolutely.” However,
research suggests the truth is more nuanced. And
indeed, one can think of anecdotal examples in 15.4.3 Power and Other Dimensions of
which powerful individuals were not corrupted, Small Group Interaction
but instead served the greater good. So how does
power actually affect the person who holds it? I n addition to studying how power shapes small
R ather than having a universally corrupting group dynamics, social scientists have examined
infl uence, it appears that holding power or how power intersects with other group processes.
feeling powerful increases “action orientation”, One area of research examines when groups will
or goal-seeking behavior (Anderson and voluntarily cede power to leaders (i.e., create
Berdahl 2002 ; Galinsky et al. 2003 ; see legitimate or recognized authorities, see Zelditch
Keltner et al. 2003 for a review). Because 2001 for a review). Some evidence suggests that
powerful individuals face fewer consequences groups dislike having leaders, and tend to prefer
for taking action, they tend to be less wary and democratic voting over allowing a leader to have
more assertive in pursuit of their goals. As a control over the group (Rutte and Wilkie 1985 ).
result, individuals who feel powerful are more However, groups do turn to leaders to help them
302 S. Benard and T.D. Mize

deal with crises, such as when the group is at risk informational infl uence (Deustch and Gerard
of overusing a scarce resource (Messick et al. 1955 ). Normative infl uence occurs when
1983 ). people conform to the perceived expectations of
A number of studies investigate how power other group members in order to gain social
and status are related. Thye ( 2000 ) fi nds that rewards (acceptance, approval) or avoid social
the resources owned by high status actors tend punishments (embarrassment, disapproval) from
to be valued more than those owned by low others. Normative infl uence is at work when
status actors. For example, a car owned by a people don’t voice their true opinion for fear of
celebrity can sell for more than a similar car criticism, laugh at a joke they don’t understand
owned by a non-celebrity. This can serve as a to avoid appearing humorless, or buy articles of
source of power when the resources of a high clothing because they hope others will approve
status person offer more leverage in negotiation. of them. In contrast, informational infl uence
Other work fi nds that status moderates the occurs when people conform to the behavior of
behavior of those in power, such that powerful their peers because they believe this behavior
actors who lack status (e.g. are not respected) are provides useful and accurate information that
more likely to treat interaction partners in will improve the quality if their decisions.
demeaning ways (Fast et al. 2012) . Powerful Informational infl uence is at work when people
individuals can gain status through generosity or choose to eat at a busy restaurant because they
philanthropy, which may offset the often believe the busyness refl ects its quality, or when
negative perception of powerful individuals as lost individuals follow a crowd because they
selfi sh or exploitative (Willer et al. 2012 ). believe the crowd must be headed to the same
destination.
S ociologists have had a particular fascination
with social norms and normative infl uence since
15.5 Social Norms and Infl uence the early days of the fi eld (Hechter and Opp 2001
), and often rely on social norms to explain
When we are part of a group, we often take our
particular phenomena (Horne 2001 ; Wrong 1961
cues from the behavior or expectations of other
). There are a number of reasons for this interest in
group members. Students hesitate to raise their
norms. Broadly, groups often use social norms to
hands in class if no one else does, and many
defi ne their rules and boundaries (Durkheim
people choose which movie to watch or which
[1894] 1988 ; Erikson 1966 ; Mead 1918) . In
restaurant to visit based on what their friends do.
small groups, social norms can sustain and
Not surprisingly, sociologists and social
encourage group cohesion, and serve as the
psychologists have devoted considerable
building blocks of more complex social structures
attention to understanding how social infl uence
and forms of social organization (Hechter 1988 ;
works. As early as the 1930s, studies found that
Hechter and Opp 2001) . Social norms are
people tend to rely on the opinions of other
transmitted across generations (Sherif 1936 ),
group members when making judgments about
helping groups maintain an existence independent
ambiguous stimuli, such as how much a point of
of particular group members, because group
light appears to be moving in a dark room
traditions continue even as membership changes.
(Sherif 1937 ). Many people are familiar with
Norms also help explain how human groups
the famous Asch ( 1951 ) conformity studies,
worked together effectively before the advent of
which found that participants were more likely
legal systems to forestall exploitative or harmful
to agree with a clearly incorrect statement about
behavior (Ellis 1971 ; de Quervain et al. 2004 ).
the relative length of several lines when other
Even today, individuals often rely on social norms
group members unanimously supported this
to resolve disputes informally, without turning to
statement.
the law (e.g. Ellickson 1994 ).
More broadly, social psychologists have
This interest in norms has led sociologists to
identifi ed two processes by which groups infl
focus on different questions than psychological
uence their members: normative and
studies of infl uence. While psychologists often
15 Small Groups: Refl ections of and Building Blocks for Social Structure 303

create a norm in the laboratory to understand the norms, given that doing so is often costly. For
circumstances under which people conform, example, criticizing a free-riding member of a
sociologists have more often been interested in the work team might encourage them to change their
conditions under which norms will arise. This is a behavior and help the group, but it might also be
trend rather than an absolute distinction: uncomfortable, and provoke resentment or even
sociologists have conducted intriguing studies on retaliation. As a result, individuals sometimes
how social infl uence contributes to hesitate to enforce group norms, even when
unpredictability in online markets (Salganik et al. doing so benefi ts the individual and the group
2006 ), or how the social status of majority and (Horne 2009 ; Oliver 1980 ).
minority group members shapes conformity when To answer this question, small groups
groups fail to reach unanimity (Melamed and researchers often use experiments in which they
Savage 2013 ) . For this reason, our discussion of create groups in the laboratory, and ask the groups
social norms and infl uence will tend towards to engage in a public goods or social dilemma task
emphasizing normative over informational infl (e.g. Kollock 1998; Komorita and Parks 1994) .
uence. In addition, because the voluminous work These group tasks give participants a choice
on the Asch study and related paradigms and between acting in a self-interested way or in a way
debates mainly occur in psychology, and have been that helps that group. Individuals fare better when
subject to extensive reviews and meta-analyses they make the self-interested choice, but if
(e.g. Bond and Smith 1996 ; Bond 2005 ; Wood everyone behaves in a self-interested manner, the
et al. 1994 ) we do not review them here. group as a whole fares more poorly than if
individuals had opted to help the group. For
example, individuals on a project team might be
15.5.1 How Do Social Norms Arise? tempted to free-ride and let others complete the
project for them, thus allowing the free-rider to
While there is no universally agreed-upon defi succeed with minimal effort. However, if everyone
nition of social norms, many scholars chooses to free-ride, the group fails and all
conceptualize norms as rules for behavior, members are worse off than if they had all opted to
consensually held by group members, and work hard. In these studies, researchers give
supported by rewards or punishments (Horne participants the option to enforce norms – often by
2001 ). Under this defi nition, norms exist to the allowing participants to spend some of the money
extent that individuals are willing to spend time that they are being paid to take part in the
and effort enforcing them (Hechter 1988 ; experiment to penalize free-riders or reward those
Oliver 1980 ). A team working to complete a who do contribute to the group’s success.
group project may hold the norm that group T he overarching pattern is that people are
members should work hard to help the group willing to enforce norms of contribution to the
succeed, rather than free- ride and create more group, even when doing so is personally costly
work for their peers or endanger the group’s (e.g. Fehr and Gachter 2002; Horne 2009 ;
success. Those that conform to this rule receive Ostrom et al. 1992 ; Yamagishi 1986 ). A number
praise or other forms of social approval from of factors moderate this tendency. Individuals are
their peers, while those who deviate experience more likely to enforce norms of group cooperation
disapproval or criticism. Scholars disagree about when the costs of enforcing norms are lower
the extent to which such norms are generally (Horne and Cutlip 2002) , when they don’t trust
clear and observed by group members, or other group members to cooperate (Yamagishi
instead continually shifting and renegotiated 1986 , 1988a) , when the risks faced by the group
(Hechter and Opp 2001 ). are serious (Yamagishi 1988b) , or when the group
E arly discussions of social norms suggested is threatened by a competing outgroup (Benard
that they arise through social interaction 2012 ; Sherif 1966 ). Individuals also appear to be
(Homans [1951 ] 1992). A key problem in more receptive to norm enforcement from a
understanding how this happens is explaining democratically elected versus a randomly assigned
why individuals are willing to enforce group leader (Grossman and Baldassari 2012 ).
304 S. Benard and T.D. Mize

This willingness to enforce norms despite the Further, groups do not always restrict
cost seems in part driven by anger at non- themselves to punishing free-riders. Research has
contributors (Fehr and Gächter 2002) ; one documented “antisocial punishment”, in which
study using PET scans found that punishing group members punish those who contribute to the
non- contributing group members appears to be group at a high rate (Herrman et al. 2008 ; Homans
rewarding at the neural level (de Quervain et al. [ 1951] 1992; Parks and Stone 2010 ). This may
2004 ). Individuals may also enforce norms as a occur because high contributors are seen as
way of signaling that they are committed to the atypical (Irwin and Horne 2013 ) or because they
group, which in turn encourages valuable are seen as “rate-busters” who make others look
exchanges with other group members (Homans bad (Homans [ 1951 ] 1992).
[1951 ] 1992; Horne 2004 ). Those who enforce I n especially puzzling cases, groups maintain
group norms tend to be rewarded by other group norms that harm the group. Some college students
members, and are rewarded more as the cost of publicly endorse binge drinking, while privately
enforcing norms increases (Horne and Cutlip holding reservations about it (Prentice and Miller
2002 ) and as the direct and indirect benefi ts of 1993) , and some disadvantaged groups hold
exchanging with other group members increase “leveling norms” that discourage their members
(Horne 2004) . Individuals who enforce group from attaining economic success beyond that of
norms are also seen as more worthy of respect other group members (Portes 1998 ). Historically,
and trust than those who do not, as long as they social norms have encouraged dueling and other
are perceived to enforce norms fairly (Barclay dangerous activities (Axelrod 1986) . One possible
2006 ). explanation for these “bad” norms is that
individuals may enforce them to signal their
commitment to the group (Centola et al. 2005 ;
15.5.2 The “Dark Side” of Social Norms Willer et al. 2009 ). Under this explanation, those
who publically conform to a norm that they
The tendency of groups to enforce norms by privately oppose fear that their insincerity will be
punishing low-contributing group members or discovered. To compensate, they make a special
rewarding high-contributors can help groups to effort to criticize those who do not conform to the
achieve their goals, by reducing the level of free- norm, under the logic that publicly defending the
riding in the group (e.g. Gürerk et al. 2006 ). norm will convince others of their sincerity. Willer
Indeed, because willingness to contribute to or et al. ( 2009) found that people who conformed to
sacrifi ce for one’s group is often viewed as a an incorrect majority group opinion in a wine-
behavioral indicator of group solidarity, norms tasting study – by agreeing that two wines differed
can be an important mechanism for maintaining greatly in quality when they were actually poured
solidarity (Hechter 1988) . However, the use of from the same bottle – were publically critical of
rewards and punishments to encourage the wine-tasting ability of an individual who
solidarity can have negative consequences as accurately described the wines as identical, while
well. When groups depend on rewards and privately agreeing with that i ndividual. Because
punishments to maintain order, they may individuals in these cases misrepresent their true
undermine the development of trust because feelings, this can lead group members to
individuals do not know if their peers behave mistakenly overestimate support for norms that
cooperatively because they are motivated to help most group members disagree with.
the group, or because they fear being sanctioned 15.6 Identity
by other group members.
Members of groups that rely on both punishments How do we come to identify with groups? How
(Mulder et al. 2005 ) and rewards (Irwin et al. do the groups we belong to and the roles we have
2014) to maintain order tend to have lower levels within them defi ne us? Two theories help
of trust in one another, compared to groups that do answer these questions: identity theory and
not rely on rewards and punishments. social identity theory. Identity theory helps
explain how social roles – including roles tied
15 Small Groups: Refl ections of and Building Blocks for Social Structure 305

to group membership – shape our behavior and a volunteer, among many other roles.
identities. Social identity theory focuses on how Individuals take a sense of identity and meaning
membership in social categories infl uences our from these positions in the social structure and
views of and behavior towards ourselves and their roles in groups, which are referred to as
others. To date, identity theory has focused on role-identities (McCall and Simmons 1966 ).
the implications of social roles for individual Roles help us learn who we are and also give us
rather than group behavior, but identity theory a sense of behavioral guidance, or ideas about
shares important ideas with other theories of the appropriate behavior necessary to fulfi ll our
small groups, and the identities that stem from role responsibilities (Stryker 1980 ; Thoits
small group membership should be an important 2011 ).
determinant of behavior and views of the self. In I ndividuals often hold multiple roles and are
contrast, social identity theory has primarily members of multiple groups which provide them
focused on intra- and intergroup behavior; we with a variety of individual. These multiple role-
discuss both theories in this section. identities are arranged in a hierarchy with higher
ranking roles more likely to be invoked and acted
upon in a wide range of situations (Stryker 1980 ).
15.6.1 Identity Theory Stryker ( 1980 ) defi nes identity salience as an
identity’s place within this hierarchy. For example,
I dentity theory is a sociological theory based on someone who is married, a mother, and an
symbolic interactionist principles. Symbolic executive will use one of these three identities most
interactionists propose that we defi ne and often in interaction with others. Put another way,
evaluate ourselves through the eyes of others, in the role that someone would use to describe
response to their real and imagined perceptions themselves when being introduced to someone is
of us (Cooley 1902) . From this perspective, our likely their most salient role (e.g., “I’m an
sense of self develops through interaction with executive at…” vs. “I’m a mother of two…”).
others, and our ability to view ourselves through Thoits ( 1992 , 2012 ) defi nes identity salience
the eyes of others is part of what makes us differently, viewing it as the importance of a role
human (Dewey [ 1922 ] 2002; Mead 1934 ). to an individual, drawing on what McCall and
Thus, we develop a sense of identity and Simmons (1966 ) defi ned as prominence.
determine who we are largely by the things we Therefore, in Thoits’ conception, the identity that
do and the way others view us. The self is not you consider most important and central to your
made up of a single concept, but instead consists self is the most salient. Callero ( 1985 ) proposes
of multiple aspects and selves (later, referred to that identity salience, however defi ned, should
as identities). impact the effect of an identity on self-esteem.
While early theorists such as Mead provided Identities that are more important (or more likely
many of the central principles underlying to be invoked) should be more intricately tied to
symbolic interactionism, the ideas represented a our self-concept and self-esteem.
framework and not a testable theory (Stryker Membership in small groups confers additional
2008 ). In order to codify symbolic identities, which help individuals defi ne
interactionism’s core ideas and principles into a themselves and guide their behavior (e.g. “group
testable theory, Stryker presented his version of member”, “chapter president”). The salience of an
“structural symbolic interactionism” and identity for an individual is further determined by
identity theory ( 1980) . Stryker drew on role the number of social ties that stem from a role.
theory to propose that our social roles are Individuals are more committed to role identities
primary determinants of our sense of self, or that involve important connections and ties to
identity. Roles are the expectations and others, resulting in those particular identities
behaviors that are associated with positions in becoming more salient (Stryker 1980 , 2008 ).
the social structure (Merton 1957 ; Stryker Thus, to the extent that small groups provide
1980 ). For example, individuals may be an individuals with roles, and connect them with
employee, a mother, a boyfriend, a teammate, or
306 S. Benard and T.D. Mize

others who know them in the context of that role, compensated by espousing more homophobic
they generate and maintain identities. views, showing higher support for war, and
W hy do role-identities matter? Thoits argues expressing greater belief in male superiority (all
that role-identities give individuals purpose and of which were shown to be associated with
meaning in life and behavioral guidance, which masculinity by the study population).
leads to a stable sense of our selves and positive R esearch has both supported and challenged
mental and physical health outcomes (Thoits identity control theory’s proposition that
1983 , 2011 , 2012) . Although early theorists individuals attempt to confi rm their identities in
suggested that holding multiple roles may be interaction. However, although individuals strive
stressful or bad for health due to the confl icting to confi rm their identities, it is not always possible
demands of balancing multiple responsibilities to do so. One experimental test showed male
(Merton 1957; Goode 1960 ), Thoits ( 1983 , leaders faced such high expectations that they were
1986 , 2003) instead argues for and fi nds unable to meet them, and thus unable to confi rm
consistent evidence that holding multiple roles their leadership identity (Burke et al. 2007) .
has positive infl uences on mental and physical Another interesting test showed that individuals
health. Therefore, membership in more groups strive to maintain their identity even when that
and thus more role-identities appears benefi cial identity is negative. That is, individuals will chose
for health – largely due to the intrapersonal to maintain a negative identity over a positive
rewards that come from occupying social roles. identity, if the positive identity is incongruent with
Burke’s ( 1991) more micro-oriented how they see themselves (Robinson and Smith-
identity control theory argues that individuals Lovin 1992 ).
are motivated to confi rm their identity in More recent work has attempted to connect
interaction. If their identity is not confi rmed, identity theory with other theories, both within and
they feel distress and are motivated to act to outside of the identity tradition. Stryker and Burke
restore their identity. Identities are not seen as fi ( 2000 ) work integrate identity and identity control
xed, but as a continuous process that is played theory, arguing that Stryker’s structural identity
out in interaction (Burke and Stets 2009 ; Stets theory explains how social roles and positions in
and Serpe 2013 ). For example, a group member the social structure shape identities and the self.
may consider Once these identities are established, Burke’s
themselves to be a high-status leader. If this identity control theory explains how behavior in
identity is challenged, perhaps by learning that interactions confi rms and stabilizes these identities
other group members view them as occupying a over time. 73 Stryker ( 2008 ) has further argued
low- status subordinate role, the individual that identity theory shares many underpinnings
should feel distress, which will motivate them to with theories of status in sociology, in particular
restore their original identity as a high-status status characteristics theory. In both theories,
leader. It is through their behavior in interaction individuals determine what to expect from
that individuals can alleviate the distress they themselves and from others based on consensual
feel and re- establish their original identity. A expectations and meanings placed on
recent experimental study found support for characteristics and identities. For instance, a person
identity interacting with a doctor has a sense of how the
control theory’s propositions in regards to interaction should play out based on expectations
gender identity. Willer and colleagues ( 2013) that derive from cultural meanings attached to the
show that when men’s masculine identity is role of doctor. This means that identities may play
threatened, they react with compensatory an important role in structuring small group
behavior that reasserts their masculinity – and interaction, by moderating – or being moderated by
thus restores their original identity. Specifi cally, – how individuals respond to status cues and other
men whose masculinity was threatened information about social position within groups. If

73
S ee Burke and Stets ( 2009) and Stets and Serpe ( 2013
) for integrated versions of the two identity theories.
15 Small Groups: Refl ections of and Building Blocks for Social Structure 307

one’s identity is strongly predicated on the belief internally cohesive and externally competitive.
that men are more competent than women, how Individuals develop more positive attitudes,
will such individuals respond to information stereotypes, and emotions towards their ingroup
indicating that women in their group are highly members, and more negative attitudes,
competent (Stryker 2008 )? Such individuals stereotypes, and emotions towards outgroup
might be less receptive to this information, or members. Thus, while confl ict may begin from
alternatively may revise their identities. a rational basis, such as contesting ownership of
a resource, the ensuing stereotypes and
emotional attachments that develop around
15.6.2 Social Identity, Realistic Group group identities can lead the confl ict to escalate
Confl ict, and Group Position out of proportion to the original dispute. This
argument fi nds support in Sherif’s fi eld studies
Identities not only stem from the roles we hold on confl ict, conducted in summer camps in the
in groups, but also from the social categories we late 1940s and early 1950s (Sherif 1966 ), as
belong to. Sociologists and psychologists have well as later studies using different settings
distinguished between identities individuals (Blake et al. 1964 ; Struch and Schwartz 1989
hold based on their social roles (as reviewed ).
above), and from identities that derive from Blumer’s ( 1958 ) group position model views
social categories: an individual’s race, ethnicity, intergroup confl ict as rooted not simply in
nationality, religious affi liation, and others. The competing goals, but in the response of a dominant
delineation between the two types of identities is group to the perception that they are losing ground
not always clear, and some roles and groups to a subordinate group. Proponents of the group
likely provide a sense of both types of identities position model argue that it is compatible with, but
(see Hogg et al. (1995 ) and Deaux and Burke ( more comprehensive than, realistic group confl ict
2010) for a discussion of the similarities and theory (Bobo 1999 ). Under the group position
differences between the two types of identities). model, intergroup prejudice arises when a
Below, we review three additional perspectives dominant group, which feels superior to and
on group membership and identity that describe entitled to greater rights and privileges than a
the impacts that groups have on our beliefs and subordinate group, perceives the subordinate group
behavior beyond the infl uence of role to be threatening its longstanding advantage. This
occupancy: realistic group confl ict theory, the implies that individuals take changes in their
group position model, and social identity theory. group’s position seriously, even when their own
G roup membership – regardless of its source individual position is unchanged. Blumer
– promotes cognitive, emotional, and behavioral developed the theory to explain white attitudes in
identifi cation with the group, which are the midst of the civil rights movement in the United
important sources of positive outcomes such as States, but later empirical work has found support
group bonding and attachment (Dimmock et al. in the contemporary US (Bobo 1999 ; Bobo and
2005 ; Henry et al. 1999) . At the same time, Hutchings 1996 ) and internationally (Minescue
ingroup identifi cation is closely bound up with and Poppe 2011 ).
intergroup competition and confl ict (Coser T ajfel and Turner’s ( 1979 , 1986 ) social
1956; Sherif 1966 ; Simmel [1908] 1955; identity theory challenged realistic group confl
Sumner [ 1906] 1960; see Benard and Doan ict theory by showing that groups often show in-
2011 ; Stein 1976 for reviews). Early work on group favoritism and out-group hostility even in
identity and intergroup confl ict led to the the absence of confl icting goals. Experiments in
development of Muzafer Sherif’s realistic the “minimal group paradigm” tradition found
group confl ict theory (Sherif 1966 ; see Jackson that even small, inconsequential distinctions –
[ 1993 ] for a review). Sherif’s theory argues that such as a preference for the painter Klee versus
when two groups share incompatible goals – for Kandinsky – cause individuals to favor those in
example both seeking to possess the same their own group. Even “the mere perception of
resource – the groups tend to become more belonging to two distinct groups…” triggers in-
308 S. Benard and T.D. Mize

group favoritism and out-group discrimination identities is in contrast to Stryker’s ( 1980 , 2008
(Tajfel and Turner 1986, p. 81). Empirical tests ) identity theory, which describes role-identities
of this idea show that trivial and even explicitly as relatively stable across various situations.
random distinctions suffi ce to form groups and
infl uence differential attitudes toward in-group
and out-group members (Tajfel et al. 1971 ; 15.6.3 Optimal Distinctiveness
Tajfel and Turner 1979 , 1986 ).
In-group favoritism is motivated by self- W hile social identity theory focuses on group
enhancement: we desire to view ourselves and identifi cation as a source of self-esteem, Brewer
our groups positively (Tajfel et al. 1971 ; Tajfel (1991 ; see also Pickett and Brewer 2001 )
and Turner 1979 , 1986 ; Hogg 2006 ). The proposes that individuals strive for “optimal
close tie between ingroup and self-evaluation distinctiveness” when joining social groups. She
leads individuals to be more extreme in their argues that individuals have a human need to be
evaluations of ingroup members than outgroup similar to and validated by others, but also a
members: likable ingroup members are rated simultaneous need to be unique and individual.
more highly than likable outgroup members, but Groups must facilitate affi liation and belonging
unlikable ingroup members are rated lower than within a group, but must also maintain boundaries
unlikable outgroup members (Markovsky et al. that differentiate them from other groups. For
1988 ). Similarly, people often judge ingroup example, youth cohorts often look and dress like
deviants more harshly than outgroup deviants each other, which allows them to form a group
(Marques et al. 1998 ), especially when ingroup identity. However, youth fashions often look quite
members deviate in ways that lead them to be different from those of other age groups, which
more similar to the outgroup (Abrams et al. allows them to distinguish themselves as unique
2000 ). (Brewer 1991 ). The basic tenants of optimal
Most people belong to a large number of distinctiveness have been supported, with
groups, but a particular group affi liation may individual’s using both a need for assimilation and
seem more relevant in a given situation and will a need for differentiation as motivations for their
correspondingly do more to determine our views of their own groups and of out-groups
behavior in that situation. For example, one’s (Pickett and Brewer 2001 ).
American identity might be most important at a The basic ideas underlying Brewer’s theory
fourth of July parade, while their soccer share many aspects with some early sociological
allegiance might matter most when attending a theory. Specifi cally, Simmel ([1908] 1971 )
soccer match. In support of this, Levine et al. ( argued that modern life led to increased
2005) found that when British study participants individualization of individuals. As societies and
were primed to think of their favorite soccer groups expand and become more diverse, the
team, they were more likely to help the victim of individual members become more individuated and
a staged accident if the victim was wearing a t- distinguished. Simmel further argued that
shirt signaling loyalty to their favorite team, individuals have a “dualistic drive” or “a need
compared to a plain t-shirt or a shirt signaling within us both for individuation and for its
loyalty to a rival team. In a subsequent study, opposite…” (Simmel [1908] 1971, p. 259). That
they primed individuals to think of themselves is, individuals strive to be seen as unique and
as soccer fans more broadly. When the study individual, but also simultaneously strive to
participants’ “soccer fan” identity was salient, belong.
they were more likely to help those wearing a t-
shirt supporting either their favorite team or its
rival; they were less likely to help those in a
plain t-shirt. Identity thus leads us to 15.7 Group Culture
demonstrate ingroup favoritism, but the
particular identity that we favor may shift with While culture is often thought of as a property
the situation. This situational nature of social of society at large, small groups also develop
15 Small Groups: Refl ections of and Building Blocks for Social Structure 309

cultures of their own. These “idiocultures” or group’s recent past. Fine ( 1979 ) reports that little
“microcultures” arise through social interaction, league teams generate nicknames, norms, and even
as groups accumulate “…a system of taboos through interaction. Fine argues that the
knowledge, beliefs, behaviors, and customs emergence and longevity of these new cultural
shared by members of an interacting group to practices depend on a number of factors, including
which members can refer and employ as the how well they support the group’s status structure
basis of further interaction” (Fine 1979) . These and functional needs, how well they relate to
local cultures play a key role in patterning social mainstream cultural reference points familiar to the
life. In this section, we highlight three important group, whether they are consistent with existing
aspects of culture in small groups (noted in Fine group practices, and whether they are triggered by
2012, see that paper for a more extensive key events that occur in the course of group life.
review). First, small groups are a key location in In organizations, informal cultures often
which individuals learn, modify, create, and emerge that are “decoupled” from the offi cial,
diffuse culture. Second, by defi ning local formal practices of the organization (Meyer and
contexts and shared meanings for individuals, Rowan 1977) . This may occur when workers
culture shapes group members’ behavior, either discover that two formal rules confl ict, and must
through scripting appropriate actions for group informally negotiate a solution. Similarly, when
members in particular situations (Goffman 1959 organizational rules are vague or abstract,
, 1983 ; Fine 2012 ) or providing a “toolkit” of individuals and groups within the organization
strategies for approaching particular situations have wide latitude to interpret them and develop
(Swidler 1986 ). Third, culture plays an their own practices, leading to local cultures that
important role in group members’ efforts to differ widely. When “re-coupling” occurs – that is,
demarcate and police the boundaries of the when individuals come under pressure to make
group, defi ne group identity, and build group their informal practices correspond to formal
cohesion. requirements – intra-organizational confl ict often
ensues (Hallett 2010 ). For example, Hallett (2010
) fi nds that when teachers who had previously been
15.7.1 Learning and Creating Culture free to implement their own approaches to
accomplish their educational mission were held to
A lthough culture exists at the level of society as more rigid, uniform standards, many became
a whole, people’s day-to-day experience with frustrated and distressed.
culture occurs on a smaller scale (Fine 2012 ). At times, groups create cultures that depart
People absorb much of what they know about quite substantially from the mainstream cultures in
culture through interaction in small groups, which they are embedded. For example, peer
often beginning with families, and continuing groups sometimes embrace “oppositional” cultures
with peer groups, teams, coworkers, and others. that reject mainstream emphasis on institutions
In addition to learning culture in groups, such as school, work, and family (e.g. Anderson
individuals also create novel bits of culture 2000 ; MacLeod 1987 ; Shibutani 1978) . Such
through their interactions, either by modifying cultures are often thought to arise when traditional
previously- known aspects of mainstream routes to success are blocked, prompting
culture, or by inventing new beliefs, behaviors, individuals to fi nd new ways to establish a sense
and customs. of identity and self-respect (Bourgois 1995 ; Portes
Children learn culture from adults, but also 1998 ). Despite their oppositional stance, such
interpretively create their own peer cultures groups have their own hierarchies of power and
(Corsaro and Eder 1990 ). In Sherif et al’s ( 1961 status, and their own norms for appropriate
) Robber’s Cave study, groups of young boys behavior, which at times can be quite rigid (Becker
created symbols such as group names, logos, and fl 1963 ).
ags that demarcated their group as unique. They The novel bits of culture created by small
also collectively developed shared histories in the groups can diffuse outwards to other groups,
form of discussions about meaningful events in the occasionally becoming part of mainstream
310 S. Benard and T.D. Mize

culture. For example, hip-hop culture began may depend on whether they interpret this
among a small group of adolescents in the Bronx disagreement as a simple difference of opinions, or
in the 1970s, before becoming a tremendously instead an attack on their intelligence or
infl uential global phenomenon (Chang 2005 ). competence. In the latter case, individuals may feel
While this process is in part driven by mass pressure to re-assert themselves initially through
media and other macro-level phenomena, verbal means, but if they fail, to resort to violence
interpersonal infl uence also plays a role Strang (Felson 1978 ).
and Soule 1998) . This occurs when individuals Many components of such interactions –
bow to conformity pressures or imitate interpretating a remark as a grave insult,
prestigious individuals (Henrich 2001) , when subsequently needing to assert one’s social status,
individuals adopt cultural practices in use by the acceptability of violence as a means of doing so
those who are similar to themselves in other – vary substantially by context. In some local
dimensions (Mark 2003 ), or are infl uenced by cultures, escalating a verbal argument to violence
“opinion leaders” in their personal networks is viewed as natural, in others, as absurd. For
(Katz 1957) . example, Anderson’s ( 2000 ) ethnography of a
Philadelphia neighborhood distinguishes between
“decent” and “street” subcultures. The “street”
15.7.2 Group Culture Shapes Individual subculture places a premium on toughness, and
Action members of this subculture believe that failure to
demonstrate toughness can lead them to be labeled
S mall groups – especially ongoing groups with as a victim or an easy target. As a result, they are
a history and a sense of collective identity – play highly sensitive to perceived slights and insults that
an important role in shaping individuals’ may undermine their social standing. Similarly,
behavior, because they create “[a] local context, work comparing the northern and southern United
or set of shared understandings arising from States fi nds that southerners are more likely to
continuing interaction…” (Fine 2012 : 160). As emphasize the importance of personal reputation
Goffman ( 1959 ) notes, a set of shared and honor, and more likely to respond aggressively
understandings or a common “defi nition of the to perceived affronts (Nisbett and Cohen 1996 ).
situation” is necessary for people to understand One study, for example, found that southerners
how to act in a given setting. These shared tended to be angered by an insult from a stranger,
understandings signal to individuals what their while northerners tended to fi nd it amusing (Cohen
role in a given situation is, and what the roles of et al. 1996 ) . Thus, local cultures can produce
others are. To illustrate, Goffman ( 1983 ) uses differing interpretations of the same event, and
the example of a person approached by a correspondingly lead to different behaviors.
stranger. To determine if the stranger is friendly C ulture also shapes behavior within small
or dangerous, people rely on culturally relevant groups by providing a “toolkit” of strategies that
cues such as manner of dress and self- individuals use in their daily life (Harrington and
presentation and choose their subsequent course Fine 2000 ; Swidler 1986 ). This toolkit consists
of action accordingly. of various “symbols, stories, rituals, and world-
Studies of interpersonal aggression provide an views” that inform individuals’ daily habits and
example of how group culture shapes individual interpersonal styles, and that they draw on for
action. While early research saw aggression as a solving everyday problems (Swidler 1986 :
product of social learning or frustration, much 273). For example, Lareau ( 2011 ) fi nds that
work in recent decades has focused on aggression middle- class children are raised with a stronger
as a form of impression management (Felson sense of entitlement, and encouraged to use self-
1978; Gould 2003) . According to this work, advocacy as a strategy for interacting with
individuals use aggression as a way of negotiating authority fi gures to a greater extent than
their identities and social standing within a group. working-class children. Similarly, Calarco (
For example, if two individuals in conversation 2014 ) fi nds that middle-class and working-
come to a disagreement, their subsequent actions class children tend to take different approaches
15 Small Groups: Refl ections of and Building Blocks for Social Structure 311

when having diffi culty with their schoolwork, ). Gender can persist as a social boundary into
with middle class children more likely to ask a adulthood, for example, when groups develop
teacher for help, and working class children norms about which kinds of jobs are considered
more likely to persist in working on the appropriate for men and women (e.g. Pierce 1995)
problems alone. These results can have . Individuals also rely on a variety of other factors
implications for social stratifi cation, as middle-
to defi ne group boundaries, ranging from ethnicity
class students subsequently receive more help to patterns of cultural consumption (Lamont and
and attention from teachers. More generally, Molnàr 2002) . Becker’s classic ( 1951) study of
these patterns illustrate how small groups serve jazz musicians found that they drew distinctions
as the setting in which individuals experience between groups (e.g. musicians versus an audience
and express larger social realities. In this case,of non-musician “squares”), and within the ingroup
while social class is a macro level-phenomenon (fi nancially successful but artistically
with deep roots in institutions – such as the labor
compromised “commercial” musicians versus true
market, the education system, and the welfare “jazz” musicians). Such distinctions helped
state – these roots are not salient to individualsmusicians maintain positive self-views in the face
in their daily lives. Instead, they experience of their frustrating dependence on “square”
these macro- level phenomena in their everyday audience members for income. Indeed, groups
interactions with parents, teachers, and friends. often support social boundaries by developing
negative stereotypes about o utgroups and positive
stereotypes about outgroups, which can serve as a
15.7.3 Culture and Group Boundaries source of group cohesion (Blumer 1958; Sherif
1966) , or by employing relational means of social
Individuals draw on culture to defi ne and adjust exclusion such as gossip (Eder 1985 ).
group boundaries (Fine 2012 ; Lamont and
Molnàr 2002 ). Such boundaries help to defi ne
what it means to be a group member, and to 15.8 Conclusion
generate cohesion and solidarity within groups
(Durkheim [1894] 1988 ; Erikson 1966 ; Mead Sociologists aim to understand social structure –
1918; Sherif et al. 1961) . Both ingroup and the institutions, networks, hierarchies, roles, and
outgroup members rely on cultural signals of other extra-individual factors that make up the
group membership when deciding how to complex web of society. Structure fascinates
interact with strangers. These interactions may sociologists in part because it shapes individual
be positive, neutral, or negative, but the fact that behavior and choices. The same person born today
they center around symbols of group versus a century ago, or in Spain versus Japan,
membership serves to strengthen perceived would face a somewhat different set of constraints
group boundaries and group identities. For and options. Social structure also fascinates
example, Tavory ( 2010 ) observes that for sociologists because, even while it constrains
Orthodox Jewish men in Los Angeles, their people’s choices, people can modify, build, and
religious attire – especially yarmulkes – leads disseminate new forms of social structure. Much of
strangers to interact with them primarily on the sociology thus revolves around the puzzle of how
basis of their Jewish identity. This ranged from people simultaneously create and are constrained
requests for advice on how to prepare kosher by the social world in which they live.
foods to verbal abuse. In contrast, the Orthodox Small groups play an important role in
men were so used to wearing yarmulkes that solving this puzzle, existing in an intermediate
they rarely thought about them, except in these “meso- level” space between individuals and
types of interactions. This led their Orthodox larger social systems (Fine 2012: 160). Small
Jewish identity to be more salient to them than it groups’ shared history, identity, structure, and
might have been otherwise. culture make them more than simply the sum of
E ven groups of children create social their individual members (Simmel 1898 ).
boundaries, often along gender lines (Thorne 1993
312 S. Benard and T.D. Mize

Small groups serve as a key setting through The fi rst point – reconnecting with other
which people feel the constraints of social disciplines – might on the face of it seem
structure – such as family obligations, team unnecessary, since the study of small groups has
rules, coworker expectations – as well as a key traditionally been an interdisciplinary fi eld on the
setting for creating social structure. As we have boundary of sociology and psychology. Over time,
discussed, small groups provide an important however, sociological and psychological social
setting in which status, power, identity, norms, psychology have moved further apart, and genuine
and culture develop, organize behavior, and are engagement between the two fi elds is less common
transmitted to other groups. They thus provide a (Thoits 1995 ; Oishi et al. 2009) . This may stem,
useful setting for sociologists to observe how as noted, because psychologists are increasingly
people create and respond to small-scale social interested in cognitive mechanisms while
structures. sociologists primarily focus on structural factors.
D espite the utility of small groups as a setting But structural factors often moderate cognitive
for the study of social structure, most reviews of processes, and cognitive processes in turn often
the literature note that interest in this area mediate the effects of structural factors. To the
peaked in the middle of the twentieth century extent that both fi elds work separately, we are less
and has since declined. This may refl ect the fact likely to have a complete picture of how small
that sociologists have more options for studying groups work, particularly if there are cross-l evel
social life: the quality and availability of interactions between the structural factors
nationally- representative survey data has emphasized by sociologists and the cognitive
improved, as has the availability of data and processes often examined by psychologists. For
tools for studying social networks or example, Anderson and colleagues ( 2012)
constructing simulation models. It may also refl fruitfully examined a range of both micro-level
ect the “cognitive revolution” in psychology, (e.g. individual personality measures) and more
which some psychologists argue has moved the meso-l evel factors (e.g. group expectations) to
fi eld too far from studying behavior, in favor of build a better understanding of why individuals
understanding cognitive mechanisms sometimes prefer to occupy low-status positions in
(Baumeister et al. 2007: 398; Cialdini 2009) . groups.
We have noted the “hub and spoke” nature A second area for future work is building
of of small groups research, in which the central additional bridges between small groups and other
concept of small groups animates a range of areas of research in sociology. For example, Bobo
theoretical and empirical approaches. In general, and Hutchings ( 1996 ) bridged social psychology
this is benefi cial for small groups researchers and work on race and ethnicity to productively
because it provides a wealth of perspectives and extend Blumer’s group position model –
fi ndings to build on. At the same time, the sheer formulated to understand the relationships between
size and diversity of the literature can make it dominant and subordinate groups – to the study of
challenging to navigate and synthesize these fi a complex multiracial society. Useful bridging
ndings. In our view, there is much to be gained could also occur between the areas of social
from building bridges between these spokes, networks and small groups – both function as
both within and across disciplines and subfi elds. meso-level connections between individuals and
Moving forward, we suggest three broad ways larger social structures, but in different ways.
in which small groups researchers can connect Networks can link far-fl ung individuals, but do not
the spokes to further develop the small groups necessarily impart a sense of shared identity or
literature and contribute to sociology. These community – indeed, one of the fascinating aspects
include (1) reconnecting with other disciplines, of social networks is that we may be structurally
especially psychology, (2) bridging the small connected to other individuals without being aware
groups literature with other subfi elds within of it (Watts 1999 ). One example of bridging these
sociology, and (3) continuing to synthesize areas areas is Lawler’s ( 2002 ) work on micro-social
of research within the small groups literature. orders, which helps explain how a network of
individuals may begin to develop a sense of
15 Small Groups: Refl ections of and Building Blocks for Social Structure 313

themselves as a group. Fine ( 2012 ) also suggests (although some work takes a quantitative approach,
examining connections between networks of small e.g. Vaisey 2009 ; Fishman and Lizardo 2013 ).
groups, which may help explain how ideas and The methods preferred in the two areas yield
other aspects of culture diffuse across groups. different, but complementary types of knowledge.
A third approach is to build bridges within For example, experimental work often examines
small groups research, further linking work on short-lived groups that offer a high degree of
status, power, identity, infl uence, and culture. control and allow researchers to make causal
There has been much promising work linking inferences – but provide little evidence as to how
the concepts of power and status (e.g. Fast et al. groups change and develop over time (McGrath et
2012 ; Thye 2000 ; Willer et al. 2012 ), status al. 2000 ). The qualitative approaches more
and infl uence (Melamed and Savage 2013 ), common in studies of culture are excellent for
identity and social identity (Hogg et al. 1995 ; abductively generating hypotheses and theories
Stets and Burke 2000 ), and status and identity (Timmermans and Tavory 2012 ), and examining
(Burke et al. 2007 ). There are many ways to groups over longer periods of time. However, these
profi tably continue in this vein. For example, as methods don’t offer the same degree of control or
a theory of the self, identity theory has been less causal inference found in experimental work. That
focused on group interaction than work in other is, while these methods both contain limitations,
areas of sociological social psychology. While together they have high potential to generate
all social roles individuals occupy should holistic inferences about the social processes
provide them with a sense of identity – including present in small groups when considered in
those stemming from membership in groups – tandem. We believe that future work could benefi t
we know less about how these identity processes by considering creative new ideas that broker links
interact with other intragroup processes such as between the two methods (e.g. Burt 2004 ; Jick
status or power dynamics. Given that few 1979 ). Others have emphasized the value of
studies drawing on identity theory examine bridging social psychology and culture (see, e.g.
small groups, this could be a fruitful avenue for the special issue of Social Psychology Quarterly
future research. As a second example, more and the introductory article by Collett and Lizardo
work could link social identity theory to other 2014 ; Dimaggio 1997) , but there remains much
areas. For example, Yamagishi et al. ( 1999 ) room for further development.
argue that the ingroup favoritism reported in For sociologists, small groups have moved
studies of social identity is not driven by from being a relatively central to a relatively
psychological identifi cation with the group, but peripheral part of the fi eld. For most of us,
instead by a rational expectation that group however, small groups have always been an
members will reciprocate the favoritism in the integral part of our daily lives. Small groups
future. This suggests that what appears to be a provide the settings in which we learn about our
social identity process could be a form of social world, and where abstract concepts such
exchange, similar to those documented in work as status, power, and identity become real for us.
on power. Yamagishi et al. ( 1999 ) provide They are also the setting in which most people
some evidence in favor of this argument, but as play a role in shaping their social world, whether
far as we are aware there has not been a great inventing a nickname for a friend, or launching
deal of additional work addressing this question. a movement with global implications. In the end,
Further research exploring the link between it is this centrality to our daily lives that keeps
identity and exchange could help elucidate this the study of small groups crucial for
relationship. sociologists.
T o offer a fi nal example, perhaps some of the
largest gains to be made are in linking work on
culture with the other areas. While work on power,
status, identity, and infl uence often uses laboratory
experiments and surveys, much work on culture
employs ethnography and open-ended interviews
314 S. Benard and T.D. Mize

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The Theories of Status 16
Characteristics and Expectation States

Murray Webster Jr. and Lisa Slattery Walker

16.1 Overview and Background Department of Sociology, University of North


Carolina, Charlotte, Charlotte, NC, USA e-mail:
mawebste@uncc.edu; lisa.walker@uncc.edu
Status Characteristics and Expectation States 1. If members of a task group begin meeting with
names a family of interrelated theories, along some noticeable social status inequality
with research settings devised to help develop the differentiating them (for instance, on juries
theories and bodies of empirical tests and where occupation and education differentiate
practical applications. While we mostly describe members), that status inequality will create a
the theories and their structures, we will mention recognized inequality among group members.
empirical work and applications as they are
2 . If members of a task group begin meeting as
significant for theory development.
equals (for instance workers at the same level
These theories all involve various sorts of in a business organization or college students
social inequality, from the smallest social working on a group project) the interaction
settings, face to face interaction, through process will create a recognized inequality
institutional settings including the family and among group members.
business organizations, to entire social systems,
nations and cultures. We begin with the theories’ In the next two sections we will develop
analyses of how inequality develops and is theoretical explanations for those two findings.
maintained or changed in small, face to face task Following that, we describe further development
groups. Task groups are ubiquitous in all of the theories for other theoretical questions and
societies. They include committees and task some applications of the work. Issues of
forces in business, sports teams, juries, military inequality at the interpersonal level, such as in
units, classroom group activities, and many groups, and at the level of society long have been
others. central to sociological theorizing. Although all of
Two of the best established findings in face-to- the theories in this chapter cannot be said to have
face social interaction are: developed out of a particular older theory, some
of the concerns of older theorists appear in topics
of the theories in this chapter.
Status—consisting of respect, prestige, and
social advantages and disadvantages—has been
studied and theorized from many different
M. Webster Jr. (*‡ /6:DONHU viewpoints. Early in the twentieth century, status
was important in the writing of the American
economist Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929). In an
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 321
S. Abrutyn (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary Sociological Theory,
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32250-6_16
M. Webster Jr. and L.S. Walker

essay that also identifies “conspicuous whether entire societies or small groups such as a
consumption,” Veblen (1899/1953) analyzed the family, faced the same four problems, called
importance of status value of objects. Status value “functional prerequisites,” for effective
impresses others without conferring any functioning and even for survival (Parsons 1937,
utilitarian value. For instance, an expensive new 1951). To fulfill the functional prerequisites,
car in the driveway can impress the neighbors but groups organize and develop patterned
it offers very little practical value above what interaction. Often the organization is what
could be gotten from a secondhand economy car. Durkheim (1893 [1933]) had called “organic
The German philosopher and social theorist solidarity,” a division of labor such that some
Georg Simmel (1858–1918) wrote that “The first subsets of a group emphasize solving one
condition of having to deal with somebody… is prerequisite and other subsets emphasize other
to know with whom one has to deal” ([1908] prerequisites.
1950: 307). Presumably, knowing the status Robert Freed Bales (1916–2004), who worked
position of a person is important social with Parsons (Parsons et al. 1953), studied small
information for knowing how to deal with him or discussion groups in a laboratory and focused on
her. More recently, Erving Goffman (1922–1982) how the nature of interaction develops during the
wrote about self- presentation, efforts to control course of a meeting. 74 To study interaction
the impressions that one makes during interaction patterns, Bales developed a famous 12-category
(1959, 1970). Goffman’s writing often focuses on system, Interaction Process Analysis, (Bales
techniques to convey a high-status image, 1950, 1999; Bales et al. 1951) for classifying
presumably for the interaction and other every speech and other communicative action,
advantages that it can confer. Veblen and such as gestures, in the group.75
Goffman treat status as desirable and something A Bales group comprises approximately 2–20
that people seek. Simmel treated status as only members, the upper limit determined by the
one part of an overall identity, and was silent number of people that we can interact with as
about whether people expend energy seeking individuals. (Beyond 20, the situation becomes a
status. As we will see later in this chapter, the speaker and an undifferentiated audience, and
contemporary view is that, while status confers participation is mostly one-way rather than
some advantages it also entails costs including interactive.) Bales recruited individuals, often
responsibility, and thus whether it is desirable college students, to join a problem-solving group
rests on other concerns and conditions. Under all and at the end of discussion, the group must settle
conditions, status differences are related to social on a single “best answer” to the group problem.
inequalities. The problem-solving task must be reasonably
Talcott Parsons (1902–1979), influenced by interesting to facilitate participation, and its
early theorists, primarily Emile Durkheim (1858– outcome has to be somewhat ambiguous so that
1917), developed a conception of social systems people can express different views and offer
that dominated sociological thought for at least a different contributions. An arithmetic problem
quarter century after the end of World War II in would not be suitable since it has a clear-cut
1945. In Parsons’ view, all social systems,

74
In Bales’ view, early interaction emphasized defining with one-way mirrors so that observers were removed
the problem—remember, these are task groups—and from the interaction. Marketing research relies on focus
collectLQJLQIRUPDWLRQ/DWHUSKDVHVHYDOX groups to assess potential new products and even plotlines
DWHGDQGV\QWKHVL]HG information and reached in movies; those are modifications of the research design
conclusions, and towards the end of the meeting, that Bales developed. Many leadership training courses
individuals turned to planning how to implement the adapt the idea of phases in group problem-solving that
conclusions (Bales and Strodtbeck (1951). were first studied by Bales and his students. And the
75
Many people are unaware how many innovations from distinction of “pro-active” and “reactive” styles of speech
Bales’ research have become accepted parts of our traces to Bales’ reports of group interactions.
culture. A one-way mirror is essential equipment for every
cop show on TV; Bales was the first to equip a laboratory
eories of Status Characteristics and Expectation States 323

answer; a question of how best to handle a case of can be evaluated by extra-systemic standards.
juvenile misdemeanor would be perfect. That simply means that someone doesn’t have to
It is worth pointing out that terms sometimes be a member of the group to judge whether it did
applied to theories—whether they refer to macro a good job; the standards for evaluation are not
phenomena, meso phenomena, or micro different for different people or for different
phenomena—do not really fit here. The theories groups. While many groups are task focused,
in this chapter, and many other theories as well, others are process focused; that is, the members’
span the range of sizes. As will be seen, main concern is the interaction itself rather than
expectation states and interaction involve producing a product or a right answer. Friendship
individuals and face to face interaction. Status groups, therapy groups, and social events such as
characteristics are features of larger society, e.g., parties are mainly process oriented. An outsider
the social definitions of the characteristics cannot really judge whether a party or a therapy
gender, race, occupation, education, and age. group was successful because that depends on
Theories in this section apply to the smallest subjective experiences of those who were there.
units, individuals and dyads; they also apply to Collective orientation means that the task is a
groups and larger social structures; and they group task. It is legitimate and necessary to take
explain how societal social beliefs and definitions everyone’s ideas into account. A soccer team is
affect interaction and group structure, and how collectively oriented; most coaches like to say
status beliefs themselves form and become “There is no ‘I’ in ‘team’.” In contrast, a
established. classroom of students taking a test are
We begin, in the next section, with individually oriented if it is not legitimate to share
development of a theory explaining how face to ideas and everyone can come up with different
face interaction can create expectation states, right or wrong solutions. A jury, which must
which are roughly comparable to ideas of task reach a unanimous verdict, must be a collectively
skill. We show how expectation states affect oriented group.
individuals’ awareness and behavior, change the /HWXVUHWXUQWRRXULOOXVWUDW
nature of interaction, and create group structure. LYH%DOHVJURXS composed of volunteer
Subsequent sections address larger social settings students who will discuss a group problem for 50
within which interacting groups exist. min or so, and at the end they will produce a
single group answer. They will then complete
confidential post-session questionnaires asking
who had the best ideas, who seemed to understand
16.2 P erformance Expectations and
the problem best, who showed leadership, who
Behavior exerted influence, and other measures of
inequality among the members. 76 During
Theories include scope conditions, descriptions
interaction, observers behind a one- way mirror
of the kinds of situations to which they apply, and
will code every speech act during discussion.
by exclusion, situations where the theories cannot
Here we focus on how often each person speaks
predict. The scope conditions for theories in this
and how often each person is spoken to.
chapter are more precise definitions of the kinds
of groups we have been discussing as “task
groups.” Two scope conditions are crucial for all
16.2.1 Interaction Regularities
the theories in this chapter, task focus and
collective orientation.
Four regularities in speaking are virtually certain
Task focus means that the primary reason for
to appear in task focused collectively oriented
meeting is to solve a problem or set of problems.
groups:
Another feature of task focus is that the outcome

76
To avoid normative answers such as “Everyone showed members of the group, including themselves, on most of
great leadership,” participants are asked to rank all the questions.
M. Webster Jr. and L.S. Walker

1. Inequality. The members will differ in how powerful reason to encourage that person to
much of the group’s time each of them participate more.
controls. Some people speak frequently, some
infrequently, and some participate hardly at 3. Consistency. On the confidential
all. Inequality is clear even in groups as small questionnaires, group members show high
as three or even two members. agreement with each other on the various
2. Reciprocity. If you rank group members from rankings. There is consensus on who had good
the highest interactor to the lowest, you also ideas, understood the problem, showed
will have ranked them in order of receipt of leadership, exerted influence, etc. If the
interaction. People who speak most are those observers also have rated group members,
who are most often spoken to. observers’ ratings concur with those of group
members. And the questionnaire measures
/HWXVSDXVHWRFRQVLGHUWKHVHWZ correlate highly with initiation rates. In other
RUHJXODULWLHV words, a person speaks frequently because
The first shows the inequality that we said is others have decided that he has good ideas.
characteristic of task focused collectively This means that the behavior and
oriented groups. Furthermore, as groups get questionnaire measures reflect a single power
larger, the amount of inequality increases. In a and prestige structure which we discuss in
three- person Bales group, the highest interactor more detail below.
controls about 43 % of the group’s time; the 4. Persistence. The inequality structure that can
second, about 30 %; and the third, about 23 %. In be seen after the first few minutes is the
a six- person group, the numbers are about 43 %, inequality at the end of the meeting. If the
19 %, 14 %, 11 %, 8 % and 5 %. The trend is that same group returns to discuss a different task
as the group gets larger, the top interactor controls (even if one or two members have been
about 45–50 % of the group’s time, and the replaced), the inequality that developed in the
remaining 50 % or 55 % is spread more and more first meeting tends to persist through
thinly across everyone else. By the time we get to subsequent meetings. This suggests that a
a 12-person group such as a jury, there will be semi- permanent mechanism has been created
some members who hardly contribute at all. during interaction that tends to maintain the
The second regularity shows that, in task particular inequality structure that emerged.
focused, collectively oriented groups,
participation rates are socially controlled. People
speak frequently because they are spoken to 16.2.2 A bstract Conception of
frequently, and not otherwise. It is not true that Interaction
someone runs on and on without social
permission. Group members usually are very Joseph Berger, a student of Bales, became
effective at controlling each other through interested in the inequality and the four
appearing interested or bored, asking questions or regularities that we have just discussed. However,
telling someone to let others speak. Why do they Berger was concerned with understanding
do that? The reason is task focus; they have to abstract general patterns rather than particular
solve the group’s problem, and time is limited. features of each group. He sought general
Even in a jury, which has no official time limit, patterns, and more importantly, he sought an
people still want to finish their work and go home. explanation for the patterns. This led him to
Nobody wants to waste time while someone goes formulate the first theory of performance
talks on without helping to solve the problem; or expectations and behavior.
worse, gives bad ideas that could mislead the All of the four regularities can be explained by
group. And on the other side, if it looks as though an underlying structure of performance
someone can help solve the problem, that is a expectation states that develop during interaction
and then creates and maintain the power and
eories of Status Characteristics and Expectation States 325

prestige structure. This concept—expectation 16.2.3 Building a General Theory


states—is key to all of the theory development
and empirical research described throughout this To construct a theory describing the processes of
chapter, and we describe it in some detail. expectation formation and maintenance, Berger
Expectations are anticipations of the quality of (1958) first developed an abstract
future performances. They are specific to conceptualization of task focused interaction.
particular actors and particular tasks, as in “I think This is a simplified model of task interaction.
she understands this task better than I do.” Thus Omitting pleasantries, jokes, irrelevant talk and
expectations are not quite the same as common other kinds of social-emotional speech, task
usage such as “I think she’s really smart” because focused interaction can be seen as having the
what matters here is: “Relative to the task at hand following four components, in sequence:
and relative to other people in the group, I expect
that she will perform better at this task than some 1. Action opportunities, or socially distributed
specific other person chances to perform. In a discussion, group,
(possibly myself).” someone might say “Do you have a suggestion
Furthermore, although it is sometimes possible for how to do this task?”
to bring expectations into conscious awareness 2. Performance outputs, or attempts to move the
through careful interviewing and in other ways, group towards problem solution. For instance,
most of the time expectations operate below the “I suggest we begin by listing all possible
conscious level. People in a task group do not options.” A performance is likely, although
often state, even to themselves, just where they not certain, to follow a given action
feel everyone’s task ability stands. Instead, they opportunity.
act as if they thought about relative expectations 3. Unit evaluations of performance outputs. For
before acting. We measure expectations through instance “That’s a good (or a bad) idea.” A
some of their behavioral effects, such as unit evaluation follows every performance
participation rates or influence. The theory output, although it might be formed privately
predicts behavior; it does not predict what people rather than expressed openly.
are thinking when they act.77 4. Influence when two or more performance
Berger’s approach was to develop a theory outputs or expressed evaluations disagree. For
explaining the development and maintenance of instance, “I guess you were right and I was
inequality using the mechanism of expectation wrong.”
states. The interaction process creates
expectations for each group member, and once We can think of interaction as composed of
those expectations exist, they affect all series of these sequences. Why does everyone
components of the power and prestige structure of make private unit evaluations of every
the group. So group members participate at a high performance output, even if they are not going to
rate because they hold relative high self- voice them? Because group members are highly
expectations. Other group members let those task focused; they need to know who is helping
people participate at a high rate because they hold reach the group’s goal and who is not. Why must
high expectations for their performances. every disagreement be resolved through
accepting or rejecting influence? Because the
group members are collectively oriented and they

77
An expectation state is a theoretical construct; a term theoretical construct. We cannot observe a conscience
used for things that are not directly observable, but that directly, but if we believe that someone has a well-
produce effects that can be observed. Gravity is a familiar developed conscience, we can use that belief to make
theoretical construct. We cannot see gravity or touch it, predictions of his or her likely behavior. Andreas (2013)
but we can see its effects and predict the effects with great describes theoretical constructs more fully.
accuracy. In everyday usage, a conscience is another
M. Webster Jr. and L.S. Walker

cannot just “agree to disagree.” That would mean


not reaching a conclusion to the group task. 5
Most of us can remember a time in school when a child
Unit evaluations are crucial to forming who was generally considered to be smart—that is, a child
performance expectation states. An expectation for whom other students and the teacher held high
state forms after a series of unit evaluations. If expectations—gave an answer that was less than stellar,
but the teacher said “good.” The opposite happens with
someone thinks “She’s right” “good idea,” “she’s
perfectly good answers from a child thought to be dumb.
right,” “good idea,” etc., at some point that Expectations affect unit evaluations of performances,
generalizes into “I think she knows how to do which usually makes expectations stable.
this.” That shows formation of high expectations 16.2.4 Explaining the Interaction
for that person. In the same way, people form self- Regularities
expectations through unit evaluations, and a task
group fairly quickly becomes structured in terms We now have a theoretical explanation for the
of the unequal distribution of expectations four regularities noted earlier.
attached to its members.
Once expectations form, they will affect all 1. Inequality. The fact that participation is
components of interaction and other elements of unequal is caused by the formation of
power and prestige in the group. The higher the performance expectations that get associated
expectations associated with a given individual, with every group member.
the more likely is he or she to receive action 2. Reciprocity. The correlation of initiation and
opportunities; the more likely is that individual to receipt of interaction is produced by the fact
accept an action opportunity and make a that both elements are produced by the same
performance output; also, the more likely is any underlying structure of expectations.
performance output to receive a positive unit 3. Consistency. Interaction, perceptions of
evaluation; and if disagreement arises, the more ability and leadership, and behavioral
likely is that person to reject influence attempts. outcomes including influence and leadership
Expectations, once they have formed, tend to choices all are produced by the structure of
persist. Why don’t they change? The main reason expectations.
is that expectations affect the very conditions that 4. Persistence. The stability of inequality, once it
created them; that is, the unit evaluations of emerges, is produced by the stability of
performances. A performance coming from a expectation states.
person linked to high expectations “just sounds
better” than a similar performance coming from a
person associated with low expectations.5 Unless
they are powerfully contradicted, once 16.3 S tatus Characteristics and
expectations form, they tend to persist. Expectations States
Expectation states produce effects that could be
considered self- fulfilling prophecies. To this point, we have described how task focused
Besides affecting the interaction sequence, interaction will create expectations and a
differentiated expectations will account for structured group inequality in a group of people
questionnaire measures of ability, leadership, who begin interaction as equals. The Harvard
etc., and will also explain actual choices for students who made up the groups that Bales
leadership positions and other positions of honor. studied were about as homogeneous as you could
The theory describes the following sequence find, reflecting the Harvard student body in the
shown in Fig. 16.1 for formation of expectation 1950s. All were white males who had done well
states through interaction in task groups. in high school, their family incomes were high,
they were all about the same ages, and they
dressed similarly. That initial homogeneity is
what made the inequality that formed in Bales
groups so striking to observers.
eories of Status Characteristics and Expectation States 327

Most natural task groups are composed of A characteristic C is a specific status


members who are differentiated on many characteristic ≡
characteristics. Consider a jury. Its members
differ on gender, occupational prestige, income, 1 . C has two or more states that are differentially
educational level, race, age, and many other evaluated in the culture; and
social characteristics. How does interaction differ
in a heterogeneous group?
Initially homogeneous and initially
heterogeneous task groups are alike in one way:
they both display inequalities of power and
prestige. However the inequality develops
differently in the two kinds of groups. Rather than
developing over a few minutes as in Bales groups,
heterogeneous groups usually are differentiated
from the outset of interaction. Another difference
is that homogeneous Bales groups often pass
through an initial period of contentiousness as
several members vie to dominate the discussion.
Heterogeneous groups, in contrast, very seldom
go through a struggle for control; the power and
prestige structure is evident from the very
beginning of the interaction.
Those similarities and differences would all be
explainable if people in differentiated groups
formed expectations for everyone at the very
outset, before any interaction takes place. In fact,
that is what happens. People use socially
evaluated characteristics to infer performance
expectations. Then expectations determine
interaction patterns and the group’s power and
prestige structure, as we have already seen. The
inequality in the outside society is “imported” to
the task group so that group structure is consistent
with social inequalities. This is the process of
status generalization illustrated in Fig. 16.2. This
process adds an additional way that expectation
states can form to the process shown in Fig. 16.1
earlier. We turn to constructing a more rigorous
theoretical explanation of the process.

16.3.1 D efined Terms

To begin, we use precise definitions of the types


of characteristics that will function in status
generalization. There are two types, specific
status characteristics and diffuse status
characteristics, denoted respectively by C and D.
M. Webster Jr. and L.S. Walker

2. Each state of C (C+ and C−), is associated with 2. Each state of D (D+ and D−), is associated with
the similarly valued state of specific the similarly valued state of specific
expectations. expectations; and
A specific status characteristic has limited 3. Each state of D is associated with the similarly
scope. It conveys advantages and disadvantages valued state of general expectations of
in certain situations and only in those situations. unknown or unspecified limits.
Being a champion or an incompetent weight
lifter, winning a spelling bee or being unable to Diffuse status characteristics are much broader
spell most three-syllable words, and being an ace than specific characteristics because of part (3) of
or a beginner at Sudoku are specific status their definition. They can create expectations for
characteristics. It is preferable to have one state virtually any task, with one limitation that we will
than the other; that is, the states have esteem note below. If, for instance, we live in a society in
Interaction Processes Performance Group Power and Prestige
Expectation States
Performances and Evaluations, influence,
participation, unit (Non-conscious choices for leadership,
Create Determine
evaluations, agreement anticipations for the perceived good ideas and
and disagreement, quality of future leadership, judgments of
influence performances) task skill

Fig. 16.1 Interaction, expectation states, and power and prestige

Socially-defined Performance Group Power and Prestige


Status Characteristics Expectation States
Evaluations, influence,
Including gender, race,
Generalize (Non-conscious choices for leadership,
age, experience, ethnicity, to produce anticipations for the Determine perceived
good ideas and education, beauty,
quality of future leadership, judgments of
motherhood and
performances) task skill
fatherhood, and others…

Fig. 16.2 Status, expectation states, and power and prestige


associated with them; this fulfills part (1) of the which people believe that (1) it is advantageous,
definition. And (2) people expect that someone preferable, better to be male than female; (2) that
possessing the high state of the characteristic can males are better at doing math problems than are
do something better than someone else who has females; and (3) that males are stronger, more
the low state. But not everything. We do not rational, more logical, better at gambling, more
ordinarily expect a champion weight lifter to mechanical, better programmers, etc., than
excel at Sudoku, or vice-versa. women, then gender is a diffuse status
A characteristic D is a diffuse status characteristic in our society. It is the “etc.” in part
characteristic ≡ (3) of the definition that makes gender a diffuse
status characteristic. Race, age, educational level,
1. D has two or more states that are differentially and other characteristics also meet the definition
evaluated in the culture; and in our society.
Notice that this theory does not predict that
gender, race, age, or any other characteristic will
eories of Status Characteristics and Expectation States 329

be a status characteristic. That depends on social


definitions, how the culture defines Assumption 1 (Salience). Any specific or diffuse
characteristics. What the theory says is that if status characteristic that differentiates actors, and any
something is a specific or diffuse status characteristic already believed to be relevant to the
characteristic in a particular culture, then certain group task will become salient; that is, it will become
a significant social fact that affects interaction
power and prestige consequences follow.
Societies differ in just which characteristics they
ascribe status beliefs to, and characteristics can Assumption 2 (Burden of Proof). Unless an interactant
believes that a particular status element is irrelevant to
acquire or lose status value as times change. Some the task, he or she will treat it as relevant for
of the further developments that we review below performance expectations for every actor. All salient
describe processes by which an initially characteristics will affect performance expectations, as
unevaluated characteristic can gain status value, follows
how status beliefs diffuse in a society, and how a
characteristic can lose status value. Diffuse characteristics will become linked to states
Now we can develop a theoretical explanation of Γ (general performance expectations) having the
that covers what happens in heterogeneous same + or − sign as the characteristic. States of Γ
will link to similarly signed states of C*, the
groups where one or more status characteristics specific ability to complete the task. States of C*
are salient. The theory uses the same scope will link to similarly signed states of T, task success
conditions as did the theory of expectations and (T+) and task failure (T−)
behavior: task focus and collectively orientation.
It adds the definitions of specific and diffuse Specific characteristics will become linked to states
status characteristics. The full theoretical of τ (specific performance expectations) having the
explanation uses five general propositions, shown
same + or − sign as the characteristic. States of τ
in Table 16.1.
will link to similarly signed states of Υ (general task
ability). States of Υ will link to similarly signed
16.3.2 T heoretical Propositions states of T, task success (T+) or task failure (T−)

Assuming a task group of people who are Assumption 3 (Sequencing). The status generalization
differentiated by one or more diffuse or specific process will continue as described in Assumptions 1
status characteristics, group inequality is created and 2 until all interactants are linked to states of T by
by the following process. all possible paths. If a new actor enters the situation,
the salience and burden of proof processes will
connect that actor to paths of T in the same manner. If
1. Salience. All differentiating status an actor leaves the situation after paths have formed,
information, and any status information that is existing connections will remain
already linked to the task by cultural beliefs,
becomes salient. Assumption 4 (Combining Status Information). All
2. Burden of Proof. Unless interactants believe salient status information functions to connect all
for certain that a salient status characteristic is actors to states of C*, the specific task ability.
Aggregate expectations form according to these
irrelevant to the task, they will treat it as
functions:
relevant and will form task-specific
expectations consistent with the states of the
characteristic. ep+ = éë1 1– – (( f ( )i
3. Sequencing. If interactants enter or leave the
group, or if the task changes, expectations )¼(1– f n( )))ùû ; ep- =-éë1 1– –(( f
already created by processes in (1) and (2) will
transfer, with attenuation, to the new task
situation. ( )i )¼(1– f n( )))ùû ;
Table 16.1 Status characteristics and expectation states
and ep = +ep+ ep-.
M. Webster Jr. and L.S. Walker

ep is aggregate expectations for actor p, f(i) is a collective orientation are crucial before status
function of the length of path i connecting an generalization is likely to take place.
interactant to outcome states of the task T through
intervening status elements A very common instance of status
The expectation advantage of actor p, which may be generalization can be seen in mixed-gender
positive or negative, is: e p–eo. groups. In our society, males have status
advantages. The status inequality produces
differential performance expectations; group
4. Combining. All salient status information members form higher expectations for males than
functions in the status generalization process; for females, whether or not the group task is
none is ignored. related to gender. The differentiated performance
5. Power and Prestige. Once aggregate expecta- expectations affect all elements of power and
tions form for all interactants, every person’s prestige in the group. Men get to participate more
relative position in the group power and and are more influential; they are thought to be
prestige structure is a direct function of their “doing better” at the group task and to be more
expectation advantages and disadvantages. valuable group members, and are more likely to
be chosen for leadership
This completes the development of the core positions.78
theory.
As we noted, a jury is a 12-person or a 6-
person task focused, collectively oriented
discussion group quite similar to the Bales groups
16.4 Some Instances of Status described above. While it is usually impossible to
Generalization study actual jury deliberations (juries work in
seclusion), we can see some status effects from
16.4.1 Juries and Sports Teams public data and other effects from conducting
simulated juries and observing them.
Before considering further theoretical develop- Feller (2010) reported that a foreperson is most
ments, we pause to study some cases that often:
illustrate the basic process of status
generalization. All of these illustrate how the ‡ Male. Only about 20 % of women are chosen
status inequalities in a society get “imported” to as foreperson (despite the gender neutral term
small task groups, where they organize the that replaced “foreman” some years ago).
group’s power and pres- ‡ Old. Only about half of jurors age 18–35
tige structure and interaction patterns among become foreperson; a person between 45 and
group members. 65 is about twice as likely to become
In our society (and in many others), all of the foreperson compared to the number of jurors
following carry status information: gender, race in that age group.
and ethnicity, age, educational level, and ‡ Educated. Two-year and 4-year college
occupation. The basic process of status graduates are over-represented as foreperson;
generalization, illustrated in Fig. 16.2 above, is people whose education ended before college
that status information becomes salient when are under-represented.
interactants notice that they possess different ‡ Experienced. Someone who has previously
states of a status characteristic. Remember also served as a foreperson is more likely to be
that status generalization occurs when certain
scope conditions obtain; both task focus and

78
Remember that this theory does not justify gender groups, the first step is to understand what’s producing the
inequality or any other sort of inequality. The theory inequality—performance expectations formed from status
describes how things work, not how they ought to work, generalization—and then use that analysis to design
what we might wish, or even what is natural. To the interventions. We will mention some effective
contrary, if you want to promote gender equality in task interventions later in this chapter.
eories of Status Characteristics and Expectation States 331

selected again than someone without jury The finding is that, as players progress through
experience. the ranks, the proportions of players from the two
ethnicities changes dramatically. Table 16.2
Once deliberation begins, the foreperson usually shows the proportions.
is the highest interactor, controlling about 25–31 The challenge is to account for the changing
% of the time in the group. (If participation were proportions of Sephardic and Ashkenazi players.
equally distributed in a 12-person jury, each At the outset, in high school, 46 % of players are
member would speak about 8 % of the time.) Sephardic; at the highest level National Team,
All of those findings are accounted for when fewer than 10 % are Sephardic. This cannot be
we note that gender, age, and education are accounted for by players’ wishes, for twice as
diffuse status characteristics in our society. The many Sephardic players said they had “a strong
theoretical process is that jurors form desire” to become professional.
expectations from status generalization, and then Table 16.2 Proportions of Sephardic and Ashkenazi soccer
select as leader the person with a status and players, and desire to become professional
expectation advantage. The foreperson not only Group % Sephardic %
speaks more than others, but he or she also is Ashkenazi
more influential over the verdict. All high school boys 46 54
What about the effect of experience? Junior league players 69 31
Experience is a specific status characteristic Senior league players 59 41
indicating some skill at working on a jury. Status
Among senior league 68 32
generalization works with both diffuse and players, having “a
specific status characteristics, in both instances strong desire” to
affecting performance expectations. become a professional
A striking fact about foreperson selection is Promotion to second 71 32
that it takes place before any actual deliberation. league (professional)
In other words, jurors are asked to select a leader player
before they have any evidence about skill, Promotion to first 19 31
knowledge, interest, or anything else. They have league (professional)
player
very little basis for choosing their leader other
than that provided by status generalization. Promotion to national 9.4 37.2
team (professional)
A sports team is very different from a jury in player
terms of concrete details such as what they do and From Yuchtman-Yaar and Semyonov (1979)
what their goal is; interaction is physical rather
than verbal, and the main goal is to win games. A
team definitely is a task focused collectively To understand how status generalization can
oriented group, and thus see status effects appear produce that effect, think about how players
in interaction processes. progress through the ranks. Being picked for a
Some years ago, two scholars in Israel promotion in level depends on coaches’ unit
(Yuchtman-Yaar and Semyonov 1976) studied evaluations of performances. Coaches see players
effects of status generalization from ethnicity— making a very large number of performance
Sephardic or Ashkenazi ancestry—among Israeli outputs, attempts to help their teams attain
soccer teams. This case is interesting because the success: kicking, passing, blocking, and all the
ethnicity characteristic studied here is one that other kinds of action. Coaches evaluate those
most Americans wouldn’t recognize, although it performances, and those evaluations generalize
is important and easily recognized in Israel. This into performance expectations that coaches attach
illustrates the point above that what constitutes a to players. When it comes time to recommend a
status characteristic is determined by the society, player for promotion to the next rank, those
what that society invests with advantages and expectations are very influential; coaches
disadvantages. recommend promotion for players for whom they
M. Webster Jr. and L.S. Walker

have come to hold high performance 16.4.3 Status or Dominance?


expectations.
Status generalization will affect unit It is important to understand that processes of
evaluations of performances, which will status generalization are consensual. In a jury,
(probably very slightly) bias evaluations upwards men are elected foreperson by both women and
for Ashkenazi players and downwards for men; it is not as though the men seize control or
Sephardic. The bias can be small because there suppress the women. Status generalization
will be so many performances and evaluations. processes affect everyone, both those who are
The cumulative effect makes Ashkenazi players advantaged by it and those who are
seem a little better than they would by a purely disadvantaged. Power and prestige inequality,
objective measure, and Sephardic players seem a when it is produced by status generalization, is
little worse. usually peacefully arrived at. The ordering seems
Notice that we are NOT saying that the right to the interactants.
coaches favor Ashkenazi players because of Dominance processes are quite different. They
“prejudice” or liking them better, or any of the create inequality through intimidation, threats,
common arguments. A coach is fundamentally and bullying, and they are conflictual rather than
concerned with winning games. Whether he likes consensual. Someone can seize control to his or
a particular player or wants to favor an ethnicity her advantage, but others will probably resent that
is virtually out of the picture. A coach will choose and when an opportunity presents itself, they will
and promote any player who seems to perform retaliate. Many years ago, Max Weber (Chap. 3)
highly. But the status generalization process is distinguished power from authority. Authority
quite subtle and mostly unconscious; it makes the marks legitimate inequality, whereas inequality
Ashkenazi players just seem to be performing a based on raw power is not seen as legitimate. If a
little better, on average. structure of inequality is not legitimate, it will be
unstable.
$QH[SHULPHQWDOVWXG\E\&HFLOLD/5L
16.4.2 Using the Theory GJHZD\
(1987) composed three-person groups of women
Could someone use the theoretical understanding in which one person was instructed to display
of status processes to make himself or herself either status cues (evidence of task skill) or
leader of a task group? The answer is yes, but a dominance cues (giving commands, interrupting,
more interesting question is: Do people want to pointing, or shouting). There were four
occupy high status positions? Certainly there are conditions, defined by how the pre-instructed
pleasant aspects. One is listened to and influential person acted: high task, low task, high
and enjoys enhanced evaluations from others. dominance, low dominance. Results showed that
What is sometimes overlooked, however, is that high task behavior made the focal person quite
group leaders bear more responsibility for group influential in the group, and low task behavior
actions than do ordinary members. Not everyone reduced her influence. She also was seen as more
would want to be foreperson of a jury in a murder competent on post-session questionnaires.
case. That might entail dooming a defendant—or However when she displayed high dominance
it might entail blocking justice for a victim. Being behaviors, she was no more influential and seen
team leader in a business organization certainly as no more competent than when she displayed
carries some perks, but if the team does not low dominance. She was, however, more
succeed, the leader is going to get much of the disliked.
blame. Power and prestige usually bring A second experiment (Ridgeway and Diekema
responsibility, and each person has to decide 1989) studied effects of dominance behaviors in
whether to strive to be leader. four-person groups of either men or women.
Here, two members of each group were pre-
instructed how to act. One displayed either
eories of Status Characteristics and Expectation States 333

dominance attempts (threatening behavior) or so much as the first status item. And so on. The
neutral behavior towards the second, who did not same process applies to items of negative status
react to either kind of behavior. Again, information. Finally, the positive and negative
dominance attempts were unsuccessful at sets are added together to yield aggregate or
increasing the person’s influence or perceived overall expectations for a person.
competence, and in these groups, the two If status items were combined consciously,
bystander members usually intervened to support nobody would be able to perform the operations
the person who was the target of the dominance in those functions in his or her head. What the
attempts. All-female and all-male groups theory claims is that they act as if they did that. In
displayed the same effects, though the level of other words, the theorist’s job is to predict how
retaliatory behaviors was higher in the male people will act. We do not believe that people
groups. perform advanced numerical calculations before
We might ask why the dominance attempts acting, only that we can predict behavior
were so unsuccessful at achieving a high position accurately using those functions. The theory
in the groups’ inequality structures, since in otherpresumes more complicated calculations than are
settings dominance sometimes works. The apparent to people whose behavior we want to
answer seems to be that we are dealing here with predict.
highly task focused groups and dominance In another way, the theory simplifies reality in
usually threatens successful task completion. The describing status positions. It treats status
members really want to do a good job of whatever characteristics as dichotomous, either positive or
their task is, so they want influence and group negative, without degrees. This means, for
structure to help further that goal. If people are instance, that if a college student interacts with a
not task focused, dominance attempts might well high school student or with a middle school
be successful, and if the threat is sufficiently student, the college student will treat either of
large, bystander intervention also may be them as giving him or her the same status
inhibited. advantage on education. The theory does not
distinguish grades of status characteristics. It
predicts that a college student treats a high school
16.4.4 Complexity and Simplification student or a middle school student equivalently
when it comes to power and prestige.
The theory of status characteristics and Of course we know that is a simplification and
expectation states in Table 16.1, like all sound reality is more comple16. But the question is not
theories, is stated precisely. Consider Assumption whether people could make fine status
4, which contains functions describing how distinctions; of course they could. The question is
multiple items of status function to affect whether they do make fine distinctions when
expectations. This assumption is needed to interacting in task focused groups. The evidence
describe expectations attached to someone when shows that they do not. Balkwell (2001) analyzed
multiple status characteristics are salient— a large amount of data relevant to the issue of
including gender, age, educational level, race, and graded characteristics. He found that the basic
others that may function in a particular case. theory of status characteristics better predicted
Assumption 4 claims that status information behavior than any alternate theory using graded
will be separated into positive and negative sets. characteristics. He noted that in task groups,
The first contains all items of status that people’s primary interest is in solving the group’s
advantage a person, and the second contains all problem, not in assessing fine distinctions of
items that disadvantage the person. Within sets, status. “It may be comforting to believe that
items are combined with declining importance. people process finely graded social information
For instance, the first positive item gives a large so as to use its full richness, but this assumption
boost to expectations for that person. A second consistently has been shown wanting (2001:
positive item will increase expectations, but not 112).”
M. Webster Jr. and L.S. Walker

Furthermore, the theory treats all status XQDWWUDFWLYH/DQG\DQG6LJDOO1974


characteristics as equal in effect on expectations; ), and many subsequent studies have found that
no status is more important than another, all carry attractive students of all ages are judged more
equal weight. This means that age, gender, race, favorably by teachers (e.g., Ritts et al. 1992).
and all other characteristics contribute equally to Attractive defendants in swindling cases are seen
performance expectations; no salient as more dangerous and given longer sentences
characteristic is ignored, and no characteristic is (Sigall and Ostrove 1975). So whether the task is
so important that it overwhelms everything else. admirable (doing well in school) or despicable
This theoretical view is much simpler than some (swindling), attractive people are thought to be
alternate views of how people use status better at it. Frevert and Walker (2014) reviewed a
information. For instance, some might think that large number of studies that show advantages
people attend mostly to status characteristics on include: hiring and promotions in organizations,
which they have an advantage and ignore or wages, success in civil lawsuits, and marketing.
downplay those on which they do not. Or perhaps Those findings are all explained by the theory of
people treat certain statuses—gender and race are status characteristics and expectation states if
often mentioned—as so important that they make beauty fits the definition of a status characteristic,
any other status information irrelevant. Or given above.
perhaps people simply add up all the positive and Webster and Driskell (1983) showed
negative statuses rather than combine them respondents photos of college students previously
according to the functions in Assumption 4. rated as highly attractive or highly unattractive by
Berger et al. (1992) conducted an elaborate other students. To measure general expectations,
experimental test of alternate models of status they asked respondents to estimate, among other
processing. Results of all those experimental tests things, reading ability, grade point average, and
were much closer to predictions from the theory ability at “things that you think count in this
as stated than they were to any of the alternate world.” To measure specific expectations,
models. The evidence shows that under the respondents estimated success of the targets at the
conditions of task focus and collective FAA exam for private pilots. Results showed, as
orientation, this theory describes behavior very predicted, that respondents estimated higher
well and better than alternatives that have been specific and general expectations for the
considered. attractive people pictured. An additional finding
is that gender of raters did not affect their
judgments. In other words, they were responding
to status rather than to sexual or romantic
16.5 Two Prominent Status
attraction.
Characteristics

16.5.1 Beauty 16.5.2 Motherhood and Fatherhood


Folklore and reality television tell us it is
Many studies of employment by sociologists and
fortunate to be beautiful and unfortunate to be
economists show that mothers experience
ugly. Almost a century ago, Perrin (1921) showed
disadvantages in hiring and salaries when
that attractiveness was important for popularity
compared with comparable women who do not
among college students, and numerous studies
have dependent children. Ridgeway and Correll
since then have documented many positive
(2004) reviewed the literature to see whether
consequences of physical attractiveness. Many,
those disadvantages might have status aspects;
though not all, of those studies involve
that is, whether motherhood carries status
performance skills. Essays said to have been
disadvantages. They found that motherhood
written by attractive students received better
indeed leads to attributions of lower competence
grades than did the same essays when the
and lower job commitment. Those factors, of
purported authors were
eories of Status Characteristics and Expectation States 335

course, could account for the hiring and salary 16.6.1 Interaction in Schools
discrepancies.
Correll et al. (2007) conducted direct tests of Classrooms, at least for the first 12 grades, are
the analysis with experiments and an audit study task focused situations where teachers distribute
of actual employers. The experiments confirmed action opportunities (such as asking “Who knows
status disadvantages connected with motherhood. the answer to this question?”), students offer
Those effects were found for both male and performance attempts (such as raising hands and
female raters, showing that the status significance answering), and teachers (and sometimes also
of motherhood appears among both women and other students) distribute unit evaluations
men. In the audit studies, the researchers (“Right” or “Wrong”). The unit evaluations lead
answered actual job announcements with resumes to teachers and students forming performance
including either childfree or motherhood as expectations. Those performance expectations
characteristics of applicants. Childfree resumes then affect future interaction, such as the
generated over twice as many callbacks (offers of likelihoods that a given child will offer a
an interview) from potential employers. performance output, and that any future
At the same time, Correll et al. (2007) found performance will receive a positive evaluation in
what might be called a “fatherhood premium,” class and on a grade sheet.
though that effect is less pronounced. In the Entwisle and Webster (1978) conducted
experiments, men who were described as fathers several experimental studies in classrooms in
were seen as more competent and committed, and which they showed that giving children positive
were recommended for higher starting salaries. evaluations would indeed raise their self-
Audit studies here did not show a difference in expectations, and those raised expectations led to
callbacks, perhaps due to a weaker effect or to a change in behavior known to affect learning,
having fairly small sample sizes. Killewald participation rates.
(2013) analyzed other data to show that Entwisle et al. (1997) studied effects of
fatherhood seems to be an advantage when the parents’ expectations for their children. On the
man is in a “standard situation;” that is, married, first day of first grade, the researchers asked
the biological parent, and living with the children. parents to tell their most realistic expectations for
Without that situation, Killewald found no their children’s school performance. Parents’
fatherhood premium. Overall, motherhood carries expectations were positively associated with
status disadvantages, while fatherhood does not. desirable outcomes later—teachers’ marks and
standardized test scores—and were negatively
associated with negative outcomes—bad conduct
reports, being held back a year. Most
16.6 Status Interventions
impressively, those effects persisted through fifth
Of course, several important status characteristics grade. While parents’ reported expectations
have been documented besides the ones just probably are connected to many different ways
described. Here we turn to using the theoretical that parents interact with their children, this
understandings to devise interventions to research shows the importance of expectations in
overcome effects of our society’s status school settings.
advantages and disadvantages. Effective
interventions of three kinds have been developed.
First are those that intervene in power and 16.6.2 Using Assumptions 3 and 4
prestige aspects of interaction processes. Second
are interventions that use Assumptions 3 and 4 on (OL]DEHWK * &RKHQ DQG 5DFKHO
how status affects expectations. Third are /RWDQ1997) modified expectation effects by
interventions using task definition. assigning roles. They selected children with a
visible ethnic status disadvantage (Hispanic
children in majority- Anglo classes), showed
M. Webster Jr. and L.S. Walker

them how to make objects (e.g., a simple radio abilities, and that it is reasonable to expect that
receiver) and then gave them the role of “teacher” some people will be good at one part, and others,
to show other children, “learners,” how to do it. at other parts. In technical terms, they defined the
This approach overcomes the ethnic status task as complex, not unitary. Thus expectations
disadvantage and equalizes interaction by adding for each part of the task are likely to be different.
status advantages based on knowledge and role. $PRQJ WKH TXHVWLRQV IRU &RKHQ
/LVD:DONHUHWDO2014) conducted DQG /RWDQ was whether task complexity
laboratory studies of groups of three adult would lead students to conclude that, on average,
women, one African American and two white. In each person is likely to contribute about the same
the control condition, without any experimental to group success. They did. The task complexity
treatment, white women participated more in instruction equalized interaction and influence
discussion and exerted greater influence over the among the children in mixed-ethnic groups.
group decision. In an experimental condition, a Carla Goar and Jane Sell (2005) adapted the
computer distributed action opportunities— task complexity intervention for use among
telling each person when to participate—and adults. They composed three-person groups of
raised the number of action opportunities given college women, one African American and two
the African American women. This change in white, and asked them to develop a group
participation rates, simply inviting them to speak decision. (This is the situation that Walker et al.
more often, equalized their influence over group (2014) later adapted for the interaction study
decisions. This intervention is potentially quite described above.) In the control condition, status
useful, for it can occur unobtrusively and is at generalization created expectation advantages
least partly under control of the interactants. from race and the white women participated more
and exerted greater influence. In the experimental
condition, Goar and Sell’s instructions
16.6.3 T ask Definition emphasized the complexity of the group task, as
&RKHQDQG/RWDQKDGGRQH5HVXOWV
Status generalization works most powerfully in ZHUHYHU\ similar. Goar and Sell succeeded in
simple situations. Any sort of complexity is likely equalizing interaction and influence using this
to increase variability and add additional sources simple intervention.
of information to expectation formation. Another In summary, the theory gives many ways to
LQWHUYHQWLRQ GHYHORSHG E\ intervene in situations where it is desirable to
&RKHQ DQG /RWDQ affect status generalization processes. New ways
(1997) and used with groups of children of suggested by the theory await implementation.
different ethnicities, stressed task definition. Most of the intervention studies to date have
These studies counteracted a common aimed at reducing unwanted status generalization,
misconception among children (and some adults) such as that from gender or race/ethnicity.
that school ability is unitary; either one is good at However there are other instances where one
school or one is not. But a more accurate might wish to enhance effects of status
representation is that school and most tasks in life generalization. For instance, if status accurately
require multiple abilities and that most of the time reflects task ability (as in a well-functioning
someone who is good at one part of the task is less bureaucracy such as a business organization or
skillful at other parts of the task. This is what the military), and if prompt acceptance of
Cohen and /RWDQ VKRZHG WKH influence is needed, it would be desirable to
VWXGHQWV 7KH\ GHVFULEHG D group enhance status and interaction advantages.
task that required multiple abilities— defining the Interventions to strengthen status effects would
task, making suggestions, organizing ideas, use the same theoretical principles as
synthesizing ideas to a useful action, interventions to lessen or overcome those effects,
implementation, evaluation, etc. They told but of course with direction of the influence
children that success required many different reversed.
eories of Status Characteristics and Expectation States 337

The second condition is interaction of the


observer with members of the two groups; this
16.7 Theoretical Extensions will spread the beliefs among a society. Suppose
the observer is male and encounters a woman who
Extensions build on a core theory to address new at this point does not hold any status beliefs for
questions. In this section we consider two recent gender. The man, however, sees a status
extensions that explain how descriptive terms can difference between them, and so he acts as a
be transformed into diffuse status characteristics. status superior towards her: he interacts at a high
Following those theories, we briefly describe rate, tries to exert influence, etc. Since people
other theoretical extensions, with references for tend to align their actions, the woman adopts
additional information. complementary low status behaviors. If that
16.7.1 Creating Status Characteristics happens repeatedly, she begins to associate low
status with being female; interaction includes
If certain diffuse status characteristics, including “training” for status beliefs. And of course a
gender and race, simply named groups without comparable process can train new men into status
implying evaluative beliefs and ideas of abilities, beliefs regarding gender.
many societal problems would disappear. Recall
that whether a characteristic is a status
16.7.1.2 The Theory of Spread of
characteristic depends on cultural beliefs and
Status Value
there is no inherent reason why any particular
A second mechanism is that status beliefs can
characteristic must carry those beliefs. But once
spread from existing status characteristics to new,
the beliefs spread in a society, they can have
initially unevaluated characteristics (Berger and
profound consequences for interaction, social
Fisek 2006). For instance, if new immigrants
structure, and people’s lives. Where did those
from Country X are low on education and
beliefs come from? Two recent theoretical
occupational prestige, the low status value from
extensions explain ways in which an unevaluated
those characteristics can spread to attach low
nominal characteristic can acquire status beliefs
status to the group of X-ers. Thus immigrants can
making it into a diffuse status characteristic.
acquire low status value. Comparable processes
can spread positive status value to other groups.
16.7.1.1 The Theory of Status Experimental tests (Walker et al. 2011) confirmed
Construction that process. So we have two theories of how
In this theory, status construction proceeds from status characteristics get created: (1) through
other types of inequality, particularly of differences in possessions and interaction
possessions or other resources (Ridgeway 1991; patterns, and (2) through spread of status value
Ridgeway and Erickson 2000). First, two (or from established status characteristics. The two
more) groups may control different amounts of theories have minor differences in scope of
wealth and other status-valued objects. Suppose, applicability, and they also have much overlap.
for instance, that an observer notices that the Notice also that both theories predict ways that
group “male” controls more wealth or more social status value can decline or vanish. One way in
esteem than the group “female.” If the difference both theories is inconsistency. If people encounter
between the groups is regular so that someone is wealth and gender groups inconsistently linked—
more likely to encounter a rich male than a rich one is as likely to encounter a rich female as a rich
female, there is a tendency to reason that “there male—then the conditions for creating and
must be a reason for it.” Then it is a short step to maintaining status beliefs no longer exist.
granting more social esteem and to inferring Similarly, if people encounter immigrants from
differential competence. This is the creation of country X who have high education and high
status beliefs and attaching them to different occupational status as often as the opposite case,
states of the characteristic gender. For that then spread of status value will equal out and the
observer, gender has become a status ethnicity X will no longer carry status beliefs.
characteristic.
M. Webster Jr. and L.S. Walker

