CONSTITUTION

DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES AND ITS JUSTICIABILITY

The directive principles differs from the fundamental rights, in this respect that while
fundamental rights are justiciable and enforceable before the court of law whereas directive
principles are non-justiciable and not enforceable before the court of law but from the last
few decades due to various cases filed and from those judgements some directive principles
had gained the fundamental status.

According to the article -37, the directive principles, though they are fundamental in the
governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the state to apply these principles in
making the law, but they are expressly made non-justiciable. On the other hand
fundamental rights are enforceable by the courts under the article-32, and the courts are
bound to declare as void any law that is inconsistent with the fundamental rights. The
directive principles are not so enforceable by the courts nor can the courts declared as void
any law which is otherwise valid on the ground that it contravenes any of the directives. For
instance if a person is illegally detained, a writ of habeas corpus can be obtained by the
relations of the detained person. But if the government does not separate judiciary from the
executive or introduce free and compulsory education the court cannot help the aggrieved.

Case:

STATE OF MADRAS (VS) CHAMPAKAM DORAIRAJAN1

In this case the supreme court held that “ if the directive principles of the state policy,
which by the article-37 are expressly made unenforceable by the courts cannot override the
provisions found in the part-III which, notwithstanding other provisions, are expressly made
enforceable by the appropriate writs, in this case it was also held that if there was any
conflict between the directive principles and the fundamental rights then the fundamental
rights will prevail.

The supreme court had changed his attitude within a year when the court was dealt with
the zamindari abolition cases, and has modified in the case

1 AIR 1951 SC 228.

CASE:

MOHD. HANSIF QUERESHI V STATE OF BIHAR2

The petitioner claimed that the sacrifice of cows on the occasion of Bakrid was an essential
part of the religion and therefore the state law forbidding the slaughter of cows was violative
of his right to practice religion, the court rejected this argument and held that sacrifice of
cows on the Bakrid day was not an essential part of the Mohammed an religion and hence
could be prohibited by the state under article 25(2)(a).

Part – 3 of the constitution contains the negative injunctions against the state as because that
part deals with the fundamental rights, state has no right to make any laws or rules against to
the fundamental rights, whereas the part – 4 of the constitution imposes positive injunctions
of the state because it deals with the directive principles which is in favourable to the state to
promote laws which ever is necessary for the development and the welfare of the state. Thus
in the earlier decisions the court paid less regard to the directive principles of the state policy
on the ground that they are not justiciable like the fundamental rights, but in the later decision
the court has taken the view that there is no conflict between the directive principles and the
fundamental rights and they supplement each other in aiming the same goal bringing about a
social revolution and the establishment of a welfare of the state which is envisaged in the
preamble.

CASE:

PATHUMMA V STATE OF KERALA3

The Supreme Court has emphasized that the purpose of directive principles is to fix
certain economic goals for immediate attainment by bringing about a nonviolent social
revolution the constitution aims at bringing about the synthesis between the fundamental
rights and directive principles.

2 AIR 1958 SC 731

3 AIR 1976 SC 490
CASE:

ASHOK KUMAR THAKUR V UNION OF INDIA4

In this case the supreme court held that no distinction was made between the two set of rights
whereas the fundamental rights refers the civil and political rights and the directive principles
refers the social and economic rights, merely because the directive principles are non-
justiciable by the judicial process does not mean that they are of subordinate importance

CASE:

RE KERALA EDUCATION BILL5

In this case the Supreme Court held that the directive principles cannot override the
fundamental rights, nevertheless in determining the scope and ambit of the fundamental
rights the court may not entirely ignore the directive principles but should adopt the
principles of the harmonious construction and should attempt to give effect to both as much
as possible, like wise a state law which prohibits slaughter of cows and calves and other cattle
capable of work has been upheld because it was meant to give effect to article -48 of the
Indian constitution.

