G.R. No.
L-48321 August 31, 1946 At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
OH CHO, applicant-appellee,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta and Assistant
Solicitor General Rafael Amparo for appellant.
Vicente Constantino for appellee.
Ferrier, Gomez and Sotelo and J. T. Chuidian as amici curiae.
PADILLA, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment decreeing the registration of a
residential lot located in the municipality of Guinayangan,
Province of Tayabas in the name of the applicant.
The opposition of the Director of Lands is based on the
applicant's lack of title to the lot, and on his disqualification, as
alien, from acquiring lands of the public domain.
The applicant, who is an alien, and his predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the lot from 1880 to filing of the application for
registration on January 17, 1940.
The Solicitor General reiterates the second objection of the
opponent and adds that the lower court, committed an error in
not declaring null and void the sale of the lot to the applicant.
The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or
should it not be applicable to the case, then he would apply for
the benefits of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141).
The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may
be confirmed under the Land Registration Act. He failed to show
that he or any of his predecessors in interest had acquired the lot
from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, under the
laws, orders and decrease promulgated by the Spanish
Government in the Philippines, or by possessory information
under the Mortgaged Law (section 19, Act 496). All lands that
were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or
by grant below to the public domain. An exception to the rule
would be any land that should have been in the possession of
an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption
that the land had never been part of the public domain or that
it had been a private property even before the Spanish
conquest. (Cariño vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; 53 Law.
Ed., 594.) The applicant does not come under the exception, for
the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessors in interest
begun in 1880.
As the applicant failed to show title to the lot, the next question is
whether he is entitled to decree or registration of the lot,
because he is alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the
public domain (sections 48, 49, C.A. No. 141).
As the applicant failed to show the title to the lot, and has
invoked the provisions of the Public Land Act, it seems
unnecessary to make pronouncement in this case on the nature
or classifications of the sought to be registered.
It may be argued that under the provisions of the Public Land
Act the applicant immediate predecessor in interest would have
been entitled to a decree of registration of the lot had they
applied for its registration; and that he having purchased or
acquired it, the right of his immediate predecessor in interest to a
decree of registration must be deemed also to have been
acquired by him. The benefits provided in the Public Land Act for
applicant's immediate predecessors in interest should comply
with the condition precedent for the grant of such benefits. The
condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of
which they had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894.
This applicant's immediate predecessors in interest failed to do.
They did not have any vested right in the lot amounting to the
title which was transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it
may thus be called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked to
that of their predecessors in interest, may be availed of by a
qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a person
as the applicant who is disqualified.
It is urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have
been declared null and void. In a suit between vendor and
vendee for the annulment of the sale, such pronouncement
would be necessary, if the court were of the opinion that it is
void. It is not necessary in this case where the vendors do not
even object to the application filed by the vendee.
Accordingly, judgment is reversed and the application for
registration dismissed, without costs.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado and Bengzon, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 112567. February 7, 2000]
THE DIRECTOR, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, petitioner
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and AQUILINO L. CARIO, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated November 11, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. 29218, which
affirmed the decision, dated February 5, 1990, of Branch XXIV,
Regional Trial Court of Laguna, in LRC NO. B-467, ordering the
registration of Lot No. 6 in the name of the private respondent.
The facts that matter are as follows:
On May 15, 1975, the private respondent, Aquilino Cario, filed
with the then Branch I, Court of First Instance of Laguna, a
petition[1] for registration of Lot No. 6, a sugar land with an area
of forty-three thousand six hundred fourteen (43,614) square
meters, more or less, forming part of a bigger tract of land
surveyed as Psu-108952 and situated in Barrio Sala, Cabuyao,
Laguna.
Private respondent declared that subject land was originally
owned by his mother, Teresa Lauchangco, who died on
February 15, 1911,[2] and later administered by him in behalf of
his five brothers and sisters, after the death of their father in
1934.[3]
In 1949, private respondent and his brother, Severino Cario,
became co-owners of Lot No. 6 by virtue of an extra-judicial
partition of the land embraced in Plan Psu-108952, among the
heirs of Teresa Lauchangco. On July 26, 1963, through another
deed of extrajudicial settlement, sole ownership of Lot No. 6 was
adjudicated to the private respondent (]AQUILINO L. CARIO)
Pertinent report of the Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands
(now Bureau of Lands Management), disclosed:
"x x x
1. That the land subject for registration thru
judicial confirmation of imperfect title is
situated in the barrio of Sala, municipality of
Cabuyao, province of Laguna as described
on plan Psu-108952 and is identical to Lot No.