And of course status value could be reversed by having low status. This can occur even among
processes similar to the ones that create it. Status people showing the same objective performance
beliefs can be altered through deliberate levels. Standards are invoked to decide whether a
intervention, using predictions derived from the particular performance level is “good enough;”
theories. In addition, historical changes might that is, whether it meets the requirements for
well produce conditions for the decline of status adequacy or excellence. The double standards
value of certain characteristics. Equal opportunity process has greatest effect when the objective
programs and laws and regulations might break performance scores are intermediate; their
up the regular association of wealth and some operation is harder to see when objective
characteristics. Changing status value of an performance is extremely high or extremely low.
existing characteristic will require overcoming A typical application of this theory is to hiring
existing status beliefs and then replacing them recommendations. Suppose that members of a
with beliefs in equality. hiring committee review folders of two
candidates for a job. Both are recent college
graduates and they have comparable GPAs in
16.7.2 Other Extensions, Variants, and relevant courses—not outstanding grades, but
Elaborations above the threshold set for hiring. If the
candidates differ on gender status (one is female
In addition to research programs on creating and one is male), the status difference is sufficient
status characteristics, a number of different to trigger the double standards process. The
theories have been developed to address specific woman is judged by a more stringent standard and
topics regarding social structures and so the man is more likely to receive hiring
interpersonal behavior. In this section we review recommendations. Foschi and her collaborators
five of these; Berger et al. (2014) describe several have conducted a large number of studies that
other developments related to theories of status repeatedly demonstrate the basic process, and
processes. also have studied additional processes, one of
All of these developments use the core which we describe below, that affect double
concepts of expectation states and status standards.
characteristics that we have been working with,
adding concepts and conditions to explain a much 16.7.2.2 Race and Interaction
wider range of phenomena. Recall that we began All of Foschi’s work to date has studied gender
this survey by noting the ubiquity of inequality in status. Sharon Doerer (2013) studied the same
groups and group structures. These theories processes, but with a different status
address different sorts of inequality and structural characteristics, race. In Doerer’s study, both job
conditions, but it is easier to understand them by candidates were identified as male, but one was
keeping in mind the overall concern with sources, African American and the other was white. The
forms, and consequences of inequality. same process took place; the white candidate was
more often recommended for hiring, despite the
16.7.2.1 Double Standards equal qualifications of the two candidates.
Martha Foschi and her collaborators (Foschi Both Foschi and Doerer also studied the effect
1989, 1996, 2000; Foschi and Valenzuela 2015) of responsibility, having to write justifications for
have developed a longstanding research program the hiring recommendations. (In the basic studies,
on ways that double standards—demanding respondents only had to recommend a candidate,
different performance levels—can affect without explaining their choices.) Simply adding
inequality. In general terms, the theory explains a requirement for responsibility greatly reduced
when and how interpretations of performance the use of double standards, both for gender and
levels can maintain existing status distinctions. for race. Why should that be the case? Because
Individuals having high status may be judged by status processes operate below the level of
more lenient standards than other individuals conscious awareness. They alter specified types
eories of Status Characteristics and Expectation States 339

of behavior, but generally without awareness that groups, it is a marker of status inequality. Two
is occurring, at least during the interaction studies on emotions help fill in the picture of how
situation. Having to justify hiring gender and emotion interrelate. Simon and Nath
recommendations apparently focuses respondents (2004) analyzed a nationally representative
more sharply on what they are doing and the job sample of adults and found no difference in the
requirements. In other words, conscious frequency of experiencing emotion between men
processes—in this case, choosing the more and women.
qualified candidate—take over and the However status advantages (being male and/or
subconscious effects of double standards become earning more money) is associated with
less significant. Introducing a requirement of experiencing more positive emotions. For the
justification is a simple change in procedure, but often- studied emotion anger, again women and
one with important consequences. men experience it about equally often, though
their ways of dealing with it differ. Women are
more likely to talk about it with friends or co-
16.7.3 E motions, Sentiments, and workers and to pray, and men are more likely to
Status Processes mask it with alcohol and other psychoactive
drugs. Overall, this study and many others
Emotions are generally defined as temporary (described in greater detail in Webster and
feeling states, subject to social conditions. They Walker 2014) show the importance of social
are only partly under one’s control (e.g., it usually structures in generating emotions and in people’s
doesn’t do much good to tell someone “Don’t be expression of them.
angry.), and while an emotion exists it affects Sentiments, enduring positive and negative
both thoughts and behavior. emotions, are extremely common in interpersonal
A theoretical paper by Ridgeway and Johnson situations. Do they affect expectations? For
(1990) describes some effects of one’s position in instance, if I dislike someone, does that lower my
a group structure on emotions. Suppose two performance expectations for that person?
people, one in a high status position and the other Perhaps a more familiar case is positive
in low status, disagree about something they both sentiment. When a parent strongly loves a child,
consider important. That is likely to generate does that love bias the parent’s view of how
different emotions for the two of them, such as capable the child is? Casual observation in both
anger and guilt or depression. The high status instances might make it seem that sentiments do
individual is more likely to attribute the emotion affect expectations, but some careful
to the other person (“He is annoying me”), while experimental studies disconfirm that. The
the low status person is likely to attribute it to relations of sentiment and status are a bit more
himself (“I may have done something wrong.”). complex than they might appear at first.
Besides the experience of emotion, the social The first question, whether sentiments affect
structure also affects the likelihood of expressing expectations, was addressed in a four-condition
it. Norms generally discourage expressing experiment by Driskell and Webster (1997). In
negative emotions and encourage expressing condition 1 of the experiment they created a status
positive. However high status individuals are difference, showing participants that their
freer to express anger, and thus negative partners were highly skillful at the group task, and
expressions tend to move downwards in the measured the partner’s influence during
structure, while positive expressions tend to move interaction. As expected, influence of the highly
upwards. skilled partner was quite high. In condition 2, they
Despite popular beliefs about inherent added dislike, showing participants that the
differences between males and females in partner disagreed with their values on several
emotionality, most research shows a more significant issues. That lowered the influence of
complex relationship. Gender, of course, is a the partner, which of course would also happen if
diffuse status characteristic, so in mixed-gender expectations for the partner were lowered.
M. Webster Jr. and L.S. Walker

However, if liking and disliking are a separate 16.7.4 Creating Legitimate Authority
process from status and expectations, then as the Structures
task becomes more important, the effect of liking
will decrease. If sentiment affects expectations, Legitimation, the process by which a group
task importance will have no effect. Conditions 3 inequality structure comes to be seen as right and
and 4 of the experiment were comparable to proper, is crucial to authority structures in
conditions 1 and 2, but with payment added for businesses and in the military. If the structure is
task success to increase the value of good seen as legitimate, authority is accepted, its
problem solution. With payment, effect of members are satisfied, and the organization
disliking was greatly reduced; participants functions efficiently. Of course when authority is
attended mostly to expectations for the partner, as not seen as legitimate, significant problems
they did in condition 1. This experiment showed follow. (Readers who are conversant with
that sentiment is a separate social process from classical theory will recognize that a concern with
status and expectations. Bianchi (2004) replicated how structures gain and lose legitimacy was a
that experiment with better controls and results main concern for Max Weber. It is an enduring,
showed the same conclusion. highly important topic.) Status and legitimacy are
In discussion groups, sentiment has an indirect dealt with in papers by Berger et al. (1998),
effect on expectations. Shelly (1993, 2001), Kalkhoff (2005), Ridgeway and Berger (1986),
Shelly and Webster (1997 DQG /RYDJOLD and others.
DQG
Houser (1996) discovered how sentiment can
indirectly affect expectations. Sentiment affects
the interaction process in open interaction. For 16.8 S ummary
instance, liking someone can make us more likely
Task groups of all sorts, including discussion
to give that person action opportunities, leading
groups, juries, athletic teams, and work groups in
to his or her greater participation. Also, liking
organizations generate performance expectations
makes us less likely to express negative unit
or accept them from outside the group or from
evaluations even if we believe the person is
status generalization. Those expectations then
wrong, and more likely to express any positive
determine most features of inequality in
evaluations. That too will affect the target
interaction and group structure. Understanding
person’s self- expectations, and of course those
the sources and consequences of performance
expectations will affect interaction process and
expectations is crucial for understanding how
the group’s power and prestige structure.
groups structure themselves and how individuals
Other elaborations apply ideas of status and
act in such groups.
expectations to understand fairness, how certain
Status generalization is a process of forming
kinds of relations between individual
performance expectations, not from observations
characteristics and outcomes can come to seem
of performance, but rather from importing
fair. For instance, it is widely thought that it is
society’s inequalities and thus allowing them to
“fair” for a college graduate to be paid more than
affect task group structures and interaction
a high school graduate, even for jobs that do not
patterns. In many cases, but not all, status
need abilities beyond those that a high school
generalization can produce undesirable effects,
graduate has. The same process operates for
such as: unfairly reducing a low status
undesirable outcomes: we form beliefs about how
individual’s chances to perform, depriving the
much punishment is “fair” for different sorts of
group of contributions from low status but
crimes. These theories and some empirical tests
competent individuals, making less than optimal
are available in Berger et al. (1972), Webster
choices for leadership positions, and generally
(1984), and Webster and Smith (1978), among
distributing power and prestige on basis other
other places.
than merit.
eories of Status Characteristics and Expectation States 341

In many other situations, status generalization Bales, R. F., & Strodtbeck, F. (1951). Phases in group
produces desirable effects, augmenting the problem solving. Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology, 46, 485–495.
influence and authority of a leader who actually %DOHV 5 ) 6WURGWEHFN ) / 0LOOV 7 0
does possess high ability. Dangerous situations Roseborough, M. E. (1951). Channels of
such as can occur during widespread fires or in communication in small groups. American
the military, may require quick obedience to Sociological Review, 16, 461–468.
Balkwell, J. W. (2001). How do actors in task-oriented
commands. When a group leader truly does have
situations process finely graded differences in ability?
high competence, dangerous situations make Sociological Focus, 34, 97–115.
quick following of orders important and even life Berger, J. (1958). Relations between performance,
preserving. rewards, and action-opportunities in small groups.
Status generalization is neither good nor bad by Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard
University, Boston.
itself; that depends on other features of situations
Berger, J., & Hamit Fisek, M. (2006). Diffuse status
in which it occurs. The important thing is to characteristics and the spread of status value: A formal
understand conditions under which it is likely to theory. The American Journal of Sociology, 111,
occur and its effects when it does. 1038–1079.
In this entry we have reviewed status processes Berger, J., Cohen, B. P., & Zelditch, M., Jr. (1972). Status
characteristics and social interaction. American
as related to some everyday characteristics. We Sociological Review, 37, 241–255.
also considered interventions, deliberately using Berger, J., Norman, R. Z., Balkwell, J., & Smith, R. F.
theoretical knowledge about status processes to (1992). Status inconsistency in task situations: A test
advance desirable outcomes. This research of four status processing principles. American
Sociological Review, 57, 843–855.
program has developed a great deal of
Berger, J., Hamit Fisek, M., & Norman, R. Z. (1998). The
information on the operation of expectation state legitimation and de-legitimation of power and prestige
and status processes in the past 50 years. There orders. American Sociological Review, 63, 379–405.
are currently more than a dozen research Berger, J., Wagner, D. G., & Webster, M., Jr. (2014).
traditions under this large classification, and new Expectation states theory: Growth, opportunities, and
FKDOOHQJHV ,Q 6 5 7K\H ( -
theory and evidence are accumulating rapidly. /DZOHU(GV
Taken as a whole, the theories in this chapter Advances in group processes (Vol. 31, pp. 19–55).
demonstrate powerful effects of small differences Bingley: Emerald Publishing.
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Negative sentiment in task groups. Sociological
inequality. Once characteristics have acquired
Perspectives, 47, 339–355.
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happens when interactants work together on heterogeneous classrooms: Sociological theory in
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criminal justice system to the classroom to the Correll, S. J., Benard, S., & Paik, I. (2007). Getting a job:
Is there a motherhood penalty? The American Journal
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Driskell, J. E., & Webster, M., Jr. (1997). Status and
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The Self 17
Alicia D. Cast and Jan E. Stets

17.1 Introduction Department of Sociology , University of


California, Riverside , Riverside , CA , USA e-
mail: jan.stets@ucr.edu
The concept of self is ubiquitous; it has been Self in Interaction conceptualizes the micro
written about in a variety of disciplines such as realm as involving the encounter or interaction
philosophy, sociology, psychology, and political between individuals (Turner 2010b ). The focus
science. Clearly, the self has utility for is on the positions that persons occupy in the
understanding questions about the human situation, and the role-related behaviors
experience. Unfortunately, given its ubiquity, associated with those positions. Included in this
conceptual confusion emerges on what is the self level of analysis are the presentation strategies
(Schwalbe 1988 ). A discussion that would cover that individuals employ to manage their own and
how the self is viewed from different areas would others’ identities. In this section, we also discuss
be a diffi cult undertaking. Our approach is simply the identity verifi cation process, which is a major
an overview of the theoretical and empirical way that people obtain support in interaction.
research on the self from a sociological Self in Groups and Social Categories focuses
perspective.
on the self at the meso level, which is comprised
A fter introducing current sociological of corporate and categoric units (Turner 2012 ).
conceptions of the self, we organize the remaining The corporate unit refl ects individuals’
chapter into three major areas: Self in Interaction embeddedness in proximal groups of varying
, Self in Groups and Social Categories , and Self sizes and organizational structures such as work
in Society and Cross - Culturally . These three organizations, schools, and families. The
areas have a close affi nity to understanding all categoric unit is a social distinction that places
sociological processes at the micro, meso, and individuals into distinct social categories as in
macro levels (Turner 2010a , b , 2012 ). being a member of a particular gender, race, class,
and sexual orientation. Given individuals’
involvement in corporate groups and their
membership in particular categorical units within
those groups, a distinct set of experiences emerges
A. D. Cast ()
for the self. For instance, membership as a woman
Department of Sociology , University of
California, Santa Barbara , Santa Barbara , CA , (in the gender category) will infl uence her
USA e-mail: acast@soc.ucsb.edu experiences within particular (corporate) groups
J. E. Stets such as the family or work, and these experiences
will differ from those whose categoric
membership is a man. Because of space

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 343


S. Abrutyn (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary Sociological Theory,
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32250-6_17
345

limitations, we will organize our discussion globalization as impacting the self as refl ected in
around categoric units (gender, race, and class), wider social networks and increasing exposure to
but we will highlight the way that categoric units different cultures.
infl uence the self through corporate groups. 17.2 Conceptualizing the Self 17.2.1
Self in Society and Cross - Culturally
discusses the self at the macro level by examining The Early Thinkers
how the organization of society facilitates the
development of particular selves, beginning with William James ( 1890 ) is credited as the fi rst
the distinction between institutional and person who provided a serious treatment on the
impulsive selves (Turner 1976 ). The distinction self. He conceptualized the self as the sum total of
between one’s real self as having an institutional all that individuals could lay claim to or call their
locus (the real self is revealed in adherence to own. He discussed four kinds of self: the mate-
normative standards and is in control of his/her rial self, the spiritual self, the social self, and
behaviors) or impulsive locus (the real self is the pure ego . His social self has been central to
something to be discovered and is revealed when the development of contemporary symbolic
inhibitions are lowered) has facilitated an analysis interactionism (Stryker 2002 [1980]). Through
of the role of modernity in theorizing about the his analysis of the social self, we learn that
self. We briefl y will discuss how modernity has individuals are complex, having as many social
infl uenced conceptualizations of self. selves as there are individuals who recognize
M ore generally, society and culture help them and carry an image of them in their heads.
construct particular kinds of selves, and cross- For instance, an individual might be known to her
cultural research reveals this. Indeed, in Western children as “mom,” to her husband as “wife,” to
societies, the self is defi ned as more independent her peers as “friend,” and to her employees as
and autonomous while in Eastern societies, it is “boss.” Each image has a set of meanings and
defi ned as more interdependent and relational expectations that individuals internalize, and
(Markus and Kitayama 1991) . Thus, we discuss which guide their behavior. Thus, the self is
the different self-orientations that have appeared located in the minds of others, and among the
in cross-cultural work. Finally, we identify how a multiple selves that exist, each refl ects a different
society’s particular morals and values shape the image others have of the self.
self. Here we address emerging research on the Not long after James’s seminal work, Charles
moral identity (Stets and Carter 2012 ). Horton Cooley ( 1902) extended James’ ideas on
W e conclude the chapter with some thoughts the social self in his now classic looking glass self
about future directions in the study of the self . As in a mirror, people see themselves, but they
from the micro, meso, and macro levels. At the also see the reactions of others refl ected back to
micro level, an area that has been garnering themselves. As Cooley indicated, individuals
attention is the self in neuroscience. Early imagine how they appear to others, they imagine
neuroscientists (Damasio 1994 ; LeDoux 1996 ) how others judge that appearance of them, and
created a good foundation in which sociological they have an emotional reaction to that judgment
social psychologists are now thinking about the that is either positive, in form of pride, or
self (Franks 2010) . At the meso level, there is a negative, in the form of shame. 79 A person might
growing interest in investigating how the self is think that others see her as intelligent, she might
experienced differently when individuals stand at think that others will judge intelligence as good or
the intersection of different groups in society. The positive given that being intelligent is valued in
way in which a white, middle class, heterosexual our society, and she will feel proud as a result.
man experiences his work or home life is likely to L ike Cooley, George Herbert Mead
be very different from a nonwhite, lower class, emphasized the social self, underscoring the
lesbian woman. At the macro level, we see intimate connection because self and society in a

79
Our refl ection as to the reactions others’ have to us, in the main ways we come to understand who we are in
contemporary terms, are called refl ected appraisals . Refl identity theory (Burke and Stets 2009 ).
ected appraisals or how we think others see us is one of
A.D. Cast and J.E. Stets

series of lectures that were eventually published uences the way the person feels. But Mead is more
in Mind , Self , and Society (Mead 1934) . explicit about minded activity. In Mind , Self ,
Similarly to Cooley, Mead envisioned the self as and Society, he opens with a discussion of the
a product of society. As Cooley conceptualized mind. For Mead, the self originates in the mind of
individuals’ views of themselves as a series of individuals. The mind develops and arises out of
imaginations about how individuals believed social interaction. Mentality comes when
others saw them, Mead saw the social self as individuals are able to point out to themselves and
derived from individuals getting outside of to others objects in situations and the meanings
themselves and taking the standpoint or role of the associated with those objects. These meanings are
other and seeing who they were through the lens communicated through signs and symbols
of others. Through repetition and over time, (language). Identifying these meanings gives
individuals would come to share others’ humans some control in the situation and allows
understanding as to who they were, they would for the coordination of activity.
anticipate the reactions of others to their actions, To the extent that the self is an object like any
and the meaning of the self would become a other object that humans point out in situations,
shared meaning. individuals attempt to control the meanings that
For Mead, the social self was revealed when are associated with who they are in order to
individuals engaged in refl exivity . Indeed, refl sustain themselves. The control of self-meanings
exivity is the hallmark of selfhood; humans have is social: how individuals see themselves comes
the ability to refl ect back on themselves and take from the standpoint of others. Individuals respond
themselves as an object. Refl exivity, selfhood, to themselves as others would respond to them,
and the development of a social self is seen in the meanings of the self are shared, and there is a
Mead’s classic discussion of the internal merger of perspectives of the self and others
conversation between the I and the Me that becoming one.
emerges within individuals and in and across
situations.
The I is the self-as-subject. It is the self that 17.2.2 Contemporary Thinkers
initiates action in a situation to bring about a
particular outcome. It represents that part of the Over time, as individuals point out who they are
self that is responsible for agency and creativity. to themselves and to others, they come to develop
The Me is the self-as-object. It is the self that an understanding of who they are; this is their self
looks at the action (of the I ), the environment, - concept . The self-concept is the sum total of
and the relationship between the two in order to individuals’ thoughts, feelings, and imaginations
guide the I to its intended outcome. The Me also on themselves (Rosenberg 1979 ). Following
contains the views of society or culture or what Mead’s approach to understanding the self in
Mead labeled the generalized other . The Me terms of the mind, researchers during the
acquires this perspective through the process of twentieth century expanded on the cognitive
role- taking where individuals attempt to perceive aspect of the self by studying the content and the
the situation from the view of others. Thus, the structure of the self, that is, one’s self-concept.
Me is the self that is social because it embodies The content of the self is understood as having
the perceptions and understandings from the cognitive components such as one’s identities
standpoint of others. However, the Me is also and emotional components such as one’s self-
individual because it attempts to help the I satisfy esteem.
its goal. In this way, the Me is refl exive because The cognitive component of one’s identity
it is able to take the self into account that is refers to the set of meanings about the self that
distinct from others, while at the same time it defi nes him/her as a particular kind of person
locates the self in a community of others. (person identities), as a role occupant (role
A side from developing the social aspect of the identities), or as a member of a group/category
self, Mead also develops the cognitive aspect of (group/social identities) (Burke and Stets 2009 ).
the self. In Cooley’s looking-glass self, we see Meanings are individuals’ responses when then
how thinking about how others see oneself infl refl ect upon themselves in a person, role, or
347

group/social identity. More specifi cally, they are 17.2.3 Self as Cognitive and
the way people describe or characterize Emotional
themselves in an identity. For instance, one may
have the meaning of being “caring” when she H istorically, the cognitive and emotional
thinks of how moral she is, “hardworking” when aspects of the self were seen as opposing forces
she thinks of herself as a student, and with cognition synonymous with rationality and
“cooperative” when she thinks of herself as a emotion synonymous with irrationality (Turner
member of her neighborhood watch group. and Stets 2005 ). Cooley more than Mead
Caring, hardworking, and cooperative, help defi incorporated emotions into his analysis of the self
ne her in her moral person identity, student role in social interaction given his looking glass self
identity, and neighborhood group identity, and individuals’ emotional reactions of pride or
respectively. mortifi cation to how they thought others
I dentities guide one’s behavior in interaction. evaluated them. Mead did not ignore emotions
Looked at another way, individuals should behave altogether, but he was less interested in the
in ways consistent, in meaning, with the meanings emotion, itself, and he was more interested in the
in their identities. Thus, if a person saw herself as display of emotions such as moving one’s top lip
hardworking in the student role identity, then we upward to show disgust or shedding tears to show
could expect that in the student role, she would be sadness or grief (Ward and Throop 1992 ). What
highly motivated to attend her classes, participate was important was that the emotional display
in class discussion, do her homework, and take called forth a response in others, operating as a
her exams. In this way, people’s behavior is a social cue. The display of disgust would cue to
window into the self-meanings tied to their others to stay away from whatever was the object
identities. of the person’s attention; the tears might signal
The emotional component of self - esteem is that the person needed comfort thereby activating
the degree to which individuals evaluate social support from others.
themselves in positive or negative terms. I t wasn’t until the latter part of the
Individuals are taking themselves as an object and twentieth century that the self as an emotional
refl ecting upon who they are in evaluative terms entity became the focus of attention for
of goodness or badness. Self-esteem can be traced sociological research (Turner and Stets 2005 ).
back to the early writing of James ( 1890 ) who We now have a wide array of theories that help us
understood it to be a function of achievements as understand why and when individuals will
well as aspirations as expressed in the formula: experience particular emotions. We know that the
self- esteem = successes/pretensions. How culture infl uences whether these emotions will be
individuals feel about themselves is the result of expressed, or whether individuals will engage in
their accomplishments (successes) relative to emotion management. And, we know that one’s
their goals (pretensions). Thus, individuals could position in the status structure encourages the
have low self-esteem even if their expression of some emotions over others.
accomplishments were high because their goals A dvances in neuroscience have made it clear
could be higher. Alternatively, persons could have that cognition and emotion should no longer be
high self- esteem if their successes were modest seen as polar opposites. The early work of
and their goals were even more modest. Damasio ( 1994) was critical in showing the
Contemporary thinkers have had a tendency to intimate connection between emotions and
see self-esteem in terms of self-worth, that is, the reason. He revealed how, when the cortical region
degree to which individuals feel that they are of the brain (where cognitive functioning occurs)
valued, accepted, and respected (Rosenberg et al. is disconnected from the subcortical region of the
1995 ). However, recently, it is argued that there brain (where emotions are located), individuals
may be two other components of self-esteem: have diffi culty making good decisions; in fact,
being effi cacious and being authentic (Stets and their decisions are irrational. Emotions serve as an
Burke 2014b ). We will have more to say about important guide for choosing between
this later. alternatives, and the choices that are made have
consequences for the emotions that are
A.D. Cast and J.E. Stets

experienced. Today, the cognitive and emotional orchestrated by his/her own or even others’
aspects of the self are seen as inextricably actions. Structural arrangements persist according
connected. to their own principles and intrude into
interaction, constraining the actions of
individuals. Indeed, every situation has an
17.2.4 Self and Social Structure implicit status hierarchy, a distribution of
resources, and a set of norms that shape and guide
A hallmark of a sociological approach to the self interaction, and this may constrain what
is to recognize that self and society mutually infl individuals can accomplish.
uence each other (Stryker 2002 [1980]). Society Another way to conceptualize the self and
creates opportunities for the development and society interplay is to view the self as embedded
organization of the self, and it provides a set of in social networks (Stryker 2002 [1980]).
meanings through language that allows for the Embeddedness both refl ects the number of social
self to interact with others. In turn, when ties within a network (referred to as extensive
individuals interact in groups and within commitment) and the emotional ties to the
institutions using shared meanings, they recreate network (referred to as affective commitment).
the very social structures that are represented by Therefore, we can think of a social network as
those meanings. Thus, social structure arises from embedding individuals in a circle of others to
the actions of individuals. However, because of whom one feels connected. Access to particular
the refl exive nature of the self, there is always the networks is based on people’s positions in the
potential for creativity and a change to the social social structure and the roles they enact, with ties
structure. to others based on self and others enacting the
Recognizing the infl uence of the self on same roles. A student, for instance, will be more
society and society on the self is expressed in the likely to have a network of others comprised of
idea that the self is a social force as well as a students than non-students. When people’s ties to
social product (Rosenberg 1981 ). As a social others depend upon them enacting a particular
force, the self can be seen as motivated to bring identity, then that identity will be salient to them.
about particular outcomes or accomplish specifi c Increasing commitment to that identity is based
goals. Action is intentional, monitored, and on being emotionally close to others in the social
regulated with the commitment to bring about network based on that identity and having a large
one’s goals despite disturbances in the compared to small social network that is based on
environment. If one’s goals are consistent with that identity. The greater the commitment to an
structural arrangements, they reinforce not only identity, the higher the salience of the identity
the person, but also the interaction within which (Stryker and Serpe 1982 ). Thus, we see how the
the action emerged, and the structure within self is understood in terms of its embeddedness in
which the interaction is embedded. If the goals are the social structure.
in opposition to social structural arrangements, Recently, researchers have gone beyond the
interaction may become disrupted and destabilize role of social networks in characterizing the social
existing structures. structure, and they have differentiated large,
As a social product, the self is shaped by the intermediate, and proximate social structures
social structure through interactions with others. (Stryker et al. 2005 ). Large social structures refl
This begins at birth and continues throughout the ect the stratifi cation system along such lines as
life cycle. While social structures impose race, class, and gender. Ties to the social structure
constraints on individuals in terms of their along these lines provide individuals with
actions, it also provides resources and opportunity different social identities that refl ect their
structures for the self. For example, while we see membership in these groups. Intermediate social
the intergenerational transmission of class structures are more local networks such as an
position, the unexpected also occurs as when we organization or neighborhood that provides social
witness upwardly mobile actors. Considering the boundaries for the probability of particular social
infl uence of the social structure makes one aware relationships forming. Proximate social structures
that a person’s outcomes are not completely are those associations and interactions that are
349

more personal to individuals such as ties to one’s Clearly a professor has other positions/roles/
family, one’s school, or one’s immediate identities that could be claimed such as friend,
department in an organization (Serpe and Stryker spouse, and or parent. Similarly, the student has
2011 ; Stryker et al. 2005 ). In proximate social other aspects that characterize who s/he is such as
structures, role identities and person identities son/daughter, boyfriend/girlfriend, and/or
have the opportunity to be developed. Taken worker. Each person in the situation does not have
together, social structures both infl uence and immediate access to all other aspects of another in
constrain the development of a particular kind of the situation, but one does not have to have access
self and the corresponding identities associated to know that these other aspects exist.
with it.

17.3.1 Role-Taking
17.3 Self in Interaction
W hat makes for successful interaction among
When we think about the self in interaction, we actors is taking the role of the other or seeing a
cannot think of the whole person communicating situation from the other’s vantage point. This
with others, but only a part of the self, depending process is an extension of what occurs in the
upon what position the person is occupying in the development of the self. Over time, who we come
situation, the corresponding role (behavioral to be is infl uenced by taking the role of signifi
expectations) associated with the position that is cant others such as family and friends in
played out, and the identity attached to the role situations, envisioning how they see us, and using
(the meanings associated with who one is in that that as a guide for how we see ourselves and how
role). An illustration of this might be if a person we behave (Kinch 1963 ; Mead 1934 ; Schwalbe
occupies the position of professor in a classroom. 1988 ; Turner 1962 ). Looked at another way,
There are cultural expectations attached to this role- taking is the appraisals of others that are refl
position such as lecturing, answering questions ected back on us, and that infl uence how we see
from students, testing students’ knowledge, and ourselves and how we behave.
rendering an evaluation on their performance. Role-taking may be conceptualized along the
What lies behind these behaviors are the dimensions of accuracy, range, and depth
meanings about who one is when these actions are (Schwalbe 1988 ). Accuracy is correctly
performed. This is the professor identity. The identifying how another sees oneself. More
professor identity may carry meanings of being sensitive individuals may be better at accurately
intelligent and critical, and these meanings will reading the views of others than less sensitive
correspond to the meanings that are “given off” persons. Range is the degree to which one can
when the professor lectures, answers students’ identify various different views on oneself. Those
queries, and provides grades at the end of the who have contact with a diverse set of others may
term. Corresponding to the professor is a counter- be exposed to more varying views of oneself.
position, counter-role, and counter-identity to Depth is how much one can see the full range or
which the professor is related and that total view that another has on oneself. More
characterizes another person in the situation. This intimate, long-term relationships reveal a more in-
counter- position would be student, the role depth view as to how another sees oneself.
expectations might include listening attentively, I ndividuals are born with the capacity to role-
taking notes, asking questions, and taking exams, take, and it develops over time through their
and the identity meanings implied by the role interactions with others (Mead 1934 ). Mead’s
expectations and that may be associated with the distinction between the play and game stage is
student identity may include being logical, hard- an account of how individuals develop this ability.
working, and curious. The initial development occurs through children
N otice that in the above illustration, what gets acting out the role of specifi c actors that they
activated for each set of actors is only one aspect encounter such as “mom,” “the store cashier,”
of who they are (either professor or student). “the mail carrier,” and “the daycare teacher.”
While the child role-takes the position of specifi c
A.D. Cast and J.E. Stets

others, the child has not yet developed an interaction (Turner 1962) . They not only imagine
understanding that these specifi c others have the perspective of others and take that into
others who they relate to in the form of counter- account, but they also creatively construct their
roles such as the store cashier responding to the own role given their goals. A conception of
requests of the store manager. The child also does interaction as having a certain amount of role-
not understand that these specifi c others occupy taking and role- making means that individuals
several other positions within society; mom might both conform to others’ expectations as well as
also be a doctor at the hospital, and a friend to create some of their own expectations.
another. Some have questioned how central role-taking
It is not until children enter team sports, is for self-development since individuals’ self-
Mead’s game stage, that children learn about roles concept is not highly correlated with how others
and counter-roles, and how individuals take on the actually see them. Instead, the self-concept
perspective of several other viewpoints appears to be fi ltered through perceptions and
simultaneously when they act. In the same way resembles how people think that others see them
that a pitcher on a baseball team plays his/her (Shrauger and Schoeneman 1979 ). Thus,
position effectively by coordinating his/her individuals may not be very accurate in judging
actions with all other players in the infi eld and what others think of them. This inaccuracy may
outfi eld, children come to learn how roles in be partly due to others being reticent in revealing
society are related to counter-roles, and how goals their views, or if they reveal their views, they may
are reached through cooperation. Through reveal primarily favorable views rather than both
repetitive involvement in organized activities, favorable and unfavorable views (Felson
children learn that organized groups expect 1993 ).
certain things of them. When children take these When sociologists have empirically
expectations into account in team sports, they are investigated role-taking in interaction, they have
rehearsing taking the role of the generalized other studied how one’s membership in the stratifi
or imagining what they think society demands of cation system infl uences who is more likely to
them when they act. As children age, they shape their view of themselves and who is more
increasingly take the role of the generalized other, likely to roletake. We fi nd, for example, that in
internalizing the expectations of society. This newly married couples, spouses with higher status
helps them abide by the norms of society. (more education, a higher occupation, and more
S ome have suggested that rather than income) in the marriage are more likely to not
individuals taking the perspective of society at only infl uence their partner’s self-views but also
large when acting, they take into account the the partner’s views of these higher status spouses
views of signifi cant others such as family and (Cast et al. 1999) . Lower status spouses have less
friends (Rosenberg 1990) or reference groups infl uence on the self-views’ of their higher status
(Shibutani 1955 ). Therefore, individuals are counterparts, or on how their higher status
likely to have a sense not only of what the counterparts view them.
members of society at large expect but also what T hose of lower status appear to role-take more
specifi c individuals expect. More generally, the than those of higher status (Thomas et al. 1972 ).
ability to take the role of the other is what makes Powerful, higher status individuals, given their
a biological being into a truly social being. By greater infl uence, may see no reason to be
individuals taking the views of others into account sensitive to others’ views in a situation and take
when they act, coordinated activity is possible. those views into account. Their structurally
Without the ability to anticipate the reactions of advantaged position is enough to maintain control
others, actors are unable to fi t their actions to the over others. Alternatively, given the structurally
actions of others. It is what makes group life disadvantaged position of less powerful
possible. individuals, role-taking is a way to meet the needs
Role-taking would appear to be inherently of the more powerful. Research reveals that
conformist given that individuals adopt the women are more likely to role-take and role-take
perspective of others and behave accordingly. more accurately (Love and Davis 2014 ).
However, individuals also role-make in However, since women have lower status in
351

society, gender is confounded with status. When that is ineffective, audience members may help to
the two are disentangled, we fi nd that status restore a person’s face by ignoring the misstep or
rather than gender predicts roletaking accuracy providing an account that the person had not
(Love and Davis 2014 ). offered.
The proliferation of social media
communication such as Facebook and Twitter
17.3.2 Self-Presentation provides new venues for self-presentation. While
some people tend to create a self-image that is
Self-presentation refers to a set of activities positive and fl attering online, it could be
people use to control an image as to who they are discredited to the extent that viewers see these
in the eyes of others. While self-presentation often self-images as contradicting offl ine
evokes the image of people conveying a positive performances. Others, however, seek to present
view that advantages them in terms of obtaining an authentic view as to who they are.
power, wealth, friends, and/or self-esteem, self- Interestingly, psychological well-being both
presentation may also involve an image that predicts authentic self-presentations on social
accurately or authentically represents them media, and well-being is enhanced when one is
(Schlenker 2012 ). These different goals are authentic. However, this is especially the case
analogous to the different self-motives that when it is a positive authentic self-presentation or
underlie human behavior. Either people want to people present a positive but honest view of
be seen favorably, or they want to be seen in ways themselves (Reinecke and Trepte 2014 ). The
that are consistent with how they see themselves. positivity norm of social media thus creates some
From the former has developed self-enhancement tension between the motive to verify the self and
theory; from the latter has developed self- verifi the motive to enhance the self.
cation theory (Kwang and Swann 2010 ). T he front and back stage regions of social
S elf-presentation is a central process within media are somewhat different than Goffman’s
Goffman’s dramaturgical approach (Goffman stage metaphor where individuals are directly
1959 ) . Using the analogy of a theater’s front and communicating with their audience. In one sense,
back stage, self-presentations are carried out in the front stage in social media is akin to the
the front region or “on stage,” and individuals performances given off when television captures
may employ a variety of behaviors, props, words, a person’s performance, or when fi lm follows
and gestures to convey a particular person in the one’s daily activities such as a reality show. The
situation. The back region or “off stage” is largely viewer can return to this performance by
inaccessible to audience members, so individuals revisiting the archive, or in social media, return to
can behave in ways that contradict front stage the original posting. The presenter does not see
performances. the audience, and the audience can be broad in
P erformances must be believable otherwise scope. And, because as discussed earlier,
they risk being negatively sanctioned (Goffman individuals have as many social selves as there are
1959) . While people may exaggerate their individuals who recognize them and carry an
abilities or accomplishments, this is more likely to image of them in their heads, a self-presentation
occur if their claims cannot be verifi ed. When may confi rm one social self but disconfi rm
their claims can be verifi ed, and if negative another social self because the social networks
information is revealed as to who they are, they that were ordinarily distinct in interaction now
may exaggerate abilities or accomplishments on overlap.
dimensions that refl ect more positively about But, there are some differences between the
themselves (Schlenker 2012 ). Sometimes, self that is presented in interaction or in television
individuals may discredit their own self- and the self that is presented over social media.
presentations as when they fail to show evidence The self-presentations over social media may be
of a skill they claim to have. Embarrassment is frequent as one posts daily accounts of
experienced, which is the uncomfortable feeling experiences and events. Others may help in a
of being exposed (Goffman 1959) . To restore person’s presentation as they post to a person’s
face, one may apologize or provide an excuse. If site through “tagged” information. Audience
A.D. Cast and J.E. Stets

members can provide feedback on a person’s are, for example, “I am caring and fair,” “I am
presentation through text and images of their own, strong-willed and confi dent,” or “I am
which can be easily transmitted to other audience competitive and unemotional” that are associated
members. And, that feedback can be immediate, with the different identities that they claim. These
or it can be delayed. Such audience involvement self-meanings comprise the identity standard for
suggests that they have a closer hand in the each of their identities: “caring and fair” may be
creation of a person’s self-presentation than is the identity standard for the moral identity,
ordinarily the case in other communication “strong-willed and confi dent” may be the
channels. standard for the control identity, and “competitive
The back stage region of social media involves and unemotional” may be the standard for the
the preparation of content that eventually gets gender identity. A particular set of identity
posted over social media (the front stage region) meanings gets activated in a situation to the extent
such as carefully composing one’s thoughts, that the identity meanings are aligned with the
crafting status updates, and fi ne-tuning photos for meanings in the situation, making the identity
one’s audience (Davis 2016) . This careful relevant in the situation (Stets and Burke 2014a ;
crafting of one’s self-image reduces the likelihood Stets and Carter 2012 ). It is this relevant identity
of a faux pas emerging and creating that is important in the identity verifi cation
embarrassment, although embarrassment can process. For instance, if the meanings in the
arise when one’s social network members present situation call forth moral behavior such as helping
images on oneself that were not authorized for an elderly person cross an intersection, the moral
viewing. identity (as opposed to some other identity such
M ore generally, as communication with others as the identity of “artist” or “golfer”) will be
increasingly becomes digitally mediated, activated to guide the prosocial act. If the person
researchers need to examine how social actors’ thinks that given her helpful act, others see her as
performances take a new form so that they can moral in a way that matches her self-view as a
continue to be positively viewed and verifi ed. moral person, identity verifi cation has occurred.
People are networked in ways they have never W hile situational meanings can “activate” a
been before, and the overlapping networks create particular identity that corresponds to the
challenges to successful self-presentations to situational meanings, it is also possible for people
diverse networks. As the self becomes connected to call up or activate a salient identity regardless
to more and more individuals and groups, there is of situational meanings. Here, the individual
an increasing number of people to whom the self would construct a set of meanings in the situation
is held accountable for successful self- that would correspond to the meanings in the
presentations (Gergen 1991 ). salient identity. If the parent identity, for example,
is particularly salient for individuals, they may
call up this identity at work and construct
17.3.3 Identity Verifi cation meanings that correspond to it such as talking
about their children to their co-workers, showing
Aside from role-taking and self-presentation, pictures of their children, texting their children at
identity verifi cation is a third process in work, and bringing their children to work. Identity
interaction that we want to highlight. Identity verifi cation of the parent identity would occur to
verifi cation occurs when individuals perceive the extent that co-workers evaluate the person in
that others in an interaction see them in the same the parent identity in the same way that the
way that they see themselves (Burke and Stets individual evaluates herself in this identity with
2009 ). Essentially, people observe the feedback all of this taking place in the workplace rather than
that they receive from others, and they interpret the home setting.
this feedback in terms of how they think that The outcome of identity verifi cation is
others see them. positive feelings for the individual (Burke and
More specifi cally, individuals enter an Harrod 2005 ; Stets and Burke 2014a ; Stets and
interaction with self-meanings, that is, Carter 2011 , 2012 ; Stets and Harrod 2004 ).
characterizations or descriptions as to who they Individuals feel good when they experience
353

identity verifi cation because it helps foster the see that their “real” self is being affi rmed. This is
view that their world is predictable and the authenticity dimension of self-esteem. Thus,
controllable. It also provides a feeling of support: while group/social identities are about social
that others know who one is. These positive acceptance (self-worth esteem), role identities are
feelings may be revealed in positive emotions about whether one’s roles performance is
such as happiness or positive self-evaluations effective (self-effi cacy esteem), and person
such as increased self-esteem. identities are about whether one’s true self is
Recent research theorizes and fi nds that the revealed (authenticity self-esteem).
verifi cation of different bases of identities While identity verifi cation fosters good
(group / social , role, and person identities ) infl feelings, identity non-verifi cation leads to
uence different self-esteem outcomes ( self - negative feelings. These negative feelings emerge
worth , self - effi cacy , and authenticity , not only when individuals think that others see
respectively) (Burke and Stets 2009; Stets and them more negatively than how they see
Burke 2014b ). ourselves, but also when they think that others see
While group identities are the self-meanings that them more positively than how they see
emerge in interaction with a specifi c set of others themselves (Burke and Stets 2009) . Further,
such as family or work group, social identities are there is a stronger negative response as the
the meanings associated with an individual’s magnitude of the discrepancy increases. Either a
identifi cation with a social category such as one’s positive or negative direction in the discrepancy is
gender, race, or social class. When individual’s upsetting because it is not verifying. Even when
group and social identities are verifi ed, they individuals think that others are over-rating them,
experience a sense of social belongingness and it is still upsetting because it may set up
integration including being accepted and valued. expectations to meet a higher standard – a
This is the self-worth dimension of self-esteem. standard they are not prepared to meet.
R ole identities are the self-meanings When identity non-verifi cation occurs, the
associated with a role that individuals play out negative emotion creates a pressure or drive
such as the role of student, worker, friend, or within individuals to reduce the discrepancy
spouse. The roles require specifi c performances between how they see themselves and how they
that should be consistent with one’s role identity think others view them. They may reduce this
meanings. As an illustration, if one perceives discrepancy through behavioral strategies such as
another playing out the role of friend by routinely doing something different in the situation so that
coming to the aid of friends when they are upset the behavior signals different meanings that
or need fi nancial help, we might assume that for others may see as more consistent with their
this person, the friend identity involves self- identity standard meanings. Alternatively,
meanings of being “reliable” and “supportive.” cognitive strategies may be enacted such as
Enacting performances in accordance with one’s ignoring the discrepant views of others or seeing
role identity is about agency and accomplishing more consistency in others’ views than actually
one’s goals. Thus, when people experience verifi exists. Still yet, individuals could slowly change
cation of role identity, it increases feelings of self- the self-meanings associated with their identity so
effi cacy, a second dimension of self-esteem. that they are more consistent with others’
Finally, person identities are the meanings that meanings of them. In extreme circumstances,
individuals attribute to themselves as unique individuals might simply abandon interactions
individuals that set them apart from others. These with non-verifying others. Regardless of the
self-meanings may be core to the individual and strategy chosen, individuals strive to move from a
include one’s values (Hitlin 2003 ) or morals state of non-verifi cation to a state of verifi cation.
(Stets and Carter 2012) , but they also include To avoid the work associated with responding
characterizations of individuals such as the degree to non-verifying situations, it would be easier to
to which they are controlling (Stets 1995 ) or reside in situations where the discrepancies
outgoing (Stets and Cast 2007 ). Since the person between self and others’ views are small or
identity identifi es what is central to the person, nonexistent and positive feelings are typical.
when person identities are verifi ed, people should Indeed, some may gravitate to family and friends
A.D. Cast and J.E. Stets

because they provide a verifying context. Support 17.4 Self in Groups and Social
is felt. When this is not possible, individuals may Categories
actively construct such contexts, which have been
labeled opportunity structures (Swann 1983 ). The self is not only involved in different
Swann indicates three ways that individuals create interactional processes as discussed above, but it
their own opportunity structures. is also a product of interactions within proximate
F irst, individuals may “give off” a particular groups of varying sizes and organizational
appearance that conveys meanings as to who they structures. Here, the self is a member of corporate
are. They may dress a certain way or use objects and categoric units (Turner 2010a ). The
such as the car they drive, the home they live in, categoric unit is a social distinction that places
or the artwork that hangs on their walls to signal individuals into distinct social categories such as
specifi c self-meanings. This appearance gender or race/ethnicity. Being defi ned as a
announces to others how they anticipate they will member of a categorical unit results in a
be seen and treated. Second, people may distinctive set of socialization experiences and
selectively interact with those who they know will outcomes such as the development of one’s
verify them and avoid those who they know will identity, self-esteem, and self-effi cacy in
not verify them. Finally, people may use families, schools, and work organizations.
interpersonal prompts to get others to see them in Furthermore, categorization carries with it the
a way that they see themselves. This is done partly implication that some groups are more valuable
through appearance as suggested above. and have more power than others (Callero 2014
However, it also occurs by behaving in a ).
particular manner that is consistent with one’s D ue to space limitations, we will be brief in
identity or, alternatively, treating others is a our discussion of the role of corporate groups in
manner that facilitates verifi cation of one’s own understanding the self. We will primarily focus on
identity. The latter is what has been otherwise the categoric units of gender, race, and class, but
labeled altercasting (Weinstein and we will also illustrate how categoric units shape
Deutschberger 1963 ). Individuals cast others into and are shaped by interactions within corporate
particular roles or identities such that it groups. First, we briefl y discuss the mechanism
encourages them to think and act in ways that that fosters internalization of categoric unit
verifi es those who do the casting. For example, if meanings: the socialization process.
a person seeks verifi cation of the parent identity, T hrough socialization, individuals learn the
the individual might treat another as a child, “norms, values, beliefs, attitudes, language
casting the other into a dependent role. characteristics, and roles appropriate to their
Identity verifi cation takes two people: one social groups” (Lutfey and Mortimer 2003 ).
who needs verifi cation and one who does the Through interaction in groups such as the family,
verifying. However, in interaction, individuals school, one’s peer group, religious group, and
can build a mutually verifying set of behaviors work group, individuals learn the positions they
and identity standards such that what emerges is a occupy in the social structure and the expectations
mutual verifi cation context (Burke and Stets associated with those positions. In the process, the
1999 ). This is a situation where two or more self takes shape. Cooley ( 1909 ) alluded to the
individuals mutually support each other by not importance of primary groups such as the family
only verifying their own identities, but in doing in self-formation. In primary groups where there
so, support the verifi cation of others’ identities in is intimate and frequent face-to-face interaction
the situation. This is common in close and individuals are valued and seen as unique and
relationships. Research shows that when this irreplaceable actors, Cooley suggested a “fusion”
occurs, it can create a stable relationship where of the individual with the group resulting in a
positive feelings are felt, and trust and feeling of “we-ness.”
commitment is experienced between individuals Secondary groups are less infl uential in self-
(Burke and Stets 1999 ). formation. Here, individuals are largely
understood in terms of the position they occupy in
organizations, and these positions can have
355

interchangeable actors such as a teacher in a life course, we focus on gender socialization in


school, a leader of a congregation, or a CEO of a families because it is here that a gendered self is
company. The distinction between socialization in established.
primary and secondary groups refl ects somewhat T here are several learning mechanisms that
the distinction between socialization during facilitate the development of a child’s gender
childhood and adulthood. Socialization in identity: imitation, praise and discouragement,
childhood tends to take place in primary groups and self-socialization (Maccoby and Jacklin 1974
and is focused on teaching children broad ). Parents treat boys and girls differently, and
principles for behavior. Socialization during children imitate their parents thereby reproducing
adulthood involves interaction in primary and gender differences in thought, feeling, and action.
especially secondary groups where individuals For example, mothers see girls as more delicate,
adopt positions within the workplace and broader passive, and cooperative compared to the view of
community and learn the roles associated with boys as more sturdy, active, and competitive.
these positions (Preves and Mortimer 2013) . Mothers are more attentive and responsive to girls
Since socialization in childhood serves as the than boys, and they foster the development of
foundation for self-development, we discuss girls’ emotional worlds and the expression of it
gender, race/ethnicity, and class socialization compared to boys. Mothers also encourage girls
during childhood. to stay in close proximity while boys are
encouraged to be adventurous and explore.
Gender differences persist in how girls and boys
17.4.1 Gender are clothed, what toys are appropriate for them,
what home chores are expected of them, and the
Research on gender socialization reveals that décor of their bedrooms. Essentially, we impose a
boys and girls are treated differently from birth “gendered lens” on the world that presumes
given the stereotypes associated with sex and difference, ignoring the role of stereotypes as the
gender categories. Gender socialization occurs source of many differences (Bem 1993 ). The
with a variety of different agents and in a variety result is that girls and boys develop in ways that
of contexts. Families tend to be the primary help sustain a gendered social order.
context, but gender socialization also occurs at G endered expectations extend to school
school and with peers. Through social learning, activity. One area of concern in recent years is the
boys and girls learn the norms for femininity and differential involvement of males and females in
masculinity. These norms become internalized in science, technology, engineering, and
the form of one’s gender identity, which is the set mathematics (STEM) because these fi elds offer
of meanings individuals associate with comparatively higher salaries and prestige than
themselves as male or female in society (Burke others fi elds. As early as elementary school,
and children have internalized the gender stereotype
Stets 2009 ). that math is for boys and not girls (Cvencek et al.
Most children develop the ability to label 2011 ). By high school, girls have signifi cantly
themselves and others with the label of “boy” or less motivation to pursue both mathematics and
“girl” by the age of 2 (Zosuls et al. 2009 ). They science compared to boys (Catsambis 1994 ).
are fi rst labeled by others who tend to respond to I n a study of talented high school students
them in sex-typed ways, shaping children’s enrolled in a science, mathematics, and
understanding of gender and of themselves as engineering (SME) summer camp, Lee ( 1998 )
“gendered selves” (Howard and Hollandar 2000 examined students’ internalized meanings, and
). Because initial categorization and their interest in science-related fi elds. He found
internalization begins so early, gender identity that girls tended to see themselves as more
becomes an important component of the self- different than other science students compared to
concept. Some argue that it is the fi rst category the boys enrolled in the program. Girls whose
that children learn and thus the fi rst identity they self-views were similar to those they associated
recognize in themselves and in others (Ridgeway with the career of engineer, physicist, and
2011 ). While socialization occurs throughout the mathematician expressed greater interest in those
A.D. Cast and J.E. Stets

careers than did girls whose self-views differed promoting pride; creating an awareness of
from those with such careers. Lee ( 1998: 214) discrimination and the ways to cope; teaching
concluded that one of the ways to increasing children to be cautious and distrustful of
women’s participation in STEM fi elds would interracial interactions; and encouraging children
entail “closing the gaps between gendered self- to value their individual characteristics over their
concepts and perceptions of SME disciplines.” group membership and avoid discussions on race
(Hughes et al. 2006 ). Such studies illustrate how
macro- level systems of inequality infl uence
17.4.2 Race micro- levels interactions that, in turn, reproduce
macro-level structures of inequality.
Some of the earliest work on racial socialization
was conducted by two psychologists who became
concerned about Black self-hatred when they 17.4.3 Social Class
found that Black children showed a preference for
white dolls (Clark and Clark 1947 ). This led to Kohn ( 1977 ) was one of the fi rst to emphasize
extensive work on Black children’s self-image, how one’s social class as refl ected in one’s
identity adjustment, self-esteem and more. The occupation shaped individuals’ values. He argued
idea was that because Black children were victims that occupations varied according to how much
of prejudice, exhibited poor performance in self- direction, complexity, and autonomy was
school relative to their White peers, and required on the job. High status occupations were
interpreted their low status as refl ecting a more self-directed, complex, and autonomous
personal failure, they internalized the prejudice, compared to low status occupations where there
and it led to negative self-views such as low self- was more conformity to authority, jobs were
esteem (Rosenberg 1981 ). simple, routinized and repetitive, and there was a
Over the ensuing decades, little support was great deal of supervision. When individuals were
found for these expectations. Researchers rewarded for behaviors consistent with the level
anticipated Black children would use the broader of self-direction or conformity expected in the
society and its racist views to defi ne them without workplace, they came to value these qualities and
considering children’s reliance on proximal foster them at home through their parenting style.
interactions with individuals of their own race The consequence of the above is that children
(Rosenberg 1981 ). Specifi cally, the source of from different classes are reared in different ways
one’s self-views were most likely to come from given their parents’ work experiences. Children
those in one’s immediate social environment such from higher classes are taught such values as
as one’s parents, teachers, and friends, all of independence and creativity, and children from
whom were more likely to be Black than White. lower classes are taught obedience to authority
Similarly, when considering school performance, and following societal norms. As they mature and
black children were more likely to compare choose careers of their own, they have a tendency
themselves to those with whom they were to select occupations in which they are expected
primarily interacting – other Black children. to behave in ways consistent with how they were
Finally, since one’s status was ascribed rather raised. Thus, children come to value what their
than achieved, children were less inclined to parents’ value, and they gravitate toward
attribute their position to personal failure. occupations similar to those chosen by their
Together, these fi ndings led to the idea that Black parents, facilitating the intergenerational
children’s self- esteem was not as vulnerable as transmission of class values and jobs. A
previously anticipated. provocative amount of work over the years and
P arents can play an important role in offsetting cross-culturally has supported the reciprocal
many of the harmful effects of prejudice and relationship between occupation and personal
discrimination and foster a positive identity. values.
Toward this end, they may adopt different In more contemporary work, Lareau ( 2002 )
strategies such as teaching children about their studied social class and childrearing in middle and
racial/ ethnic heritage and customs, and working-class white and black families. Similar to
357

Kohn’s argument, she argued that parents differed occupational experiences shaped parental values,
in their childrearing practices. Middle-class the strategies by which they instilled these values
parents tended to employ a “cultural logic” of in their children seemed less direct.
what she referred to as “concerted cultivation”
(Lareau 2002 : 748). This involved engaging
children in activities such as music and dance
lessons, sports, scouts, and other cultural
17.5 Self in Society and
activities. Discipline involved reasoning and Cross-Culturally
talking with their children, and as a result,
children spent a great deal of time in the company 17.5.1 Self in Society
of adults. This produced an emerging sense of
entitlement when interacting with others in The idea that there is an intimate connection
various institutional contexts such as educational between self and society, that the self refl ects
and medical systems. society and vice versa, can be traced to the early
L ower class parents tended to adopt what thinkers such as Mead and Cooley as well as more
Lareau referred to as “the accomplishment of contemporary theorists such as Stryker and
natural growth” (Lareau 2002: 748). Children Rosenberg. In this section, we broadly examine
were involved in fewer activities, and parents how the organization of society and its culture
believed that if they provided the basic shape the particular kinds of selves that are
necessities, their children would thrive. Discipline possible and available to individuals. It is at the
was less likely to involve reasoning and more macro level that fundamental connections
likely to involve an authoritarian, punishing style. between social organization, culture, and self can
Interactions with institutions tended to be be seen.
characterized by distrust and fear. Similar to O ne issue is how the self has responded to
Kohn’s work, Lareau’s two cultural logics related postmodern times. Early theorizing on this comes
to parents’ occupational experiences. Middle- from Turner’s ( 1976 ) distinction between the self
class parents found their work to be challenging as anchored in institutions and the self as
and exciting and wanted to develop in their anchored in impulse . A stronger adherence to
children the skills necessary to be successful in social norms and conventions is expected of
the workforce. Working class parents tended to fi individuals with institutionally defi ned selves. In
nd their work lives as drudgery, and they wanted contrast, impulsive selves are defi ned more in
to protect their children from life’s pains by just terms of individual preferences and self-
letting “kids be kids.” discovery. Here, the “true self” is discovered and
In later work, Weininger and Lareau ( 2009 ) achieved rather than prescribed by the institution.
found support for Kohn’s assertion that middle The immediate access to multiple worlds created
class parents valued self-direction in their by technological advances only intensifi es this
children more than lower class parents. However, movement towards an impulsive self by
the value of self-direction was not well weakening bonds to traditional institutions such
represented in their actual parenting behavior. as the family and other immediate communities
Middle class parents often employed practices (Gergen 1991 ).
that reduced the amount of self-direction in their W riting in the mid-1970s, Turner speculated
children. For example, in the interest of on a shift in the self from an institutional to an
developing valuable skills and interests in their impulsive emphasis. He saw this as emerging, in
children, middle class parents asserted high levels part, from the political process during his time as
of control over their activities. In contrast, the revealed in social movements such as the student
parenting practices of lower class parents who demonstration movement and the women’s
presumably valued more conformity than middle- movement of the 1960s. Additionally, he noted a
class parents actually allowed children to assert a greater acceptance of expressing one’s impulses –
great deal of control over their activities given that one’s spontaneous thoughts and feelings – in
much of their time was spent away from the literary writings (e.g. Nietzsche), psychology,
physical presence of adults. Thus, while adult (e.g. Freud), and child-rearing. But Turner took a
A.D. Cast and J.E. Stets

step back from these more recent patterns to a self that is constructed and constituted within
indicate some general trends over time that might systems of power while still retaining the
provide an explanation as to the shift from an possibility of emancipation (Schlenker 2012 ).
institutional anchorage to an impulsive Other evidence of a movement away from the
anchorage. self in institutional terms has emerged in the
O ne trend he discussed was the cultural argument of a loss of the communal self and a
changes that occurred in the nineteenth and focus on the individual as revealed in the work of
twentieth centuries where cultural diversity Bellah and his colleagues ( 1985) and Putnam (
challenged a consensual world view such that 2000 ). Analyses such as these are not without
institutional frameworks were seen as relativistic controversy including the recent analysis by
rather than absolute, thereby weakening Fischer ( 2011) that reveals that the bonds with
institutional allegiances. Another trend was the family and friends are alive and strong.
movement from a producing society to a Individuals adjust to a changing society, but it is
consuming society where group life and not at the sacrifi ce of personal relationships.
disciplined work habits became more tenuous,
and achievement and interpersonal bonds
appeared as less credible clues to a real person. 17.5.2 Self Cross-Culturally
Still another trend was the Freudian dynamic that
inhibiting one’s impulse caused a preoccupation C ulture is characterized by a set of shared values
with the blocked tendency, making it more real and ideas that are revealed in institutional
and important. practices, customs, and artifacts within a
To a certain extent, postmodernist scholars particular community. Individuals may not
also have commented on a general shift away always endorse the values and ideas, but they
from defi ning the self in institutional terms. generally are aware of their existence, and they
Essentially, societal advancement infl uences a often inform their behavior. Culture is both
destabilization of institutional practices and internal and external to the individual. Internally,
cultural assumptions. Giddens ( 1991) argues that it may be seen in individuals’ understandings of
in the postmodern world, increasing how they appear to others in their community (the
individualism and the growing complexity of refl ected appraisals process); externally, it may
society creates the possibility and potential for be seen in the patterns of individuals’ interactions
any number of “selves” to be constructed by the in groups and organizations and in the underlying
individual. Gergen ( 1991 : 61) discusses how logic of social institutions (Reinecke and Trepte
technological advances have “saturated the self.” 2014 ). A view of culture that emphasizes both the
Our ability to communicate instantly through a internal and external components is analogous to
variety of different technologies anywhere in the our conceptualization of the self at the micro,
world creates a “swirling set of social relations” meso, and macro levels. Culture not only shapes
such that individuals come to have the potential to the internal dynamics of the self but also the
possess a variety of different identities within an identities enacted within proximal and larger
ever-i ncreasing number of social relationships. social institutions.
This creates challenges for constructing a C ross-cultural research on the self
coherent self. conceptualizes the self as a social construction.
Others emphasize the self as a site of political Individuals are socialized into different cultures
controversy; through the specifi c historical (and in different positions within those cultures),
systems of discourse, individuals are controlled thus they have different selves or self - construals
and dominated (Thomas et al. 1972 ). Agency is . Self- construal is “how individuals defi ne and
an illusion. While some have argued that within make meaning of the self” (Cross et al. 2011 :
such historically specifi c systems of domination 143). Cross and her colleagues point out that self-
the possession of a true self is not possible (Love c onstrual has become synonymous with the
and Davis 2014 ), others have argued that the distinction between independence and
centrality of refl exivity within symbolic interdependence or how people see themselves in
interactionst theorizing allows for the retention of relation to others. This distinction was originally
359

identifi ed by Markus and Kitayama ( 1991 ) who groups as characterized by an interdependent self-
found Westerners (Europeans and Americans) construal. Kashima and colleagues were not only
and Easterners (Japanese) showed differences in the fi rst to identify relational self-construal as
self orientations. Westerners construe the self as distinct from an interdependent self-construal, but
separate from others. The question “Who am I?” they also argued that this relational dimension
is answered in terms of internal traits that set the could distinguish between men and women across
person apart from others. 80 Interpersonal cultures.
relationships are important to the extent that they Others went on to use the relational self-
benefi t the self in terms of providing support or construal dimension to differentiate men and
esteem. In contrast, Easterners construe the self as women in Western cultures (Cross and Madson
connected to others. “Who am I?” is answered 1997 ). Women were more likely to create self-
with reference to important relationships (such as views that focused on connection in social
being a wife/husband, or a parent/son or daughter) relationships, and men were more likely to see
or group memberships (church member or themselves as independent and distinct from
Latino). Fitting in is an important basis of self- social relationships. However, other research
esteem. Social comparisons are used to determine revealed that while women were more likely to
whether individuals are fulfi lling their see themselves in relational terms, men were more
obligations within their relationships, and there is likely to see themselves in terms of the group or
a concern with how they benefi t the groups to the collective (Gabriel and Gardner 1999) . Thus,
which they belong (Cross et al. 2011 ). interdependence had relational and collective
While individuals possess both independent aspects. Essentially, being connected to others is
and interdependent characteristics, culture infl core to human existence. It just gets expressed
uences the development of one self-construal differently for men and women.
more than the other. Independent self-construals Most research has investigated the
generally correspond to individualistic cultures consequences of having an independent compared
and interdependent self-construals correspond to to interdependent self-construal. A useful review
collectivistic cultures. In individualistic cultures, of this research reveals some of the following
priority is given to personal goals over collective patterns (Cross et al. 2011 ). An independent self-
goals; in collectivistic cultures, the emphasis is on construal is associated with greater positive
collective goals (Miyamoto and Eggen 2013 ). emotions such as happiness and less negative
While the dimension of individualism- emotions such as unhappiness, depression, and
collectivism describes cultures (Triandis et al. social anxiety; an interdependent self-construal is
1989 ), independent-interdependent self- associated with greater negative emotions. Part of
construals describe individuals, thus the two refer this difference may be due to the mediating role
to different levels of analysis (Cross et al. 2011 ). of social anxiety, which interdependent persons
Independent and interdependent self-construals are more likely to feel than independent persons
are only one dimension of individualistic and as they are more concerned with appropriate
collectivistic cultures. Another dimension of such behavior in relationships. Indeed, when social
cultures is the degree to which behavior is guided anxiety is controlled for in analyses, the
by individual attitudes (more so in individualistic difference in depression disappears.
cultures) compared to social norms (more likely Still another distinction is how individuals
in collectivistic cultures) (Triandis 1995 ). exercise control over themselves to attain their
More recently, a third type of self-construal goals. Two self-regulatory foci have been identifi
has been distinguished: the relational self - ed: a focus on promotion or the motivation to
construal (Kashima et al. 1995) . This is a self approach one’s goal state, and a focus on
that is defi ned in terms of close relationships (e.g. prevention or the motivation to avoid undesired
family and friends) rather than a self that is goals (Higgins 1999) . Those with an independent
connected to others through proximal social self- construal are more inclined to engage in

80
Early research in this area began by simply asking Statements Test (TST) that asked the question “Who am
individuals to list their identities using the Twenty- I?” (Kuhn and McPartland 1954 ).
A.D. Cast and J.E. Stets

promotion as they seek to reach their desired end “good” and the “desirable,” and how this varies
state. Because those with an interdependent self- across the globe. A shared sense of morality and
construal want to fi t in, maintain harmony in their values within a given culture creates social
relationships, and fulfi ll others’ expectations, integration and cohesion among members while
they are more sensitive to the harm that potential simultaneously creating the potential for confl ict
failures could create. Thus, they are more oriented between cultures.
to preventive self-regulation. Consistent with As defi ned elsewhere, morality is the
these patterns, we also fi nd that those with an “evaluative cultural codes that specify what is
independent self-construal are more likely to right or wrong, good or bad, acceptable to
engage in primary control (manipulate the unacceptable” in a society (Turner and Stets
environment to meet their needs), while those 2006: 544). At the level of the self, individuals
with an interdependent self-construal are more internalize meanings as to who they are along the
likely to rely on secondary control (modify their good-bad dimension. This is their moral identity.
own thoughts and feelings to fi t into the While many psychologists argue that having a
environment). moral identity means that being moral is at the
It is assumed that individuals possess all three core of the self, it is the essence of who they are,
(and possibly other) self-construals but to varying sociologists would argue that having a moral
degrees. For our purposes, we see much affi nity identity does not necessarily mean that it is core
between conceptions of the self at the micro, to the self, but rather that it is one among a host of
meso, and macro levels with these three dominant identities that individuals may claim (Stets 2010
self-construals. As identity theorists note, ). What psychologists and sociologists agree on is
individuals defi ne themselves as unique that self-views along the moral dimension, the
individuals in terms of individual characteristics moral identity, infl uence behavior in situations.
(person identities); this is similar to the individual W hen the moral identity has been studied, two
self- construal. Individuals also defi ne underlying meaning dimensions typically have
themselves as members of larger social groups been operationalized: a justice and rights
(group/social identities), and this is similar to dimension and a care and relationship dimension
having an interdependent self-construal in that the (e.g. Stets and Carter 2011 , 2012) . This is
self is defi ned in relation to larger collectivities. consistent with earlier discussions regarding the
Finally, individuals defi ne themselves in terms of basis of morality (Gilligan 1982 ; Kohlberg 1981
role identities and the counter role identities to ).
which they are related as in the parent role identity Additionally, it is consistent with Western
and child counter-role identity, teacher role compared to Eastern conceptions of morality in
identity and student counter-role identity, and the which the fundamental unit of moral value is the
employer role identity and the employee counter- individual, and the person’s autonomy and
role identity. This shares an affi nity to the welfare are to be protected (Haidt and Graham
relational self- construal. Sociological research on 2009 ).
the self could benefi t from understanding both The individualizing approach to morality that
intra-cultural and inter-cultural contexts that characterizes Western countries does omit a
make different self-construals and the identities binding approach that may describe many non-
potentially attached to them more or less relevant Western countries (Haidt 2008) . For example, an
in particular situations. in-depth analysis of India revealed that there are
three bases of morality: an ethic of autonomy,
community, and divinity (Shweder et al. 1997 ).
17.5.3 Morals and Values Cross- The emphasis on community highlights the
Culturally collective, and the emphasis on the divine
incorporates societal members focus on the
Another important area where cross-cultural sacred. Others have developed Shweder and his
studies have been important is in the study of colleagues work further by offering not three but
people’s morals and values. Here, we examine the fi ve bases of morality cross-culturally (Graham
degree to which individuals are oriented to the et al. 2011 ). These include the individualizing
361

foundations of fairness/reciprocity and harm/ conservation , which includes the values of self-
care, and three communal foundations: in-group/ direction, stimulation, and hedonism vs. tradition,
loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. conformity and security. A second dimension is
V alues are beliefs about what is desirable that self - transcendence vs. self - enhancement,
guides behavior and transcend situations (Gecas which includes the values of universalism and
2000 ; Hitlin and Piliavin 2004) . Some see benevolence vs. achievement and power.
values as core to one’s personal identity (Hitlin Generally, those who endorse one dimension,
2003 ). More specifi cally, Hitlin sees the personal such as openness to change, have a tendency not
identity as “produced through value to endorse its opposite – conservation.
commitments” (Hitlin 2003 : 121). Identity Interestingly, a recent cross-cultural analysis
theorists would agree that values may be reveals that Schwartz’s model of values does a
meanings that make up the person identity, but better job of predicting value priorities across
there also are other meanings that make up the countries than within countries, thereby refuting
person identity and that characterize one as the strong claim that culture determines individual
distinctive or unique compared to others, which is values (Fischer and Schwartz 2011) . Only the
a defi ning feature of person identities (Burke and value of conformity such as honoring one’s
Stets 2009) . Empirical work would be needed to parents, politeness, and obedience appear to
examine whether values are more likely to be garner within country consensus. Recently, the
linked to person identities then role identities or ten values have been expanded to 19 values with
group/social identities. data from ten countries (Schwatz et al. 2012 ).
In a slightly different conceptualization,
Gecas ( 2000) maintains that people have value
- identities , that is, they defi ne themselves in
17.6 Future Micro, Meso and
terms of the values they hold. Value identities can
refer to desired personal qualities such being Macro Directions
honest or brave as compared to value identities
that refer to social conditions such as freedom or At the micro level, in the last 20 years, research
equality (Gecas 2000) . Values that refer to in neurosociology has generated important
personal qualities Gecas labels one’s “character insights into how self-related processes are
identity.” Here, we begin to see an overlap with associated with the activation of particular regions
the moral identity as discussed above. Gecas in the brain including but not limited to self- refl
discusses the relationship between values and ection and taking the role of the other. In this
morality by maintaining that the relationship is regard, two functionally related areas of the brain
tighter when one’s moral orientation is justice- are important: the default mode network (DMN)
oriented vs. care-oriented. In the former, values and the mirror neuron system (MNS) (Molnar-
and principles are more likely to guide moral Szakacs and Uddin 2013 ). The DMN is
behavior compared to the latter, which is more associated with the processing of self-related
likely to be guided by situational circumstances information such as how individuals think about
and interpersonal concerns. This is analogous to themselves, while the MNS is associated with
the independent vs. interdependent self-construals taking the role of the other and refl ecting on the
discussed earlier. Those with an independent self- behaviors and emotions of others, reproducing
construal are more likely to have their value those same actions and feelings within the person.
identities guide their moral behavior compared to Because the MNS is activated when individuals
those with an interdependent self-construal. act as well as when they observe the actions of
How values are represented cross-culturally is others, the MNS apparently facilitates the
evidenced in Schwartz’s ( 1992 , 1994 ) research, development of shared meanings in interaction
although the fi ndings primarily exists in literate (Molnar-Szakacs and Uddin 2013 ). Further,
or developed countries. He reveals that while the DMN and MNS have different
individuals across societies endorse ten values functions, they are interrelated. In the same way
that have two broader value dimensions. One that when the self is formed, it is always in
dimension is openness to change vs. relation to others, the DMN and MNS interact to
A.D. Cast and J.E. Stets

allow for an integrated self-representation, 1997 ). Thus, the unique experiences associated
reminding us of Cooley’s dictum that self and with any one intersectional profi le may be rooted
society are “twin born.” in compromises that are made along the way to
T he potential for resolving issues in the area reach a set of non- confl icting meanings that
of self and identity using neurosociology is a rich individuals can manage in interaction.
and fruitful line of further work. For example, At the macro level, researchers may want to
given the centrality of role-taking in study the self in relation to globalization. The
understanding the self, and given that lower status process of globalization and the increasing
actors are more likely to role-take than higher connectedness in the world includes but is not
status actors, neuroimaging might be able to map limited to transnational migrations, international
changes in the fl ow of blood to particular areas of business interests, world tourism, and the
the brain in response to situational shifts in status existence of technology and media, all of which
and power (Franks 2013 ). create the potential for individuals to have instant
As another illustration, because activating access to information from around the world. The
different kinds of memory (episodic, semantic, ability to interact with a variety of individuals
and semantic autobiographical) stimulates from around the world and in a variety of cultures
different parts of the brain, linking the has the potential for the colonization of the self
conventional and idiosyncratic self-meanings of (Callero 2008 ).
an identity to semantic and episodic memories, The colonization of the self refers to the idea
respectively, would allow us to study how that globalization is primarily fueled by capitalist
individuals employ conventional and markets and a Western consumerist culture. The
idiosyncratic identity meanings in different proliferation of Western businesses and global
situations (Niemeyer 2013 ). Situations that are media conglomerates throughout the world
informed by cultural norms may activate more creates a self that is uniform in terms of its cultural
conventional meanings of an identity, thereby content. According to Callero, selves are
linking identities and normative behavior. reconstructed in a way that traditional roles
Conversely, situations that are less controlled by disappear, are redefi ned, and novel roles
normative imperatives may stimulate potentially emerge that are inconsistent with
idiosyncratic identity meanings, allowing for traditional cultural practices but consistent with
more novel ways in which an identity is enacted. global economic conglomerates.
A t the meso level, future research on the self O ne new shape that the self may take is in the
could more systematically address issues of development of a new identity given the mixing
intersectionality that are pervasive in feminist of cultures. Another is the development of a
literatures. James’ early idea that people possess multicultural identity in which individuals adopt
as many selves as there are individuals to whom multiple identities that represent identifi cation
they relate to shores up the idea of with a variety of cultures. Alternatively, people
intersectionality in contemporary work. might develop a defensive stance toward
Individuals are members of multiple social encroaching cultural infl uences.
categories and multiple groups, creating a unique Finally, Callero suggests that globalization
set of experiences. Research on the self can be can create the potential for radical social change.
advanced by examining how intersectionality The rapid-fi re communication networks that on
provides insights into how to understand multiple the one hand have the potential to constrain the
identities that individuals claim within and across self to hegemonic cultural ideals also have the
situations. For instance, in the family group potential to resist cultural hegemony. One
identity, there are certain expectations attached to example of this is the use of Facebook to organize
the parent role identity that vary across the protests locally and globally on a variety of social
categorical identities of being male and female, issues including climate change and human rights.
white and non-white, and heterosexual and Globalization carries with it the potential to
homosexual. Further, as meanings in one identity not only allow for greater individual choice in the
change, they create the potential for a change in construction of the self but also constrain the self
meanings in other identities (Burke and Cast (Callero 2008) . One fruitful line of research
363

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Part IV
Constraints on
Experience
Microsociologies: Social Exchange, Trust, Justice,

and Legitimacy 18
Michael J. Carter Sociology Department, California State
University, Northridge, Northridge, CA, USA e-
mail: michael.carter@csun.edu
ences as just or unjust, and how they endorse (or
do not endorse) power differentials between self
and others.
The plan of this chapter is as follows: I first
discuss how social exchange, trust, justice, and
legitimacy operate as specific dimensions of
18.1 Introduction social comparison. I then address each process
individually, summarizing their basic elements
The past decades have witnessed the growth and and illustrating each. In each summary section I
development of various sociological theories that survey the recent literature that has advanced our
address micro-level social phenomena. The understanding of how the processes operate to
“micro realm” of social reality encompasses intra- influence interactions in social life. Finally, I
and interpersonal processes that influence social discuss recent research that has examined
interaction. Microsociological theories address interrelations of exchange, trust, justice, and
dyads, triads, and small groups—the everyday legitimacy—work that has addressed some
social structures that influence (and constrain) combination of these processes.
experience (Turner 2010). In the literature, social exchange, trust, justice,
This chapter surveys contemporary and legitimacy are often treated as analytically
sociological theories and research that address distinct. Across the social sciences, there are
four micro- level processes: social exchange, thoroughly developed research programs that
trust, justice, and legitimacy. These four address each—to some degree—in relative
processes are central in social life; they are isolation. Examining them together makes sense
common themes that are diffuse and active in however, as each is a specific dimension of a
virtually all social interactions. Whether greater abstract process: social comparison.
experiences are novel or routine, attitudes and Comparisons are central in social life. There is
behaviors are greatly influenced by social norms ample evidence that individuals compare
that represent what is right and proper. Knowing themselves to others in the social structure on
how individuals (and groups) determine what is multiple dimensions, beginning early in the life-
right and proper—and why social interactions course and continuing throughout life (Jensen et
often go smoothly—requires an understanding of al. 2015; Hoorens and Van Damme 2012;
how actors exchange resources, how they come to Boissicat et al. 2012). For instance, from early on
trust (and distrust) others, how they attribute we compare what we look like to what others look
actions and experi- like, and what we have to what others have. We
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 369
S. Abrutyn (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary Sociological Theory,
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32250-6_18
also compare how we are treated, and what we
receive compared to what others receive.
M.J. Carter (*)
Perceptions based on social comparisons
M.J. Carter

influence many important behavioral and uncooperative? How do some people persuade
emotional outcomes, such as motivation, self- authority figures to give them a warning rather
esteem, and self-efficacy. Theories that examine than a ticket in such situations? And why do some
how social exchange, trust, justice, and legitimacy people attribute the situation of being stopped for
operate as comparison processes attempt to a traffic infraction as caused by external factors
understand how individuals make evaluative (e.g., the perception that the law regarding the
determinations about the relative status, power, speed limit is unfairly slow) rather than due to
dependability, entitlement, and properness of their own actions (e.g., speeding because one
others in society (and oneself), and how wanted to get a good parking spot at work)? How
individuals act based on those determinations. can we understand these different courses of
To illustrate how social exchange, trust, action, none of which are uncommon? Answers to
justice, and legitimacy operate in social life let us these questions require us to understand basic
consider the example of an individual who is social processes that commonly occur in social
stopped by a police officer for speeding on a situations, such as the how individuals exchange
freeway. Such occurrences are relatively resources, defer to authority, trust and predict
common, especially in metropolitan areas, and the courses of action, and strive to behave in
interaction between the police officer and the expected, normative ways.
individual caught speeding in this example might In the above example, it is evident that social
be considered somewhat predictable: The police exchange, trust, justice, and legitimacy are all in
officer would likely approach the perpetrator from operation. The police officer is depending on the
behind, flash the lights of her police car to signify speeder to respect her authority, and comply with
that the speeder should pull to the side of the road, her demands; the respect of authority is a
and approach the individual on foot after both cars legitimation process. The interaction between the
had come to a stop. The interchange between the officer and the speeder is also influenced by
police officer and the speeder may then take procedural justice processes; the speeder
various forms, depending on a variety of factors, perceives whether the officer acts within the
such as the prevailing cultural norms that define bounds of what is fair (and lawful), and in line
acceptable behavior, personality traits/ with how an authority figure should behave. Trust
dispositions of each actor in the situation, each is evident as well (or the lack of trust); because if
actor’s experience in previous situations that are the police officer is unfamiliar with the
similar to the present situation, meanings of the perpetrator she would likely approach the car
present context (time of day, others present in the cautiously, perhaps with her hand on her gun in
situation, etc.), and each actor’s personal case something goes awry during the interaction.
biography. A predictable script in this example Without a previous history of interactions neither
would be the police officer informing the driver the officer nor the speeder will have high feelings
that they were speeding, the police officer asking of trust for one another, and such perceptions will
the driver for their license and proof of insurance, likely affect the manner in which each talk to one
a ticket being written and administered, and both another, and what each expects the other to do.
actors going on with their day. And, if the speeder tries to talk the officer out of
The situation described above seems receiving a ticket it is likely that some form of
commonplace and not particularly novel, but what social exchange process would be invoked, e.g.,
makes such an example so commonplace? What either an ingratiation tactic or perhaps even m
basic social processes are active in the situation onetary bribery. It is clear that even in the most
that account for the behavior of each actor? What routine micro-level encounters, social comparison
accounts for variations in real-life situations such processes such as exchange, trust, justice, and
as this? For instance, why do some people comply legitimacy can operate to influence how people
in such situations, listening to and following the interact.
orders of the police officer as the situation There are myriad theories in sociology that
unfolds, whereas others do not comply, arguing address the manner in which individuals compare
with the police officer, becoming disruptive and themselves to others. Let us now examine
ociologies: Social Exchange, Trust, Justice, and Legitimacy 371

contemporary theoretical frameworks that have (the idea that behavior that leads to positive
developed regarding social exchange, trust, outcomes is likely to be enacted in future
justice, and legitimacy. encounters), (3) the value proposition (the idea
that the more valuable an outcome of an action is,
the more likely the action will be performed in the
future), (4) the deprivation-satiation proposition
18.2 Social Exchange Theory
(the idea that accumulated rewards have a utility
Of all the processes that involve social of diminished marginal returns—the more of a
comparisons, social exchange has been a central resource one receives, the less valuable additional
focus in sociology and psychology (see Cook et units become), and (5) the frustration- aggression
al. (2013), Emerson (1981) and Molm and Cook proposition (the idea that actors become agitated
(1995) for detailed summaries of exchange theory when they are withheld a resource in which they
as an evolving, cumulative research program). anticipate receiving or feel entitled to have).
Classic ideas on the nature of social exchange Generally, social exchange theory examines
were developed by George C. Homans (1958, the benefits people gain from interacting with
1961), John Thibaut and Harold Kelley (1959), others and the opportunity structures and
and Peter Blau (1964). Richard Emerson (1962, interdependencies that influence and constrain
1976) then furthered understanding of social those exchanges (Emerson 1981; Molm 2006;
exchange by incorporating power and dependence Molm and Cook 1995). Let us examine the
in classic models of social exchange, providing a relationship between benefits and opportunity
more complete understand of exchange relations structures by summarizing the basic concepts of
(see Chap. 15 in this volume for a detailed social exchange, to better understand how
discussion of Emerson’s power- dependence individuals exchange resources in social life.
theory). The work of Homans, Thibaut and
Kelley, Blau, and Emerson have inspired many
contemporary sociologists, who together have 18.2.1 Elements of Social Exchange
established a strong and thorough research
program over the past half-century (Molm 1997; Social exchange involves the “exchange of
Chesire et al. 2010; Cook and Emerson 1978). activity, tangible or intangible, and more or less
The exchange tradition in sociology began rewarding or costly, between at least two persons”
with Homans’ (1961) belief that all social (Homans 1961). All forms of social exchange
behavior is exchange behavior: it involves two contain three elements: actors, resources, and
actors who exchange some resource, and all social exchange structures (Molm 2006). An “actor” in
behavior involves the reinforcement or an exchange relation is a general term that can
punishment of one individual upon the other. This represent various entities, including both
basic orientation to social life provided the individuals and groups (i.e., when group members
foundation for all future work on social exchange. behave in solidarity as a singular unit).
While many now see Homans’ work as simplistic “Resources” are skills or things one possesses that
and reductionist (he focused mostly on dyadic have value for others. Resources can be material
exchange), his five propositions of social (i.e., tangible) such as money or goods, or
exchange still resonate and apply to contemporary immaterial (i.e., intangible), such as love or
exchange theories. Based on the notion that all affection.
social behavior is influenced by perceived Exchanges between actors do not occur outside
rewards and punishments that one receives while a specific social context; various factors influence
interacting with others, Homans’ (1961) and determine the nature of an exchange, such as
propositions for social exchange include: (1) The the number of actors involved in an exchange, and
stimulus proposition (the idea that past behavior the setting in which an exchange occurs. These
that has been rewarded is likely to be performed varying factors are known as exchange structures
in future encounters), (2) the success proposition (Emerson 1972), which can take the form of
direct, generalized, or productive exchange
M.J. Carter

(Molm 2006). A direct exchange is a situation process by which exchanges occur within
where (usually) two actors’ outcome in an exchange structures. The process of social
exchange relation is directly dependent on one exchange involves four components: exchange
another’s actions. For example, purchasing an opportunities, initiations, transactions, and
iPod from the Apple Store is an example of direct
exchange relations. An exchange opportunity
exchange; a customer pays a specific amount of refers to an actor’s opportunity to initiate an
money to a clerk for the good—the transaction is
exchange. When an initiated exchange is
singular (though direct exchanges can also be reciprocated by another it is called a transaction.
repeated over time), immediate, and direct Transactions are mutual exchanges of benefits
between the exchanging units. between two or more actors. When multiple
A generalized exchange is an exchange among transactions occur between or among actors, it is
three or more actors, where the reciprocal known as an exchange relation (Molm 2006).
dependence among all actors in the exchange is When actors develop an exchange relationship,
indirect rather than direct. For instance, in athe relationship takes the form of being a
generalized exchange actor A provides actor B negotiated exchange relation or a reciprocal
with some resource, but actor B does not exchange relation (Emerson 1981; Molm et al.
reciprocate and provide A with a resource in 1999, 2000; Lawler 2001). Negotiated exchanges
return. After A provides the resource to B, B in
occur when actors engage in a joint decision
turn provides some resource to actor C, and actor
making process and reach an agreement about the
C then provides some resource to A. Generalizedterms of the exchange. Negotiated exchanges are
exchange is circular rather than direct. discrete and singular; generally, actors involved
Universities provide a good example of in negotiated exchanges are not considering the
generalized exchange. Students pay tuition to take
effect of the exchange relation on future
classes from professors; professors are paid for
interactions or exchanges. An example of
their expertise and teaching service. However, negotiated exchange would be the purchasing of a
students and professors are not directly involved
home. Both the buyer (actor A) and the seller
in an exchange relation. Rather, a student (actor
(actor B) negotiate an acceptable price and then
A) pays tuition to a university (Actor B); the complete the transaction, in a one-time deal.
university then pays the professor (actor C), and Reciprocal exchanges, on the other hand, occur
the then professor renders their service to thewhen an actor provides a resource to another actor
student (by teaching the student). without the expectation that a resource will be
In a productive exchange two or more actors immediately returned (or without the absolute
work together to produce some valued commodity knowledge that a resource indeed will be returned
or outcome that benefits all members in the at a future date). Reciprocal transactions are
exchange. Team sports provide good examples of generally the most interesting to sociologists.
productive exchange. For instance, all members While negotiated exchanges are often economic
on a football team work together, exchanging transactions, reciprocal exchanges are inherently
individual efforts to the team concept (i.e., social (and not economic). Reciprocal exchanges
everyone role-plays) so that the team can win. All
imply that exchange behaviors between actors are
members of the team realize that in order for multiple rather than singular; the exchange carries
everyone to accomplish the common goal, all forth across transactions, not solely within a
must exchange and sacrifice individually; the single transaction. Therefore, exchange theorists
reward (winning) is accomplished through treat the sequence or series of transactions
productive exchange. between actors as the unit of analysis in reciprocal
exchange, rather than one specific exchange
transaction. The classic example of a common
18.2.2 The Exchange Process reciprocal exchange is that of helping a friend
move. In helping a friend move one provides a
In addition to defining the elements of social service to another without knowing when (or even
exchange, exchange theory also addresses the if) the friend will reciprocate the favor. Reciprocal
ociologies: Social Exchange, Trust, Justice, and Legitimacy 373

exchanges involve a complex set of psychological on the emergence of integrative bonds of trust and
and sociological processes, including social solidarity (Molm 2010).
integration and trust. The crucial difference A network exchange approach has also been
between negotiated and reciprocal exchanges are employed to understand social exchange. Some
that in negotiated exchange actor A’s benefits to have examined how exchange patterns of
actor B are contingent on B’s benefits to A, where commitment and inequality are affected when
as in reciprocal exchange benefits provided and negotiated exchanges are combined with
received in previous exchanges between actor A reciprocal exchanges in more complex
and actor B affect A’s future behavior toward relationships of embeddedness (Molm et al.
actor B (Molm 2006). 2013), showing that embedding negotiated
exchanges in a relationship of reciprocal
exchange increases the strength of behavioral
18.2.3 General Assumptions and commitments and reduces the effects of structural
Propositions of Social power differences on inequality.
Others have examined the development of
Exchange
commitments in structurally enabled and
While theories of social exchange have different structurally induced (constraining) exchange
emphases, all share a few common assumptions relations, revealing that a structurally enabled
and make similar predictions. Exchange theory relation generates a greater sense of control, more
makes assumptions about the structure in which positive emotions, greater perceived cohesion,
exchange relations occur, the manner in which and more commitment behavior than a
actors will behave in social structures, the way structurally induced relation (Lawler et al. 2006).
that actors will interact within social structures, Studies such as these show the importance for
and the classes (or types) of resources exchanged understanding both enabling and constraining
between actors in social structures (Molm and features of network structures and how they
Cook 1995). More specifically, exchange theory impact cohesion and commitment in relations
involves four core assumptions: (1) Exchange within such structures.
relations develop within existing structures of And, some have examined how groups form in
mutual dependence between actors, (2) actors competitive exchange networks, specifically how
behave in ways to increase outcomes they and when small networks of self-interested agents
positively value and decrease outcomes they generate group ties at the network level, revealing
negatively value, (3) actors engage in recurring, that group affiliations are formed when actors
mutually contingent exchanges with specific perceive themselves as members of a group and
partners over time, and (4) all outcomes of value share resources with each other (despite an
obey a principle of satiation (in psychological underlying competitive structure in which actors
terms) or diminishing marginal utility (in may be embedded) (Thye et al. 2011).
economic terms) (Molm and Cook 1995).

