SECOND DIVISION Jr.
, the next day he went to court and the respondent judge
[G.R. No. L-33720-21. March 10, 1975.]
THE PHILIPPINE BRITISH CO., INC. and THE CIBELES
INSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. THE HON.
WALFRIDO DE LOS ANGELES in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, Branch IV of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City, THE HON. VICENTE S. OCOL
in his capacity as Clerk of Court of First Instance of
Quezon City and Ex-Oficio Sheriff of Quezon City and
MULTIFIELD ENTERPRISES and MOISES M.
TAPIA, Respondents.
Alfonso Felix, Jr., for Petitioners.
B.M. Grecia & Associates and D.G. Garin & Associates
for Respondents.
SYNOPSIS
For filing belated joint answer by mail, petitioners were
declared in default and private respondent’s evidence was
received ex parte. On April 28, 1971 default judgments
against petitioners were rendered, and duly docketed, were
released for service by registered mail on May 17,1971
addressed to petitioner’s counsel, Felix, Jr. The postman
delivered three notices to counsel’s secretary, the first on
May 19, 1971, the second on May 30,1971 and the last on
June 15, 1971.
According to Felix , Jr., he examined the expedientes of the
cases in May 24, 1971 and he did not find his joint answer
therein and instead saw that orders of default had been
issued and that private respondent’s evidence had been ex
parte. He claimed that he did not find any copy of any
decision. Two days later he filed a joint motion to lift the
order of default, unverified and unaccompanied by any
affidavit of merit, which he set for hearing on June 1, 1971.
This was declared a public holiday; and according to Felix.
advised him to set motion for hearing anew.
Felix, Jr. received a notice that his motion had been set for
hearing on June 30, 1971, but on June 22, 1971, respondent
judge issued an order canceling this notice for the reason
that the court can no longer set aside its order of default
since petitioners failed to comply with section 3 of Rule 18.
On June 28, 1971, on private respondent’s motion, an order
for the immediate execution of the default judgments was
issued. Petitioners filed a joint petition for relief from
judgment but before said petition could be acted upon by the
trial court, the instant petition was filed and summons,
together with the writ of preliminary injunction, were served
on respondents.
The Supreme Court gave due course to the present petition
notwithstanding the fact that a petition for relief from
judgment had been filed with the trial court because the
petition hinted possible irregularities in the actuations of the
respondent judge and his employees, and the Court felt it
was in the best interest of justice to inquire into what actually
happened. On this point, the Court ruled that the official
records and the affidavits of the employees of the trial court
as well as those of the Bureau of Posts conclusively belie
counsel’s allegations.
Finding that there were enough incontrovertible facts in the
record on the basis of which the litigation between the parties
can be terminated, the Court resolved the cases instead of
remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings and
final determination of the issues. It compared the conflicting
allegations of the parties in the light of their respective
supporting affidavits and documents and concluded that
petitioners have not shown that they have good and valid
defenses against the claim of respondent Tapia.
The Court noted counsel’s failure to substantiate his charges
against the actuation of the judge and his personnel and the
fact that he made positive allegations that his clients have
Page 1 of 25
good and valid defenses knowing the truth to be otherwise.
He was made to show cause why no administrative action
should be taken against him as a member of the bar.
Petition dismissed.
SYLLABUS
1. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; PETITION GIVEN
DUE COURSE DESPITE ADEQUATE REMEDY IN ORDINARY
COURSE OF LAW IF IT ASSAILS INTEGRITY OF JUDGE,
PERSONNEL AND PROCEEDINGS. — Ordinarily, petition for
relief from judgment will be deemed as an adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law that constitutes a bar to
a certiorari review or any other kind of special civil action.
But where the petition for certiorari strongly hints possible
irregularities in the actuations of the judge and the
employees which could involve their honesty and good faith
as well as the integrity of judicial and proceedings, the
Supreme Court, in the best interest of justice, will inquire into
what actually happened and give the petition due course.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCUSATION OF IRREGULARITIES BELIED
BY OFFICIAL RECORDS IN CASE AT BAR. — The official
records and the affidavits of the employees of the court as
well as allegation that respondent judge connived with his
co-respondents to make it appear that proper judgments by
default had been regularly rendered when in truth there was
none.
3. ID.; ID.; SUPREME COURT WILL RESOLVE RATHER THAN
REMAND CASE TO LOWER COURT IF THERE ARE ENOUGH
FACTS ON RECORD. — Where in a petition for certiorari, the
Supreme Court finds that there are enough incontrovertible
facts in the record on the basis of which the litigation between
the parties can be terminated, the Court will resolve the
whole case instead of returning the case to the trial court for
further proceeding and final determination of the issues. It is
a primordial principle that the courts must always strive for
a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of all actions
and proceedings.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONERS HAVE NOT SHOWN VALID
DEFENSE AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S CLAIM IN CASE
AT BAR. — In an unsworn memorandum, petitioners
questioned the default judgments rendered against them on
private respondent’s insurance claims, stating that he was
guilty of fraud and arson and because of this he availed of
every means to secure judgments without going to trial. In
support of this allegation they presented the supposed expert
opinion of the former’ Chief of the PC crime laboratory
regarding the gasoline traces found in private respondent’s
premises. Private respondent replied that the expert’s
findings were worthless as the adjusters trusted by
petitioners had investigated private respondent’s claim and
found no well-grounded reason to warrant non-payment and
had recommended out-of-court settlement. Held: Comparing
the conflicting allegations, the Court concluded that
petitioners have not shown that they have good and valid
defenses against private respondent’s claim.
5. DEFAULTS: DEFENDANTS DECLARED IN DEFAULT FOR
FAILURE TO FILE ANSWER. — When the incontrovertible
facts in the record show that petitioner’s joint answer was
undoubtedly filed out of time, their contention that they were
erroneously declared in default has no merit and they cannot
justly say that the respondent judge committed a grave
abuse of discretion in making such declaration.
6. ID.; ID.; MOTION TO LIFT ORDER OF DEFAULT; MOTION
MUST BE UNDER OATH, ACCOMPANIED BY AFFIDAVIT OF
MERIT. — A motion to lift an order of default should be under
oath and accompanied by an affidavit of merit. These are
substantial requirements and the omission thereof justifies
the denial of the motion.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; OMISSION OF AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT; TRIAL
COURT CANNOT CONSIDER MOTION. — The requirements of
Page 2 of 25
Section 3 of Rule 18 (Relief from order of default) are
practically identical to those of Section 3 of Rule 38 (Relief
from judgment) regarding the need to show the existence of
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence that caused
the default and to accompany the motion to set aside with
affidavits of merit. The ruling which states that a petition to
set aside a judgment which is not accompanied by an
affidavit of merit has no standing in court, is applicable to a
motion to lift an order of default. Thus, the trial court has no
authority to consider a motion to lift an order of default if the
affidavit of merit is omitted.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; FATALLY DEFECTIVE MOTION CANNOT
REVIVE RIGHT TO NOTICE OF FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. —
The mere filing of a fatally defective motion to set aside an
order of default does not entitle the defaulting defendants to
notice of all subsequent proceedings. Section 9 of Rule 13
must be read in conjunction with section 3 of Rule 18. The
motion to set aside default, which effects the revival of the
right to notice of further proceedings, referred to in Section
9 of Rule 13 must be one the contents of which are precisely
those provided for in Section 3 Rule 18. Thus, where the
motion to lift the order of default did not comply with section
3 of Rule 18, the movant cannot contend that the failure of
the judge to notify him of the motions for immediate
execution of the default judgments fatally vitiated the order
granting the same and the writs and levies pursuant thereto.
9. JUDGMENTS; EXECUTION: PREVAILING PARTY CAN HAVE
FINAL JUDGMENT EXECUTED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT. —
Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing
party can have it executed as a matter of right and the
granting of execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court.
In the case at bar, where it is indisputably borne by the
records that the impugned judgments became final and
executory on June 23, 1971, the action taken by the trial
court June 28, 1971 granting respondents’ motion for
immediate execution assumed the character of an order of
execution of a final and executory judgment and has
therefore, become a matter of right to the prevailing party
and ministerial on the court to grant.
10. ATTORNEY-AT-LAW; DISCIPLINE; COUNSEL IN CASE AT
BAR ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE WHY NO ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN AGAINST HIM. — The court
cannot begrudge any lawyer of his right to be assiduous and
zealous, even tenacious, in the prosecution or defense of the
cause of his client. But when counsel fails to substantiate his
charges directly assailing the personal integrity of the judge
and his personnel as well as that of the proceedings, and
makes positive allegations that his clients have good and
valid defenses knowing the truth to be otherwise, he must be
made to show cause why no administrative action should be
taken against him as a member of the bar.
DECISION
BARREDO, J.:
Petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the default
proceedings, the judgments and the writs of execution of
respondent judge in Civil cases Nos. Q-15377-8 of the Court
of First Instance of Quezon City entitled Multifield
Enterprises, Et. Al. v. Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc.
and Multifield Enterprises Et. Al. v. Cibeles Insurance
Corporation, respectively, and for prohibition to enjoin the
execution of said judgments. Upon the filing of the petition,
the Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for.
Respondents were required to answer and after issued were
joined, the parties filed their respective memoranda in lieu of
oral argument.
On June 12, 1970, a fire broke out in the premises of private
respondents (Tapia, for short) at No. 245 Roosevelt Avenue,
San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. Being holders of fire
insurance policies from different companies, among them the
petitioners, and having failed to secure extrajudicial
Page 3 of 25
settlement of their claims, they filed corresponding civil
actions in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. All of
said cases, dealing as they did with the same facts and