3015, Cad. 455-D, Cabuyao Cadastre; and
that the same is agricultural in nature and the
improvements found thereon are sugarcane,
bamboo clumps, chico and mango trees and
one house of the tenant made of light
materials;
2. That the land subject for registration is
outside any civil or military reservation,
riverbed, park and watershed reservation and
that same land is free from claim and conflict;
3. That said land is neither inside the relocation
site earmarked for Metro Manila squatters nor
any pasture lease; it is not covered by any
existing public land application and no
patent or title has been issued therefor;
4. That the herein petitioner has been in
continuous, open and exclusive possession of
the land who acquired the same thru
inheritance from his deceased mother, Teresa
Lauchangco as mentioned on the Extra
judicial partition dated July 26, 1963 which
applicant requested that said instrument will
be presented on the hearing of this case; and
that said land is also declared for taxation
purposes under Tax Declaration No. 6359 in
the name of the petitioner;
x x x"[5]
With the private respondent as lone witness for his petition, and
the Director of Lands as the only oppositor, the proceedings
below ended. On February 5, 1990, on the basis of the evidence
on record, the trial court granted private respondent's petition,
disposing thus:
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders and
declares the registration and confirmation of
title to one (1) parcel of land identified as Lot
6, plan Psu-108952, identical to Cadastral Lot
No. 3015, Cad. 455-D, Cabuyao Cadastre,
situated in the barrio of Sala, municipality of
Cabuyao, province of Laguna, containing an
area of FORTY THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
FOURTEEN (43,614) Square Meters, more or
less, in favor of applicant AQUILINO L.
CARINO, married to Francisca Alomia, of legal
age, Filipino with residence and postal
address at Bian, Laguna.
After this decision shall have become final, let
an order for the issuance of decree of
registration be issued.
SO ORDERED."[6]
From the aforesaid decision, petitioner (as oppositor) went to the
Court of Appeals, which, on November 11, 1993, affirmed the
decision appealed from.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present
Petition; theorizing that:
I.
 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NOT
SUBMITTED PROOF OF HIS FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR
PROOF OF POSSESSION IN THE MANNER AND
FOR THE LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED BY THE
LAW TO JUSTIFY CONFIRMATION OF AN
IMPERFECT TITLE.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS
NOT OVERTHROWN THE PRESUMPTION THAT
THE LAND IS A PORTION OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES.[7]
The Petition is impressed with merit.
The petition for land registration[8] at bar is under the Land
Registration Act.[9] Pursuant to said Act, he who alleges in his
petition or application, ownership in fee simple, must present
muniments of title since the Spanish times, such as a titulo real or
royal grant, a concession especial or special grant,
a composicion con el estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de
compraor title through purchase; and informacion possessoria or
possessory information title, which would become a titulo
gratuito or a gratuitous title.[10]
In the case under consideration, the private respondents
(petitioner below) has not produced a single muniment of title to
substantiate his claim of ownership.[11] The Court has therefore no
other recourse, but to dismiss private respondent's petition for the
registration of subject land under Act 496.
Anyway, even if considered as petition for confirmation of
imperfect title under the Public land Act (CA No. 141), as
amended, private respondents petition would meet the same
fate. For insufficiency of evidence, its denial is inevitable. The
evidence adduced by the private respondent is not enough to
prove his possession of subject lot in concept of owner, in the
manner and for the number of years required by law for the
confirmation of imperfect title.
Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,[12] as amended by
R.A. No. 1942 and R.A. No. 3872, the law prevailing at the time
the Petition of private respondent was filed on May 15, 1975,
provides:
"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of
the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or
an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to
the Court of first Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of
their claim and the issuance of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least
thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter." (Emphasis supplied)
Possession of public lands, however long, never confers title
upon the possessor, unless the occupant can prove possession or
occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the
required period to constitute a grant from the State.[13]
Notwithstanding absence of opposition from the government,
the petitioner in land registration cases is not relieved of the
burden of proving the imperfect right or title sought to be
confirmed. In Director of Lands vs. Agustin,[14] this Court stressed
that:
" x x x The petitioner is not necessarily entiled
to have the land registered under the Torrens
system simply because no one appears to
oppose his title and to oppose the registration
of his land. He must show, even though there
is no opposition, to the satisfaction of the
court, that he is the absolute owner, in fee
simple. Courts are not justified in registering
property under the Torrens system, simply
because there is no opposition offered. Courts
may, even in the absence of any opposition,
deny the registration of the land under the
Torrens system, upon the ground that the facts
presented did not show that petitioner is the
owner, in fee simple, of the land which he is
attempting to have registered."[15]
There is thus an imperative necessity of the most rigorous scrutiny
before imperfect titles over public agricultural lands may be
granted judicial recognition.[16]
The underlying principle is that all lands that were not acquired
from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to
the state as part of the public domain. As enunciated
in Republic vs. Lee:"[17]
"x x x Both under the 1935 and the present
Constitutions, the conservation no less than
the utilization of the natural resources is
ordained. There would be a failure to abide
x by its command if the judiciary does not
. scrutinize with care applications to private
. ownership of real estate. To be granted, they
. must be grounded in well-nigh
. incontrovertible evidence. Where, as in this
. case, no such proof would be forthcoming,
. there is no justification for viewing such claim
. with favor. It is a basic assumption of our polity
. that lands of whatever classification belong to
. the state. Unless alienated in accordance
. with law, it retains its right over the same as
. dominus. x x x"[18]
. order that a petition for registration of land may prosper and
In
.
the petitioners may savor the benefit resulting from the issuance
. certificate of title for the land petitioned for, the burden is
of
.
upon him (petitioner) to show that he and/or his predecessor-in-
.
interest has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and adverse
.
possession and occupation of the land sought for registration, for
x least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the
at
.
petition for confirmation of title.[19]
. the case under consideration, private respondent can only
In
.
trace his own possession of subject parcel of land to the year
.