18.3 Theories on Trust


18.2.4 Recent Research on Social Exchange
Theory and research on trust is found in both
Recent applications of exchange theory have sociology and psychology (Lewis and Weigert
addressed a wide variety of processes. For 2012). In sociology, most scientific investigations
instance, some have addressed the structure of of trust as a social process are found in the social
reciprocity—the giving of benefits to another in exchange literature (Cook et al. 2009). Work in
return for something received—arguing that this vein examines how trust and confidence in
reciprocity is structured and variable across others influences social exchange relationships,
different forms of exchange, and that variations in specifically how uncertainty affects cooperative
the structure of reciprocity have profound effects relationships. Similar to social psychological
M.J. Carter

examinations of trust in sociology, research in survival mechanism (Cosmides and Tooby 1992;
economics has examined how trust and the fear of Brewer and Caporael 1990). For instance, some
betrayal motivate individuals when they theorists conceive trust (and altruistic behavior) as
participate in negotiated (economic) exchanges an evolutionary byproduct that emerged in human
(Bohnet and Zeckhauser 2004). Regardless of civilizations due to the need for humans to hunt
disciplinary emphasis, most contemporary cooperatively (Kurzban 2003). Popular
perspectives on trust see it as a foundational theoretical orientations on trust in this tradition
interpersonal process that involves cognition, link the emergence of trust in humans to their
behavior, and emotions (Weber and Carter 2002). tendency and ability to mutually sanction one
Much of the work on trust is found in another for transgressions; the idea being that
psychology, influenced by the work of Morton without mutual sanctioning, trust in the norms and
Deutsch, who defines trust as the confidence that social institutions of contemporary society— and
an individual will find what is desired from the tendency for individuals to regulate
another rather than what is feared (Deutsch 1973). trustworthiness in one another—would not have
While work on trust is often psychological in evolved as it has (Simpson 2007; Henrich and
nature, most contemporary scholars believe that Boyd 2001; Gintis 2003).
trust is an objective social reality, not reducible to Ultimate causal theories of trust often cite
psychological factors alone (Lewis and Weigert genetics as determinants of trusting behavior,
2012; Kasperson et al. 2005). Research has shown emphasizing that trust is a trait that was selected
that trust plays a central role in social life, not only during evolution. Here, gene-centered
in maintaining successful interpersonal evolutionary models of selection such as inclusive
relationships, but in developing as a healthy fitness theory (Hamilton 1964) and reciprocal
human being over time (Miller and Rempel 2004; altruism theory (Trivers 1971) have been applied
Cook and Cooper 2003). to understand the development of trust. These
Theories on trust are generally classified three models see trust as an evolutionary trait that is
ways, addressing either ultimate causation, passed down through generations; altruistic
ontogeny, or proximate causation (Sherman 1988; behavior emerged when individuals showed
Tinbergen 1963; Simpson 2007). Theories on preferences toward helping biological relatives.
trust that are centered on ultimate causation focus These early, mostly biological explanations for
on evolutionary and cultural origins of traits that the development of trust evolved to more
are associated with trusting behavior; theories of sociological perspectives, which noted that
trust centered on ontogeny address altruistic behavior is not rooted solely in primary
environmental, experiential, and socialization groups or in-groups—that trusting and self-
factors that influence how trusting behavior sacrificial behavior is extended outward among
becomes a valued orientation for individuals in inhabitants of a community, as a mechanism of
society; theories that address proximate causal social integration and social control. More recent,
mechanisms of trust examine stimuli or events gene-cultural co-evolutionary models emphasize
that activate, maintain, or regulate trusting that humans developed trust via their tendency
behavior in populations. Let us examine these toward “strong reciprocity,” which occurs when
three theoretical perspectives on trust more individuals enforce social norms and keep others
closely. in check to ensure that cheaters do not destroy the
cooperative mechanisms that exist within groups
(Fehr and Fischbacher 2003).
18.3.1 U ltimate Causal Theories of
Trust
18.3.2 Ontogenetic Theories of Trust
Ultimate causal theories of trust cite a plethora of
historical factors that together provide evidence Early ontogenetic theories of trust were
for trust evolving in the human species as a influenced by Erikson (1963), who emphasized
that trust develops early in life-course
ociologies: Social Exchange, Trust, Justice, and Legitimacy 375

socialization, from conflicts that children must Many of the proximate causal theories of trust
deal with as they mature across stages of have emerged in the past few decades, in the work
development of Kelley et al. (2003), Holmes and Rempel
(Simpson 2007). Erikson noted that trust vs. (1989), and Wieselquist et al. (1999). Deutsch
mistrust is one of the first conflicts for children. (1973) provided one of the original proximate
Feelings of trust toward others are influenced by causal theories of trust. These theories emphasize
how attentive or neglectful primary group situational factors that influence the development
members are regarding early psycho-social needs. of trust between individuals. For instance, Kelley
Children who have needs met by significant et al. (2003; Kelley and Thibaut 1978) and others
caregivers come to expect—and trust—that such see trust emerging when high levels of
needs will be met in the future, while children interdependence exist between social units, when
whose needs are not met come to doubt and individuals need to coordinate activities to
distrust that their needs will be met. achieve goals, and when individuals are involved
Subsequent ontogenetic theories of trust were in exchange relationships where positive
developed by Bowlby (1969, 1973, 1980), whose outcomes are needed for one or both exchanging
attachment theory showed that children develop partners. The model of trust proposed by Kelley
trust when they learn that they can turn to support et al. sees interdependence, coordination, and
systems in times of distress, and by Bowen exchange being largely influenced by fear
(1978), whose family systems theory links trust to (Simpson 2007).
the development of a differentiated self- concept, Additional proximate theories of trust focus on
representing an individual’s ability to feel both the normative development of relationships,
attachment to and independence from others. specifically how trust develops based on
Bowlby and Bowen’s ontogenetic theories show predictability and uncertainty reduction (Holmes
that those with differentiated self- concepts find it and Rempel 1989). Trust emerges between
easier to develop trusting relationships with others individuals when they come to expect and predict
as they progress through their life-course; the others’ behavior. For instance, two individuals
differentiation in attachment and independence who meet likely have idealized expectations for
allows for individuals to trust others and rely on what the other is and should be. These idealized
them in times of need while not over-identifying expectations are vague and generalized in the
with others and relying solely on them. initial stages of a relationship, but become more
More recent ontogenetic, life-history theories specific as interdependency forms between the
of trust state that early childhood experiences individuals over time. As individuals form a
provide children with diagnostic information dependency, doubt, fear, and concern of rejection
about the situations and environments they are can emerge, causing anxiety. Actors diminish
likely to experience as adults. For example, their anxiety by reciprocating trusting actions
stressful situations and family dissension in early toward one another. This “reciprocal assurance”
childhood can influence children to develop reveals that each individual remains attached and
negative conceptions of themselves and others, committed to the other. Trust elevates when such
which leads a child to have more insecure reciprocated action takes the form of making
attachment patterns later in life (Belsky et al. sacrifices, taking risks, or placing oneself in a
1991; Chisolm 1993). Early life experiences such vulnerable position in relation to the other
as these can lead one to adopt short-term (Simpson 2007; Pruitt 1965).
expectations for future relationships, based on a
level of distrust and belief that such relationships
are ephemeral rather than long-lasting. 18.3.4 Recent Research on Trust

Classic research on trust found that trust


18.3.3 Proximate Causal Theories of Trust violations during interactions tend to be more
harmful when they occur early on rather than later
during interactions (Komorita and Mechling
M.J. Carter

1967). Recent research has addressed this 1980). Justice represents one’s notion that
phenomenon by examining the operation of trust resources, procedures, and/or outcomes of social
cross- culturally, in high-trust vs. low-trust relationships are administered or distributed
cultures. In an examination of trust behaviors in fairly. Justice is a fundamental social comparison
the United States (a society defined by high-trust) process; one does not need to look far to see
and Japan (a society defined by low-trust), examples of individuals evaluating self and others
Kuwabara et al. (2014) discovered that during in terms of justice orientations. A young child
interactions early trust violations are more may react negatively when they perceive that they
harmful than late trust violations (but only in do not receive as many cookies as another child;
high-trust societies). They also found that adults protest when they feel they are overcharged
generalized trust is not only lower but also less during a monetary transaction—justice processes
important in low-trust cultures. This research are ubiquitous in social life. Much of the theory
advances our understanding of how culture affects and research on justice is sociological (Hegtvedt
the development of solidarity in exchange and Markovsky 1995; Hegtvedt and Scheuerman
relations. 2010; Jasso 2007b), though it is commonly
Recent studies have examined whether reward examined across the social sciences (Young 2011;
systems generate the same positive effects as Sen 2009).
punishment systems (increased cooperation)
without negative side effects (decreased
interpersonal trust), or whether reward systems 18.4.1 The Elements of Justice
also lead to detrimental effects on trust, finding
that while reward systems can generate the same The process of justice involves a combination of
positive effects as punishment systems, they also both individual and situational factors, which
generate the same negative side effects (Irwin et involve perceivers, receivers, and evaluations
al. 2014). (Hegtvedt 2006). Perceivers are individuals who
Classical sociological ideas on trust has been assess the outcome of some procedure or
revisited as well; Frederiksen (2012) has applied distributed resource. Receivers are recipients of
Simmel (1971) to better understand how trust outcomes or targets of a procedure. Justice
operates differently in various types of social evaluations are determinations made regarding
relations. Contemporary research on trust spans expected outcomes or procedures, or whether a
various disciplines and is both qualitative and distributed resource or procedure was properly
quantitative in nature. Recent qualitative studies conducted.
on trust have examined the distrust people feel Three personal factors influence how a
toward healthcare systems (Meyer 2015) and how perceiver assesses whether an outcome or
trust influences doctor-patient relationships procedure is just: The first regards an individual’s
(Skirbekk et al. 2011). Recent quantitative studies characteristics, such as status (e.g., one’s gender
have shown that the possession of high status or age) (Hegtvedt and Cook 2001) and identity
leads individuals to trust others more (Lount and meanings (based on in-group favoritism and the
Petit 2012). Game-theory has also been used to tendency for individuals to devalue out-groups)
understand how trust influences investments and (Clay- Warner 2001). Second, one’s beliefs can
returns in social networks (Frey et al. 2015). influence perceptions of justice. For example, if
one believes that gambling is immoral one would
likely not feel as sympathetic for someone who
lost money gambling. Third, personal motivations
18.4 Justice Theories
can influence whether one sees an outcome as just
Theories of justice seek to understand how people or unjust (for example, if one behaves
assess the allocation of resources amongst self altruistically toward another they may not expect
and others, particularly whether resources are resources in return, whereas if one’s motivations
distributed equitably (Hegtvedt 2006; Jasso 2001, were self-interested a resource may be expected
after some helping behavior).
ociologies: Social Exchange, Trust, Justice, and Legitimacy 377

In addition to personal factors, situational the object of comparison (Hegtvedt and


factors are also important to consider in justice Markovsky 1995; Adams 1965).
evaluations. Generally, individuals will behave When an individual determines that something
more justly when they are in situations that is unjust, it causes a reaction, taking the form of
increase their level of self-awareness; also, an emotion, cognition, or behavior (Hegtvedt
decisions made in groups are often perceived as 2006). Regarding emotional outcomes of justice
more just than decisions made by individuals evaluations, individuals often feel guilt when they
alone (Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995). assess that they are over-rewarded some resource
Additionally, justice outcomes can be interpreted or when a procedure or outcome goes in their
differently depending on whether such outcomes favor unfairly, and they feel anger when they are
exist between friends or strangers (individuals under-rewarded or when procedures or outcomes
generally prefer more equitable distributions are deemed unfair. Regarding cognitive outcomes
between friends than with strangers) (Hegtvedt of justice evaluations, individuals are likely to
and Cook 2001; Tyler and Dawes 1993). alter their attitude or belief about another who has
Justice evaluations are determined based on the contributed to their injustice. And, individuals are
previous personal and situational factors, and are likely to behave toward another differently based
influenced by both cognitive (Cohen 1982; Van on whether one attributes a justice evaluation as
den Bos et al. 1999) and comparison processes contingent on another’s motives or actions. For
(Hegtvedt 2006). Social cognition comes into example, one may behave aggressively toward
play when an individual makes an attribution another if one perceives that the other person is
regarding a source of injustice. For instance, responsible for an outcome that is unjust.
research has shown that being under-rewarded is 18.4.2 Distributive Justice and
likely to be perceived as more unjust than being Procedural Justice
over-rewarded, and that people tend to perceive
situations as more just when attributions of Past research has examined various dimensions of
injustice are internal rather than external (Utne justice. Two main areas of emphasis in the justice
and Kidd 1980). Social comparison processes literature include theories of distributive justice
operate to determine one’s evaluation of justice as and procedural justice. Theories on distributive
well, illustrated by Adams’ (1965) formula of justice address how resources are distributed
justice determination: among individuals, noting that one’s perception
of distributive justice is influenced by equality
OA / I A = O B / I B (the idea that recipients of resources should
receive equal shares of distributed outcomes),
Where “O” represents an actor’s outcomes, “I”
equity (the idea that resources should be
indicates an actor’s inputs, and “A” and “B”
commensurate to contributions), and need (the
represent two different individuals in a situation.
idea that resources should be distributed based on
The comparison equation reveals an unjust
recipients’ needs) (Hegtvedt 2006). Theories of
situation when actor A or B believe that their
procedural justice address the fairness of
outcomes compared to their inputs are not
processes by which resources are distributed.
commensurate with one another. Drawing on
Classic work on procedural justice examined
cognitive dissonance theory, Adams noted that an
legalities of resource allocation and conflict
imbalance in the formula of justice determination
resolution (Thibaut and Walker 1975; Lind and
causes distress in an actor whose outputs do not
Tyler 1988) and situational and consistent
equate their inputs, in comparison to another. In
decision making in organizational settings
these situations actors will seek to reduce their
(Leventhal et al. 1980; Folger 1977). Generally,
discomfort and restore balance to the equation, by
scholars of procedural justice have found that
either: (1) Altering inputs, (2) altering outcomes,
individuals prefer procedural rules that fulfil
(3) cognitively distorting inputs or outcomes, (4)
important situational goals (Hegtvedt and
exiting the situation, (5) cognitively distorting
Markovsky 1995; Leventhal et al. 1980); thus,
inputs or outcomes of the other, or (6) changing
M.J. Carter

individuals’ perceptions of procedural justice are perceptions of procedural, distributive, and


influenced by: (1) Consistency of procedures ecological injustice regarding the environment.
across individuals and across time, (2) the Clay-Warner et al. (2005) examined how
suppression of bias in procedures, (3) the procedural and distributive justice impact worker
accuracy of information regarding a procedural attitudes differently, showing that each type of
decision, (4) Mechanisms to correct bad justice predicts different levels of commitment to
decisions, (5) representativeness of the an organization for workers who are victims or
participants to a decision, and (6) The ethicality of survivors of downsizing (results showed that
standards. procedural justice is a more important predictor of
Another area of focus in the justice literature organizational commitment for survivors and
regards authoritative justice (Hegtvedt 2006; unaffected workers of downsizing than for
Tyler and Lind 1992), which addresses how victims of downsizing, while distributive justice
individuals defer to and obey authority, revealing is more important for victims than for either
that individuals defer to authority figure based on survivors or unaffected workers).
an authority figure’s standing (one’s relative Additional research on justice includes work
status and degree of respect and treatment shown), by Melamed et al. (2014) that examines
neutrality (an authority figure’s equal treatment of distributive justice and referent networks, and
subordinates), and trust (an authority figure’s Hegtvedt and Isom’s (2014) summary on the
intentions of fairness). relationship between justice and inequality.
Justice evaluations take many forms, and have Methodology in justice studies has also been
varying degrees of significance and intensity addressed, with scholars providing criticism and
regarding the outcomes they influence. Social recommendations for how to improve research
interactions are often affected by justice designs that address justice and social comparison
processes; they are a fundamental comparison processes (Jasso 2012; Markovsky and Eriksson
process that defines the structure of people’s 2012). Social psychologists have examined the
experience in society. Hegtvedt (2006) relationship between justice and identity,
summarizes the three main assumptions implicit revealing how one’s moral identity (based on
in justice processes, based on previous theory and meanings of justice and care) operates to motivate
research on justice (Adams 1965; Berger et al. behavior and emotions across social situations
1972; Leventhal et al. 1980; Lind and Tyler 1988; (Carter 2013; Stets and Carter 2011, 2012). And,
Walster et al. 1978; Van den Bos et al. 2001): (1) some have examined the relationship between
Individuals attempt to make sense of their social justice and emotions (Jasso 2007a).
experiences and are likely to assess the justice of
their expectations, (2) evaluations of injustice
produce unpleasant sensations of distress and
18.5 L egitimacy Theory
tension, and (3) individuals are motivated to
eliminate distress by restoring justice for Legitimacy theory is a theory of social
themselves (and, if applicable, for others). comparison that examines whether things in
society (such as authority figures) are right and
proper, and in accord with how they ought to be
18.4.3 Recent Research on Justice (Zelditch 2006). Legitimacy theory is a theory of
perception, seeking to explain how power is
Recent research on justice processes has defined, respected, and obeyed—i.e.,
examined how individual-level and contextual legitimized—among individuals in society. In
factors combine to affect one’s perception of legitimacy theory, power is one’s ability to
justice. For instance, Parris et al. (2014) examined control and allocate resources; or more simply,
college students’ perceptions of justice with power is the ability to reward or penalize others.
regards to the environment, showing that one’s Generally, legitimacy theory seeks to understand
environmental identity and perception that one’s how power becomes legitimated in social groups
university encourages sustainability enhances
ociologies: Social Exchange, Trust, Justice, and Legitimacy 379

and in greater society, and the causes and entity that has authority) receives support from
consequences of the legitimation of power peers or superiors, it is the authorization of their
(Zelditch 2006; Zelditch et al. 1983; Walker et al. power. When subordinates act in deference to
1991). authority, they endorse the authority figure’s
power as legitimate. A main concern of
legitimacy theory is the manner in which validity,
18.5.1 The Elements of Legitimacy propriety, authorization, and endorsement
interrelate to influence stable authority structures
Central to legitimacy theory is the notion that and the normative regulation of power (Zelditch
once power becomes legitimated it takes the form 2006).
of authority. Authority represents an individual’s Previous work in legitimacy theory has
ability to regulate others’ behavior by invoking revealed that legitimation is a function of four
rights that are vested in a social role. But once elements (Zelditch and Walker 2003): consensus,
authority is established, not everyone complies impartiality, objectification, and consonance.
with it. Legitimacy theory seeks to understand the These four elements represent the notions that:
situational contexts that are present when an (1) Generally, an authority’s claim to legitimacy
individual voluntarily complies (or does not will not be successful unless a consensus exists
comply) to an authority figure. To understand between authority figures and subordinates
how and why people comply with authority, a regarding norms, values, beliefs, purposes,
better understanding of power is needed. In practices, or and procedures that are aligned with
legitimacy theory, power takes two forms: pure the use of power, (2) additionally, authority will
power, and legitimate power (Zelditch 2006). not be considered legitimate unless it is fair and
Pure power is power that is overt and coercive, impartial—that benefits gained by the authority
such as direct physical aggression. Pure power is figure benefit the common good or have some
difficult to wield effectively, especially over time, universal applicability, (3) beliefs in which an
because it is often not respected, costly, and authority figure appeals must be based on
unstable. Military regimes that have had difficulty objective facts, and (4) there must be an
garrisoning borders or coercing large populations agreement between values, norms, beliefs,
of people provide examples of pure power being purposes, or procedures, and the nature,
ineffective; the continuing need to display and conditions, and consequences of the structure of
enact power through coercion makes it unstable the authority that is legitimated (Zelditch 2006).
and difficult to maintain. Legitimate power is Myriad empirical studies have validated these
authority that is generally respected and obeyed prior conditions of legitimacy as central to the
willingly, making it the much more effective and process of authority and subordinate relationships
stable form of maintaining order. (Massey et al. 1997; Zelditch and Floyd 1998;
Legitimacy theory differentiates the meaning Zelditch and Walker 2000).
of power at different levels of analysis. At the
micro (individual) level, legitimacy is propriety.
At the macro (group) level, legitimacy is validity 18.5.2 Recent Research on
(Zelditch 2006; Dornbusch and Scott 1975; Legitimacy
Weber 1968 [1918]). When an individual treats
another as a legitimate authority figure, that One of the most common applications of
person has propriety. When an individual accepts legitimacy theory is to law enforcement. Scholars
the existence of a normative order and complies have used legitimacy theory to understand how
with general expectations for behavior as defined police and civilians interact, and how power is
by sources of power in the greater social structure, wielded by those in positions of authority. One
the individual sees the normative order as valid. example of such research is provided by Long et
Legitimacy theory also distinguishes the levels al. (2013), who examined how legitimacy and
of the hierarchy of authority that supports a fairness processes influence whether or not police
legitimate entity. When an authority figure (or an
M.J. Carter

officers report acts of misconduct perpetrated by 18.6 Interrelations Among Social


fellow officers. This research found that the Exchange, Trust, Justice, and
perceived seriousness of an offense and
legitimacy (endorsement) are consistently strong
Legitimacy
predictors of officers’ intentions to report
So far we have covered four main areas of inquiry
misconduct. Legitimacy theory has also been
in microsociological theory: social exchange,
applied to understand how modern sexist
trust, justice, and legitimacy. While these subjects
viewpoints are endorsed (legitimized) by men and
have been presented in discrete sections, it is
women, showing that females are relatively
important that their commonalities be addressed.
disinclined to recognize expressions of modern
After all, these social processes do not operate in
sexism as prejudicial, and positing that modern
isolation; each operates reflexively, often
forms of prejudice may be perilous because they
simultaneously with corresponding
remain unchallenged (Barreto and Ellemers
processes. For example, trust, justice, and
2005).
legitimacy often influence how individuals
Legitimacy theory has also been used to
exchange resources with one another. When an
understand identity verification processes,
individual makes a justice assessment regarding
specifically how individuals verify their “leader
how resources are allocated, the legitimacy of the
identity” in a task-oriented group (Burke et al.
involved actors often influences perceptions of
2007). Findings of this work revealed that
equity and fairness. And, an individual’s feelings
verification of one’s leader identity is influenced
of trust toward another are sometimes affected by
by both gender and legitimation processes:
the perception that they abuse a position of
Legitimated female leaders and non-legitimated
authority, or do not treat others in a just manner.
males find it easier to verify identities in task-
It is more likely that these processes operate in
oriented groups. In addition, legitimated male
concert rather than in isolation. With that notion
leaders tend to be over-evaluated in the amount of
in mind, let us investigate recent research that has
their leadership relative to their own identity
examined interconnections among social
standards, while non-legitimated female leaders’
exchange, trust, justice, and legitimacy.
leadership behavior tends to be under-evaluated
Past research applied knowledge of social
relative to their own identity standards.
exchange and trust to understand what affects
Legitimacy theory has also been expanded and
individuals’ trust toward managers in
applied to marketing research. A recent study by
organizational settings (Whitener et al. 1998).
Wang et al. (2014) has shown that individuals
More recent work has examined the reciprocal
perceive the worth and legitimacy of products
relations between trust and perceived justice,
differently depending on the country in which the
using neuroscientific evidence that suggests that
product is produced. And, some have examined
trust can develop between actors without
how annual reports and financial statements of
conscious deliberation; this shows that contrary to
organizations create a sense of legitimacy,
previous notions that trust develops slowly
showing how fledging companies carve out
between workers and management, trust can also
legitimate reputations over time in a competitive
form rapidly, exerting a significant influence on
market (Irvine and Fortune 2015, forthcoming). A
employee perceptions of justice (Holtz 2013).
review of the literature that incorporates some
Exchange theory and theories of procedural
facet of legitimacy theory shows how central
justice have been applied to management,
notions of authority and subordination are in
specifically to understand how firms are managed
social interactions.
differently depending on whether firms are
populated by family or non-family managers
(Barnett et al. 2012).
Using a more sociological lens, Hegdvedt
(2015) summarized the interrelated roles of
justice and trust, showing how social identity-
ociologies: Social Exchange, Trust, Justice, and Legitimacy 381

models and resource-based models of justice after a change occurs in the mode of exchange
processes facilitate the creation of legitimacy, and (Chesire et al. 2010). Others have examined how
revealing how justice and trust are influenced by power, trust, and social exchange combine to
power and leadership, intergroup processes, determine how a community supports tourism,
situational factors, and emotions. In addition, finding that communities are more likely to
Max Weber’s conceptions of legitimate and support tourism when residents trust in their
charismatic authority have been applied to government officials and when they trust that that
understand how trust develops in online worlds, benefits will be realized by increased tourism
when people collaborate to accomplish a task (Nunkoo 2012).
together (O’Neil 2014). There are many other examples of recent
In research examining the relationship between research that has examined some relationship
justice and legitimacy, Bottoms and Tankebe among exchange, trust, justice, and legitimacy
(2012) examined how legitimacy operates in the (Gillham and Edwards 2011; Schilke et al. 2015;
criminal justice system, proposing that a dialogic Mazerolle et al. 2013). One can see how broadly
model that includes both power-holder legitimacy these four processes have been applied in recent
and audience legitimacy must be considered to years. While most work on each originated in
understand legitimacy processes in the criminal sociology or psychology, scholars from across the
justice field. This work advances previous work disciplines have applied theories of exchange,
that focuses mostly on compliance to the law to trust, justice, and legitimacy to understand areas
address justifications of the claims to legitimacy of social life.
made by power-holders, and how legitimacy
changes over time. In a similar vein, Murphy
(2005) examined relationships among procedural
18.7 C onclusion
justice, legitimacy, and tax non- compliance,
showing that attempts to coerce and threaten One of the great conundrums in sociology is to
taxpayers into compliance can undermine the understand how free-willed individuals are
legitimacy of a tax office’s authority, which in constrained by greater social forces that they
turn can affect taxpayers’ subsequent compliance themselves create. Reconciling this somewhat
behavior. paradoxical duality has been a charge for
Some have applied theories of justice and sociologists since the discipline’s inception.
legitimacy and examined the collectivity- Understanding social exchange, trust, justice, and
generated legitimacy of reward procedures and legitimacy as core social processes that connect
individual-level justice perceptions about reward individuals to others in the social structure helps
distributions, finding that collectivity sources of us detangle the mystery of social organization.
validity (authorization and endorsement) exert Scholars who have generated theories on and
positive effects on individual-level justice researched these processes have moved us toward
perceptions (as predicted by Hegtvedt and answering the questions that have commonly
Johnson (2000)), but that the influence is entirely plagued sociology; by understanding how people
indirect through an individual’s perception of exchange resources, trust in others, perceive
procedural justice (Mueller and Landsman 2004). things as just, or legitimize the use of power, we
Trust has also been examined in the context of begin to conceive how ephemeral micro-level
social exchange. For instance, the relationship encounters connect to stable macro- level social
between uncertainty and trust in exogenous shifts structures. In many ways, social exchange, trust,
in modes of social exchange has been addressed justice, and legitimacy are bridges that link the
(exchanges that are not initiated by individuals in micro- and macro-realms.
a given exchange system) (Colquitt et al. 2012). Of course, these four processes are not the only
Results in these studies have shown that trust mechanisms by which individuals create and
declines when the uncertainty created by the maintain the social structure. But, they are
mode of exchange decreases, if cooperation rates ubiquitous elements of social life, active to some
between exchange partners are high before and
M.J. Carter

degree in virtually all encounters. As dimensions and social comparison mechanisms among elementary
of social comparison, these processes greatly school children. Social Psychology of Education,
15(4), 603–614.
influence attitudes and behaviors of individuals in Bottoms, A., & Tankebe, J. (2012). Beyond procedural
society. And, these processes are also crucial justice: A dialogic approach to legitimacy in criminal
dimensions of social integration and social justice. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology,
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Bowen, M. (1978). Family therapy in clinical practice.
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Social Psychology Quarterly, 76, 203–223.
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Ethnomethodology and Social 19
Phenomenology

Jason Turowetz , Matthew M. Hollander ,


and Douglas W. Maynard

19.1 Introduction mail: jturowet@ssc.wisc.edu;


mholland@ssc.wisc.edu;
maynard@ssc.wisc.edu
“Ethnomethodology,” a term coined by the This chapter has two principal aims. First, it
American sociologist Harold Garfi nkel (1917– provides a comprehensive overview of classic
2011) in the 1950s (Garfi nkel 1967: 11), and contemporary research in ethnomethodology.
represents a theoretical paradigm that emerged In this we proceed chronologically, beginning
out of his thinking from the 1940s onward. From with Garfi nkel’s earliest work and then tracking
its inception, ethnomethodology was infl uenced its development, by both Garfi nkel and his
by and in dialogue with the philosophy of students, in the latter part of the twentieth century
phenomenology, particularly the social through to contemporary theoretical and
phenomenology developed by Alfred Schütz and empirical projects in the ethnomethodological
later popularized by his students. To understand tradition. Second, we emphasize the ongoing
and appreciate the core precepts of dialogue and reciprocity between
ethnomethodology, then, familiarity with the ethnomethodology and social phenomenology.
basic features of phenomenology is necessary. At Thus, while our major focus is
the same time, in tracing the evolution of ethnomethodology, we also review key
ethnomethodology and its relationship with developments in philosophical and social
phenomenology, we can also see how phenomenology, particularly with respect to their
ethnomethodologists advanced the theories of infl uence on Garfi nkel and their re-specifi cation
phenomenologists by grounding many of their by ethnomethodologists. Accordingly, the
fundamental insights in empirical results and “re- chapter starts with a discussion of
s pecifying” key concepts. As we will see, such phenomenology’s origins and evolution, its
re-specifi cation (Garfi nkel 1991 ) entails (re)- development by Schütz in a sociological
describing social phenomena in terms of the direction, and its further development and
observable, concrete, and concerted practices of popularization by his students, most notably Peter
society’s members, or what Garfi nkel calls Berger and Thomas Luckmann ( 1966 ). Further,
“members’ methods.” as the chapter proceeds, we address contemporary
ideas and advances in social phenomenology as
these become relevant to our exposition. It is
J. Turowetz () • M. M. Hollander • D. W. Maynard worth noting from the outset, though, that by the
Department of Sociology , University of
1990s, social phenomenology had largely merged
Wisconsin- Madison , Madison , WI , USA e-

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 387


S. Abrutyn (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary Sociological Theory,
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32250-6_19
J. Turowetz et al.

with other microsociological paradigms in a kind consciousness of something. The method of


of “theoretical syncretism” (Flaherty 2009 ) that phenomenological analysis, accordingly, entailed
variously mixed phenomenology with elements describing how the intentionality of
of symbolic interactionism, Goffmanian micro- consciousness constitutes objects of perception
structuralism, and ethnomethodology. Therefore, and experience. Phenomenological
when referring to recent developments in social description requires the “bracketing” of our
phenomenology, we are not dealing with a ordinary experience of the world via a series of
coherent paradigm per se, but rather a syncretic phenomenological “reductions.” This disciplined
hybrid of which phenomenology forms a more or and rigorous suspension of the natural attitude of
less prominent part. Finally, we evaluate everyday life—which takes for granted that
ethnomethodology’s position in the things in the world are generally as they appear—
contemporary fi eld of sociological theories and reveals how acts of consciousness are ceaselessly
propose avenues for dialogue with other producing the apparent naturalness of the world.
paradigms, while also proposing future research Husserl’s goal was to ground knowledge in
agendas. general, and scientifi c knowledge in particular,
in propositions about consciousness that were
necessarily and certainly true. He thought of the
history of the sciences in terms of perennial crisis,
19.2 Phenomenology: Origins of
a situation in which what was required was a
Social Phenomenology and systematic transcendental philosophy.
Ethnomethodology Phenomenology would establish indubitable
truths about the conditions of the possibility of
P henomenology is a philosophical tradition with our everyday experience and knowledge of
origins in systematic efforts to anchor classical ordinary worldly objects, which would then
Western claims about knowledge and reality, provide a universal basis for the more specifi c
particularly those of natural science, logic, and knowledge claims of the sciences. 81
mathematics, in universal structures of human S tarting in the 1910s, Husserl’s program
consciousness. Founded by German philosopher was taken up and developed by a series of
Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), phenomenology students, some of whom departed in brilliant and
sought to methodically investigate and lay bare original ways from his own developing vision of
the most basic elements of conscious perception. phenomenology. Those of his disciples with the
In Husserl’s philosophy, this took the form of most relevance to ethnomethodology and social
establishing the relationship between noesis — phenomenology include Martin Heidegger, Aron
the act by which consciousness constitutes Gurwitsch, and (although not personally working
reality— and noema , the reality so constituted. with him) Alfred Schütz and Maurice Merleau-
As in Kant’s transcendental idealism (a major infl Ponty. Heidegger, generally regarded as
uence on Husserl), perception of objects is Husserl’s single most infl uential student, also
regarded as an activity with distinct stages, and has the distinction of being his most radical critic.
their existence for an ego-subject is “an Trained in medieval philosophy, Heidegger was
accomplishment of consciousness” (Moran 2005 primarily concerned with the history of ontology
: 53). Mediating this fundamental relationship is and how it had seemingly trivialized “the
intentionality , “the manner in which objects question of being” (Heidegger 1996: 1). He thus
disclose themselves to awareness as transcending combined an awareness of modern philosophy
the act of awareness itself” ( ibid) . Put with the ontological concerns of medieval
differently, for Husserl consciousness is always Scholastic and ancient Greek philosophers. In his

81
Husserl was initially a student of mathematics, and his ideas stemmed from some of the same sources (e.g.,
concern for system and certain knowledge refl ects this Frege) that inspired Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein, and the
background. Though a “continental” philosopher, his fi rst generation of “analytic” philosophers in Britain.
methodology and Social Phenomenology 389

lecture courses of the 1920s, culminating in the attributes that can be contemplated independently
classic treatise Being and Time (1927), he of any particular door. By confl ating ontic and
transformed Husserl’s epistemological and ontological modes of being, argues Heidegger,
Kantian understanding of intentionality the Western philosophical tradition has
(consciousness is always correlated with an overlooked the transcendental conditions of the
object of consciousness) into an original possibility of any determinate way of human
ontological view (being is always the being of being-in-the-world.
something). The distinctive way of existing of A nother of Husserl’s students, Aron
human beings ( Dasein : literally “being there”) Gurwitsch, took his philosophy in a different
is seen as necessarily situated and engaged with direction, producing a phenomenological
worldly activities, with theoretical consciousness psychology. Gurwitsch was critical of Husserl’s
emerging as only one among many ways of notion that consciousness constitutes objects out
human “being-in-the-world” (Dreyfus 1991 ). of discrete, unconnected elements, arguing
T he contrast of Husserl and Heidegger is instead that we always confront objects in the
par-ticularly instructive for our later discussion of world that are already constituted as wholes, or
Garfi nkel’s relationship with much of the gestalts . Rather than asking how consciousness
sociology of his time (see below). Whereas unifi es discrete elements of experience into
Husserl held that conscious, intentional mental coherent objects, Gurwitsch’s gestalt theory
states provide a primordial foundation for our posits the pre-intentional appearing of
engagement with the world, Heidegger phenomena as cohesive totalities. Objects appear
developed a “phenomenology of ‘mindless’ to us as wholes, rather than collections of parts;
everyday coping skills” (Dreyfus 1991 : 3), or indeed, the parts that comprise an object appear
pre-conceptual practices by which people make as individual parts only secondarily, against the
themselves at home in the world, rendering background of the whole. This would suggest,
worldly phenomena intelligible and familiar. pace Husserl, that a complete reduction of the
Such commonsensical practices both precede and elements of reality to atomistic elements (as
make possible the adoption of various theoretical constituted by individual acts of consciousness) is
perspectives on the world, including Husserlian impossible.
phenomenological analysis. Consider, for A third student, the French phenomenologist
example, the ordinary, everyday activity of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, also begins from the
opening a door. It is not necessary to perceive or premise that a complete reduction of the
understand doors theoretically—as wooden phenomenal world to individual acts of
artifacts with certain colors, textures, and consciousness is impossible; also, like Gurwitsch,
geometric dimensions—in order to competently he had a keen interest in psychology, and held that
interact with them. Rather, opening doors is a philosophy can make crucial contributions to that
commonsensical cultural skill that we acquire science. In contrast with Gurwitsch, however,
during socialization as young children; only later Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of perception is
do we come to regard doors as possible objects of grounded more in embodiment than cognition.
theoretical inquiry. Indeed, Heidegger argues that More precisely, he insists on the irreducible role
this intellectual stance typically only arises when of the body in cognition, and refuses to consider
our normal non-conceptual relationships to mental processes apart from their embodiment. In
worldly objects is disrupted in some way. 82 The this, he is closer to Heidegger, whose work infl
door as an “ontological” entity embedded in the uenced Merleau-Ponty’s classic study
fl ow of lived experience then shows up for us in Phenomenology of Perception ( 1962 )—
a different mode, as an “ontic” one with abstract although, in contrast to Heidegger, he explicitly

82
Heidegger’s view of mind and thinking is thus broadly
parallel with that of the classical pragmatists Dewey and
Mead.
J. Turowetz et al.

accords the body a central place in his analysis of cases, dissatisfaction with the cognitivist aspects
being-in-the-world. of the work of an infl uential mentor led to an
Merleau-Ponty thus challenges the original and non-cognitivist vision of the
assumptions of traditional European structures of experience and how people make
philosophies, and the psychologies that arose sense of the world.
from them, that mind and body are distinct kinds
of reality; that mind is the seat of human volition
and takes ontological precedence over body; and 19.2.1 Social Phenomenology
that the body is a mere instrument through which
mind acquires impressions of the world, which it In the 1920s, Alfred Schütz (1899–1959) was
then synthesizes independently of the body—a one of the fi rst (with Max Scheler) to make
position that received its classic statement in connections between sociological theory,
Descartes’ dictum cogito ergo sum (I think, particularly that of Max Weber, and Husserlian
therefore I am). In effect, Merleau-Ponty turns the phenomenology. His reasons for doing this were
cogito on its head, reformulating it as “I am, analogous to those of Husserl, but in the context
therefore I think” (Dreyfus 1991 ). As in of the social sciences rather than of philosophy.
Heidegger, being-in-the- world precedes, and Specifi cally, Schütz held that, like the natural
makes possible, any conceptual refl ections that sciences, the social sciences need a
take the world as an object of inquiry. In place of phenomenological grounding in what Husserl
the Cartesian intellectualized body, termed the Lebenswelt (“life-world”); without
MerleauPonty posits the “phenomenal body” such foundations, the fi ndings of any
whose primordial, pre-representational practices sociological theory of social action will perforce
disclose the existential horizons that make be incomplete (Schütz 1962 ). Especially after
rational thought and action possible. his emigration to New York in the 1930s, Schütz
T he work of these classical was in dialogue with other infl uential
phenomenologists, particularly as interpreted by philosophers of science such as John Dewey and
Alfred Schütz (see below), laid the groundwork Carl Hempel, and with sociological theorists such
for interpretivist and interactionist as Talcott Parsons (and, starting in the late 1940s,
phenomenological variants of sociological with Garfi nkel, who was Parsons’ student at
theory. As we will see, the earliest formulations Harvard).
of social phenomenology followed Husserl in In his mature statement of social
according primacy to mental constructs—most phenomenology, Schütz highlights the role of
notably the idealizations and typifying schemas common sense thinking and knowledge in social
posited by Schütz—in their analyses of the social action and social scientifi c theorizing. Following
world. Early social phenomenology, in turn, Weber, Schütz posited that we act with awareness
inspired Garfi nkel in his creation of that others are acting; from this precept, he
ethnomethodology, which originated in part as a developed a theory of how mutually coordinated
critique of Schütz’s emphasis on concepts at the social action is possible. 83 To this end, he argues
expense of actual bodily practices. Garfi nkel’s that by way of socialization, we assimilate
relationship to Schütz, then, paralleled that of idealizations that structure our perception of the
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty to Husserl. In both world. Central among these idealizations are (1)

83
Schütz follows Weber in defi ning social action in terms occurrence (ibid). As we argue later in the chapter, this
of (actual or intended) interaction with other persons. conception of the social is unnecessarily narrow, and
According to Weber, “Social action…can be oriented to recent developments in ethnomethodology (anticipated to
the past, present, or future anticipated behavior of others” some degree in the philosophical phenomenology of
(Whimster 2004 : 327). The stipulation that action is MerleauPonty and others) point to “acting alone” (i.e.,
social “only when one’s own behavior is sensibly oriented with nonhuman entities) as a viable domain for
to that of others” (ibid: 328) implies that conduct oriented sociological analysis.
to non-human objects is asocial, “a mere event” or
methodology and Social Phenomenology 391

the reciprocity of perspectives , which assumes socialized into the norms and practices embedded
that standpoints are interchangeable, such that if in these structures. This phenomenological
person A stands in person B’s position, they’ll see conception of social reality contrasted with the
the same object, X, in the same way; and (2) the positivist orthodoxy pervading the philosophy of
congruency of relevances, or that any way of social science in the 1960s, and for this reason
perceiving X stemming from biographical was regarded as revolutionary. Social
differences will not affect its objective empirical constructionism especially resonated with
identity. Further, A assumes B imputes these symbolic interactionists, resulting in an alliance
idealizations to her, and assumes B assumes that that reinvigorated that paradigm (Fine 1993 ). It
A does the same. also infl uenced sociologists with a Marxist bent,
Together, (1) and (2) illustrate “the general thesis who saw parallels between social
of reciprocal perspectives.” This allows us to (re)- phenomenology and the humanistic philosophy
construct the other’s subjective point of view in of the young Marx (circa 1843–1844). It was in
an intelligible way. It is on this foundation that this intellectual context of the late 1960s that
the typifi ed constructs of common sense are ethnomethodology fi rst became a household
based (Schütz 1962 : 12–13). Typifi cations, in word among sociologists.
turn, are formulated preeminently through the
medium of language, enabling the transmission of
knowledge within and between generations.
19.3 Garfi nkel and the
Although prominent American philosophers
of science knew of Schütz, his work being
Development of
published in prestigious academic journals, he did Ethnomethodology
not achieve wide recognition as a sociological
theorist until after his death in 1959. Two of his Like social phenomenology, ethnomethodology
former students at the New School, Peter Berger was signifi cantly infl uenced by classical
and Thomas Luckmann, went on to develop and phenomenology. Born in 1917, Garfi nkel
popularize his ideas in their highly infl uential developed a strong interest in sociology as a
book The Social Construction of Reality ( 1966 young man, attending the University of North
). This classic statement of social phenomenology Carolina, where he received his Master’s degree
launched numerous sociological variants of what in 1942, and then Harvard, where he earned a
soon became known as “social constructionism.” PhD in 1951. Although it is well known that he
Though conducting original and important was a student of Talcott Parsons, whose concern
studies of their own, their basic philosophy of with the problem of social order and theory of
social science derived from Schütz. For example, social action became central to Garfi nkel’s own
they argue that it is only in and through human project, it is less often noted that during his time
interaction that social reality emerges, such that in North Carolina, he closely studied (under
the social world is continually produced and Howard Odum) the works of the early Chicago
enacted through social interaction. More specifi School ethnographers, especially Florian
cally, building on a scheme Berger also Znaniecki (Rawls 2002 ). As Emirbayer and
articulated in an infl uential study of religion ( Maynard ( 2011 ) have noted, this represents an
1967 ), he and Luckmann posit that social reality early engagement on Garfi nkel’s part with
consists of three dialectically interrelated classical American pragmatism, although the
moments: (1) externalization , whereby writings of the pragmatists had less of a direct infl
subjective attitudes are made available to other uence on his formative ideas than those of the
members of a society, primarily through the phenomenologists, particularly Husserl and,
medium of language, (2) objectivation, or the several years later, Schütz and Gurwitsch.
concretization of externalized phenomena in the L ike his teacher Parsons, Garfi nkel’s
form of routines and institutions, and (3) touchstone question (sometimes referred to as the
internalization , whereby individuals are “Hobbesian problem of order”) was, “How is
J. Turowetz et al.

social order possible?” But rather than pursuing sense knowledge (e.g., “in-order-to-” and
this question by moving away from the details of “because- motives,” “stocks of knowledge,” and
life as it is lived and experienced, as Parsons did “we- orientations” that collectively comprised the
in the 1940s and 1950s, Garfi nkel followed both fabric of the life-world). 84
the Chicago school ethnographers and the Garfi nkel, however, was dissatisfi ed with
phenomenologists in striving to keep the details abstract sociological typologies of any sort,
of concrete action in the forefront of his whether those of Parsons or of Schütz. Though
sociological lens. During his years in Cambridge, Schütz came closer to the domain of human
he also began reading, and then personally beings’ actual sense-making practices, he
meeting with, Schütz, periodically taking the nevertheless stopped short of the observable and
train to New York to discuss phenomenology and reportable activities in and by which social actors
sociology with him. He also had fruitful produce a shared, mutually intelligible world.
discussions with Gurwitsch, who was also living According to Garfi nkel, these practices, which he
in Cambridge as a lecturer at Harvard (Rawls came to call “ethnomethods,” were not located
2006 ). primarily in the private cognitions of actors—the
By the early 1950s, Schütz had developed a contents of their minds—but rather in the lived,
mature version of his social phenomenology and recognizable, and accountable actions that
was publishing his ideas in leading American individuals concertedly exhibited in interaction.
sociology journals (e.g. Schütz 1945) . In many It was not that consciousness and intentionality
ways, Garfi nkel’s work began at the point at do not matter for ethnomethodology; but rather,
which Schütz’s ended. Although a kindred spirit that these features of human life are always
in many respects, even at this early stage of his already embedded in shared practices, which
development Garfi nkel differed from Schütz (as precede them and provide for their intelligibility.
noted earlier) in his interest in the empirical Garfi nkel was not the fi rst to have this overall
observation of people acting in actual, everyday insight: G.H. Mead ( 1934) , for example, had
situations. For Garfi nkel, this is the sine qua non argued that mental activity was a phase of social
of any adequate theory of social action: it must do interaction, rather than its antecedent (see also
justice to actual human activities in their concrete Joas 1996 ; Emirbayer and Maynard ( 2011 ).
and detailed orderliness (Heritage 1984 ; Garfi And as we saw above, Heidegger and Merleau-
nkel and Rawls 2006) . In contrast, Schütz Ponty criticized Husserl’s privileging of
remained a philosopher to the end, content to conscious intentionality, instead emphasizing the
theorize about action in the abstract without background conditions for its emergence.
observing it in real time (also characteristic of However, Garfi nkel went farther than these
Berger and Luckmann). It is perhaps ironic that, predecessors in his efforts to empirically
despite their many differences, Schütz shared a demonstrate and specify the practices that
number of traits with Parsons and other constituted the seen-but- unnoticed background
positivistic theorists of action and philosophers of against which social action becomes visible and
science. Both sought to model the foundation of possible. Thus, in his early work (see below),
society with conceptual structures, thereby Garfi nkel offered experimental demonstrations
relying on unexamined assumptions—unscientifi of Schütz’s abstract theses (e.g. about the thesis
c, commonsensical notions—of what common- of reciprocal perspectives) and, in the process,
sense knowledge actually consists of. Whereas detailed how the natural attitude—the mundane,
for Parsons this approach culminated in commonsense perception of the life-world—is in
formalistic typologies (e.g., AGIL diagrams), for fact an ongoing preconceptual achievement of
Schütz it led to universal structures of common- social actors.

84
B oth thinkers also drew extensively on empirical James and phenomenological psychologists such as
psychology to explain the motives shaping social action. Gurwitsch.
Whereas Parsons drew on Freud, Schütz drew on William
methodology and Social Phenomenology 393

I n their overview of the varieties of demonstrates how, through mutual adherence to


ethnomethodology, Maynard and Clayman ( the basic constitutive rules of daily life, we
1991 ) suggest three basic concerns shared by continually (re)-produce the commonsensical
ethnomethodology and phenomenology. First, fabric of the everyday world.
they share a focus on gestalt contextures , or the A reading of Garfi nkel’s classic Studies in
constitutive features of everyday settings that Ethnomethodology ( 1967 ), which constituted the
make up the life-world. To explain how these culmination of his thinking by the late 1960s,
contextures are achieved in interaction, Garfi nkel reveals all of these convergences between
proposed that people make use of the ethnomethodology and phenomenology. At the
documentary method of interpretation , an ethno- same time, it indicates some crucial differences.
method by which underlying patterns are ascribed As intimated earlier, the most basic difference
to local phenomena. As Garfi nkel puts it, “The was Garfi nkel’s insistence that theories of social
method consists of treating an actual appearance action be empirically grounded in people’s actual
as a ‘the document of’, as ‘pointing to’, as activities, in their details. This, in turn, led to a
‘standing on behalf of’, a presupposed underlying reciprocal engagement between his analytical
pattern. Not only is the underlying pattern derived vocabulary for documenting members’ practices
from its individual documentary evidences, but (ethnomethods) on the one hand, and his
the individual documentary evidences, in their empirical fi ndings, on the other. The best-known,
turn, are interpreted on the basis of ‘what is and arguably most important, concepts in this
known’ about the underlying pattern. Each is used vocabulary are (1) indexical expressions, (2)
to elaborate the other” (Garfi nkel 1967 : 78). accountability, and (3) refl exivity.
Second, ethnomethodology treats rules as
resources that actors use to accomplish situated 1. Indexical expressions are utterances that are
activities, rather than abstract algorithms that understood according to their deep
predetermine behavior. That is, a rule is not an embeddedness in the social context of their
exogenous force that causes us to act in one way production and understanding. Such
or another; nor does it have a determinate sense expressions have posed problems for
apart from the occasions of its use. Rather, traditional linguists and philosophers, who
members use rules as resources in performing have spent much effort incorporating certain
various actions, such as justifying, exculpating, classes of statements (e.g. deictic references,
sanctioning, categorizing, etc. Moreover, since no performative speech acts, etc.) into formal
rule can ever exhaustively specify all conditions theories of language use. To paraphrase Garfi
of its application, members must continually nkel and Sacks ( 1970 ), the mission of the
manage the discrepancy between rules and their social sciences, traditionally speaking, has
referents; we continually bring our actions into involved repeated attempts to substitute
alignment with rules, which requires practical objective expressions, which are putatively
competences not encoded in the rules themselves. context-independent, for indexical ones,
Just as contracts have a non-contractual basis, per which are susceptible to endless (re)specifi
Durkheim’s ( 1964 [1893]) well-known cations relative to their spatio-t emporal
formulation, so too do rule following and usage location in particular situations. Rather than
have a basis that is not stated in the contents per trying to tame indexical expressions in the
se. Third, ethnomethodology highlights the sense of regarding them as targets of remedy
accomplished character of the world, or repair, Garfi nkel effectively radicalizes
delineating the idealizations that support our them by making them subject to inquiry, and
shared belief in and orientation to an objective positing that all speech (and embodied action)
reality. Rather than presuppose the existence of is irremediably and inherently indexical—
the natural attitude, or ascribe it to a vague including any and all formal treatments of
mechanism such as “socialization,” Garfi nkel such expressions, as in social scientifi c
treats it as a topic of inquiry in its own right and theorizing.
J. Turowetz et al.

Garfi nkel’s famous breaching chaos of an infi nite regress of such


experiments ( 1963 , 1967 ), wherein his explanations if we did.
confederates (mostly students) intentionally W hen that kind of trust is violated, i.e. we
violated social expectations to reveal their encounter someone acting in culturally inept
taken-for-granted features, illustrate the ways, that causes a breakdown in our sense of
pervasiveness of indexical expressions. For reality unless we can rationalize it, for
example, Garfi nkel describes an episode example by coming to regard the person as
where a wife continually asks her husband to incompetent (Garfi nkel 1963) . As shown by
elaborate on what he means by the statement the breaching experiments, people do not
“I’m tired” ( 1967 : 43), asking if he means simply let breaches stand, but take swift action
“physically, mentally, or just bored”; thus, to restore a sense of normality and
when he replies “physically, mainly” she predictability. For instance, in the discussion
requests further clarifi cation between wife and husband described above,
(“You mean your muscles ache or your the husband reprimands his wife, admonishing
bones?”). The fact that endless clarifi cation/ her, “Don’t be so technical”; indeed, later in
elaboration like this is not requested in ordinary the conversation, after further prompts for
conversation is due to the use of tacit practices clarifi cation (“What do you mean”), he lashes
whereby members “fi ll in the gaps” surrounding out, saying “You know what I mean! Drop
such expressions and hold one another dead!” ( 1967 : 43). Here, the husband’s
accountable for doing so (see below). directives (don’t be technical) and subsequent
2. A ccountability : The accountable character of expletive treat his wife as deliberately
situated social life has two dimensions. First, violating social expectations. In other cases, a
when participants or members are engaged member may decide the other party is joking
with one another, there are accounting around, being evasive, or even showing signs
practices used to make their remarks to one of mental illness. As Garfi nkel puts it,
another both intelligible and warranted. Those “…activities whereby members produce and
practices are constantly, and without manage settings of organized everyday affairs
remediation or time out, conferring meaning are identical with members’ procedures for
on what we say and do. For example, making those settings account-able” ( 1967:
participants accord meaning to deictic terms in 1). That is, acting accountably is a ubiquitous
talk (such as pronouns) by way of practices for concern of society’s members; it is a condition
relating such terms to some referent in of displaying one’s competence.
previous talk, the person using the expression, 3. Refl exivity : since its introduction into the
or an aspect of the environment in which it is vocabulary of the social sciences, refl exivity
spoken. Garfi nkel’s fundamental insight was has taken on varied, and sometimes
that all expressions are like deictic ones in that incommensurable, meanings. When Garfi
they acquire their meaning through nkel coined the term, he had in mind a very
participants’ methods of contextualizing specifi c meaning: that everything members
them. Second, members use of practices and say and do is a constitutive feature of the
methods have an inherently moral dimension setting in which it’s said or done, and that each
in the sense that we take it for granted, and next-action feeds back into the intelligibility
assume others take for granted, that practices of that setting. To concretize this, consider
and methods indeed will be conjoined with our again the wife-husband conversation above:
talk to render what we say meaningful. Garfi the husband’s directive (don’t be so technical)
nkel refers to this mutuality of assumptions as treats the wife’s actions as pedantic, and
a kind of trust . In other words, we ordinarily thereby constitutes the situation as one where
do not have to explain ourselves in so many she is being diffi cult; by continuing to solicit
words and do not hold others to such a clarifi cations, she may be seen to not comply
requirement, which would only result in the with the directive, which would in turn
methodology and Social Phenomenology 395

reinforce the husband’s defi nition of the Investigations


situation. Suppose, though, that the husband
were to laugh at his wife, treating the whole Garfi nkel’s early ideas and writings inspired a
matter as a joke. This would result in a very number of colleagues and students to investigate
different understanding by the participants of ethnomethodology’s topics by undertaking their
“what’s going on here.” The situation is now own research. These scholars collectively co-
(re)defi ned as humorous; a defi nition which created the genre of ethnomethodological
the wife could then affi rm or challenge in herethnography, which pays particular attention to
the details of members’ practices for achieving
next turn at talk. The point is that each one of
the participants’ actions evinces an the intelligibility of their actions. Their studies
understanding of what’s currently happening, show how the precepts central to Garfi nkel’s
such that each next-action does not simply program are operative in a range of everyday and
respond to the situation, but continually (re)-institutional settings. Classic exponents of this
constitutes it. Further, there is “no time out”form of ethnography include Egon Bittner (
(Garfi nkel) from this process; even if one 1967a , b ), Lawrence Wieder ( 1974 ), Don
Zimmerman
were to leave the situation entirely, that, too,
would occasion an account (“did you leave (1969 a , b) , David Sudnow ( 1965 , 1967 ), and
because you were angry?” “Was it because Aaron Cicourel ( 1964 ). In what follows, we
you were bored?” “Did you have to go to the review three now-canonical contributions from
washroom?” etc.), that would then refl exively this early group of ethnomethodologists—those
feed back into the situation’s defi nition. of Bittner, Zimmerman, and Wieder—paying
particular attention to how they investigated and
In addition to the aforementioned breaching developed key concepts originated by Garfi nkel.
experiments (also known as “tutorial 85
demonstrations”), Garfi nkel empirically Bittner’s ( 1967a , b) investigations of
illustrates and analyzes indexical expressions, policing on skid row have become classic
accountability, refl exivity, documentary method, examples of how members use rules as resources
and other phenomena (“ad hocing,” “the etcetera to solve practical problems. In contrast with
clause”) in studies of jury deliberations, traditional approaches to law and social action,
determining causes- of-d eath (at a suicide which treat laws as exogenous rules that structure
prevention center), data coding, clinical record conduct in a deterministic way, Bittner examines
making (and keeping), patient selection at a how they are drawn upon in specifi c situations to
psychiatric clinic, and the ongoing accomplish local tasks. One of his central fi
accomplishment and demonstration of femininity ndings concerns the amount of discretion police
by an inter-sexed person (in his famous display in applying the letter of the law to
investigation of “Agnes”). Garfi nkel’s early particular cases. For example, police use laws to
followers supplied further investigations of achieve objectives like “keeping the peace,” the
ethnomethodological themes, to which we now defi nition of which depends on what is
briefl y turn. considered normal or routine for a given setting.
A panhandler on a street corner who is part of the
routine goings-on in that context may not be cited
19.3.1 Other Classic or arrested, as the law may prescribe; however,
Ethnomethodological were that same panhandler discovered in a

85
Other classic studies include Sudnow’s ( 1965 ) sciences; Pollner’s (1975 ) explication of “reality
ethnography of a public defender’s offi ce, in which he disjunctures”; and Harvey Sacks’ ( 1963 ) early research
documents how a range of criminal acts are (re)- on descriptive categories that eventually evolved into
interpreted as “normal crimes” committed in usual ways conversation analysis, which will be addressed later in the
for reasons typical of a given class of offenders; Cicourel’s chapter.
( 1964 ) critical analysis of measurement in the social
J. Turowetz et al.

different (atypical) location, he could face legal accounted for the overall failure of the reform
consequences. This is one way of further program in terms of the code—for instance,
specifying what Garfi nkel’s notion of residents would invoke it to justify not sharing
commonsense knowledge of social structures information with staff, who then used it, in turn,
could mean in the context of policing. In addition to account for why the reform program was
to rules-as-resources, the analysis also illustrates failing (the majority of residents were rearrested
the phenomena of indexical expressions, in that or jumped parole).
the panhandler’s actions take on different T he second half of the study is an
meanings and signifi cances depending on their ethnomethodological “re-specifi cation” of the
context, to which they are refl exively connected. ethnographic fi rst half. Wieder argues that the
Another classic demonstration of rules-as- refl exive, accountable, and indexical features or
resources is Zimmerman ( 1969a , b) study of properties of the code are exemplifi ed in the
how welfare offi cers apply bureaucratic setting of the halfway house. The code was not
regulations. Previous studies of bureaucratic merely a normative guide to conduct; instead, it
organizations largely accepted the Weberian constituted the very conduct that it regulated.
model of Wieder ( 1974 : 169–70) presents the example of
b ureaucracy, whereby formal, codifi ed rules a resident refusing to answer a staff member’s
prescribe best practices for most effi ciently question, saying, “I can’t answer that; you know
achieving organizational ends. The more closely I won’t snitch.” Besides accounting for his refusal
members of the organization adhere to these rules to answer in terms of the code, the resident also
(the more they conform to the ideal-type of legal frames the situation as one in which the staff
rationality), the more effectively they perform person is fi shing for information; he thereby refl
their work. What Zimmerman found, in contrast, exively constitutes the ongoing conversation as
is that in many instances, welfare offi cers one where staff are trying to make him slip up. By
handled diffi cult situations in ways not invoking the code to make sense of situations and
prescribed by the rules in order to make the motives, residents and staff simultaneously
agency function smoothly. That is, there is a gap constitute these as instances to which the code
between blueprints for how the organization is to applies; indeed, the code receives its defi niteness
run and the actual situations encountered by solely in terms of such instances. Accordingly,
members; members’ practices and routines are though staff and residents oriented to the code as
indispensible for bridging that gap and rendering an external, objective constraint on their
it unproblematic (and perhaps even behavior— a social fact—this objectivity was
“uninteresting” per Garfi nkel only achieved in and through the work of
1967 ). applying it—work that quickly becomes invisible
A third classic study in this tradition is even as it is being done.
Wieder’s ( 1974) ethnomethodological
ethnography of a halfway house for paroled drug
offenders, which has become a classic example of 19.4 The Evolution of
ethnomethodology’s take on the relation between
rules and action. The fi rst half of the study
Ethnomethodology
presents a fairly traditional ethnography of (Post-1967)
Wieder’s experiences learning about the “convict
code,” a name given to the informal rules of L ike Husserl, Garfi nkel was a thinker in constant
conduct by which residents regulated their own motion; he regularly revised, and occasionally
and others’ behavior. For example, the rules even rejected, his own previous analyses
prohibited snitching on fellow residents and (Lieberman 2013 ). Accordingly, despite its
“copping out” (i.e., confessing to illegal overall continuity, any sharply drawn
activities) and sharing information with staff characterization of his work will be somewhat
members. He also showed how staff and residents misleading. Nonetheless, for expository purposes
methodology and Social Phenomenology 397

a useful distinction may be drawn between his proliferating interpretations continue to infl uence
earlier thinking through 1967, and his later the way many non-specialists understand
output. Reviewing Garfi nkel’s work in the 1970s ethnomethodology to this day (e.g. Collins 2004
and beyond, two key developments can be identifi ).
ed: (1) the emergence of a clearer, more How, then, did Garfi nkel conceive of
programmatic commitment to non-cognitivism, ethnomethodology’s relationship to sociology? In
or the rejection of theories that accord causal a paper with Harvey Sacks (Garfi nkel and Sacks
primacy to private mental states in explaining 1970 ), Garfi nkel distinguishes between
human behavior; and (2) an increasing interest in constructive analysis and ethnomethodology .
what Garfi nkel termed “ethnomethodology’s This early distinction later evolved into one
topics”: particularly studies of science and work, between Formal Analysis (FA) and
as well as natural language (Garfi nkel and Sacks ethnomethodology (EM), or what Garfi nkel
1970 ). During this period there was also would come to call ethnomethodology’s
confusion and debate about ethnomethodology’s “asymmetric alternates” (Garfi nkel 2002) .
relationship to other types of sociology, a matter Formal analysis adopts a theoretical stance
which Garfi nkel and his students made numerous toward the world, transforming it into an object
attempts to clarify. Their efforts would result in of disinterested inquiry. This attitude is
ongoing and occasionally polemical exchanges characteristic of conventional social science, and
between ethnomethodologists and their critics. In of the academic disciplines more broadly.
what follows, we fi rst discuss these exchanges, Ethnomethodology, by contrast, is concerned
and then turn to the two aforementioned with the very conditions under which worldly
developments in Garfi nkel’s post-1967 work. phenomena can be made into research objects in
the fi rst place. EM and FA are asymmetric
alternates because a precondition for doing
19.4.1 Controversy and Clarifi cation formal analysis is glossing over, or concealing,
the practices through which theoretical objects
When ethnomethodology entered the common are produced; one cannot do both simultaneously,
vocabulary of sociology in the 1960s, there was though one (FA) begets the other (EM).
uncertainty about its aims. To some, it seemed Accordingly, the EM-FA relationship is not one
like a radical critique of the very possibility of of antagonism or subversion, but
producing sociological knowledge. Accordingly, complementarity, in the sense that all attempts at
it appeared to some that Garfi nkel was trying to FA invariably conceal their preconditions, which
subvert the discipline, replacing it with a then become EM’s topics.
relativisitic, “anything goes” ethos (Coser 1975 Thus, in response to critics who accused him
). 86 Others were more sympathetic, but of undermining the discipline, Garfi nkel made it
appropriated ethnomethodology in ways that clear that he intended no such thing. Rather, his
Garfi nkel would come to take issue with. In this intention was, and always had been, to ground the
group we can place Aaron Cicourel ( 1964 ) and formal analytic claims of sociology in an
Dorothy Smith ( 1987 ), as well as certain fi gures understanding of the preconditions for their
in symbolic interaction (e.g. Denzin 1969 ). As a articulation. Inspired by the phenomenologists
result, Garfi nkel increasingly lost control over who infl uenced him in his formative years,
the meaning of “ethnomethodology”; these particularly Husserl, Garfi nkel sought to

86
As Maynard ( 1986 ) observed, from its outset, avoidance of history and social structure), vs. liberal
ethnomethodology was regularly characterized in starkly because of its focus on freedom of action and intention,
contrasting ways: methodologically, as a method without vs. radical in uncovering the tacit procedures for
substance vs. lacking any methodology whatsoever; reproducing reality and its capacity to demystify social
theoretically, too subjective and embedded in reifi cations, vs. apolitical because any political
philosophical idealism vs. radically empirical and neo- perspective could “use” it.
positivistic; politically conservative (with its seeming
J. Turowetz et al.

delineate the taken-for-granted background language, and behavior. Cognitivist explanations


procedures and practices that give rise to the tend to share the view that mental states play a
phenomena of the social sciences (see Psathas paramount role in explaining human behavior.
1989 ). That is, just as Husserl sought to “ground” The relationship is typically presented as causal:
the particular sciences by means of antecedent mental states cause social actions,
phenomenological analysis without thereby such that in order to explain actions, we must
claiming to criticize or revise their fi ndings, so determine the intention behind them. By contrast,
Garfi nkel sought to discover the roots of the non-cognitivist approaches, represented in
various topics studied by sociologists in actual philosophy by Ludwig Wittgenstein ( 2010 ) and
human activities. Gilbert Ryle ( 1984 [1949]), as well as certain
Garfi nkel would later frame the FA-EM strains in phenomenology (e.g. Merleau-Ponty
distinction in terms of “Durkheim’s aphorism,” or and Heidegger; see Dreyfus 1991) and
the dictum that, “The objective reality of social pragmatism (see Emirbayer and Maynard 2011 )
facts is sociology’s fundamental principle” (Garfi view mental states, along with rules and norms,
nkel 1991 , 2002 ). Whereas FA is concerned to not as causal forces, but resources with which to
enumerate, categorize, and analyze objective account for and describe actions. Minded action,
social facts, EM seeks to understand how these then, is itself a phenomenon for members
facts are generated in and as the concerted actions (Coulter 1989 ). Mind does not cause actions, but
of social actors. In order to accomplish this, EM rather emerges in the course of action,
needs to remain separate from FA; for, otherwise, particularly when a problematic or perplexing
EM would just become another branch of FA and (Dewey 1910 ) situation arises—e.g., when our
treat its phenomena as given, rather than being habitual ways of acting encounter obstacles or
constituted in and through the practices of aporia. Accordingly, mentality is not an
ordinary members of society. 87 In other words, omnipresent feature of social action, but rather is
they are and must remain “asymmetric.” This, a special feature of certain of its cases.
then, is Garfi nkel’s mature response to F or many thinkers of the 1960s and 1970s, the
sympathetic thinkers who appropriated EM to do only alternative to cognitivism was behaviorism,
constructive/formal analysis, namely, that they as classically articulated by John Watson and B.F.
reduced EM to just another variant of FA. Skinner. Cognitivism, having become ascendant
in the 1960s with Noam Chomsky’s
revolutionary work on computational linguistics
19.4.2 Ethnomethodology and and generative grammar, posited mental activity
Non-cognitivism as the basis for our relationship to the world. To
this extent, it drew on established Western
T o return to the new directions in Garfi nkel’s philosophical traditions in prioritizing the
thinking, during the 1970s and 1980s, he became theoretical and mental. Any human activity
increasingly critical of cognitivism and should be understood as caused by the mind, or
concerned to argue that ethnomethodology had our rational mental faculties. Regardless of what
always been a non-cognitivist enterprise. we’re doing, our mind is always engaged.
Although there are many different varieties of Behaviorism, by contrast, treats mind as an
“cognitivism,” it is a general theoretical approach epiphenomenon that has no scientifi c validity, as
taken by many social scientifi c, psychological, it is not directly observable. Thus, the focus
and philosophical explanations of mentality,

87
Garfi nkel’s position on this matter recalls Heidegger’s it to a particular being, thereby concealing what it meant
(1996 ) insistence on the fundamental, radical distinction to reveal. By the same token, efforts to translate EM into
between beings, or empirical entities and objects in the formal analytic terms would reduce it to another branch
world, and Being (Dasein), as the irreducible, ineffable of FA, and thereby lose the phenomena that are EM’s
background against which beings appear. Any attempt to topics.
articulate a formal analytic conception of Being reduces
methodology and Social Phenomenology 399

should be entirely on visible behavior, and all attitude in order to study its preconditions, to the
descriptions ought to be in behavioral terms. “ethnomethodological attitude” which similarly
Ethnomethodology, with its unique “suspends belief in society as an objective reality,
conception of mentality-in-action, and as it except as it appears and is ‘accomplished’ in and
evolved in the hands of Garfi nkel and a younger through the ordinary everyday activities of
generation that he infl uenced—especially Jeff members themselves. That is, [it] does not
Coulter (1979 )—represented a third way that suspend belief in members’ beliefs or in their
pointed beyond the impasse between cognitivism practices as being themselves in the world of
and behaviorism. Coulter worked out a coherent everyday life” (Psathas 1989 : 82–3).
social philosophy of mind that combines P sathas rightly points out that
ethnomethodology with the later philosophy of ethnomethodology involves transcending and
Wittgenstein, terming the resultant approach bracketing the natural attitude to investigate its
“epistemic sociology” (Coulter 1979 ). Coulter essential constituents. At the same time, however,
conceives of mind as a publically observable Psathas’ formulation proposes that our
feature of certain human activities; it follows that fundamental relation to society is one of belief .
we commit a “category mistake” (Ryle 1949) Here, he runs into the same diffi culties that
when we reify mind and treat it as a distinct type Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger identifi ed in
of reality. Mind is a way of doing things, and is Husserl. In particular, the most basic relation of
not located in either a spatio-temporal locus (i.e. humans to each other and the world is not a matter
a module(s) in the brain, as argued by cognitive of consciousness or conscious states like
scientists and philosophers [e.g. Fodor 1983 ]) or believing or knowing; rather, it is constituted
a second type of immaterial reality. Beyond through shared actions and practices, or what
philosophical materialism and dualism, third Wittgenstein called shared “forms of life.”
ways of understanding mentality are possible. Accordingly, the attitude ethnomethodology
Many of the discussions and debates over the takes up, beyond a “suspension of belief,” is one
relationship of ethnomethodology to the rest of that highlights what Garfi nkel ( 1967 ) called the
sociology, including social phenomenology, “seen-but-unnoticed” features of human actions.
hinge on the question of cognition, and its place
in an analysis of members’ methods for
constituting social phenomena. Husserl’s 19.4.3 Ethnomethodological Studies of
phenomenology was decidedly concerned with Work
cognition, consciousness, and the role of
intentionality in constituting phenomena. As we T he second of Garfi nkel’s post-1967
saw, this was the version of phenomenology that preoccupations was with “work,” particularly
Schütz transformed into a social phenomenology scientifi c work, and the uniquely adequate
that was developed and popularized by Berger procedures needed to accomplish it. Early refl
and Luckmann. It was also the version to which ections of this interest can be found in Garfi
certain scholars tried to assimilate nkel’s studies of jury deliberations, outpatient
ethnomethodology in the 1970s and 1980s, psychiatric clinics, and suicide prevention centers
including Denzin (1969 ) and Psathas ( 1989 ). ( 1967) . Later, in a paper written with Michael
Psathas in particular sought to articulate a Lynch and Eric Livingston, he examined the
distinctively phenomenological discovery of a scientifi c object—a pulsar—by
ethnomethodology, which involved arguing that workers in an astronomical observatory (Garfi
the two enterprises were basically pursing the nkel, Lynch, and Livingston 1981 ). Garfi nkel
same objectives, such that ethnomethodology and his collaborators treat the discovered object
provided an empirical extension and grounding of as inextricably bound up with the process of its
phenomenology’s theoretical concepts. Thus, discovery; it is constituted through the very
Psathas compares the phenomenologist’s eidetic embodied practices, or members’ methods, that
reduction, or suspension of belief in the natural provide for its manifestation, rather that somehow
J. Turowetz et al.

existing outside of or apart from them. That is, are Lynch’s ( 1985 ) investigation of
they were interested in the “ particular occasions neurobiological laboratory work—which, along
as of which the object’s production—the object with Latour and Woolgar ( 1979) and Knorr-
—consists, only and entirely” (ibid: 139, italics Cetina ( 1981 ), was among the earliest and most
in original ). infl uential lab ethnographies in the fi eld of
Already in 1967, Garfi nkel had challenged science and technology studies; Suchman’s (
the conventional distinction between scientifi c 1987 ) research on human- machine interaction,
and everyday (“lay”) rationalities. Rather than and its implications for cognitive science ( 1988)
posit a sharp difference between the disciplined ; and Livingston’s ( 1987 ) analysis of
inquiry of the scientist and the undisciplined mathematical reasoning.
reasoning of the layperson, Garfi nkel instead
proposes that, in fact, scientifi c activities depend
on and adapt practices of commonsense 19.4.4 Natural Language in
reasoning to the constitution and investigation of Interaction: Conversation
scientifi c objects. Analysis
A s he developed his thinking about work and
the professions, Garfi nkel ( 1986 ) conceived of A nother important event in the 1960s and 1970s
“hybrid studies” in which researchers immerse was the development of conversation analysis
themselves in a work setting—the classroom, (CA), which emerged out of and in dialogue with
factory, laboratory, etc.—and learn the practices ethnomethodology. As already noted, from the
necessary to become competent practitioners 1970s onward Garfi nkel became increasingly
there. In the process, students of the workplace interested in natural language in interaction, and
become hybrid worker-researchers who can collaborated with CA founder Harvey Sacks on a
refl exively articulate the just - thisness , and seminal paper (Garfi nkel and Sacks 1970 ) in
phenomenal properties, of professional practice. which they analyzed language use as a members’
Working on this level of detail provides fi ne- method for accomplishing social actions. While
grained insights into the shop fl oor problem , CA has become more autonomous from
which essentially concerns the actual making of ethnomethodology over time, the mainstream
coherent, worldly things (Garfi nkel 2002 : 109). view of CA is that its theoretical commitments are
Like his earlier demonstrations of the similar to those of ethnomethodology. 88 These
inexhaustibility of descriptions, which are indefi include, but are not limited to, preserving the
nitely extendible (i.e. indexical), the shop fl oor phenomenon being analyzed; warranting
problem denotes the ever-present discrepancy analyses of talk- in- interaction through
between blueprints and the practices through members’ own displayed orientations and actions
which they are realized; or, as Suchman ( 1987 ) (rather than those of the analyst); and a refl exive
puts it, between “plans and situated actions.” sense that concrete social interaction is “a
In addition to his own research (Garfi nkel primordial site” of human sociality (Schegloff
1986 , 2002 ), Garfi nkel’s students and 1986 ). 89
colleagues published a number of infl uential CA, emerging from the collaborative work of
hybrid studies. Among the better known of these Harvey Sacks with Emanuel Schegloff and Gail

88
S ome ethnomethodologists have been critical of what themselves to consciousness—and the disciplined
they deem CA’s pretensions to formal analysis. Lynch commitment of CA to remaining agnostic about actors’
(1997 ), for example, charges that CA practices a mental and psychic states and motives in order to attend to
“molecular sociology” that risks losing its phenomena by the granularity of members’ practices. That is, the analyst
assimilating them to a uniform analytic apparatus. tries, to the extent possible, to bracket “commonsensical”
89
T here are also affi nities between the intuitions about why members do certain things and to
phenomenologist’s method of eidetic reduction— attend instead to how they do what they do—how, that is,
bracketing all assumptions about and knowledge of they collaboratively produce intelligible, recognizable
phenomena in order to analyze just how they present social phenomena in and through their interactional
practices.
methodology and Social Phenomenology 401

Jefferson in the 1960s and 1970s, examines is the relationship between cognition and action,
naturally occurring talk and embodied conduct in and how it plays out in various social domains.
interaction, with the aim of identifying A recent wave of theorizing has proposed
procedures that members deploy to co-produce cognitivist or psychologistic answers to these
the intelligibility of everyday and institutional questions. A representative example can be found
actions. CA works with audio and, more recently, in the work of Vaisey ( 2009 ) who, in comparing
video data, which the analyst transcribes subjects’ responses to interview questions about
according to a set of conventions developed by their moral values with their answers to survey
Jefferson (1974 ) that are meant to capture the questions, discovered that the latter predicted
details of speech and gesture in social conduct. future behavior, whereas the former did not.
While CA as an autonomous research tradition is Since the interview questions were explicitly
outside the scope of this paper (see Clayman and about morality, while the survey question was
Gill ( 2004 ), for a comprehensive overview, and not, he concluded that participants were acting on
Maynard ( 2013 ) for CA’s relationship to EM motives of which they were not consciously
and cognate disciplines), many of the scholars aware (here, he draws on a distinction in
who advanced both ethnomethodology and cognitive psychology between type one
conversation analysis work in both traditions, processing, which is unconscious/automatic, and
effectively doing ethnomethodological CA. type two processing, which involves refl ection).
Accordingly, their work will be presented below. Further, he argues that if actions are conditioned
19.5 Current and Future Directions by implicit, unconscious motives, those motives
may be said to effectively cause the actions; this
In this section, we review recent and ongoing challenges Mills’ ( 1940) position that motives
developments in ethnomethodology, explore their are anticipatory and post-hoc justifi cations for
points of convergence (and divergence) with actions, rather than causal forces per se, along
contemporary practice-theoretic approaches to with that of scholars in the Millsian tradition (for
sociology—especially social phenomenology— a lively debate on this topic, see the exchange
and project lines of development for future between Vaisey ( 2008 ) and Swidler ( 2008 )).
ethnomethodological scholarship. We What might ethnomethodology contribute to
concentrate on the following four areas: (1) social this conversation? To begin with, the concepts at
praxis— specifi cally in the realms of culture and issue would need to be re-specifi ed in terms of
morality, (2) embodied action, (3) acting alone members’ observable and reportable practices.
(or solitary action), and (4) the interaction order. Further, these practices would need to be
observed in situ and as they unfold in real time,
rather than as reported retrospectively (e.g. via
19.5.1 Social Praxis survey or interview). To concretize our
discussion, we will concentrate on two
In recent decades, there have been many substantive areas that have been of considerable
attempts, both in sociology and the philosophy of interest to practice-theoretic researchers of
the social sciences, to theorize how social various stripes: culture and morality.
structures and categories are embodied in the
practices and corporeal experiences of 19.5.1.1 Culture
individuals and groups. Prominent exponents of The relationship between culture and social
such theories, which can be grouped under the action is complex, and sociologists have long
(admittedly broad) umbrella of social praxis or been concerned to explain how cultural
“practice theory” (Vom Lehn 2014 ), include discourses affect praxis. That is, by what
Pierre Bourdieu, Anthony Giddens, Theodore mechanism(s) does culture translate into action,
Schatzki, and Ann Swidler, to name a few. One and vice-versa? A number of infl uential
of the key questions addressed by these thinkers mechanisms have been proposed, including
habitus (Bourdieu 1984 ), culture as tool-kit
J. Turowetz et al.

(Swidler 1986 , drawing on Mills 1940 ), rational accountable way. Indeed, such reports do not
choice (Coleman 1994) , the dispositifs of power simply document standardization, but help
(Foucault 1977 ), performance (Alexander 2004 constitute it as an established fact. In the process,
), and ritual (Collins 2004 ). The distinctive however, clinicians also reproduce the medico-
feature of ethnomethodology’s approach to cultural assumptions that standardized protocols
culture is its re-specifi cation of cultural encode.
phenomena in terms of members’ practices. In A second example concerns the negotiation of
what follows, we provide two examples that legitimate authority in the Milgram “Obedience”
illustrate this mode of analysis. The fi rst shows Experiment of 1961–1962. In one of the most
how biomedical models of self and disorder are famous and controversial series of experiments in
reproduced through practices for diagnosing twentieth century social psychology, Stanley
autism; the second, how legitimacy and authority Milgram (1933–1984) found that randomly
were negotiated in an (in)famous situation of selected residents in Connecticut would deliver
social interaction, the Milgram “Obedience” what they thought were increasingly powerful
Experiment. electroshocks to another ordinary citizen, simply
A utism is a developmental disorder of on the say-so of a research psychologist. In 24
childhood characterized by impairments in experimental conditions, Milgram tested a variety
communication and social interaction, and of situational variables, some of which
repetitive, stereotyped behaviors. No biomarkers dramatically raised or lowered rates of obedience
have been established for autism, and clinicians to the psychologist (e.g., proximity to the man
rely on a combination observation, interviewing, receiving shocks, placement in a chain of
testing, and third-party reports to make a command, proximity of the authority fi gure).
diagnosis. Recent studies by Turowetz ( 2015a , Despite the seeming importance of these fi ndings
b ) examine how clinicians identify children’s (the question of Milgram’s research ethics
potentially symptomatic behaviors, particularly notwithstanding), social psychologists have
in the context of reporting on their interactions experienced great diffi culty over the years in
with a particular child to colleagues during arriving at a consensus as to how they are best
diagnostic discussions. For example, key fi gures interpreted. In “obedience to authority,” did
in the assessment process, including the child, Milgram discover a coherent social psychological
clinician, and test instrument, are represented in process at work in a wide variety of real-world
ways that foreground the child’s conduct—by situations, ranging from everyday authority-
way of a practice called citation— while eliding subordinate relations at work and school to cases
the interactional context where it appeared ( of genocide such as the Holocaust? Is “obedience
2015a ). While this practice comports with the to authority” in fact the process at work in the
requirement of standardized assessment that other experiments, or is some other description of
agents (clinician, test instrument) not contribute action more apt?
to the child’s performance, it has the effect of Recently, Hollander ( 2015 ) has addressed
individualizing children’s symptoms, which it such questions from the perspective of
locates primarily inside the child, rather than the ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, re-
environment in which s/he is embedded. In so specifying “obedience to authority” in terms of
doing, it reproduces reductionist tenets of modern directive-response conversational sequences.
biomedicine, which tends to treat patients as Whereas most literature on Milgram has focused
selfcontained monads divorced from the social on obedience, Hollander highlights the role
world. Further, it encourages interventions aimed resistance to continuation played in the
principally at the child, leaving the environment experiments. Specifi cally, he fi nds that
largely unchanged. resistance to the Experimenter’s directives to
By fi tting their reports to standardized continue shocking the Learner is a typologically
assessment protocols, clinicians demonstrate that and sequentially organized phenomenon of social
results were achieved in a warrantable and interaction. By “typologically,” he means that six
methodology and Social Phenomenology 403

types of resistance to the directives recur amongst actually occurs (also Jerolmack and Khan 2014)
both outcome groups (the “obedient” research ; at best, they provide ex post facto accounts of
participants who fully complied, and the “defi actions from the perspective of an interviewee,
ant” ones who successfully stopped the rather than the situated rationalities evinced as
experiment). By these actions were performed. Since an action’s
“sequentially,” he indicates that resistance takes meaning is inseparable from the sequence of talk-
place against a background of organized based and embodied moves in which it’s located,
conversational sequencing. Conversation it is to that sequential context that
analysis can show how Milgram’s research ethnomethodologists would recommend
participants fi nd themselves in a situation of turning our attention. 90
competing and opposed relevant next actions— In many ways, morality is at the center of the
whereas the Experimenter directs them to ethnomethodological perspective (Turowetz and
continue (directive- response sequencing), the Maynard 2010 ). Garfi nkel always stressed that
Learner complains about the shocks and demands the social order was a moral order founded on
for the experiment to be discontinued (complaint- mutual trust that others will act as expected.
remedy sequencing). This research thus takes a Following his lead, Garfi nkel’s students have
classic topic of social psychology—obedience to interrogated the socio-logic of moral concepts
authority—and rethinks it, examining the (Coulter 1989) as well as their use-in-practice
Milgramesque situation at the level of detailed (Turowetz and Maynard 2010 ). Moral reasoning
structures of social interaction. and accountability are observable, reportable, and
analyzable in such everyday activities as agreeing
19.5.1.2 Morality and disagreeing with others’ assessments
Some of the liveliest debates about cognition and (Pomerantz 1984 ), aligning and/or affi liating
practice have concerned morality and moral with others’ actions (Heritage and Stivers 2013 ),
behavior. On one side of this debate are scholars turn-taking (Sacks et al. 1974 ), complaining
like Vaisey, who view (implicit) values as causes (Drew 1998 ), blaming (Pomerantz 1978 ),
of action; on the other are those who, like arguing (Antaki 1994; Reynolds 2011) , or
Swidler, defend a version of Mills’ pragmatist delivering or receiving bad or good news
conception of values, construing them as tools for (Maynard 2003 ), as well institutional activities
justifying and accounting for actions (for another that proceed in such venues as courtrooms
classic statement of this perspective, see Scott and (Atkinson and Drew 1979 ; Maynard 1984 ),
Lyman 1968 ). doctor’s offi ces (Heritage and Maynard 2006) ,
O n the territory of this debate, and social scientifi c experiments (Hollander
ethnomethodology is certainly closer to Mills’ 2015 ). Accordingly, any attempt to predict moral
side of the terrain. However, whereas those in the behavior would fi rst need to specify just what
Millsian tradition have conventionally used that behavior is, in its details, and how it looks in
actors’ responses to interview and survey practice. Among other things, such specifi cations
questions (or vignettes; see Swidler 2013) to have the potential to open a fruitful dialogue
investigate their moral orientations, between EMCA and other approaches to moral
ethnomethodologists examine their situated praxis.
practices, increasingly with the assistance of
video technology (see below), to identify
morality-in-action. As Rawls ( 2006 ) points out,
interviews and surveys are different from the
social contexts in which the asked-about behavior

90
F or a different take for ethnomethodology’s relation to of studies of work, see Maynard and Schaeffer ( 2000 ).
the survey interview—wherein the interview is treated as On ethnomethodological studies of work, see below.
an interactional domain for investigation along the lines
J. Turowetz et al.

19.5.2 Embodied Action relation between speech and gaze, with Rossano
et al. ( 2009 : 188) fi nding, on the basis of a cross-
Recent research in ethnomethodology and cultural study, that gaze is not directly connected
conversation analysis has stressed the embodied, to turn-taking per se, but rather is used “to
multimodal character of social action. coordinate the development and closure of
Multimodality refers to the synchronized use of sequences and courses of action, to pressure for
speech, gesture, gaze, and bodily comportment to responses and pursue them, [and] to indicate
coordinate and accomplish everyday activities. special states of recipiency.” Alongside this
This line of work has been greatly enhanced by research on focused interaction (Goffman 1961 )
the use of video recordings (Vom Lehn 2014 ), involving parties in an already constituted
which allow researchers to repeatedly examine interactional space, recent work has examined
the concerted, moment-by-moment performance how multi- modal practices may be used in
of social actions at a level of detail and unfocused situations—such as passing through
granularity that would otherwise be unavailable. public spaces—to initiate and stabilize focused
Social phenomenologists, too, have begun to encounters (Heath and Luff 2013 : 307). For
make use of video technology to analyze the example, in her analysis of video footage of
lived, embodied production of social actions. researchers approaching strangers for directions
Katz ( 1996 , 2001) , for example, analyzes in public places, Mondada ( 2009 ) shows how
video-recordings of actors transform an unfocused encounter (being
fun-house visitors, demonstrating how patrons in proximity to another in an anonymous setting)
combine various practices to construct fractured into a focused one by way of “a range of
(and sometimes grotesque) mirror images of multimodal resources: walking trajectories, body
themselves and others as humorous. positions, body postures, unilateral glances,
W ithin ethnomethodology and conversation mutual gaze, [and] vocal and verbal materials
analysis, video research was pioneered by designing turn pre-beginnings, beginnings, and
Charles Goodwin ( 1981) who developed a completions” ( 2009: 1994). Indeed, on close
notation system to accompany Jefferson’s ( 1974 inspection, the apparent simplicity of these
) conventions for transcribing speech, and by encounters turns out to conceal a range of skillful,
Christian Heath ( 1986 , 1989 ) who used video fi nely orchestrated practices: categorizing
data to analyze doctor-patient interactions. These strangers as approachable persons (or not),
studies, in turn, built on the pioneering work of coordinating walking trajectories in space and
Kendon ( 1990) and Goffman (e.g. 1963 ). Since time (e.g., pacing, rhythm), establishing contact
the corpus of EMCA research employing video (often via joint gaze or a turn pre-beginning
data to analyze multimodal action is much too particle like “euh” to secure the target’s
broad to cover here, we will restrict ourselves to attention), transitioning from walking to standing
a few illustrative examples and substantive areas. together—and thereby establishing a stable,
B eginning with Goodwin’s ( 1981) studies of shared interactional space; and initiating a
the relationship between gaze and turn allocation, question-answer sequence about directions (ibid).
there emerged a substantial literature on Relatedly, Vom Lehn et al. ( 2001) examine
embodied conduct and turn taking and video recordings of actors in a public, but
construction. In contrast to other disciplines, such institutional, space—museums— to determine
as cognitive science, that sought to locate the how they interact with exhibits in the presence of
coordination of gaze and talk in cognitive known (companions) and unknown (strangers)
processes, early conversation analysts found that others; and with a view to explicating how “the
actors construct their turns to accomplish physical environment and material realities affect
interactional tasks—for example, interrupting a conduct and interaction and are constituted
turn-in-progress to secure a recipient’s gaze through conduct and interaction” ( 2001 : 208).
(Heath and Luff 2013 : 286). Subsequent They show how, among other things, the
research suggests a more complex, nuanced sequential order in which exhibits are viewed
methodology and Social Phenomenology 405

matters for how they are seen; how patrons (e.g. nature/culture, mind/body), the social and
achieve a joint focus of attention; and how their non-social are always already entangled, such
bodily comportment affects not just their own that sharp distinctions between human (social)
experience of an exhibit, but also whether their and non-human (animals, objects, environmental
fellows look at it, and for how long (ibid: 207). ecologies) cannot stand up to critical scrutiny;
V ideo data has also played a critical role in similar arguments have been made by actor-
workplace studies (Heath and Luff 2000 ). In network theorists (e.g. Latour 2005 ), for whom
addition to studies of medical consultations (see “the social” consists of more or less stable
Heritage and Maynard ( 2006 ) and Gill and assemblages of human and non-human actants.
Roberts ( 2013 ), for a comprehensive overview) Recent work in ethnomethodology similarly
and diagnostic practices (Gill 1998 ; Heath 1992 expands the scope of social action to include non-
; Maynard 1992; Perakyla 1998; Turowetz human objects, treating these as actors in their
2015a, b) , workplace researchers have own right. In addition to a growing body of
examined railway conductors (Heath and Luff research on human-animal interaction (e.g.
1991 ), auctioneers (Heath 2012 ), the news Solomon 2015 ) and the human-machine
media (Clayman and Heritage 2002 ), computer- interfacing examined in workplace studies (see
mediated action and interaction (Suchman 1987 above), ethnomethodologists have also begun to
; Heath and Luff 2000 ), the use and production explore solitary action, or action on one’s own.
of clinical (Heath and Luff 1996) and legal Among other things, such studies demonstrate
(Suchman 2000) documents, and command- that we are never truly “alone” or “asocial” in that
control centers (Goodwin and Goodwin 1996 )— we are always using socially learned practices to
to name just a few areas of inquiry. These studies engage with objects embedded in a web of
resonate with cognate research in the actor- practical signifi cances. This resonates with the
network tradition (Latour 2005 ) and practice- arguments of classical phenomenologists
theoretic paradigms (e.g. Pickering 1995) in (Heidegger, Merleau- Ponty) and pragmatists
their conception of technology as not just an (Dewey, Mead) that the individual self does not
instrument for human use, but a kind of agent (or, end with the epidermis; rather, the soma is
in the parlance of actor- network theory, actant ) extended, so to speak, in and through objects in
in its own right that variously constrains, enables, the immediate environment, to which we have
and mediates action. habitual, pre-refl ective ways of relating. These
habits, and the modes of practical, situated
reasoning they entail, can be investigated through
19.5.3 Acting Alone (and with close observation of one’s own behaviors, either
Objects) extemporaneously or with the aid of video
technologies. Livingston ( 2008 ), for example,
Traditionally, sociologists have defi ned social carefully refl ects on his efforts to assemble
action in terms of interaction with other human tangrams and jigsaw puzzles (among other
beings. This approach, which can be traced to objects), enumerating the (usually tacit) practices
Weber and was adopted by Schütz, views human involved in and disclosed by this work. Besides
interactions with non-human entities as basically demonstrating the domain-specifi c character of
asocial. On this view, there is a dichotomy the skill and reasoning required for these projects,
between actions involving the use of objects, on his results point to the social, and socialized,
the one hand, and interactions with other humans, nature of his activities, such as the ability to
on the other, with only the latter qualifying as recognize patterns and gestalts (e.g. to see puzzle
social. In recent decades, this division has been pieces as parts of a whole image). Other studies
challenged and problematized on various fronts: in this vein include an investigation, also by
for example, post-humanist theories (e.g. Livingston ( 1987 ), of the reasoning involved in
Haraway 2013 ) posit that as with other proving mathematical theorems, Sudnow’s (1978
dichotomies inherited from the Enlightenment ) phenomenological account of learning to play
J. Turowetz et al.

jazz piano, and Bjelic’s ( 1996 ) extemporaneous divisions among groups, effectively creating
analysis of replicating a classic experiment separate interaction orders with disparate moral
(Galileo’s pendulum). commitments and values (Rawls 2000 : 247).
Given the prevalence of machines and other This, in turn, can create confl ict. For example,
artifi cial media in post-modern life, Rawls ( 2000 ) fi nds that interactional troubles
ethnomethodological and cognate (e.g. actor- between white and black Americans result from
network theory) re-specifi cations of social the two groups’ divergent expectations about
action, and corollary investigations thereof, are social conduct and communication, such that
both timely and potentially far-reaching in their “persons are not able to recognize one another’s
implications. conversational moves” ( 2000 : 241). Members
treat these perceived breaches as accountable, and
the accounts they produce often draw upon and
19.5.4 Mapping the Interaction Order reproduce racial stereotypes, which in turn
contributes to the perpetuation of social
The fi nal focus for current and future research inequality. 11
encompasses the previous three but also extends Rawls provides an empirical illustration of her
beyond them. Goffman’s ( 1983) notion of an argument by analyzing differences in the greeting
interaction order, defi ned as a sui generis domain and introductory talk practices of African
of face-to-face interaction that is relatively Americans and White Americans. She shows that
autonomous from other orders of society
(markets, states, etc.) and governed by its own
endogenous “rules of traffi c,” has been infl 11
B uilding on Du Bois’ ( 1903) notion of double
uential among e thnomethodologists, and consciousness, Rawls ( 2000 : 247) argues that the African
conversation analysts in particular (see Kendon et American self is simultaneously accountable to both
al. 1988 ). Indeed, the procedures for concertedly interaction orders—white and black—whereas the white
self can safely ignore the latter and orient only to the
producing recognizable social actions, including former.
turn-taking, repair, preference organization, etc., whereas White Americans prioritize information
identifi ed by conversation analysts can be seeking by way of category-questions (e.g. about
viewed as invariant features of the interaction occupation, residence, etc.), African Americans
order of society. These practices have their roots tend to focus on displaying solidarity—which,
in ordinary conversation; when modifi ed, among other things, involves not placing
however, they can be adapted to more interlocutors in hierarchical categories; further,
circumscribed interaction orders—for example, where African Americans generally prefer to
courtrooms prescribe specifi c rules for the volunteer personal information, whites expect to
allocation of turns, repairing misunderstandings, be asked (249). These confl icting expectations
question-answer sequences, etc. (Atkinson and can lead to misunderstandings and resentment,
Drew 1979) ; doctor’s offi ces have their with African Americans viewing whites as prying
characteristic interactional structures (Heritage and intrusive and whites perceiving African
and Maynard 2006 ); and so forth. Americans as rude or ignorant (255).
Rawls ( 1987 ) has written extensively on the Another recent investigation of race and
interaction order from an ethnomethodological inequality that takes an ethnomethodological
perspective, particularly with regard to how it approach to interaction orders is Duck’s ( 2015 )
organizes and sustains self-presentation, and its ethnographic study of a poor, predominantly
attendant obligations and entitlements, in African American neighborhood in an urban area.
everyday interactions. The interaction order is In the tradition of ethnomethodological
both a social and moral order, in that it forms the ethnography pioneered by Garfi nkel, Wieder,
basis for mutual intelligibility and self- and Bittner (see above), Duck documents the
presentation. Different expectations about the practices and expectations whereby residents
interaction order can refl ect and (re)-produce
methodology and Social Phenomenology 407

constitute their neighborhood as a community. projects and acts of meaning-making they


Whereas outsiders view the neighborhood as undertake in their daily lives. However, whereas
chaotic and disorderly, and plagued by drugs and phenomenologists locate the wellspring of this
violence, Duck demonstrates that for residents, achievement in the private cognitions of
the community is both orderly and organized; individuals, ethnomethodologists emphasize
and, to the extent that outsiders—from the media instead a set of shared practices, or ethnomethods,
to policy- makers—misconstrue the that are discoverable in the observable and
neighborhood as a disorganized space, this is due reportable behavior of the society’s members.
to a failure to understand the dynamics of the The present chapter has reviewed several of these
local interaction order and how it provides for the ethnomethods as documented in the early work of
intelligibility and accountability of everyday Garfi nkel and his students (e.g. indexical
happenings. expressions, refl exivity) and in more recent
The work of Rawls and Duck represents, and research concerning social praxis, embodied
exemplifi es, the potential of the interaction order, action, acting alone, and the interaction order.
specifi ed in terms of members’ concerted Moreover, we have emphasized how EM re-
practices and perspectives, to illuminate the specifi es canonical theoretical concepts in terms
interactional bases of phenomena ranging from of these ethnomethods. Although these re-specifi
microaggression and conversational cations have sometimes been considered
misunderstandings to large-scale social-structural subversive, critique of other forms of sociology
inequalities. has not been central to ethnomethodology, as this
chapter hopefully makes clear. Rather, the aim
has always been to ask “what more” is left out of
formal analytic glosses of worldly phenomena,
19.6 Concluding Remarks
and to recover such phenomena by way of
When Garfi nkel died in 2011 at the age of 93, he ethnomethodological inquiry and critique; to
left a vast legacy to sociological theory: through always return to the phenomena themselves, as
his scholarly efforts, he created one fi eld, they reveal themselves in and through and for
ethnomethodology, and contributed to the members of the society.
creation of another, conversation analysis. The As our review of current research in EM (and
aims of this chapter have been to expound CA) indicates, ethnomethodology continues to be
ethnomethodology’s core precepts, as Garfi nkel a vibrant paradigm in contemporary sociological
conceived of them; to enumerate key points of theory. Further, given its grounding in an
convergence and divergence between Garfi empirical program of research, EM is constantly
nkelian ethnomethodology and other theoretical confronted with novel phenomena which, in turn,
traditions, particularly social phenomenology, provide for its ongoing evolution, and continued
and thereby encourage dialogue among relevance, as a theoretical approach. Indeed, as
exponents of these perspectives; and to give some advances in audio and video technology make the
indication of how ongoing scholarship in EM and accomplishment of social life available for
CA continues to address prominent themes, analysis at ever-fi ner levels of detail, and as EM
topics, and challenges in contemporary explores new domains of action (e.g. acting
sociological theory. alone), it promises to continue to discover the
As we have shown, ethnomethodologists “what more” of social order, yielding novel
remain committed to the basic impulse behind insights while also providing a constant reminder
both classical and social phenomenology. Like of the near-infi nite richness of what Garfi nkel
phenomenology, ethnomethodology is concerned memorably termed “Immortal Ordinary Society”
with the ways in which members concertedly (Garfi nkel 2002 ).
create a shared, mutually intelligible reality that,
in turn, serves as a foundation for the various
J. Turowetz et al.