issues, were assigned to respondent judge, to whom by raffle
the first of them had fallen. Petitioner British (for short) was
served summons in Civil Case No. Q-15377 on March 29,
1971 while petitioner Cibeles (for short) was served theirs for
Civil Case No. Q-15378 on April 2, 1971, hence their answers
were due on April 13 and 17, respectively.
On April 13, 1971, counsel for British filed by mail a motion
asking for fifteen (15) days extension of its time to answer,
claiming that due to the intervening Holy Week and pressure
of other works, he would be unable to prepare his answer
within the reglementary period. He was granted only five (5)
days ending April 19. 1 No answer came until April 28, 1971,
albeit it was mailed by registered service on April 22, 1971.
Cibeles in turn filed its own motion for extension on April 19,
1971, two days after due date. Obviously, the period could
not be extended anymore. Just the same, it filed its answer
on April 22, 1971, which was joint with that of British.
In the meanwhile, on April 24, 1971, Tapia filed separate
motions in the two cases praying that petitioners be declared
in default. Not having received by then any answer of
petitioners, (Petitioners did file a joint answer, but as will be
seen later, the same was actually received by respondent
court only on April 28, 1971.) an order of default was issued,
directing at the same time that plaintiffs’ evidence be
received by the clerk of court. This reception of evidence was
done on April 26 and 27, and on April 28, 1971, the
judgments complained of herein were rendered. After being
duly docketed, these judgments were released for service by
registered mail on May 17, 1971, addressed to petitioners’
counsel, Atty. Alfonso Felix, Jr. at his given address at Room
212 Lopez Building, Aduana Street, Intramuros, Manila.
According to the postman assigned in that area, Alfredo E.
Sugatan, the first registry notice of said mail matter,
Registered Mail No. 13648, was delivered by him actually to
counsel’s secretary who was known to him personally, a
certain Miss Tuliao, in the morning of May 19, 1971, as he
similarly delivered to her subsequently the second and third
notices on May 30, 1971 and June 15, 1971.
According to Atty. Felix, Jr., on May 24, 1971, the day he
received the order of default in Q-13577 (Par. 12 and Annex
C-1 of Petition) he found himself in the respondent court and
to his great surprise, in the corresponding expedientes, he
found neither (1) his motion for extension of time to file
answer in Q-13577 nor (2) the aforementioned joint answer
he had filed on behalf of petitioners and that instead he saw
therein that orders of default had been issued in both cases
and, further, that evidence of the plaintiffs had been received
ex-parte on April 26 and 27, 1971. 2 He claims also that on
said occasion, when he examined the expedientes of the
cases, he did not find therein any copy of any decision. To be
noted, however, he does not pretend that he made any
inquiry from any of the officials and employees of the court
as to what was the exact status of his cases as of that date.
Two days later or on May 26, 1971, he filed a joint motion,
dated May 25, 1971, to lift the order of default, unverified
and unaccompanied by any affidavit of merit, which he set
for hearing on June 1, 1971. According to him, "the motion
to set aside the Order of Default could not be heard on June
1 the day on which it was set for hearing for the reason that
day had been declared a public holiday, undersigned counsel
went to respondent court the next day, June 2, 1971,
consulted the expedientes and seeing respondent Judge de
los Angeles showed him a copy of the Joint Motion Annex `D’
to lift the Order of Default. Respondent Judge de los Angeles
after reading in the presence of undersigned counsel that
Joint Motion Annex `D’ asked him to set it for hearing anew
and told him that it was always his practice to give parties a
chance to present evidence." (Par. 17 of Petition). And so,
counsel did as told.
Thus, on June 10, 1971, a notice was received by Atty. Felix,
Jr. Advising him that the motion had been set for hearing on
Page 4 of 25
June 30, 1971, but on June 22, 1971, respondent judge
issued an order cancelling this notice for the reason that "for
failure of defendants in the above-entitled cases to comply
with the requirements imposed by Section 3 of Rule 18, Rules
of Court and pursuant to the decisions of the Supreme Court
on the matter, this Court can no longer set aside its order
dated April 24, 1971." (Annex H of the Petition). And on June
28, 1971, respondent judge issued the following
order:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Acting on the motion for immediate execution of judgments
filed by the plaintiffs through counsel in the above-entitled
cases, this Court finds and the records of these cases bear
out and show that the judgments adverted to were rendered
by this Court on April 28, 1971 and copies thereof were sent
and posted as registered mail No. 13648 to the counsel for
defendants on May 17, 1971 by the Clerk of this Court. The
copies of the decisions as registered mail No. 13648 were
returned to this Court by the Post Office as unclaimed by the
addressee, the counsel for the defendants, on June 23, 1971.
"Both the certification (Annex "A" of the motion for
immediate execution) and the proof of service of the notices
sent by the postmaster stamped on the envelop-cover of the
decisions show that the first notice of this registered mail was
sent to the counsel for defendants at his office address on
May 19, 1971 by the postmaster. Again, on May 30, 1971, a
notice was sent to him by the postmaster on these decisions
as registered mail No. 13648. The last and third notice by the
postmaster was sent to him by the postmaster on June 15,
1971. Still counsel for defendants did not claim from the Post
Office his copies of the decisions for which no less than three
notices were sent to him by the postmaster.
"Completeness of service of the decisions on defendants’
counsel was thus accomplished after the expiration of five
days from the date of the first notice which is May 19, 1971,
pursuant to Section 8 of Rule 13, Rules of Court and the
numerous decisions of the Supreme Court on this particular
matter. The period of thirty (30) day within which to
interpose an appeal from these decisions rendered by this
Court in the above-entitled cases commenced on May 25,
1971 the day after the fifth day from May 19, 1971 and
expired after June 23, 1971, the thirtieth day. From May 25,
1971 to June 23, 1971, no appeal from these decisions was
taken by the defendants. Considering that the period of thirty
(30) days has already expired and no appeal has been taken
by the defendants from the decisions rendered by this Court
on April 28, 1971, they are by law now final, unappealable
and, as matter of right, the plaintiffs are entitled to their
immediate execution.
"WHEREFORE, the immediate execution of the judgments in
the above-entitled cases are hereby granted. Let the
corresponding writs of execution be issued.
SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
Pursuant to the writs issued under this order, the Hongkong
& Shanghai Banking Corporation paid to respondent Sheriff
P294,750.00 for the account of British and the First National
City Bank of New York the sum of P75,000 for the account of
Cibeles (Pars. 30 and 31, Petition), but all the amounts thus
paid were returned to the respective banks by virtue of the
writ of preliminary injunction of this Court of July 9, 1971.
On July 1, 1971, petitioners filed a joint "Petition for Relief
from Judgment." But before said petition could be acted upon
by the court, the instant petition was filed with this Court on
July 2, 1971 and summons, together with the writ of
preliminary injunction was served on public respondents on
July 10, 1971. (Annex N, Petition). In the meantime, on the
same day that the petition for relief was set for hearing, July
7, 1971, respondent judge found it to be "sufficient in form
and substance" and ordered the respondents "to answer the
same within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt
hereof." (Annex A, Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss of
September 5, 1972.) Nothing else developed in the trial court
later because the injunction of this Court which was served
on respondent judge on July 10, 1971 enjoined him from
Page 5 of 25
"taking further action" in the two subject cases.
At this juncture, it becomes necessary to discuss and resolve
a point of procedure before going any further. As may be
noted, We could have refused to give due course to the
present petition when it was filed on July 2, 1971, considering
that it already avers that a petition for relief from judgment
dated June 30, 1971 (Annex N of Petition) had been filed by
petitioners with the trial court on July 1, 1971, which,
pursuant to the usual practice, We could have deemed as an
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that
constitutes a bar to a certiorari review or any other kind of
special civil action. But the petition, on its face, presented
the situation that obtained in the trial court in such an
alarming manner, to the point of strongly hinting possible
irregularities in the actuations of the respondent judge and
the employees in his sala, which could involve their honesty
and good faith as well as the integrity of judicial records and
proceedings, that the Court felt it was in the best interest of
justice for the Court itself to inquire without further loss of
time into what actually happened. Indeed, even after the
parties had filed their respective memoranda and the Court
had by resolution of October 21, 1971 declared these cases
submitted for decision, when the respondents filed their
motion to dismiss of September 5, 1972, based precisely on
the ground that on July 7, 1971 the trial court had given due
course to petitioners’ petition for relief, We resolved to defer
determination of the dismissal motion until this decision on
the merits.
Now, having thus disregarded the existence of an ordinary
remedy in the court below at the earlier stages of these
cases, it is but proper and logical for Us to pursue such course
of action to its ultimate conclusion, since anyway, counsel for
petitioners has himself vehemently objected to said motion
to dismiss, and, after all, as We see it, there are enough
incontrovertible facts in the record, furnished by both parties,
on the basis of which the Court can put an end to the
litigation between the parties regarding the insurance claims
of private respondents against petitioners, the subject matter
of the actions in the court below. To now confine Ourselves
to holding that the trial court should be accorded the
opportunity to resolve the petition for relief of British and
Cibeles therein pending would serve no purpose than to
proliferate proceedings, only to end in the same inevitable
result which even here is already obvious and unavoidable.
That would be sacrificing substance to achieve nothing more
than perfection of form and procedure, which is inconsistent
with the primordial principle that the courts must always
strive for a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of all
actions and proceedings. And so, the Court has decided to
determine here even the question of whether the petition for
relief filed by petitioners with the respondent court should be
granted or denied, thereby avoiding any possible doubt that
petitioners might entertain as to the impartiality and integrity
of future actuations of the respondents. Indeed, petitioners
have placed before Us by their petition, memorandum and
subsequent pleadings, complete with appropriate annexes,
consisting of affidavits, letters and other documents, all the
facts which they must believe are relevant, whereas
