The Past and Present Society

The Sense of the Past and the Origins of Sociology

Author(s): Philip Abrams
Source: Past & Present, No. 55 (May, 1972), pp. 18-32
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Past and Present Society
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THE SENSE OF THE PAST AND THE ORIGINS
OF SOCIOLOGY *
SOCIOLOGY IS AN ATTEMPT TO UNDERSTANDTHE DIRECTION OF CHANGE.
More emphatically, it is a scienceof social development. This is
notjusta matterofitsearlyentanglement withevolutionism.If one
asks what sort of projectsociologywas for Max Weber or is for
TalcottParsons,if one seeksthe underlying significance of the mass
of apparently disconnected empiricalwork,or the commonconcerns
of,say,TheodorGeigerand RaymondAron,one discoversa diverse
but sustainedand remarkably coherenteffort, firstto identify indus-
trialismas a typeof societyin contra-distinction to a pre-industrial
typeortypes,and secondto tellindustrial manwhereindustrialization
is going. Everyso oftenthismaincommitment ofsociologyappears
to go underground, as whenDurkheimthoughthe had buriedComte
and Spencerby constructing a non-historical
scienceof social facts.
But on each occasionwhatwas takento be a graveturnsout to have
been onlya tunnel,as whenDurkheimhimselfreverted to a rampant
historicism in orderto explainthe social functionsof religion. In
1937 we find ProfessorParsons firmlyrepudiatingevolutionary
interestsin the openingsentencesof his manifesto fora new, non-
historicalsociology:"Who now reads HerbertSpencer?" But by
1967 it is apparentthat Parsons himselfhas been busy reading
Spencerand is devotinghis energyto just the old Spencerianquest
for evolutionary universalsand stagesof development.1Certainly
Comte and Spencerwould have feltquite at home in the plenary
sessionsof the 1970 World Congressof Sociology,2in whichthe
effortto understandthe futureby extrapolating tendenciesfrom
relationshipspresumedto existbetweenabstractmodelsof past and
presentwas takenas seriouslyas it had everbeen in theirday.
Whatthedisciplineis after,in otherwords,is notjustexplanations
ofsocialbehaviour,buttendentious explanations ofsocialbehaviour:
"a science to teach the laws of tendencies",as Buckle put it.3
* This paper is based on my paper to the 1970 Past and Present Conference
on "The Sense of the Past and History". Since then some of the material it
contains has been used in my inaugural lecture, Being and Becoming in
Sociology(Durham, 1972).
1 T. Parsons, The Structureof Social Action (New York, 1937); Societies:
Evolutionaryand ComparativePerspectives(New Jersey,1970).
2 VIIth World Congress of Sociology, Varna, 1970, Transactions(Inter-
national Sociological Association, 1971).
S T. H. Buckle, Historyof Civilisationin England,i (London, 1857), p. 27.

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 THE SENSE OF THE PAST AND THE ORIGINS OF SOCIOLOGY I9

Whethersuch an enterpriseis, in principle,philosophicallyor

empiricallyviable is a matterfor debate. PersonallyI thinkit is,
and that it is just this emphasis in sociologywhich gives the
disciplineits importance, or at leastits seriousness. Still,it can be
arguedthatthe waysin whichsociologyhas so fargone about the
explanation oftendency, or transition,
havebeenflawedbya radically
unsound methodology.And it can be argued that much of this
unsoundnessis rootedin the mannerin whichsociologistsconceive
of the past.
Some conceptionof the past is inescapable. Sociologyproceeds
in itsmosttypicalformsby wayofthetypingofstructural systems-
for example, industrialism,feudalism, legal-rationalauthority.
But if structuralism of thiskindis to explainanything it mustbe by
advancingexplanationsin termsof theprinciplesof structuring, or
of whatPiagetin a strongerphrasecallsthetransformation laws of
structures.4Now it is plainlynot the case that all structuring is
chronologicalstructuring:this would not be so for linguisticor
mathematical structuresforexample. But it is necessarily the case
in thefieldsofhistory, sociologyand anthropology, thesocialsciences
for which the idea of action in time is the essentialelementin
explanation.5Analysisofthemechanicsofhistorical transitionis the
proper basic of
activity the practitionersof these sciences. The only
referencethe idea of structural transformation can have here is a
referenceto historicalprocess. Far fromdetachingsocial analysis
fromchronology, structuralism in the social sciencesentailshistori-
cally groundedexplanation. I would agree with Gellnerthatthe
resonanceand appeal of sociologyin recentyearsspringsfromthe
impressionthe subjectgives of dealingdirectlywiththe mechanics
of the transition thatrightlyconcernsus most- industrialization.6
But I am not as confident as he seemsto be thatsociologyhas been
attackingthisproblemin any particularly usefulway. Whatseems
to have happened,rather,is that structuraltypes have been put
togetherin a generally impressionistic and historicallycasual manner
4J. Piaget, Structuralism(London, 1971): "Were it not for the idea of
transformationstructureswould lose all explanatoryimport,since they would
collapse into static forms" (p. 12).
5 To this extentI would agree with W. G. Runciman (Sociologyin its Place,
Cambridge, 1970) that there can be no serious distinction between history,
sociologyand anthropology. But by the same token I disagree withhis further
claim thatall threedisciplinescan be reduced to some sortof psychology. It is
just their central emphasis on historical structuringthat makes them non-
reducible. "Men make their own history, but they make it in spite of
themselves"(Marx) - it is theireffort to understandthe "in spite of" thatgives
these disciplinestheir autonomy.
6 E. Gellner, Thought and Change (Chicago, 1964).

