On Quiddity and Essence

In our epistemology we affirm the possibility of knowledge and the reality of things, and establish,
sense perception and observation, reason, true report based on authority and intuition as sources
and methods of knowledge. 231 With regard to the problems connected with the nature of existence
in its relation to reality as known by means of rational analysis and demonstration, we maintain that,
according to the level of knowledge based upon sense perception and reason-which we consider to
be valid criteria for the verification of truths, and which we ourselves apply in our own
investigations-existence is a single, general and abstract concept common to all existences. This
single, general and abstract concept common to all existences becomes multiple, we said, 232 due to
a rational division into 'portions' corresponding to things in the course of its being attributed to
quiddities. The meaning of 'reality', in the sense of there being in the external world something actual
to which it corresponds, pertains only either to the existence or the quiddity or a thing,233 one of
them being a secondary intelligible, that is, a purely conceptual entity to which nothing in the external
world corresponds. Existence in this sense, and in this sense only, is the mental entity having no
corresponding reality in the external world. 234

But we also affirm, in addition to existence understood in the above sense, and as based upon true
report and intuition founded upon the authority of the Holy Qur'an and the Tradition as well as upon
reason and experience, that there is another entity corresponding to the purely conceptual notion of
existence which is not mental but real. This other entity is the reality of existence, which produces in
the mind the notion of existence as a pure concept, as well as the notion of 'things' and their
'quiddities' to which portions of existence as a conceptual entity are correspondingly attributed. We
have given a gist of this already, 235 identifying this reality of existence, which is also the Absolute
Existence, with the Aspect of God referred to in the Holy Qur'an as That which encompasses
everything in a pervasive sort of way and which remains after the perishing of created things.

Our notion of a thing as it is immediately perceived in this case a man, for example-is simply that of
a real, concrete existent (mawjud) having a particular individuality to which a word-for example,
'man '-is applied to denote it, and which word when mentioned will bring to mind the object which
it denotes. This, in brief, describes our primary notion of a thing, a physical object of the senses. The
mind, when contemplating the thing which demands its definition, and in answer to its own inner
question about the thing: “What is it?”, proceeds to analyse it; to judge, discriminate, clarify and
classify it until it arrives at a definition of the thing, that is, 'rational animal' in the case of 'man'. In
this concept-forming process the mind is able to abstract the thing's 'whatness' from its existence,
existence here being considered as something which is attributed to the thing itself, as if it were a
property of the thing that is superadded to it. This 'whatness' is quiddity (mahiyyah). 236 In this way
a mental division and distinction is made between quiddity and existence, quiddity being considered
as the reality of a thing whereas existence is that which qualifies it.

From this we distinguish two stages of understanding. The primary stage of understanding refers to
the objects of physics, to concrete things, such as indicated by the word 'animal' with respect to 'man',
to which apply the ten Aristotelian categories of substance, or the stuff of which a physical thing is
made, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, posture, possession, action, and passivity or being acted
upon. 237 Things as such are the original stuff from which are derived primary ideas apprehended
by the intellect called primary intelligibles (al-ma‘qulat al-ula). They (the things) are the concretely
existent objects of the external world that correspond to the concepts derived from them which we
call primary intelligibles. The secondary stage of understanding, however, refers not to the objects of
physics, but rather to those of logic. It pertains to a highly abstract mental process; a rational
elaboration of concepts arrived at and established according to the rules of logic and the logical
divisions of genus, species, and difference. Thus at this stage the mind reflects upon itself, upon its
own contents, as It were, and the way it understands the ideas it formulates. These ideas or concepts
do not correspond with anything in the external world, as they are not concepts that are derived from
concrete objects, but are concepts of concepts like the concept of 'rational animal' as derived from
another concept 'man'. Concepts such as these are called secondary intelligibles (al-ma‘qulat al-
thaniyah). It is clear from the foregoing explanation that the reality of a thing, as understood
according to the rules of logic and the logical divisions of genus, species, and difference, refers to
quiddity as opposed to existence, in the sense that the quiddity is regarded as the reality which is
distinct from, and is qualified conceptually by existence; the relation between quiddity and existence
being respectively like that of subject and predicate. This perspective involves the understanding of
the nature of existence as a secondary intelligible to which nothing in the external world corresponds.

But there is another sense in which quiddity is understood. In contrast to quiddity as logically
understood to be what is defined in the reply to the question: "what is it?" that is, 'rational animal'
with reference to 'man', quiddity may also be ontologically understood to be 'that by which a thing is
what it is'. The distinction between these two meanings of quiddity is that in the former case it refers
only to genus in relation to species, for 'rational animal' is the genus by which the species 'man' is
defined; whereas in the latter case it refers always to a particular existent, like the individual thing to
which applies the ten categories, such as to a particular man.

When we consider the quiddity of a thing, we conceive it either in the thing itself as it exists in the
external world, or as it exists in the mind. The nature of quiddity as conceived by the intellect has
three aspects: 238
1. as pure abstraction ( mujarradah), unrelated to any thing or to any mind.239 Quiddity in this
aspect is completely independent in itself and cannot be related to any other concept. The
concept of 'animal' as it is in itself, for example, is nothing but pure 'animal' and cannot be
predicated of the concept 'man' because 'man' signifies something more than pure 'animal'.
In such a condition of pure abstraction, no other concept can be combined with it to form a
meaningful unity. If the concept 'rational' were added to 'animal' in this case, it would not
produce a coherent combination, since 'animal' as pure 'animal' cannot be qualified by
rationality.
2. as absolute indeterminate (mutlaqah), unrestricted by unrelatedness to any thing and free to
engage itself in individual things. The concept of 'animal', in the case of quiddity in this aspect,
is no longer restricted to itself as pure 'animal', but is indeterminate and has the potentiality
of being predicated of other concepts in a coherent combination. V\Then the concept
'rational' is predicated of 'animal' here, it produces the composite in the form of the concept
'man'. 'Animal' in this case can be predicated of 'man', since animality and rationality are
constituent parts of man;
3. same as in (2) above, and present in the mind240 where it receives various c.ccidents such
as predication, universality, particularity, and the like whereby the aspect of quiddity here is
mixed ( makhliifah), as when the concept of 'animal' refers to what is already actualized in
the external world as something specified as 'rational'. 'Animal' thus specified refers to an
object of the external world, to a particular man.

The same quiddity as considered by the intellect under the guise of these three aspects is called, in
the first case, 'conditioned by unrelatedness to anything' (bi shart la shay); in the second case, 'not
conditioned by unrelatedness to anything' (la bi shart shay); and in the third case, 'conditioned by
something' (bi shart shay). 241 The first refers to quiddity in relation to prime matter (maddah); the
second to genus (jins); and the third to species (naw'). 242