G.R. No.

L-38429 June 30, 1988

CARLOS BALACUIT, LAMBERTO TAN and SERGIO YU CARCEL, petitioners-appellants,

vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY, Branch 11, and the CITY OF
BUTUAN, respondents-appellees.

Romeo B. Sanchez, Eduardo Deza Mercado and Wilfred D. Asis for petitioners.

The City Legal Officer for respondents-appeliees.

GANCAYCO, J.:

At issue in the petition for review before Us is the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April
21, 1969, the title and text of which are reproduced below:

ORDINANCE--640

ORDINANCE PENALIZING ANY PERSON, GROUP OF PERSONS, ENTITY OR CORPORATION

ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS OF SELLING ADMISSION TICKETS TO ANY MOVIE OR OTHER
PUBLIC EXHIBITIONS, GAMES, CONTESTS OR OTHER PERFORMANCES TO REQUIRE
CHILDREN BETWEEN SEVEN (7) AND TWELVE (12) YEARS OF AGE TO PAY FULL PAYMENT
FOR TICKETS INTENDED FOR ADULTS BUT SHOULD CHARGE ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE
SAID TICKET

xxx xxx xxx

Be it ordained by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan in session assembled, that:

SECTION 1—It shall be unlawful for any person, group of persons, entity, or corporation engaged in
the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests, or
other performances to require children between seven (7) and twelve (12) years of age to pay full
payment for admission tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the value of the
said tickets.

SECTION 2—Any person violating the provisions of this Ordinance shall upon conviction be
punished by a fine of not less than TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P200.00) but not more than SIX
HUNDRED PESOS (P600.00) or an imprisonment of not less than TWO (2) MONTHS or not more
than SIX (6) MONTHS or both such firm and imprisonment in the discretion of the Court.

If the violator be a firm or corporation the penalty shall be imposed upon the Manager, Agent or
Representative of such firm or corporation.

SECTION 3—This ordinance shall take effect upon its approval.

Petitioners are Carlos Balacuit Lamberto Tan, and Sergio Yu Carcel managers of the Maya and Dalisay Theaters,
the Crown Theater, and the Diamond Theater, respectively. Aggrieved by the effect of Ordinance No. 640, they filed
a complaint before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City docketed as Special Civil Case
No. 237 on June 30, 1969 praying, inter alia, that the subject ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore,
void and unenforceable. 1

Upon motion of the petitioners, 2 a temporary restraining order was issued on July 14, 1969 by the court a quo
enjoining the respondent City of Butuan and its officials from enforcing Ordinance No. 640. 3 On July 29, 1969,
respondents filed their answer sustaining the validity of the ordinance.4
On January 30, 1973, the litigants filed their stipulation of facts. 5 On June 4, 1973, the respondent court rendered its
decision, 6 the dispositive part of which reads:

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby adjudges in favor of the respondents
and against the petitioners, as follows:

1. Declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of Butuan constitutional and valid: Provided, however,
that the fine for a single offense shall not exceed TWO HUNDRED PESOS, as prescribed in the
aforequoted Section 15 (nn) of Rep. Act No. 523;

2. Dissolving the restraining order issued by this Court; and;

3. Dismissing the complaint, with costs against the petitioners.

4. SO ORDERED. 7

Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration 8 of the decision of the court a quo which was denied in a resolution
of the said court dated November 10, 1973.9

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an
invalid exercise of police power.

Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is not within the power of' the Municipal Board to enact as provided for
in Section 15(n) of Republic Act No. 523, the Charter of the City of Butuan, which states:

Sec. 15. General powers and duties of the Board — Except as otherwise provided by law, and
subject to the conditions and limitations thereof, the Municipal Board shall have the following
legislative powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(n) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following; . . . theaters, theatrical
performances, cinematographs, public exhibitions and all other performances and places of
amusements ...

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent City of Butuan, on the other hand, attempts to justify the enactment of the ordinance by invoking the
general welfare clause embodied in Section 15 (nn) of the cited law, which provides:

(nn) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the
furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort,
convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act, and to fix
the penalties for the violation of the ordinances, which shall not exceed a two hundred peso fine or
six months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment, for a single offense.

We can see from the aforecited Section 15(n) that the power to regulate and fix the amount of license fees for
theaters, theatrical performances, cinematographs, public exhibitions and other places of amusement has been
expressly granted to the City of Butuan under its charter. But the question which needs to be resolved is this: does
this power to regulate include the authority to interfere in the fixing of prices of admission to these places of
exhibition and amusement whether under its general grant of power or under the general welfare clause as invoked
by the City?
This is the first time this Court is confronted with the question of direct interference by the local government with the
operation of theaters, cinematographs and the like to the extent of fixing the prices of admission to these places.
Previous decisions of this Court involved the power to impose license fees upon businesses of this nature as a
corollary to the power of the local government to regulate them. Ordinances which required moviehouses or theaters
to increase the price of their admission tickets supposedly to cover the license fees have been held to be invalid for
these impositions were considered as not merely license fees but taxes for purposes of revenue and not regulation
which the cities have no power to exact, 10 unless expressly granted by its charter. 11

Applying the ruling in Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, 12 where the word "regulate" was interpreted to include the power
to control, to govern and to restrain, it would seem that under its power to regulate places of exhibitions and
amusement, the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan could make proper police regulations as to the mode in which
the business shall be exercised.

While in a New York case, 13 an ordinance which regulates the business of selling admission tickets to public
exhibitions or performances by virtue of the power of cities under the General City Law "to maintain order, enforce
the laws, protect property and preserve and care for the safety, health, comfort and general welfare of the
inhabitants of the city and visitors thereto; and for any of said purposes, to regulate and license occupations" was
considered not to be within the scope of any duty or power implied in the charter. It was held therein that the power
of regulation of public exhibitions and places of amusement within the city granted by the charter does not carry with
it any authority to interfere with the price of admission to such places or the resale of tickets or tokens of admission.

In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of public
exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated police power by the local
government. 14 Thus, in People v. Chan, 15 an ordinance of the City of Manila prohibiting first run cinematographs
from selling tickets beyond their seating capacity was upheld as constitutional for being a valid exercise of police
power. Still in another case, 16 the validity of an ordinance of the City of Bacolod prohibiting admission of two or more
persons in moviehouses and other amusement places with the use of only one ticket was sustained as a valid
regulatory police measure not only in the interest of preventing fraud in so far as municipal taxes are concerned but
also in accordance with public health, public safety, and the general welfare.

The City of Butuan, apparently realizing that it has no authority to enact the ordinance in question under its power to
regulate embodied in Section 15(n), now invokes the police power as delegated to it under the general welfare
clause to justify the enactment of said ordinance.

To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public generally requires an
interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 17 The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the
public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful
occupations. In other words, the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power is not final or
conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts. 18

Petitioners maintain that Ordinance No. 640 violates the due process clause of the Constitution for being
oppressive, unfair, unjust, confiscatory, and an undue restraint of trade, and violative of the right of persons to enter
into contracts, considering that the theater owners are bound under a contract with the film owners for just
admission prices for general admission, balcony and lodge.

In Homeowners' Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Municipal Board of the City of Manila, 19 this Court held:

The authority of municipal corporations to regulate is essentially police power, Inasmuch as the
same generally entails a curtailment of the liberty, the rights and/or the property of persons, which
are protected and even guaranteed by the Constitution, the exercise of police power is necessarily
subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the regard, the respect and the
obedience due to the prescriptions of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the
Constitution of Liberty, otherwise known as the Bill of Rights — the police power measure must be
reasonable. In other words, individual rights may be adversely affected by the exercise of police
power to the extent only — and only to the extent--that may be fairly required by the legitimate
demands of public interest or public welfare.
What is the reason behind the enactment of Ordinance No. 640?

A reading of the minutes of the regular session of the Municipal Board when the ordinance in question was passed
shows that a certain Councilor Calo, the proponent of the measure, had taken into account the complaints of parents
that for them to pay the full price of admission for their children is too financially burdensome.

The trial court advances the view that "even if the subject ordinance does not spell out its raison d'etre in all
probability the respondents were impelled by the awareness that children are entitled to share in the joys of their
elders, but that considering that, apart from size, children between the ages of seven and twelve cannot fully grasp
the nuance of movies or other public exhibitions, games, contests or other performances, the admission prices with
respect to them ought to be reduced. 19a

We must bear in mind that there must be public necessity which demands the adoption of proper measures to
secure the ends sought to be attained by the enactment of the ordinance, and the large discretion is necessarily
vested in the legislative authority to determine not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures
are necessary for the protection of such interests. 20 The methods or means used to protect the public health,
morals, safety or welfare, must have some relation to the end in view, for under the guise of the police power,
personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitralily invaded by the
legislative department. 21

We agree with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public interest. The police power
legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between
purposes and means.22 The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of
parents who have to shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their children, as they would for
themselves, A reduction in the price of admission would mean corresponding savings for the parents; however, the
petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these savings. The ordinance does not only make the petitioners
suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise penalizes them for failure to comply with it. Furthermore, as petitioners
point out, there will be difficulty in its implementation because as already experienced by petitioners since the
effectivity of the ordinance, children over 12 years of age tried to pass off their age as below 12 years in order to
avail of the benefit of the ordinance. The ordinance does not provide a safeguard against this undesirable practice
and as such, the respondent City of Butuan now suggests that birth certificates be exhibited by movie house patrons
to prove the age of children. This is, however, not at all practicable. We can see that the ordinance is clearly
unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business of petitioners. Moreover, there is no discernible relation
between the ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety, morals and the general welfare.

Respondent City of Butuan claims that it was impelled to protect the youth from the pernicious practice of movie
operators and other public exhibitions promoters or the like of demanding equal price for their admission tickets
along with the adults. This practice is allegedly repugnant and unconscionable to the interest of the City in the
furtherance of the prosperity, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and the general well-being of its inhabitants.

There is nothing pernicious in demanding equal price for both children and adults. The petitioners are merely
conducting their legitimate businesses. The object of every business entrepreneur is to make a profit out of his
venture. There is nothing immoral or injurious in charging the same price for both children and adults. In fact, no
person is under compulsion to purchase a ticket. It is a totally voluntary act on the part of the purchaser if he buys a
ticket to such performances.

Respondent City of Butuan claims that Ordinance No. 640 is reasonable and necessary to lessen the economic
burden of parents whose minor children are lured by the attractive nuisance being maintained by the petitioners.
Respondent further alleges that by charging the full price, the children are being exploited by movie house
operators. We fail to see how the children are exploited if they pay the full price of admission. They are treated with
the same quality of entertainment as the adults. The supposition of the trial court that because of their age children
cannot fully grasp the nuances of such entertainment as adults do fails to convince Us that the reduction in
admission ticket price is justifiable. In fact, by the very claim of respondent that movies and the like are attractive
nuisances, it is difficult to comprehend why the municipal board passed the subject ordinance. How can the
municipal authorities consider the movies an attractive nuisance and yet encourage parents and children to
patronize them by lowering the price of admission for children? Perhaps, there is some ,truth to the argument of
petitioners that Ordinance No. 640 is detrimental to the public good and the general welfare of society for it
encourages children of tender age to frequent the movies, rather than attend to their studies in school or be in their
homes.

Moreover, as a logical consequence of the ordinance, movie house and theater operators will be discouraged from
exhibiting wholesome movies for general patronage, much less children's pictures if only to avoid compliance with
the ordinance and still earn profits for themselves. For after all, these movie house and theater operators cannot be
compelled to exhibit any particular kind of film except those films which may be dictated by public demand and those
which are restricted by censorship laws. So instead of children being able to share in the joys of their elders as
envisioned by the trial court, there will be a dearth of wholesome and educational movies for them to enjoy.

There are a number of cases decided by the Supreme Court and the various state courts of the United States which
upheld the right of the proprietor of a theater to fix the price of an admission ticket as against the right of the state to
interfere in this regard and which We consider applicable to the case at bar.

A theater ticket has been described to be either a mere license, revocable at the will of the proprietor of the theater
or it may be evidence of a contract whereby, for a valuable consideration, the purchaser has acquired the right to
enter the theater and observe the performance on condition that he behaves properly. 23 Such ticket, therefore,
represents a right, Positive or conditional, as the case may be, according to the terms of the original contract of sale.
This right is clearly a right of property. The ticket which represents that right is also, necessarily, a species of
property. As such, the owner thereof, in the absence of any condition to the contrary in the contract by which he
obtained it, has the clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom he pleases and at such price as he can obtain. 24 So
that an act prohibiting the sale of tickets to theaters or other places of amusement at more than the regular price
was held invalid as conflicting with the state constitution securing the right of property. 25

In Collister vs. Hayman, 26 it was held:

The defendants were conducting a private business, which, even if clothed with a public interest,
was without a franchise to accommodate the public, and they had the right to control it, the same as
the proprietors of any other business, subject to such obligations as were placed upon them by
statute. Unlike a carrier of passengers, for instance, with a franchise from the state, and hence under
obligation to transport anyone who applies and to continue the business year in and year out, the
proprietors of a theater can open and close their place at will, and no one can make a lawful
complaint. They can charge what they choose for admission to their theater. They can limit the
number admitted. They can refuse to sell tickets and collect the price of admission at the door. They
can preserve order and enforce quiet while the performance is going on. They can make it a part of
the contract and condition of admission, by giving due notice and printing the condition in the ticket
that no one shall be admitted under 21 years of age, or that men only or women only shall be
admitted, or that a woman cannot enter unless she is accompanied by a male escort, and the like.
The proprietors, in the control of their business, may regulate the terms of admission in any
reasonable way. If those terms are not satisfactory, no one is obliged to buy a ticket or make the
contract. If the terms are satisfactory, and the contract is made, the minds of the parties meet upon
the condition, and the purchaser impliedly promises to perform it.

In Tyson and Bro. — United Theater Ticket Officers, Inc. vs. Banton, 27 the United States Supreme Court held:

... And certainly a place of entertainment is in no legal sense a public utility; and quite as certainly, its
activities are not such that their enjoyment can be regarded under any conditions from the point of
view of an emergency.

The interest of the public in theaters and other places of entertainment may be more nearly, and with
better reason, assimilated to the like interest in provision stores and markets and in the rental of
houses and apartments for residence purposes; although in importance it fails below such an
interest in the proportion that food and shelter are of more moment than amusement or instruction.
As we have shown there is no legislative power to fix the prices of provisions or clothing, or the
rental charges for houses and apartments, in the absence of some controlling emergency; and we
are unable to perceive any dissimilarities of such quality or degree as to justify a different rule in
respect of amusements and entertainment ...
We are in consonance with the foregoing observations and conclusions of American courts. In this jurisdiction,
legislation had been passed controlling the prices of goods commodities and drugs during periods of
emergency, 28 limiting the net profits of public utility 29 as well as regulating rentals of residential apartments for a
limited period, 30 as a matter of national policy in the interest of public health and safety, economic security and the
general welfare of the people. And these laws cannot be impugned as unconstitutional for being violative of the due
process clause.

However, the same could not be said of theaters, cinematographs and other exhibitions. In no sense could these
businesses be considered public utilities. The State has not found it appropriate as a national policy to interfere with
the admission prices to these performances. This does not mean however, that theaters and exhibitions are not
affected with public interest even to a certain degree. Motion pictures have been considered important both as a
medium for the communication of Ideas and expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perceptions by
our people of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits are
considerable. 31 People of all ages flock to movie houses, games and other public exhibitions for recreation and
relaxation. The government realizing their importance has seen it fit to enact censorship laws to regulate the movie
industry. 32 Their aesthetic entertainment and even educational values cannot be underestimated. Even police
measures regulating the operation of these businesses have been upheld in order to safeguard public health and
safety.

Nonetheless, as to the question of the subject ordinance being a valid exercise of police power, the same must be
resolved in the negative. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must
be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be
oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful
business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of
police power.33 A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not
encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights.34 The right of the owner to fix
a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within
the protection of the due process clause."" Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property
in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who
did not approve could stay away. 36

Respondent City of Butuan argues that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of the ordinance. This
maybe the rule but it has already been held that although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or
reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or
unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence.37 The exercise of
police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the
legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation
of a common right.38

Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners for even if We could assume that,
on its face, the interference was reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it has been fully shown that it is an
unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an
undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986

PATRICIO TAN, FELIX FERRER, JUAN M. HAGAD, SERGIO HILADO, VIRGILIO GASTON, CONCHITA
MINAYA, TERESITA ESTACIO, DESIDERIO DEFERIA, ROMEO GAMBOA, ALBERTO LACSON, FE HOFILENA,
EMILY JISON, NIEVES LOPEZ AND CECILIA MAGSAYSAY, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, respondents.

Gamboa & Hofileña Law Office for petitioners.