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20 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 55

- considerthewayin whichbureaucracy and anomiewereidentified

as emergent properties of industrialism by Weberand Durkheimfor
example. And secondly,logicallyorderedcontrastsbetweenstruc-
turaltypeshave been treated,quite naivelyfor the most part,as
thoughtheyeffectively indicatedchronologically orderedtransitions.
On thisbasis a sociologicalpast has been workedup, a past whichis
linked to the presentnot by carefullyobservedand temporally
locatedsocial interaction but by inferentially necessaryconnections
betweenconcepts. Discussionsof the declineof community, of the
traditionalworkingclassand oftheproblemsofmodernization in the
contextof contrastsbetween"developing" and "modern" social
systemsare amongthe betterknowncontemporary examplesof the
applicationof thismode of thought. In each case a perspectiveon
presentsocial experienceis gained by postulatinga tendentious
relationshipbetweenwhat is observednow and a structuraltype
associatedfirmly but unspecifically withthe "past". The function
ofthesociologist's pastin otherwordshasnotbeento providea frame
of reference forempiricalstudiesof themechanicsof transition but
insteadto furnisha rationaleforside-stepping suchtedioushistorical
choresand movingat oncetotheconstruction ofpredictive interpreta-
tionsofthepresent. We havetheodd spectacleofa disciplinewhich
claimsimportance just becauseit takesthe problemof the temporal
transformation ofstructure as itscentralanalytical issue,but whichat
thesametimeappearscommitted to a senseofthepastwhichactually
directsattentionaway fromthe need for analyses of structural
transitionas a temporally and culturally situatedprocess. Parsons's
influentialand representative essay"The Institutional Framework of
EconomicDevelopment"is perhapsour bestrecentexampleofboth
sides of this ambivalencein sociology.' Unlike Rostow,Hoselitz
and a numberof others8who can be said to use theidea of stagesof
developmentin a fairlymechanicalway in producingscenariosof
development policy,Parsonsdisplaysa good deal of refinement and
in
subtlety applying his model of industrializationto the predicament
of the underdevelopedcountries. He allows for examplethatthe
actualpresentof thesecountriesis importantly unlikethepastofthe
European countries as a result ofthe intervening history ofthelatter.
Nevertheless, whenall hisrefinements and modifications aremade,the

7 T. Parsons, "The InstitutionalFrameworkof Economic Development",

in
Structureand Process in Modern Society(Glencoe, Illinois, 1960).
8 Cf. W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth(Cambridge, 1962);
B. Hoselitz, Sociological Factors in Economic Development(Glencoe, Illinois,
1960).

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 THE SENSE OF THE PAST AND THE ORIGINS OF SOCIOLOGY 21

problemof development remainsone of adjustingthe historyof the

underdevelopedcountriesto a model of structuraltransformation
abstractedfromEuropeanand Americanexperience. Althoughhe
sees that,as a resultof the time lag in industrialization,political
institutionswill be relatively
moreimportant in the underdeveloped
countriesthantheywerein Europe,thetrajectory ofindustrialization
remainsessentiallythe same; the point of departure(traditional
society)and thedestination society)aretreatedas conform-
(industrial
ing in all importantrespectsto a common model. For such a
procedureto makeanysenseat all it mustbe assumed,as itis, thatthe
pasts of the developedand underdevelopedcountriesare basically
similarand basicallyunproblematic.
RobertNisbet,criticizing whathe calls the metaphorof develop-
ment in Social Change and History,9 and Andre Gunder Frank,
criticizingwhathe callstheideal-typicalindexapproachto thestudy
of transitionin "The Sociologyof Developmentand the Under-
developmentof Sociology",lohave exposed some of the more
startlingconsequencesof thisstateof affairs. In thispaper I want
to considercauses ratherthan consequences,however. How is it
that sociologyhas remainedso unregenerate in its commitment to
a senseofthepastwhichwe havebeentoldagainand againcontributes
moreto ignorancethanto knowledge? The paper is not meantto
provideyet anotheroccasionfor historiansto feel superiorat the
expenseof sociology. The attemptto understandthe mechanicsof
transitioninvolvedin structuralchangeseemsto me unquestionably
moreimportant thanthesortofthingthatnormallygoes on in most
Departmentsof History. We have,too,enoughexamplesofsuccess
in this sortof enterprise
to knowthatthe workis not in principle
futile:the best example,I suppose,is the firstvolumeof Capital.
So it becomesa questionworthaskingwhysociologistshavebeen so
unsuccessfulin strikinga fruitfulbalance betweenthe typingof
structures - whytheyhave
and the empiricalanalysisof transition
forthe mostpartfeltthatthe need "to orderstructural typesand
relatethemsequentiallyis a firstorderof business"- and have in
proportionneglectedthe business of using structuralconceptsto
inform historical investigation.11 The ordering of structuraltypes
is a relevantheuristicsettingforthe analysisof change. It cannot

9Published Oxford, 1969.