1949, when the same was adjudicated to him by virtue of an
.
extra-judicial settlement and partition. Assuming that such a
.
partition was truly effected, the private respondent has
.
possessed the property thus partitioned for only twenty-six (26)
.
years as of 1975, when he filed his petition for the registration
.
thereof. To bridge the gap, he proceeded to tack his possession
. what he theorized upon as possession of the same land by his
to
.
parents. However, other than his unilateral assertion, private
.
respondent has not introduced sufficient evidence to
.
substantiate his allegation that his late mother possessed the
.
land in question even prior to 1911.
.
Basic is the rule that the petitioner in a land registration case
.
must prove the facts and circumstances evidencing his alleged
.
ownership of the land applied for. General statements, which
x mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession
are
are unavailing and cannot suffice.[20]
From the relevant documentary evidence, it can be gleaned
that the earliest tax declaration covering Lot No. 6 was Tax
Declaration No. 3214 issued in 1949 under the names of the
private respondent and his brother, Severino Carino. The same
was followed by Tax Declaration No. 1921 issued in 1969
declaring an assessed value of Five Thousand Two Hundred
Thirty-three (P5,233.00) Pesos and Tax Declaration No. 6359 issued
in 1974 in the name of private respondent, declaring an
assessment of Twenty-One Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy
(P21,770.00) Pesos.[21]
It bears stressing that the Exhibit "E" referred to in the decision
below as the tax declaration for subject land under the names
of the parents of herein private respondent does not appear to
have any sustainable basis. Said Exhibit "E" shows that it is Tax
Declaration 1921 for Lot No. 6 in the name of private respondent
and not in the name of his parents.[22]
The rule that findings of fact by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals are binding upon this Court is not without exceptions.
Where, as in this case, pertinent records belie the findings by the
lower courts that subject land was declared for taxation
purposes in the name of private respondent's predecessor-in-
interest, such findings have to be disregarded by this Court.
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,[23] the Court ratiocinated thus:
"This case represents an instance where the
findings of the lower court overlooked certain
facts of substance and value that if
considered would affect the result of the case
(People v. Royeras, 130 SCRA 259) and when
it appears that the appellate court based its
judgment on a misapprehension of facts
(Carolina Industries, Inc. v. CMS Stock
Brokerage, Inc., et al., 97 SCRA 734; Moran, Jr.
v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 88; Director of
Lands v. Funtillar, et al., G.R. No. 68533, May 3,
1986). This case therefore is an exception to
the general rule that the findings of facts of
the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive
and cannot be reviewed on appeal to this
Court.
and-
x x x in the interest of substantial justice this
Court is not prevented from considering such
a pivotal factual matter that had been
overlooked by the Courts below. The Supreme
Court is clothed with ample authority to
review palpable errors not assigned as such if
it finds that their consideration is necessary in
arriving at a just decision."[24]
Verily, the Court of Appeals just adopted entirely the findings of
the trial court. Had it examined the original records of the case,
the said court could have verified that the land involved was
never declared for taxation purposes by the parents of the
private respondent. Tax receipts and tax declarations are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership. They are mere indicia
of claim of ownership.[25] In Director of Lands vs. Santiago:[26]
"x x x if it is true that the original owner and
possessor, Generosa Santiago, had been in
possession since 1925, why were the subject
lands declared for taxation purposes for the
first time only in 1968, and in the names of
Garcia and Obdin? For although tax receipts
and declarations, of ownership for taxation
purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership, they constitute at least proof that
the holder had a claim of title over the
property."[27]
As stressed by the Solicitor General, the contention of private
respondent that his mother had been in possession of subject
land even prior to 1911 is self-serving, hearsay, and inadmissible
in evidence. The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public,
peaceful and in concept of owner", by which characteristics
private respondent describes his possession and that of his
parents, are mere conclusions of law requiring evidentiary
support and substantiation. The burden of proof is on the private
respondent, as applicant, to prove by clear, positive and
convincing evidence that the alleged possession of his parents
was of the nature and duration required by law. His bare
allegations without more, do not amount to preponderant
evidence that would shift the burden of proof to the oppositor.[28]
In a case,[29] this Court set aside the decisions of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals for the registration of a parcel of land
in the name of the applicant, pursuant to Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Law; holding as follows:
"Based on the foregoing, it is incumbent upon
private respondent to prove that the alleged
twenty year or more possession of the spouses
Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan which
supposedly formed part of the thirty (30) year
period prior to the filing of the application,
was open, continuous, exclusive, notorious
and in concept of owners. This burden, private
respondent failed to discharge to the
satisfaction of the Court. The bare assertion
that the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda
Vinluan had been in possession of the
property for more than twenty (20) years
found in private respondent's declaration is
hardly the 'well-nigh incontrovertible'
evidence required in cases of this nature.
