Crisostomo Et Al v. Atty. Nazareno

SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS
CASE DIGESTS
BATCH 2
SECTION 3C
University of Santo Tomas
Faculty of Civil Law
Espana, Manila
Submitted to:
Hon. Ronald B. Moreno, LL.M.
Presiding Judge – RTC – 147, Makati City
2018
NAME CASE TITLE
Agcaoili, Karlyn Mae E. RULE 102: HABEAS CORPUS
 Ampatuan vs Macaraig
 Adonis vs Tesoro
 Caballes vs CA
 Office of the Court Administrator vs. Jude Perello
Alava, Quino  Enrile vs. Salazar
 Ilusorio vs Bildner
 In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Kunting
 Ampatuan vs. Macaraig
Banatin, Alyssa Monique  Go, Sr. Vs. Ramos
 Office of the Solicitor General vs Judge De Castro
 Wong vs Wong
 Velasco vs CA
Brito, Jhon Patrick  Larranaga vs CA
 In the matter of the petition for Habeas Corpus of
Alejano vs. Cabuay
 Vicente vs. Majaducon
 Go vs. Dimagiba
Castillo, Jephtah  In the matter of the Application for writ of Habeas of
Corpus Reclassifying Sentence to R.A. No. 8353 in Behalf
of Rogelio Ormilla et, al. vs. The Director, Bureau of
Corrections
 People vs Caco
 Galvez vs CA
 Salientes vs Abanilla
Erika Mariz Sicat Cunanan  Demaisip vs Cabcaban
 Hernandez vs. San Juan- Santos
 Araneta vs Araneta
 Militante vs. Cada-Deapera
De Jesus, Kristina Teresa  Madrinan vs. Madrinan
RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO
 De Lima vs Gatdula
 Caram vs Segui
 Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo
Del Prado, Darren Joseph  Rubrico vs Arroyo
 So vs. Tacla
 Rodriguez vs. Arroyo (2011 decision AND 2013
resolution)
 Castillo vs Cruz
Dioquino, Apriljo Frances  Navia vs. Pardico
 Pador vs. Arcayan
 Reyes vs. Gonzales
 Balao vs. Arroyo
Flores, Steffi Nicole  Razon vs. Tagitis
 Roxas vs Arroyo
THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
 Rodriguez vs. Arroyo
 Vivares vs. St. Theresa’s College
Ingente, Felix Crisanjo  Gamboa vs. Chan
 Tapuz vs. Rosario
 Lee vs Ilagan
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
CASES WRIT OF KALIKASAN
 Most Reverend Pedro D. Arigo vs. Scott S. Swift

Garcia, Charlotte Yris  Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape
Tanon Strait vs. Secretary Angelo Reyes
CHANGE OF NAME CORRECTION OF CLERICAL

ERRORS, AND CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION
OF ENTRIES IN CIVIL REGISTRY
 Chiu Hap Chiu vs Republic of the Philippines

 Republic vs Mercadera
 Republic vs CA
Guevarra, Jhaypee  Republic vs Zosa

 Republic vs Marcos
 Republic vs CA
 Leonardo vs CA
Lintao, Jude Erwin  Grande vs Antonio
 Republic vs Capote
 In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/ or Correction/
Cancellation of Entryt of Civil Registry of Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang
 Yasin vs. Judge. Shari’a District Court
Lucero, Joey  Silverio vs Republic
 Republic vs Cagandahan
 Re. Final Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the
RTC, Br, 67, Paniqui, Tarlac, A.M. No. 06-7-414-RTC
 Onde vs. Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las
Pinas City
Lopez, Sherlyn  Republic vs Mercadera
 Silverio vs Republic
 Lasam vs Ramolete
 Alba vs CA
Magaoay , Rhose Azcelle  Republic vs Kho
 Republic vs Benemerito
 Lee vs CA
 Braza vs City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental
Manalastas, Myron  Republic vs Coseteng - Magpayo
 Ceruila vs. Delantar
 Republic vs. Lugsanay Uy
Marquez, Bettina Isabel ABSENTEES
 Republic vs Cantor
 Republic vs Bermudez- Lorino
 Republic vs Tango
 Republic vs Garceda
Oropesa, Hazel Marie  Republic vs CA
APPEAL IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
 Republic vs Marcos II
 Aranas vs Mercado
Pagalilauan, Gerome  SPS. Lebin vs Mirasol
 Briones vs. Henson- Cruz
 Republic vs Nishina
Prudente, Maica  Lebin vs. Mirasol
 Quasha Ancheta Pena and Nolasco Law Office vs. LCN
Construction Corp
RULE ON LEGAL SEPARATION (A.M. NO. 02-11-10-
SC)
 Quiao vs Quiao
Ramo, Keif Khari  Tuazon vs CA
 Sabalones vs CA
 Hernandez vs CA
Sobrepena, Kim Angeli  Santos vs CA
 Agraviador vs Agraviador
 Ochosa vs Alano
Solis, Patrick David  Republic vs CA and Molina
 Ngo Te vs. Yu -Te
 Marcos vs Marcos
Vallarit, Anne Lizeth  Ting vs Velez- Tin
 Suazo vs Suazo
 Yambao vs Republic
Villanueva, Mary Grace  Toring vs Toring
 Vinas vs Vinas
 Kalaw vs Fernandez
Villanueva, Manuel  Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA
 Republic vs Olaybar
 Juliano - Llave vs Republic
Vitug, Loisse  Bolos vs Bolos
 Calderon vs Roxas
 Lua vs Lua
RULE 102: HABEAS CORPUS
AGCAOILI, Karlyn Mae E. (3C)
NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN vs. JUDGE VIRGILIO MACARAIG, et al.

G.R. No. 182497, 29 June 2010, FIRST DIVISION (Perez, J.)
A restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under

investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty.
On 10 November 2007, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig (Atty. Dalaig), the head of the COMELEC Legal
Department, was killed at the corner of M.H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets at Ermita, Manila.
The investigation conducted by the Manila Police District (MPD) found that the perpetrator was
Police Officer 1 Basser B. Ampatuan (PO1 Ampatuan). Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was
commanded to the MPD District Director for proper disposition and, later on, inquest
proceedings were conducted by the prosecutor’s office.
Police Senior Superintendent Atty. Clarence V. Guinito rendered his Pre-Charge Evaluation
Report, finding probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct (Murder) and
recommending that he be subjected to summary hearing. Thereafter, a Memorandum dated 18
April 2008 directed the Regional Director of the National Capital Region Police Office
(NCRPO) to place PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody.
In the meantime, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the case
against PO1 Ampatuan be set for further investigation and that the latter be released from
custody, unless he is being held for other charges/legal grounds.
Armed with this recommendation from the City Prosecutor’s Office, Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan
(Nurhida), the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas
Corpus before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
The RTC dismissed the petition of Nurhida, reasoning that the administrative case against PO1
Ampatuan and his being placed under restrictive custody was pursuant to Section 52, par. 4 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8551, or the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act
of 1998.
ISSUE:
Should the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus be granted?
HELD:
No. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or
lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person's
detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even
if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as
the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of
the application.
In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody. This is pursuant to R.A.
No. 8551, which provides that members of the police force are subject to the administrative
disciplinary machinery of the PNP. Such disciplinary actions include restrictive custody.
Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid
argument for his continued detention. A restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or
whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal
detention or restraint of liberty. Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond
the ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the grant
of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities
that the police officers concerned are always accounted for.
Therefore, the petition should be dismissed.

ALEXANDER “LEX” ADONIS vs. SUPERINTENDENT VENANCIO TESORO

G.R. No. 182855, 5 June 2013, FIRST DIVISION (Reyes, J.)
The writ of habeas corpus is issued only for the lone purpose of obtaining relief for those
illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient legal basis. It is not issued when the person is
in custody because of a judicial process or a valid judgment.
In a criminal case for libel, Alexander “Lex” Adonis (Adonis) was convicted by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) to an indeterminate sentence of five months and one day of arresto mayor as
minimum penalty to four years, six months, and one day of prision correccional as maximum
penalty. He began serving his sentence on 20 February 2007. Subsequently, a second libel case
was likewise filed against him, and the same was pending before the RTC.
On 11 December 2007, the Board of Pardons and Parole (BPP) issued an order for the Discharge
on Parole of seven inmates, including Adonis. The document was received by the Parole and
Probation Office of Davao, where Adonis was serving his sentence. Meanwhile, on 25 January
2008, the Supreme Court issued Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, entitled “Guidelines in the
Observance of a Rule of Preference in the Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases”.
In view of these developments, Adonis filed a Motion to Reopen Case, praying for his immediate
release from detention and for the modification of his sentence to payment of fine, pursuant to
the said Circular.
On the other hand, on the second libel case against him, Adonis moved for his provisional release
from detention, which was granted by the RTC judge after he posted bail in the amount of
PhP5,000. As such, the trial court issued an Order directing the Chief of Davao Penal Colony "to
release the accused Alexis Adonis unless he is being held for some other crimes or offenses."
However, the release of Adonis was not effected.
Due to his continued detainment, Adonis filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus on 30 May 2008, alleging that his liberty was being restrained for no valid reason.
In the interim, on 11 February 2009, the Court was informed by Superintendent Venancio Tesoro,
the respondent, that Adonis had been released from confinement on 23 December 2008, after
accepting the conditions set forth in his parole.
ISSUE:
Should the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus be granted?
HELD:
No. The writ exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint
and as an effective defense of personal freedom. It is issued only for the lone purpose of
obtaining relief for those illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient legal basis. It is not
issued when the person is in custody because of a judicial process or a valid judgment.
In the present case, Adonis was convicted for libel. Since his detention was by virtue of a final
judgment, he is not entitled to the writ of habeas corpus. While it is true that a convict may be
released from prison on parole when he had served the minimum period of his sentence; the
pendency of another criminal case, however, is a ground for the disqualification of such convict
from being released on parole. Notably, at the time he was granted the parole, the second libel
case was pending. The issuance of the writ under such circumstance was, therefore, proscribed.
There was basis to deny his immediate release at that time.

GLENN CABALLES y CHUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 163108, 23 February 2005, SECOND DIVISION (Callejo, Sr., J.)
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus cannot be joined with the special civil action for certiorari
because the two remedies are governed by a different set of rules
Glenn Chua Caballes (Caballes) was charged with rape of a minor in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malabon City. Because he was charged with a non-bailable offense, he was detained. In
his arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
The prosecution presented as witnesses the victim and her mother. Caballes’ commenced his
cross-examination through his counsel, however, he failed to complete the same. In January
2003, Caballes engaged the services of a new counsel, Atty. Noel S. Sorreda (Atty. Sorreda).
Atty. Sorreda continued the cross-examination of the victim, but failed to terminate the same.
The trial was initially set on 6 March 2003 for Atty. Sorreda to terminate his cross-examination
of the victim, however, the trial did not proceed on the said date because the private prosecutor
was not present due to illness.
The continuation of the trial was set on April 3, 21, and 30, 2003. On 3 April 2003, the Caballes
was able to conclude his cross-examination and filed a petition for bail on 28 April 2003.
However, the trial on the said date did not proceed because Atty. Sorreda filed a Manifestation
that his presence was required in an execution sale in Cavite; therefore, the trial date was reset
once again to 19 June 2003.
On 5 May 2003, Caballes filed a motion seeking an earlier trial date, invoking his right to a
speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act of 1998. He also filed a motion for the urgent resolution
of his petition for bail. His petition for bail was denied, after a finding that the evidence of guilt
against Caballes was strong. Subsequently, the trial dates were reset once more due to the
unavailability of the other witnesses of the prosecution.
On 4 July 2003, Caballes filed a motion for reconsideration of his petition for bail. His motion
was set for hearing, however, on 11 July 2003, Caballes pre-empted the resolution of his motion
by filing a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that his right to a speedy trial was violated.
The RTC denied the motion, stating that there was no violation to his right to a speedy trial,
considering that the delays cannot be attributed to the prosecution alone. Likewise, the RTC
considered that Caballes abandoned his motion for reconsideration with regard to his bail
petition upon the filing of his motion to dismiss.
Caballes then filed a “Petition For Habeas Corpus and/or Certiorari and Prohibition” with the
Court of Appeals (CA). In his petition, Caballes reiterated that he was deprived of his right to a
speedytrial and his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the case, and that the trial court
gravely abused its discretion in denying his petition for bail. The CA dismissed Caballes’
petition.
ISSUE:
Should the petition be granted?
HELD:
No. Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial
courts function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be
used to investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or
on the merits. It is not ordinarily granted where the law provides for other remedies in the regular
course, and in the absence of exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be
granted in advance of trial. It is not ordinarily granted where the law provides for other remedies
in the regular course, and in the absence of exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus
should not be granted in advance of trial.
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus cannot be joined with the special civil action for certiorari
because the two remedies are governed by a different set of rules. Rule 2, Section 5(b) of the
Rules of Court mandates that the joinder of causes of action shall not include special actions or
actions governed by special rules, thus proscribing the joinder of a special proceeding with a
special civil action. As such, the petition was properly dismissed.
Even assuming that it should be treated solely as a habeas corpus petition, the CA nonetheless
rightly. Dismissed the petition because Caballes failed to establish his right to. The writ. He was
charged with rape of a minor, punishable by reclusion perpetua, and was detained based on the
said charge. As such, if the evidence of his guilt is strong, he shall not be admitted to bail
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE NORMA C. PERELLO, et al.

A.M. No. RTJ-05-1952, 24 December 2008, EN BANC (Leonardo-De Castro, J.)
The Rules clearly require that a copy of the commitment or cause of detention must accompany
the application for the writ of habeas corpus. It must be emphasized that rules of procedure have
been formulated and promulgated by this Court to ensure the speedy and efficient administration
of justice.
The case stemmed from the judicial audit conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) in all seven branches of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City, including the
Branch 276, the branch presided by Judge Norma C. Perello (Judge Perello). The audit was
prompted by reports of perceived irregular dispositions of habeas corpus petitions by the court.
The audit team that conducted the investigation noted that for the period of 1998-2004, a total of
219 petitions of habeas corpus were assigned to Judge Perello’s branch. They noted the huge
disparity of petitions for habeas corpus raffled to Branch 276, as compared to other branches.
The team likewise noted several substantive and procedural lapses with regard to the disposition
of habeas corpus petitions in the said branch. Finally, they observed that, in some of the habeas
corpus petitions, Judge Perello erred in ordering the release of the prisoners even before they
have served the full term of their sentence.
As such, the audit team recommended the OCA to consider the judicial audit report as an
administrative complaint against Judge Perello for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of
discretion, and grave misconduct. In its Resolution dated 2 March 2005, the Court adopted the
aforesaid recommendation.
Judge Perello insisted that her decisions were in line with law and jurisprudence. For those
convicted of illegal possession of firearms under the old law (Presidential Decree No. 1866), she
applied retroactively the provisions of the amendatory law or R.A. No. 8294, pursuant to Article
22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides for the retroactive application of laws that are
favorable to the accused even to those already convicted and serving sentence. Inasmuch as R.A.
No. 8294 imposed the penalty of six years only, it was incumbent upon her to grant the writs to
those prisoners who have been imprisoned for eight years already. For those convicted for
violation of R.A. No. 6425, she applied the said law and not the amendatory law or R.A. No.
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, mainly because it
aggravated the penalty and is therefore not favorable to them. She even enumerated her
credentials and qualifications, and alleged that most of her decisions were upheld by the
Supreme Court, thus cementing her competence in applying the law.
Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. recommended that Judge Perello be found guilty of
gross ignorance of the law and jurisprudence, and be meted with the penalty of suspension for
three months without salary and benefit. Justice Conrado Molina, the consultant of OCA,
adopted entirely the recommendations of the Court Administrator.
ISSUE:
Should Judge Perello be disciplined for her manner of handling habeas corpus petitions?
HELD:
Yes. Concurring with the finding of the Court Administrator, Judge Perello is found guiltyof
gross ignorance of the law and jurisprudence.
Judge Perello maintains that the provisions of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be given retroactive effect
insofar as the prisoners are concerned for the main reason that it would not be favorable to them.
Thus, according to Judge Perello, the provisions of R.A. No. 6425, as interpreted in the case of
People v. Simon, must be applied to the released prisoners.
While the Court agreed that R.A. No. 9165 cannot be applied retroactively, they, however,
disagree with her justification in granting the writs, as it was the wrong application of the ruling
in Simon. In obstinately granting the writs of habeas corpus even if the convicted prisoners had
only served the minimum period of their sentence, Judge Perello displayed a blatant disregard of
the rule on graduation of penalties as well as settled jurisprudence tantamount to gross ignorance
of the law. As a trial judge, respondent is the visible representation of law and justice. Under
Canon 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, she is expected to be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence. Judges are expected to keep abreast of developments in
law and jurisprudence.
Notably, the record shows that Judge Perello granted the writs of habeas corpus even without the
pertinent copies of detention and judgment of conviction. The Rules clearly require that a copy
of the commitment or cause of detention must accompany the application for the writ of habeas
corpus. It must be emphasized that rules of procedure have been formulated and promulgated by
this Court to ensure the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Failure to abide by these
rules undermines the wisdom behind them and diminishes respect for the rule of law. Judges
should therefore administer their office with due regard to the integrity of the system of law
itself, remembering that they are not depositories of arbitrary power, but judges under the
sanction of law.
Therefore, Judge Perello should be disciplined accordingly. In view, however, of Judge Perellos
compulsory retirement which makes suspension impossible to impose, the proper action is to
impose a fine on her in the maximum amount of P40,000.00, deductible from her retirement pay.
ALAVA, QUINO
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS.

JUAN PONCE ENRILE vs. JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR
G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990
FACTS: Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement
officers on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar. The warrant had issued on an
information charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio
Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly
committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10,
1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters, without bail. They
were eventually transferred to Camp Karingal in Quezon City.
Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus herein alleging that he was
deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been held to, among others, answer for
criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books and denied of his right to bail. The
Office of the Solicitor General posits that petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandez
ruling because the information in Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes
committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the information
against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but
not in furtherance, of rebellion.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners afforded the right to bail
HELD: Yes. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's
case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the information against him should be
considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction,
that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts
from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle
for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's
right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or
deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that
jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of
the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court
should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first
applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.
Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the information
charges a non-existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than
one offense, would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either
hypothesis, the obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal
action before the respondent Judge. That notwithstanding, the Court decided to touch on the
merits of the case and held that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the
questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and
Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are
entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to
petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered
remanded to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners.
ALAVA, QUINO
ILUSORIO v. BILDNER
GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000
FACTS: Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued
at millions of pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio
Country Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten
6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and
Shereen. They separated from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he
was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On
the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City.
In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in
Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdose
Potenciano which caused the latter’s health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with
RTC petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latter’s
advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a
corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland
Condominium in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to
have the custody of his husband alleging that the respondents refused her demands to see and
visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.
HELD: A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by
which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the
grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective not merely
nominal or moral.
Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potenciano’s
liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and
under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. He still has the
capacity to discern his actions. With his full mental capacity having the right of choice, he may
not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of
his right to privacy.
The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife
to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is
at liberty to do so without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture, is
a matter beyond judicial authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas
corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other process.
ALAVA, QUINO
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS ENGR. ASHRAF
KUNTING
G.R. No. 167193 | April 19, 2006
FACTS: Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the Malaysian Internal Security
Act. On June 12, 2003 the Royal Malaysian Police in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, turned over
Kunting to the PNP-IG and Task Force Salinglahi pursuant to warrants for his arrest issued by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela City charging him of four counts of Kidnapping for
Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention.
PNP-IG, informed the Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC that Kunting was already in the custody
of the PNP-IG. Atty. Danipog requested for Kunting’s temporary detention at the PNP-IG, Camp
Crame, Quezon City due to the high security risks involved and prayed for the issuance of a
corresponding commitment order. The RTC issued an Order directing the Police Superintendent
and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to immediately turn over Kunting to the trial court
since Kunting filed an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation.
The PNP-IG requested representation and a motion to be filed for the transfer of venue of the
trial from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City. Kunting’s motion was subsequently denied since
the PNP-IG has not turned over the former
On March 14, 2005, Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus. Kunting stated that he has been restrained of his liberty since June 12, 2003 by the PNP-
IG and alleging that he was never informed of the charges filed against him until he requested his
family to research in Zamboanga City.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus can prosper.
HELD: No. Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus extends
to "all case of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or
by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." The
remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person, and
if found illegal, the court orders the release of the detainee. If, however, the detention is proven
lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the writ is not allowed:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears that the person alleged to
be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge
or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be
allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged
by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in
this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in
the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In this case, Kunting’s detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by the RTC. He was
arrested by the PNP by virtue of the alias order of arrest issued by Judge Danilo M. Bucoy, RTC,
Branch 2, Isabela City, Basilan. His temporary detention at PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City,
was thus authorized by the trial court.
Moreover, Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal
Detention in Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129, 3674-1187, and 3611-1165. In
accordance with the last sentence of Section 4 above, the writ cannot be issued and Kunting
cannot be discharged since he has been charged with a criminal offense. Bernarte v. Court of
Appeals7 holds that "once the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer
question his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus."
Nevertheless, this Court notes that the RTC in its Order dated February 11, 2005 reiterated its
Order dated September 15, 2003, directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs
Division, PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, to turn over Kunting to the court. The trial court
has been waiting for two years for the PNP-IG to turn over the person of Kunting for the trial of
his case. The PNP-IG has delayed the turn over because it is waiting for the DOJ to request for
the transfer of venue of the trial of the case from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City. In the
absence of evidence that the DOJ has indeed filed a motion for the transfer of venue, In its
Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General stated that the PNP-IG is presently awaiting the
resolution of the Motion for Transfer of Venue it requested from the DOJ. In this regard, t the
Police Chief Superintendent is, therefore, directed to take positive steps towards action on said
motion.comply with the Order of the trial court, dated February 11, 2005, to turn over the body
of petitioner Kunting to the trial court.
ALAVA, QUINO
NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN vs. JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG

G.R. No. 182497, 29 June 2010
FACTS: Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed at the
corner of M. H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila. Investigation conducted by the
Manila Police District Homicide Section yielded the identity of the male perpetrator as PO1
Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was commanded to the MPD District Director for
proper disposition. Likewise, inquest proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutor’s
Office.
Police Senior Superintendent Guinto, rendered his Pre-Charge Evaluation Report against PO1
Ampatuan, finding probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct (Murder)
and recommending that said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to summary hearing. The City
Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the case against PO1 Ampatuan be set for further
investigation and that the latter be released from custody unless he is being held for other
charges/legal grounds.
Armed with the recommendation of the Manila City’s Prosecution Office, petitioner, who is the
wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. The trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
commanding therein respondents to produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan and directing said
respondents to show cause why they are withholding or restraining the liberty of PO1 Ampatuan.
Seeking the reversal of RTC directive, the respondents averred that the filing of the
administrative case against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by the PNP and this Court has no
authority to order the release of the subject police officer. The petitioner countered that the letter
resignation of PO1 Ampatuan has rendered the administrative case moot and academic.
Respondent however stressed that the resignation has not been acted by the appropriate police
officials of the PNP, and that the administrative case was filed while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the
active status of the PNP. The RTC reversed and dismissed the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is grave abuse its discretion when the trial court failed to consider
that the arrest and detention of PO1 Basser B. Ampatuan was made without any warrant.
HELD: The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or
lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person's
detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even
if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as
the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of
the application
In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody. Republic Act No. 6975
(also known as the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990), as amended by
Republic Act No. 8551 (also known as the Philippine National Police Reform and
Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly provides that members of the police force are subject to the
administrative disciplinary machinery of the PNP.
Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid
argument for his continued detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and
monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their
superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty.
Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is
neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a
permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers
concerned are always accounted for.
In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is entitled to the issuance
of the writ prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1 Ampatuan. The petition fails to show on its
face that the latter is unlawfully deprived of his liberty guaranteed and enshrined in the
Constitution.
NAME: Banatin, Alyssa Monique
TITLE: CARLOS T. GO, SR., Petitioner, v. LUIS T. RAMOS, Respondent.
TOPIC: Rule 102 – Habeas Corpus
Facts:
The petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos
before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy
T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy
represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmy’s personal circumstances and other records
indicate that he is not so. To prove his contention, Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy,
issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmy’s citizenship as
Chinese. Luis argued that although it appears from Jimmy’s birth certificate that his parents,
Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because only the
citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten. He
also averred that in September 1989 or thereabout, Jimmy, through stealth, machination and
scheming managed to cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and
untruthful declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport from the Department of
Foreign Affairs.
Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit, averring that the complaint for deportation
initiated by Luis was merely a harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful share in their
business dealings. Jimmy maintained that there is no truth to the allegation that he is an alien,
and insisted that he is a natural-born Filipino. Jimmy alleged that his father Carlos, who was the
son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with
Article IV, Section 1, paragraph
4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/167569.htm - _ftn12 of the 1935
Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 625, as evidenced by his having taken the Oath of
Allegiance on July 11, 1950 and having executed an Affidavit of Election of Philippine
citizenship on July 12, 1950. He denied that his father arrived in the Philippines as an
undocumented alien, alleging that his father has no record of arrival in this country as alleged in
the complaint-affidavit precisely because his father was born and raised in the Philippines, and in
fact, speaks fluent Ilonggo and Tagalog.
With regard to the erroneous entry in his birth certificate that he is Chinese, he maintained that
such was not of his own doing, but may be attributed to the employees of the Local Civil
Registrar’s Office who might have relied on his Chinese-sounding surname when making the
said entry. He asserted that the said office has control over his birth certificate; thus, if his
father’s citizenship appears to be handwritten, it may have been changed when the employees of
that office realized that his father has already taken his oath as a Filipino. As regards the entry in
his siblings certificates of birth, particularly Juliet Go and Carlos Go, Jr., that their father is
Chinese, Jimmy averred that the entry was erroneous because it was made without prior
consultation with his father.
In a Resolution, Associate Commissioner Hornilla dismissed the complaint for deportation
against Jimmy. Associate Commissioner Hornilla affirmed the findings of the National Bureau of
Investigation tasked to investigate the case that Jimmy’s father elected Filipino citizenship in
accordance with the provisions of the 1935 Philippine Constitution. By operation of law,
therefore, the citizenship of Carlos was transmitted to Jimmy, making him a Filipino as well.
The Board of Commissioners (Board), however, reversed said dismissal, holding that Carlos election
of Philippine citizenship was made out of time. Finding Jimmy’s claim to Philippine citizenship in
serious doubt by reason of his father’s questionable election thereof, the Board directed the
preparation and filing of the appropriate deportation charges against Jimmy.
The corresponding Charge Sheet was filed against Jimmy, charging him of violating Section 37(a)
(9) in relation to Section 45(c) of Com. Act No. 613, otherwise known as The Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940.
Carlos and Jimmy filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for injunctive
reliefs before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 167, seeking to annul and set aside the Resolution
of the Board of Commissioners, the Charge Sheet, and the proceedings had therein. In essence,
they challenged the jurisdiction of the Board to continue with the deportation proceedings.
In the interim, the Board issued a Decision, ordered the apprehension and deportation of Jimmy.
In view of the said Decision, Carlos and Jimmy filed a supplemental petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the trial court and reiterated their application for injunctive reliefs. Later,
however, the trial court dissolved the writ in a Decision as a consequence of the dismissal of the
petition. Carlos and Jimmy moved for reconsideration. But their motion was likewise denied.
Following the dismissal of the petition in SCA No. 2218, the Board issued a warrant of
deportation which led to the apprehension of Jimmy. Jimmy commenced a petition for habeas
corpus, but the same was eventually dismissed by reason of his provisional release on bail.
The course of action taken by the trial court was also approved by the appellate tribunal. The
Court of Appeals stated that the trial court necessarily had to rule on the substantial and legal
bases warranting the deportation proceeding in order to determine whether the Board acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, the appellate
court found that due process was properly observed in the proceedings before the Board,
contrary to the claim of Jimmy.
Unfazed with the said ruling, they moved for reconsideration. Their motion having been
denied, Carlos and Jimmy each filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court.
Meanwhile, in view of the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP. No. 85143, Bureau of Immigration
Commissioner Fernandez, Jr. issued Warrant of Deportation No. AFF-04-003 to carry out the
Decision in BSI-D.C. No. ADD-01-117. This resulted in the apprehension and detention of
Jimmy at the Bureau of Immigration Bicutan Detention Center, pending his deportation to China.
On account of his detention, Jimmy once again filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC
of Pasig City, Branch 167, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 11507 assailing his apprehension and
detention despite the pendency of his appeal and his release on recognizance.
In an Order, the trial court dismissed the said petition ruling that the remedy of habeas corpus
cannot be availed of to obtain an order of release once a deportation order has already been
issued by the Bureau. Jimmy moved for reconsideration of the Order, but this was also denied by
the trial court in an Order.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court correctly dismissed the petition for habeas corpus
Held:
Yes. Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in fact ordered arrested
pending his deportation, coupled by this Courts pronouncement that the Board was not ousted of
its jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings, the petition for habeas corpus is
rendered moot and academic. A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special
proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to
determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be
issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a persons’ detention as of, at the earliest, the
filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception
illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section
4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application.
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through
a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information
and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after
the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term court in this context
includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the persons
confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration. Likewise, the
cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is
detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the
Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in
habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.
We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus are available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. The writ of certiorari does not lie where an appeal may be taken or
where another adequate remedy is available for the correction of the error.
The petitioners correctly argue that appeal should have been the remedy availed of as it is more
plain, speedy and adequate. The 48-hour appeal period demonstrates the adequacy of such
remedy in that no unnecessary time will be wasted before the decision will be re-evaluated.
TITLE: OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, Complainant, v. JUDGE ANTONIO I. DE

CASTRO, Respondent
Facts:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), through Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo, filed an
administrative complaint against Executive Judge Antonio Eugenio, Jr. and Judge Antonio I. De
Castro (respondent), for (a) knowingly rendering an unjust judgment; (b) grossly disregarding
the law and prevailing jurisprudence; and (c) dishonesty and abuse of authority.
The complaint stemmed from the issued by respondent in the habeas corpus proceedings. Said
order temporarily restrained the deportation of a Chinese national, Gao Yuan, for 17
days. Complainant alleges that the order was in blatant disregard of Commonwealth Act No. 613
or the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of
Court on habeas corpus, and prevailing jurisprudence thereon. As to Judge Eugenio, Jr., he had
earlier, issued an order restraining Gao Yuan’s deportation for 72 hours.
Gao Yuan is a national of the Peoples Republic of China (PROC) and holder of a special non-
immigrant visa to the Philippines and an immigrant visa to Canada. Gao Yuan, her husband
James Mahshi, a U.S. national, and their two young children were on their way to a vacation
in Canada when Philippine immigration officers arrested Gao Yuan and prevented her from
boarding her flight. Gao Yuan’s arrest was by virtue of an order issued by Bureau of Immigration
(BI) Commissioner Alipio Fernandez, Jr., which, in turn, was a response to a letter from the
Consul General of the PROC which alleged that Gao Yuan was a fugitive from justice and
charged with embezzlement by Chinese police and requested her arrest and deportation to
China. Gao Yuan was detained at the BI Detention Center.
James Mahshi filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila the Petition for the writ
of Habeas Corpus with Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, impleading Commissioner Fernandez as respondent. It was alleged
that Gao Yuan was illegally detained since she is not a fugitive from justice as in fact, she was
not charged with any crime at the time she left China in 2001 and [a]t such time, no case had
been filed against her, no process to compel her testimony had been issued and no travel
restrictions had been imposed on her by Chinese authorities. It was also alleged that Gao Yuan
had filed with the Department of Justice a petition for asylum as a political refugee.
The same day that the petition for habeas corpus was filed in RTC, Exec. Judge Eugenio, Jr.
issued a 7-hour TRO enjoining the BI from initiating any deportation proceeding and/or directing
the suspension of any such proceedings against Gao Yuan. The case was then raffled to Branch 3
of the Manila RTC presided by respondent.
Commissioner Fernandez, through the OSG, filed a Return of the Writ. The Return informed the
RTC that Gao Yuan’s passport had been cancelled by the PROC and her apprehension had been
expressly requested by the Embassy of the PROC. Gao Yuan’s summary deportation was already
ordered for being an undocumented and undesirable alien by the BI Board of Commissioners.
During the clarificatory hearing, respondent Judge de Castro insisted on the release on bail of
Gao Yuan. Through an interlocutory order, the RTC took custody of Gao Yuan. The RTC
clarified that it was only a provisional release for the duration of the TRO. Respondent based the
provisional release on humanitarian reasons, considering that Gao Yuan was merely wanted as a
witness in a case in the PROC and she is a nursing mother to a 17-month old child.
It was after the filing of the habeas corpus that a summary deportation order was issued.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge erred when he ordered for the immediate discharge
of Gao Yuan
Held:
Yes.
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule
102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the
confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be
inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for
the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of
some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Sec. 4 of Rule 102, be no longer
illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Thus, once a person detained is duly charged in
court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information
and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after
the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term court includes quasi-
judicial bodies or governmental agencies authorized to order the persons confinement, like the
Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.
In the case at bar, the petition for habeas corpus was filed and was raffled on the same day to
respondent’s sala. The Return of the Writ was filed the next day, accompanied by the Charge
Sheet and the Summary Deportation Order. When the petition was filed by James Mahshi, a
charge sheet and deportation order had already been filed against Gao Yuan. By then, the
restraint of Gao Yuan’s liberty was already by virtue of a lawful process. Clearly, respondent’s
court no longer had jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus and it was error for
respondent to order Gao Yuan’s release upon the filing of a cash bond and take full responsibility
for the release and custody of Gao Yuan.
Respondent’s acts also disregarded the rule on burden of proof after the writ has been returned as
laid down in Sec. 13 of Rule 102. If the detention is by reason of or in pursuance of law, the
return is considered prima facie evidence of the validity of the restraint and the petitioner therein
has the burden of proof to show that the restraint is illegal. The reason for this is the presumption
that official duty has been regularly performed. The transcript of stenographic notes of the
hearing shows that the allegations in the return that Gao Yuan had a pending deportation case
with the BI Board of Commissioners, as shown by the Charge Sheet, and that a Summary
Deportation Order was already issued against her and that she used an expired Chinese passport
in her attempt to leave the Philippines, were not controverted by James Mahshi. It seems that
respondent merely confirmed from Gao Yuan the allegations in the petition for habeas
corpus that she was not a fugitive from justice but was merely wanted as a witness in a case and
that she was a nursing mother to a 17-month old baby. Believing that Gao Yuan’s detention was
without due process of law, respondent ordered that the court take custody of her and that she be
not returned to the BI Detention Center.
The provisional or temporary release of Gao Yuan also effectively granted the petition
for habeas corpus insofar as the discharge of the detainee is concerned, since the main prayer in
a petition for habeas corpus relates to the release or discharge of the detainee. The general rule is
that the release, whether permanent or temporary, of a detained person renders the petition
for habeas corpus moot and academic. Such release must be one which is free from involuntary
restraints. Gao Yuan’s release, while still subject to certain conditions, did not unduly restrain her
movements or deprive her of her constitutional freedoms. The conditions were deemed necessary
by the court below to ensure her attendance in the subsequent hearings on the case. Said
conditions did not at all restrict her freedom of movement as she was able to elude the authorities
who tried to arrest her for her failure to appear before the trial court.
Respondent may also have been under the impression that the case before him was one for
extradition, particularly because Gao Yuan’s arrest and detention were pursuant to a request from
the PROC to hold and deport her in connection with an embezzlement case in China. If that were
so, his acts of ordering Gao Yuan’s release upon the filing of a bond would have been sanctioned
by this Court’s ruling in Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented
by the Philippine Department of Justice v. Hon. Felixberto T. Olalia and Juan
Antonio Munoz which allows the prospective extraditee to apply for bail, provided that he
presents clear and convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the
orders and processes of the extradition court. However, the petition filed before respondent was
one for habeas corpus which raised the simple issue of whether Gao Yuan was held under lawful
authority. The Return filed by the Commissioner sufficiently established the basis of Gao Yuan’s
detention, which were the Charge Sheet and Summary Deportation Order. By the time the
petition for habeas corpus was filed, there was already a legal basis to detain Gao Yuan. Her
confinement was not illegal. It was thus error for respondent to continue with the proceeding and
thereafter order her release upon posting of a cash bond.
Accordingly, respondent is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law. In the present
case, there is no finding of bad faith or malice, but this does not excuse respondent. When the
law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it, and anything less than
that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.
TITLE: TZE SUN WONG, Petitioner, v. KENNY WONG, Respondent.
TOPIC: Writ of Certiorari
Facts:
Petitioner is a Chinese citizen who immigrated to the Philippines in 1975 and subsequently
acquired a permanent resident status in 1982. As the records would show, he studied, married,
and continued to reside in the country, and even owned a company called Happy Sun Travel and
Tours.
Respondent Kenny Wong (respondent), filed a Complaint-Affidavit against petitioner before the
Bureau of Immigration (BOI), alleging that the latter had misrepresented, in his driver’s license
application, that he was a Filipino citizen. Respondent also averred that petitioner and his
business partner issued post-dated checks which, however, bounced to his damage and prejudice.
Thus, taking cue from the foregoing acts, respondent prayed that petitioner be investigated by the
BOI for violation of immigration laws.
In the petitioner’s Counter-Affidavit, he denied respondent’s claim of misrepresentation, stating
that when he applied for a driver’s license, it was another person who filled up the application
form for him; that said person entered the wrong information, particularly, on his name, birth
year, and nationality.
Finding probable cause, the Special Prosecutor filed with the BOI the applicable deportation
charges against petitioner. Thereafter, the BOI Commissioner issued a Mission Order to verify
petitioner’s immigration status which was later recalled and the Law and Investigation Division
endorsed the records to the Board of Special Inquiry which directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.
The BOI Ruling: The BOI Board of Commissioners ordered the deportation of petitioner on the
grounds of: (a) illegal use of alias, i.e., Joseph Wong, the name appearing in his driver’s license
application; and (b) misrepresenting himself as a Filipino citizen in the same application, in
violation of Section 37 (a) (7) and (9) of “The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940” in relation to
Sections 1, 2, and 3 of Republic Act No. 6085. Also, the fact that driver’s license applications
require the personal appearance of the applicant in order to prevent fraud. Thus, by allowing
someone to apply for him, he actively involved himself in the preparation and issuance of a
fraudulent driver’s license. He cannot then aver that he was without any participation in the entry
of his supposed Philippine citizenship in his driver’s license.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the BOI in a Resolution. As
such, petitioner filed an appeal before the Secretary of Justice.
The Secretary of Justice Ruling: In a Resolution, Acting Secretary of Justice affirmed the ruling
of the BOI.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration and raised the argument that the Judgment of the BOI was
null and void since only two commissioners participated in the decision-making process.
Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez rendered a Resolution rejecting petitioner’s argument on
the basis of Section 8 of the Immigration Act which simply requires that “[i]n any case coming
before the [BOI] Board of Commissioners, the decision of any two members shall prevail[,]” as
in this case. It was added that when petitioner sought to reconsider said Judgment, all four (4)
commissioners decided in favor of his deportation.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.
The CA Ruling: The CA denied the certiorari petition and affirmed the ruling of the Secretary of
Justice that petitioner should be deported for violating the abovementioned rules. Preliminarily, it
found that petitioner chose the wrong remedy considering that the decisions of the BOI Board of
Commissioners are directly appealable to the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The CA
also observed that even on the assumption that the Secretary of Justice was given the authority to
countermand the BOI Judgment under the Administrative Code, no countermand was made, and
hence, the same should have already attained finality.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution, hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly denied petitioner’s petition for certiorari.
Held:
Yes. In this case, petitioner instituted an administrative appeal before the Secretary of Justice and
thereafter sought direct recourse to the CA via certiorari, thereby leap-frogging other available
remedies, the first being a subsequent administrative appeal to the OP and, eventually, an appeal
of the OP decision to the CA via Rule 43. While these remedies remained available to him, the
Court deems that they would not afford him speedy and adequate relief in view of the plain
imminence of his deportation, by virtue of the issuance of a warrant of deportation. The urgency
of such circumstance therefore justified his direct resort to certiorari. However,
petitioner’s certiorari petition before the CA basically revolves on his denial of the acts of
misrepresentation imputed against him, claiming that the same do not warrant his deportation.
The commission of said acts involves factual matters that have already been established during
the proceedings before the BOI Board of Commissioners. In this regard, it is crucial to point out
that “[t]he Bureau is the agency that can best determine whether petitioner violated certain
provisions of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. In this jurisdiction, courts
will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies
entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and
training of such agencies. By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative
departments over matters falling within their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass
judgment thereon and their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded respect, if not
finality, by the courts.” As petitioner has not sufficiently demonstrated any cogent reason to
deviate from the BOI Board of Commissioners’ findings, courts are will not to defer to its
judgment.
Further, petitioner’s argument is correct in theory since deliberation by all members of the
collegial body is evidently what the rule contemplates, with the votes of only two (2) members
being sufficient for a decision to prevail. Unfortunately, however, petitioner has not shown any
proof that deliberations were not conducted by all commissioners before the questioned
Judgment was made. The rule is well-settled that he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving
it and a mere allegation is not evidence. Thus, once more, his self-serving assertion cannot be
given credence. This is especially so in light of the presumption of regularity, which herein ought
to prevail due to the absence of any clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In particular,
the presumption that the Judgment had been deliberated by the BOI Board of Commissioners as
a collegial body stands. In any event, the lack of any concurrence or dissension from the two (2)
other commissioners missing on the face of the Judgment has already been placated by their
eventual signing of full concurrence in the subsequent Resolution denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
TITLE: DIRECTOR EPIMACO A. VELASCO, as Director of the National Bureau of