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Theory in Sociology of Emotions 20
Emi A. Weed and Lynn Smith-Lovin

20.1 Introduction Department of Sociology , Duke University ,


Durham , NC , USA
e-mail: eaw42@duke.edu; smithlov@ssc.duke.edu
For over 100 years, the study of emotions played
to better understand the role of emotions in
a minor role in sociology. Emotions were
people’s social lives at the individual, small
conceptualized as antithetical to rationality. As an
group, and societal levels.
apparently individual, ephemeral phenomenon,
T here are actually two literatures that could be
emotions seemed more suited for study in
termed sociologies of emotion. Most central is the
psychology and the interpretative humanities,
scholarly tradition that grew out of a group of
rather than in the struggling new social science.
primarily qualitative researchers, including
Even early sociologists who focused on micro-
Hochschild ( 1979 , 1983 ), Shott ( 1979 ), Thoits
level processing, the thinkers that we now call
(1984 ), and Clark ( 1987 ), among many others.
symbolic interactionists, emphasized cognitive
As investigators of a previously ignored
processing and ignored emotional response as
phenomenon, these researchers used inductive
theoretically in signifi cant.
methods to develop new concepts and describe
That situation changed dramatically in the late
how social forces shaped emotional experience.
1970s and early 1980s. Several major works
These researchers drew on dramaturgical and
brought emotions to the fore of sociological
symbolic interactionist perspectives to argue for
thinking (e.g., Denzin 1985; Heise 1974;
the social nature of emotions. The second
Hochschild 1979 , 1983 ; Kemper 1978 ). These
sociology of emotions developed more directly
scholars theorized that cognition and emotion
from work in social psychology. Kemper
were inextricably tied. Over the past 40 years, the
published A Social Interactional Theory of
importance of culture in shaping both emotional
Emotions ( 1978 ) around the same time as
experience and expression have become
Hochschild’s work ( 1979 ), as an attempt to
increasingly clear. In modern sociology,
develop a traditional, hypothetical- deductive
emotions play a central role in the way that the
framework within which emotions could be
discipline views how we, as people, interact with
explored. Consistent with his goals, many
our social environment. Theory in sociology of
sociological social psychologists drew on
emotions seeks
Kemper’s work and began to incorporate
emotions into their theoretical work on identity,
status, exchange and justice. In this chapter, we
E. A. Weed () • L. Smith-Lovin summarize theoretical developments within both
of these “sociologies” of emotion. We

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 411


S. Abrutyn (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary Sociological Theory,
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32250-6_20
in Sociology of Emotions 413

concentrate fi rst on the former, qualitative 20.2 Dramaturgy and Culture


tradition, since it is seldom treated elsewhere and
is centered more exclusively on emotion. We then Our fi rst section centers around dramaturgical
review the latter, more structural, approach, theory, as fi rst stated by Erving Goffman, and
because it contains many important developments developed by many others since, including Arlie
in sociological understanding of emotion. Hochschild, Peggy Thoits, and Candace Clark.
Though researchers in these two theoretical Emotion theory in the dramaturgical tradition
traditions use very different approaches, as we generally lays out abstract understandings of how
detail below, they occasionally share a emotions are used in social interaction, focusing
vocabulary, and regularly arrive at fi ndings that less on how emotional arousal is experienced.
are consistent with one another. Work in this tradition is largely qualitative,
B oth literatures on emotion within sociology exploring emotions across a wide variety of
use a variety of terms to refer to their phenomena contexts. Dramaturgical researchers have
of study – emotion, affect, sentiment, mood, etc. developed new ways to classify emotion by
These terms have different meanings within studying it as a tool used to perform roles and
different theoretical traditions and have evolved manage others’ impressions.
over time even within specifi c strands of
research. Rather than try to defi ne the terms in
general here, we discuss specifi c defi nitions that 20.2.1 Erving Goffman’s Dramaturgy
are relevant to the traditions that we describe
below. However, we will concentrate this review The dramaturgical approach developed out of the
on what are typically called feelings and insights put forth by Erving Goffman in his
emotions. Feelings are physical sensations that seminal work The Presentation of Self in
are subject to cognitive interpretation. Emotions Everyday Life ( 1959 ). Goffman’s work was
are states of feeling that can include the initial among the fi rst to study the sociological
physical sensation, the cognitive appraisal of that importance of face–to– face interaction. He
sensation, the continued rumination on that proposed that social scientists could gain a better
feeling as it passes through consciousness, and understanding of society and social structure by
the physical manifestation of that cognitive imagining individuals as actors on a stage,
appraisal or the display. We treat more trans- wearing masks and putting on performances to
situational, long-term phenomena like moods, manage the expectations and impressions of
affect, sentiments, and so on, only as they are valued others. The focus of dramaturgical
relevant for theoretical traditions that also involve analysis, then, is not on an individual’s personal
feelings and emotions. In this chapter, we thoughts or feelings, but rather on their
selectively review the contributions of three performance, and how it is perceived. Goffman’s
traditions in sociology – the dramaturgical work provided a foundation for important
approach, symbolic interactionism, and group research into emotional display, beginning with
processes – to current theory in sociology of Arlie Hochschild’s work in emotion management
emotion. Along the way, we recount the evolution in the early 1980s, and continuing through the
of the fi eld, tying the development of theory to present day with Candace Clark’s sympathy
recent empirical research and method. We end by margins.
providing our hopes for the future of emotion I n keeping with Goffman’s metaphor of the
theory in sociology. actor on a stage, researchers in the dramaturgical
tradition generally share his original language,
examining and labeling social life in terms of
frontstage and backstage, scripts, roles, scenes,
acts, and audience. Individuals perform on the
frontstage , where they display and interact.
While in the frontstage, people perform their
E.A. Weed and L. Smith-Lovin

roles by communicating in scripts and emotional ideologies, feeling rules, and display
performing acts that consist of sequences of rules by engaging in either surface acting or deep
behavior and interaction. All performances acting.
unfold in a particular context or setting, the I n Hochschild’s framework, emotion
scene, for a particular audience . Of course, no management and emotional labor are guided by
individual can present their public face every feeling rules, prescriptions of what we ought to
moment of every day. Following a performance, feel and
the actors retire once again to the backstage to how we ought to show it ( 1979 ). We all learn
relax, evaluate the success of their performance, feeling rules throughout our lives. In childhood,
and prepare for their next public appearance. This these rules are often quite explicit, such as “Big
extensive metaphor forms the common language boys don’t cry.” In adulthood, these may take
with which dramaturgical researchers analyze the more nuanced forms, and may be instead
social world. disguised as statements of shared assumptions or
as questions, such as “Aren’t you psyched to ride
that new roller coaster!?” In this case, it is entirely
20.2.2 Arlie Hochschild’s Emotion possible that you are terrifi ed of roller coasters
Management and would rather fi ght a bear than be anywhere
near one, but your social interaction will be much
The rise of emotion studies within sociology smoother if you embrace and share your friend’s
represents a divergence from previous research understanding that riding roller coasters is cause
emphasizing the rational concerns and appraisals for happiness and excitement.
that motivate human action. The limited I f you decide to manage your fear of roller
theorizing on emotion that existed prior to the coasters, you have two options: deep acting and
1970s generally contrasted the affective with the surface acting. In surface acting, you maintain
rational. This distinction has since been your emotion, but display another. You take your
disproved; in fact, rationality without emotion is place as an actor on the stage and don a mask of
now thought to be impossible (Damasio 1995 ). excitement while internally, your fear is
However, in 1983, Arlie Hochschild broke new unabated. In deep acting, you work to turn the
ground in sociological theory and emotion socially problematic emotion into something
research by combining rational, culturally– more appropriate. You might, for example, work
informed action with automatic emotional to slow your breathing, or tell yourself that very
response in her work The Managed Heart : The few people die on rollercoasters and think about
Commercialization of Human Feeling ( 1983 ). the whole experience as a fun adventure instead
In The Managed Heart, Hochschild studies of a ride to your inevitable death. No matter what
the day–to–day interaction of Delta fl ight strategy you use, your aim in employing deep
attendants with their superiors, peers, and acting is to change the underlying emotion in
passengers. She fi nds that the fl ight attendants order to change your performance or display to
perform emotion management, also called match shared emotion norms.
emotion work, to bend their emotional responses Consider this passage from The Managed
to fi t their context and smooth the rough edges in Heart where a fl ight attendant describes how she
social interactions that occur at 30,000 feet. She deals with problem passengers:
further notes that their emotions are managed in I f I pretend I’m feeling really up, sometimes I
one of three ways: cognitively, bodily, and actually get into it. The passenger responds to me
expressively. Because emotion management is a as though I were friendly, and then more of me
responds back. [ surface acting ] Sometimes I
mandatory part of the attendants’ jobs, purposely take some deep breaths. I try to relax my
Hochschild terms this work emotional labor. neck muscles. [ deep acting with the body] . . . I try
Hochschild theorized that through emotion to remember that if he’s drinking too much, he’s
management, individuals bring their emotional probably scared of fl ying. I think to myself, “he’s
like a little child.” [ cognition] Really, that’s what
responses into line with culturally–shared
in Sociology of Emotions 415

he is. And when I see him that way, I don’t get mad a football game and one of the wide receivers
that he’s yelling at me. He’s like a child yelling at fumbles the ball and the opposing team runs it
me then. [ deep acting ] 91
back. Angrily, he stamps his feet and throws his
helmet on the ground shouting expletives. Now
This interaction demonstrates Hochschild’s
imagine you are in an offi ce meeting and the new
core concepts, and makes clear use of the
intern fl ubs his presentation and begins throwing
dramaturgical analogy. The scene is an airplane
a similar tantrum. While we expect impassioned
cabin. This setting and her employment limits the
display from athletes on the fi eld, we do not
attendant’s ability to leave a diffi cult situation.
expect the same from the offi ce intern – to
Instead, she must stay on the frontstage and in
display intense anger would be inconsistent with
character as the fl ight attendant for the majority
his role. Next, imagine the intern fl ubs his
of the long fl ight. Her role as fl ight attendant,
presentation and is angrily and loudly rebuked by
hired by an airline that does little to protect its
his older, white, male supervisor. In this case, the
employees from angry passengers, severely limits
supervisor will probably not be censured for his
her personal agency. In fact, during training, she
behavior – he has enough status to overcome this
has been taught several scripted methods for
inappropriate display. Lastly, imagine that
dealing with passengers. These scripts ensure that
instead of being older, white, and male, the angry
all employees will be successful in managing
supervisor is young, black, and female. Instead of
their emotions. Here, the attendant describes a
accepting her criticism, the intern may report her
successful performance for a particularly tough
for inappropriate behavior, evaluate her more
audience. Through surface and deep acting, she
poorly as a supervisor, or she may be labeled in
successfully maintains the interaction and
the offi ce as “the angry black woman.” People
handles the drunken passenger without displaying
experience different rules and different
any of her own negative emotions. Though not
consequences for violating the rules based on
described here, she is supported by the cast of
their roles, their relative status in the context of
other fl ight attendants, who assist her in her
the interaction, and personal characteristics that
efforts at emotion management, and may even
are tied to stereotypes or shared beliefs about
intervene to allow her to recover backstage before
what kind of person they are. For this reason, as
heading back to the frontstage to perform some
Hochschild found, even within the same role as fl
more.
ight attendants, men and women can have very
Although managing her own emotions and the
different experiences of emotional labor because
emotions of others may make the interaction
of different status and the different expectations
easier for the attendant, there is signifi cant
for social engagement that are tied to their gender.
emotional cost to being frontstage for so long (see
Hochschild does not develop her discussion of the
a similar point by Wharton 2009 ). Further,
effect of social position on emotion into an
because she is hired and directed by the airline,
explicit framework. Still, her discussion is
most of the value of her acting accrues to her
strongly consistent with Kemper’s theorization of
employer. Her emotion management, then, has a
status and power as part of his social interactional
paid value, and is more appropriately referred to
theory of emotion ( 1978 ), outlined in the fi nal
as emotional labor.
section of this chapter on group processes.
I mportantly, the kinds of feeling rules to
which people are subject depend on the social
position they occupy. Imagine you are watching

91
D escriptions altered

in from original
(Hochschild 1983 , p. 55)
brackets
E.A. Weed and L. Smith-Lovin

20.2.2.1 Advances in Emotion negative feelings in response to these macro– and


Management Theory: The micro–aggressions, and do identity work to reaffi
Intersection of Race and rm their identity as professors by going to extra
Gender lengths to successfully enact their professor roles,
Consistent with Hochschild’s early fi ndings, despite doubt and criticism. Here, identity,
work in the emotion management tradition shares emotion work, and emotional labor are intimately
a focus on the inequalities inherent in emotion tied.
management, and how the gendered, classed, and I n response to doubt about their ability and
racialized socialization of emotion can reaffi rm more blatant disrespect, black professors work to
differences in status and contribute to overarching reassert their identity in the professor role while
inequality. Roxanna Harlow investigated the downplaying the importance of race as a factor.
impact of occupying an intersectional minority To remain professional and successfully enact the
status on emotion management and emotion labor professor role, they must manage the negative
in her ( 2003 ) article “‘Race Doesn’t Matter, emotions that result from any disrespect, such as
But…’: The Effect of Race on Professors’ anger, frustration, annoyance, and hurt or
Experiences and Emotion Management in the sadness. Black women, Harlow notes, must
Undergraduate College Classroom.” Because negotiate a dually devalued status in terms of both
black professors are seen by students as lower race and gender. Black female professors were
status, and even out of place in the classroom more likely to be offi cially evaluated by students
environment, they are not afforded the same as mean, cold, or intimidating. This is because
respect and deference as their white colleagues. black
Of Harlow’s interviewees, just 7 % of the white women face the overlap of two potentially
professors felt that students called their qualifi injurious stereotypes: the angry black woman,
cations into question, compared with 76 % of and the overly–emotional, nurturing, matronly,
black professors ( 2003, p. 353), and a greater obedient mammy ( 2003 , p. 360). In the words of
proportion of black professors felt as if their one black female faculty member:
authority in the classroom had been challenged. I’m just so aware of this whole black woman as,
Their subordinate social position requires black you know, angry person kind of myth. Somehow
that we’re like 70 percent attitude [. . .] I think they
professors to engage in more emotion don’t allow me the room to be serious, and I really
management and to more strictly enact the perfect do think that’s about the “angry black woman with
professor role than white professors, in order to so much attitude” myth, you know? … I do feel like
be taken seriously and to be considered good at some students expect that I’m gonna be more
maternal, and if I don’t live up to that, then the only
their jobs.
place that’s familiar to them that they can go in
Harlow combines emotional labor and terms of judgments is “Oh, then she must have an
management with approaches from identity attitude.” So I’m not like “Oh come here, honey, let
theory and affect control theory (both presented me hug you, feel my bosom” kind of thing, right …
but I really do feel like I don’t have options. That
in greater detail later). Harlow draws on work by
there are these sort of two caricatures of black
Stryker, Burke, and Heise, among others, and womanhood that they’re familiar with, and that
argues that while individuals have multiple somehow I have to work within those. 92
important identities, the more salient or relevant
identity for her interviewees in the classroom is B y not being overly nurturing in ways that would
that of professor. When black professors enact the not be expected of white male professors, black
professor identity by teaching, they are met by women are cast as the angry black woman; their
students who instead treat them as if their most teaching is evaluated negatively as a result. Thus,
salient identity were their race. Black professors for these women, like Hochschild’s fl ight
must then do emotion work to manage their attendants, emotional labor is required for them to

92
Shortened from original length (Harlow 2003 , p. 357)
in Sociology of Emotions 417

be good at their jobs, while it is not required of their own emotions as part of successful
white men. interaction, emotion management can also be
Through her work, Harlow demonstrates how interpersonal: that is, individuals can manage
racialized culture and structure shape individuals’ others’ emotions, aiding others in their
experiences of emotion management and performance (Thoits 1995 ), also called
emotional labor. Although most black professors “collaborative emotion management” (Staske
in her sample were cognizant of the impact of 1996 ). Building on the idea of interpersonal
race, it was only by devaluing and ignoring the emotion management, Lois differentiated
salience of race that they were able to manage between “tight” and “loose” interpersonal
their emotions. They had to prevent negative emotion management.
classroom experiences from negatively affecting Rescue workers employed tight emotion
their self–identities and their effectiveness as management when they needed victims to quickly
professors. Others have since investigated follow directions that might be emotionally diffi
differences in black/white feeling rules in cult for them. Lois recalls the story of a woman
professional environments (Wingfi eld 2010 ), who fell into the water and was badly beaten by
and for black women (Durr and Wingfi eld 2011 the river. When she fi nally made it to a small
). island in the middle of the river, her rescuers
A s the study of emotion management has decided to evacuate her back through the water to
expanded, research on emotional labor has grown safety, but the woman was terrifi ed of going back
into a vast literature in its own right. In the into the water. She described her experience after:
absence of a clear, testable theoretical framework, When I began to cry, he took me gently by the
many researchers have contributed to the shoulders and told me I could not do that right
literature on emotional labor by cataloguing now, he needed me there with him… They were
very clear with their directions… They held me
unique workplaces and the differences between tight and made me feel safe… (Lois 2003 , p. 126)
them (e.g., Kang 2010 ; Smith 2008 ; Smith and
Kleinman 1989) . As a result of this tendency to
emphasize difference, most articles in this H ere, the rescuer asserts control over the victim’s
theoretical tradition replicate Hochschild’s feelings, telling her she cannot cry, in order to
original fi ndings with a twist, but do not ensure that she can be evacuated safely. By
contribute to theory or to a clearer model of changing her body sensation and reorienting the
emotion in the workplace. focus of the interaction, the rescuer manages the
victim’s fear, doing the deep acting for her,
20.2.2.2 Advances in Emotion replacing the petrifying fear with emotions more
Management Theory: conducive to her rescue. Because male rescue
Interpersonal Emotion workers tended to be on the frontlines and in
charge, tight emotion management more
Management
commonly fell to the men.
One notable exception to this tendency is
Rescue workers employed loose emotion
Jennifer Lois’ ( 2003 ) book, Heroic Efforts : The
management to manage victim’s families’
Emotional Culture of Search and Rescue
emotions. As families struggled to come to terms
Workers. In this book, Lois spends 6 years
with the possible and, in some cases, eventual loss
volunteering as part of a search and rescue team,
of a loved one, rescue volunteers worked with
documenting her own experience of the
them, empathizing, expressing sympathy, and
emotional culture. Through in– depth interviews
practicing active listening. This task was
and participant observation, Lois fi nds evidence
primarily assigned to women, who were said to
for separating out two new types of emotion
have better skill in handling delicate emotions.
management: tight and loose.
Lois described these interactions as compressed
A lthough most of the discussion up to now has
intimacy. Through this process of being managed
primarily focused on how individuals manage
by the rescue workers, many of the families
E.A. Weed and L. Smith-Lovin

developed deep bonds with the members of the (cognitive), but either strategy would change the
rescue team assigned to be family liaisons, though associated emotion.
these bonds varied in strength after the rescue Thoits argued that individuals could intervene
effort was complete. With few exceptions, these to alter their own emotions or the emotions of
deep bonds ended just after the rescue effort did, others at any of these key points. These four
often with a letter of thanks or a donation. factors are also interdependent, so a change in one
L ike other emotion management researchers, can prompt a change in the others. Recall the
Lois details the status and gender differences experience of the young woman trapped on the
associated with different types of emotion island in the middle of the cold river in Lois’
management. In doing so, however, she also Heroic Efforts. Being physically held by the
contributes to a more refi ned typology of rescuer changes her physiological experience –
emotion management and sociological she may feel warmer and stop shaking – and this
understanding of the ongoing social construction causes her to feel safe, mitigating her fear. At the
of personally experienced emotion. same time, her rescuer works on her cognition by
refocusing her attention, and relabels the situation
as safe. With her emotion managed, she is able to
20.2.3 Peggy Thoits’ Emotional successfully keep herself together long enough to
Deviance get across the river to safety. People naturally rely
on this interdependence of factors to change their
W hile work in emotion management has shed experience of the world. Athletes breathe quickly
light on the social process of emotion and hop from foot to foot to psych themselves up
management, it has generally given less attention before a big race, and parents inform their
to the question “How is emotion management children that roads are not fun, but rather
achieved?” Studies in emotion management often dangerous and deadly, relabeling the situation to
provide deep descriptions of the cognitive inspire fear that keeps their children from running
strategies that people use, such as Harlow’s out into traffi c.
conclusion that black professors downplay the Both Hochschild and Thoits have contributed
importance of race in order to manage their to our understanding of what happens when there
emotions and identity. They frequently fall short, is discrepancy between felt emotions and feeling
however, of systematically addressing how rules that defi ne what is appropriate in a given
individuals go about changing the emotion itself. situation. However, where the literature on
In 1984, Peggy Thoits expanded Schacter’s two– emotion management has tended to focus
factor theory of emotion, which described primarily on how individuals successfully
emotion as having two components: bodily manage their emotions, Thoits’ contribution to
sensation or arousal, and situational cues that emotion theory has been more focused on
prompt a cognitive appraisal of the arousal emotional deviance and what happens when
(Schachter and Singer 1962 ). Thoits called individuals are unable to manage their own
instead for a four–factor theory of emotion, emotions and thus behave in ways that are
including: physiological arousal, cognition, considered abnormal or inappropriate by the other
labeling the experience, and expression of the people in the interaction.
emotion ( 1984 ). In 1990, Thoits further Thoits suggests that individuals engage in
developed her four–factor model to include more noticeable emotional deviance when they:
emotion management techniques. This model (1) occupy multiple, generally contradictory,
includes four foci: situation, emotion and roles; (2) belong to two or more competing or
physiology, gesture and expression, and label. contradictory subcultures; (3) undergo a major
Individuals can use either behavioral or cognitive role transition due to personal or structural
strategies to change any of these focuses. For factors; or (4) are subject to especially rigid
example, one might change the situation by either emotional constraints ( 1990 ). Individuals who
leaving it (behavioral) or reinterpreting it publicly engage in deviant emotion risk being
in Sociology of Emotions 419

labeled deviant and/or mentally ill, either by their workplace is an important example of
themselves or others. Thoits’ explicit discussion emotional deviance as described by Thoits ( 1990
of emotional deviance and its ties to labeling ). Copp contributes to emotion theory by
theory has been widely used in the literature on differentiating emotional deviance by domain –
mental health and stigmatized identities. occupational and personal – similar to
Martha Copp’s ( 1998 ) article “When Hochschild’s distinction between emotion
Emotion Work is Doomed to Fail: Ideological management and emotional labor. Copp’s work
and Structural Constraints on Emotion also shows just how intertwined emotion
Management” ties together Hochschild’s emotion management and emotional deviance are. Both
management with Thoits’ work in emotional the emotion management and emotional deviance
deviance and labeling theory. In this work, Copp traditions rely heavily on the idea of feeling rules,
investigates the constraints placed on workers’ but there is relatively little theory around feeling
emotion management and emotional labor by rules in and of themselves. Candace Clark’s
examining the experiences of instructors and work, presented in the next section, is an
managers at a social service agency that provides exception.
vocational training and ‘sheltered employment’
to people with developmental disabilities.
Though instructors aspire to cultivate a friendly, 20.2.4 Candace Clark’s Theory of
supportive environment in which to teach Sympathy Margins
developmentally disabled people how to work,
the work environment is diffi cult and repetitive, T he work of emotions scholars relies heavily on
and the job doesn’t pay well. Under these the concept of feeling rules, or shared
conditions, Copp asserts, instructors move from understandings of what emotions are appropriate
gentle, cooperative interpersonal emotion for certain settings and how they ought to be
management to coercion and confrontation, often expressed. Despite this, sociology of emotions
losing control all together. scholars have generally taken an “I’ll know it
As described by Hochschild ( 1983 ) and when I see it” approach, addressing particular
Thoits ( 1984 , 1990 ), Copp’s instructors feeling rules that become obvious in the course of
engaged in cognitive emotion management research, but putting little effort toward
strategies to manage their emotions, reframing developing a comprehensive theory of how
their experiences in a positive light and working feeling rules function or what the content of these
to fi nd the positive parts of their work and to feeling rules is. One exception to this gap in
emphasize these experiences ( 1998) . Instructors emotion theory is Candace Clark’s work on
often had help in this management from their sympathy margin (see Clark 1997 for an
peers, who engaged in backstage teamwork, overview).
validating and managing each other’s emotions C lark’s theory of sympathy margin integrates
on breaks away from the disabled employees, past work on social margin with emotion theory.
relaxing together after long shifts on the Consistent with research in emotional deviance,
frontstage. As Hochschild found, however, the very few singular acts of emotional deviance are
relief provided by these backstage support severe enough to result in the person being
sessions was only temporary. Too much time in labeled as deviant. Instead, most transgressions
the job resulted in burnout, and instructors are slight and pass quickly. This is because most
became largely unsuccessful at continuing to people possess enough social margin (i.e. social
manage their own emotions and those of their ties, material resources, and an established
disabled employees. When the amount of identity) to overcome slight slips. Clark’s work
emotion management and emotional labor are draws on our understanding of social margin to
unrealistic, employees have little choice but to illustrate how sympathy, a social emotion, is
breach the norms or to leave the situation. negotiated through interaction.Clark argues that
Instructors’ breaching of the emotion norms of there are four general rules of sympathy etiquette.
E.A. Weed and L. Smith-Lovin

1. Do not make unwarranted counteract feelings of anger. Clark further argues


claims to sympathy. that sympathy can be manipulated to counter fear,
2. Do not claim too much sympathy or accept it hatred, and anger. Feeling sorry for someone may
too readily. feel like a much stronger position than being
3. Claim and accept some sympathy to keep angry at someone, especially when a display of
sympathy accounts open. anger would be unacceptable. Emotion
4. Repay sympathy with gratitude, sympathy, or management also becomes necessary for those
both. who have exhausted their sympathy margins.
(Clark 1987 , p. 290) Clark notes that people recognize these
These rules are always in place, and people draw limitations on others’ sympathy, as demonstrated
on the same sympathy margin across time. Thus in her interview with this middle–aged man:
someone who in the past claimed sympathy when T hat month when I had three deaths in the family
others judged them underserving of it (a and my car broke down and my mother–in–law
fraudulent claim) may fi nd it harder to claim needed constant care and the kids were sick, well,
it was too unbelievable. I was embarrassed to even
sympathy in the future, even if a new tell people what was happening. I didn’t bring up
circumstance might have drawn sympathy the details. (Clark 1987 , p. 306)
otherwise (a valid claim). Clark describes people
who follow these rules well enough as having T hose who have no sympathy margin left must
acceptable sympathy biographies: they are likely limit their display of negative emotion, avoiding
to be able to draw upon their sympathy margin drawing attention to their negative feelings and
and exercise their right to sympathy should an unpleasant circumstances. Drawing on depleted
appropriate situation arise. sympathy margins can result in censure,
Clark argues that sympathy, then, is traded exclusion, and further decreased margins. As a
through micro-interaction, resulting in a kind of result, these people may choose to manage their
relationship politics. When an individual is own negative emotions without the help of a
provided sympathy, she or she is in a lower status supportive cast of interaction partners. This can
position compared to the provider of the prove exceedingly diffi cult and emotionally
sympathy, who occupies a higher status position. exhausting.
This is because sympathy both benefi ts the C lark’s work on the rules of sympathy is
recipient and obligates him or her to repay it. By intimately tied to emotion management theory
offering sympathy, individuals can knowingly or and research on identity work (presented in the
unknowingly place the recipient of the sympathy next section). Kenneth Kolb ties these themes
in a lower social position. As such, attempts to together in his recent article “Sympathy Work:
offer sympathy to higher status individuals by Identity and Emotion Management Among
lower status group members may cause the high Victim–
status member to refuse the offer of sympathy. At Advocates and Counselors” ( 2011 ). In this work,
the same time, those who always refuse sympathy Kolb describes how victim–advocates use
and always avoid the lower status position may be emotion management to muster up sympathy for
seen as not playing fair and not valuing the those who have violated sympathy rules.
relationship. To maintain balance, individuals Although many clients are cooperative and
generally must swap sympathy. Relationships in enjoyable to work with, a few clients continually
which one person gives all the sympathy are engage in problematic behaviors – illegal drug
unbalanced, and this imbalance may complicate use, returning to abusers, accusing advocates of
social interaction, even to the point of moving one coercion – that interfere with advocates’ abilities
person to dissolve the relationship. to feel sympathy for them. By turning anger and
A s an emotion, sympathy can also be subject frustration into sympathy, advocates reinforce
to emotion management. As Clark notes, their identities as good, kindhearted helpers and
Hochschild’s fl ight attendants sometimes are more successful in their jobs providing
cultivated sympathy for their passengers to support for victims.
in Sociology of Emotions 421

G offman’s metaphor of the actor on a stage 20.3.1 Cooley and Mead


provided fertile ground for a wide variety of work
that has shed light on the nature of emotion. Symbolic interactionism in the twentieth century
While the dramaturgical metaphor has allowed begins with Charles Horton Cooley and his
new understandings of how people cognitively concept of the looking–glass self. The looking–
manage their emotions in response to social glass self is the process by which individuals
pressure, this literature focuses more on general imagine how they appear to others, then how
cultural rules for emotion and behavior that shape those others judge or perceive them. They then
individuals’ lives. The individual as a person with experience an affective response to that imagined
a singular self that enacts roles or identities is judgment (1902 ) . Cooley noted that very
discussed primarily as the recipient of these powerful emotions are attached to an individual’s
cultural rules. The next section focuses on work sense of self. Further, emotions themselves are
that ties emotion to interaction and identity, not only made up of physical responses; they are
consisting largely of theories that lay out socially constructed through the process of refl
blueprints for testing hypotheses about the exivity ( 1964 ).
emotional and social world. In contrast to G eorge Herbert Mead expanded on this idea
dramaturgical theories, then, interactionist of the self as formed through interaction. He
theories tend to use quantitative analysis and stressed the importance of signifi cant symbols –
survey or experimental methods to provide words, gestures, and actions that people use to
insight into how emotions are personally call forth in others the same meanings that they
experienced and the role they play in interaction. themselves understand ( 1934 ). For example, you
20.3 Symbolic Interactionism and might smile at a friend to indicate that you are
Identity happy with them, assuming that they will
understand your smile as a sign of warmth and
Our second section centers around research on goodwill because that is what you think when
identity, in the tradition of symbolic someone smiles at you. While there is a
interactionists such as Cooley, Mead, and possibility that they will not understand your
Blumer. Though emotion is not their focus, smile in the same way that you do, this possibility
identity theories developed in this tradition by is remote. As members of the same culture, you
Stryker, Burke, and Heise, among others, have generally share the same meanings of the signifi
signifi cantly infl uenced how emotion is cant symbols that constitute everyday interaction.
understood today. Similar to the dramaturgical M ead reasserted the importance of the
tradition, emotion theory in the symbolic generalized other – the people an individual
interactionist tradition generally centers around imagines when thinking about how they appear to
the experience of emotion in interaction, but others. He argued that the generalized other is
differs in its attention to self- structure and fundamental to social control because it causes
internalized identities. Symbolic interactionism individuals to police their own thoughts,
focuses on how people form their identities, label emotions, and actions ( 1934 ). Shame, for
their world, and refl ect on the judgments of example, stems from the perception that one’s
themselves and others. Identity theories address group members are disappointed in, angry with,
identity from either an individual or a structural or disgusted by the individual’s self. This
perspective, keeping the role of culture in mind negative emotion serves as an impetus to stop or
throughout. Work in this tradition is largely make amends for behaviors that are deemed
quantitative, using hypothetical-deductive inappropriate by the group. In the reverse, an
theories to create predictions about the social individual feels pride when he or she takes the
world, and statistical analyses to test them. role of the other interaction partners and
perceives positive evaluations of the self (also see
Cooley 1964 ).
E.A. Weed and L. Smith-Lovin

M uch research in the symbolic interactionist 20.3.2.1 Sheldon Stryker’s Identity


tradition points to the centrality of emotion in Theory
shaping how people understand the world, the Sheldon Stryker’s work comes from the tradition
kinds of behaviors in which they choose to of structural symbolic interactionism, focusing on
engage, and even how they think about how social structure affects the organization and
themselves. Like research in the dramaturgical content of the self, and how this self in turn affects
tradition, symbolic interactionist research relies, social behavior ( 2000 ). In Stryker’s conception,
often implicitly, on the notion of feeling rules, the similar to that of identity theories as a whole and
social guidelines for how we ought to feel in a drawing directly on the work of Mead, identities
given situation. While research in the are the internalized meanings attached to roles.
dramaturgical tradition has focused more on how The self is made up of multiple identities, which
individuals navigate emotion, however, for are organized in a salience hierarchy, some
symbolic interactionists, the social act is the identities being more important and enacted more
primary unit of analysis, as it is through repeated frequently than others ( 2004 ). The ordering of
interaction that individuals become human and a identities is based on what Stryker calls
society is formed. As a result, researchers and commitment: how strong a person’s social ties are
theorists in this tradition tend to use statistical to the network that activates a particular role and
research to aggregate people’s defi nitions of its associated identity ( 2001 , 2004 ). Clearly,
situations and circumstances. then Stryker’s theory is primarily a theory of
20.3.2 Identity Theory identity and not emotion. In keeping with the
work of Cooley, however, Stryker recognizes the
The term identity is so widely used that it has importance of emotion as a force that shapes and
developed many different meanings within motivates behavioral choices, believing as
sociology. For the purpose of discussing identity Hochschild does, that emotions act as a liaison
in the context of the two identity theories between the self and the outside world
presented in this section, identity refers to the (Hochschild 1983 ; Stryker 2004 ).
meanings attached to the roles that people play. Stryker argues that the strength of emotional
In identity theories, each individual can be said to reactions helps to signal the importance of a
have multiple selves, each tied to a group of particular identity, ordering and reordering
people with whom they interact and a role that identities in an individual’s salience hierarchy,
they play. You may be a graduate student at and affecting their commitment to different
school, a musician when you play an instrument identities ( 2004 ). Imagine you enroll in graduate
in a band, and a tutor or mentor when you teach school, and you expect to enact the role of
someone else to play like you do. Each of these graduate student. Instead, you fi nd upon starting
roles – graduate student, musician, and tutor – and your new career as a graduate student, you are
the meanings and social ties attached to them are treated more like a gofer, and you have very few
identities. Together, these overlapping and opportunities to properly enact your graduate
different identities make up your self. You learn, student role and receive praise for doing so. This
develop, confi rm, and legitimize your identities is likely to cause an intensely negative emotional
through interaction with others, who provide affi response, and it may lead you to reevaluate
rmation for successful performances and censure whether you really are a graduate student and how
for mistakes. Identities theories seek to important it is to you to be a graduate student.
understand why, when people have agency and Having been consistently disconfi rmed, and
freedom to choose, people behave in one way feeling very negatively about your ability to enact
instead of another. Identity theories explain why the graduate student role, you are likely to change
people make the decisions they do by tying the your self and take on a new identity that you can
behaviors in which people engage to the roles enact. You might, for example, prioritize a new
they occupy. identity – perhaps that of gofer – or move to a new
network and take on a new identity – perhaps that
in Sociology of Emotions 423

of a researcher in industry. In either case, you will and Michael Harrod, entitled “Too Much of a
experience more positive, less intense emotion Good Thing?” ( 2005 ).
once you are able to successfully enact your most In their paper, Burke and Harrod compare two
valued identities. types of identity theories: self-discrepancy
Stryker’s instincts about the centrality of theories and self-enhancement theories ( 2005 ).
emotion are made more concrete in Peter Burke’s Self- discrepancy theories, like identity control
work in identity control theory, and even more so theory, assert that people experience negative
in David Heise’s affect control theory. Because of emotions when they are either over- or under-
its ambiguity surrounding the integration of evaluated, and that they are motivated to avoid
emotion, cognition, and interaction, few either case. Self-enhancement theories assert
researchers use Stryker’s theory of emotion and instead that people seek out, and respond
identity in isolation. Instead, it is frequently positively to, over- evaluations but negatively
paired with work by Peter Burke and Jan Stets.. toward under- evaluations. Burke and Harrod test
these confl icting predictions using longitudinal
20.3.2.2 Burke’s Identity Control data of married couples, from newly-wed to their
Theory third year of marriage. Each participant was asked
W here Stryker’s identity theory focuses on how to rate themselves on intelligence, physical
structure infl uences identity (Stryker and Burke appearance, likeability, friendliness, and how
2000 ), Burke’s identity control theory, fi rst understanding they are. They were then asked to
delineated in the early 1990s, focuses on how rate their partner. The discrepancy between a
individuals process their roles in relation to their person’s own rating and their partner’s rating of
context, and how this process shapes their social them was used as a measure of self-evaluation
behavior (Burke 1991 ). Identity in identity discrepancy. One issue to note is that identity
control theory has four components: identity control theory makes predictions about one’s self
standard – what it means to be oneself in a and one’s perception of how others see the self,
particular situation; input – how one sees oneself while this study design collects information on
in the situation based on feedback from others; how one sees oneself and how one’s partner sees
comparator – a comparison between the input and oneself. To equate a partner’s evaluation with
the standard; and output – the difference between input is to assume perfect information and
the ideal identity enactment and the individual’s interpretation, unlikely under even the best
perception of others’ judgment of their identity conditions. Therefore, self-evaluation
enactment (Burke and Stets 2009 ). When the discrepancy is not equal to the theoretical concept
discrepancy between ideal and perceived is small of output. Despite this, Burke and Harrod fi nd
or decreasing, identity control theory predicts that people feel worse about themselves, in terms
people will feel positive emotions. When the of their self-worth, self-effi cacy, and experience
discrepancy is large or increasing, they will feel more depression, anger, and distress when their
negative emotions. In accordance with these partners over- or under-evaluate them.
emotional prompts, individuals will make efforts Two issues are worth noting, however. Firstly,
to decrease this discrepancy and avoid the depression, self-worth, and self-effi cacy are not
associated negative emotions (Burke and Harrod emotions as defi ned by most sociologists of
2005 ). In 2004, Stryker expanded his theory, emotion. Secondly, most people feel pretty good
presenting several hypotheses, most of which are about themselves. Those who rate themselves
consistent with Burke’s earlier discussion. A few poorly enough that their spouses can rate them
articles have attempted to demonstrate the higher than they do themselves are likely to be
validity of the theoretical prediction that more negative in general than their positively-
discrepancy between identity standard and input, rating counterparts. As a result, they may be more
or output, predicts emotional experience. The likely to evaluate their self-worth and -effi cacy
most commonly cited of these articles is by Burke negatively and to experience more negative
emotions than those who rate themselves more
E.A. Weed and L. Smith-Lovin

positively. Most research studying identity (role/identity), behavior (action), and an object
control theory and emotion has been done using (role/ identity). When people interact, they may
this same data set, rendering the fi ndings about have different conceptions of the situation.
emotion similarly inconclusive. More research is Returning to an earlier example, as a graduate
needed to ascertain whether over-evaluation leads student in conversation with your professor, you
to positive or negative emotion. This debate is might cognitively label the situation graduate
taken up by the affect control theory literature, student talks with professor. If the professor
which makes very different predictions about instead sees the situation as gofer talks with
emotion. professor, then there is a calculable discrepancy
between the EPA values for graduate student and
gofer. Gofers are less good (lower E) and less
20.3.3 Heise’s Affect Control Theory powerful (lower P) than graduate students. Affect
control theory predicts that this discrepancy,
An alternative model of identity and emotion is called defl ection , will cause an emotion, and
provided by David Heise, developed in the 1970s push you to action or cause you to re-label part of
(see Heise 2007 for a complete overview). Affect the situation. Individuals can be negatively defl
control theory is tied more concretely to emotion ected, as when someone refers to the graduate
than either Stryker’s work before or Burke’s work student as a gofer, or positively defl ected, as
after. Under affect control theory, members of a when someone refers to the graduate student as a
culture share meanings about roles, objects, and genius.
behaviors. Members of the same culture share Affect control theory is situated in between
these understandings, whether they agree with self-enhancement and self-discrepancy theories,
them or not. In affect control theory, actors, in that it predicts that (1) individuals will feel
behaviors, and objects are conceptualized in three positive emotions when positively defl ected and
dimensions: evaluation – good to bad; potency – negative emotions when negatively defl ected
powerful to powerless, or big to little; and activity (self-enhancement consistent), but (2) individuals
– slow to fast, quiet to noisy, or inactive to active are driven to confi rm their identities and conform
(EPA, hereafter). Every identity (mother, banker, to culturally shared understandings in order to
prisoner) and behavior (run, talk to, hit) has an facilitate social interaction, and (3) when
EPA value, a point in a three- dimensional space individuals confi rm their identities, they feel
that describes how good, powerful, and active emotions fi tting with that identity (Heise 2007 ;
that concept is. Emotions are also rated on the MacKinnon 1994 ). Picture a funeral. As suits the
same EPA scales. setting, most of the people there are probably
Affect control theory asserts that members of mourners. In one corner, two people are
a culture share these understandings. For conversing, and one laughs loudly at a joke that
example, most Americans think of mothers as was told. They both probably feel happy, an
quite good, somewhat powerful, and somewhat emotion with a similar EPA rating to the identity
active. Even if our own mother is not this way, or of friend. Unfortunately, while the conversing
we see a mother behaving badly in the news, we pair was probably defi ning themselves as friend
share an understanding of what the prototypical talks to friend and friend laughs with friend, the
mother ought to be. Thus, when we see a mother other mourners probably expected the pair to be a
doing something relatively good and powerful mourner whispering to a mourner. The laugh
like hugging another good but less powerful disrupted the understanding of the situation as
actor, like a baby, we feel that things are as they mourner whispers to mourner, causing a great
should be. On the other hand, when we hear news deal of defl ection: mourners are very different
of a mother abusing a baby, we probably think from friends and whispering is very different
this is a very surprising and disconcerting event. from laughing. This difference between
Affect control theory uses a mathematical model expectation and perceived reality may cause the
to analyze these events, made up of an actor mourners to shush the pair or glare at them. In
in Sociology of Emotions 425

response, the chastened pair may make a gesture would hit a baby, but a baby would feel sad only
to restore their identities to something close to once he or she has been hit. The emotions
mourner and socially appropriate, perhaps by predicted, then, have different meanings
apologizing or beseeching the other attendees for depending on where a person is in the sequence
their forgiveness and feeling ashamed. Once the of the event. More research is needed to clarify
people are fi rmly back in the identity of mourner, and test the emotional hypotheses of affect
affect control theory predicts that they will feel control theory.
emotions consistent with being a mourner, O ne recent advance in emotion theory comes
including sadness and anguish. directly from affect control theory. In their ( 2004
I mportantly, though these examples make ) analysis, Sociological Realms of Emotional
intuitive sense, they actually originate from the Experience , Kathryn Lively and David Heise
formal math of the model, which uses EPA developed a model of emotional experience that
ratings and a set of equations that calculate defl integrates work in affect control theory and
ection between events to predict what emotions emotion management, explicitly and clearly tying
people will feel as a result of participating in an identity to emotional transitions. Using EPA
event, how people can cognitively re-label parts ratings of emotions collected for work in affect
of events, and how people act to change events. control theory as their starting point, Lively and
In this way, affect control theory is consistent Heise applied shortest path analysis to
with Hochschild’s research in emotion correlations between pairs of emotions in order to
management and Thoits’ four-factor theory of create a measure of relative distance between
emotion. Affect control theory independently emotions. The authors demonstrate that the
predicts that Hochschild’s stewardesses would distance between distress and tranquility can be
relabel a belligerent man as a fearful child reduced by segueing through anger and fear.
because fearful child yells at stewardess is a lower A s described previously, in affect control
defl ection event than man yells at stewardess. theory, emotions are tied to consonant identities:
Affect control theory is also consistent with other when confi rmed in their identities, mourners feel
emotion theory. Like Thoits’ work in labeling sad and friends feel happy. As such, individuals
theory, affect control theory relies on the should be able to change their emotions by
assumption that labels have signifi cant transitioning to new identities, and vice versa.
implications for our orientations and actions. This model is consistent with qualitative research
Recent research using affect control theory has in the dramaturgical tradition on emotions in
also found support for the symbolic interactionist therapy, in which mental health care providers
assumption that labels have real effects on how have been found to redefi ne patients’ identities in
people think about, feel about, and act toward, order to manage their emotions (Francis 1997 ).
situations (for example, see Boyle and McKinzie By transitioning bereaved spouses from victims
2015 ). to mourners to widow[er]s to survivors, mental
Despite this strength, the emotion predictions health professionals change their patients’
of the affect control theory model are its weakest emotions from sad and distressed to happy and
part. It is currently unclear what exactly the tranquil. Lively later expanded on this model in
emotions predicted by the mathematical model examining how men and women experience
indicate. As an example, consider the event emotional transitions differently, fi nding that
mother hits baby. Affect control theory predicts women tend to have a longer, more complicated
that the mother feels angry and the baby feels sad. series of emotional segues than do men, with
Though the math is the same for calculating the more positive and less powerful emotions than
appropriate emotion for the mother (actor) and their male counterparts ( 2008 ).
the baby (object), the model appears to predict Though not initially focused on emotion,
emotions that prompt actors to action, while identity theories have provided new models of
predicting emotions that objects of actions feel describing individuals’ emotional experience.
following the event. In this case, an angry mother While identity theories have made great strides in
E.A. Weed and L. Smith-Lovin

situating the individual in a cultural context, deference, while power refers to deference
concrete theory in this tradition focuses on dyadic gained by coercion. Kemper suggested that
interactions. In its focus on individual identities, emotions emerged from these two key aspects of
identity theory has largely neglected empathetic interaction. Under his paradigm, different
and sympathetic emotion. The next section emotions are associated with different levels of
focuses on work that investigates emotion in the power and status, and changes in power or status
context of the group, particularly as emotion is cause correspondent changes in emotion.
used to negotiate and affi rm social hierarchies. In Kemper’s work served as a foundation for later
contrast to interactionist theories, then, work in scholars in this tradition, who relied on his
group processes seeks more information about conjectures on the importance of status and
how individuals interact to negotiate status and power.
power, and theorizes the impact of exchange
interactions on larger group order. Group
processes researchers generally rely on 20.4.2 Expectation States Theories
experiments to describe the creation and reifi
cation of power and status differences on a broad Expectation states theory is a research program
scale. for the study of status hierarchies, most concisely
20.4 Group Processes: Social laid out in Joseph Berger and colleagues’ 1974
Exchange, Status, Legitimacy, treatise, Expectation States Theory: A
and Justice Theoretical Research Program (Berger et al.
1974 ). Drawing on Robert Bales’ work on affect
O ur third and fi nal section centers around and behavior in small groups ( 1950 ), Berger
research on status, power, and justice in social asserted that much of small group behavior can be
exchange, in the tradition of Bales and Kemper. explained in terms of power and prestige (1974).
Exchange theories developed in this tradition by Under expectation states theory, members of a
Berger, Ridgeway, Lawler, and others have group develop expectations for their own and
contributed greatly to sociology of emotions by others’ behavior in comparison with other group
calling attention to how emotions shape, and are members. These performance expectations are
shaped by, social and structural arrangement. an individual’s best guess for how others expect
Social structure, in the form of status and power them to behave, and are generally unspoken and
hierarchies, is the focus of analysis. Despite this may be unconscious. Much like Burke’s identity
dramatic difference in focus, emotion theory in control theory model, individuals form these
the group processes tradition shares several expectations through interaction with others,
assumptions with the literature in both the interpreting other group member’s actions to
dramaturgical and symbolic interactionist situate themselves appropriately within the
traditions. Work in this tradition is largely group. Research using the status characteristics
quantitative, using primarily experimental branch of this theory has emphasized the
methods, though the use of survey measures has importance of differences in salient social and
grown in recent years. demographic attributes – such as age, race, and
gender – that infl uence the expectations a group
has for an individual’s prestige, participation, and
20.4.1 Kemper’s Social Interactional infl uence in a group (for a review, see Ridgeway
Theory of Emotion 2001 ).

I n the late 1970s, Theodore Kemper established 20.4.2.1 Joseph Berger’s Affect
status and power as two important features of Expectation Theory
social interaction ( 1978 ). For the purposes of I n 1988, Berger expanded on expectation states
discussing his work and the work of others who theory to develop the closely-related affect
have come after, status refers to voluntary expectation theory ( 1988) . In a chapter about the
in Sociology of Emotions 427

future of expectation states theory, Berger and status is founded on the understanding that
describes four stages of emotional reaction. In the every situation has norms for behavior that are
fi rst stage, some stimulus leads an individual to shared among members of the group, called
experience affect. In the second, this affect is blueprint rules (Ridgeway and Johnson 1990 ).
exchanged between the individuals of the group. Ridgeway and Johnson argue that these blueprint
This exchange process prompts individuals to rules include feeling rules, consistent with work
form or reform their expectations for affect in the by Hochschild in the emotion management
group. In the third stage, the affect becomes more literature (Hochschild 1979 ). Thus, in an
stable and more consistently infl uences group extension of Berger’s model (1974), Ridgeway
members’ behavior and orientations toward each and Johnson draw on Kemper’s insights into
other. In the fourth and fi nal stage, affect status and power (1978 ) to argue that the fl ow
becomes a part of personality, and expectations of affect within a group is affected by the status
for affect are made more concrete. of the members in the group ( 1990 ). Emotion is
T o place these stages in the context of a real structured by status hierarchies in that individuals
life situation, imagine you are running late to a are subject to different blueprint rules, and more
lunch meeting when you join your colleagues at specifi cally, feeling rules, based on their status in
the table. Although lunch was promised, there the group (Ridgeway 2006 ). Empirical tests of
were not quite enough meals, and since you were this theory have shown that low-status
late, there is no lunch for you. You might feel individuals are expected to manage their negative
frustrated and angry about this, and make your emotions in interaction with higher-status
displeasure known by speaking harshly to the individuals. High- status individuals do not face
person who ordered lunch. They, in turn, calmly the same constraints (Ridgeway and Johnson
and evenly rebut your criticism, making you even 1990 ).
angrier as you sit there watching everyone else eat To return to the example of voicing anger in
with your stomach growling. As you continue an offi ce meeting, some people have more social
through the meeting with a gruff tone, a furrowed leeway to voice their negative emotions, like
brow, and red face, other members of the group anger, without facing harsh sanctions or social
may decide that anger is a stable characteristic of rebuke. If you were an older, white, male with a
yours. As a result, they act toward you expecting seat on the board, for example, few would argue
you to respond negatively and angrily in return. If when you began yelling. Indeed, your lower-
this happens enough, your anger may be seen as status group members would probably defer to
part of who you are. Unfortunately, your anger you and look properly guilty and ashamed for not
may not end with you. If, at this meeting, you are saving a lunch for you. If, however, you are a
representing social psychologists and enacting young, black, female who has just started at the
the role of social psychologist as your primary company, for you to voice your anger to your
role, others at the meeting may come to believe higher-status group members would be seen as an
that all social psychologists are angry – applying affront, and rather than being met with ashamed
your personality trait to the entire group you faces, other group members might instead
represent (Ridgeway 1991 ). sanction you for failing to follow the emotion
norms commensurate with your status and
20.4.2.2 Cecelia Ridgeway’s Theory of discredit your emotions by attributing your anger
Socioemotional Behavior and to your characteristics. This insight from group
Status processes literature parallels fi ndings by Harlow
C ecelia Ridgeway, in collaboration with Cathryn ( 2003 ) and other researchers (Durr and Wingfi
Johnson, drew upon Kemper and Berger’s eld 2011 ; Wingfi eld 2010) in the dramaturgical
theories to develop a new theory that ties together literature. In Harlow’s case, black, female
the dramaturgical tradition with work in group professors were constrained in their behavior and
processes (for a review, see Ridgeway 2006 ). emotional display for fear of being labeled the
Ridgeway’s theory of socioemotional behavior stereotypical angry black woman. These often
E.A. Weed and L. Smith-Lovin

unspoken assumptions about what emotions are how inequality develops and persists in small
appropriate for different people reaffi rm groups and larger society.
stereotypes and reinforce status hierarchies.
Enforcing these norms can amount to symbolic
violence, as the enforcement of status-based 20.4.3 Edward Lawler’s Affect Theory of
emotion norms acts is a form of social and Social Exchange
cultural domination (Bourdieu
1979 ). Researchers in the Bales and Kemper traditions
F urther research has expanded on this theory have primarily focused on theorizing specifi c
to demonstrate that, consistent with affect control emotions and distinguishing between positive and
theory, members of the same culture have a negative emotional situations, rather than
shared understanding of certain emotions (Lively developing general theories of emotion. In his
and Heise 2004) as being more or less acceptable affect theory of social exchange, Edward Lawler
for low- or high-status individuals (Tiedens et al. distinguishes between emotions as more global
2000 ). In their article, “Sentimental Stereotypes: feelings toward a situation, in comparison with
Emotional Expectations for High- and Low- sentiments, which in his paradigm are affective
Status Group Members,” Tiedens et al. conduct a responses directed at specifi c others (Lawler
series of vignette studies to examine emotional 2001) . Under this theory, then, the object of a
stereotypes of high and low status individuals sentiment can be used to predict the type of
(2000 ). They fi nd that in negative situations, emotion. In Lawler’s paradigm, emotions can be
participants expect high-status individuals to feel attributed to the task at hand, the self, another
angry, in contrast to low-status individuals, who social actor, or the social unit as a whole. When
are expected to feel more sad and guilty. In emotions are attributed to each of these four
positive situations, high-status individuals were social objects, the following is expected.
expected to feel more pride, while low-status
individuals were expected to feel appreciation. 1. The positive emotion felt toward a task is
In an extension of Berger and Ridgeway’s pleasantness; the negative is unpleasantness.
work, Tiedens and colleagues used another 2. The positive emotion felt toward the self is
vignette to test whether emotions could be used pride; the negative is shame.
to infer social status: a reversal of most previous 3. The positive emotion felt toward another
literature (Tiedens et al. 2000 ). In the vignette, social actor is gratitude; the negative is anger.
the authors present two characters: “X” and “Y.” 4. The positive emotion felt toward the social
They varied which of the two characters – X or Y unit as a whole is affective attachment; the
– was described as sad and guilty, or angry, and negative is affective detachment.
then asked which of the characters was an (Lawler 2001 , p. 332)
executive and which was an assistant. The authors Lawler notes, however, that based on work by
found that when Y was described as feeling Bernard Weiner ( 1986 ), individuals are more
angry, and X was described as feeling sad and likely to attribute positive feelings to themselves
guilty, respondents more frequently inferred that and negative feelings to outside factors (Lawler
Y was the executive and X was the assistant. That 2001 ). To better understand how individuals
is, people may use information about others’ move past this bias in order to attribute positive
emotions to infer social status. A similar pattern emotion toward outside factors, Lawler looks to
was found by Robinson et al. in the context of two key factors of social exchange: the type of
affect control theory ( 1994 ). While these exchange, and the extent to which a person’s
vignette studies contribute greatly to furthering contribution to the task can be isolated from the
the literature, they leave open the question of contributions of others.
interactions between status and emotion, and race While Lawler’s affect theory of social
and gender. Future research in this literature may exchange is the most emotion-focused, there are
have important implications for understanding several variations of exchange theory that provide
in Sociology of Emotions 429

predictions or make assumptions about the role of hat) is agreed-upon and procedurally just, even
emotion in social exchange or interaction. Taken when the distributive outcome (only one person
together, the affect theory of social exchange is selected) is quite unjust.
(Lawler 2001 ), relational cohesion theory Generally, people feel more positive emotions
(Lawler and Yoon 1996 ), and the theory of social when both procedural justice and distributive
commitments (Lawler et al. 2009 ) all predict or justice are high, and experience more negative
assume that people who believe they are in equal emotions when procedures and outcomes are
and just social exchanges experience more perceived as unfair (Hegtvedt and Parris 2014 ).
positive emotion, which can increase their This is true whether a person is thinking about
affective commitment to, and participation in, the what is just for his or herself or another. Because
group. justice has at least two parts, there is an
20.4.4 Justice and Equity Theory interaction between distribution and procedure.
Even when people get less than they believe they
Like other group processes theories, the should, if they believe that the way the decision
literatures of equity and justice have detailed the was made was fair (Hegtvedt and Killian 1999 ),
reciprocal relationship between emotion and or that the person who made the decision had the
social structure. These parallel literatures theorize right to do so (Clay-Warner 2006 ), they will feel
emotion primarily as a response to inequity and less negative emotion than if both distribution and
injustice. Although there are many possible procedure were perceived to be unjust. While
objective ways to measure how fair a situation is most justice literature continues to focus on the
from the outside, understanding objective direction (positive or negative) and intensity of
fairness is not a focus of either literature. As noted emotion, as opposed to the theorization of
to varying degrees by other theories previously discrete emotions, such as anger, joy, or sadness
discussed – including affect control theory, (see Guillermina 2007 for examples), equity
identity control theory and emotion management literature has recently moved toward more
– emotion is a personal response to a stimulus as distinct classifi cations of emotion.
that stimulus is perceived by an individual.
Further, perception is consistently more 20.4.4.2 Equity Theory
predictive of behavior and emotional response E xchange interactions are equitable not when all
than more objective measures (Merton 1995 ). individuals contribute or gain equally from the
What is fair to one person is not always fair to interaction, but rather when all individuals
another. Thus, these literatures generally evaluate involved in the group or task have roughly the
perceptions of equality and justice in relation to same ratio of perceived contributions to benefi ts.
emotions. Under equity theory, negative emotions follow
inequity while positive emotions follow equity.
20.4.4.1 Justice Theory As a result, individuals are motivated to maintain
Justice theory study of emotion generally centers equitable situations. Notably, both over- benefi
around two types of justice: distributive and ting and over-contributing are predicted to cause
procedural . Distributive justice assesses the negative emotions for all individuals involved
extent to which outcomes are allocated according (Adams 1965 ). Over time, this relatively
to equity or equality (Hegtvedt 2006) . If uniform notion of negative emotion or distress
everyone gets the same thing, then the was differentiated into more specifi c emotions.
distribution is equal. If everyone is given enough Tests of the theory showed that anger is more
to have the same outcome, then the distribution is likely when individuals over-contribute, while
less equal, but more equitable, since it is based on guilt or shame is more likely when individuals
need. Procedural justice, by contrast, is concerned over-benefi t (Walster et al. 1975 ). Research in
with the process by which outcomes are this literature has investigated many contexts in
distributed ( 2006 ). Members of a group can which people may experience inequity [e.g. stem
agree that a process (e.g. pulling names from a cell transplants (Beattie and Lebel 2011 ),
E.A. Weed and L. Smith-Lovin

expression of white privilege (Branscombe et al. and may even operate to disguise what inequity
2007 ), impression management in does exist.
communication with journalists (Westphal et al. Work in group processes has demonstrated
2012 )]. Although most equity researchers who quite conclusively the importance of emotion in
focus on emotion have used experiments, a few the negotiation of power and status. This
have approached the issue through surveys to literature has also made the greatest contribution
investigate longer- term inequity than can be to theorizing emotions beyond the individual
simulated in experiments. level, developing new models that describe how
I n their 2010 article, “Equity, Emotion, and emotion is involved in the creation of society-
Household Division of Labor,” Kathryn Lively, wide inequalities and stereotypes. Because of the
Lala Carr Steelman, and Brian Powell use the complexity of establishing a mechanism between
General Social Survey and the National Survey of individual’s emotion, dyadic interaction, group-
Family and Households to examine inequity in level emotions, and widespread inequalities,
the household division of labor and its impact on more work is needed to test this theoretical
emotions within couples. Lively and colleagues framework.
start with the equity theory fi nding that over-
benefi ting and over-contributing lead to guilt and
anger, respectively (Walster et al. 1975 ). The 20.4.5 Ritual Theories
authors then draw on Kemper’s social
interactional theory and his notions of power and A similar process to that described in the group
status (1978 ), as well as research from affect processes literature is ritual . In the early 1900s,
control theory on role-consistent emotions (Heise Durkheim theorized that culture exerts a common
2007 ) to further develop how emotions interact pull on individual people through emotionally
with consistent inequalities in long-term arousing rituals (Durkheim 2001 ). He described
relationships (Lively et al. 2010) . Lively and the result of shared rituals as effervescence, in
colleagues fi nd that, in the case of household which emotions are heightened and group
labor, men are more likely to report feeling anger membership becomes more central.
or rage when they perceive that they are under-
benefi tting, while women are more likely than 20.4.5.1 Interaction Ritual Chains and
men to report feeling fear and mild guilt/shame Emotional Energy
when they perceive they have under-contributed. Randall Collins developed Durkheim’s initial
As the authors point out, their fi ndings theorization about rituals to describe interaction
suggest that women may be willing to do more ritual chains. According to Collins, emotions are
housework than their male partners, both to aroused when individuals meet and interact, as
minimize their own guilt and their partner’s well as throughout the course of interaction (2004
anger. Consistent with work in emotion ) . When individuals reference their group,
management by Hochschild ( 1979) and Thoits ( positive feelings are aroused, and this
1990 ), doing more housework may allow women phenomenon reinforces group culture.
to manage their own emotions and their partners’ Individuals move through many single rituals,
emotions. This inequality in household labor and making ritual chains. Emotional energy is
emotion work is exacerbated by the fact that men positive when these rituals succeed, and negative
overestimate their work in the household to a when they do not. Collins’ draws on Kemper’s
greater extent than do women, meaning that male notions of status and power to suggest that
partners are quicker to perceive that they are over- individuals with high power and status have a
contributing and to respond with anger (Coltrane greater capacity to create positive emotional
1996 ). While emotion management may help energy and are motivated to reaffi rm group
couples cooperate and maintain their culture ( 1990) . As a result, positive emotional
relationships, it does little to change the energy lifts high status individuals and helps them
conditions that underlie perceptions of inequity, retain their higher status. This understanding of
in Sociology of Emotions 431

the important of differential social position in resulted in almost as many conceptualizations of


interaction ritual is in accordance with fi ndings emotion as there are sociological emotion
in the literatures on emotion management, scholars. Scholars in the dramaturgical tradition
expectation states, and equity theory, reviewed generally focus on one of four emotions or their
above. variants: happiness, fear, anger, and sadness.
Erika Summers-Effl er’s work offers an Identity theory, by contrast, considers a broad
extension of ritual theory. Summers-Effl er has array of concepts in testing their hypotheses about
theorized that when circumstances prevent emotion. This array includes these four emotions,
individuals from leaving an interaction or group, but also includes states such as depression,
they develop strategies to minimize negative general distress (Burke and Harrod 2005 ),
emotional energy ( 2004b ). Her recent research apathy, compassion, lustfulness, regret, and grief
represents an important start to integrating theory (Heise 1997) . By most defi nitions in the
of self and identity into ritual theory (Summers- dramaturgical tradition and the literature in
Effl er 2004a ), but more work is needed to psychological social psychology, none of these
concretely tie emotional experience to ritual. states is an emotion. Instead, they represent
moods, and even behavioral impulses or identity
labels, but not emotions or variants thereof.
Emotion research is still ongoing, but it may be
20.5 Avenues for Future Research
most useful for scholars who seek to discuss and
and Concluding Thoughts theorize emotion to start with the four emotions
that are shared between sociology and
T heory in sociology of emotions seeks to
psychology: happiness/joy, anger, fear, and
understand an experience that is often ephemeral,
sadness/upset. These emotions are experienced
fl eeting, and deeply personal, as a shared, social
and displayed in similar ways across cultures (see
phenomenon. In this chapter, we have detailed the
Turner 2000 for an overview) and could
contributions of three traditions within sociology
represent a common point of departure for
of emotion: dramaturgical, symbolic
emotions scholars.
interactionist, and group processes. In 40 years,
H aving established commonality around what
sociology has moved the concept of emotion from
an emotion is, the issue of theory remains.
an unfortunate complication of rationality to a
Hochschild’s work provided a unique look at
fundamental, shared experience that shapes and is
emotion and valuable insight into the workings of
shaped by society at every level of interaction.
emotion management. Her central concepts –
Despite these advances, however, there is much
emotion management, feeling rules, and surface
room for further growth. Though there are areas
and deep acting – have served as a foundation for
of almost perfect overlap, emotion theory in the
much of the work in emotion since.
dramaturgical tradition remains quite distinct
Unfortunately, she neglected to enumerate a
from work in symbolic interactionism and group
testable framework, and the research that has
processes, creating parallel literatures that fail to
followed has done the same. The literature of
draw on each other’s successes, though they
emotion management has remained a collection
reside in the same academic discipline. Two
of examples, with each new piece of research
points of disagreement make integration diffi
offering little new theoretical insight. At the same
cult. These are: what an emotion is, and what a
time, researchers in the identity theory and group
useful theory of emotion contains.
processes literatures have advanced theories of
T here are over 20 typologies of emotion
emotion, but these theories are either underspecifi
within sociology (Turner 2000) . Despite this
ed, or largely untested. For example, Burke’s
vast array from which to choose, most emotion
identity control theory lays out specifi c
scholars neglect to pick one, instead settling for
hypotheses about emotion, but the theory focuses
their own typology of emotion that fi ts a
on the simplifi ed contrast between positive and
particular study or dataset. This practice has
negative emotions, and research remains mixed,
E.A. Weed and L. Smith-Lovin

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Sociology as the Study of Morality 21
Kevin McCaffree
K. McCaffree ()
Department of Sociology , Indiana-Purdue
University , Fort Wayne , IN , USA e-mail:
kmcca007@ucr.edu
tive studies of inequalities, prejudicial attitudes
and violence associated with race, gender and
social class/income, homophobia and
transphobia, nationalistic ethnocentrism,
policing/imprisonment/conviction), the
frequencies with which authors used the terms
21.1 Introduction “moral,” “morals,” and “morality,” in sociology
journals declined precipitously from the years
The sociology of morality has had a rocky
1950 to 2010 (Hitlin and Vaisey 2013 ;
history. Explicitly sociological studies of morality
Brueggemann 2014 ).
rose in prominence in the mid-to-late nineteenth
T he study of morality, as such, had gone
and early twentieth centuries. From its inception,
underground in sociological theory beginning in
sociology was justifi ed in moral language—
the 1950s. The study of morality ceased being the
Auguste Comte, considered the French founder of
dispassionate, theoretical, concern of naive
the discipline, introduced the term “altruism” into
intellectuals, interested in the tools of dissection
the scientifi c literature. His reluctant intellectual
and analysis, and became the luminescent passion
heir, Emile Durkheim, directly equated societal
of the workers, women and cultural minorities
stability (“solidarity”) with morality (Smith and
who understood instances of immorality more
Sorrell 2014) . Spencer in England and Pareto in
precisely, and who were as a result too
Italy and Northern Europe spoke of the ethics of
emotionally impatient to bother with mere
individualism and the irrationality/ emotionality
observation and armchair theory. The academic
of moral judgments, respectively.
shift was profound. Sociology went from a
In more recent years, with the slow erosion of
positive inquiry into the content of morality to a
Parson’s theoretical hegemony throughout the
critical inquiry into the nature (and prevalence) of
1970s, 1980s and 1990s, “issue-based” moral
immorality. The sociology of morality became
rhetoric has emerged forcefully in sociology
expressly— manifestly—political and critical.
(Turner and Turner 1990 ). These “issue-based”
An over-focus on the documentation and
morally-laden research programs have not been
understanding of immorality obscures inquiry
formally about what morality is, but rather about
into what morality is in the positive sense of what
what immorality might be understood as in
something we call “morality” substantively
various areas of human life. Though immorality
constitutes. This dialogue is inclusive of all of the
was studied prolifi cally in sociology after the
acts and attitudes that are immoral, it merely
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 435
S. Abrutyn (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary Sociological Theory,
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32250-6_21
mid- twentieth century (i.e., qualitative and directs its attention to the positive,
quantita- interdisciplinary contents of what the term
“morality” means for sociologists. A sociological
K. McCaffree

study of morality cannot exist without a Andrew Miles, for example, suggest that morality
documentation and investigation into injustice. has two meanings, and that one meaning
But, it also cannot exist without a defi nition of addresses “a priori, universal standards of harm,
what morality (as opposed to immorality) is , in rights, and justice,” while the other meaning
other words, without an inquiry into the social and addresses “questions of good and bad or right and
physiological mechanisms of solidarity and wrong that might vary between individuals or
bonding. collectivities,” ( 2014 , pp. 312).
Some contemporary general theorists are Gabriel Abend ( 2011 , 2013 ) has defi ned the
openly critical of the contemporary sociology of sociology of morality, in part, in terms of the
(im)morality. Donald Black, for example, argues, study of “thick” and “thin” morality. Thin
[ Sociologists] side with blacks and other morality involves relatively simple,
minorities against whites, women against men, and decontextualized judgments or attitudes about
anyone else with power or other social status what is right as opposed to wrong or good as
against those with more. …much of what they call opposed to bad. The kinds of experiments
sociology is little more than the promotion of
liberal or otherwise left-wing ideology, (Black
conducted by neuroscientists, that involve
2013 , pp. 764). subjects having their brain scanned in an MRI
machine while making snap judgments during
Other contemporary theorists of the sociology of abstract thought experiments, are examples of
(im)morality, often the younger ones, say “thin morality”. 93
something a bit more diplomatic, If examples of “thin” moral judgments are
“right vs wrong” and “good vs bad,” than
[Sociologists of morality work] in many domains,
including…the Vietnam War, and 9/11, fi ghts examples of “thick” morality include judgments
over the contents of school curricula, abortion about “dignity, decency, integrity, piety,
politics, food politics, animal rights, protest responsibility, tolerance, moderation, fanaticism,
movements, and the development of welfare extremism, despotism, chauvinism, rudeness,
policy, to name a few areas of research. What
uptightness, misery, exploitation, oppression,
unites these diverse studies as part of the sociology
of morality is not a shared substantive focus, but humanness, hospitality, courage, cruelty, chastity,
the recognition that moral evaluations and perversion, obscenity, lewdness, and so on and so
categorizations are an essential part of struggles in forth,” (Abend 2011, pp. 150). Thick morality,
‘social fi elds,’ (Hitlin and Vaisey 2013 , pp. 59). as opposed to thin morality, involves description
and evaluation. When you make thin moral
The sociology of morality is a rapidly growing judgments, you only describe an act, policy or
area, despite the potential biases Black points out person as good or bad, right or wrong. With thick
or the admitted lack of a substantive focus morality, however, description and evaluation
mentioned by Hitlin and Vaisey. In this essay, I occur simultaneously. Calling a father cruel for
will attempt to organize the primary areas of beating his children provides a condemnation of
research. After reviewing these popular topics in an act (beating children is wrong/bad), while
the fi eld, I will point out some critical simultaneously describing an element of the
disciplinary disputes and, lastly, provide an nature of that act (cruelness is a certain way of
integrative, positive, theoretical framework for acting/behaving, in addition to being wrong or
the sociology of morality. bad). Courage, on the other hand, is a moral good,
21.2 Sociological Defi nitions of in most cases. But, in addition to being good,
Morality courage is also a certain kind of behavior. In this
way, judging something as courageous both
Several theorists of morality within sociology describes an act (as a certain type of behavior—
have recently attempted to provide substantive courageous behavior) and evaluates that act (as
defi nitions of morality. Stephen Vaisey and morally good) simultaneously. Abend argues that

93
S ee Abend (2 011) for a review of the relevant constructed moral judgements as entirely, suffi ciently,
arguments against viewing artifi cially/philosophically constitutive of morality.
gy as the Study of Morality 437

thick morality, moreso than thin morality, is 21.3 Social Psychological Aspects
culturally embedded. Thick morality is therefore of Morality
more in the purview of sociology than of
neuroscience or cognitive psychology. From a social-psychological standpoint,
Abend, in his more recent work, argues for emotions (e.g., anger, guilt and shame),
three levels of analysis within the sociology of reputational concerns, and self-conceptions (or
morality (Abend 2011) . He suggests we should identities) drive moral behavior. Emotions
consider (a) the behavior and practices that people motivate us to conform to normative expectations
call “moral,” (b) the moralistic judgments, and to condemn normative transgressions,
attitudes and beliefs that people hold and, lastly, reputational concerns direct our attention to how
(c) what he calls the “moral background,” or others perceive our behaviors, and our moral
cultural milieu, that frames behavior and identities guide our actions in morally relevant
cognition generally. The moral background of a situations. In this section, I will briefl y review
culture defi nes the behaviors and attitudes of research in the areas of moral emotions,
individuals in terms of thick morality. That is, the reputational concern and the moral identity.
moral background of a culture provides defi
nitions of behaviors and attitudes as cruel, rude,
hospitable, perverse, chaste and so on. These three 21.3.1 Moral Emotions
levels of analysis interact and reciprocally form
one another—they are the constitutive, Emotion research has a long and storied pedigree
substantive “stuff” of morality that sociologists within the sociology of morality (Harkness and
should consider. Hitlin 2014 ). Recognition for the importance of
The closest approximation I can make to a emotions in social solidarity and social
current substantive sociological defi nition of a coordination goes back at least to Durkheim in
“morality” would be something like, the France, and no doubt even earlier to Islamic
universal mechanisms of social bonding (i.e., sociologist Ibn Kaldun in the fourteenth century.
emotion , entrainment , exchange relationships , In Durkheim’s ([ 1912 ] 1976) understanding,
etc.) as shaped by localized , cultural bonding positive emotional energy circulated between
styles / patterns (i.e., normative behaviors , people when they had self and group-affi rming
attitudes , identities , values and worldviews ). interactions. When people congregate,
This defi nition is overbearing, perhaps, and may ritualistically and habitually, a sort of energy
not be quite exhaustive. Nevertheless, it captures builds up which feels externally pressuring due to
the tensions as well as the topics, of the current the crystallization of expectations into norms and
state of the discipline. rules. This congregating originally happened in
Substantive defi nitions of morality are bound large tribal festivals among hunter gatherers, but
to be complex, but the contemporary sociology of the interactional accumulation of emotional
morality has something of an identity crisis—a energy can, in principle, be measured within and
crisis of priority between description and compared across a variety of more modern
explanation, between effecting social change and institutional domains—occupational, economic,
searching for mechanisms of stability, and familial, religious, political, and educational
between studying zoologically universal or (Collins 2004 ; Turner 2007 , 2010a ).
culturally relative aspects of morality. I think Emotions scholarship in the sociology of
these confl icts are inherent to sociological morality is also driven by a structural,
inquiry, but I think they can be satisfyingly Goffmanian line of research that comes from
addressed. I will show this as the essay Identity Theory (Stryker 1980 , 2004; Stryker
progresses, but next I describe the current state of and Burke 2000 ; Burke and Stets 2009 ). In
scientifi c knowledge in the sociology of morality. Identity Theory, self- views, dramaturgically
created and re-created in interaction, are the units
of analysis when speaking of emotional energy.
K. McCaffree

When our identities as parents, workers or Brandt and Rozin 2013) . Appealing to
community members are verifi ed by others in anthropologist Richard Shweder’s (Shweder et al.
interactions, the emotions felt are positive and 1997 ) three “ethics” of morality, Rozin suggests
motivating. On the other hand, when our that violations of communal norms by others lead
situational performances fail to elicit the expected to feelings of contempt, arbitrary violations by
approval from others, the emotions we feel are others of one’s own freedom/autonomy lead to the
very negative and potentially de-motivating. experience of anger, and violations of bodily
I f modern inquiry into the emotional aspects purity/health or ideological purity by others lead
of social bonds and identities owes its license to to the feeling of disgust.
Kaldun, Durkheim, and Goffman, contemporary The experience of moral emotions is also
inquiries into the emotional aspects of values and driven by status differences between individuals.
worldviews (e.g., Vaisey and Miles 2014 ; Miles It is often assumed in sociology that high-status
2014 ; Hitlin and Pinkston 2013) owe their individuals tend to experience a greater freedom
sociological roots to Weber. Weber denied that of emotional expression within the family and
ideal, moral, values could be determined by workplace (Hochschild [ 1983 ] 2003). This
scientifi c inquiry, and saw value systems fl greater freedom of emotional expression
uctuating between historical epochs more or less sometimes, in turn, enables the expression of
randomly (Weber [ 1919 ] 2004). Values, aggression and anger towards those who are
attitudes and worldviews were nevertheless perceived to be lower in status. Due to the higher
emotionally infl uential for Weber, at least once status individual’s relatively greater access to
they were diffused among populations in large power, rewards and resources, the potential social
numbers. He famously argued that nascent costs and consequences associated with displays
industrial capitalism grew so quickly in Europe of anger or frustration are fewer than they would
precisely because the logic of hard labor and be for a lower-status actor (in any given situation).
accumulation had found emotional justifi cation I n an important study, Jessica Collett and
in a previous historical epoch’s worldview of Omar Lizardo ( 2010 ) provide evidence to show
puritan ascetic devotion (Weber [ 1920 ] 2002). that the experience of anger is common among
More recent scholarship has suggested that the both high and low status actors, depending on the
moral emotions people experience may be infl context. Collett and Lizardo test two general
uenced by psychological attribution mechanisms. hypotheses against one another with regard to the
When individuals feel fearful or threatened, they experience of anger—do higher status individuals
begin to make attributions about the causes of experience more anger because of a tendency to
these emotions. In many cases, the causes of these attribute failures to others, instead of the self?
emotions are attributed to something the self has Recall, as discussed above, that when blame for
done wrong—a broken rule, tradition or negative emotions is directed towards self, shame,
expectation. When one blames self for violating a guilt and embarrassment result, but when blame
moral transgression, one may additionally feel a for negative emotions is attributed to the actions
sense of shame, embarrassment or guilt. of another, anger and disgust result. Thus, could it
Conversely, however, if one attributes the be that higher status individuals are more likely to
perception of threat and fear to the actions of experience and express anger because they are
another, the emotions felt include contempt, anger more likely to blame others for their failures and
and disgust. These are sets of moral emotions in indiscretions? Or, alternatively, are higher status
that shame, embarrassment and guilt motivate individuals less likely to experience and express
individuals to conform to social expectations, anger precisely because of their high status (i.e.,
while contempt, anger and disgust motivates relatively greater access to power and resources)?
individuals to punish rule and norm violators. After all, low-status parties are, by defi nition, in
The psychologist Paul Rozin has been infl a power and resource- disadvantaged position.
uential in this area of research, and has attempted People who are perceived as low status, in
to show how each set of moral emotions emerge numerous areas of their life, may actually be the
from specifi c social contexts (Rozin et al. 1999 ;
gy as the Study of Morality 439

ones accumulating anger, frustration and negative One’s reputation is their greatest resource—their
emotionality more generally (Turner greatest form of capital—because of the dense,
2010 a ). supervisory networks that foragers depend on for
Collett and Lizardo ( 2010 ) show that both survival. Cooperators choose to interact with
hypotheses can be supported, with scope others who cooperate, so that both achieve
conditions. That is, lower status individuals do, collective goals (food, shelter, protection) more
indeed, feel more anger associated with the sense quickly.
of a “loss of control” that results from occupying A nthropologist Christopher Boehm ( 2012 )
resource and power-disadvantaged positions in has drawn on the work of evolutionary biologist
society. However, under certain circumstances, Richard Alexander, in addition to his own
high status actors are also likely to experience and ethnographic work on contemporary hunter-
express anger—specifi cally, when they begin gather societies, in order to craft a theory of social
blaming unfamiliar, lower-status others in formal cohesion in hunter-gatherer bands. Reputation, he
settings such as the workplace. Lower-status concludes, is a primary force driving the earliest
individuals, however, tend to make more self- of humanity’s moral bonds—small supervisory
attributions for personal failures, are more likely networks do a lot of gossiping and, as a result,
to experience a sense of losing control in their have a lot of power to rescind tribal membership
lives, and consequently, are more likely to feel to deviant individuals. Tribal deviants and
guilt and shame (Turner 2010a ). When lower- bullies—say, those who put in little effort during
status individuals do express anger, it tends to be the hunt, sleep with someone else’s partner,
anger directed towards the self, which may be repeatedly lie about something or arbitrarily
experienced as shame (Turner 2007 ). Higher- instigate someone—are often dealt with
status actors appear to disproportionately use their ruthlessly, though typically democratically.
positions of power to externalize anger (and Social ostracism is a typical punishment
blame) for frustrations onto subordinate others, pluralistically agreed upon by other band
while lower-status parties may be more likely to members. Repeat and chronic offenders,
internalize their anger and feel a sense of shame. however, are sometimes abandoned entirely.
I t appears, then, that moral emotions like Given that foragers depend on their tribe—
anger, shame and guilt may be differentially their society—for their clothes, shelter, food
experienced by individuals depending on the (hunting success is mercurial), and protection,
status positions they occupy vis a vis others across abandonment by the tribe is tantamount to death.
institutional domains, due to the patterns of Establishing a good reputation, therefore, is every
attributions they make regarding the negative bit as important as avoiding a negative one. The
emotional states they experience. notion that one might strive for and maintain a
good reputation—that is, a form of social capital
accrued merely by virtue of the kindness and
21.3.2 Reputational Maintenance helpfulness one offers—provided emotional/
motivational encouragement to follow rules and
In addition to the emotional dimensions of contribute fairly to the maintenance of the band,
morality, concerns over reputation also infl uence while simultaneously providing the social
how individuals act towards one another. legitimacy to force others to do so as well.
Historically, foraging bands of hunter-gatherers S ociologists Brent Simpson and Robb Willer
maintained a pluralistic social cohesion by have contributed critical insights into the moral
constantly scrutinizing one another’s reputation. dynamics of reputations (e.g., Simpson and Willer
Foragers make and maintain strong, emotionally 2008 , 2015 ; Willer et al. 2012 ). Among other
rich social ties with under 150 people, and usually things, their laboratory research has revealed that
fewer than 50 (Turner and Maryanski 2008; self-interested actors behave altruistically (i.e.,
Apicella et al. 2012 ) . These “families” of genetic contribute more resources in a public goods
and fi ctive kin hunt, play, worship, gather game) when others have the opportunity to
materials, raise children and go to war together. witness their actions and form judgments about
K. McCaffree

their behaviors. When individuals motivated by 21.3.3 The Moral Identity


self-interest conduct their affairs in private, or are
somehow obscured from full transparency, they In addition to research on the moral dynamics of
begin to behave much less altruistically. Public emotions and reputations, research on moral self-
perceptions of reputation-relevant behavior perceptions or “identities,” continues to grow in
therefore, appear to turn self-interested sociology. The central dynamic here involves the
psychological motivations into socially degree to which some people view themselves as
cooperative behaviors. moral (vs immoral) and the infl uence that this
Most everyone should have a motivation to self-conception has on behavior. It is not only the
forge and maintain a positive reputation to the desire for a good reputation that is morally
degree that they perceive themselves to be motivating, but also a desire for cognitive
socially/emotionally or fi nancially dependent on consistency. Thus, if an individual understands
co-present others. However, when avenues for the themselves to be an “honest, “fair” or “helpful”
creation of a reputation are blocked (as when one person, let’s say, than this individual will
acts anonymously or in a context of low generally behave in a way consistent with this
supervision), selfi sh motivations become more self-understanding, all else equal, in order to
powerful. To be a bit blunt, “watched people are achieve a comforting sense of psychological
nice people,” (Norenzayan 2013 ). stability and control (Carver and Scheier 1982 ).
Once individuals are visible and accountable Though one’s identity as a certain type of moral
to others, positive reputations accrue, in part, from actor will change throughout the life-course, the
acts of deference and kindness. This is especially psychological desire to perceive trans-situational
true when an individual occupies a position of stability within the self will be a constant
power—Robb Willer and colleagues (2012 ) fi nd motivator of behavior.
in a study that powerful individuals (i.e., those As for what counts as a moral identity, Jan
with greater degrees of material resources) are Stets and Michael Carter ( 2012 ), have argued
perceived as having better reputations by that the most substantive meanings that comprise
observers to the degree that they withhold from the moral identity include meanings related to
accepting maximal rewards during exchange justice and care as these meanings are regarded
opportunities, or elect to donate to charity. Confi as moral universals in human and primate
rming the research from the anthropological societies (e.g., Newman 1976; Brown 1991 ,
record on foraging societies described above, it 2004 ; Shweder et al. 1997 ; Boehm 1999 ; De
appears that kindness is socially advantageous, Waal 2009 ; Haidt 2012 ) . Stets and Carter
even if one already occupies a position of power, subsequently specify— and factor load—a
as perceptions of power legitimacy appear to number of self-meanings that might reasonably be
covary with visible displays of kindness and associated with holding a view of oneself as a just
fairness. or caring person. These meanings included
This is a general principle of morality that is perceiving oneself as honest, kind, fair, helpful,
now underscored by numerous lines of separate generous, compassionate, truthful, hardworking,
research from different scientifi c fi elds. In a friendly, selfl ess, or principled. They fi nd that
recent summarization of the social science study participants with higher moral meanings
literature, Simpson and Willer conclude that those within their moral identity—that is, with higher
with good (that is, pro-social) reputations, “are scores (1–5) on meanings measures like fair,
trusted more, are respected more, are cooperated helpful or generous—acted more ethically than
with more, have more infl uence, and are those with lower average scores. In Stets and
disproportionately selected as exchange partners Carter’s study, ethical behaviors involved not
and group leaders,” (Simpson and Willer 2015 , copying on tests, not driving drunk, not stealing,
pp 10.7). and other behaviors of specifi c relevance to
college students who, of course, comprised the
study sample.
gy as the Study of Morality 441