Private respondent should have presented
specific facts that would have shown the
nature of such possession. x x x"[30]
In Director of Lands vs. Datu,[31] the application for confirmation
of imperfect title was likewise denied on the basis of the
following disquisition, to wit:
"We hold that applicants' nebulous evidence
does not support their claim of open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious
occupation of Lot No. 2027-B en concepto de
dueno. Although they claimed that they have
possessed the land since 1950, they declared
it for tax purposes only in 1972. It is not clear
whether at the time they filed their
application in 1973, the lot was still cogon
land or already cultivated land.
They did not present as witness their predecessor, Peaflor, to
testify on his alleged possession of the land. They alleged in their
application that they had tenants on the land. Not a single
tenant was presented as witness to prove that the applicants
had possessed the land as owners.
xxx
On the basis of applicants' insubstantial
evidence, it cannot justifiably be concluded
that they have an imperfect title that should
be confirmed or that they had performed all
the conditions essential to a Government
grant of a portion of the public domain."[32]
Neither can private respondent seek refuge under P.D. No.
1073,[33] amending Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
under which law a certificate of title may issue to any occupant
of a public land, who is a Filipino citizen, upon proof of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Failing to prove that his
predecessors-in-interest occupied subject land under the
conditions laid down by law, the private respondent could only
establish his possession since 1949, four years later than June 12,
1945, as set by law.
The Court cannot apply here the juris et de jure presumption that
the lot being claimed by the private respondent ceased to be a
public land and has become private property.[34] To reiterate,
under the Regalian doctrine all lands belong to the
State.[35] Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its
basic rights over the same as dominus.[36]
Private respondent having failed to come forward with
muniments of title to reinforce his petition for registration under
the Land Registration Act (Act 496), and to present convincing
and positive proof of his open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious occupation of Lot No. 6 en concepto de dueno for at
least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of his
petition,[37] the Court is of the opinion, and so finds, that subject
Lot No. 6 surveyed under Psu-108952, forms part of the pubic
domain not registrable in the name of private respondent.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated November 11, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. 29218
affirming the Decision, dated February 5, 1990, of Branch XXIV,
Regional Trial Court of Laguna in LRC No. B-467, is SET ASIDE; and
Lot No. 6, covered by and more particularly described in Psu-
108952, is hereby declared a public land, under the
administrative supervision and power of disposition of the Bureau
of Lands Management. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes,
JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 171631 The case was set for initial hearing on April 30, 2004. On said
Petitioner, date, respondents presented documentary evidence to prove
Present: compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the law.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic),
CARPIO, J., through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the
-versus- Chairperson, application for registration on the following grounds, among
CARPIO-MORALES,* others: (1) that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-
PERALTA, interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
ABAD, and possession and occupation of the land in question for a period
AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, MENDOZA, JJ. of not less than thirty (30) years; (2) that the muniments of title,
ARSENIO R. DELA PAZ, JOSE and/or the tax declarations and tax payments receipts of
R. DELA PAZ, and GLICERIO applicants, if any, attached to or alleged in the application, do
R. DELA PAZ, represented by not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona
JOSE R. DELA PAZ, Promulgated: fide acquisition of the land applied for; and (3) that the parcel of
Respondents. land applied for is a portion of public domain belonging to the
November 15, 2010 Republic not subject to private appropriation. Except for the
Republic, there was no other oppositor to the application.
On May 5, 2004, the trial court issued an Order of General
Default[6] against the whole world except as against the
Republic. Thereafter, respondents presented their evidence in
support of their application.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
In its Decision dated November 17, 2004, the RTC granted
respondents' application for registration of the subject property.
DECISION
The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, affirming the order of

PERALTA, J.:
general default hereto entered, judgment is
hereby rendered AFFIRMING and
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
CONFIRMING the title of AVELINO R. DELA
45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision[1] of the
PAZ, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz
Court of Appeals (CA), dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV
and Glicerio R. dela Paz, all married and
No. 84206, which affirmed the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial
residents of and with postal address at No.
Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514,
65 Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila,
granting respondents application for registration and
over a parcel of land described and
confirmation of title over a parcel of land located
bounded under Plan Ccn-00-000084
in Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
(consolidation of Lots No. 3212 and 3234,
The factual milieu of this case is as follows:
Mcadm-590-D, Taguig, Cadastral Mapping,
containing Twenty-Five Thousand Eight
On November 13, 2003, respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio
Hundred Twenty-Five (25,825) Square Meters,
R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz,
more or less, situated at Barangay Ibayo,
represented by Jose R. dela Paz (Jose), filed with the RTC of
Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, under the
Pasig City an application for registration of land[3] under
operation of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as
Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529) otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree.
the Property Registration Decree. The application covered a
parcel of land with an area of 25,825 square meters, situated at
After the decision shall have been
Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, described under survey
become final and executory and, upon
Plan Ccn-00-000084, (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos.
payment of all taxes and other charges due
3212 and 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping).
on the land, the order for the issuance of a
Together with their application for registration, respondents
decree of registration shall be accordingly
submitted the following documents: (1) Special power of
undertaken.
attorney showing that the respondents authorized Jose dela Paz
to file the application; (2) Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot
SO ORDERED.[7]
Nos. 3212 and 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping
(Ccn-00-000084) with the annotation that the survey is inside L.C.
Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Notice of
Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B classified as alienable/disposable by
Appeal.[8] The CA, in its Decision dated February 15, 2006,
the Bureau of Forest Development, Quezon City on January 03,
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The
1968; (3) Technical Descriptions of Ccn-00-000084; (4) Geodetic
CA ruled that respondents were able to show that they have
Engineer's Certificate; (5) Tax Declaration No. FL-018-01466;
been in continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession of
(6) Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob dated June 18, 1987;
the subject property through themselves andtheir predecessors-
(7) Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pagaari
in-interest. The CA found that respondents acquired the subject
ng Namatay dated March 10, 1979; (8) Certification that the
land from their predecessors-in-interest, who have been in
subject lots are not covered by any land patent or any public
actual, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession
land appilcation; and (9) Certification by the Office of the
in the concept of an owner since time immemorial. The CA,
Treasurer, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, that the tax on
likewise, held that respondents were able to present sufficient
the real property for the year 2003 has been paid.
evidence to establish that the subject property is part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Hence,
Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property,
the instant petition raising the following grounds:
which is an agricultural land, by virtue of Salaysay ng
I
Pagkakaloob[4] dated June 18, 1987, executed by their parents
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
Zosimo dela Paz and Ester dela Paz (Zosimo and Ester), who
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER GRANTING
earlier acquired the said property from their deceased parent
RESPONDENTS' APPLICATION FOR
Alejandro dela Paz (Alejandro) by virtue of aSinumpaang
REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LOT
Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pag-aari ng
CONSIDERING THAT THE EVIDENCE ON
Namatay[5] dated March 10, 1979. In their application,
RECORD FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT
respondents claimed that they are co-owners of the subject
RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN IN OPEN,
parcel of land and they have been in continuous, uninterrupted,
CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS
open, public, adverse possession of the same, in the concept of
POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT LOT IN THE
owner since they acquired it in 1987. Respondents further
CONCEPT OF AN OWNER.
averred that by way of tacking of possession, they, through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, adverse,
II
continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the same, in the
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING
concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, or for a period
THE REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LOT IN
of more than fifty (50) years since the filing of the application of
RESPONDENTS' NAME CONSIDERING THAT NO
registration with the trial court. They maintained that the subject
EVIDENCE WAS FORMALLY OFFERED TO PROVE
property is classified as alienable and disposable land of the
THAT THE SAME IS WITHIN THE ALIENABLE AND
public domain.
DISPOSABLE AREA OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.[9]

In its Memorandum, petitioner claims that the CA's findings that
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, uninterrupted, public, and adverse possession in the
concept of owners, for more than fifty years or even before June
12, 1945, was unsubstantiated. Respondents failed to show
actual or constructive possession and occupation over the
subject land in the concept of an owner. Respondents also
failed to establish that the subject property is within the alienable
and disposable portion of the public domain. The subject
property remained to be owned by the State under the Regalian
Doctrine.
In their Memorandum, respondents alleged that they were able
to present evidence of specific acts of ownership showing open,
notorious, continuous and adverse possession and occupation in
the concept of an owner of the subject land. To prove their
continuous and uninterrupted possession of the subject land,
they presented several tax declarations, dated 1949, 1966, 1974,
1979, 1980, 1985, 1991, 1994 and 2000, issued in the name of their
predecessors-in-interest. In addition, respondents presented a
tax clearance issued by the Treasurer's Office of the City of
Taguig to show that they are up to date in their payment of real
property taxes. Respondents maintain that the annotations
appearing on the survey plan of the subject land serves as
sufficient proof that the land is within the alienable and
disposable portion of the public domain. Finally, respondents
assert that the issues raised by the petitioner are questions of fact
which the Court should not consider in a petition for review
under Rule 45.
The petition is meritorious.
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, this Court is limited to reviewing
only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings
complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on
record, or the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts.[10] It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh
evidence all over again, unless there is a showing that the
findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are
glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error or grave
abuse of discretion.[11]
In the present case, the records do not support the
findings made by the CA that the subject land is part of the
alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.
Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The
following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance an application for registration
of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by
themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest
have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and
occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the
public domain under
a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
From the foregoing, respondents need to prove that (1) the land
forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12,
1945 or earlier.[12] These the respondents must prove by no less
than clear, positive and convincing evidence.[13]
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our
Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of
land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly,
public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as
alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by
the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain.[14] The
burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove
that the land subject of theapplication is alienable or disposable.
To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must
be established that the land subject of the application (or claim)
is alienable or disposable.[15]
To support its contention that the land subject of the application
for registration is alienable, respondents presented survey Plan
Ccn-00-000084[16] (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212
& 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping) prepared by
Geodetic Engineer Arnaldo C. Torres with the following
annotation:
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623
Proj. No. 27-B clasified as alienable/disposable
by the Bureau of Forest Development, Quezon
City on Jan. 03, 1968.
Respondents' reliance on the afore-mentioned annotation is
misplaced.