Investigation (NBI), NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION SPECIAL
OPERATIONS GROUP (SOG), SPECIAL INVESTIGATORS III FLOR L.
RESURRECCION and ANTONIO M. ERUM, JR., and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, FELICITAS S. CUYAG, for and in
behalf of LAWRENCE A. LARKINS, respondents.
Facts:
A warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Manuel Padolina of Branch 162 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, against accused Lawrence Larkins in Criminal Cases Nos.
101189-92 for violations of B.P. Blg. 22.
A certain Desiree Alinea executed and filed before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) a
complaint-affidavit accusing Larkins of the crime of rape allegedly committed against her on 19
November 1994 at 2:00 a.m. in Victoria Valley Subdivision, Valley Golf, Antipolo, Rizal.
Acting on the basis of the complaint of Alinea, petitioners Special Investigators Flor L.
Resurreccion and Antonio M. Erum, Jr. proceeded to the office of Larkins in Makati, Metro
Manila, and arrested the latter, who was thereupon positively identified by Alinea as her
rapist. Larkins was then detained at the Detention Cell of the NBI, Taft Avenue, Manila.
On 22 November 1994, Larkins posted his bail in Criminal Cases Nos. 101189-92. Judge
Padolina forthwith issued an order recalling and setting aside the warrant of arrest issued on 16
September 1993 and directing the Jail Warden of the NBI Detention Cell to release Larkins from
confinement "unless otherwise detained for some other cause."
Special Investigators Resurreccion and Erum refused to release Larkins because he was still
detained for another cause, specifically for the crime of rape for which he would be held for
inquest.
Subsequently, a complaint against Larkins for rape was executed by Alinea. It contains a
certification by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ma. Paz Reyes Yson that it is "filed pursuant to
Section 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, the accused not
having opted to avail of his right to preliminary investigation and not having executed a waiver
pursuant to Article 125 of the RPC. . . ." The complaint was filed with the RTC of Antipolo, and
assigned to Branch 71 of the court, presided by Judge Felix S. Caballes.
Larkins, through his counsel Mauricio C. Ulep, filed an Urgent Motion for Bail wherein he
alleged, inter alia, that the evidence of guilt against him for rape is not strong, as he had no
carnal knowledge of the complainant and the medical report indicates that her hymen was neither
lacerated nor ruptured; that he is entitled as a matter of right to bail; and that he has no intention
of going out of the country or hiding away from the law.
Larkins, through his new counsel, Atty. Theodore O. Te, filed in Criminal Case No. 94-11794 an
Urgent Omnibus Motion for the Dismissal of the Complaint and for Immediate
Release, principally based on the alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest.
In the order of 5 January 1995, the trial court denied the aforesaid motions, finding no legal or
valid grounds to dismiss the complaint or release the accused, or to grant him bail.
Unable to accept the ruling, Larkins' common-law wife, Felicitas S. Cuyag, filed before the
Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus with certiorari. Impleaded as respondents were the
herein petitioners and Judge Felix S. Caballes. The Court of Appeals issued a resolution ordering
the respondents therein to appear and produce Lawrence A. Larkins before the court on 31
January 1995 at 10:30 a.m. and to show cause why Larkins' liberty is being restrained.
After hearing the arguments of the parties, the Court of Appeals rendered the challenged
decision, holding that on the basis of which Larkins was detained without a warrant of arrest for
rape did not meet the legal requirements provided for in warrantless arrest under Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court. Furthermore, on the day the detention of Larkins commenced, no other criminal
complaint or information had been filed or pending in any court. It was only sometime between
November 25, 1994 (when filing of the complaint was approved by the Rizal Provincial
Prosecutor) and November 29, 1994 (the date appearing on the Urgent Motion for Bail filed by
Larkins's former counsel, said Atty. Ulep) that the complaint for rape was filed with the Antipolo
RTC.
Issue:
1. Whether or not private respondent Cuyag has the personalty to institute on the behalf of
her common-law spouse the petition for habeas corpus and certiorari
2. Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus should prosper
Held:
1. Yes. She falls within the purview of the term "some person" under Section 3, Rule 102 of
the Rules of Court, which means any person who has a legally justified interest in the freedom
of the person whose liberty is restrained or who shows some authorization to make the
application. She is not, however, the real party in interest in the certiorari aspect of the
petition. Only Larkins could institute a petition for certiorari to set aside the order denying his
motions for bail and for the dismissal of the complaint against him. It does not, however,
follow that if certiorari is available to Larkins, an application for a writ of habeas corpus will
absolutely be barred. While ordinarily, the writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when
there is an adequate remedy by writ of error or appeal or by writ of certiorari, it may,
nevertheless, be available in exceptional cases, for the writ should not be considered
subservient to procedural limitations which glorify form over substance. It must be kept in
mind that although the question most often considered in both habeas
corpus and certiorari proceedings is whether an inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction, the
former involves a collateral attack on the judgment and "reaches the body but not the record,"
while the latter assails directly the judgment and "reaches the record but not the body."
2. No. Even granting that Larkins was illegally arrested, still the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus will not prosper because his detention has become legal by virtue of the filing
before the trial court of the complaint against him and by the issuance of the 5 January 1995
order.
Even as we thus decide in favor of the petitioners, we are, nevertheless, disturbed by certain
incidents relative to the warrantless arrest of Larkins. Firstly, assuming that it was lawful, the
facts before us disclose that the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with (1) the last
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court requiring that the person lawfully
arrested without a warrant shall forthwith be delivered to the nearest police station or jail and
shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7, Rule 112; and (2) Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, providing that he be delivered to the proper judicial
authorities within thirty-six hours, the crime with which Larkins was charged being punishable
by an afflictive penalty. Although the arrest was made in Makati where there is a police station
and a municipal (now city) jail, Larkins was brought to the NBI Detention Cell at Taft Avenue,
Manila, and though the complaint of the offended party was executed on 23 November 1994, it
was not until 2 December 1994 that the said complaint was actually filed in court. Unless
satisfactorily explained, the non-compliance by the arresting officers with the said provisions
merits nothing but disapproval from the Court. In the performance of their duty and in their
commendable pursuit to stamp out crimes and bring criminals to the bar of justice, law
enforcement authorities should make no shortcuts, but must comply with all procedures to
safeguard the constitutional and statutory rights of accused persons.
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is lost in antiquity, was devised and
exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as the best
and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. More specifically, its vital purposes are to
obtain immediate relief from illegal confinement, to liberate those who may be imprisoned
without sufficient cause, and to deliver them from unlawful custody. It is then essentially a writ
of inquiry and is granted to test the right under which a person is detained.
Under our Constitution, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus cannot be suspended except in
cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 102
of the Rules of Court, it extends, except as otherwise provided by law, to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. It is not available, however,
under the instances enumerated in Section 4 of the said Rule which reads:
Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of
record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of
any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in
this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted
of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment
BRITO, JHON PATRICK
G.R. No. 130644. March 13, 1998

Short Title: Larranaga -vs- CA
Full Title: The Minor Francisco Juan Larranaga, Represented by his mother, Margarita G.
Present: Larranaga, petitioner -vs- Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines,
respondents.
TOPIC: HABEAS CORPUS
PONENTE: Puno, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Juan is charged with 2 counts of kidnapping and serious illegal detention pending
before RTC Cebu City. He is presently detained at the Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation Center.
Petitioner, through her mother, filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction. Alleging that he was denied the right
to preliminary investigation and to annul the informations and warrant of arrest issued in
consequence thereof. Petitioner filed a supplemental petition for habeas corpus or bail.
SC issued a resolution holding that petitioner was deprived of his right to preliminary
investigation when the City Prosecutor of Cebu insisted that he was only entitled to an inquest
investigation.
Judge Ocampo filed with this Court a letter-complaint alleging that petitioners counsels
deliberately withheld from the SC the omnibus order, supplemental order and order of
arraignment issued by him thereby unwittingly misled the Court in its resolution.
The counsels for the prosecution filed an MR on the SC resolution. They raised the following
arguments:
1. Petitioner is charged with a continuing offense; hence, his arrest and detention about two
months after the abduction of the victims was lawful;
2. Since petitioner was arrested without a warrant, his case comes within the purview of Section
7 of Rule 112, not under Section 3 thereof;
3. The filing of the informations in court and the issuance of the corresponding warrants of arrest
by Executive Judge cured whatever defect there was in petitioners arrest and detention;
ISSUE:
(1) WON petitioner is entitled to a regular preliminary investigation, and
(2) WON petitioner should be released from detention pending the investigation.
RULING:
(1). YES. Section 7 of Rule 112 applies only to persons lawfully arrested without a
warrant. Petitioner in this case was, in the first place, not arrested either by a peace officer or a
private person. It does not appear in the case at bar that petitioner has just committed, is actually
committing or is attempting to commit an offense when the police officers tried to arrest him. In
fact, petitioner was attending classes at the Center for Culinary Arts at that time.
BRITO, JHON PATRICK
G.R. No. 160792. August 25, 2005
Short Title: In the Matter of Petition for Habeas Corpus of Alejano -vs- Cabauay
Full Title: In the Matter of Petition for Habeas Corpus of Capt. Gary Alejano, Capt. Nicanor
Faeldon, Capt. Gerardo Gambala, Lt. Sg. James Layug, Capt. Milo Maestrecampo, Lt. Sg.
Antonio Trillanes IV, Homobono Adaza and Roberto Rafael Pulido, Petitioners, -vs- Gen. Pedro
Cabauay, Gen. Narciso Abaya, Sec. Angelo Reyes, and Sec. Roilo Golez
PONENTE: Carpio, J.
FACTS:
321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers, took control of the Oakwood
Premier Luxury Apartments in Makati City. The soldiers disarmed the security officers of
Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its immediate surroundings then publicly renounced
their support for the administration and called for the resignation of President Arroyo and several
cabinet members.
On the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several
negotiations, defused the explosive devices then returned to their barracks.
Gen. Abaya issued a directive to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention
Center. Government prosecutors then filed an Information for coup detat with RTC Makati City..
Granting the petition, the SC issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus directing the production of the
detainees in the CA for hearing. Thereafter, the detainees filed with the a Motion for Preliminary
Investigation, which the trial court granted.
CA – dismissed the petition. the detainees are already charged of coup detat before the
RTC. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees confinement is under a valid
indictment, the legality of which the detainees and petitioners do not even question.
Petitioner’s Argument:
- That the order granted the Habeas Corpus and the SC remanded the case to the CA only for a
factual hearing
-There was an actual prohibition of the detainees right to effective representation when
petitioners visits were limited by the schedule of visiting hours thus limiting their right to
counsel.
-That the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center violated the detainees right to privacy when the
ISAFP officials opened and read the letters handed by detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo to
one of the petitioners for mailing.
ISSUE:
WON CA erred in reversing a decision of the SC
RULING:
NO. In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual before the court is a
preliminary step in the hearing of the petition. The respondent must produce the person and
explain the cause of his detention. However, this order is not a ruling on the propriety of the
remedy or on the substantive matters covered by the remedy. Thus, the Courts order to the CA to
conduct a factual hearing was not an affirmation of the propriety of the remedy of habeas
corpus.
Even if, case law has expanded the writs application to circumstances where there is deprivation
of a person’s constitutional rights. However, a mere allegation of a violation of one’s
constitutional right is not sufficient.
The courts will extend the scope of the writ only if any of the following circumstances is present:
(a) there is a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the unlawful restraint of a person;
(b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or
(c) an excessive penalty is imposed and such sentence is void as to the excess.[
Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides the standard to make regulations in detention centers
allowable: such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the detainees safety and
prevent his escape. In the present case, the visiting hours accorded to the lawyers of the
detainees are reasonably connected to the legitimate purpose of securing the safety and
preventing the escape of all detainees.
There was no violation of right to privacy of communication since the letters were not in a sealed
envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same purpose as
the opening of sealed letters for the inspection of contraband.
Lastly, the detainees in the present case are junior officers accused of leading 300 soldiers in
committing coup detat, a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua.[65] The junior officers are not
ordinary detainees but visible leaders of the Oakwood incident involving an armed takeover of a
civilian building in the heart of the financial district of the country. As members of the military
armed forces, the detainees are subject to the Articles of War.
BRITO, JHON PATRICK
A.M. No. RTJ-02-1698. June 23, 2005

Short Title: Vicente -vs- Majaducon
Full Title: Dante Vicente, petitioner -vs- Judge Jose S. Majaducon, respondent.
PONENTE: Austria-Martinez, J.
FACTS:
RTC found Evelyn Te guilty on four counts of violation of B. P. Blg. 22 and sentenced her to 2
months of imprisonment on each count. The decision became final and executory after SC had
denied the petition for review from the affirmance of the trial court’s decision by the CA.
Te filed an MR, which she prayed be also considered as a petition for issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus. Citing Vaca v. Court of Appeals in which the sentence of imprisonment for
violation of B.P. 22 was reduced to a fine equal to double the amount of the check involved, Te
prayed that her sentence be similarly modified and that she be immediately released from
detention. RTC denied the petition for Habeas Corpus having been detained by virtue of a final
judgment.
She then filed an omnibus motion praying for her release on the ground that she had fully served
the three months minimum of her total sentence under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. She
further prayed that pending determination as to whether the Vaca ruling applied to her, she also
be allowed to post bail pursuant to Rule 102.
RTC allowed Te to post bail and ordered her release.
In the present case, complainant, the station manager of Radyo Bombo, alleges that while Te was
in prison, respondent judge allowed her to be released and confined at a local hospital in the
guise that she was suffering from certain illnesses. He further alleges that respondent approved
Te’s application for bail even though no petition for habeas corpus was filed.
As a result the local media in General Santos City made an uproar and criticized respondent. In
addition, complainant alleges that in a separate case, respondent allowed the release of the
accused without the posting of the necessary bail. On the basis of the above allegations,
complainant prays that respondent judge be investigated and if warranted, be terminated and
removed from service
ISSUE:
WON respondent erred in granting bail
RULING:
YES. Rule 102, 14 provides:
When person lawfully imprisoned recommitted, and when let to bail. If it appears that the
prisoner was lawfully committed, and is plainly and specifically charged in the warrant of
commitment with an offense punishable by death, he shall not be released, discharged, or bailed.
If he is lawfully imprisoned or restrained on a charge of having committed an offense not so
punishable, he may be recommitted to imprisonment or admitted to bail in the discretion of the
court or judge. If he be admitted to bail, he shall forthwith file a bond in such sum as the court
or judge deems reasonable, considering the circumstances of the prisoner and the nature of the
offense charged, conditioned for his appearance before the court where the offense is properly
cognizable to abide its order or judgment; and the court or judge shall certify the proceedings,
together with the bond, forthwith to the proper court. If such bond is not so filed, the prisoner
shall be recommitted to confinement.
However, it applies to cases where the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus is restrained by
virtue of a criminal charge against him, not where, as here, he is serving sentence by reason of a
final judgment.
Section 24, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court is plain and clear in prohibiting the grant of bail after
conviction by final judgment and after the convict has started to serve sentence. It provides:
An accused shall not be allowed bail after the judgment has become final, unless he has
applied for probation before commencing to serve sentence, the penalty and the offense being
within the purview of the Probation Law. In case the accused has applied for probation, he may
be allowed temporary liberty under his bail, but if no bail was filed or the accused is incapable
of filing one, the court may allow his release on recognizance to the custody of a responsible
member of the community. In no case shall bail be allowed after the accused has commenced to
serve sentence. (Emphasis supplied)
The only exception is when the convict has applied for probation before he commences to serve
sentence, provided the penalty and the offense are within the purview of the Probation Law.
In this case, the judgment finding her guilty of violation of B.P. 22 has already become final and
executory. She did not apply for probation. At the time respondent judge granted her bail she was
already serving her sentence.
BRITO, JHON PATRICK
G.R. No. 151876. June 21, 2005

Short Title: Go -vs- Dimagiba
Full Title: Susan Go and the People of the Philippines, petitioner, -vs- Fernando L. Dimagiba,
respondent.
PONENTE: Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
Dimagiba issued to Go thirteen 13 checks which were dishonored for the reason account closed.
Dimagiba was subsequently prosecuted and convicted for 13 counts of violation of BP 22 under
separate Complaints filed with the MTCC in Baguio City. (Penalty: Imprisonment 3mos per
count; Fine 1,295,000.)
RTC denied the appeal and sustained his conviction. There being no further appeal to CA, the
RTC issued a Certificate of Finality of the Decision. Thus, the MTCC issued an Order directing
the arrest of Dimagiba for the service of his sentence as a result of his conviction. The trial court
also issued a Writ of Execution to enforce his civil liability.
Dimagiba filed an MR of the MTCC Order. He prayed for the recall of the Order of Arrest and
the modification of the final Decision, arguing that the penalty of fine only, instead of
imprisonment also, should have been imposed on him. The arguments were reiterated in a
Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution.
MTCC denied MR, he was arrested and imprisoned for the service of his sentence. He then filed
with the RTC a Petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
RTC Ruling on the petition:

Granted the petition and directed the immediate release of Dimagiba from confinement and
requiring him to pay a fine of P100,000 in lieu of imprisonment. In justification, RTC cited Vaca
and (SC-AC) No. 12-2000 which allegedly required the imposition of a fine only instead of
imprisonment also for BP 22 violations, if the accused was not a recidivist or a habitual
delinquent. The RTC held that this rule should be retroactively applied in favor of Dimagiba.
MR of Go was denied.
ISSUE:
(1) WON the petition for Habeas Corpus was validly granted
(2) WON imprisonment is the preferred penalty for violation of BP 22
(3) WON the RTC committed and error in modifying the judgment of the MTCC
RULING:
1) No.
Respondent’s resort to this (MR and Partial Quashal) extraordinary remedy was a procedural
infirmity. The remedy should have been an appeal of the MTCC Order denying his Motions, in
which he should have prayed that the execution of the judgment be stayed. But he effectively
misused the action he had chosen, obviously with the intent of finding a favorable court. His
Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was clearly an attempt to reopen a case that had already
become final and executory.
Such an action deplorably amounted to forum shopping. Respondent should have resorted to the
proper, available remedy instead of instituting a different action in another forum.
2) Preference depends on the discretion of the trial court.

When the circumstances of the case clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without
taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone may be considered as the preferred penalty.
The determination of the circumstances that warrant the imposition of a fine rests upon the trial
judge only.
The competence to determine the proper penalty belongs to the court rendering the decision
against the accused. That decision is subject only to appeal on grounds of errors of fact or law, or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Another trial court may not
encroach upon this authority. Indeed, SC-AC No. 12-2000 necessarily requires a review of all
factual circumstances of each case. Such a review can no longer be done if the judgment has
become final and executory.
3) YES.
Citing So -vs- CA,The Court exercised in that case its authority to suspend or to modify the
execution of a final judgment when warranted or made imperative by the higher interest of
justice or by supervening events. The supervening event in that case was the petitioners urgent
need for coronary rehabilitation for at least one year under the direct supervision of a coronary
care therapist; imprisonment would have been equivalent to a death sentence.
The peculiar circumstances of So do not obtain in the present case.

CASTILLO, JEPHTAH
Rogelio Ormilla v. Bureau of Corrections
FACTS:
This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus filed for and in behalf of
Rogelio Ormilla, Rogelio Rivera and Alfredo Navarro, praying for their release from
confinement on the ground that an excessive penalty was imposed on them. Petitioner, together
with Rivera and Navarro, was convicted of two counts of rape and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua for each count. He is presently confined at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa and
has served approximately 17 years of his sentence. In the instant petition, Ormilla alleged that he
should be released from confinement by virtue of Republic Act No. 8353, otherwise known as
The Anti-Rape Law of 1997. He claimed that under the new rape law, the penalty for rape
committed by two or more persons was downgraded to prision mayor to reclusion
temporal.Thus, the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed on him is excessive and should be
modified in accordance with R.A. No. 8353. He prayed that he be released so he could apply for
pardon or parole.
ISSUE: Whether of not the writ may be granted in favor of petitioner.
RULING: The petition lacks merit.
Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus may be availed of in cases of illegal confinement by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto. In Feria v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the writ may also be
issued where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to
impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to
such excess. None of the above circumstances is present in the instant case.
Recall that petitioner was charged and convicted under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code which states that, “When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1.) By using force or
intimidation; 2.) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
and 3.) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. The crime of rape shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua. Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of
a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death. (Emphasis added)
With the enactment of R.A. No. 8353, petitioner claims that the penalty of reclusion
perpetua has become excessive, as the new law now punishes rape with prision mayor, citing
Article 266-B as follows: Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by prision mayor. Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or
by two or more persons, the penalty shall be prision mayor to reclusion temporal.
Petitioners reliance on the above-mentioned portion of Article 266-B is

misplaced. Note that the penalty of prision mayor is imposed for rape committed under
paragraph 2 of Article 266-A which is committed by any person who inserts his penis into
another persons mouth or anal orifice; or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal
orifice of another person. It bears stressing that petitioner, together with Rivera and Navarro,
was charged with and convicted of rape by having carnal knowledge of a woman using force and
intimidation under Article 335, which is now embodied in paragraph 1 of Article 266-A. When
and How Committed. Rape is committed: 1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances: a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
x x x x 2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1
hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of
another person.
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, the
penalty for rape committed by two or more persons, using force, threat or intimidation
is reclusion perpetua to death, to wit:
Art. 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next

preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
xxxx
It must be emphasized that the same penalties were imposed under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8353. It is clear therefore that R.A. No.
8353 did not downgrade the applicable penalties to petitioners case.
Considering that the penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed and that
petitioner is confined under authority of law, the petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus is hereby DENIED.
CASTILLO, JEPHTAH
People v. Caco
Facts:
The SC affirmed in toto the decision of Branch 172 of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, in Criminal Case finding Caco y Palmario guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the violation of Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentencing
her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00.
On motion, she alleged therein that she has been detained since 23 February 1990 and is
presently serving her sentence at the Correctional Institution for Women at Mandaluyong City;
that the marijuana involved in this case is ten (10) sticks, ... costing P20.00 only which is less
than 200 grams; and that pursuant to People v. Simon, the penalty imposable therefor under R.A.
No. 7659 is prision correccional whose duration is from six months and one day to six
years. She then prayed that the decision of 14 May 1993 be reconsidered and the life
imprisonment meted upon her be reduced accordingly.
SC required the Office of the Solicitor General to comment on the motion. SG in Lieu of
Comment wherein it agreed with the appellant that she is entitled to the application of the
decisions in People v. Simon and People v. De Lara. It did not refute the allegations of the
appellant that the marijuana involved in this case is less than 200 grams and that she has been in
detention since 23 February 1990. It then concluded that the appellant deserves to be released
from prison.
Issue:
Should Caco be release?
Held:
Ordered to be released
Since the weight of the marijuana involved in the instant case is below 250 grams, the
penalty imposable pursuant to R.A. No. 7659, as interpreted in People v. Simon and in People v.
De Lara, is prision correccional, whose duration is from six months and one day to six years. We
declared in People v. Simon that provisions of R.A. No. 7659 which are favorable to the accused
should be given retroactive effect.
Our decision of 14 May 1993 cannot, however, be modified because it had long become
final and the appellant is already serving the sentence.
It is settled that where the decision is already final, the appropriate remedy of an accused to
secure release from prison in view of the retroactive effect of a favorable law is to file a petition
for habeas corpus. Nonetheless, although the remedy availed of by the appellant is a motion for
modification of sentence, it may be treated as a substantial compliance with the rules on habeas
corpus.
CASTILLO, JEPHTAH
Galvez vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San
Ildefonso, Bulacan, and one Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate informations with
homicide and two counts of frustrated homicide for allegedly shooting to death Alvin Calma
Vinculado and seriously wounding Levi Calma Vinculado and Miguel Reyes Vinculado, Jr.
On December 15, 1993, before petitioners could be arraigned, respondent prosecutor filed
an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw Informations of the original informations. This motion was
granted by Judge Villajuan also on December 15, 1993 and the cases were considered withdrawn
from the docket of the court. On the same day, Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new
informations against herein petitioners for murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms.
Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the new informations for lack of jurisdiction was filed by
petitioners before Judge Pornillos on January 3, 1994. At the court session set for the
arraignment of petitioners on January 24, 1994, Judge Pornillos issued an order denying the
motion to quash.
In the meantime, and prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners before Judge
Pornillos, an order was issued on January 20, 1994 by Judge Villajuan granting the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners, ordering the reinstatement of the original informations, and
setting the arraignment of the accused therein for February 8, 1994. On said date, however, the
arraignment was suspended and, in the meanwhile, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with respondent Court of Appeals, assailing the order dated January
24, 1994 issued by Judge Pornillos which denied petitioners’ motion to quash filed for the new
informations. As earlier stated, respondent court dismissed the petition in its questioned
resolution of February 18, 1994, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the original informations is null and void on the
ground that there was no notice and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court.
Held:
No, considering that in the original cases before Branch 14 of the trial court petitioners
had not yet been placed in jeopardy, and the ex parte motion to withdraw was filed and granted
before they could be arraigned, there would be no imperative need for notice and hearing thereof.
In actuality, the real grievance of herein accused is not the dismissal of the original three
informations but the filing of four new informations, three of which charge graver offenses and
the fourth, an additional offense. Had these new informations not been filed, there would
obviously have been no cause for the instant petition. Accordingly, their complaint about the
supposed procedural lapses involved in the motion to dismiss filed and granted in Criminal Cases
Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93 does not impress us as a candid presentation of their real
position.
Petitioner’s contention that the dismissal of the original informations and the consequent
filing of the new ones substantially affected their right to bail is too strained and tenuous an
argument. They would want to ignore the fact that had the original informations been amended
so as to charge the capital offense of murder, they still stood to likewise be deprived of their right
to bail once it was shown that the evidence of guilt is strong. Petitioners could not be better off
with amended informations than with the subsequent ones. It really made no difference
considering that where a capital offense is charged and the evidence of guilt is strong, bail
becomes a matter of discretion under either an amended or a new information.
Contrary to petitioners’ submission, the absence of notice and hearing does not divest a
trial court of authority to pass on the merits of the motion. It has been held that—“The order of
the court granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of
service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent court
of jurisdiction over the case. The court still retains its authority to pass on the merits of the
motion. The remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is either to have the order set aside or
the irregularity otherwise cured by the court which dismissed the complaint or to appeal from the
dismissal and not certiorari.”
CASTILLO, JEPHTAH
Salientes vs Abanilla
Facts:
Loran Abanilla and Marie Salientes are the parents of the minor, Lorenzo. They loved with
Marie's parents. Due to in-law problems, Abanilla suggested to his wife that they transfer to their
own house, but Salientes refused. Abanilla left the house, and was thereafter prevented from
seeing his son.
Abanilla, in his personal capacity and as a representative of his son, filed a petition for
habeas corpus and custody before the RTC of Muntinlupa City. The trial court ordered the
Salienteses to produce and bring before the court the body of Lorenzo, and to show cause why
the child should not be discharged from restraint. Salienteses filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA, but it was dismissed. CA stated that the order of the trial court did not award custody but
was simply a standard order issued for the production of restrained persons. The trial court was
still about to conduct a full inquiry. A subsequent MR was likewise denied.
Hence, Salienteses filed the current appeal by certiorari.
Issue:
1. Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari against the trial
court's order
2. Whether the remedy of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is available to the
father
Held
(1) The CA rightfully dismissed the petition for certiorari
With respect to Salientes, the order is contrary to the Family Code which provides that no
child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise. Even assuming that there were compelling reasons, the
proper remedy for private respondent was simply an action for custody, but not habeas corpus.
Petitioners assert that habeas corpus is unavailable against the mother who, under the law, has
the right of custody of the minor. They insist there was no illegal or involuntary restraint of the
minor by his own mother. There was no need for the mother to show cause and explain the
custody of her very own child.
With respect to Abanilla, the writ of habeas corpus is available against any person who
restrains the minor’s right to see his father and vice versa. He avers that the instant petition is
merely filed for delay, for had petitioners really intended to bring the child before the court in
accordance with the new rules on custody of minors. Under the law, he and petitioner Marie
Antonette have shared custody and parental authority over their son. He alleges that at times
when petitioner Marie Antonette is out of the country as required of her job as an international
flight stewardess, he, the father, should have custody of their son and not the maternal
grandparents.
The CA was correct in holding that the order of the trial court did not grant custody of the
minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and
explain why they are restraining his liberty. The assailed order was an interlocutory order
precedent to the trial court’s full inquiry into the issue of custody, which was still pending before
it. an interlocutory order is not appealable but the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special action under Rule 65. The aggrieved party must show that the court gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the interlocutory order. In the present case, it is incumbent upon petitioners
to show that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order.
(2) Habeas corpus is available to the father
Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person
entitled thereto. Under Article 211 of the Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie
Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Further,
although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the
court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to
the custody of their child. In the present case, private respondent’s cause of action is the
deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas
corpus is available to him.
Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and
serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a
counter argument for private respondent’s petition for custody. But it is not a basis for
preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from
seeing or visiting his child under seven years of age
Cunanan, Erika Mariz S.
Title: In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Minor Shang Ko Vingson Yu Shirly
Vingson@ Shirly Vingson Demaisip v. Jovy Cabcaban, UDK No.143483, January 13, 2014
Topic: Writ of Habeas Corpus
The writ of habeas corpus is available, not only in cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, but also in cases involving the rightful custody over a
minor.
FACTS:
Shang Ko Vingson Yu (Shang Ko), the 14 year-old daughter of Shirly Vingson, was placed in the
custody of Calvary Kids, an NGO working with abused women and children.
This prompted Shirly Vingson to file a petition for habeas corpus against Jovy Cabcaban and
other unnamed officials of Calvary Kids before the Court of Appeals (CA) rather than the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City citing as reason several threats against her life in that city.
Shirly alleged that Shang Ko ran away from their home. But Shang Ko told the social workers
who interviewed her that Shirly had been an abusive mother to her. In fact, Shirly gave her
P280.00 and instructed her to go to IloIlo City, look for a job, and never come back to Bacolod
City. When Shang Ko reached IloIlo City, she had nowhere to go, so she went back to Bacolod.
Upon her return, nobody, not even her siblings, would accept her anymore.
That’s when she ended up outside a church in Bacolod, where Bacolod police officers found her,
and endorsed her to Cabcaban, head of the Women’s and Children’s Desk.
The CA denied Shirly’s petition. It said, “habeas corpus may not be used as a means of obtaining
evidence on the whereabouts of a person or as a means of finding out who has specifically
abducted or caused the disappearance of such person.”
The petitioner filed a petition for review in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the writ of habeas corpus is available in this case
RULING:
Yes. Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus is available, not
only in cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty,
but also in cases involving the rightful custody over a minor.
The general rule is that parents should have custody over their minor children. But the State has
the right to intervene where the parents, rather than care for such children, treat them cruelly and
abusively, impairing their growth and well-being and leaving them emotional scars that they
carry throughout their lives unless they are liberated from such parents and properly counselled.
WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the Court of Appeals Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP
07261 dated December 18, 2012 and January 8, 2013 and ORDERS this custody case forwarded
to the Family Court of Bacolod City for hearing and adjudication as the evidence warrants.
Meantime until such court orders otherwise let the minor Shang Ko Vingson remain in the
custody of Calvary Kids of Bacolod City.
Further the Court ORDERS petitioner Shirly Vingson Shirly Vingson Demaisip to pay the
balance of the docket and other legal fees within 10 days from receipt of this Resolution.
Title: Cecilio C. Hernandez, Ma. Victoria C. Hernandez-Sagun, Teresa C. Hernandez-Villa
Abrille and Natividad Cruz-Hernandez v. Jovita San Juan-Santos, G.R. No. 166470 and G.R. No.
169217, August 07, 2009
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention or by which the
rightful custody of person is withheld from the one entitled thereto.
FACTS:
Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was born on February 14, 1947 to the spouses
Felix Hernandez and Maria San juan Hernandez. Unfortunately, the latter died due to
complications during childbirth. After Maria’s death, Felix left Lulu in the care of her maternal
uncle, Sotero San Juan.
On December 16, 1951, Felix married Natividad Cruz. The union produced three children, the
petitioners Cecilio Hernandez, Ma. Victoria Hernandez-Sagun and Teresa Hernandez-Villa
Abrille. Meanwhile, as the only child of Maria and the sole testate heir of Sotero, Lulu inherited
valuable real properties from the San Juan family (conservatively estimated at P50 million in
1997).
Sometime in 1957, Lulu went to live with her father and his new family. She was then 10 years
old and studying at La Consolacion College. However, due to her violent personality, she
stopped going to school when she reached Grade 5, In 1968, upon reaching the age of majority,
Lulu was given full control of her estate. However, because she was not able to finish her
elementary education, Felix continued to exercise actual administration on Lulu’s properties.
Upon Felix’s death in 1993, petitioner’s took over the task of administering Lulu’s properties.
During the period of their informal administration (from 1968 until 1993), Felix and petitioner’s
undertook various projects involving Lulu’s real properties. Lulu was also deceived by the
petitioners in selling the former’s properties to another.
In September 1998, Lulu sought the assistance of her maternal first cousin, respondent Jovita San
Juan-Santos, after learning that petitioners had been dissipating her estate.
On October 02, 1998, respondent filed a petition for guardianship in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76. She alleged that Lulu was incapable of taking care of
herself and managing her estate because she was of weak mind.
Petitioners moved to intervene in the proceedings to oppose the same. Natividad denied that
Marilou Subdivision belonged to Lulu. Since she and her late husband were the registered
owners of the said property, it was allegedly part of their conjugal partnership. Cecilio, Teresa
and Ma. Victoria, for their part, claimed that the issue of Lulus competency had been settled in
1968 (upon her emancipation) when the court ordered her legal guardian and maternal uncle,
Ciriaco San Juan, to deliver the properties for her to manage.
The RTC concluded that, due to her weak physical and mental condition, there was a need to
appoint a legal guardian over the person and property of Lulu. Thus, it declared Lulu an
incompetent and appointed respondent as guardian over the person and property of Lulu on a P1
million bond. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied. They further appealed to
the Court of Appeals (CA) but the latter upheld the decision of the RTC.
Lulu moved into 8 R. Santos St., Marikina City and was provided with two housemaids tasked to
care for her. Sometime in November 2003, Lulu was abducted. Jovita immediately sought the
assistance of the Police Anti-Crime Emergency Response (PACER) division of the Philippine
National Police.
The PACER subsequently discovered that petitioners were keeping Lulu somewhere in
Rodriguez, Rizal. The petitioners contend that Lulu voluntarily left with Natividad because her
guardian had allegedly been maltreating her. On December 15, 2003, respondent filed a petition
for habeas corpusin the CA alleging that petitioners abducted Lulu and were holding her captive
in an undisclosed location in Rodriguez, Rizal. The CA granted the petition.
Petitioners claim that Lulu should be allowed to live with them since under Articles 194 to 196
of the Family Code,legitimate brothers and sisters, whether half-blood or full-blood are required
to support each other fully because respondent failed to prove Lulu’s illness rendered her
incompetent.
Respondent disclosed that Lulu had been confined in a psychosocial rehabilitation center and
convalescent home care facility in Quezon City, since 2004 due to violent and destructive
behavior. She also had delusions of being physically and sexually abused by Boy Negro and
imaginary pets she called Michael and Madonna.
ISSUE:
Whether Lulu is an incompetent who requires the appointment of a judicial guardian over her
person and property.
RULING:
Yes. Under, Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, persons who, through of sound of mind but
by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking care of
themselves and their property without outside aid, are considered as incompetents who may
properly be placed under guardianship. The RTC and the Ca both found that Lulu was incapable
of taking care of herself and her properties without outside aid due to her ailments and weak
mind.
Similarly, we see no compelling reason to reverse the trial and appellate courts finding as to the
propriety of respondent’s appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu. We therefore affirm her
appointment as such. Consequently, respondent is tasked to care for and take full custody of Lulu
and manage her estate as well.
Inasmuch as respondent’s appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu was proper, the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus in her favor was also in order.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention or by which the
rightful custody of person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. Respondent, as he judicial
guardian of Lulu, was duty-bound to care and protect her ward, For her to perform her
obligation, respondent must have custody of Lulu. Thus, she was entitled to a writ if habeas
corpus after she was unduly deprived of the custody of her ward.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DENIED.
Petitioners are furthermore ordered to render to respondent, Lulus legal guardian, an accurate
and faithful accounting of all the properties and funds they unlawfully appropriated for
themselves from the estate of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez, within thirty (30) days from
receipt of this decision. If warranted, the proper complaints should also be filed against them for
any criminal liability in connection with the dissipation of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandezs
estate and her unlawful abduction from the custody of her legal guardian.
Treble costs against petitioners.
Title: Michelle Lana Brown-Araneta, for herself and representing her minor daughters, Arabella
Margarita B. Araneta and Avangelina Mykaela B. Araneta v. Juan Ignacio Araneta, G.R. No.
190814, October 09, 2013
The writ of habeas corpus is available, not only in cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, but also in cases involving the rightful custody over a
minor.
FACTS:
Juan Ignacio and Michelle were married and had 2 children, Ara and Ava. After seven years, they
separated and their two children remained in Michelle’s custody.
Juan filed, pursuant to The Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to
Custody of Minors, a Petition for Custody of his children with prayer for visitation rights with
the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Michelle and her mother, Glenda Santos,
claiming that they have completely barred him from seeing or getting in touch with his daughters
despite repeated requests.
The process server attempted to serve summons upon both of them, but only Santos was served.
In Santos’ answer, she disclaimed knowledge of Michelle’s whereabouts and she raised the
court’s jurisdiction over Michelle and rattled off negative habits and traits of Juan.
After a visiting grant was granted to Juan later on, Michelle filed a Motion to Admit Answer and
an Answer with Affirmative Defences and with Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of
Protection, acknowledging that she heard about the delivery of summons, but she disregarded it
because she claimed she thought that it was improperly served upon her person.
The RTC of Makati, in a hearing for the issuance of TPO, the judge expressed her bent to
maintain jurisdiction over the Petition for Custody and her disinclination to issue the TPO. Juan
was granted visitation rights for one Saturday and Sunday because he was previously unable to
see his children.
Subsequently, the RTC resolved to deny admission of Michelle’s answer to the Petition for
Custody and declared her in default. Michelle interposed to Withdraw Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
for Protective Order. She initiated a Petition for Temporary and Permanent Protection Order
before the RTC Muntinlupa. In the verification portion of her petition for protection order,
Michelle stated that there was a pending petition for custody of their children in Makati.
The RTC of Muntinlupa granted Michelle’s prayer for a TPO which ordered Juan to stay away at
a specified distance from Michelle and the children and to desist from communicating with
Michelle. Juan filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition with Prayer to Lift TPO anchored on,
among others, litis pendentia, since RTC of Makati is competent to grant her Petition which
constitutes forum shopping. The RTC conceded the exclusionary effect of the RTC Makati
assuming the jurisdiction on the issue of custody first, so it partially granted the Motion to
Dismiss and modified the protection order to exclude from its coverage the orders issued by the
RTC of Makati in the exercise of its jurisdiction on the pending custody case.
Meanwhile, Michelle went to the Court of Appeals (CA) on certiorari. The CA partly ruled in
favour of Michelle and decided that RTC of Makati erred in not admitting her answer and
holding her in default.
Juan also went to the CA on petition for certiorari, from the adverse orders of the RTC of
Muntinlupa and prayed to enjoin the RTC of Muntinlupa from further taking cognizance of
Michelle’s protection order petition since it will intrude upon the RTC of Makati’s disposition of
the custody case. Michelle opposed and sought the dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the
ground that it is a prohibited pleading under RA 9262.
The CA found Michelle guilty of forum shopping but also ruled that Juan’s petition for certiorari
is a prohibited pleading which renders it dismissible. Nevertheless, it ruled in favour of Juan,
declaring void the issuances made by the RTC of Muntinlupa. Michelle sought to set aside the
decision of the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Michelle committed forum shopping
RULING:
Yes. The court ruled that Michelle committed forum shopping and pointed that even if she
withdrew the protection order in Makati Court, it is only after it was denied. Also, there is
nothing in the decision of the CA declaring that all issuances of the RTC of Makati were void for
lack of jurisdiction over Michelle, the court said that this posture was meant to deceive and
mislead the court.
Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions involving the same parties for the same
cause of action either simultaneously or successively, on the suspension that one or the other
court would come out with a favourable disposition.
The test for determining whether there is forum shopping is where the elements of litis pendentia
are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.
Applying the rules, Michelle committed forum shopping because, as a result or in anticipation of
the adverse ruling of the RTC of Makati, she sought the favourable opinion of the RTC of
Muntinlupa. (1) The cases have identical; (2) The rights asserted and reliefs prayed for are based
on the same facts; and (3) Elements of litis pendentia are present and any judgment rendered in
the pending cases, regardless of which party is successful, will amount to res judicata.
The evil to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by two competent
tribunals of two separate and contradictory decisions, thereby causing confusion, is present in
this case.
The petition for TPO filed by Michelle in the RTC of Muntinlupa should be dismissed with
prejudice since this is a clear case of forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed May 11, 2009 Decision and the December
28, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No.105442, particularly insofar as
these ordered the dismissal of subject Civil Case No. 08-023 and the nullification of the orders
made in that case, are hereby AFFIRMED.
Title: Ma. Hazelina A. Tujan-Militante v. Raquel M. Cada-Deapera, G.R. No. 210636; July 28,
2014
The filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus before a family court in any of
the cities in the National Capital Region is proper as long as the writ will be enforced within the
National Capital Judicial Region. Service of summons is not required in a habeas corpus
petition.
FACTS:
Respondent Raquel M. Cada-Deapera filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan a
verified petition for writ of habeas corpus. In the said petition, respondent demanded the
immediate issuance of the special writ, directing petitioner Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante to
produce before the court the respondent’s biological daughter Criselda M. Cada and to return to
her custody of the child.
Additionally, respondent, indicated that petitioner has three known addresses where she can be
served with summons and other court processes to wit: (1) 24 Bangkal St. Amparo Village,
Novaliches, Caloocan City; (2) 118B K9 Street, Kamias, Quezon City; and (3) her office at the
Ombudsman-Office of the Special Prosecutor. 5 th floor, Sandiganbayan, Centennial Building,
Commonwealth Avenue cor. Batasan Road, Quezon City.
The next day, the RTC of Caloocan issued a writ of habeas corpus, ordering petitioner to bring
the child to court on March 28, 2011.
However, despite diligent efforts and several attempts, the Sheriff was unsuccessful in personally
serving petitioner copies of the habeas corpus petition and of the writ.
Meanwhile, petitioner filed a Petition for Guardianship over the person of Criselda before the
RTC of Quezon City but was dismissed due to the pendency of the habeas corpus petition before
RTC of Caloocan. Thereafter, respondent filed a criminal case for kidnapping against petitioner
and her counsel.
Raquel moved for the ex parte issuance of an alias writ of habeas corpus before the RTC of
Caloocan, which was granted by the trial court. On even date, the court directed the Sheriff to
serve the alias writ upon petitioner at the Office of the Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
In compliance, the Sheriff served petitioner the Order as well as the Alias Writ during the
preliminary investigation of the kidnapping case. Aggrieved, petitioner, via certiorari to the CA,
assailed the issued order.
Over a year later, the CA, in the challenged decision dated May 17, 2013, dismissing the petition
for certiorari. The CA held that jurisdiction was properly laid when respondent filed the habeas
corpus petition before the designated Family Court in Caloocan City.
Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the RTC Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus petition filed by
respondent.
2. Whether the writ issued by RTC-Caloocan in Quezon City where petitioner was served a copy
is enforceable.
3. Whether or not RTC-Caloocan validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and the person of
Criselda.
RULING:
1. Yes, the RTC-Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus proceeding. A verified petition
for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court.
However, the petition may be filed with the regular court in the absence of the presiding judge of
the Family Court, provided, however, that the regular court shall refer the case to the Family
Court as soon as its presiding judge returns to duty. The petition may also be filed with the
appropriate regular courts in places where there are no Family Courts.
2. Yes. The writ issued by the Family Court or the regular court shall be enforceable in the
judicial region where they belong. In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the
family court of Caloocan City. Since Caloocan City and Quezon City both belong to the same
judicial region, the writ issued by the RTC-Caloocan can still be implemented in Quezon City.
Whether petitioner resides in the former or the latter is immaterial in view of the above rule.
3. As regards petitioner’s assertion that the summons was improperly served, suffice it to state
that service of summons, to begin with, is not required in a habeas corpus petition. As held in
Saulo v. Cruz, a writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons, in
ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated May 17,
2013 and its Resolution dated December 27, 2013 are AFFIRMED.
NAME: DE JESUS, KRISTINA TERESA M.
TITLE: FELIPE N. MADRIAN, Petitioner v. FRANCISCA R. MADRIAN, Respondent, G.R.
No. 159374, July 12, 2007
TOPIC: RULE 102 HABEAS CORPUS
FACTS:
On May 18, 2002, Spouses Madrian had a quarrel and with said incident, petitioner allegedly left
their conjugal abode and took their three sons with him. Respondent sought help from her
relatives and even to the Lupong Tagapamayapa in their barangay for possible conciliation
between her and the petitioner but to no avail.
Consequently, respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of her three sons in the Court of
Appeals (CA) wherein she alleged that the petitioner’s act of leaving the conjugal dwelling
disrupted the education of their children and deprived them of their mother’s care. As a response,
petitioner filed a Memorandum refuting the respondent’s allegations. Additionally, he questioned
the jurisdiction of CA claiming that under Sec. 5(b) of RA 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997)
family courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide said petition.
On October 21, 2002, CA rendered a decision asserting its authority to take cognizance of the
petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus filed by
the respondent which involves custody of her minor sons.
RULING:
YES. The petitioner erred in claiming that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family
courts under RA 8369. The CA should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA
8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.
In fact, family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and the SC in petitions for habeas
corpus where the custody of minors is at issue. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the CA over sa
petitions was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and
Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors.
A careful reading of Sec. 5(b) of RA 8369 reveals that family courts are vested with original
exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases, not in habeas corpus cases. Writs of habeas corpus which
may be issued exclusively by family courts under Sec. 5(b) of RA 8369 pertain to the ancillary
remedy that may be availed in conjunction with a petition for custody of minors under Rule 99 of
the Rules of Court. In other words, the issuance of the writ is merely ancillary to the custody case
pending the family court.
RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO

TITLE SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DIRECTOR NONNATUS R. ROJAS and
DEPUTY DIRECTOR REYNALDO O. ESMERALDA, Petitioners, vs. MAGTANGGOL B.
GATDULA, Respondent. G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013
TOPIC: RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO
FACTS:
On February 27, 2012, Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the RTC
Manila wherein he prayed for De Lima, et.al to cease and desist from framing him up for the
fake ambush incident by filing bogus charges of Frustrated Murder against him in relation to the
alleged ambush incident. The judge, instead of deciding on the issuance of said writ, issued
summons and ordered De Lima, et. al. to file an Answer, and set the case for hearing to
determine whether a temporary protection order must be issued. During said hearing, De Lima,
et. al. manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is appropriate for Amparo cases.
In an Order, the judge insisted that since no writ has been issued, return is not the required
pleading but answer. Thereafter, the RTC rendered a decision granting the issuance of the writ as
well as the interim reliefs prayed for. The petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, as
enunciated in Sec. 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, assailing the trial court’s decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a decision granting the issuance of the writ of amparo may be
assailed via a petition for review on certiorari.
2. Whether or not an Answer is the required pleading in Amparo cases.
3. Whether or not the holding of a hearing on the main case prior to the issuance of
the writ and requiring to file a Memorandum is proper.
RULING:
1. NO. The trial court’s petition in granting the writ of amparo is not the judgment or
final order contemplated under Sec. 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The assailed
decision pertained to the issuance of the writ under Sec. 6, not the judgment under Sec.
18. It is an interlocutory order, as suggested by the fact that the interim reliefs were given
together with the decision.
2. NO. it is the Return that serves as the responsive pleading for petitions for the
issuance of Writs of Amparo. The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the
intention of the court to provide a speedy remedy to those whose right to life, liberty and
security are violated.
3. NO. It is not proper to hold a hearing on the main case prior to the issuance of the
writ and the filing of a Return. Without a Return, the issues could not have properly
joined. The trial court cannot also require a Memorandum in lieu of a responsive
pleading. The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues subject
to a hearing. Hence, it should be done prior to the hearing, not after. A memorandum, on
the other hand, is a synthesis of the claims of the party litigants and is a final pleading
usually required before the case is submitted for decision. One cannot substitute for the
other since these submissions have different functions in facilitating the suit. More
importantly, a memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo.
TITLE: Infant JULIAN YUSA Y CARAM, represented by his mother, MA. CHRISTINA
YUSAY CARAM, Petitioner, vs. Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D. ESCUTIN,
VILMA B. CABRERA, and CELIA C. YANGCO, Respondents. G.R. No. 193652. August 5,
2014
FACTS:
After getting pregnant, Christina Caram (Christina) misled Marcelino Constantino III
(Marcelino), the father of the child, into believing that she had an abortion when in fact she
proceeded to complete her pregnancy. She intended to have the child adopted through Sun and
Moon home for Children (Sun & Moon) to avoid embarrassment for having an illegitimate son.
When Christina gave birth to Julian Caram (Julian), she voluntarily surrendered him to DSWD
by way of a Deed of Voluntarily Commitment. On November 27, 2009, the DSWD declared
Julian as legally available for adoption and afterwards, matched with spouses Vergel and
Filomina (Sps. Medina) of Kaisahang Bahay Foundation. Supervised trial custody then
commenced.
On May 5, 2010, Christina changed her mind about the adoption and wrote a letter to DSWD
asking for the suspension of Julian’s adoption proceedings. The DSWD, through Atty. Segui,
signified that the certificate declaring Julian legally available for adoption had attained finality
on November 13, 2009, or three months after Christina signed the Deed.
Marcelino’s brother, sent a letter to Atty. Escutin informing her that a DNA testing was
scheduled. Assistant Secretary, through a letter, responded that it would not allow Julian to
undergo DNA testing as the procedures were all proper; the DSWD was no longer in the position
to stop the adoption process; and, should Christina wish to reacquire her parental authority over
Julian or halt the adoption process, she may bring the matter to the regular courts as the
reglementary period for her to regain her parental rights had already lapsed under Section 7 of
RA No. 9523.
On July 27, 2010 Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC
seeking to obtain custody of Julian.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo is proper for obtaining parental
authority and custody of Julian.
RULING:
NO. The writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, or to threats thereof. The elements of enforced disappearance are:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the
State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or

give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition;
and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of
the law for a prolonged period of time.
Herein, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers caused her "enforced separation"
from Baby Julian and that their action amounted to an "enforced disappearance" within the
context of the Amparo rule. Contrary to her position, however, the respondent DSWD officers
never concealed Baby Julian's whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD's
May 28, 2010 Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina
Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition
for review on certiorari that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the
RTC during the hearing held in the afternoon of August 5, 2010. There is therefore, no "enforced
disappearance" as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are
missing.
TITLE: THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners. vs. RAYMOND MANALO AND
REYNALDO MANALO, Respondents. G.R. No. 180906. October 7, 2008
FACTS:
Raymond and Reynaldo were abducted by some men whom they subsequently recognized to be
members of CAFGU. Both were detained and tortured several times. On the course of the violent
acts orchestrated by the soldiers, they repeatedly asked Raymond if he was a member of the New
People’s Army but the latter answered on the negative.
After detention of more than a year, both were able to escape. Thereafter, they filed a petition for
prohibition, injunction, and temporary restraining order against the petitioners. While the petition
was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated. The court then resolved to treat
the petition as a petition for a writ of amparo as it would be more effective and suitable to the
circumstances of the Manalo brothers’ enforced disappearance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for writ of amparo should be granted.
RULING:
YES. Since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by private
citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will as
they are forced to limit their movements or activities. Precisely because respondents are being
shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence of
overt acts of threat such as face-to-face intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and
security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents abduction, detention, torture and escape
reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted,
tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life,
actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. Their right to security as a guarantee of
protection by the government is likewise violated by the ineffective investigation and protection
on the part of the military.
DEL PRADO, DARREN
RUBRICO v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
G.R. No. 183871
FACTS:
On 03 April 2007, Lourdes Rubrico, chair of Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa Adhikan,
was abducted by armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron
(AISS) based in Lipa City while attending a Lenten pabasa in Dasmarinas, Cavite. She was
brought to and detained at the air base without charges. She was released a week after relentless
interrogation, but only after she signed a statement that she would be a military asset.
Despite her release, she was tailed on at least 2 occasions. Hence, Lourdes filed a complaint
with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for kidnapping and arbitrary detention
and grave misconduct against Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, and Jonathan, but nothing has
happened. She likewise reported the threats and harassment incidents to the Dasmarinas
municipal and Cavite provincial police stations , but nothing eventful resulted from their inv
estigation.
Meanwhile, the human rights group Karapatan conducted an investigation which indicated
that men belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) led the abduction of Lourdes.
Based on such information, Rubrico filed a petition for the writ of amparo with the Supreme
Court on 25 October 2007, praying that respondents be ordered to desist from performing any
threatening act against the security of petitioners and for the Ombudsman to immediately file an
information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the
offended party. Rubrico also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents
submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
The Supreme Court issued the desired writ and then referred the petition to the Court of
Appeals (CA) for summary hearing and appropriate action. At the hearing conducted on 20 Nov
ember 2007, the CA granted petitioner’s motion that the petition and writ be serv ed on Darwin
Sy /Rey es, Santana, Alfaro, Cuaresma, and Jonathan. By a separate resolution, the CA dropped
the President as respondent in the case.
On 31 July 2008, after due proceedings, the CA rendered its partial judgment, dismissing the
petition with respect to Esperon, Razon, Roquero, Gomez, and Ombudsman. Hence, the
petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an amparo

petition.
RULING:NO.
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of
laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, command responsibility, in its simplest
terms, means the responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of
the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic
conflict. In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The
Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the
present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his
subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command
responsibility is an omission mode of individual criminal liability, whereby the superior is made
responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the
perpetrators.
There is no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under the Doctrine of
Command
Responsibility – While there are several pending bills on command responsibility, there is still no
Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under that doctrine. It may plausibly be
contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military /police commanders liable
for extra -legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this
jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of
international law or customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of
the Constitution. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of
command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity
through omission, for individual respondents criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the
reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of
criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may
have been committed.
Reluctance of the amparo petitioners or their witnesses to cooperate ought not to pose a
hindrance to the police in pursuing, on its own initiative, the investigation in question to its
natural end – [T]he right to security of persons is a guarantee of the protection of one’s right by
the government. And this protection includes conducting effective investigations of extra-legal
killings, enforced disappearances, or threats of the same kind. The nature and importance of an
investigation are captured in the Velasquez Rodriguez case, in which the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights pronounced: [The duty to investigate] must be undertaken in a serious manner and
not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective
and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not a step taken by private interests that
depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon offer of proof, without an
effective search for the truth by the government.
The remedy of amparo ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously – The privilege of the
writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and
security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an
extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of
extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to
and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by
the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo
reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.
DEL PRADO, DARREN
SO V. TACLA
G.R. No. 190108 October 19, 2010
FACTS: Herein petitioner is the father of Elena Guisande who was charged with a
criminal case of Qualified Theft, a non-bailable offense. Prior to the institution of the criminal
proceedings, Elena was admitted to Makati Medical Center for psychiatric treatment and
declared “not ready for discharge” by her attending personal psychiatrist.
The prosecution however requested the trial court to seek the assistance of NCMH a
Government Hospital to further evaluate the psychological illness of the accused, to determine if
she could stand arraignment. The RTC, thru Judge Esteban Tacla granted their motion, and
Elena, upon request by NCMH was brought to the said hospital, was further examined and later
on, confined. Because of her claim of “life-threatening" circumstances surrounding her
confinement at the NCMH which supposedly worsened her mental condition and violated her
constitutional rights against solitary detention, the counsel of the accused and his father, filed a
petition for habeas corpus and amparo. Because of this claim, she was then transferred to Saint
Claire’s Medical Center.
However, she was released from confinement because as per report by the NCMH
regarding the psychological state of the accused, it was stated that she is already competent to
stand the rigors of the court trial.
And unpredictably, during the pendency for her petition for the writs, the criminal case
against her was dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether the accused can still be granted of her petition for the writ of amparo and writ
of habeas corpus
RULING: No. The petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo was based on the
criminal case for Qualified Theft against petitioner So’s daughter, Guisande. To recall, petitioner
So claimed that the conditions and circumstances of his daughter’s, accused Guisande’s,
confinement at the NCMH was "life threatening"; although Guisande was accused of a non-
bailable offense, the NCMH could not adequately treat Guisande’s mental condition. The
petition has been therefore rendered moot and academic by the dismissal of the Criminal Case.
The Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo are clear; the act or omission or
the threatened act or omission complained of - confinement and custody for habeas corpus and
violations of, or threat to violate, a person’s life, liberty, and security for amparo cases - should
be illegal or unlawful.
DEL PRADO, DARREN
Rodriguez vs Arroyo
FACTS: This case involved two consolidated petitions assailing the April 12, 2010 Decision of
the
Court of Appeals granting the writ of amparo and writ of habeas data by petitioner Noriel
Rodriguez, who is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a
peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).
Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State
under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances. Petitioner was then abducted, tortured and forced to confess
to being a member of the New People's Army (NPA).
Rodriguez filed before this Court a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the
Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and
Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The petition was filed against former
President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General
Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, and five others. The
writs were granted but the CA dropped President Arroyo as party-respondent, as she may
not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency as part of her
presidential immunity. Also, the prayer for the issuance of a temporary protection order
and inspection order was denied by the CA.
The respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the decision of the CA but before
such motion could be resolved petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration
raising that the CA erred in not granting the interim relief for temporary protection order
and in dropping President Arroyo as party-respondent.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the interim reliefs prayed for by petitioner may be granted even after
the writs of amparo and habeas data have been granted.
2. Whether or not President Arroyo should be dropped as respondent because of her
presidential immunity.
3. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas
data cases
4. Whether the rights to life, liberty and property of Rodriguez were violated or
threatened by respondents
HELD: 1. The interim reliefs prayed for by the petitioner is only available before final judgment.
Section 14 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo clearly provides that interim reliefs may
only be availed of upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment. Given
that there has already been a final judgment in the given case, petitioner may no longer
avail of the interim relief of temporary protection order.
2. No, President Arroyo should not be dropped. There is no determination of

administrative, civil or criminal liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings as courts
can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the enforced
disappearance or extrajudicial killing.
As it was held in the case of Estrada v Desierto, a non-sitting President does not enjoy
immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latter’s tenure; that courts should
look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it
impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. Also, the Supreme
Court (SC) reiterated that the presidential immunity from suit exists only in concurrence
with the president’s incumbency. Given these, former Pres. GMA cannot use presidential
immunity to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the
context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of
Rodriguez.
3. Yes, As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo, command responsibility pertains to the

“responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the
armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic
conflict.” Although originally used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the command
responsibility doctrine has also found application in civil cases for human rights abuses.
Precisely in the given case, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to
determine whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the
abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to
protect his rights. Nothing precludes this Court from applying the doctrine of command
responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and accountability in
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
4. Yes, the rights to life, liberty and property of Rodriguez were violated or threatened by
respondents. The SC held that there was no reason to depart from the factual findings of
the Court of Appeals, the same being supported by substantial evidence following the
doctrine of totality of evidence in amparo cases which is to consider all the pieces of
evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible
under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence
adduced. The sworn affidavit of the petitioner and the medical examinations conducted
on him are sufficient evidence proving that the military personnel involved in the case
indeed abducted Rodriguez on September 6, 2009 and then detained and tortured him.
DEL PRADO, DARREN
Castillo vs Cruz
GR 182165
Facts: Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz
(Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property),
refused to vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan
(the Province) which intended to utilize it for local projects.
Several cases were filed by both parties to enforce their rights over the property. The pertinent
case among the filed cases was the issuance by the MTC an alias Writ of Demolition in favor of
the Province. Respondents filed a motion for TRO in the RTC, which was granted. However, the
demolition was already implemented before the TRO issuance.
On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were
deployed by the City Mayor in compliance with a memorandum issued by Governor Joselito R.
Mendoza instructing him to “protect, secure and maintain the possession of the property,”
entered the property.
Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however. Insisting that the
RTC Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province from repossessing it, they shoved
petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their indictment for direct assault,
trespassing and other forms of light threats.
Thus, respondents filed a Motion for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.
Issue:
WON Amparo and Habeas Data is proper to property rights; and,

WON Amparo and Habeas Data is proper when there is a criminal case already filed.
Held:
On the 1st issue:
Section 1 of the Rules of Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data provides that the coverage of the
writs is limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and security, and the writs cover not only
actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo teaches: “As the Amparo Rule was intended to address
the intractable problem of “extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances.” Tapuz v. Del
Rosario also teaches: “What it is not is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.”
To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold
requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful
act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute between the
Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the acts
complained of and its effect on respondents’ right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not
delve on the propriety of petitioners’ entry into the property.
It bears emphasis that respondents’ petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or
continuing threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations of petitioners will not suffice
to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or detention
was present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a day after their
arrest.
On the 2nd issue:
Respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have been barred,
for criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested in flagrante
delicto and proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up by
respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data.
DIOQUINO, Apriljo Frances B.
EDGARDO NAVIA versus VIRGINIA PARDICO, for and in behalf and in representation
of BENHUR V. PARDICO
G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2010
Writ of Amparo
FACTS:
On March 2008, a vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation arrived at the house of
Lolita Lapore located in Grand Royale Subdivision, Malolos City. Two uniformed guards
disembarked from the vehicle and asked for Enrique “Bong” Lapore, Lolita’s son. Upon seeing
Bong, the guards asked that he and Benhur “Ben” Pardico come with them to the security office
because a complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric wires and lamps in the
subdivision.
At the security office, the suspects admitted that they took the lamp but clarified that they
were only transferring it to a post nearer to the house of Lolita as the area was very dark and
Bong’s father had long been requesting the administrator of the subdivision to install a lamp.
However, the lamp was no longer working so Bong reinstalled it on the post and abandoned his
plan.
According to the version of the facts of the respondent, the supervisor of the security
guards, petitioner Edgardo Navia, maltreated Ben, slapping him while seated and delivering a
flurry of punches. Navia then allegedly took hold of his gun, looked at Bong, and said, “Wala
kang nakita at wala kang narinig, papatayin ko na si Ben.”
The following morning, Ben’s wife, Virginia Pardico, went to the Asian Land security
office to visit her husband but was told that petitioners had already released him together with
Bong the night before. She then looked for Ben, asked around, and went to the
barangay.Thereafter, she reported the matter to the police.
Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a Petition
for Writ of Amparo with the RTC of Malolos City. The RTC issued an order directing the
issuance of the writ and the production of the body of Ben, as well as granting a Temporary
Protection Order.
After a summary hearing, the Court granted the privilege of the writ of amparo and
directed the NBI to conduct a deep and thorough investigation of the circumstances surrounding
the disappearance of Ben Pardico.
A petition for review on certiorari was thus filed challenging the decision of the RTC to
grant the Petition for Writ of Amparo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion ruling that the respondent is
entitled to the privilege of the writ of amparo
RULING:
YES. While A.M. No. 07-9-12 SC does not define extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, the same should be construed to mean the enforced or involuntary disappearance
of persons contemplated in Section 3(g) of RA 9851, to wit:
“(g) ‘Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons’ means the arrest, detention, or
abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a
political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to
give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing
from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.”
In an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise essential
to establish that such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization,
support or acquiescence of the government. This indispensable element of State participation is
not present in this case.
In the absence of an allegation or proof that the government or its agents had a hand in
Ben’s disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating his
case, the Court will definitely not hold the government or its agents either as responsible or
accountable persons.
While under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie against a private
individual or entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable
element.
Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision and their
principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the government and nothing
has been presented that would link or connect them to some covert police, military or
governmental operation.
This hallmark of State participation differentiates an enforced disappearance case from an
ordinary case of a missing person.
DIOQUINO, Apriljo Frances B,
Spouses NERIO and SOLEDAD PADOR and REY PADOR versus Barangay Captain
BERNABE ARCAYAN, Barangay Tanod CHIEF ROMEO PADOR, Barangay Tanods
ALBERTO ALIVIO, CARMELO REVALES, ROBERTO ALIMORIN, WINELO
ARCAYAN, CHRISTOPHER ALIVIO & BIENVENIDO ARCAYAN, all of Barangay
Tabunan, Cebu City
G.R. No. 183460 March 12, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioners alleged that in February 2008, rumors circulated that petitioner Nerio Pador
was a marijuana planter in Barangay Tabunan, Cebu City. On 17 March 2008, respondents
Alberto Alivio, Carmelo Revales and Roberto Alimorin raided their ampalaya farm to search for
marijuana plants, but found none. After the raid, petitioners Nerio and Rey Pador received
invitation letters for a conference from respondent Barangay Captain Arcayan. They referred the
invitation letters to their counsel, who advised them not to attend and, instead, send a letter-reply
to Barangay Captain Arcayan. When the latter received the letter-reply, he allegedly read its
contents, got one copy, and refused to sign a receipt of the document. Petitioners then concluded
that the conduct of the raid, the sending of the invitation letters, the refusal of respondent
barangay captain to receive their letter- reply – as well as the possibility of more harassment
cases, false accusations, and possible violence from respondents – gravely threatened their right
to life, liberty and security and necessitated the issuance of a writ of amparo. After examining
the contents of the petition and the affidavits attached to it, the RTC issued the Writ and directed
respondents to make a verified return. Respondent filed a verified return. The RTC then heard the
petition. On 3 July 2008, it issued the assailed Resolution finding that petitioners’ claims were
based merely on hearsay, speculations, surmises and conjectures, and that respondents had
sufficiently explained the reason behind the issuance of the letters of invitation. It thereafter
proceeded to deny petitioners the privilege of the writ of amparo.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to the privilege of the writ of Amparo?
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that to be entitled to the privilege of the writ, petitioners must
prove by substantial evidence that their rights to life, liberty and security are being violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission. The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a
response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to
the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It
is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an
extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a
remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely
property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain
grounds.
REVEREND FATHER ROBERT P. REYES versus COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY
RAUL M. GONZALEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND COMMISSIONER MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION
G.R. No. 182161, Dec. 3, 2009
FACTS:
Father Robert Reyes was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on
Nov. 30, 2007. He and 49 others were brought to Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings. The
DOJ Panel of Prosecutors conducted said proceedings to ascertain whether or not there was
probable cause to hold petitioner and the others for trial on charges of Rebellion and/or Inciting
to Rebellion. On Dec. 1, 2007, DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzalez issued Hold Departure Order
(HDO) No. 45 ordering the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration (BID) to include Reyes
and the 49 others in the list relative to the aforementioned case in the interest of national security
and public safety. The following day, the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors found probable cause and
filed an Information against Reyes and 36 others in RTC Makati City. The RTC dismissed the
charge of Rebellion against Reyes and 17 others for lack of probable cause. Reyes’ counsel Atty.
Francisco Chavez wrote DOJ Secretary Gonzalez, requesting the latter to lift the HDO against
Reyes in view of the dismissal of the case, which the Secretary did not act on.
Reyes then filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo with the CA, which was
dismissed. He then filed a petition for review with the SC. Reyes claims that despite the
dismissal of the Rebellion case, the HDO still subsists and that in his travels from Hong Kong to
the Philippines, he has been detained and interrogated by BID officers at NAIA due to the
continued inclusion of his name in the HDO. Reyes further maintained that immediate recourse
to the SC for the availment of the writ is exigent as the continued restraint on petitioner’s right to
travel is illegal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation
by the issuance of the subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of
amparo.
RULING:
NO. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:

Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.
The Court, in Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al., made a categorical
pronouncement that the Amparo Rule in its present form is confined to these two instances of
"extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," or to threats thereof, thus:
x x x As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal
killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these
two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due
process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand,
"enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or
abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting
with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the
fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law."
In Tapuz v. Del Rosario, the Court laid down the basic principle regarding the rule on the
writ of amparo as follows:
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to
the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the
perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is
intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an
extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a
remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely
property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain
grounds.
The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. As we have
stated in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, "xxx a person’s right to travel is subject to the usual
constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases,
whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a
matter of the court’s sound discretion."
Here, the restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of
the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that
his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious
violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal
recourse or remedy.
ARTHUR BALAO, WINSTON BALAO, NONETTE BALAO, JONILYN BALAO-
STRUGAR and BEVERLY LONGID versus GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
EDUARDO ERMITA, GILBERTO TEODORO, RONALDO PUNO, NORBERTO
GONZALES, Gen. ALEXANDER YANO, Gen. JESUS VERZOSA, Brig. Gen.
REYNALDO MAPAGU, Lt. P/Dir. EDGARDO DOROMAL, Maj. Gen. ISAGANI
CACHUELA, Commanding Officer of the AFP-ISU based in Baguio City, PSS EUGENE
MARTIN and several JOHN DOES
G.R. No. 186050
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA,
SECRETARY GILBERTO TEODORO, SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, SECRETARY
NORBERTO GONZALES, GEN. ALEXANDER YANO, P/DGEN. JESUS VERZOSA,
BRIG GEN. REYNALDO MAPAGU, MAJ. GEN. ISAGANI CACHUELA ANDPOL. SR.
SUPT. EUGENE MARTIN versus ARTHUR BALAO, WINSTON BALAO, NONETTE
BALAO, JONILYN BALAO-STRUGAR and BEVERLY LONGID
G.R. No. 186059
December 13, 2011
FACTS:
The siblings of James Balao, and Longid (petitioners), filed with the RTC of La Trinidad,
Benguet a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in favor of James Balao who was
abducted by unidentified armed men earlier. Named respondents in the petition were then
President GMA, Exec Sec Eduardo Ermita, Defense Sec Gilberto Teodoro, Jr., ILG Secretary
Ronaldo Puno, National Security Adviser (NSA) Norberto Gonzales, AFP Chief of Staff Gen.
Alexander . Yano, PNP Police Director General Jesus Verzosa, among others.
James M. Balao is a Psychology and Economics graduate of the UP-Baguio. In 1984, he
was among those who founded the Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA), a coalition of NGOs
working for the cause of indigenous peoples in the Cordillera Region.
According to witnesses’ testimony, James was abducted by unidentified men, saying they
were policemen and were arresting him for a drugs case and then made to ride a white van.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of amparo and likewise prayed for (1) an
inspection order for the inspection of at least 11 military and police facilities which have been
previously reported as detention centers for activists abducted by military and police operatives;
(2) a production order for all documents that contain evidence relevant to the petition,
particularly the Order of Battle List and any record or dossier respondents have on James; and
(3) a witness protection order.
The RTC issued the assailed judgment, disposing as follows:
ISSUE a Writ of Amparo Ordering the respondents to (a) disclose where James is
detained or confined, (b) to release James considering his unlawful detention since his abduction
and (c) to cease and desist from further inflicting harm upon his person; and
DENY the issuance of INSPECTION ORDER, PRODUCTION ORDER and WITNESS
PROTECTION ORDER for failure of herein Petitioners to comply with the stringent provisions
on the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and substantiate the same.
ISSUE:
Whether the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof required by the Amparo
Rule to establish an enforced disappearance?
HELD:
NO. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated on October 24, 2007 amidst
rising incidence of “extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances.” It was formulated in the
exercise of this Court’s expanded rule-making power for the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, albeit limited to these two situations.
“Extralegal killings” refer to killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, “enforced disappearances” are attended by
the following characteristics: an arrest, detention, or abduction of a person by a government
official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence
of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person
concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such person
outside the protection of law.
The trial court gave considerable weight to the discussion in the petition of briefing
papers supposedly obtained from the AFP indicating that the anti-insurgency campaign of the
military under the administration of President Arroyo included targeting of identified legal
organizations under the NDF, which included the CPA, and their members, as “enemies of the
state.
We hold that such documented practice of targeting activists in the military’s counter-
insurgency program by itself does not fulfill the evidentiary standard provided in the Amparo
Rule to establish an enforced disappearance.
As the law now stands, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in this
jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to
carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised
Penal Code and special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the
matter; the determination of what acts are criminal x x x are matters of substantive law that only
the Legislature has the power to enact. x x x[
Assessing the evidence on record, we find that the participation in any manner of military
and police authorities in the abduction of James has not been adequately proven. The identities of
the abductors have not been established, much less their link to any military or police unit. There
is likewise no concrete evidence indicating that James is being held or detained upon orders of or
with acquiescence of government agents. Consequently, the trial court erred in granting amparo
reliefs. Such pronouncement of responsibility on the part of public respondents cannot be made
given the insufficiency of evidence. However, we agree with the trial court in finding that the
actions taken by respondent officials are “very limited, superficial and one-sided.” Its candid and
forthright observations on the efforts exerted by the respondents are borne by the evidence on
record.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 186050 and 186059 are PARTLY GRANTED. The
Judgment dated January 19, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch
63, in Special Proceeding No. 08-AMP-0001 is MODIFIED as follows:
1) REVERSING the grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo;
2) AFFIRMING the denial of the prayer for inspection and production orders, without prejudice
to the subsequent grant thereof, in the course of hearing and other developments in the
investigations by the Philippine National Police/Philippine National Police Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group and the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
3) ORDERING the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or his
successor, and the incumbent Director General of the Philippine National Police, or his
successor, to CONTINUE the investigations and actions already commenced by the Philippine
National Police Regional OfficeCordillera, Baguio City Police, Northern Luzon Command,
Philippine National Police/Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group, Philippine Army-Intelligence Service Unit and other concerned units, and specifically
take and continue to take the necessary steps:
(a) to identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by Task Force Balao;
(b) to locate and search the vehicles bearing the plate numbers submitted by the petitioners and
which James Balao had reported to be conducting surveillance on his person prior to his
abduction on September 17, 2008, and investigate the registered owners or whoever the previous
and present possessors/transferees thereof; and to pursue any other leads relevant to the
abduction of James Balao;
The incumbent Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff, Philippine National Police
Director General, or their successors, shall ensure that the investigations and actions of their
respective units on the abduction of James Balao are pursued with extraordinary diligence as
required by Sec. 17 of the Amparo Rule.
For purposes of these investigations, the Philippine National Police/Philippine National Police
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group shall periodically report the detailed results of its
investigation to the trial court for its consideration and action. On behalf of this Court, the trial
court shall pass upon the sufficiency of their investigative efforts. The Philippine National Police
and the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group shall have six (6)
months from notice hereof to undertake their investigations. Within fifteen (15) days after
completion of the investigations, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Director General of the Philippine National Police shall submit a full report of the results of
the said investigations to the trial court. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the trial court shall
submit its full report to this Court.
These directives and those of the trial court made pursuant to this Decision shall be given to, and
shall be directly enforceable against, whoever may be the incumbent Armed Forces of the
Philippines Chief of Staff, Director General of the Philippine National Police and Chief of the
Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group and other concerned
units, under pain of contempt from this Court when the initiatives and efforts at disclosure and
investigation constitute less than the EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE that the Amparo Rule
and the circumstances of the case demand; and
4) DROPPING former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as party-respondent in the petition
for writ of amparo;
This case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch
63 for continuation of proceedings in Special Proceeding No. 08-AMP-0001 for the purposes of
monitoring compliance with the above directives and determining whether, in the light of any
recent reports or recommendations, there would already be sufficient evidence to hold any of the
public respondents responsible, or, at least, accountable. After making such determination, the
trial court shall submit its own report and recommendation to this Court for final action. The trial
court will continue to have jurisdiction over this case in order to accomplish its tasks under this
decision;
Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded in this petition to answer
for any responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have incurred during their
incumbencies.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
FLORES, STEFFI NICOLE
Gen. Avelino I. Razon, et al. v. Mary Jean B. Tagitis