respondents have duly joined issued with them as to all said
facts in their own answer, memorandum and other papers,
complete also with similar corresponding annexes, and there
being no serious, much less any credible indication that any
of the parties’ annexes are not authentic, We deem it
unnecessary to prolong further the main controversy
between the parties. We will resolve the whole case here.
The contention of petitioners that they were erroneously
declared in default has no merit. From the incontrovertible
facts in the record, We cannot see how it can be justly said
that respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion
in making such declaration. As regards Cibeles, there can be
no question that even its motion for extension to file its
answer was filed out of time. It was served summons on April
2, 1971, and it is not disputed that its motion for extension
was filed on April 19th, two days late. With respect to British,
its answer was admittedly due on April 13, 1971, and
although it asked for an extension of fifteen (15) days, it was
given only five (5) days ending April 19, 1971; 3
Page 6 of 25
consequently, its answer jointly filed with Cibeles on April 22,
1971 was undoubtedly out of time.
Counsel suggests that he was not given enough time,
considering that there was the Holy Week to take into
account, but His Honor ruled that precisely, counsel would
have more time because of the holidays. Again, We perceive
no grave abuse of discretion in such a pragmatic
ratiocination. Besides, it is settled that parties and counsel
should not assume that courts are bound to grant the time
they ask for compliance with the rules, and, therefore, the
fact that counsel received the order of extension by mail only
on April 26, 1971, is no reason for him to complain. Likewise,
that he was not notified of the motion to declare his clients
in default is not against the rules, for he had no right to such
notice. (Pielago v. Generosa, 73 Phil. 654.)
Anent the motion to lift the orders of default, counsel invites
attention to the alleged directive of respondent judge to him
to have the hearing of his said motion reset because it is the
judge’s "practice to give parties a chance to present
evidence." We take it, however, that seemingly what
happened then must have been that His Honor was just
trying to figure out how counsel could be helped out of his
self-imposed predicament, but, evidently, upon further
reflection, he must have realized the legal obstacles on the
way and consequently found no alternative than to rule that
the motion to lift did not have to be reset for hearing
anymore. Upon perusing the motion when it was filed, he
must have noted that it did not comply, as he so stated in his
order, with the requirements of Section 3 of Rule 18.
As may be seen, petitioners’ joint motion to lift the order of
default, Annex D of the Petition, the same is neither under
oath nor accompanied by any affidavit of merit. And in Ong
Peng v. Custodio, 111 Phil. 382, We held as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . Upon examination of the motion to set aside the order
of default, we find it to be lacking in the following substantial
requirements: it does not contain an affidavit of merits, the
motion to set aside the default order is not under oath and
contains only a promise or an assurance, not an affidavit of
merits, that defendant has a good defense. The court was,
therefore, fully justified in denying the motion to set aside
the order of default."cralaw virtua1aw library
In fact, in view of the omission of petitioners to accompany
their motion with any affidavit of merit, the trial court had no
authority to consider the same. It is to be noted that the
requirements of Section 3 of Rule 18 are practically identical
to those of Section 3 of Rule 38 regarding the need to show
the existence of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence that caused the default and to accompany the
motion to set aside with affidavits of merit. Consequently, it
is but proper to apply to such a motion the same ruling
applicable to petitions for relief under Rule 38, which is to the
effect that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Furthermore, it appears that appellant’s petition to set aside
the judgment and reopen the case, is grounded on his alleged
excusable negligence in failing to appear and testify during
the hearing of the case on February 3, 1959, namely, his
becoming ill with flu (influenza) on said date. We find,
however, that appellant failed to accompany said petition
with affidavits of merit showing the excusable negligence
relied upon, and the facts constituting his good and
substantial cause of action or defense, as expressly required
under Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. We have
repeatedly held that such a defect is fatal (Abao v. Virtucio,
Et Al., 109 Phil., 821; Price Stabilization Corporation v. Court
of First Instance of Manila, Et Al., 97 Phil., 153) which
warrants the denial of the relief sought (Abao v. Virtucio, Et
Al., supra, citing Coombs v. Santos, 24 Phil., 446; McGrath
v. Del Rosario, 49 Phil., 330; Villanueva, Et. Al. v. Alcoba,
101 Phil., 277). The reason for the rule is that it is the
affidavits of merit which serve as jurisdictional basis for a
court to entertain a petition for relief (Abao v. Virtucio, Et Al.,
supra; Omandam v. Director of Lands, 95 Phil., 450; Off.
Gaz., 4840). Stated differently, where a petition to set aside
Page 7 of 25
a judgment or reopen a case pursuant to Rule 38 of the Rules
of Court is not accompanied with said affidavits of merit, the
court with which it is filed is not called upon to entertain the
petition. Applied to the instant case, appellant’s petition to
set aside the judgment in question and reopen the case
acquired no standing in court and, consequently, it was
rightly denied." (Fernandez v. Tan Tiong Tick, 111 Phil. 773
at pp. 780-781.)
Indeed, the identity of these two remedies is such that in Ong
Peng, supra, We already expressed Our "doubt if the same
issue raised in the original motion to set aside the order of
default, may again be raised in a petition for relief under Rule
38 of the Rules of Court. The general rule is that once a
matter in issue has been decided by the court, it may no
longer be brought again in the form of another objection, and
in the guise of a motion under another provision of the rules"
(at p. 387). True it is that as a matter of form, under Section
3 of Rule 18 it is not essential that the affidavit of merit be
separate from the motion and may instead be incorporated
therein, but in the instant case of petitioners’ motion, even if
it makes general allegations of merit, these allegations are
not supported by oath of anyone who has knowledge of the
fact. As already stated, not even Atty. Felix Jr. swore to the
truth thereof. Accordingly, We find no error in the subsequent
action of respondent judge of cancelling the notice of hearing
of the joint motion to lift the order of default.
Besides, the same section expressly provides that motions to
lift orders of default may be filed only before judgment, and
petitioners’ joint motion was filed only on May 26, 1971,
whereas the judgments in question were rendered on April
28, 1971.
But counsel would attach importance to another aspect of his
motion to lift the default orders, regardless of its legal
untenability. He contends that having filed such a motion, he
became entitled under Section 9 of Rule 13 to notice "of all
further proceedings" and, therefore, the failure of
respondents to notify him of the motions for immediate
execution of the default judgments fatally vitiated the order
granting the same and the writs and levies pursuant thereto.
It is quite obvious that counsel’s reliance on the provision
cited by him is misplaced. Textually, the said section reads
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 9. Service upon party in default. — No service of
papers other than substantially amended or supplemental
pleadings and final orders or judgments shall be necessary
on a party in default unless he files a motion to set aside the
order of default, in which event he shall be entitled to notice
of all further proceedings regardless of whether the order of
default is set aside or not."cralaw virtua1aw library
We are not prepared to agree with counsel that the right of
a party in default to notice of further proceedings which this
rule revives as a result of the filing of a motion to set aside
the default order is intended by the rule to be so easily
reacquired that just by the mere filing of any motion with a
prayer to set aside the default, the provision may be deemed
as already complied with. Logic and principle dictate that the
effects of default may not be treated as lightly as if it were
of no juridical essence. While the Court has generally been
liberal in giving a party in default a chance to participate in
the trial, We cannot sanction any proposition that would so
reduce the effect of an order of default that to have it set
aside all that has to be done is for the party concerned to file
any perfunctory motion therefor. A party who by inaction or
negligence allows himself to be declared in default offends
the rule requiring him to answer the summons without
unnecessary delay to the end that the issues may be duly
joined and the litigation be expeditiously terminated. To
purge himself of the effects of such offense, it should not be
enough for him to just tell the court he has, after all, decided
to wake up and take part in the proceedings. It is but proper
that he must justify his failure to comply with the rule before
he is relieved from the adverse consequences of his omission.
Thus, Section 9 of Rule 13 must be read in conjunction with
Section 3 of Rule 18. In other words, the motion to set aside
Page 8 of 25
default referred to in Section 9 of Rule 13 must be one the
contents of which are precisely those provided for in Section
3 of Rule 18. Thus, the filing of such a motion to set aside
short of the requirements of this latter provision may not as
it cannot produce the revival of the right to notice
contemplated in Section 9 of Rule 13. Any other construction
in line with the position of petitioners would render the intent
and purpose of the pertinent provisions nugatory and
ineffective. Considering, therefore, that counsel’s joint
motion to lift the order of default in the subject cases did not
comply with Section 3 of Rule 18, there is no justification at
all for his gripe that he was not notified of further
proceedings.
The next point raised by petitioners is more basic. They
maintain that the circumstances related by their counsel
should prove to Us that there were in fact no judgments yet
against them on June 2, 1971, the day when said counsel
verbally took up with respondent judge the matter of having
the orders of default lifted. It is the emphatic charge of
counsel that when he examined the records of the subject
cases on May 24, 1971 "no decision of any sort appeared"
therein. (Par. 11-d, Petition). He also "affirms under oath
that on June 2, 1971, no decision of any sort appeared in
these expedientes nor did respondent Judge de los Angeles
ever aver that any decision had been rendered." (Par. 18,
Petition). He further adds that "the clearest evidence that we
can furnish the Supreme Court that as late as June 3, 1971,
no decision had (yet) been rendered" is that he had received
on June 10, 1971 a notice setting his motion to lift the order
of default for hearing on June 30, 1971, "for had any decision
been rendered, clearly the deputy clerk of court who is under
the control and supervision of respondent judge and who is
doubtless familiar with the expedientes of these cases would
have not set a Motion to Lift the Order of default for hearing