10A. G. Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution(New York,
1964). The essay cited is also published separately,New York, 1968.
11T. Parsons, Societies,Evolutionaryand ComparativePerspectives,p. III;
and see Nisbet,op. cit.,ch. 8.

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22 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 55

be a substitute
forit. How did sociologistscometo adoptan idea of
historywhichso directlyimpliedthe opposite?
We may startfromJohn Burrow'sobservationthat the social
sciences were in the firstinstancea responseto anarchy:"social
anarchyas a fear,intelletcual
anarchyas a fact".'2 Moreimportantly
perhapsthesocialand culturalconfusionofthetimewas understood
not as an effectof wickedness(as a comparabledisorderhad been
understoodin the seventeenth century),but as an effectof history.
The sense of disorderwas ubiquitousand acture. Its intensity was
such thatmanyfeltunable to say,at eventhe mostmodestlevel of
whatwasgoingon. The predicament
abstraction, waswelldescribed
by Lamartinein his accountofwhtit was liketo livethroughthelast
monthsof the JulyMonarchy:
Thesetimesaretimesofchaos;opinionsarea scramble;partiesarea jumble;
the language of new ideas has not been created; nothingis more difficult
than
to givea gooddefinition
ofoneselfinreligion,
inphilosophy,
inpolitics. One
feels,one knows,one lives, and at need one dies forone's cause, but one cannot
nameit. It is theproblemofthetimeto classify
thingsandmen. The world
has jumbledits catalogue.13
But the collapseof meaninghad in additiona specifically historical
content. Eric Hobsbawmhas drawnattentionto the propensity in
all societiesto use the past as a resourceforeitheranticipatingor
prescribingthe future.14 It was preciselythe possibilityof such
thoughtthat the pace and scope of changein the mid-nineteenth
centuryseemedto undermine. The senseofthemeaninglessness of
the presentwas feltas a matterof the lack of relationship between
presentand past. The generationthatgave birthto sociologywas
probablythefirst generation ofhumanbeingseverto haveexperienced
withinthespan oftheirownlifetime sociallyinducedsocialchangeof
a totallytransformative nature - change which could not be
identified,explained and accommodatedas a limited historical
variationwithinthe encompassing orderof the past. One facedfor
the firsttime a situationin whichthe idea of historicalaction or
accident- conquest,revolutionor plague- could not begin(so it
seemed)to accountforthewaysin whichthepresentdiffered fromthe
past. To act effectively in the present,a frameof reference which
allowed one to identifythe structureof one's situation,and so to
anticipatetheconsequencesofone's actions,was essential. But such
a frameof reference could not be deriveddirectlyfromthe studyof
12
J. Burrow, Evolutionand Society(Cambridge, 1966), p. 93.
by C. Geertz "Ideology as a Cultural System" in D. Apter (ed.),
13 Cited
Ideologyand Discontent(New York, 1964), P. 43.
14E. J. Hobsbawm, "The Social Function of the Past", above pp. 3-17.