ALAMPAY, J.:

Prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to
be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, which took effect on December 3, 1985, Petitioners herein, who are
residents of the Province of Negros Occidental, in the various cities and municipalities therein, on December 23,
1985, filed with this Court a case for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping respondents Commission on Elections
from conducting the plebiscite which, pursuant to and in implementation of the aforesaid law, was scheduled for
January 3, 1986. Said law provides:

SECTION 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso,
Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona; and Salvador Benedicto, all in the northern
portion of the Island of Negros, are hereby separated from the province to be known as the Province
of Negros del Norte.

SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the City of Silay, the
Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the south and the territorial limits of
the northern portion to the Island of Negros on the west, north and east, comprising a territory of
4,019.95 square kilometers more or less.

SEC. 3. The seat of government of the new province shall be the City of Cadiz.

SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas affected
within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act. After the ratification of
the creation of the Province of Negros del Norte by a majority of the votes cast in such plebiscite, the
President of the Philippines shall appoint the first officials of the province.

SEC. 5. The Commission on Elections shall conduct and supervise the plebiscite herein provided,
the expenses for which shall be charged to local funds.

SEC. 6. This Act shall takeeffect upon its approval.(Rollo, pp. 23-24)

Petitioners contend that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is unconstitutional and it is not in complete
accord with the Local Government Code as in Article XI, Section 3 of our Constitution, it is expressly
mandated that—

See. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or
units affected.

Section 197 of the Local Government Code enumerates the conditions which must exist to provide the legal basis
for the creation of a provincial unit and these requisites are:
 SEC. 197. Requisites for Creation. A province may be created if it has a territory of at least three
thousand five hundred square kilometers, a population of at least five hundred thousand persons, an
average estimated annual income, as certified by the Ministry of Finance, of not less than ten million
pesos for the last three consecutive years, and its creation shall not reduce the population and
income of the mother province or provinces at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements under this section. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more
islands.

The average estimated annual income shall include the income alloted for both the general and
infrastructural funds, exclusive of trust funds, transfers and nonrecurring income. (Rollo, p. 6)

Due to the constraints brought about by the supervening Christmas holidays during which the Court was in recess
and unable to timely consider the petition, a supplemental pleading was filed by petitioners on January 4, 1986,
averring therein that the plebiscite sought to be restrained by them was held on January 3, 1986 as scheduled but
that there are still serious issues raised in the instant case affecting the legality, constitutionality and validity of such
exercise which should properly be passed upon and resolved by this Court.

The plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of Negros del N•rte, namely: the Cities of Silay,
Cadiz, and San Carlos, and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.B.
Magalona and Don Salvador Benedicto. Because of the exclusions of the voters from the rest of the province of
Negros Occidental, petitioners found need to change the prayer of their petition "to the end that the constitutional
issues which they have raised in the action will be ventilated and given final resolution.'"At the same time, they
asked that the effects of the plebiscite which they sought to stop be suspended until the Supreme Court shall have
rendered its decision on the very fundamental and far-reaching questions that petitioners have brought out.

Acknowledging in their supplemental petition that supervening events rendered moot the prayer in their initial
petition that the plebiscite scheduled for January 3, 1986, be enjoined, petitioners plead, nevertheless, that-

... a writ of Prohibition be issued, directed to Respondent Commission on Elections to desist from
issuing official proclamation of the results of the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986.

Finding that the exclusion and non-participation of the voters of the Province of Negros Occidental
other than those living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte to be not in
accordance with the Constitution, that a writ of mandamus be issued, directed to the respondent
Commission on Elections, to schedule the holding of another plebiscite at which all the qualified
voters of the entire Province of Negros Occidental as now existing shall participate, at the same time
making pronouncement that the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect, being a
patent legal nullity;

And that a similar writ of Prohibition be issued, directed to the respondent Provincial Treasurer, to
desist from ordering the release of any local funds to answer for expenses incurred in the holding of
such plebiscite until ordered by the Court. (Rollo pp. 9-10).

Petitioners further prayed that the respondent COMELEC hold in abeyance the issuance of any
official proclamation of the results of the aforestated plebiscite.

During the pendency of this case, a motion that he be allowed to appear as amicus curiae in this case (dated
December 27, 1985 and filed with the Court on January 2, 1986) was submitted by former Senator Ambrosio Padilla.
Said motion was granted in Our resolution of January 2, 1986.

Acting on the petition, as well as on the supplemental petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with prayer
for restraining order, the Court, on January 7, 1986 resolved, without giving due course to the same, to require
respondents to comment, not to file a motion to dismiss. Complying with said resolution, public respondents,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, on January 14, 1986, filed their Comment, arguing therein that the
challenged statute.-Batas Pambansa 885, should be accorded the presumption of legality. They submit that the said
law is not void on its face and that the petition does not show a clear, categorical and undeniable demonstration of
the supposed infringement of the Constitution. Respondents state that the powers of the Batasang-Pambansa to
enact the assailed law is beyond question. They claim that Batas Pambansa Big. 885 does not infringe the
Constitution because the requisites of the Local Government Code have been complied with. Furthermore, they
submit that this case has now become moot and academic with the proclamation of the new Province of Negros del
Norte.

Respondents argue that the remaining cities and municipalities of the Province of Negros Occidental not included in
the area of the new Province of Negros del Norte, de not fall within the meaning and scope of the term "unit or units
affected", as referred to in Section 3 of Art. XI of our Constitution. On this reasoning, respondents maintain that
Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 does not violate the Constitution, invoking and citing the case of Governor Zosimo
Paredes versus the Honorable Executive Secretary to the President, et al. (G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128
SCRA 61), particularly the pronouncements therein, hereunder quoted:

1. Admittedly,this is one of those cases where the discretion of the Court is allowed considerable
leeway. There is indeed an element of ambiguity in the use of the expression 'unit or units affected'.
It is plausible to assert as petitioners do that when certain Barangays are separated from a parent
municipality to form a new one, all the voters therein are affected. It is much more persuasive,
however, to contend as respondents do that the acceptable construction is for those voters, who are
not from the barangays to be separated, should be excluded in the plebiscite.

2. For one thing, it is in accordance with the settled doctrine that between two possible constructions,
one avoiding a finding of unconstitutionality and the other yielding such a result, the former is to be
preferred. That which will save, not that which will destroy, commends itself for acceptance. After all,
the basic presumption all these years is one of validity. ...

3. ... Adherence to such philosophy compels the conclusion that when there are indications that the
inhabitants of several barangays are inclined to separate from a parent municipality they should be
allowed to do so. What is more logical than to ascertain their will in a plebiscite called for that
purpose. It is they, and they alone, who shall constitute the new unit. New responsibilities will be
assumed. New burdens will be imposed. A new municipal corporation will come into existence. Its
birth will be a matter of choice-their choice. They should be left alone then to decide for themselves.
To allow other voters to participate will not yield a true expression of their will. They may even
frustrate it, That certainly will be so if they vote against it for selfish reasons, and they constitute the
majority. That is not to abide by the fundamental principle of the Constitution to promote local
autonomy, the preference being for smaller units. To rule as this Tribunal does is to follow an
accepted principle of constitutional construction, that in ascertaining the meaning of a particular
provision that may give rise to doubts, the intent of the framers and of the people may be gleaned
from provisions in pari materia.

Respondents submit that said ruling in the aforecited case applies equally with force in the case at bar.
Respondents also maintain that the requisites under the Local Government Code (P.D. 337) for the creation of the
new province of Negros del Norte have all been duly complied with, Respondents discredit petitioners' allegations
that the requisite area of 3,500 square kilometers as so prescribed in the Local Government Code for a new
province to be created has not been satisfied. Petitioners insist that the area which would comprise the new
province of Negros del Norte, would only be about 2,856.56 square kilometers and which evidently would be lesser
than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute. Respondents, in this regard, point out and stress that
Section 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 creating said new province plainly declares that the territorial boundaries of
Negros del Norte comprise an area of 4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less.

As a final argument, respondents insist that instant petition has been rendered moot and academic considering that
a plebiscite has been already conducted on January 3, 1986; that as a result thereof, the corresponding certificate of
canvass indicated that out of 195,134 total votes cast in said plebiscite, 164,734 were in favor of the creation of
Negros del Norte and 30,400 were against it; and because "the affirmative votes cast represented a majority of the
total votes cast in said plebiscite, the Chairman of the Board of Canvassers proclaimed the new province which shall
be known as "Negros del Norte". Thus, respondents stress the fact that following the proclamation of Negros del
Norte province, the appointments of the officials of said province created were announced. On these considerations,
respondents urge that this case should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic as the creation
of the new province is now a "fait accompli."
In resolving this case, it will be useful to note and emphasize the facts which appear to be agreed to by the parties
herein or stand unchallenged.

Firstly, there is no disagreement that the Provincial Treasurer of the Province of Negros Occidental has not
disbursed, nor was required to disburse any public funds in connection with the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986
as so disclosed in the Comment to the Petition filed by the respondent Provincial Treasurer of Negros Occidental
dated January 20, 1986 (Rollo, pp. 36-37). Thus, the prayer of the petitioners that said Provincial Treasurer be
directed by this Court to desist from ordering the release of any public funds on account of such plebiscite should
not longer deserve further consideration.

Secondly, in Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which led to the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 and the creation
of the new Province of Negros del Norte, it expressly declared in Sec. 2 of the aforementioned Parliamentary Bill,
the following:

SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the City of Silay, the
Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the South and the natural
boundaries of the northern portion of the Island of Negros on the West, North and East, containing
an area of 285,656 hectares more or less. (Emphasis supplied).

However, when said Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was very quickly enacted into Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, the
boundaries of the new Province of Negros del Norte were defined therein and its boundaries then stated to be as
follows:

SECTION 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Toboso,
Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona; and Salvador Benedicto, all in the northern
portion of the Island of Negros, are hereby separated from the Province of Negros Occidental and
constituted into a new province to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte.

SEC. 1. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the City of Silay, the
Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the south and the territorial limits of
the northern portion of the Island of Negros on the West, North and East, comprising a territory of
4,019.95 square kilometers more or less.

Equally accepted by the parties is the fact that under the certification issued by Provincial Treasurer Julian L.
Ramirez of the Province of Negros Occidental, dated July 16, 1985, it was therein certified as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

This is to certify that the following cities and municipalities of Negros Occidental have the land area
as indicated hereunder based on the Special Report No. 3, Philippines 1980, Population, Land Area
and Density: 1970, 1975 and 1980 by the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila.

Land Area

(Sq. Km.)

1. Silay City ...................................................................214.8

2. E.B. Magalona............................................................113.3

3. Victorias.....................................................................133.9

4. Manapla......................................................................112.9

5. Cadiz City ..................................................................516.5

 6. Sagay .........................................................................389.6

7. Escalante ....................................................................124.0

8. Toboso.......................................................................123.4

9. Calatrava.....................................................................504.5

10. San Carlos City...........................................................451.3

11. Don Salvador Benedicto.................................... (not available)

This certification is issued upon the request of Dr. Patricio Y. Tan for whatever purpose it may serve
him.

(SGD.) JULIAN L. RAMIREZ

Provincial Treasurer (Exh. "C" of Petition, Rollo, p. 90).

Although in the above certification it is stated that the land area of the relatively new municipality of Don Salvador
Benedicto is not available, it is an uncontradicted fact that the area comprising Don Salvador municipality, one of the
component units of the new province, was derived from the City of San Carlos and from the Municipality of
Calatrava, Negros Occidental, and added thereto was a portion of about one-fourth the land area of the town of
Murcia, Negros Occidental. It is significant to note the uncontroverted submission of petitioners that the total land
area of the entire municipality of Murcia, Negros Occidental is only 322.9 square kilometers (Exh. "D", Rollo, p. 91).
One-fourth of this total land area of Murcia that was added to the portions derived from the land area of Calatrava,
Negros Occidental and San Carlos City (Negros Occidental) would constitute, therefore, only 80.2 square
kilometers. This area of 80.2 square kilometers if then added to 2,685.2 square kilometers, representing the total
land area of the Cities of Silay, San Carlos and Cadiz and the Municipalities of E.R. Magalona, Victorias, Manapla,
Sagay, Escalante, Taboso and Calatrava, will result in approximately an area of only 2,765.4 square kilometers
using as basis the Special Report, Philippines 1980, Population, Land Area and Density: 1970, 1975 and 1980 of
the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila (see Exhibit "C", Rollo, p. 90).

No controversion has been made by respondent with respect to the allegations of petitioners that the original
provision in the draft legislation, Parliamentary Bill No. 3644, reads:

SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one hundred and
twenty days from the approval of this Act. After the ratification of the creation of the Province of
Negros del Norte by a majority of the votes cast in such plebiscite, the President shall appoint the
first officials of the new province.

However, when Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 was enacted, there was a significant change in the above provision. The
statute, as modified, provides that the requisite plebiscite "shall be conducted in the proposed new province which
are the areas affected."

It is this legislative determination limiting the plebiscite exclusively to the cities and towns which would comprise the
new province that is assailed by the petitioners as violative of the provisions of our Constitution. Petitioners submit
that Sec. 3, ART XI thereof, contemplates a plebiscite that would be held in the unit or units affected by the creation
of the new province as a result of the consequent division of and substantial alteration of the boundaries of the
existing province. In this instance, the voters in the remaining areas of the province of Negros Occidental should
have been allowed to participate in the questioned plebiscite.

Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-compliance with constitutional requisites, the
fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before
Us cannot truly be viewed as already moot and academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly proclaimed
province which petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired into by this Tribunal
so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of that error should not provide the very excuse
for perpetuation of such wrong. For this Court to yield to the respondents' urging that, as there has been fait
accompli then this Court should passively accept and accede to the prevailing situation is an unacceptable
suggestion. Dismissal of the instant petition, as respondents so propose is a proposition fraught with mischief.
Respondents' submission will create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court decline now to perform its duty of
interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be, this might tempt again those who strut about in the
corridors of power to recklessly and with ulterior motives, create, merge, divide and/or alter the boundaries of
political subdivisions, either brazenly or stealthily, confident that this Court will abstain from entertaining future
challenges to their acts if they manage to bring about a fait accompli.

In the light of the facts and circumstances alluded to by petitioners as attending to the unusually rapid creation of the
instant province of Negros del Norte after a swiftly scheduled plebiscite, this Tribunal has the duty to repudiate and
discourage the commission of acts which run counter to the mandate of our fundamental law, done by whatever
branch of our government. This Court gives notice that it will not look with favor upon those who may be hereafter
inclined to ram through all sorts of legislative measures and then implement the same with indecent haste, even if
such acts would violate the Constitution and the prevailing statutes of our land. It is illogical to ask that this Tribunal
be blind and deaf to protests on the ground that what is already done is done. To such untenable argument the reply
would be that, be this so, the Court, nevertheless, still has the duty and right to correct and rectify the wrong brought
to its attention.

On the merits of the case.

Aside from the simpler factual issue relative to the land area of the new province of Negros del Norte, the more
significant and pivotal issue in the present case revolves around in the interpretation and application in the case at
bar of Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution, which being brief and for convenience, We again quote:

SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or
units affected.

It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it imperative that there be first obtained "the
approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" whenever a province is created, divided
or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the
boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of
its existing boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and
simple logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of
Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be
composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros
del Norte.

We find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform to said constitutional requirement but
eliminates the participation of either of these two component political units. No amount of rhetorical flourishes can
justify exclusion of the parent province in the plebiscite because of an alleged intent on the part of the authors and
implementors of the challenged statute to carry out what is claimed to be a mandate to guarantee and promote
autonomy of local government units. The alleged good intentions cannot prevail and overrule the cardinal precept
that what our Constitution categorically directs to be done or imposes as a requirement must first be observed,
respected and complied with. No one should be allowed to pay homage to a supposed fundamental policy intended
to guarantee and promote autonomy of local government units but at the same time transgress, ignore and
disregard what the Constitution commands in Article XI Section 3 thereof. Respondents would be no different from
one who hurries to pray at the temple but then spits at the Idol therein.

We find no merit in the submission of the respondents that the petition should be dismissed because the motive and
wisdom in enacting the law may not be challenged by petitioners. The principal point raised by the petitioners is not
the wisdom and motive in enacting the law but the infringement of the Constitution which is a proper subject of
judicial inquiry.

Petitioners' discussion regarding the motives behind the enactment of B.P. Blg. 885 to say the least, are most
enlightening and provoking but are factual issues the Court cannot properly pass upon in this case. Mention by
petitioners of the unexplained changes or differences in the proposed Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 and the enacted
Batas Pambansa Blg. 885; the swift and surreptitious manner of passage and approval of said law; the abrupt
scheduling of the plebiscite; the reference to news articles regarding the questionable conduct of the said plebiscite
held on January 3, 1986; all serve as interesting reading but are not the decisive matters which should be reckoned
in the resolution of this case.