had any decision been rendered (already)" (Pars. 20 and 21,
Petition). Additionally, he points out that even in the order of
June 22nd cancelling the notice of hearing issued by the clerk
of court of the motion to lift, His Honor made no hint that he
had already decided counsel’s cases. Finally, counsel
surmises that it is rather strange that respondent judge had
the material time to prepare his decisions on April 28, when
the reception of the evidence took place only on April 26 and
27.
In plain language, the accusation is that the decisions in
question must have been prepared subsequent to June 3,
1971. Undoubtedly, the indictment is serious. It directly
implies misfeasance on the part of the officials and
employees of the trial court, not excluding respondent judge.
Upon the other hand, the rotund denial of the respondents is
coupled with their own counter-accusation that counsel is
frantically but vainly trying only to make up with his clients
for his failure to act on their behalf on time. In the face of
these sharply opposite positions, We could do no less than
scrutinize the record minutely and carefully, if only to be able
to pin proper responsibility on whosoever might be guilty of
violating his sacred oath as functionary of the court, either
as judge, clerk of court or mere employee thereof or as
counsel.
After a conscientious review of the pertinent facts extant in
the record, it is our considered opinion that counsel’s
suspicion is unfounded. To begin with, respondents have in
their favor the presumption heretofore invariably relied upon
by the Court in similar situations that official duty has been
regularly performed by them and that they have acted in
good faith. It has been the constant ruling of this Court that
this kind of presumption must stand, even against the most
well reasoned allegations seemingly pointing to some
possible irregularity or anomaly. "In the absence of a
showing to the contrary, a judicial proceeding is presumed to
be regular, and all steps required by law to be taken before
the Court may validly render judgment, had been so taken."
(El Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921; Ongsiako
v. Natividad, L-1371, Aug. 5, 1947; People v. Baco, L-2633,
Feb. 23, 1958; Go Chi, Et. Al. v. Go Chi, Et Al., L-5203, Feb.
23, 1955; People v. Nazario, L-7629, Sept. 29, 1955). And
so far, We have not seen anything in the record to support
the charges of Atty. Felix Jr. beyond his own allegations
Page 9 of 25
which, considering they do not necessarily belie the contrary
representations of the adverse party, do not appear to Us to
have any added weight just because counsel has taken pains
to emphasize he has made them "under oath."cralaw
virtua1aw library
As to the disputed existence of the judgments in question
prior to June 3, 1971, or for that matter, before May 24,
1971, We are fully convinced that said judgments were
entered in the docket on April 28, 1971. We do not feel
justified under the circumstances revealed in the record to
say that such entry was made days before the judgments
were actually prepared and signed. The vital fact of such
entry is borne out by the certification to such effect of the
respondent Clerk of Court Vicente S. Ocol, Annex 9 of the
answer herein, and the affidavit of Branch Clerk of Court Leon
D. Paradero, Annex 9-B, attesting to the rendition of said
judgments on the same date, the truth of which can easily
be checked with the regularity or irregularity of the entries in
the docket of the trial court. If the corresponding entries in
the docket do not appear to be regular, Atty. Felix Jr. could
have completely rebutted these annexes with proof based on
what appears in said docket itself. The utter silence of
counsel in this respect is eloquent evidence against him.
Besides, the apparent thrust of counsel’s theory is that
respondents were in such hurry to make the impugned
judgments effective that they allegedly overlooked
compliance with the rules cited by him, but, to Our mind, the
incontrovertible fact that it was not until May 17, 1971, or
almost three weeks after April 28, 1971, that Jesus B.
Marzan, the Chief of the Civil Cases Section in the court
below, released the said judgments, according to his affidavit
(Annex 9-A, id.), belies entirely such claim. This somewhat
belated release is also proven by the evidence, to be
discussed anon, as to when the postal authorities got the
decision for delivery to petitioners’ counsel. If it were true
that respondents were acting in haste, such release would
have been immediate.
The reality of the existence of the judgments in controversy
prior to the dates when counsel claims he did not see them
is corroborated by evidence coming from sources other than
the office of respondent court. Annex 11-A of the
respondents’ answer herein is the certification of Mr. H. G.
Guzman, Postmaster of the Port Area Post Office, Manila, to
the effect that Registered Letter No. 13648 of sender, "CFI
Branch IV, Quezon City" was received by his office on May
19, 1971 "and the corresponding Registry Notice was issued
on said date, and sent to addressee on same day," that "the
succeeding second and third notices was (sic) issued after
about weeks’ intervals (sic) the exact date of which was
noted on the envelope cover of the said letter" and further
"that the Registered Letter was return (sic) to the sender, it
being (sic) remain(ed) unclaimed for more than thirty days,
on June 22, 1971 under our Registry Bill No. 199 for Quezon
City line 1, page 1 as shown by our records." Annex 10 is the
affidavit of Alfredo E. Sugatan, the postman assigned to the
Port Area Post Office, Manila, entrusted specifically with the
delivery of "letters, notices of mails and other mail matters"
in the area "composed of Aduana and Arsobispo Streets,
Intramuros, City of Manila", stating in detail that in the
morning of May 19, 1971 he personally delivered at Room
212 Lopez Building, Aduana, Intramuros, Manila, to Miss
Tuliao, known to him to be the secretary of Atty. Alfonso
Felix, Jr., also personally known to him, by reason of the
performance of his duties for a "long period of time" in that
area, "the FIRST NOTICE on (sic) Registered Mail No. 13648"
(the same number referred to in Annex 11-A above) and that
he also delivered to her on May 31, 1971 and June 15, 1971,
the second and third notices corresponding to the same
registered letter, respectively. Annex 11 is the photostat
copy of the face and the dorsal portion of the envelope
addressed to "Atty. Alfonso Felix Jr., Rm. 212 Lopez Bldg.,
Intramuros, Manila", with notations such as: the number
13648 enclosed in an oblong figure; "Q-15378-D and Q-
15377-D" (which are precisely the numbers of the subject
cases); "Reg. Mail w/ return card" ; and "Republic of the
Philippines, Court of First Instance, Branch IV — Quezon City"
; and marked with rubber stamp data as follows: "Registered,
Page 10 of 25
Quezon City, Philippines, May 17, 1971", "Port Area, Manila,
Philippines received May 19, 1971" as well as "Second Notice,
5-30-71" and "Third Notice, 6-15-71."
Considered in the light of ordinary official practice and
experience, all the foregoing prove that mail matter related
to Civil Cases Nos. Q-15377-D and Q-15378-D of Branch IV
of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City duly addressed
to Atty. Alfonso Felix, Jr. was posted by registered mail, No.
13648, at the Quezon City Post Office on May 17, 1971 and
received by the Port Area Manila Post Office on May 19, 1971
and received back by the Quezon City Post Office on June 23,
1971, unclaimed after a second notice on May 30, 1971 and
a third notice on June 15, 1971. And since it has not been
shown that any other notices referring to the same cases had
proceeded from the trial court on or about the dates
mentioned, it stands to reason that what the envelope,
Annex 10, contained were precisely the judgments in
question, as attested by the affidavit, Annex 9-A, of the
mailing clerk of the respondent court who released the same.
This telling mass of official evidence stands unrebutted in the
record by any evidence legally worthy of consideration. Atty.
Felix, Jr. has not shown the Court any evidence which can
effectively dent the effect thereof other than his own
allegations "under oath" and the inconclusive and general
assertions in (1) the affidavit of Miss Cleofe V. Tuliao, "in
charge of the clerical work in the office including the issuance
and receipt of the correspondence" to the effect that "She
knows in (sic) of her own knowledge that the (sic) matter of
practice which has never been deviated from (is that) the
postman gives her the notice cards for registered mail, she
then brings these cards to Atty. Alfonso Felix, Jr., who signs
them and these cards are then given to Carlos de la Cruz, the
office messenger who collects them" and that "on no occasion
did she fail to present any of these notice cards to Atty.
Alfonso Felix, Jr. nor did she fail to deliver the cards thus
signed to Carlos de la Cruz for collection", Annex A of Annex
1 of Respondents’ Petition for dissolution of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction dated July 13, 1971 4 and (2) the
affidavit of said Carlos de la Cruz stating that "he knows that
it is the practice of the office which is never deviated from
that he receives the notice cards for registered mail from Miss
Cleofe Tuliao either in hand or by having them put on his
desk and he then picks up all such registered mail at the
proper post office" and that "on no occasion whatsoever that
he failed to collect registered mail covered by card notices."
(Annex B, id.). At a glance, anyone can see that these
assertions do not disprove the facts evidenced by the official
records just referred to. It is not an exaggeration to say that
the regularity of the actuations of the respondents in relation
to the declaration of default and rendition and execution of
the judgment here in question has been proven by such
convincing evidence as to relieve Us from any doubt about it.
Now, very little needs be said as regards the contention that
petitioners should have been notified of respondents’ motion
for execution. Prescinding already from the consideration
discussed above that the mere filing of petitioners’ motion to
set aside did not, because of the fatal defects of the same,
have the effect of entitling them to notice of all subsequent
proceedings, with the regularity of the rendition of the
impugned judgments as well as the fact of their having
become final and executory on June 23, 1971 5 being
indisputably borne by the record, the action taken by the trial
court on June 28, 1971, Annex 12 of the Answer, of granting
respondents’ motion for immediate execution assumed the
character of an order of execution of a final and executory
judgment, as so stated in the order itself, and has, therefore,
become a matter of right to the prevailing party and
ministerial on the part of the court to grant. In Pamintuan v.
Muñoz, 22 SCRA 1109, the Court
held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Regarding the first point, it is by now axiomatic that a
judgment on a compromise — like the one in the case at bar
— is at once final and Immediately executory. Also of the
same stature is the rule that once a judgment becomes final
and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as
a matter of right and the granting of execution becomes a
Page 11 of 25
ministerial duty of the court. Otherwise stated, once sought
by the prevailing party, execution of a final judgment will just
follow as a matter of course. Hence, the judgment debtor
need not be given advance notice of the application for
execution nor be afforded prior hearing. (Rule 39, Sec. 1,
Rules of Court; Luther v. Clay, 100 Ga. 236, 28 S. E. 46.)
This renders of little significance then the fact alleged by