Theoretically, the moral identity should drive oil spill better than prior civic engagement or
the objective display of moralistic behaviors, due political affi liation.
to an emotional motivation to maintain cognitive Before concluding, I would like to point out a
consistency. It is not only identities that drive very important caveat. Typically, in studies of the
behaviors, of course, behaviors also drive identity moral identity, respondents report high levels
processes. Research shows that making moralistic (consistently above the midpoint on a given
judgments about others, or even just watching response scale) of moral self-views. This
others engaging in moralistic judging behaviors, tendency to self-enhance is well documented in
may increase the strength of meanings within psychology—people tend to think they are more
peoples’ own moral identities (Simpson et al. trustworthy, more honest, more responsible, more
2013 ). kind and more fair than the average person
Research into moral identities has proven to be (Gilovich 1991 ). A problem, however, arises
practically useful. Consider a pair of recent when theorists also assume a tendency towards
examples in criminology and environmentalism. cognitive consistency among respondents. If
Drawing on Wikstrom’s ( 2010 ) Situated Action people tend to see themselves as more moral than
Theory, Hitlin and Kramer ( 2014 ) suggest a path the average person, and people also strive to
to identity change for delinquent adolescents. In maintain consistent self-views (i.e., as a moral
their model, they show that arrest and conviction, person), than how can identity dynamics explain
to the degree that it produces shame in the immorality? Why would anyone ever act
individual (i.e., a self-attribution regarding felt unethically if they view themselves as moral and
negative emotions), provides an emotional seek— always—to gain confi rming feedback
opportunity for a re-appraisal of self. This re- from others? Clearly, there is a theoretical gap
appraisal of self might involve changing the here. The solution to this conundrum, which
strength of the meanings within the moral requires copious future research, is that
identity. Assuming the individual holds some attentional allocation can be diverted based on
degree of legitimacy for the criminal justice situational dynamics. Thus, people may tend to
system, and assuming the individual has a view themselves as more moral than the average
remaining reservoir of self- esteem, experiencing person, and they may also seek cognitive
shame may provide an emotional and consistency, but certain situational characteristics
psychological incentive for identity change. (e.g., a person is under pressure to perform, as
Research into environmentalism has been when business leaders engage in price-fi xing in
equally intriguing. Stets and Biga ( 2003 ) fi nd order to meet profi t goals) may reduce
that views about oneself as being part of, in individuals’ allocation of attention to moralistic
cooperation with, or dependent on, the self-views.
environment better predict participants’ self-
reported environmentalist behavior than political
attitudes about social policy and environmental
21.4 Structure and Culture
protection. Put another way, self-meanings,
moreso than attitudes about objects (i.e., the Comte, Durkheim, Marx, and Weber all feared,
environment, in this case) better predict self- in their own ways, the encroachment of a market-
reported behaviors. Further research has based, differentiated, metropolitan, irreligious
underscored this fi nding. A recent study showed modernity (Hodgkiss 2013 ) . Comte and
that participants who identifi ed themselves as Durkheim worried about how and whether
environmentalist were also more likely to have atheists could create a secular, civil form of social
donated money to or volunteer with an solidarity, while Weber and Marx concerned
environmentalist organization (Farrell 2014) . themselves with how power relationships in
Moreover, holding a self- conception as an capitalist culture and economy were driving
“environmentalist” predicted charity donations people to form exploitive, disenchanted
and volunteered time before and after the BP gulf relationships and ideologies. This section
K. McCaffree

addresses these, still relevant, moral concerns barriers may prevent individuals from
about modernity. experiencing the same kinds of emotional
Specifi cally, I review here some of the central responses as they often do with more perceptually
debates surrounding the moral signifi cance of proximate street crimes like robbery, burglary,
religion and capitalist economies, before and murder. Perhaps as a result of these
discussing the moral import of cultural values obstructions to public perception, government
more generally. estimates of the cost in dollars and human lives of
corporate crimes are 50–100 times greater than
street crime (Iadicola 2014 ).
21.4.1 Capitalism Capitalism, as a general economic system, has
also been critiqued as distributively and
T he above mentioned study by Justin Farrell contributively unjust (e.g., Sayer 2011) . At least
(2014 ) on environmentalism and self-identity since the work of Marx and Engels, the ruthless
also highlights an interesting point about side of capitalism has been a major focus of
disasters—corporate-caused human disasters may sociologists who study moral problems (e.g.,
be harder for people to understand compared to Marx [ 1857 ] 2008; Anderson 1999 ; Wright
other forms of deviance (like street crime), and 2010 ). The sense in which capitalist economies
therefore, may be harder to address from a are considered to be distributively unjust is the
humanitarian and fi nancial standpoint. sense in which occupational prestige hierarchies
Corporate- caused human disasters may not be (rooted in cultural practice and tradition) unfairly
concentrated in any specifi c (that is, extremely inequitably) distribute valued
geographical/community location, and may cause social (i.e., respect, infl uence, power) and
harm over long stretches of time, leading to material (i.e., income, healthcare and retirement
relatively few immediate deaths. Unlike a murder programs) resources. The sense in which
or a natural disaster, where death follows capitalist economies are considered to be
immediately from a localized behavior or contributively unjust is the sense in which under-
meteorological event, violations of laws on fossil employment and micro- management in the
fuel emissions, for example, may elevate cancer workforce prevent people from realizing their
rates in an area over 30 years. Farrell cites each of own personal potential as creative contributors to
these reasons in noting how comparatively little the economic system (Sayer 2011 ).
money Americans donated to the BP relief fund Women (and especially non-white women),
after the oil spill compared to how much was for example, are both more likely to work in jobs
donated after Hurricane Katrina (only 4 million low in the occupational prestige hierarchy (e.g.,
dollars 42 days after the spill compared to 580 hospice care, childcare, secretarial offi ce work,
million dollars only 8 days after Hurricane nannies) and paid less income over their lifetimes
Katrina). compared to white men (Ridgeway 2007 , 2009
Market-driven corporate competition may , 2011) . Black and Hispanic men, meanwhile, are
drive certain organizations to avoid, for example, both more likely to be arrested (or even contacted
addressing regulatory increases, or consistent by the criminal justice system) and more likely to
maintenance. Regardless of the reasons for be unemployed and live in poverty compared to
corporate malfeasance and corporate crime, it the rates for white men (Rios 2009; Peterson and
may be harder for individuals to perceive Krivo 2010; Krivo et al. 2013 ; Wagmiller and
corporate deviance because it is (a) more likely to Lee 2014 ).
occur in remote areas, (b) oftentimes not W ork by others has also established a strong,
immediately physically visible in its damaging empirically verifi ed, connection between social
effects and (c) responsibility for action is class and health (Link and Phelan 1995 ; Phelan
distributed among hundreds, if not thousands, of et al. 2004 , 2010 ). Poverty is not often thought
employees. It is possible that, for the above of as a health risk, but it is. Prolonged poverty
reasons, corporate crime is also less likely to be may lead to depression and a lack of social
reported on in media. These, and other, perceptual support that, combined with chronic stress and
gy as the Study of Morality 443

uncertainty, leads to a higher rate of disease. cannot therefore conclude that capitalist
Bruce Link and other researchers have democracies are the worst possible form of
disentangled the complicated empirical web of economy/ government.
when poor health leads to poverty and vice versa. This would be very, very diffi cult to show, let
Subsequent research confi rms some pretty horrifi alone defend. And, if capitalist democracies are
c conclusions. Rates of infant morality, heart not the worst possible form of societal
disease, diabetes, obesity, cancer and other economy/governance, then some subset of
diseases are all higher among racial minorities in scholars should also focus on the relative
the United States, and especially among African improvements or benefi ts that have accrued to
Americans (Schnittker and Mcleod 2005 ). human beings by virtue of shifts from widespread
Poverty, un/ under-employment, healthcare and slavery or monarchal/ideological dictatorship to a
housing discrimination have mutually conspired (relatively) more open, democratic, market
to produce these outcomes (see also Marmot economy. This research on the benefi ts of
2006 ). capitalism (i.e., higher per capita income) should
Empirical observations like these motivate occur alongside, and in dialogue with, those
many sociologists to take a critical stance towards revealing the inequalities and injustices of
capitalist economies, and this is a rich literature capitalist democracies.
that sociologists of morality will need to engage
with more directly moving forward. The moral
consequences of market-driven corporate 21.4.2 Religion
malfeasance, or of class structure and health are
signifi cantly more complicated than I can do M any sociologists of morality have considered
justice to here. I only wish to point out that moral the importance of religion and religious belonging
critique of market competition among for human values and social solidarity (Durkheim
corporations, and the economic system of [ 1912] 1976; Weber ([ 1920 ] 2002),
capitalism more generally, continues to be a Emerson and Smith 2000 ; Bader and Finke 2010
central focus of many sociologists. ; Lee 2014 ). Research in this vein often discusses
Although some studies simply involve the social psychology of belonging to a religious
narrated counts of the immoral aspects of market- community, and about the ways in which religion
based societies (i.e., harsh working conditions, can motivate altruism or compassion.
exploitation, workaholism, overscheduling, There does appear to be some good data on
divorce, debt, tax loopholes, lobbying and so on— religion and charitable donation that shows
see e.g., Brueggemann 2014) , other studies religious individuals to be more giving (e.g.,
address the comparative benefi ts of capitalist Brooks 2006 ). This work is often criticized,
societies compared to agrarian or horticultural however, as it is typically based upon self -
societies and their respective feudalistic and reported giving behavior, and religious
monarchical economies (e.g., Lenski 2005 ; individuals often self- report being more generous
Turner and Maryanski 2008 ). Still others dissect than they actually are in laboratory studies of their
the variation within capitalist economies. A recent behavior (Norenzayan and Shariff 2008 ; Galen
study, for example, found that people in the 2012 ). Also, to the degree that religious
“professional” class who make over 125,000 individuals donate to charities which promote
dollars per year (in the US) were more generous their specifi c religion, it is unclear how this
(using a dictator game experimental paradigm) constitutes “charity.” Political psychologists
when their perceptions of income inequality were have, moreover, shown religious fundamentalism
lower. Perceptions of higher income inequality to correlate strongly with political conservatism,
actually reduced the generosity of donors (Côté et and both have been positively associated with
al. 2015 ). racial (and general out-group) prejudice,
C ritique and analysis of capitalist democracies authoritarianism, generalized perceptions of
is crucial and important both practically and threat, death anxiety, and intolerance of ambiguity
theoretically. However, such critique and analysis (Jost et al. 2003 ; Jost 2006 ; Amodio et al. 2007
K. McCaffree

; Carney et al. 2008 ; Johnson et al. 2010 , 2012) institutions in Western society, and as a result,
. Even more damning for the religion-compassion sociologists have speculated that moral attitudes
thesis, the most secular (that is, least religious) about these issues are most likely to be infl uenced
nations on Earth are also the greatest by religious commitment (e.g., Desmond and
disseminators of social welfare and assistance to Kraus 2014) . However, as other scholars have
the poor, elderly, and those struggling with drug insisted, most prominently, Rodney Stark, any
addiction and other health problems (Paul 2005 ; infl uence religion has on behavior will only hold
Zuckerman 2008 ). for those who truly believe in the holy doctrine
There nevertheless appears to be a pop-culture and the strength of god, and who have friends that
equivocation of religion with moral behavior, at do as well (Bainbridge 1992) . Casual, “cafeteria
least in the United States (Edgell et al. 2006 ; Christians,” who self-identify as Christian (or
Gervais et al. 2011 ). This equivocation of whatever religion) but who engage in few
religion and morality in popular culture seems to religious behaviors and rituals (e.g., church
be processed at a subliminal level for many attendance, prayer, fasting, volunteering) will
Americans. Priming studies, for example, have likely not be infl uenced by the moral
shown that when participants are subliminally fl proscriptions advocated by religious institutions
ashed with religious concepts on a computer (Bruce 2011 ).
screen, asked to unscramble words denoting
religious terminology, or even just asked to write
down religious rules (e.g., the Ten 21.4.3 Values
Commandments), they subsequently act more
pro-socially. This pro-sociality ranges widely, Several prominent sociologists of morality have
from cheating less on tests to donating more recently followed social psychologists Shalom
money to charity (see Bloom 2012 , for a review). Schwartz and Jonathan Haidt in operationalizing
People appear to make subliminal associations the term “values” (e.g., Hitlin and Pinkston 2013
between religious terminology and situational ; Vaisey and Miles 2014 ). Values, for Schwartz
expectations for moral behavior. These studies are a list of ten “concepts or beliefs, about
suggest that the socio-cultural development of desirable end states or behaviors, that transcend
individuals in the US contains numerous specifi c situations, guide selection or evaluation
narratives about the supposed link between of behavior or events and are ordered by relative
religious belief and morality. importance,” (Schwartz and Bilsky 1987 :551
I t is possible, but incredibly unlikely, that quoted from Hitlin and Pinkston 2013 ).
moral beliefs and values come from (that is, have Schwartz’s ten universal values included
their ultimate origin in) religious beliefs. There conformity, tradition, benevolence, achievement,
are mountains of ethnographic and laboratory hedonism, security, universalism, self-direction,
examples of mammals (with, of course, no stimulation, and power.
religion) displaying ethical behavior, and there Jonathan Haidt’s ( 2001 , 2012 ; Haidt and
are good theoretical and empirical reasons to Bjorklund 2007 ) work has been even more infl
believe that the neural mechanisms that underlie uential within the contemporary sociology of
parent- infant bonding, in general, are the morality. Haidt cites anthropology and
ultimate, phylogenetic, origins of moral concern philosophy in formulating his fi ve moral
(e.g., De Waal 2009 ; Churchland 2011 ; Preston foundations that, he says, explain and underlie all
2013 ; McCaffree 2015 ). of the variation in human value systems. Morality
E ven if religions cannot be considered the for Haidt is “intuitionist” in that we are rarely
origin of human values, religious commitments aware of the emotional infl uences behind our
and religious beliefs do, of course, infl uence the moral judgments. We can, and often do, however,
moral beliefs and behaviors that people express use our education and refl ection in order to justify
during the course of their practical, everyday life. the moral judgments we come to for emotional
For example, religious institutions tend to address reasons. Haidt uses the metaphor of the rational
sexual behavior and drug use, moreso than other mind as the rider of an unruly elephant. The
gy as the Study of Morality 445

erratic elephant, who no doubt dictates when and about Shweder’s scheme is that each of his three
where the rider goes despite the rider’s rational ethical value sets can be emphasized differently
protestations, represents our emotions and depending on the society in which they are found.
feelings in any given context. For Haidt, our This therefore constitutes an example of moral
emotional intuitions drive our moral judgments universalism with relativist scope conditions
and these emotional intuitions have fi ve relating to the idiosyncratic history and traditions
manifestations—concerns for care , fairness , of each society.
loyalty , respect for authority , and purity / F iske takes a similar approach to crafting
sanctity . 94 broad ideal-types of value categories from
Using these defi nitions of moral values, Miles historical and anthropological data. He refers to
(2014 ) in an analysis of a sample of over 2,000 his categories of values as the “relational models”
Americans, fi nds that, for example, women are of “communal sharing, “authority ranking,”
more likely to emphasize the value of “equality matching,” and “market pricing” (Fiske
benevolence, and of having a moral identity, 1992 ). Each of Fiske’s four basic relational
whereas men were more likely to value power and models of values has their own logic of
achievement. Also of interest is his fi nding that, materialism, work, distribution, reciprocation,
compared to those with no religious identity, decision making, motivation, aggression and so
those who were religiously affi liated had a on.
stronger moral identity and were more likely to “ Community sharing” includes a set of values
value conformity and tradition. oriented towards treating every member (of the
T his emerging literature on values within the ingroup) of society fairly and integratively.
sociology of morality has its true roots in the work Secondly, “authority ranking” involves values
of Alan Fiske ( 1992) , Fiske and Haslam (2005 ) associated with people loyally, dutifully, and
, Richard Shweder et al. ( 1997 ), Robert Bellah honorably serving in their roles as workers,
and colleagues ([ 1985] 2008), Ronald Inglehart protestors, parents, religious adherents, students
( 1977 , 1997 ), and James Hunter ( 1992 ). and so on.
Shweder and Fiske both argue in favor of their T hirdly, Fiske defi nes the relational model of
respective cross-cultural typologies of values. “equality matching” as a set of values about
Bellah, Inglehart and Hunter, on the other hand, balanced fairness and reciprocity. Values related
focus on the modernization of values in terms of to equality matching are values that deal with
people in the West becoming more expressive, balancing the allocation of contributions and
progressive and individualistic. Though not every rewards, and just desserts. Lastly, values in the
theorist mentioned above expressly uses the term “market pricing” category include highly
“values,” for their inquiry, a discussion of their rationalized, utilitarian moral calculations.
approaches is relevant to this subject matter. Market pricing values are those that are invoked
Anthropologists Shweder and Fiske both by large multinational corporations that wish to
presented summarized “ideal-type” models of the create actuaries of the risk of death and illness in
cross-cultural variation in human value systems. order to make decisions about whether to recall
For Shweder, human values can be organized into defi cient car models, or offer healthcare or life
three basic types—values relating to autonomy, insurance plans to people. Though these business
community and divinity. Roughly, these three decisions may appear cold and calculated, they
“ethics” represent the universal cultural are, for Fiske, merely more rationalized, abstract,
tendencies of individuals to fi nd value in the and fi nancialized moral values compared to those
integrity of the individual, the importance of the values underlying other relational models. Other,
family and collective, and the purity/sacredness of more altruistic examples of the market pricing set
the soul/ heart/mind/god. What is interesting of values might be given—consider the values of

94
E lsewhere, Haidt has fl irted with adding additional
moral foundations to his list. Here I discuss only his
original “foundations”.
K. McCaffree

entrepreneurialism, thrift, effi ciency, managerial particular and humans especially. Mammals,
compassion, and attention to fi nancial detail that primates and people care for their young, hunt
would be required to make a non-profi t cooperatively, maintain fairly strict status
philanthropic organization thrive. hierarchies, and try to avoid biological pathogens
B ellah and colleagues ([ 1985 ] 2008), (i.e., viruses and bacteria) and social threats
Inglehart (1977 , 1997) , and Hunter ( 1992) , (ostracization, gossip). The result of long-term
moreso than Shweder and Fiske, focus on the adaptations to these common social problems, is
recent trends of the last 50 or so years of cultural that human beings, the world over, supposedly
change. Bellah and colleagues rely largely on emphasize (more or less, depending on the person
analyses of qualitative interviews and ideal- and social context): care, fairness, loyalty, respect
typical social generalizations in order to conclude for authority, and purity/sanctity (of the body or
that American values are shifting slowly away of ideology).
from biblical and nationalist concerns and H aidt has argued that social science has
increasingly more toward individual achievement historically used too narrow a defi nition of
and individual expression. This trend is analogous morality. Though eighteenth and nineteenth
to Inglehart’s contention that, as societies increase century liberal enlightenment philosophers may
their wealth through market capitalism, people have emphasized care and fairness in their
will increasingly assert the value of human rights, critiques of monarchy and religion, according to
equality and self-expression primarily because Haidt, they failed to pay equally good attention to
they have the material resources to access the the moral values of loyalty, respect and purity. As
educational and political avenues necessary to do a result, according to Haidt, the largely liberal
so. Where poverty is extreme and political academic social science tradition over-
instability or corruption is very high, individuals emphasizes the largely liberal moral values of
tend to endorse values that emphasize order, harm and care. This bias in academia has not only
safety and stability. This is because individuals in produced inadequate research into the group-
this deprived context lack the avenues for political binding values of loyalty, respect for authority
visibility and support, and so they cling—orderly and purity/sanctity, it has also discriminated
and dogmatically—to the modicum of living and against conservative students and scholars (Haidt
self- actualization that is available. 2012 ).
Thus, it is not that citizens of Western H aidt’s theory has widely been used to
democracies are somehow more innately explain differences between political liberals
individualistic or self-expressive—rather, it is (who value care and fairness especially) and
that market systems, in concert with technological political conservatives (who tend to value loyalty,
sophistication and dissemination, have provided respect and purity moreso). Statistical models that
political, occupational and educational outlets for control for all fi ve of Haidt’s moral
self- expression and self-improvement. In further foundations—not just harm and care—are good
consonance, James Hunter suggests that peoples’ predictors of political affi liations, as well as
value structures in the US (and in the West) are voting behavior and attitudes toward contentious
becoming more progressive (relativistic, local, social issues like gun control, stem cell research,
skeptical, individually tailored, non-traditional) immigration, or same-sex marriage (Graham et al.
and less orthodox (universal, transcendental, 2009 ; Koleva et al. 2012; Johnson et al. 2014)
pious, communally embedded, traditional). . It appears descriptively true that political liberals
Amidst all of this interesting work into the and conservatives emphasize different value
shifting nature of moral values, Jonathan Haidt’s systems or “moral foundations”, and that these
“Moral Foundation Theory” stands as the most different foundations further predict peoples’
currently infl uential. Haidt ( 2012) and Haidt and individual social attitudes.
Kesebir ( 2010 ) argues that all humans I n a piece of theory that unifi es the work
experience intuitive emotional states that result of Haidt with the cultural predictions of Bellah et
from adaptations to social situations that are al. ([1985] 2008 ), Eriksson and Strimling ( 2015
common to mammals in general, primates in ) suggest that liberals will canalize the political
gy as the Study of Morality 447

nature of future cultural trends because they in a population when perceptions of threat rise is
emphasize fewer moral foundations. Since both because in-groups can protect people from the
conservatives and liberals emphasize values fatal consequences of disease and social
related to care and fairness, but only persecution. Perceptually, people assume that
conservatives tend to also emphasize respect, pathogen and parasite transmission can be
loyalty and purity/sanctity, liberal arguments will reduced to the degree that they become
seem more persuasive to conservatives, over discriminatory about who they interact with, and
time, than the alternative. Put differently, it is to the degree that they follow old, familiar rituals
easier to win over a conservative, than it is a and behaviors, as opposed to new, less understood
liberal, because conservatives have a broader base ones. The same is true for individuals who desire
of moral values or foundations. The implication is to reduce the perception of social threats
that, since 1950, conservatives have been emanating from rapid technological, cultural, or
changing their minds to embrace liberal positions political changes. Sticking with the old ways of
at a faster rate than liberals have been changing behaving, and the old hierarchies of leadership,
their mind to embrace conservative positions. appear safer than adopting new behaviors and
There is more to the story of Haidt’s moral new hierarchies that are both less understood and,
foundations than this, however. The by defi nition, less experienced. This is why
values/foundations of loyalty, respect for individual and group differences in the perception
authority and sanctity/purity may be a result of of stress and threat appear related to the
motivated cognition . Cultural liberals and endorsement of more conservative, collectivist
conservatives may only appear different because value-orientations.
those who are emphasizing loyalty, respect and 21.5 Contemporary Debates in
purity are actively recruiting psychological and the Field
emotional resources in order to do so. At least one
study has shown that when conservatives are tired A lmost no general theory exists in the modern
from engaging in self-regulation, or fatigued from sociology of morality (with some exceptions, e.g.,
using their working memory, they begin to self- Black ( 2011 ). I contend that this is because of
report moral values similarly to liberals (Wright the persistence of several unresolved theoretical
and Baril issues. These issues are various, but they conspire
2011 ). to make the sociology of morality a very
R ecent research by Florian van Leeuwen and treacherous and exciting fi eld to navigate. These
Park ( 2009 , 2012) and van Leeuwen et al. ( 2014 issues are: disagreements about the primacy of
) establishes a robust empirical and theoretical structure over culture, dual-process models of
relationship between historical and cross- culture-in-action, and whether moral realism or
sectional perceptions of biological and social moral relativism is the proper meta-theoretical
threats and endorsement of collectivist moral position for sociologists of morality to take. Let
values in general, including Haidt’s binding me say just a bit about each.
values. In an analysis of over 100,000 respondents
from over 65 countries, historical and
contemporary levels of global pathogen and 21.5.1 Structure Versus Culture
parasite stress levels positively predicted Haidt’s
binding values of loyalty, authority and purity. T here are countless thorny debates in sociology
Further research has confi rmed this relationship and anthropology about the relationship between
between perceptions of social or biological threat social structure and culture that I will not have
and moral values emphasizing tradition, respect time to address here (e.g., Durkheim and Mauss
for authority, and purity/sanctity (e.g., Oxley et al. [1903 ] 1963; Levi-Strauss 1966; Giddens 1984
2008 ; Dodd et al. 2012 ; Hibbing et al. 2014 , ; Harris 1989 ). More recently, sociologists of
2015 ). morality have insisted theoretically and
The reason, of course, why values that demonstrated empirically that moral values and
underlie group-bonding become more prevalent
K. McCaffree

beliefs are better predictors of behavior than 21.5.2 Cognition and Culture as Dual
network structure, previous behavior or Processes
demographic category membership alone (Vaisey
2007 ; Vaisey and Lizardo 2010 ; Miles and The second issue facing the sociology of morality
Vaisey 2015 ). Location in social structure—as, is the need to integrate dual-process models of
say, a woman, Muslim, student or homosexual— culture into current theory and research. In an infl
actually tells researchers less about who people uential article, Vaisey ( 2009) integrates recent
will interact with or about how they will behave research from cognitive neuroscience and
than does an examination of who shares and does suggests that people enact culture in two ways—
not share moral identities, values and attitudes. as subliminally habituated behavior (one’s day-
Individuals who share their moralities in to- day routines—see Bourdieu 1990; Ignatow
common, according to this view, are more likely 2009 ) or by employing various, highly cognitive,
to interact with one another and to share ideological “tools” or strategies (when
behaviors. confronting especially complex or novel
The sociology of morality has recently tended problems). He calls these the “practice” and
to emphasize the importance of this shared moral “culture-as-toolkit” models of culture.
culture in rates of interaction and subsequent T he advantage of Vaisey’s approach is that it
behavioral outcomes. Researchers might, just as updates sociological theory to be current and
easily, however, study how the structure of consistent with neuroscientifi c data showing the
interactions infl uence the formation of shared brain to be, at times, a rapid, habituated,
moral identities, values and attitudes. Ed Lawler subliminal processor of information and, at other
and colleagues ( 2009 ), for example, show that times, a deliberative, refl ective, effortful
cooperative exchange contexts, and other forms processor. Oftentimes, according to Haidt’s (
of exchange with a high rate and duration of 2001 ) “social intuitionism,” people cannot be
interaction and mutuality of attentional focus, expected to articulate or understand the
produce, over time, shared goals, identities and subliminal emotional motivations underlying
values. Moral identities and attitudes are their moral beliefs and behaviors. Consistent with
produced by structures of interaction and this view, Vaisey ( 2009 ) fi nds that individuals’
exchange, while simultaneously serving as the moral worldviews (part of their “cultural
basis for the formation of shared beliefs and the toolkit”), regardless of their ability to articulate
adoption of shared behaviors. Once these shared them, later predict behavior.
moral beliefs and behaviors emerge, they now A n important emerging area of research for the
serve as their own, higher-order, dynamic infl sociology of morality involves specifying what
uencing individual selection of future network ties practical, daily aspects of morality occur
and future exchange relationships. The generation relatively effortlessly, ritualistically and
of culture may have its origins in networks and subconsciously and what practical, daily, aspects
exchange structures, but culture becomes causally of morality require more directed attention and
autonomous once it emerges. Structure produces focus. Preliminary research suggests that people
culture and this emergent culture subsequently will be more likely to effortfully/consciously/ refl
canalizes future structures. ectively use their cultural ideologies when
A ll of this is to say that there is no inherent addressing moral issues where (a) self-
confl ict between the structure and culture of presentational concerns are not especially salient
morality. Cross-sectionally and longitudinally, in the situation, (b) the self is not very emotionally
researchers are free to either study (a) how shared invested, (c) the self perceives the moral identity,
conceptions of moral values, attitudes and attitude or value at issue to be commonplace,
identities lead to new network ties and the typical or banal (Hitlin and Pinkston 2013 ).
adoption of new behaviors or (b) how extant T hat is, when situational concerns with self-
network ties and shared behaviors enable and presentation are greater, emotional arousal is
constrain the development of new moral values, higher, or the context is
attitudes or identities. uncomfortable/unfamiliar, people may respond
gy as the Study of Morality 449

more habitually/subliminally. When the brain is 2008 ; Abend 2008 , 2010 ; Goode and Ben-
taxed with higher processing burdens (i.e., greater Yehuda
situational attentional allocation), fewer cognitive [1994 ] 2009; Black 2013 ; Smith 2013 ).
resources (i.e., circulating blood glucose levels in Tavory’s ( 2011 ) effort to theorize moral
the brain) remain to suppress habitual responding action is a representative example of such meta-
(see Baumeister et al. 2007 ). Individuals, thus, theoretical moral agnosticism. He claims that
are most capable of responding carefully, refl moral realism is false because it supposes, a
ectively and abstractly when they are in situations priori, that morality is a universal human
that require lower levels of situational attentional phenomenon and not a culturally-relative one, and
allocation. As situations become more self- that, in essence, this presumptuous claim is
relevant, more emotional, or more atypical, the presumptuous. Moral relativist arguments, he
neural resources recruited to increase attentional adds, are equally problematic because they
allocation prevents the suppression of habituated preclude comparisons of moral dynamics between
responses. Conversely, when situations are less societies and between historical epochs. His
self-relevant, less emotional or more typical, solution is to suggest that the moral relevancy of
situational attentional allocation is lower, and a subject matter should be determined by whether
available cognitive resources can be recruited for or not individual and collective self - conceptions
more refl ective/abstract thought and behavior. are emotionally impacted by the behavior of
T hese remain, largely, theoretical speculations others , trans - situationally and over - time. This
in need of further research. That the brain is a dual is an incredibly broad, albeit ingenious, attempt to
processor, responding in both habitual and refl characterize what should count as “moral” to
ective ways, is beyond dispute. However, the scholars in this area. Still, it teeters on being too
situational dynamics driving more habitual versus broad to satisfyingly be called morality. And, as I
more refl ective responses remain empirically want to suggest, sociologists of morality would be
under-explored. far more substantively satisfi ed with an
interdisciplinary, moral realist defi nition of
morality.
21.5.3 The Ontology of Morality I f sociologists will generally admit that facts
are value-laden, why won’t they admit that values
A fi nal disciplinary debate within the sociology are also fact-laden (Gorski 2013 )? Moral
of morality that I wish to highlight involves a relativism is a fl awed metatheoretical position
metatheoretical debate. The debate over moral because certain objective states of consciousness
realism and moral relativism is a debate over what are universally better than/preferable to others
morality, itself, is . Is morality an objective (Harris 2010 ). Consequently, some social
phenomenon, something that individuals and policies and aspects of traditions will be—
cultures can have more or less of? Or, is morality empirically—more or less conducive to the
entirely a social construction—just the arbitrary moment to moment well- being of individuals. 95
cultural expression of status hierarchies, religions, For example, high rates of poverty and chronic
legal systems and traditions? stress are objectively harmful to health and
I n principle, this is a very important issue for psychological effi cacy. Social policies that
sociologists of morality to resolve. In practice, produce lower rates of poverty and chronic stress
however, sociologists of morality have mostly (invariably concentrated among women and
ignored it. Most sociologists are minorities) are universally, cross- culturally,
methodologically relativist and philosophically objectively, better than policies that contribute to
and ontologically agnostic about morality (Lukes higher rates. Social structures and contexts of
interaction can be substantively critiqued with

95
I am defi ning wellbeing in a psychological and social networks, opportunities and resources (power, respect,
sense—wellbeing involves cognition that is not overly infl uence, capital) people need to pursue valued cultural
taxed with stress and fear, and it also involves the goals.
K. McCaffree

regard to their capacity to contribute to the to large bodies of work in psychology, zoology
resources and opportunities that individuals need and biology (e.g., Epley and Gilovich 2006 ;
to build communities and express themselves. Panksepp and Panksepp 2013 ; Decety 2011 ;
Moral relativism is mistaken because it makes Decety and Svetlova 2012 ; Decety 2014 ). By
the old Weberian assumption that people differ way of concluding, I will briefl y show how this
irrationally and endlessly in their moral needs and synthetic theory of morality (McCaffree 2015 )
expectations for treatment. On the contrary, may be helpful to integrating the diverse and
humans are united by phylogenetically divergent issues discussed throughout this
mammalian concerns for group belonging, care chapter.
for infants, fairness in the distribution of resources M oral beliefs and behaviors, in this scheme,
and loyalty in exchange for protection (Turner are conceived of as resulting from perceptual
2014; McCaffree 2015) . Peoples’ behaviors and overlap , or the degree to which two animals or
attitudes are structured by their preferences and groups of animals view themselves as physically
their preferences share an ancient, mammalian set similar, familiar or competent. The physiological
of expectations for fairly re-distributive, caring mechanisms of perceptual overlap include mirror
treatment. The sociology of morality is therefore neurons and executive cognitive functioning at
intrinsically evaluative. Though descriptive the neural level and oxytocin, dopamine and
accounts of the societal distribution of moral serotonin at the hormonal level. From an
identities, attitudes and values are critically evolutionary standpoint, these physiological
important, so too are empirically supported, mechanisms evolved alongside mammalian
clinical, evaluations of how formal policy and reproductive strategies emphasizing mother-
informal tradition impact the wellbeing of offspring social bonds (Churchland 2011) . The
individuals. cognitive and hormonal hardware that enables
Andrew Sayer ( 2011 ) argues, mammalian mothers to extensively care for their
[There is] the common idea that social scientifi c infants, also underlies the pro-social motivations
discourses regarding what is are simply unrelated, but familiar or similar conspecifi cs
incommensurable with normative discourse have for each other.
regarding what ought to be…However, this is an Perceptual overlap—that is, perceptions of
unhelpful polarization…Critique is…implicit in
our descriptions of social life, rather than a separate
familiarity, physical similarity and competence—
activity involving stepping into a separate realm of is created through long and frequent bouts of co-
‘values’….If one doesn’t know that suffering or presence. During such bouts of co-presence,
racism are bad, then one doesn’t understand what individuals will spontaneously begin mimicking
they are …a description of an abused child which (i.e., matching) the posture and emotional
did not acknowledge that it was suffering would
expressions of others, in addition to
fail not merely as an evaluation but as an adequate
description of its state of being, (Sayer 2011 , pp synchronizing (i.e., coordinating) vocalizations,
8–9, italics in original). heart rates, breathing rates, gestures and other
behaviors. When this physiological and emotional
entrainment occurs between human beings, as
opposed to non-human animals, peoples’
21.6 A Proposed Theoretical Unifi identities bubble up to the surface via symbolic
cation language. Once people have an understanding of
one another’s identities, they can begin searching
I have recently advanced a synthetic theory of for symbolic (in addition to purely physical)
morality that integrates the work of Emile similarities to self.
Durkheim ([ 1912] 1976, [ 1893] 1997), C o-presence does not necessarily lead to
Jonathan perceptual overlap, of course. Theoretically, there
Turner ( 2010b ), Turner and Maryanski ( 2008 ), are three mediating variables that threaten to
Turner ( 2014 ), Jan Stets and Peter Burke (Stets reduce the fl ow of perceptual overlap between
and Carter 2012 ; Stets and McCaffree 2014 ), individuals: (1) exchange contexts, (2) proximity
and Randall Collins ( 1981 , 2004 ), in addition
gy as the Study of Morality 451

contexts, and (3) status contexts. These three Status contexts , lastly, infl uence perceptual
contexts harbor the causes of immorality. overlap between individuals and groups by
Exchange contexts infl uence the absolute rate casting some parties as more competent than
and duration of co-presence, in addition to the others. Research from both zoology and
distribution of resources. Within sociological psychology indicates that mammals, including
exchange theory (e.g., Molm 2003; Lawler et al. human children and adults, preferentially mimic
2009 ) , four ideal-typical forms of exchange and synchronize body language, emotion and
relationships are outlined: cooperative exchange, vocalizations with higher-status others (Over and
negotiated exchange, reciprocal exchange and Carpenter 2012; see also McCaffree 2015 ).
generalized exchange. Each of these exchange Status considerations canalize entrainment
relationships differ by their characteristic rate and because perceived competence is a general source
duration of interaction, along with their degree of of prestige in mammalian hierarchies. Even when
shared intentionality. perceived status is illegitimately rooted in
Cooperative exchanges, for example, are historical discrimination—as when men are, on
characterized by a high rate and duration of average, assumed to be more competent as task
interaction oriented toward the accomplishment leaders than women (see Ridgeway 2011 )—this
of a shared goal. Negotiated exchanges, on the status may still serve to direct the situational
other hand, are not necessarily oriented toward a mimicry and synchrony of behaviors and
shared goal, though each party is obligated to emotion.
provide some form of service or resource to other This theory of perceptual overlap—that
parties in the exchange. Each form of exchange is physiological entrainment and perceptions of
important for determining the rate, duration, and symbolic (i.e., identity) similarity drive empathy
degree of shared intentionality among interacting and that this entrainment and perceived symbolic
parties. When the rate and duration of interaction, similarity is mediated by exchange, proximity and
along with shared intentionality, are low among status contexts—is suffi ciently robust to explain
interacting parties, perceptual overlap between many of the above-mentioned empirical
interacting parties will lessen and displays of observations within the sociology of morality.
empathy will be less common. Consider, as an example, how the forces of
Proximity contexts include where people are perceptual overlap might be used to theoretically
arranged in geographic and cultural space. When interpret some of the empirical fi ndings on the
individuals or groups are separated by geographic moral signifi cance of reputations.
distance, the expected rate and duration of
interaction will obviously be lower than in
contexts where people live close in proximity. 21.6.1 Applying the Principles of
However, cultural distance also critically infl Perceptual Overlap:
uences the likelihood of interaction. People with
The Example of Reputational
shared cultural characteristics are more likely to
interact regardless of geographic distance, a Maintenance
phenomenon known as the “homophily bias,”
T o demonstrate the usefulness of this theory of
(McPherson and Ranger-Moore 1991;
morality, allow me to discuss the forces of
McPherson et al. 2001 ). Someone living next
perceptual overlap in the context of the research
door to a person of a different religion or ethnicity
on reputation discussed above. Reputational
might, despite being in close geographic
concerns might be theoretically understood as
proximity, avoid interaction due to lower
attempts to mitigate the perceptual partitioning
perceived physical or symbolic similarity. Thus,
that accrues from constant evaluations of greater
geographic proximity is important for predicting
competence associated with social status. That is,
co-presence and perceptual overlap, but so too is
when a person or group is presumed to be more
cultural proximity or “social distance,” (Park
competent by virtue of their (potentially arbitrary)
1924 ).
higher status in a given institutional domain, the
K. McCaffree

potential of that person or group to be unfair or (Eds.), Handbook of the sociology of morality (pp.
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Forgetting to Remember: 22 The Present
Neglect and Future Prospects of Collective
Memory
in Sociological Theory
Christina Simko
C. Simko ()
Department of Anthropology and Sociology ,
Williams College , Williamstown , MA , USA e-
mail: Christina.Simko@williams.edu
Durkheim’s student, Maurice Halbwachs,
22.1 The Classical Roots of elaborated the concept of collective memory . 96
Collective Memory Halbwachs veered somewhat from an orthodox
Durkheimian view, emphasizing collective
M emory is rarely considered one of the core consciences in the plural—“the multiplicity,” as
subjects of sociological theory. Yet a concern he put it, “of collective memor ies ” (Halbwachs
with memory—and indeed an understanding of [1950 ] 2011:146, emphasis added) developed
memory as integral to the heart and soul of within group contexts, including families,
collective life—has been inscribed in the religions, and social classes rather than in
sociological tradition from the beginning. In The ‘Society’ writ large. Nevertheless, Halbwachs
Elementary Forms of Religious Life , Émile argued forcefully that memory is a fundamentally
Durkheim captured the social power of social phenomenon: in order to understand
commemorative rites. These rituals, he argued, memory, we should not search for where
“serve only to sustain the vitality” of the beliefs memories are stored in the brain, but instead look
that comprise a group’s mythology, “to keep to the social contexts within which people
them from being effaced from memory and, in “acquire their memories” as well as “recall,
sum, to revivify the most essential elements of the recognize, and localize their memories”
collective consciousness” (Durkheim [ 1912 ] (Halbwachs [ 1925 ] 1992:38). Social groups give
1915:375). In reminding group members of shape and form to our past, and our parents,
cherished mythology, commemoration “renews siblings, and friends, among others, spur us on as
the sentiment which [a group] has of itself and of we remember, providing social cues that guide
its unity,” and links “the present to the past or the what we remember as well as how and when .
individual to the group” (ibid.:375, 378). Indeed, understanding memory requires attention
Commemoration is thus a crucial wellspring for to group dynamics in and of themselves: “It is not
social solidarity, common identity, and collective suffi cient,” Halbwachs (ibid.:40) argued, “to
effervescence. show that individuals always use social
C arrying forward this line of thinking—and frameworks when they remember. It is necessary
expanding it from a few powerfully suggestive to place oneself in the perspective of the group or
lines to a more fully developed theory— groups” within which the individual’s memories
take on shape and meaning.

96
H albwachs was not the fi rst to use the term “collective continue to be remarkably
memory,” but he imbued it with “a theoretical weight generative (Olick et al. 2011 :16).
previously unknown” and outlined a set of ideas that
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 457
S. Abrutyn (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary Sociological Theory,
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32250-6_22
C. Simko

In a similar vein, Halbwachs argued that the on memory can move forward two major projects
act of remembering is not fundamentally ‘about’ in contemporary theory: fi rst, the project of
recalling the past as it happened or somehow theorizing the nature of the epoch in which we
recovering history ‘intact.’ Instead, it is oriented live—making sense of the moment that theorists
toward the needs of the present, the demands of have termed “late,” “high,” “refl exive,” “liquid,”
our immediate social milieu: “collective or “post” modernity (e.g., Giddens 1990; Beck
memory,” he argued, “adapts the image of 1992; Bauman 2000 )—and second, the project
ancient facts to the beliefs and spiritual needs of of theorizing the meaning of “culture,” a term that
the present” (quoted in Schwartz 1982: 376). has simultaneously captivated and perplexed
Writing in a different context, George Herbert recent generations of sociologists.
Mead advanced a remarkably similar argument. Today, as I alluded above, the study of
Much like Halbwachs, he understood the past as collective memory is a vibrant interdisciplinary
a tool for addressing present dilemmas: “reality,” enterprise. 97 Especially for scholars well versed
Mead wrote, “is always that of a present,” and in this enterprise, it is worth clarifying my
“the past…is as hypothetical as the future” ( 1932 purposes here. There are now numerous review
:235, 12). Again, memory is a social essays (e.g., Olick and Robbins 1998 ; Conway
phenomenon, amenable to continuous 2010b ), survey texts (e.g., Misztal 2003; Erll
reconstruction, and must therefore be understood 2011 ), handbooks (e.g., Erll and Nünning 2008
using distinctively sociological tools. ), and readers (e.g., Olick et al. 2011) that
Over the past few decades, the insights these synthesize the fi eld, often taking into account—
fi gures have bequeathed to us have been brought and even thematizing—the conversations and
to bear in reviving a vibrant discourse on tensions that exist between and across disciplines.
collective memory, within sociology and beyond. Here, my focus is more delimited: to provide a
In sociology, however, this revival has had a broad sense for the relationship between
relatively delimited impact. At present, the sociological work on memory in particular and
sociology of memory is largely understood not as some of the overriding concerns in contemporary
a broad concern for sociological theory, but as a theory. My aim, then, is not to provide a
special interest—a sub-subfi eld within cultural comprehensive review of the memory literature,
sociology, composed of scholars with particular but to highlight the themes most pertinent to
interests in history or commemoration. Yet this sociological theorizing, and to sensitize a broader
assumption obscures the profound ways in which community of theorists to the (perhaps
the sociology of memory addresses central surprising) relevance that collective memory
questions in contemporary theory. For as might hold in addressing their concerns. First,
Durkheim, Halbwachs, and Mead all recognized however, I set the stage with a brief account of
in their own ways, memory belongs at the core of collective memory’s reemergence as an explicit
our understanding of the social. It is the tissue that analytic framework in sociology during the 1980s
binds collectivities—from families to religions to and 1990s.
nations—together. It is not merely a way of
preserving bygone history, but a source of both
power and meaning in the present. In the pages
that follow, then, I argue for re-centering the
sociology of memory, for moving it from the
periphery to the core of pressing theoretical
debates. Specifi cally, I argue that the scholarship

97
Indeed, the classic sociological texts on memory have life (for recent overviews, see Erll 2011 ; Olick et al. 2011
become core references in the interdisciplinary fi eld of ). The fi eld now has its own journals (e.g., Memory
“memory studies,” which has—over the past few Studies ), book series (e.g., Palgrave Macmillian’s
decades—brought together scholars from across the “Memory Studies” and Stanford’s “Cultural Memory in
humanities and social sciences in a vigorous dialogue the Present”), and conference circuit, among other
about the nature of memory and its place in human social markers of its institutionalization.
tting to Remember: The Present Neglect and Future Prospects of Collective… 459

22.2 Recovering “Collective preeminent architect behind the contemporary


Memory” sociology of memory—pointed to the rise of
multiculturalism, postmodernism, and hegemony
F or several decades following his death, theory as the links between the 1960s and 1970s
Halbwachs had little infl uence in the English- “cultural revolution” and the scholarly interest in
speaking world. The concern with memory did the (re)construction of the past that solidifi ed
not disappear—perhaps most notably, W. Lloyd throughout the 1980s. Specifi cally, all three of
Warner’s ( 1959 :278) The Living and the Dead these perspectives challenged taken-for- granted
turned a Durkheimian lens on the images of, and narratives about, the past,
commemorative rituals of “Yankee City,” underscoring how they excluded women,
highlighting the integrative powers of Memorial minorities, and working classes. They thus
Day rites and arguing that they constituted “a heightened both sensitivity to and interest in the
modern cult of the dead” that conformed “to social construction—and the possibilities for re
Durkheim’s defi nition of sacred collective construction—of the past.
representations.” Yet the specifi c language of The reemergence of “collective memory” as
collective memory remained notably absent from an organizing principle for a fi eld of inquiry thus
Warner’s discussions. By the early 1980s, resonated with wider intellectual currents that
however, sociologists had begun to revive sensitized sociologists to the role of the past in the
Halbwachs’ legacy and renovate his idea of present. On the one hand, scholars highlighted,
collective memory for contemporary sociology, and even celebrated, the continued power of the
creating an organized fi eld of inquiry around the past in providing meaning and orientation in the
concept. 98 late modern world: Edward Shils’ ( 1981 )
The fi rst English translation of selections Tradition argued that the sharp boundaries the
from Halbwachs’ writings on collective classical theorists drew between tradition and
memory—a series of programmatic essays that modernity in fact obscured the enduring
his admirers had published 30 years prior— relevance of the past in providing moral
appeared in 1980 under the title The Collective guidance; in Habits of the Heart , Robert Bellah
Memory , with an introduction by Mary Douglas. and his colleagues ([ 1985 ] 1996:152–155) wrote
Though the book quickly went out of print, Lewis powerfully about “communities of memory,”
Coser’s translation of key selections from bound together by a sense of shared history. On
Halbwachs’ 1925 work The Social Frameworks the other hand, Eric Hobsbawm and Terence
of Memory as well as a brief excerpt from his Ranger ( 1983 ) dismantled and desacralized the
1941 work The Legendary Topography of the “invented traditions” that modern nation-states
Gospels in the Holy Land appeared in 1992, and elaborated in the effort to shore up their
has had much greater staying power. Infl uential legitimacy, uncovering the centrality of the
as it would be, however, Halbwachs’ work “did past—or rather, highly fabricated images of the
not cause the present current of collective past—in securing and maintaining political
memory research” but was “rather swept into it” power. Here, in keeping with the cultural
(Schwartz 1996a :276). Indeed, throughout the transformations mentioned above, memory was
1960s and 1970s, broad intellectual, cultural, and less a source of solidarity and group identity and
political factors created conditions for a renewed more a tool for elites to manipulate the masses.
concern with the past, including such issues as Ultimately, the language of collective memory
memory, tradition, and heritage. Refl ecting on provided a rubric for synthesizing these kinds of
the reemergence of collective memory from the concerns—for systematically examining the
vantage of the mid- 1990s, Barry Schwartz interplay between past and present and for
(ibid.:277–278)—who was perhaps the

98
For a discussion of other relevant scholarship in the of his work in the Anglophone world during the 1980s,
years between Halbwachs’ death in 1945 and the revival see
Olick et al. ( 2011 :25–29).
C. Simko

making this relationship an explicit object of this “presentist” view, Schwartz ( 1982 :395–
concern for social theory. 396) found that the demands of the present bore
A series of works by Schwartz re- powerfully on the commemorative symbolism
appropriating, renovating, and reformulating the displayed in the U.S. Capitol: prior to the Civil
concept of collective memory paved the way for War, Capitol iconography featured “founding
a vibrant sociological discourse on the subject— heroes” whose memory underwrote unity for the
one whose theoretical relevance is still fl edgling nation. Following the Civil War—with
underappreciated today. Schwartz’s early work the federal union secured—the commemorative
situated collective memory squarely within the symbolism in the Capitol expanded signifi cantly.
Durkheimian tradition. In a 1982 article American leaders rediscovered post-
examining the events and persons revolutionary events that once would have
commemorated in the United States Capitol—a provoked confl ict; they established the National
study that can retrospectively be understood as Statuary Hall as a forum for commemorating
the starting point for this new tradition of regional heroes whose inclusion would have been
inquiry—Schwartz too threatening when national unity was still
(1982 :374) pointed out that “[f]ew problematic; and they began to commission busts
contemporary sociologists have systematically and portraits according to incumbency rather than
studied how the past, as a ‘collective perceived achievement—honoring individuals
representation,’ is affected by the organization for their offi ces rather than their personal
and needs of social groups.” Yet this, he pointed qualities. In short, as the nation’s needs
out, was precisely Halbwachs’ concern in his transformed, so, too, did its commemorative
writings on collective memory: Halbwachs, symbolism—just as Halbwachs would have
Schwartz (ibid.:375) explained, concluded “that anticipated.
changes in our knowledge of the past correspond Yet Schwartz qualifi ed Halbwachs’
to changing organization needs and to presentism in important ways, and in doing so
transformations in the structure of society.” established the foundation for the broad debate
Grappling with this conclusion, Schwartz about the malleability of memory. Certainly,
simultaneously introduced Halbwachs to Schwartz acknowledged, recollections are called
American sociologists and laid the groundwork forth and shaped by present circumstances. But
for the theoretical debate that would propel the even as circumstances change, the new
contemporary sociology of memory into being: symbolism that emerges to address them does not
namely, the debate over the malleability of supplant earlier commemorations; it is instead
memory. superimposed upon them ( 1982 :396). 99 Earlier
symbolism thus endures— and presumably
confers its legacy—within the ever-shifting
22.2.1 The Malleability of Memory present, apart from (and perhaps even in spite of)
the exigencies of the moment.
As I noted above, one of the core claims in T he revived tradition of collective memory
Halbwachs’ sociology of memory—a claim that research took up the questions Schwartz opened
also found support in Mead—was that our in this study. To what extent can the past be
understanding of the past is the product of our reimagined and reformulated to suit present
interests and needs in the present. Indeed, interests? Is the past more of a mechanism for
Halbwachs went so far as to claim that “a gaining and sustaining power, or a source of
knowledge of the origin of these facts [about the collective identity, solidarity, and moral
past] must be secondary, if not altogether useless, guidance? When and how does the past constrain
for the reality of the past is no longer in the past” social actors in the present, limiting what they can
(quoted in Schwartz 1982 :376). In keeping with do or say? Presentism, as Jeffrey Olick and Joyce

99
Schwartz ( 1982: 396) argues that this “pattern conforms not negate the mechanical kind but rather presupposes it
to Durkheim’s observations that organic solidarity does and is welded on to it.”
tting to Remember: The Present Neglect and Future Prospects of Collective… 461

Robbins (1998 :128) point out, can “emphasize logic attached to it: mythic or rational . Mythic
either instrumental or meaning dimensions of constraints are “[m]oral, constitutive,
memory.” For instance, while Hobsbawm and endogenous, projective, [and] defi nitional,” and
Ranger’s ( 1983) landmark work stressed the take the form of either taboos (proscriptions) or
instrumental dimensions of tradition, Schwartz duties (prescriptions), while rational constraints
and his colleagues’ study on the recovery of are “[c] alculative, interested, exogenously
Masada among Palestinian Jews—which drew caused, mundane, [and] strategic,” taking the
heavily on Mead’s legacy as well as form of either prohibitions (proscriptions) or
Halbwachs’—stressed the role of the past in fulfi requirements (prescriptions) (ibid.:925). The
lling a subsequent desire for meaning and prevailing logic applied to a particular past,
orientation: Masada’s function, they explained, however, can change over time. For instance,
was “not instrumental…but semiotic,” and it successful appeals to rationality can, at times,
provided “a symbolic structure in which the transform a taboo into a prohibition that can be
reality of the community’s inner life could be dealt with calmly and calculatively, having lost
rendered more explicit and more comprehensible its mythic power (ibid.:931–933).
than it would have been otherwise” (Schwartz et Observing such transformations, Olick and
al. 1986:160) . The past can serve present needs Levy (ibid.:934) go one step further to outline a
not only by feeding the quest for power or processual approach to collective memory that
domination, but also by fi lling an existential overcomes the dichotomy between presentist and
void. objectivist views of the past: collective memory,
B y and large, however, memory sociologists they argue, is itself the “continuous negotiation
worked to forge via media between presentist between past and present…rather than pure
views—whether instrumentalist or cultural—and constraint by, or contemporary strategic
a more objectivist view of the past as durable and manipulation of, the past.” Collective memory, in
unchanging. Arising alongside the “cultural turn” other words, is a dynamic process, not a static
and now integral to cultural sociology, the early thing— “an active process of sense-making
discourse on collective memory was particularly through time” (ibid.:922)—and conceptualizing
concerned with countering strictly it as such captures the constant tension between
instrumentalist views of the past. Building on malleability and constraint. Subsequently, Olick
Schwartz’s argument that fresh reconstructions of ( 1999b , forthcoming ) specifi ed the mechanism
the past are superimposed upon their for this ongoing negotiation: namely, dialogue.
predecessors, other scholars elaborated the Fresh representations of the past, he argues, are
specifi c factors that limit or constrain the not just superimposed upon earlier images—
malleability of the past. Michael Schudson ( 1989 discrete moments in a series of representations—
) identifi ed three such limitations: the structure but instead emerge in conversation with them; the
of pasts available in a given social context, the memory of commemoration thus intervenes in the
structure of individual choice, and the structure of interplay between past and present.
social confl icts over the past. Actors thus cannot Though there of course remain tensions over
simply “invent” pasts out of thin air to serve their the malleability of memory, the prevailing
needs in the present, but instead must work with wisdom is that the relationship between past and
the materials available to them, and within a present is a complex and variable one. Largely
structure imposed by their social and historical embracing these via media , recent scholarship
context. And importantly, these materials and has continued the effort to specify the
structure may or may not serve their present mechanisms of path-dependency (e.g., Saito
desires and aspirations—an insight brought 2006 ; Jansen 2007 ), or to clarify the nexus of
vividly to life in Schudson’s (1992 ) study of cultural and institutional factors that shape
Watergate in American memory. commemorative trajectories (e.g., Vinitzky-
In a similar vein, Olick and Daniel Levy ( Seroussi 2002 ; Simko 2012; Steidl 2013 ), refi
1997 ) argue that the past constrains present ning the conceptual toolkit for grasping
actors in different ways depending on the cultural mnemonic processes.
C. Simko

22.2.2 New Directions in a related strain of research and theorizing,


other scholars have used in-depth interviews and
As a body of research on collective memory has ethnographic observation to examine collective
solidifi ed, of course, new issues have come to the memory from the micro level—asking, for
fore. In the pages that follow, I focus in depth on instance, how individuals deploy collective
two lines of inquiry that speak especially memories to make sense of present problems or
powerfully to broad questions in sociological challenges (e.g., Teeger 2014) , or how people
theory. But it is worth pausing for a moment here draw on collective representations to organize
to highlight salient debates and tensions that their autobiographical narratives, linking past and
space considerations preclude me from fully present in meaningful ways in order to create a
elaborating here. sense of coherence over time (e.g., Vinitzky-
For one, sociologists have debated the relative Seroussi 1998 ; DeGloma 2010 ). 100
primacy of collective representations sui A t the other end of the spectrum, sociologists
generis—monuments, memorials, museums, have criticized the focus on national memories
public addresses, textbooks, and the like—and specifi cally—not because they obscure
aggregated individual memories, accessed individual experience or the multiplicity of
primarily through interviews or survey research. memories but because they fail to recognize that
Olick ( 1999a ) characterizes these two in modern consumer societies “an increasing
competing “cultures” as collective and collected number of people…no longer defi ne themselves
memory, respectively. While early studies (exclusively) through the nation” (Levy and
generally approached collective memories as Sznaider 2006 :2). Increasingly, these scholars
collective representations in the Durkheimian suggest, people understand themselves as part of
sense—and Halbwachs was, after all, inspired wider communities that transcend ethnic and/or
and informed by his mentor’s work—Halbwachs’ territorial boundaries. As such, collective
legacy is indeed multiple, stressing both the memory now takes on transnational or
representations of the past embodied in broadly cosmopolitan forms, cracking the “container of
shared symbolism and the social frameworks the nation state” (ibid.) in ways that call for
that fi lter individual memory. In particular, analytic attention. The Holocaust, for instance,
Howard Schuman, Barry Schwartz, and their has increasingly become a global emblem of evil
collaborators have called for memory scholars to (Alexander 2002) and a catalyst for a
“bring people back in” through surveys that cosmopolitan human rights culture (Levy and
capture how “individuals process historical and Sznaider 2006) . Though I take up this argument
commemorative statements,” arguing that in a different context below, it is worth
“individuals… alone, as creators and recipients, underscoring here the concern with the units of
ascribe meaning to historical and analysis most appropriate for understanding
commemorative objects” (Schwartz and collective memory in the present moment—
Schuman 2005 :183, 186, 198; see also Schuman sociologists call for attention to both the micro
et al. 2005 ; Schuman and Corning 2011 ). Here, (autobiographical memories) and the radically
Schwartz expands upon his earlier Durkheimian macro (global frameworks of memory).
approach by examining the interplay between Indeed, the latter critique is bound up with a
collective representations and individual broader transformation in substantive focus that
interpretations. While Schuman, Schwartz, and has profound—and, I argue, underappreciated—
their colleagues emphasize survey research as a relevance for contemporary social theory: what
complement to the analysis of public symbolism, we might characterize as a “melancholic turn” in
collective memory itself, and a corresponding

100
M icro and macro approaches need not be seen in particularly crucial strategy given the “new ethic of
opposition, of course. For instance, Thomas DeGloma ( autobiographical storytelling” that infl uences public
2015 :158, 161) examines how mnemonic agents deploy debates. “Collected” memories in Olick’s ( 1999a ) sense
autobiographical narratives in their struggles to gain are thus deployed to legitimate particular claims about
“mnemonic authority” within the public sphere—a “collective” memory.
tting to Remember: The Present Neglect and Future Prospects of Collective… 463

shift in the subjects of memory research. The shift are themselves nothing new, but their centrality
identifi ed in the collective memory literature— to the political agenda certainly is. And
from heroism and triumph to victimhood and answering these questions takes us to the very
atrocity—is not merely about the subjects of heart of sociology’s effort to theorize the modern.
commemoration, however. Rather, the subjects
of commemoration embody broad epochal
transformations that we can understand when we 22.3.1 Collective Identity in a
afford memory a more central place in our Melancholic Age
theories of modernity. Here, the sociology of
memory intersects with, and speaks to, much O nce again, the founding questions for this line
more general concerns. of inquiry emerged out of a dialogue with
Durkheim. As Robin Wagner-Pacifi ci and
Schwartz ( 1991 :379) summarize—and as I
22.3 Memory, Melancholy, noted above—for Durkheim, commemorative
and Modernity rituals
“preserve and celebrate traditional beliefs,”
On the face of it, the transformation that now integrating “the glory of a society’s past into its
preoccupies many sociologists of memory is present concerns and aspirations.” Accordingly, a
deceptively simple. Collective memory once strict Durkheimian perspective assumes that “the
centered upon the heroic: national celebrations events or individuals selected for
(e.g., Spillman 1997 ), national idols (e.g., commemoration are necessarily heroic, or at least
Schwartz 1991 b , 1998 , 2000 , 2008 ), and the untainted,” allowing for “a unifi ed, positive
stuff of triumph. Today, commemorative image of the past” (ibid.). Even the piacular rites
symbolism is increasingly preoccupied with that Durkheim ([ 1912 ] 1915:494) described—
much darker subjects, including both suffering “rites which are celebrated by those in a state of
infl icted upon collectivities and the atrocities uneasiness or sadness”—arouse common
perpetrated by them. For one, “victims assume emotions and in doing so reconstitute the social
the position that, before, was the place of heroes” body. Here, too, “collective sentiments are
at the center of collective identities (Giesen 2004 renewed which then lead men to seek one another
:3). For another, political legitimacy increasingly and to assemble together,” and indeed “[s]ince
hinges on acknowledging and atoning for they weep together…the group is not weakened,
misdeeds rather than celebrating past glories and in spite of the blow which has fallen upon it”
present greatness (Olick 2007b :122). Not (ibid.:507, 510). 101
surprisingly, this transformation has shaped the Yet modern commemorations take shape in
core questions of contemporary memory deeply pluralistic contexts, and frequently under
research. How do collectivities come to terms the shadow of divisive debates over the meaning
with “diffi cult pasts” and fi nd languages for of the past. How, then, do collectivities construct
memorializing suffering, misdeeds, and/or representations of episodes that evoke confl ict
dissent, and how do these differ from the and dissensus rather than unity, shame and regret
languages used to memorialize triumph, heroism, rather than pride? Examining the development of
and unity? Perhaps even more profoundly, why the Vietnam Veterans Memorial on the U.S.
have victims supplanted heroes as the linchpin of National Mall in Washington, D.C.,
collective narratives, and why is it now Wagner- Pacifi ci and Schwartz ( 1991 argue
incumbent upon collectivities to grapple that ) Maya Lin’s design addressed this powerful
explicitly and publicly with pasts that are diffi commemorative dilemma through its
cult, ugly, and shameful? Suffering and atrocity multivocality: the black granite walls, inscribed

101
P utting Durkheim in conversation with more indicating “what sort of affect is to be displayed on a given
contemporary treatments of emotion, Schwartz argues that occasion” (Schwartz 1991a :354); common emotion thus
piacular rites impose “feeling rules” (Hochschild 1979 ) regenerates the group’s sense of solidarity.
C. Simko

with the names of over 58,000 dead, allow people commemorations that not only center on painful
to project their own sentiments and episodes, but also grapple overtly with mnemonic
interpretations onto the memorial, providing confl ict and its ramifi cations for collective
contemplative space that visitors can share even identity. With this transformation in the core
in the absence of a common narrative. subjects of collective memory has come a steady
Building on this foundational case study, stream of books and articles addressing how
sociologists have theorized how collectivities “diffi cult pasts” have reverberated among both
commemorate diffi cult pasts under varying “victims” and “perpetrators” (while also
social conditions. Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi ( illuminating the contestation that often emerges
2002) identifi es factors that support multivocal over this very boundary): the Nazi past in postwar
commemorations such as the Vietnam Veterans Germany (Olick 2005 , forthcoming ); the
Memorial: a relatively consensual political atomic bombing of Hiroshima and its legacies in
culture, a past that is not highly relevant to the both the United States (Zolberg 1998) and Japan
contemporary political agenda, and a (Saito 2006 ); apartheid in South Africa (Teeger
circumstance where nonstate agents of memory and Vinitzky- Seroussi 2007 ; Teeger 2014 );
possess relatively little power. The and Bloody Sunday in Northern Ireland (Conway
commemorations of Yitzhak Rabin in Israel, she 2010a ), among many others. More broadly,
argues, took shape under very different others have addressed the array of mnemonic
circumstances: the political culture was deeply practices that have developed to deal with these
confl ictual; the past remained highly relevant; weighty legacies, including political apologies
and nonstate agents of memory possessed signifi (Celermajer 2009 ), reparations politics (Torpey
cant power. Here, commemorations assumed a 2006 ), and truth commissions (Jelin 2003; Posel
fragmented form: they took place across multiple 2008) , as well as the phenomena of silence and
(separate) spaces, each with its own distinct denial (Cohen 2001 ; Zerubavel 2006 ; Vinitzky-
commemorative discourse and audience. And Seroussi and Teeger 2010) that—even in an era
examining the memory of the May 4, 1970, of acknowledgment—are often integral in the
shootings at Kent State University, Christina trajectory of diffi cult pasts. 102 Our age is
Steidl ( 2013 :19) traces how commemorations different from Durkheim’s, and—while there is
can shift dynamically between forms, theorizing still crucial guidance to be found in his treatment
a third, integrated commemorative type that of commemoration—grasping the sources of
“allows for the expression of divergent narratives collective identity and social solidarity in
and the maintenance of separate commemorative contemporary society also requires new
spaces (like a fragmented memorial) and theoretical tools. 103
enhances social solidarity through shared meta-
narratives stressing overarching values” like a
multivocal memorial. 22.3.2 Memory and the Modern
T his strand of research and theorizing has
wide implications, examining the complex Even more, understanding this transformation
symbolism that emerges in commemorative can provide a window onto modernity itself.
rituals Durkheim could not have anticipated—

102
As Vinitzky-Seroussi and Teeger ( 2010) point out, emphasizes—serve to reinforce a society’s moral
however, silence can be a vehicle for memory and boundaries (and thus underwrite consensus), memories of
commemoration, not only for forgetting: for instance, the failure and incompetence are generated through
“moments of silence” that are now a ubiquitous part of “discursive rivalry,” tension and debate among competing
commemorative rituals interrupt the ordinary fl ow of time “reputational entrepreneur[s]” (Fine 1996 :1160, 1162).
to provide space for contemplating the past, facilitating Fine’s approach thus expands upon the Durkheimian view
memory rather than undermining it. of memory, emphasizing the “intense battle for control”
103
I n a related line of theorizing, Gary Alan Fine has that often takes place before a symbol comes to represent
examined “diffi cult” or “negative” reputations. While society for its members (ibid.:1160).
memories of evil and villainy (e.g., Ducharme and Fine
1995 )—like the memories of greatness that Schwartz
tting to Remember: The Present Neglect and Future Prospects of Collective… 465

What does the preoccupation with these darker present”—are in his view “benign conditions to
narratives say about the epoch in which we live? be maintained, not pathologies to be deplored and
Can a focus on memory illuminate modernity in abolished” (Schwartz 2008: 218), he also argues
new ways? For a number of sociologists, the that something has been lost in the process.
answer is yes, and sites of memory become Equality and inclusivity are bound up with “the
windows onto the conditions of late modern fraying fabric of American nationhood and self-
life broadly conceived. Here, I consider four esteem”
perspectives arising out of or in dialogue with the (ibid.:267), leaving citizens without the sources
sociology of memory that offer particularly rich of inspiration and orientation that once sustained
insights for this line of inquiry. their predecessors. Whatever one thinks of
Schwartz’s normative take on these
22.3.2.1 The Post-Heroic Era developments—and many contemporary
Schwartz ( 2008) , for one, theorizes an inverse sociologists no doubt view them through a
relationship between a society’s investment in different ideological lens—Schwartz maps a
equality and its reverence for heroes. The very profound transformation in the relationship
developments that fueled renewed intellectual between past and present, with signifi cant
interest in collective memory—multiculturalism, implications for collective life: certainly, the
postmodernism, hegemony theory, and the like— declining power of heroes contributes to the sense
have also given rise to a cultural moment in of unmooring captured in the discourse on
which the power of the past to orient and inspire “liquid” (Bauman 2000 ) or “refl exive” (Beck
has severely diminished. Focusing particularly on 1992 ) modernity.
the U.S. case, but also drawing comparisons (e.g.,
Schwartz and Heinrich 2004 ), Schwartz ( 2008: 22.3.2.2 The Politics of Regret
187) argues that ours is “a post-heroic” era, in Even more explicit in its contribution to epochal
which “the very notion of greatness has eroded.” theories is Olick’s account of the contemporary
Figures such as Abraham Lincoln and George “politics of regret.” Though they have long been
Washington, once perceived as godlike, are now omitted from this tradition of theorizing, Olick
understood in more complicated terms, as a (2007 b :130) argues that “memory and regret” in
mélange of good and evil, strength and weakness. fact belong “at the center” of our “sociological
As the boundary between ordinary people and account of modernity.” Observing that political
their heroes has eroded, the qualities associated legitimation increasingly relies on “‘learning the
with each are visible in the other. lessons’ of history more than…fulfi lling its
F or Schwartz, this is part of the promises or remaining faithful to its legacy”
disenchantment process outlined by Max (ibid.:122), he shows that attention to
Weber—though he is careful to note that the temporality can illuminate the contemporary
transformation is not total; reverence for heroes preoccupation with regret and indeed the very
diminishes rather than disappearing altogether. In emergence and development of the modern.
this way, Schwartz challenges postmodernist Familiar theories of modernity capture crucial
theories that posit a more radical disintegration of background factors that help explain the
the national memories that once provided a sense contemporary preoccupation with regret.
of collective identity (e.g., Nora 1989) : the post- Durkheim ([1893 ] 1984) and, subsequently,
heroic age is not a fundamentally new epoch, but Elias ([ 1939 ] 2000) captured the process of
a shift that— in keeping with his earlier accounts differentiation that creates conditions for regret:
of commemoration—is superimposed upon what collective memory itself arises to fi ll the gap that
came before. With this assessment, Schwartz opens between individual and collective
seeks to draw attention to what he perceives as experience in increasingly complex urban
the tradeoffs that come with equality and environments, while “the dense networks of
inclusivity. While he makes clear that “[e]quality relations” that emerge “give any single action a
and distrust of authority”—which “[lead] to the wide and unforeseeable circle of implication”
rupturing of the tissue connecting past and (Olick 2007b: 131), generating an intensifi ed
C. Simko

sense of both personal and collective that in some sense demand to be reckoned with,
responsibility. Rationalization, as Weber interpreted, and understood, even as they resist
described it, produces the conditions of narrativization.
possibility for an ethic of responsibility (Weber
[1919] 1946 ), which presumes both a sense that 22.3.2.3 Cultural Trauma
values are relative—and thus that value confl icts W ithin this context has also arisen an infl uential
are ultimately inescapable—and an ability to sociological discourse on “cultural trauma.”
distinguish means from ends. 104 And the Bringing it into conversation with refl ections on
emergence of universalistic principles of justice regret and temporality can enhance our
that Jürgen Habermas ( 1996 ) traces also paves understanding of the present epoch in productive
the way for the contemporary politics of regret. ways. A trauma is precisely an interruption to
According to Olick ( 2007b :136), however, these progressive temporality (Olick 2007b: 164): an
standard accounts miss “the most event is so painful that it cannot be absorbed into
important…feature of modernity’s trajectory”— existing narratives—and so it does not pass away,
namely, temporality . but instead returns, as if of its own accord, against
In this view, the transformation in our the sufferer’s will (Caruth 1995: 4–5). While the
experience of time is the hallmark of modernity: psychological discourse on trauma refers to pasts
as Reinhardt Koselleck ( 1985 ), Lutz that cannot be assimilated at the individual
Niethammer (1992 ) , and Benedict Anderson ( level—ultimately codifi ed in the diagnosis of
1991 ) have argued, cyclical temporality— “post-traumatic stress disorder” (Hacking 1995 ;
supported by both the rhythms of rural life and Young 1995) —the more recent sociological
church eschatology—gave way to progressive theorizing on cultural trauma refers to a breach in
linear temporality. And the “historical a collective narrative. 105 Cultural traumas—
consciousness” that arose as a result is the Jeffrey Alexander, Ron Eyerman, and their
primary force behind modern regret (Olick colleagues argue—are events that create “wounds
2007b: 136). With the rise of linear temporality to social identity” (Alexander 2012 :2), setting
came the grand narratives of modernity— off “a deep- going public discourse” that
narratives of ascent and progress, with the nation- questions and interrogates the very foundations
state as their “dominant purveyor” (ibid.:188). of that identity (Eyerman 2011 :xv). Ultimately,
Uninterrupted progress, however, never cultural traumas—like psychological traumas—
materialized in the way these narratives are understood as leaving indelible wounds,
anticipated: instead, the triumphant march “marking [a collectivity’s] memories forever and
forward was interrupted by a series of atrocities, changing [its] future identity in fundamental and
culminating in a century that some observers irrevocable ways” (Alexander 2004 :1).
(e.g., Hobsbawm 1994 ) have characterized as Countering “naturalistic” perspectives,
unprecedented in its brutality. And because these Alexander and his colleagues emphasize that
violent interruptions cannot be assimilated into a cultural trauma inheres not in an event itself, but
narrative that moves inexorably forward, they in its interpretation: “cultural traumas are for the
undermine linear temporality. In doing so, they most part historically made, not born” (Smelser
alter our relationship to the past, to history. No 2004 :37), and they come into being when
longer is the past strictly a source of glorious “[c]ollective actors ‘decide’ to represent social
triumphs that foreshadow an even more pain as a fundamental threat to their sense of who
promising future. It is also a source of painful they are, where they came from, and where they
episodes that haunt us in the present—episodes want to go” (Alexander 2004 :10). It is carrier

104 105
Weber ( [1919] 1946 ), of course, contrasted this ethic T he psychological understanding of trauma is itself a
of responsibility with an e thic of conviction , which metaphor. Originally, trauma referred to a physical
pursues “ultimate ends”—general ethical principles— wound, and indeed the term still carries that meaning—as
without regard for their consequences. in the “trauma center” of a hospital. The concept of
cultural trauma, then, takes the metaphor one step further.
tting to Remember: The Present Neglect and Future Prospects of Collective… 467

groups —in Weber’s sense of the term—who strongly solidarious community, anchored
construct events as traumatic, as indelible socioemotionally and morally to a multilayered
wounds to a social group or body politic. Indeed, center that had to be protected” (Abrutyn 2015
this constructivist approach to cultural trauma has :125). Collective suffering thus generated rituals
been applied across a vast—and ever-growing— that sustained— and in some cases continue to
array of cases, from slavery in the United States sustain—memory and community. 106
(Eyerman 2001 ), to World War II in Germany Though the trauma metaphor has been
(Giesen 2004 ) and Japan (Hashimoto 2015 ), to fruitfully extended beyond the modern epoch as
political assassinations in the United States, an analytic tool, it is also worth noting that the
Sweden, and the Netherlands (Eyerman 2011 ). language of trauma itself emerged and gained
C ontemporary approaches to cultural trauma traction under the peculiar set of social and
explicitly revive the link between emotions and cultural conditions outlined above. And trauma’s
memory evident in Durkheim’s foundational emergence as a rubric for coming to terms with
treatments of commemoration and piacular rites. modern suffering, whether individual or
As Hiro Saito ( 2006: 358) points out, cultural collective, is no accident. To be traumatized,
trauma “has an emotional and therefore again, is to be unable to move forward in a
psychological dimension, which cannot be narrative, to be caught unwillingly in a past that
reduced to discursive construction.” In Japan, he will not pass away. The experience of trauma,
argues, the atomic bombing of Hiroshima came then, interrupts the modern sense of time as
to be understood as a cultural trauma only after linear, the assumption that one will move
the fallout from a hydrogen bomb test near Bikini continuously ahead (Olick 2007b) . Cultural
Atoll struck a Japanese fi shing boat in March trauma thus not only involves the stories that
1954. Almost a decade after Hiroshima, the carrier groups actively construct out of the
overarching “structure of feeling” (see Williams troublesome past, but also the force of “what the
1977 ) transformed from “pity” for “distant past does to us” (Olick 2007 a :21)—an interplay
suffering” to “sympathy” and an understanding between an event (that disrupts or undermines a
of the Japanese nation as “a community of received narrative) and a broad historical context
wounded actors” (that arguably makes the very experience of
(Saito 2006: 354) affected profoundly by the trauma possible, or at least increasingly
suffering in Hiroshima. More recently, Seth probable). Indeed, the concept of trauma
Abrutyn ( 2015 ) has both expanded the historical resonates powerfully in the present moment; it is
reach of the trauma concept and further not only a psychiatric diagnosis and a cultural
illuminated the intricate relationship between metaphor, but it has also “infi ltrate[d] social
memory and emotion. Collective traumas, he discourse” (Fassin and Rechtman 2009 :22) and
suggests, were “the core framework and become a pervasive frame for characterizing the
motivating force undergirding the evolution of confrontation with suffering (see also Davis
Israelite religion and contem- 2005 ; Illouz 2007 ). Transformations in the
porary Judaism’s adaptive success” (ibid.:131). experience of time heighten the potential for
Interpreting communal suffering through a trauma, and help to explain why it has become
pollution narrative (see Alexander 1988) , elite such a hallmark feature of the present age.
entrepreneurs “impos[ed] daily, weekly and 22.3.2.4 Cosmopolitan Memory
annual purifi cation rituals” that served as a “true As I alluded above, the melancholic turn in
shield against the outside,” resulting in “a memory is bound up with the decline of the

106
As the anthropologist Paul Connerton ( 1989 :102)—a out that the past is carried forward through “practices that
seminal fi gure in the interdisciplinary fi eld of memory work ‘below’ and beyond consciousness”—an idea with
studies—underscores, collective memory is not only roots in Durkheim’s accounts of “effervescent—thus
inscribed through language, but also incorporated in the highly bodily—collective rituals” that lead to “the social
body: “the past,” he writes, “can be kept in mind by construction of affect and the affective construction of
habitual memory sedimented in the body.” Expanding on social meaning.”
this argument, Rafael Narvaez ( 2006 :52, 56, 57) points
C. Simko

nation- state as a source of identity and memorials—has also led sociologists to


orientation in a globalizing world (Nora 1989 ): underestimate its relevance for addressing core
the traumas and atrocities that interrupt theoretical questions in the sociology of culture.
progressive narratives also undermine the state’s Re-emerging in a robust way around the same
legitimacy. In this milieu, sociologists have time as “collective memory,” culture is now
theorized the emergence of new, more central to the broad disciplinary conversation.
encompassing identities and forms of The culture section is one of the largest in the
solidarity—as well as new transcultural or American Sociological Association, and
cosmopolitan memories that support them. sociologists have developed a cultural
R epresentations of the Holocaust, Levy and perspective on a dizzying array of substantive
Natan Sznaider ( 2006) theorize, have been at the issues (see Chap. 6 ). Even more important in the
foundation of these new memoryscapes. Initially present context, parsing the relationships
met with silence, then subsequently brought to between “material” and “ideal,” “culture” and
public awareness and transformed into the “structure,” is one of the core questions
subject of national memories, the Holocaust— reverberating through the canon of sociological
they suggest—has become a globally theory.
recognizable representation of evil (see also Despite the widespread interest in culture—or
Alexander 2002 ). Because its meaning is so perhaps because of it—sociologists still struggle
widely shared, memories of the Holocaust have to defi ne the very concept that motivates their
underwritten the emergence of a pervasive work. Is culture largely discursive and public, the
concern for “distant suffering” (Boltanski 1999 stuff of collective representations and shared
), fostering social action on behalf of victims symbolism (e.g., Alexander and Smith 1993 ;
across the globe. After the fall of the Berlin Alexander 2003) , or is it cognitive and practical,
Wall—and in the midst of what Ulrich Beck consisting of everyday habits and routines (e.g.,
terms Second Modernity, modernity that “has Lizardo and Strand 2010) ? Is culture largely
become refl exive, directed at itself”—the implicit and even inarticulable—the things we
Holocaust has become a source of “moral “just know” (e.g., Lizardo and Strand 2010 ;
certainty,” specifi cally by providing the Martin 2010) —or is it the accounts, justifi
foundation for “moral consensus about human cations, and repertoires we deploy consciously as
rights,” making this issue “politically relevant to we make decisions, defi ne and navigate social
all who share this new form of memory” (Levy situations, and draw social boundaries (Swidler
and Sznaider 2006 :6, 18, 20, 132; see also Beck 1986 ; Lamont 1992 ; Boltanski and Thévenot
2000 ). According to this view, then, even in a 1999 )? Is culture the process of arranging and
time of deep uncertainty and ‘liquidity’ (Bauman re- arranging fundamental and unchanging
2000 )—following the demise of modernity’s structures—binary codes, generic forms,
master narrative—collective memory, albeit in narrative templates (e.g., Alexander and Smith
new forms, provides an anchor, a source of 1993 ; Alexander 2010 )—or are symbols,
connective tissue and social solidarity that genres, and narratives themselves always in
transcends enormous geographic distance. motion (Townsley 2001 ; Sewell 2005 ; Olick
2007b , forthcoming) ? The sociology of memory
cannot resolve all of these questions. But it can
shed new light on the question of what culture is,
22.4 Memory and Culture,
how it is comes into being, and how it helps to
Memory as Culture shape and direct social and political processes,
playing the constitutive—even causal—role in
The assumption that memory is a special social life that leading culture scholars (e.g.,
interest—a framework useful for a small cadre of Alexander 2003 , 2010 ; Wagner-Pacifi ci 2010
scholars inclined toward both culture and history, ; Reed 2011 ) have claimed for it.
or, even more limiting, a perspective pertinent
only to those who study commemorations and
tting to Remember: The Present Neglect and Future Prospects of Collective… 469

22.4.1 Cultural Claims in the the toxic legacies of the Nazi past. This is not
Sociology of Memory necessarily because speakers are explicitly
referencing earlier commemorations, as were
Schwartz’s body of work has been duly those who held up Abraham Lincoln as a symbol
recognized for bringing memory back into during World War II. But because their responses
sociological discourse. What is less commonly to enduring commemorative dilemmas are
noticed, however, is that these works address not moments in an ongoing dialogue, they are part of
only memory specifi cally, but also culture writ memory genres that inevitably contain residues of
large, and the crucial place of memory within it. earlier claims and frames. Here, memory is not
In his series of books and articles on Abraham exactly a lamp, but it nevertheless remains a
Lincoln, Schwartz (1996 b , 2000 , 2008 ) powerful cultural structure, often operating
develops the twin concepts of “keying” and beneath the level of conscious awareness.
“framing” to capture how memory serves as both Indeed, it is perhaps because memory’s infl
a model of society—a “mirror” of what we are uence is often so subtle that it has largely been
—and a model for society—a “lamp” for what omitted from our broad theories of culture.
we might become. For Schwartz ( 2000: 252), Certainly, even in a post-heroic age, there are still
memory’s primary function is “semiotic”—it moments when the past once again becomes a
illuminates the values that undergird and lamp, a source of guidance and a wellspring for
motivate collective action. It does so by linking social solidarity. In the days following September
past with present—not merely through analogies, 11, 2001, for instance, memories of Abraham
but through the more profound mechanism of Lincoln once again provided consolation,
keying , which places the present “against the orientation, and hope—and memories of Franklin
background of an appropriate symbol” from the Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and World War II
past (Schwartz 2008: xi) that then provides a more generally took their place alongside these
frame “for the perception and comprehension of references to Lincoln (Simko 2015) . Even when
current events” (Schwartz 1996b :911). For the past is not overtly on the agenda, however, the
instance, in the U.S., the suffering and bloodshed symbolic materials we deploy to come to terms
of World War II took on shape and meaning with with the unfolding present are “historical
reference to Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War. accretions,” containing “memory traces” of what
In the 1940s, it was memory that provided came before (Olick 1999b: 383). In this sense,
orientation and hope. Following Clifford Geertz “[a]ll memory is cultural, and all culture is
(1973 ), then, memory is a cultural system , “an historical” (Olick 2008 :16).
organization of symbolic patterns on which
people rely to make sense of their experience”
(Schwartz 1996b :909). 22.4.2 Cultural Memory
Schwartz (ibid.:924–925) suggests that, in the
present post-heroic age, memory’s power as a C apturing the fullest implications of this
cultural system is in decline: “Americans,” he perspective requires a brief detour outside
observes, “now look less often to the past as a sociology, though we remain in direct dialogue
model for the present than ever before,” with the sociological tradition. Indeed, this detour
recognizing “that their nation’s history can be brings us back full circle to Halbwachs. We turn,
seen as a source of shame rather than direction specifi cally, to the German Egyptologist Jan
and inspiration.” Yet we should not be too quick Assmann, whose critical reading of Halbwachs
to dismiss the power of memory as a cultural
system even when it does not serve as an explicit
source of inspiration. As Olick’s ( 1999b , 2005
, forthcoming ) work on postwar German
memory demon-
strates, the past powerfully structures what can be
said in the present as public offi cials grapple with
C. Simko

led him to coin the term cultural memory . 107 problematic, confl ictual, or burdensome?
Assmann (2006 :8) praises Halbwachs for Second, premediation captures how symbolic
overcoming solipsism, for leading the study of frameworks inherited from the past impinge upon
memory outside “the internal world of the our understanding of the present even as it
subject.” Yet he argues that Halbwachs failed to unfolds. “[E]xistent media which circulate in a
elaborate the most radical implications of the given society,” Erll (ibid.:111) explains, “provide
collective memory concept: much as he schemata for new experience and its
recognized “the social and emotional representation,” giving shape and meaning to
preconditions of memory,” Assmann (ibid.) fresh events from the fi rst. In many ways, this
claims that Halbwachs “refused to go so far as to conceptual pair resembles Schwartz’s keying and
accept the need for symbolic and cultural framing: when the present is linked to the past,
frameworks.” 108 Halbwachs, that is, focused on the past provides orientation, a framework
what Assmann (ibid.) terms communicative through which new experience is fi ltered and
memory—“lived, embodied memory” that spans understood. Yet Erll (ibid.:114) stresses the
about three generations. Yet Assmann (1995 implicit and even unconscious dimensions of this
:132) points out that collective memory is process: her discussion of premediation
transmitted more subtly, and over much longer underscores the ways in which the past infuses
timespans, through “that body of reusable texts, and structures the present “inconspicuously,” as
images, and rituals specifi c to each society in we turn refl exively to familiar frames to impose
each epoch, whose ‘cultivation’ serves to order upon fresh events.
stabilize and convey that society’s self-image.” S o, we may indeed turn less and less to
This is what Assmann refers to as cultural heroic ideals as the idols of the past—the
memory —the signs and symbols inherited from Washingtons and Lincolns—diminish in
the past to which we turn, often implicitly and prestige. But the past is no less infl uential in the
unthinkingly, for meaning in the present. The present, because cultural memory—that
signs and symbols that comprise cultural memory storehouse of symbols— confers the only tools
inevitably contain residues from the past— we possess in making sense of our world, even as
including the very distant and largely forgotten we transform these tools in turn. As Philip
past that is no longer part of “communicative” Abrams ( 1982 :8) put it, “the past is not just the
memory. Such residues of the past infl uence the womb of the present but the only raw material out
present even if those who deploy these symbols of which the present can be constructed.” Again,
are unaware of their trajectories. culture is laden with memory, and memory is the
Building on Assmann, Astrid Erll ( 2009 ) lifeblood of culture (see also Olick 2008: 16).
develops a pair of sensitizing concepts that help And theories of cultural memory offer analytic
to capture the dynamics of cultural memory: tools for capturing the construction of the present
remediation and premediation. First, remediation out of the past.
captures how the past is re-presented, and thus in To illustrate, consider one brief anecdote from
some sense reconstructed or reinterpreted, in my own work. When I began a project on the
new, and sometimes quite disparate, contexts. political discourse surrounding the events of
Remediation is perhaps the dominant subject in September 11, 2001, in the United States, I was
the sociology of memory: how is the past struck by the presence of the past: references to
refashioned in the present, how much can it be Lincoln and Roosevelt, Valley Forge and
transformed to serve present purposes, and how Gettysburg, Pearl Harbor and Iwo Jima—both
do we adapt when the past is especially implicit and explicit—provided consolation and

107
See also Olick’s ( 2007a , 2008 ) discussions of representations in his discussion of historical memory ,
Assmann and cultural memory, to which I am indebted which he understood as “residues of events by virtue of
here. which groups claim a continuous identity through time,”
108
As Olick and his colleagues point out, Assmann’s even if none of their members have autobiographical
interpretation understates the extent to which Halbwachs memories of these events (Olick et al. 2011 :19).
in fact acknowledged the power of collective
tting to Remember: The Present Neglect and Future Prospects of Collective… 471

meaning in the midst of collective suffering and At a theoretical level, the transformation of
uncertainty about the future. But one reference to ground zero reveals that culture is indeed
the past was more subtle and perplexing— memory-l aden. Memory, therefore, is not only
namely, the term “ground zero,” which was the stuff of commemorations and memorials. It is
quickly adopted as the nomenclature for the site not a special interest but instead the central
in lower Manhattan where the Twin Towers once constituent of the tools and tropes, repertoires and
stood. Today, this usage is so widely accepted schemas, signs and symbols that cultural analysts
that it is often rendered as a proper noun: identify. It infl uences our interpretation of new
“Ground Zero.” Politicians, journalists, and even events even when we do not turn to it explicitly,
scholars have readily adopted it. What perplexed because it infuses the only frameworks available
me was that the term “ground zero” originally to us to fi nd orientation, to gain a foothold in the
referred to the site directly beneath a detonated face of the unfolding present. And the specifi c
atomic bomb. It was initially used in the U.S. case of “ground zero” illuminates the payoff of
Strategic Bombing Survey, commissioned by the this historical understanding of culture—the view
Truman administration to assess the impact of the of symbols as containing residues of the past—in
atomic weapons that U.S. forces dropped on the a particularly powerful way. The connection
Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in between Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 and
1945. How, then, did this term that originated to lower Manhattan in 2001 is rarely recognized and
describe an act of American violence come to articulated, let alone discussed or grappled with
stand for American victimhood, and indeed even explicitly. But what would it mean for Americans
American nationhood? to understand that the ground zero designation—
T heories of cultural memory provide a which now evokes sorrow, respect, and even
lan-guage for understanding the connection reverence—is a borrowed term? And even more,
between these two disparate events. In some that it originally referred to a site where
subtle and implicit way, Hiroshima and Nagasaki American forces unleashed an unprecedented act
premediated the events of September 11, 2001: of violence, ushering in a new era in global
they provided one of the key symbols through politics? Understanding the power of the past—
which this disorienting series of occurrences was especially when it remains implicit, even
understood from the fi rst. But why was this invisible to most observers—is a crucial part of
symbolism so readily available? In fact, there is grasping the constitutive force of culture. As
a long tradition of envisioning an “American meanings exert their infl uence in larger social
ground zero” that emerged quite rapidly in the and political processes, they carry with them the
months and years following the August 1945 weight of the past, residues that ideas of
bombings. The U.S. Strategic Bombing survey “collective” and “cultural” memory enable us to
itself contemplated this possibility, calculating identify and illuminate in new ways.
the damage that an atomic explosion would cause
in American city centers, including Washington,
D.C. and New York. What would an American
22.5 The Future Prospects of
“ground zero” look like? Subsequently, popular
magazines and national newspapers published Collective Memory
detailed descriptions of the suffering and
devastation an atomic attack on American soil Despite the revitalization of collective memory
could cause, often accompanied by vivid visual in sociology, much of the discipline has
images that depicted these imagined attacks. nevertheless forgotten to remember. Not only
Again, these projections frequently focused on have we failed to integrate collective memory
the very spaces where the violence of September into our theories, however. We have also in many
11, 2001, unfolded, selecting landmarks in ways forgotten the guiding questions that
Manhattan and Washington as the epicenter— captivated the classical fi gures whose
“ground zero.” meditations on the modern gave birth to the
tradition we have inherited. Yet the answers to
C. Simko

these questions have been magnifi cently ections on commemoration suggested long ago
generative. Classical theorists’ efforts to come to that memory— the interplay between past and
terms with industrial modernity, to comprehend a present—is at the very core of the social, there
new epoch even as it came into being, bequeathed remains much work to be done to understand how
to us concepts and frames—from anomie and the past reverberates, how it shapes the tools and
alienation, to rationalization and legitimation, to tropes available to us for making sense of our
differentiation and disenchantment—that world, how it implicitly infuses every act of
continue to illuminate and enlighten, that guide meaning. Even if the world we inhabit is
us as we work make sense of our own milieu. And profoundly different from the one that Durkheim
thus it seems that reconnecting with these observed, memory is no less critical in our
questions is an especially worthwhile endeavor ongoing effort to understand it.
for contemporary theorists.
T he vibrant conversations taking place around
collective memory provide a powerful
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Intersectionality 23
Zandria Felice Robinson