Part – 3 of the constitution imposes negative injunctions on the state i.e the part -3 of the
Indian constitution deals with the fundamental rights which are in favour to the rights of the
individuals, and these fundamental rights are always against to the state, whereas part-4 of the
Indian constitution deals with the Directive principles which imposes positive injunctions to
the state and these directive principles are the positive commands to the state to make laws to
promote social welfare, at the initial stage when the constitution came into force the courts
paid less interest regarding the directive principles on the ground that they are not justiciable
like fundamental rights i.e if there was any violation of fundamental rights we can challenged
in the court of law under article-32, and at earlier stage there was always conflict between the
fundamental rights and the directive principles and in the later stage court has realised and
said that fundamental rights and directive principles are supplement to each other in aiming at
the same goal bringing about a social revolution and the welfare of the state, due to this the
court have a responsibility to interpret the provisions of the constitutions in such a way so as
to ensure the implementation of the directive principles and to harmonise the social

4 (2008) 6 SCC 771

5 AIR 1957 SC 956
objectives which are related to the individual rights. 6 Though these directives are not
enforceable by the courts, yet these principles have been declared to the fundamental in the
governance of the country, it is the duty of the state to apply to these principles in making the
laws.

AUSTIN said in his book called cornerstone of a nation there is no antithesis between the
fundamental rights and directive principles and they are meant to supplement to each other.

DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES GIVEN THE STATUS OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS:

CASE:

UNNIKRISHNAN V STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH7

The court specifically held that right to education for the children of the age of 6 to 14
years a fundamental right and the court has overruled the decision given in the mohini jain
case the court held that after 14 years of the age of the children the obligation of the state
depends on the economic capacity and development. Article 21A makes it obligatory for the
government to enact a central legislation to give effect to the constitutional amendment the
parliament in the 86th amendment in 2002 passed the right of children to compulsory
education act 2009, and the main responsibility of this act is to provide the education to the
children below 14 years and above 6 years.
The Supreme Court held that the right to basic education is implied by the fundamental right
to life Article 21 when read in relation with the directive principle on education Article 41.
The Court held that the parameters of the right must be understood in the context of the
Directive Principles of State Policy, including Article 45 which provides that the state is to
endeavour to provide, within a period of ten years from the commencement of the
Constitution, for free and compulsory education for all children under the age of 14. The
Court ruled that there is no fundamental right to education for a professional degree that
flows from Article 21. It held, however, that the passage of 44 years since the enactment of
the Constitution had effectively converted the non-justiciable right to education of children
under 14 into one enforceable under the law. After reaching the age of fourteen, their right to
education is subject to the limits of economic capacity and development of the state (as per
Article 41). Quoting Article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, the Court stated that the state's obligation to provide higher education
6 RANJAN DWIVEDI V UOI AIR 1983 SC 624
7 (1993) 1 SCC 645
requires it to take steps to the maximum of its available resources with a view to achieving
progressively the full realization of the right of education by all appropriate means.

The state responded to this declaration nine years later by inserting, through the Ninety-third
amendment to Constitution, Article 21-A, which provides for the fundamental right to
education for children between the ages of six and fourteen. In addition, several States in
India have passed legislation making primary education compulsory. These statutes “have
however remained un-enforced due to various socio-economic and cultural factors as well as
administrative and financial constraints. There is no central legislation making elementary
education compulsory.

CASE:

STATE OF GUJARAT V MIRAZPUR MOTI KURESHI KASSSAB JAMAT8

The petitioner who was the butchers had challenged constitutional validity of the Bombay
animals act 1994 on the ground that it was violative of their fundamental right under the
article 19(1)(g) of the constitution, under the above legislation the gujarat state had imposed a
total ban on the slaughter of cows and calves, thus the Supreme Court held that directive
principles are relevant in considering the reasonable restriction imposed on the fundamental
rights, it is a constitutional mandate under the article 37 of the constitution which provides
the making the laws the state shall apply the directive principles, a restriction placed on
fundamental right will be held reasonable and hence valid subject only to two limitations

a) It does not conflict with the fundamental rights

b) The concerned legislature is competent to enact it

The court held that prohibition on the slaughter of cows does not amount to total ban on
business activity of the butchers and said that ban on the slaughter of cows is not a
prohibition it is a reasonable restriction and they can do the slaughter of other animals
which are not mentioned in the act and the ban on the slaughter of cows is therefore the
interest of the general public with in the article 19(6) of the constitution.