What the Court considers the only significant submissions lending a little support to respondents' case is their
reliance on the rulings and pronouncements made by this Court in the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus
The Honorable Executive Secretary to the President, et al., G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 6). In said
case relating to a plebiscite held to ratify the creation of a new municipality from existing barangays, this Court
upheld the legality of the plebiscite which was participated in exclusively by the people of the barangay that would
constitute the new municipality.

This Court is not unmindful of this solitary case alluded to by respondents. What is, however, highly significant are
the prefatory statements therein stating that said case is "one of those cases where the discretion of the Court is
allowed considerable leeway" and that "there is indeed an element of ambiguity in the use of the expression unit or
units affected." The ruling rendered in said case was based on a claimed prerogative of the Court then to exercise
its discretion on the matter. It did not resolve the question of how the pertinent provision of the Constitution should
be correctly interpreted.

The ruling in the aforestated case of Paredes vs. The Honorable Executive Secretary, et al. (supra) should not be
taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent when it is acknowledged therein that "it is plausible to assert, as
petitioners do, that when certain Barangays are separated from a parent municipality to form a new one, all the
voters therein are affected."

It is relevant and most proper to mention that in the aforecited case of Paredes vs. Executive Secretary, invoked by
respondents, We find very lucidly expressed the strong dissenting view of Justice Vicente Abad Santos, a
distinguished member of this Court, as he therein voiced his opinion, which We hereunder quote:

2. ... when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units affected" it means all of the people of the
municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or an of the people of two or
more municipalities if there be a merger. I see no ambiguity in the Constitutional provision.

This dissenting opinion of Justice Vicente Abad Santos is the— forerunner of the ruling which We now consider
applicable to the case at bar, In the analogous case of Emilio C. Lopez, Jr., versus the Honorable Commission on
Elections, L-56022, May 31, 1985, 136 SCRA 633, this dissent was reiterated by Justice Abad Santos as he therein
assailed as suffering from a constitutional infirmity a referendum which did not include all the people of Bulacan and
Rizal, when such referendum was intended to ascertain if the people of said provinces were willing to give up some
of their towns to Metropolitan Manila. His dissenting opinion served as a useful guideline in the instant case.

Opportunity to re-examine the views formerly held in said cases is now afforded the present Court. The reasons in
the mentioned cases invoked by respondents herein were formerly considered acceptable because of the views
then taken that local autonomy would be better promoted However, even this consideration no longer retains
persuasive value.

The environmental facts in the case before Us readily disclose that the subject matter under consideration is of
greater magnitude with concomitant multifarious complicated problems. In the earlier case, what was involved was a
division of a barangay which is the smallest political unit in the Local Government Code. Understandably, few and
lesser problems are involved. In the case at bar, creation of a new province relates to the largest political unit
contemplated in Section 3, Art. XI of the Constitution. To form the new province of Negros del Norte no less than
three cities and eight municipalities will be subtracted from the parent province of Negros Occidental. This will result
in the removal of approximately 2,768.4 square kilometers from the land area of an existing province whose
boundaries will be consequently substantially altered. It becomes easy to realize that the consequent effects cf the
division of the parent province necessarily will affect all the people living in the separate areas of Negros Occidental
and the proposed province of Negros del Norte. The economy of the parent province as well as that of the new
province will be inevitably affected, either for the better or for the worse. Whatever be the case, either or both of
these political groups will be affected and they are, therefore, the unit or units referred to in Section 3 of Article XI of
the Constitution which must be included in the plebiscite contemplated therein.
It is a well accepted rule that "in ascertaining the meaning of a particular provision that may give rise to doubts, the
intent of the framers and of the people, may be gleaned from the provisions in pari materia." Parliamentary Bill No.
3644 which proposed the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte recites in Sec. 4 thereof that "the
plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval
of this Act." As this draft legislation speaks of "areas," what was contemplated evidently are plurality of areasto
participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such plebiscite would be the people living in the area
of the proposed new province and those living in the parent province. This assumption will be consistent with the
requirements set forth in the Constitution.

We fail to find any legal basis for the unexplained change made when Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was enacted into
Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 so that it is now provided in said enabling law that the plebiscite "shall be conducted in
the proposed new province which are the areas affected." We are not disposed to agree that by mere legislative fiat
the unit or units affected referred in the fundamental law can be diminished or restricted by the Batasang Pambansa
to cities and municipalities comprising the new province, thereby ignoring the evident reality that there are other
people necessarily affected.

In the mind of the Court, the change made by those responsible for the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885
betrays their own misgivings. They must have entertained apprehensions that by holding the plebiscite only in the
areas of the new proposed province, this tactic will be tainted with illegality. In anticipation of a possible strong
challenge to the legality of such a plebiscite there was, therefore, deliberately added in the enacted statute a self-
serving phrase that the new province constitutes the area affected. Such additional statement serves no useful
purpose for the same is misleading, erroneous and far from truth. The remaining portion of the parent province is as
much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the other
adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners.

Petitioners have averred without contradiction that after the creation of Negros del Norte, the province of Negros
Occidental would be deprived of the long established Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, as well as the
municipality of Victorias. No controversion has been made regarding petitioners' assertion that the areas of the
Province of Negros Occidental will be diminished by about 285,656 hectares and it will lose seven of the fifteen
sugar mills which contribute to the economy of the whole province. In the language of petitioners, "to create Negros
del Norte, the existing territory and political subdivision known as Negros Occidental has to be partitioned and
dismembered. What was involved was no 'birth' but "amputation." We agree with the petitioners that in the case of
Negros what was involved was a division, a separation; and consequently, as Sec. 3 of Article XI of the Constitution
anticipates, a substantial alteration of boundary.

As contended by petitioners,—

Indeed, the terms 'created', 'divided', 'merged', 'abolished' as used in the constitutional provision do
not contemplate distinct situation isolated from the mutually exclusive to each other. A Province
maybe created where an existing province is divided or two provinces merged. Such cases
necessarily will involve existing unit or units abolished and definitely the boundary being substantially
altered.

It would thus be inaccurate to state that where an existing political unit is divided or its boundary
substantially altered, as the Constitution provides, only some and not all the voters in the whole unit
which suffers dismemberment or substantial alteration of its boundary are affected. Rather, the
contrary is true.

It is also Our considered view that even hypothetically assuming that the merits of this case can depend on the mere
discretion that this Court may exercise, nevertheless, it is the petitioners' case that deserve to be favored.

It is now time for this Court to set aside the equivocations and the indecisive pronouncements in the adverted case
of Paredes vs. the Honorable Executive Secretary, et al. (supra). For the reasons already here express, We now
state that the ruling in the two mentioned cases sanctioning the exclusion of the voters belonging to an existing
political unit from which the new political unit will be derived, from participating in the plebiscite conducted for the
purpose of determining the formation of another new political unit, is hereby abandoned.
In their supplemental petition, dated January 4, 1986, it is prayed for by petitioners that a writ of mandamus be
issued, directing the respondent Commission on Elections, to schedule the holding of another plebiscite at which all
the qualified voters of the entire province of Negros Occidental as now existing shall participate and that this Court
make a pronouncement that the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.

The Court is prepared to declare the said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as null and void and violative of the
provisions of Sec. 3, Article XI of the Constitution. The Court is not, however, disposed to direct the conduct of a
new plebiscite, because We find no legal basis to do so. With constitutional infirmity attaching to the subject Batas
Pambansa Big. 885 and also because the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte is not in accordance with
the criteria established in the Local Government Code, the factual and legal basis for the creation of such new
province which should justify the holding of another plebiscite does not exist.

Whatever claim it has to validity and whatever recognition has been gained by the new province of Negros del Norte
because of the appointment of the officials thereof, must now be erased. That Negros del Norte is but a legal fiction
should be announced. Its existence should be put to an end as quickly as possible, if only to settle the complications
currently attending to its creation. As has been manifested, the parent province of Negros del Norte has been
impleaded as the defendant in a suit filed by the new Province of Negros del Norte, before the Regional Trial Court
of Negros (del Norte), docketed as Civil Case No. 169-C, for the immediate allocation, distribution and transfer of
funds by the parent province to the new province, in an amount claimed to be at least P10,000,000.00.

The final nail that puts to rest whatever pretension there is to the legality of the province of Negros del Norte is the
significant fact that this created province does not even satisfy the area requirement prescribed in Section 197 of the
Local Government Code, as earlier discussed.

It is of course claimed by the respondents in their Comment to the exhibits submitted by the petitioners (Exhs. C and
D, Rollo, pp. 19 and 91), that the new province has a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less. This
assertion is made to negate the proofs submitted, disclosing that the land area of the new province cannot be more
than 3,500 square kilometers because its land area would, at most, be only about 2,856 square kilometers, taking
into account government statistics relative to the total area of the cities and municipalities constituting Negros del
Norte. Respondents insist that when Section 197 of the Local Government Code speaks of the territory of the
province to be created and requires that such territory be at least 3,500 square kilometers, what is contemplated is
not only the land area but also the land and water over which the said province has jurisdiction and control. It is even
the submission of the respondents that in this regard the marginal sea within the three mile limit should be
considered in determining the extent of the territory of the new province. Such an interpretation is strained, incorrect,
and fallacious.

The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 is most revealing. As so stated therein the "territory need not
be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands." The use of the word territory in this particular provision of the
Local Government Code and in the very last sentence thereof, clearly reflects that "territory" as therein used, has
reference only to the mass of land area and excludes the waters over which the political unit exercises control.

Said sentence states that the "territory need not be contiguous." Contiguous means (a) in physical contact; (b)
touching along all or most of one side; (c) near, text, or adjacent (Webster's New World Dictionary, 1972 Ed., p.
307). "Contiguous", when employed as an adjective, as in the above sentence, is only used when it describes
physical contact, or a touching of sides of two solid masses of matter. The meaning of particular terms in a statute
may be ascertained by reference to words associated with or related to them in the statute (Animal Rescue League
vs. Assessors, 138 A.L.R. p. 110). Therefore, in the context of the sentence above, what need not be "contiguous" is
the "territory" the physical mass of land area. There would arise no need for the legislators to use the word
contiguous if they had intended that the term "territory" embrace not only land area but also territorial waters. It can
be safely concluded that the word territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is meant to be synonymous with
"land area" only. The words and phrases used in a statute should be given the meaning intended by the legislature
(82 C.J.S., p. 636). The sense in which the words are used furnished the rule of construction (In re Winton Lumber
Co., 63 p. 2d., p. 664).

The distinction between "territory" and "land area" which respondents make is an artificial or strained construction of
the disputed provision whereby the words of the statute are arrested from their plain and obvious meaning and
made to bear an entirely different meaning to justify an absurd or unjust result. The plain meaning in the language in
a statute is the safest guide to follow in construing the statute. A construction based on a forced or artificial meaning
of its words and out of harmony of the statutory scheme is not to be favored (Helvering vs. Hutchings, 85 L. Ed., p.
909).

It would be rather preposterous to maintain that a province with a small land area but which has a long, narrow,
extended coast line, (such as La Union province) can be said to have a larger territory than a land-locked province
(such as Ifugao or Benguet) whose land area manifestly exceeds the province first mentioned.

Allegations have been made that the enactment of the questioned state was marred by "dirty tricks", in the
introduction and passing of Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 "in secret haste" pursuant to sinister designs to achieve
"pure and simple gerrymandering; "that recent happenings more than amply demonstrate that far from guaranteeing
its autonomy it (Negros del Norte) has become the fiefdom of a local strongman" (Rollo, p. 43; emphasis supplied).

It is not for this Court to affirm or reject such matters not only because the merits of this case can be resolved
without need of ascertaining the real motives and wisdom in the making of the questioned law. No proper challenge
on those grounds can also be made by petitioners in this proceeding. Neither may this Court venture to guess the
motives or wisdom in the exercise of legislative powers. Repudiation of improper or unwise actions taken by tools of
a political machinery rests ultimately, as recent events have shown, on the electorate and the power of a vigilant
people.

Petitioners herein deserve and should receive the gratitude of the people of the Province of Negros Occidental and
even by our Nation. Commendable is the patriotism displayed by them in daring to institute this case in order to
preserve the continued existence of their historic province. They were inspired undoubtedly by their faithful
commitment to our Constitution which they wish to be respected and obeyed. Despite the setbacks and the
hardships which petitioners aver confronted them, they valiantly and unfalteringly pursued a worthy cause. A happy
destiny for our Nation is assured as long as among our people there would be exemplary citizens such as the
petitioners herein.

WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the new
province of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the officials thereof are also declared null and void.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 103328 October 19, 1992

HON. ROY A. PADILLA, JR., In his capacity as Governor of the Province of Camarines Norte, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

RESOLUTION

ROMERO, J.:

Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7155, the Commission on Elections promulgated on November 13, 1991, Resolution No. 2312 which reads as follows:

WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7155 approved on September 6, 1991 creates the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the Province of Camarines
Norte to be composed of Barangays Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot,
and Calabasa, all in the Municipality of Labo, same province.

WHEREAS under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution 1 the creation of a municipality shall be subject to approval by a majority of
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected, and pursuant to Section 134 of the Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa
Blg. 337) 2 said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections;

WHEREAS, Section 6 of said Republic Act No. 7155 provides that the expenses in holding the plebiscite shall be take out of the Contingent
Fund under the current fiscal year appropriations;
 NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as the Commission hereby resolves, to promulgated (sic) the following guidelines to govern the
conduct of said plebiscite:

1. The plebiscite shall be held on December 15, 1991, in the areas or units affected, namely the barangays comprising
he proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labor, Camarines
Norte (Tan vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 73155, July 11, 1986).

xxx xxx xxx

In the plebiscite held on December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo, only 2,890 votes favored its creation while 3,439 voters voted against the creation
of the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. Consequently, the day after the political exercise, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared the rejection and disapproval
of the independent Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa by a majority of votes. 3

Thus, in this special civil action of certiorari, petitioner as Governor of Camarines Norte, seeks to set aside the plebiscite conducted on December 15, 1991
throughout the Municipality of Labo and prays that a new plebiscite be undertaken as provided by RA 7155. It is the contention of petitioner that the plebiscite was
a complete failure and that the results obtained were invalid and illegal because the plebiscite, as mandated by COMELEC Resolution No. 2312 should have been
conducted only in the political unit or units affected, i.e. the 12 barangays comprising the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa namely Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San
Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa. Petitioner stresses that the plebiscite should not have included the
remaining area of the mother unit of the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. 4

In support of his stand, petitioner argues that with the approval and ratification of the 1987 Constitution, particularly Article X, Section 10, the ruling set forth in Tan
v. COMELEC 5 relied upon by respondent COMELEC is now passe, thus reinstating the case of Paredes v. Executive Secretary 6 which held that where a local
unit is to be segregated from a parent unit, only the voters of the unit to be segrated should be included in the plebiscite. 7

Accordingly, the issue in this case is whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2312 and,
consequently, whether or not the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother
Municipality of Labo is valid.

We rule that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse in promulgating Resolution No. 2312 and that the plebiscite, which rejected the creation of the
proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa, is valid.

Petitioner's contention that our ruling in Tan vs. COMELEC has been superseded with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, thus reinstating our earlier ruling
in Paredes vs. COMELEC is untenable. Petitioner opines that since Tan vs. COMELEC was based on Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution our ruling in
said case is no longer applicable under Section 10 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution, 8 especially since the latter provision deleted the words "unit or."

We do not agree. The deletion of the phrase "unit or" in Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution from its precursor, Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973
Constitution not affected our ruling in Tan vs. Comelec as explained by then CONCOM Commissioner, now my distinguished colleague, Associate Justice Hilario
Davide, during the debates in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, to wit:

Mr. Maambong: While we have already approved the deletion of "unit or," I would like to inform the Committee that under the formulation in
the present Local Government Code, the words used are actually "political unit or units." However, I do not know the implication of the use of
these words. Maybe there will be no substantial difference, but I just want to inform the Committee about this.

Mr. Nolledo: Can we not adhere to the original "unit or units"? Will there be no objection on the part of the two Gentlemen from the floor?

Mr. Davide: I would object. I precisely asked for the deletion of the words "unit or" because in the plebiscite to be conducted, it must involve
all the units affected. If it is the creation of a barangay plebiscite because it is affected. It would mean a loss of a territory.9 (Emphasis
supplied)

It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly affected," it means that residents of the political
entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the
phase "political units directly affected," is the plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite. 10 Logically, those to be included in such political
areas are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines
Norte. Thus, we conclude that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2312.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 40243 March 11, 1992

CELESTINO TATEL, petitioner,

vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC, SALVADOR A. SURTIDA, in his capacity as Mayor of Virac, Catanduanes;
GAVINO V. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Virac, Catanduanes; JOSE T. BUEBOS, in his
capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; ANGELES TABLIZO, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac,
Catanduanes; ELPIDIO T. ZAFE, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; MARIANO ALBERTO, in
his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; JULIA A. GARCIA, in her capacity as Councilor of Virac,
Catanduanes; and PEDRO A. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes, respondents.