23.1 Introduction Rhodes College , Memphis , TN , USA e-


mail: robinsonz@rhodes.edu
The term “intersectionality,” the moved defi nitively outside of the academy as
epistemological, theoretical, and methodological black women social media users refi ned and
ground it covers, and the lived experiences it expanded the theory’s emphasis and critiqued
captures were once very much on the conceptual mainstream feminism’s racial blindspots (Jarmon
margins of the discipline of sociology proper. 2013) . By 2015, The Washington Post had
Although it had been a central feature of black published a symposium on the term and the
women’s intellectual work in history (Barnett theory, refl ecting and signaling its mainstream
1993; Davis 1998 ), fi ction, women’s and import and including an essay by critical legal
gender studies (Springer 2002 ; Andersen 2005; scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw, who coined the term
Johnson 2005; Moore 2006 ), and critical legal in 1989.
studies (Roberts 1997 ), particularly since the Across the social sciences, the term and the
1980s, sociology was slower to canonically adopt multilayered practices it constitutes have caused
the theory than other fi elds of inquiry. Yet, over theoretical, methodological, and empirical
the course of the 25 years from the coining of the conundrums, which black feminist scholar
term to its mainstreaming as a household theory, Patricia Hill Collins has called intersectionality’s
intersectionality has moved in, through, and “defi nitional dilemma” (Collins 2015 ; Cho et
beyond sociology while remaining central to al. 2013; MacKinnon 2013; Choo and Ferree
some of the fi eld’s most pressing questions about 2010 ; McCall 2005 ). Certainly,
the workings of power. Building on the intersectionality has been adapted by several
intellectual labor of generations of black women disciplines, including psychology, political
before them, black feminist sociologists science, and anthropology, towards disciplinary-
positioned intersectionality in the center of specifi c ends. Yet, beyond its current and varied
stratifi cation research in the fi eld, which disciplinary uses, intersectionality’s enduring
subsequently began to parse the theoretical dilemma is one best articulated through an
purchase and empirical conundrums of the theory intellectual history of intersectionality as an idea.
(Collins 1989, 1990 ; King 1988 ). In concert Specifi cally, attention to the tension between its
with the emergence of social media, origins in black women’s theorizations of their
intersectionality experiences and social structures and its current
use as shorthand for co- occurring and
intersecting disadvantaged positions reveals two
somewhat divergent, and in some cases
Z. F. Robinson ()

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 477


S. Abrutyn (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary Sociological Theory,
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32250-6_23
Z.F. Robinson

contradictory, paths for the theory. This chapter in concert with the goals of capital (Collins 2005
attends to the black feminist origins of ). Whereas the positivist core of social science,
intersectionality, highlighting how black and sociology in particular, essentially dismisses
women’s theory shaped intersectional thought individual or group knowledge claims as
(Smith 1984 ; hooks [ 1984 ] 2000; Guy-Sheftall disruptive to the integrity of scientifi c inquiry,
1995 ; Taylor 2001 ). intersectionality theorists offer an important and
At its core, intersectionality is concerned with radical rejection of this claim on two fronts—the
how multiple systems of oppression—racism, fallacy and impossibility of objectivity and value-
classism, sexism, heterosexism, cissexism, and neutrality as well as the idea that a social science
ableism in particular—simultaneously reinforce must draw on lived experience as empirical
and constitute one another to maintain existing evidence that guides question development,
stratifi cation hierarchies across categories. theory building, and interpretation.
Rather than focusing on oppression as an additive Intersectionality’s engagement with
phenomenon, e.g., black + woman = more epistemology is often conceptualized as a form of
oppressed than white + woman, intersectionality identity politics; but for these theorists, identity is
highlights the “multiplicative” effect of an outcome of processes of stratifi cation, rather
interlocking systems of oppression, or the than a starting point. Standpoint theory, then—
“multiple jeopardy” faced by black women, who, which insists that any science or knowledge claim
because of the intersections of racism and sexism, emerges from a particular standpoint, or lived
are often economically disadvantaged (King experience, that is often obscured or deemed
1988 ; Hancock irrelevant when the knower is white and male
2007 ). In this vein, intersectionality theorists in (Harding 2003 )— works to make visible the
general reject the notion that race or gender or producers of knowledge and compels us to
class are the primary axis on which inequality is consider how their place in the “matrix of
based, thereby diverging from early race men and domination” affects their scientifi c inquiries and
Marxist theorists, and even from some Marxist conclusions.
feminisms. I ntersectionality is the sociological theory that
F rom a theoretical perspective, there are three is perhaps the most exemplary of praxis. It is, in
tenets of intersectionality: (1) its analytical fact, through the action of navigating an unequal
critique of labor and capital, as well as other society that the theory’s structure and import
social institutions like family and health, vis-à- become apparent. Thus, this chapter both narrates
vis black women’s experiences; (2) its the theorizing and resistance strategies that
epistemological critique of the positivist claims constitute the contours of intersectionality and
of social scientifi c research; (3) and its accounts assesses the theory as sociologists have deployed
of resistive praxis through descriptions of black it towards various substantive ends. It traces the
women’s everyday organizing and community- history of intersectionality through two parallel
based social justice initiatives. Analyses often and sometimes intersecting histories of the
emerge from black women’s critiques of labor idea—that of black feminist and womanist
and capital, and their place in a system that thinkers and that of sociologists, two usually, but
exploits their physical and reproductive labor to, certainly not always, mutually distinct groups.
in effect, enrich the nation and maintain white Black feminist organizing and theorizing
supremacy (Murray extended to analyses of labor and capital, as well
1970; Davis 1983; Brewer 1993, Jones 1985 as other social institutions, like marriage; of the
; Glenn 2009 ); include critiques of how black epistemology that undergirded inequality
women are represented in the media and other research and movement organizing; and of
sites in the public sphere to delegitimize their representations and identities. In sociology, late
claims of and simultaneously justify their nineteenth and early twentieth century black
oppression (Ladner 1971 ; Pough 2004 ); and sociologists, including Anna Julia Cooper, Ida B.
consider how black women’s sexuality is policed Wells, and W. E. B. Du Bois, laid the
ctionality 479

groundwork for the theory’s sociological 23.2.1 Black Women, Enslavement, and
importance and offered important contributions Theory
to its foundations, although intersectionality
would not be canonized in the fi eld until nearly Intersectionality is rooted in theorizations of
a century later. The chapter then considers U.S. nineteenth century enslaved and free women
intersectionality’s quarter century in the in speeches and writings they generated on
discipline of sociology, beginning with the abolition, race, and the woman question. Beyond
publication of Patricia Hill Collins’ Black these narratives of women who had more access
Feminist Thought in 1990, assessing the to the public sphere than most enslaved women,
methodological and theoretical challenges of the black feminist historians have uncovered the
theory and the fi eld’s transformation of the lived experiences of enslaved black women to
theory into a scientifi c enterprise. Finally, this understand more about these women’s everyday
chapter discusses the implications of continued lives and how they theorized labor, capital, and
black feminist theorizing that calls for fresh resistance in antebellum America (Davis 1983 ;
theoretical language with which to describe Hine and Thompson 1999 ; White 1999 ). These
interlocking systems of oppression for the historians’ research demonstrates how the lived
discipline of sociology. experiences of enslaved women gave them a
distinct space through which to evaluate and
critique the structure and hierarchies of race,
23.2 Intersectionality, Inequality, gender, and capital as they were being shaped by
a shifting slavery context. Enslaved women
and the Black Feminist
recognized that they were a source of capital as
Tradition childbearers, as laborers, and as reproductive
laborers in the plantation economy. They also
F rom slavery to the present, the black feminist
were aware that their status as black and property
tradition in the U.S. has concerned itself with
relegated them to particular kinds of labor that
highlighting the importance of an intersectional
would not have been fi tting for a “woman” or a
perspective, variously situating intersectionality
“lady,” including fi eldwork and cooking (Fox-
as a moral claim, then as a claim for political
Genovese 1988 ). Women and ladies were free,
equality, and more recently as an epistemological
white, and often wealthy and slave holding,
claim and a claim for inclusion and social justice.
circumscribed in a sphere of power and
Although the tradition is often communicated
domesticity to which enslaved women did not
through the writings of formally educated
have access. Further, enslaved women were
women, black feminist academics recognize that
especially aware of how their status as black
most black feminist theorizing, and therefore
women and property rendered them vulnerable to
most of the black feminist tradition, occurs
sexual violence that regulated and constrained
outside of the academy in the intellectual culture
their economic choices as well as contributed
work of black women comedians, singers, artists,
directly to the plantation economy. Using their
and other kinds of culture workers taking up
critical understanding of the intersecting systems
questions of race, class, gender, and sexuality. At
of gender and race inequality in the plantation
the center of the tradition is a critique of the
economy, these women developed resistance
specifi c arrangements of inequality that
strategies to protect themselves and undermine
disproportionately affect black women in U.S.
the power structure. It is in these women’s
society and a call for an epistemic shift in how we
resistance strategies, in addition to the arguments
conceptualize both race and gender as
made by enslaved and formerly enslaved women
interlocking oppressions.
in slave narratives, that the origins of black
feminist theorizing can be found.
The narratives of women who had been
enslaved, like Harriet Jacobs’ ([1861] 2009 )
Z.F. Robinson

Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl , plainly have only been extended to white women given
delineated the perils of being both enslaved and a the nature of race prejudice in the South. Black
woman. Like Sojourner Truth’s ([1851] 1995 ) women, including Ida B. Wells-Barnett in
famous “ain’t I a woman?,” Jacobs’ narrative is Chicago, established their own suffrage
indicative of black women’s use of intersectional organizations, again recognizing that their status
epistemologies as a moral claim, appealing to as both women and black situated them outside
white women and abolitionists to understand how of the political discourse (Higginbotham 1993 ;
enslavement, as a function of race, prevented Giddings 2009 ). During the struggle for
enslaved women having agency over moral suffrage, black women made both moral and
choices about sexual behavior and domestic political intersectional claims to suffrage,
power over childrearing. Indeed, this was a drawing on still prevalent discourses about the
rhetorical strategy meant to appeal to the milieu, role of women in elevating the race as well as
but it is an important strategy in that it rests on discourses of political equality and representation
the intended audiences’ acknowledgement of the for all citizens, regardless of their place in the
uniquely disadvantaging intersection of race and social structure. Advocating for black women as
gender in the lives of enslaved women. Using this central political agents in a bourgeoning post-
argument, enslaved and free women advocated slavery American democracy, theorist Anna Julia
for the abolition of slavery, presuming that the Cooper argued that “only the BLACK WOMAN
absence of an unequal structural context—the can say when and where I enter, in the quiet,
plantation economy—would decrease the power undisputed dignity of my womanhood, without
of race as a determinant of black women’s lives. violence and without suing or special patronage,
As such, black women would have access to the then and there the whole Negro race enters with
moral and social protections of womanhood. me” (Cooper 1892: 31). However, this
However, this kind of discursive appeal also discursive epistemological strategy did not
required its intended audiences to believe that overcome entrenched white supremacy. In fact,
black women were, in fact, women and therefore in the following years, black women’s status as
deserving of the protections afforded wealthy non- women and non-citizens as a result of their
white women. Although this moral argument race and gender positions was reinforced by the
about the intersection of race and gender gained systematic lack of response to crimes committed
some traction in abolitionist discourse, it was against them by whites.
ultimately broader considerations of morality that After the outcome of the suffrage battle
overshadowed these in the push for freedom. solidifi ed black women’s political place as
Still, the groundwork had been laid for partial citizens and non-women because of their
organizing around a disadvantaged social race and gender, racialized and gendered Jim
location, epistemic position, and set of lived Crow violence reinforced black women’s status
experiences. on the outside of the legal protections of the law
and the social protections of womanhood.
Throughout the South, as well as other regions of
23.2.2 Intersectionality and Feminist the country, including the Midwest, white men
Fissures from Suffrage to Jim raped black women with impunity, often arguing
Crow that the victim was a prostitute or otherwise
enticed the men into sex (Hine 1989 ; McGuire
The battle for suffrage was the fi rst national 2011 ). Even in cases where victims were not
political moment when black women were accused of being paid for sex, black women’s
discursively trapped between the “woman unequal race, gender, and citizen statuses meant
question” and the “Negro problem.” White that investigations and prosecutions were rare.
women actively campaigned against black Still, organizing around moral and political
suffrage, which would have only been extended claims as women and citizens, black women
to men, but women’s suffrage would ultimately demanded their grievances be recognized on both
ctionality 481

fronts. The denial of black women’s womanhood men in the civil rights and Black Power
on the basis of race became a point of organizing movements and by white women in the women’s
and resistance for black communities, and public liberation movement (Hull et al. 1982) . In their
spaces where black women were most April 1977 declarative, “A Black Feminist
vulnerable, like buses, became targets for Statement,” the Combahee River Collective, a
boycotts. Thus, drawing on a moral claim to the group of black women thinkers and organizers,
protections of womanhood and a political claim argued that they were “actively committed to
to the protections of citizenship, black women led struggling against racial, sexual, heterosexual,
the charge to disrupt the workings of capital in and class oppression and see as our particular task
order to bolster their claims to protection. Here, the development of integrated analysis and
both race and gender are centered in black practice based upon the fact that the major
women’s lived experiences of inequality and systems of oppression are interlocking” (CRC
strategies of resistance. The struggle against 1977 : 232). In concert with black feminist
sexual assault refl ected black feminists’ refusal thinkers that came before them, they offered
to put either race or gender fi rst, but to instead sophisticated institutional critiques of the social
lay moral and political claim to the privileges structures that contributed to black women’s
afforded both (white) women and (black and labor, sexual, and race oppression. The
white) men by situating their strategy fi rmly Combahee River
within the theoretical and epistemic premise of Collective’s statement is foundational for modern
intersectionality. intersectionality because of its deliberate and
In addition to critiquing and resisting the centering integration of black women’s sexuality
gendered and racialized sexual violence that they into black feminist analyses. Consisting of black
experienced, black women critiqued the labor lesbian thinkers, the CRC represented a break
conditions to which they were relegated in the from moral appeals—which often applied to
South, and domestic labor in particular. They married women, black women who could be
wrote to public offi cials, and even to sitting considered “ladies” in black communities
presidents, asking for relief from the low wages, because of their education or access to capital—
the lack of work protections, and the lack of to defi nitively political and social justice-based
access to a variety of employment opportunities demands for reprieve from oppression.
they faced (Sharpless 2010 ). Again, here, black A s the Combahee River Collective was
women understood that it was intersection of race meeting, organizing, and preparing to craft its
and gender that was disadvantaging them, tying foundational statement, black women workers at
labor discrimination to the sexual violence they General Motors were suing the company for
experienced and appealing to the government for discrimination on the basis of race and gender.
their rights as women, citizens, and mothers to The gender and race division of labor
work for decent wages, control their work opportunities at General Motors excluded black
conditions, and support their families without the women entirely from participation—only men,
threat of violence (Jones 1949 ). which included black men, were allowed to work
on the factory fl oor; and only whites, which
included white women, were allowed to work
23.2.3 Movement Politics and the administrative positions. Thus, all the jobs were
Emergence of Modern Black for black men or white women, but not black
Feminist Thought women. As Kimberlé Crenshaw
( 1989) points out in her analysis of the case as a
Modern intersectional thought is built on the galvanizing moment for the importance of
acknowledgement of this legacy of resistance at intersectionality in the modern moment, the
the nexus of interlocking systems of oppression. court’s ruling—that the black women could only
It is also a response to the continued ignoring of claim discrimination based on one of their
intersectionality in movement politics by black statuses, race or gender, and not on the
Z.F. Robinson

intersection of both—was a legal dismissal of the theoretical and epistemological origins. This
lived experiences of black women whose lives portability has been useful in highlighting the
occurred at the nexus of multiple oppressions. nature and shape of the “multiple jeopardy”
Refl ecting on how this case led to her articulation experienced by a variety of racial and ethnic
of intersectionality, Crenshaw ( 2015 ) writes, minority groups simultaneously occupying
I wanted to defi ne this profound invisibility in several disadvantaged positions. However, the
relation to the law. Racial and gender excising of intersectionality from these origins
discrimination overlapped not only in the
workplace but in other arenas of life; equally
has also created methodological, theoretical, and
signifi cant, these burdens were almost completely epistemological challenges (McCall 2005 ;
absent from feminist and anti-racist advocacy. Davis 2008 ). In social scientifi c and popular
Intersectionality, then, was my attempt to make deployments of intersectionality, the
feminist, anti-racist activism, and anti-
fundamental aspects of black women’s
discrimination law do what I thought they
should—highlight the multiple avenues through arguments are obscured, compromising the
which racial and gender oppression were scientifi c enterprise and our ability to understand
experienced so that the problems would be easier how institutions work together to disadvantage
to discuss and understand. specifi c groups.

Crenshaw’s argument, as well as that of the


Combahee River Collective, was built on a 23.3 Classical Black Sociology and
personal-i s-political, theory-as-praxis black
Intersectional Thought
feminist tradition that began with the experiences
of black women in various structural confi A merican sociology began as a multicultural
gurations—the plantation economy, Jim Crow enterprise that built on the work of European
domestic labor, and the industrial economy. From thinkers and generated new theoretical
these positions in an unequal economic system, foundations for the U.S. context to interrogate
black feminist thinkers theorized how racial, community life, social problems,
gender, and sexuality oppression intersected to industrialization, and other issues of modernity.
compound and refl ect economic marginalization. From its inception, the fi eld was comprised of
They developed sophisticated analyses of how two distinct epistemic foundations—one white
various forms of violence were used to reinforce (and thus at best epistemologically misguided
this societal disadvantage, but also highlighted and at worst outright racist) and one black.
how black women’s understanding of their place Despite limited access to institutions, academic
in the social structure infl uenced their and otherwise, black sociologists developed a
development of resistance strategies that tradition of investigating the place of newly freed
simultaneously addressed multiple systems of African Americans in America’s evolving
oppression and the mechanisms of those systems. democracy and offering distinct theoretical and
Intersectionality is now shorthand for this methodological contributions to the discipline of
tradition of black feminist thought, organizing, sociology—contributions that were later erased
critique, and activism, and this fact is due in part in historiographies of the fi eld—in the process
to the work of sociologist and black feminist (Wright 2016 ; Young and Deskins 2001 ).
scholar Patricia Hill Collins ( 1990 ). However, These contributions are central to recovering the
intersectionality is not the whole of black theoretical origins of intersectionality in
feminist thinking (Cooper 2015 ). Ironically, its sociology.
acceptance in the wider fi eld of sociological Only recently have the three pioneering
theory and research largely divorced it from the scholars of the fi rst period of African American
considerations of social critique based on lived sociological thought—Anna Julia Cooper,
experiences in which it was once rooted. Its W.E.B. Du Bois, and Ida B. Wells-Barnett—been
portability beyond this initial, broad context recognized as founding thinkers, theorists, and
rested on its ability to be extricated from its
ctionality 483

scholars in the fi eld. In the case of Du Bois, important role black women were already playing
despite the canonization of his work in American in American politics through their organizations
sociology through the naming of awards and and through the shaping of men’s political
attention to scholarship that recovers his behavior. Further, she considers the special
contributions, the fi eld has still been slow to knowledge that black women bring to multiple
broadly incorporate his multiple contributions to institutions—education, politics, criminal justice,
the fi eld’s methodological and theoretical and healthcare—and calls in particular on black
interventions beyond his theory of double men to recognize black women’s import in
consciousness (Morris 2015 ; Wright 2016 ). reforming those institutions.
Yet, to understand the sociological origins of A Voice from the South is the fi rst book-length
intersectionality, these thinkers must be situated text to explicitly advocate for black women’s
as contributing to a distinct early black sociology unique epistemological perspectives as both a
that challenged the racist undertones of the moral and political imperative for American
emerging fi eld of American sociology while democracy, and to analyze black women’s
producing theoretical, methodological, and relationship to the nation’s growing global
empirical innovations (Young and Deskins 2001 sensibility.
). These thinkers took up and shaped the Class was a central, though sometimes
culture/structure dualism with attention to how implicit, feature in Cooper’s analysis of black
social institutions reinforced inequality and women’s position vis-à-vis social institutions.
disadvantaged black populations at multiple She was aware, however, like many of her
intersections. antebellum abolitionist predecessors, of the
A nna Julia Cooper’s work is pioneering in distinct economic disadvantages that black
both black feminism and sociology. Earning the women experienced as a result of their
PhD from the Sorbonne, Cooper’s work spoke intersecting race and class positions. She
fundamentally to questions of race, gender, and advocated for black women to have access to
region that were central to early American education and other economic resources and
sociological thought and research. Her book, A frequently criticized black men on this account,
Voice from the South, By a Black Woman of the declaring that on questions of other matters
South (1892 ), is the fi rst black feminist text that pertinent to the race they were especially vocal
theorizes the intersections of race and gender but were strangely silent on issues that would
simultaneously in the lives of black women. improve the status of women. She was also
Writing on the eve of the Chicago World’s especially critical of the institution of marriage as
Columbian Exhibition, Cooper ( 1892 ) said, a site in and through which women were
“The colored woman of to-day occupies, one may economically subjugated and unable to reach
say, a unique position in this country. In a period their full potential as contributors to improving
of itself transitional and unsettled, her status the nation. As such, Cooper brought forth an
seems one of the least ascertainable and defi analysis of race, class, and gender in a moment
nitive of all the forces which make for our where class for African Americans had
civilization. She is confronted by both a woman transitioned from the dichotomous categories of
question and a race problem, and is as yet an enslaved or free.
unknown or an unacknowledged factor in both” Whereas Cooper’s work shaped sociological
(Cooper, 45). Cooper here acknowledges the theory through a focus on the lived experiences
distinctiveness of black women in American and epistemology of black women, Du Bois’s
democracy, and in this case formerly enslaved work on the simultaneity of institutions of
women as well as women coming of age in the oppression were largely a critique of structure. As
early years of freedom. She quickly points out such, although Du Bois rarely considered the
their social location as central to both the “race simultaneity of race and class and gender, like
problem” and the “woman question” has not been Cooper and other black women writers did, race
suffi ciently theorized. Still, she highlights the and class or race and gender were central to his
Z.F. Robinson

understanding of the racialized structure of a preface from Frederick Douglass. In a 1900


American inequality. As Du Bois scholar Ange- follow-up essay to her original analysis, Wells
Marie Hancock ( 2005) notes, Du Bois’s work writes, “instead of lynchings being caused by
contains allusions to either a “theory of multiple assaults upon women, the statistics show that not
yet mutually exclusive identities and oppressions, one-third of the victims of lynchings are even
or toward a theory of intersecting and mutually charged with such crimes” (Wells-Barnett, 73).
constitutive identities and oppressions” ( 2005 She highlights, instead, the signifi cant number of
:74). Writing about the experiences of black unpunished rapes endured by black women at the
women, Du Bois, like Cooper, is concerned with hands of white men compared to the dearth of
how the woman question and the Negro question such crimes, alleged or actual, perpetrated by
can be simultaneously considered. Similarly, black men against white women. Here, then,
writing about the experiences of poor black Wells-Barnett uses methodological
people in Philadelphia’s Seventh Ward, Du Bois innovations—content and statistical analyses—to
( 1899 ) actively considers how racial substantiate her epistemological claims about
disadvantage co- occurs and intersects with anti-black racism, lynching, economic inequality,
economic disadvantage, theorizing the two as and sexual violence in the South and beyond
mutually constitutive and reinforcing forms of (Royster 1997 ).
oppression that uniquely affected black people in I n addition to these contributions on the
an anti-black society. Du Bois, thus, applies intersection of race, labor, and capital as
theories of intersecting oppressions to his fi explanatory factors in lynchings, Wells-Barnett
ndings in the fi eld, and it is this theoretical made signifi cant theoretical contributions to how
perspective that undergirds his analyses in the black feminism would later more explicitly
studies produced through the Atlanta incorporate sex and sexuality into analyses of
Sociological Laboratory (Wright 2016 ). economic and racial inequality. Offering up a
J ournalist Ida B. Wells-Barnett is also central discursive analysis of what Patricia Hill Collins
to founding theories of intersectionality in early would call “controlling images,” Wells-Barnett
black sociology, applying intersecting theories of critiqued the myth of the black male rapist and
race, class, and gender to her analyses of the black female prostitute, both narratives
lynchings in the South (Wells-Barnett 1959 ). constructed in the public discourse and media as
Wells- Barnett’s analysis is rooted in lived in justifi cations for lynching. She deconstructed
experiences but is simultaneously critical of the these narratives and demonstrated their
social structures that shape lived experience. As relationship to economic competition in a South
such, Wells- Barnett’s work is perhaps the most where whites were determined to maintain
similar to modern black feminist analyses. It complete political and economic control through
takes on a particular problem—the national whatever means. It was this plain deconstructive
problem of lynching—and examines the analysis that led to the burning of her paper, The
phenomenon from multiple institutional Free Speech and Headlight of Memphis , and her
perspectives, uncovering the economic, sexual, inability to return to the city. In an editorial she
and social control motivations for the persistent wrote in the paper on May 21, 1892, a couple of
and unpunished violence. She roundly critiques a months after three of her friends were murdered
criminal justice system that gestured towards by a lynch mob for running an economically profi
civility but was, in fact, overtaken by a spirit of table grocery, Wells-Barnett declared: “Nobody
lawlessness and an “unwritten law” of lynching. in this section of the country believes the old
Engaging in one of the fi rst known uses of threadbare lie that Negro men rape white women.
content analysis in sociology, Wells combed If Southern white men are not careful, they will
newspaper accounts of lynchings, creating a over-reach themselves and public sentiment will
statistical record of lynching and what she called have a reaction; a conclusion will then be reached
its “alleged causes,” which she compiled in the which will be very damaging to the moral
pamphlet A Red Record , published in 1895 with reputation of their women.” Here, Wells-Barnett
ctionality 485

provides a sophisticated analysis of the discourse


about race and moral superiority that supported
the institution of lynch law in the American South 23.4 Black Feminist Organizing
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. and Modern Black Feminism
Later, scholars working in the black feminist
tradition would apply similar discursive analyses Black feminist work, rooted in activist responses
to constructions of “welfare queens” and “baby to conditions specifi c to black women’s lives in
mamas,” deconstructing how these discourses the context of American inequality, continued
were designed to obscure unequal economic after this classical period, still carving out space
relationships. in the public discourse for black women to author
I ntersectionality was central to these thinkers’ and theorize their own experiences. After the
critical analyses of the social world as they suffrage struggle underscored the identity,
worked to bridge empiricism and epistemology. analytic, and epistemological fi ssures that
For Cooper in particular, the experiences of black excluded black women from visions of freedom
women were a starting point from which to assess in a changing nation, black women increasingly
the political landscape and theorize new formed spaces to theorize their particular
possibilities for freedom with black women at the experiences, whether in the Jim Crow South or in
helm of addressing society’s ills. For Wells and Diasporic contexts. Some of the most signifi cant
Du Bois, the experiences of black people in their work that served as the basis for intersectional
interactions with the social structure, particularly theory and practice emerged from the organizing
the economy, were the beginning point of theory- work of black women in the anti-imperialist, civil
generation about the intersections of race and rights, and women’s rights movements in
class or race and gender. Wells and Cooper postwar era. Imperialist expansion, sexual
offered epistemological critiques that privileged violence against black women, degenerating
black women’s unique standpoint, while Du Bois conditions in black communities, an oppressive
uncovered how economic inequality and racial welfare state that frustrated black women’s
inequality created structurally unequal outcomes. ability to choose how and when they formed
Wells and Du Bois provided important families, lack of access to equal healthcare, and
methodological interventions based on their persistent racial inequality were among the many
understanding of intersectionality, and from these manifestations of oppression that black women’s
methods discovered new ways of thinking about consciousness raising and liberation groups
how the intersection of social locations and social organized to address.
institutions worked together to disadvantage
black people in general and black women in
particular. Although they were working fi rmly 23.4.1 Black Feminist Theorizing on the
within the structure of a discipline that, as Young Margins of Movements
and Deskins ( 2001 ) argue, drew on “the same
paradigms, language, and logic employed by the A s with the classical period, black women’s
creators of not just racialist, but racist American post- suffrage organizing is central to
social thought,” they nonetheless improved upon understanding the development of black feminist
and created new theory and methods that prefi thought in general and theorizations of
gure the institutionalization of intersectionality. intersectionality in particular. Although black
Their work is indeed the groundwork of feminist theorizing vis-à-vis communism and
sociological theories of intersectionality, radicalism in the interwar and immediate postwar
foreshadowing how black feminist periods is understudied, black women’s analyses
epistemologies are central to the development of of communist texts and ideologies shaped The
methodological innovation in intersectionality Left and the African American intellectual
research. enterprise. In one of her most widely cited essays,
“An End to the Neglect of the Problems of the
Z.F. Robinson

Negro Woman!” prominent radical thinker Some prominent black feminists straddled
Claudia Jones ( 1949 ) implores labor unions to multiple organizations, like attorney Florynce
take up the cause of advocating for domestic Kennedy who helped found NOW and worked
workers to have the same labor protections as diligently in the Black Power Movement
other workers to relieve their economic (Kennedy 1976; Randolph 2015 ). These
disenfranchisement. Highlighting what she women’s labor often went unseen and exploited
dubbed the “double exploitation” of women as in these organizational contexts, and their
gender and class minorities, Jones contended that experiences were often marginalized in
“negro women—as workers, as Negroes, and as movement goals. In organizing for their
women—are the most oppressed stratum of the liberation, black women found themselves again
whole population” (109). She described what she trapped by a discursive and policy erasure of their
called the “superexploitation” of black working lives and experiences of inequality. For instance,
class women, and drawing on U.S. Department of advocating for reprieve from and punishment for
Labor statistics, she connected black women’s domestic violence meant relying on police who
economic status to their place in movement were often hostile to the interests of black men
politics and ideology. Perhaps most signifi cant and women. Also, while some white women
to one of the key interventions of black feminism, advocated for the right to control their fertility,
Jones analyzed how the denial of labor and including the right to be sterilized whenever they
property rights affected black women’s ability to chose without the consent of their partners or
protect their bodies from white sexual violence. physicians’ restrictions, black women and other
She calls out white women’s complicity in a women of color were still facing forced
system that lynched black men to avenge white sterilizations, performed without their knowledge
women’s allegedly violated womanhood while and often at the behest of government
simultaneously subjecting black women to “daily organizations. These women, who were forming
insults…in public places, no matter what their the basis for the reproductive justice movement,
class, status, or position” (119). Sexual violence were excluded from considerations and
affected black women across class, but also was protections for which white women, and white
a result of their broad economic marginalization, middle class women especially, were striving.
rooted in an institutionalized anti-black Socialist and other anti-capitalist movements too
misogyny that imagined all black women as often subsumed practices of inequality that
disposable laborers and disposable bodies. disproportionately affected certain groups under
Although Jones’ political biographer (Davies an umbrella that would supposedly resolve itself
2007) notes that she frequently returned to the when labor triumphed over capital. At every turn,
party line—that an anti-capitalist and anti- the dominant narratives of most large-scale
imperialist victory would alleviate if not movement organizations ignored, or at least
eradicate black women’s marginalization— downplayed, the experiences of black women
Jones’ theorizations of sexual violence against and the histories of anti-black misogyny that
black women indicate her understanding of the undergirded all systems of oppression. Yet, out of
specifi c intersections of oppression for black this praxis came further refi nement and
women. They also underscore some of black expansion of black feminist theorizing on race,
people’s, and black women’s in particular, gender, and class oppression as systems, as well
frustrations with the radical Left in this particular as specifi c intersectional analyses of social
historical moment. institutions—family, health, the labor market and
In the height of the civil rights and Black economy, religion, politics, and education.
Power eras, black women worked diligently in a The intersection of race and gender, and
wide range of organizations, from civil rights specifi cally disadvantaged positions in those two
organizations like the Southern Christian systems, remained central to black feminist
Leadership Conference to the Black Panther conceptions of the structure of inequality in
Party to the National Organization for Women. America. Analyzing black women’s economic
ctionality 487

lives as enslaved and later as relegated to the exposing them to economic disadvantage. Thus,
worst paying jobs in the labor force, their organizing also recognized the economic
intersectionality theorists carefully delineated underpinnings of unchecked sexual violence.
how black women’s distinct economic This work laid the foundation for Joan Little, a
subjugation was rooted in anti- black misogyny. woman tried for defending herself against an
Writing in 1970, lawyer and scholar Pauli Murray assailant, to be acquitted in 1974 (McGuire 2011
argued that “the economic disabilities of women ). This verdict, widely seen as a victory of a
generally are aggravated in the case of black multiracial movement coalition, helped change
women,” highlighting how a signifi cant how the law treated rape and opened the door for
proportion of working women of color were then marital rape to be punished. Black women’s
employed as domestic laborers with no labor decades of resistance to sexual violence, and their
protections (195). The denial of labor p rotections strivings to protect themselves, helped win broad
for this class of workers was an explicit denial of victories for women in general.
labor rights to black women. Black feminist Black feminist theorists saw sexual violence
historians have noted how domestic labor was as tied to reproductive oppression, writing
framed as black women’s work, continuing eloquently about practices of forced birth control
slavery-era discourse about black women’s and sterilization of people of color in the U.S. and
“special talents” as wet nurses, nannies, and abroad. Because access to welfare benefi ts was
cooks during slavery (Sharpless 2010 ; Wallace- often predicated upon visits to specifi c clinics or
Sanders 2009 ). These discourses refl ected and doctors, women of color were forced to exchange
reinforced black women’s economic their reproductive liberty, usually without their
disempowerment but also underscored their knowledge, for meager economic resources in a
particular vulnerability as unprotected and society that designed and profi ted from their
undervalued laborers. Their working conditions impoverishment and low wages. After surgical
rendered them subject to sexual violence and sterilizations abated, long-acting reversible
physical abuse while earning low wages that were contraception was often forced on black women,
often withheld by employers. Black feminist especially when those women were receiving
theorists connected this subjugation to the welfare benefi ts. Yet, in cases where women
maintenance of white racial supremacy and wanted to access birth control, costs were often
capitalism domestically and internationally. prohibitively high to enable them to do so. In
addition to bodily reproductive oppression
through forced sterilization, black women
23.4.2 Theorizing Sexual Violence organized in concert with several other
movements, including the environmental
Black women also organized against sexual, movement, to highlight how the conditions in
reproductive, and heterosexist oppression in the which black women found themselves were often
United States and in the communities of color in not conducive to reproduction. Government
the developing world. These systems were disinvestment in black communities, lack of
conceptualized as intersecting and were analyzed protection from violence, environmental hazards,
for how they contributed to economic and low wages all created circumstances in which
disadvantage while simultaneously compounding black women could not choose to give life.
racial disadvantage. While all women—across I n their critique of the system of patriarchy
class and marital status—were disadvantaged by that enabled sexual violence against black
patriarchal power that governed sex, black women and the restriction of their reproductive
women experienced a racialized sexual choices based on their economic status, black
oppression that meant that anyone could lay women— and black lesbian women in particular
claim to their bodies and they would have little to (CRC 1977 ; Lorde 1984a , b )—also launched
no recourse. Constant assaults against black a critique of heterosexism, which they argued
women constrained their labor choices, further was integral to the deployment of racial,
Z.F. Robinson

economic, and gender inequality. Writing in This feminist theorists therefore emphasized that
Bridge Called My Back, published on the sexism and racism were inextricably linked with
Kitchen Table: Women of Color Press started by the mechanisms of capitalism, rather than
Barbara Smith, Cheryl Clarke ( 1983 [1995]) operating as mere derivative outcomes of
contended that, “while the black man may capitalism.
consider racism his primary oppression, he is Although a few theorists continued to analyze
hard put to recognize that sexism is inextricably the parallels between racism and sexism in the
bound up with the racism the black woman must 1960s and into the 1970s, this kind of theorizing
suffer, nor can he see that no women (or men for fell out of favor as black women intellectuals
that matter) will be liberated from the original worked to more accurately articulate how
“master-slave” relationship, viz., that between multiple systems of oppression interacted with
men and women, until we are all liberated from one another to produce differential outcomes
the false premise of heterosexual superiority” based on one’s position in the structure of power.
(246). Black lesbian women struggled against Rather than “twin evils,” then, racism and sexism
heterosexism in movement organizations and were increasingly theorized as interdependent
dismal economic outcomes that were a product of and mutually constitutive systems of oppression.
their intersecting race, gender, and sexuality Building on previous generations’ analyses of the
statuses. They were also central to a radical “double slavery” or “double burden” of the
broadening of the foci of black feminist praxis to woman question and the Negro question, black
more defi nitively include attention to global feminists in the 1960s increasingly began
oppressions, sexuality oppressions, trans* elaborating on the simultaneous outcomes of
oppression, and the intersection of race, gender, racism and sexism in mathematical terms.
and disability studies. Drawing on Marxist critiques of women’s place
in a capitalist society, activists like Frances Beale
focused on how black women, as “the slave of
23.4.3 From Parallels to Intersections slaves,” were exposed to “double jeopardy” as
they were exploited in labor markets that
As part of the turn towards new language in the constrained them both on the basis of race and
theorization of black women’s experience, black gender. But this double jeopardy implied more
feminist intellectuals began to more explicitly than the addition of one system to another (and
resist the parallelism in the juxtaposition of therefore the ability to subtract one system from
analyses of racism and sexism. Whereas aligning the other and altogether absent its effects from
the two had been a moral and rhetorical strategy existence); rather it signifi ed a multiplying and
used by women abolitionists to advocate for the reinforcing condition in which these respective
end of slavery, describing slavery’s ills as systems do not exist without, and in fact enable,
something that burdened black enslaved women one another.
and white mistresses equally was neither accurate I t is this theorization of the gendered and
or aligned with achieving justice. After slavery, racialized exploitation of black women, rooted in
describing the race problem as akin to the black feminist economic analyses since slavery,
problem of women’s suffrage or other forms of that heightened differences between black
inequality yielded friction between black and women’s and white women’s respective
white women suffragists. Black women’s movements for liberation. Beale ( 1970) argued
employment in dangerous and grossly underpaid that, “if the white groups do not realize that they
domestic labor in the homes of white women, are in fact fi ghting capitalism and racism, we do
even those white women who were not wealthy, not have common bonds” (153), therefore
further highlighted the distinctions in outcomes requiring an anti-racist struggle that also
between black and white women. Further, these recognized economic inequities and an anti-
inequities could not be explained away with capitalist struggle that understood how
merely an analysis of class inequality. Black eradicating racism was necessary for eliminating
ctionality 489

capitalism. In tandem with these analyses, black activist enterprise, black women academics,
feminist activists elaborated on how sexism intellectuals, and activists aimed to rewrite
functioned to disadvantage black women in and American history and the history of
outside of black communities, as well as how contemporary movements—women’s liberation
sexism and heterosexism within black and civil rights. This task included the
communities refl ected and reinforced both development of new language to capture and
racism and capitalism. They critiqued the theorize black women’s experiences, a
tendency to place the restoration of black men’s reformulation of coalition politics to maximize
masculinity via patriarchy ahead of race and the possibilities for justice, and the recovery of a
gender liberation for black women. They also range of black women’s experiences into
deconstructed resurgent discourses about black formally recognized aspects of the black feminist
people’s unfi tness for the middle class family movement and black feminist thought.
model, including notions of “pathology,” black As part of this expansion, and in tandem with
“matriarchy,” and the supposed inferiority of movement organizing, black women scholars in
woman-headed households. and outside of the academy wrote corrective,
B lack women’s organizing in resistance to descriptive, and theoretical scholarship about
rape, economic oppression, sexual and their experiences and the structure of inequality
reproductive oppression, and racism forms the in the U.S. and globally. They fundamentally re-
fundamental backbone of intersectionality wrote American history, recovering the role
theorizing. It is in and through mobilization for black women played in shaping not only race,
self-preservation and survival that this aspect of gender, and sexuality politics but also national
black feminist theorizing emerged as a signifi politics. Highlighting the “racist, sexist, and class
cant marker of black women’s experiences. This biases [that] are perpetuated in American
organizing, and the hard-fought gains won from historiography” (Scott 1982: 87), they
black feminist activism since WWII, co-occurred emphasized the importance of an intersectional
with theory- building and the institutionalization focus in the grand narrative of American history,
that contributed to the expansion of black from slavery, to suffrage, to labor, to anti-war
feminist theory in the academy beginning in the activism, to the civil rights, women’s rights, and
1980s. LGBT movements. Just as movement activists
had done in the 1960s and 1970s, black feminist
scholar-activists theorized race, class, gender,
sexuality, gender presentation, ability, and
23.5 Black Feminist Theory
nationality as part of a structural system of
and the Expansion of domination that infl uenced individual and group
Intersectionality outcomes, privileging those on the chosen end of
those status spectra and disadvantaging those on
The expansion of racial, ethnic, and women’s the oppressed end. They consistently emphasized
studies departments in American institutions in that the contemporary arrangement and structure
the 1960s and 1970s provided the fi rst broad- of inequality was rooted in America’s capital
scale opportunity for the institutionalization of origins in slavery. Yet, rather than recast slavery
black women’s studies, and by the 1980s, black as solely an economic system that simply
feminist intellectuals had formed a recognizable arranged an unequal system in service of itself,
fi eld, historiographical practice, and theoretical black feminists contended that in fact racism,
enterprise (Guy-Sheftall 1992 ). This fi eld anti-black misogyny, and suppression of labor
compelled a reimagining of black studies and worked in tandem to maintain white supremacy
women’s studies, in addition to the core of and capitalism simultaneously. Proceeding from
various humanities and social science disciplines. slavery, black feminist scholars critiqued the
Documenting and archiving of black women’s epistemic underpinnings of much work about
work as central to the American intellectual and black women, which towards the end of the civil
Z.F. Robinson

rights era was infl uenced by the arguments of the emphasis on coalition building, spurred on by
Moynihan report and notions of a pathological Third World and indigenous feminist theorizing
black “matriarchy.” and activism, held major groups accountable for
B lack feminists also began intensive projects rethinking movement action.
of anthologizing and canonizing black women’s Simultaneity was inherently more complex
work. Beginning with Hull et al. ( 1982 ) But than double-ness; even though the latter required
Some of Us Are Brave, anthologies of black a sense of simultaneity, it did not necessarily
feminist writing, either by a sole author or a encapsulate the multiple oppressions black
collection of writers, increasingly defi ned the fi women were organizing against. Building on
eld and the theoretical grounds on which W. E. B. Du Bois’ “double consciousness” of the
intersectionality would take hold. Brave was, at turn of the century and Frances Beale’s ( 1970 )
its core, a black feminist disciplinary “double jeopardy” nearly two decades previous,
intervention, covering women’s studies, black sociologist Deborah King ( 1988) offered
studies, and the humanities and social sciences. “multiple jeopardy” and “multiple
Angela Davis anthologized a set of her previously consciousness” to describe the context of black
published essays in Women, Race, and Class in feminist theorizing and organizing, as well as the
1983. That same year, Barbara Smith’s edited structure of inequality. Recognizing that the
volume, Home Girls: A Black Feminist widespread use of race- sex parallelism in social
Anthology , was published on Kitchen Table: theory was largely due to its legibility and
Women of Color Press. Smith’s volume was portability—“the race-sex correspondence has
disciplinarily expansive, including humanistic, been used successfully because the race model
social scientifi c, and aesthetic works, and was was a well-established and effective pedagogical
also the most explicitly dedicated to highlighting tool for both the theoretical conceptualization of
the distinctive voices of black lesbian feminists and the political resistance to sexual inequality”
in movement politics and aesthetic practice. In (44)—King contended that this “race-sex
1984, black feminist scholar bell hooks published correspondence” could not stand because within
a collection of essays on feminist theory. it, “all the women are white and all the blacks are
Ultimately, these and other anthologies and men.” Further, in underscoring the limits of
edited volumes rendered the contours of black “double” and “triple” jeopardy, King highlights
feminist theorizing visible in academic contexts. that “racism, sexism, and classism constitute
M ajor theoretical formulations emerged from three, interdependent control systems”
this work, as black feminists refl exively assessed (emphasis added, 47) for which an “interactive
their positions in the radical, women’s liberation, model” (Smith and Stewart 1983) is necessary.
and civil rights movements as well as assessed Importantly, King uses historical and
their current economic positions. For black contemporary instances of movement organizing
women scholars and activists, gender and to elaborate this interactive model, demonstrating
sexuality oppression were not secondary forms of the continued signifi cance of experiences of
inequality that would fall away after capitalism or organizing against oppression to developing and
racism. In a discursive shift, Smith ( 1985 ) writes refi ning black feminist theory in general, and
that “a black feminist perspective has no use for intersectionality in particular.
ranking oppressions, but instead demonstrates the O ther language emerged to capture the move
simultaneity of oppressions as they affect Third beyond additive models of oppression. In
World women’s lives” (6, emphasis added). This addition to multiple jeopardy/consciousness,
notion of a “simultaneity” of oppression refl Smith and Stewart’s ( 1983 ) notion of a
ected a shift in movement politics from single- “contextual interactive model/perspective” and
issue to multi-issue organizing in some of the Jeffries and Ransford’s ( 1980 ) “ethnogender”
mainstream organizations. Although black were exemplary of language shifts intended to
women had always been compelled to, in many recognize the multiplicity, simultaneity, and
ways, serve two or more movements, this new interdependence of systems of inequality. Yet,
ctionality 491

Kimberlé Crenshaw’s ( 1989 ) devalue, erase, and exclude black women’s work
“intersectionality”—which stood for ideas that just as the process of formalizing black feminist
had been theorized for more than a century under theory was underway in the academy. On the rise
different names and through different forms— of theory as commodity in the 1980s, Christian (
became canonical language and later shorthand 1987 ) argued that “people of color have always
for difference, diversity, and inclusion. Crenshaw theorized—but in forms quite different from the
elaborated the concept in two practical cases: a Western form of abstract logic. And I am inclined
legal case of black women against General to say that our theorizing (and I intentionally use
Motors ( 1989 ) and the case of women’s the verb rather than the noun) is often in narrative
organizing against gendered violence (1991 ) . forms, in the stories we create, in riddles and
These two works exemplifi ed the idea of an proverbs, in the play with language, since
intersecting, interactive model of oppression that dynamic rather than fi xed ideas seem more to our
was interested in how interdependent systems of liking” (52). How to reconcile the knowledge that
oppression operated to erase the experiences of arose from lived experiences, one’s standpoint, as
certain groups. Moreover, these papers, like other it were, with the knowledge that came from
black feminist work emerging in the 1980s, assessing categorical aggregate distributions of
argued for a recognition of the vast intraracial privilege and disadvantage became central to the
diversity amongst black people and black course of intersectionality’s reassertion in
women. This language was taken up in the work sociology.
of critical race theorists and critical legal
theorists, in some black feminist scholarly and
activist circles, and later would become common
23.6 Sociology and the Science of
language in feminist movement politics.
I t was in this expansion period of Intersectionality
intersectionality theory in the 1980s that two
disciplinary fi ssures—one epistemological and 23.6.1 Black Feminist Thought and
one methodological—emerged. Social science, in the Institutionalization of
the inherently racist and sexist biases in its Intersectionality
language, was often times ill-equipped to
appropriately theorize about black women’s T he sociologist Patricia Hill Collins is the black
lives, experiences, and outcomes. Black social feminist scholar most frequently tied to the
scientists in the 1970s and 1980s, like the advent of intersectionality in the fi eld. Her
classical black sociologists, found themselves up seminal monograph in this area, Black Feminist
against a set of methods that were based on faulty Thought ([ 1990 ] 2000), chronicled and built
assumptions (Ladner 1973 ; Aldridge 2008 ). upon black women’s studies across disciplines,
They consequently attempted to both build on representing the fi rst historiography of U.S.
these methods and devise new ones to black feminist theory. It offered important new
appropriately address black women’s lives. language to solidify the turn from parallelism to
While the humanities provided a more expansive simultaneity and multiplicity. Describing how
lens through which to conceptualize black intersectionality related to the work she sought to
women’s experiences, this created an empirical undertake in Black Feminist Thought , Collins
conundrum in enumerating inequality. Further, wrote: “Intersectional paradigms remind us that
the rise of critical theory and post-structural and oppression cannot be reduced to one fundamental
post-modern theories pushed scholars to move type, and that oppressions work together in
further from their subjects, an epistemic position producing injustice. In contrast, the matrix of
anathema to the organizing- bases of black domination refers to how these intersecting
feminist theory. Black feminist theorists, notably oppressions are actually organized. Regardless of
Barbara Christian, were critical of this particular the particular intersections involved, structural,
theoretical turn because of how it functioned to disciplinary, hegemonic, and interpersonal
Z.F. Robinson

domains of power reappear across quite different the Race, Gender, and Class section of the
forms of oppression” (18). Collins retools American Sociological Association in 1996.
standpoint theory via a black feminist lens, and These formal academic channels, established by
thus creates a threefold approach to black people who had been working in the bourgeoning
feminist theory and methodology. (1) fi eld of “race, class, gender studies” for several
Intersectionality, in her analysis, operated on a years, provided a space for intersectional
meta-level to capture the simultaneity of scholarship to be published, debated, and
oppressions in the lives of groups and recognized. Still, competing ideas about what
individuals; (2) standpoint theory was the constituted race, class, and gender research,
individual, epistemic ground on which black particularly in the context of which research was
feminist thought was built and conceived on the taken up and recognized beyond the boundaries
micro- level, as it had been since slavery; and (3) of the section, shaped both the institutionalization
the matrix of domination was a macro-structural of intersectionality and how the theory would be
description of how these multiple oppressions expressed in the discipline. These priorities refl
were organized. These levels were at once co- ected the disciplinary rift evidenced in the 1980s
occuring and interacting, as were the multiple between humanities and social scientifi c
systems of oppression. This sociological approaches to theorizing about inequality and
intervention, then, accounted for a long history of black women’s experiences in particular.
black feminist theorizing in the U.S., developed
and refi ne language with which to better research
inequality in the U.S., and highlighted the 23.6.2 The Rise of Intersectionality
importance of black feminist epistemologies to Research in Sociology
theorizing about a range of institutional
inequities—family, labor, religion, politics, and T he 1990s marked the beginning of an explosion
education amongst others. of intersectionality and intersectionality-inspired
A fter the initial publication of Black Feminist research—that is research that used the word
Thought , black feminist theory and language “intersectionality” to describe its methods,
were rapidly integrated into analyses of stratifi theory, or epistemology; that explicitly drew on a
cation. Rather than assuming gender meant white race, class, gender paradigm to account for
women and race meant black men, inequality inequality; that analyzed race, gender, class, and
scholars began to more consistently examine the another system of oppression or difference, like
“four categories”—black men, white men, black sexuality; and/or that acknowledged the
women, white women. While these categories researcher’s location in the matrix of domination
continued to be extraordinarily limited in their to contextualize the research and its fi ndings.
recognition of intragroup diversity or racial and This proliferation occurred simultaneously with
ethnic groups beyond black and white, the intersectionality’s institutionalization in the
mainstream move from two categories of analysis discipline, the rise of the refl exive turn in
to four or more signifi cantly expanded the rigor postmodern theory, and sociology’s
and usefulness of inequality research, reinvigorated commitment to documenting
illuminating precisely how inequality affected inequality as a distinguishing disciplinary
groups in multiple locations in the matrix of feature. The theory’s institutionalization yielded
domination. a large and broad fi eld of work unifi ed chiefl y
Black feminist theory was also by its insistence on considering the simultaneity
institutionalized in the discipline in various ways, of oppressions, both as experienced by
including the founding of Race, Gender, and individuals and groups and as arranged in the
Class journal in 1993 109 and the establishment of matrix of domination. This expansive and diverse

The journal’s original title was Race, Sex, and Class


109

and was changed to Race, Gender, and Class in 1995.


ctionality 493

fi eld yielded some of the most important employers—to demonstrate how and
sociological work on the nature of inequality in intersectional perspective might be used and why
the post-civil rights era. However, its breadth it, to the exclusion of other forms of analysis that
yielded methodological and theoretical did not take these intersections into account,
challenges in the fi eld. should be used.
T his work can be divided analytically into Scholars consistently acknowledged the
three distinct but interrelated branches: (1) complexity of theorizing, researching, and
empirical, (2) theoretical, and (3) writing about these interactive systems of
methodological. The empirical branch of this domination. West and Fenstermaker ( 1995 )
work was interested in how race, class, and proposed “doing difference” as a new way to
gender interacted to affect a number of outcomes, think about these systems, contending that the
from family formation, maintenance, and mathematical metaphors that had been used and
parenting strategies (Dill critiqued since early black feminist thought—
1988 ; Jacobs 1994 ; McDonald 1997 ; Battle double, triple, intersecting, simultaneous,
1999 ; Dillaway and Broman 2001 ), hiring multiplicative, additive. In a symposium of
practices (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004 ; responses to West and
Pager and Quillian 2005 ), occupational Fenstermaker’s article, several scholars
segregation (Glenn 1992 , 2009 ; Romero 1995 expressed reservations with the authors’ apparent
; Wingfi eld 2009 ), housing (Massey and Lundy elision of power and oppression for the language
2001) , organizations (Acker 2000 ), political of “doing” difference. In her response, Collins (
ideologies (Simien 2005 ), policy (Deitch 1993 1995 ) offered a classic critique of
; Haney 1996 ; Roberts 1996 ; Mink 1999 ; postmodernism, contending that social
Mink et al. 2003 ; constructions of “difference” had erased the very
Lovell 2002 ) and education (Bettie 2002 ; Stoll real systems of racism, patriarchy, and
2013) . This research also more explicitly treated capitalism. She reviewed the fi eld of race, class,
sexuality as a category of analysis and lived and gender studies up to that point to rearticulate
experience, bringing theories of sexuality and some of the key theoretical claims in her work
queer theory into intersectional research and the work of activists and theorists working in
(Gamson and Moon 2004 ; Moore 2008 ; Hunter the black feminist tradition. Describing the
2010 ). existing language, Collins wrote, “…the notion
The theoretical and methodological branches of interlocking oppressions refers to the macro
of this work both built on empirical level connections linking systems of oppression
intersectionality research by assessing and refi such as race, class, and gender. This is the model
ning its methods and theoretical assumptions as describing the social structures that create social
well as continued in theory-building in ways positions. Second, the notion of intersectionality
somewhat separate from the developing body of describes micro level processes—namely how
empirical research. In an early sociological each individual and group occupies a social
evaluation of the relationship of Marxist and neo- position within interlocking structures of
Marxist theories to the claims of intersectionality oppression described by the metaphor of
theory, Belkhir ( 1996) carefully analyzes the intersectionality. Together they shape
respective relationships between Marxism and oppression” (492). This response and other
feminism and Marxism and race theory, similar responses revealed the theoretical
concluding that Marxist theory nor class analysis tensions in the postmodern turn in critical theory
alone are useful to understanding the fractured, and the lived experiences of people of color and
rather than strictly hierarchical, nature of other marginalized groups and their theorizations
domination in the U.S. and globally. As with of those experiences.
most theoretical analyses of intersectionality, The West and Fenstermaker symposium also
Belkhir utilized a theoretical case study—hers underscored ongoing epistemological concerns in
was the case of domestic laborers and their intersectionality research, both as a result of the
Z.F. Robinson

erasure of black feminist activism and theory as 23.6.3 Intersectionality’s


well as exogenous forces, like the rise of Methodological and
postmodern theory, from outside of the Epistemological
discipline. Still, working in the tradition of black Complexities
feminist thought, several race, class, and gender
sociologists highlighted the importance of the After over a decade of increased intersectionality
scholarship in black women’s studies and research in sociology, sociologist Leslie McCall
moreover the voices of black women as key to (2005 ) , writing primarily about women’s studies
understanding inequality and to theoretical but implicitly to sociology as well, surveyed the
innovations in sociology (Barnett et al. 1999) . methodological approaches of intersectional
Jewish, Latina, and Asian women scholars also research. Providing a typology of intersectional
contributed to theorizing on intersectionality, research that is now widely used across
drawing on standpoint theory and the history of humanities and social science disciplines, McCall
women of color organizing separately and in attempts to construct a bridge between
coalitions with black women (Chow 1987; Blea interdisciplinary fi elds, like gender and sexuality
1992; Martinez 1996 ; Greenebaum 1999 ; studies, and disciplinary fi elds, like sociology.
Bettie 2002 ; Wilkins 2004 ). The distinctions she draws between typologies
If the epistemological question, a source of are as much about the theoretical assumptions
tension in the evolution of intersectionality, was that undergird scholars’ methodologies—“the
not fully addressed during this period in i philosophical underpinnings of methods and the
ntersectionality’s development in sociology, the kinds of substantive knowledge that are produced
related questions of methodology were amplifi in the application of methods” (1774)—as they
ed. Sociologists working in the area of race, class, are about precisely how scholars investigate their
and gender and in adjacent areas of inquiry have subjects. Imagining these approaches on a
been chiefl y concerned with how to deploy continuum of the conceptualization of categories,
intersectionality methodologically (Cuadraz and McCall describes the (1) “anticategorical”
Uttal 1999 ; McCall 2005 ; Bowleg 2008 ; Choo approach, which rejects categories given the fl
and Ferree 2010) . The wide emphasis on issues uidity of social identities and structures and
of method could at once be seen as the resembles the ethnomethodological approach of
disciplinary requirements for sound and precise “doing difference”; (2) the “intracategorical”
methodology and as an attempt to nullify or at approach, which recognizes the slippage of
least muddy the fi ndings of intersectionality categorical boundaries while also holding those
research. Critics expressed concern about the categories constant, particularly in terms of
lack of a uniform method and skepticism about structures of oppression; and (3) the
measuring the interactive effects of discrete intercategorical approach, which accepts
systems of power on individual and group categories based largely on how they are created
outcomes. Moreover, assessing and measuring by hegemonic structures in order to measure and
such complex dynamics so that fi ndings might assess inequalities, while implicitly recognizing
be considered defi nitive, authoritative, or signifi (outside of the context of the research) the
cant often necessitated leaving certain variables shifting nature of these boundaries. The
or categories out altogether. Researchers thus intercategorical approach is one McCall
needed to account methodologically for these described as applicable to her own research on
absences, even as it was evident that these the structural intersections of race, class, and
absences mattered for outcomes. gender inequality across social institutions, and
employment in particular. Although these kinds
of large-scale quantitative analysis that account
for inequities between groups at multiple
intersections were and are sometimes cast as
irrevocably complex, they nevertheless have, in
ctionality 495

the years since the publication of McCall’s work,


increased signifi cantly.
Developing along quantitative and qualitative 23.7 Black Feminist Theorizing
lines within the discipline, intersectionality and the Legacy of
research described the precise nature of Intersectionality
inequality across groups, space, and place;
illustrated how categories of race, class, gender, As a robust and diverse assessment of
and sexuality were made and re-made by state interlocking systems of oppression with attention
and individual actors (Moore 2008 ; Hunter to empirical data, sociology’s engagement with
2010 ); accounted for how individuals and groups intersectionality has transformed sociological
made sense of categories of identity and instances research on stratifi cation. Through the use of
of domination within place and space contexts qualitative and quantitative empirical data, and
(Garcia 2012 ; Robinson 2014 ); and attended to theorizing that has emerged from these research
unaccounted for social locations (Chun 2011 ; fi ndings, sociologists have been able to
Moore 2011 ). This scholarship both generated empirically confi rm and theoretically
empirical research and built on existing research, complement the major tenets of intersectionality
expanding intersectionality’s scope to include a that black feminist scholars have articulated since
wide range of study types that were focused on slavery. This work theorizes the mechanisms of
uncovering the relational nature of social inequality largely as they affect groups at
inequality and oppression, how groups navigated different social locations, e.g., black lesbian
equality vis-à-vis their social locations, and how women or working class white men, as well as
overarching social structures reinforced the how social structures of inequality interlock to
inequality order. create disadvantage. It has become increasingly
T hrough this scholarship, the discipline infl uential in how non- profi t organizations,
carved out the scientifi c boundaries of philanthropic groups, and public policy scholars
intersectionality research in sociology, even as think about inequality.
approaches to and uses of intersectionality in the Yet, as part of a broader range of black
fi eld remained varied. On the whole, sociology feminist theorizing, intersectionality has not yet
bracketed the more “complicated” aspects of been fully integrated into sociological knowledge
theory, particularly as they had been articulated production practices. There is a disjuncture
by black feminist and black queer theorists, in between the black feminist origins of
favor of a theoretical approach that could be more intersectionality and the deployment of
easily integrated into existing paradigms in intersectionality in sociology. Sociology tacitly
stratifi cation and inequality research. recognizes that people experience the world as
Intersectionality’s main theoretical assumptions their simultaneous embodiments and social
were widely portable—systems of oppression are locations in the matrix of domination, and
interlocking and the effects of this should be therefore and cannot be neatly subdivided into
assessed at micro, meso, and macro levels. In the categories. Yet, by taking categories as the
process, methodological consistency and enduring unit of analysis, even solely for
replicability became essential to transforming purposes of creating a general narrative about
intersectionality into a disciplinarily legible inequality, the specifi c mechanisms of inequality
science. Because methodology and theory are for people at the most marginalized social
often created and refi ned in a dialectical process, locations are obscured. Further, the workings of
this methodological work of trimming oppression—the fundamental questions of
intersectionality into a sociological science power—are often inadvertently obscured in
simply demonstrated the various conceptions of social scientifi c research. Conversely, black
science and approaches to analyses that undergird feminist theorists strove tirelessly to interrogate
sociological scholarship. and make visible these systems of power, and not
solely how the systems manifested in people’s
Z.F. Robinson

lives. The discipline thus lacks a key murder of Michael Brown in August 2014, the
historiographical consciousness about the founding of Black Lives Matter by community
development of intersectionality within the organizers Patrisse Cullors, Alicia Garza, and
context of a long history of black feminist Opal Tometi also thrust intersectionality into the
theorizing and black women’s organizing and public discourse. Black feminist activists in
activism. As a result, its epistemological particular have been especially vocal about the
blindspots and insistence on a certain kind of importance of intersectionality in the Black Lives
empiricism continue to ensure that most new Matter movement, highlighting the victimization
intersectionality theorizing happens outside of of black women by the state, via extrajudicial
the discipline. violence, and through domestic violence in black
With the popularization of intersectionality in communities. This resurgence of attention to
the academy and the public discourse, there have black feminist organizing created a new
been multiple calls for scholars to “move opportunity for black feminist theorizing,
beyond” the concept, even as it has been divorced returning to the origins of intersectionality to refi
from its epistemic origins and thus shorn of its ne how twenty-fi rst century movement politics
original potential as a methodological and affect theory-building and vice versa.
theoretical intervention in traditional disciplinary The two broad tracts of intersectionality
forms of knowledge. Collins ( 2015 ) research—the theoretical and discursive analysis
acknowledges this shift, arguing that in humanities and the empirical data focus in the
“intersectionality now garners its share of self- social sciences—continue to shape the
proclaimed experts and critics of its ideas and development of the theory, albeit in different
potential, many of whom demonstrate unsettling directions and to somewhat divergent ends.
degrees of amnesia and/or ignorance concerning Academic work occurs in tandem and sometimes
the scope of intersectional knowledge projects in cooperation with organizing work. Increased
writ large” (11). In her assessment of black attention to the radical potential of conversations
feminist theorizing and the function of shorthand about organizing and scholarship might
concepts like “the politics of respectability,” theoretically inform more than just the inequality
“standpoint,” and “intersectionality,” black literature, but also the social movements
feminist historian Brittney Cooper ( 2015) literature as well (Cohen 2004 ). From its
encouraged black feminist theorists across inception, black feminist theory has suggested
disciplines to fi nish covering the theoretical that inquiry should begin with lived experience
ground of black feminist thought. This pushback and help refi ne and drive theory- building and
against intersectionality in and beyond the empirical investigations. Black feminist scholars
discipline refl ects a broad fatigue with the idea have continued to hold this theoretical tenet as
and its prominence, our various disciplinary central to their intersectional investigations,
needs to be in constant search of new theories, recognizing the dialectical relationship between
and an unwillingness to reckon how the theory and practice. By engaging more directly
theoretical shortcuts we have taken to arrive at with black feminist theories of intersectionality
our respective versions of intersectionality have outside of the discipline, as well as the
compromised our ability to fully appreciate the intersectionality theory developed within the fi
concept. eld of sociology since the classical period,
The popularity of intersectionality in the sociologists can strengthen the robustness of
2010s grew as a result of a proliferation of black intersectionality by not avoiding or bracketing
feminist work on social media (Jarmon 2013 ), a some of its more refl exive and critical theoretical
reinvigoration of feminist movement politics in histories. This more comprehensive engagement
response to America’s rape culture, an expanded would illuminate how the macro-structural
recognition of the experience of trans* people, contours of the matrix of domination, the lived
and increased constraints on women’s experiences of identity at multiple social
reproductive rights. Further, in response to the locations, and coalition-based social movements
ctionality 497

function simultaneously to shape outcomes, C how, E. N. L. (1987). The development of feminist


theory, methods, and practice. consciousness among Asian American women.
Gender & Society, 1 (3), 284–299.
Christian, B. (1987). The race for theory. Cultural
Critique, 6 , 51–63.
Chun, J. J. (2011). Organizing at the margins: The
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Part V
Modes of Change
Social Evolution 24
Richard Machalek and Michael W. Martin
R. Machalek and M.W. Martin

24.1 Introduction sociology, considerations of evolutionary


changes in the human organism have attracted the
In common usage, including that employed by attention of sociologists only during the last 40
social scientists, the term evolution typically years or so, prompted in large part by the
refers to change that is both gradual and long- publication of Edward O. Wilson’s book
term. Social change has been described by Sociobiology: The New Synthesis ( 1975 ) and the
western thinkers as evolutionary at least as early extensive scientifi c developments to which it has
as the writings of Kant (Degler 1991) , and some given rise.
of the earliest social scientists framed their This chapter provides an overview of
thinking in evolutionary terms (e.g., Herbert evolutionary thinking in sociological theory from
Spencer, Emile Durkheim, Edward A. Ross, the nineteenth century to the present. Particular
Charles Ellwood, Franklin Giddings, Charles attention is devoted to the emergence and
Horton Cooley, Lester Frank Ward, William development of theoretical ideas and empirical
Graham Sumner). There is, however, research that have been stimulated by the “second
considerable variation with regard to specifi c Darwinian revolution,” which is the application
phenomena that can be said to undergo of neo-Darwinian theory (the integration of
evolutionary change. For example, early Darwin’s theory of natural selection with
sociological theorists often described various Mendelian genetics) to the study of human social
social structures such as groups or institutions, behavior. The 1975 publication of Wilson’s
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 503
S. Abrutyn (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary Sociological Theory,
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32250-6_24
and even entire societies or social systems, as Sociobiology can be said to have signifi ed the
subject to evolutionary change (e.g., Spencer dawning of the second Darwinian revolution.
1885; Durkheim 1947) . With the rise of Two primary branches of behavioral biology,
Darwin’s theory of evolution, entire species came sociobiology and behavioral ecology, have been
to be viewed as subject to transformation by the most infl uential in guiding efforts to apply
evolutionary processes comprising “natural insights derived from the second Darwinian
revolution to the study of human social behavior.
More recently, sociologists have begun to turn to
the neurosciences as well in order to gain
purchase on how natural selection has shaped the
R. Machalek ()
University of Wyoming , Laramie , WY , USA e- evolution of human social behavior (Turner 2000
mail: machalek@uwyo.edu , 2012 , 2015 ; Franks 2010 , 2015 ).
M. W. Martin T hus, a perusal of the history of evolutionary
Adams State University , Alamosa , CO , USA e- thinking in sociology reveals two primary foci:
mail: mwmartin@adams.edu (1) a traditional focus on changes in the structure
selection” (Darwin 1859 ). In Darwin’s view, of society and its various components, and (2) a
evolutionary change is manifest over more recent focus on the evolved features of the
generational time in populations of individuals, human brain and mind and how these features
and such change entails modifi cations in their help shape human social behavior. Elements of
morphological and physiological traits. When both foci can be found in a growing body of
such traits promote the survival and reproductive sociological thought and inquiry that is being
prospects of individuals, they are said to be called “evolutionary sociology” (Maryanski
adaptations. Until recently, the term evolution in 1998 ; Turner and Maryanski 2008 ; Runciman
the social sciences has been used less frequently 2015 ). In recent years, much of evolutionary
to describe changes in individual organisms and thinking in sociology has begun to converge. But
more frequently to describe changes in society various conceptual and theoretical divergences
and its constituent parts. In contemporary persist, and a strong consensus about exactly
what a unifi ed evolutionary perspective in forms of selection that can occur in sociocultural
sociology should entail remains elusive. This evolution: “Darwinian selection,” “Durkheimian
situation is not unique to evolutionary sociology. selection,” and “Spencerian selection” (Turner
In fact, signifi cant differences prevail even today 2010 ). Durkheimian selection and Spencerian
among biologists regarding fundamental issues in selection will be discussed later.
evolutionary theory and research. One of the In classical, Darwinian evolutionary theory,
foremost and most contentious of such issues is evolution means intergenerational changes in the
the recent debate over levels of selection in social distribution of traits within populations of
evolution (Wilson and Wilson 2007 ; West et al. individuals. These traits are the product of gene-
2011 ). Given continuing debate among environment interactions that produce
evolutionary biologists themselves about phenotypes, some of which constitute evolved
fundamental issues in evolutionary theory, it is adaptations. An adaptation is a genetically-based
hardly surprising that evolutionary-minded trait that enhances an individual’s chances of
sociologists are not of one mind about how to survival and reproductive success within a
develop and apply evolutionary thinking to the particular environment. Adaptations comprise
study of human social behavior. The purpose of morphological, physiological, and behavioral
this chapter is to review key issues and recent traits. In theories of sociocultural evolution,
developments in theoretical thinking produced by individuals are sometimes the focus of
evolutionary sociologists and to summarize and evolutionary analysis, but most traditional
consolidate basic insights that are emerging sociological theories of evolution focus on
among those engaged in a pursuit of an changes in the structure of society or its corporate
evolutionary understanding of human social components (groups, organizations, institutions,
behavior. or stratifi cation systems). Such
24.2 Fundamental Issues in
Conceptualizing Evolution

The notion of evolution in the history of social


thought ranges from very casual conceptions
such as “long-term, gradual change” to more
formal and technical conceptions that derive from
current work being conducted in scientifi c
disciplines such as evolutionary biology,
population and molecular genetics, behavioral
ecology, and the cognitive neurosciences. In that
regard, we will briefl y review basic issues
entailed in viewing social change as an
evolutionary process.
Although the rate and degree of change that
can be regarded as evolutionary in nature vary,
most traditional conceptualizations of evolution,
including social evolution, connote change that is
both gradual and incremental. In organic
evolution, natural selection occurs over
intergenerational time, from reproductive cycle
to reproductive cycle. Recent conceptualizations
of sociocultural evolution posit that evolutionary
change also can occur intragenerationally, within
an individual’s lifetime. The evolutionary
sociologist Jonathan H. Turner has posited three
506 R. Machalek and M.W. Martin

changes can occur either within or across advantages constitute elevated prospects for
generations. survival and reproduction by individuals (and
B oth organic and sociocultural evolution sometimes, kin groups) and are summarized by
depend upon the infl uence of informational the expressions “fi tness” or “reproductive
media that produce evolved adaptations success.” Accordingly, the measure of
(phenotypic traits). In organic evolution, the evolutionary success is not captured by a literal
informational medium is genetic. In sociocultural interpretation of the phrase survival of the fi ttest.
evolution the medium is culture. However, Instead, survival matters only if it yields the
culture can also be conceptualized as an consequence of reproductive success of either
environment that interacts with genes to produce individuals, which is labeled individual or
evolved adaptations. The study of how genes and Darwinian fi tness, or the reproductive success of
culture interact to produce traits at both the members of kin groups, which is labeled
individual and collective level is called gene- inclusive fi tness (Hamilton 1964 ). In
culture coevolution (Boyd and Richerson 1985; sociocultural evolution, the notion that
Lumsden and Wilson 1981 ). Evolutionary evolutionary change confers advantages extends
changes in the distribution of either individual or beyond the survival and reproductive success of
societal traits are understood to represent individuals. Instead, fi tness (success in
adjustments to conditions presented by sociocultural evolution) is commonly construed
environments. Such adjustments may constitute to mean “the ability of sociocultural units to
modifi cations that are responses to stable sustain themselves in their environments”
features of environments, or they may entail (Turner 2010 :30). Thus, fi tness in sociocultural
modifi cations that are responses to changing evolution (the enhanced ability of a society or a
environmental conditions. corporate structure to persist) may or may not
In classical organic evolutionary theory, contribute to biological fi tness (reproductive
phenotypic changes produced by the interaction success of individuals). In fact, the maintenance
between genes and their environments are the of a sociocultural system that is stressed in terms
result of random, non-purposive (non- of resources needed to sustain its population may
teleological) changes in genes whose products be enhanced by reduced biological fi tness
are subject to non-random, but equally non- (fertility rates) among members of that
purposive environmental forces of selection. That population, because this will reduce demand for
is, organic evolution is not directed by goals or resources such as food. While sociocultural fi
informed by foresight. It is a purely mechanical tness and biological fi tness may be mutually
process entailing gene-environment interaction enhancing in certain environmental contexts,
that has been described metaphorically as the they may work at cross-purposes in others.
work of a “blind watchmaker” (Dawkins 1986 ). A mong evolutionary theorists, a long debated
By way of contrast, sociocultural evolution can, question is the level at which adaptations evolve.
but need not be, powered by purposive, goal- Does natural selection produce traits that enhance
oriented human conduct that is informed by the survival and reproductive success of
foresight and directed by planning. In other individuals alone, or does it produce traits that are
words, sociocultural evolution can be shaped by fi tness- enhancing for groups, populations, or
teleological processes while, simultaneously, even species as well? This is commonly
remaining subject to purely mechanical, non- discussed as the “group selection” (or “levels of
purposive forces as well. selection”) problem. Most of the discussion
A lmost all versions of evolutionary pertains to behavior that is mediated by genes
explanation imply that either individual or rather than culture. Accordingly, the levels of
collective adjustments to features of selection debate is more contentious among
environments confer advantages of some sort. In biologists studying organic evolution than it has
classical organic evolutionary theory, such been among sociologists studying sociocultural
24 Social Evolution 507

evolution. In simplifi ed terms, the basic question from theories of sociocultural evolution, Abrutyn
is this: Does natural selection produce traits for explains how “institutional entrepreneurs” acting
the “good of the individual” or for the “good of over long periods of historical time crafted
the group?” “cultural assemblages” that contributed signifi
Though sociocultural evolution arguably cantly to the survival of Israelite religion and the
entails phenomena of greater complexity than population that bore it ( 2015b ). Particularly
does organic evolution, the question of group signifi cant were pollution-purifi cation rituals
selection is, ironically, more easily resolved in that were performed annually, weekly, and even
the minds of sociologists rather than biologists. In daily, and these rituals integrated the salvation of
conventional organic evolutionary theory, the the individual with the well-being and endurance
forces of selection act directly on individuals and of the community, thereby functioning as a
indirectly on the genes that produce them. Since group- selection mechanism that helps explain
only individual bodies, not groups, actually house the survival of the Jewish people and their
genes and transmit them to individual offspring, religion for over two millennia (Abrutyn 2014 ,
the “target of selection” is the individual. 2015b ).
However, when describing and analyzing As conceptualized by evolutionary
patterns of sociocultural evolution, sociologists sociologists such as Lenski ( 2005 ), Turner (
view various sorts of collectivities as 2010 ), Blute ( 2010 ), and Abrutyn ( 2014 ), the
“superorganisms” that are also “potential units history of sociocultural evolution presents
subject to selection,” and such superorganisms unassailable evidence of the existence of group
include groups, organizations, communities, selection, a complex set of processes by means of
institutional domains, entire societies, or even which diverse sociocultural phenotypes evolve
intersocietal systems (Turner and Maryanski among different groups and populations.
2015 :103). Like the physical phenotypes of Consequently, in the view of at least two
individual organisms, “sociocultural phenotypes” evolutionary sociologists, “it is so obvious that
are seen as “survivor (sic) machines” that buffer selection is working on social structures and their
the forces of selection which emanate from the cultures organizing individual organisms that it is
environments in which populations of individuals diffi cult to see what the controversy (about group
live (Turner and Maryanski 2015: 103–106). In selection) is all about in biology” (Turner and
sociocultural evolution, the targets of selection Maryanski 2015 :104). The question of why the
are complex and multi-layered forms of culture issue of group selection is more hotly disputed
and social structure, not merely the physical among evolutionary biologists than among
phenotypic traits of individual organisms. Over evolutionary sociologists becomes clearer when
time, some sociocultural phenotypes succumb to differences in the way group selection is viewed
various forces of selection, while others exhibit by these “two cultures” of evolutionary thinkers
higher “fi tness,” which is defi ned in terms of are understood.
length of time that a sociocultural system exists In simplest terms, evolutionary biologists
or its ability to exist and endure in a range of approach the levels of selection (including group
environments (Turner and Maryanski 2015 :95). selection) issue in terms of the genetic, not
A n example of this sort of thinking about cultural, forces that underpin social evolution. In
sociocultural evolution and group selection is mainstream, evolutionary biological theory,
available in historical analyses of the survival of natural selection favors any genetically-based
a sociocultural system that has been targeted by trait that increases the survival and reproductive
some of the most severe selection forces to which success of an individual bearing that trait, not
any human population has been subjected, the other members of groups to which that individual
people of Israel and their religion (Abrutyn 2015 might belong. In organic evolutionary theory, the
a , b) . By integrating elements of cultural idea of group selection means that natural
sociological analysis with principles derived selection would somehow favor genes that would
508 R. Machalek and M.W. Martin

reduce the survival and reproductive chances of argued that the group is a fundamental unit of
any individual that bore them, but cultural evolution, or that cultural evolution is a
simultaneously, increase the survival and group-level process (Boyd and Richerson 1985)
reproductive success of the population of the , there is no formal basis for this” (West et al.
group as a whole. Put casually, group selection 2011: 248). As is clear from this brief discussion
would mean that natural selection would favor of group selection, the levels of selection issue is
genes that are “good for the group” at the expense complex and multifaceted in the context of both
of genes that are “good for the individual.” In this organic and sociocultural evolution, and it does
conception of group selection, the adaptive not resolve itself easily to the satisfaction of all
consequences of a trait are always measured participants. As more dialogue develops between
using the metric of “gene-counting,” not the social scientists and evolutionary biologists,
persistence or demise of a collectivity organized prospects increase for the advancement of
and regulated by the “sociocultural phenotypes.” scientifi c understanding of this important aspect
Thus, the case of the variable success and failure of social evolution.
of automobile companies as an example of group In summary, the very existence of
selection in sociocultural evolution fails to sociocultural systems and sociocultural evolution
address the central issue around which the debate depends ultimately on processes of organic
over group selection in organic evolution evolution, because the existence of culture
revolves (Turner and Maryanski 2015 :104). depends on the evolved cognitive capabilities of
Unless, and only unless, the survival or demise a species that has a brain that can produce and
of automobile companies could be shown to be process symbols. The trajectory of organic
linked somehow to genetic variability among evolution, however, can be and is shaped by
individuals who comprise the populations of processes of sociocultural evolution, as is
those companies, the issue of group selection as illustrated by biological fi tness-reducing
conceptualized in organic evolution is not even meanings (e.g., celibacy norms in certain
addressed in this example. religious groups) and technologies (effective
I t is not surprising that confusion persists contraceptive technologies). Thus, the
about what is at issue in notions of group relationship between organic evolution and
selection in sociocultural evolution versus sociocultural evolution represents an important
organic evolution. In fact, debate about the levels topic in evolutionary inquiry in general.
of selection issue is even more extensive, and
probably rancorous, among evolutionary
biologists than it is between social scientists and
24.3 Evolutionary Sociological
biologists. A recent article written by three
evolutionary biologists identifying 16 Theory Before the Second
misconceptions about the evolution of Darwinian Revolution
cooperation among humans provides insight into
the complexity of this issue (West et al. 2011 ). I n the broad, most general sense of the term,
Of the 16 misconceptions, almost one-third (fi evolution in traditional sociological thought
ve) pertain to the issue of group selection. Efforts commonly referred to long-term, gradual changes
to determine if group selection actually occurs in in the overall organization of society or certain
organic evolution are made more challenging by parts of it. Evolutionary change was frequently
the fact that the concept of group selection has at characterized as entailing a sequence of stages. In
least four different meanings (West et al. 2011 almost all such conceptions of evolutionary
:246–249). Though most of their discussion change, each stage was viewed as an
pertains to group selection in organic evolution “advancement” of some sort, and the overall
alone, the authors briefl y address “cultural group course of evolution was commonly understood to
selection,” and conclude that “while it is often represent “progress” (Blute 2010 :3–7, 183).
24 Social Evolution 509