petitioners that they received copy of respondent’s motion
for execution only on the afternoon of the day set for its
hearing."cralaw virtua1aw library
At this point, it should be noted that viewed strictly,
petitioners’ fundamental pose rests exclusively on a claim of
denial of due process in that they have been improperly
declared in default and that writs of execution were issued
against them without notice. Neither in the petition herein
nor even earlier in the motion to lift the order of default,
Annex D, or the petition for relief from judgment, Annex N,
filed with the court below, is there the adequate showing
required by the rules to make the Court inquire into the
possible existence of good and valid defenses on the part of
petitioners so as to justify granting them an opportunity to
prove them. To be sure, in the joint motion, Annex D, counsel
does make mention in paragraphs 4 and 9 thereof of "good
and valid reasons for the denial of plaintiff’s claim by
defendant company" (British) and "good and valid defenses"
of Cibeles. The trouble however is that to support the same,
counsel only makes reference to the joint answer, Annex B,
he had filed on behalf of the two petitioners but, neither the
motion itself nor the joint answer is supported by any
corresponding oath. The same observations may be made
with regard to the petition for relief, Annex N. And as to the
allegations on the point in question in the petition herein, all
that is stated in paragraph 9 thereof is as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(9) In the meantime, undersigned counsel had on behalf of
both petitioners filed a joint answer on April 22, 1971 which
was received by the Court on April 28, 1971. This answer
signed in behalf of both petitioners alleges meritorious
defenses. A copy of the Joint Answer is annexed to the
present pleading as Annex "B" hereof."cralaw virtua1aw
library
While the petition appears to be verified by Atty. Felix Jr., it
is obvious that said verification may not be deemed sufficient
for the purpose of attesting to the truth of the allegations of
fact in the joint answer, Annex B, not only because no direct
reference is made to them by counsel but also because said
counsel cannot pretend he has adequate personal knowledge
of said facts.
Fatal as such inadequacies are in the light of established
jurisprudence too well known to need being cited, if only to
satisfy Our curiousity which was aroused by the alarming
allegations of the petition, We have opted to look into the
purported defenses of the petitioners, on the basis of the
allegations pertinent thereto in the memoranda of the
parties, to which are annexed, as noted earlier above,
corresponding documents supposed to evidence the truth of
the facts stated in said allegations. After careful and mature
consideration and evaluation of their respective allegations,
We are convinced that petitioners’ alleged defenses cannot
stand close scrutiny.
Thus, counsel for petitioners opens his unsworn
memorandum with the following "preliminary statement"
:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In his memorandum of August 17, 1971 filed in
these certiorari proceedings, Moises Tapia avers that we
have resorted to these proceedings purely to cause further
delays for we have no real defense. This is not true. The truth
of the matter is that the evidence clearly shows Moises Tapia
to be guilty of arson and fraud. It was because of this
respondent Moises Tapia availed himself of every means,
even those frowned upon by law, in order to secure judgment
in his favor without going to trial. The evidence against
Moises Tapia was such that be had to avoid going to trial. In
support of this averment, we now present the following
Page 12 of 25
documents:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library we submit to this Supreme Court it is in the interest of justice
for trial proceedings to be had.
1. A certification from Lt. Col. Jose Fernandez, former chief
of the Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory showing that "The foregoing statements are addressed to the equity of this
there were gasoline residues in fourteen (14) different places Supreme Court. They have become particularly necessary
of the burned bodega and that one of these places was the since Moises Tapia in his memorandum filed on August 17,
steel cabinet presumably containing the company papers so 1971, before this Supreme Court has gone so far as to allege
that even these papers would burn. All these places had been that your petitioners are merely seeking to delay for they
saturated with gasoline. (Annex A). have no real defense. This Supreme Court may now judge for
itself." (Pp. 189-191, Record.)
2. A sketch of the bodega premises showing the widespread
distribution of the gasoline. (Annex B). and closes the same with "final remarks"
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
3. Twenty-two (22) photographs of the burned bodega.
(Annexes C, D, E, F, G, H and I). "Should this Supreme Court be puzzled as to why all these
unbecoming things were done, the answer is as we have said
4. Chromatographic specimens of the fourteen (14) gasoline in our opening statement that respondents could not afford
residues found in the fourteen (14) aforesaid areas. the luxury of a trial. A trial with a corresponding presentation
(Annexes J, K, L and M). of evidence, part of which is annexed to this present
memorandum as Annexes A to M would have shown
"Moises Tapia claims that on occasion of the fire suffered by respondent Tapia’s case to be baseless so that even a
his bodega, be suffered damages in the amount of five decision had been rendered in his favor in the trial court, it
hundred thousand (P500,000.00) pesos. We have annexed would certainly have been reversed by this Supreme Court.
twenty-two (22) photographs taken of his bodega after the It was necessary to declare your petitioners in default so that
fire. (Annexes C, D, E, F G, H and I) showing that his bodega your petitioners would not be around to present evidence, to
hardly contained anything. Please note that the alleged adjudge the case in secrecy so that your petitioners would
contents of this bodega were iron and steel spare parts which not learn of the judgment, and to execute in haste so that
do not burn. The conclusion to be drawn from all these your petitioners would find themselves deprived of their
photographs, chemical analysis and chromatographic property without due process of law and before they even
specimens is obvious. Moises Tapia having withdrawn his knew what was happening to them. Fortunately, this
merchandise from his bodega saturated fourteen (14) Supreme Court intervened. We rely on its continued
different places in his bodega with gasoline including his steel intervention" (Pp. 209-210, Record.)
cabinet so as to make sure that even his papers would burn
and then caused his bodega to be burned. The foregoing allegations are traversed squarely in
respondents’ Reply Memorandum as
"Under these circumstances, it was imperative for Moises follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Tapia to avoid having to go to trial. It was imperative for him
also, that we, your petitioners herein should not be allowed "To give their cause some semblance of cogency, which it
to present evidence of these acts. That is why Moises Tapia does not possess, petitioners would want this Honorable
exerted every effort to avoid trial proceeding and that is why Supreme Court to believe that they have a good defense. The
Page 13 of 25
alleged defense consists of a report made by one ex-Lt. Col.
Jose Fernandez and related papers attached as Annexes ‘A’
to ‘M’ to petitioners’ Memorandum. Petitioners’ purpose
cannot prosper, for the following reasons:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
1. The said Lt. Col. Jose Fernandez is a biased and unreliable
source. He was hired and paid by petitioners to conduct an
analysis on specimens he himself did not gather. Naturally
his findings had to tally with his employer’s theory and must
serve their purpose and interest. That was what he was paid
for.
2. The falsity and baselessness of said findings are irrefutably
proven by the fact that no criminal action was instituted
against respondent Tapia. Yet petitioners have the effrontery
to assert before this Honorable Supreme Court that "the
evidence clearly shows Moises Tapia to be guilty of arson and
fraud," for which reason he allegedly wanted to avoid going
to trial. If that was his intention he would not have filed the
cases against petitioners in the lower court.
As a matter of fact, in the two other cases filed by him against
two other insurance companies (Civil Case No. 15376 —
Multifield, et al v. Monarch Insurance Co., Inc., and Civil Case
No. 15379 — Philippine Home Insurance Corp.) for loss
arising from the same conflagration, and involving the same
evidence and proof of loss and with which petitioners have a
common adjuster and investigator, respondent Tapia has
gone to trial. There, the defendant insurance companies were
not declared in default because they answered on time.
If petitioners herein were declared in default, it was because
their counsel failed to observe the reglementary period for
answering and could not or failed to obtain relief from the
order of default in accordance with the Rules of Court. Now
an attempt is being made to shift the blame to respondent
Tapia by falsely attributing to him a desire to avoid going to
trial purportedly because the evidence will show he is guilty
of arson and fraud’. Such foul tactics are beneath the dignity
of the Bench and Bar.
The Worthless Findings of Mr. Jose Fernandez:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
3. The said findings were not even believed and accepted by
the petitioners’ commissioned and employed adjustment
company which, after a thorough and careful investigation of
respondent Tapia’s claim, had recommended that petitioners
better pay. The reports and findings of the petitioners’
adjuster are attached as Annexes "A" and "B" and form
integral parts of this reply. These reports completely refute
the petitioners’ allegations that respondent Tapia is guilty of
arson and that he fraudulently removed the contents from
his bodega before it was destroyed by fire.
Petitioners’ commissioned and employed investigator and
adjuster, the Manila Adjustment Company, in its report dated
February 26, 1971 (Annex "A") to the four insurance
companies, is very explicit in its findings and
recommendation that there is no basis to deny respondent
Tapia’s claim on the ground of fraud. The petitioners’ hired
investigator had examined respondent Tapia under the
"Examination-under Oath-Clause" of the policies and it was
satisfied that no such fraud exists.
The same Adjustment Company to which the much vaunted
report of the private chemist, Mr. Jose Fernandez, was
submitted, brushed aside the same and concluded, in its
report of March 11, 1971, that the said findings are not
sufficient basis for denying the claim of respondent Tapia.
Even this Honorable Supreme Court, in several cases, has
categorically ruled that the existence of traces of gasoline in
the burned premises does not necessarily indicate that there
was arson. (Ya Hun & Co. v. British Traders Ins. Co., L-5719-
25, May 18, 1954; Hua Chu Gan, v. Law Union & Rock Ins.
Co., Ltd., L-4611, Dec. 17, 1955.)
4. These reports conclusively prove that petitioners’ counsel
told a brazen lie when he claimed that there were no goods
Page 14 of 25
destroyed in the burned bodega. As said reports clearly
indicate, the items therein inventoried after the fire had a
total value of P367,311.00. Respondent Tapia was able to
prove, through the proofs of loss he submitted in the lower
court and which proofs were the same ones he submitted to
the herein petitioners, that he suffered loss and damage in