NOCON, J.:

This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction with the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes filed by
appellant, Celestino Tatel, a businessman engaged in the import and export of abaca and other products against the
Municipal Council of Virac, Catanduanes and its municipal officials enjoining them from enforcing Resolution No
29 1of the Council, declaring the warehouse of petitioner in barrio Sta. Elena of the said municipality a public
nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and directing the petitioner to remove
and transfer said warehouse to a more suitable place within two (2) months from receipt of the said resolution.

It appears from the records that on the basis of complaints received from the residents of barrio Sta. Elena on March
18, 1966 against the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside the warehouse of
petitioner which affected the peace and tranquility of the neighborhood due to the smoke, obnoxious odor and dust
emitted by the machine, a committee was appointed by the municipal council of Virac to investigate the matter. The
committee noted the crowded nature of the neighborhood with narrow roads and the surrounding residential houses,
so much so that an accidental fire within the warehouse of the petitioner occasioned by the continuance of the
activity inside the warehouse and the storing of inflammable materials created a danger to the lives and properties of
the people within the neighborhood.

Resultantly, Resolution No. 29 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on April 22, 1966 declaring the
warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the New Civil
Code. 2

His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Municipal Council of Virac, petitioner instituted the present
petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction.

Respondent municipal officials contend that petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No.
13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or
barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives
and properties by accidental fire.

On the other hand, petitioner contends that said ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to the due process and equal
protection clause of the Constitution and null and void for not having been passed in accordance with law.

The issue then boils down on whether petitioner's warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning of Article 694 of the
Civil Code and whether Ordinance No. 13, S. 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and void.

In a decision dated September 18, 1969, the court a quo ruled as follows:

1. The warehouse in question was legally constructed under a valid permit issued by the municipality
of Virac in accordance with existing regulations and may not be destroyed or removed from its
present location;

2. Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, is a legitimate and valid exercise of police power by the
Municipal Council of Virac is not (sic) unconstitutional and void as claimed by the petitioner;

3. The storage by the petitioner of abaca and copra in the warehouse is not only in violation of the
provisions of the ordinance but poses a grave danger to the safety of the lives and properties of the
residents of the neighborhood due to accidental fire and constitutes a public nuisance under the
provisions of Article 694 of the New Civil code of the Philippines and may be abated;
 4. Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby directed to remove from the said warehouse all abaca and
copra and other inflammable articles stored therein which are prohibited under the provisions of
Ordinance No. 13, within a period of two (2) months from the time this decision becomes final and
that henceforth, the petitioner is enjoined from storing such prohibited articles in the warehouse. With
costs against petitioner.

Seeking appellate review, petitioner raised as errors of the court a quo:

1. In holding that Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, of the Municipality of Virac, Catanduanes, is a
legitimate and valid exercise of police power of the Municipal Council, and therefore, constitutional;

2. In giving the ordinance a meaning other than and different from what it provided by declaring that
petitioner violated the same by using the warehouse for storage of abaca and copra when what is
prohibited and penalized by the ordinance is the construction of warehouses.

3. In refusing to take judicial notice of the fact that in the municipality, there are numerous
establishments similarly situated as appellants' warehouses but which are not prosecuted.

We find no merit in the Petition.

Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It
is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance
of local self-government and as such are endowed with the police powers in order to effectively accomplish and
carry out the declared objects of their creation. 3 Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the
Administrative Code, which reads:

The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law,
as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by
law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the municipality and
the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein. 4

For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must
also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, and must be in consonance with certain well
established and basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that a municipal ordinance (1)
must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and
(6) must not be unreasonable. 5 Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, meets these criteria.

As to the petitioner's second assignment of error, the trial court did not give the ordinance in question a meaning
other than what it says. Ordinance No. 13 passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on December 29, 1952, 6 reads:

AN ORDINANCE STRICTLY PROHIBITING THE CONSTRUCTION OF WAREHOUSE IN ANY

FORM NEAR A BLOCK OF HOUSES EITHER IN POBLACION OR BARRIO WITH NECESSARY
DISTANCE TO AVOID GREAT LOSSES OF PROPERTY AND LIVES BY FIRE ACCIDENT.

Section 1 provides:

It is strictly prohibited to construct warehouses in any form to any person, persons, entity,
corporation or merchants, wherein to keep or store copra, hemp, gasoline, petroleum, alcohol, crude
oil, oil of turpentine and the like products or materials if not within the distance of 200 meters from a
block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios to avoid great losses of properties inclusive lives by
fire accident.

Section 2 provides: 7
 Owners of warehouses in any form, are hereby given advice to remove their said warehouses this
ordinance by the Municipal Council, provided however, that if those warehouses now in existence
should no longer be utilized as such warehouse for the above-described products in Section 1 of this
ordinance after a lapse of the time given for the removal of the said warehouses now in existence,
same warehouses shall be exempted from the spirit of the provision of section 1 of this
ordinance, provided further, that these warehouses now in existence, shall in the future be converted
into non-inflammable products and materials warehouses.

In spite of its fractured syntax, basically, what is regulated by the ordinance is the construction of warehouses
wherein inflammable materials are stored where such warehouses are located at a distance of 200 meters from a
block of houses and not the construction per se of a warehouse. The purpose is to avoid the loss of life and property
in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of the government.

This was also the observation of the trial court:

A casual glance of the ordinance at once reveals a manifest disregard of the elemental rules of
syntax. Experience, however, will show that this is not uncommon in law making bodies in small
towns where local authorities and in particular the persons charged with the drafting and preparation
of municipal resolutions and ordinances lack sufficient education and training and are not well
grounded even on the basic and fundamental elements of the English language commonly used
throughout the country in such matters. Nevertheless, if one scrutinizes the terms of the ordinance, it
is clear that what is prohibited is the construction of warehouses by any person, entity or corporation
wherein copra, hemp, gasoline and other inflammable products mentioned in Section 1 may be
stored unless at a distance of not less than 200 meters from a block of houses either in the
poblacion or barrios in order to avoid loss of property and life due to fire. Under Section 2, existing
warehouses for the storage of the prohibited articles were given one year after the approval of the
ordinance within which to remove them but were allowed to remain in operation if they had ceased to
store such prohibited articles.

The ambiguity therefore is more apparent than real and springs from simple error in grammatical
construction but otherwise, the meaning and intent is clear that what is prohibited is the construction
or maintenance of warehouses for the storage of inflammable articles at a distance within 200
meters from a block of houses either in the poblacion or in the barrios. And the purpose of the
ordinance is to avoid loss of life and property in case of accidental fire which is one of the primordial
and basic obligation of any government. 8

Clearly, the lower court did NOT add meaning other than or differrent from what was provided in the ordinance in question. It merely stated the purpose of the
ordinance and what it intends to prohibit to accomplish its purpose.

As to the third assignment of error, that warehouses similarly situated as that of the petitioner were not prosecuted,
suffice it to say that the mere fact that the municipal authorities of Virac have not proceeded against other
warehouses in the municipality allegedly violating Ordinance No. 13 is no reason to claim that the ordinance is
discriminatory. A distinction must be made between the law itself and the manner in which said law is implemented
by the agencies in charge with its administration and enforcement. There is no valid reason for the petitioner to
complain, in the absence of proof that the other bodegas mentioned by him are operating in violation of the
ordinance and that the complaints have been lodged against the bodegas concerned without the municipal
authorities doing anything about it.

The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have not been substantiated. Its purpose
is well within the objectives of sound government. No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to
engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products in the warehouse because of the danger
of fire to the lives and properties of the people residing in the vicinity. As far as public policy is concerned, there can
be no better policy than what has been conceived by the municipal government.

As to petitioner's contention of want of jurisdiction by the lower court we find no merit in the same. The case is a
simple civil suit for abatement of a nuisance, the original jurisdiction of which falls under the then Court of First
Instance.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 102782 December 11, 1991

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RODOLFO A. MALAPIRA, STEPHEN A. MONSANTO, DAN R. CALDERON, and
GRANDY N. TRIESTE, petitioners
vs.
THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MANDALUYONG, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, G.R. No. 91023, promulgated
on July 13, 1990, 1 the Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations
was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was
permitted only under the conditions laid dowm by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public
streets. It was there also observed that even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly
prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission. No motion for
reconsideration of that decision was submitted. The judgment became final and executory on August 6, 1990, and it
was duly entered in the Book of Entries of Judgments on July 13, 1990.

Subsequently, the following developments transpired:

In a letter dated October 17, 1990, Rodolfo A. Malapira complained to the Court that when he was stopped for an
alleged traffic violation, his driver's license was confiscated by Traffic Enforcer Angel de los Reyes in Quezon City.

On December 18,1990, the Caloocan-Manila Drivers and Operators Association sent a letter to the Court asking
who should enforce the decision in the above-mentioned case, whether they could seek damages for confiscation of
their driver's licenses, and where they should file their complaints.

Another letter was received by the Court on February 14, 1991, from Stephen L. Monsanto, complaining against the
confiscation of his driver's license by Traffic Enforcer A.D. Martinez for an alleged traffic violation in Mandaluyong.

This was followed by a letter-complaint filed on March 7, 1991, from Dan R. Calderon, a lawyer, also for confiscation
of his driver's license by Pat. R.J. Tano-an of the Makati Police Force.

Still another complaint was received by the Court dated April 29, 1991, this time from Grandy N. Trieste, another
lawyer, who also protested the removal of his front license plate by E. Ramos of the Metropolitan Manila Authority-
Traffic Operations Center and the confiscation of his driver's license by Pat. A.V. Emmanuel of the Metropolitan
Police Command-Western Police District.

Required to submit a Comment on the complaint against him, Allan D. Martinez invoked Ordinance No. 7, Series of
1988, of Mandaluyong, authorizing the confiscation of driver's licenses and the removal of license plates of motor
vehicles for traffic violations.
For his part, A.V. Emmanuel said he confiscated Trieste's driver's license pursuant to a memorandum dated
February 27, 1991, from the District Commander of the Western Traffic District of the Philippine National Police,
authorizing such sanction under certain conditions.

Director General Cesar P. Nazareno of the Philippine National Police assured the Court in his own Comment that
his office had never authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles and that he had in fact
directed full compliance with the above-mentioned decision in a memorandum, copy of which he attached, entitled
Removal of Motor Vehicle License Plates and dated February 28, 1991.

Pat. R.J. Tano-an, on the other hand, argued that the Gonong decision prohibited only the removal of license plates
and not the confiscation of driver's licenses.

On May 24, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself "to
detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or
obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila."

On July 2, 1991, the Court issued the following resolution:

The attention ofthe Court has been called to the enactment by the Metropolitan Manila Authority of
Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, providing inter alia that:

Section 2. Authority to Detach Plate/Tow and Impound. The Metropolitan Manila Authority, thru the
Traffic Operatiom Center, is authorized to detach the license plate/tow and impound
attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in
Metro Manila.

The provision appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court in the case at bar (as reported in 187
SCRA 432), where it was held that the license plates of motor vehicles may not be detached except only
under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43. Additionally, the Court has received several complaints against
the confiscation by police authorities of driver's licenses for alleged traffic violations, which sanction is,
according to the said decision, not among those that may be imposed under PD 1605.

To clarify these matters for the proper guidance of law-enforcement officers and motorists, the Court
resolved to require the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the Solicitor General to submit, within ten (10) days
from notice hereof, separate COMMENTS on such sanctions in light of the said decision.

In its Comment, the Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said ordinance on the ground that it was adopted
pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO 392. It particularly cited Section 2 thereof vesting in the Council (its
governing body) the responsibility among others of:

1. Formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination or consolidation for the
Authority; and

2. Promulgation of resolutions and other issuances of metropolitan wide application, approval of a code of
basic services requiring coordination, and exercise of its rule-making powers. (Emphasis supplied)

The Authority argued that there was no conflict between the decision and the ordinance because the latter was
meant to supplement and not supplant the latter. It stressed that the decision itself said that the confiscation of
license plates was invalid in the absence of a valid law or ordinance, which was why Ordinance No. 11 was enacted.
The Authority also pointed out that the ordinance could not be attacked collaterally but only in a direct action
challenging its validity.

For his part, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it represented
an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. The flaw in the measure was that it violated existing law,
specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the
confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention, however, of the
alleged impropriety of examining the said ordinance in the absence of a formal challenge to its validity.
On October 24, 1991, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted a motion for the early resolution of the questioned
sanctions, to remove once and for all the uncertainty of their vahdity. A similar motion was filed by the Metropolitan
Manila Authority, which reiterated its contention that the incidents in question should be dismissed because there
was no actual case or controversy before the Court.

The Metropolitan Manila Authority is correct in invoking the doctrine that the validity of a law or act can be
challenged only in a direct action and not collaterally. That is indeed the settled principle. However, that rule is not
inflexible and may be relaxed by the Court under exceptional circumstances, such as those in the present
controversy.

The Solicitor General notes that the practices complained of have created a great deal of confusion among motorists
about the state of the law on the questioned sanctions. More importantly, he maintains that these sanctions are
illegal, being violative of law and the Gonongdecision, and should therefore be stopped. We also note the disturbing
report that one policeman who confiscated a driver's license dismissed the Gonong decision as "wrong" and said the
police would not stop their "habit" unless they received orders "from the top." Regrettably, not one of the
complainants has filed a formal challenge to the ordinances, including Monsanto and Trieste, who are lawyers and
could have been more assertive of their rights.

Given these considerations, the Court feels it must address the problem squarely presented to it and decide it as
categorically rather than dismiss the complaints on the basis of the technical objection raised and thus, through its
inaction, allow them to fester.

The step we now take is not without legal authority or judicial precedent. Unquestionably, the Court has the power to
suspend procedural rules in the exercise of its inherent power, as expressly recognized in the Constitution, to
promulgate rules concerning "pleading, practice and procedure in all courts." 2 In proper cases, procedural rules may
be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice, which otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid
and formalistic adherence to such rules.

The Court has taken this step in a number of such cases, notably Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 3 where Justice Tuason
justified the deviation on the ground that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that
they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure."

We have made similar rulings in other cases, thus:

Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment ofjustice.
Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be avoided. (Aznar III vs. Bernad, G.R. No. 81190, May 9, 1988, 161 SCRA
276.) Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their
operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy
disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly
to the merits of the case. (Piczon vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 31).

Three of the cases were consolidated for argument and the other two were argued separately on other
dates. Inasmuch as all of them present the same fundamental question which, in our view, is decisive, they
will be disposed of jointly. For the same reason we will pass up the objection to the personality or sufficiency
of interest of the petitioners in case G.R. No. L-3054 and case G.R. No. L-3056 and the question whether
prohibition lies in cases G.R. Nos. L-2044 and L2756. No practical benefit can be gained from a discussion
of these procedural matters, since the decision in the cases wherein the petitioners'cause of action or the
propriety of the procedure followed is not in dispute, will be controlling authority on the others. Above all, the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821 cited in
Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368.)

Accordingly, the Court will consider the motion to resolve filed by the Solicitor General a petition for prohibition
against the enforcement of Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the Metropohtan Manila Authority, and Ordinance
No. 7, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong. Stephen A. Monsanto, Rodolfo A. Malapira, Dan R.
Calderon, and Grandy N. Trieste are considered co-petitioners and the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the
Municipality of Mandaluyong are hereby impleaded as respondents. This petition is docketed as G.R. No. 102782.
The comments already submitted are duly noted and shall be taken into account by the Court in the resolution of the
substantive issues raised.

It is stressed that this action is not intended to disparage procedural rules, which the Court has recognized often
enough as necessary to the orderly administration of justice. If we are relaxing them in this particular case, it is
because of the failure of the proper parties to file the appropriate proceeding against the acts complained of, and the
necessity of resolving, in the interest of the public, the important substantive issues raised.

Now to the merits.

The Metro Manila Authority sustains Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, under the specific authority conferred upon it
by EO 392, while Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied
in the Local Government Code. 4 It is not disputed that both measures were enacted to promote the comfort and
convenience of the public and to alleviate the worsening traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila due in large part to
violations of traffic rules.

The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearing that
the requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are. 1) the completeness of the statute making the
delegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient standard. 5

Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in all its terms and provisions such that all the delegate will have to do when the statute reaches it
is to implement it. What only can be delegated is not the discretion to determine what the law shall be but the discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced. This has
been done in the case at bar.