G.R. No. 182498, 3 December 2009, EN BANC (Brion, J.)
To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the

unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition should be to determine whether it
contains the details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause
of action showing a violation of the victims rights to life, liberty and security through State or
private party action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its
isolated component parts, to determine if the required elements namely, of the disappearance,
the State or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or
security are present.
FACTS
Respondent filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo alleging that: her husband, Morced
Tagitis, was a consultant for the World Bank and Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic
Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship, was attending a seminar when he vanished; that he was
abducted by burly men who they believed to be police intelligence operatives; that she sought
help from the PNP but she was told that her husband, subject of the petition, was not missing but
was with another woman having good time somewhere; and that she exerted all administrative
remedies to find her husband but to no avail.
Petitioners, on the other hand, deny any involvement in the abduction and claimed that
they exerted efforts such as coordinating with local police, holding case conferences and
rendering legal advice to ascertain the whereabouts of respondent’s husband.
The Court of Appeals (CA) confirmed the disappearance of Morced as an enforced

disappearance and thus granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo in favour of respondent.
ISSUE/s:
1. Whether or not the petition for the Writ of Amparo was sufficient in form and
substance to warrant its grant.
2. Whether or not respondent’s husband was subject to an enforced disappearance.
3. Whether or not the pieces of evidence adduced by the respondents are sufficient to
prove that the disappearance was done with government participation.
RULING
1. YES. The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete
in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights. As in any
other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting
the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition, however, this
requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which
addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with
certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or
arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may
purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this type of
situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners
apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of
judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security.
To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the

unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition should be to determine whether it
contains the details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting
a cause of action showing a violation of the victims rights to life, liberty and security
through State or private party action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality,
rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to determine if the required elements
namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or threatened
violations of the rights to life, liberty or security are present.
In the present case, the petition amply recites in its paragraphs 4 to 11 the
circumstances under which Tagitis suddenly dropped out of sight after engaging in
normal activities, and thereafter was nowhere to be found despite efforts to locate
him. The petition alleged, too, under its paragraph 7, in relation to paragraphs 15 and
16, that according to reliable information, police operatives were the perpetrators of the
abduction. It also clearly alleged how Tagitis rights to life, liberty and security were
violated when he was forcibly taken and boarded on a motor vehicle by a couple of burly
men believed to be police intelligence operatives, and then taken into custody by the
respondents police intelligence operatives since October 30, 2007, specifically by the
CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to
involve and connect [him] with different terrorist groups.
Also, Section 5(d) of the Amparo Rule requires that prior investigation of an alleged
disappearance must have been made, specifying the manner and results of the
investigation. Effectively, this requirement seeks to establish at the earliest opportunity
the level of diligence the public authorities undertook in relation with the reported
disappearance.
The Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the respondents petition did not
comply with the Section 5(d) requirements of the Amparo Rule, as the petition specifies
in its paragraph 11 that Kunnong and his companions immediately reported Tagitis
disappearance to the police authorities in Jolo, Sulu as soon as they were relatively
certain that he indeed had disappeared. The police, however, gave them the ready answer
that Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group or other anti-government
groups. The respondent also alleged in paragraphs 17 and 18 of her petition that she filed
a complaint with the PNP Police Station in Cotobato and in Jolo, but she was told of an
intriguing tale by the police that her husband was having a good time with another
woman. The disappearance was alleged to have been reported, too, to no less than the
Governor of the ARMM, followed by the respondent’s personal inquiries that yielded the
factual bases for her petition.
These allegations sufficiently specify that reports have been made to the police
authorities, and that investigations should have followed. That the petition did not state
the manner and results of the investigation that the Amparo Rule requires, but rather
generally stated the inaction of the police, their failure to perform their duty to
investigate, or at the very least, their reported failed efforts, should not be a reflection on
the completeness of the petition. To require the respondent to elaborately specify the
names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority, as well the
manner and conduct of the investigation is an overly strict interpretation of Section 5(d),
given the respondents frustrations in securing an investigation with meaningful results.
Under these circumstances, we are more than satisfied that the allegations of the petition
on the investigations undertaken are sufficiently complete for purposes of bringing the
petition forward.
Section 5(e) merely requires that the Amparo petitioner (the respondent in the
present case) allege the actions and recourses taken to determine the fate or whereabouts
of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or
omission.
2. YES. Enforced disappearance is defined as the arrest, detention, abduction or any

other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of
persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or
whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection
of the law. Under this definition, the elements that constitute enforced disappearance are
essentially fourfold:
(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with
the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State;
(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the
fate of the disappeared person; and
(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law.
In her direct testimony, the respondent pointed to two sources of information as her
bases for her allegation that Tagistis had been placed under government custody (in
contrast with CIDG Zamboanga custody). The first was an unnamed friend in Zamboanga
(later identified as Col. Ancanan), who occupied a high position in the military and who
allegedly mentioned that Tagitis was in good hands. Nothing came out of this claim, as
both the respondent herself and her witness, Mrs. Talbin, failed to establish that Col.
Ancanan gave them any information that Tagitis was in government custody. Col.
Ancanan, for his part, admitted the meeting with the respondent but denied giving her any
information about the disappearance.
The more specific and productive source of information was Col. Kasim, whom the
respondent, together with her witness Mrs. Talbin, met in Camp Katitipan in Davao City.
Col. Kasim never denied that he met with the respondent and her friends, and that he
provided them information based on the input of an unnamed asset. He simply claimed in
his testimony that the informal letter he received from his informant in Sulu did not
indicate that Tagitis was in the custody of the CIDG. He also stressed that the information
he provided the respondent was merely a raw report from barangay intelligence that still
needed confirmation and follow up as to its veracity.
Petitioners never really steadfastly disputed or presented evidence to refute the

credibility of the respondent and her witness, Mrs. Talbin. The inconsistencies the
petitioners point out relate, more than anything else, to details that should not affect the
credibility of the respondent and Mrs. Talbin; the inconsistencies are not on material
points.
It was duly established that Col. Kasim informed the respondent and her friends,
based on the informants letter, that Tagitis, reputedly a liaison for the JI and who had
been under surveillance since January 2007, was in good hands and under custodial
investigation for complicity with the JI after he was seen talking to one Omar Patik and a
certain Santos of Bulacan, a Balik Islam charged with terrorism. The respondents and
Mrs. Talbins testimonies cannot simply be defeated by Col. Kasims plain denial and his
claim that he had destroyed his informant’s letter, the critical piece of evidence that
supports or negates the parties conflicting claims. Col. Kasims admitted destruction of
this letter effectively, a suppression of this evidence raises the presumption that the letter,
if produced, would be proof of what the respondent claimed.
3. YES. Denials on the part of the police authorities, and frustration on the part of
the respondent, characterize the attempts to locate Tagitis. No evidence was ever offered
on whether there was active Jolo police investigation and how and why the Jolo police
arrived at this conclusion. The respondents own inquiry in Jolo yielded the answer that he
was not missing but was with another woman somewhere. Again, no evidence exists that
this explanation was arrived at based on an investigation. Thus, it was only the inquiry
from Col. Kasim that yielded positive results. Col. Kasims story, however, confirmed
only the fact of his custodial investigation (and, impliedly, his arrest or abduction),
without identifying his abductor/s or the party holding him in custody. The more
significant part of Col. Kasims story is that the abduction came after Tagitis was seen
talking with Omar Patik and a certain Santos of Bulacan, a Balik Islam charged with
terrorism. Mrs. Talbin mentioned, too, that Tagitis was being held at Talipapao,
Sulu. None of the police agencies participating in the investigation ever pursued these
leads. Notably, TASK FORCE TAGITIS to which this information was relayed did not
appear to have lifted a finger to pursue these aspects of the case.
It can be gleaned from all these pieces of evidence and developments a consistency
in the government’s denial of any complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis, disrupted
only by the report made by Col. Kasim to the respondent at Camp Katitipan. Even Col.
Kasim, however, eventually denied that he ever made the disclosure that Tagitis was
under custodial investigation for complicity in terrorism. Another distinctive trait that
runs through these developments is the government’s dismissive approach to the
disappearance, starting from the initial response by the Jolo police to Kunnongs initial
reports of the disappearance, to the responses made to the respondent when she herself
reported and inquired about her husband’s disappearance, and even at TASK FORCE
TAGITIS itself.
As the CA found through TASK FORCE TAGITIS, the investigation was at best
haphazard since the authorities were looking for a man whose picture they initially did
not even secure. The returns and reports made to the CA fared no better, as the CIDG
efforts themselves were confined to searching for custodial records of Tagitis in their
various departments and divisions. To point out the obvious, if the abduction of Tagitis
was a black operation because it was unrecorded or officially unauthorized, no record of
custody would ever appear in the CIDG records; Tagitis, too, would not be detained in the
usual police or CIDG detention places. In sum, none of the reports on record contains any
meaningful results or details on the depth and extent of the investigation made. To be
sure, reports of top police officials indicating the personnel and units they directed to
investigate can never constitute exhaustive and meaningful investigation, or equal
detailed investigative reports of the activities undertaken to search for
Tagitis. Indisputably, the police authorities from the very beginning failed to come up to
the extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires.
In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and the Writ of Habeas Data in favour
of Melissa C. Roxas v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.
G.R. No. 189155, 7 September 2010, EN BANC (Perez, J.)
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of
the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to
address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or
security. While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of whether
an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpired the writ does not,
by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal,
civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law.
FACTS
Petitioner, an American citizen, was a volunteer in an exposure program in the
Philippines when she, and 2 of her companions, were abducted by armed men. Her abductors
told her that she was being detained for being allegedly a member of the Communist Party of the
Philippines-New People’s Army. For 5 days, she endured endless interrogations and torture.
When she was finally released, petitioner her abductors gave her, among others, a SIM
card through which she continued to receive calls from her abductors. Fearing that she would be
harmed, petitioner filed a Petition for the Erits of Amparo and Habeas Data against the
respondents. Respondents claimed, however, that petitioner’s abduction was staged; that her
medical certificate belied her claims of torture; and that they were not remiss in their duties in
ascertaining the truth about petitioner’s alleged abduction.
The Court of Appeals (CA) granted the privilege of the writs. But it ruled that there is no
sufficient proof that respondents were the ones responsible for petitioner’s abduction.
ISSUE/s:
1. Whether or not petitioner can use the Doctrine of Command Responsibility to
justify impleading the respondents in the amparo petition.
2. Whether or not petitioner was able to prove respondents’ responsibility for her
abduction.
3. Whether or not the CA rightfully granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data.
RULING
1. NO. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that
establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a
party-respondent in an amparo petition. Since the application of command responsibility
presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown
criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding.
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief

consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the
court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional
rights to life, liberty or security. While the principal objective of its proceedings is the
initial determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats
thereof had transpired the writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance,
killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the
applicable substantive law.
It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command

responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading
military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition
were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders
may be impleaded not actually on the basis of command responsibilitybut rather on the
ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability. Responsibility refers to the
extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in
whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the
remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal
and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on
the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who
exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their
complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with
knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure;
or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in
the investigation of the enforced disappearance.
2. NO. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not inspire
reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military or police personnel and that she
was detained at Fort Magsaysay.
First. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of

abduction with those surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does
not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove that the government orchestrated such
abduction. In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel
circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on the availability or
non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving the
identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable,
must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity,
because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true identity and
affiliation of the perpetrators. An amparo court cannot simply leave to remote and hazy
inference what it could otherwise clearly and directly ascertain.
In the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to include in her Offer of
Exhibits, the cartographic sketches of several of her abductors whose faces she managed
to see. These cartographic sketches have the undeniable potential of giving the greatest
certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of petitioner’s abductors. Unfortunately for
the petitioner, this potential has not been realized in view of the fact that the faces
described in such sketches remain unidentified, much less have been shown to be that of
any military or police personnel. Bluntly stated, the abductors were not proven to be part
of either the military or the police chain of command.
Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was not
adequately established by her mere estimate of the time it took to reach the place where
she was detained and by the sounds that she heard while thereat. Like the Court of
Appeals, We are not inclined to take the estimate and observations of the petitioner as
accurate on its face not only because they were made mostly while she was in blindfolds,
but also in view of the fact that she was a mere sojourner in the Philippines, whose
familiarity with Fort Magsaysay and the travel time required to reach it is in itself
doubtful. With nothing else but obscure observations to support it, petitioner’s claim that
she was taken to Fort Magsaysay remains a mere speculation.
These evidentiary gaps, in turn, make it virtually impossible to determine whether

the abduction and torture of the petitioner was in fact committed with the acquiescence of
the public respondents.
Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to any military

involvement in petitioners ordeal, there was no error on the part of the Court of Appeals
in denying an inspection of the military camp at Fort Magsaysay. We agree with the
appellate court that a contrary stance would be equivalent to sanctioning a fishing
expedition, which was never intended by the Amparo Rule in providing for the interim
relief of inspection order.
3. NO. An indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be

extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. This, in the case
at bench, the petitioner failed to do.
The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is actually
no evidence on record that shows that any of the public respondents had violated or
threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals
to the public respondents that would have violated or threatened the right to privacy of
the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations and other reports about the
petitioners ties with the CPP-NPA, was not adequately proven considering that the origin
of such records were virtually unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by the
appellate court from the video and photograph released by Representatives Palparan and
Alcover in their press conference. No evidence on record even shows that any of the
public respondents had access to such video or photograph.
In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals enjoining
the public respondents from distributing or causing the distribution to the public any
records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers relative to the petitioners
alleged ties with the CPP-NPA, appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The public
respondents cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing something that, in the first
place, it was not proven to have.
RULE ON THE HABEAS DATA
In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data in Favor of Noriel H.
Rodriguez v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.
G.R. No. 191805 & 193160, 15 November 2011, EN BANC (Sereno, J.)
The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides rapid
judicial relief, as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to
make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner. It is not an action
to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages
requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial
evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. Rather, it serves both preventive and
curative roles in addressing the problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.[
It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses,
and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably
leading to subsequent investigation and action.
Meanwhile, the writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a persons right
to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances where such information is
being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. As an independent
and summary remedy to protect the right to privacy especially the right to informational
privacythe proceedings for the issuance of the writ of habeas data does not entail any finding of
criminal, civil or administrative culpability. If the allegations in the petition are proven through
substantial evidence, then the Court may (a) grant access to the database or information; (b)
enjoin the act complained of; or (c) in case the database or information contains erroneous data
or information, order its deletion, destruction or rectification.
FACTS
Noriel Rodriguez alleged that he was abducted and tortured by members of the 17 th
Battalion of the Philippine Army; their purpose being to coerce him into confessing that he was a
member of the New People’s Army. On the 12 th day of his capture, the soldiers instructed him to
dress up, repeatedly reminding him that he should not disclose to the media his ordeal and
instead that he surrendered voluntarily.
His mother and brother arrived accompanied by Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
personnel who took photographs of his body to check for signs that Rodriguez was tortured.
Rodriguez and his family were finally allowed to return home. Upon arriving in their home,
however, the soldiers took photographs and a video footage of their home. Months later,
Rodriguez observed that suspicious-looking men were following them at the Metro Rail Transit,
in the streets and on the jeepney.
Concerned about his safety and that of his family, Rodriguez filed a petition for the Writ
of Amparo and Writ of Habeas Data with prayers for a Protection Order, Inspection of Place, and
Production of Documents and Personal Properties. In their Return, the respondents claimed that
Rodriguez offered to help the military in exchange for his protection. And fearing that his
comrades were already suspecting him, Rodriguez and respondents staged an abduction to
remove suspicion about Rodriguez being an informant.
The Court of Appeals (CA) granted the writs and directed the respondents to refrain from
using official or unofficial reports regarding Rodriguez, to expunge records connected to him,
and to ensure that his right to life, liberty and security are not further violated. The CA, however,
denied the issuance of a temporary protection order and inspection order.
ISSUE/s:
1. Whether or not the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be granted after
the writs of amparo and habeas data have already been issued in his favour
2. Whether or not the respondents are accountable for violating Rodriguez’s right to
life, liberty and security.
RULING
1. NO. These provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious
determination of the amparo petition. Being interim reliefs, they can only be granted before a
final adjudication of the case is made. In any case, it must be underscored that the privilege of
the writ of amparo, once granted, necessarily entails the protection of the aggrieved party.
Thus, since we grant petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no need to issue a
temporary protection order independently of the former. The order restricting respondents from
going near Rodriguez is subsumed under the privilege of the writ.
2. YES. A careful examination of the records of this case reveals that the totality of the
evidence adduced by Rodriguez indubitably prove the responsibility and accountability of
some respondents in G.R. No. 191805 for violating his right to life, liberty and security.
Rodriguez’s Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 4 December 2009 was a meticulous and

straightforward account of his horrific ordeal with the military, detailing the manner in which
he was captured and maltreated on account of his suspected membership in the NPA. His
narration of his suffering included an exhaustive description of his physical surroundings,
personal circumstances and perceived observations. He likewise positively identified
respondents 1st Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina to be present during his abduction, detention
and torture, and respondents Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan as the CHR representatives who
appeared during his release. More particularly, the fact of Rodriguezs abduction was
corroborated by Carlos in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 16 September 2009, wherein he
recounted in detail the circumstances surrounding the victims capture.
As regards the allegation of torture, the respective Certifications of Dr. Ramil and Dr.
Pamugas validate the physical maltreatment Rodriguez suffered in the hands of the soldiers
of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division. Dr. Pamugas performed a separate
medical examination of Rodriguez on 19 September 2009, the results of which confirmed
that the injuries suffered by the latter were inflicted through torture. Despite these medical
findings that overwhelmingly supported and lent credibility to the allegations of Rodriguez in
his Sinumpaang Salaysay, respondents in G.R. No. 191805 still stubbornly clung to their
argument that he was neither abducted nor detained. Rather, they claimed that he was a
double agent, whose relationship with the military was at all times congenial. This contention
cannot be sustained, as it is far removed from ordinary human experience.
If it were true that Rodriguez maintained amicable relations with the military, then he
should have unhesitatingly assured his family on 17 September 2009 that he was among
friends. Instead, he vigorously pleaded with them to get him out of the military
facility. Furthermore, the appellate court also properly ruled that aside from the abduction,
detention and torture of Rodriguez, respondents, specifically 1 st Lt. Matutina, had violated
and threatened the formers right to security when they made a visual recording of his house,
as well as the photos of his relatives. It must be pointed out, however, that as to respondents
Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan, there was no substantial evidence to show that they violated,
or threatened with violation, Rodriguezs right to life, liberty and security. Despite the dearth
of evidence to show the CHR officers responsibility or accountability, this Court nonetheless
emphasizes its criticism as regards their capacity to recognize torture or any similar form of
abuse.
In the instant case, this Court rules that respondents in G.R. No. 191805 are responsible
or accountable for the violation of Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security on account of
their abject failure to conduct a fair and effective official investigation of his ordeal in the
hands of the military. Respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen.
Ochoa, Col. De Vera and Lt. Col. Mina only conducted a perfunctory investigation, exerting
no efforts to take Ramirezs account of the events into consideration. Rather, these
respondents solely relied on the reports and narration of the military.
Rhona Ave S. Vivares, et al. v. St. Theresa’s College, et al.

G.R. No. 202666, 29 September 2014, Third Division (Velasco, Jr., J.)
To "engage" means "to do or take part in something." It does not necessarily mean that
the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person or entity must
be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or
her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a
business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no
reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said person or
entity.
FACTS
Julia Daluz and Julienne Suzara, minors, were graduating high school students of
respondent St. Theresa’s College (STC) when one of their friends posted a picture of them
scantily clad in their undergarments. When one of their teachers saw this post, said teacher asked
her students to log into their accounts and they showed pictures Julia and Julienne drinking
liquor, smoking cigarettes, etc. Consequently, respondent banned both students from attending
the commencement exercises.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages against the respondents, praying
that the school be stopped from implementing its sanction. But despite the issuance of a
temporary restraining order, the respondent still barred the students from attending the
commencement exercises. The petitioners then filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Data. This petition was dismissed by the RTC ruling that the petitioners failed to show
that there was an existing actual or threatened violation of the students’ right to privacy.
ISSUE/s:
1. Whether or not a writ of habeas data can only issue in cases of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances.
2. Whether or not respondent is “engaged” in the business of gathering, collecting or
storing data within the meaning of the Rules.
3. Whether or not the petitioner’s right to privacy was violated which would entail
issuance of the writ of habeas data.
RULING
1. NO. Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only
to cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the above underscored portion
of Section 2, reflecting a variance of habeas data situations, would not have been made.
Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in
the information age." As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances only. The writ of habeas data, however, can be
availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy, more specifically
the right to informational privacy. The remedies against the violation of such right can
include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or
information or files in possession or in control of respondents. Clearly then, the privilege
of the Writ of Habeas Data may also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances.
2. YES. Nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be
available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of gathering,
storing, and collecting of data. Section 1 of the Rules on the Writ of Habeas Data when
taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas data is a
protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private individuals
or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and
his or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not
be in the business of collecting or storing data.
To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To

"engage" means "to do or take part in something." It does not necessarily mean that the
activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person or entity
must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party
or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when
one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason
or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting
to said person or entity.
To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly limiting the reach
of the writ to a very small group, i.e., private persons and entities whose business is data
gathering and storage, and in the process decreasing the effectiveness of the writ as an
instrument designed to protect a right which is easily violated in view of rapid
advancements in the information and communications technology––a right which a great
majority of the users of technology themselves are not capable of protecting.
3. NO. Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is "Public," it can be
surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook,
absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the
photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right
to informational privacy.
Even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’
Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy
invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol.
Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any
unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by
persons who had legitimate access to the said posts.
Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents

reproduced and broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what petitioners attributed to
respondents as an act of offensive disclosure was no more than the actuality that
respondents appended said photographs in their memorandum submitted to the trial court
in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594. These are not tantamount to a violation of
the minor’s informational privacy rights, contrary to petitioners’ assertion.
The records are bereft of any evidence, other than bare assertions that they utilized
Facebook’s privacy settings to make the photos visible only to them or to a select few.
Without proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within the ambit of
their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an expectation of
privacy with respect to the photographs in question.
Felix L. Ingente
MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, petitioner, vs. P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS THE PNP-PROVINCIAL DIRECTOR OF ILOCOS NORTE and P/SUPT.
WILLIAM O. FANG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, PNP
PROVINCIAL OFFICE, ILOCOS NORTE, respondents. G.R. No. 193636. July 24, 2012
SERENO, J
TOPIC: A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC (Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data)-Limitation

Facts:
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative
Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), “Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged
Existence of Private Armies in the Country.” The body, which was later on referred to as the
Zeñarosa Commission, was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in
the country with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling
them permanently in the future. Marynette Gamboa (Gamboa) alleged that the Philippine
National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations
against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG. Purportedly without
the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to
the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of
individuals maintaining PAGs. On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening
news program the portion of the Report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be
maintaining a PAG.
Gamboa averred that her association with a PAG also appeared on print media. Thus, she
was publicly tagged as someone who maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified information
that the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and forwarded to the Zeñarosa Commission. As a result, she
claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the enumeration of personalities maintaining a
PAG as published in the Report also made her, as well as her supporters and other. people
identified with her, susceptible to harassment and police surveillance operations. Contending that
her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a
Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their
capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte. respondents alleged that they had acted within the
bounds of their mandate in conducting the investigation and surveillance of Gamboa. Further,
that the Petition was incomplete for failing to comply with the following requisites under the
Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data: (a) the manner in which the right to privacy was violated or
threatened with violation and how it affected the right to life, liberty or security of Gamboa; (b)
the actions and recourses she took to secure the data or information; and (c) the location of the
files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in
control of the data or information.
Issue: Whether or not the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data against the
respondent must be granted by the court
Held:
No. The petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data against the respondent must
be not be granted by the court.
According to the Supreme Court, The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of
private armies and other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority. It also
provides for the establishment of one police force that is national in scope and civilian in
character, and is controlled and administered by a national police commission. Taking into
account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate
state aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of
dismantling them permanently. To enable the Zeñarosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O.
275 clothed it with the powers of an investigative body, including the power to summon
witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation and use
compulsory processes to produce documents, books, and records.62 A.O. 275 likewise
authorized the Zeñarosa Commission to deputize the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the
National Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, the PNP, and any other law
enforcement agency to assist the commission in the performance of its functions. The fact that
the PNP released information to the Zeñarosa Commission without prior communication to
Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a
violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial component of
intelligence gathering and investigation. Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had
a validation system, which was used to update information on individuals associated with PAGs
and to ensure that the data mirrored the situation on the field. Thus, safeguards were put in place
to make sure that the information collected maintained its integrity and accuracy. This Court
rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list
of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to
increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the
investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was
implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to
overcome. It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far
outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and
forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore,
the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed Decision in
Special Proc. No. 14979 dated 9 September 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Laoag City, Br. 13,
insofar as it denies Gamboa the privilege of the writ of habeas data, is AFFIRMED.
Felix L. Ingente
DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZ-MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M.
ASCUNCION, LADYLYN BAMOS MADRIAGA, EVERLY TAPUZ MADRIAGA,
EXCEL TAPUZ, IVAN TAPUZ AND MARIAN TIMBAS, petitioners vs. HONORABLE
JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC Br. 5 Kalibo,
SHERIFF NELSON DELA CRUZ, in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC, THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, stationed in Boracay Island, represented by the PNP
STATION COMMANDER, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CEBU 18TH
DIVISION, SPOUSES GREGORIO SANSON AND MA. LOURDES T. SANSON,
respondents. G.R. No. 182484. June 17, 2008. BRION, J.
Topic: A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC (Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data)-Content of a petition for the
issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data.
Facts:
Spouses Gregorio and Ma. Lourdes Sanson (Spouses Sanson) filed with the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga-Malay, Aklan a complaint for forcible entry with a prayer for the
issuance of writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the petitioners. They claim that they
were the registered owners of the disputed land and that they were in physical possession of it
until they were ousted by armed men. The lower court ruled in favor of Spouses Sanson and
ordered the petitioners to vacate the said premises. The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
under rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of Writ of Habeas Data so that the PNP may release
the report on the burning of homes of the petitioners and the acts of violence employed against
them by Spouses Sanson.
Issue: Whether or not the prayer for the issuance of Writ of Habeas Data should be granted.
Held:
No. Under Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following
material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life,
liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in
charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or
destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent.
In the present case the Writ of Habeas Data was applied by petitioners so that the PNP
may release the report on the burning of homes of the petitioners and the acts of violence
employed against them by Spouses Sanson. These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on
Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally
deficient. Specifically, there are no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of
the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not
alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police authorities
other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or justification for the
issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information,
has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing
more than the fishing expedition that this Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas
data - had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the present
petition OUTRIGHT for deficiencies of form and substance patent from its body and
attachments.
SO ORDERED.
Felix L. Ingente
DR. JOY MARGATE LEE, Petitioner, vs. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN, Respondent. G.R.
No. 203254, October 08, 2014 PERLAS-BERNABE, J
Topic: A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC (The Rule on Writ of Habeas Data)- substantial evidence
requirement.
Facts:
P/SUPT. NERI ILAGAN (Ilagan) and Dr. Joy Lee (Lee) were former common law
partners. Sometime in July 2011, Ilagan left his camera in Lee’s condominium. When Lee
opened it she discovered sex videos involving Ilagan and another woman. Ilagan denied the
video and demanded Lee to return the camera, but to no avail. During the confrontation, Ilagan
slammed Lee’s head against a wall inside his office and walked away. Subsequently, Lee utilized
the said video as evidence in filing various complaints against Ilagan, namely: (a) a criminal
complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the “Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004,” before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Makati; and (b) an administrative complaint for grave misconduct before the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM). Ilagan claimed that Lee’s acts of reproducing the subject video
and threatening to distribute the same to the upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it
to the internet violated not only his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that of the
other woman, and thus, he prayed for the issuance of the writ of habeas data. On the other hand,
Lee contended that Ilagan’s petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data should be
dismissed because: (a) its filing was only aimed at suppressing the evidence against Ilagan in the
cases she filed; and (b) she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data
regarding the person of Ilagan. The RTC granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data in
Ilagan’s favor, and accordingly, ordered the implementing officer to turn-over copies of the
subject video to him, and enjoined Lee from further reproducing the same.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in
favor of Ilagan.
Held:
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as “a
remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party.” Thus, in order
to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially
requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, “[t]he manner the right to privacy is
violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved
party.” In other words, the petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the
right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Corollarily,
the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. In this
relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely property
or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are
vague and doubtful.
In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to
privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction
and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in
the suppression of this video – which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be
uploaded in the internet for public consumption – he failed to explain the connection between
such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot
speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions. As the rules and existing jurisprudence
on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to the
cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure
on either account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case. In fact, even
discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would equally be dismissible due to
the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the records show, all that Ilagan submitted in
support of his petition was his self-serving testimony which hardly meets the substantial
evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule. This is because nothing therein
would indicate that Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards the end of violating
Ilagan’s right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would anything on record even lead a
reasonable mind to conclude that Lee was going to use the subject video in order to achieve
unlawful ends – say for instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin Ilagan’s reputation.
Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in her testimony that the only reason why she reproduced
the subject video was to legitimately utilize the same as evidence in the criminal and
administrative cases that she filed against Ilagan.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 30, 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 in SP No. 12-71527is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Petition for Issuance of the Writ
of Habeas Data filed by respondent P/Supt. Neri A. Ilagan is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CASES WRIT OF KALIKASAN
Felix L. Ingente
MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, et al., Petitioners v. SCOTT H. SWIFT, et al.,
Respondents. GR No. 206510, Sep 16, 2014 VILLARAMA, JR., J
Topic: A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC(Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases Writ of Kalikasan)-
Locus Standi to file petition.
Facts:
In 1988, Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue of Proclamation No.
306 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on August 11, 1988. Located in the middle of
Central Sulu Sea, 150 kilometers southeast of Puerto Princesa City, Tubbataha lies at the heart of
the Coral Triangle, the global center of marine biodiversity. In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by
the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a World
Heritage Site. It was recognized as one of the Philippines' oldest ecosystems, containing
excellent examples of pristine reefs and a high diversity of marine life. The 97,030-hectare
protected marine park is also an important habitat for internationally threatened and endangered
marine species. UNESCO cited Tubbataha's outstanding universal value as an important and
significant natural habitat for in situ conservation of biological diversity; an example
representing significant on-going ecological and biological processes; and an area of exceptional
natural beauty and aesthetic importance. On April 6, 2010, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 10067, otherwise known as the "Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" "to
ensure the protection and conservation of the globally significant economic, biological,
sociocultural, educational and scientific values of the Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity for the
enjoyment of present and future generations." Under the "no-take" policy, entry into the waters
of TRNP is strictly regulated and many human activities are prohibited and penalized or fined,
including fishing, gathering, destroying and disturbing the resources within the TRNP. The law
likewise created the Tubbataha Protected Area Management Board (TPAMB) which shall be the
sole policy-making and permit-granting body of the TRNP.On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m.
while transiting the Sulu Sea, the USS Guardian ran aground on the northwest side of South
Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in
the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil. On April 17, 2013, the
petitioners on their behalf and in representation of their respective sector/organization and others,
including minors or generations yet unborn, filed the present petition against Scott H. Swift in
his capacity as Commander of the US 7thFleet, Mark A. Rice in his capacity as Commanding
Officer of the USS Guardian and Lt. Gen. Terry G. Robling, US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific
and Balikatan 2013 Exercises Co-Director ("US respondents"); President Benigno S. Aquino III
in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), DFA
Secretary Albert F. Del Rosario, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr., Secretary Voltaire T.
Gazmin (Department of National Defense), Secretary Jesus P. Paje (Department of Environment
and Natural Resources), Vice-Admiral Jose Luis M. Alano (Philippine Navy Flag Officer in
Command, AFP), Admiral Rodolfo D. Isorena (Philippine Coast Guard Commandant),
Commodore Enrico Efren Evangelista (Philippine Coast Guard-Palawan), and Major General
Virgilio O. Domingo (AFP Commandant), collectively the "Philippine respondents." Petitioners
claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause
and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of
Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del
Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology. They also seek a directive from this Court for the institution of
civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of environmental laws and
regulations in connection with the grounding incident.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners have local standi to file the petition.
Held:
Yes. The petitioners have local standi to file the petition. On the novel element in the
class suit filed by the petitioners minors in the case of Oposa vs. Factoran, the Court ruled that
not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental
rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future generations. As stated by the
Supreme Court in the said case “Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as
well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality
to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature.
"Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation
of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to
the present as well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to
the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that
right for the generations to come.”
The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to minors and
generations yet unborn, is now enshrined in the Rules which allows the filing of a citizen suit in
environmental cases. The provision on citizen suits in the Rules "collapses the traditional rule on
personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature."
GARCIA, CHARLOTTE YRIS
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS vs. REYES

RULE: Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (Writ of Kalikasan)
DATE: April 21, 2015
GR No. 180771 GR No. 181527

Case Original Petition for Certiorari, Original Petition for Certiorari,
Summary Mandamus, and Injunction which seeks Prohibition, and Mandamus, which
to enjoin respondents from seeks to nullify the ECC issued by
implementing SC-46 and to have it DENR in connection with SC-46; to
nullified for willful and gross violation prohibit its implementation; and to
of the Constitution and certain compel public respondents to provide
international and municipal laws. petitioners access to the pertinent
documents involving the Tañon Strait
Oil Exploration Project.
Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals (they are the Central Visayas Fisherfolk
toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and Development Center (FIDEC), a non-
other cetacean species inhabiting the stock, non-profit, non-governmental
waters in and around the Strait). organization, established for the
welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in
Joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos Region VII.
(Ramos) and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio
(Eisma-Osorio) as legal guardians and Cerilo D. Engarcial (Engarcial),
as friends (collectively known as "the Ramon Yanong (Yanong) and
Stewards") who allegedly empathize Francisco Labid (Labid), in their
with, and seek the protection of, the personal capacities and as
aforementioned marine species. representatives of the subsistence
fisherfolk of the municipalities of
Former President Gloria Macapagal- Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, Cebu.
Arroyois impleaded as unwilling co-
petitioner for her express declaration
and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter
to protect the Tañon Strait, among
others.
Respondents The late Angelo T. Reyes, as then Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE);
Jose L. Atienza, as then Secretary of the DENR;
Leonardo R. Sibbaluca, as then DENR-Regional Director for Region VII and

Chairman of the Tañon Strait Protected Seascape Management Board;
Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX), a company organized and
existing under the laws of Japan with a Philippine branch office; and
Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS), as the alleged Philippine agent of JAPEX.
Additional Alan C. Arranguez (Arranguez) in his

Public capacity as then Director of the EMB,
Respondents Region VII
Antonio Labios (Labios), in his
capacity as then Regional Director of
the DOE, Region VII
FACTS:
The Government, acting through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and
Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX involving geological and geophysical
studies of the Tañon Strait.
DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into SC-46 for the exploration,
development, and production of petroleum resources in a block covering approximately 2,850
square kilometers offshore the Tañon Strait. JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the
Tañon Strait. A multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751 kilometers was
also done to determine the area's underwater composition.
JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the
project. Since the well was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan,
where the Tañon Strait was declared a protected seascape in 1988, JAPEX agreed to comply with
the Environmental Impact Assessment requirements pursuant to PD No. 1586, entitled
"Establishing An Environmental Impact Statement System, Including Other Environmental
Management Related Measures And For Other Purposes."
Protected Area Management Board of the Tañon Strait (PAMB-Tañon Strait) issued Res.
No. 2007-001 adopting the Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX,
and favorably recommended the approval of JAPEX's application for an ECC.
EMB of DENR granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas
exploration project in Tañon Strait. JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of
3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province.
Petitioners sought that respondents be enjoined from implementing SC-46 for, among
others, violation of the 1987 Constitution.
SOS filed a Motion to Strike its name as a respondent on the ground that it is not the
Philippine agent of JAPEX; that it only acted as logistics contractor for JAPEX.
Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards opposed SOS's motion on the
ground that it was premature, it was pro-forma, and it was patently dilatory. Petitioners Resident
Marine Mammals and Stewards also asked the Court to implead JAPEX Philippines as a co-
respondent or as a substitute for its parent company, JAPEX. The two cases were consolidated.
FIDEC manifested that they were adopting in toto the Opposition to Strike with Motion
to Implead filed by petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards in G.R. No. 180771.
Public respondents filed their Manifestation that they were not objecting to SOS's Motion to
Strike as it was not JAPEX's resident agent.
This Court issued a Resolution directing the process serving unit to again serve the
parties with a copy of the Resolution giving due course to the petitions which required the parties
to submit their respective memoranda. The Court granted JAPEX PH’s Motion to Admit its
Motion for Clarification and also its motion for extension of time to file its memorandum.
JAPEX PH’s second request for additional time to file its Memorandum was denied.
Petitioners’ contentions:
- A study made after the seismic survey showed that there is a drastic reduce in fish
catch by 50-70% attributable to the destruction of the “payao” or the artificial reef.
- The ECC obtained by the respondents is invalid because there is no public
consultations and discussions prior to its issuance.
- SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, considering that there is no general law prescribing the standard or uniform
terms, conditions, and requirements for service contracts involving oil exploration and
extraction
- FIDEC alleges that it was barred from entering and fishing within a 7-kilometer
radius from the point where the oilrig was located, an area grated than the 1.5-kilometer
radius exclusion zone stated in the Initial Environmental Examination
Respondents’ contentions:
- The “Resident Marine Mammals” and “Stewards” have no legal standing to file
the petition.
- SC-46 is constitutional.
- The ECC was legally issued.
- The case is moot and academic since SC-46 is mutually terminated on 21 June
2008.
ISSUES
1. WON the case is moot and academic