the amount of P446,781.60.
Incidentally, both Monarch Insurance and Philippine Home
Insurance, defendants in Civil Cases Nos. 15376 and 15379,
for collection of insurance proceeds in the amounts of
P100,000.00 and P50,000.00, respectively, have just
recently paid and satisfied respondent Tapia’s claim. In
paving respondent Tapia, these two defendants also acted
upon the findings of the Manila Adjustment Company that
there is neither fraud nor arson involved in the claim of
respondent Tapia. Dr. Alberto B. Guevarra, Jr., counsel for
Monarch Insurance Company and Philippine Home Insurance
Company, was in full accord with the Adjustment Company’s
findings and recommendation and he did not hesitate to
recommend to his clients full settlement of the claim of
respondent Tapia. (Photostat copies of joint motions to
dismiss and corresponding orders of respondent judge
granting said motions are attached as Annexes "C", "C-1"
and "D" - "D-1" and form integral parts of this reply).
5. Petitioners stand on quick-sand. Their counsel himself, Mr.
Felix, in his letter to his clients, marked as Annex "7" of
respondents’ Answer to the instant petition, stated that their
case is "far from strong." Hence, petitioners’ case is not even
strong. How can he say now that they have a good defense?
And if the evidence did show that respondent Tapia was guilty
of arson and fraud, why does Mr. Felix consider petitioners’
case as `far from strong?’ 6 insured persons making claims on their policies are more or
"6. This contention should have been interposed in the lower
court through the motion to lift the order of default, by means
of affidavits of merits. Had this been done, respondents could
have opposed the same with counter affidavits. That would
have been the proper procedure. Apparently, petitioners’
counsel does not believe in the Rules of Court. He would
instead burden this Honorable Supreme Court with the task
of hearing and deciding a question which was not even raised
in his petition. Respondents submit that this particular point
has been raised by petitioners rather too late. In one case,
where a similar belated effort was attempted, this Honorable
Supreme Court made the following sagacious
ruling:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘We believe that this is a last minute attempt to defend a
losing case. If defendants really had any valid defense, this
should have been brought at the first opportunity, that is, by
the first motion to set aside the order of default.’ (Ong Peng
v. Custodio, L-14911, March 25, 1961)." (Pp. 227-232,
Record.)
Anyone would see from a simple comparison of the foregoing
conflicting allegations of the parties in the light of their
respective supporting affidavits and documents that it is
rather petitioners, not Tapia, who may have more reason to
avoid a full-blown trial, contrary to the charge made by Atty.
Felix Jr. in all his papers filed with this Tribunal and the court
below. The attorney himself must have felt the subject cases
of his clients to be weak when he advised them in his letter,
Annex 7 of respondents’ answer, that the same are "far from
being strong." At the time he wrote that letter, he was well
aware of the various reports of his clients’ adjusters
minimizing the significance of the supposed expert opinion of
Col. Fernandez regarding the gasoline traces found in Tapia’s
premises after the fire and referring to them as being
innocuously insufficient to indicate arson. The attorney also
knew that said adjusters, the ones trusted by insurance
companies to give them reliable advice on whether or not
less guilty of fraud and other improper schemes to collect
unjustified claims, had investigated Tapia’s claims thoroughly
and had found no well-grounded reason to warrant non-
payment, and that, in fact, they had recommended out of
court settlement. There is no showing at all that Tapia has
ever been criminally charged with arson. On the contrary, the
Page 15 of 25
record reveals that two other insurance companies serviced
by the same adjusting company as that of petitioners have
already compromised their cases with Tapia without the
latter having them declared in default. In other words, in
these cases against the other two companies, Tapia was
prepared to proceed to trial, and if he had secured default
judgments against petitioners, the cause was none other
than counsel’s omissions already discussed earlier in this
opinion.
We reiterate that these circumstances make it unnecessary
for Us to adhere to the technical procedure of returning these
cases to the trial court for further proceedings and final
determination of the issue of whether or not petitioners’
petition for relief from judgment should be granted. We find
all the proceedings leading to the rendition of the impugned
judgments and to the issuance of all the writs of execution
thereunder to have been regular and legal. And as to whether
or not petitioners have been able to make the requisite
showing that they have good and valid defenses, We likewise
hold that they have failed to do so. It would be idle ceremony
to still require respondent court to take further action on the
petition for relief, Annex N. The order of respondent judge of
July 7, 1971, giving due course to said petition has in effect
become functus officio. We are persuaded that the respective
situations of the parties can no longer be possibly altered,
should We prolong this judicial battle in any way.
What has been said so far should suffice to settle once and
for all the litigation between petitioners and private
respondents. But there is another aspect of these cases
which cannot be left unresolved, since it affects matters
related to the integrity of judicial proceedings and the
attitude and conduct displayed by counsel for petitioners in
connection therewith. The Court cannot begrudge any lawyer
of his right to be assiduous and zealous, even tenacious, in
the prosecution or defense of the cause of his client. But
when, as in these cases, counsel makes charges against the
actuations of a judge and the personnel of his court directly
assailing their personal integrity as well as that of the
proceedings by alleging irregularities implying bad faith and
outright misfeasance, he should be prepared to substantiate
the same. This Court will be the last to overlook, much less
to tolerate the kind of misconduct alleged by counsel in his
instant petition. This is not to say, however, that trial judges
may be maligned at random with accusations that cannot be
proven. Anyone who deliberately moves this Court to act on
such kind of representations may do so only at his peril of
being called to account therefor, should his charges turn out
to be a mere attempt to hide his own inadequacies and
omissions in order to escape criticism of his clients.
We hold that Atty. Felix Jr.’s implied accusation that
respondent judge connived with his co-respondents to make
it appear that proper judgments by default had been
regularly rendered against petitioners on April 28, 1971,
when in truth there was no such judgments, has not been
proven by him. On the contrary, the official records and the
affidavits of the employees of the trial court as well as those
of the Bureau of Posts belie conclusively counsel’s
allegations, and the mere fact that he did not see said
judgments and other pertinent 6pleadings and papers in the
corresponding expedientes on May 24, 1971, assuming the
same to be true, cannot disprove their existence, particularly,
when it is considered that counsel has never pretended that
he had actually made inquiries and asked the proper
personnel of the court about them, which he would naturally
have done, considering that before then he had filed motions
for extension followed by the joint answer. It is particularly
unfortunate that counsel made positive allegations in his
petition in the instant cases purporting to show that his
clients have good and valid defenses and that respondent
Tapia’s insurance claim was fraudulent and maliciously
exaggerated, when, as may be readily seen from the
communications of the petitioners’ own adjusting company,
Annexes A and B of respondents’ reply memorandum, of
which communications counsel must have been, in the
ordinary course of client and lawyer relationship, duly
informed, and from counsel’s own letter to his client, Annex
7 of respondent’s answer, it is more than obvious that he
Page 16 of 25
knew the truth to be otherwise. It is indeed regrettable that
on the basis of such unjustified allegations, the Court had
been induced to issue a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction counter-manding the writ of execution issued by
the court below, thereby causing undue prejudice to all
parties concerned. Such lack of candor bordering on
conscious misstatements of fact which has actually misled
the Court calls for at least an appropriate explanation from
counsel.
IN VIEW OF ALL, THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
rendered dismissing the petition in these cases and setting
aside the writ of preliminary injunction issued on July 8,
1971, with the consequence that the executions enjoined
thereby may now proceed in accordance with law and the
rules, with costs against petitioner. And for the reasons
above-stated, Atty. Alfonso Felix, Jr. is hereby ordered to
show cause within ten (10) days from notice hereof why no
administrative action should be taken against him as a
member of the Philippine Bar.
Fernando (Chairman) and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Antonio, J., in the result.
Fernandez, J., concurs and states that he is not related to
Col. Jose Fernandez.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. L-33720-21. May 21, 1975.]
THE PHILIPPINE BRITISH CO., INC. and THE CIBELES
INSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. THE HON.
WALFRIDO DE LOS ANGELES in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, Branch IV of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City, THE HON. VICENTE S. OCOL
in his capacity as Clerk of Court of First Instance of
Quezon City and Ex-Oficio Sheriff of Quezon City and
MULTIFIELD ENTERPRISES and MOISES M.
TAPIA, Respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Required to show cause why he should not be dealt with
administratively in consequence of representations made by
him on the merits of his clients’ cases and on the actuations
of the trial judge and the court personnel in the instant cases,
Felix, Jr. submitted his Compliance and Explanation
expressing his regrets.
The Court, taking into consideration that this is the first time
that counsel failed to comply with his duty to be strictly
candid with the courts and to accord good faith thereto,
resolved to simply remind counsel to be more careful
henceforth in his dealing with the courts.
SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; DISCIPLINE; COUNSEL REMINDED
TO BE MORE CAREFUL IN DEALING WITH THE COURTS. —
Petitioners’ counsel who be failed to comply with his duty to
be strictly candid with the court and to accord good faith
thereto was simply reminded to be more careful in his future
dealings with the courts, as this is the first occasion that he
had allowed his noted zeal in the protection of the interest of
his clients to obscure compliance with such duty, and he had
expressed his regrets for having done so.
RESOLUTION
BARREDO, J.:
Submitted for the consideration of the Court is the
Compliance and Explanation filed by Atty. Alfonso Felix, Jr.
Page 17 of 25
pursuant to the dispositive portion of the decision in these
cases requiring said counsel to show cause why he should
not be dealt with administratively in consequence of
representations made by him in connection with the merits
of the cases of his client and with the actuations of the trial
judge and the personnel of his court in these cases.

