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© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. Authorized only for instructor use in the classroom. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written consent of McGraw-Hill Education.
Learning Objectives
1. Identify strategies to manage risk and uncertainty,
including diversification and optimal search strategies.
2. Calculate the profit-maximizing output and price in an
environment of uncertainty.
3. Explain why asymmetric information about “hidden
actions” or “hidden characteristics” can lead to moral
hazard and adverse selection, and identify strategies for
mitigating these potential problems.
4. Explain how differing auction rules and information
structures impact the incentives in auctions, and
determine the optimal bidding strategies in a variety of
auctions with independent or correlated values.
Risk Aversion
• Attitudes toward risk differ among consumers.
– A risk-averse consumer prefers a sure amount of $𝑀
to a risky prospect with an expected value of $𝑀.
– A risk-loving consumer prefers a risky prospect with
an expected value of $𝑀 to a sure amount of $𝑀.
– A risk-neutral consumer is indifferent between a
risky prospect with an expected value of $𝑀 and a
sure amount of $𝑀.
Consumer Search
• Suppose that three-quarters of stores in a market
charge $100 and one-quarter charge $40.
– A consumer observing a price of $40 should stop
searching since there is no price below $40.
– What should a risk-neutral consumer do after observing
a price of $100, if search occurs with free recall and
with replacement?
• One-quarter of the time the consumer will save $100 − $40 =
$60.
• Three-quarters of the time the consumer will save nothing.
• The expected benefit from an additional search is: 𝐸𝐵 =
1 3
$100 − $40 + $100 − $100 = $15.
4 4
• A consumer should search for a lower price as long as the
expected benefits for an additional search are greater than the
cost of an additional search.
© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 12-10
Uncertainty and Consumer Behavior
𝐸𝐵 𝑅 = 𝑐
$𝑐 𝑐
Reservation price:
Price at which a consumer
is indifferent between
purchasing at that price and
searching for a lower price.
$𝑐 ∗ 𝑐∗
Due to
Increase
in search
costs.
$𝑐 𝑐
𝑅 𝑅∗ Price
Producer Search
• When producers are uncertain about the prices
of inputs, an optimizing firm will use optimal
search strategies.
– These strategies mimic consumer search previously
developed.
Asymmetric Information
• Uncertainty can profoundly impact markets abilities
to efficiently allocate resources.
• Some markets are characterized by individuals who
have better information than others.
– Implication: Those individuals with the least information
may choose not to participate in a market.
• When some people have better information than
others in a market, the information people have is
called asymmetric information.
• There are two specific manifestations related to
asymmetric information in markets:
– Adverse selection
– Moral hazard
© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 12-22
Uncertainty and the Market
Signaling
• Another way to mitigate the problem of moral
hazard is signaling, which is an attempt by an
informed party to send an observable indicator
of his or her hidden characteristics to an
uninformed party.
• For signaling to be effective it must be:
– observable by the uninformed party.
– a reliable indicator of the unobservable
characteristic(s) and difficult for parties with other
characteristics to easily mimic.
Screening
• A final way to mitigate the moral hazard
problem is by screening, which is an attempt by
an uninformed party to sort individuals
according to their characteristics.
• Screening may be achieved through a self-
selection device.
– A self-selection device is a mechanism in which
informed parties are presented with a set of
options, and the options they choose reveal their
hidden characteristics to an uninformed party.
Types of Auctions
• An auction is a mechanism where potential buyers
compete for the right to own a good, service, or, more
generally, anything of value.
• Sellers participating in an auction offer an item for sale,
and wish to obtain the highest price.
• Buyers participating in an auction seek to obtain the item
at the lowest possible price.
– Bidders’ risk preferences can affect bidding strategies and the
expected revenue a seller receives.
• Four basic auction types:
– English (ascending-bid)
– First-price, sealed-bid
– Second-price, sealed-bid
– Dutch (descending-bid)
© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 12-27
Auctions
English Auction
• An English auction is an ascending sequential-
bid auction in which bidders observe the bids of
others and decide whether or not to increase
the bid. The auction ends when a single bidder
remains; this bidder obtains the item and pays
the auctioneer the amount of the bid.
– Bidders continually obtain information about one
another’s bids.
– Bidder who values the item the most will win.
Dutch Auction
• A Dutch auction is a descending sequential-bid
auction in which the auctioneer beings with a
high asking price and gradually reduces the
asking price until one bidder announces a
willingness to pay that price for the item.
– Bidders obtain no information about one another’s
bids throughout the auction process.
– Bidder who values the item the most will win and
pay the amount of his or her bid.
Information Structures
• While the four auction types differ with respect
to the information bidders have about the bids
of other bidders, bidders also have different
information structures about the value of their
own bids.
– Perfect information
– Independent private values
– Affiliated (or correlated) value estimates
• Special case: common-value auctions
Expected Revenues in
Alternative Types of Auctions
Comparison of expected revenue in auctions with
risk-neutral bidders