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 THE SENSE OF THE PAST AND THE ORIGINS OF SOCIOLOGY 23

thepresent- theworldhad jumbledits catalogue. Nor couldit be

derivednaivelyfromknowledgeofthepastbecausethenatureofthe
historicalconnectionof past and presenthad become obscure,the
conventionalcategoriesof historicalthoughtcould not grasp it.
Hithertothe past had providedthe patternforthe presentin quite
straightforward ways. Historyhad been an unproblematic matterof
recordingdurationand succession. Neitherdurationnorsuccession
had appearedto bringthenatureoftheprinciplesof socialorganiza-
tion into question. But that was just whathappenedin the mid-
nineteenth century.
One did not need to be verysophisticated to feelthatthe present
whenconsideredin relationto the past was deeplyenigmatic. The
merchantsand landlordswho joined togetherto formthe Bristol
StatisticalSocietyin 1838weredrivento an interestin socialresearch
by motives not very different
from those which were to inspire
Durkheimor LePlay.
In a simple stateof society[theynoted] a man may know tolerablywell what
his dutiesto the poor are . . . butwhat shall be said of thatartificial
and
complicated state of thingswhen a nation manufacturesforhalf the world -
and when the consequence unavoidably is the enormous distance between
the labourer and his virtualand sub-divided employer?'5
The rapidand amazinglyramified extensionofthedivisionoflabour
was thebeginning oftheproblem. Butlayeruponlayerofcomplica-
tion had been heaped upon it untilall effective
sense of historically
anchoredprocesswas lost. Even Bagehot,theleastflappablethinker
of his generation,sensed the dilemma. "The greatestliving
contrast",he was moved to remarkin 1861, "is betweenthe old
Eastern and customarycivilizationsand the new Western and
changeablecivilizations".16
Whatresourceswereavailableformakingsenseoftheexperienceof
livingin a changeablecivilization? Only knowledgeof the past.
Somehowthatknowledgehad to be used to yieldup a new under-
standingof what was happeningin the present. G. H. Lewes
expressedtheproblemveryclearly. Like mostofhiscontemporaries
he foundhimselfin "an age ofuniversalanarchyofthought",an age
'"anxious to reconstruct. . . but as yet impotent" - impotentbecause
the anarchywas historicallyinduced and historicallyincompre-
hensible. "In this plight",he concluded,"we may hope for the
futurebut can clingonly to the past: that alone is secure,well-
grounded. The past must formthe basis of certaintyand the
15J. of the Statistical Soc., ii (1839).
16 W. Bagehot, Physicsand Politics (London, 1872), P. 114.

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24 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 55

materialsfor speculation"."1 In turningto the past, then, the

intentionwas somehow to transcendmere history. Here the
emergingsocial sciencesfaceda fundamental strategicchoice. Was
thepastto be understood as a structuralsystemoras a fieldofhistory ?
Because the mosturgentissue was to identify thegeneralorganizing
principlesof industrialsocietyand thegeneralprinciplesof change
involved in industrialization, it was perhaps natural that the
historicalcharacterof thepast shouldin thefirstinstancehave been
ignored,thatthefirstresponseshouldhavebeen a set of attempts to
reifyboththepastas a structural typeand history as a developmental
process. What was not so natural,but nevertheless happenedin
almosteverycase,was thatthisintitialelaborateconstruction ofideal
typesdid notlead socialscientists backto substantive investigations of
historicaltransition
in particular but
settings was allowed to stand as
beingin itselfa theoretically and empirically adequatealternative to
suchinvestigations.EvenMax Weberin TheProtestant Ethicandthe
SpiritofCapitalism,18 thenearestthingto an exampleofgood histori-
cal sociologywhichthe foundingfathersof the disciplinewere to
produce,was astoundingly casual aboutthedetailedhistorical valida-
tionofhisargument. One ofthethingswhichmakesitso difficult for
studentsto answerthe standardexaminationquestionwhichinvites
themto compareWeber'saccountof the development of capitalism
withthatofKarl Marxis thatMarxis simplya muchbettera historian
thanWeber.
Marx was, of course,alwaysprimarily interestedin the mechanics
oftransition,therelationalbasisofindustrialization.By comparison
the construction of developmental typeshas a second-order, even a
background,importance in his thought. Nevertheless it is strange
in generalshouldnothavebeenled as Marxwasfrom
thatsociologists
of the stagesand processesof development
the reification to thesort
of empiricalhistoricalsociologyMarx himselfachieved. We can
hardlyexplainthe failureby suggestingthat the sociologistswere
work-shy. On the contrarythe importantnineteenth-century
sociologistswereat leastas industrious as Marx. It is possiblethat
Spenceraccumulatedmoredatathananyotherscholarhas yetdone.
Nor weretheearlysociologists disinclined to handlehistorical data-
Weberforone seemsto have had an inexhaustible interestin such

17 G. H. Lewes, "The State of Historical Sciences in France", cited in

Burrow, op. cit., p. 94.
18M. Weber, The ProtestantEthic and theSpiritof Capitalism,firstpublished
in Archivfur Socialwissonschaftund Social politik,vols. xx and xxI (1904-5),
English translationby T. Parsons (New York, 1930).