As a second requirement, the enforcement may be effected only in accordance with a sufficient standard, the function of which is to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and thus "prevent the delegation from running riot." This requirement has also been met.
It is settled that the "convenience and welfare" of the public, particularly the motorists and passengers in the case at bar, is an acceptable sufficient standard to delimit the delegate's authority. 6

But the problem before us is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. The question we must resolve is the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.

The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and
conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us, we apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by
the accepted principles governing municipal corporations.

According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must
be general and consistent with public policy. 7

A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The
pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan
Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and now the Metropolitan Manila Authority) to impose such
sanctions:

Section 1. The Metropolitan Manila Commission shall have the power to impose fines and otherwise discipline drivers and operators of motor vehicles for violations
of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations in Metropolitan Manila in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed. For this purpose, the
powers of the Land Transportation Commission and the Board of Transportation under existing laws over such violations and punishment thereof are hereby
transferred to the Metropolitan Manila Commission. When the proper penalty to be imposed is suspension or revocation of driver's license or certificate of public
convenience, the Metropolitan Manila Commission or its representatives shall suspend or revoke such license or certificate. The suspended or revoked driver's
license or the report of suspension or revocation of the certificate of public convenience shall be sent to the Land Transportation Commission or the Board of
Transportation, as the case may be, for their records update.
 xxx xxx xxx

Section 3.` Violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations, committed within a twelve-month period, reckoned from the date of birth of the licensee,
shall subject the violator to graduated fines as follows: P10.00 for the first offense, P20.00 for the and offense, P50.00 for the third offense, a one-year suspension
of driver's license for the fourth offense, and a revocation of the driver's license for the fifth offense: Provided, That the Metropolitan Manila Commission may
impose higher penalties as it may deem proper for violations of its ordinances prohibiting or regulating the use of certain public roads, streets and thoroughfares in
Metropolitan Manila.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 5. In case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated but the erring driver shall be immediately issued a traffic citation ticket prescribed
by the Metropolitan Manila Commission which shall state the violation committed, the amount of fine imposed for the violation and an advice that he can make
payment to the city or municipal treasurer where the violation was committed or to the Philippine National Bank or Philippine Veterans Bank or their branches
within seven days from the date of issuance of the citation ticket.

If the offender fails to pay the fine imposed within the period herein prescribed, the Metropolitan Manila Commission or the law-enforcement agency concerned
shall endorse the case to the proper fiscal for appropriate proceedings preparatory to the filing of the case with the competent traffic court, city or municipal court.

If at the time a driver renews his driver's license and records show that he has an unpaid fine, his driver's license shall not be renewed until he has paid the fine
and corresponding surcharges.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 8. Insofar as the Metropolitan Manila area is concerned, all laws, decrees, orders, ordinances, rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent herewith
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied).

In fact, the above provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic
violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed," that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by
the decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall
not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the
Municipality of Mandaluyong.

The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own

They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate
sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). 8

legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times
the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot
prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.

The self-serving language of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance is worth noting. Curiously, it is the measure
itself, which was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila Authority, that authorizes the Metropolitan Manila Authority to
impose the questioned sanction.

In Villacorta vs, Bemardo, 9 the Court nullified an ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Dagupan City for
being violative of the Land Registration Act. The decision held in part:

In declaring the said ordinance null and void, the court a quodeclared:

From the above-recited requirements, there is no showing that would justify the enactment of the
questioned ordinance. Section 1 of said ordinance clearly conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496,
because the latter law does not require subdivision plans to be submitted to the City Engineer before
the same is submitted for approval to and verification by the General Land Registration Office or by
the Director of Lands as provided for in Section 58 of said Act. Section 2 of the same ordinance also
contravenes the provisions of Section 44 of Act 496, the latter being silent on a service fee of P0.03
per square meter of every lot subject of such subdivision application; Section 3 of the ordinance in
question also conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not mention of a
 certification to be made by the City Engineer before the Register of Deeds allows registration of the
subdivision plan; and the last section of said ordinance impose a penalty for its violation, which
Section 44 of Act 496 does not impose. In other words, Ordinance 22 of the City of Dagupan
imposes upon a subdivision owner additional conditions.

xxx xxx xxx

The Court takes note of the laudable purpose of the ordinance in bringing to a halt the surreptitious
registration of lands belonging to the government. But as already intimated above, the powers of the
board in enacting such a laudable ordinance cannot be held valid when it shall impede the exercise
of rights granted in a general law and/or make a general law subordinated to a local ordinance.

We affirm.

To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so violating
national laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing additional
requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the registration of vehicles, to
minimize carnapping; the execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of parts, to deter imposture;
the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if
the end be valid, would be ultra vires.

The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the
decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect
partially repeal the law.

We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan Manila area. It is an
exception to the general authority conferred by R.A. No. 413 on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish
violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country with the sanction therein prescribed, including those here
questioned.

The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of
the rest of the public for the effective reduction of traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila through the imposition and
enforcement of more deterrent penalties upon traffic violators. At the same time, it must also reiterate the public
misgivings over the abuses that may attend the enforcement of such sanction in eluding the illicit practices
described in detail in the Gonong decision. At any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory authority for — and
indeed there is a statutory prohibition against — the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be impose by the challenged enactments by virtue only of the
delegated legislative powers.

It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions, either
directly through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local governments in Metropolitan
Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues prohibit the confiscation of license plates of
motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations
in Metropolitan Manila.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(1) declaring Ordinance No.11, Seriesof l991,of theMetropolitan Manila Authority and Ordinance No. 7, Series of
1988 of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, NULL and VOID; and

(2) enjoining all law enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license plates of motor
vehicles (except when authorized under LOI 43) and confiscating driver licenses for traffic violations within the said
area.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 92389 September 11, 1991

HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI,petitioners,

vs.
HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT,respondents.

Jejomar C. Binay for himself and for his co-petitioner.

Manuel D. Tamase and Rafael C. Marquez for respondents.

PARAS, J.:

The only pivotal issue before Us is whether or not Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the
Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.

The pertinent facts are:

On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which reads:

A RESOLUTION TO CONFIRM AND/OR RATIFY THE ONGOING BURIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

INITIATED BY THE OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, OF EXTENDING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OF FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) TO A BEREAVED FAMILY, FUNDS TO BE TAKEN OUT OF
UNAPPROPRIATED AVAILABLE FUNDS EXISTING IN THE MUNICIPAL TREASURY. (Rollo, Annnex "A"
p. 39)

Qualified beneficiaries, under the Burial Assistance Program, are bereaved families of Makati whose gross family
income does not exceed two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) a month. The beneficiaries, upon fulfillment of other
requirements, would receive the amount of five hundred pesos (P500.00) cash relief from the Municipality of Makati.
(Reno, Annex "13", p. 41)

Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution No. 60. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement
fired of four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) for the implementation of the Burial Assistance Program. (Rollo,
Annex "C", p. 43).

Resolution No. 60 was referred to respondent Commission on Audit (COA) for its expected allowance in audit.
Based on its preliminary findings, respondent COA disapproved Resolution No. 60 and disallowed in audit the
disbursement of finds for the implementation thereof. (Rollo, Annex "D", P. 44)

Two letters for reconsideration (Annexes "E" and "F", Rollo, pp. 45 and 48, respectively) filed by petitioners Mayor
Jejomar Binay, were denied by respondent in its Decision No. 1159, in the following manner:

Your request for reconsideration is predicated on the following grounds, to wit:

1. Subject Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, of the Municipal Council of Makati and the intended disbursements
fall within the twin principles of 'police power and parens patriae and

2. The Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC), under a Certification, dated June 5, 1989, has already
appropriated the amount of P400,000.00 to implement the Id resolution, and the only function of COA on the
matter is to allow the financial assistance in question.

The first contention is believed untenable. Suffice it to state that:

 a statute or ordinance must have a real substantial, or rational relation to the public safety, health,
morals, or general welfare to be sustained as a legitimate exercise of the police power. The mere
assertion by the legislature that a statute relates to the public health, safety, or welfare does not in
itself bring the statute within the police power of a state for there must always be an obvious and real
connection between the actual provisions of a police regulations and its avowed purpose, and the
regulation adopted must be reasonably adapted to accomplish the end sought to be attained. 16 Am.
Jur 2d, pp. 542-543; emphasis supplied).

Here, we see no perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained under
Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, supra, and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of
Makati.

Anent the second contention, let it be stressed that Resolution No. 60 is still subject to the limitation that the
expenditure covered thereby should be for a public purpose, i.e., that the disbursement of the amount of
P500.00 as burial assistance to a bereaved family of the Municipality of Makati, or a total of P400,000.00
appropriated under the Resolution, should be for the benefit of the whole, if not the majority, of the
inhabitants of the Municipality and not for the benefit of only a few individuals as in the present case. On this
point government funds or property shall be spent or used solely for public purposes. (Cf. Section 4[2], P.D.
1445). (pp. 50-51, Rollo)

Bent on pursuing the Burial Assistance Program the Municipality of Makati, through its Council, passed Resolution
No. 243, re-affirming Resolution No. 60 (Rollo, Annex "H", p. 52).

However, the Burial Assistance Program has been stayed by COA Decision No. 1159. Petitioner, through its Mayor,
was constrained to file this special civil action of certiorari praying that COA Decision No. 1159 be set aside as null
and void.

The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized
government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est
suprema lex Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.

Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations (Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del Norte, 163
SCRA 182). Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such
power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police
power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal
corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and
purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes
conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the
enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. (62 C.J.S., p. 277). The so-called inferred police powers
of such corporations are as much delegated powers as are those conferred in express terms, the inference of their
delegation growing out of the fact of the creation of the municipal corporation and the additional fact that the
corporation can only fully accomplish the objects of its creation by exercising such powers. (Crawfordsville vs.
Braden, 28 N.E. 849). Furthermore, municipal corporations, as governmental agencies, must have such measures
of the power as are necessary to enable them to perform their governmental functions. The power is a continuing
one, founded on public necessity. (62 C.J.S. p. 273) Thus, not only does the State effectuate its purposes through
the exercise of the police power but the municipality does also. (U.S. v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102).

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with
authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety,
comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general
welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein." (Sections 91,
149, 177 and 208, BP 337). And under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance
such as to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order in the
local government unit, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is
the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. It is elastic and must be responsive to various social
conditions. (Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC, 176 SCRA 719). On it depends the security of social order, the life and health
of the citizen, the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private and social life,
and the beneficial use of property, and it has been said to be the very foundation on which our social system rests.
(16 C.J.S., P. 896) However, it is not confined within narrow circumstances of precedents resting on past conditions;
it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life. (Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC, supra).

In the case at bar, COA is of the position that there is "no perceptible connection or relation between the objective
sought to be attained under Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, supra, and the alleged public safety, general welfare. etc. of
the inhabitants of Makati." (Rollo, Annex "G", p. 51).

Apparently, COA tries to re-define the scope of police power by circumscribing its exercise to "public safety, general
welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati."

In the case of Sangalang vs. IAC, supra, We ruled that police power is not capable of an exact definition but has
been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet
the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.

The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to
exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as
consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all
legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is
especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community,
it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest
welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the
preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation (62 C.J.S. Sec. 128). Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to
attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.

COA's additional objection is based on its contention that "Resolution No. 60 is still subject to the limitation that the
expenditure covered thereby should be for a public purpose, ... should be for the benefit of the whole, if not the
majority, of the inhabitants of the Municipality and not for the benefit of only a few individuals as in the present
case." (Rollo, Annex "G", p. 51).

COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally
benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is
towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services (Section 9, Art.
II, Constitution), the promotion of the general welfare (Section 5, Ibid) social justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as
human dignity and respect for human rights. (Section 11, Ibid." (Comment, p. 12)

The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted
exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.

There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be
reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down
to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to
the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc.

Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing
program of our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though
not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be
financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon
Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This decision, however must not be taken as a
precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-
outs for motives political or otherwise.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, and with the afore-mentioned caveat, this petition is hereby GRANTED and the
Commission on Audit's Decision No. 1159 is hereby SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. L-31249. August 19, 1986.]

SALVADOR VILLACORTA as City Engineer of Dagupan City, and JUAN S. CAGUIOA as Register of Deeds of
Dagupan City, Petitioners, v. GREGORIO BERNARDO and HON. MACARIO OFILADA as Judge of Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, Respondents.

Victor T. Llamas, Jr. for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; DELEGATION OF POWERS; MUNICIPAL BOARD; ORDINANCE NO. 22,

NOT VALID FOR IMPOSING ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS OTHER THAN THAT PROVIDED FOR BY
THE NATIONAL LAW. — To sustain the ordinance No. 22, "An Ordinance Regulating Subdivision
Plans over Parcels of Land in Dagupan City" would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances
amending and so violating national laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances
could be passed imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to
prevent bigamy; the registration of vehicles, to minimize carnapping; the execution of contracts,
to forestall fraud; the validation of passports, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of
speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the end be
valid, would be ultra vires. Ordinance No. 22 suffers from the additional defect of violating this
authority for legislating in contravention of the national law by adding to its requirements.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POLICE POWER; PROTECTION OF RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUAL,

IMPORTANT AS PROTECTION OF RIGHT OF PUBLIC. — We urge that proper care attend the
exercise of the police power lest it deteriorate into an unreasonable intrusion into the purely
private affairs of the individual. The so-called "general welfare" is too amorphous and convenient
an excuse for official arbitrariness. Let it always be remembered that in the truly democratic
state, protecting the rights of the individual is as important as, if not more so than, protecting
the rights of the public. This advice is especially addressed to the local governments which
exercise the police power only by virtue of a valid delegation from the national legislature under
the general welfare clause.

DECISION

CRUZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari against a decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan annulling an ordinance adopted
by the municipal board of Dagupan City.

The ordinance reads in full as follows: jgc:cha nro bles.c om.ph

"ORDINANCE 22

"AN ORDINANCE REGULATING SUBDIVISION PLANS OVER PARCELS OF LAND IN THE CITY OF DAGUPAN.

"Be it ordained by the Municipal Board of Dagupan City in session assembled: jgc:chan rob les.com. ph

"Section 1. Every proposed subdivision plan over any lot in the City of Dagupan, shall, before the same is submitted for
approval and/or verification by the Bureau of Lands and/or the Land Registration Commission, be previously submitted to the
City Engineer of the City who shall see to it that no encroachment is made on any portion of the public domain, that the
zoning ordinance and all other pertinent rules and regulations are observed.

"Section 2. As service fee thereof, an amount equivalent to P0.30 per square meter of every lot resulting or will result from
such subdivision shall be charged by the City Engineer’s Office.

"Section 3. It shall be unlawful for the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City to allow the registration of a subdivision plan unless
there is prior written certification issued by the City Engineer that such plan has already been submitted to his office and that
the same is in order.

"Section 4. Any violation of this ordinance shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two hundred (P200.00) pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months or both in the discretion of the judge.

"Section 5. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon approval." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

In declaring the said ordinance null and void, the court a quo declared: jgc:chan roble s.com. ph

"From the above-recited requirements, there is no showing that would justify the enactment of the questioned ordinance.
Section 1 of said ordinance clearly conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not require subdivision
plans to be submitted to the City Engineer before the same is submitted for approval to and verification by the General Land
Registration Office or by the Director of Lands as provided for in Section 58 of said Act. Section 2 of the same ordinance also
contravenes the provisions of Section 44 of Act 496, the latter being silent on a service fee of P0.03 per square meter of
every lot subject of such subdivision application; Section 3 of the ordinance in question also conflicts with Section 44 of Act
496, because the latter law does not mention of a certification to be made by the City Engineer before the Register of Deeds
allows registration of the subdivision plan; and the last section of said ordinance imposes a penalty for its violation, which
Section 44 of Act 496 does not impose. In other words, Ordinance 22 of the City of Dagupan imposes upon a subdivision
owner additional conditions.

x x x

"The Court takes note of the laudable purpose of the ordinance in bringing to a halt the surreptitious registration of lands
belonging to the government. But as already intimidated above, the powers of the board in enacting such a laudable
ordinance cannot be held valid when it shall impede the exercise of rights granted in a general law and/or make a general
law subordinated to a local ordinance." cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry

We affirm.

To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so violating national laws in the
guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage
licenses, to prevent bigamy; the registration of vehicles, to minimize carnaping; the execution of contracts, to forestall fraud;
the validation of passports, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. The list is
endless, but the means, even if the end be valid, would be ultra vires.

So many excesses are attempted in the name of the police power that it is time, we feel, for a brief admonition.

Regulation is a fact of life in any well-ordered community. As society becomes more and more complex, the police power
becomes correspondingly ubiquitous. This has to be so for the individual must subordinate his interests to the common good,
on the time-honored justification of Salus populi est suprema lex.