In Republic v. Sarmiento,[17] the Court ruled that the
notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer on the blue print
copy of the conversion and subdivision plan approved by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Center, that this survey is inside the alienable and disposable
area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3,
1968 by the Bureau of Forestry, is insufficient and does not
constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the
presumption that the land remains part of the inalienable public
domain.
Further, in Republic v. Tri-plus Corporation,[18] the Court held that:
In the present case, the only
evidence to prove the character of the
subject lands as required by law is the
notation appearing in the Advance Plan
stating in effect that the said properties are
alienable and disposable. However, this is
hardly the kind of proof required by law. To
prove that the land subject of an application
for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the
government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, an
administrative action, investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators, and a
legislative act or statute. The applicant may
also secure a certification from the
Government that the lands applied for are
alienable and disposable. In the case at bar,
while the Advance Plan bearing the notation
was certified by the Lands Management
Services of the DENR, the certification refers
only to the technical correctness of the survey
plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do
whatsoever with the nature and character of
the property surveyed. Respondents failed to
submit a certification from the proper
government agency to prove that the lands
subject for registration are indeed alienable
and disposable.
Furthermore, in Republic of the Philippines v. Rosila Roche,[19] the
Court held that the applicant bears the burden of proving the
status of the land. In this connection, the Court has held that he
must present a certificate of land classification status issued by
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO), or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the
land as alienable and disposable, and that it is within the
approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO or
PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as
true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These
facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the
land is alienable and disposable.
Clearly, the surveyor's annotation presented by respondents is
not the kind of proof required by law to prove that the subject
land falls within the alienable and disposable zone.Respondents
failed to submit a certification from the proper government
agency to establish that the subject land are part of the
alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. In the
absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject
property is already classified as alienable and disposable, we
must consider the same as still inalienable public domain.[20]
Anent respondents possession and occupation of the subject
property, a reading of the records failed to show that the
respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest possessed and occupied the subject land since June 12,
1945 or earlier.
The evidence submitted by respondents to prove their possession
and occupation over the subject property consists of the
testimonies of Jose and Amado Geronimo (Amado), the tenant
of the adjacent lot. However, their testimonies failed to establish
respondents predecessors-in-interest' possession and occupation
of subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Jose, who was
born on March 19, 1939,[21] testified that since he attained the
age of reason he already knew that the land subject of this case
belonged to them.[22]Amado testified that he was a tenant of the
land adjacent to the subject property since 1950,[23] and on
about the same year, he knew that the respondents were
occupying the subject land.[24]
Jose and Amado's testimonies consist merely of general
statements with no specific details as to when respondents'
predecessors-in-interest began actual occupancy of the land
subject of this case. While Jose testified that the subject land was
previously owned by their parents Zosimo and Ester, who earlier
inherited the property from their parent Alejandro, no clear
evidence was presented to show Alejandro's mode of acquisition
of ownership and that he had been in possession of the same on
or before June 12, 1945, the period of possession required by
law. It is a rule that general statements that are mere conclusions
of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and
cannot suffice.[25]An applicant in a land registration case cannot
just harp on mere conclusions of law to embellish the application
but must impress thereto the facts and circumstances evidencing
the alleged ownership and possession of the land.[26]
Respondents earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax
declaration issued in the name of their predecessors-in-interest
only in the year 1949. At best, respondents can only
prove possession since said date. What is required is open,
exclusive, continuous and notorious possession by respondents
and their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fideclaim of
ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[27] Respondents failed to
explain why, despite their claim that their predecessors-in interest
have possessed the subject properties in the concept of an
owner even before June 12, 1945, it was only in 1949 that their
predecessors-in-interest started to declare the same for purposes
of taxation. Well settled is the rule that tax declarations and
receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right
to possess land when not supported by any other evidence. The
fact that the disputed property may have been declared for
taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration
or of their predecessors-in-interest does not necessarily
prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim
of ownership.[28]
The foregoing pieces of evidence, taken together,
failed to paint a clear picture that respondents by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and occupation
of the subject land, under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Evidently, since respondents failed to prove that (1) the subject
property was classified as part of the disposable and alienable
land of the public domain; and (2) they and their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation thereof under a bonafide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, their application
for confirmation and registration of the subject property
under PD 1529 should be denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206,
affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The application for registration and confirmation of title
filed by respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose
R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, as represented by Jose R.
dela Paz, over a parcel of land, with a total area of twenty-five
thousand eight hundred twenty-five (25,825) square meters
situated at Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila,
is DENIED.
G.R. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST
DEVELOPMENT), petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA
ROSA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44081 April 15, 1988
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORIA,
BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented
by their father JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44092 April 15, 1988
ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORlA,
BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented
by their father, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth
that may be found in the bowels of the earth even if the land
where the discovery is made be private. 1 In the cases at bar,
which have been consolidated because they pose a common
issue, this doctrine was not correctly applied.