2. WON Petitioners have a legal standing
3. WON SC-46 is unconstitutional
RULING
1. No. The Court makes clear that the “moot and academic” principle is not a magic formula
that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Despite the termination of SC-
46, the Court deems it necessary to resolve the consolidated petitions as it falls within the
exceptions. Both petitioners allege that SC-46 is violative of the Constitution, the
environmental and livelihood issues raised undoubtedly affect the public’s interest, and the
respondents’ contested actions are capable of repetition.
2. Yes. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more
liberalized approach. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allow for a “citizen
suit,” and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violation of our
environmental laws on the principle that humans are stewards of nature:
“Section 5. Citizen suit. – Any Filipino citizen in representation of others,

including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights
or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court
shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and
the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to
intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may
publish the order once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines or
furnish all affected baragngays copies of said order.
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be
governed by their respective provisions. (Emphasis supplied)”
Although the petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules
of Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of
procedure may be retroactively applied to actions pending and undetermined at the time
of their passage and will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure.
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became
effective, the SC had already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in
environmental cases. In Oposa, the SC allowed the suit to be brought in the name of
generations yet unborn “based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar
as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.”
It is also worth noting that the Stewards in the present case are joined as real
parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species.
3. Yes. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides in part:
“The President may enter into agreement with foreign-owned corporations

involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and
technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in
accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.”
(Emphases supplied)
The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of

indigenous petroleum in the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 (PD
87) or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972. Although the Court finds that
PD 87 is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a general law, the absence of the two
other conditions, that the President be a signatory to SC-46, and that the Congress be
notified of such contract, renders it null and void.
SC-46 appears to have been entered into and signed by the DOE through its then
Secretary Vicente S. Perez, Jr. Moreover, public respondents have neither shown nor
alleged that Congress was subsequently notified of the execution of such contract.
Service contracts involving the exploitation, development, and utilization of our

natural resources are of paramount interest to the present and future generations. Hence,
safeguards were out in place to insure that the guidelines set by law are meticulously
observed and likewise eradicate the corruption that may easily penetrate departments and
agencies by ensuring that the President has authorized or approved of the service
contracts herself.
Even under the provisions of PD 87, it is required that the Petroleum Board, now
the DOE, obtain the President’s approval for the execution of any contract under said
statute.
The SC likewise ruled on the legality of SC-46 vis-à-vis other pertinent laws to
serve as a guide for the Government when executing service contracts.
Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Tañon Strait is an environmentally critical

area, having been declared as a protected area in 1998; therefore, any activity outside the
scope of its management plan may only be implemented pursuant to an ECC secured
after undergoing an Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) to determine the effects of
such activity on its ecological system.
Public respondents admitted that JAPEX only started to secure an ECC prior to
the 2nd sub-phase of SC-46, which required the drilling of the exploration well. This
means that no environmental impact evaluation was done when the seismic surveys were
conducted. Unless the seismic surveys are part of the management plan of the Tañon
Strait, such surveys were done in violation of Section 12 of NIPAS Act and Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 1586.
While PD 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for
petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization
of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by
Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area. Since there is no such law specifically
allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in the Tañon Strait, no energy resource
exploitation and utilization may be done in said protected seascape.
CHANGE OF NAME CORRECTION OF CLERICAL ERRORS, AND
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN CIVIL REGISTRY
CHIU HAP CHIU vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

RULE: Rule 103 (Change of Name)
DATE: April 30, 1966
VENUE: CFI of Davao
FACTS:
Petitioner seeks to change his name to Lo Hap Chiu in a petition before the CFI of
Davao. He testified that he was 30 years old, single, a doctor of medicine and a resident of
Davao City. The name given to him at birth was Lo Hap Chiu and that during his school days
from elementary to high school he was referred to as Lo Hap Chiu for which reason he desires to
adopt such name to avoid confusion. The name given him in his alien certificate of registration is
Chiu Hap Chiu.
The court a quo granted the petition. It found that petitioner was born on February 1,
1930 in China; that he is a Chinese citizen holding an alien certificate of registration; and that he
is a physician and has no criminal record; that he has paid all his taxes.
The government opposed the petition I view of its failure to find sufficient justification
for the change of name.
ISSUE:
WON there is proper justification to grant the petition for change of name.
RULING:
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entitles for purpose of
identification and that a change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right. So that before a
person can be authorized to change the name given him either in his certificate of birth or in the
civil registry he must show proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason which may
justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied. (Ong Peng Oan vs. Republic)
The following may be considered among others, as proper and reasonable causes that
may warrant the grant of a petition for change of name: (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted
with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is
a consequence of a change of status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or
legitimized; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion.
Petitioner has not shown any proper or compelling reason that may justify the request for
change of name other than his desire to use the name Lo Hap Chin on the alleged reason that that
is the name given him in his birth certificate and in the schools he attended, but his claim was not
satisfactorily proven, for aside from his own testimony and a photostatic copy of a certification
issued in his favor as Doctor of Medicine by the University of Santo Tomas wherein it appears
that his name is Lo Hap Chiu, there is nothing in the record to show that he used said name from
grade school to college for he failed to present any documentary evidence to prove it. The truth is
that he was registered in the Bureau of Immigration as Chiu Hap Chiu and in all the clearances
secured by him from said Bureau the name used therein was Chiu Hap Chiu thereby indicating
that he considered himself as such as regards the public. He has not shown that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name, and as a matter of fact he was referred to as
Dr. Chiu Hap Chiu in his clearance from the Court of First Instance of Davao. Since the State has
an interest in the name borne by an individual, especially an alien, and the latter's identity as a
rule is established by the name appearing in his alien certificate of registration, we find no
plausible reason for authorizing the change of name desired by petitioner.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside. No costs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERLYN MERCADERA through her Attorney-
in-Fact, EVELYN M. OGA
RULE: Rule 103 (Change of Name) and RULE 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Civil Registry)
DATE: December 8, 2010
VENUE: RTC of Dipolog City
FACTS:
Mercadera, represented by her sister and Attorney-in-Fact, Oga, sought the correction of
her given name as it appeared in her Certificate of Live Birth - from Marilyn L.
Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog
City pursuant to RA No. 9048.
Under RA No. 9048 the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general, as the case
may be, is now authorized to effect the change of first name or nickname and the correction of
clerical or typographical errors in civil registry entries. Jurisdiction over applications for change
of first name is now primarily lodged with administrative officers and excludes it from the
coverage of Rule 103 until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed
and subsequently denied and removes "correction or changing of clerical errors in entries of the
civil register from the ambit of Rule 108." Hence, what are left for the scope of operation of the
rules are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil register.
The Office of the Local Civil registrar of Dipolog City refused to effect the correction
unless a court order was obtained “because the Civil Registrar therein is not yet equipped with a
permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions for corrections filed before their
office as mandated by Republic Act 9048."
Mercadera was then constrained to file a Petition For Correction of Some Entries as
Appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108 before the RTC of Dipolog City.
RTC issued an order finding the petition sufficient in form and substance and a notice of
hearing was given.
OSG entered its appearance for the Republic of the Philippines and deputized the Office
of the City Prosecutor to assist in the case only on the very day of the hearing. This prompted the
court to reset the hearing on a later date. On said day, there being no opposition, counsel for
Mercadera moved for leave of court to present evidence ex parte. Without any objection from the
City Prosecutor, the trial court designated the branch clerk of court to receive evidence for
Mercadera.
Facts gathered from pieces of evidence gathered:
1. Petitioner was born on August 19, 1970 in Dipolog.
2. She is the daughter of Tirso Mercadera and Norma Lacquiao.
3. The fact of her birth was reported to the Office of the City Civil Registrar of
Dipolog City on September 8, 1970.
4. In the certification of birth dated May 9, 2005 issued by the same registry, her
given name appears as Marilyn and not Merlyn.
5. She was baptized by the name Merlyn L. Mercadera.
6. All of her diplomas uniformly show her name as Merlyn L. Mercadera.
7. Her GSIS certificate of membership also bears Merlyn L. Mercadera.
8. When she secured an authenticated copy of her certificate of live birth from the
National Statistics Office, she discovered that her given name as registered is Marilyn
and not Merlyn; hence, this petition.
RTC granted her petition and directed the Office of the City Civil Registrar to correct
her name appearing in the certificate of live birth from Marilyn Lacquiao Mercadera, to
MERLYN Lacquiao Mercadera.
OSG prayed for the reversal and setting aside of the decision with the CA arguing that the
lower court erred (1) in granting the prayer for change of name in a petition for correction of
entries; and (2) in admitting the photocopies of documentary evidence and hearsay testimony of
Oga.
For the OSG, the correction in the spelling of Mercadera’s given name might seem
innocuous enough to grant but "it is in truth a material correction as it would modify or increase
substantive rights." What the lower court actually allowed was a change of Mercadera’s given
name, which would have been proper had she filed a petition under Rule 103 and proved any of
the grounds therefor. The lower court, "may not substitute one for the other for purposes of
expediency." Further, because Mercadera failed to invoke a specific ground recognized by the
Rules, the lower court’s order in effect allowed the change of one’s name in the civil registry
without basis.
CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE:
WON CA erred in granting the change in name.
RULING:
Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or surname, or
both, pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code. This rule provides the procedure for an
independent special proceeding in court to establish the status of a person involving his relations
with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the community. In petitions
for change of name, a person avails of a remedy to alter the designation by which he is known
and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. When granted,
a person’s identity and interactions are affected as he bears a new label or appellation for the
convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of, or dealing with him.
Judicial permission for a change of name aims to prevent fraud and to ensure a record of the
change by virtue of a court decree.
It is an action in rem which requires publication of the order issued by the court to afford
the State and all other interested parties to oppose the petition. When complied with, the decision
binds not only the parties impleaded but the whole world. As notice to all, publication serves to
indefinitely bar all who might make an objection. It is the publication of such notice that brings
in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide
it.
Essentially, a change of name does not define or effect a change of ones existing family
relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter ones legal capacity or
civil status. However, there could be instances where the change applied for may be open to
objection by parties who already bear the surname desired by the applicant, not because he
would thereby acquire certain family ties with them but because the existence of such ties might
be erroneously impressed on the public mind. Hence, in requests for a change of name, what is
involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious
evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced x x x mindful of the
consequent results in the event of its grant x x x.
Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the correction or
cancellation of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code. Entries in
the civil register refer to acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons, also as enumerated in Article 408 of the same law. Before, only mistakes or errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature in the entries in the civil registry may be corrected under Rule
108 and substantial errors affecting the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party are
beyond the ambit of the rule.
If the purpose of the petition is merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to
the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue an
order for the correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may
affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and
controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary
proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues involved. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
provides only the procedure or mechanism for the proper enforcement of the substantive law
embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Code and so does not violate the Constitution.
OSG posits that the conversion from MARILYN to MERLYN is not a correction of an
innocuous error but a material correction tantamount to a change of name which entails a
modification or increase in substantive rights. For the OSG, this is a substantial error that
requires compliance with the procedure under Rule 103, and not Rule 108.
The change of name contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be confused
with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of ones name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on
grounds provided by law. In order to justify a request for change of name, there must be a proper
and compelling reason for the change and proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced by
the use of his official name. To assess the sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there must
be adversarial proceedings.
In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous
errors in the civil registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108
also includes changes of name, the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule
108. Suffice it to say, not all alterations allowed in one’s name are confined under Rule 103.
Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.
This rule in names, however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to the correction
of clerical errors in civil registry entries by way of a summary proceeding. Republic v.
Valencia is the authority for allowing substantial errors in other entries like citizenship, civil
status, and paternity, to be corrected using Rule 108 provided there is an adversary
proceeding. After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 is to ascertain the truths about the
facts recorded therein.
The petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as it
simply sought a correction of a misspelled given name. To correct simply means to make or set
aright; to remove the faults or error from. To change means to replace something with something
else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute.
From the allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly prayed for the lower court to
remove the faults or error from her registered given name MARILYN, and to make or set aright
the same to conform to the one she grew up to, MERLYN. It does not take a complex assessment
of said petition to learn of its intention to simply correct the clerical error in spelling.Mercadera
even attempted to avail of the remedy allowed by R.A. No. 9048 but she unfortunately failed to
enjoy the expediency which the law provides and was constrained to take court action to obtain
relief.
The use of the letter a for the letter e, and the deletion of the letter i, so that what appears
as Marilyn would read as Merlyn is patently a rectification of a name that is clearly
misspelled. The similarity between Marilyn and Merlyn may well be the object of a mix- up that
blemished Mercaderas Certificate of Live Birth until her adulthood, thus, her interest to correct
the same.
The CA did not allow Mercadera the change of her name. What it did allow was the
correction of her misspelled given name which she had been using ever since she could
remember.
CA’s decision is affirmed.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA and MAXIMO WONG
RULE: Rule 103 (Change of Name) and RULE 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Civil Registry)
DATE: May 21, 1992
FACTS:
Private respondent Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundida
Alcala. When he was 2 and a half years old (then known as Maximo Alcala, Jr.) and his sister
Margaret was 9, they were legally adopted by spouses Hoong Wong (deceased) and Concepcion
Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos.
When private respondent was 22, already married and an Engineering student at Notre
Dame Univeristy in Cotabato, he filed a petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was
averred that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and
friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino
residing in a Muslim community, and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of alien
nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus hampering his
business and social life; and that his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to revert to his
former surname.
The trial court granted his prayer and his name was changed from Maximo Wong to
Maximo Alcala, Jr. On appeal and over the opposition of petitioner Republic through the
Solicitor General, the decision was affirmed in full. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON private respondent’s reasons for the petition are valid, sufficient and proper to
warrant the granting of such petition.
RULING:
The Solicitor General posits that for private respondent to cast aside the name of his
adoptive father is crass ingratitude to the memory of the latter and to his adoptive mother who is
still alive, despite her consent to the petition for change of name. Further, the Solicitor General
posits that the reversion of Maximo Wong to his old name violates Articles 341 and 365 of the
Civil Code, which requires an adopted child to use the surname of the adopter, and would
identify him with his parents by nature, thus giving the impression that he has severed his
relationship with his adoptive parents.
Private respondent argues that he did as the law required, that is, upon adoption he used
the surname of the adopter. However, being already emancipated, he can now decide what is best
for and by himself. It is at this time that he realized that the Chinese name he carries causes him
undue ridicule and embarrassment and affects his business and social life. In fact, his adoptive
mother, being aware of his predicament, gave her consent to the petition for change of name,
albeit making it clear that the same shall in no way affect the legal adoption, and even underwent
the rigors of trial to substantiate her sworn statement. If his adoptive mother does not take
offense nor feel any resentment, abhorrence or insecurity about his desire to change his name,
private respondent avers that there can be no possible prejudice on her, much less the State.
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is
known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word
or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as
the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him,
of in speaking of or dealing with him. Names are used merely as one method of indicating the
identity of persons; they are descriptive of persons for identification, since, the identity is the
essential thing and it has frequently been held that, when identity is certain, a variance in, or
misspelling of, the name is immaterial.
The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper name, and the
surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at
birth or baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The name or family name is that
which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given
name may be freely selected by the parents for the child; but the surname to which the child is
entitled is fixed by law.
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to protect
the individual from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody
can be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may
be changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of
man, and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is
imprescriptible.
A change of name is a special proceeding to establish the status of a person involving his
relation with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the community. It is
a proceeding in rem and, as such, strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements,
particularly on publication, is essential in order to vest the court with jurisdiction thereover. For
this purpose, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil
register.
The change of name contemplated under Article 376 and reglementarily implemented by
Rule 103 must not be confused with and cannot be effected through the summary proceeding
proposed in Article 412 of the some Code, as procedurally regulated by Rule 108 of the Rules,
which refers only to correction of clerical errors, such as those which are visible to the eye or
obvious to the understanding, or an error made by a clerk or transcriber, or a mistake in copying
or writing, or some harmless or innocuous change, and not those which will involve substantial
changes.
We find unacceptable the assertion of the Solicitor General that private respondent's
allegation of ridicule and embarrassment due to the use of his present surname is
unsubstantiated.
To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper
or compelling reason therefor but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a)
When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b)
When the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) When the change
will avoid confusion; (d) Having continuously used and been known since childhood by a
Filipino name, unaware of her alien parentage; (e) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name
to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and
(f) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired
change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice
public interest.
There could be no other plausible reason for private respondent to first secure has
adoptive mother's consent before resorting to the questioned legal recourse other than the
parental respect and reverence which is owed by and to be expected of a dutiful child. If private
respondent was such an ingrate, as the Solicitor General would have us believe, he would not
have bothered to seek his adoptive mother's counsel. In the same breath, had his adoptive mother
regarded him as an ungrateful adoptee, she would not have executed the affidavit above quoted,
much less testify in his behalf at the hearing of his petition.
We have heretofore held that a change of name does not define or effect a change in one's
existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one's legal
capacity, civil status or citizenship; what is altered is only the name.
Petition is DENIED.
GUEVARRA, JHAYPEE D.
TITLE: Republic vs. Soza, G.R. No. L-48762, September 12, 1988
TOPIC: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME
DOCTRINE: The proceeding for a change of name is a proceeding in rem. Jurisdiction to hear
and determine the petition for change of name is acquired after due publication of the order
containing certain data, among which is the name sought to be adopted, a matter which should be
indicated in the title of the petition [Pabellar vs. Republic, 70 SCRA 16 (1976); Gil Go vs.
Republic, 77 SCRA 65 (1977)]
FACTS:
Private respondent is a bonafide resident of Catbolagan in Samar. On February 10, 1977,
respondent Lee King Sing filed a petition with the CFI of Samar for change of name.
Accordingly, he desires that his present name be changed to ANTONIO C. LEE. The Lee
appearing in his present name is in fact his surname but in the Chinese way of writing the name,
the surname is stated first; hence, his desire to have ANTONIO as his first name, C. in the first
letter of his mother' surname and LEE his present surname which he desires to be written after
his first name as it is the Filipino way. The name he now asked for is ANTONIO C. LEE.
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
The lower court granted the petition. Hence, the state appealed through the office of the Solicitor
General alleging that the lower court never acquired jurisdiction over the petition on the ground
that the name sought to be adopted by respondent and other names by which he is known are not
indicated or included in the title of the petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the petition?
RULING:
NO. Due to the substantial defect of the petition, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
petition.
The reason for the rule requiring the inclusion of the name sought to be adopted by and the other
names or aliases of the applicant in the title of the petition or in the caption of the published
order is that the ordinary reader only glances fleetingly at the caption of the published order or
the title of the petition in a special proceeding. Only if the caption or the title strikes him does he
proceed to read the contents of the order. And the probability is great that he does not at all notice
the other names or aliases of the applicant if these are mentioned only in the body of the order or
petition. The non-inclusion of all the names or aliases of the applicant in the caption of the order
or in the title of the petition defeats the very purpose of the required publication (Go vs.
Republic, (supra); Telmo vs. Republic, 73 SCRA 29 [1976]).
TITLE: REPUBLIC VS. MARCOS, G.R. No. L-31065 February 15, 1990
TOPIC: Petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court
FACTS: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME

On March 30, 1968, a verified petition was filed by private respondent Pang Cha Quen alleging
that she is a citizen of Nationalist China, married to Alfredo De la Cruz, a Filipino citizen; that
she had resided in Baguio City since her birth on January 29, 1930; that by a previous marriage
to Sia Bian alias Huang Tzeh Lik, a citizen of Nationalist China, she gave birth to a daughter,
May Sia alias Manman Huang on January 28, 1958 in the City of Manila; that on January 12,
1959, she caused her daughter to be registered as an alien under the name of Mary Pang, i.e.,
using the maternal surname, because the child's father had abandoned them; Pang Cha Quen filed
a petition for "the name of the minor child May Sia alias Manman Huang, also known as Mary
Pang [to] be changed to Mary Pang De la Cruz"
The reasons offered for changing the name of petitioner's daughter are: (1) that "her daughter
grew up with, and learned to love and recognize Alfredo de la Cruz as her own father"(p. 23,
Rollo); (2) to afford her daughter a feeling of security (pp. 23-24, Rollo); and (3) that "Alfredo
de la Cruz agrees to this petition, and has signified his conformity at the foot of this pleading"
STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
The lower court granted the petition. Hence, the Solicitor General appealed the decision.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the Court acquired jurisdiction over the petition
2. Whethe or not there is a valid ground to grant the petition
3. Whether or not Pang Cha Quen has the personality to file the petition for her daughter?
RULING:
1. NO. Petitioner himself admits that he is known by all these names. This gives rise to the
necessity of including his aliases in the title of the petition not only in the body thereof.
Otherwise, it is considered as a fatal defect and the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
petition. The Court accordingly hold that for a publication of a petition for a change of name to
be valid, the title thereof should include, first, his real name, and second, his aliases, if any.
The omission of her other alias-- "Mary Pang"-- in the captions of the court's order and of the
petition defeats the purpose of the publication. In view of that defect, the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the subject of the proceedings.
2.NONE. Clearly, the reasons offered are not valid reasons for a change of name. The general
rule is that a change of name should not be permitted if it will give a false impression of family
relationship to another where none actually exists (Laperal vs. Republic, L-18008, October 30,
1962; Johnson vs. Republic, L-18284, April 30, 1963; Moore vs. Republic, L-18407, June 26,
1963). In Padilla vs. Republic, 113 SCRA 789, we specifically held that our laws do not
authorize legitimate children to adopt the surname of a person not their father, for to allow them
to adopt the surname of their mother's husband, who is not their father, can result in confusion of
their paternity.
3. NONE. Clearly, the petition for change of name must be filed by the person desiring to change
his/her name, even if it may be signed and verified by some other person in his behalf. In this
case, however, the petition was filed by Pang Cha Quen not by May Sia.
Hence, only May Sia herself, alias Manman Huang, alias Mary Pang, when she shall have
reached the age of majority, may file the petition to change her name. The decision to change her
name, the reason for the change, and the choice of a new name and surname shall be hers alone
to make. It must be her personal decision. No one else may make it for her. The reason is
obvious. When she grows up to adulthood, she may not want to use her stepfather's surname, nor
any of the aliases chosen for her by her mother.
TITLE: REPUBLIC vs. CA, G.R. No. 97906

TOPIC: Petition for change of surname
FACTS:
The private respondent, Maximo Wong, file a petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala. He
wanted to carry the surname of his biological parents.
Upon reaching the age of twenty-two, herein private respondent, by then married and a junior
Engineering student at Notre Dame University, Cotabato City, filed a petition to change his name
to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated
him from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in
fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community, and he wants to erase any
implication whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese
surname, thus hampering his business and social life; and that his adoptive mother does not
oppose his desire to revert to his former surname.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
The lower court granted the petition after having been complied with the jurisdictional
requirements. Hence, a petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Solicitor General.
Further, the Solicitor General posits that the reversion of Maximo Wong to his old name violates
Articles 341 and 365 of the Civil Code, which requires an adopted child to use the surname of
the adopter, and would identify him with his parents by nature, thus giving the impression that he
has severed his relationship with his adoptive parents. And it is a form of ingratitude to his
adoptive parents.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the reasons given by private respondent in his petition for change of name are
valid, sufficient and proper to warrant the granting of said petition
RULING:
YES. While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of the Civil Code is to the effect that
an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it must nevertheless be borne in mind that
the change of the surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of
adoption proceedings.
A petition for change of name is a remedy allowed under our law only by way of
exception to the mandatory provisions of the Civil Code on the use of surnames. The law fixes
the surname that may be used by a person, at least inceptively, and it may be changed only upon
judicial permission granted in the exercise of sound discretion. Section 1 of Rule 103, in
specifying the parties who may avail of said remedy, uses the generic term "persons" to signify
all natural persons regardless of status. If a legitimate person may, under certain judicially
accepted exceptional circumstances, petition the court for a change of name, the court cannot see
any legal basis or logic in discriminating against the availment of such a remedy by an adopted
child. Furthermore, the act of the petitioner in petitioning the court for the change of his surname
cannot be considered as a form of ingratitude because the facts provided that his adoptive mother
consented to said change and actually, let the petitioner hire her counsel to effect the change.
TITLE: Leonardo vs CA, G. R. No. 125329. September 10, 2003
TOPIC: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME
FACTS:
Petitioner Ann Brigitt Leonardo was on July 14, 1993 born in Manila to common-law-spouses
Eddie B. Fernandez and Gloria C. Leonardo. She is using the surname of her mother. She a
petition to change her surname from Leonardo to Hernandez. The petition she filed before the
local civil registry before was denied outright on the ground that petitioner, being illegitimate,
should carry her mothers surname as provided under Article 176 of the Family Code and Article
412 of the New Civil Code which provides that no entry in the civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order.
Petitioners appeal to the Civil Registry General citing Article 366 of the Civil Code allowing an
illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father should he/she be recognized by his/her
legitimate father.
Though conceding that the appeal had valid arguments, Civil Registrar General Tomas P. Africa,
by letter of December 26, 1994, denied the appeal on the ground that neither the Office of the
Civil Registrar General nor any of the Civil Registry Offices in the country is given the power or
discretion to effect an administrative change of entry in the civil register.
It was appealed to the NEDA, but however denied on ground that it lacked authority to decide on
the matter.
Again, an appeal was filed before the office of the President. Consequently, the latter upheld the
decision of the local civil registrar.
Petitioner, represented by her parents, thereupon filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Review under Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court.
ISSUE/S:
1. whether an illegitimate child born after the effectivity of the Family Code has the
right to use her fathers surname.
2.
RULING:
None. Ubi jus, ibi remedium. When there is a right, there is a remedy. Conversely, if there is no
right, there is no remedy as every remedial right is based on a substantive right.
Article 176 of the Family Code effectively repealed Article 366 of the Civil Code.
Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority
of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of
each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
The rule applies even if petitioner’s father admits paternity. Hence, since petitioner was born an
illegitimate child after the Family Code took effect, she has no right to use her father’s surname.
Lintao, Jude Erwin
GRANDE VS. ANTONIO
FACTS:
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period of time
lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to
someone else. Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis and Jerard
Patrick, both minors. The children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the
Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties relationship, however,
eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two children. This
prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer
to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors
and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction, appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary
Recognition of Paternity of the children.
The RTC held in favor of Antonio, ordering the Office of the City Registrar to cause the entry of
the name of Antonio as the father of the aforementioned minors in their respective Certificate of
Live Birth and causing the correction/change and/or annotation of the surnames of said minors in
their Certificate of Live Birth from Grande to Antonio; granting the right of parental authority
over the minors; granting the primary right and immediate custody over the minors; and ordering
Grande to immediately surrender the persons and custody of the minors to Antonio.
Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was denied by the
trial court.
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part of the RTC
for allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the grant of sole custody to
the mother over her illegitimate children.
The CA modified in part the Decision of the RTC, directing the Offices of the Civil Registrar
General and the City Civil Registrar of Makati City to enter the surname Antonio as the surname
of the minors in their respective certificates of live birth, and record the same in the Register of
Births; ordering Antonio to deliver the custody to their mother; Antonio shall have visitorial
rights upon Grandes consent; parties are directed to give and share in support of the minor
children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the recognition made by
respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction with the universally
protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause, compels the use by the children of the surname
"ANTONIO."
Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for
reconsideration, particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the change of the
minors surname to "Antonio." When her motion was denied, petitioner came to this Court via the
present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the father has the right to compel the use of his surname by his
illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation?
HELD: The petition is partially granted
Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:

Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this
modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in
force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 which now reads:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate
children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by
their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a
public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has
the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime.
The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate
child.
The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The
exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the
father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public
document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the
illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation
of the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors
from Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public under
Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But
he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official
declaration of his children's surname as Antonio.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their
father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is
granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be taken
to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any interpretation.
Respondents position that the court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no
legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one
must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an
acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate
father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate
children.
Lintao, Jude Erwin
Republic vs Capote
Facts: In 1998, respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote (guardian ad litem) filed a petition for change
of name of her ward from Giovanni Nadores Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. The petition
alleged that: Giovanni is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado
Gallamaso; he was born on July 9, 1982, prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code; his
mother made him use the surname of the natural father despite the absence of marriage between
them; from the time Giovanni was born and up to the present, his father failed to take up his
responsibilities [to him] on matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns;
Giovanni is now fully aware of how he stands with his father and he desires to have his surname
changed to that of his mother’s surname; Giovanni’s mother might eventually petition him to join
her in the United States and his continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the surname of his
natural father, may complicate his status as natural child; and the change of name will be for the
benefit of the minor.
Having found respondent’s petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave due
course to the petition. Publication of the petition was ordered and the local civil registrar and the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was notified. Since there was no opposition to the petition,
respondent moved for leave of court to present her evidence ex parte before a court-appointed
commissioner. The OSG, acting through the Provincial Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the
lower court granted the motion. After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a
decision ordering the change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an appeal with a lone assignment
of error: the court a quo erred in granting the petition in a summary proceeding. Ruling that the
proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as required, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision ordering the change of name.
Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court contending that the CA erred in affirming the trial
court’s decision which granted the petition for change of name despite the non-joinder of
indispensable parties. The purported parents and all other persons who may be adversely affected
by the child’s change of name should have been made respondents to make the proceeding
adversarial.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petition for change of name should be granted?
2. Is a proceeding for change of name adversarial?
3. Did Capote comply with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding?
4.When is a proceeding considered adversarial?
Held:
1. Yes. The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of the
proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and
complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the
appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovanni’s petition
sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his
name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as
her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father.
It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mother’s intended petition to have him join her
in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son.
2. The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of name must be heard in an
adversarial proceeding. Unlike petitions for the cancellation or correction of clerical errors in
entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, a petition for change of name
under Rule 103 cannot be decided through a summary proceeding. There is no doubt that this
petition does not fall under Rule 108 for it is not alleged that the entry in the civil registry suffers
from clerical or typographical errors. The relief sought clearly goes beyond correcting erroneous
entries in the civil registry, although by granting the petition, the result is the same in that a
corresponding change in the entry is also required to reflect the change in name.
3. Capote complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding by posting in a

newspaper of general circulation notice of the filing of the petition. The lower court also
furnished the OSG a copy thereof. Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the
petition including the OSG. The fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the court of
its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature. The
lower court is still expected to exercise its judgment to determine whether the petition is
meritorious or not and not merely accept as true the arguments propounded. Considering that the
OSG neither opposed the petition nor the motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the
opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower court were not
adversarial enough.
4. A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other
party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Respondent gave notice of the petition
through publication as required by the rules. With this, all interested parties were deemed
notified and the whole world considered bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial
court gave due notice to the OSG by serving a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the
requirements to make a proceeding adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties,
including petitioner as represented by the OSG, were afforded the opportunity to contest the
petition.
Lintao, Jude Erwin
In RE: Petition for Change of Name and/or correction/cancellation of Entry of Civil
Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
Facts: Julian was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-
Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got
married on September 22, 1998, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the
child’s name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
Since the couple planned to live in Singapore where Julian will study together with a sister who
was born in Singapore, Anna Lisa decided to file a petition in the Regional Trial Court seeking to
drop his middle name and have his registered name in the Civil Registry changed from Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. The reason given for the change of name sought in the
petition is that Julian may be discriminated against when he studies in Singapore because of his
middle name since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother is not
carried in a person's name.
After trial, the RTC denied the petition because the reason given did not fall within the grounds
recognized by law. The RTC ruled that since the State has an interest in the name of a person it
cannot just be changed to suit the convenience of the bearer of the name. The RTC said that
legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is
no reason why this right should be taken from Julio considering that he was still a minor. When
he reaches majority age he could then decide whether to change his name by dropping his middle
name, added the RTC.
Issues:
Was the RTC correct in denying the petition?
Held:
Yes. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as
further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has.
When an illegitimate child is legitimated by subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged
by the father in a public instrument or private handwritten instrument, he then bears both his
mother's surname as his middle name and his father's surname as his surname, reflecting his
status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged natural child. The registered name of a
legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a last name, middle name
and a surname.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can
be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he
must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change.
Otherwise, the request should be denied.
To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or
compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the
name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid
confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino
name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the
surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for
a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is
convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean
society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle
name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to
drop it from his registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition
for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his
judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not
yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at
this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
Lintao, Jude Erwin

Yasin vs. Judge of Sharia District Court
Facts:
After the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Law of the
Philippines, petitioner Yasin filed a petition to resume the use of maiden name before the Shari'a
District Court. The respondent court denied the petition on the ground that the petition is
substantially for change of name and that compliance with the provisions of Rule 103 Rules of
Court on change of name is necessary if the position is to be granted.
Issue:
1. Does petitioner seek to change her registered name?
2. In case the marriage ties no longer exist (as in the case of death, divorce, annulment), does
women need to seek judicial confirmation of the change in their civil status in order to revert to
their maiden name?
Held:
1. The true and real name of a person is that given to him and entered in the civil register. While
it is true that under Article 376 of the Civil Code, no person can change his name or surname
without judicial authority, nonetheless, the only name that may be changed is the true and official
name recorded in the Civil Register. In the instant petition, petitioner does not seek to change her
registered maiden name but, instead, prays that she be allowed to resume the use of her maiden
name in view of the dissolution of her marriage, by virtue of a decree of divorce granted in
accordance with Muslim law.
2. No. When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her
husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her
husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil
Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of
the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek
judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the
use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her. When petitioner married
her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status. Neither was she required to
secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage, as no law requires
it. The use of the husband's surname during the marriage, after annulment of the marriage and
after the death of the husband is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation.
The court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner before the
respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so as
her former husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from
her in accordance with Muslim laws.
LUCERO, JOEY
TITLE: Silverio vs Republic

TOPIC: CHANGE OF NAME, CORRECTION OF CLERICAL ERRORS, AND
FACTS:
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for
thechange of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 8. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live
birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels,
thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since
childhood. Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He
underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts
to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex
reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino
Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical
certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure. From then on,
petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his
name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male"
to "female."
The RTC granted Silverio’s petition. The RTC ruled that it should be granted based on
equity; that Silverio’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should
not be in any way taken against him; that there was no opposition to his petition even the OSG
did not make any basis for opposition at this point; that no harm, injury or prejudice will be
caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the
petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of Silverio and [her] fiancé and the
realization of their dreams.
Later, a petition for certiorari was filed by the OSG before the CA. The CA reversed the decision
of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the entries pertaining to sex and first name in the birth certificate
may be changed on the ground of gender re-assignment.
HELD:
No. There is no law authorizes the change of entry as of sex and first name through the
intervention of sex reassignment surgery. Article 376 of the Civil Code as amended by RA 9048
(Clerical Error Law), together with Article 412 of the same Code, change of name or sex in the
birth certificate is allowed by the courts so long as clerical or typographical errors are involved.
Changes sought by Silverio will have serious legal and public policy consequences. To grant this
petition filed by Silverio will greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. Second,
there will be major changes in statutes that underscore the public policy in relation to women.
LUCERO, JOEY
TITLE: Cagandahan vs Republic

FACTS:
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction
of Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna. In her petition, she
alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of
Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was
diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons
thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was
diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound
where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian
structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual
development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and
emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected
such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from
Jennifer to Jeff.
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive
weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General
entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael
Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General
Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that respondents condition is known as
CAH. He explained that genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes male
hormones, her female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs female and
male. He testified that this condition is very rare, that respondents uterus is not fully developed
because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further testified that
respondents condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender because respondent
has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be
advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondents petition Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the RTC decision.
ISSUE: Whether the correction of entries in her birth certificate should be granted.
HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding the
case, the Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.” The Supreme
Court made use of the availale evidence presented in court including the fact that private
respondent thinks of himself as a male and as to the statement made by the doctor that
Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen), which is preponderant
biological support for considering him as being male.”
The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how
an individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court respects the
respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult
for the ordinary person. The Court added that a change of name is not a matter of right but of
judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the consequences that will
follow.
LUCERO, JOEY
TITLE: Re. Final Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the RTC, Br, 67, Paniqui,
Tarlac, A.M. No. 06-7-414-RTC

FACTS: A judicial audit and physical inventory of cases was conducted on 20-24 June
2005 at the RTC, Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67, then presided by Judge Cesar M. Sotero who
compulsorily retired on 23 February 2006.
The audit team noticed that there were no special proceedings case records presented. Upon
inquiry, the Clerk of Court Paulino Saguyod asserted that most of these cases are for Petitions for
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry and gave the audit team copies of the decisions.
The audit team observed that almost all of the petitions have no hearings conducted and that the
date of filing indicated in the docket books and the date of the decision was so near that it will be
improbable to comply with the publication requirement under the Rules of Court.
In view of these observations, the Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Saguyod were made to
explain why these petitions for change of name and/ or correction of entries in the civil registry
were granted without the required hearing. In their answer, they explained that these petitions
may be covered by RA 9048 which authorized city or municipal registrar to correct clerical or
typographical errors in the civil registry without need for a judicial order. They further averred
that these petitions were filed before the trial court because there was no incumbent Local Civil
Registrar and the OIC-Civil Registrar could not act on these petitions. Since RA 9048 allows
correction of entries without hearing and publication, the trial court considered the same
procedure. The trial court also adopted the procedure in civil cases where the defendant is
declared in default and the court renders judgment based on the pleadings filed by the plaintiff.
ISSUES:
1. Whether trial court still have jurisdiction over petitions on change of name and
correction of entries.
2. Whether the summary procedure prescribed in RA No. 9048 should be adopted in
cases filed before the courts, or should the proceeding under Rule 108 be followed.
HELD:
During the deliberation, it was clear that the local civil registrar is given the authority to act on
petitions for corrections of entries and change of first name or nicknames, yet there was no
mention that such petition can no longer be filed with the regular courts. There was no intent on
the part of the lawmakers to remove the authority of the trial courts to make judicial corrections
of entries in the civil registry. It can thus be concluded that the local civil registry has primary,
not exclusive jurisdiction over such petitions for correction of clerical errors and change of first
name or nickname.
Since RA 9048 refers specifically to the administrative summary proceedings before the local
civil registrar it would be inappropriate to apply the same procedure to petitions for correction of
entries in the civil registry before the courts. The promulgation of rules of procedure for court of
justice is the exclusive domain of the Supreme Court. Moreover, as observed by the Office of the
Court Administrator, there is nothing in RA 9048 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
that warrants the adoption of the procedure set therein for petitions before the court even for
purposes of expediting the resolution of said petitions.
Thus, there should be recourse to the procedure prescribed for the courts as if RA 9048 were not
enacted at all. In other words, the procedure provided in the Revised Rules of Court for such
petitions remains binding and should be followed by the courts. The procedural requirements laid
down in Rules 103 and 108 still have to be complied with.
LUCERO, JOEY
TITLE: Onde vs. Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pinas City