In this prolix age, practically everything a person does and owns affects the public interest directly or at least vicariously,
unavoidably drawing him within the embrace of the police power. Increasingly, he is hemmed in by all manner of statutory,
administrative and municipal requirements and restrictions that he may find officious and even oppressive.

It is necessary to stress that unless the creeping interference of the government in essentially private matters is moderated,
it is likely to destroy that prized and peculiar virtue of the free society: individualism.

Every member of society, while paying proper deference to the general welfare, must not be deprived of the right to be left
alone or, in the idiom of the day, "to do his thing." As long as he does not prejudice others, his freedom as an individual must
not be unduly curtailed.

We therefore urge that proper care attend the exercise of the police power lest it deteriorate into an unreasonable intrusion
into the purely private affairs of the individual. The so-called "general welfare" is too amorphous and convenient an excuse
for official arbitrariness.

Let it always be remembered that in the truly democratic state, protecting the rights of the individual is as important as, if
not more so than, protecting the rights of the public.

This advice is especially addressed to the local governments which exercise the police power only by virtue of a valid
delegation from the national legislature under the general welfare clause. In the instant case, Ordinance No. 22 suffers from
the additional defect of violating this authority for legislation in contravention of the national law by adding to its
requirements.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court annulling the challenged ordinance is AFFIRMED, without any pronouncement as
to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983

VICENTE DE LA CRUZ, RENATO ALIPIO, JOSE TORRES III, LEONCIO CORPUZ, TERESITA CALOT,
ROSALIA FERNANDEZ, ELIZABETH VELASCO, NANETTE VILLANUEVA, HONORATO BUENAVENTURA,
RUBEN DE CASTRO, VICENTE ROXAS, RICARDO DAMIAN, DOMDINO ROMDINA, ANGELINA OBLIGACION,
CONRADO GREGORIO, TEODORO REYES, LYDIA ATRACTIVO, NAPOLEON MENDOZA, PERFECTO
GUMATAY, ANDRES SABANGAN, ROSITA DURAN, SOCORRO BERNARDEZ, and PEDRO
GABRIEL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EDGARDO L. PARAS, MATIAS RAMIREZ as the Municipal Mayor, MARIO MENDOZA as
the Municipal Vice-Mayor, and THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF BOCAUE, BULACAN, respondents.

Federico N. Alday for petitioners.

Dakila F. Castro for respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

The crucial question posed by this certiorari proceeding is whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan,
represented by respondents, 1 can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the
pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses. It is contended that the ordinance assailed as
invalid is tainted with nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or
calling, petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were
violated as the licenses previously given to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing. 2
The assailed ordinance 3 is worded as follows: "Section 1.— Title of Ordinance.— This Ordinance shall be known
and may be cited as the [Prohibition and Closure Ordinance] of Bocaue, Bulacan. Section 2. — Definitions of Terms
— (a) 'Night Club' shall include any place or establishment selling to the public food or drinks where customers are
allowed to dance. (b) 'Cabaret' or 'Dance Hall' shall include any place or establishment where dancing is permitted
to the public and where professional hostesses or hospitality girls and professional dancers are employed. (c)
'Professional hostesses' or 'hospitality girls' shall include any woman employed by any of the establishments herein
defined to entertain guests and customers at their table or to dance with them. (d) 'Professional dancer' shall include
any woman who dances at any of the establishments herein defined for a fee or remuneration paid directly or
indirectly by the operator or by the persons she dances with. (e) 'Operator' shall include the owner, manager,
administrator or any person who operates and is responsible for the operation of any night club, cabaret or dance
hall. Section 3. — Prohibition in the Issuance and Renewal of Licenses, Permits. — Being the principal cause in the
decadence of morality and because of their other adverse effects on this community as explained above, no
operator of night clubs, cabarets or dance halls shall henceforth be issued permits/licenses to operate within the
jurisdiction of the municipality and no license/permit shall be issued to any professional hostess, hospitality girls and
professional dancer for employment in any of the aforementioned establishments. The prohibition in the issuance of
licenses/permits to said persons and operators of said establishments shall include prohibition in the renewal
thereof. Section 4.— Revocation of Permits and Licenses.— The licenses and permits issued to operators of night
clubs, cabarets or dance halls which are now in operation including permits issued to professional hostesses,
hospitality girls and professional dancers are hereby revoked upon the expiration of the thirty-day period given them
as provided in Section 8 hereof and thenceforth, the operation of these establishments within the jurisdiction of the
municipality shall be illegal. Section 5.— Penalty in case of violation. — Violation of any of the provisions of this
Ordinance shall be punishable by imprisonment not exceeding three (3) months or a fine not exceeding P200.00 or
both at the discretion of the Court. If the offense is committed by a juridical entity, the person charged with the
management and/or operation thereof shall be liable for the penalty provided herein. Section 6. — Separability
Clause.— If, for any reason, any section or provision of this Ordinance is held unconstitutional or invalid, no other
section or provision hereof shall be affected thereby. Section 7.— Repealing Clause.— All ordinance, resolutions,
circulars, memoranda or parts thereof that are inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance are hereby
repealed. Section 8.— Effectivity.— This Ordinance shall take effect immediately upon its approval; provided,
however, that operators of night clubs, cabarets and dance halls now in operation including professional hostesses,
hospitality girls and professional dancers are given a period of thirty days from the approval hereof within which to
wind up their businesses and comply with the provisions of this Ordinance." 4

On November 5, 1975, two cases for prohibition with preliminary injunction were filed with the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan. 5 The grounds alleged follow:

1. Ordinance No. 84 is null and void as a municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or
calling.

2. Ordinance No. 84 is violative of the petitioners' right to due process and the equal protection of the law, as the
license previously given to petitioners was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing. 3. That under Presidential
Decree No. 189, as amended, by Presidential Decree No. 259, the power to license and regulate tourist-oriented
businesses including night clubs, has been transferred to the Department of Tourism." 6 The cases were assigned to
respondent Judge, now Associate Justice Paras of the Intermediate Appellate Court, who issued a restraining order
on November 7, 1975. The answers were thereafter filed. It was therein alleged: " 1. That the Municipal Council is
authorized by law not only to regulate but to prohibit the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs
invoking Section 2243 of the RAC, CA 601, Republic Acts Nos. 938, 978 and 1224. 2. The Ordinance No. 84 is not
violative of petitioners' right to due process and the equal protection of the law, since property rights are subordinate
to public interests. 3. That Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended, did not deprive Municipal Councils of their
jurisdiction to regulate or prohibit night clubs." 7 There was the admission of the following facts as having been
established: "l. That petitioners Vicente de la Cruz, et al. in Civil Case No. 4755-M had been previously issued
licenses by the Municipal Mayor of Bocaue-petitioner Jose Torres III, since 1958; petitioner Vicente de la Cruz, since
1960; petitioner Renato Alipio, since 1961 and petitioner Leoncio Corpuz, since 1972; 2. That petitioners had
invested large sums of money in their businesses; 3. That the night clubs are well-lighted and have no partitions, the
tables being near each other; 4. That the petitioners owners/operators of these clubs do not allow the hospitality girls
therein to engage in immoral acts and to go out with customers; 5. That these hospitality girls are made to go
through periodic medical check-ups and not one of them is suffering from any venereal disease and that those who
fail to submit to a medical check-up or those who are found to be infected with venereal disease are not allowed to
work; 6. That the crime rate there is better than in other parts of Bocaue or in other towns of Bulacan." 8 Then came
on January 15, 1976 the decision upholding the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and dismissing the
cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.

In an exhaustive as well as scholarly opinion, the lower court dismissed the petitions. Its rationale is set forth in the
opening paragraph thus: "Those who lust cannot last. This in essence is why the Municipality of Bocaue, Province of
Bulacan, stigmatized as it has been by innuendos of sexual titillation and fearful of what the awesome future holds
for it, had no alternative except to order thru its legislative machinery, and even at the risk of partial economic
dislocation, the closure of its night clubs and/or cabarets. This in essence is also why this Court, obedient to the
mandates of good government, and cognizant of the categorical imperatives of the current legal and social
revolution, hereby [upholds] in the name of police power the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 84, Series
of 1975, of the Municipal Council of Bocaue, Bulacan. The restraining orders heretofore issued in these two cases
are therefore hereby rifted, effective the first day of February, 1976, the purpose of the grace period being to enable
the petitioners herein to apply to the proper appellate tribunals for any contemplated redress."9This Court is,
however, unable to agree with such a conclusion and for reasons herein set forth, holds that reliance on the police
power is insufficient to justify the enactment of the assailed ordinance. It must be declared null and void.

1. Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general terms as follows: "General power of council to enact
ordinances and make regulations. - The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations,
not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon
it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof,
and for the protection of property therein." 10 It is practically a reproduction of the former Section 39 of Municipal
Code.11An ordinance enacted by virtue thereof, according to Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court in the leading
case of United States v. Abendan 12"is valid, unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or
an Act of the Philippine Legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial,
discriminating, or in derogation of common right. Where the power to legislate upon a given subject, and the mode
of its exercise and the details of such legislation are not prescribed, the ordinance passed pursuant thereto must be
a reasonable exercise of the power, or it will be pronounced invalid." 13 In another leading case, United States v.
Salaveria, 14 the ponente this time being Justice Malcolm, where the present Administrative Code provision was
applied, it was stated by this Court: "The general welfare clause has two branches: One branch attaches itself to the
main trunk of municipal authority, and relates to such ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. With this class we are not
here directly concerned. The second branch of the clause is much more independent of the specific functions of the
council which are enumerated by law. It authorizes such ordinances as shall seem necessary and proper to provide
for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience
of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.' It is a general rule that
ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable,
consonant with the general powersand purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of
the State." 15 If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would
pass the test of validity. In the two leading cases above set forth, this Court had stressed reasonableness,
consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or
policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify
under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a
measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by
overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by
an absolute prohibition. The admonition in Salaveria should be heeded: "The Judiciary should not lightly set aside
legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police
regulation." 16 It is clear that in the guise of a police regulation, there was in this instance a clear invasion of personal
or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs and property in
terms of the investments made and salaries to be earned by those therein employed.

2. The decision now under review refers to Republic Act No. 938 as amended. 17 It was originally enacted on June
20, 1953. It is entitled: "AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO
REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF
AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS.' 18 Its first section insofar as
pertinent reads: "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power to regulate by
ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions,
cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement within its territorial
jurisdiction: ... " 19 Then on May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate,
but likewise "Prohibit ... " 20The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as Republic Act No. 938. It is
to be admitted that as thus amended, if only the above portion of the Act were considered, a municipal council may
go as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. If that were all, then the appealed decision is not devoid of
support in law. That is not all, however. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one whit. The exact
wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. There is thus support for the
view advanced by petitioners that to construe Republic Act No. 938 as allowing the prohibition of the operation of
night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. " 21 Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to
regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue,
the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to
provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, 22 in the language of the Administrative
Code, such competence extending to all "the great public needs, 23 to quote from Holmes, and to interdict any
calling, occupation, or enterprise. In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that
between two possible interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other
tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than one that would
affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself. We have done so before We do so again. 24

3. There is reinforcement to the conclusion reached by virtue of a specific provision of the recently-enacted Local
Government Code. 25The general welfare clause, a reiteration of the Administrative Code provision, is set forth in the
first paragraph of Section 149 defining the powers and duties of the sangguniang bayan. It read as follows: "(a)
Enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety,
comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general
welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein; ..." 26 There are
in addition provisions that may have a bearing on the question now before this Court. Thus the sangguniang
bayan shall "(rr) Regulate cafes, restaurants, beer-houses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses and lodging
houses, except travel agencies, tourist guides, tourist transports, hotels, resorts, de luxe restaurants, and tourist inns
of international standards which shall remain under the licensing and regulatory power of the Ministry of Tourism
which shall exercise such authority without infringing on the taxing or regulatory powers of the municipality; (ss)
Regulate public dancing schools, public dance halls, and sauna baths or massage parlors; (tt) Regulate the
establishment and operation of billiard pools, theatrical performances, circuses and other forms of entertainment;
..." 27 It is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but
not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under
review were sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs.
A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction.
That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to
appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result
of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their business. During such time, their
employees would undergo a period of deprivation. Certainly, if such an undesirable outcome can be avoided, it
should be. The law should not be susceptible to the reproach that it displays less than sympathetic concern for the
plight of those who, under a mistaken appreciation of a municipal power, were thus left without employment. Such a
deplorable consequence is to be avoided. If it were not thus, then the element of arbitrariness enters the picture.
That is to pay less, very much less, than full deference to the due process clause with its mandate of fairness and
reasonableness.

4. The conclusion reached by this Court is not to be interpreted as a retreat from its resolute stand sustaining police
power legislation to promote public morals. The commitment to such an Ideal forbids such a backward step.
Legislation of that character is deserving of the fullest sympathy from the judiciary. Accordingly, the judiciary has not
been hesitant to lend the weight of its support to measures that can be characterized as falling within that aspect of
the police power. Reference is made by respondents to Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc.
v. City Mayor of Manila. 28 There is a misapprehension as to what was decided by this Court. That was a regulatory
measure. Necessarily, there was no valid objection on due process or equal protection grounds. It did not prohibit
motels. It merely regulated the mode in which it may conduct business in order precisely to put an end to practices
which could encourage vice and immorality. This is an entirely different case. What was involved is a measure not
embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. Moreover, while it was
pointed out in the aforesaid Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. decision that there must be a
factual foundation of invalidity, it was likewise made clear that there is no need to satisfy such a requirement if a
statute were void on its face. That it certainly is if the power to enact such ordinance is at the most dubious and
under the present Local Government Code non-existent.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the decision of the lower court dated January 15, 1976 reversed,
set aside, and nullied. Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 of the Municipality of Bocaue is declared void and
unconstitutional. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court is hereby made permanent. No costs.

G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch
XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents.

City Fiscal for petitioners.

Manuel Villaruel, Jr. and Feliciano Tumale for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review which seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XVIII declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, of the Quezon City Council null and void.

Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND
WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION
THEREOF" provides:

Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside
for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City
for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area
so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than six
months from the date of approval of the application.

For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but seven years
after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the following resolution:

RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does hereby request the City
Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in
Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for
paupers burial.

Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced

Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII at Quezon
City, a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction (Sp. Proc. No. Q-
16002) seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question The respondent alleged that the same is contrary
to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code.

There being no issue of fact and the questions raised being purely legal both petitioners and respondent agreed
to the rendition of a judgment on the pleadings. The respondent court, therefore, rendered the decision declaring
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void.
A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City Government and City Council filed the instant petition.

Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power
and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argue
that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, " to make such
further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge
the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of
the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein."

On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking or confiscation of property is
obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be
used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property.

The respondent also stresses that the general welfare clause is not available as a source of power for the taking
of the property in this case because it refers to "the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property." The respondent points out that if an owner is deprived of his property
outright under the State's police power, the property is generally not taken for public use but is urgently and
summarily destroyed in order to promote the general welfare. The respondent cites the case of a nuisance per se
or the destruction of a house to prevent the spread of a conflagration.

We find the stand of the private respondent as well as the decision of the respondent Judge to be well-founded.
We quote with approval the lower court's ruling which declared null and void Section 9 of the questioned city
ordinance:

The issue is: Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?

An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any provision
that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police power to the City.
Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee,
and regulatesuch other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practised in
the City.' (Subsections 'C', Sec. 12, R.A. 537).

The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit (People vs. Esguerra, 81 PhiL 33,
Vega vs. Municipal Board of Iloilo, L-6765, May 12, 1954; 39 N.J. Law, 70, Mich. 396). A fortiori,
the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only
confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under Section
13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or
imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and maintain a private
cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled.' The confiscatory clause and the penal provision in effect
deter one from operating a memorial park cemetery. Neither can the ordinance in question be
justified under sub- section "t", Section 12 of Republic Act 537 which authorizes the City Council
to-

'prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and
provide for their burial in such proper place and in such manner as the council
may determine, subject to the provisions of the general law regulating burial
grounds and cemeteries and governing funerals and disposal of the dead.' (Sub-
sec. (t), Sec. 12, Rep. Act No. 537).

There is nothing in the above provision which authorizes confiscation or as euphemistically

termed by the respondents, 'donation'

We now come to the question whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid
exercise of police power. The police power of Quezon City is defined in sub-section 00, Sec. 12,
Rep. Act 537 which reads as follows:
 (00) To make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant to law as may
be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred
by this act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the
health and safety, promote, the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order,
comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the
protection of property therein; and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful
fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe under the provisions of
subsection (jj) of this section.

We start the discussion with a restatement of certain basic principles. Occupying the forefront in
the bill of rights is the provision which states that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law' (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution).