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 THE SENSE OF THE PAST AND THE ORIGINS OF SOCIOLOGY 25

material. Generallyit was throughthereinterpretation of historical

materialsthattheyhopedto achievean understanding ofthemeaning
ofthepresent. Whatis odd is thattheyremainedcommitted to ways
of using historical materials that were both ahistorical and
historicist.It is thisahistoricalhistoricismofsociologythatneedsto
be explained.
The explanationseems to have two main elements. Firstthere
was the intellectualascendancyof evolutionism. Second one must
recognizetheapparentpoweroftheanalyticalparadigmproducedby
the treatmentof the past as a structuraltype. It did permitas,
Marxism apart, nothingelse did, a generalizedaccount of the
structure and tendencyof industrialism.An exhaustiveexplanation
would also have to considerthe importanceof some questionsof
academic convenienceand convention. In establishingits own
academiccredentials,sociologyhad above all to differentiate itself
from history. Since it, too, dealt in historicalmaterialsand
problems, thedifferentiation had to be in termsofsociology's
virtually
specialmethodology. Once methodology becamethehallmark ofthe
disciplineat this level it was surprisingly easy for it to prove an
obstacleto theadoptionofnew waysof dealingwiththeproblemsas
well. It is bizarre but not unrevealingthat we should observe
attempts to demonstrate thatStanleyElkinsis "notreally"a historian
or thatBarrington Moore Jr.is "not really"a sociologist.19But this
is by theway.
As an empiricalscienceof the laws of tendency,sociologysprang
directlyfromthe sense, pervasiveand disturbingas it was, of a
changeable civilization. Either changeabilitymade civilization
unpredictable - a prospectnot even HerbertSpencerwas sanguine
enough to embrace - or it was scientifically
orderedin wayswhich
appropriate contemplation could reveal. Appropriate contemplation
in turn was feltto involvethreethings:first,the discoveryof a
conceptuallanguagecapable of differentiating betweenpresentand
past,ofmarking outthetrajectory ofchange;thena generalstructural
characterization of the presentas distinctfromthe past; and finally
theidentification of theprocessesof changeor growthin termsof
whichpast, presentand futurewerebound together. For each of
thesepurposesit was not historicalactionbut objectified historical
19S. Elkins, Slavery (Chicago,
1959) and BarringtonMoore Jr., The Social
OriginsofDictatorshipand Democracy(Benson Press,Boston, 1966) are amongthe
betterknownrecentstudies to have createdintra-disciplinarysoul-searchingby
demonstratingthe unavoidably inter-disciplinarynature of explanation in the
social sciences. For currentexamples of pedantic boundary disputes of this
kind, see The AmericanSociologist,vi (New York, 1971).

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26 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 55

process that was of interest. The idea that process could be

ascertainedonly throughcarefulobservationalstudies of action
occurredto veryfewpeople.
In passingwe mightnote thatthe problemof puttingtogethera
suitablelanguageof conceptswas itselfan acute one. Few things
areas evidentin earlynineteenth-centurysocialanalysisas thewantof
appropriatetermsto specifythe variationsin social experiencethat
observers wished to discuss. The vocabularythat served to
describetraditionalsocial relationshipssimplycould not grip the
experienceof the presentwithany precision. Comparethe vigour
ofthefirstpartofthisstatement by Cobbettwiththelimpnessofthe
end: "When masterand man were the termseveryonewas in his
place and all were free; now in factit is an affairof mastersand
slaves".20 Now of courseit was not reallyan affairof mastersand
slaves. But Cobbett'srepertoire of conceptssimplycould not get
him any nearer. Nor was it sufficient to see the presentsimplyas
a negationof the past: Shelley'sstringof negatives- "sceptreless,
uncircumscribed, unclassed,tribelessand nationless,exemptfrom
awe, worshipand degree"21- was a good intuitiveresponseto the
situationbut no basis foranalysis.
In the event the vocabularyproblem was solved under the
umbrellaof thegeneralattemptto characterize the presentas a type
of social order, and to infer from the supposed typological
propertiesof typesof social order supposed laws of tendencyor
principlesof social development. The overriding necessitywas to
obtainan objective,abstractyardstick outsidethefluxof thepresent
situation- thecomplicatedand artificial stateof things- to which
thepresentsituationcouldbe referred and in termsofwhichit could
thencebe known. To thisend the emergingsocial sciencesseized
hold of historyin two ways. Firstin the formof a seriesof bold
conceptualpolarities,explicitantithesesbetweenpast and present
whichNisbethas calledthe unitideas of sociology. Secondin the
formof a set of ambitiousdescriptive theoriesof the stagesof social
development. The effect ofbothprocedureswas to turnhistory into
an object.22

W. Cobbett,PoliticalRegister,
20 lxxxvi(London,1835)p. 767.
P. B. Shelley,"Prometheus
21
Unbound",Act III, Scene iv, The Complete
PoeticalWorks(Oxford,1907).
22 R. Nisbet, The SociologicalTradition(New York, 1966). If one were
disposedto acceptthe argument thatthe principalpropertyof the cultureof
in whichall secondary
capitalismis a processof reification tend
relationships
increasinglyto be perceivedas relationshipsbetweenthings,one could then
add to Engels'sanalysisofthewayin whichtherealconnectedness ofmanand
(cont.on p. 27)