After going over the said explanation, the Court notes that
counsel has not been able to make it clear why there was
less than candor to the court in his allegations regarding the
merits of his clients’ cases, when it appears rather evident
that he was in possession of adverse information or
knowledge in regard thereto. Besides, the contention of
counsel that he has not actually received the decision of the
trial court, assuming it is factually true, is no warrant for his
insistence that it did not exist when the trial judge ordered
execution thereof.

Considering, however, that counsel has expressed his regrets

and this is the first occasion that he has allowed his noted
zeal in the protection of the interests of his clients to obscure
his compliance with the duty to be strictly candid with the
courts and to accord good faith thereto unless he has clearly
demonstrable cause to act otherwise, the Court resolved to
simply REMIND counsel to be more careful henceforth in his
dealings with the courts.

Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion,

Jr., JJ., concur.

Page 18 of 25
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26679 April 30, 1969
JOAQUIN UYPUANCO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION, ET
AL., respondents-appellees.
Court; Jurisdiction; Where the sum in the case at bar is less
than P4,000, not more than P5,000.—Appellant recoursed on
certiorari and prohibition to the Court of First Instance of
Manila, urging that the complaint of appellee Bank had
claimed, in addition to the basic debt of P4,500.00, ten
percent due in case the collection was done through counsel
(paragraph 2) and “a further liability” of 10% of the whole
amount due (paragraph 4); that all these amounts put
together totalled more than P5,000.00 (excluding interest
and costs), which was the upper limit of the municipal court’s
jurisdiction under Republic Act 2613, then the law in force.
The court of first instance rejected the petition, asserting that
the complaint only demanded collection of P4,500.00, plus
10% attorney’s fees, or P4,950.00, exclusive of interest and
costs, and said amount was within the jurisdiction of the
inferior court. Not content, Appellant appealed to the Court
of Appeals, and the latter certified the case to the Supreme
Court. The present appeal is absolutely devoid of merit. A
mere reading of the essential allegations of the complaint,
transcribed at the beginning of this opinion, reveals that
paragraph 2 thereof avers the sums due under the terms of
the promissory note, while paragraphs 3 and 4 allege the
actual amounts due by reason of the defendants’ failure to
comply with their obligation. The claim under paragraphs 3
and 4 is the same one averred under paragraph 2, to wit:
P4,500.00, as balance due on the principal, and 10% thereof
as attorney’s fees, or a total of P4,950.00, as correctly
declared by the court of first instance. The ten per centum
alleged in paragraph 4 of the complaint is the same one
referred to in paragraph 2, and not an additional amount, as
contended by appellant.
Appeal; Treble costs; Appellant’s lawyer liable when appeal
is frivolous.—The circumstances surrounding ,the present
litigation definitely prove that the appeal is frivolous and a
plain trick to delay payment and prolong litigation
unnecessarily. Such attitude deserves severe condemnation,
wasting, as it does, the time that the courts could well devote
to meritorious cases. It is but proper therefore that
appellant’s counsel shall pay treble costs in all instances.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. Vasquez, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ramon V. Sison for petitioner-appellant.
Tañada, Carreon & Tañada for respondents-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., Acting C.J.:
Appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals as
involving a question of jurisdiction of an inferior court
(Judiciary Act, section 17).
The Equitable Banking Corporation, a domestic bank, had
sued Joaquin Uypuanco, Mariano Mabasa, and the Traders
Insurance and Surety Co. in the Municipal Court of Manila. In
the complaint it was alleged:
2. That on June 5, 1957, the defendants obtained by
way of loan from the plaintiff the sum of FIVE
THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency,
promising jointly and severally to pay the same Ninety
(90) days after date, with interest thereon at ten
Page 19 of 25
 (10%) per centum per annum, of which amount there
still remains an outstanding balance of FOUR
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P4,500.00) PESOS
TOGETHER WITH TEN (10%) per centum of the
amount due, in case the collection of said
indebtedness is made by or through an attorney-at-
law, as set forth in the promissory note, executed by
said defendants on said date, a true copy of which is
hereto attached and made as an integral part hereof
as Annex "A".
3. That the above-mentioned sum of P4,500.00 due
and payable to plaintiff on the promissory note, Annex
"A", is now long overdue and the defendants have
failed and refused, and still fail and refuse to pay the
same, or any portion thereof, despite repeated
demands upon them to do so;
4. That because of defendant's failure and refusal to
satisfy plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable
claim, plaintiff was compelled to retain the services of
the undersigned counsel to enforce the collection of
the above-said obligation and said defendants have
therefore incurred a further liability of ten (10) per
centum of the whole amount due and payable to the
plaintiff on the promissory note, Annex "A", for
attorney's fees, as stipulated therein;
Prayer was for judgment against defendants in the sum of
P4,500.00, with interest at 10% per annum; plus interest on
the accrued interest; and 10% of the entire amount payable
by way of attorney's fees.
The municipal court heard the plaintiff ex parte because
defendants failed to appear at the hearing and decided in
favor of the plaintiff. The latter then moved for execution. At
the hearing of the motion, Joaquin Uypuanco opposed the
issuance of the writ on the ground that the municipal court
had no jurisdiction over the case. The opposition was
overruled, and a writ of execution was issued.
Uypuanco recoursed on certiorari and prohibition to the
Court of First Instance of Manila, urging that the complaint
had claimed, in addition to the basic debt of P4,500.00, ten
per cent due in case the collection was done through counsel
(paragraph 2) and "a further liability" of 10% of the whole
amount due (paragraph 4); that all these amounts put
together totalled more than P5,000.00 (excluding interest
and costs), which was the upper limit of the municipal court's
jurisdiction under Republic Act 2613, then the law in force.
The court of first instance rejected the petition, asserting that
the complaint only demand connection of P4,500.00, plus
10% attorney's fees, or P4,950.00, exclusive of interest and
costs, and said amount was within the jurisdiction of the
inferior court. Not content, Uypuanco appealed to the Court
of Appeals, and the latter certified the case to this Supreme
Court.
The appeal is absolutely devoid of merit. A mere reading of
the essential allegations of the complaint, transcribed at the
beginning of this opinion, reveals that paragraph 2 thereof
avers the sums due under the terms of the promissory note,
while paragraphs 3 and 4 allege the actual amounts due by
reason of the defendants' failure to comply with their
obligation. The claim under paragraphs 3 and 4 is the same
one averred under paragraph 2, to wit: P4,500.00, as
balance due on the principal, and 10% thereof as attorney's
fees, or a total of P4,950.00, as correctly declared by the
court of first instance. The ten per centum alleged in
paragraph 4 of the complaint is the same one referred to in
paragraph 2, and not an additional amount, as contended by
appellant.lawphi1.nêt
This party lays much emphasis on the expression "incurred
a further liability of ten (10) per centum of the whole amount
due and payable"; but this "further liability" must be taken
together with the averment of paragraph a of the same
complaint, that there is "P4,500.00 due and payable to
plaintiff on the promissory note". That is to say, that besides
the principal of P4,500.00 defendants owed an additional
Page 20 of 25
("further") ten per cent for attorney's fees. By studiously
omitting all reference to paragraph 3, appellant and his
counsel would make it appear that paragraph 4 demanded
10% over and above the ten per cent averred in paragraph
2, which is not true.

The circumstances surrounding this litigation definitely prove

that appeal is frivolous and a plain trick to delay payment
and prolong litigation unnecessarily. Such attitude deserves
severe condemnation, wasting, as it does, the time that the
courts could well devote to meritorious cases.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, and

appellant's counsel shall pay treble costs in all instances. Let
this decision be noted in the personal record of the attorney
for appellant in this Court for future reference. So ordered.

Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando and Barredo,

JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Castro, J., are on leave.
Capistrano and Teehankee, JJ., took no part.

