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Q1. How do you think China feels about the US being welcomed into the group, in
light of recent maritime spats especially?
ANSWER: Ever since the idea of the East Asia Summit arose, and after its meeting,
the question of membership and membership expansion has been a continuing
source of discussion. China prefers the ASEAN Plus Three framework but has
gradually conceded to ASEAN’s preference for a larger body, first incorporating India,
Australia and New Zealand, and now Russia and the United States. Adding both India
and the US was designed to balance China. China has adjusted to this. It cannot
support ASEAN‐led regionalism and its centrality in the regional architecture, on the
one hand, and oppose ASEAN when ASEAN suggests expanding membership.
The EAS has not ventured into security issues and maritime territorial disputes in
particular. Although China ‘spat the dummy’ at the 17th ASEAN Regional Forum when
the South China Sea was raised, China has since simmered down. China is now more
reassured following the inaugural ASEAN Defence Ministers Plus Eight meeting
where the South China Sea was not on the formal agenda. China has no real
concerns that sensitive maritime sovereignty issues will be raised at the EAS. The US
will not be formally represented at head of government level until next year’s
summit in Indonesia. Before then President Hu Jintao will have visited the White
House and met with President Obama. This so‐called Group of 2 will set the
framework for dealing with pressing security concerns, not the EAS.
Q2. Will China see it as a setback in its longer‐term goal of reducing US reliance in
the region?
ANSWER: China and the United States are joined at the hip economically. They have
no choice but to cooperate with each other while sharing differences. China would
like to see less US military presence but recognizes that the US plays a stabilizing role
in East Asia. The US presence keeps Japan from militarizing and going nuclear and
the US military lends stability to the Korean Peninsula, for example.
China’s smile diplomacy has resulted in deep enmeshment with ASEAN and East
Asian regionalism. China is taking a long term view about its rise and what it believes
will be its eventual displacement of the United States as number one in East Asia.
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China will see US membership in the EAS as both a challenge and opportunity. It is in
China’s own interest to be seen to be working constructively with the US. The
challenge for China is to be seen as part of the solution and not part of the problem.
The opportunity for China is to take a leadership role in tandem with the US and
other states in East Asia.
The prospect of US membership is not something new. China has had time to adjust.
China sought to keep the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) process central to East Asia
regionalism and was unenthusiastic about the EAS. Gradually China began to play a
less zero‐sum game and began supporting both the APT and the EAS. The struggle
for influence is not over membership but over agenda setting. The role of the EAS is
not yet clear. What is new is the Obama Administration’s decision to engage with
East Asia on a multilateral basis and join the EAS.
Q3, What about Russia? We've heard a lot about strategic American influences in the
region (the US has made it clear it wants free access to shipping lanes), but wherelie
Russia's main interests in the region? What does it stand to gain from joining the
EAS?
ANSWER: Russia is not a major player in East Asia and is unlikely to become one in
the next decade. However, the Russian Federation does border on the Pacific, Russia
is a nuclear power and Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. In
regional terms, Russia has economic linkages with Vietnam especially in the joint
development of oil and gas. Russia is in on the ground floor to develop Vietnam’s
nuclear energy industry. Russia has stepped up arms sales to Vietnam, Indonesia and
Malaysia and may be considering a regional arms service and repair center.
Russia acquires status and prestige as a member of the EAS and this accords it some
influence. Russia is probably motivated by the desire not to be shut out. It sought
membership when the EAS was first created in 2004 but was accorded only observer
status. The package deal of admitting the US and Russia gives the EAS a more
multipolar flavor. Russia can be expected to act independently. From ASEAN’s point
of view this mitigates Sino‐American rivalry from dominating the EAS.