CASE:

8 AIR 2006 SC 212

 M.C. MEHATA V STATE OF TAMIL NADU9

suo moto cognizance was taken in the present case itself when news about an "unfortunate
accident", in one of the Sivakasi cracker factories was published. At the direction of the
Court, Tamilnadu Government filed a detailed counter stating, inter alia, that number of
persons to die was 39. The Court gave certain directions regarding the payment of
compensation and thought that an advocates committee should visit the area and make a
comprehensive report relating to the various aspects of the matter, as mentioned in the order
of August 14, 1991. The committee was to consist of (1) M.R. R.K. Jain, a senior advocate;
(2) Ms. Indira Jaisingh, another senior advocate; and (3) M.R. KC Dua, Advocate.

The committee had submitted the report with many recommendations to the court that
Tamilnadu government has to implement the following propositions in their laws.

a) State of Tamilnadu should be directed to ensure that children are not employed
in fireworks factories.

b) The children employed in the match factories for packing purposes must work
in a separate premise for packing.

c) Employers should not be permitted to take work from the children for more
than six hours a day.

d) Proper transport facilities should be provided by the employers and State

Govt. for travelling of the children from their homes to their work places and
back.

e) Facilities for recreation, socialisation and education should be provided either

in the factory or close to the factory.

f) Employers should make arrangements for providing basic diets for the
children and in case they fail to do so, the Government may be directed to
provide for basic diet - one meal a day programme of the State of Tamilnadu
for school children may be extended to the child worker.

g) Piece-rate wages should be abolished and payment should be made on

monthly basis. Wages should be commensurate to the work done by the
children.

9 (1996) 6 SCC 756; AIR 1997 SCC 699

 h) All the workers working in the industry, whether in registered factories or in
unregistered factories, whether in cottage industry or on contract basis, should
be brought under the Insurance Scheme.

In this case the Supreme Court had stated that article-45 had acquired the fundamental status
by the judgement given by the constitutional bench in unnikrishnan case, In addition, the
Court said that, in order to treat a right as fundamental right, it is not necessary that it should
be expressly stated as one in Part III of the Constitution: “the provisions of Part III and Part
IV are supplementary and complementary to each other”. The Court rejected that the rights
reflected in the provisions of Part III are superior to the moral claims and aspirations
reflected in the provisions of Part IV.

Held that children from the age of 6 years to 14 years have fundamental right to free and
compulsory education similarly

The directive principles are also relevant to consider what reasonable restrictions under the
article-19 are. Article 19 permits the imposition of reasonable restriction on the fundamental
rights. A restriction which promotes any objective embodied in the directive principles is
usually considered the reasonable by courts of law.

CASE:

BIJOY COTTON MILLS V STATE OF AJMER10

In this case the act was challenged as being violation of article-19(1)(g), the court held that
the restriction imposed by the act to be reasonable as being imposed in the interest of general
public. The court observed that in an under developed country which faces the problem of
unemployment on a very large scale, it is not unlikely that labour may offer to work even on
starvation wages. The policy of the act is to prevent the employment of such sweated labour
in the interest of the general public, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of
the minimum wages act 1948, because it was enacted to give effect to directive principles of
the state policy in the article-43 of the constitution and it was upheld that fixation of wages
for labourers did not violate the freedom of trade under the article-19(5).