On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes
with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are
said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty.

Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property' (Quoted in Political Law by Tanada and Carreon, V-11,
p. 50). It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the
owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy
in order to promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the
government for injury sustained in consequence thereof (12 C.J. 623). It has been said that police
power is the most essential of government powers, at times the most insistent, and always one of
the least limitable of the powers of government (Ruby vs. Provincial Board, 39 PhiL 660; Ichong
vs. Hernandez, 1,7995, May 31, 1957). This power embraces the whole system of public
regulation (U.S. vs. Linsuya Fan, 10 PhiL 104). The Supreme Court has said that police power is
so far-reaching in scope that it has almost become impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its
existence from the very existence of the state itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in
its scope. Being coextensive with self-preservation and survival itself, it is the most positive and
active of all governmental processes, the most essential insistent and illimitable Especially it is so
under the modern democratic framework where the demands of society and nations have
multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions. The field and scope of police power have become
almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all
embracing and have transcended human foresight. Since the Courts cannot foresee the needs
and demands of public interest and welfare, they cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of
the police power by which and through which the state seeks to attain or achieve public interest
and welfare. (Ichong vs. Hernandez, L-7995, May 31, 1957).

The police power being the most active power of the government and the due process clause
being the broadest station on governmental power, the conflict between this power of government
and the due process clause of the Constitution is oftentimes inevitable.

It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually exercised in the form of
mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general
welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases
where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of
protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the
confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.

It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a
mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property
without due process of law, nay, even without compensation.

In sustaining the decision of the respondent court, we are not unmindful of the heavy burden shouldered by
whoever challenges the validity of duly enacted legislation whether national or local As early as 1913, this Court
ruled in Case v. Board of Health (24 PhiL 250) that the courts resolve every presumption in favor of validity and,
more so, where the ma corporation asserts that the ordinance was enacted to promote the common good and
general welfare.

In the leading case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila (20
SCRA 849) the Court speaking through the then Associate Justice and now Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando
stated

Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the a of any evidence to offset the
presumption of validity that attaches to a statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by
Justice Malcolm 'The presumption is all in favor of validity. ... The action of the elected
representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature
of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular ... municipality and with all the facts
and lances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by
enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well-
being of the people. ... The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is
not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation. (U.S. v.
Salaveria (1918], 39 Phil. 102, at p. 111. There was an affirmation of the presumption of validity of
municipal ordinance as announced in the leading Salaveria decision in Ebona v. Daet, [1950]85
Phil. 369.)

We have likewise considered the principles earlier stated in Case v. Board of Health supra :

... Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as the general welfare clauses, a
city, by virtue of its police power, may adopt ordinances to the peace, safety, health, morals and
the best and highest interests of the municipality. It is a well-settled principle, growing out of the
nature of well-ordered and society, that every holder of property, however absolute and may be
his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the
rights of the community. An property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, which
are necessary to the common good and general welfare. Rights of property, like all other social
and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall
prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations, established
by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the
constitution, may think necessary and expedient. The state, under the police power, is possessed
with plenary power to deal with all matters relating to the general health, morals, and safety of the
people, so long as it does not contravene any positive inhibition of the organic law and providing
that such power is not exercised in such a manner as to justify the interference of the courts to
prevent positive wrong and oppression.

but find them not applicable to the facts of this case.

There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order,
safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain
area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building
or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of
Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of
the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the
provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the
dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide
its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been
the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just
compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions
to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to
buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said
 requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome
environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when
individual lots are sold to home-owners.

As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers of the municipal
corporation, not on any express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of power. The clause has
always received broad and liberal interpretation but we cannot stretch it to cover this particular taking. Moreover,
the questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had incorporated. received necessary
licenses and permits and commenced operating. The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery cannot even
be considered as having been impliedly acknowledged by the private respondent when it accepted the permits to
commence operations.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent court is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Relova, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

G.R. No. L-24670 December 14, 1979

ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO., defendant-appellee.

Ramirez & Ortigas for appellant.

Tañada, Teehankee & Carreon for appellee.

SANTOS, J.:

An appeal interposed on June 23, 1965 by plaintiff-appellant, Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership, from the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, at Pasig, Hon. Andres Reyes presiding, which dismissed its
complaint in Civil Case No. 7706, entitled, "Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, plaintiff, v. Feati Bank and
Trust Company, defendant," for lack of merit.

The following facts — a reproduction of the lower court's findings, which, in turn, are based on a stipulation of facts
entered into by the parties are not disputed. Plaintiff (formerly known as "Ortigas, Madrigal y Cia") is a limited
partnership and defendant Feati Bank and Trust Co., is a corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with
the laws of the Philippines. Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the public,
particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong, Rizal. 1

On March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as vendor, and Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles, as vendees, entered
into separate agreements of sale on installments over two parcels of land, known as Lots Nos. 5 and 6, Block 31, of
the Highway Hills Subdivision, situated at Mandaluyong, Rizal. On July 19, 1962, the said vendees transferred their
rights and interests over the aforesaid lots in favor of one Emma Chavez. Upon completion of payment of the
purchase price, the plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez. Both the
agreements (of sale on installment) and the deeds of sale contained the stipulations or restrictions that:
 1. The parcel of land subject of this deed of sale shall be used the Buyer exclusively for residential
purposes, and she shall not be entitled to take or remove soil, stones or gravel from it or any other
lots belonging to the Seller.

2. All buildings and other improvements (except the fence) which may be constructed at any time in
said lot must be, (a) of strong materials and properly painted, (b) provided with modern sanitary
installations connected either to the public sewer or to an approved septic tank, and (c) shall not be
at a distance of less than two (2) meters from its boundary lines. 2

The above restrictions were later annotated in TCT Nos. 101509 and 101511 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal,
covering the said lots and issued in the name of Emma Chavez.3

Eventually, defendant-appellee acquired Lots Nos. 5 and 6, with TCT Nos. 101613 and 106092 issued in its name,
respectively and the building restrictions were also annotated therein. 4 Defendant-appellee bought Lot No. 5 directly
from Emma Chavez, "free from all liens and encumbrances as stated in Annex 'D', 5 while Lot No. 6 was acquired
from Republic Flour Mills through a "Deed of Exchange," Annex "E". 6TCT No. 101719 in the name of Republic Flour
Mills likewise contained the same restrictions, although defendant-appellee claims that Republic Flour Mills
purchased the said Lot No. 6 "in good faith. free from all liens and encumbrances," as stated in the Deed of Sale,
Annex "F" 7 between it and Emma Chavez.

Plaintiff-appellant claims that the restrictions annotated on TCT Nos. 101509, 101511, 101719, 101613, and 106092
were imposed as part of its general building scheme designed for the beautification and development of the
Highway Hills Subdivision which forms part of the big landed estate of plaintiff-appellant where commercial and
industrial sites are also designated or established. 8

Defendant-appellee, upon the other hand, maintains that the area along the western part of Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue (EDSA) from Shaw Boulevard to Pasig River, has been declared a commercial and industrial zone, per
Resolution No. 27, dated February 4, 1960 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal. 9 It alleges that plaintiff-
appellant 'completely sold and transferred to third persons all lots in said subdivision facing Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue" 10 and the subject lots thereunder were acquired by it "only on July 23, 1962 or more than two (2) years
after the area ... had been declared a commercial and industrial zone ... 11

On or about May 5, 1963, defendant-appellee began laying the foundation and commenced the construction of a
building on Lots Nos. 5 and 6, to be devoted to banking purposes, but which defendant-appellee claims could also
be devoted to, and used exclusively for, residential purposes. The following day, plaintiff-appellant demanded in
writing that defendant-appellee stop the construction of the commerical building on the said lots. The latter refused
to comply with the demand, contending that the building was being constructed in accordance with the zoning
regulations, defendant-appellee having filed building and planning permit applications with the Municipality of
Mandaluyong, and it had accordingly obtained building and planning permits to proceed with the construction.12

On the basis of the foregoing facts, Civil Case No. 7706, supra, was submitted in the lower court for decision. The
complaint sought, among other things, the issuance of "a writ of preliminary injunction ... restraining and enjoining
defendant, its agents, assigns, and those acting on its or their behalf from continuing or completing the construction
of a commercial bank building in the premises ... involved, with the view to commanding the defendant to observe
and comply with the building restrictions annotated in the defendant's transfer certificate of title."

In deciding the said case, the trial court considered, as the fundamental issue, whether or not the resolution of the
Municipal Council of Mandaluyong declaring Lots Nos. 5 and 6, among others, as part of the commercial and
industrial zone of the municipality, prevailed over the building restrictions imposed by plaintiff-appellant on the lots in
question. 13 The records do not show that a writ of preliminary injunction was issued.

The trial court upheld the defendant-appellee and dismissed the complaint, holding that the subject restrictions were
subordinate to Municipal Resolution No. 27, supra. It predicated its conclusion on the exercise of police power of the
said municipality, and stressed that private interest should "bow down to general interest and welfare. " In short, it
upheld the classification by the Municipal Council of the area along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue as a commercial
and industrial zone, and held that the same rendered "ineffective and unenforceable" the restrictions in question as
against defendant-appellee.14 The trial court decision further emphasized that it "assumes said resolution to be valid,
considering that there is no issue raised by either of the parties as to whether the same is null and void. 15
On March 2, 1965, plaintiff-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision, 16 which motion was
opposed by defendant-appellee on March 17, 1965.17 It averred, among others, in the motion for reconsideration that
defendant- appellee "was duty bound to comply with the conditions of the contract of sale in its favor, which
conditions were duly annotated in the Transfer Certificates of Title issued in her (Emma Chavez) favor." It also
invited the trial court's attention to its claim that the Municipal Council had (no) power to nullify the contractual
obligations assumed by the defendant corporation." 18

The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration in its order of March 26, 1965. 19

On April 2, 1965 plaintiff-appellant filed its notice of appeal from the decision dismissing the complaint and from the
order of March 26, 1965 denying the motion for reconsideration, its record on appeal, and a cash appeal
bond." 20 On April 14, the appeal was given due course 21 and the records of the case were elevated directly to this
Court, since only questions of law are raised. 22

Plaintiff-appellant alleges in its brief that the trial court erred —

I. When it sustained the view that Resolution No. 27, series of 1960 of the Municipal Council of
Mandaluyong, Rizal declaring Lots Nos. 5 and 6, among others, as part of the commercial and
industrial zone, is valid because it did so in the exercise of its police power; and

II. When it failed to consider whether or not the Municipal Council had the power to nullify the
contractual obligations assumed by defendant-appellee and when it did not make a finding that the
building was erected along the property line, when it should have been erected two meters away
from said property line. 23

The defendant-appellee submitted its counter-assignment of errors. In this connection, We already had occasion to
hold in Relativo v. Castro 24that "(I)t is not incumbent on the appellee, who occupies a purely defensive position, and
is seeking no affirmative relief, to make assignments of error, "

The only issues to be resolved, therefore, are: (1) whether Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police
power; and (2) whether the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations assumed by
defendant-appellee.

1. The contention that the trial court erred in sustaining the validity of Resolution No. 27 as an exercise of police
power is without merit. In the first place, the validity of the said resolution was never questioned before it. The rule is
that the question of law or of fact which may be included in the appellant's assignment of errors must be those which
have been raised in the court below, and are within the issues framed by the parties. 25 The object of requiring the
parties to present all questions and issues to the lower court before they can be presented to the appellate court is
to enable the lower court to pass thereon, so that the appellate court upon appeal may determine whether or not
such ruling was erroneous. The requirement is in furtherance of justice in that the other party may not be taken by
surprise. 26 The rule against the practice of blowing "hot and cold" by assuming one position in the trial court and
another on appeal will, in the words of Elliot, prevent deception. 27 For it is well-settled that issues or defenses not
raised 28 or properly litigated 29 or pleaded 30 in the Court below cannot be raised or entertained on appeal.

In this particular case, the validity of the resolution was admitted at least impliedly, in the stipulation of facts below.
when plaintiff-appellant did not dispute the same. The only controversy then as stated by the trial court was whether
or not the resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong ... which declared lots Nos. 4 and 5 among others, as
a part of the commercial and industrial zone of the municipality, prevails over the restrictions constituting as
encumbrances on the lots in question. 31 Having admitted the validity of the subject resolution below, even if
impliedly, plaintiff-appellant cannot now change its position on appeal.

But, assuming arguendo that it is not yet too late in the day for plaintiff-appellant to raise the issue of the invalidity of
the municipal resolution in question, We are of the opinion that its posture is unsustainable. Section 3 of R.A. No.
2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act," 32 empowers a Municipal Council "to adopt zoning and
subdivision ordinances or regulations"; 33 for the municipality. Clearly, the law does not restrict the exercise of the
power through an ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a
regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of the word "regulation" under the provision. As a matter of fact
the same section declares that the power exists "(A)ny provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding ... "
An examination of Section 12 of the same law 34 which prescribes the rules for its interpretation likewise reveals that
the implied power of a municipality should be "liberally construed in its favor" and that "(A)ny fair and reasonable
doubt as to the existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of the local government and it shall be
presumed to exist." The same section further mandates that the general welfare clause be liberally interpreted in
case of doubt, so as to give more power to local governments in promoting the economic conditions, social welfare
and material progress of the people in the community. The only exceptions under Section 12 are existing vested
rights arising out of a contract between "a province, city or municipality on one hand and a third party on the other,"
in which case the original terms and provisions of the contract should govern. The exceptions, clearly, do not apply
in the case at bar.

2. With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obligations assumed by the
defendant-appellee – referring to the restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in the corresponding
Transfer Certificates of Title issued to defendant-appellee – it should be stressed, that while non-impairment of
contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate
exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety and general welfare of the people. 35 Invariably described as "the most essential, insistent, and
illimitable of powers" 36and "in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of government, 37 the exercise of the
power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, 'whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there
having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee. 38 As this Court
held through Justice Jose P. Bengzon in Philippine Long Distance Company vs. City of Davao, et al. 39police power
"is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions; it is not, confined within narrow circumscriptions of
precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life." We were even
more emphatic in Vda. de Genuino vs. The Court of Agrarian Relations, et al., 40 when We declared: "We do not see
why public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should not be made to prevail through the
state's exercise of its police power.

Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of highway 54, now E. de los Santos Avenue (EDSA, for short)
from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone, was obviously passed by the
Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety,
peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality, Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions
prevailing in the area, especially where lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. The lots themselves not only front the
highway; industrial and commercial complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery which
runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the
resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route.
Having been expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations, the
municipality of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal 'council, was reasonably, if not perfectly, justified under the
circumstances, in passing the subject resolution.

The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances, stressed this Court, speaking thru Justice
Laurel in the leading case of Calalang v. Williams et al., 41 Thus-

As was said in the case of Dobbins v. Los Angeles (195 US 223, 238 49 L. ed. 169), 'the right to
exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a business lawful today may in the future,
because of changed situation, the growth of population or other causes, become a menace to the
public health and welfare, and be required to yield to the public good.' And in People v. Pomar (46
Phil. 440), it was observed that 'advancing civilization is bringing within the scope of police power of
the state today things which were not thought of as being with in such power yesterday. The
development of civilization), the rapidly increasing population, the growth of public opinion, with an
increasing desire on the part of the masses and of the government to look after and care for the
interests of the individuals of the state, have brought within the police power many questions for
regulation which formerly were not so considered. 42 (Emphasis, supplied.)

Thus, the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
business and occupations. Persons may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the
general comfort health and prosperity of the state 43 and to this fundamental aim of our Government, the rights of the
individual are subordinated. 44
The need for reconciling the non-impairment clause of the Constitution and the valid exercise of police power may
also be gleaned from Helvering v. Davis 45 wherein Mr. Justice Cardozo, speaking for the Court, resolved the conflict
"between one welfare and another, between particular and general, thus —

Nor is the concept of the general welfare static. Needs that were narrow or parochial a century ago
may be interwoven in our day with the well-being of the nation What is critical or urgent changes with
the times. 46

The motives behind the passage of the questioned resolution being reasonable, and it being a " legitimate response
to a felt public need," 47not whimsical or oppressive, the non-impairment of contracts clause of the Constitution will
not bar the municipality's proper exercise of the power. Now Chief Justice Fernando puts it aptly when he declared:
"Police power legislation then is not likely to succumb to the challenge that thereby contractual rights are rendered
nugatory." 48

Furthermore, We restated in Philippine American Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor General49 that laws and reservation of
essential attributes of sovereign power are read into contracts agreed upon by the parties. Thus —

Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the parties,
but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a
postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairments presupposes the
maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile – a government
which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society.