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 THE SENSE OF THE PAST AND THE ORIGINS OF SOCIOLOGY 27

The attemptto formulatelaws of developmentas a matterof

explicithistoricalprocesswas of coursea conspicuousfailure. Its
empiricaldifficulties
werequicklyapparentto mostobservers. Thus
HenrySidgwickobservedin I885 how:
With equal confidencehistoryis representedas leading up, now to the naive
and unqualified individualismof Spencer, now to the carefullyguarded and
regulated socialism of Schaeffle,now to Comte's dream of securing seven-
roomed houses forall workingmen .... Guidance, truly,is here enough and
to spare; but how shall the bewilderedstatesmanselect his guidance when his
sociological doctors exhibit such portentousdisagreement?
Not surprisingly Sidgwickended by begginghis audience"to take
no steps calculatedto fosterdelusionsof this kind".23 The more
importantepistemological of evolutionary
difficulties sociologywere
no less effectivelyexposed,firstby would-beevolutionists such as
Hobhouse and Ginsberg,thendefinitively by Popper.24 Two years
afterPopper's firstonslaughton sociologicalhistoricismParsons
proposedtherepudiation ofall interest
in diachronicanalysisand the
reorientation of sociologyaround the synchronicinvestigation of
systemsof actionin termsofformalized ahistorical
properties.26
Whatactuallyhappenedat thispoint,however,was that,although
thediscrediting oftheovertintellectualstrategies of evolutionismwas
acknowledged, theinfrastructure ofevolutionism remainedembedded
in sociologicalthought. It was herethattheconceptualpolaritiesof
sociology's unit ideas were important. Status and contract,
communityand association,organic and mechanical solidarity,
traditionaland legal-rationalauthority, the folkcommunity and the
urbancommunity - all thesedoubleconceptswerewaysoftrying to
apprehendand identifythe changes in the structuralformatof
societyassociatedwithindustrialization.More or less explicitly the
changes indicated in the conceptualantitheseswere treated as
necessaryconcomitants of industrialization,an idea whichsurfaced
fromtimeto time(mostrecentlyin the workof ClarkKerr and his
colleaguesin theI96os) in thenotionofthe"logicofindustrialism".26
Therecouldbe and was wide-ranging disputeas to theexactnatureof
(note22 cont.)
his historyis "lost for fair" in the veils of fetishismspun by philosophers,
political theoristsand jurists the observationthat the peculiar contributionof
the sociologistto this process has been, as a finalironictransformation,
to turn
historyitselfinto a thing.
13 BritishAssociation forthe Advancementof Science, Proceedings (London,
1885).
24 L. T. Hobhouse, Social Development(Allen and Unwin, London, 1924)
and Morals in Evolution (Macmillan, London, I901); M. Ginsberg, The
Diversityof Morals (London, 1956); K. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism
(London,
2r T.
1957).
Parsons, The Structureof Social Action (Glencoe, Illinois, 1937).
26
C. Kerr, et al., Industrialismand IndustrialMan (London, 1962).

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28 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 55

the logic of industrialismbut the salienceof the idea as a governing

focusof thoughtremainedstrong. Not all of the earlysociologists
adopted the device of conceptualpolarizationin its fullestform.
Often the polaritywas merelyimplied in the assertionof some
distinctive
processualproperty of industrialization:
theemergenceof
chronic anomie, urbanism as a way of life, bureaucratization,
secularization,the isolation of the conjugal family. But the
procedureis reallythe same. It is a matterof abbreviating history.
It involvedthe observationof key structuraldifferences in the
constitution of the presentas distinctfromthepast. But it did not
necessarily involveanyneedto showhow,historically, thedifferences
had been effected. It was theobservation of contrasted momentsof
development that mattered. Having characterized past and present
as statesofbeingin termsofsomekeyproperties, one couldgo on to
inferlaws of tendencyby logicalratherthan historicalprocedures.
Whateverthedifficulties ofthemethod,itssheereconomywas among
itsprincipalattractions.Quitesimply,therewas no quickermethod
of producinga theoretical accountof wheresocietywas goingor of
whatwereits significant structuralcomponents.
It did matter,of course, to show that the past postulatedby
sociology- the worldof the extendedfamily,of community and
corporation, offolkcultureand traditionalism - had beenreallythere
in some concretesense. But to see how thiswas done is to see still
moreclearlyhow profoundly unhistorical the wholeenterprise really
was. The pointafterall was notto knowthepastbutto establishan
idea of the past whichcould be used as a comparative base forthe
understanding of the present. Once the floodof ethnographic data
became available and once it became clear that the Iroquois, the
ancientPictsand theIrishin Manchesterwere,analytically, thesame
thing, the essentialirrelevanceof history in the construction of this
past was revealed. This did not, of course, at all reduce the
importanceof callingit the past. That importance was irreducible.
But it sprangfromthe sociologists'concernto achievea theoryof
modernity, and ifpossibleof modernization, notfromanyinterest in
themechanicsof historical transition.As J. F. McLennanput it in
a generalrubricforthe social scienceswithwhichmostof his co-
workersseem to have been thoroughly sympathetic:
The firstthingto be done is to informourselves of the facts relatingto the
least developed races ...their condition, as it may be observed today, is
trulythe most ancient condition of man. It is the lowest and simplest...
and ... in thescienceofhistory
oldmeansnotold in chronology
butin struc-
ture. That is most ancient which lies nearest the beginning of human
progressconsidered as a development.27
27 T. F. McLennan, Studies in AncientHistory,2nd ser. (London, 1896),

p. 16.