10 AIR 1955 SC 33
ARTICLE – 39(d) i.e EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK of the Indian constitution had
also raised its status from the directive principle to fundamental rights in the case

CASE:

RANADHIR SINGH V UNION OF INDIA11

It is of the case that there was a difference in paying the salary of driver constables in delhi
police force and other drivers in the service of the delhi administration has been held to be
irrational as there is no reason to give driver constables a lower scale than other drivers as
their duties are more, not less , onerous than those of others drivers the court refused to
accept the argument of the delhi administration that the circumstance that the persons belong
to different departments of the government is itself a sufficient reason to justify different
scales of pay irrespective of the identity of their powers, duties and responsibilities and it
was held by the Supreme Court that the principle of “EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK”
though not a fundamental right is certainly a constitutional goal and therefore capable of
enforcing a through constitutional remedies under article-32 of the Indian constitution, the
Doctrine of equal pay for equal work is equally applicable to a persons employed on a daily
wages, they are entitled to the same wages as other permanent employees in the departmental
employed to do the identical work.

CASE:

GRIH KALYAN KENDRA WORKERS UNION V UNION OF INDIA12

In this case the workers sought for writ of MANDAMUS directing the union of India to pay
the equal scale of salaries with other employees performing similar works, the court held that
equal pay for equal work is not expressly declared as a fundamental right, but in view of
directive principles of the state policy as contained in article – 39(d) of the constitution,
‘equal pay for equal work’ has assumed the status of the fundamental right regard with the
constitutional mandate of equality in article – 14 & 16 of the constitution. The court made it
clear that under the above circumstances it is that the concept of equality implies and requires
equal treatment of those who are situated equally and issue of appropriate directions.

As per article -39(d), parliament has enacted the equal remuneration act 1976, the directive
contained in article-39(d) and the act passed there to can be judicially enforced by the court.
11 AIR 1982 SC 879
12 AIR 1991 SC 1173.
State of Haryana v rajpal sharma

State of Punjab v jagjit singh

FREE LEGAL AID AND SPEEDY TRIAL:

SPEEDY TRIAL:

Speedy trial as such is not mentioned as a specific fundamental right in the constitution, the
criminal procedure code does not guarantee specifically any right to speedy trial, the Supreme
Court has recognised the same to implicit in the spectrum of the article 21, and has derived
the right of an accused to a speedy trial from article 21 it is well settled that the right to
speedy trial in all criminal prosecutions and is an inalienable right under article 21 of the
constitution and this right is applicable not only to the actual proceedings in the court but also
includes the sweep the preceding police investigation as well, speedy trial is the fundamental
right implicit in the broad sweep and content of the article 21, the article confers fundamental
right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by the law.

CASE:

KARTAR SINGH V STATE OF PUNJAB13

The Supreme Court has considerably narrowed down the scope of the TADA act and held that
unless the crime alleged against an accused could be classified as a terrorist act in letter and
spirit he should not be charged under the act, and should be tried under the normal penal laws
by the regular courts and the Supreme Court has laid down another safe guard against the
misuse of the act was that speedy trial of accused which is of the essential part of the
fundamental part of the right to life and liberty under article 21 of the constitution. The apex
court has said that the concept of the speedy trial is an essential part of the article 21 which is
related to the fundamental right to life and liberty and preserved under the constitution the
right to speedy trial begins with actual restraint imposed by arrest and consequent and it
continues all stages, namely, the stage of investigation , inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so
that any possible prejudice that may result from impermissible and avoidable delay from the
time of the commission of the offence.

13 (1994) 3 SCC 569, 638.

CASE:

ABDUL REHMAN ANTULAY V R.S. NAIK.14

The Supreme Court had held that there is a right of speedy trial of the case pending against
him but there can be no time limit with in which a trial must be completed it is thus the
obligation of the state or the complainant as the case may be to proceed with the case with
reasonable promptitude.