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a petition2 for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth before the R TC
and named respondent Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pifias City as sole respondent.
Petitioner alleged that he is the illegitimate child of his parents Guillermo A. Onde and Matilde
DC Pakingan, but his birth certificate stated that his parents were married. His birth certificate
also stated that his mother's first name is Tely and that his first name is Franc Ler. He prayed that
the following entries on his birth certificate be corrected as follows:
Entry From To
1) Date and place of marriage of his parents December 23, 1983 - Bicol Not Married
2) First name of his mother Tely Matilde
3) His first name Franc Ler Francler
In its Order dated October 7, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for correction of entries on
the ground thatit is insufficient in form and substance. It ruled that the proceedings must be
adversarial since the first correction is substantial in nature and would affect petitioner’s status as
a legitimate child. It was further held that the correction in the first name of petitioner and his
mother can be done by the city civil registrar under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048, entitled An
Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the ConsulGeneral to Correct a Clerical
or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil
Registrar Without Need of a Judicial Order, Amending for this Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines.
In its Order dated March 1, 2011,the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, as it
found no proof that petitioner’s parents were not married on December 23, 1983.
In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the RTC correctly
dismissed the petition for correction of entries. It points out that the first names of petitioner and
his mother can be corrected thru administrative proceedings under R.A. No. 9048. Such
correction of the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were married on December
23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is a substantial correction affecting his legitimacy. Hence, it
must be dealt with in adversarial proceedings where all interested parties are impleaded.
ISSUES:
(1) whether the RTC erred in ruling that the correction on the first name of petitioner and
his mother can be done by the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048;
(2) whether the RTC erred in ruling that correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth
certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is
substantial in nature requiring adversarial proceedings;
(3) whether the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for correction of entries; and
(4) whether the RTC erred in ruling that there is no proof that petitioner’s parents were
not married on December 23, 1983.
HELD:
1. YES, Supreme Court agreed with the RTC that the first name of petitioner and his
mother as appearing in his birth certificate can be corrected by the city civil registrar under R.A.
No. 9048.
2. YES, Supreme Court also agreed with the RTC in ruling that correcting the entry on
petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not
married" is a substantial correction requiring adversarial proceedings. Said correction is
substantial as it will affect his legitimacy and convert him from a legitimate child to an
illegitimate one. In Republic v. Uy, we held that corrections of entries in the civil register
including those on citizenship, legitimacyof paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of
marriage,involve substantial alterations. Substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected
and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversaryproceedings.
3. YES, Supreme Court likewise affirm the RTC in dismissing the petition for correction
of entries. As mentioned, petitioner no longer contested the RTC ruling that the correction he
sought on his and his mother’s first name can be done by the city civil registrar. Under the
circumstances, we are constrained to deny his prayer that the petition for correction of entries
before the RTC bereinstated since the same petition includes the correction he sought on his and
his mother’s first name.
4. Supreme Court held that it is no longer necessary to dwell on the last issue as petitioner
will have his opportunity to prove his claim that his parents were not married on December 23,
1983 when he files the new petition for the purpose.
LOPEZ, Sherlyn
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. MERLYN MERCADERA through her
Attorney-in-Fact, EVELYN M. OGA, Respondent. G.R. No. 186027, December 8, 2010,
MENDOZA, J.:
Facts:
Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera) represented by her sister and Atty-in-Fact, Evelyn M.
Oga (Oga) sought the correction of her given name as indicated in the Certificate of Live Birth –
Marilyn M. Mercadera to Merlyn M. Mercadera before the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Dipolog City pursuant to Republic Act No. 9048.
The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City, however, refused to effect the
correction unless a court order was obtained "because the Civil Registrar therein is not yet
equipped with a permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions for corrections
filed before their office as mandated by Republic Act 9048.
As a result, Mercadera filed a Petition For Correction of Some Entries as Appearing in
the Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108 before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog
City (RTC). RTC granted Mercadera’s petition and directed the Office of the City Civil Registrar
of Dipolog City to correct her name appearing in her certificate of live birth, Marilyn Lacquiao
Mercadera, to MERLYN Lacquiao Mercadera.
The Office of Solicitor General (OSG) timely interposed an appeal praying for the
reversal and setting aside of the RTC decision. It mainly anchored its appeal on the availment of
Mercadera of the remedy and procedure under Rule 108. The OSG claimed that correction in the
spelling of Mercadera’s given name might seem innocuous enough to grant but "it is in truth a
material correction as it would modify or increase substantive rights." It argued that the proper
remedy for the change of Mercadera’s given name is under Rule 103 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
The Court of Appeals was not persuaded. It affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not the application of Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is proper?
Ruling: Yes, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is the proper remedy.
The "change of name" contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be
confused with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of one’s name under Rule 103 can be granted,
only on grounds provided by law. In order to justify a request for change of name, there must be
a proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that the person requesting will be
prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess the sufficiency of the grounds invoked
therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings.
In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous
errors in the civil registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108
also includes "changes of name," the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule
108. Suffice it to say, not all alterations allowed in one’s name are confined under Rule 103.
Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.
Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as it
simply sought a correction of a misspelled given name. To correct simply means "to make or set
aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change means "to replace something with
something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." From the
allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly prayed for the lower court "to remove the faults or
error" from her registered given name "MARILYN," and "to make or set aright" the same to
conform to the one she grew up to, "MERLYN." It does not take a complex assessment of said
petition to learn of its intention to simply correct the clerical error in spelling.
The use of the letter "a" for the letter "e," and the deletion of the letter "i," so that what
appears as "Marilyn" would read as "Merlyn" is patently a rectification of a name that is clearly
misspelled. The similarity between "Marilyn" and "Merlyn" may well be the object of a mix-up
that blemished Mercadera’s Certificate of Live Birth until her adulthood, thus, her interest to
correct the same.
The CA did not allow Mercadera the change of her name. What it did allow was the
correction of her misspelled given name which she had been using ever since she could
remember.
LOPEZ, Sherlyn
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent. G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007, CORONA, J.:
Facts:
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio was born on April 4, 1962 in the City of Manila. His sex
was registered as “male”. Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he underwent sex reassignment
surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction
surgeon in the Philippines issued a medical certificate attesting to that effect. He then lived his
life as a woman.
He filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207,
impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent. The Regional Trial Court granted the
petition. It ordered the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the name of the petitioner from
"Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female" in his birth certificate.
The Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth
certificate by reason of sex alteration. The appellate court reversed the decision of the RTC.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not change of name of the petitioner in his birth certificate is allowed?
(2) Whether or not change of sex of the petitioner in his birth certificate is allowed?
Rulings:
(1) No, there is no law allowing the change of name on the ground of sex
reassignment.
RA 9048 provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change
of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor
or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He
intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into
through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable
cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege,
any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s
first name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed
with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper
remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It
was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Manila where his birth certificate is kept.
(2) No Law allows the change of entry in the Birth Certificate as to sex on the ground
of sex reassignment.
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a
mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure
is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. However, the birth certificate of petitioner contained no error.
All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No
correction is necessary.
Civil Register Law states that a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they
existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the
birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering
that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex
made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
While petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil
registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change
of the entries in his birth certificate.
LOPEZ, Sherlyn
Fe Cayao-Lasam, petitioner, vs. Spouses Claro and Editha Ramolete, respondents.
GR. No. 159132, December 18, 2008, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Facts:
On July 28, 1994, Editha Ramolete who is three months pregnant was brought to Lorma
Medical Center due to Vaginal Bleeding. Upon the direction of Petitioner via telephone, Editha
was brought to LMC on the same day. A pelvic sonogram revealed that there was no fetal
movement and the fetus has weak cardiac pulsation. Petitioner advised Editha to undergo a Dilatation
and Curettage Procedure (D&C) or raspa. On July 30, 1994, petitioner performed the D&C procedure.
Editha was discharged from the hospital the following day.
On September 16, 1994, Editha was once again brought at the LMC, as she was suffering from
vomiting and severe abdominal pains. The Physician informed Editha that there was a dead fetus in the
latter’s womb. After, Editha underwent laparotomy, she was found to have a massive intra-abdominal
hemorrhage and a ruptured uterus. Thus, Editha had to undergo a procedure for hysterectomy] and as a
result, she has no more chance to bear a child.
Editha and her husband Claro Ramolete (respondents) filed a Complaint for Gross Negligence and
Malpractice against petitioner before the Professional Regulations Commission (PRC).
The Board of Medicine (BOM) rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. It exonerated the
petitioner from the charges against her. The Respondents appealed before the PRC. The PRC reversed the
decision of the board. It revoked the petitioner’s license to practice medicine.
Then, the petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for review under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court. However, the CA dismissed the petition since the remedy was improper. It reiterated that
the enumeration of quasi-judicial agencies under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is exclusive. PRC is not
included in the enumeration. The proper remedy is to file an appeal before the office of the President.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is the proper
remedy in this case?
Ruling: Yes. Sec. 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides:
“Section 1. Scope.—This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or

final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals, and from awards, judgments, final orders
or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission,
Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission,
Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission,
Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer,
National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under
Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees’
Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance
Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments,
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators
authorized by law.”
PRC is not expressly mentioned as one of the agencies which are expressly enumerated
under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. However, its absence from the enumeration does
not, by this fact alone, imply its exclusion from the coverage of said Rule. The Rule expressly
provides that it should be applied to appeals from awards, judgments final orders or resolutions
of any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. The phrase “among
these agencies” confirms that the enumeration made in the Rule is not exclusive to the agencies
therein listed.
LOPEZ, Sherlyn
ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother and natural guardian, Armi A. Alba,
and ARMI A. ALBA, in her personal capacity, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ROSENDO C. HERRERA, respondents. G.R. No. 164041, July 29, 2005, YNARES-
SANTIAGO, J.:
Facts:
Private respondent Rosendo C. Herrera filed a
petitionhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/164041.htm - _ftn5 for cancellation of the
following entries in the birth certificate of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr., to wit: (1) the surname
Herrera as appended to the name of said child; (2) the reference to private respondent as the
father of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr.; and (3) the alleged marriage of private respondent to the
childs mother, Armi A. Alba (Armi). He claimed that the challenged entries are false and that it
was only sometime in September 1996 that he learned of the existence of said birth certificate.
Herrera alleged that he married only once, i.e., on June 28, 1965 with Ezperanza C.
Santos and never contracted marriage with Armi nor fathered Rosendo Alba Herrera. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a decision ordering the correction of the entries in the
Certificate of Live Birth of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr., in such a way that the entry under the
name of the child, the surname Herrera, Jr.[,] is ordered deleted, and the child shall be known as
ROSENDO ALBA.
On November 24, 2000, Armi and petitioner minor filed a petition for annulment of
judgment before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction
over their person. According to Armi, her address i.e., No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila, as
appearing in the birth certificate of their son, was entered in said certificate through the
erroneous information given by her sister, Corazon Espiritu. She stressed that private respondent
knew all along that No. 418 Arquiza St., is the residence of her sister and that he deliberately
caused the service of notice therein to prevent her from opposing the petition.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. It stated that petitioner failed to prove that
private respondent employed fraud and purposely deprived them of their day in court. Hence,
this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction?
Ruling: Yes. The court has jurisdiction over the case.
Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, judgments may
be annulled on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud.
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner and her
minor child depends on the nature of private respondents action, that is, in personam, in rem or
quasi in rem. An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an
action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in
rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to subject that persons interest in a property to
a corresponding lien or obligation.
In the case at bar, the filing with the trial court of the petition for cancellation vested the
latter jurisdiction over the res. Substantial corrections or cancellations of entries in civil registry
records affecting the status or legitimacy of a person may be effected through the institution of a
petition under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, with the proper Regional Trial Court.
Being a proceeding in rem, acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner is therefore
not required in the present case. It is enough that the trial court is vested with jurisdiction over
the subject matter.
The service of the order at No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila and the publication
thereof in a newspaper of general circulation in Manila, sufficiently complied with the
requirement of due process, the essence of which is an opportunity to be heard. Said address
appeared in the birth certificate of petitioner minor as the residence of Armi. Considering that the
Certificate of Birth bears her signature, the entries appearing therein are presumed to have been
entered with her approval. Moreover, the publication of the order is a notice to all indispensable
parties, including Armi and petitioner minor, which binds the whole world to the judgment that
may be rendered in the petition. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication. The absence of personal service of the order to Armi was therefore cured by the trial
courts compliance with Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by publication, thus:
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix
the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to
the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent
judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have
been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out.
Magaoay , Rhose Azcelle
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CARLITO I. KHO et al.
FACTS:
Carlito Kho (Kho) and his family applied for the correction of various details in their birth
certificate. Kho petitioned for (1) change the citizenship of his mother from “Chinese” to
“Filipino”; (2) delete “John” from his name; and (3) delete the word “married” opposite the date
of marriage of his parents. The last correction was ordered to be effected likewise in the birth
certificates of respondents Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira.
The petition from a non-adversarial nature of the change is premised on Republic Act No. 9048,
which allows first name and nickname in birth certificates without judicial order. The Municipal
officer approved of the change. The Solicitor General objected to the correction on
the ground that the correction not merely clerical but requires an adversarial proceeding.
The Court of Appeals found in favor of Kho.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Kho‘s request for change in the details of their birth certificate requires an
adversarial proceeding
HELD:
It can not be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change the citizenship of Carlito‘s
mother as it appeared in his birth certificate and delete the “married” status of Carlito‘s parents in
his and his siblings‘ respective birth certificates, as well as change the date of marriage
of Carlito and Marivel involves the correction of not just clerical errors of a harmless and
innocuous nature. Rather, the changes entail substantial and controversial amendments.
For the change involving the nationality of Carlito‘s mother as reflected in his birth certificate is
a grave and important matter that has a bearing and effect on the citizenship and nationality not
only of the parents, but also of the offspring.
Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlito‘s and his siblings‘ parents were “married” alters
their filiation from “legitimate” to “illegitimate,” with significant implications on their
successional and other rights. Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in
an adversaryproceeding.
The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise known as “An Act
Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct A Clerical or
Typographical Error In An Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the
Civil RegisterWithout Need of Judicial Order,” has been considered to lend
legislative affirmation to the judicial precedence that substantial corrections to the civil status of
persons recorded in the civil registry may be effected through the filing of a petition under Rule
108.
When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the
appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial corrections to the entries of the
civil register is satisfied.

Republic vs. Benemerito
FACTS:
On 29 February 1998, respondent Petronio L. Benemerito, filed a verified petition before the
Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija asking for the correction of certain entries in the record of
birth of his son, Joven Lee Benemerito, on file with the Local Civil Registrar of Guimba, Nueva
Ecija. The entries sought to be corrected included -
(a) a change of the father's name from Peter Laurente Benemerito to Petronio L. Benemerito;
and
(b) the date of marriage of Joven Lee’s parents, Edna V. Sicat and Petronio L. Benemerito
appearing therein from 01 September 1989 to 25 January 1998.
Respondent testified that he and Edna V. Sicat were married on 25 January 1998. Prior to their
marriage, they had been living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage and
during the cohabitation, a son, Joven Lee Benemerito, was born to them. According to
respondent, he was surprised to later discover that his name was erroneously recorded in the birth
certificate of his son as Peter Laurente Benemerito instead of his correct name Petronio Laurente
Benemerito, and that the date of his marriage with Edna V. Sicat appearing in the birth certificate
of Joven Lee as 01 September 1989 instead of 25 January 1998.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Benemerito complied with the requirements under the Rules of Court for change
of name?
HELD:
No.
The proceeding there contemplated may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling,
typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is
visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a
mistake in copying or writing,2 or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly
misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. 3 On the other hand, substantial or
contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested
parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed.
The "corrections" sought to be made by respondent in the birth certificate of Joven Lee could
hardly qualify as just clerical errors. In order to effect the desired changes, it would be essential
to establish that Peter Laurente Benemerito, the person named as being the father of Joven Lee,
and Petronio L. Benemerito, herein respondent, refer to the same person. The intended correction
of the date of marriage of the parents of Joven Lee from 01 September 1989, appearing in his
certificate of birth, to 25 January 1998, would, in effect, change the status of the child, Joven
Lee, born on 01 June 1990 at a time when he and his wife were not as yet legally married, from
being the legitimate son of Peter Laurente Benemerito to being instead the legitimated child of
Petronio L. Benemerito and a certain Peter Laurente Benemerito.
Apparently, the proceedings conducted by the trial court in the instant case fell much too short of
the requirements. Nowhere in the records would it appear that all possible indispensable parties
were duly notified of the proceedings.

Lee vs. CA
FACTS:
The private respondents are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful wife, Keh Shiok
Cheng. The petitioners are children of Lee Tek Sheng and his concubine, Tiu Chuan.
Private Respondents—Rita K. Lee, Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng, Rosa K. Lee-Vanderlek, Melody K.
Lee-Chin, Lucia K. Lee Tek Sheng-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Henry K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Victoriano
K. Lee, Natividad K. Lee-Miguel and Thomas K. Lee, filed two (2) separate petitions for the
cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of the petitioners—Marcelo Lee,
Albina Lee-Young, Mariano Lee, Pablo Lee, Helen Lee, Catalino K. Lee, Eusebio Lee, and
Emma Lee.
A case was filed against all petitioners, except Emma Lee, before RTC Manila assigned to
respondent Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion. A similar petition against Emma Lee was filed before
the RTC of Kalookan and assigned to the sala of respondent Judge Jaime T. Hamoy.
Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false and erroneous entries in all pertinent
records of birth of petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein the name of “Keh Shiok
Cheng” as their mother, and by substituting the same with the name “Tiu Chuan”, who is
allegedly the petitioners’ true birth mother.
The private respondents alleged in their petitions that they are the legitimate children of spouses
Lee Tek Sheng and Keh Shiok Cheng who were legally married in China.
Tiu Chuan was introduced by Lee Tek Sheng to his family as their new housemaid but
immediately became his mistress. As a result of their illicit relations, Tiu Chuan gave birth to
petitioners.
Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time Tiu Chuan gave birth to each
of the petitioners, their father, falsified the entries in the records of birth of petitioners by making
it appear that petitioners’ mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.
Since the birth of petitioners, it was Tiu Chuan who took care of the petitioners. They all lived in
the same compound Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents were residing in. All was well,
therefore, before private respondents’ discovery of the dishonesty and fraud perpetrated by their
father, Lee Tek Sheng.
When Keh Shiok Cheng died, Lee Tek Sheng insisted that the names of all his children,
including those of petitioners’, be included in the obituary notice of the former’s death that was
to be published in the newspapers.
The private respondents requested the NBI to conduct an investigation. After investigation, the
NBI prepared a report that the false entries in the records of birth of petitioners made it appear
that the latter were legitimate children of Kek Shiok Cheng.
It was this report that prompted private respondents to file the petitions for cancellation and/or
correction of entries in petitioners’ records of birth with the lower courts.
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitions on the grounds that: (1) resort to Rule 108
is improper where the ultimate objective is to assail the legitimacy and filiation of petitioners; (2)
the petition, which is essentially an action to impugn legitimacy was filed prematurely; and (3)
the action to impugn has already prescribed.
Respondent Judge Veneracion denied the motion to dismiss for failure of the petitioners to
appear at the hearing of the said motion.
On the other hand, respondent Judge Hamoy issued an Order stating that the petitioners have
complied with the jurisdictional requirements for the Court to take cognizance of this case.
Petitioners’ attempts at seeking a reconsideration of the above-mentioned orders failed and they
appealed to the CA. The CA, however, found no merit in their arguments and dismissed their
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not resort to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is proper
HELD:
The proceedings are simply aimed at establishing a particular fact, status and/or right. The thrust
of said proceedings was to establish the factual truth regarding the occurrence of certain events
which created or affected the status of persons and/or otherwise deprived said persons of rights.
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court establishes the status or right of a party, or a particular
fact. The petitions filed by private respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners’
records of birth were intended to establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was
impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in
their birth records.
Contrary to petitioners’ contention that the petitions before the lower courts were actually actions
to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children
of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latter’s children. There is
nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners.
In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth was filed by
private respondents and pursuant to the order of the RTC-Manila, dated February 17, 1993, a
copy of the order setting the case for hearing was ordered published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. In the RTC-
Kalookan, there was an actual publication of the order setting the case for hearing in “Media
Update” once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. In both cases notices of the orders were
ordered served upon the Solicitor General, the Civil Registrars of Manila and Kalookan and upon
the petitioners herein. Both orders set the case for hearing and directed the Civil Registrars and
the other respondents in the case below to file their oppositions to the said petitions. A motion to
dismiss was consequently filed by herein petitioners Marcelo, Mariano, Pablo, Helen, Catalino
and Eusebio, all surnamed Lee, and Albina Lee-Young in the RTC-Manila, and an opposition
was filed by Emma Lee in the RTC-Kalookan.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the petitions filed by the private respondents in the courts
below by way of a special proceeding for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil
registers with the requisite parties, notices and publications could very well be regarded as that
proper suit or appropriate action
Braza vs. Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental
FACTS:
Petitioner Ma. Cristina Braza and Pablo Braza Jr. were married. In 2002, Pablo died in a
vehicular accident. During the wake, respondent Lucille Titular and her son, Patrick Alvin Titutar
showed up and introduced themselves as the wife and son, respectively, of Pablo. Cristina made
inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick’s birth certificate from the Local Civil
Registrar of Negros Occidental which stated that: (1) Pablo is the father of Patrick having
acknowledged by the father on January 13, 1997; and, (2) Patrick was legitimated by virtue of
the subsequent marriage of his parents; hence, his name was changed to Patrick Alvin Titular
Braza. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille
were married in 1998.
Cristina and her co-petitioner (her three legitimate children with Pablo) filed before the RTC of
Negros a petition to correct the entries in the birth certificate record of Patrick in the Local Civil
Registry. They contended that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed
subsequent marriage between Lucille and Pablo because said marriage is bigamous on account of
a valid and subsisting marriage between her (Cristina) and Pablo.
Petitioner prayed for the:
1. Correction of the entries in Patrick’s birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name of
the father and his acknowledgment and the use of the last name “BRAZA”;
2. A directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor
Patrick, to submit Patrick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation;
3. The declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for
this purpose, the declaration of the marriage between Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.
The trial court dismissed the petition holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry,
the court, which is not acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over
an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order
Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, and that the controversy should be ventilated in an
ordinary adversarial action.
ISSUE:
May the court pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy in an action to
correct entries in the civil registrar?
HELD:
No. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule
on legitimacy and filiations.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by
which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated
therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other
innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or
writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a
misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be
allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due
process is properly observed.
The petitioners’ cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage
as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are
governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003,
and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively; hence, the petition should be filed in a Family
Court as expressly provided in said Code. It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of
marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably
filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the
court a quo.
MANALASTAS, MYRON
REPUBLIC vs COSETENG-MAGPAYO
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG-
MAGPAYO (A.K.A. JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG)
G.R. No. 189476, February 2, 2011
Topic:
CHANGE OF NAME CORRECTION OF CLERICAL ERRORS, AND
Facts:
Respondent Julian Edward Emerson was born in Makati City to Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and
Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of live birth shows,
contracted marriage on March 26, 1972. Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally
married, respondent filed before RTC of Quezon City a petition to change his name to Julian
Edward Emerson Marquez-Lim Coseteng. In support of his petition, respondent submitted a
certification from the NSO stating that his mother Anna Dominique does not appear in its
National Indices of Marriage. Respondent also submitted his academic records
from elementary up to college showing that he carried the surname "Coseteng," and the birth
certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as his surname. Respondent ran and was elected
as Quezon City’s Councilor using the name "JULIAN M.L. COSETENG."
The RTC granted the petition and ordered the Civil Registrar to:
1. Delete the entry “date and place of marriage” (of parents) in respondent’s live birth certificate
2. Change entry of “Last name” from Magpayo to Coseteng
3. Delete entry of Coseteng from “Middle name”
4. Delete entry of Fulvio Miranda Magpayo Jr in the entry for "Father".
Republic appealed contending that deletion of the entry on the date and place of marriage of
respondents parents from his birth certificate has the effect of changing his civil status from
legitimate to illegitimate, hence, any change in civil status of a person must be effected through
an appropriate adversary proceeding.
Issues:
1. Whether or not there was a valid ground for changing respondent's name?
2. Whether or not the respondent file the proper remedy?

Held:
1. The petition is impressed with merit. A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103
(CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results
as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when
one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was
unaware ofalien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former
alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. Respondent’s reason for
changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds,
however.
The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines. In Alfon,
the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she had been known
since childhood in order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She
merely sought to use the surname of her mother which she had been using since childhood.
Ruling in her favor, the Court held that she was lawfully entitled to use her mother’s surname,
adding that the avoidance of confusion was justification enough to allow her to do so. In the
present case, however, respondent denies his legitimacy.
2. No. Changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate are substantial
and controversialalterations which can only be allowed after
appropriate adversary proceedings. Since respondents desired change affects his civil status from
legitimate to illegitimate, Rule 108 applies and not Rule 103. Rule 108 clearly directs that a
petition which concerns ones civil status should be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is
sought to be cancelled or corrected, that of Makati in the present case, and all persons who have
or claim any interest which would be affected thereby should be made parties to the proceeding.
As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth
certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned title of the petition
filed by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and
mother were made parties thereto.
Even assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously availed of these two statutory
remedies, respondent cannot be said to have sufficiently complied with Rule 108. For, as
reflected above, aside from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and
all affected parties as respondents in the case.
When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial
and controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or
legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court is mandated.
MANALASTAS, MYRON
CERUILA VS. DELANTAR
GR NO. 140305 DECEMBER 9, 2005
Topic: CHANGE OF NAME CORRECTION OF CLERICAL ERRORS, AND
FACTS:
Spouses Platon and Librada Ceruila filed an action for annulment and cancellation of the birth
certificate of Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar, the child-victim in the rape case involving Romeo
Jalosjos for the reasons that said birth certificate was made an instrument of the crime
of simulation of birth and therefore invalid and spurious, and it falsified all material entries
therein.
On April 11, 1997 the RTC rendered its decision granting the petition. On July 15, 1997 Rosilyn
represented by her legal guardian filed with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment in the
petition for cancellation of entry of her birth certificate claiming that she and her guardian were
not notified of the petition and the subsequent judgment and learned about the same only from
the news on May 16, 1997. On June 10, 1999 the CA granted the petition and declared null and
void the decision of the RTC. The motion for reconsideration filed by spouses Ceruila was
denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or the requirements of Rule 108 were complied with.
HELD:
No. In the case at bar only the Civil Registrar of Manila was served summons, who, however, did
not participate in the proceedings. This alone is clearly not sufficient to comply with the
requirements laid down by the rules. The claim that lack of summons on Rosilyn was cured by
publication of the order setting the case for hearing is not correct. Summons must still be served,
not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction, but to comply with the requirements of
fair play on due process. This is but proper to afford the person concerned the opportunity to
protect her interest if she so chooses. Rosilyn was never made a party at all to the proceedings
seeking the cancellation of her birth certificate. Neither did petitioners make any effort to
summon the Solicitor General.
MANALASTAS, MYRON
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY

G.R. No. 198010 August 12, 2013
Topic: CHANGE OF NAME CORRECTION OF CLERICAL ERRORS, AND
FACTS:
Respondent alleged tha she was born on February 8, 1952 and is the illegitimate daughter of Sy
Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. Her Certificate of Live Birth shows that her full name is "Anita Sy"
when in fact she is allegedly known to her family and friends as "Norma S. Lugsanay." Her
school records, Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Board of Medicine Certificate, and
passport bear the name "Norma S. Lugsanay."
She is an illegitimate child considering that her parents were never married, so she had to follow
the surname of her mother. She is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings bear the
surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos.
The RTC set the case for hearing. The order was published in a newspaper of general circulation
in the City of Gingoog and the Province of Misamis Oriental once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks. The (OSG) and the City Prosecutor’s Office was furnished with the copy of
the petition and court order for their information and guidance.
On June 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order in favor of respondent. OSG assailed the decision for
failure to implead indispensable parties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent’s compliance to publication and notice requirement under S4R108
cured the defect of failure to implead indispensable parties?
RULING:
No. RTC/CA Decisions nullified.
If the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and
innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial
as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in
nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be
remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle
that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding.
In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was impleaded as
respondent in the petition.
The respondent seeks the correction of her first name and surname, her status from "legitimate"
to "illegitimate" and her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino." Thus, respondent should have
impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the
persons who have interest and are affected by the changes or corrections respondent wanted to
make.
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice
thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. A reading
of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets of
notices to different potential oppositors: (1) The persons named in the petition; and (2) other
persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or
affected parties.
Summons must be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to
comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person concerned the
opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.
There may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the affected or
interested parties may be cured:
1. by the publication of the notice of hearing, earnest efforts were made by petitioners in
bringing to court all possible interested parties;
2. where the interested parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings;
3. when there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties;
or
4. When a party is inadvertently left out.
When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial
and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation,
or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 ofthe Rules of
Court is mandated.
ABSENTEES
MARQUEZ, BETTINA ISABEL C.
TITLE: Republic of the Philippines v. Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor, G.R. No. 184621, 10
December 2013
TOPIC: Absentees
FACTS:
Cantor and Jerry were married. Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a violent quarrel
brought about by Cantor’s inability to reach sexual climax whenever she and Jerry would have
intimate moments and Jerry’s expression of animosity toward the respondent’s father. After their
quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that the Cantor ever saw him.
On May 21, 2002, or more than 4 years from the time of Jerry’s disappearance, Cantor filed
before the RTC a petition for her husband’s declaration of presumptive death. She claimed that
she had a well-founded belief that Jerry was already dead. She alleged that she had inquired from
her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her sisters-in-law, as well as her neighbors and friends,
but to no avail. In the hopes of finding Jerry, she also allegedly made it a point to check the
patients’ directory whenever she went to a hospital. All these earnest efforts, Cantor claimed,
proved futile, prompting her to file the petition in court.
The RTC granted the petition and declared Jerry presumptively dead. The CA affirmed the RTC
order and dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by the Republic.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the court’s judgment in the judicial proceedings for Declaration of Presumptive
Death is final and executory, hence, unappelable
(2) Whether certiorari lies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial courts in
petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family
Code
(3) Whether Cantor had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead
RULING:
(1) YES. The Family Code was explicit that the court’s judgment in summary proceedings, such
as the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code,
shall be immediately final and executory.
With the judgment being final, it necessarily follows that it is no longer subject to an appeal, the
dispositions and conclusions therein having become immutable and unalterable not only as
against the parties but even as against the courts. Modification of the court’s ruling, no matter
how erroneous is no longer permissible. The final and executory nature of this summary
proceeding thus prohibits the resort to appeal. As explained in Republic of the Phils. v.
Bermudez-Lorino, the right to appeal is not granted to parties because of the express mandate of
Article 247 of the Family Code1.
(2) YES. A losing party in this proceeding, however, is not entirely left without a remedy. While
no appeal can be made from the trial court’s judgment, an aggrieved party may, nevertheless, file
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question any abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that transpired.
The fact that a decision has become final does not automatically negate the original action of the
CA to issue certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in connection with orders or processes issued
by the trial court. Certiorari may be availed of where a court has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and where the ordinary remedy of appeal is not
available.
(3) NO. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are 4 essential requisites for the declaration
of presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive
years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances
laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.
1 Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
Article 41 requires a “well-founded belief” that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted. Thus, mere absence of the spouse, lack of any
news that such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate or general presumption of absence
under the Civil Code would not suffice. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present
spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and
inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes
that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active
effort (not a mere passive one).
The effort of Cantor, however, fell short of the stringent standard and degree of diligence
required for the following reasons: (1) Cantor did not actively look for her missing husband. Her
hospital visits and her consequent checking of the patients’ directory therein were unintentional.
She did not purposely undertake a diligent search for her husband as her hospital visits were not
planned nor primarily directed to look for him. (2) She did not report Jerry’s absence to the
police nor did she seek the aid of the authorities to look for him. (3) The persons from whom
Cantor allegedly made inquiries were not named. (4) There was no other corroborative evidence
to support Cantor’s claim.
TITLE: Republic of the Philippines v. Gloria Bermudez-Lorino, G.R. No. 160258, 19 January
2005
TOPIC: Absentees
FACTS:
Gloria, together with her 3 children, left her husband Francisco Lorino, Jr. because of his violent
character and his being unable to engage in any gainful work. She was compelled to work abroad
in order to support her children.
From the time of her physical separation from her husband in 1991, Gloria has not heard of him
at all. She had absolutely no communications with him, or with any of his relatives.On August
14, 2000, nine (9) years after she left her husband, Gloria filed a verified petition with the RTC
Rizal under the rules on Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law provided in the
Family Code. RTC granted her petition.
Despite the judgment being immediately final and executory under the provisions of Article 247
of the Family Code, the Office of the Sol Gen, nevertheless filed a Notice of Appeal.
In its decision, the CA, treating the case as an ordinary appealed case under Rule 41 of ROC,
denied the Republic’s appeal and affirmed the appealed RTC decision.
Without filing any MR, Republic directly went to SC via the instant recourse under Rule 45,
maintaining that the petition raises a pure question of law that does not require prior filing of
MR.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA acquired jurisdiction over the appeal on a final and executory judgment of the
RTC
RULING:
NO. An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express

provision of law, is immediately final and executory. Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of
the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are
immediately final and executory, the right to appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein.
The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive death,
should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the said RTC decision.
It was fortunate, though, that the CA denied the Republic’s appeal and affirmed without
modification the final and executory judgment of the lower court.
TITLE: Republic of the Philippines v. Ferventino Tango, G.R. No. 161062, 31 July 2009
TOPIC: Absentees
FACTS:
On March 9, 1987, Ferventino and Maria were got married. After spending a night together,
Maria told Ferventino that she and her family will soon be leaving for the US. Maria assured
Ferventino, however, that she will file a petition so he can live with her in the US. In the event
that said petition is denied, she promised to return to the Philippines to live with him. On March
13, 1987, Maria and her family flew to Seattle, USA.
Ferventino alleges that Maria kept in touch for a year before she stopped responding to his
letters. Out of resentment, he burned all the letters Maria wrote him. He claims to have forgotten
her address since.
Ferventino recounts the efforts he made to find Maria. Upon inquiry from the latter’s uncle in
Las Piñas, Ferventino learned that even Maria’s relatives were unaware of her whereabouts. He
also solicited the assistance of a friend in Texas, Capt. Luis Aris of the US Air Force, but to no
avail. Finally, he sought the aid of his parents, and his aunt in Seattle. Their attempts to find
Maria proved fruitless. The next 14 years went by without any news of Maria.
On the belief that his wife had died, Ferventino filed a verified petition dated October 1, 2001
before the Ligao City RTC for the declaration of presumptive death of Maria within the
contemplation of Article 41 of the Family Code.
When the case was called for initial hearing, nobody entered any opposition. Thereafter, the RTC
declared Maria Villarba presumptively dead.
This prompted the Office of the Sol Gen, for the Republic, to file a Notice of Appeal. Acting
thereon, Presiding Judge Romulo Villanueva of the Ligao City RTC had the records of the case
transmitted to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, treating the case as an ordinary appealed case under Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court, affirmed the RTC’s Order.
ISSUE:
Whether the filing of notice of appeal before the CA is proper
RULING:
NO. By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of
the trial court’s judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of
an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the CA in accordance with the Doctrine of
Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the CA in certain cases, such concurrence does not
sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of
Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court with the SC. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the
exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.
In this case, petitioner committed a serious procedural lapse when it filed a notice of appeal in
the CA instead of a petition for certiorari. The RTC equally erred in giving due course to said
appeal and ordering the transmittal of the records of the case to the appellate court. By no means
did the CA acquire jurisdiction to review the judgment of the RTC which, by express provision
of law, was immediately final and executory.
Adding to the confusion, the CA entertained the appeal and treated the same as an ordinary
appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. As it were, the CA committed grave reversible error
when it failed to dismiss the erroneous appeal of the Republic on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction because, by express provision of the law, the judgment was not appealable.
Before the SC, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. But, even if petitioner used the correct mode of appeal at this level, the hands of the Court
are tied. Without a doubt, the decision of the trial court had long become final.
TITLE: Republic v. Narceda, G.R. No. 182760, April 10, 2013

TOPIC: Absentees
FACTS:
Robert Narceda married Marina on 22 July 1987.
Marina went to Singapore sometime in 1994 and never returned since. There was never any
communication between them. He tried to look for her, but he could not find her. Several years
after she left, one of their town mates in Luna, La Union came home from Singapore and told
him that the last time she saw his wife, the latter was already living with a Singaporean husband.
In view of her absence and his desire to remarry, Narceda filed with the RTC Petition for a
judicial declaration of the presumptive death and/or absence of Marina. RTC granted the petition.
The petitioner appealed to the CA. According to petitioner, Narceda failed to conduct a search
for his missing wife with the diligence required by law and enough to give rise to a “well-
founded” belief that she was dead. The CA dismissed the appeal on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, ruling that the judgment of the trial court in summary court proceedings shall be
immediately final and executory.
The petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court before the Supreme
Court. The petitioner insists that the CA had jurisdiction to entertain the Petition, because
respondent had failed to establish a well-founded belief that his absentee spouse was dead. In
support of its stance, it cited Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino:
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no

reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because
judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code
are immediately final and executory. It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the
RTC to give due course to the Republic’s appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy?