Again, We held in Liberation Steamship Co., Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 50 through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, that
... the law forms part of, and is read into, every contract, unless clearly excluded therefrom in those cases where
such exclusion is allowed." The decision in Maritime Company of the Philippines v. Reparations
Commission, 51 written for the Court by Justice Fernando, now Chief Justice, restates the rule.

One last observation. Appellant has placed unqualified reliance on American jurisprudence and authorities 52 to
bolster its theory that the municipal resolution in question cannot nullify or supersede the agreement of the parties
embodied in the sales contract, as that, it claims, would impair the obligation of contracts in violation of the
Constitution. Such reliance is misplaced.

In the first place, the views set forth in American decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in the
Philippines, the laws of which must necessarily be construed in accordance with the intention of its own lawmakers
and such intent may be deduced from the language of each law and the context of other local legislation related
thereto. 53 and Burgess, et al v. Magarian, et al., 55 two Of the cases cited by plaintiff-appellant, lend support to the
conclusion reached by the trial court, i.e. that the municipal resolution supersedes/supervenes over the contractual
undertaking between the parties. Dolan v. Brown, states that "Equity will not, as a rule, enforce a restriction upon the
use of property by injunction where the property has so changed in character and environment as to make it unfit or
unprofitable for use should the restriction be enforced, but will, in such a case, leave the complainant to whatever
remedy he may have at law. 56 (Emphasis supplied.) Hence, the remedy of injunction in Dolan vs. Brown was denied
on the specific holding that "A grantor may lawfully insert in his deed conditions or restrictions which are not against
public policy and do not materially impair the beneficial enjoyment of the estate. 57 Applying the principle just stated
to the present controversy, We can say that since it is now unprofitable, nay a hazard to the health and comfort, to
use Lots Nos. 5 and 6 for strictly residential purposes, defendants- appellees should be permitted, on the strength of
the resolution promulgated under the police power of the municipality, to use the same for commercial purposes.
In Burgess v. Magarian et al. it was, held that "restrictive covenants running with the land are binding on all
subsequent purchasers ... " However, Section 23 of the zoning ordinance involved therein contained
a proviso expressly declaring that the ordinance was not intended "to interfere with or abrogate or annul any
easements, covenants or other agreement between parties." 58 In the case at bar, no such proviso is found in the
subject resolution.

It is, therefore, clear that even if the subject building restrictions were assumed by the defendant-appellee as vendee
of Lots Nos. 5 and 6, in the corresponding deeds of sale, and later, in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 101613 and
106092, the contractual obligations so assumed cannot prevail over Resolution No. 27, of the Municipality of
Mandaluyong, which has validly exercised its police power through the said resolution. Accordingly, the building
restrictions, which declare Lots Nos. 5 and 6 as residential, cannot be enforced.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from, dismissing the complaint, is hereby AFFIRMED.
"without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994

MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,

vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION, respondents.

Aquilino G. Pimentel, Jr. and Associates for petitioners.

R.R. Torralba & Associates for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic
organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious elements echoed the objection and so did the women's
groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city legislators. The media trumpeted the
protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city.

The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its
operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties
Corporation, Inc., one of the herein private respondents, renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to
inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season.

The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992,
it enacted Ordinance No. 3353 reading as follows:

ORDINANCE NO. 3353

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT AND CANCELLING

EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND ALLOWING TO
BE USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF CASINO.

BE IT ORDAINED by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro, in session

assembled that:

Sec. 1. — That pursuant to the policy of the city banning the operation of casino within its territorial
jurisdiction, no business permit shall be issued to any person, partnership or corporation for the
operation of casino within the city limits.

Sec. 2. — That it shall be a violation of existing business permit by any persons, partnership or
corporation to use its business establishment or portion thereof, or allow the use thereof by others
for casino operation and other gambling activities.

Sec. 3. — PENALTIES. — Any violation of such existing business permit as defined in the preceding
section shall suffer the following penalties, to wit:
 a) Suspension of the business permit for sixty (60) days for the first
offense and a fine of P1,000.00/day

b) Suspension of the business permit for Six (6) months for the
second offense, and a fine of P3,000.00/day

c) Permanent revocation of the business permit and imprisonment of

One (1) year, for the third and subsequent offenses.

Sec. 4. — This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days from publication thereof.

Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93 reading as follows:

ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND PROVIDING PENALTY FOR

VIOLATION THEREFOR.

WHEREAS, the City Council established a policy as early as 1990 against CASINO under its
Resolution No. 2295;

WHEREAS, on October 14, 1992, the City Council passed another Resolution No. 2673, reiterating
its policy against the establishment of CASINO;

WHEREAS, subsequently, thereafter, it likewise passed Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the
issuance of Business Permit and to cancel existing Business Permit to any establishment for the
using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of CASINO;

WHEREAS, under Art. 3, section 458, No. (4), sub paragraph VI of the Local Government Code of
1991 (Rep. Act 7160) and under Art. 99, No. (4), Paragraph VI of the implementing rules of the Local
Government Code, the City Council as the Legislative Body shall enact measure to suppress any
activity inimical to public morals and general welfare of the people and/or regulate or prohibit such
activity pertaining to amusement or entertainment in order to protect social and moral welfare of the
community;

NOW THEREFORE,

BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council in session duly assembled that:

Sec. 1. — The operation of gambling CASINO in the City of Cagayan de Oro is hereby prohibited.

Sec. 2. — Any violation of this Ordinance shall be subject to the following penalties:

a) Administrative fine of P5,000.00 shall be imposed against the proprietor, partnership or

corporation undertaking the operation, conduct, maintenance of gambling CASINO in the City and
closure thereof;

b) Imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year or a fine in the amount of
P5,000.00 or both at the discretion of the court against the manager, supervisor, and/or any person
responsible in the establishment, conduct and maintenance of gambling CASINO.

Sec. 3. — This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days after its publication in a local newspaper of
general circulation.

Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and
supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the
ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was
denied on July 13, 1993. 2

Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor are now before us in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. 3 They aver that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that:

1. Under existing laws, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro does not have
the power and authority to prohibit the establishment and operation of a PAGCOR gambling casino
within the City's territorial limits.

2. The phrase "gambling and other prohibited games of chance" found in Sec. 458, par. (a), sub-par.
(1) — (v) of R.A. 7160 could only mean "illegal gambling."

3. The questioned Ordinances in effect annul P.D. 1869 and are therefore invalid on that point.

4. The questioned Ordinances are discriminatory to casino and partial to cockfighting and are
therefore invalid on that point.

5. The questioned Ordinances are not reasonable, not consonant with the general powers and
purposes of the instrumentality concerned and inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.

6. It had no option but to follow the ruling in the case of Basco, et al. v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649,
May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 53 in disposing of the issues presented in this present case.

PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance,
including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine
Amusements and Gaming Corporation, 4 this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the
benefits of the entity to the national economy as the third highest revenue-earner in the government, next only to the
BIR and the Bureau of Customs.

Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes
indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the
General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows:

Sec. 16. — General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental
for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the
general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure
and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and
safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their
residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically declares that:

Sec. 458. — Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. — (a) The Sangguniang Panlungsod, as
the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for
the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the
proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code,
and shall:

(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city
government, and in this connection, shall:

xxx xxx xxx

 (v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose
appropriate penalties for habitual drunkenness in public places,
vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and maintenance
of houses of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited games of
chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money or property,
drug addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile
delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or
pornographic materials or publications, and such other activities
inimical to the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the city;

This section also authorizes the local government units to regulate properties and businesses within their territorial
limits in the interest of the general welfare. 5

The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, the Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of
casinos because they involve games of chance, which are detrimental to the people. Gambling is not allowed by
general law and even by the Constitution itself. The legislative power conferred upon local government units may be
exercised over all kinds of gambling and not only over "illegal gambling" as the respondents erroneously argue.
Even if the operation of casinos may have been permitted under P.D. 1869, the government of Cagayan de Oro City
has the authority to prohibit them within its territory pursuant to the authority entrusted to it by the Local Government
Code.

It is submitted that this interpretation is consonant with the policy of local autonomy as mandated in Article II,
Section 25, and Article X of the Constitution, as well as various other provisions therein seeking to strengthen the
character of the nation. In giving the local government units the power to prevent or suppress gambling and other
social problems, the Local Government Code has recognized the competence of such communities to determine
and adopt the measures best expected to promote the general welfare of their inhabitants in line with the policies of
the State.

The petitioners also stress that when the Code expressly authorized the local government units to prevent and
suppress gambling and other prohibited games of chance, like craps, baccarat, blackjack and roulette, it
meant all forms of gambling without distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos. 6 Otherwise, it
would have expressly excluded from the scope of their power casinos and other forms of gambling authorized by
special law, as it could have easily done. The fact that it did not do so simply means that the local government units
are permitted to prohibit all kinds of gambling within their territories, including the operation of casinos.

The adoption of the Local Government Code, it is pointed out, had the effect of modifying the charter of the
PAGCOR. The Code is not only a later enactment than P.D. 1869 and so is deemed to prevail in case of
inconsistencies between them. More than this, the powers of the PAGCOR under the decree are expressly
discontinued by the Code insofar as they do not conform to its philosophy and provisions, pursuant to Par. (f) of its
repealing clause reading as follows:

(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and
administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of
this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

It is also maintained that assuming there is doubt regarding the effect of the Local Government Code on P.D. 1869,
the doubt must be resolved in favor of the petitioners, in accordance with the direction in the Code calling for its
liberal interpretation in favor of the local government units. Section 5 of the Code specifically provides:

Sec. 5. Rules of Interpretation. — In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the following
rules shall apply:

(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and
in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the
lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be
interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned;

xxx xxx xxx

 (c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to
local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the
people in the community; . . . (Emphasis supplied.)

Finally, the petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically harmful and cite various provisions of the Constitution
and several decisions of this Court expressive of the general and official disapprobation of the vice. They invoke the
State policies on the family and the proper upbringing of the youth and, as might be expected, call attention to the
old case of U.S. v. Salaveria,7 which sustained a municipal ordinance prohibiting the playing of panguingue. The
petitioners decry the immorality of gambling. They also impugn the wisdom of P.D. 1869 (which they describe as "a
martial law instrument") in creating PAGCOR and authorizing it to operate casinos "on land and sea within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines."

This is the opportune time to stress an important point.

The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered
inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing
gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the
exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may
prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has
prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress
has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said
that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. 8 That is the prerogative of the political
departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicibility of statutes are not addressed
to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs
in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, they are
answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the
courts of justice.

The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity of Ordinance No. 3355 and Ordinance No.
3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City. And we shall do so only by the
criteria laid down by law and not by our own convictions on the propriety of gambling.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions 9 has held that to be valid, an ordinance
must conform to the following substantive requirements:

1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.

2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.

3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.

4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.

5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.

6) It must not be unreasonable.

We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to
prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision
excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The petitioners are less than
accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded such games of chance but did not. In fact it does. The
language of the section is clear and unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be
interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is associated. Accordingly, we conclude
that since the word "gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited games of chance," the word should be read
as referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or
suppressed.
We could stop here as this interpretation should settle the problem quite conclusively. But we will not. The vigorous
efforts of the petitioners on behalf of the inhabitants of Cagayan de Oro City, and the earnestness of their advocacy,
deserve more than short shrift from this Court.

The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied
therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan
de Oro City. The petitioners have an ingenious answer to this misgiving. They deny that it is the ordinances that
have changed P.D. 1869 for an ordinance admittedly cannot prevail against a statute. Their theory is that the
change has been made by the Local Government Code itself, which was also enacted by the national lawmaking
authority. In their view, the decree has been, not really repealed by the Code, but merely "modified pro tanto" in the
sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino over the objection of the local government unit concerned. This
modification of P.D. 1869 by the Local Government Code is permissible because one law can change or repeal
another law.

It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting that the decree has only been "modified pro
tanto," they are actually arguing that it is already dead, repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because
the Code has shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize and regulate casinos. Strictly speaking, its operations may
now be not only prohibited by the local government unit; in fact, the prohibition is not only discretionary
but mandated by Section 458 of the Code if the word "shall" as used therein is to be given its accepted meaning.
Local government units have now no choice but to prevent and suppress gambling, which in the petitioners' view
includes both legal and illegal gambling. Under this construction, PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to
regulate or centralize as they must all be prohibited by the local government units pursuant to the mandatory duty
imposed upon them by the Code. In this situation, PAGCOR cannot continue to exist except only as a toothless tiger
or a white elephant and will no longer be able to exercise its powers as a prime source of government revenue
through the operation of casinos.

It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of the repealing clause, conveniently discarding the rest
of the provision which painstakingly mentions the specific laws or the parts thereof which are repealed (or modified)
by the Code. Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of them. A reading of the entire repealing clause, which is
reproduced below, will disclose the omission:

Sec. 534. Repealing Clause. — (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the "Local
Government Code," Executive Order No. 112 (1987), and Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are
hereby repealed.

(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees, orders, instructions,
memoranda and issuances related to or concerning the barangay are hereby repealed.

(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regarding hospital fund; Section
3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act. No. 5447 regarding the Special Education Fund; Presidential
Decree No. 144 as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential Decree No.
231 as amended; Presidential Decree No. 436 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and
Presidential Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed and
rendered of no force and effect.

(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it governs locally-funded projects.

(e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they are inconsistent with
the provisions of this Code: Sections 2, 16, and 29 of Presidential Decree No. 704; Sections 12 of
Presidential Decree No. 87, as amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended; and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 972, as
amended, and

(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and
administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of
this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and
unmistakable showing of such intention. In Lichauco & Co. v. Apostol, 10 this Court explained:

The cases relating to the subject of repeal by implication all proceed on the assumption that if the act
of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the lawmaking power to abrogate the prior law,
this intention must be given effect; but there must always be a sufficient revelation of this intention,
and it has become an unbending rule of statutory construction that the intention to repeal a former
law will not be imputed to the Legislature when it appears that the two statutes, or provisions, with
reference to which the question arises bear to each other the relation of general to special.

There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869. On the contrary, as the private respondent points
out, PAGCOR is mentioned as the source of funding in two later enactments of Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309, creating
a Board of Claims under the Department of Justice for the benefit of victims of unjust punishment or detention or of
violent crimes, and R.A. 7648, providing for measures for the solution of the power crisis. PAGCOR revenues are
tapped by these two statutes. This would show that the PAGCOR charter has not been repealed by the Local
Government Code but has in fact been improved as it were to make the entity more responsive to the fiscal
problems of the government.

It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another in an inevitably destructive
confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve a becoming
respect as the handiwork of a coordinate branch of the government. On the assumption of a conflict between P.D.
1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both by
harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in the case before us. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is
to hold that under the Local Government Code, local government units may (and indeed must) prevent and
suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The
exception reserved in such laws must be read into the Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally effective
and mutually complementary.

This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal and those authorized
by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern concept; it is probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so.
The petitioners' suggestion that the Code authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the
distinction between these two forms of gambling without a clear indication that this is the will of the legislature.
Plausibly, following this theory, the City of Manila could, by mere ordinance, prohibit the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office from conducting a lottery as authorized by R.A. 1169 and B.P. 42 or stop the races at the San
Lazaro Hippodrome as authorized by R.A. 309 and R.A. 983.

In light of all the above considerations, we see no way of arriving at the conclusion urged on us by the petitioners
that the ordinances in question are valid. On the contrary, we find that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has
the character and force of a statute, as well as the public policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of
certain games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in general.

The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal
governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers
conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo
the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the
mandate of the statute.

Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the
legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it
may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional
limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so
great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the
State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the
corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the
legislature. 11
This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by
the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from
that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly
reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy.
The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the
Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, 12 which cannot now be
withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local
government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.

The Court understands and admires the concern of the petitioners for the welfare of their constituents and their
apprehensions that the welfare of Cagayan de Oro City will be endangered by the opening of the casino. We share
the view that "the hope of large or easy gain, obtained without special effort, turns the head of the workman" 13 and
that "habitual gambling is a cause of laziness and ruin." 14 In People v. Gorostiza, 15 we declared: "The social scourge
of gambling must be stamped out. The laws against gambling must be enforced to the limit." George Washington
called gambling "the child of avarice, the brother of iniquity and the father of mischief." Nevertheless, we must
recognize the power of the legislature to decide, in its own wisdom, to legalize certain forms of gambling, as was
done in P.D. 1869 and impliedly affirmed in the Local Government Code. That decision can be revoked by this Court
only if it contravenes the Constitution as the touchstone of all official acts. We do not find such contravention here.

We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and
sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the
Local Government Code, which empowers the local government units to prevent or suppress only those forms of
gambling prohibited by law.

Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or
nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro
City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No.
3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to
P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.