Antulay was the chief-minister of Maharashtra and a private prosecution was launched
against him under the prevention of corruption act for various offences alleged to have been
committed by him during his tenure as the chief minister as a consequences Antulay had
resigned his office and the prosecution had stated in 1981 and had not been completed till
1991 December, then he filed a writ in the Supreme court under article-32 for quashing the
prosecution on account of long delay which violated the fundamental right to speedy trial.

Based on this case the Supreme court had drafted some propositions regarding the speedy
trial:

1) Fair, just, reasonable procedure implicit in article-21, of the constitution creates a

right of the accused to be speedy trial. Right of the speedy trial is the right of the
accused, the fact that a speedy trial is also in the public interest.
2) Right to speedy trial flowing from article-21 encompasses all the stages, namely, the
stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision, and re-trial.
3) While determining whether undue delay has occurred one must regard to all the
attendant circumstances, including the nature of the offence, number of the accused
and witness and it is true that it is the obligation of the state to ensure the speedy trial
and the state includes judiciary.
4) The court has refused to accept the demand rule, an accused cannot try himself, he is
tried by the court at the best of the prosecution, hence an accused plea of denial of
speedy trial cannot be defeated by saying the accused did at no time demand a speedy
trial
5) The court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors- balancing test and
balancing process and determine in each case whether the right of speedy trial has
been denied in the given case.
6) It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time limit for the trial of the offence,
in every case of complaint of denial of right to speedy trial it is primarily for the

14 AIR 1992 SC 1701

 prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the
court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case pronouncing upon the complaint.
7) An objection based on denial of right to speedy trial and for relief on that account
should first be addressed to the high court, even if the high court entertains the plea
ordinarily it should not stay the proceeding except in a case of grave and exceptional
nature. Such proceedings in the high court must, however be disposed of on a priority
basis.

In the antulay case after saying this propositions regarding the right of the accused to a
speedy trial of this case the Supreme court refused to quash the proceedings against him
although the proceedings had started from 1981 and were still continuing in 1991 most of
the delay was caused due to the accused himself had raised many objections before the
court from time to time.

CASE:

SANTOSH DE V ARCHANA GUHA15

The supreme court had quashed the prosecution for inordinate delay as the trial for
corruption of the government servant was kept pending for 14 years the case was filed
against the director of mines, government of bihar under the prevention of the corruption
act, as the bihar government refused to give permission to take action against him, no
charge sheet was filed for many years but the prosecution was kept pending, the Supreme
court quashed the prosecution saying that long delay was caused entirely and exclusively
because of the fault of the prosecution and it has not been able to explain the reasons for
delay, the unexplained long delay in commencing trial by itself infringed the right of the
accused to speedy trial.

CASE:

UNION OF INDIA V ASHOK K. MITRA16

In this case there was a delay in trial but it was not attributable only to the prosecution
and the respondent himself had contributed to the delay, refusing the quash the
prosecution in the instant case the court observed that the respondent could not be

15 AIR 1994 SC 1229

16 AIR 1995 SC 1976
 allowed to take advantage of his own wrong and take shelter under speedy trial to escape
from prosecution.

FREE LEGAL AID: ARTICLE 39A

As per article 39A of the Indian constitution ordains the state to secure legal system
which promotes justice on the basis of equal opportunity, it is emphasised that the legal
system should be able to deliver the justice on the basis of equal opportunity and provide free
legal aid to ensure that the opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by
reasons of economic or other disabilities.

Article 39A has been read with article 21 and thus free legal assistance at state cost
has been raised to the status of the fundamental right of a person accused of an offence which
may involve jeopardy to his life or personal liberty.

CASE:

HUSSAINARA KHATOON V HOME SECRETARY BIHAR17

The Supreme Court has held that it is the constitutional right of every accused
person who is enable to engage a lawyer and secure legal services on account of reasons such
as poverty, indigence to have free legal services provided to him by the state and the state is
under the constitutional duty to provide a lawyer to such person if needs of justice require, if
free legal services are not provided the trial itself may be vitiated as contravening the article
21.