RULING:
YES. The remedy of a losing party in a summary proceeding is not an ordinary appeal, but a
petition for certiorari. By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary
proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no
appeal can be had of the trial court’s judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without
saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals
in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts.
When the OSG filed its notice of appeal under Rule 42, it availed itself of the wrong remedy. As
a result, the running of the period for filing of a Petition for Certiorari continued to run and was
not tolled. Upon lapse of that period, the Decision of the RTC could no longer be questioned.
OROPESA, HAZEL MARIE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

Vs
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ( TENTH DIVISION ) and ALAN B. ALEGRO,
Respondents
GR. Nos. 159614 December 9, 2005 Justice Callejo, Sr.
Facts:
On March 29, 2001, Alan filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Catbalogan, Samar for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Lea.
At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on January 20, 1995
in Catbalogan, Samar. That on February 6, 1995, he berated Lea for arriving home late in the
evening and told her that if she enjoyed the life of a single person, it would be better for her to go
back to her parents. Lea, the following day was nowhere to be found.
Alan testified that he went to the house of Lea’s parents on February 14, 1995 to see if
she was there, he was told by his father-in-law that, yes, Lea had been to there but then left
without notice. He also inquired from his friends and from Lea’s friends but to no avail. Alan
sought the help of Barangay Captain Juan Magat who promised to help him locate his wife.
Sometime in August 1995, Alan testified that he left for Manila to look for Lea and ask
Lea’s friend Janeth Bautista of her wife’s whereabouts but Janeth had not seen Lea. As Alan
decide to work as part-time taxi driver, on his free time he would look for Lea in the malls but
still to no avail. Alan returned to Catbalogan in 1997 and again looked for his wife but failed.
Failing to locate his wife, Alan thus filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive
death of Lea on March 29, 2001.
On May 28, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition, which was, however, denied by the court
for failure to comply with Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station. Alan
also reported Lea’s disappearance to the National Bureau of Investigation.
Barangay Captain, Juan Magat corroborated the testimony of Alan. He had not seen Lea
in the barangay ever seen Alan sought his help in trying to locate Lea. Lea’s father, who was the
owner of Radio DYMS, told Alan that he did not know where Lea was.
Alan rested his case. On January 8, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting the
petition declaring Lea presumptively dead.
The OSG appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals (CA) which rendered
judgment affirming the decision of the RTC.
The OSG filed a petition for review on certiorari of the CA’s decision alleging that
respondent Alan failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that Lea was already dead. The
OSG pointed out that Alan only reported his wife’s disappearance to the local police and to the
NBI only after the OSG filed a motion to dismiss the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Alan acted on a well-founded belief of death of Lea
Decision:
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent
spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-
founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great
many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the
nature and extent of the inquiries made by the present spouse.
Although testimonial evidence may suffice to prove the well-founded belief of the
present spouse that the absent is already dead, in Republic v Nolasco, the Court warned against
collusion between the parties when they find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through
existing legal means. It is also the maxim that “men readily believe what they wish to be true.”
In this case, Alan failed to present a witness other that the barangay captain. Alan even
failed to present Janeth Bautista or any other person from whom he allegedly made inquiries
about Lea to corroborate his testimony. What is so worrisome is that, Alan failed to make
inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Lea’s whereabouts before filing his petition in the
RTC. It could have enhanced the credibility of Alan had he made inquiries from his parents-in-
law about Lea’s whereabouts considering that lea’s father was the owner of Radio DYMS.
Alan did report and seek the help of the local police and the NBI to locate Lea, but it was
only an afterthought. He did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss the petition in the
RTC.
The Court finds and so holds that Alan failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief,
before he filed his petition in the RTC, that Lea was already dead.
APPEALS IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
Vs
FERDINAND R. MARCOS II and IMELDA R. MARCOS, Respondents
GR. Nos. 130371 & 130855 August 4, 2009 Justice Del Castillo
Facts:
On January 11, 1996, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, acting as a probate
court, in Special Proceeding No. 10279 issued an Order granting letters testamentary in solidum
to respondents as executors of the last will and testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos.
On January 15, 1996, the petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration which was
denied by the RTC. RTC held that under the Rules, a decedent’s testamentary privilege must be
accorded utmost respect. The RTC also held that its assailed January 11, 1996 Order was arrived
at only after extensive consideration of every legal facet available on the question of validity of
the will.
On June 6, 1996, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Review on
Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, questioning the RTC Order granting letters
testamentary to respondents.
On February 5, 1997 the First Division of the Supreme Court issued a Resolution
referring the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) for consideration and adjudication on the
merits or any other action as the CA may deem appropriate, the CA having jurisdiction
concurrent with the Supreme Court over the case, and the Supreme Court having been cited to no
special and important reason for it to take cognizance of said case in the first instance.
On March 13, 1997, the CA issued a Decision, dismissing the referred petition for having
taken the wrong mode of appeal. It invoked Supreme Court Circular 2-90 which expressly
provides that:
4. Erroneous Appeals – An appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the
Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the CA in a
Resolution dated August 27, 1997.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA gravely erred in dismissing the Petition on technical ground
despite the Supreme Court Resolution specifically referring said Petition for a decision on the
merits
Decision:
Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90, which was then in effect reads:
2. Appeals from Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court. – Except in criminal cases
where the penalty imposed is life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua, judgments of regional trial
courts may be appealed to the Supreme court only by petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948 as amended, this being the clear intendment of the provision of the interim Rules that
appeals to the Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed by
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The pertinent portions of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 read:
The Supreme court shall further have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on certiorari as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and
decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in –
1. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance or executive order or regulation is in question;
2. All case involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toll , or
any penalty impose in relation thereto;
3. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue
4. All other cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved:
Provided, however, that if in addition to constitutional, tax or jurisdictional
questions, the cases mentioned in the three next preceding paragraphs also
involve questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, the aggrieved
party shall appeal to the Court of Appeals, and the final judgment or decision
of the latter may by reviewed, revised, reversed, modified or affirmed by the
Supreme Court on writ of certiorari; and
5. Final awards, judgments , decision or orders of the Commission on
Elections, Court of Tax Appeals, Court of Industrial Relations, the Public
Service Commission, and the Workmen’s Compensation Commission
A reading of Supreme Court Circular 2-90, in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act
of 1948, clearly shows that the subject matter of therein petition, that is, the propriety of granting
letters testamentary to respondents, do not fall within any ground which can be the subject of a
direct appeal to this Court. The CA was thus correct in declaring that the issue raised by
petitioner do not fall within the purview of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 such that the
Supreme Court should take cognizance of the instant case.
Moreover, the Court’s pronouncement in Suarez v Judge Villarama is instructive:
Section 4 of Circular No. 2-90, in effect at the time of the antecedents, provides that an
appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the CA by the wrong mode or inappropriate mode
shall be dismissed.
Moreover, the filing of the case directly with this Court runs afoul of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme
Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lower
tribunals. This Court is a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform
the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition.
Thus, no error can be attributed to the CA when the action it deemed appropriate was to
dismiss the petition for having availed of an improper remedy.
THELMA M. ARANAS, Petitioner
Vs
TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO, CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND,
RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M. ANDERSON, and FRANKLIN L. MERCADO,
Respondents
GR. Nos. 156407 January 15, 2014 Justice Bersamin
Facts:
Emigdio S. Mercado died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his second wife,
Teresita and their five children namely: Allan, Felimon, Carmencita, Richard and Maria Teresita;
and his two children by his first marriage, namely Franklin and petitioner Thelma.
On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition
for the appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio’s estate. The RTC granted the
petition and letters of administration in favor of Teresita were issued on September 7, 1992.
As an administratrix, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio. Thelma

moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory claiming that Emigdio had owned
other properties that were excluded from the inventory.
RTC granted Thelma’s motion through an order. Teresita filed a compliance with the
order and filed an amended inventory requesting for the approval of the same.
On April 19, 1993, Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of
court to examine Teresita on the inventory.
With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court on the issue
of what properties should be included in or excluded from the inventory, the RTC set dates for
the hearing on that issue.
After series of hearing that ran for almost eight years, the RTC issued on March 14, 2001
an order finding and holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties
that should be included and hereby orders the said administratrix to re-do the inventory of
properties which are supposed to constitute as the estate of the late Emigdio Mercado.
Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio timely sought the reconsideration of the order,
but on May 18, 2001, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration stating that there was no
cogent reason for the reconsideration and that the movants’ agreement as heirs to submit to the
RTC the issue of what properties should be included or excluded from the inventory already
estopped them from questioning its jurisdiction to pass upon the issue.
Alleging that the RTC thereby acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to approve
the inventory and ordering her as administratrix to include the other real properties which held
by the RTC are excluded by her, Teresita et al assailed the adverse orders of the RTC
promulgated on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by petition for certiorari.
Thelma contends that the resort to the special civil action for certiorari to assail the orders
of the RTC by Teresita and her co-respondents was not proper.
The Court of Appeals (CA) opined that Teresita, et al. had properly filed the petition for
certiorari because the order of the RTC directing a new inventory of properties was interlocutory.
Issue:
Whether or not certiorari was the proper recourse to assail the questioned orders of the
RTC?
Decision:
Thelma’s contention cannot be sustained.
The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended on whether
the assailed orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature. In Pahila –Garrido v Tortogo,
the Court distinguished between final and interlocutory orders as follows:
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first
disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action,
leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined,
but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided
upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to
be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is
interlocutory or final is: does the order of judgment leave something to be done in the trial court
with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory, otherwise,
it is final.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate

special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed
to be resorted to.
The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s motion for the approval of the
inventory and the order date May 18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration were
interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the properties in the inventory was not yet a final
determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and the concomitant
determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were
provisional and subject to revision at any time during the course of the administration
proceedings.
On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct recourse for Teresita, et al. to take
against the assailed orders. The final judgment rule embodied in the first paragraph of Section 1,
Rule 41, Rules of Court, which also governs appeals in special proceedings, stipulated that only
the judgments, final orders of a court of law that completely disposes of the case, or of a
particular matter therein when declared by these rules to be appealable may be the subject of an
appeal in due course. The same rule states that an interlocutory order or resolution is expressly
made non –appealable.
PAGALILAUAN, GEROME
Spouses Lebin vs. Mirasol

Facts:
In Special Proceedings involving the settlement of the estate of the late L.J. Hodges, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Iloilo City, issued an order dated May 3, 1995 (ruling that a
property of the estate sold to the petitioners be divided in two equal portions between the
petitioners and the respondent). On March 2, 1998, the RTC affirmed the order dated May 3,
1995. The petitioners filed a notice of appeal and, later on, a record on appeal, but the
respondents moved to dismiss their appeal on June 15, 2000 on the ground of tardiness of the
record on appeal. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss on February 1, 2002. On March 13,
2002, the petitioners moved for reconsideration of the dismissal, but the RTC denied the motion
for reconsideration on May 21, 2004. Thus, on June 23, 2004, the petitioners directly appealed to
the Court, assailing the orders of February 1, 2002 and May 21, 2004.
Issue: Whether the petitioners filed their appeal within the reglementary period.
Held:
No. Under the law Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a
record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on
appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed.
The petitioners received the assailed May 3, 1995 order of the RTC on May 15, 1995.
They filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial on May 24, 1995. On March 23, 1998,
they were served with the order dated March 2, 1998 (denying their motion for reconsideration
and/or new trial). Although they filed a notice of appeal on March 27, 1998, they submitted the
record on appeal only on May 5, 1998. Undoubtedly, they filed the record on appeal 43 days
from March 23, 1998, the date they received the denial of their motion for reconsideration and/or
new trial. They should have filed the record on appeal within 30 days from their notice of the
judgment. Their appeal was not perfected, therefore, because their filing of the record on appeal
happened beyond the end of their period for the perfection of their appeal.
The petitioners filing of the motion for reconsideration vis--vis the order of May 3, 1995
interrupted the running of the period of 30 days; hence, their period to appeal started to run from
May 15, 1995, the date they received the order of May 3, 1995. They filed their motion for
reconsideration on May 24, 1995. By then, nine days out of their 30-day period to appeal already
elapsed. They received a copy of the order dated March 2, 1998 on March 23, 1998. Thus, the
period to appeal resumed from March 23, 1998 and ended 21 days later, or on April 13, 1998.
Yet, they filed their record on appeal only on May 5, 1998, or 22 days beyond the end of their
reglementary period.
Therefore, the failure of the petitioners and their counsel to file their record on appeal on
time rendered the orders of the RTC final and unappealable. Thereby, the appellate court lost the
jurisdiction to review the challenged orders, and the petitioners were precluded from assailing
the orders.
PAGALILAUAN, GEROME
Briones vs. Henson Cruz
Facts:
Ruby filed a petition for the allowance of the will of Luz however, Lilia opposed it. The
trial court designated Atty. Briones as Special Administrator of the estate. The heirs of Luz filed
a Notice of Appeal assailing the order as to the payment of Briones’ commission. They
subsequently filed their record on appeal. The trial court denied the appeal and disapproved the
record on appeal on the ground of forum shopping. The heirs filed with CA a Petition for
certiorari. CA reversed the decision of the trial court for the latter had no power or authority to
deny the appeal on the ground of forum shopping. CA also refused to resolve the issue of forum
shopping
ISSUE: Whether multi- appeals are allowed in the same case.
RULING:
YES.
The rationale behind allowing more than one appeal in the same case is to enable the rest
of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and
held to be final. In this multi-appeal mode, the probate court loses jurisdiction only over the
subject matter of the appeal but retains jurisdiction over the special proceeding from which the
appeal was taken for purposes of further remedies the parties may avail of. Where multi-appeals
are allowed, we see no reason why a separate petition for certiorari cannot be allowed on an
interlocutory aspect of the case that is separate and distinct as an issue from the aspect of the case
that has been adjudged with finality by the lower court. To reiterate, the matter appealed matter
was the special administrator's commission, a charge that is effectively a claim against the estate
under administration, while the matter covered by the petition for certiorari was the appointment
of an auditor who would pass upon the special administrator's final account. By their respective
natures, these matters can exist independently of one another and can proceed separately as
envisioned by the Rules under Rule 109
PAGALILAUAN, GEROME
Republic vs. Nishida
Facts:
Nisaid Sumera Nishina (respondent), represented by her mother Zenaida Sumera
Watanabe (Zenaida), filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan a verified
petition for cancellation of birth record and change of surname in the civil registry of Malolos,
Bulacan.
The RTC granted the petition and directed the Local Civil Registry of Malolos to cancel
the second birth record of Nisaida Sumera Hakamada issued in 1993 and to change particularly
the surname of [respondent] from NISAIDA SUMERA NISHINA to NISAIDA
SUMERA WATANABE.
The OSG filed a notice of appeal.
Before the Court of Appeals, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, alleging
that petitioner adopted a wrong mode of appeal since it did not file a record on appeal as required
under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 41 (appeal from the RTCs) of the Rules of Court.
Opposing the motion, petitioner countered that a record on appeal is required only in
proceedings where multiple appeals may arise, a situation not obtaining in the present case.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondent.
Issue: Whether the Republic perfected its appeal in accordance with the law.
Held:
Yes.
Under Section 1 of Rule 109 of the Rules of Court a record on appeal in addition to the
notice of appeal is thus required to be filed as the original records of the case should remain with
the trial court to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct
issue is resolved by said court and held to be final.
In the present case, the filing of a record on appeal was not necessary since no other
matter remained to be heard and determined by the trial court after it issued the appealed
order granting respondents petition for cancellation of birth record and change of surname in the
civil registry.
Maica A. Prudente
Sps. Elibe and Erlinda Lebin vs. Vilma Mirasol,

G.R. No. 164255, 7 September 2011, (Bersamin, J.)
TOPIC: Appeal in Special Proceedings
FACTS:
Sps. Lebin relayed their offer to the administrator of the Estate of L.J. Hodges to
purchase for Lot 18, an asset of the Estate situated on D.B. Ledesma Interior, Jaro, Iloilo City.
The administrator sought judicial approval of the offer, stating that petitioner Erlinda Lebin
(Lebin) was the actual occupant of Lot 18. RTC granted the administrators motion for approval
of the offer. Meanwhile, respondent Mirasol (Mirasol) also offered to purchase the lot. The lot
was initially identified as Lot 4 but later the survey revealed that her house was actually standing
on Lot 18. Learning of the approval of Lebin’s offer, Mirasol filed a petition for relief from the
order. Pending resolution of the petition for relief, Lebin paid the last installment for Lot 18 and
moved for execution of the deed of sale. The motion was not acted upon by the RTC. RTC ruled
to execute the corresponding deed of sale over the subjected lot in favor of both offeror-
claimants Lebin and Mirasol. On May 23, 1995, Lebin moved for reconsideration and/or new
trial. RTC denied motion. On May 27, 1998, Lebin filed a notice of appeal in the RTC, alleging
that on May 5, 1998, they also filed a record on appeal. On January 25, 1999, they presented an
ex parte motion to approve the record on appeal. On June 15, 2000, Mirasol filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal, insisting that the record on appeal had been filed late. RTC granted motion to
dismiss the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC erred in dismissing Lebin’s appeal for their failure to timely file a
record on appeal
RULING:
NO. Among the innovations introduced by BP Blg. 129 is the elimination of the record
on appeal, retaining the record on appeal only for appeals in special proceedings and in other
cases in which the Rules of Court allows multiple appeals. A judgment or final order in special
proceedings is appealed by record on appeal. An appeal by notice of appeal is a mode that
envisions the elevation of the original records to the appellate court as to thereby obstruct the
trial court in its further proceedings regarding the other parts of the case. In contrast, the record
on appeal enables the trial court to continue with the rest of the case because the original records
remain with the trial court even as it affords to the appellate court the full opportunity to review
and decide the appealed matter.
The petitioners received the assailed May 3, 1995 order of the RTC on May 15, 1995.
They filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial on May 24, 1995. On March 23, 1998,
they were served with the order dated March 2, 1998 (denying their motion for reconsideration
and/or new trial). Although they filed a notice of appeal on March 27, 1998, they submitted the
record on appeal only on May 5, 1998. Undoubtedly, they filed the record on appeal 43 days
from March 23, 1998, the date they received the denial of their motion for reconsideration and/or
new trial. They should have filed the record on appeal within 30 days from their notice of the
judgment. Their appeal was not perfected, therefore, because their filing of the record on appeal
happened beyond the end of their period for the perfection of their appeal.
The petitioners filing of the motion for reconsideration vis--vis the order of May 3, 1995
interrupted the running of the period of 30 days; hence, their period to appeal started to run from
May 15, 1995, the date they received the order of May 3, 1995. They filed their motion for
reconsideration on May 24, 1995. By then, nine days out of their 30-day period to appeal already
elapsed. They received a copy of the order dated March 2, 1998 on March 23, 1998. Thus, the
period to appeal resumed from March 23, 1998 and ended 21 days later, or on April 13, 1998.
Yet, they filed their record on appeal only on May 5, 1998, or 22 days beyond the end of their
reglementary period. Although, by that time, the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure had meanwhile
taken effect (July 1, 1997), their period of appeal remained 30 days. Section 13, Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court empowers the RTC as the trial court, motu proprio or on motion, to dismiss
the appeal for having been taken out of time or for non-payment of the docket and other lawful
fees within the reglementary period. For that reason, the RTC rightly granted Mirasols motion to
dismiss the record on appeal.
Maica A. Prudente
Quasha Ancheta Peña and Nolasco Law Office for its own behalf and representing the heirs
of Raymond Triviere v. LCN Construction Corp.
G.R. No. 174873, 26 August 2008, (Chico-Nazario, J.)
TOPIC: Appeal in Special Proceedings
FACTS:
Raymond Triviere passed away. Proceedings for the settlement of his intestate estate were
instituted by his widow, Amy Consuelo Triviere before the RTC Makati. Atty. Syquia and Atty.
Quasha of the Quasha Law Office, representing the widow and children of the deceased,
respectively were appointed administrators of the estate of the deceased. As administrators, Atty.
Syquia and Atty. Quasha incurred expenses for the payment of real estate taxes, security services
and the preservation and administration of the estate, as well as litigation expenses. They filed
before the RTC a Motion for Payment of their litigation expenses. Citing their failure to submit
an accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate under administration, RTC denied the
motion.
LCN, the only remaining claimant against the Intestate Estate of the deceased filed its
Comment on/Opposition to the Motion. LCN countered that the RTC had already resolved the
issue of payment of litigation expenses when it denied the first Motion for Payment filed by Atty.
Syquia and Atty. Quasha for failure of the administrators to submit an accounting of the assets
and expenses of the estate as required by the court. RTC declared that there was no more need
for accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate considering that there has no more assets
except the money deposit with Union Bank. Furthermore, RTC granted the second Motion for
Payment. LCN filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by RTC. LCN sought recourse
of CA. CA ruled in favor LCN which held that Atty. Syquia and Quasha Law Office’s
administrator’s feed and litigation expenses could not be claimed from the funds of the estate.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CA erred in ruling that the award in favor of the heirs of the
deceased is already a distribution of the residue of the estate; and
2. Whether or not CA erred in nullifying the award of attorney’s feed in favor of the
co-administrators.
RULING:
1. NO.
Although it is within the discretion of the RTC whether or not to permit the advance
distribution of the estate, its exercise of such discretion should be qualified by the following: [1]
only part of the estate that is not affected by any pending controversy or appeal may be the
subject of advance distribution (Section 2, Rule 109); and [2] the distributees must post a bond,
fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of outstanding obligations of the estate (second
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 90). There is no showing that the RTC, in awarding to the petitioner
children and widow their shares in the estate prior to the settlement of all its obligations,
complied with these two requirements or, at the very least, took the same into consideration. Its
Order of 12 June 2003 is completely silent on these matters. It justified its grant of the award in a
single sentence which stated that petitioner children and widow had not yet received their
respective shares from the estate after all these years. Taking into account that the claim of LCN
against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere allegedly amounted to P6,016,570.65, already in
excess of the P4,738,558.63 reported total value of the estate, the RTC should have been more
prudent in approving the advance distribution of the same.
2. YES.
The Court notes with disfavor the sudden change in the theory by petitioner Quasha Law
Office. Consistent with discussions in the preceding paragraphs, Quasha Law Office initially
asserted itself as co-administrator of the estate before the courts. The records do not belie this
fact. Petitioner Quasha Law Office later on denied it was substituted in the place of Atty. Quasha
as administrator of the estate only upon filing a Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of
Appeals, and then again before this Court. As a general rule, a party cannot change his theory of
the case or his cause of action on appeal. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below,
he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not
only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play,
justice and due process. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention
of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as
these cannot be raised for the first time at such late
stage.http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/aug2008/gr_174873_2008.html - fnt28
This rule, however, admits of certain exceptions. In the interest of justice and within the
sound discretion of the appellate court, a party may change his legal theory on appeal, only when
the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse
party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory.
On the foregoing considerations, this Court finds it necessary to exercise leniency on the
rule against changing of theory on appeal, consistent with the rules of fair play and in the interest
of justice. Petitioner Quasha Law Office presented conflicting arguments with respect to whether
or not it was co-administrator of the estate. Nothing in the records, however, reveals that any one
of the lawyers of Quasha Law Office was indeed a substitute administrator for Atty. Quasha upon
his death.
The records of the case are wanting in evidence that Quasha Law Office or any of its
lawyers substituted Atty. Quasha as co-administrator of the estate. None of the documents
attached pertain to the issuance of letters of administration to petitioner Quasha Law Office or
any of its lawyers at any time after the demise of Atty. Quasha in 1996. This Court is thus
inclined to give credence to petitioner's contention that while it rendered legal services for the
settlement of the estate of Raymond Triviere since the time of Atty. Quasha's death in 1996, it did
not serve as co-administrator thereof, granting that it was never even issued letters of
administration.
The attorney's fees, therefore, cannot be covered by the prohibition in the third paragraph
of Section 7, Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court against an attorney, to charge against
the estate professional fees for legal services rendered by them.
However, while petitioner Quasha Law Office, serving as counsel of the Triviere children from
the time of death of Atty. Quasha in 1996, is entitled to attorney's fees and litigation expenses of
P100,000.00 as prayed for in the Motion for Payment dated 3 September 2002, and as awarded
by the RTC in its 12 June 2003 Order, the same may be collected from the shares of the Triviere
children, upon final distribution of the estate, in consideration of the fact that the Quasha Law
Office, indeed, served as counsel (not anymore as co-administrator), representing and performing
legal services for the Triviere children in the settlement of the estate of their deceased father.
RULE ON LEGAL SEPARATION
Maica A. Prudente
Brigido B. Quiao v. Rita C. Quiao, Kitchie C. Quiao, Lotis C. uiao, Petchie C. Quiao,
represented by their mother Rita Quiao,
G.R. No. 176556, 4 July 2012, (Reyes, J.)
TOPIC: Rule on Legal Separation
FACTS:
Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B.
Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the
custody of their three (3) minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be
divided equally between the spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the
payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities. Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by
the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children because Brigido is the
offending spouse. Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the
period of 270 days later or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision.
Brigido filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define “Net
Profits Earned.” RTC held that the phrase “Net Profit Earned” denotes “the remainder of the
properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each of the spouse and the
debts.” It further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited
in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any
share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family
Code. Brigido claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family
Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no
other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a
result of legal separation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on dissolution

of conjugal partnership of gains is applicable in this case;
2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights over½of the properties in the
conjugal partnership; and
3. Is the computation of “net profits” earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the
same with the computation of “net profits” earned in the absolute community?
RULING:
1. Art. 129 will govern.
First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the current Family
Code, the default rule is that in the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void,
the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code,
shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses’ marriage the operative law is
already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Art. 129 of the
Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
2. NO.
Brigido is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by
the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, he acquired vested rights over
half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil
Code, which provides: “All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by
the husband and wife.” While one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the
same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, Brigido was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-
aware that the Rita prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her.
In fact, in his Answer, the Brigido prayed that the trial court divide the community assets
between the spouses as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory
of all the community properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for legal separation
was promulgated, Brigido never questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial court
termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, he cannot claim
being deprived of his right to due process.
3. NO.
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife
become joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings
into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article
92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple’s properties. And when the
couple’s marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses,
or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of
the value each one may have originally owned.
In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established
that the spouses have no separate properties, what will be divided equally between them is
simply the “net profits.” And since the legal separation½share decision of Brigido states that
the in the net profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido will still be left with nothing. On
the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under
Article142 of the Civil Code, “the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their
separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the
dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.” From the foregoing provision, each of
the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or
merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete
separation of capitals.
In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have
no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are
considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed
properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However,
since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the
conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the
Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be
returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate
property which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.
RAMO, KEIF KHARI
G.R. No. 116607, April 10, 1996

EMILIO R. TUASON vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA VICTORIA L. TUASON
FACTS:
In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the Regional Trial Court
(Makati) a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner Emilio R.
Tuason. She alleged that at the time of the marriage, petitioner was already psychologically
incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations which became manifest afterward
and resulted in violent fights between them. In one of their fights, petitioner inflicted physical
injuries on private respondent which impelled her to file a criminal case for physical injuries
against him; that petitioner also used prohibited drugs, was apprehended by the authorities and
sentenced to a one-year suspended penalty and has not been rehabilitated; and that petitioner was
a womanizer. In 1984, he left the conjugal home and cohabited with three women in succession,
without giving any support to the family. Petitioner likewise became a spendthrift and abused his
administration of the conjugal partnership by alienating some of their assets and incurring large
obligations with banks, credit card companies and other financial institutions, without private
respondent's consent; attempts at reconciliation were made but they all failed because of
petitioner's refusal to reform. In addition to her prayer for annulment of marriage, private
respondent prayed for powers of administration to save the conjugal properties from further
dissipation.
Petitioner denied the imputations against him, claiming that they were a normal married couple
during the first 10 years of the marriage, and that the relationship turned sour when his wife did
not accord the respect and dignity due him as a husband but treated him like a persona non
grata; and that because of the extreme animosities between them, he had to leave the conjugal
home. Also, private respondent had been taking prohibited drugs and had an affair with another
man. Petitioner opposed respondent's petition for appointment as administratrix of the conjugal
partnership of gains.
The trial court rendered a decision declaring the nullity of private respondent's marriage to
petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the defendant and awarding
custody of the children to private respondent. No appeal was taken from the decision. Thereafter,
petitioner filed with the trial court a petition for relief from judgment of the June 29, 1990
decision, which was denied by the same court. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether a petition for relief from judgment is warranted in this case.
RULING:
No.
Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that, a final and executory judgment
or order of the Regional Trial Court may be set aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence. In addition, the petitioner must assert facts showing that he has a good,
substantial and meritorious defense or cause of action. If the petition is granted, the court shall
proceed to hear and determine the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted
therein.
In this case, the decision annulling petitioner's marriage to private respondent had already
become final and executory when petitioner failed to appeal during the reglementary period.
Petitioner justifies that his failure to appear for 2 successive hearings, which allowed the court to
render judgement on the basis of the evidence presented, was due to his confinement for
treatment of drug dependency at the Drug Rehabilitation Center at Camp Bagong Diwa. Even if
true, the court found that petitioner’s counsel was not able to inform him of the trial court’s
decision, which coulf have been his chance to appeal. Such an act is considered negligence
which is not excusable.
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in exception cases
where there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available
to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial
or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he
cannot avail himself of this petition. Relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance
from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own
negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had
been lost thru inexcusable negligence.
Petitioner contends that when he failed to appear at the hearings, the trial court should have
ordered the prosecuting officer to intervene for the state and inquire as to the reason for his non-
appearance, in accordance with Art 48 and 60 of the Family Code. A grant of annulment of
marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases
for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the purpose of preventing any collusion
between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the
defendant spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but
instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the
parties.
The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60 of the
Family Code. In this case, it was shown that petitioner was not declared in default by the trial
court for failure to answer. Petitioner filed his answer to the complaint and had actively
participated in the proceedings below.
The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.

RAMO, KEIF KHARI
SAMSON T. SABALONES vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and REMEDIOS GAVIOLA-
SABALONES
G.R. No. 106169 February 14, 1994
FACTS:
As a member of the diplomatic service assigned to different countries during his successive tours
of duties, petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones
(respondent), the administration of some of their conjugal, properties for fifteen years.
When he retired as an ambassador, he came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and
children. Later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot located in
San Juan, Manila, belonging to the conjugal partnership. He claimed that the proceeds of the sale
will be used to defray the cost of his hospitalization and medical treatment.
His wife Remedios opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation,
claiming that the said house was being occupied by her and their six children, and that they
depend on the rental income generated by one of the conjugal properties, a building and house
and lot in Forbes, being leased out to one Nobumichi Izumi. She also informed the Court that
since his retirement, he had been living in his house in Quezon City, with Thelma Cumareng and
their three children. In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree of legal separation and
order the liquidation of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband's share therein
because of his adultery.
The trial court, upon finding the petitioner contracted a bigamous marriage with Thelma
Cumareng, decreed the legal separation of the spouses and the forfeiture of his share in the
conjugal properties, declaring that he was not entitled to support from his respondent wife.
The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals. Pendente lite, it issued a preliminary
injunction against petitioner, in view of petitioner’s attempt to interfere with his wife’s
administration of the Forbes property, by harassing the tenant (Izumi) thereof by informing him
that his lease would not be renewed.
ISSUE/S:
1. Was there an invalid designation of the wife as the administrator of the conjugal
properties, taking into account Art. 61 of the Family Code, which provides that, in case of
legal separation, the court shall appoint either of the spouses or a third person to
administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership property?
2. Can an injunctive relief be issued against one of the spouses, considering that Art
24 of the Family Code provides for the joint administration of the conjugal properties by
the spouses.
RULING:
1. No.
Pending the appointment of an administrator over the whole mass of conjugal assets, the
CA was justified in allowing the wife to continue with her administration. It was also
correct in enjoining the petitioner from interfering with his wife's administration pending
resolution of the appeal.
The Court agrees that joint administration over the conjugal properties is granted to both
spouses and that in cases of legal separation, the court shall appoint either one of the
spouses or a third person to act as the administrator.
In this case, while it is true that no formal designation of the administrator was made,
such designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court when it denied petitioner
any share in the conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying him as administrator
thereof). That designation was in effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued
in favor of the respondent wife the preliminary injunction.
2. Yes.
The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status
quo of the things subject of the action or the relations between the parties and thus protect
the rights of the plaintiff respecting these matters during the pendency of the suit.
Otherwise, the defendant may, before final judgment, do or continue doing the act which
the plaintiff asks the court to restrain and thus make ineffectual the final judgment that
may be rendered afterwards in favor of the plaintiff.
In this case, the Court observed that in her motion for the issuance of the injunction,
Remedios Sabalones alleged that petitioner’s harassment of the tenant in the property in
Forbes, would jeopardize the lease agreement and deprive her and their children of the
income therefrom on which they depend for their subsistence. Add to that was
petitioner’s execution of a quitlclaim over their property in California, in favor of his
common-law wife.
To the Court, these allegations show that the injunction is necessary to protect the
interests of the private respondent and her children and prevent the dissipation of the
conjugal assets. There is reason to believe that entrusting said estate to the petitioner may
result in its improvident disposition to the detriment of his wife and children. Thus, while
the trial court had declared the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal
properties, it would be prudent not to allow him in the meantime to participate in its
management.
It should be noted that the injunction has not permanently installed the respondent wife as
the administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to
continue administering the properties in the meantime without interference from the
petitioner, pending the express designation of the administrator in accordance with
Article 61 of the Family Code.
RAMO, KEIF KHARI
LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIO C.
HERNANDEZ
G.R. 126010, December 8, 1999
FACTS:
Lucita Hernandez (petitioner) and Mario Hernandez (private respondent) met in 1977 at the
Philippine Christian University in Dasmariñas, Cavite. Petitioner, who is five years older than
private respondent, was then in her first year of teaching zoology and botany. Private respondent,
a college freshman, was her student for two consecutive semesters. They became sweethearts
when she was no longer private respondent's teacher. Eventually they got married. The family
income came from petitioner's salary as a faculty member of the Philippine Christian University.
It was agreed that private respondent would help her in her business, but he was not able to do so
because he was a spendthrift and had vices. Add to that the fact that he cannot find a stable job to
help support the family and got involved with other women. After being confronted by her wife
on his alleged extra marital affairs and having admitted committing the same, Mario left the
conjugal home. He returned and was accepted by her wife, in the hope of saving the marriage.
Subsequently, respondent was able to find a job, but did not stay that long because he availed of
the company’s early retirement. The retirement pay, according to petitioner, was spent all to
himself within 4 months from his retirement.
In 1992, Lucita sought for the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of
psychological incapacity of the latter. She alleged that from the time of their marriage up to the
time of the filing of the suit, private respondent failed to perform his obligation to support the
family and contribute to the management of the household, devoting most of his time engaging
in drinking sprees with his friends. That after they were married, he cohabited with another
woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs with different women, and
that, because of his promiscuity, private respondent endangered her health by infecting her with a
sexually transmissible disease (STD). She averred that private respondent was irresponsible,
immature and unprepared for the duties of a married life.
In her prayer, she asked that respondent be ordered to give support to their children, that she be
awarded the custody, that she be adjudged as the sole owner of a parcel of land located in Cavite,
purchased during the marriage, as well as the jeep which private respondent took with him when
he left the conjugal home.
The trial court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for annulment of marriage filed by
petitioner. It said that the circumstances on which petitioner anchors her petition were grounds
for legal separation, and not for annulment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court. It ruled that “psychological incapacity”, as a ground for declaration of nullity of
marriage, must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Also, chronic sexual infidelity,
abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not grounds per se, of psychological
incapacity of a spouse.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be annulled on the ground of
private respondent's psychological incapacity.
RULING:
No.
Psychological incapacity" should refer to a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage. The intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality, disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party
being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
In this case, petitioner failed to establish the fact that at the time they were married, private
respondent was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to
assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. No evidence was
presented to show that private respondent was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. It
was not sufficiently proved that private respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties
due to some incapacity of a psychological nature, and not merely physical.
However, private respondent's alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that
these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make private respondent
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due
to private respondent's youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome. The incapacity must
be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically
ill to such an extent that the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish
the precise cause of private respondent's psychological incapacity to show the nullity of the
marriage rests upon rests petitioner. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity
of the marriage.
SOBREPENA, KIM ANGELI
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND

JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.
Facts: Leouel, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia. They got married before
MTC of Iloilo, and eventually a church wedding. They lived with the latter’s parents, and
thereafter Julia gave birth to a baby boy named Leouel Santos Jr. Their happiness, allegedly did
not last long because of the constant interference of Julia’s parents.
On 1988, Julia left for USA to work as a nurse despite Leouel’s pleas to dissuade her. Julia
finally called Leouel after 7 months of working, and promised to return to Philippines upon the
expiration of her contract. She never did. Leouel got a chance to visit the US and underwent a
training program under AFP in 1990. He desperately tried to locate Julia, to no avail.
Leouel then filed with RTC of Negros Oriental a complaint for Voiding of marriage under Art 36
of the Family Code. He contends that the failure of Julia to return or communicate with him for
more than 5 years clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.
Julia filed in her answer that it was Leouel who was irresponsible and incompetent.
RTC: Dismissed complaint for lack of merit.
CA: Affirmed RTC
Issue: Whether or not the marriage can be declared void under Art 36 of the Family Code
Ruling: Petition denied.
Julia’s failure to return to her husband and communicate with him does not constitute
psychological incapacity. It is the intention of the law to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the cases of most serious personality disorders which would result to utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to marriage. Such psychological
incapacity must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
Psychological incapacity is characterized by: (1) juridical antecedence; (2) gravity; and (3)
incurability.
The petition is died because of Leouel’s failure to show the alleged psychological incapacity of
Julia. The facts presented do not come close to the standard required to decree a nullity of
marriage.
Enrique Agraviador vs. Erlina Amparo-Agraviador
GR. No. 170729
Facts: Enrique first met Erlina in 1971 where the latter worked as a waitress in a beerhouse.
They often spent nights together, and soon entered into a common law relationship.
On 1973, the petitioner and respondent contracted marriage at a church in Tondo, Manila.
Enrique’s family was apprehensive because of the nature of Erlina’s work, and because she came
from a broken family. Out of their union, they begot 4 children: Erisque, Emmanuel, Evelyn, and
Eymarey.
On 2001, Enrique filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage under Art 36 of the
FC. He alleged that Erlina was carefree and irresponsible, and refused to do household chores
like cleaning, and stayed away from their house for long periods of time. She also had an affair
with a lesbian, and failed to take care of their sick child. She also refused to use the name
Agraviador in her activities. He claimed that Erlina consulted a mangkukulam to bring bad faith
upon him. He also claimed that Erlina refused to have sex with him since 1993 because she
became very close to a male tenant of their house. In fact, he discovered their love notes and
caught them inside his room several times.
Erlina moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the root cause of her psychological
incapacity was not medically identified and alleged in the petition.
Erlina denied that she engaged in extramarital affairs and maintained that it was Enrique who
refused to have sex with her. She claimed that Enrique wanted to have their marriage annulled
because he wanted to marry their former helper. She added that she was the one who took care of
their son at the hospital before he died.
RTC ordered city prosecutor and SolGen to investigate if collusion existed between the parties.
On 2001, RTC allowed petitioner to present his evidence ex parte.
Petitioner presented a psychiatric evaluation report where Dr. Patac made the following findings:
1. Enrique is psychologically capable to fulfill the essential obligations of

marriage,
2. Erlinda failed to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage.

3. Erlinda anifested inflexible aldaptive behavior even at the time before
their marriage.
The above data shows that Erlinda is suffering from Mixed Personality Disorder, and she is
deemed psychologically incapacitated to perform the obligations of marriage.
RTC: Nullified the marriage of the petitioner and respondent.