Page 21 of 25
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22304 July 30, 1968
SAMAR MINING CO., INC., petitioner-appellant,
vs.
FRANCISCO P. ARNADO, POMPEYO V. TAN and
RUFINO ABUYEN, respondents-appellees.
Workmen's Compensation Act; Jurisdiction of regional office
of Departmcnt of Labor; Hearing officer; When regional
administrator may enter an aicard.—A regional office of the
Department of Labor has original jurisdiction to hear and
determine claims for compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act. If a claim is controverted, it shall be heard
and decided only by a regularly appointed hearing officer or
any other employee duly designated by the Regional
Administrator to act as hearing officer. But when the claim is
uncontroverted and there is no necessity of requiring the
claimant to present further evidence, the Regional
Administrator may enter an award or deny the claim.
Remedial law; Courts; Power to reopen a case; Its
restriction.—Trial courts have discretionary power to reopen
a case either before or after rendition of judgment, for the
introduction of additional evidence, so as to dispel doubts on
material points. Such power is controlled by no other rule
than that of the paramount interest of justice, and its
exercise will not be reviewed on appeal in the absence of
clear abuse thereof (Capellania of Tambobong v. Antonio, 8
Phil. G83; Soriano v. Aquino, 31 Phil. 176; etc.).
Legal ethics; Conduct of counsel in appealing a case for
purpose of delay; Duty to assist in the administration of
justice.—Where counsel interposed an appeal in behalf of his
client manifestly for the purpose of delay, a policy "often
resorted to as a means of draining the resources of the
poorer party" and "of compelling it to submit out of sheer
exhaustion," such conduct of counsel is hardly compatible
with the duty of the Bar to assist in the administration of
justice, not to obstruct or defeat the same.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
Mendoza, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Benedicto G. Arcinas for petitioner-appellant.
Villavieja & Zapanta, for respondents-appellees.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
dismissing this case, with costs against the petitioner, and
lifting the writ of preliminary injunction therein issued.
Acting upon a claim for compensation, under Act No. 3428,
filed by Rufino Abuyen, on June 18, 1956, for a disease
allegedly contracted in the course of his employment, as
foreman of the Samar Mining Co., Inc. — hereinafter referred
to as the petitioner — and docketed as WC Case No. R-VI-
217, decision was rendered, on October 14, 1958, by
Pompeyo V. Tan — an officer of Regional Office No. VI of the
Department of Labor — sentencing petitioner herein:
1. To provide continued medical treatment and
hospitalization to the claimant in accordance with
Section 13 of the Act until his tuberculosis is cured or
arrested;
Page 22 of 25
 2. To pay to the claimant a lump sum of TWO
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY THREE
(P2,523.00) PESOS and a weekly compensation of
P17.40 from date hereof until he is cured or his
pulmonary tuberculosis is arrested as certified by a
competent physician but the total compensation
should not exceed P4,000.00; payment to be made,
thru the Regional Office No. VI of the Department of
Labor;
3. To pay to the workmen's compensation fund the
amount of P26.00 as administrative costs pursuant to
Section of 55 of Act 3428, as amended.
A reconsideration of said decision having been denied, on
March 24, 1960, petitioner commenced Civil Case No. 42836
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, for a writ of certiorari
and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, against
Francisco P. Arnado, as Regional Administrator of said office,
Pompeyo V. Tan, as the writer of said decision, and claimant
Abuyen, upon the ground that Tan had acted without
jurisdiction in hearing said claim and rendering decision
thereon, and that Arnado had committed a grave abuse of
discretion in sustaining and upholding said acts of Tan.
Sustaining respondents' objection, upon the ground of wrong
venue, the case was, however, dismissed by said court, the
decision of which was, on June 30, 1961, affirmed by Us.
On July 21, 1961, petitioner commenced, against the same
respondents in said Case No. 42836, the present action
for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, in
the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Upon the filing of the
case, said court issued a restraining order, which was, later,
followed by a writ of preliminary injunction, upon the filing
and approval of the requisite bond. After appropriate
proceedings, said court subsequently rendered the decision
mentioned in the opening paragraph hereof, dismissing the
petition, upon the ground that respondent Tan had authority
to hear and pass upon the aforementioned claim of Abuyen,
and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction issued
meanwhile. Hence, this appeal by petitioner herein, who
insists: 1) that, being merely a labor attorney, respondent
Tan had no authority to make the award complained of; 2)
that as Regional Administrator, respondent Arnado could not
delegate said authority to respondent Tan; and 3) that no
such delegation of authority to him has been made.
It is not disputed that respondent Tan is a labor attorney,
assigned to Regional Office No. VI of the Department of
Labor, and that, as such, he has no authority to hear claims
for compensation under Act No. 3428 and to render decisions
thereon. Based, however, upon Plan No. 20-A, submitted to
the President of the Philippines by the Government Survey
and Reorganization Commission, and Executive Order No.
218, dated December 10, 1956, particularly section 32
thereof 1 as well as on Rule 21, section 1, of the Rules of
Procedure promulgated by the Workmen's Compensation
Commission, 2 pursuant to section 12, of Article III of said
Plan No. 20-A, and section 45 of Act No. 3428, as amended
by Republic Act No. 772,3 we have held, as early as August
21, 1961 —
... that a regional office of the Department of Labor
has original jurisdiction to hear and determine claims
for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation
Act. If a claim is controverted, it shall be heard and
decided only by a regularly appointed hearing
officer or any other employee duly designated by the
Regional Administrator to act as hearing officer. But
when the claim is uncontroverted and there is no
necessity of requiring the claimant to present further
evidence, the Regional Administrator may enter an
award or deny the claim. Furthermore, an employer is
duty bound to controvert a claim within 14 days from
the date of the accident or illness of the laborer or
within 10 days after he or his representative first
acquired knowledge of the said accident or sickness.
Failure to do so within the period provided will result
in the renunciation of his right to controvert the claim.
But an employer may reinstate his right to controvert
Page 23 of 25
 the claim by filing a petition under oath specifying the
reasons for his failure to do so. 4 .
We have repeatedly reiterated this view,5 which is now well
settled. In the case at bar, respondents-appellees contend
and have introduced evidence to the effect that Regional
Administrator Arnado had — by virtue of an office order,
dated November 29, 1957, and marked as Exhibit 1 —
designated respondent Tan — who is a duly qualified Member
of the Philippine Bar — "as Hearing Officer in the case
of Rufino Abuyen vs. Samar Mining Co., WCC Case No. 44238
(R-VI-217)." As a consequence, the only issue for
determination is whether or not there has been such
designation in his favor.
Petitioner assails the evidence thereon upon the theory:
1) that the lower court erred in reopening the case, after its
submission for decision, for the reception of said evidence;
and 2) that the same is insufficient to establish the
designation aforementioned.
As regards the first alleged error, it appears that petitioner
had asked the lower court to render judgment on the
pleadings; that, thereafter, both parties submitted their
respective memoranda; that, in order to bolster up their
contention, respondents attached to their Memorandum, as
Annex 1, the alleged designation of respondent Tan by
Regional Administrator Arnado that petitioner, however,
objected to the consideration of said Annex 1; that,
accordingly, the lower court deemed it best to reopen the
case for the introduction of additional evidence and the
determination of the admissibility in evidence of said Annex
1; and that the same was identified, marked and admitted as
Exhibit 1 at the rehearing.
In this connection, it should be noted that trial courts have
discretionary power to reopen a case either before or after
rendition of judgment, for the introduction of additional
evidence, so as to dispel doubts on material points. Such
power is controlled by no other rule than that of the
paramount interest of justice, and its exercise will not be
reviewed on appeal in the absence of clear abuse thereof.6 No
such abuse has been committed in the case at bar. On the
contrary, the exercise of said power by his Honor, the trial
Judge, served to promote the interest of justice, by clarifying
the question whether or not respondent Tan had been given
the aforementioned designation.
As a matter of fact, said Exhibit 1 merely confirmed the
allegation in respondents' answer to the effect that
respondent Tan had acted "not as Labor Attorney but as
Hearing Officer designated pursuant to the authority granted
him by the previous Regional Labor Administrator to try and
hear the merits of the compensation case ... WCC Case No.
R-VI-217, Rufino Abuyen vs. Samar Mining Co., Inc."
Moreover, pursuant to the very cases cited by petitioner,7 the
truth of this allegation had been deemed impliedly admitted
by the petitioner, when it submitted the case for judgment
on the pleadings.8
Independently of the foregoing, the second alleged error is
obviously devoid of merit, the signature of Regional
Administrator Arnado on said Exhibit 1 having been identified
by one of his subordinates, who, as such, as familiar
therewith.
One other point must be stressed. The illness on which
Abuyen's claim is based took place in 1956. Yet, — through
the present case, and Civil Case No. 42836 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila — petitioner has succeeded in
prolonging the litigation, for the compensation involved
therein, for twelve (12) years. What is more, petitioner's
contention was based upon a theory that had been rejected
by this Court as early as August, 1961. Then again, the
compensability of Abuyen's disability had never been
questioned by petitioner herein. Hence, it is manifest that the
purpose of this case, like the previous one, has been merely
to delay, a policy "Often resorted to" — in the language of
Mr. Justice Reyes (J.B.L.) — "as a means of draining the
Page 24 of 25
resources of the poorer party" — in this case
a tuberculosis patient — "and of compelling it to submit out
of sheer exhaustion."9 Thus, the conduct of petitioner's
counsel is hardly compatible with the duty of the Bar
to assist in the Administration of Justice, not to obstruct or
defeat the same.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,

with treble costs, jointly and severally, against the petitioner
and its counsel, Attorney Benedicto G. Arcinas and let
certified copy of this decision be attached to the personal
record of the latter, as a Member of the Bar. It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles

and Fernando JJ., concur.
Castro, J., took no part.

Page 25 of 25