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 THE SENSE OF THE PAST AND THE ORIGINS OF SOCIOLOGY 29

There are fewclearerstatements of the centralstrategy of the social

sciences- and fewmoreindicativeof theirindifference to anything
that could be called, strictly,the historicalpast. Long after
McLennan'shopefulinvolvement withovertnotionsof progressand
developmenthad been abandoned,the conceptionsimplicitin the
idea of systemsbeing "old in structure"remained rooted in
sociologicalmethod.
Some consequencesof this methodare worthnoting. It is not
just thatit directsattentionaway fromthe need forpropositional
theoriesabout the organizationof change in particularhistorical
contexts;or that it permittedpeople like Bagehotto regardthe
workingclassesas "primitive" ;28 its economy, eleganceand apparent
effectiveness in differentiating past and presenthave encourageda
stateof affairs in whicha highproportion of sociologicalresearchis
in fact researchon mythswhichsociologistshave invented. The
sociologyofthefamilyprovidessomelovelyexamplesofthisprocess.
Familysociologyhas untilquiterecently been dominatedbytheidea
of the classicalpre-industrial family,or, as W. J. Goode puts it,
"a prettypictureoflifedownon Grandma'sfarm". Withreference
to this construct,assembledby means of McLennan's brand of
structural historyand theskilfulextrapolation fromit of ideal types,
a wholeseriesof quite detailedmythswereformulated about what
happens,and has to happen,to the familyin the courseof indus-
trialization. Goode, who has been moreinvolvedthananyoneelse
in thedismantling ofthisparticular bodyofmyth,nowconcludesthat
no determinate relationshipcan be establishedeitherway between
familypatternsand industrialization.29 This, however,is not so
mucha definitive findingas a statement thatthegroundis now clear
forthe sort of researchthat oughtto have been done in the first
place. Meanwhilean expensiveresearchunit in Cambridgehas
devotedseveralyearsto provingthe non-existence in pre-industrial
Englandand elsewhereofa typeoffamilywhichno-onefamiliar with
thehistorical evidenceeversaid did exist.3" This sortofthingis the
least of the costsof sociology'shiddenahistoricalhistoricism.The
highercosts are paid in the termsof referenceembodiedin whole
strategies of sociologicalthought. A case in pointwouldbe the use

28 Bagehot, op. cit., pp. 82-5; cf. Nisbet, Social Change and History.
29 W. J. Goode, "Industrialisation and Family Change" in B. F. Hoselitz
and W. E. Moore (eds.), Industrialisationand Soczety (New York, 1963),
PP. 237-59.
30 T. P. R. Laslett, The World We Have Lost
(London, 1965), pp. 8I-Io6.

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30 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 55

that has been made of ProfessorParsons's influential proposal to

analysesocialactionin termsofa schemeofpatternvariables.31
The patternvariablesappearedas an integralpart of Parsons's
manifestofora new sociologytwenty-five yearsago, the attemptto
reconstitute sociologyas an analysisof the structure of social action
dissociatedfromthe studyof tendency. In pursuitof this object
Parsonsproposedthat orientations to action could be investigated
schematicallyin termsof a limitednumberof pure types. He
recommendedthatthesetypesshould be organizedin fouror five
pairsofopposities. The fourpairsofpatternvariables(variableways
of patterning action)forwhichhe foundmostuse wereidentified as
follows:particularism versusuniversalism;affectivityversusaffective
neutrality;ascriptionversus achievement;and diffuseness versus
specificity.This set of variationsis offered as encompassing, if not
the fullrangeof possiblemodesof action,at leastsuch a largefield
thateffectively all systemsof actioncan be broughtwithinthe scope
of sociologicalanalysis. The meritclaimedforthepatternvariables
as analyticaltools in other words is preciselythat they are
independentof, theyrise above, any particularhistoricalcontext.
They are quite simplyvalue-freetools. Yet the use thathas been
made ofthem,in partby Parsonsbut moreespeciallyby someofhis
followers,makesthishardto believe. It turnsoutthattheydo have,
again in the structural sense,a referenceto historyor at leastto the
difference betweenpast and present,traditionalism and modernity,
afterall. Thus Sutton,Hoselitzand manyothershaveidentified the
differencebetween modernand pre-modernsocial systemsas a
polarityof universalism, achievement
affective-neutrality, orientation
and functionalspecificity on the one hand and of particularism,
affectivity,ascriptionand functionaldiffusenesson the other.32
WhetherParsonsintendedhis polaritiesto servetheturnof socio-
logical historicismin this way is not clear. His categoriesplainly
are anchoredin quite familiarcontrastsbetween the presumed
propertiesof industrialism and pre-industrialism, however,and the
use that has been made of themis in thissense legitimate. They
do serve as one more device enablingsociologyto theorizeabout
31 T.
Parsons, The Social System(Glencoe, Illinois, I95I). Parsons's con-
structsare of course an explicit extensionof Weber's distinctionbetween the
propertiesof "traditionality"and "rationality":M. Weber, The Theoryof Social
and EconomicOrganisation(New York, 1947).
32 Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution,discusses this
procedure at some length. F. X. Sutton, "Social Theory and Comparative
Politics" in H. Eckstein and D. Apter (eds.), ComparativePolitics (Glencoe,
Illinois, 1963).