CA: Reversed and set aside RTC resolution
The CA held that Dr. Patacs psychiatric evaluation report failed to establish that the respondents
personality disorder was serious, grave and permanent; it likewise did not mention the root cause
of her incapacity. The CA further ruled that Dr. Patac had no basis in concluding that the
respondents disorder had no definite treatment because he did not subject her to a mental
assessment.
Issue: Whether or not there is basis to nullify the petitioner’s marriage to the respondent on the
ground of psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations
Ruling: Petition denied.
No. Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code does not involve a species of
vice of consent. The spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was,
nonetheless, incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations. Psychological incapacity to
comply with the essential marital obligation does not affect the consent to the marriage.
The totality of Enriques's evidence is insufficient to prove Erlinda's psychological incapacity.
Her refusal or unwillingness to perform certain marital obligations, and a number of unpleasant
personality traits such as immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness do not rise to the level
of psychological incapacity that the law requires.
Dr. Patac's psychiatric evaluation report do not hold sufficient amount in proving that Erlinda
was psychological incapacitated to perform the essential marital duties. Dr. Patac did not
personally evaluate and examine Erlinda, as he relied only on the information fed by Enrique, the
parties’ second child and household helper.
OCHOSA v. ALANO
G.R. No. 167459
FACTS:
Bona’s illicit affairs with other men started at the onset of their marriage on October 27,
1973, when Jose was assigned in various parts of the country as an officer in the AFP. She
continued her infidelity even when they lived together at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City sometime
in 1985, whenever Jose was out of their living quarters.
In 1987, Jose was incarcerated in Camp Crame for rebellion for the alleged participation of the
failed coup d’etat. He heard circulation of rumors of Bona getting caught having sex with his
driver, Corporal Gagarin.
He got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona about the rumors, which she and
Gagarin admitted. Since then they were separated, and their foundling, Ramona Celeste, stayed
with Bona in Basilan until 1994 to live with Jose.
Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage between him
and Bona J. Alano, based on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the
essential marital obligations of marriage.
Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist, one of the witnesses, testified and submitted a

psychological evaluation report on Bona’s mental state. The interviews she had with Jose and
two of his witnesses brought her to the conclusion that respondent was suffering from histrionic
personality disorder, and it was traceable to her family history.
On January 11, 1999, the dispositive portion of the trial court declared the marriage of Jose and
Bona void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity of the respondent under Article 36
of the Family Code. The Court finds that Bona’s illness exhibited gravity, antecedence, and
incurability.
OSG appealed the said ruling to the CA, and the CA subsequently granted the appeal and
reversed the ruling of the trial court decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.
Ruling:
No. There is inadequate credible evidence that her defects were already present at the inception
of, or prior to, the marriage. Bona’s alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the
jurisprudential requisite of “juridical antecedence”. Her persistent sexual infidelity and
abandonment are not badges of psychological incapacity nor can’t it be traced to the inception of
their marriage.
The psychiatrist’s conclusion about Bona’s HPD which made her prone to promiscuity and
sexual infidelity existed before her marriage to Jose, cannot be taken as credible proof of
antecedence since the method by which such an inference was reached leaves much to be desired
in terms of meeting the standard of evidence required in determining psychological incapacity.
Dr. Rondain’s conclusion was based solely on the assumed truthful knowledge of Jose. No other
witness testified to Bona’s family history or her behavior prior to or at the beginning of their
marriage. The two witnesses only started to live with them in 1980 and 1986, respectively.
Verily, Dr. Rondain evaluated Bona’s psychological condition directly from the information
gathered solely from Jose and his witnesses. These factual circumstances evoke the possibility
that the information fed to the psychiatrists is tainted with bias for Jose’s cause, in the absence of
sufficient corroboration.
Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond
at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Article 68 to 71,
220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Solis, Patrick David S.
Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina

268 SCRA 198, G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
Psychological incapacity must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.—In Leouel Santos vs.
Court of Appeals, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that “psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity x x x and that (t)here is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.” Citing
Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that “the psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.”
Facts:
Respondent Roridel O. Molina filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage
to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on
April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that
after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” as a
husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom
he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never
honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that
sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel
had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense
quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel
resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few
weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that
Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential
marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrelsome individual who
thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple’s best interest to
have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an
incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as
husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to:
(1) Roridel’s strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their
marriage; (2) Roridel’s refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and
(3) Roridel’s failure to run the household and handle their finances.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends
Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and
of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center.
The trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was
denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision. Hence, the present
recourse.
Issue:
Whether or not, “opposing and conflicting personalities” of the spouses should be considered
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
No.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled
that “psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity x x
x and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.” Citing
Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that “the psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.”
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological
defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a “difficulty,” if not outright
“refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of
“irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties
as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to
some psychological (not physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could not get
along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its
juridicial antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive
of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was
made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of “thoughtfulness and
gentleness” on Reynaldo’s part and of being “conservative, homely and intelligent” on the part of
Roridel, such failure of expectation is not indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at
all, it merely shows love’s temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
From their submissions and the Court’s own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it “as the foundation of the nation.” It decrees marriage as legally
“inviolable,” thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family
and marriage are to be “protected” by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological—not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.”
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of
the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
“The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.”
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws
with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally—subject
to our law on evidence—what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly
void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the
State and the Church—while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other—shall
walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage
and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such
ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te, 579 SCRA 193, G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009
The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January
1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The
psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated.
Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder,
and respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder. By the very nature
of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not
discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological
and mental temperaments of the parties.
Facts:
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-
Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college.
Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another and developed a
certain degree of closeness towards each other. Around three months after their first meeting,
Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was young and
jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu
that month; he, providing their travel money and she, purchasing the boat ticket.
However, Edward’s P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house accommodation
and daily sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they decided
to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house and Edward to his parents’ home.
As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening him that she would
commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncle’s place.
On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then 25
years old, and she, 20. The two then continued to stay at her uncle’s place where Edward was
treated like a prisoner—he was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed
Edward his guns and warned the latter not to leave Rowena. At one point, Edward was able to
call home and talk to his brother who suggested that they should stay at their parents’ home and
live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he should get his
inheritance so that they could live on their own. Edward talked to his father about this, but the
patriarch got mad, told Edward that he would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go
home.
After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowena’s uncle, and stayed with his parents.
His family then hid him from Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for him.
Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should live with his
parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives. They then parted ways.
After almost four years, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the
latter’s psychological incapacity.
As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to investigate whether there was collusion between the parties.
In the meantime, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance and deputized
the OCP to appear on its behalf and assist it in the scheduled hearings.
On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it could not
determine if there was collusion between the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits.
The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties psychologically
incapacitated, and made the following findings and conclusions:
“Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive
upon swearing to their marital vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on
marriage.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still unsure and unready so as
to commit himself to marriage. He is still founded to be on the search of what he wants in life.
He is absconded as an introvert as he is not really sociable and displays a lack of interest in
social interactions and mingling with other individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of
lifestyle that he finds it boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship especially to
that of respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of the
reserved and timid type of person, as he prefer to be religiously attached and spend a solemn
time alone.
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the aggressive-rebellious type
of woman. She is seen to be somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and
glamour. She is seen to take move on marriage as she thought that her marriage with petitioner
will bring her good fortune because he is part of a rich family. In order to have her dreams
realized, she used force and threats knowing that [her] husband is somehow weak-willed. Upon
the realization that there is really no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the
relationship.
REMARKS:
Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and marry himself before
submitting to marital vows. Marriage should not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a
serious institution solemnized by religious and law. In the case presented by petitioner and
respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear that both parties have impulsively taken marriage for
granted as they are still unaware of their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of
weakening their relationship by his weak behavioral disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is
extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to be unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly uncaring
in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent that she is suffering the grave, severe, and
incurable presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder that started since
childhood and only manifested during marriage. Both parties display psychological incapacities
that made marriage a big mistake for them to take.”
The trial court rendered its Decision declaring the marriage of the parties null and void on the
ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The Republic, represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal.
On review, the appellate court, in the assailed decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867, reversed and
set aside the trial court’s ruling. It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological
incapacity of respondent. The clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and
relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was
not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability.
Issue:
Whether or not, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the parties is null
and void.
Ruling:
Yes.
The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996,
eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist
who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s
behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and
respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-
making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on
the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.
The psychological assessment, which we consider as adequate, produced the findings that both
parties are afflicted with personality disorders—to repeat, dependent personality disorder for
petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent.
Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner—
“A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such

individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism
and are easily hurt by others’ comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others
through a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this
disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others,
may allow others to make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree
with people even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing
things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from
other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of
being abandoned.
The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this
case, finds as decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules
that the marriage of the parties is null and void on ground of both parties’ psychological
incapacity. We further consider that the trial court, which had a first-hand view of the witnesses’
deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the
essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering
help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows
others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people
even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do
things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or
helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.67 As clearly shown
in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is
insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to
speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being afflicted
with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations.
This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and
control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the
conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society.68 Moreover, as shown in this case,
respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her
threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the
precipitous marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
Marcos vs. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755, G.R. No. 136490 October 19, 2000
There could be no conclusion of psychological incapacity where there is absolutely no showing

that the “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable.—Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide
material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the
totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage
or that they are incurable.
Facts:
Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he
was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacañang during the Marcos Regime.
Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women’s Auxilliary Corps under the
Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from
the military service.
They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacañang Palace,
she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos.
Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.
After their marriage, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing
unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she was still single.
After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in
different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look
for work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good
provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and
as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him
despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake
and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation,
he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately.
The ‘straw that broke the camel’s back’ took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter
quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house
anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted
him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to
her aid. The following day, she and their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister’s
house.
On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong
Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions.
Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss
unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After
knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even
[beat] her driver.
At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella.
Parañaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father
as cruel and physically abusive to them.
The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph. D., for psychological
evaluation, while the appellant on the other hand, did not.
“The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent
attitude towards appellee and their children. x x x.”
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the
totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
xxx
“In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric
evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were
based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove that the parties were or any
one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he
or she was assuming, or as would make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he
offered testimonial evidence to show that he was not psychologically incapacitated. The root
cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically
identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no
evidence at all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was]
psychological or mental—not physical to the extent that he could not have known the obligations
he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was]
incurable.”
Issues
Whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case—including the testimonies of
petitioner, the common children, petitioner’s sister and the social worker—was enough to sustain
a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
Ruling
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to
provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on
his part. There is absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already present at the inception
of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was
not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he
became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family
home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of
the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable,
especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady
so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under
Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted
in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.12
At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for
declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the
procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully
observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show
that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.
VALLARIT, ANNE
BENJAMIN G. TING,
- versus -
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING,
G.R. No. 166562

March 31, 2009
Facts:
Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical
school. They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was
already pregnant with their first child. On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18
years to petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified
petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage
based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological
incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became
manifest thereafter.
Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the following
manifestations:
1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the
family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts,
because he no longer had money to pay the same; and
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give regular
financial support to his family.
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a

respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He also pointed out that it was he who often
comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a
week. Both presented expert witnesses (psychiatrist) to refute each others claim. RTC ruled in
favor of the respondent declaring the marriage null and void.
Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA reversed RTC’s decision. Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case
Issues:
1. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set
forth under the Santos and Molina cases,
2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological
incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family
Code has been liberalized,
3. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and
void is in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
Held:
1. No. respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina
should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer
new.
2. The Case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on
the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions
of church tribunals.
3. There is no evidence that adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is

psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more
particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage
eighteen (18) years ago.
VALLARIT, ANNE
Jocelyn Suazo vs Angelito Suazo
June 14, 2015
FACTS:
In 1985, Jocelyn and Angelito Suazo met each other. They were just 16 years old at that time. In
1986, they got married before the Mayor of Biñan, Laguna. But their marriage did not turn out to
be ideal. It was Jocelyn who had to work while Angelito was lazy. When confronted by Jocelyn,
Angelito would beat her. Angelito was also constantly drunk. And in 1987, Angelito left Jocelyn
for another woman.
In 1997, Jocelyn filed a petition to have their marriage be declared void on the ground that
Angelito was psychologically incapacitated.
In court, Jocelyn presented Dr. Nedy Tayag who testified that based on her interview with
Jocelyn and the description fed to her by Jocelyn, she concluded that Angelito is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
The RTC voided the marriage but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage should be annulled on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
HELD: No. The psychologist, using meager information coming from a directly interested party
(Jocelyn), could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively
formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito’s psychological condition.
Further, habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of
psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply
indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations that cannot be
considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the absence of proof that these are
manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness.
Anent Angelito’s violent tendencies, physical violence on women indicates abnormal behavioral
or personality patterns, however, such violence, standing alone, does not constitute psychological
incapacity. Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. In
this case, the psychologist failed to link the violence to psychological incapacity. Even assuming,
therefore, that Jocelyn’s account of the physical beatings she received from Angelito were true,
this evidence does not satisfy the requirement of Article 36 and its related jurisprudence,
specifically the requisites provided for in the case of Santos vs CA.
VALLARIT, ANNE
YAMBAO V. REPUBLIC AND YAMBAO
GR. No. 184063 [January 24, 2011]
FACTS:
Petitioner Cynthia Yambao (hereinafter petitioner wife) filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of her marriage with respondent Patricio Yambao (hereinafter respondent husband) after 35 years
of marriage. She invoked the ground of psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Petitioner wife alleged that since the beginning, her marriage with the respondent husband had
been marred by bickering, quarrels, and recrimination due to the latter’s inability to comply with
the essential obligations to married life. She elaborated by saying that through all the years of
their married life, she was the only one who earned a living and took care of the children and that
respondent husband just ate and slept all day and would spend time with friends. In addition, she
claimed that respondent husband would venture into several businesses but all of these failed.
Respondent husband was also a gambler. Petitioner wife also claimed that, when their children
were babies, respondent did not even help to change their diapers or feed them, even while
petitioner was recovering from her caesarean operation, proffering the excuse that he knew
nothing about children. Later, respondent husband became insecure and jealous and would get
mad every time he would see petitioner talking to other people, even to her relatives. When
respondent husband started threatening to kill petitioner, she decided to leave the conjugal abode
and live separately from him. She then consulted a psychiatrist who concluded that respondent
was indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
Respondent husband denied that he has refused to work. He claimed that he had been trying to
find a decent job, but was always unable to because of his old age and lack of qualifications. He
also claimed that he did not stay long in the jobs he had because the same could not support the
needs of his family, and yielded benefits that were not commensurate to the efforts he exerted.
He had ventured into small businesses but they failed due to various economic crises.
Respondent further claimed that he was not, in fact, contented with living with petitioner’s
relatives since his every move was being watched with eagle eyes. He also denied that he
gambled. He alleged that even without a steady source of income, he still shared in the payment
of the amortization of their house in BF Homes, Parañaque City. He also denied that he
threatened to kill petitioner, considering that there was never any evidence that he had ever
harmed or inflicted physical injury on petitioner to justify the latter having a nervous breakdown.
He further alleged that he never consulted any psychiatrist, and denied that he was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
RTC dismissed the petition for lack of merit holding that petitioner wife’s evidence failed to
support her argument that respondent husband was indeed psychologically incapacitated to fulfill
his marital obligations. Thus:
• The court said that, even as petitioner claimed to be unhappy in the marriage, it is
incontrovertible that the union lasted for over thirty years and the parties were able to raise three
children into adulthood without suffering any major parenting problems.
The court also noted that respondent was faithful to petitioner and never physically abused her.
Likewise, when the parties lived with petitioner’s parents, respondent got along well enough with
her family.
• The court recognized that respondent did indeed have many faults, such as his indolence and
utter irresponsibility. However, the RTC said, respondent’s failure to find decent work was due to
his not having obtained a college degree and his lack of other qualifications. Likewise,
respondent’s failure in business could not be entirely attributed to him, since petitioner was a
business partner in some of these ventures.
• RTC also rejected the supposed negative effect of respondent’s Dependent Personality
Disorder. The RTC said that, although the evidence tended to show that respondent would unduly
rely upon petitioner to earn a living for the family, there was no evidence to show that the latter
resented such imposition or suffered with the additional financial burdens passed to her by her
husband.
• The RTC concluded that while respondent might have been deficient in providing financial
support, his presence, companionship, and love allowed petitioner to accomplish many things.
Thus, respondent could be relied on for love, fidelity, and moral support, which are obligations
expected of a spouse under Article 68 of the Family Code.
• Lastly, the RTC rejected petitioner’s claim that she suffered through respondent’s overbearing
jealousy. It found that respondent only became jealous when he thought that petitioner was
cheating on him. The RTC determined that jealousy was not a character trait that contributed to
respondent’s psychological dysfunction; much less did it amount to psychological or mental
torture on petitioner.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. It held that:

Petitioner failed to show that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage
Petitioner exerted efforts to find a source of income to support his family. However, his failure to
find a suitable job and the failure of his business ventures were not mental but physical defects
and, hence, could not be considered “psychological incapacity” as contemplated under the law.
The fact that the parties lived together for 35 years and raised three children well, and the fact
that respondent never physically abused petitioner belied the former’s psychological incapacity.
The respondent’s refusal to care for the children was not psychological incapacity but “merely
constituted refusal to perform the task,” which is not equivalent to an incapacity or inability.
• It rejected petitioner’s allegation of respondent’s unbearable jealousy. It said that the same must
be shown as a manifestation of a disordered personality which would make respondent
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state. The CA averred that
a jealous attitude simply evinced respondent’s love for his wife, whom he could not bear to lose
to another man.
The the purported threats to kill petitioner is an “emotional immaturity” and not psychological
incapacity.
Lastly, the CA found the report of expert witness Dr. Edgardo Juan Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino) to
be unsupported by sufficient evidence since the findings therein were not corroborated by any
other witness. Moreover, the CA said, neither the report nor petitioner’s testimony established
that respondent’s psychological condition was grave enough to bring about the inability of the
latter to assume the essential obligations of marriage, so that the same was medically permanent
or incurable.
ISSUE:
WON the totality of petitioner wife’s evidence establish respondent’s psychological incapacity to
perform the essential obligations of marriage?
HELD:
No.
RATIONALE:
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that psychological incapacity must be characterized
by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. These guidelines do not require that
a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root
cause may be “medically or clinically identified.” What is important is the presence of evidence
that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. Thus, for a marriage to be annulled under Article 36 of
the Family Code, the psychologically incapacitated spouse must be shown to suffer no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes him or her to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
In this case, there is no showing that respondent was suffering from a psychological condition so
severe that he was unaware of his obligations to his wife and family. On the contrary,
respondent’s efforts, though few and far between they may be, showed an understanding of his
duty to provide for his family, albeit he did not meet with much success. Whether his failure was
brought about by his own indolence or irresponsibility, or by some other external factors, is not
relevant. What is clear is that respondent, in showing an awareness to provide for his family,
even with his many failings, does not suffer from psychological incapacity.
Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations
or ill will. This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the
essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations
of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the
procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a
psychological abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable
of doing so due to some psychological illness.
That respondent, according to petitioner, “lack[ed] effective sense of rational judgment and
responsibility” does not mean he is incapable to meet his marital obligations. His refusal to help
care for the children, his neglect for his business ventures, and his alleged unbearable jealousy
may indicate some emotional turmoil or mental difficulty, but none have been shown to amount
to a psychological abnormality. Moreover, even assuming that respondent’s faults amount to
psychological incapacity, it has not been established that the same existed at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
Furthermore, as found by both RTC and CA, respondent never committed infidelity or physically
abused petitioner or their children. In fact, considering that the children lived with both parents,
it is safe to assume that both made an impact in the children’s upbringing. Still, the parties were
able to raise three children into adulthood “without any major parenting problems,” and such fact
could hardly support a proposition that the parties’ marriage is a nullity.
Villanueva, Mary Grace R.
Ricardo Toring v. TeresitaToring

G.R.No. 165321
August 3, 2010
Facts:
Teresita and Ricardo, after meeting at his aunt’s house and after some three months of
courtship, got married. They begot 3 children. 20 years after, Ricardo filed a petition for
annulment of marriage before the RTC of Quezon City, alleging psychological incapacity as the
ground for annulment. He offered as evidence his marriage certificate, the expert testimony of
Dr. Albaran, their testimonies. Ricardo alleged that Teresita is a squanderer and an adulteress,
claiming that all his money sent to Teresita for the sustenance of their family were all spent by
her. He also claimed that she also carries another man’s child with her. Teresita also allegedly
mismanaged funds and also remiss in her duties to collect rent.
The expert testimony of Dr. Albaran states that the factor contributive to the demise of the
marriage is the Narcissistic Personality Disorder that she has.She based her diagnosis on the
information she gathered from her psychological evaluation on Ricardo and Richardson (Ricardo
and Teresita’s eldest son). She admitted, though, that she did not personally observe and examine
Teresita; she sent Teresita a personally-delivered notice for the conduct of a psychiatric
evaluation, but the notice remained unanswered.The OSG opposed the petition stating that there
is no basis for the annulment of the marriage. The RTC ruled in favor of Ricardo. However, the
CA reversed the decision of the RTC, ruling that it did not satisfy the guidelines laid down in
Republic v. CA and Molina.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the judgment of the RTC
Held:
No.
In the leading case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al., we held that psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability, to be sufficient basis to annul a marriage. The psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage.
Article 36 of the Family Code in Molina laid down definitive guidelines in the
interpretation and application of this article. These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements
of gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability established in the Santos case, as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts.
As regards Dr. Albaran’sexpert testimony, We are in no way convinced that a
mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and Richardson, coupled with the results of the
psychological tests administered only on Ricardo, without more, already constitutes sufficient
basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder. This Court
has long been negatively critical in considering psychological evaluations, presented in evidence,
derived solely from one-sided sources, particularly from the spouse seeking the nullity of the
marriage. The law does not require that the allegedly incapacitated spouse be personally
examined by a physician or by a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of
nullity of marriage under the Fmily Code. This recognition, however, does not signify that the
evidence, we shall favorably appreciate, should be any less than the evidence that an Article 36
case, by its nature, requires.
We do not find Ricardo’s characterizations of his wife, that she is a squanderer and
andadultress, sufficient to constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Mere difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on
the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted on some debilitating psychological
condition or illness. Ricardo’s testimony merely established that Teresita was irresponsible in
managing the family’s finances by not paying their rent, utility bills and other financial
obligations.
Teresita’s alleged infidelity does not constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36
of FC. In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the respondent’s
unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a disordered personality, completely
preventing the respondent from discharging the essential obligations of the marital state
Contrary to Ricardo’s position that alleging the root cause of the incapacity is no longer
necessary, jurisprudence does not do away with the root cause requirement. The ruling simply
means that the statement of the root cause does not need to be in medical terms or be technical in
nature, as the root causes of many psychological disorders are still unknown to science. It is
enough to merely allege the physical manifestations constituting the root cause of the
psychological incapacity, as it is also provided for in sec.2 on the Rules on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages. What the Rules really eliminated was the need for an expert
opinion to prove the root cause of the psychological incapacity.
Viñas v. Viñas
G.R. No. 206790
January 21, 2015
Facts:
Glenn and Mary Grace were married. At that time, Mary Grace was already pregnant
with their child. However, the child died at birth due to weakness and malnourishment. This was
attributed to ary Grace’s constant drinking of alcohol and smoking. Mary Grace left their home
to work in Dubai. Glenn then filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity. He alleges that she is insecure, extremely jealous, outgoing
and prone to regularly resorting to any pretext to be able to leave the house; she thoroughly
enjoys the night life, drank and heavily smoked, and refused to do chores at home.
Dr. Tayag, expert witness for Glenn, assessed her personality through the statements of
Glenn and his cousin Rodelito. He claimed she is suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder, which prevents her from fulfilling her marital obligations. The RTC ruled in favor of
Glenn. In the appeal before the CA, the Solicitor General opined that there was no competent
evidence to prove Mary Grace’s psychological incapacity. The CA then reversed the decision of
the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage should be declared null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity
Held:
No. the lack of personal examination of the respondent by a psychologist or psychiatrist
is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. If the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted thereto. However in this case,
the cumulative testimonies of Dr. Tayag and Rodelito do not sufficiently prove the root cause,
gravity and incurability of Mary Grace’s condition.
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity to take cognizance of and to assume basic
marital obligations. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations,
or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted on some illness.
Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion etc., do not by themselves warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity as the same may be only due to a person’s refusal or
unwillingness to assume essential obligations.
The testimonies are wanting of material details the statements of Rodelito are hardly
objective as he is a relative of Glenn. Also, Dr. Tayag’s conclusions about the respondent’s
psychological incapacity were based on information fed by only one side, whose bias cannot be
doubted.
Valerio Kalaw v. Elena Fernandez

G.R. No. 166357
January 14, 2015
Facts:
Valerio Kalaw filed a case for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The petitioner in this case alleges that Fernandez is a gambler,
constantly at the mahjong sessions; always going to the beauty parlor; hanging out with friends
on a regular basis; alleged adultery; and eventually, the neglect in taking care of their children.
These allegations of the petitioner were heavily relied upon by the expert witnesses to arrive at
the finding that those habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of her time as wife and
mother, constitute a psychological incapacity, naming Narcissistic Personality Disorder as the
illness,
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner, but it was reversed by the subsequent
courts. The Supreme Court ruled that the petition has no sufficient factual basis for the
conclusion of psychological incapacity, dismissing the petition. Hence, this motion for
reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage should be declared null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity
Held:
Yes. The Supreme court, in granting the motion for reconsideration, considered the
relaxation of the guidelines provided in the Molina Doctrine. They opined that Section 36 of the
Family Code should not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear
intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of “less specifity” obviously to obtain
“some resiliency in its application”. Every court should approach the issue of nullity “not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations , but according to its own facts”.
To determine psychological incapacity, the courts, which are admittedly not experts on
the subject matter, must necessarily rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves
on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment.
In saying so, there is no rule which necessitates the personal examination of a person
sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated by a physician; what is important is the
evidence which adequately establishes the psychological incapacity. This totality of evidence
must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity
and the psychological disorder. If other evidence showing that a certain condition could possible
result from and assumed state of facts existed in the record, the expert opinion should be
admissible.
In the case at bar, Fernandez failed to take care of their children. She even brought them
in her mahjong sessions. She obviously failed to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities
of a parent. Her bringing of children in mahjong sessions, imbibing in her children a culture of
gambling, shows the wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental development.
Villanueva Manuel Jejomar M.
3C
TITLE:
CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI
GR No. 119190 - Jan. 16, 1997
J. PERALTA
TOPIC:
LEGAL SEPARATION
FACTS:
● In 1995 Gina Lao-Tsoi filed for annulment of marriage in the Quezon City RTC
against her husband Chi Ming on the grounds of psychological incapacity.
● They were married in 1988, however Gina claims that until the present time the
marriage has yet to be consummated. In the following year, they submitted themselves
for medical examinations regarding the matter. The doctor declared that she is in a perfect
state of health including her virginity. Her husband on the other hand, his records were
kept confidential, along with the treatments and medication prescribed by the doctor.
● Gina asserts that her husband is impotent, a homosexual, and therefore refuses to
reconcile their marriage. While Chi avers that the fault lies with the wife, that he is
psychologically, and physically able therefore the marriage may still be salvaged.
● The doctor submitted medical reports which states that even though the
husband’s manhood clearly fell below the average size, it was capable of erection, and
therefore able to consummate the marriage.
● Nevertheless the court declared their marriage void, and was later affirmed by the
appellate court.
ISSUE:
Can a marriage be annulled on the ground of psychological incapacity based on his non-
performance on the marriage bed?
RULING:
The court declared that the fact that the marriage remained unconsummated despite cohabitation
for almost ten (10) months is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the
mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based
on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end
of marriage." Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
This case was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated
by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to
believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against
her husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.
Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is
needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is
definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love
amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious
of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less
but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
3C
TITLE:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERLINDA R. OLAYBAR
GR No. 189538 - February 10, 2014
J. Torres
TOPIC:
LEGAL SEPARATION
FACTS:
● Merlinda applied for a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) with the

National Statistics Office in order to marry her boyfriend. However, based on the same
the CENOMAR stated that she was already married to a Korean national named Ye Son
Sune as far back as 2002.
● She denies the same, and files for a cancellation, and annulment of entry in the
civil registry. However, she stated that she recognized the names of the witnesses in the
document, that she met them while working at Tadel’s Pension House. She believes that
her name was used by one named Johnny Sigh who operated a travel agency whom she
gave her personal details in order to obtain a passport.
● The court found that the signature on the marriage contract was forged, also that
the person who appeared during the marriage ceremony was not the petitioner. Therefore
the court ruled on her favor.
● The Republic however, assailed the decision claiming that there were no clerical
errors in the marriage contract, and that the cancellation of the entries in the civil registry
effectively renders the marriage void ab initio.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Rule 108 is applicable only when there are clerical errors in the civil registry, and
that whether cancellation of entries is in effect a substitute for rendering a marriage void ab
initio.
RULING
The court says no on both counts. A Filipino cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient
of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry. However in the case at bar, apart from the
document, there was absolutely no evidence of marriage at all.
Therefore the respondent does not seek to nullify the marriage, but merely sought to correct the
records in order to reflect the non-existence of the same.
3C
TITLE:
JULIANO-LLAVE vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 169766 - March 30, 2011
J. DEL CASTILLO
TOPIC:
LEGAL SEPARATION
FACTS:
● In 1993 Senator Tamano married Estrelita under two separate ceremonies. First in
May under Islamic laws and traditions, then in June under a civil ceremony officiated by
an RTC Judge.
● In 1994 Haja Putri Zorayda A.Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A.
Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamanos Legitimate
children with Zorayda,filed a complaint with the RTC for the declaration of nullity of
marriage between Estrellita and Sen.Tamano for being bigamous.
● Estrelita filed a motion to dismiss contending that under Presidential Decree No.
1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines , questions and issues
involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of sharia
courts.
● Her motion was denied, she therefore a filed a petition for certiorari with the
appellate court questioning the denial of her motion. Meanwhile the RTC continued to
hear the case regarding the allegation of her bigamous marriage with Tamano.
● The lower court declared her marriage with Tammano to be bigamous. She
appealed that the court should have first waited for the resolution of her petition with the
court of appeals, and that Muslim laws should’ve have been applied.
ISSUES:
● Was the RTC wrong to continue hearing the trial without awaiting the decision of
the Appellate court?
● Did the RTC have jurisdiction over her marriage in the first place?
RULING:
The court declared that the RTC did not have to await the resolution of the CA before continuing
with the proceedings. An action for certiorari is an independent action which is not a part of a
continuation of the trial which rendered the assailed decision, hence it cannot bar the action from
proceeding.
The trial court has jurisdiction over the action, Zorayda and Tamano’s previous marriage was a
union between a non-muslim, and a muslim. During the time of their marriage in 1958 the only
existing law governing the marriage of such individuals was the 1950 Civil Code, which requires
a declaration of nullity of marriage before a subsequent marriage may be contracted. In the case
at bar, the documents provide Tamano’s status merely as “divorced,” and there was no such
declaration. Therefore, Tamano’s marriage to estrelita is void ab initio.
VITUG, LOISSE
G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner,
vs.
DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent.
FACTS:
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity
of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code.
After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment declaring the marriage
between petitioner CYNTHIA S. BOLOS and respondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated on
February 14, 1980 as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the
part of both petitioner and respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code with all the legal
consequences provided by law.
A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely filed the Notice
of Appeal on September 11, 2006.
In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s
failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages.
On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of Danilo’s appeal was likewise
denied.
On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006 decision final and
executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia.
Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to
annul the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC. The
appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to
appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia
and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," is applicable to the case at bench.
HELD:
NO. The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.
Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is unavailing. The
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15,
2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage
extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which
took effect on August 3, 1988. The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by
the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.
The Court finds itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase "under the
Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions" rather than to the word
"marriages."
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application.
As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule
or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of
intention."
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which denied due
course to respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration.
Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its purpose is to bring up for review a final
judgment of the lower court. The courts should, thus, proceed with caution so as not to deprive a
party of his right to appeal.
In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits
of his appeal considering that what is at stake is the sacrosanct institution of marriage.
The Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Our family law
is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the
State is vitally interested. The State finds no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy
families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their
preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.
VITUG, LOISSE
G.R. No. 185595 January 9, 2013
MA. CARMINIA C. CALDERON represented by her Attorney-In-Fact, Marycris V.
Baldevia, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE ANTONIO F. ROXAS and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Ma. Carminia C. Calderon and private respondent Jose Antonio F. Roxas, were
married on December 4, 1985 and their union produced four children. On January 16, 1998,
petitioner filed an amended complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The trial
court granted petitioner’s application for support pendente lite.
The aforesaid order and subsequent orders for support pendente lite were the subject of a case
before the Court of Appeals. The Decision in said case declared that "the proceedings and orders
issued by the trial court in the application for support pendente lite (and the main complaint for
annulment of marriage) in the re-filed case, were not rendered null and void by the omission of a
statement in the certificate of non-forum shopping regarding the prior filing and dismissal
without prejudice.
The assailed orders for support pendente lite were thus reinstated and the trial court resumed
hearing the main case.
The trial court issued an Order dated October 11, 2002 directing private respondent to give
support in the amount of P42,292.50 per month starting April 1, 1999 pursuant to the May 19,
1998 Order.
On February 11, 2003, private respondent filed a Motion to Reduce Support citing, among other
grounds, that the P42,292.50 monthly support for the children as fixed by the court was even
higher than his then P20,800.00 monthly salary as city councilor. The trial court granted the
same.
Petitioner’s motion for partial reconsideration was denied. Trial court declared null and void the
marriage between Carmina and Antonio, awarding the custody of the minor children to their
mother with visitorial rights in favor of Antonio. The latter was likewise ordered to provide
support to the children in the amount of P30,000.00 a month, which support shall be given
directly to petitioner whenever the children are in her custody, otherwise, if the children are in
the provisional custody of respondent, said amount of support shall be recorded properly as the
amounts are being spent. For that purpose the respondent shall then render a periodic report to
petitioner and to the Court to show compliance and for monitoring. In addition, the respondent is
ordered to support the proper schooling of the children providing for the payment of the tuition
fees and other school fees and charges including transportation expenses and allowances needed
by the children for their studies.
An appeal was made by petitioner before the CA, which the latter dismissed on the ground that
granting the appeal would disturb the RTC Decision of May 16, 2005 which had long become
final and executory. The CA further noted that petitioner failed to avail of the proper remedy to
question an interlocutory order. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by
the CA.
ISSUE: Whether the orders on the matter of support pendente lite are interlocutory or final
HELD:
The assailed orders relative to the incident of support pendente lite and support in arrears, as the
term suggests, were issued pending the rendition of the decision on the main action for
declaration of nullity of marriage, and are therefore interlocutory. They did not finally dispose
of the case nor did they consist of a final adjudication of the merits of petitioner’s claims as to
the ground of psychological incapacity and other incidents as child custody, support and conjugal
assets.
The Rules of Court provide for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite which may be
availed of at the commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or at any time prior to the
judgment or final order.
Petitioner contends that the CA failed to recognize that the interlocutory aspect of the assailed
orders pertains only to private respondent’s motion to reduce support which was granted, and to
her own motion to increase support, which was denied. Petitioner points out that the ruling on
support in arrears which have remained unpaid, as well as her prayer for reimbursement/payment
under the May 19, 1998 Order and related orders were in the nature of final orders assailable by
ordinary appeal considering that the orders referred to under Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 61 of the
Rules of Court can apply only prospectively.
The Court disagrees.

The word interlocutory refers to something intervening between the commencement and the end
of the suit which decides some point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole
controversy.
An interlocutory order merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be done
to resolve the merits of the case. In contrast, a judgment or order is considered final if the order
disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage of the same
action. Clearly, whether an order or resolution is final or interlocutory is not dependent on
compliance or non-compliance by a party to its directive, as what petitioner suggests. It is also
important to emphasize the temporary or provisional nature of the assailed orders.
The subject orders on the matter of support pendente lite are but an incident to the main action
for declaration of nullity of marriage. Moreover, private respondent’s obligation to give monthly
support in the amount fixed by the RTC in the assailed orders may be enforced by the court
itself, as what transpired in the early stage of the proceedings when the court cited the private
respondent in contempt of court and ordered him arrested for his refusal/failure to comply with
the order granting support pendente lite.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65 provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Having chosen the wrong remedy in questioning
the subject interlocutory orders of the RTC, petitioner's appeal was correctly dismissed by the
CA.
VITUG, LOISSE
G.R. Nos. 175279-80 June 5, 2013.
SUSAN LIM-LUA, Petitioner
vs.
DANILO Y. LUA, Respondent.
FACTS:
Susan Lim-Lua filed a petition against Danilo Lua for a declaration of nullity of marriage with
a prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children amounting to P500,000.00 per
month before the RTC, citing respondent’s huge earnings from salaries and dividends in several
companies and businesses here and abroad.
After due hearing, RTC cited Art. 203 of the Family Code, stating that support is demandable
from the time plaintiff needed the said support but is payable only from the date of judicial
demand, and thus also granted support pendente lite of P250,000.00.
The husband filed for Motion for Reconsideration asserting that petitioner is not entitled to
spousal support considering that she does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their
children and respondent has continued to support the family for their sustenance and well- being
in accordance with family’s social and financial standing.
The husband also asserts that the P250,000 monthly support and the P1,750,000.00 retroactive
support is unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law for not having considered the
needs of the respondent. The motion for reconsideration was denied, as well as the second. He
appealed to the CA wherein it reduced the monthly support to P115,000.00 which ruling was no
longer questioned by both parties.
The controversy between the parties resurfaced when respondent’s compliance with the final CA
decision indicated that he deducted from the total amount in arrears (P2,645,000.00) the sum
of P2,482,348.16, representing the value of the two cars for the children, their cost of
maintenance and advances are given to the petitioner and his children.
The CA ruled in favor of the husband that the expenses incurred by the husband be considered
advances which may be properly deducted from the support in arrears due to the petitioner and
the two children. Thus, ordered the deduction of the amount of PhP3,428,813.80 from the current
total support in arrears of Danilo to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two children. Petitioner
appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted from the total
support in arrears owing to the petitioner and her children
HELD:
Not all. As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family
relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or
means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient. Here, the CA should no have allowed all the
expenses incurred by respondent to be credited against the support. The Court ordered
Danio to resume payment of his monthly support of PhP115,000.00 pesos starting from the time
payment of this amount was deferred by him. Secondly, that only the amount of Php 648,102.29
may be allowed as deductions from the accrued support pendente lite.

Crisostomo Et Al v. Atty. Nazareno

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 Most Reverend Pedro D. Arigo vs. Scott S. Swift

CHANGE OF NAME CORRECTION OF CLERICAL

 Chiu Hap Chiu vs Republic of the Philippines

Guevarra, Jhaypee  Republic vs Zosa

AGCAOILI, Karlyn Mae E. (3C)

NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN vs. JUDGE VIRGILIO MACARAIG, et al.

A restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under

Therefore, the petition should be dismissed.

ALEXANDER “LEX” ADONIS vs. SUPERINTENDENT VENANCIO TESORO

Therefore, the petition should be dismissed.

GLENN CABALLES y CHUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Should the petition be granted?

Therefore, the petition should be dismissed.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE NORMA C. PERELLO, et al.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS.

NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN vs. JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG

TITLE: CARLOS T. GO, SR., Petitioner, v. LUIS T. RAMOS, Respondent.

TOPIC: Rule 102 – Habeas Corpus

TITLE: OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, Complainant, v. JUDGE ANTONIO I. DE

TOPIC: Rule 102 – Habeas Corpus

TITLE: TZE SUN WONG, Petitioner, v. KENNY WONG, Respondent.

TOPIC: Writ of Certiorari

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.

Whether or not the CA correctly denied petitioner’s petition for certiorari.

TITLE: DIRECTOR EPIMACO A. VELASCO, as Director of the National Bureau of

TOPIC: Rule 102 – Habeas Corpus

BRITO, JHON PATRICK

G.R. No. 130644. March 13, 1998

A.M. No. RTJ-02-1698. June 23, 2005

G.R. No. 151876. June 21, 2005

RTC Ruling on the petition:

2) Preference depends on the discretion of the trial court.

The peculiar circumstances of So do not obtain in the present case.

Rogelio Ormilla v. Bureau of Corrections

ISSUE: Whether of not the writ may be granted in favor of petitioner.

RULING: The petition lacks merit.

Petitioners reliance on the above-mentioned portion of Article 266-B is

Art. 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next

Should Caco be release?

Galvez vs. Court of Appeals

Hence, Salienteses filed the current appeal by certiorari.

(1) The CA rightfully dismissed the petition for certiorari

(2) Habeas corpus is available to the father

NAME: DE JESUS, KRISTINA TERESA M.

(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or

Whether or not the petition for writ of amparo should be granted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an amparo

2. No, President Arroyo should not be dropped. There is no determination of

3. Yes, As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo, command responsibility pertains to the

WON Amparo and Habeas Data is proper to property rights; and,

On the 1st issue:

On the 2nd issue:

NO. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:

Gen. Avelino I. Razon, et al. v. Mary Jean B. Tagitis

To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the

The Court of Appeals (CA) confirmed the disappearance of Morced as an enforced

To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the

2. YES. Enforced disappearance is defined as the arrest, detention, abduction or any

(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

Petitioners never really steadfastly disputed or presented evidence to refute the

The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief

It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command

First. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of