Eventually, Darwin’s theory of evolution by and empirically- informed of that among any of
natural selection largely replaced teleological and his contemporaries and most of his successors in
orthogenetic conceptions of change in which western classical sociological theory. The
evolution was viewed as a process directed organizing theme of all of his evolutionary
toward a predetermined outcome. analyses was the empirical tendency for human
24.3.1 Evolutionary Thought in societies to exhibit a near-universal transition
Classical Sociological from structural simplicity to complexity, a
Theory development that was echoed in the work of a
number of his successors in classical sociological
The two classical sociological theorists whose theory, including Durkheim, Marx, Simmel,
writings were most heavily infused with Tönnies, and Veblen, among others. The work of
biological ideas were Herbert Spencer and Emile all of these theorists placed heavy emphasis on
Durkheim. Of the two, Spencer’s theoretical the evolutionary trend toward greater structural
thinking was more fully developed in differentiation within societies, which, in turn,
evolutionary terms. Though Durkheim relied was often described as a series of evolutionary
heavily on biological metaphors to propose a stages through which societies evolved.
structural- functional analysis of society, S pencer was perhaps the fi rst classical
Spencer’s theories provided a more complete and theorist to assert that, inasmuch as human
nuanced account of processes implicated in societies are “superorganisms,” their analysis
societal evolution. A number of key ideas were requires concepts and explanatory principles
shared by both thinkers, including the notion that beyond those that are suffi cient for studying
(1) populations of human societies exhibit a long- organic systems. Yet, there is considerable
term trend toward growth, (2) population growth isomorphism in the conceptual apparatus that
leads to increasing complexity and structural Spencer used to analyze sociocultural evolution
differentiation within societies, (3) increasing and that used to analyze organic evolution. In
societal complexity alters the nature of fact, as has been commonly observed, Darwin
integration/solidarity within societies, (4) all of expressed a debt of gratitude to Spencer (as well
these changes typically enhance the ability of as to Adam Smith and Thomas Malthus) for
societies to adjust more successfully to their insights about organic evolution, including
environments, and (5) all of these changes are Spencer’s now-famous
amenable to systematic, empirical investigation. phrase, “the survival of the fi ttest.”
Another key feature shared by the writings of According to Spencer, the fundamental force
both thinkers, also infl uenced by biology, was that drives the evolution of the transition of
their advocacy of interpreting the “structures” of societies from simplicity to complexity is growth
sociocultural systems in terms of the “functions” in population size, a development which itself
those structures performed for the survival and became the focus of explanatory efforts among
maintenance of those systems. Subsequently, later evolutionary thinkers. According to
both Spencer and Durkheim became associated Spencer, the survival of all human societies
with the theoretical perspective of depends on their ability to solve three basic
“functionalism,” or “structural- functionalism” problems that he labeled operation (the
which dominated western sociology through the production of resources and the reproduction of
fi rst half of the twentieth century, and slightly populations and social structures), regulation (the
beyond. coordination and control of activities of members
B ecause of his role in the development of of a population), and distribution (the allocation
extensive data sets on many societies, Spencer’s of information and resources among members of
theories were heavily informed by empirical a population, and the movement of those people)
evidence (Turner 1985) . As a result, his (Spencer 1885 ). In Spencer’s view, these three
evolutionary analysis is perhaps the most detailed problems constitute adaptive challenges in
510 R. Machalek and M.W. Martin

response to which adaptive structures such as consequences for the mechanisms by means of
human institutions evolved. which societies
S pencer’s scheme for specifying how societal achieved (or failed to achieve) solidarity, or
complexity, or differentiation, evolves merits integration. In Durkheim’s view, the evolution of
brief description as both a framework for increasingly complex societies constituted a
conducting comparative analysis among societies long-term evolutionary trend that could be
as well as a map of stages through which he c described in terms of a transition from a form of
ontended that societies tend to evolve. societal cohesion based on shared culture
Foreshadowing the kind of thinking that (mechanical solidarity) to a form of cohesion
eventually developed into the full-blown based on specialization and the interdependence
theoretical school known as “functionalism,” that it necessitated (organic solidarity). Like
Spencer contended that, as populations grow, Spencer, Durkheim’s work was highly infl
they evolve increasingly specialized structures uential both in stimulating subsequent stage-
that achieve the societal mandates of operation, model thinking among sociological theorists and
regulation, and distribution. Some of this growth in laying a foundation for the development of
occurs by means of amalgamation, whereby functionalism.
previously distinct societies become conjoined, Though less fully developed than the work of
while normal demographic processes of Spencer and even Durkheim as a distinct
migration and fertility contribute further to larger theoretical perspective, evolutionary ideas
population sizes. Spencer used the term populate aspects of the writings of other classical
“compounding” to denote the trend toward sociological theorists as well. Like Spencer and
greater differentiation within societies, and this, Durkheim, Georg Simmel attributed considerable
in turn, led to his designating stages of societal sociological signifi cance to increasing structural
evolution as comprising simple (with and without differentiation (Turner 2013 :172–176, 192–
heads) societies, compound societies, doubly 203). Similarly, by tracing the rise of capitalism
compound societies, and trebly compound through a sequence of eras distinguished by their
societies (Spencer 1885 ). Informed by modes of production, Marx’s writing provided
systematic, detailed cross-cultural data sets, another stage model of societal evolution, one
Spencer’s scheme for classifying societies at which later became infl uential in informing the
different stages of evolution was the most more explicitly evolutionary theory of Gerhard
sophisticated and empirically informed of his Lenski ( 2005 ). Adopting L. H. Morgan’s labels
time of “savagery,” “barbarism,” and “civilization,
(Turner 1985 , 2013 ). Thorstein Veblen described and analyzed long-
Though far-less conceptually and term changes in human societies. The
theoretically detailed than Spencer’s scheme, characteristics of his societal stages correspond
Durkheim also contributed to a stage-model surprisingly closely to contemporary models
conceptualization of societal evolution which, in which feature hunting-gathering, horticultural,
many ways, closely parallels that of Spencer agricultural, and industrial stages of societal
(Durkheim 1947 ). Like Spencer, Durkheim tried evolution found commonly in contemporary
to explain the nature and course of the long-term anthropological and sociological analyses. And
trend of increasing structural complexity though most closely associated with his
commonly evident in human societies. And like contributions to the development of micro-
Spencer, Durkheim focused on increasing sociology and social psychology, evolutionary
population size as the driving force behind this insights constituted foundational principles on
trend. For Durkheim, greater structural the basis of which George Herbert Mead
differentiation was most sociologically signifi constructed his theory of self and society.
cant in the form of the division of labor and its T he work of the sociological theorists
discussed above represented attempts to
24 Social Evolution 511

characterize and explain societal-level changes in 24.3.2 Evolutionary Thought in


social structure in evolutionary terms. Another Sociological Theory
group of classical sociologists, some of whom Before 1975
were associated with the intellectual
misadventure of Social Darwinism, focused more The survival and development of evolutionary
directly on the evolution of human nature. thinking in sociology during most of the second
Interestingly, however, they were not all of one half of the twentieth century was limited largely
mind. While some contributed directly to the to the further development of stage-models of
development of Social Darwinism, including evolution represented by the work of theorists
racist conceptions of human variation, others such as Talcott Parsons, Gerhard and Jean
explicitly rejected ideas on which Social Lenski, Patrick Nolan, and Jonathan H. Turner,
Darwinism was based. For example, eschewing among others. Prior to the onset of the second
the notion that the idea of the survival of the fi Darwinian revolution, roughly 1975, Lenski (
ttest necessarily led to the conclusion that natural 1966 ) and Parsons ( 1966 ) produced the most
selection is driven by a ruthless war of “all infl uential stage models in evolutionary
against all,” both L. F. Ward and E. A. Ross sociological theory. Like Spencer and Durkheim
attributed to evolution the existence of “social before them, Lenski and his colleagues traced the
instincts” that make humans concerned with the long-term evolution of human societies from the
welfare of others and in possession of both hunting-gathering era to the industrial and post-
“human sympathies” and a sense of “the industrial eras. They placed primary emphasis on
corporate self” (Degler 1991 :12– 14). Ward, in the role of subsistence technologies as the
fact, viewed evolution as a powerful, progressive primary driving force of societal evolution, and
force that installed extraordinary, innate potential they mapped the consequences of changes in
in human nature that was all-too- often thwarted subsistence technology on economic activity, the
by environmental circumstances. development of surplus, and the evolution of
N evertheless, both racist and sexist systems of social stratifi cation (Lenski 1966 ;
conceptions of human nature that prevailed in the Lenski and Lenski 1970 ; Nolan and Lenski
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 2015 ). As did Spencer and Durkheim before
clearly helped shape the thought and writings of them, Lenski and his colleagues emphasized the
other sociologists as well as anthropologists, long-term trend toward greater structural
economists, and psychologists (Degler 1991 :13– differentiation within societies and
31). As the twentieth century progressed, accompanying developments in both societies’
however, hereditarian conceptions of human institutions and corporate structures. Societal
nature waned, and the concept of culture became evolution was characterized as consisting of
the primary notion informing explanations of process of variation and selection within
human behavior in both the social and behavioral environmental contexts, including the contexts
sciences. It was not until the mid- to latter part of created by other societies. The analogue to
the twentieth century that ideas and information genetic variation in their models was cultural
from evolutionary biology prompted a re- innovation, and the social structural products of
examination of the possibility that an evolved cultural information were patterns of social
human nature manifests itself in human social structure, the sociocultural analogue to
behavior. phenotypes in organic evolution. Subsistence
technology was the feature of culture to which
Lenski and his colleagues attributed greatest infl
uence in shaping societal evolution.
A bout the same time that Lenski ( 1966 ) was
developing his “ecological-evolutionary” model
of societal evolution, Parsons also produced a
512 R. Machalek and M.W. Martin

theory of societal evolution ( 1966 ). As did biology (ethology, behavioral ecology), but
Spencer and Durkheim before him, Parsons eventually, in the social and behavioral sciences
focused on the long-term evolutionary trends as well. The remainder of this chapter reviews
toward increasing societal size and greater key developments within sociobiology and
cultural and social structural differentiation. associated fi elds of evolutionary inquiry and
Framing his evolutionary thinking in their eventual impact on the rise of a new
functionalist terms, Parsons addressed the “evolutionary sociology.”
question of how increasing societal complexity
affects the problem of “integration” and yields
“adaptive upgrading” which better enables
24.4 Evolutionary Sociological
societies to cope both with new, internal societal
developments as well as novel environmental Theory After the Second
conditions. Darwinian Revolution
S ociologists often equate evolution and
development, but biologists distinguish between 24.4.1 The Rise and Infl uence of
these two processes. Development occurs in Sociobiology
individuals, while evolution occurs in
populations. Refl ecting on this distinction, Sociobiology is a branch of evolutionary biology
Marion Blute explains that stage models of devoted to the scientifi c study of the biological
societal change are better regarded as bases of social behavior among animals,
developmental than evolutionary in nature ( 2010 including humans. Preceded by older branches of
:3–7). Blute concludes that the theories of social behavioral biology such as ethology and
change produced by Spencer, Durkheim, and comparative psychology, sociobiology coalesced
even Parsons better characterize processes of into a new and distinct branch of behavioral
biological development than they do evolution. biology in 1975 with the publication of Wilson’s
And since the process of development can be tome. As Wilson describes it, sociobiology is
described as a sequence of stages that ends in a simply the study of how social behavior and
largely predetermined outcome (e.g., and infant societies evolve by natural selection. The
matures into an adult), early social thinkers explanatory logic of sociobiology was developed
tended to think about change as representing for the study of non-human animals, but Wilson
“progress” (Blute 2010) . As will become evident expanded it to include the study of human social
later, contemporary stage-theories of evolution behavior and societies as well.
rarely imply developmental trajectories that are In evolutionary theory, if a trait produced by
somehow predetermined in the process of social natural selection contributes to an organism’s
change itself. Though stage-model thinking can chances of survival and reproductive success, it is
still be found in sociological theory, this tradition called an adaptation. Adaptations consist of
of sociological thought is being succeeded by morphological (anatomical) traits, physiological
newer versions of evolutionary theory, which will traits, and behavioral traits, including social
be discussed later. behaviors. Sociobiological research entails
D uring the 1960s and 1970s, signifi cant efforts to identify and analyze patterns of social
developments occurred in evolutionary biology behavior as possible evolved adaptations. For
which eventually led to the threshold of what is example, sociobiologists are interested in
now called the “second Darwinian revolution” exploring how the allocation of parenting
(Machalek and Martin 2004) . The most infl responsibilities, which they call “parental
uential of those developments was the investment,” might entail evolved adaptations for
publication of Sociobiology: The New Synthesis assuring that offspring survive to reproductive
(Wilson 1975 ), and it launched a new era of age (Trivers 1972 ). Categories of social
evolutionary thinking not only in behavioral behavior that sociobiologists have identifi ed as
24 Social Evolution 513

possibly infl uenced by evolved adaptations eusocial insects, commonly giving rise to
include parenting, mating and mate selection, colonies with very large populations and colony-
cooperation, competition, confl ict, level complex systems of social organization
communication, altruism, reciprocity and (Hölldobler and Wilson 1990 ). One of the most
exchange, aggression and violence, parent- notable features of such colonies is the
offspring confl ict, sibling competition, and status phenomenon of “reproductive altruism” whereby
competition, among others. as few as one female (the “queen”) in the colony
Natural selection favors traits which, within monopolizes all egg- laying activity and is
the environmental contexts in which they exist, supported by all of the other females. It might be
maximize an individual’s fi tness , or its genetic said that the queen occupies the status of
representation in the next generation. “designated reproducer” for the entire colony,
Sociobiological theory distinguishes between and all of the other females labor in support of her
individual fi tness (also called “Darwinian” fi reproductive effort. The colony itself, sometimes
tness), and inclusive fi tness. Individual fi tness described as a “superorganism,” is like an
refers to the success of an individual in individual, a reproductive unit, and the
contributing its genes to the next generation by extraordinary degree of cooperation and sacrifi ce
reproduction, and inclusive fi tness refers to the exhibited by colony members inspired
sum of an individual’s fi tness plus that evolutionary biologists to investigate the extent
individual’s contribution to the fi tness of its to which genetic kinship comprises the
relatives other than direct descendants. Inclusive foundation of cooperative social life among other
fi tness is increased by the process of kin taxa as well, including vertebrates, thereby
selection , whereby social behaviors have launching a now 50-year long program of
adaptive consequences for members of kin sociobiological research (Hölldobler and Wilson
groups, not just individuals. 2009 ).
Sociobiological theory traces the evolution of It is important to understand that
basic forms of cooperation among individuals in sociobiology, when applied to humans, does not
groups to the processes of kin selection, which entail studying a non-human species and then
can be supplemented by other evolutionary extrapolating to humans what has been fi rst
mechanisms such as “mutualism” (interaction learned about the non-human species. For
with consequences that benefi t all participants, example, a sociobiologist would never claim that
regardless of their degree or relatedness) or the existence of “altruistic suicide” among bees
“reciprocal altruism” (reciprocity among non- and ants explains “altruistic suicide” among
kin). human soldiers. Rather, sociobiological research
The idea that genetic kinship is the foundation on non- human animals can lead to the discovery
on which cooperative social life fi rst evolved was of general evolutionary processes and
infl uenced strongly by research on the eusocial mechanisms that can inform explanations of
insects, which are ants, bees, wasps and termites. social behavior across species lines. Simply put,
Ants, bees, and wasps (but not termites) feature though general evolutionary processes such as
an unusual genetic system known as kin selection are expressed among many social
“haplodiploidy” whereby sisters within a colony species, this does not mean that a particular
are more closely genetically related to each other behavior found in two species means that the
than they are to their mothers. The genetic behavior was inherited by one species from the
“hyper- relatedness” among full sisters means other. Consequently, early objections by critics of
that they share, on average, 75 % of their genes sociobiology that it is futile to try to explain the
with each other in contrast to full siblings in causes of human social behavior by studying ants
diploid species, which share, on average, only 50 (or, for that matter, any other non-human species)
% of their genes. Consequently, kin selection reveals a failure to understand the logic of
favors high levels of cooperation among the
514 R. Machalek and M.W. Martin

evolutionary theory in general and increases, processes of reciprocity and mutualism


sociobiological theory in particular. and cultural labels can create a sense of kinship
Efforts to explain human social behavior on among group members who are “genetic
the basis of what has been learned by studying strangers” to each other. Thus, psychological
non-human social species precede the emergence mechanisms that evolved in support of
of sociobiology. The anthropologists Lionel cooperation based on genetic kinship can be
Tiger and Robin Fox advocated the adoption of a extended to enable the formation and
zoological perspective in social science almost a maintenance of cooperative groups based on
decade before the publication of Sociobiology cultural “kinship.”
(Tiger and Fox 1966 ). Similarly, the sociologist In addition to his analysis of ethnic groups,
Pierre van den Berghe’s advocacy of the van den Berghe also uses sociobiological
development of a “biosocial” approach to the concepts and theory in analyzing patterns of
study of human social behavior also preceded the marriage and mating among humans ( 1990 ).
publication of Wilson’s tome (van den Berghe Specifi cally, like sociobiologists, van den
1973 , 1974 ). Not long after the publication of Berghe looks at variation in systems of marriage
Sociobiology, another sociologist, Joseph (monogamy, polygamy, polygyny, hypergamy,
Lopreato, was pioneering the application of etc.) as evolved strategies for maximizing fi
sociobiological theory to the study of human tness. As has long-been observed, human mating
society and social behavior (Lopreato 1984 ). systems (marriage) are highly variable and thus
The work of van den Berghe and Lopreato might not seem tractable to sociobiological
represent early, “fi rst-generation” sociological interpretation because of their variability.
efforts to apply sociobiological principles to the However, following sociobiological reasoning,
study of human social behavior. van den Berghe interprets such variability as
Though all organisms have kin, only humans adaptive variation to variable environmental
clearly have a concept of kinship. Accordingly, it contexts, variation that has been designed by
is plausible in terms of sociobiological theory to natural selection to be fi tness- maximizing for its
hypothesize that evolved psychological participants. For van den Berghe, instead of
mechanisms that support nepotism (favoritism constituting evidence for the lack of biological
directed toward kin-group members) could also infl uence on patterns of human mate-selection
constitute a platform upon which kin- like groups and mating, the variability of human mating
could be constructed. Van den Berghe takes the strategies represents evolved sensitivities to the
idea that preferential association and cooperation opportunities and threats posed by variation of
among kin group members could be extended dimensions of environments in which humans
somehow to non-kin and become the basis of live and strive (almost always unconsciously) to
group affi liation among individuals who are not maximize inclusive fi tness.
close kin and uses it to explain the existence of A bout the same time that van den Berghe was
and cooperation within ethnic groups (van den developing new sociological explanations of
Berghe 1981 ). In van den Berghe’s view, ethnic kinship and ethnic relations based on
groups can be thought of as “fi ctive” kin groups, sociobiological theory and research, Lopreato
the members of which are united not by genetic was re-framing established topics of sociological
kinship but by cultural identity. Van den Berghe research in sociobiological terms and exploring
coined the term “ethny” for such groups, and he the compatibility between sociobiological theory
analyzes relations within and between ethnys and strains of classical sociological theory ( 1984
using concepts derived from sociobiology, ). Lopreato contended that sociobiology provides
including kin selection, inclusive fi tness, and sociologists with an opportunity to develop new
reciprocal altruism (van den Berghe 1981) . and more powerful explanations of numerous
Though true genetic relatedness among members topics of traditional sociological interest
of an ethnic group dissipates as group size including incest, gender relations, marriage and
24 Social Evolution 515

family patterns, relations of domination and behaviors in the archaic environments in which
subordination, cultural evolution, relations of they evolved, especially the Pleistocene era
reciprocity and exchange, and even fertility- (Barkow et al. 1992) , but may or may not be
mortality patterns (Lopreato 1984 , 1989; Carey adaptive in contemporary environments.
and Lopreato 1995 ). Lopreato argued that Furthermore, evolutionary psychologists place
sociology had close ties to evolutionary thinking little, if any, emphasis in trying to ascertain the fi
in classical sociological theory, especially in tness consequences of contemporary human
theoretical work of Vilfredo Pareto (Lopreato behavior, including social behavior. Thus,
1984 ). Lopreato also proposed a modifi ed evolutionary psychology developed primarily as
“maximization principle” on the basis of which an effort to identify and explain the nature and
sociobiological theory could be used to guide origins of evolved human “cognitive algorithms,”
sociological inquiry. While embracing the the sum of which might be seen as constituting a
sociobiological premise that organisms evolve universal, species-specifi c human nature that is
traits that maximize their inclusive fi tness, the product of 2 million years of hominin
Lopreato argued that the maximization principle evolution.
must be modifi ed somewhat to accommodate the
unique evolved attributes of Homo sapiens
(Lopreato 1989 ). Specifi cally, Lopreato 24.4.2 The Rise and Infl uence of
contended that an evolved human nature Evolutionary Psychology
manifests a tendency to maximize inclusive fi
tness, but some elements of this nature are far B y about 1940 or so, biological explanations of
from fi tness-maximizing, and there is signifi cant human social behavior had all but disappeared in
variation among individuals with regard to the the western social science canon, and the concept
extent to which they adopt fi tness-enhancing, of culture became central to virtually all social
much less maximizing, behaviors. Furthermore, science analysis. A new orthodoxy about human
culture, itself a product of natural selection, often nature and behavior emerged which later came to
produces fi tness-reducing behaviors, such as be described as the “Standard Social Science
contraceptive technology, and humans appear Model” (Tooby and Cosmides 1992) . Key
predisposed to try to satisfy their needs and wants elements of this model include the basic notions
in a manner that may or may not yield fi tness- that (1) environmental factors and experience, not
enhancing results. Thus, culture and evolved p heritable traits, determine human behavior, (2)
sychological attributes of human nature may there is insuffi cient variability in the human
work at cross-purpose to adaptations that evolved genome to account for the almost infi nite
in archaic environments to maximize human variability within and among human cultures, (3)
inclusive fi tness. learning, not instinct, determines human
S ociobiology places primary emphasis on behavior, and (4) the human mind is, at birth,
trying to determine if, and to what extent, patterns virtually devoid of content that specifi es
of social behavior constitute evolved adaptations behavior, especially social behavior, and such
for maximizing inclusive fi tness. By the late content must be acquired by experience,
1980s, an emerging cadre of psychologists was including social learning (Tooby and Cosmides
developing an alternative approach for analyzing 1992 ). The fourth notion is commonly
human behavior in evolutionary terms. Instead of characterized as the tabula rasa , or blank slate,
trying to determine if currently observable assumption about the nature of the human brain
patterns of human behavior are adaptive in and mind (Pinker 2002 ).
contemporary environments, the new B y the mid- to late-1980s, a growing number
evolutionary psychologists pursued research of psychologists were questioning the blank slate
designed to discover evidence of evolved mental assumption about human nature, and they had
mechanisms that may have produced adaptive begun to pursue inquiries that were guided by
516 R. Machalek and M.W. Martin

theory and research derived from evolutionary By way of contrast, the adapted mind model
biology. One of the earliest and most infl uential incorporates what psychologists call “prepared”
of such efforts was the work of Martin Daly and or “biased” learning (Garcia and Koelling 1966 ;
Margo Wilson on homicide ( 1988 ). Guided by Seligman 1971; Seligman and Hager 1972 ). In
the sociobiological principle that the expression this view, the human brain features learning
of violence among humans will be infl uenced by biases that enable humans to learn more quickly,
the degree of genetic relatedness between easily, and reliably from experiences that are
attackers and victims, Daly and Wilson reviewed adaptively relevant. Put differently, the adapted
data about patterns of homicide to see if they mind is said to possess innate “aptitudes” for
conformed to predictions derived from acquiring information and behavioral strategies
sociobiological theory. They were successful in for coping with circumstances that are highly
demonstrating that sociobiological principles, salient to prospects for survival and reproductive
especially kin selection, provided predictions success. For example, Wilson asserts that the
about the incidence of homicide that could not be human mind is likely to possess a special learning
derived from other theoretical perspectives in the bias regarding the threat posed by snakes, an
behavioral and social sciences. Consequently, archaic and near-universal threat to humans in
their work helped launch a rapidly growing environments the world-over (Wilson 1998 :79).
branch of psychology now known as An innate propensity to be especially vigilant for
“evolutionary psychology” (Buss 2008 ). serpentine forms and a behavioral inclination to
E volutionary psychologists replaced the blank behave very cautiously when they are detected
slate conception of the human mind with a new represents a highly adaptive learning bias from
model that they called the “adapted mind” which ancestral (as well as many contemporary)
(Barkow et al. 1992 ). The adapted mind is said humans have benefi tted.
to have evolved during the Pleistocene era, and it The notion of the adapted mind is most
consists of specialized “cognitive algorithms” relevant to sociological theorists when
that represent mental adaptations for solving the considering the possibility that humans may
challenges posed routinely by the environments possess innate cognitive algorithms for coping
in which humans evolved. These cognitive with threats and opportunities created by social
algorithms resemble closely what sociobiologists living. In that regard, a number of pioneering
have called “epigenetic rules” (Lumsden and experiments conducted by John Tooby and Leda
Wilson 1981 ) and sociologists have called Cosmides provide an example of one such mental
“behavioral predispositions” (Lopreato 1984 ; adaptation that appears designed specifi cally for
Lopreato and Crippen 1999 ) or “behavioral group life.
propensities” (Turner 2015 ). The full A defi ning sociological feature of group life
complement of evolved cognitive algorithms that among humans, in both ancestral and
constitute the adapted mind are said to have contemporary contexts, is the existence of
evolved in the “environment of evolutionary systems of reciprocity and exchange. The
adaptedness” (the EEA) and can be thought of as development of exchange theory within
the defi ning components of a universal, species- sociology testifi es to the fundamental
specifi c human nature (Bowlby 1969 ; Tooby importance of these processes (e.g., Homans
and 1961 ; Blau 1964 ; Emerson 1972 ). To the extent
Cosmides 1990 ). that a social relationship depends on reliable and
It is erroneous to think of the adapted mind as stable reciprocity among participants in a system
the “nature” version of a “nature versus nurture” of exchange, instances wherein one party fails to
model of the human brain and mind. In the uphold a contractual obligation to another party
classical, stereotypic “nature” conception of the constitute a threat to the durability of the
human mind, learning is absent, and heritable, relationship. Conceptualized as “defection” or
inalterable “instincts” govern human behavior. “cheating” by evolutionary game theorists
24 Social Evolution 517

(Axelrod 1984; Maynard Smith 1982 ), such 24.4.3.1 Sociocultural Evolution


behavior threatens participants who might fail to Several sociologists including Gerhard Lenski,
detect such contractual violations. Accordingly, Jonathan Turner, Marion Blute, and Christopher
Cosmides and Tooby conducted a series of Chase-Dunn have developed new variants of
controlled experiments designed to determine if sociocultural evolutionary theory that are
humans have an innate aptitude for detecting informed by neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory
instances of non-reciprocity in relations of social in biology. However, all of these theorists adopt
exchange (Cosmides and Tooby 1992 ). Their the position that explaining sociocultural
experiments provided evidence of the existence evolution requires an explanatory approach that
of an innate “cheating-detection mechanism” takes into account emergent, unique properties of
which Cosmides and Tooby interpret as an human societies and thus requires the use of
evolved, mental adaptation for coping with the additional concepts and explanatory principles
threat of non-reciprocity in social relations that are unavailable in sociobiology and
comprising cooperation based on social evolutionary psychology alone. Accordingly,
exchange. these sociological theorists develop new
F ollowing the lead provided by Cosmides and theoretical ideas designed specifi cally for
Tooby, evolutionary psychologists are now analyzing the emergent properties of human
engaged in systematic searches for other societies and the processes by means of which
cognitive algorithms that may have evolved to they evolve.
enable the establishment and maintenance of Building on his earlier version of ecological-
stable patterns of cooperation on the basis of evolutionary theory, Lenski advocates the pursuit
which societal life is made possible. of a “new evolutionary theory in the social
Consequently, the tabula rasa assumption about sciences” ( 2005: 3). Parting company with most
human nature has been discarded by sociological sociological theorists who subscribe to the
theorists whose work is informed by Standard Social Science Model, Lenski asserts
contemporary evolutionary sciences, including the necessity of acknowledging that humans
sociobiology and evolutionary psychology. And possess an evolved human nature that is
though, as will be discussed later, some genetically based and manifests itself in the
evolutionary sociologists take exception to the “neurological information” that produces human
model of the adapted mind proposed by social behavior ( 2005 :45–50). In Lenski’s
Cosmides and Tooby and other evolutionary theory of sociocultural evolution, human
psychologists, none embrace the tabula rasa societies are “adaptive mechanisms that mediate
model which has dominated the social sciences relations between a population and its
for most of the twentieth century. environment” ( 2005 :60). The goal of his
24.4.3 Evolutionary Sociology ecological-evolutionary theory is to help develop
a comprehensive science for analyzing human
After decades of near total quiescence in societies at three levels: (1) individual societies,
sociology, evolutionary thinking has re-emerged (2) sets of societies, and (3) the global system of
in sociological theory, and it has assumed diverse societies. Social relations within and among
forms and has addressed a growing range of human societies are the product of fi ve sets of
topics. What is now being characterized as forces that comprise three types of information
“evolutionary sociology” features work that can (genetic, neurological, and cultural) and two
be classifi ed roughly into four basic variants, kinds of environments (biophysical and
each of which addresses different aspects of sociocultural). Like the early stage theorists who
human social evolution: (1) sociocultural preceded him, Lenski’s ecological-evolutionary
evolution, (2) the adapted mind, (3) neurosocial theory is designed for macro-level and
evolution, and (4) cross-species analysis. Each comparative sociological analysis, a project
variant will be discussed in turn.
518 R. Machalek and M.W. Martin

largely abandoned when sociologists abandoned in sociology based on well-established (as well as
structural-functional analysis ( 2005 :15). novel) principles in evolutionary theory. In
I n Lenski’s view, the key to explaining the Turner’s view, contemporary sociological theory
evolution of human societies is to understand that is remiss in its neglect of macro-level phenomena
evolution fundamentally entails the “cumulation including stratifi cation systems and societies
of information,” and in sociocultural evolution, themselves as distinctive macro-level units of
the fundamental driving force of societal analysis ( 2013 :434–435). Similarly, Abrutyn (
evolution is technological information, especially 2014) and Abrutyn and Turner ( 2011) point to
subsistence technology ( 2005 :63–68). the surprising irony that, despite its centrality and
Subsistence technologies represent an extension pervasiveness in conventional sociological
of the human genetic heritage, and while they are thought, sociological explication of the
not narrowly deterministic of human social macrodynamics of societal institutions suffers
behavior and human societies, Lenski describes surprising vagueness and neglect. Both Abrutyn
them as the “critical interface between the and Turner contend that the full potential and
biophysical environment and all the other analytical value of the long- venerated but
components of sociocultural systems” ( 2005 surprisingly under-theorized sociological
:62). Consequently, Lenski maps the basic types concept of institutions can best be realized by
of societies produced by humanity in terms of the subjecting it to evolutionary theoretical scrutiny.
relationship between subsistence technology and Turner built his theory from information
environments. This yields a taxonomy of seven derived from stage-models of societal evolution,
major “sets” of societies which are hunting- and his goal is to identify the common social
gathering, fi shing, horticultural, herding, dynamics that operate at “any stage” of societal
agrarian, maritime, and industrial societies evolution and in all types of societies ( 2010 ).
(Lenski 2005 :84). Ecological- evolutionary Toward that end, he develops a theory
theory provides a framework for analyzing the comprising 23 abstract propositions about the
nature and evolution of each societal set, its macrodynamics of human society that can be
relations to other societal sets, and the global used to analyze any human social system (Turner
network of relations among these sets. It provides 2010 :323–344). Turner contends that focusing
a comprehensive vantage point for analyzing the on selection processes in sociocultural evolution
universe of human societies and patterns of can revive the project of grand theorizing that
continuity and change therein. characterized structural-functionalism but avoid
A more recent variant of evolutionary theory the shortcomings of functional analysis that
designed for analyzing sociocultural evolution eventually led to its near-total abandonment by
has been produced by Turner ( 2010) . Like sociologists.
Lenski, Turner builds his theory on the In order to extend evolutionary thinking
established theoretical principles and empirical fi beyond its biological origins, Turner identifi es
ndings of the evolutionary life-sciences. two forms of selection besides Darwinian
However, Turner rejects the premise that fi elds selection that operate in sociocultural systems:
such as sociobiology or evolutionary psychology “Durkheimian selection” refers to competition
alone are adequate for analyzing and explaining among actors that drives them to fi nd resources
patterns of sociocultural evolution (Turner and in new niches, and “Spencerian selection” refers
Maryanski 2015 ). Rather, emergent properties to the process by means of which actors innovate
of human societies that derive from the and produce entirely new adaptations for coping
production and use of symbols (and culture) with selection pressures ( 2010 :24–27).
require additional, as well as novel, concepts and Spencerian selection acknowledges the almost-
principles for explaining the evolution of human certainly unique human trait of foresight, the
sociocultural systems. Accordingly, Turner sets ability to imagine future conditions, envision
about to resurrect the tradition of “grand theory” novel ways of behaving in response to future
24 Social Evolution 519

conditions, and adopt novel strategies in an effort Though, as Turner notes, macro-level
to cope with these conditions. In Turner’s theory, theorizing declined signifi cantly with the demise
changes in fi ve fundamental properties of human of grand theory in general and functionalism in
societies can act as selection forces, and they are particular, contemporary sociology has exhibited
population, production, regulation, distribution, high levels of activity about global or “world-
and reproduction ( 2010 41–103). Like numerous system” level societal change ( 2013 :434).
: evolutionary theorists before him, Turner Recently, theorists of sociocultural evolution
identifi es integration as a basic focal point of his have contributed to these efforts at global-level,
analysis. Specifi cally, Turner asks how social intersocietal analysis (Lenski 2005 ; Chase-Dunn
structure and culture are integrated by means of 2015 ) . Lenski’s ecological-evolutionary theory
both cultural and structural mechanisms that is designed to provide a framework for
operate in response to various selection pressures. understanding the nature of the “global system of
Only by resurrecting the project of grand theory societies,” how it came into existence, and its
and framing it in evolutionary terms does Turner sociocultural evolution ( 2005 :111–124). In a
believe that sociological theorists can produce recent effort to account for the emergence of
macro- level theories that are adequate to the task global level, sociocultural complexity, Chase-
of explaining the behavior of entire societies. Dunn has integrated world-systems theory with
O ther contemporary sociologists have ideas derived from evolutionary theory ( 2015 ).
adopted evolutionary thinking to explain In his analysis of the sociocultural evolution of
fundamental processes of sociocultural change world-systems, Chase- Dunn assigns primary
and stability. For example, Marion Blute signifi cance to phenomena such as
distinguishes among gene-based, social learning semiperipheral development, waves of trade
(meme-based), and dual inheritance globalization and deglobalization, and crises of
(coevolutionary) Darwinian theories of change ( the contemporary world-system and its possible
2010: 7). Like Turner, Blute contends that a futures ( 2015 :270–282).
satisfactory explanation of sociocultural
evolution is not available in sociobiological or 24.4.3.2 The Adapted Mind
evolutionary psychological theory alone. Rather, Most contemporary sociological theory is based
in order to explain processes of sociocultural on the tabula rasa assumption about the human
evolution, attention must be devoted to (1) the brain and mind, a core component of the Standard
unique properties of culture and social learning, Social Science model. At best, most sociologists
(2) memes as units of cultural inheritance and will concede only that the newborn human infant
transmission, (3) the role of human agency in is in possession of a few inborn “refl exes,” such
producing and guiding human social behavior, as rooting and suckling, swallowing, the Moro
(4) human subjectivity and the processes by (startle) refl ex, the Palmar grasp (grasping an
means of which humans construct and are object placed in the palm of the hand), and the
constructed by niches, and (5) the role of both Babinski refl ex (extension of the big toe and
ecological complexity (more kinds) and fanning of other toes). It is very uncommon to fi
individual complexity (more complex kinds) in s nd in contemporary sociological theory a view of
ociocultural evolution (Blute 2010 ). While Blute the human brain and mind as instantiated, at birth,
acknowledges and appreciates both gene-based with an extensive suite of innate behavioral
and dual inheritance evolutionary theories, she predispositions for producing complex behaviors,
makes the case for the necessity of developing a including social behaviors. Rather, the brain is
Darwinian theory of sociocultural evolution that typically viewed as a powerful, complex
places primary emphasis on processes of human information processing machine that captures,
social learning and meme-based information stores, organizes, and expresses information that
systems. is acquired by personal experience or cultural
transmission. And it is by means of symbolic
520 R. Machalek and M.W. Martin

media that such information is processed. The human mind is a tabula rasa, generalized
emergence of sociobiology and later, information- processing machine, Rosemary
evolutionary psychology, has posed a direct and Hopcroft proposes, instead, the notion of an
formidable threat to this traditional view of “evolved actor” that is in possession of an entire
human mental life and social behavior. suite of evolved, innate behavioral
In Sociobiology, Wilson identifi ed a range of predispositions including an innate aptitude for
social behaviors displayed by numerous taxa that learning social norms above other kinds of rules,
he analyzed as genetically-based, evolved an innate preoccupation with fairness and
adaptations produced by natural selection ( 1975 altruism when interacting with genetic strangers,
). However, Wilson said little in Sociobiology behavioral predispositions toward religious
about mental processes by means of which such sentiments, a predisposition to form social
adaptations might be organized and operate in the hierarchies, and a predisposition to be
human mind. In response to those who criticized preferentially loyal to close kin ( 2009b ).
him for this omission, he and Charles Lumsden Hopcroft also applies the notion of behavioral
published Genes, Mind, and Culture: The predispositions in her analyses of evolved gender
Coevolutionary Process (1981) in an effort to differences ( 2009a , 2002 , 2006 ).
identify and explicate the psychological The sociologist (and evolutionary
processes that comprise the “ontogenetic psychologist) Satoshi Kanazawa also offers
development of mental activity and behavior” evolutionary explanations of evolved cognitive
and how such processes evolved by natural adaptations possessed by humans regarding
selection (1981:ix). The development of various phenomena such as intelligence ( 2004a , 2010 ),
mental activities and the behaviors they produce risk-taking and crime (Kanazawa and Still 2000)
are described by Lumsden and Wilson as , gender differences in preferences for different
entailing “epigenetic rules,” especially types of social capital (Savage and Kanazawa
“secondary epigenetic rules” ( 1981: 53–98). 2002 ), and human decision-making in the
Epigenetic rules channel and direct the context of prisoner’s dilemma and public choice
development of anatomical, physiological, and contexts ( 2004a ). Much of Kanazawa’s
cognitive traits. They can be thought of as “rules theorizing about these and other phenomena is
of thumb” that provide responses to informed by his “Savanna-IQ Interaction
environmental stimuli so as to yield adaptive Hypothesis” which states that the human mind is
outcomes. Thus, a brain supplied with a equipped with both specialized, domain-specifi c
repertoire of epigenetic rules is far from a blank algorithms for coping with archaic and recurrent
slate, but rather, a complex information challenges that all humans confront, as well as a
processing machine that is richly supplied with second, “generalized intelligence” that enables
adaptively- relevant information for producing humans to reason about and cope with problems
adaptive behavior in response to environmental that are adaptively relevant but appear only in
challenges and opportunities. novel environments ( 2010 ). Thus, the human
Evolutionary theorists have used additional brain and mind enable humans to cope quickly,
terms to characterize epigenetic rules including and largely unrefl ectively, with challenges that
“behavioral predispositions” (Lopreato 1984 ), have been present in virtually all environments in
“cognitive algorithms” (Cosmides and Tooby which humans have evolved and currently live, as
1992 ) and “behavioral propensities” (Turner well as with unprecedented challenges presented
2015 ). A growing number of sociologists have by newly-developed environments that feature
begun exploring the possibility that the human novel demographic, technological, cultural, and
mind contains specialized, evolved cognitive sociological traits. According to Kanazawa, we
mechanisms that constitute the platform on which can expect more variability among humans in
behavioral adaptations can develop. For example, terms of their generalized intelligence, and less
rejecting the long-standing orthodoxy that the variability in their specialized mental adaptations
24 Social Evolution 521

for coping with the archaic and near-universal evolved. Part of those environments are social
challenges confronted by ancestral humans in the environments, thus, social structures and
EEA ( 2010 ). processes themselves are likely to have
An important concept on the basis of which functioned as selection forces, equipping the
the notion of the adapted human mind rests is the human mind with learning biases that enable
psychological phenomenon of “prepared” or them to recognize and process effectively any
“biased” or “directed” learning (Garcia and information about social scenarios that is highly
Koelling 1966 ; Rachman and Seligman 1976 ; adaptively relevant.
Seligman 1971 , 1993 ; Seligman and Hager One such scenario that has been the
1972 ). The idea of prepared learning stands in investigated by experimental research is the work
contrast to the long-standing misconception that of Cosmides and Tooby on cognitive adaptations
a behavior must be the consequence of either for social exchange ( 1992) . Well over a century
instinct or learning. The Standard Social Science of sociological theorizing and research has
Model represents the human brain as a general, documented the importance of relations of
equipotential, all-purpose information processing reciprocity and exchange in human social
machine, and almost all behavior is attributed to systems (e.g., Smith 1776 [1805]; Lévi-Strauss
learning and not instinct (Tooby and Cosmides 1969 ; Homans 1961 ; Blau 1964 ; Emerson
1992) . In contrast, evolutionary theory suggests 1972 ). More recently, sociobiologists have also
that the brain is predisposed to learn and retain explored the nature and incidence of systems of
certain types of information over others, and that reciprocity in non-human societies (Trivers 1971
the adaptive relevance of the information is what ; Clutton-Brock 2009 ). A serious threat to any
causes the brain to preferentially acquire and participant in an exchange relationship is that
process it. alter will fail to provide a resource that s/he owes
A n example of how biased learning occurs is ego in repayment for a resource that s/he received
provided by what psychologists call from ego. In the game theoretic model of the
“ophidiophobia,” the development of an extreme prisoner’s dilemma, this is known as the threat of
fear of snakes (Wilson 1998 :79). Snakes have defection. If ego is unable to recognize and
long represented a serious source of mortality in respond effectively to acts of defection by alter,
many human populations, so evolutionary then s/he faces a serious, adaptively- relevant
reasoning would predict that natural selection threat within this system of reciprocity and
would favor the evolution of a cognitive exchange. Thus, evolutionary reasoning would
algorithm in the brain that makes humans highly lead to the hypothesis that humans may possess
vigilant about possible encounters with snakes. A an evolved, specialized cognitive algorithm to
fear of snakes must be learned, but the brain protect against this selection force.
appears to learn to fear snakes much more easily In a series of ingenious controlled
than it learns to fear novel and more recent threats experiments designed to determine how
such as fast-m oving automobiles, which are competent humans are at detecting instances of
currently a much greater source of human non- reciprocity in a prisoner’s dilemma scenario,
mortality. Automobiles, however, were not a Cosmides and Tooby adduced evidence in
feature of ancestral human environments. support of their hypothesis that humans appear to
Accordingly, automobiles, however deadly, are have a strong aptitude for detecting instances of
rarely the target of phobias. The notion of cheating in relations of social exchange, and they
prepared learning means that it is theoretically characterize this specialized aptitude, or
plausible that natural selection would have cognitive algorithm, as a “cheating detection
supplied the human brain with suites of c ognitive mechanism” ( 1992 ).
algorithms for coping with highly adaptively One of the most interesting lines of inquiry
relevant threats and opportunities that were that has been prompted by theory-building and
presented by the environments in which humans empirical research about the adapted mind is the
522 R. Machalek and M.W. Martin

possibility that the human brain/mind may be large, with comparable signifi cance in promoting
densely supplied with specialized cognitive the evolution of human sociality ( 2000) . The
algorithms that represent evolved adaptations to limbic systems enhance the emotional repertoire
selection forces presented by the structures and of humans, thereby enabling the formation of
processes of group life itself. In short, it is now strong social ties and complex patterns of social
plausible to use evolutionary theory to pursue interaction (Turner and Maryanski ( 2008 ). The
new avenues inquiry that might lead to the work of Turner and Maryanski represents an
discovery of other types of cognitive adaptations important new direction in an effort to synthesize
that evolved to enable humans to cope with the the neurosciences with sociological, ecological,
challenges and opportunities presented by the anthropological, and psychological perspectives
social environments in which they live and have toward the development of a comprehensive,
evolved. evolutionary theory of the evolution of human
societies.
24.4.3.3 Neurosocial Evolution A nother recent contribution to the
Until recently, it would not have been development of a neurosociology is the work of
indefensible to describe sociology as an David Franks ( 2010 , 2015) and Franks and his
“acerebral science.” To most sociologists, the colleague Jeff Davis ( 2012 ). Franks provides an
brain is relevant to sociological explanation only account of the phylogeny of the human brain and
as a recorder and processor of personal the ecological and evolutionary forces that
experience and culture. In terms of specifying and shaped its development into an organ with
generating social behavior, the brain is viewed as specialized features that support the existence of
virtually empty of informational content. Put complex patterns of social organization and
more casually, sociologists commonly regard the interaction. Reviewing hominin phylogeny,
human brain as devoid of “social instincts,” Franks explains how changing ecological forces
therefore, there is little if anything to be learned led to selection for brain structures that favored a
about the nature, causes, or consequences of shift from olfaction to vision as a primary sensory
social behavior by studying the brain itself. modality, enhanced memory, and enhanced
Contemporary evolutionary theory and research capabilities for abstract thought which, in turn,
make this an increasingly untenable position for strongly predisposed the evolution of human
sociologists to embrace. language ( 2015) . Reviewing the evolution of
One of the earliest, and most thorough, these neural systems, Franks concludes that the
theoretical developments in evolutionary human brain is highly social by nature, a
sociology to focus attention on the evolved determination that has signifi cant implications
properties of the human brain is the work of for the future development of sociological theory
Turner on the evolution of human emotions and ( 2015 :294).
their role in social behavior ( 1996 , 1999 , 2000 O ther developments in the nascent area of
, 2007 ). In Turner’s view, the adapted mind neurosociology provide additional examples of
consists of complex arrays of neural systems that how the integration of sociological inquiry with
are “diffuse and complex sub-assemblages” the neurosciences can promote the development
which are distributed across the neo-cortex and of a robust evolutionary sociology. For example,
sub-cortex and function as “bioprogrammers for Leveto and Kalkhoff show how a
group living” ( 2015: 177). Disproportionately neurosociological perspective can provide insight
large, even for a primate, the neo-cortex has been about how brain function pertaining to the
regarded as especially important in explaining processing of paralanguage and biosocial
complex behavior because of its ability to support interaction are implicated in Autism Spectrum
reasoning and other sophisticated cognitive Disorders ( 2012 ). Similarly, Firat and Hitlin
activities. Turner, however, credits the limbic demonstrate how integrating neuroscientifi c and
systems of the brain, also disproportionately sociological thinking can shed new light on the
24 Social Evolution 523

scientifi c study of morality and its bearing on the T he work of Maryanski (and Maryanski and
formation of groups and interactional dynamics Turner) provides a good example of how
among them ( 2012) . Finally, and perhaps comparisons between humans and other primates
surprisingly to traditional sociological theorists,can provide insights about how natural selection
the phenomenon of intersubjectivity, a concept has shaped the constitutive elements of human
central to theoretical perspectives in sociology nature and how this nature has infl uenced the
such as phenomenology, may be tractable to evolution of human social life (Maryanski 1992
neurosociological analysis. Franks and Davis ; Maryanski and Turner 1992; Turner and
review neuroscientifi c studies of “mirror Maryanski 2008 ). By comparing the
neurons,” and they conclude that their activity phylogenies of humans to other apes and to
may be foundational to key social interactive monkeys, Maryanski has provided new
processes like imitation, role- taking, ritual, theoretical insights and empirical evidence in
cooperation, self-control, and other sociological support of her claim that humans are, by nature,
phenomena that generate social cohesion less highly-social than long-believed (Maryanski
(solidarity) which, in the words of Franks and 1992 ; Maryanski and Turner 1992 ). Like other
Davis, constitutes the “glue” of social life ( 2012apes, early humans were unlikely to have been
). predisposed to forming strong social ties, and it
was only when natural selection modifi ed the
24.4.3.4 Cross-Species Analyses human brain to expand the palette of emotions
Historically, sociology has been a “single- that humans now possess that they became a
species science,” devoted almost exclusively to “strong tie” primate (Maryanski 1992 ). In fact,
the study of human social behavior alone. The Maryanski concludes that natural selection has
uniqueness of human beings, attributed basically produced a human nature that is predisposed in
to the human capacity for symbol production and part toward sociality, but equally predisposed
use (culture), has justifi ed in the minds of many toward individuality, and these two propensities
sociologists an assumption that humans are co-exist in a sort of uneasy tension that is evident
essentially exempt from most of the biological in human group life.
forces that shape the social behavior of other A n early example of extending the
species. This is a position that has come under sociological study of social structure and social
direct criticism recently by evolutionary dynamics to include nonhuman animals is the
behavioral and social scientists (e.g., Kanazawa work of Ivan Chase (1974, 1980; Chase et al.
2004 b ). However, a number of sociologists see 2002 ). Chase reviews two models designed to
value in extending the scope of sociological explain the development of dominance
theory and research beyond humans to include hierarchies among both human and nonhuman
some of the thousands of other social species as social species. The fi rst model predicts position
well. Two rationales are advanced to justify this in dominance hierarchies on the basis of
extension in the scope of sociological analysis: individual trait differences, and the second
(1) integrating biological methodologies like predicts dominance position as the product of
cladistics analysis with sociological approaches iterated social interactions. Experimental work he
like social network analysis can provide insight conducted on how dominance hierarchies
about the origins of human nature and how it develop in chickens supports the social
shapes group life among humans, and (2) interaction explanation ( 1980) . In this regard,
comparing basic forms of social organization, Chase’s work suggests that there is merit in
like dominance hierarchies or macrosocieties, pursuing a Simmelian-type analysis of “social
across species lines can help identify and explain forms” across species lines. That is, regardless of
the fundamental processes by means of which all the species in which a particular social form is
societies are assembled and function. found, there may be features that are common to
that form and the processes by which it develops
524 R. Machalek and M.W. Martin

and operates, whatever the species that expresses 24.5 Conclusion: A Future for
it. Evolutionary Theory in
More recently, Machalek ( 1992 ) and Cohen
Sociology
and Machalek ( 1988) also advocate the
development of a “new comparative sociology”
E volutionary thinking fl ourished in much of the
that explores how forms of social organization
work of the founders of sociology. However, the
evolve among diverse social species and how
misadventure of Social Darwinism and the rise of
these forms are expressed by animals as different
cultural explanations of human social behavior
as eusocial insects (ants, bees, wasps, and
eventually consigned evolutionary thought to
termites) and humans (Machalek 1992) . Noting
obscurity for much of the twentieth century. By
that a “form of sociation” that he calls
the mid-1960s, new variants of stage models of
“macrosociality” occurs only among modern
social change were being developed, but it was
humans (10,000 years ago to present) and the
not until the 1970s that a new wave of
eusocial insects, Machalek identifi es the
evolutionary analysis began to proliferate in the
organismic, ecological, cost-b enefi t, and
social and behavioral sciences. The major
sociological constraints that have to be overcome
impetus behind this newly resurgent interest in
if macrosociality is to evolve in any species (1992
evolutionary analyses of human social behavior
: 39–59). A macrosociety consists of a very large
was the publication of Wilson’s Sociobiology:
population that is organized into a complex
The New Synthesis
division of labor executed by members of distinct
(1975 ).
social categories. Only the eusocial insects and
D espite initial and widespread fears of a
modern humans have overcome these constraints
reappearance of Social Darwinism and a
to produce and live in macrosocities, and
reintroduction of long-discredited positions of
theoretical principles developed for a cross-
naïve reductionism, genetic determinism, and
species version of comparative sociology offer
new ideological agendas designed to support
promise for explaining how and why this occurs
sexism and racism, more and more social and
(Machalek 1992: 59–61). Finally, another
behavioral scientists became drawn to the
example of how evolutionary thinking makes
evolutionary life- sciences. Eventually, the
possible cross-species analyses of sociological
growing receptivity among social scientists to
phenomena is provided by the work of Cohen and
evolutionary theory and research led to the
Machalek on “expropriative crime” ( 1988 ).
development of new fi elds such as evolutionary
Using basic concepts and explanatory principles
anthropology, evolutionary economics,
derived from sociobiology and behavioral
evolutionary psychology, and evolutionary
ecology, Cohen and Machalek offer an account of
sociology. All of these new ventures share a
how the incidence of expropriative behaviors
common premise: the tabula rasa model of the
(called “social parasitism” by behavioral
human brain and mind is no longer tenable, and it
biologists), is either enabled or inhibited by
must be replaced by a conception of an adapted
routine patterns of social organization and
mind that is the product of evolution by natural
processes of social interaction. When
selection. As previously discussed, evolutionary
expropriative behaviors violate laws, as occurs
social and behavioral scientists are not of one
only in humans, they are called crimes. However,
mind about the nature of the adapted mind and
forms of expropriation occur in nonhuman
how it functions. However, they all share a
societies as well, and Cohen and Machalek
common interest in exploring its features and
identify properties of any social system, human
how they infl uence complex processes such as
or nonhuman, that are conducive to the incidence
the generation and transmission of culture, the
of expropriation.
role of prepared learning in the development of
social behaviors, the manner in which genetic and
memetic (cultural) information interact, and the
24 Social Evolution 525

infl uences of an evolved mind on the adapted mind and, simultaneously, provide new
development of the emergent properties of insight about the emergent structures and
human groups and societies. processes by means of which social systems
When Wilson speculated about how function within the ecosystems in which they
sociology, and the other social sciences, appeared develop. Similarly, as the nascent fi eld of
destined to be transformed by new developments neurosociology provides greater depth of
in sociobiology, behavioral ecology, and the understanding about the evolved properties of the
neurosciences, many social and behavioral social mind, sociological theorists will be in a
scientists reacted with alarm (Wilson 1975 :574– better position to understand the forces by means
575; Segerstråle 2000) . Many expressed of which phenomena such as social solidarity
apprehension about what they perceived as an develop and function. And as the scope of
imperial intellectual agenda in Wilson’s work. sociological inquiry expands beyond the study of
Four decades later, however, these fears and Homo sapiens alone to include any of the tens of
apprehensions have not been realized. Even in thousands of nonhuman social species, entirely
light of the “triumph of sociobiology,” as Alcock new kinds of opportunities for the development
puts it ( 2001 ), and the increasing colonization of of sociological theory and research will emerge.
the social and behavioral sciences by Twenty-fi rst century sociological theory
evolutionary ideas, none of these disciplines, appears poised to be energized by the
including sociology, have been dissolved in the development of a stronger and closer association
corrosive solvents of biological reductionism or with the evolutionary life sciences. And, in turn,
genetic determinism. In fact, as some sociologists it offers promise to stimulate new types of
have become knowledgeable about the theoretical inquiry and empirical research among
evolutionary life-sciences, they have discovered behavioral scientists who study nonhuman social
opportunities to apply fundamental sociological species and their social lives.
principles in the study of nonhuman social
species and their patterns of social interaction.
For example, the emergent nature of group
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Reimagining Collective Behavior 25
Justin Van Ness and Erika Summers-Effl er

25.1 Introduction J. Van Ness () • E. Summers-Effl er


University of Notre Dame , Notre Dame , IN ,
USA e-mail: jvanness@nd.edu; erika.m.effl
From religion, recreation, and city-life, to er.1@nd.edu
emergency response, social movements, and stantial theoretical and methodological
revolutions, people come together in time and innovation. Increasingly, theories of collective
space to engage in the business of social life. action are treating culture, emotions, and social
They seek each other to defi ne situations, to psychological processes seriously (e.g., Abrutyn
create order during crisis, and to drive social, 2014 ; Abrutyn and Van Ness 2015 ; Abrutyn et
cultural, and political change. In all of its forms, al. 2017 ; Collins 2009; Gould 2009; Jasper
collective behavior is alive and well. However, 1997 ; Klandermans 1997; Polletta 2008;
can the same be said about collective behavior Polletta and
theory ? Jasper 2001 ; Summers-Effl er 2010 ; Summers-
T he 1960s witnessed a dismissal of collective Effl er and Kwak 2015 ). In fact, many argue that
behavior theory as it was supplanted in favor of explanations of social behavior not integrating
rational choice explanations in the burgeoning fi these dynamics remain undertheorized and leave
eld of social movements. Early theories of much to be desired (Jasper 2011; Scheff 1990
motivation, emotionality, and the effects of ). With new tools to explain individual,
groups on individuals were often without interactional, and situational dynamics, and the
systematically collected empirical data and thus thriving interdisciplinary fi eld of cognitive social
became labeled as conjecture and promptly science, it is time to make use of theoretical and
rejected. Activists turned academics issued in an methodological advances to revisit and rebuild
era of portraying the rational protestor (see the fi eld of collective behavior. In this chapter,
Morris and Herring 1987 ). Decades of social we contribute to this revitalization movement by
movement research followed suit, leaving long- reviewing what the past got right and wrong, and
lasting consequences to theory development. using new fi ndings and theory to pave a way
Though case studies of collective behavior have forward. Specifi cally, we argue the fi eld of
continued, general collective behavior theory has collective behavior has been trapped in old ways
withered. of thinking in spite of theoretical and empirical
O ver the past 20 years, the study of culture, advances and when we turn towards these
emotions, and cognition have undergone sub- advances we fi nd that early collective behavior
theory had more right than we tend to credit.
J. Van Ness and E. Summers-Effl er

T his chapter will continue in four parts. In the power to anticipate specifi c dynamics. This is
fi rst, we review the major approaches to part of the reason the theoretical baby was thrown
categorizing the study of collective behavior. out with the underspecifi ed empirical bath water.
Following, we trace the history of major Another approach to the study of collective
theoretical contributions and perspectives while behavior focuses on a collectivity creating social,
also discussing the rationalist’s turn away from political, and cultural change (e.g., Blumer 1969
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 527
S. Abrutyn (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary Sociological Theory,
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32250-6_25
early theory. Next, we revisit the prematurely [1939]; Marwell and Oliver 1993; Marx and
dismissed theories in light of recent advances in Wood 1975; Oliver 1989) . Many in this
cognitive social science with an emphasis on perspective tend to use “collective action”
emotion, cognition, and action. Finally, we end interchangeably with collective behavior to
the chapter with fruitful paths for the future of attempt to emphasize rationality and purpose
collective behavior. This includes not only a behind actions. This change-oriented perspective
suggestion for where our theoretical attention can emerges when “usual conventions cease to guide
be focused but also a methodological approach social action and people collectively transcend…
which we believe established institutional patterns and structures”
affords great potential for creativity and (Turner and Killian 1987) . Snow and Oliver
theoretical innovation. (1995 ) defi ne this as “extrainstitutional”
behavior aimed at problem solving. Broadly
conceived, these events tend to be temporary
gatherings and less organizationally based than
25.2 Defi ning Collective Behavior
social movement campaigns and protest events.
The study of collective behavior has referred to They tend to arise during moments of newly
wide ranging phenomena. Some scholars have available opportunities or when established
used the term for the study of crowds, mobs, conventions cease to guide action. Scholars
panics. Crazes, fads, manias and other contributing to this perspective often heavily
spontaneous acts also fall within this scope. contribute to the fi eld of social movements as
Others have used the term for the study of riots well.
and behavior during crises. Collective behavior American sociology often fuses collective
can also describe rather mundane events that take behavior and social movements together.
place when two or more people come together in McCarthy ( 1991) states “scholars…have
time and space. These may include waiting in insisted on wedding the study of crowds and
line, marching, singing in church, rooting for social movements…A distinctively American
sports teams, victory celebrations, or mosh-pits at marriage, it was one not consummated in
a concert. To account for such a wide range, Europe” (xii). While all social movements are a
Clark McPhail defi nes collective behavior as form of collective behavior, not all collective
“two or more persons engaged in one or more behavior takes the form of an organizationally
behaviors (e.g., locomotion, orientation, based social movement. Despite this, the
vocalization, verbalization, gesticulation, and/or distinction has been less defi ned because most
manipulation) judged common or concerted on developments in the study of collective behavior
one or more dimensions (e.g., direction, velocity, have come from the study of protest events or
tempo, or substantive content)” ( 1991 : 159). As from disaster research. Consequently, the breadth
if McPhail’s defi nition wasn’t all encompassing, of cases with systematic research is rather
Park and Burgress ( 1921 ) even went so far as to limited. Additionally, what contributions have
claim the entire fi eld of sociology as “the science come from these two specializations have also
of collective behavior”. To a fault, when theories been hindered by their own methodological
begin to “explain” everything, they lose their biases. Protest event research, for instance,
gining Collective Behavior 531

largely relies on newspaper records which limit trying to explain the radical social, economic, and
the ability to record and theorize the individual political upheaval of urban Europe. Violent
and interactional processes in naturalistic strikes, riots, confl icts, and repression painted
contexts (e.g., Amenta et al. 2009 ; Andrews and the social scene. Society was rapidly changing.
Caren 2010 ; Earl et al. 2004 ; Oliver and Meyer Attempting to explain this assault upon the status
1999 ). quo, scholars honed their attention onto crowds.
Generally, early collective behavior Many believed that by understanding the
developed with an explicit attention to mechanisms and processes of crowds, they could
psychological processes, both through better educate and assist the government’s ability
psychological and sociological standpoints. The to control the masses. This historical period,
former tended to focus on the infl uence of perspective, and intent fi ltered the theoretical
crowds and group behavior on the individual’s lens through which early theory developed (see
cognition, behavior, and emotions. The Borch 2012 ). In this section, we review the
sociological approach tends to focus on processes major theoretical strands in the fi eld of collective
facilitating the emergence of collective behavior, behavior.
the interactional processes, and the consequences
of action. These two approaches should be
viewed as complementary rather than 25.3.1 Transformation
contrasting. The distinctions are less visible than
they were during the developments of early Arguably, LeBon’s The Crowd has been the
collective behavior theory and sociologists often most infl uential work in the early study of
integrate psychological research into their work collective behavior. LeBon believed that when
(Thoits 1995 ). people came together, no matter their individual
Increasingly, scholars are integrating theories characteristics, the nature of being together
across specializations and disciplines in order to transforms individuals into a crowd and induces
provide the most well-informed explanations of within them a collective mind (1895). A “mental
behavior (e.g., Abrutyn and Mueller 2015 ; unity” is born. This new state of mind leads
Collett and Lizardo 2014 ; Summers-Effl er et al. individuals to feel, think, and act differently than
2015 ). The fi eld of collective behavior is they would if they were in isolation.
particularly well suited for integration; Marx and Consequently, he argued, this transformation
McAdam agree, stating “the eclectic nature of the lead to the disappearance of critical reasoning
fi eld of collective behavior…is an ideal area skills, placing the crowd in a position
within which to examine basic, and unfortunately “perpetually hovering on the borderland of
often unrelated, theoretical perspectives” ( 1994 : unconsciousness” (LeBon 1895: 14). He also
4). Thus, whether one chooses to focus on the believed that the anonymity of the crowd would
emotions of crowds, the potential for change, lead one to believe that they were unaccountable
emerging interaction orders, stability through for their behaviors; that is, there is a sense of
crises, or the conditions and consequences of “invincibility” when acting within a crowd.
collective action, the fi eld of collective behavior Together, this would lead to otherwise normal
is ripe with potential for theoretical innovation individuals acting in extraordinary ways. This
(see transformation became all the more dangerous as
Summers-Effl er 2007 ). the crowd increases “suggestibility” in
individuals, making them more vulnerable to the
infl uence and potential manipulations of leaders.
LeBon’s ideas were most directly introduced
25.3 Collective Behavior Theory
to American sociology through Robert E. Park (
Eighteenth and nineteenth century crowd 1904 ; Park and Burgess 1921 ), while also infl
psychology birthed early collective behavior uencing French sociologists (e.g., Tarde 1901 )
theory. During this time period, scholars were and American psychologists (e.g., Freud 1921 ;
J. Van Ness and E. Summers-Effl er

Martin 1920) . Park is often credited with characteristics. Some argue that this is an
founding the fi eld of collective behavior within oversimplifi cation for the potential diversity of
sociology (Turner and Killian 1987 : 2). He emotions, motives, roles, and actions within
argued that crowds and collective behavior groups. Couch (1968 ) argues that behaviors such
played pivotal roles in social change. They were as protesting and rioting become described as
“forces which dealt the fi nal blow to old existing irrational because they challenge the normative
institutions… and introduced the new spirit of expectations from the analyst’s cultural
new ones” (Park 1972 : 48). Park added that the expectations – not because they are actually
crowd transformation takes place within the irrational. The transformation thesis remained the
context of “social unrest”. During these tense dominant collective behavior theory into the
moments of unrest, a mutual contagion – what he 1960s. The idea of a “group mentality” was
called “circular reaction” – creates a shared mood especially infl uential in popular culture, though
and a common impulse to act. Interaction, some claim it has not withstood empirical
communication, and circular reaction then create scrutiny (Allport 1924b ; McPhail 1991 ; Norris
unanimity within the crowd and afford the 1988 ). Interestingly enough, emerging work is
potential to achieve common ends. supporting of some LeBon, Park, and Blumer’s
Herbert Blumer, a student of Robert Park and theories which had been dismissed long ago. We
George Herbert Mead, continued with an will return to this later in the chapter.
emphasis on interaction and the communication
processes through which people construct and
share worldviews. Blumer argued that “social 25.3.2 Predisposition and
unrest” emerges from the disruption of routine Deprivation
activities or the onslaught of new impulses or
dispositions which the social order cannot Another thesis views crowds as composed of
accommodate. People respond to this lack of individuals with common predispositions, inner
accommodation with a feeling of restlessness act impulses, and unmet needs (Hoffer 1951 ;
aimlessly, erratically, excited, and are vulnerable Lasswell 1930 ; Martin 1920 ). The
to rumors. predisposition explanation argues there is
Blumer argued that crowds come to act nothing unique about crowds or crowd behavior.
through fi ve steps. First, an exciting event There is no “transformation” or “mob mentality”
captures the attention of the crowd. People then when people come together. Rather, behavior is
begin milling about by walking around, simply the result of actors converging with
exchanging rumors, and focusing on the event. similar interests towards releasing tension. Some
This is when circular reactions “make the in this perspective even believed crowd
individuals more sensitive and responsible to one participants converge to act out narcissism and
another” (Blumer 1969 [1939]: 174). The crowd latent homosexuality (cf. Lasswell
becomes more cohesive as a group. Third, a 1930 ).
common object of attention gives the group a F loyd Allport ( 1924a, b) , one of the fi rst
shared orientation and mutual excitement. This major critics of the transformation hypothesis,
furthers conformity. As the group shares a argued that innate and learned tendencies
common heightened mood and orientation, the predispose people to crowd participation. These
fourth step is the stimulation of shared impulses. tendencies compelled people to converge in
Finally, the crowd acts upon impulse in a way common locations in order to satisfy drives or
they would not have acted if alone. overcome barriers to rewards; any action would
The transformation hypothesis developed be the result of shared predispositions being
through LeBon, Park, and Blumer portrays crowd triggered by a situational stimulus. This
behavior as irrational and strongly infl uenced by activation could come from a leader’s suggestion
group emotions. From a distance, the crowd is or from the crowd modeling behavior. To the
treated as a collective whole with universal extent that individuals infl uence one another,
gining Collective Behavior 533

they are intensifying and activating latent behavior emerges as a solution to overcome
impulses rather than generating new ones. reward-barriers.
Allport continued the assumption that crowd Ted Gurr ( 1970 ) built on the deprivation
behaviors are driven by strong emotional thesis by arguing that relative deprivation
responses with tendencies towards violence emerges with an actor’s perception of the
(1924 b ). In contrast to crowds, “common group discrepancy between what one deserves and what
behaviors” were non-emotional and means-ends one is capable of attaining and keeping. A point
oriented. Similar to Blumer’s “circular reaction,” of reference may come from history, an abstract
Allport’s “social facilitation” was a reciprocal ideal, a leader’s vision, or a comparison group.
process wherein actors model, suggest, and The relative deprivation thesis was largely used
activate behaviors within one another. The to explain urban riots of the 1960s and 1970s.
circular process may strengthen when spatial Arguments were made about perceived injustice,
arrangements and other mediating ecological anger, and frustration because of the rioters’
factors increase crowd density, thus bringing position in society.
nearness to potential activating stimuli. The more extreme the negative affect, the greater
This thesis has been critiqued as a sleight of the intensity of relative deprivation. Gurr states
hand, simply taking the transformation view from “one innate response to perceived deprivation is
the group level and positioning it at the individual discontent or anger, and the anger is a motivation
level (McPhail 1991) . Questions of motivation state for which aggression is an inherently
also became problematic as actions were used satisfying response” ( 1968 : 1105). Others have
post-hoc to explain driving factors. For instance, argued that absolute deprivation is also a
those participating in dancing manias were precipitating factor for collective behavior (e.g.,
believed to be victims of devil possession and Toch 1965 ). For instance, Rude ( 1964) argues
people in lynch mobs were argued to be driven by rising food prices and worsening conditions
religious fanaticism. These assumptions lie threatening minimum human survival motivated
beyond the limits of our knowledge; thus, this France’s revolutionary crowds.
speculation is often a better refl ection of the
theorist than the phenomena which being studied.
However, there are benefi ts to breaking down 25.3.3 Emergent Norms
types of emergent crowd behavior; we can think
of the differentiation as analogous to different R alph H. Turner and Lewis Killian, both students
types of individual behavior. Cognitively, we can of Herbert Blumer, posited the emergent norm
see this as sometimes acting out of the highly refl theory of collective behavior. This interactionist
exive cerebral cortex, other times the emotional approach diverged from the early work of LeBon,
amygdala, and other times the fi ght, fl ight, or Park, and Blumer by rejecting the “illusion of
freeze of the brain stem. unanimity” premise. In contrast, Turner and
Miller and Dollard ( 1941 ) developed the Killian believed that crowds were composed of
deprivation thesis through the use of learning individuals with varying motives, emotions, and
theory which views behaviors as a result of behaviors. Wherein day-to-day life is governed
learned tendencies in response to rewards. An by routine social norms, Turner and Kilian
inability to attain rewards through behaviors described collective behavior as “extraordinary
which have previously been successful creates a social behavior” which operates outside of
sense of frustration. This eventually leads to habitual norms and is the product of a negotiated
action in order to remove what is perceived as the emergent norm particular to that situation in time
blockade when previous behavior-reward and space. In these moments, an opening emerges
pathways become problematic. Thus, they argued where actors within the situation have greater
that aggressive action always indicates the ability to shape the attitudes of others.
existence of prior frustration and collective Crowds and gatherings emerge in response to
a condition or event that generates extraordinary
J. Van Ness and E. Summers-Effl er

circumstances. These circumstances may emerge lesser degree of involvement. “Insecure” persons
from the physical world, such as tsunamis, sought out crowds for the direct satisfaction of
earthquakes, and wildfi res, or from chemical participation and security that stems from the
spills or nuclear accidents. Events may also emergence of defi nitions that make sense of
emerge from social problems in the normative extraordinary conditions. “Spectators” can also
order, social structure, or communication be found, motivated by curiosity and intrigue.
channels. For instance, sudden repression and Lastly, “exploiters” are present to capitalize on
censorship may motivate collective behavior. the concentration of people in a common location
Alternatively, in conditions that were previously for self-interested gains. Breaking down crowds
repressive, new opportunities for free speech and into types is generally a useful theoretical move.
assembly may also facilitate gatherings. Across In addition to arguing for a variation in
situations, people utilize existing channels of motives and emerging norms in crowd situations,
communication to exchange rumor in response to Turner and Killian’s second edition of Collective
the changing conditions; the growing literature Behavior ( 1972) argues ecology, social control,
on social networks has broadened our and shared symbols may also facilitate or inhibit
understanding and increased our ability to predict collective behavior. While still a theoretically
and explain these mechanisms and processes and empirically underdeveloped insight, more
(e.g., Beyerlein and Hipp 2006; Beyerlein and recently, ecology is central to Zhao’s ( 1998 )
Sikkink 2008 ; Gould 1991 ; McAdam and research on the 1989 Beijing student movement.
Paulsen 1993 ; Snow et al. He argues the university campuses had a unique
1980 ). spatial distribution with high density of students
U nlike previous conceptions of rumor, Turner in small areas which nurtured close knit student
and Killian did not assume that rumor was the networks. The layout of the dorms facilitated
perpetuation of inaccurate information. Rather, in quick transmission of dissident ideas, created
alignment with the symbolic interactionist predictable patterns of interactions, and made
perspective, it was a form of communication to communication between campuses easy. The
construct a defi nition of the problematic campus density also directly exposed students to
situation in order to guide future lines of action. a collective action environment once crowds
This information could be spread through face- formed, thus facilitating recruitment. Since the
to-face interactions or various forms of mass campuses were surrounded by a brick wall,
media. It may also precede or emerge students were afforded protection from social
concomitantly with convergence in a common control agents, creating a low-risk mobilization
location. Rumor tends to develop in reaction to environment.
the exciting event. In different degrees, actors Exposure to emotionally powerful cultural
provide suggestions for what has happened, what symbols can also facilitate the rumor and milling
is happening, and what should happen next. process as people seek to construct a defi nition
Others may be concerned with leadership and of the situation. For example, in 2009, when anti-
who is going to act fi rst. After an exciting event abortion activists protested President Barack
and the rumoring and milling process, a common Obama’s commencement speech by fl ying a
mood and imagery emerges as the new defi nition plane with a banner in tow of an aborted fetus
of the situation and lines of action develop over the University of Notre Dame, they were
(Turner and Killian inciting a rumor and milling process. It was an
1987 : 4). attempt to make salient the supposed confl ict in
Questions of motivation lead Turner and values between President Obama’s pro-choice
Killian to posit fi ve roles in collective behavior stance and the Catholic Church’s anti-choice
situations. The fi rst were “ego-involved” who position. Other examples may be more reactive
tended to have direct relationships to the situations where culturally powerful symbols are
extraordinary event. “Concerned” participants introduced less consciously into situations where
were those with personal relationships but a they are not expected. That is, crowds may
gining Collective Behavior 535

emerge in reaction to a cultural symbol which Oliver ( 1989 ) argues that prior to
may have confl icting meanings or has been assembling processes there are often “occasions”
integrated into a situation where it is deemed where actors engage in calculation and planning.
inappropriate. During occasions, people communicate and
signal to one another their intentions to act or not
under future conditions. Feelings of injustice and
25.3.4 Life Course indignation motivate future action and future
successes build a sense of effi cacy in collective
Clark McPhail contends that too often scholars action. Through occasions, tactics become
confl ate the study of crowds with the study of loosely structured and are open to modifi cation
collective behavior (McPhail 1991 ; McPhail and when they are deployed in collective action
Miller 1973 ). This leads to an overemphasis on situations. Oliver also argues that behind some
theories being developed about what happens crowd events is a social movement downplaying
when a large group of people are already an organizational role because of the “odd
congregated. He argues that not only does an cultural belief” that spontaneous crowds are more
emphasis on the crowd narrow the range of legitimate than calculated and organized crowd
sociological phenomena within the study of events. Some of these organizational decisions
collective behavior, but the notion of crowds may be choosing the time and place and even
implies homogeneity of motivations and planning for social control measures to prevent
behaviors. To counter, McPhail ( 1991) draws “true” spontaneous crowd formation.
from Goffman ( 1963 ), suggesting collective Spontaneity has also returned to the study of
behavior be studied in a life-course perspective collective behavior and social movements. An
with an analytic focus on gatherings . insight present in Turner and Killian’s Collective
When two or more people come together, a Behavior (1987), Snow and Moss ( 2014 ) revisit
gathering is created which creates the the concept and posit conditions when
opportunity for collective behavior, though it spontaneity becomes likely to emerge and
does not guarantee it (Goffman 1963 ; McPhail consequential to organization and collective
1991 ). Gatherings tend to be temporary and action outcomes. They argue nonhierarchical
undergo three stages: the assembling process, the movements encourage openness, innovation, and
assembled gathering, and the dispersal process. experimental forms of collective action. These
The assembling process refers to the forces which dynamics increase the likelihood for unplanned
bring groups of people together, such as exciting action and spontaneity. They also argue that
events. The assembled gathering is the moment behavioral and emotional priming creates
when people are in a similar space and time with sensitivity to stimuli prior to experiences and
the potential for collective action. 110 Dispersals increases the probability of directing future
are often unproblematic though they can also take emotions and lines of actions. Priming becomes
the form of emergency dispersals, such as exiting particularly infl uential during moments of
a burning building, or through coercion, as when ambiguity and situational breakdown. Finally,
the police intervene. By differentiating the they too argue spontaneity is infl uenced by the
various stages of collective behavior, theories can ecological arrangements in situations. Not only
be developed with greater specifi city and not can ecology facilitate crowd formation and
misstep by creating too general of arguments. mobilization, but it also may increase the
Similar to Turner and Killian’s move to likelihood of unplanned action and confrontation
differentiate roles within collective behavior from social control agents and exacerbate effects
situations, differentiating stages in time is also a of ambiguity and priming.
useful move.

110
For a complete discussion on how to systematically Collective Action Observation Primer (McPhail et al.
record data during collective gatherings see The 1997 ).
J. Van Ness and E. Summers-Effl er

M cPhail and Miller ( 1973 ) differentiate the seems to be the case. Koopmans ( 1997 ) states
assembling process between periodic assembly this disagreement exists because of poor
and non-periodic assembly. Periodic assemblies methodology, data, and theory. Most models use
tend to have recurring participants who establish static, cross- sectional data, despite the fact that
schedules to converge at the same time-space repression is dynamic (see Maher 2010 ) and
locations. For instance, churches, which have varies across situations and time. Snyder ( 1976)
services at the same time and place every week, has similarly critiqued the fi eld for a lack of
or classes, which announce their schedules differentiation between forms and timing of
semesters at a time. Non-periodic assemblies coercion.
seldom have completely sustained membership D espite the mixed fi ndings, the fi eld is ripe
across events and often have differing motivating with case studies that afford potential for
forces. Communication channels can also lead to innovation. One such article is Khwaja ( 1993 )
differing assembly processes and can be response to Snyder’s critique. He uses data from
distinguished between short range the Palestinian West Bank from 1976 to 1985 to
communication (e.g., face-to-face interaction) address both shifts in form and level of repression
and long range communication (e.g., social and the effects on collective action. Because the
media). Nearness to events, such as a fi re or a Israeli military uses various countermeasures of
protest, may explain variation in who enters into coercion to suppress resistance, he says it allows
non-periodic assemblies. Thus, for non-routine insight into various strategies used by the state.
gatherings, theories about ecology, population Of the 14 forms of repression measured, all forms
density, communication, and afforded of repression increased collective action except
interactions, can be theorized in distinctly for one: home searches. This implies that
different ways than those that are more deeply generally repression reinforces resistance
rooted in personal and institutional histories. regardless of costs (also see: De Nardo 1985 ;
Non-routine dispersals, such as those coerced by McAdam [1982] 1999 ). However, this also
social control agents, also focus on similar suggests that repression at the group or crowd
intervening variables. level (e.g., curfews) may create mixed results
compared to repression at the individual level
(e.g., invading a family’s home).
25.3.5 Repression In addition to motivating increased resistance,
Khawaja argues repression can also strengthen
Research on the effects of social control on collective identity, provide a sense of belonging
collective behavior has produced mixed and even to a group, and can operate as a symbolic
contradictory fi ndings. Rational choice reminder of a group’s shared circumstances vis-
explanations argue that repression depresses à-v is authorities. Perhaps one of Khawaja’s most
resistance because it increases the costs of interesting, yet arguably under-theorized, fi
participation (e.g., Opp and Roehl 1990 ; Snyder ndings is the notion that during acts of repression,
and Tilly 1972 ; Tilly 1978 ), while others argue authorities are likely to violate moral standards
the opposite claiming repression increases which may further draw in bystanders who were
mobilization (Khwaja 1993; Rasler 1996) . Gurr previously unengaged. This insight can be
( 1970 ) argues the greatest magnitude of violence integrated with Thomas Scheff’s theory
and resistance emerges at medium levels of shame/rage spirals ( 1990 ). Scheff argues for a
repression. Some argue for a various non-linear dynamic understanding of shame and anger
relationship between repression and resistance which can rise both between interactants and
(De Nardo 1985 ; Muller and Weede 1990 ). within actors, manifesting as explosive outbursts
Zimmermann ( 1980) claims there to be or enduring tones, and may operate at varying
arguments for all conceivable relationships levels along the micro-macro continuum.
between repression and mobilization, except for Enduring tones of shame and rage can give way
the claim that there is no relationship. Indeed, this to outbursts through group confl ict. A historical
gining Collective Behavior 537

and cultural analysis of the group’s histories, with


response to “strain” in the social structure
a particular attention to emotions of shame and (Smelser 1962 ). This strain emerges when
rage, can help explain reactions to particular environmental conditions create impairments in
triggers of confl ict. the structural relations among components of
Koopmans ( 1997 ) fi nds a lack of society. As structure breaks down, actors begin to
consistency by repressive forces may also feel tension and a feeling of uncertainty. In a
generate moral outrage among public post-hoc explanation, Smelser argues that the
nature of collective action is proof of the
sympathizers; that is, tolerating a protest tactic 1
day and then repressing it the next is likely toexistence of structural strain.
anger and motivate participation. From violation While some advocated for the merit of strain
of consistency, repression comes to “embod[y] theory (Marx and Wood 1975) , the Tilly’s
the very message that [protestors] seek to (1975) supplanted the strain metaphor with a
convey…a repressive political system that is in distinction between “breakdown” and
need of revolutionary change” (Koopmans 1995 “solidaristic” theories of collective action. The
: 32). Differentiating between institutional central tenet of breakdown theories is that
repression (e.g., bans, trials, raids) and situational
underlying all forms of collective action is rapid
repression (e.g., tear gas, arrests), he fi nds social change and disintegration. Crises weaken
situational repression escalating tensions whilethe regulative and integrative functions in
institutional repression comparatively lesseningsociety, thereby threatening social cohesion.
levels of protests. In Smith’s ( 1996 ) researchConsequently, these strains in the sociopolitical
with the Central America Peace Movement, the order incite frustration which motivates
government used institutional repression by collective action. To a fault, this approach
relabeling Nicargua as a high-risk destination, perpetuates the assumption that society can
consequently making travel diffi cult, while also
actually achieve a harmonious, perfectly
requiring burdensome tax audits, tapping integrated and regulated state. Like strain theory,
protestors phones, and going to great lengths toit has not fared well to empirical tests. Tilly et al.
intimidate and discredit protestors, sympathetic(1975 ) found little support for the breakdown
journalists, and academics. He fi nds varying thesis. Rather, they found it was new forms of
effects on mobilization from discouragement, organization, with new bonds of solidarity, which
ineffectiveness, and even re-motivating
incited collective action. Thus, they posited the
protestors. Generally, he argues when repression“solidaristic” approach as opposed to supporting
generates fear activism tends to be lessened; breakdown theories. Broadly conceived, these
feelings of anger, however, tended to increase theories can be viewed as push and pull theories
commitment and investment. With a similar of collective action whereas breakdown pushes
attention to perception and emotions, Maher ( and solidarity pulls. One of the main tenets in the
2010 ) fi nds that in highly repressive “push” hypothesis from strain theory which
environments, collective action may emerge social movement research has rejected is the
when the absence of group action is perceived asnotion that collective behavior is incited by
posing a greater threat than the potential response
socially isolated actors. In fact, one of the most
to resistance. well supported fi ndings in the study of social
movements confi rms that participants are often
embedded in social networks and organizations
25.3.6 Structure which draw one into participation (Gould 1991 ,
1993 ; McAdam and Paulsen 1993 ; Snow et al.
T hree main macro concepts have received the 1980 ).
most theoretical attention and development: Useem’s ( 1985 ) research on the 1980 New
strain , breakdown, and, quotidian - disruption Mexico prison riots suggests that breakdown
. Neil Smelser, a student of Talcott Parsons, processes can contribute to at least some
argues that collective behavior emerges in instances of collective action. The brutal prison
J. Van Ness and E. Summers-Effl er

riots were a product of the termination of inmate not emerge despite conditions which one would
programs, crowding, idleness, poor expect to motivate action (see Della Fave 1980
administration, and bad living conditions. Over ).
the course of 5 years, living conditions in the
prison gradually worsened. This incited feelings
of deprivation and frustration which eventually 25.3.7 Testing the Myths
amounted into a bloody prison riot. Useem’s fi
ndings challenge both the Tilly’s (1975) Some empirical research claims to have
solidaristic model and social movement theory’s dispelled many of the early collective behavior
resource mobilization thesis. Collective action “myths” (see McPhail 1991 ). Disaster research,
did not arise because of an increase in solidarity for instance, has argued that even in moments of
amongst inmates nor the infusion of new crisis, people in crowds do not suffer from
resources – quite the opposite, in fact. The irrationality or cognitive defi ciencies (Bryan
processes of disorganization and the fragmenting 1982 ; Cantor 1980 ; Johnston and Johnson 1989
of bonds among inmates contributed to the weak ). For example, Tierney ( 2002) describes the
and chaotic leadership structures. Even though emergency evacuations in the World Trade
inmates were in prison, prisoners set standards by Center on September 11th, 2001 as prosocial,
which how much deprivation can be tolerated. It orderly, and
was the violation of these standards that created “with a virtual absence of panic”. This emphasis
the frustration which fueled the response. on rationality is also present in much social
Another perspective focuses on the routine in movement research, particularly within the
day-to-day life. Snow et al. ( 1998 ) utilize rationalist and resource mobilization tradition
cognitive psychology’s prospect theory to argue (Klandermans and Oegema 1987 ; McCarthy and
the key relationship between breakdown and Zald 1977 ; Walsh and Warland 1983) . Many
collective action emergence resides in the theorists who have made this move continue to
“quotidian” and its actual or threatened perpetuate the false dichotomy between
disruption. Prospect theory argues that actors will emotionality and rationality. As we explain in the
be more likely endure risk in order to protect what next section of this chapter, this contrast is no
they already have rather than take on the same longer empirically supportable. Thus, theorizing
level of risk in order to gain something new. which assumes that action driven through
Thus, when one’s everyday life – their quotidian emotions is refl ective of a “cognitive defi
– is disrupted, actors are more likely to respond ciency” is inherently problematic.
in order to restore life conditions than they are to In addition to research challenging the
attempt to improve them. Quotidian’s can “irrationality” of actors, the myth of the
become disrupted by: (1) an increase in claimants anonymous and violent crowd has also been
or demand for resources, yet no change in critiqued with much greater success. Despite
resource availability; (2) a decrease in available popular conceptions, crowds are not typically
resources but constant claimants and demand; (3) violent (Collins 2009 ; Eisinger 1973 ; McPhail
crises which disrupt or threaten a community’s 1994 ). Violence is often carried out by small
daily routines; (4) actual or threatened intrusions groups within a crowd or by state authorities
on privacy and safety. The quotidian-disruption (Couch 1968; Marx and McAdam 1994 ; Stott
approach appears most useful as it gives attention and Reicher 1998 ). Collins (2009 ) provides a
to individual perception, resource disparities, thorough account of processes and pathways
population pressures, and other structural creating violent situations. By all measures,
phenomena which may threaten the true or violence is a rare phenomenon and it is a more
perceived conditions in one’s daily life. It also useful theoretical move to consider the conditions
demonstrates how the politically rich get richer when situations become violent, rather than
and other forms of inequality become emphasizing violent individuals . Collins argues
exacerbated in addition to why resistance does violent situations create an emotional fi eld of
gining Collective Behavior 539

tension and fear. Within these fi elds, actual when one looks outside of sociology and into the
violence happens when one side of the interdisciplinary fi eld of cognitive social
confrontation turns emotional tension into science, as many in the emotions turn tend to do
emotional energy, becomes more attuned to the (Collins 2001 ; Gould 2009; Jasper 2011 ;
situation’s audience in order to assert dominance, Summers-Effl er 2010 ), one would likely be
or when one side has a fracture in solidarity and surprised by recent fi nding’s resemblance to
shows weakness. early collective behavior theories.
T he evolving histories of collective behavior I n this section, we draw from recent
theories suggests not that some are completely advancements in interdisciplinary fi eld of
wrong and others are right, but that it would cognitive social science to discuss the
behoove us to understand how and when different implications for collective behavior theory with a
causes and conditions create variation in specifi c focus on how emotions and cognitions
outcomes. Certainly, the history of collective infl uence and are infl uenced by collective
behavior has provided important pieces of the behavior. Specifi cally, we utilize research on
puzzle. The most pressing work is fi nding a dual process models, mirror neurons, and
common foundation and putting them all embodied cognition to re-center the body and to
together. In the next section, we work towards revisit theories of emotionality, cognition, and
this endeavor by drawing from interdisciplinary action. In so doing, we contribute to the
cognitive social science to begin to salvage revitalization of collective behavior now
theories which were prematurely dismissed in emerging with, what we believe, is the third
order to recover some of our puzzle pieces. movement within collective behavior (e.g., Snow
and Moss 2014; Van Dyke and Soule 2002 ).
Recent research returning to the fi rst movement
reveals that the early theorists had more right than
25.4 Collective Behavior Theory
what the rationalist turn gave credit for.
Redux

Thus far, we have covered the fi rst two


25.4.1 Dual Process
movements within the fi eld of collective
behavior. The fi rst movement focused on
R esearch in cognitive science, neuropsychology,
theories of how individuals are changed by a
and social psychology have uncovered that
result of their participation in crowds, as well as
humans possess two memory systems which has
the nature, causes, and consequences of
been developed under the “dual process
collective behavior. The second movement was
framework” (Brewer 1988 ; Gawronksi and
marked by the emergence of the social movement
Bodenhausen 2006 ; Haidt 2001 ; Smith and
fi eld (see Chap. 26 ) and coinciding rationalist
DeCoster 2000 ). Within the dual process
turn in collective behavior (McPhail 1991 ;
framework, there are dual process models which
McPhail and Miller 1973 ; McPhail et al. 1997)
describe the implications for the enculturation
. The rationalist turn quickly became the
process, culture in thinking, storage, and culture
dominant approach to collective behavior and
in action (see Lizardo et al. unpublished ). Of the
often scholars continue to set up their
varying models, those focused on culture in
contributions in reaction to the theories of LeBon,
storage and action differentiate between
Blumer, and Turner and Killian.
schematic, associative memory processes and
If one were to ignore developments outside of
symbolically- mediated, rule - based processes
sociology, or work from the more recent
(see Kahneman 2011 ; Smith and DeCoster
emotions turn within sociology, one would likely
2000) . Research in this area has uncovered how
be content with where the fi eld of collective
and under what conditions actors tend to use one
behavior and social movements is currently
type of memory over another. Both memory
positioned vis-à-vis the early theories. However,
systems infl uence perception, judgments,
J. Van Ness and E. Summers-Effl er

affective states, and lines of action in distinct evokes varying emotions, motives, and actions
ways (e.g., Hunzaker 2014 ; Lizardo and Strand rather than presuming that individuals are
2010 ; Vaisey 2009 ). constant across situations. It is problematic to
Schematic memory records information assume that theories of action in abnormal
through a slow, incremental patterning of situations can be “disproven” by developing
experiences which develop into general, stable theories in mundane situations because variation
expectations. Once created, schemas help “fi ll in the situation evokes variation in cognitive and
in” missing information pre-consciously in day- emotive processes .
to- day life by automatically relating the current Here we discover the importance of
situation to expected information and affective specifying situational conditions. Atypical
reactions from similar situation’s in one’s history situations are likely to shift one out of associative,
(Strauss and Quinn 1997 . When situations are ) schematic processing and into rule-based
predictable and stable, actions tend to fl ow symbolically- mediated processing and action
automatically (Strack and Deustch 2004 ). Fast- (Smith and DeCoster 2000 ). Conditions of
binding, symbolically-mediated “ rule - based ” social unrest evoke cognitive and emotive
processes encode episodic experiences and processes qualitatively different than those
contexts. This system constructs new evoked during comparatively stable conditions.
representations which bind together disparate Such situational conditions afford opportunities
information from an immediate context and can for the creative development of lines of action not
often be constructed, directed, and controlled afforded in comparatively stable, predictable
strategically by others within the situation (Smith situations. Thus, when LeBon spoke of
and DeCoster 2000 : 112). Fast learning systems “suggestibility” and Blumer of “susceptibility to
particularly attend to details of events which are rumor,” their concepts emphasize where an
novel and interesting, with a specifi c focus on the actor’s attention lies and the potential the
unexpected and unpredicted. That is, one is more situation affords. Susceptibility to rumors can be
likely to encode and act through rule-based understood as susceptibility to prioritizing
processes in atypical moments as opposed to emerging understandings over historical ones
relying on deeply engrained schemas and habits. because they are utilizing symbolically mediated
Understanding that conditions infl uence which rule-based processing instead of schematic
type of cognitive processes drive action reveals associations. One does not have increased
why some theorists see situations of radical suggestibility because they are a “dope,” but
moments full of creativity while others see rather because in unexpected situations actors
situations of “rationality,” stability, and habit. hone their attention towards processes in the
LeBon, Park, and Blumer all centered their immediate present and are more open for the
analyses within conditions of social unrest. construction of novel lines of action.
Turner and Killian described collective behavior LeBon’s fi xation with the unequal infl uence
as being precipitated by an “exciting event” and of leaders during “suggestible” situations can be
“extraordinary circumstances”. All agreed these understood as an actor’s ability to infl uence the
were atypical moments which afforded potential emerging defi nition of the situation and lines of
for creativity and signifi cant change. Specifying action. Inequality of attention within situations is
the context for the behavior being theorized is not a contested notion; the unequal distribution of
important because humans utilize differing attention and emotional resources is a structural
memory systems depending upon the novelty, property of situations, not a property of
stability, or predictability of a situation (also see individuals (Collins 2004 ). Thus, when certain
Harvey 2010 ). Thus, to understand variation in situational conditions encourage rule-based
lines of action, we must make the processing, there is an increased opportunity for
microsociological move towards the situation the transmission of emergent meanings and lines
(Collins 2004 , 2009 ; Goffman 1974 ). By of action which may be infl uenced in unequal
doing this, the analyst observes how the situation
gining Collective Behavior 541

ways dependent upon the distribution of attention . Contagion is the process where members imitate
within the situation. the emotions, action states, and behaviors of
Turner and Killian’s theory of emergent others. Interestingly enough, and perhaps to the
norms has also found its support from the dual surprise of many, neuropsychology has decades
process framework. In situations where emergent of research supporting contagion theories
meanings are in tension with one’s historical (Gallese and Sinigaglia 2011 ; Hatfi eld et al.
understanding, conformity towards the emergent 1994 , 2009 ;
develops through the perception of situational Knoblich and Flach 2003 ; Rizzolatti and
group consensus (Smolensky 1988 ). When lines Sinigaglia 2007) . Indeed, actors do infl uence
of action are articulated through explicit, the emotions and readiness for action in other
conscious thought, actors are more likely to individuals in pre-conscious ways (for a list of
assume proposals are valid (Mackie and Skelly contagion mechanisms, see Hatfi eld et al. 2009
1994 ). Once perceived as valid, actors are more ).
likely to attribute emergent meanings as O ne major mechanism facilitating contagion
objectively true and become less likely to assume is through the activation of mirror neurons.
they are an artifact of possible interpretive errorsResearch has found that human brains are
or misrepresentations (Smith and DeCoster 2000 biologically wired to be social. Mirror neurons
: 112). The notion that actors may align link perception and motor action directly,
themselves to emergent meanings, despite the affording the potential for perceived sights and
possibility that they may be in confl ict with one’ssounds to activate embodied simulation (Gallese
historic understandings, aligns with Turner and and Sinigaglia 2011 ; Iacoboni 2008 ; Rizzolatti
Killian’s suggestion that norms may emerge and
within situations and align actions even though Sinigaglia 2007 ). This simulation alters the
co-present actors may hold varying motives and bodily and emotional states in the perceiver,
dispositions. Such an attention to situational creating a “resonance” which “is the functional
conditions, and the corresponding perceptual, outcome of attunement that allows us to feel what
emotive, and cognitive effects, also reveals the is felt by another person” (Siegel 2007 : 166).
power of a skilled frame articulator and a Co-presence initiates this attunement as mirror
successful frame alignment process; alignment neurons are particularly receptive to face-to-face
processes are more complex and situationally interactions, responding to even the most micro
contingent than simply broadening, bridging, or of gestures such as facial expressions (Christakis
transforming symbolically-mediated meanings – and Fowler 2009 ; Iacoboni 2008 ), in addition
an insight underdeveloped within the extensive to other synchronization processes which
framing literature (see Snow et al. respond to body posturing (Bernieri et al. 1988)
2014 ). and voice tones (Hatfi eld et al. 1995 ).
Importantly, mirror neuron activation does not
require explicit, deliberate recognition of the
25.4.2 Contagion information being simulated; rather, it is an “
effortless, automatic, and unconscious inner
Many early collective behavior theorists mirroring” (Iacoboni 2008 : 120).
described processes of conformity. LeBon Research within the dual process framework
described a “mental unity,” both Park and Blumer also fi nds that moods can infl uence the types of
spoke of a “circular reaction,” and Allport memory systems driving action. Actors are more
emphasized “social facilitation”. While Allport likely to rely on schematic processes during
might disagree with how LeBon, Park, and positive moods, while negative moods tend to
Blumer chose to emphasize the circular nature to increase a reliance on emergent meanings (Smith
contagion, even Allport argued that co-presence and Decoster 2000 : 117). Aligning this insight
facilitates the activation of inner impulses. These with mirror neuron research, we know that
insights can broadly be referred to as contagion emotions can spread contagiously, often in pre-
J. Van Ness and E. Summers-Effl er

conscious ways when co-present. The tone of the actions which one may classify as irrational
emotions being spread infl uences whether (Damasio 2003 ). Again, this demonstrates that
greater weight is placed on the present situation emotionality is a requisite for rational thinking.
or on historical meanings. When co-presence Early collective behavior theory was well
facilitates the contagion of negative emotions, attuned to emotional dynamics in group
actors are more likely to rely on symbolically- situations. Granted, many of these theorists relied
mediated rule based processing, just as they are on the perception of emotionality as an indication
when embedded within novel situations. In of a group’s irrationality. Despite this, it is
addition to the interactional contagion of negative surprising that it took decades for the study of
moods, an inability to rely on historical emotions to return to theories of collective
dispositions may also give rise to a sense of behavior (Jasper 2011 ). The decades-long
frustration. This insight is shared with the extraction of all emotional dynamics from
pragmatists who suggest that engaging in an theories of collective behavior and social
unpredictable and novel situation may force movements actually perpetuated this antagonism
attention towards the immediate present because between emotionality and rationality rather than
of the inability to rely on historical challenge and critique such an assumption.
understandings (Dewey 1922 ; James 1890 Fortunately, those who treat emotions seriously
[2007]; Mead 1934) . Contagion research have begun to rebuild theories of collective
supports the insights of the early theorists who action and a growing body of literature has
believed there to be emergent processes which emerged (e.g., Collins 2009; Goodwin et al.
arise when groups of people come together in 2001; Gould 2009 ; Summers-Effl er 2002 ,
time and space. 2010 ; Turner and Stets 2005 ). Among other
25.4.3 Rationality and Emotionality salvageable components of early theories, there is
still great potential for revisiting and rebuilding
Finally, the fallacy that emotionality and emotional dynamics in collective behavior.
rationality are at odds has long been dispelled –
though this belief unfortunately continues to
linger in Sociology. Frequently, sociologists
25.5 Future Directions
perpetuate this misconception because of the
false assumption that individual refl exive In this section, we focus primarily on three areas
thought is the seat of all rationality. As discussed, where we believe collective behavior theory can
refl exive thought is only a portion of cognition develop. First, we emphasize a methodological
and much which drives action happens through approach which re-centers the body. Second, we
pre-conscious habitual associations linking believe questions of time and space should be
situations to expected cognitions and affective revisited with the methodological approach
states. When emotions are accounted for, they’re advocated, particularly with an attention towards
often associated with intuition, as if emotions do emotional dynamics. Finally, we argue that
not infl uence both refl exive reasoning and questions of motivation, which are rising to the
intuition (Haidt 2001 ). Turning this surface in recent theories of collective action,
misconception on its head, research in should be developed with an awareness of
neuroscience suggests rational thinking requires cognitive social science’s contributions.
emotional attunement (Damasio 1994 ). The
human amygdala, for instance, has been found to
link emotional cues to other cognitive systems 25.5.1 Re-centering the Body
underlying cognition and action (see Phelps
2006 ; Whalen 1998 ). In fact, when the The eclectic nature of collective behavior is refl
prefrontal lobe becomes separated from the sub- ected in the diversity of methods scholars have
cortical emotion stem, individuals have a diffi employed. Despite wide variation and the
cult time making decisions and often engage in creative combination of multiple approaches
gining Collective Behavior 543