CASE:

H.M HOSKOT V UNION OF INDIA18

Equal Justice and free legal aid. The State shall secures that the operation of the
legal system promotes justice, on a basis of equal opportunity, and shall, in
particular, provide free legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in any
other way, to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any
17 AIR 1979 SC 1377
18 AIR
citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities. (emphasis added) . This article
is an interpretative tool and held that legal aid and speedy trial are the
fundamental rights under the article-21.

PROTECTION OF ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION:

The state shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to
safeguard the forests and wild life of the country, laid by the constitution in the
article- 48A of the constitution

CASE:

M.C.MEHTA V KAMALNATH19

For preserving the natural environment, the court has also used the public trust doctrine,
under this doctrine, the state is the trustee of all natural resources which are by nature meant
for public use and enjoyment the state as a trustee is under the legal duty to protect the natural
resources, in this case it was held that article -21 a fundamental right was held supportive to
the article- 48A a directive principle which mandates the state to protect and improve the
environment and to safeguard the forest and wild life of the country.

CASE:

SUBHASH KUMAR V STATE OF BIHAR20

It has been held that public interest litigation is maintainable for ensuring enjoyment of
pollution free air and water which is included in the right of life under article-21 of the
constitution if anything endangers or impairs that quality of life in violation of laws a citizen
has right to have recourse to article-32 for removing pollution of water or air which may be
19 AIR 2000 SC 1997
20 AIR 1991 SC 420
detrimental to the quality of life, such petition under the article-32 is maintainable at the
instance of affected persons or even by a group of social workers.

CASE:

RURAL LITIGATION AND ENTITLEMENT KENDRA V STATE OF U.P21

The court ordered the closure of certain lime stone quarries on the ground that there was
serious deficiencies’ regarding safety and hazards in them. The court had appointed a
committee for the purpose of inspecting certain lime stone quarries. The committee had
ordered certain lime quarries having regard to adverse impact of mining operations in then, a
large scale pollution was caused by lime stone quaries adversely affecting the safety and
health of the people in the living area.

CASE:

M.C. MEHTA V UNION OF INDIA22

It is also called as tanneries case. The supreme court ordered the closure of tanneries at
jajmau near Kanpur, polluting the river ganga, the matter was brought to the notice of the
court by the petitioner, a social worker through a public interest litigation. The court said that
notwithstanding the comprehensive provisions contained in the water pollution and
prevention act and the environmental act, no effective steps were taken by the government to
stop the grave public nuisance caused by the tanneries at jajmau at Kanpur it was held by the
court was entitled to order the closure of tanneries unless they took steps to set up treatment
plants.

PROTECTION OF WORKING WOMEN FROM SEXUAL HARASSMENT AT

WORK PLACE:

As per article-43A of the Indian constitution requires that state has to take steps by suitable
legislation or in any other way to secure participation of workers in the management of
undertakings and establishments and after the visakha’s case the court had issued certain
guidelines to all the states to make legislations and also to the employers of the organisations
to take steps to protect the working women from the sexual harassment at work place.
21 (1985) 2 SCC 431
22 (1987) 4 SCC 463
CASE:

VISAKHA AND OTHERS V STATE OF RAJASTHAN23

The judgment of the court was delivered on a writ petition filed by vishaka, a non-
governmental organisation working for gender equality by way of public interest litigation
seeking enforcement of fundamental rights of working women under article-14, 19&21of the
constitution, the immediate cause for filing the petition was alleged brutal gang rape of a
social worker of rajasthan, the Supreme court in absence of enacted laws to provide for
effective enforcement of basic human rights of gender equality and guarantee against sexual
harassment laid down the following guidelines.