These cases arose from the application for registration of a
parcel of land filed on February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on
his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria,
Benjamin and Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon,
Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and covered by plan
Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to
Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio
and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964. 2
The application was separately opposed by Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge Corporation,
as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic
of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development,
as to lots 1-9. 3
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified
that they had acquired the subject land by virtue of prescription
Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly
after the Liberation. She testified she was born in the land, which
was possessed by her parents under claim of
ownership. 4 Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his
mother, Bella Alberto, who declared that the land was planted
by Jaime and his predecessors-in-interest to bananas, avocado,
nangka and camote, and was enclosed with a barbed-wire
fence. She was corroborated by Felix Marcos, 67 years old at the
time, who recalled the earlier possession of the land by Alberto's
father. 5 Balbalio presented her tax declaration in 1956 and the
realty tax receipts from that year to 1964, 6 Alberto his tax
declaration in 1961 and the realty tax receipts from that year to
1964. 7
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral
claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934, by
the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim
in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From
the date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual,
continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of
owner, as evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits of
annual assessment, its geological mappings, geological
samplings and trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes on the
land. 8
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots
6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims
located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and
recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder
of Baguio. These claims were purchased from these locators on
November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open,
continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots as
evidenced by its annual assessment work on the claims, such as
the boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes thereon. 9
The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance
with Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 which provided that:
SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public
lands in the philippine Islands both surveyed
and unsurveyed are hereby declared to be
free and open to exploration, occupation
and purchase and the land in which they are
found to occupation and purchase by the
citizens of the United States, or of said islands.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its
objection, arguing that the land sought to be registered was
covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under
Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by
reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973. 10
The trial court * denied the application, holding that the
applicants had failed to prove their claim of possession and
ownership of the land sought to be registered. 11 The applicants
appealed to the respondent court, * which reversed the trial
court and recognized the claims of the applicant, but subject to
the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining
claims. 12 In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same
time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by
virtue of their mining claims.
Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking
their superior right of ownership. The Republic has filed its own
petition for review and reiterates its argument that neither the
private respondents nor the two mining companies have any
valid claim to the land because it is not alienable and
registerable.
It is true that the subject property was considered forest land
and included in the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did
not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that
time. The Court of Appeals correctly declared that:
There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June
Bug mineral claims of Benguet and the "Fredia and Emma"
mineral claims of Atok. The June Bug mineral claim of plaintiff
Benguet was one of the 16 mining claims of James E. Kelly,
American and mining locator. He filed his declaration of the
location of the June Bug mineral and the same was recorded in
the Mining Recorder's Office on October 14, 1909. All of the Kelly
claims ha subsequently been acquired by Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. Benguet's evidence is that it had made
improvements on the June Bug mineral claim consisting of mine
tunnels prior to 1935. It had submitted the required affidavit of
annual assessment. After World War II, Benguet introduced
improvements on mineral claim June Bug, and also conducted
geological mappings, geological sampling and trench side cuts.
In 1948, Benguet redeclared the "June Bug" for taxation and had
religiously paid the taxes.
The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several claims of
Harrison registered in 1931, and which Atok representatives
acquired. Portions of Lots 1 to 5 and all of Lots 6 to 9 are within
the Emma and Fredia mineral claims of Atok Big Wedge Mining
Company.
The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and
Emma mineral claims of Atok having been perfected prior to the
approval of the Constitution of the Philippines of 1935, they were
removed from the public domain and had become private
properties of Benguet and Atok.
It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under
consideration was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when
the Government of the Commonwealth was inaugurated; and
according to the laws existing at that time, as construed and
applied by this court in McDaniel v. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil.
749), a valid location of a mining claim segregated the area
from the public domain. Said the court in that case: The moment
the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands
located, and perfected his location in accordance with law, the
power of the United States Government to deprive him of the
exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the located
claim was gone, the lands had become mineral lands and they
were exempted from lands that could be granted to any other
person. The reservations of public lands cannot be made so as
to include prior mineral perfected locations; and, of course, if a
valid mining location is made upon public lands afterwards
included in a reservation, such inclusion or reservation does not
affect the validity of the former location. By such location and
perfection, the land located is segregated from the public
domain even as against the Government. (Union Oil Co. v.
Smith, 249 U.S. 337; Van Mess v. Roonet, 160 Cal. 131; 27 Cyc.
546).
"The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only
to segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to
the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to
a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and
conditions prescribed by law. Where there is a valid location of a
mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public
domain and the property of the locator." (St. Louis Mining &
Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650; 655; 43 Law ed.,
320, 322.) "When a location of a mining claim is perfected it has
the effect of a grant by the United States of the right of present
and exclusive possession, with the right to the exclusive
enjoyment of all the surface ground as well as of all the minerals
within the lines of the claim, except as limited by the extralateral
right of adjoining locators; and this is the locator's right before as
well as after the issuance of the patent. While a lode locator
acquires a vested property right by virtue of his location made in
compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains in the
government until patent issues."(18 R.C.L. 1152) (Gold Creek
Mining Corporation v. Hon. Eulogio Rodriguez, Sec. of Agriculture
and Commerce, and Quirico Abadilla, Director of the Bureau of
Mines, 66 Phil. 259, 265-266)
It is of no importance whether Benguet and
Atok had secured a patent for as held in the
Gold Creek Mining Corp. Case, for all physical
purposes of ownership, the owner is not
required to secure a patent as long as he
complies with the provisions of the mining
laws; his possessory right, for all practical
purposes of ownership, is as good as though
secured by patent.