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 THE SENSE OF THE PAST AND THE ORIGINS OF SOCIOLOGY 31

the course of developmentwithoutreferenceto the mechanicsof

transition.
Consider a final example. The literatureof contemporary
sociologyis full of generalcharacterizationsof advancedindustrial
society- as mass the
society, acquisitivesociety,theaffluent
society
and most recentlythe chaotic society. Most particularresearch
projectsproceedunderthe intellectualauspices of one or otherof
these characterizations.None of the characterizationsis the result
ofscholarlyhistoricalanalysis. All ofthemdepend,however,on the
actualityof an assumedhistoricalprocess. Daniel Bell's accountof
the theoryof mass societyprovidesa good example of what is
involved:
The revolutions in transport and communications have broughtmen into
closercontactwitheachotherand boundthemin newways;thedivisionof
labourhas madethemmoreinterdependent; tremorsin one partof society
affectall others. Despitethisgreaterinterdependence, however, individuals
havegrownmoreestranged fromoneanother. The oldprimary tiesoffamily
and local community have been shattered;ancientparochialfaithsare
questioned;few unifying beliefsor values have takentheirplace. Most
important thecriticalstandardsofan educatedeliteno longershapeopinion
ortaste. As a resultmoresandmoralsarein constant flux,relationsbetween
individuals aretangentialor compartmentalized ratherthanorganic. At the
sametimegreater mobility, concernoverstatus.
spatialand social,intensifies
Insteadof a fixedor knownstatussymbolized by dressor title,each person
assumesa multiplicity ofrolesandconstantly hastoprovehimself ina succes-
sion of newsituations. Becauseof all this,the individualloses a coherent
senseofself. His anxieties increase. There ensuesa search fornewfaiths.
The stageis set forthe charismatic leader,the secularmessiah,who by
bestowingupon each person the semblance of necessarygrace and of fulness
ofpersonalitysuppliesa substitute beliefthatthemass
fortheolderunifying
societyhas destroyed.33
Whetheror notthistypeofcharacterization, whichis quiteprevalent
in sociology,is based on good historyor not is not immediately
relevant. The important featureof such thinkingis thatin it the
characterizationof historicalprocess and the characterization of
presentstructureare totallyinterdependent.Each pervades the
otherand the conceptionas a whole is inconceivable withoutboth.
All questionsof how the various transformations entailedin the
movementbetween structuraltypes were effectedare, however,
firmlysetaside. The pointis notto focusinvestigationon thesocial
organization processbutto setup a frameofreference
ofhistorical for
of thepresent. And
researchon a thingcalled the social structure
yet structureis definedin terms which have meaning only in
termsofconceptions ofprocess. We arefacedwiththesameparadox
33 D. Bell, The End of Ideology(Glencoe, Illinois, 1960). ProfessorBell is
not,of course,espousingthe theoryof mass societyin this passage. His exposi-
tion of it is nonethelesswell-takenforthat.

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32 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 55

as before:theidentification ofstructural types,theformaldifferentia-

tion of past and present,is effectedwith such elan and internal
cogencythatit endsup byapparently makingunnecessary anyfurther
studyoftheintervening structuring throughwhichthepastpresum-
ably becamethe present. Yet, of course,it is onlysuch workthat
will tell us whetherour structuralconceptsmake sense, let alone
whethertheyexplainanything.
The academicand intellectual dissociationofhistory and sociology
seems,then,to havehad theeffect of deterring bothdisciplinesfrom
attendingseriouslyto the most importantissues involvedin the
understanding of social transition.Many currentaccountsof the
historian'spast, requiringas theydo a wholesalerejectionof any
formof structural analysis,strikeme as no bettersuitedthan the
normalversionofthesociologist's pastto dealwiththeseissues. This
is nottheplaceto considerwhatchangesofheartorshiftsofemphasis
wouldbe neededto producea morefruitful and sociologicalhistory.
What I have triedto do is to show how one could begin to move
towardsa morepenetrating historicalsociology. The essentialstep
is notto abandonthestructural typingofpastand presentbutrather
to recognizethatthefunction ofstructural typesis notto allowus to
by-passhistory byinferring logicallynecessarytendencies, buton the
contrary to directattentionto thosekindsofhistorical inquirywhich
we shouldexpect,theoretically, to explainphenomenaof structural
transformation.
University ofDurham PhilipAbrams

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