1) All the employers persons in charge of work place whether in the public or private
sector, should take appropriate steps to prevent sexual harassment with-out prejudice
to the generality of his obligation he should take the following steps:
a) Express prohibition of sexual harassment which include physical conduct and
advances a demand or request for sexual favours, sexually coloured remarks
showing pornographic or any other unwelcome physical verbal and non- verbal
conduct of sexual nature should be noticed, published and circulated in
appropriate ways.
b) As regards to private employers, steps should be taken to include the aforesaid
prohibitions in the standing orders under the industrial employment act 1946.
c) Appropriate work conditions should be provided in respect of work leisure,
health and hygiene to further ensure that there is no hostile environment towards
women at work place and no woman should have reasonable grounds to believe
that she is disadvantaged in connection with her employment
2) Where such conduct amounts to specific offences under the Indian penal code or
under any other law, the employer shall initiate appropriate action in accordance with
law by making a complaint with the appropriate authority
3) The victim of sexual harassment should have the option to seek transfer of the
perpetrator or their own transfer.

The fundamental right to carry on any occupation, trade, or profession depends on the
availability of a safe working condition. Right to life means life with dignity. The primary
responsibility for ensuring such safety and dignity through suitable legislation when however

23 AIR 1997 SC 3011

instances of resulting in violation of fundamental rights of women workers under the article-
14,19,&21 are brought before the court for redressal under the article-32 of the constitution.

The court held that the court has the power under article-32 to lay down such guidelines for
effective enforcement of fundamental rights of working women at their work places and
declared that this would be treated as the law declared by the supreme court under the article-
141 of the constitution.

CASE:

APPAREL EXPORT PROMOTIONN COUNCIL V A.K.CHOPRA24

It of the case where the supreme court had applied the law laid down in the visakha’s case
and upheld the dismissal from service of a superior office of delhi based apparel export
promotion council who was found guity of sexual harassment of a subordinate female
employee at the place of work on the ground that it is violated her fundamental right
guaranteed by the article-21 of the constitution, the respondent was working as a private
secretary to the chairman of the apparel export promotion council, a private company. The
respondent insisted his female employee for many times and finally he tried to insist her in
the lift and finally she gave complaint regarding the sexual harassment at work place the
respondent was suspended and charge sheet was filed and the respondent denied the
allegations and he said that he merely attempted to molest her but had no actually molested
her the disciplinary committee agreed with the report of the inquiry officer and imposed
punishment of removing him from service.

It was held by the court that the act done by the respondent was wholly against moral
sanctions decency, and was offence to female subordinate modesty and undoubtedly amount
to sexual harassment and hence the punishment for dismissal from service imposed on him
was commensurate with the gravity and objectionable behaviour was valid.

CASE:

MEDHA KATWAL LELE V UNION OF INDIA25

In the group of four public interest litigations, the main grievance raised before the Supreme
Court was that women continued to be the victims of sexual harassment at work places and

24 AIR 1999 SC 625

25 AIR 2013 SC 93.
the guidelines laid down by the supreme court in the visakha’s case were being followed for
the breach of substance, the women workers suffers insult and indignity for their harassment
through legal and extra legal methods. In this case the main focus is on the implementation of
the guidelines in visakhas case, then the supreme court with three judge bench had issued
further directions until the legislative enactment take’s place.

a) The state and union territories which have not yet carried out adequate and
appropriate amendments in their respective civil services shall do so with-in two
months from the date of judgement.
b) The state and union territories which have not yet carried out amendments in the
industrial employment rules shall now carry out amendments on the same lines with
in two months from the date of the judgement,
c) The state functionaries and private and public sector undertakings etc.. shall put in
place of sufficient mechanism to ensure full implementation of the visakhas
guidelines and further found that if any harraser is found guilty, then the victim is not
forced to work under such harraser and where appropriate and possible the alleged
harasser should be transferred or suspended from the tenure of the service.
d) The bar council of India states that and shall ensure that all bar associations in the
country and the persons registered with the state bar councils follow the visakha
guidelines, the same has to be followed by all statutory and non- statutory bodies. And
the circulars had passed to all statutory bodies for the effective implementation.