We agree likewise with the oppositors that
having complied with all the requirements of
the mining laws, the claims were removed
from the public domain, and not even the
government of the Philippines can take away
this right from them. The reason is obvious.
Having become the private properties of the
oppositors, they cannot be deprived thereof
without due process of law. 13
Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the
Commonwealth Constitution against the alienation of all lands of
the public domain except those agricultural in nature for this was
made subject to existing rights. Thus, in its Article XIII, Section 1, it
was categorically provided that:
SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy and other natural
resources of the Philipppines belong to the
State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to
citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations at least 60% of the capital of
which is owned by such citizens, subject to
any existing right, grant, lease or concession
at the time of the inauguration of the
government established under this
Constitution. Natural resources with the
exception of public agricultural lands, shall
not be alienated, and no license, concession,
or lease for the exploitation, development or
utilization of any of the natural resources shall
be granted for a period exceeding 25 years,
except as to water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than
the development of water power, in which
case beneficial use may be the measure and
the limit of the grant.
Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on
November 8, 1935, declared:
Any provision of existing laws, executive order,
proclamation to the contrary notwithstanding,
all locations of mining claim made prior to
February 8, 1935 within lands set apart as
forest reserve under Sec. 1826 of the Revised
Administrative Code which would be valid
and subsisting location except to the
existence of said reserve are hereby declared
to be valid and subsisting locations as of the
date of their respective locations.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to
mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it from
the public domain. 14 By such act, the locators acquired
exclusive rights over the land, against even the government,
without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land
or the obtention of a patent over it. 15As the land had become
the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer
the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.
It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private
property was subject to the "vicissitudes of ownership," or even to
forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as the private
respondents aver, by acquisitive prescription. However, the
method invoked by the de la Rosas is not available in the case
at bar, for two reasons.
First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous,
adverse and exclusive possession submitted by the applicants
was insufficient to support their claim of ownership. They
themselves had acquired the land only in 1964 and applied for
its registration in 1965, relying on the earlier alleged possession of
their predecessors-in-interest. 16The trial judge, who had the
opportunity to consider the evidence first-hand and observe the
demeanor of the witnesses and test their credibility was not
convinced. We defer to his judgment in the absence of a
showing that it was reached with grave abuse of discretion or
without sufficient basis. 17
Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest
of the de la Rosas had really been in possession of the subject
property, their possession was not in the concept of owner of
the mining claim but of the property as agricultural land, which it
was not. The property was mineral land, and they were claiming
it as agricultural land. They were not disputing the lights of the
mining locators nor were they seeking to oust them as such and
to replace them in the mining of the land. In fact, Balbalio which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935
testified that she was aware of the diggings being undertaken prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain
"down below" 18 but she did not mind, much less protest, the except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the
same although she claimed to be the owner of the said land. time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been
The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive
interest" between the owners of the surface rights and the prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them
owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.
well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30,
not only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the 1976, is SET ASIDE and that of the trial court dated March 11,
airspace above it up to a reasonable height. 19 Under the 1969, is REINSTATED, without any pronouncement as to costs.
aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and SO ORDERED.
agricultural on the surface, subject to separate claims of title. This Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ.,
is also difficult to understand, especially in its practical concur.
application.
Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will
be planting on the land while the mining locator will be boring
tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he
may interfere with the operations below and the miner cannot
blast a tunnel lest he destroy the crops above. How deep can
the farmer, and how high can the miner, go without
encroaching on each other's rights? Where is the dividing line
between the surface and the sub-surface rights?
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and
that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral.
The classification must be categorical; the land must be either
completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant
case, as already observed, the land which was originally
classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral —
and completely mineral — once the mining claims were
perfected. 20 As long as mining operations were being
undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so
and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was
enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were
unlawfully occupying the surface.
What must have misled the respondent court is Commonwealth
Act No. 137, providing as follows:
Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain
and minerals belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development or
utilization, shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations, or associations,
at least 60% of the capital of which is owned
by such citizens, subject to any existing right,
grant, lease or concession at the time of the
inauguration of government established
under the Constitution.
SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the
use of land for agricultural, industrial,
commercial, residential, or for any purpose
other than mining does not include the
ownership of, nor the right to extract or utilize,
the minerals which may be found on or under
the surface.
SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to
extract and utilize, the minerals included
within all areas for which public agricultural
land patents are granted are excluded and
excepted from all such patents.
SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to
extract and utilize, the minerals included
within all areas for which Torrens titles are
granted are excluded and excepted from all
such titles.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name
implies, is intended for the benefit of the State, not of private
persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that
may be found in public and even private land devoted to
"agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any
purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is the owner of
agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership
of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the
said minerals without the permission of the State to which such
minerals belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing
that the rights over the land could be used for both mining and
non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is
that once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use
to which it is being devoted at the time, such use may be
discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals
therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is
thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any
private party, including the registered owner thereof, for any
other purpose that will impede the mining operations to be
undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of
course entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in
appropriate expropriation proceedings. 21
Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the
property in question by virtue of their respective mining claims