(e.g., Collins 2009 ), detailed ethnographic change. Thus, when an analyst seeks to make
accounts of collective behavior are in short sense of how change evolves through space and
supply. With some exceptions, much of what is time, she fi nds herself in the realm of
classifi ed as ethnographic research is simply a rhythmanalysis (Lefebvre 2014 [2004]). Such
form of interviewing in naturalistic contexts. This theorizing fi ts well with Summers-Effl er’s
creates a tendency to privilege discourse over approach to ethnography, as Lefebvre states “the
emotive processes and habitual behaviors which theory of rhythms is founded on the experience
may fall outside of discursive awareness (see and knowledge of the body… the rhythmnanalyst
Summers-Effl er et al. 2015) . It also makes calls on all of his [sic] senses” (Lefebvre 2014
theorizing processes of time and space more diffi [2004]: 31). With the Self as a resource, rhythm
cult when the researcher’s data is limited by the becomes a tool for analysis rather than simply an
cognitive constraints of the interviewee (see object of study. As a novel way of seeing, the
Baddeley 1986 ). analyst unveils that which rhythms make
A particularly fruitful method which may help apparent and that which they conceal. For
address this bias in data collection comes from instance, one may make perceptible patterns of
Summers-Effl er’s ( 2010 ) comparative stability and change by varying temporal
ethnography. Her multisensory approach utilizes constraints or positions of perception. By doing
the Self as a form of social propioception in order so, analysts will reveal how collective action
to account for how one’s social position and the leaves imprints on the social, cultural, and
role of the body, timing, and emotions infl uence political fabric of an era.
processes of social organization (see Summers- T o aid future research, the microsociological
Effl er 2010 : 203–212). This approach affords unit of analysis – situations – is due resurgence
researchers the potential to purposefully align in the fi eld of collective behavior. Researchers
oneself in relational fi elds so as to take up should situate themselves within collective
varying positions in order to develop a behavior situations and record how material and
multidimensional theory. It also encourages refl social conditions constrain or encourage
exivity of one’s research role in relation to the particular meanings, emotions, and actions. In
phenomena being explained which helps reveal this respect, J.J. Gibson’s ( 1979 ) theory of
why some scholars distant from the fi eld tend affordances becomes particularly useful and can
towards viewing action as rooted in more rational be integrated with the pragmatists emphasis on
motivations while those more embedded tend to history in order to understand how and when
see the emotional and cultural motivations. history enables or constrains moments of change
Ethnographers who adopt an active research role (Dewey 1922 ; James 1912 ; Mead 1934 ).
have produced compelling ethnographic research Situations afford particular emotions, meanings,
(e.g., Desmond 2007; Pagis 2009 ; Tavory 2009 and interactions which may become constrained
; Wacquant 2004 ) and Summers-Effl er’s or enabled by perceptual and material conditions.
approach lends itself well for creative theorizing An embedded analyst can purposefully
of collective behavior. problematize components of situations in order to
theorize variation in affordances (e.g.,
McDonnell 2016 ). This may include an attention
25.5.2 Space and Time towards potential cultural, political, and
emotional meanings of places (e.g., Fuss 2004 ;
B y re-centering the body, dynamics of space and Gieryn 2000 , 2002 ; Mukerji 1994 ), ecological
time can be more directly and creatively conditions facilitating or inhibiting group
theorized. Indeed, spatial and temporal dynamics formation (e.g., Haffner 2013 ; Lefebvre 1991;
are often implicit and, in some cases, explicit, in Scott 1998; Zhao 1998) , or the way material
both early and contemporary collect behavior conditions interact with an actor’s perceptual
theories. At its core, collective behavior capabilities (e.g., Griswold et al. 2013 ; Klett
developed as a way to make sense of radical 2014 ; McDonnell 2010 ).
J. Van Ness and E. Summers-Effl er

25.5.3 Motivation future of collective behavior theory looks


promising.
Finally, in light of recent advancements in
cognitive science and the study of emotions,
questions of motivation and theories of action are
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Theorizing Social Movements 26
Dana M. Moss and David A. Snow

26.1 The Importance of and University of California , Irvine , CA , USA e-


mail: dsnow@uci.edu
Warrants for Social resistance on one side or the other. Theories of
Movement Theory social movements aim to understand the factors
and conditions producing such organized,
The analysis and theorization of social collective action dedicated to producing or
movements is central to the study of social life, resisting change across time and place and the
state- society relations, and social change, and consequences of those struggles.
comprises one of the most vibrant areas of F rom the rise of Christianity to the Arab
sociological inquiry today. From the proletarian Spring revolutions, challenges to entrenched
revolutions envisioned by Marx, to the Protestant power structures and formalized systems of
Reformation theorized by Weber, to the civic social control comprise some of the most
associations described by de Tocqueville, the formative and well-recognized events in human
examination of collective action has long been history. For this reason, social movements are
central to the sociological enterprise. In addition often conceived of as collectivities, ranging from
to its central place in classical theory, the informal groups to formal organizations, that
emergence, dynamics, and outcomes of social launch campaigns challenging governing
movements have grown to encompass much of structures and the elites who run them. Because
the study of contemporary politics and culture. governments and regimes have considerable
For as long as there have been social problems advantages that others lack, including a
creating systemic inequality based on class, monopoly over the use of force in a given
ethnicity, race, gender, or religion, there has also territory (Weber 1978 ), social movements are
been subversion and dissent, and rarely does often distinguished by their extra- institutional
there exist an important social issue about which character and exclusion from the polity (Gamson
there is no contentious collective debate and [ 1975 ]1990; Tilly 1978 ). This
organized conceptualization distinguishes actors who seek
to initiate or prevent change through means of
normative politics from those who are engaged in
what McAdam et al. ( 2001 ) call “transgressive
D. M. Moss () contention.” Social movements, therefore, do not
University of Pittsburgh , Pennsylvania , PA , USA e- rely primarily or solely on institutionalized
mail: dmmoss@uci.edu mechanisms, such as casting votes, as a means
D. A. Snow with which to lodge claims and induce or prevent

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 547


S. Abrutyn (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary Sociological Theory,
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32250-6_26
D.M. Moss and D.A. Snow

social change. Instead, movements are often hierarchical or patriarchal institutions through
characterized by their extra-institutional more or less obtrusive means of contention
character and tactics. Because social movements (Katzenstein 1990 ; Kucinskas 2014 ). In
challenge powerholders on unequal terms, a addition, as we discuss further below, movements
guiding concern driving theories of mobilization may also launch challenges by exiting from
is how movements lacking the authority, institutions and by withdrawing from society
legitimacy, capacity, and the means of social more generally (Hirschman 1970 ; see Snow and
control possessed by states come into being, Soule 2010 ).
sustain their campaigns, and sometimes win in Whether movements are conceptualized as
spite of their systemic disadvantages. being opposed to states or to other kinds of
Social movements are not only those authorities, both views are mutually conducive to
collectivities seeking to challenge, reform, or understanding the course and character of
replace state authorities, however. Instead, they movements and their outcomes. As such, we defi
may also be conceived more broadly as collective ne social movements broadly as collectivities
challenges to systems or structures of authority that seek to challenge or defend institutional and
writ large (Snow 2004b ). An authority is any / or cultural systems of authority and their
center of decision-making, regulation, or associated practices and representatives in order
procedure that infl uences the lives of individuals to account for the fact that social movements take
and social groups. This perspective recognizes a range of forms, employ a variety of more- or
that the relevance and targets of social less- transgressive tactics, may last for a matter of
movements extend beyond the state to other types days or decades, and may be embedded in the
of institutions, systems of beliefs, socio-cultural social structures they seek to challenge to varying
practices, identities, and social groups. Collective degrees, such as state institutions. They can also
actors may, for example, call the values, beliefs, arise in opposition to other movements and
and interpretations that undergird and legitimate collectivities, elites, and objects that are
social structures into question and aim to reconfi perceived as representing unwanted systems of
gure relationships of entities within those authority, such as other social movements, the
structures. Social movements sometimes seek to display of the Ten Commandments in public
change the cultural and legal relations between places, or Muslim women’s headscarves.
persons in everyday life—such as those between I mportantly, we also distinguish between
children and adults, husbands and wives, or what social movements are and what social
persons of different racial or ethnic categories— movement theory can help to explain. Though
or the relationship of persons to non-persons, social movements are often defi ned as extra-
such as that of people to animals or the institutional to some degree, this does not mean
environment. Movements may also challenge that theories explaining their emergence,
socio-cultural and legal systems of authority by dynamics, and outcomes are limited to cases of
working to bestow recognition and dignity on protest movements or radical groups. On the
subordinated groups, from slave-caste groups to contrary, theories of collective action may be
the transgendered; appropriate and reconfi gure useful in explaining the mobilization of
social institutions, such as marriage; and defi ne institutional group dynamics, such as those
actions and behaviors as more or less moral and occurring within and between political parties,
legitimate, from littering to abortion. Social the various institutions comprising the military,
movements also arise in opposition to other religious organizations, and interest groups, as
extra-institutional actors and the causes and well as changes in organizational fi elds, such as
authorities that they represent, producing those that take place among domestic and
counter-movements. Furthermore, rather than international non-governmental organizations or
emerging outside of a given authority structure, educational systems. Furthermore, in societies in
members of organizations often challenge which demonstrations and civic organizing are
normative cultural practices and meanings within permitted and not inherently transgressive, the
ing Social Movements 551

distinction between extra-institutional 2004 ; Klandermans 2004 ; Rohlinger and Snow 2003 ;
mobilization and institutionalized politics has Snow and Soule 2010 ), we devote less attention to the
topic throughout the chapter.
become increasingly fuzzy (Meyer and Tarrow
respondingly deviant behavior. In addition, Karl
1998 ). We therefore submit that social
Marx and Friedrich Engels argue in the
movement theory may be applied to a wide
Manifesto of the Communist Party that capitalism
variety of cases and collective actions across
produces and depends on the increased
different venues, historical periods, and places.
exploitation and alienation of the proletariat,
which in turn produce shared interests among
workers and lead to the mobilization of class-
26.2 Theorizing the Emergence of based social movements. Additionally, theorists
Social Movements writing in the years following the genocidal
violence and disruptions of World War II
The factors and conditions producing social likewise argued that mobilizing grievances arise
movements’ emergence are arguably at the core from the disintegration of social life (Kornhauser
of the study of social movements and associated 1959) , and that structural strains are one of
collective actions, such as demonstrations, several necessary conditions for individuals to
strikes, sit-ins, boycotts, and rebellions. Indeed, participate in collective protest (Smelser 1962 ).
few topics in the fi eld have generated such a S ubsequent studies published in the 1970s
range of theorization and research, with the argued against strain theory, fi nding little
possible exception of the study of recruitment evidence of breakdown as a precipitating factor
and participation in collective action. 1 As we of protest and rebellions (Tilly et al. 1975 ; Rule
outline below, a range of theories are currently and Tilly 1972 ). These studies also refuted
employed by social scientists to explain how, earlier social psychological and functionalist
why, where, and when individuals come together approaches to protest that viewed rebellion as
and the conditions prompting and sustaining their anomic or irrational (see Hoffer 1951 ; LeBon
mobilization. 1897 ). In response to the emergence of the Civil
Rights Movement and other rights-oriented
movements taking place across the U.S. in the
26.2.1 Social Strain and Breakdown 1960s, social movements came to be understood
as rational responses to injustice by educated
T heories of mobilization were fi rst derived by individuals and integrated social groups
classical theorists who emphasized the role of (McAdam [1982] 1999 ). Furthermore, rather
social strains in the emergence of collective than viewing action- driving grievances as the
action. Strains are the conditions, trends, or outcome of acute socio- economic downturns or
events—such as economic hardship or political upheavals, scholars instead argued that
violence—that create the mobilizing grievances grievances arising from structural conditions are
motivating disruptive collective action. Emile often long-term, ubiquitous phenomena. Because
Durkheim, for example, argues that because African Americans had been facing systemic
society is characterized by social integration, repression and violence for decades after
strains that disrupt the functioning and emancipation in the U.S., the existence of strain-
integration of normative social life produce induced grievances did little to explain why the
grievances and cor- movement for civil and political rights emerged
where and
1
when it did. In order to address these
S ince the topics of differential recruitment and
participation have received considerable attention in
shortcomings, subsequent perspectives began to
recent years (see, for example, Corrigall-Brown et al. theorize alternatives, and social strain was largely
2009 ; Diani discarded in the theoretical canon for several
decades (see Buechler 2004 ).
D.M. Moss and D.A. Snow

26.2.2 Resource Mobilization in places where local authorities were tolerant


enough to allow people to mobilize, but closed
The turn away from strain theory was marked in off to negotiation with marginalized groups.
part by the founding of the resource mobilization These formative studies gave rise to the “political
approach to movement emergence, spear-headed process” model of movement emergence
by John McCarthy and Mayer Zald ( 1973 , 1977 (McAdam [1982] 1999 ; Tarrow 1994 ; Tilly
). This perspective argues that social movements 1978 , 1995 ). The political process approach
are distinct from collective behavior writ large argues that the key to explaining movement
because they have organized and institutionalized emergence resides primarily in relation to their
characteristics that allow them to launch and political context, which sets the baseline rules of
sustain action-oriented campaigns. Because dissent and determines their opportunities for
social movement organizations (SMOs) are like protest. In addition to how liberal or intolerant a
other kinds of organizations in society, they are polity is, studies of political opportunity
therefore likely to emerge when resources are generally focus on four factors denoting what
available to sustain them. This perspective kinds of opportunities can facilitate movement
acknowledges that SMOs do not have the emergence. These include (1) increased access to
complete freedom of choice in how they organize political authorities, (2) divisions between
and what they do, but maintains that the greater power-holders, (3) the presence of allies to the
the pool of resources available to fuel a given movement among elites, and (4) a relative
issue— including the labor of volunteers, the decrease in state repression (McAdam 1996 ;
expertise of professional advisors and full-time Meyer 2004 ). Such opportunities may be
staff, and the support of conscience generated at different levels, including at the
constituents—the more likely that SMOs will local, national, and extra-national level
proliferate in order to compete for these resources (McAdam 1998) and by elites with varying
and engage in collective actions (Edwards and degrees of authority and control. Further
McCarthy 2004 ). Although critiqued in part for complicating the “opportunity structure” are the
being overly-rationalistic (Ferree 1992 ), the presence and actions of counter-movements
resource mobilization approach has remained an (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996 ; Mottl 1980 ), as
integral “partial theory” with which to which well as changes in public opinion that may occur
understand movement emergence (McCarthy and independently of movements. Critiques of this
Zald 1977 ). perspective as unwieldy and potentially
tautological notwithstanding (see Goodwin and
Jasper 1999 ), the core of the paradigm, which
26.2.3 Political Process and asserts that social movements’ political
Opportunity Theory environments are greatly determinative of their
emergence and character, continues to drive
A second infl uential post-1970 genre of much of the study of emergence.
theorization draws attention to how changes in
movements’ political contexts and relations with
elites infl uence their emergence across place and 26.2.4 Advancing Theories of
time (Kriesi 2004 ). This line of theorization was Emergence
heavily infl uenced by Michael Lipsky’s Protest
in City Politics ( 1970) , which called for S ince the rise and dominance of the political
increasing attention as to how facilitative process perspective, theory has developed in two
political conditions for protest fl uctuate over general directions. The fi rst has been to revitalize
time, as well as Peter Eisinger’s ( 1973 ) hallmark discarded theories, such as social strain and
study of riots. Eisinger found that disruptive breakdown, to demonstrate their utility in
events were most likely to occur in cities explaining mobilization, as well as to refi ne and
exhibiting both “open” and “closed” features, i.e., modify structural theories of emergence, such as
ing Social Movements 553

that of political opportunity. The second has been attitudes of everyday life. Such breakdowns in
to expand explanations of emergence by bringing the normative social order include: (1) accidents
in neglected concepts, such as emotions, that disrupt routines and threaten a community’s
networks, ecological factors, and culture and survival; (2) an actual or threatened intrusion that
identity to its theorization. We elaborate on these decreases the collective sense of safety, privacy
in turn below. or sense of control; (3) alterations in subsistence
routines, such as the means by which people
26.2.4.1 Revitalizing Theories of attain food and shelter; and (4) dramatic changes
Strain and Breakdown in the structures and implementation of social
Recent studies have reintroduced social strain control. These factors have been at play in
into the discussion of emergence by collective movements ranging from prison riots
demonstrating how structural conditions, such as (Useem 1985) , to “Not In My Backyard”
relatively high levels of inequality and economic movements (Snow and Anderson 1983 ), to
decline, generate oppositional frameworks that women’s activism in Argentina (Borland and
can produce high levels of extra-institutional Sutton 2007 ). Because individuals are adverse
behavior (McVeigh 2006) . For instance, the to loss, as argued by prospect theory (Kahneman
emergence of protests by homeless populations and Tversky 1979 ), they are more likely to
has been shown to be more likely in cities engage in collective action in order to preserve
experiencing a rising cost of living and a decline what they already have, as opposed to mobilizing
in manufacturing jobs (Snow et al. 2005 ). Van in order to gain something new. This fi nding
Dyke and Soule ( 2002 ) also explain the complements studies of the effects of state
emergence of radical movements by showing that repression on mobilization. Violent quotidian
economic restructuring, indicated by the loss of disruptions instigated by authorities often spur a
manufacturing jobs and family farms, are highly backlash because severe escalations in violence
correlated with white patriot and militia violate normative expectations about how
organizing. Furthermore, while the causes of the authorities should act, whether inside of prisons
Arab Spring revolutions that swept across the or in authoritarian states (Almeida 2003 ;
Middle East in 2011 will remain the subject of Einwohner 2003 ; Goodwin
heated debate in the years to come, the rising 2001 ; Hess and Martin 2006 ; Kurzman 2004 ;
disparity between the number of university- Loveman 1998 ; Moss 2014 ; Moore 1978 ;
educated youths and unemployment in places Useem and Kimball 1989 ; White 1989 ). As
such as Tunisia and Egypt is a probable factor in such, changes in the quotidian can spur
creating the grievances necessary for high-risk mobilization and participation under repressive
collective action (see Goldstone 2014 ). As such, conditions.
social strains can play a role in movement
emergence and may be a necessary condition, 26.2.4.2 Refi ning Political Opportunity
albeit not a suffi cient one, for mobilization— Scholars have also refi ned theories of political
particularly for movements that form despite opportunities by testing its assumptions against
signifi cant resource shortages and a relative lack alternative cases and specifying how
of political opportunities. opportunities should be delimited (Meyer 2004
In an effort to better specify the effects of ). For example, Eisinger’s ( 1973 ) curvilinear
social disruptions on mobilization, Snow and his model of movement emergence has been
colleagues ( 1998 ) also argue that breakdown , challenged by studies analyzing non-Western
an acute variant of social strain, can also play an movements in authoritarian or democratizing
important role in the emergence of movements, states. De la Luz Inclán’s ( 2008) study of
but in a different way than classically theorized. Zapatista mobilization in Mexico fi nds that
They argue that collective action is often the protest activity emerged in localities that were
product of actual or threatened disruption of the closed and repressive and decreased in more
“quotidian,” or the taken-for-granted routines and democratic zones. Almeida ( 2003 ) also
D.M. Moss and D.A. Snow

demonstrates that strains and threats prompted and relationships make individuals more or less
heightened protest waves in El Salvador by susceptible to collective action (Diani and
examining the effects of economic strains, land McAdam 2003 ; Fernandez and McAdam 1988
access, bank closures, and the general erosion of ; Gould 1991; McAdam and Paulsen 1993 ;
rights and state repression on public dissent. Passy 2003 ). As Diani ( 2013 ) writes, social
Other scholars have also called for increased movements may draw in prospective participants
attention as to how collective actors’ perceptions through both recruitment efforts and personal
of political opportunities and threats shape their networks, neither of which are mutually
mobilization dynamics, since grievances and exclusive (Snow et al. 1980) . Participation in
corresponding actions are dependent on movements is dependent, at least in part, on the
subjectively- understood and interpretive absence of blockages (Kitts 2000 ). The
processes (Kurzman 1996 ; see also Khadivar anchoring effects of immediate family, for
2013 ). example, signifi cantly shape the likelihood of
participation in protest and high-risk activism
26.2.4.3 The Role of Emotions (Viterna 2006 ). Potential participants also
Relatedly, scholars have also brought renewed consider the reactions of people with whom they
attention to the role of emotions in movement have strong ties when deciding to participate in
emergence (Goodwin et al. 2001; Jasper 2011 risky collective actions (McAdam 1986 ). But
), as when feelings anger and shock produce further complicating these dynamics is the fact
collective responses that impact the course and that individuals are embedded in multiple
character of mobilization. Smith ( 1996 ), for relationships that expose her or him to confl
example, argues that moral outrage prompted icting pressures (McAdam and Paulsen 1993 :
mobilization against the Reagan administration’s 641). Relationships are “multivalent” in that they
deportation of refugees from Central America in can exert positive and negative effects (Kitts
the 1980s. In an analysis of the emergence of the 2000 ), and the effects of social ties may change
Montgomery Bus Boycott, Shultziner ( 2013 ) over the course of a confl ict, rather than be static
demonstrates that this landmark civil rights-era forces that either block or facilitate mobilization
protest movement emerged as a result of the (Viterna 2006 ).
escalation in the abuse and humiliation of
African- American passengers by white bus 26.2.4.5 Ecological Factors
drivers. Furthermore, movements are often The focus on relations between individuals has
produced and sustained by sentiments of also brought attention to the importance of
altruism, compassion, and empathy. As Randal ecological factors in shaping possibilities for
Collins’ ( 2004 ) theory of interaction ritual protest (Sewell 2001 ). Such theories harken
chains argues, emotional energies can produce back to the arguments of Tilly et al. ( 1975) that
and reinforce solidarities necessary for collective capitalists “unwittingly afforded the proletariat
action (see also Fantasia 1988 ). Activists ideal settings within which to mobilize” by
therefore often work strategically to amplify and concentrating workers in urban dwellings
sustain outrage or empathy among members and (McAdam and
to foster sympathy among observers to bolster Boudet 2012: 19). Ecological structures can also
their campaigns (Nepstad 2004 ; Summers-Effl foster spontaneous protest events, which refer to
er 2010 ). actions not planned or organized in advance, such
as riots and sit-in movements (Snow and Moss
26.2.4.4 Networks 2014 ). For example, Zhao’s ( 2001 ) study of
Scholars have also paid increased attention to movement emergence during the 1989 “Beijing
how networks facilitate the emergence of, and Spring” demonstrates that the unique spatial
members’ participation in, social movements. distribution of students on university campuses
This line of research demonstrates how actors’ created the conditions necessary for the
embeddedness in particular social arrangements occupation of Tiananmen Square. Important
ing Social Movements 555

ecological factors prompting the emergence of production of culture and knowledge. Moral and
the student movement included the closeness of cultural resources are also important for
various university campuses to one another; the emergence processes and may spark changes in
separation and protection of students by campus collective consciousness. Such resources may be
security and high walls; the dense living “out there,” but must be harnessed and framed to
conditions; the “total institution” characteristics motivate participation, as is discussed later in this
of the campuses; and the walking and biking chapter (Snow et al. 1986 , 2013 ). Movements
routes taken by students. focused on “identity politics,” for example, seek
F ree spaces, or small-scale settings insulated recognition for their identities and lifestyles in
from the repressive intrusion of authorities, are ways that overlap with politically- oriented goals,
also important incubators of mobilizing ideas and such as with gay, lesbian, bi- sexual, and
plans for action (Snow and Soule 2010 ). Free transgender rights movements
spaces do more than provide a physical structure (Polletta and Jasper 2001 ; Taylor et al. 2009 ).
for nascent collective action; they also foster
relationships that produce oppositional ideas and
cultures (Polletta 1999) . Morris’ ( 1981) study 26.2.5 Challenges to Understanding
of Black colleges and churches, for example, Emergence
argues that these institutions served as important
resources, both ecologically and culturally, for While all of the aforementioned perspectives
dissident ideas and emergent solidarities in the have done a great deal to refi ne theories of
Civil Rights Movement. Futrell and Simi ( 2004 emergence, we note that identifying when and
) further demonstrate how white power activism how movements are born is conceptually tricky.
requires different types of ecological spaces in As Taylor ( 1989) argues, literatures tend to
order to facilitate networks and solidarity and to assume that movements are “birthed,” rather than
shield the Aryan movement from repression. the outcome of continuous mobilization
Likewise, Johnston and Snow ( 1998 ) fi nd that processes that may be less visible to researchers.
in Estonia under Soviet rule, accommodative Further complicating matters is that movements
subcultures emerged that hid dissident opinions give rise to other movements, particularly within
within adversarial talk, songs and poetry. These the context of a “social movement society” where
cultures were an important factor in prompting protest has become a routine feature of civic life
above-ground resistance and nationalist (Meyer and Tarrow 1998 ). As we discuss in
solidarity when the political context changed and more detail below, movements may diffuse
mobilization broke above-ground. through spillover effects (Meyer and Whittier
1994) , in reaction to other movements (Meyer
26.2.4.6 Culture and Identity and Staggenborg 1996 ), and as later generations
R elatedly, scholars have also increasingly turned of founding movements, such as the various
to cultural explanations in examining emergence “generations” of feminist thought and activism.
processes, which has shed light on how beliefs, The Civil Rights Movement, for example, had
identities, and solidarities emerge and motivate mobilizing effects and infl uences on women’s,
collective action. The role of culture in environmental, ethnic, and peace movements, but
movement emergence draws attention to how was itself also infl uenced by independence
collective behavior is contingent upon how movements against colonialism and preceded by
events and environments take on meanings that abolitionist movements, the formation of the
are not inherent to them, but are instead “assigned National Association for the Advancement of
or imputed through interpretive processes” Colored People, and lesser known forms of
(Snow 2003 : 818). Collective actors may be collective resistance by African Americans.
inspired by more than the prospect of some Furthermore, the eruption of transgression and
utilitarian gain, mobilizing instead to assert a protest in the streets is not always a reliable
particular way of life, a set of values, and the marker of movement emergence. As Johnston (
D.M. Moss and D.A. Snow

2006 ) argues, protest is often just one tactic that collectivities may work to overthrow governing
signifi es the presence of a new or revitalized authorities by force or through disruptive social
movement and may be the end result of actions or seek to exit from existing authority
mobilization processes, rather than marking the structures altogether.
beginning of a new social movement or set of Revolutionary and reformist are relative
collective actors. terms, and are labels to be applied in light of
move-
ments’ socio-political contexts, since how radical
a set of grievances, claims, and demands are
26.3 Theorizing Movements’
depends on the degree of change demanded, the
Dynamics status quo at play, and the interpretive or labeling
powers of the institutionalized authorities or
T heories of social movement dynamics draw
targets. While movements can exhibit a
attention to what movements do and how they
combination of radical and reformist tendencies
change over time in light of their revolutionary or
and lie on a continuum between these two ideal
reform-oriented goals. Explanations take into
types, revolutionary and reformist views are not
account movements’ tactics and strategies; their
easily reconciled. As such, disagreement over
claims-making processes; their organizational
how revolutionary or reform-oriented a social
forms and the cultures that undergird activist
movement should be among participants is likely
collectivities; and the relational processes taking
to be a source of factionalization within and
place within movements and with their allies or
between movement groups. Additionally, the
opponents, including counter-movements.
conditions under which movements transform
from one type to the other, as when reformers
become radicalized, or when insurgents become
26.3.1 Revolutionary Versus Reform-
institutionalized, remains an important topic of
Oriented Movements study in understanding mobilization and social
confl ict. As we discuss below, the potential effi
Discussions of social movement dynamics, cacy of reformers and revolutionaries in
whether implicitly or explicitly, often cast social achieving social change goals informs much of
movements as either revolutionary or reform- the debate over movements’ strategies and
oriented. Reformist movements seek to gain tactics, forms, and ideologies.
concessions within existing social structures,
such as changes in the law, increased material
benefi ts, shifts in public opinion, or adjustments
26.3.2 Strategies and Tactics
in individuals’ consumption habits. As such, their
calls for change address a specifi c area of social Movements are largely characterized by their
life. Revolutionary movements, on the other strategies and tactics. Strategies 111 are broad
hand, seek more sweeping and disruptive plans for attaining goals, and tactics are the
changes, often by circumventing routinized specifi c means and methods by which strategies
means of social change because those means are are enacted. Groups of previously unorganized or
perceived as futile or illegitimate. Because unrecognized actors often use forbidden tactics in
revolutionaries call social arrangements and an effort to produce “negative inducements to
culture into question more than their reformist bargaining” (Lipsky 1970 ; McAdam 1983 ;
counterparts, their rationales often require greater Wilson 1961 ). In other words, some movements
elaboration (Williams 2004) . These launch tactics with the intention of creating

111
For a more theorized and detailed assessment of
strategy, see Jasper ( 2004 , 2013 ), Meyer ( 2015 ), and
Turner ( 1970 ).
ing Social Movements 557

disruptions in the normative order of everyday reinstated jobs and instituted boss-less systems of
life and in authorities’ social control. These production by reclaiming shuttered factories
tactics are designed to attract publicity and through nonviolence resistance, for example.
attention through the media (Gamson 2004 ; Secessionist movements seek to withdraw from
Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993; Wisler and Giugni existing authority structures by claiming territory
1999) , and to provoke authorities into reacting in and establishing their own states. Violent tactics,
ways that damage their legitimacy (McAdam such as mass murders and suicide bombings, also
1983 ). This process offsets the relative serve to target states indirectly by attacking
disadvantage facing movements by placing symbols of state power or illegitimate
pressure on authorities to respond favorably by institutions, punishing bystanders, and bringing
intervening on behalf of, or negotiating with, international attention to movements’ grievances
social movements (see also Schattschneider and demands.
1960 ). In certain times and places, disruptive Radical movements sometimes also target other
tactics characterize insurgencies and non-state actors that threaten their worldview and
revolutionary movement goals (Jenkins and systems of belief, as in the case of Taliban attacks
Eckert 1986 ). Yet, no tactic is inherently against women’s rights organizations and
transgressive. How disruptive a given protest or activists in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Jafar 2007
boycott is, for example, depends on a number of ).
factors, including the socio-historical context in M ovements are dynamic social entities,
which movements operate, local and national- however, and are likely to draw on a range of
level laws regulating the expression of dissent, tactics to pursue their goals. As Snow ( 2003 :
the relations of movements to existing 817) writes, a social movement is “engaged in a
institutions and political entities, and the degree highly interactive relationship with various
of repression wielded by authorities against publics and collectivities that constitute its
challengers. That said, even when public environment of operation, and this ongoing
demonstrations are not transgressive, they can dialectic” prompts movements to engage in a
still serve to demonstrate movements’ range of “anticipatory strategic action[s].”
worthiness, unity, numbers, and solidarity to Relatedly, McAdam’s ( 1983 ) study of the
authorities and the public (Tilly and Tarrow 2007 tactical interactions between the Civil Rights
). Movement and repressive authorities highlights
While public rallies, marches, protests, and how movements are engaged in a dynamic
violence largely dominate the study of process of contention with their opponents.
movements’ tactics, often because these events Movements work to innovate their tactics in
are easier to count in data sources such as order to evade repression or create leverage, and
newspapers, movements may engage in a variety movement opponents engage in tactical
of other tactics to promote or prevent social adaptations that seek to neutralize the effects of
change. As mentioned above, members may seek movements’ innovations and reassert social
to withdraw or exit from authority structures as a control. As a result, challengers involved in
form of protest (Tierney 2013 ). Commune and resistance against highly repressive state systems
“cult” movements of the 1960s and 1970s, for must continuously engage in a process of tactical
example, were initiated as a result of modifi cation and change in order to be effective.
dissatisfaction with larger and more amorphous And yet, movements do not innovate their tactics
authority structures perceived as illegitimate or out of thin air. Instead, they rely on tactical
harmful, including mainstream religions and repertoires that are shaped and constrained, at
capitalism. Movements may also seek to exit least in part, by broader social structures (Tilly
from authorities by contesting powerholders’ 1995 ). As Snow and Soule ( 2010: 179) posit,
monopoly and jurisdiction over territory, “the occurrence of peasant revolts and food riots
violence, or the means of economic production. in agrarian society, labor strikes in capitalist
This includes labor movements that have societies, and public demonstrations in
D.M. Moss and D.A. Snow

democratic societies” suggest that dominant 26.3.3 Cultural and Discursive Dynamics
political and economic arrangements shape and
constrain the tactical repertoires of challengers I n addition to more radical and visible forms of
and their opponents. Movements’ tactical choices resistance, movements are also characterized by
are also shaped by their worldviews and their cultural and discursive dynamics, including
ideologies, such as principles of nonviolence, and everyday forms of resistance (Scott 1985 ) and
best practices are typically the subject of great contentious talk and oppositional speech
debate within movements. A change in tactics is (Johnston 2005 , 2006 ; Johnston and Mueller
likely when activists view that the costs of a given 2001 ). These include meaning-making activities
tactic outweigh prospective gains, when they that David Snow and his colleagues brought to
perceive that bargaining or negotiating with the fore with the introduction of the framing
authorities is no longer a viable option, or when processes perspective of collective action.
they gain access to new resources or Building from Goffman’s 1974 essay on Frame
technological innovations (Snow and Soule Analysis , their theory argues that meanings do
2010; see also Colomy 1998 on organizational not automatically arise in a given situation, but
entrepreneurs). instead come about through interactive and
The literature on movement dynamics has interpretive processes (Benford and Snow 2000
also pointed to the importance of understanding ; Snow et al. 1986 , 2014) . Framing calls
the conditions under which movements engage in attention to how grievances are understood and
strategic accommodations in response to their strategically transformed by collective actors into
broader environments. In order to shore up injustices that warrant mobilization, as well as
legitimacy and respectability in the eyes of the how collective actors serve as signifying agents
communities in which they are embedded, by bringing certain issues in frame while
movement actors may deploy specifi c strategies discarding others. Frames diagnose social
to try to “fi t in” and achieve a degree of problems, describe what is to be done through
acceptance while simultaneously pursuing social prognostic frames, and motivate participation.
change goals and enacting alternative or non- They are derived in part from the culture in which
normative rituals and lifestyles (Snow 1979 ). social movements are embedded, but may also
Strategies of accommodation by movements’ challenge that culture and frame the status quo as
targets are also an important part of the tactical contestable (Snow 2004a ). This perspective
interactions that unfold between collective actors differentiates frames from ideologies, which are
and their opponents, as when movements gain typically conceptualized as a relatively stable set
concessions and are permitted to demonstrate in of values or beliefs. While frames and ideologies
public spaces, for example, or have a portion of may overlap, frames do not just stem
their demands granted by authorities. Though automatically from ideology, but are debated,
strategies of accommodation on either side may negotiated, and deployed strategically by
be perceived as giving in or a form of cooptation, collective actors (see Oliver and Johnston 2000 ;
how movements strive to accommodate external Snow 2004a ).
audiences, as well as how they are
accommodated at times by their opponents, is an
important aspect of understanding how tactical 26.3.4 Organizational Forms
interactions unfold in a dynamic fashion, as well
as how both sides attempt to accrue legitimacy in In addition to understanding what movements
the eyes of broader publics. do, scholars have also paid a great deal of
attention to movements’ organizational forms,
which range from “loosely networked groups…
to highly bureaucratic and formal social
movement organizations” (Snow and Soule 2010
: 150–151). The benefi ts and drawbacks of
ing Social Movements 559

various organizational types comprise a the nuclear freeze movement demonstrates that
longstanding theoretical debate in the literature. the institutionalization of anti-nuclear
The bureaucratization and professionalization of proliferation movements left behind an extensive
movements has been controversial because, as advocacy network, making anti-nuclear
argued by Michels’ ([ 1915 ] 1962) “iron law of advocacy a relatively stable fi xture of the
oligarchy,” organizations often come to value political landscape. Professionalized movements
their own survival and interests over those of may also provide a foundation for future
their members and conservatize the movement’s incarnations of protest and sustain activism
tactics. The very process of organization, Michels during periods of abeyance (Taylor 1989 ) when
argues, enforces a separation between leaders and political opportunities for protest diminish. It is
their members and an abandonment of therefore useful to conceptualize
revolutionary or radical social change goals. The professionalization and institutionalization as
fact that professionalized SMOs tend to be run by more than a process of self-interested, ineffi cient
members of the middle class and are funded by bureaucratization. In addition, having both
resourced patrons, often without members, has member and non- member advocacy
been interpreted as an elitist shift in advocacy organizations work on a particular issue may
more generally (Skocpol 2003 ). foster a productive division of labor that helps to
Institutionalized movements have also been strengthen activists’ aggregate capacity to lobby
accused of forfeiting the ability to utilize extra- on a behalf of a given cause (Walker et al. 2011)
institutional and disruptive tactics on behalf of . Nor do formal organizations always trade in
society’s most marginalized members (Piven and their radical methods for moderate and non-
Cloward 1979 ). For example, Jenkins and disruptive approaches (Rucht 1999 ). Movement
Eckhert’s study of the Civil Rights Movement organizations thought to be hopelessly
(1986 ) argues that the most effective branch of ineffective and oligarchical may also experience
the Black insurgency acted as an indigenous revitalizations. As Voss and Sherman’s (2000 )
organization, relying primarily on volunteer labor study of labor unions demonstrates, movements
by the intended benefi ciaries of the movement. may break out of bureaucratic conservatism
After the movement was “channeled” by elite under certain conditions in spite of contracting
patrons into professionalized SMOs with a paid political opportunities and resources.
staff and a formalized leadership, the movement Important addendums to these organizational
lost its leverage. Private foundations, Jenkins and debates have further demonstrated that “bottomu
Eckhert ( 1986: 819) argue, are “institutionalized p” grassroots and deliberative movements have
agencies of the capitalist class and, as such, will their own sets of limitations. While informal and
generally be politically cautious in their support leaderless organizations may seek to practice
for social reform.” Elite patrons, including what they preach by working to equalize relations
government agencies and private foundations, between members and defending their
tend to support moderates, and in so doing, they organizations from elite cooptation, no
undermine the “radical fl ank” (Haines 2013 ). In movement is fully egalitarian (Robnett 1996) . In
this view, social movements require sustained addition, organizations seeking to remain
indigenous and disruptive mobilization in order separated, both pragmatically and ideologically,
to produce meaningful change, whereas reformist from institutionalized politics may limit their infl
organizations are a hindrance to that change. uence and input on policy (see Blee and Currier
I n response to the bifurcation of movements 2006 ). Participatory democratic organizations
into coopted/reformist/institutionalized versus are inherently fragile and susceptible to internal
militant/radical/volunteerist variations, confl icts (Blee 2012; della Porta 2005; Polletta
subsequent scholarship has painted a more 2012 ). Leaderless movements also face hurdles
complex picture of movements’ organizational to mobilization when their members come to be
forms and their effects (Clemens and Minkoff more focused on democratic deliberation than on
2004 ). For example, Meyer’s ( 1990) study on implementing strategies through collective action
D.M. Moss and D.A. Snow

(Polletta 2005 ). For example, while participants


in the Occupy Movement that emerged across
U.S. cities in 2011 engaged in refl exive rituals to 26.4 Theorizing Movement’s
promote inclusiveness and egalitarianism, the Outcomes and
movement as a whole may have been subsumed Consequences
more by its focus on internal inclusion and self-
expression than by concrete, outward-looking Because movements articulate claims against
change-oriented goals. While future studies are authorities, studies of social movement outcomes
likely to fi nd that Occupy movements had generally focus on whether or not movements
varying dynamics and consequences by city, this gained concessions or received a desired
example highlights the limitations of deliberative response from third-parties in pursuit of their
democracy in action. In sum, no one goals. The consequences can vary temporally and
organizational form can or should be uniformly in scope, and it is usually up to the researcher to
equated with effi cacy or “true” social change. delimit what an outcome means for a given case.
26.3.5 Movement Diffusion and If movements are conceived of as challenging the
Spillover state, regime change or policy modifi cations are
likely to be the outcomes under scrutiny (e.g.,
Theories of mobilization dynamics have also Amenta et al. 1992 , 2005 ; McAdam and Su
raised important questions about how social 2002 ). Movement consequences also include
movements infl uence one another (Oliver and how their mobilization dynamics infl uence
Myers 2003; Soule 1997) . In addition to the subsequent episodes of contention (McAdam et
fact that certain structural conditions make al. 2001 ), as well as how they produce
specifi c types of movements more or less likely transformations in cultures, consciousness, and
(Oberschall 1973; Pinard 1971) , movements identities among movement members and among
may also diffuse across time and place through wider publics (Morris 1992 ). However, the
specifi c mechanisms. Tactical innovations, distinction between political and cultural
ideas, or practices spread through direct and outcomes should not be drawn too sharply, as we
indirect ties, innovations in communication, will argue below.
organizational and network infrastructures, or
cultural “caches” of best practices, for instance.
Soule ( 2004 ) suggests that tactics are likely to 26.4.1 Assessing Movement Success
diffuse when they are perceived by receiving
movements as effective, cost-friendly, and T heories of movement success, originally
compatible with the values and needs of activists. posited by William Gamson ([ 1975 ] 1990)
Meyer and Whittier’s ( 1994 ) study of include the acceptance of movements by elites
“spillover” from the women’s movement to the and the gaining of new advantages.
peace movement suggests that cross-movement Conceptualizing movement success as win-or-
infl uence occurs under specifi c conditions, lose can be analytically useful when a movement
including the formation of movement coalitions, has a delimited goal, such as changing a specifi c
shared communities of support and activist law or raising the minimum wage to a set amount.
personnel, and facilitative changes in However, what success looks like may be diffi
movements’ external environments. This cult to discern in light of the fact that movements
research brings important attention to the ways in may have publicly- stated goals that differ from
which a set of actors in a given “strategic action their private goals (Andrews 2004 ) and that
fi eld” (Fligstein and McAdam 2012 ) shape one these goals are subject to change over time. In
another and produce effects that can outlast the addition, after a movement suffers a defeat or
life of a given campaign or social movement setback, activists may shift their aims or revert to
organization. clandestine actions. Furthermore, even when
movements do not get exactly what they want
ing Social Movements 561

(which they rarely, if ever, do) they may still 26.4.3 Clarifying Movement Outcomes
achieve some degree of favorable policy change
or collective good for their constituents, whether Because social movement consequences can
material or immaterial (Amenta 2006 ). vary dramatically, scholars have increasingly
called for clarifi cation of their outcomes by level
of analysis and over time. At the macro-level, for
26.4.2 Movement’s Unintended example, SMO action could lead to the extension
Consequences of democratic and civil rights. At the intermediate
level, movements may push for policy creation,
The actions of collective actors can also have modifi cation, extension, or enforcement. They
unintended consequences that harm the may also spur the establishment or
realization of a movement’s ambitions or damage institutionalization of new collective identities
their infl uence in the political process. For that foster the labeling of certain social groups as
example, McVeigh et al.’s ( 2004 ) study of the worthy of concessions or as moral and deserving
Ku Klux social groups (Skrentny 2006) . Political
Klan in Indiana demonstrates that the framing representation and resources, whether for the
processes effective in promoting grassroots movement itself or for its benefi ciary groups, and
mobilization hindered access to and infl uence relief are also important outcomes sought by
over presidential candidates in the 1924 election. movements (Amenta 2006 ; Cress and Snow
As such, tactics that produce favorable outcomes 2000). Another related outcome is that SMO
in a given context may not translate effectively to actors in a given “policy monopoly” fi eld may
other arenas, thus potentially contributing to come to be perceived as legitimate
movement decline. Furthermore, unintended representatives of a wider constituency (Meyer
movement outcomes may include schisms and 2005) . This is likely to determine which social
civil wars, as well as repression and counter- movements will incur attention and resources in
mobilization by third-parties (Snow and Soule a given fi eld, as well as what issues are deemed
2010: 208). As such, the actions of social to be worthy recipients of governmental
movements may draw in third parties into their attention, access, and infl uence. The
spheres of contention that subvert movements’ institutionalization of a given issue may also
aims. For example, when the Egyptian military comprise an important consequence of social
defected on behalf of protesters calling for the movement activity. Baumgartner and Mahoney (
end to Hosni Mubarak’s autocratic reign in 2011, 2005) , for example, demonstrate that there is a
this was initially viewed as a movement success. growing correlation over time between
However, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces congressional hearings and particular interest
later launched a coup in 2013 against president- issues after the emergence and growth of a
elect Mohamed Morsi and subsequently assumed movement family. However, while governmental
the governance of Egypt. To date, this has attention to an issue of relevance to social
produced a retrenchment of the military elite in movements may grow over time, such attention
the executive branch of government, the release may also court the efforts of counter-movements.
of deposed dictator Hosni Mubarak from prison, An increase in congressional hearings on
the imprisonment and court-ordered death women’s issues, for example, could have as
sentence of Morsi, and severe violent repression much to do with some movements’ mobilization
against Muslim Brotherhood members and against women’s use of contraception as it does
leftists alike. Cycles of contention, therefore, can with their access to legal abortions.
produce a variety of gains and setbacks for social H ow tightly the grievances and demands of
movements. social movements “fi t” with the agenda of elites
also matters for their outcomes (Skocpol 1992 ).
If the frames espoused by the movement mirror
the agendas of bureaucracies or the political
D.M. Moss and D.A. Snow

regime, then their movement is more likely to be participation in collective action may shape
accommodated by state actors, and less assertive members’ worldviews and actions in important
action will be required (Amenta 2006 ). This ways over the life course (Fernandez and
process is not solely the result of coincidental McAdam 1988; Klatch 1999; Giugni 2004 ;
movement- state compatibility. Movements can Corrigall- Brown 2012 ). Likewise, outcomes for
improve the fi t between their demands and the participants in religious movements can include
agendas of elites through strategic action and signifi cant changes in lifestyle and beliefs, as
framing and accommodative tactics, referenced well as a radical confi guration of everyday life
above (McCammon et al. 2008 ). However, the and activists’ orientations toward authority, their
fi t of movement frames at one level may foster family members, and fellow participants.
adversarial conditions at another (McVeigh et al. Cultural consequences may be infl uenced by
2004 ). The outcome of movements’ tactical movement action through a variety of
interactions with counter-mobilized groups and mechanisms, such as through framing processes,
political elites have also been shown to produce their networks, and the ways in which movement
specifi c outcomes. In his study on the civil rightsleaders and organizations serve as cultural
movement, for example, Andrews ( 2004 ) brokers with other audiences and movements
examines how SMO infrastructures and (Diani 1997 ; McAdam 1994 ). Snow and his
strategies, in combination with the degree of colleagues (2013 ) suggest, for example, that
white counter- mobilization and federal movements can spur cultural revitalization and
intervention, produced a localized legacy of civil fabrication through framing mechanisms that
rights activism in Mississippi. More attention is connect and accent specifi c events and ideas in a
needed to understand how confl ict is patterned strategic fashion. Movements may, for instance,
by these interactions and what the enduring select artifacts of history, including written
consequences of those confl icts are in history. materials, identities, and symbols, to legitimize
their ideas and to promote their worldviews and
agendas. The use of the swastika by the Nazi
26.4.4 Cultural and Biographical regime or the appropriation of Nordic
Outcomes iconography by contemporary white
supremacists, for example, illustrates how
Social movements also matter in shaping culture movements use culture and revitalize cultural
and biography. As Earl ( 2004 ) describes, elements selectively for their purposes (Snow et
cultural outcomes may include changes in values, al. 2013) , but also change what cultural symbols
opinions, and beliefs; cultural production and and artifacts come to mean. While more research
practices, including language and fashion; and is needed to link the actions of social movements
broader, more encompassing worldviews and to cultural outcomes, we again caution scholars
beliefs that lie outside of what is in people’s from drawing too fi ne a line between political
heads, such as the rise of an international human and cultural consequences. Amenta’s (2006 )
rights regime. While tying the actions of specifi c study of the Townsend Plan, for example,
social movements and their organizations to addresses both how the movement infl uenced
sweeping changes in public opinion or practice is welfare policy and cultural understandings of the
empirically challenging, Earl ( 2004 ) suggests “aged” as an identity group warranting rights and
that scholars consider the cultural impact of protections (see also Skocpol 1992 ). When
movements as a matter of degree, rather than as a movements produce long-term changes in
zero-sum dependent variable. For example, even identity and behavior, such as political party affi
if movements fail to achieve policy change, the liation (McVeigh et al. 2014) , or changes in how
act of participating in a movement may have people perceive and respond to injustice
notable consequences on the belief systems and (McVeigh et al. 2003 ), these outcomes also
practices of its members. Studies of movements’ signify normative changes in society-wide
biographical consequences have shown that
ing Social Movements 563

practices and values as much as in the political theories of breakdown, ecological factors, and
realm. emotions, this perspective accounts for the fact
that spontaneous interactions and occurrences
can shape the course and character of social
movements and related protest events. Such
26.5 Developing Theory
occurrences may also produce the riots and
T he study and theorization of social movements violence that inspired the study of collective
has produced an expansive research agenda in behavior in the fi rst place. Social movements’
sociology that will continue to shed light on trajectories or collective revolts often evolve in
critical historical and contemporary social ways that appear puzzling or irrational if scholars
problems, events, and confl icts. As outlined only look at “objective” criteria, such as changes
above, young scholars of today are likely to in fungible resources or political opportunities.
acknowledge that a multitude of factors, By taking into account the perspectives,
including political contexts, resources and emotions, and relational dynamics of social
mobilizing structures, framing processes, social movements and protest events, we can better
networks and ecological structures, culture, understand the conditions shaping the dynamics
emotions, and identities, all impact mobilization of mobilization and how contention unfolds over
processes. As Snow ( 2013 : 1201) writes, “one time.
does not have to choose one emphasis or focus
over another so long as it is recognized that each
conceptualization accents a particular dimension 26.5.2 Analyzing Movements
or aspect of social movements, much like the case Within Their Fields of
of the storied description of an elephant rendered Contention
by six blind men on the basis of the part they
touched: all parts were important features of the S econd, we support recent calls by
elephant but alone could not provide a complete McAdam and Boudet ( 2012 ) and Fligstein and
picture.” So where is the discipline to go from McAdam ( 2012 ) for scholars to better
here? In closing, we draw on recent innovations understand how social movements emerge and
in the fi eld and suggest ways to refi ne, elaborate, mobilize within broader fi elds of contention. As
and expand the existing theoretical repertoire. McAdam and Boudet argue ( 2012 : 21), social
movement theorists should not be limited to
investigating processes and dynamics internal to
those of social movements. In order to remedy
26.5.1 Collective Behavior and Social
what some scholars perceive as a narrowing of
Psychology social movement theory and its application,
scholars may fi nd it useful to adopt a wider lens
F irst, we suggest that scholars incorporate
to understanding movements’ embeddedness in
theories of collective behavior and social
and relation to larger social systems (see also
psychology in the study of movements (Oliver
Goldstone 2004 ). This includes, for example,
1989 ). While older theories associating
how episodes of contention are impacted by
collective protest with irrationality certainly
political economies, such as capitalist systems of
warranted criticism and reformulation, scholars
production (Paige 1975 ), the crises and
should attend to the relatively unplanned,
recessions produced within the world system
uncoordinated, and spontaneous dynamics that
(Smith and Weist 2012 ), and the relations
take place in crowds and during organized or
between social movements and global confl icts
SMO-sponsored protest events (Snow and Moss
and wars (Chaudhary and Guarnizo 2016 ;
2014 ). While social movements are largely
Tarrow 2015 ). Furthermore, additional
rational enterprises, not all social movement-
theorization is needed as to how cases of
related occurrences are preplanned or strategized
“domestic” mobilization are impacted by extra-
in advance of their occurrence. Drawing on
D.M. Moss and D.A. Snow

national events, transnational cultural and movement’s side. The benefi ts of


ideational trends, and foreign regimes. This problematizing the people-versus-the-regime
includes, for example, relationship between the archetype will undoubtedly lead to innovation in
American civil rights movement and anti- theorizing processes of contention.
colonialist movements (see McAdam 1998) and
the repression or sponsorship of domestic
collective actors by foreign states (Moss 2015 ). 26.5.3 Attending to Neglected
Further theorization is needed as to how social Movement Types
movements become transnational (Tarrow 2005)
, including the conditions under which Fourth, we suggest that scholars attend to certain
movements scale up and across borders to link types of social movements that remain on the
with extra-national actors and institutions periphery of movement studies despite their
(Ayoub 2013 ; Bob 2005 ; Smith 2004 ; von centrality and importance in history and
Bülow 2010) . A comparative, transnational contemporary social life, such as formative pre-
perspective will help scholars to understand why modern movements and the study of religious
movements with similar goals and tactics have movements, including sects and cults (but see
arisen simultaneously across the globe and the Kniss and Burns 2004 ). Despite the fact that
trends in movements’ political orientations in religious movements were at the forefront of
history (Mannheim [1936] 2013 ; Turner 1969 ; classical theories of society and change
Walder 2009 ). (Wuthnow 1986 ), their study has been more
T hird, while we know a great deal about recently neglected in case studies of social
the factors producing movement emergence, movements and in the theoretical development of
increased attention is needed as to understanding the fi eld (Snow 2015 ). Additionally, studies
their trajectories and transformations over time rarely incorporate social movement theory into
(Zald and Ash 1966 ). How and why movements the study of collective action that produces
succumb to infighting and factionalization, political violence, mass killings, and genocide
repression, or end up purging their own (see della Porta 2008 ; Luft 2015 ; Olzak 2004
constituents matters greatly for understanding the ; Owens et al. 2013 ). Movement theorists also
rise and demise of movements and their related neglect to address how religion and violence
forms (Davenport 2014 ; Kretschmer 2013) . intersect, despite the prominence of violent
Additionally, greater specification of the actors religious movements in some of the most
operating in a given field is needed. contentious and consequential events in recent
Disaggregating the state, for example, is memory (Almond et al. 2003 ; Hall 2000 , 2003
theoretically necessary in order to understand its ; Juergensmeyer 2000) . For reasons unclear to
varying methods of social control, the state’s us, the study of these movements has been largely
varying capacities for accommodation and relegated to the fi eld of international relations,
repression, and officials’ differential relations despite the pervasive existence and threat of
with activists (Loveman 1998 ; Moss 2014; Su domestic violent extremism and the transnational
and He 2010) . This calls attention to the operation and effects of extra-national radical
importance of understanding regime types as movements.
existing on a range between democratic and R elatedly, we lack theorization as to what role
authoritarian, and variations in the degrees to religion plays in such movements. Questions
which state authority and coercion are applied by remain about whether violent non-state actors,
social movement, population, and place such as the so-called “Islamic State” (ISIS) or
(Cunningham 2004) . Extra-institutional and Christian anti-abortion activists, are “really”
revolutionary activists may, for example, engage religious and represent permutations of that
in routine interactions and dialogues with state religion, or are just “using” religion. In either
offi cials or work to persuade state institutions, case, far more empirically-grounded theorization
such as militaries or foreign regimes, to take the is needed as to how waves of religious extremism
ing Social Movements 565

arise across different belief systems and how more remains an important topic of debate and
religious authorities incite collective action and further empirical inquiry (Carty 2015 ), but we
violence. Furthermore, understanding how submit that scholars would do well to understand
extremist movements are produced and whether what happens online facilitates or
supported by broader communities of hinders the face-to-face interactions between
sympathy—or are not supported (Acevedo and movements and their participants and the
Chaudhary 2015 )—will enhance our potential for social change.
understanding of how cultural and political
conditions shape social movements, and in turn,
how those movements shape broader confl icts in
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Bargaining , 47, 56, 235, 242, 554, 555 biographical
Index , 560
Bases of identity
group , 352
person , 352
role , 352
Bearman, P. , 5, 181, 271
Behavioral predispositions , 514, 518, 519
Behavioral propensities , 125, 126, 150, 518
Bentley, A. , 172, 173
Bioprogrammers , 520
Black feminism , 483–486
A
Blau, P. , 24, 26, 45, 47, 56, 136, 163, 181, 225, 269, 272,
Abbott, A. , 167
299, 371, 515, 520
Abrutyn, S. , 1–13, 23, 28, 31, 45, 46, 127,
Bourdieu, P. , 6, 8, 10, 45, 46, 68, 73, 74, 79, 91, 101,
128, 130, 132, 207–226, 467,
118, 186, 188, 189, 192–197, 200, 201, 216,
506, 517, 527, 529
218, 221, 236, 401, 426, 448
Accommodation, social movements , 530, 556, 562
Bourdieu, P. (and fi eld theory) . See Field theory,
Accountability , 274, 276, 393–395, 403, 406 Acting
Bourdieu, P.
alone , 390, 401, 405, 407
Breakdown, Theory of Movement Emergence , 550, 551
Activism , 482, 489, 490, 493, 495, 551–553,
Brokerage , 48, 174, 177, 282
557, 560, 563
Bureaucracy , 22, 43, 45, 50, 53, 55, 58, 135, 222, 272,
Activity concept , 65–67, 69–77, 80, 81
273, 278, 279, 336, 395, 559
Actor , 3, 23, 25, 45, 46, 63–65, 85, 88–90, 101,
Burke, P.J. , 8, 76, 80, 86, 140, 163, 217, 225, 293, 306,
128, 130, 152, 156, 167, 185, 207, 210,
307, 313, 344, 346, 351–354, 360, 362, 380,
263, 273, 299, 324, 347, 369, 392, 412,
415, 420–422, 425, 430, 438, 450
438, 460, 517, 530, 547
Burt, R. , 48, 173, 177, 271, 282, 313
Adapted mind , 514–516, 518–520, 523
Affect , 11, 12, 20, 44, 47, 74, 91, 125, 128, 170, 190,
193, 221, 229, 269, 296, 323, 370, 390, 412, C
463, 478, 510, 531 Callero, P.L. , 305, 354, 362
Althusser, L. , 168 Capacity , 31, 33, 36, 46, 47, 49, 68, 71, 77, 85, 92, 94,
Asymmetric alternates , 397 113, 117, 126, 127, 131, 140, 145, 146, 150,
Authoritative justice , 378 158, 161, 162, 164, 170, 187, 189, 194, 212,
Authority , 22, 24, 28, 43, 46, 49, 50, 52, 54–56, 58, 59, 229, 237, 240, 265, 299, 349, 397, 429, 450,
64, 67, 106, 111, 134, 137, 138, 142, 144, 521, 548, 557, 562
150, 190, 192, 200, 210, 211, 215–217, Capitalism , 38, 59, 91, 103, 131, 168, 208, 221, 231,
222, 242, 255, 275, 277, 301, 311, 332, 235, 237, 241, 242, 258, 259, 438, 442–443,
339–340, 356, 360, 370, 378–381, 401, 446, 487–490, 493, 509, 549, 555
402, 415, 445–447, 462, 465, 534, 536, Cheating detection mechanism , 515, 520
548, 550, 551, 553–556, 558, Civil rights movement , 139, 198, 307, 490, 549, 553,
560, 562 555, 557, 561

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 571


S. Abrutyn (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary Sociological Theory,
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32250-6
Authority structures , 144, 339–340, 379, Class , 2, 3, 20, 23, 45, 51, 72, 96, 103, 125, 133, 156,
548, 554, 555 162, 177, 186, 223, 229, 275, 302, 335, 343,
Authorization , 55, 379, 381 372, 435, 443, 457, 459, 478, 479, 533, 547
Autonomy , 43, 64, 67, 69, 144, 153–155, 158–162, Closure , 174, 210, 404, 552
164, 207, 209–212, 214, 215, 217, 218, Coercion , 19, 25, 36, 44, 53, 80, 197, 230, 277, 379, 418,
226, 249, 250, 253–255, 259, 263, 276, 356, 419, 425, 533, 534, 562
360, 438, 445 Cognitive algorithms , 514, 515, 518–520
Cognitivism , 398
Coleman, J. , 9, 48, 50, 54, 79, 150, 169–171, 176, 401
B Collective behavior , 12, 13, 157, 527–542, 550, 553,
Bales group , 322–324, 326, 327, 330 561
Bales, R.F. , 11, 294–296, 322–324, 326, 425, 427 Collective orientation (defi ned) , 296, 323, 329, 333
Commitment , 8, 23, 24, 28–30, 34–36, 48, 52, 56,
572 Index

68, 81, 103, 105, 111, 113, 131, 141–143, 464–467, 469, 470, 479, 480, 484, 485, 487,
145, 146, 149–165, 220, 221, 225, 263, 488, 495, 496, 531, 532, 540, 553, 556
273, 276, 294, 299, 300, 304, 334, 347, Discretion , 53, 56, 59, 274, 277, 395
353, 360, 373, 378, 396, 400, 406, 421, Distributive justice , 378, 428
427, 444, 492, 535 extensive and Division of labor , 4, 5, 26, 34, 43, 49, 52, 54, 58, 59, 73,
affective , 152, 155, 158–162, 125, 130, 134, 136–139, 225, 254, 257, 258,
220, 347, 427, 467 322, 428, 481, 509, 522, 557
Communalism , 69 Double standards research , 337–338
Consequent processualism , 79 Dramaturgy , 412–419, 431
Constructive analysis , 397 Dual process , 115, 448–449, 537–539
Conventions , 57, 169, 172, 174, 179, 197, 229, 255, 357, Durkheim, E. , 3, 5–10, 12, 19, 21, 22, 43, 44, 59, 69–71,
400, 404, 528 73, 104–107, 110, 111, 118, 167, 208,
Conversation analysis , 178, 395, 400, 402–404, 406 211–213, 222, 248, 250, 251, 253–256, 263,
Cooley, C.H. , 3, 86, 250, 251, 255, 256, 263, 302, 311, 322, 429, 435, 437, 438, 442, 443,
305, 344–346, 354, 357, 361, 448, 450, 457, 458, 463–465, 472, 503, 508–
420, 421, 503 511, 541, 549
Coordination , 7, 24, 28, 45, 52, 66, 73, 127, 131, 132,
149, 150, 174, 176, 178, 181, 242, 278–280,
345, 375, 404, 437, 508 E
Counter-mobilization, counter-movements , 26, 114, Ecological-evolutionary theory , 516, 518
548, Ecological factors, role in movement emergence ,
550, 554, 559, 560 551–552
cultural , 114 Ecology , 10, 35–36, 139–140, 201, 210, 216–220, 225,
Cross-species analysis , 516 256–259, 264, 275, 504, 511, 522, 523,
Culture properties of , 128, 517 532–534
role in movement emergence , Eisenstadt, S.N. , 7, 46, 47, 209, 215, 216, 222, 223
553 Embedding , 23, 24, 27, 29, 31, 125, 132, 133, 135–137,
Culture and the self , 357 142, 144, 145, 158, 347, 373
successive nature of , 31, 135–136, 142, 144
Embodied action , 393, 401, 403–405, 407
D Emergence social movement ,
Dahl, R. , 47, 49 537, 549–550
Deliberative movements , 557 theory of , 538
Dependence , 47, 48, 54, 143, 173, 192, 242, 299–301, Emergent properties , 8, 71, 170, 516, 517, 523
311, 371–373 Emerson, Richard , 47, 48, 56, 143, 156, 299–301, 371,
Depersonalization of power , 54, 59 372, 443, 515, 520
Dewey, J. , 73, 76, 172, 173, 305, 389, 390, 398, 405, Emotions , 5, 7, 24, 25, 75, 86, 132, 150, 210, 248, 254,
539, 541 301, 338–339, 346, 373, 411–431, 437, 463,
Dialogue , 12, 75, 77, 182, 225, 387, 388, 390, 400, 520, 527, 551 role in
403, 407, 435, 443, 458, 461, 463, 465, movement emergence , 551
469, 507, 523, 562 sentiment and status , 339
Differentiation physical Empiricism , 63, 73, 171, 485, 495
space , 12, 217, 224 Encounters , 8–10, 19–21, 27, 29–35, 37, 52, 72, 86, 124,
properties of , 22 social 125, 130, 132–146, 154–156, 159–161, 165,
space , 225 symbolic 172, 188, 207, 209, 211, 217, 220, 221, 224,
space , 213, 218 temporal 225, 237, 263, 278, 336, 337, 343, 349, 371,
space , 216, 218 382, 394, 396, 398, 404, 519
DiMaggio, P. , 8, 35, 52, 57, 59, 99, 113, 114, transactional needs in , 32–34, 140–142, 144
185, 188, 190, 193, 195, 197, 208, Endorsement , 55, 379–381, 447
216, 222, 275, 314 Environment of evolutionary adaptedness
DiMaggio, P. (and fi eld theory) . See Field theory, (EEA) , 515, 519
DiMaggio, P. Epigenetic rules , 514, 518
Direct exchange , 372 Epistemology , 1, 67, 76, 213, 478, 479, 483, 485, 492
D iscourse/speech/talk, 1, 9, 11, 28, 32, 33, 57, 76, 78– Ethnomethodology , 11, 387–407
80, Ethnys , 513
91, 93, 101, 103, 117, 130, 131, 173, 182, 197, Evaluations , 11, 19, 25–27, 31, 32, 37, 44, 68, 133–138,
207, 209, 220, 221, 223, 225, 247, 276, 274, 276, 281, 296, 297, 308, 323, 325–327,
322–325, 339, 358, 370, 393, 394, 400, 401, 331, 334, 335, 339, 348, 376–378, 420, 422,
403, 404, 406, 423, 450, 458, 460, 461, 423, 436, 445, 450, 452, 493
Index 573

Evolutionary psychology , 194, 514–519, 523 235–242, 272–275, 277, 294, 296–298,
Evolutionary sociology , 12, 126, 504, 506–522 306, 311, 323, 326, 328–330, 332–334,
Evolutionary theory , 10, 12, 127, 504–506, 509, 511, 336–338, 343, 348, 350–352, 354–355,
512, 516–524 377, 380, 414–416, 425, 427, 430, 435,
Evolved actor , 519 477–490, 492–494, 496, 513, 519, 547
Exchange opportunities , 372, 440 Generalized exchange , 372, 451
relations , 23, 24, 153, 156, 371–373, Generalized symbolic media , 21, 24, 28, 31, 34–36, 38,
376 130–133, 220, 221, 225
Exit/withdrawal, social movements , 34, 146, 554 types of , 28
Gergen, K.J. , 351, 357
Gestalt , 187, 389, 392, 405
F Goffman, E. , 12, 25, 76, 86, 96, 125, 139, 195, 217, 221,
Factionalization, social movements , 554, 562 224, 309, 310, 322, 350, 351, 404, 405,
Fields , 3, 4, 35–37, 45, 74, 77, 91, 99, 185–202, 412–413, 419, 438, 533, 538, 556
264, 270, 294, 355, 381, 388, 412, 436, Grassroots movements , 557
458, 477, 511, 527, 548 Grievances , 78, 133, 480, 549, 551, 552, 554–556, 559
Fields of contention , 561–562 identity politics , 553
Field theory agency and actors Group identities , 5, 33, 140, 160, 161, 163, 164, 307–
, 192–196 309,
Bourdieu, P. , 185, 186, 188–189, 192–193, 196–197 311, 346, 352, 362, 459
classical roots , 187–188 processes , 256, 257, 299, 301, 313, 381,
contemporary elaborations , 188–192 412, 414, 424–431
DiMaggio, P (see Field theory, neoinstitutional selection , 505–507
theory of fi elds ) Group processes , 256, 257, 299, 301, 412, 414, 424–431
DiMaggio, W.W (see Field theory, neoinstitutional
theory of fi elds )
fi eld change , 197–200 H
fi eld emergence , 197– Habit , 69, 73, 74, 76, 92, 95, 108, 185, 187, 188, 193,
200 fi eld stability , 197– 257, 275, 311, 357, 405, 468, 538, 554
200 Habitus , 4, 6, 73–77, 94, 186, 188, 189, 192,
Fligstein, N (see Field theory, strategic action fi elds 193, 195, 401
) Haplodiploidy , 512
future directions , 200–202 Hindess, B. , 169
McAdam , D (see Field theory, strategic Hitlin, S. , 12, 352, 360, 435–438, 441, 444, 449, 521
action fi elds ) Holism , 64, 167–171, 182
meso-level social order , 186, 200 Homophily , 162, 177, 181, 274, 451
neoinstitutional theory of fi elds ,
Hybrid studies , 399, 400
189–190, 193–194, 197–198
organizational fi elds (see Field theory,
neoinstitutional theory of fi elds ) I
social skill , 194–196, 198–200 I and the Me , 345
strategic action fi elds , 190–192, 194–196, 198–200 Ideas , 3–6, 10–12, 35, 37, 40, 46, 57, 63, 64, 67,
Fligstein, N. , 8, 10, 35, 185–202, 211, 212, 218, 264, 68, 71, 72, 76–79, 86–88, 99, 101–106,
265, 558, 561 108–112, 115, 118, 127, 134, 144, 145, 150,
Fligstein, N. (and fi eld theory) . See Field theory, 151, 154, 155, 160, 162, 164, 167, 169, 171,
Fligstein, N. 176, 181, 182, 186–188, 190, 193–195, 198,
Formal analysis , 397, 398, 400 200–202, 209, 222, 224, 225, 230, 238, 240,
Framing , 47, 150–152, 186, 187, 194, 195, 469, 470, 249–253, 259, 261–263, 269, 271, 275, 276,
510, 517, 539, 556, 558–560, 562 279–284, 293, 305, 308, 313, 322–325, 335,
Franks, D.D. , 344, 361, 504, 521 336, 339, 344, 347, 355, 357, 358, 362, 371,
Free spaces , 553 374, 376, 378, 387, 388, 391, 392, 395, 416,
Functional explanation , 168 418, 420, 450, 457, 459, 467, 471, 477, 478,
Functionalism , 5, 76, 96, 100–102, 106, 108, 111–114, 490–492, 495, 496, 503, 506, 508–510, 512,
117, 118, 127, 168, 209, 513, 516, 518, 519, 523, 529, 530, 532, 553,
212, 213, 225, 508, 509, 518 558, 560, 562
G Identity role in movement
Gadamer, H.G. , 171, 172 emergence , 551 standard , 351,
Gecas, V. , 360, 361 353, 380, 422 verifi cation , 163,
Gender , 12, 19, 28, 34, 58, 125, 126, 229, 230, 343, 351–353, 380
574 Index

Ideology/Ideologies , 4, 21, 22, 24–29, 31, 34, 37–39, 57, 446, 539, 541
65, 93, 102, 103, 113, 114, 129–136, 142, 146, Justice , 28, 33, 67, 68, 131, 144, 179, 214, 215, 218,
159, 168, 221, 236, 238, 251, 257, 259, 264, 219,
285, 413, 436, 442, 446, 454, 485, 486, 493, 221, 223, 331, 340, 360, 369–382, 392, 411,
554–556 425–431, 436, 440, 441, 443, 466, 478, 479,
Impulse , 66, 357, 407, 430, 472, 530, 539 481, 483, 484, 486, 488, 489
Inclusive fi tness , 374, 505, 511, 513, 514
Indexical expressions , 393, 395, 407
Individual (Darwinian) fi tness , 505, 511 K
Individualism , 67–69, 71, 167–171, 182, 248, 250, 252, Kin selection , 511–514
254, 255, 259, 260, 357, 358, 435 Kohn, M.L. , 356
Inequity , 235, 274, 428, 429, 442, 488, 492, 494
Information communication technologies , 563
internet , 563 L
Initiations , 324, 326, 372 Lareau, A. , 99, 311, 356
Institutional analysis , 44, 79, 208, 224, 228 Legitimacy , 51, 53, 55, 59, 146, 187, 190, 191, 195,
Institutional autonomy , 217, 218 196, 198, 200, 201, 214, 222, 276, 277, 340,
Institutional entrepreneurs , 193–195, 211, 215, 506 369–382, 401, 425–430, 440, 441, 459, 463,
Institutionalization/institution formation , 468, 548, 554, 556
46, 77–79, 92, 188, 190, 193, 198, Legitimacy and authority , 401
202, 208, 215, 271, 275, 285, 458, Legitimation , 7, 10–12, 142, 188, 339, 370, 379,
485, 489, 491–492, 557, 559 380, 465, 472
Institutional logic , 46, 185, 198, 201, 202, Level of analysis , 77, 78, 273, 343, 559
209, 221, 225 Loadability, emic of theories , 65
Institutional sphere defi nition of , 57, Looking glass self , 86, 344–346, 420
207 evolution of , 208–211 Luhmann, N. , 25, 36, 131, 139, 209, 210, 216, 220,
institutional core , 207, 215, 217– 223–225
220 institutional environment ,
222
Institutions , 6, 10, 11, 24, 28, 44–47, 51, 54, 57–59, M
66, 70, 71, 73, 77–81, 107, 114, 128, 132, Macro cultural properties of , 128
134, 151, 159, 160, 168, 186, 190, 193, structural properties of , 138–
195, 196, 198, 207–212, 214, 216, 217, 140
Macrosociety , 521, 522
220, 221, 224, 225, 230–232, 235, 238,
Mann, M. , 25, 44–46, 198
240–243, 255, 258–260, 270, 275, 287,
Marx, K. , 3, 4, 6–8, 12, 43, 44, 59, 68, 72, 73, 96,
311, 347, 356–358, 374, 391, 444, 478,
100–103, 106, 118, 125, 167, 168, 211, 229,
482–486, 489, 494, 503, 504, 508, 510,
231, 236, 248, 254, 255, 258, 263, 391, 442,
517, 529, 548, 553, 555, 561, 562
508, 509, 528, 529, 535, 536, 547, 549
Institutiosis , 79
Maximization principle , 513
Integration cultural
mechanisms of , 21 defi McAdam, D. (and fi eld theory) . See Field theory,
nition of , 19 McAdam, D.
macrodynamics of , 20–29 Mead, G.H. , 3, 11, 68, 75, 85–87, 94, 167, 170, 188,
mesodynamics of , 34–39 195, 301, 302, 305, 311, 345, 346, 348,
microdynamics of , 29–34 349, 357, 389, 392, 405, 420, 421, 458,
structural mechanisms of , 21–29 460, 461, 509, 530, 539, 541
Intentionality , 65, 388, 392, 399, 451 Meaning , 5, 6, 28, 44, 46, 67, 85–97, 101, 139, 151, 179,
Interaction order , 401, 187, 210, 248, 275, 297, 344, 370, 394, 412,
405–407, 529 436, 458, 507, 532, 548
regularities , 323–324, Media and the self , 351
326 Merleau-Ponty, M. , 168, 170, 172, 188, 388–390,
Interdependence , 43, 59, 171, 173, 254, 256, 258, 358, 392, 398, 399, 405
359, 375, 417, 490, 509 Merton, R. , 4–6, 25, 76, 168, 177, 213, 225, 269,
Intersections , 21, 24, 26–27, 31, 35, 36, 39, 76, 91, 273, 305, 306, 428
136–138, 223, 229, 344, 352, 414–416, Meso cultural beliefs in , 134
478, 480, 481, 484–486, 488–489, structural properties of , 132–
491, 493, 494 134
J Meso-level (and fi eld theory) . See Field theory, meso-
James, W. , 46, 50, 51, 73, 170, 344, 346, 362, 392, 445, level
Metaphor, theories as , 6, 65, 66, 70, 71, 74, 76,
Index 575

110, 188, 189, 212, 217, 293, 351, Organizing , 7, 8, 20, 35, 69, 71, 125, 127–129, 131,
412, 413, 419, 445, 466, 467, 493, 143, 190, 253, 254, 258, 265, 294–296,
505, 508, 535 335, 459, 478, 480–482, 485–491, 493,
Methodological individualsim , 171 495, 496, 506, 508, 548, 551
Methods , 1, 2, 53, 70, 86, 87, 157, 167, 224, 247, 271, Outcomes, social movements , 559–560
300, 313, 387, 411, 540, 554, 557 policy , 559, 560
Michels, R. , 50, 51, 53, 80, 222, 269, 556
Micro cultural expectations in ,
137–138 structural properties P
of , 138 Parsons, T. , 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 12, 19, 76, 77, 96, 100, 102,
Micro/macro , 1, 7, 19, 43–59, 91, 123–146, 168, 185, 104, 106–113, 115–117, 124, 129, 131, 152,
210, 229, 255, 276, 293, 322, 343, 369, 411, 168, 169, 207, 209, 211–213, 216, 220, 225,
442, 462, 491, 534 322, 390–392, 510, 511, 535
Milgram , 181, 401, 402 Perceivers , 376, 377, 539
Mische, A , 8, 167, 172, 179 Perceptual overlap , 450–452
Modernity and the self , 344 Performance , 58, 75–77, 80, 96, 97, 131, 150, 217, 221,
institutional vs. impulsive selves , 224, 225, 260, 269, 273, 274, 276, 277, 279,
344 281, 286, 296, 297, 323–327, 329–331,
Moral emotions , 333–335, 337–340, 348, 350–352, 355,
437–439 401–403, 412–414, 416, 421, 438
identity , 337, 344, 351, 352, 360, 440–442, Performance expectation states (defi ned) , 324, 325
445, 448–450 Performativity , 76, 77
Motives, motivation , 32, 54, 63, 64, 67, 75, 78, 104, Person identities , 346, 348, 352, 359, 360
114, 145, 163, 188, 194, 197, 239, 249, Phenomenology , 71, 118, 185, 187, 188, 190, 261,
252, 270, 297, 298, 351, 355, 359, 370, 264, 387–407, 521
377, 392, 396, 400, 401, 440, 441, 445, 527, Political fecundity of theories , 68
530–532, 538–542 Political opportunity theory , 550–552, 557, 561
Political process theory , 240, 263, 357, 468,
471, 550, 558
N Politics , 36, 43, 65, 169, 237, 240, 250, 252, 286, 419,
Negotiated exchange , 372, 373, 451 436, 464, 478, 547
Neoinstitutional theory (and fi eld theory) . See Field Popper, K. , 168
theory, Neoinstitutional theory Positions and ranks , 53
Networks , 3, 9, 22, 48, 153, 167, 185, 198, Powell, W.W. (and fi eld theory) . See Field theory,
209, 236, 258, 270, 271, 300, 344, Powell, W.W.
347, 373, 405, 421, 439, 465, 516, 532, Power , 2, 4, 23, 43–59, 63, 91, 112, 127, 153, 156, 169,
535, 551–553 185, 210, 229, 251, 258, 269, 293, 324, 350,
Networks, role in movement emergence , 552 369, 401, 414, 436, 457, 477, 528, 547
Neurosocial evolution , 516, 520–521 Power and authority , 211, 222
Neurosociology , 361, 521, 523 Power balance , 50, 173
Niches , 35–39, 212, 218, 236, 239, 517 Practice , 1, 2, 7, 46, 51, 52, 63, 68, 72–74, 76, 77, 80,
94, 103, 114, 133, 139, 169, 171,
174, 186, 188–191, 196, 198, 207, 210,
O 217, 221, 222, 225, 237, 241, 243, 260–262,
Ontic fecundity of theories , 66 269, 270, 273–277, 279–282, 285, 309,
Opportunity structures , 347, 353, 371, 550 310, 356–358, 362, 380, 387, 389–407,
Oppression , 240, 241, 264, 436, 478, 479, 481–495 430, 437, 442, 448, 449, 464, 467, 477,
Organic evolution , 504–508, 510 481, 485–487, 489, 490, 495, 496, 548,
Organizational fi elds (and fi eld theory) . See Field 555, 557, 558, 560
theory, organizational fi elds
Praxis , 72–74, 76, 401–403, 407, 478, 482, 486, 488
Organizational forms, social movements , 10, 13, 51, 57,
Prepared (biased, directed) learning , 519, 523
99, 133, 143, 146, 164, 180, 195, 198, 201,
Procedural justice , 370, 378, 381, 428
208, 264, 265, 270, 272, 277, 278, 280, 283,
Productive exchange , 144, 372
284, 357, 496, 527, 528, 533, 535–537, 540,
Propositions, theoretical , 328–329
541, 547–563 Propriety , 379
Organizations , 2, 6, 19, 20, 43, 69, 70, 91, 114, 123, 125,
149, 177, 180, 186, 187, 207, 208, 236, 247,
269–287, 321, 343, 378, 395, 421, 441, 460, Q
469, 480, 504, 533, 547 Quotidian disruption , 535, 536, 551
576 Index

R Rules , 5, 25, 44, 46, 49, 50, 53–56, 59, 68, 74, 76, 93,
Race , 3, 11, 34, 58, 90, 177, 181, 229, 230, 126, 137, 139, 185, 187, 189–193, 195–199,
275, 286, 294, 323, 343, 406, 208, 217, 218, 220, 222, 252, 270, 272, 274,
415–416, 435, 478, 547 278, 279, 302, 303, 309, 312, 378, 393, 395,
Radcliffe-Brown, A. , 108, 168 396, 398, 405, 406, 413–415, 417–420, 426,
Radical social movements , 164, 362, 529, 556 reform- 430, 437, 438, 440, 444, 463, 514, 518, 519,
oriented social movements , 554 539, 549, 550, 553
Rational action , 63–65, 67–69, 71 Rules as resources , 393, 395
Receivers , 335, 376, 377, 414 Ryle, G. , 115, 169, 398
Reciprocal exchange , 372, 373, 451
Refl exes , 518
Refl exivity , 68, 85, 194, 345, 358, 393–395, S
407, 420, 541 Salience , 3, 39, 136–142, 156, 215, 220, 305, 328, 329,
Regulation , 5, 7, 8, 10–12, 23, 44, 53, 59, 127, 128, 150, 347, 415, 421
213, 241, 270, 278, 286, 337, 379, 382, 395, Sanctions/sanctioning , 30–34, 47, 51, 139, 141–143,
508, 509, 517, 548 145,
Relational sociology , 167–182 146, 156, 190, 220, 223, 374, 393, 426
Relations , 5, 20, 43, 68, 69, 86, 99, 125, 153, 167, 187, Scott, W. Richard , 44, 49, 190, 208, 269, 270,
188, 208, 209, 231, 248, 270, 339, 371, 396, 276, 279, 379
422, 465, 482, 513, 535, 547 Second Darwinian revolution , 503, 504, 507–522
Religion , 10, 19, 22, 25, 29, 38, 43, 44, 46, 70, 99, 103, Self-concept , 305, 345, 349, 354, 355, 375
104, 128, 130–133, 135, 207, 208, 210, 214, Self-construals independent ,
215, 217, 221, 223–226, 250, 391, 442–444, 358, 359, 361
446, 449, 451, 457, 458, 467, 486, 492, 506, interdependent , 358, 359,
527, 547, 555, 562 361 relational , 359, 360
Religious movements , 560, 562 repertoires , Self-esteem authenticity , 352 self-
effi cacy , 164, 352, 354, 370, 422
6, 94, 172, 275, 279, 468, 471,
self-worth , 346, 352, 422
518, 521, 555, 561
Self-presentation , 310, 322, 350–351, 406, 449
Representations , 67, 104–106, 110, 111, 114,
Serpe, R.T. , 306, 347, 348
262, 335, 459–463, 468, 470, 478,
Sexuality , 240, 478, 479, 481, 482, 484,
480, 511, 537, 559
488–490, 492–494
Reputation , 48, 55, 57, 285, 310, 380, 439, 440, 452,
Sexual violence , 479, 481, 484–488
463, 464, 484
Shils, E. , 76, 106, 109, 113, 209, 216, 217, 459
Resource mobilization, theory of movement emergence
Shop fl oor problem , 400
,
Simmel, G. , 3, 9, 23, 48, 69, 74, 75, 86, 131, 167, 173,
535, 536, 550, 562
220, 225, 248, 255, 256, 307–309, 312, 322,
revolutionary movements , 554, 555
376, 508, 509
Resources , 3, 20, 46, 47, 68, 79, 94, 99, 100, 127, 151,
Slavery , 238, 443, 467, 479–489, 492, 495
169, 173, 185, 186, 210, 211, 229, 237, 248,
SNA . See Social network analysis (SNA)
277, 298, 336, 347, 369, 393, 418, 438, 483,
Social action , 1, 8, 50, 71, 75–77, 94, 104, 106, 117, 171,
487, 505, 535, 536, 550
185, 186, 188, 208, 255, 263, 265, 269–287,
Respecifi cation , 393, 396, 401, 405, 407
390–393, 395, 398, 400, 401, 403, 405, 406,
Revolutions , 43, 55, 64, 67, 72, 73, 78, 197, 222,
468, 528, 554
229–231, 277, 312, 459, 503, 504, 507–522,
Social class , 15, 20, 31, 39, 135–137, 177, 186, 236,
527, 531, 547, 551
278,
Rituals , 5, 8, 12, 20, 25, 40, 43, 70, 78, 139–141, 144,
286, 311, 352, 356–357, 435, 443, 457
209, 213, 218, 221, 225, 311, 401, 429–430,
Social comparison , 358, 369–371, 376, 377, 379, 382
444, 447, 457, 459, 463, 464, 467, 470, 506,
Social dilemmas , 149–151, 153, 162, 303
521, 552, 556, 557
Social exchange , 152, 156–158, 221, 299, 369–382,
Role , 2, 6, 33, 48, 50, 63, 64, 85, 101, 103, 138, 152,
425–430, 515, 520
156, 168, 186, 209, 232, 236, 248, 274, 299,
Social force , 11, 255, 258, 259, 261, 264, 274,
305, 335, 344, 372, 389, 411, 412, 446, 459,
347, 382, 411
480, 508, 529, 549
Social movement society , 553
Role identities , 33, 140, 220, 225, 305, 306, 308, 346,
Social network analysis (SNA) , 168, 171, 174, 175,
348, 352, 359, 360, 362
177–182, 521
Role-taking , 345, 348–351, 361, 521
Social networks , 48, 167–182, 236, 239, 279, 282,
Rosenberg, Morris , 345–347, 349, 355, 357
300, 312, 313, 344, 347, 348, 351, 376,
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich , 53, 54, 59, 222
521, 532, 535, 560
Rule of proximity , 218, 220
Index 577

Social order , 43, 44, 63, 64, 73, 99, 111, 123–146, Status processes adult task groups ,
149–165, 180, 185–187, 189, 191, 192, 335, 336 distinct from
195, 196, 199, 200, 202, 209, 236, 250, dominance , 331–332 in juries ,
264, 273, 275, 277, 355, 391, 403, 329–331 in schools , 334–335
407, 530, 551 in soccer teams , 308, 323, 330
Social phenomenology , 387–407 Status value, spread of , 337
Social product , 259, 347 Stets, J.E. , 8, 11, 12, 86, 140, 163, 306, 313,
Social psychology and social movements , 7, 10, 47, 86, 343–362, 379, 421, 422, 438, 440,
99, 104, 133, 134, 164, 180, 188, 195, 209, 441, 450, 540
264, 270, 294, 357, 402, 411, 444, 496, 509, Stinchcombe, A. , 50, 51, 53, 274, 275, 285
527, 537, 547–563 Strategic action fi elds (and fi eld theory) .
Social Science , 13, 65–68, 70, 76, 80, 81, 99, 107, See Field theory, strategic action fi elds
180, 187, 239, 248, 253, 369, 376, 390, Strategies, social movements , 554–556
391, 393–395, 397, 401, 411, 440, 446, tactical interactions , 555, 556, 559
447, 458, 477, 478, 489–491, 494, 496, Stratifi cation , 2, 6, 10–12, 19–21, 25–29, 31, 34–38,
503, 512, 514–516, 518, 519, 523, 527, 124, 125, 128, 130–138, 141, 142, 145,
528, 536, 537, 540, 542 146, 211, 213, 225, 229–243, 261, 262,
Social solidarity , 437, 442, 443, 457, 464, 468, 469, 523 272, 285, 287, 311, 348, 350, 477, 478,
Social strain, theory of movement emergence , 549–551 492, 495, 504, 510, 517
Social structure , 9, 19, 24–26, 31, 34, 37, 49–51, 77, Structure and agency , 79, 178–179, 182, 192
90, 96, 99, 110, 117, 126, 127, 129, 132, 138, Stryker, S. , 8, 94, 220, 294, 305–308, 344, 347, 348,
140, 142, 144, 154, 157, 181, 189, 192, 202, 357, 415, 420–422, 438
208, 222, 224, 236, 240, 248, 275, 281, Superorganism , 506, 508, 512
293–314, 336–339, 347–348, 354, 369, 373, Symbolic interaction , 188, 397
379, 382, 395, 397, 401, 412, 421, 425, 428, Symbols , 25, 109, 110, 126, 131, 133, 210, 219, 261,
448, 450, 477, 480–482, 484, 485, 493, 495, 309, 311, 345, 420, 468, 470, 471, 507, 517,
503, 506, 508–510, 517, 520, 522, 531, 535, 532, 555, 560
548, 554, 555 Systems
Social ties , 70, 151, 172, 173, 273, 278, 281, 285, 306, behavioral , 76
347, 418, 421, 439, 521, 522 cultural , 27, 29, 37, 38, 76, 101, 107, 109,
Social worlds , 6–9, 11, 58, 70, 81, 90, 91, 93, 111, 113, 115–117, 127, 129, 210,
95–97, 114, 123, 149, 151, 167, 169–172, 220, 250, 469, 548 personality , 76,
174, 180, 181, 188, 189, 192, 194, 196, 107, 109, 116 social , 76, 106, 107, 109,
110, 116, 168, 200,
202, 207, 214, 226, 312, 314, 390, 391,
247, 254, 261, 312, 321, 322, 503, 517,
402, 413, 419, 420, 485
520, 522, 523
Societal organization, levels of , 20, 129, 523
Sociobiology , 503, 511–518, 520, 522, 523
Sociocultural evolution , 211–213, 504–508, T
516–518, 523 Tactics, social movements
Sociological methods , 247 transgressive , 55, 547, 548
Sociology of morality , 12, 435–438, 445, 448– unintended , 558–559
450, 452 Task focus (defi ned) , 323
Spillover, social movements , 11, 553, 558 Thatcher, M. , 169
SSSM . See Standard Social Science Model (SSSM) Thick and thin morality , 436, 437
Stage models , 211, 212, 509–511, 517, 523 Transactions , 48, 50, 55–57, 172, 173, 270, 282,
Standard Social Science Model (SSSM) , 372, 373, 376
514, 516, 518, 519 Trust ontogenetic theories , 375
State, modern , 240 proximate causation theories ,
Status in encounters , 336, 337 374 ultimate causation theories
nature of , 138 transactional , 374
needs in , 140–142 Turner, J.H. , 1, 6, 7, 9, 10, 19–40, 57, 123–146, 150,
Status characteristics beauty , 151,
333–334 diffuse (defi ned) , 154–156, 159–163, 165, 207, 209–213, 216,
138, 328 and expectation states 220, 308, 343, 344, 346, 348, 354, 357, 360,
, 326–329 motherhood and 430, 435, 438, 439, 443, 450, 504–510,
fatherhood , 334 specifi c (defi 515–518, 520–522
ned) , 327–328 Turner, R.H. , 220, 348, 349, 357, 528, 529,
Status construction , 298, 336–337
531–533, 537, 538
U
578 Index

Uncertainty , 46, 48, 54–57, 151, 156, 190, 195,


276, 300, 374, 375, 381, 397, 443,
468, 470, 535
Understanding discursive , 75, 78, 93,
467, 480 emotive , 75, 78, 538–540
sensory , 78
Universal human concerns , 211, 213–215

V
Validation , 78, 79
Validity , 6, 47, 79, 110, 111, 186, 379,
381, 398, 422
Values , 3, 6, 21, 43, 44, 68, 69, 106, 129, 149, 173, 175,
190, 210, 232, 252, 273, 298, 321, 344, 371,
401, 414, 437, 464, 517, 532, 548
Veblen, T. , 51, 321, 322, 508, 509
Verifi cation , 33, 40, 140, 163, 177, 343, 351–353, 380

W
Weber, M. , 2, 3, 6–8, 12, 22, 23, 25, 38, 43, 44, 46, 47,
50, 53, 55, 64, 66, 68, 75, 76, 79, 80, 99–104,
106, 107, 110, 111, 116, 118, 152, 170, 185,
187, 188, 209, 215, 216, 222, 226, 229, 231,
248, 255, 269, 272, 287, 332, 340, 374, 379,
381, 390, 405, 438, 442, 443, 465–467, 547
White, H. , 154, 172, 180, 185, 190, 551

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