Pasei vs Drilon
branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc.
(PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of
Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," 1
challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1,
Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the
character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY
SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND
HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and
prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination
against males or females;" 2 that it "does not apply to all Filipino
workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;"
3 and that it is violative of the right to travel. The concept of police
power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the
"state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." 5 As
defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or
property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of
an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to
underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to
anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for
an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus
assuring the greatest benefits." 6
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does
not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing power and
eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and
sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has
enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall,
to whom the expression has been credited, 7 refers to it succinctly as
the plenary power of the State "to govern its citizens."
Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its
own limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it may not be
exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it
defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the
public good.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested
measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department
Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," 14 but it does
not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-
settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution 15 does
not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It
admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the
law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply
equally to all members of the same class. 16
Ichong vs Hernandez
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail
Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main
provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens
of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of
the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade;
(2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually
engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue
to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance
with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural
persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the
expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception
therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States;
(4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail
business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights
and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and
industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by
aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or
engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper
authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving,
among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and
liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and
(7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail
business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months
for purposes of liquidation.
Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1)
it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives
of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject
of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the
Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the
Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by
aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those
requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to
entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections
1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it
has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its
existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to
be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with
self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and
active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and
illimitable.
b. Limitations on police power. —
The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in
the following provisions of our Constitution:
SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution)
These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of
individual liberty and freedom in democracies, are not limited to
citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application, without
regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality. (
c. The, equal protection clause. —
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation,
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons
within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do
not.
d. The due process clause. —
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation
enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there public interest, a
public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not
unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or
reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a
capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be
achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified
interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask
when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of
due process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real.
Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist.
The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable
means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic
society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that
would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that
would mean license and anarchy.
There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to
be true to fact, about the controlling and dominant position that the
alien retailer holds in the nation's economy. Food and other essentials,
clothing, almost all articles of daily life reach the residents mostly
through him. In big cities and centers of population he has acquired not
only predominance, but apparent control over distribution of almost all
kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware, textiles, groceries, drugs,
sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other goods and articles.
Lutz vs Araneta
This case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental to test the legality of the taxes imposed by Commonwealth
Act No. 567, otherwise known as the Sugar Adjustment Act.
Promulgated in 1940, the law in question opens (section 1) with a
declaration of emergency, due to the threat to our industry by the
imminent imposition of export taxes upon sugar as provided in the
Tydings-McDuffe Act, and the "eventual loss of its preferential
position in the United States market"; wherefore, the national policy
was expressed "to obtain a readjustment of the benefits derived from
the sugar industry by the component elements thereof" and "to stabilize
the sugar industry so as to prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of
its preferential position in the United States market and the imposition
of the export taxes."
Plaintiff, Walter Lutz, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the
Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from the
Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of P14,666.40 paid by the estate
as taxes, under section 3 of the Act, for the crop years 1948-1949 and
1949-1950; alleging that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being
levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which
in plaintiff's opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax may be
constitutioally levied. The action having been dismissed by the Court
of First Instance, the plaintifs appealed the case directly to this Court
(Judiciary Act, section 17).
This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that sugar production is
one of the great industries of our nation, sugar occupying a leading
position among its export products; that it gives employment to
thousands of laborers in fields and factories; that it is a great source of
the state's wealth, is one of the important sources of foreign exchange
needed by our government, and is thus pivotal in the plans of a regime
committed to a policy of currency stability. Its promotion, protection
and advancement, therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare.
Hence it was competent for the legislature to find that the general
welfare demanded that the sugar industry should be stabilized in turn;
and in the wide field of its police power, the lawmaking body could
provide that the distribution of benefits therefrom be readjusted among
its components to enable it to resist the added strain of the increase in
taxes that it had to sustain.
Once it is conceded, as it must, that the protection and promotion of
the sugar industry is a matter of public concern, it follows that the
Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary
for its protection and expedient for its promotion. Here, the legislative
discretion must be allowed fully play, subject only to the test of
reasonableness; and it is not contended that the means provided in
section 6 of the law (above quoted) bear no relation to the objective
pursued or are oppressive in character. If objective and methods are
alike constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why the state may not
levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment. Taxation
may be made the implement of the state's police power.
Lozano vs Martinez
The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short),
popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law, which was approved on
April 3, 1979, is the sole issue presented by these petitions for decision.
The question is definitely one of first impression in our jurisdiction.
These petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses
under the statute. The defendants in those cases moved seasonably to
quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not
constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional.
The language of BP 22 is broad enough to cover all kinds of checks,
whether present dated or postdated, or whether issued in payment of
pre-existing obligations or given in mutual or simultaneous exchange
for something of value.
BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check
on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment
of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." The
penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less than 30
days nor more than one year or a fine or not less than the amount of
the check nor more than double said amount, but in no case to exceed
P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of
the court. 3
An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the
maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or
credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since this
involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates
a prima facie presumption of such knowledge where payment of the
check "is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or
credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the
date of the check. 5 To mitigate the harshness of the law in its
application, the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise
if within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor,
the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by
the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check.
BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing
checks that are worthless, i.e. checks that end up being rejected or
dishonored for payment. The practice, as discussed later, is proscribed
by the state because of the injury it causes to t public interests.
Before the enactment of BP 22, provisions already existed in our
statute books which penalize the issuance of bouncing or rubber
checks. Criminal law has dealth with the problem within the context of
crimes against property punished as "estafa" or crimes involving fraud
and deceit. The focus of these penal provisions is on the damage caused
to the property rights of the victim.
Among the constitutional objections raised against BP 22, the most
serious is the alleged conflict between the statute and the constitutional
provision forbidding imprisonment for debt. It is contended that the
statute runs counter to the inhibition in the Bill of Rights which states,
"No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax."
16 Petitioners insist that, since the offense under BP 22 is
consummated only upon the dishonor or non-payment of the check
when it is presented to the drawee bank, the statute is really a "bad debt
law" rather than a "bad check law." What it punishes is the non-
payment of the check, not the act of issuing it. The statute, it is claimed,
is nothing more than a veiled device to coerce payment of a debt under
the threat of penal sanction.
"The 'debt' intended to be covered by the constitutional guaranty has a
well-defined meaning. Organic provisions relieving from
imprisonment for debt, were intended to prevent commitment of
debtors to prison for liabilities arising from actions ex contractu The
inhibition was never meant to include damages arising in actions ex
delicto, for the reason that damages recoverable therein do not arise
from any contract entered into between the parties but are imposed
upon the defendant for the wrong he has done and are considered as
punishment, nor to fines and penalties imposed by the courts in
criminal proceedings as punishments for crime."
t "one of the purposes of the law is to suppress possible abuses on the
part of the employers who hire laborers or employees without paying
them the salaries agreed upon for their services, thus causing them
financial difficulties. "The law was viewed not as a measure to coerce
payment of an obligation, although obviously such could be its effect,
but to banish a practice considered harmful to public welfare.
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making
and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation
which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce
a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain
of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an
offense against property, but an offense against public order.
It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize
a person for non-payment of a debt ex contractu But certainly it is
within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts
deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are
not the only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be
considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but
because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be
outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can
do this in the exercise of its police power.
DECS vs San Diego
The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person
who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT)
is entitled to take it again.
The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that-
h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT.
After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to
take the NMAT for the fourth time.
The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with
a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that
he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times.1 When
he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the
basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test.
In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his
constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education.
After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4,
1989, declaring the challenged order invalid and granting the petition.
Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had been
deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary
exercise of the police power. 3
We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be
reversed.
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 4 this Court upheld the constitutionality of the
NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools
only to those who have initially proved their competence and
preparation for a medical education.
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice
it to repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are
reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.5
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have
a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in
which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer
the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness
its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no
less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner
that will best promote the common good while also giving the
individual a sense of satisfaction.
A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to
his patients. If one who wants to be a lawyer may prove better as a
plumber, he should be so advised and adviced. Of course, he may not
be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand he may not force his
entry into the bar. By the same token, a student who has demonstrated
promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to take a course in nursing,
however appropriate this career may be for others.
The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not
absolute. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the
right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.6
The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way
to those better prepared. Where even those who have qualified may
still not be accommodated in our already crowded medical schools,
there is all the more reason to bar those who, like him, have been tested
and found wanting.
Restituto Ynot Vs IAC
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump
boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the
police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of
E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the
constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos.
After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained
and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The
petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court
but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.
Issue: Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
Ruling: The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police
power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting
the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme
court said that The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned
measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition
of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere,
with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously,
retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter
there, any more than moving them to another province will make it
easier to kill them there
The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive
act defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately
imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process
was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were
arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned
to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and
given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once
and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be
heard, thus denying due process.
Quezon City vs Ericta
This is a petition for review which seeks the reversal of the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII declaring Section 9
of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, of the Quezon City Council null and
void.
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE
REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR
BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON
CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION
THEREOF" provides:
Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park
cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who
are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years
prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities.
The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be
open for operation not later than six months from the date of approval
of the application.
Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid
and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for
a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They
further argue that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its
charter, in the exercise of local police power, " to make such further
ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary
to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by
this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for
the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein."
On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that
the taking or confiscation of property is obvious because the
questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such
that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the
owner of all beneficial use of his property.
The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit (People
vs. Esguerra, 81 PhiL 33, Vega vs. Municipal Board of Iloilo, L-6765,
May 12, 1954; 39 N.J. Law, 70, Mich. 396). A fortiori, the power to
regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in
question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a
memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13 of said ordinance,
'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or
imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate
and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled.'
Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the
public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property' (Quoted in Political Law by Tanada and Carreon, V-11, p.
50). It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and
enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property
outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to
promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not
recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence
thereof (12 C.J. 623). It has been said that police power is the most
essential of government powers, at times the most insistent, and always
one of the least limitable of the powers of government
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six
(6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial
grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good
order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is
actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for
this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private
cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the
Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to
prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the
city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the
provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries.
Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary of Agrarian
Reform
In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked and
challenged Hercules for his life on his way to Mycenae after
performing his eleventh labor. The two wrestled mightily and Hercules
flung his adversary to the ground thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose
even stronger to resume their struggle. This happened several times to
Hercules' increasing amazement. Finally, as they continued grappling,
it dawned on Hercules that Antaeus was the son of Gaea and could
never die as long as any part of his body was touching his Mother
Earth. Thus forewarned, Hercules then held Antaeus up in the air,
beyond the reach of the sustaining soil, and crushed him to death.
Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without whose
invigorating touch even the powerful Antaeus weakened and died.
These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related
laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice
and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an
agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an
agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands
they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of
the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was
promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory acquisition of
private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify
maximum retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon
Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of
the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still
unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their
payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian
reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing
the mechanics for its (PP131’s) implementation, was also enacted.
Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while considerably changing
the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory
effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought
exception from the land distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657.
The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands
whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since
their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced
to distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they
themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In short, they
want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because they claim
to belong to a different class.1
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws
(PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the ground that these laws already
valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the
specific amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in
eminent domain which provides that only courts can determine just
compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under
the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners
may be paid for their land in bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay
averred that just compensation has always been in the form of money
and not in bonds.
There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the
power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of
both powers at the same time on the same subject. In the case of City
of Baguio v. NAWASA, 24 for example, where a law required the
transfer of all municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA in
exchange for its assets of equivalent value, the Court held that the
power being exercised was eminent domain because the property
involved was wholesome and intended for a public use. Property
condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious
purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be
demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should
be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such
property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the
power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just
compensation to the owner.
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of
the police power deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed,
and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the State of rights in property
without making compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the
public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking.
The restriction here in question is merely the prohibition of a noxious
use. The property so restricted remains in the possession of its owner.
The state does not appropriate it or make any use of it. The state merely
prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount
rights of the public. Whenever the use prohibited ceases to be noxious
— as it may because of further changes in local or social conditions —
the restriction will have to be removed and the owner will again be free
to enjoy his property as heretofore.
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to
forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of
just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to
expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms also
acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may
be agreed upon by the parties. 35 It is only where the owner is
unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered
by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play
to assert the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the
property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible
demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as in
the case of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the
supreme law.
But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by
no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is
found in the constitutional injunction that "private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation" and in the abundant
jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle.
Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1)
public use and (2) just compensation.
As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, 42 there is
compensable taking when the following conditions concur: (1) the
expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry must be for
more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under warrant or
color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use
or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5)
the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as
to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the
property. All these requisites are envisioned in the measures before us.
Manila Memorial Park vs DSWD
Before us is a Petition for Prohibition2 under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court filed by petitioners Manila Memorial Park, Inc. and La Funeraria
Paz-Sucat, Inc., domestic corporations engaged in the business of
providing funeral and burial services, against public respondents
Secretaries of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) and the Department of Finance (DOF).
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 7432,3 as amended by RA 9257,4 and the implementing
rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and DOF insofar as these
allow business establishments to claim the 20% discount given to
senior citizens as a tax deduction.
Factual Antecedents
On April 23, 1992, RA 7432 was passed into law, granting senior
citizens the following privileges:
SECTION 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The senior citizens
shall be entitled to the following:
a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments
relative to utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar
lodging establishment[s], restaurants and recreation centers and
purchase of medicine anywhere in the country: Provided, That private
establishments may claim the cost as tax credit;
b) a minimum of twenty percent (20%) discount on admission fees
charged by theaters, cinema houses and concert halls, circuses,
carnivals and other similar places of culture, leisure, and amusement;
c) exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: Provided,
That their annual taxable income does not exceed the property level as
determined by the National Economic and Development Authority
(NEDA) for that year;
d) exemption from training fees for socioeconomic programs
undertaken by the OSCA as part of its work;
e) free medical and dental services in government establishment[s]
anywhere in the country, subject to guidelines to be issued by the
Department of Health, the Government Service Insurance System and
the Social Security System;
f) to the extent practicable and feasible, the continuance of the same
benefits and privileges given by the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), Social Security System (SSS) and PAG-IBIG, as the
case may be, as are enjoyed by those in actual service.
On August 23, 1993, Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 02-94 was issued
to implement RA 7432. Sections 2(i) and 4 of RR No. 02-94 provide:
Sec. 2. DEFINITIONS. – For purposes of these regulations: i. Tax
Credit – refers to the amount representing the 20% discount granted to
a qualified senior citizen by all establishments relative to their
utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar lodging
establishments, restaurants, drugstores, recreation centers, theaters,
cinema houses, concert halls, circuses, carnivals and other similar
places of culture, leisure and amusement, which discount shall be
deducted by the said establishments from their gross income for
income tax purposes and from their gross sales for value-added tax or
other percentage tax purposes. x x x x Sec. 4.
RECORDING/BOOKKEEPING REQUIREMENTS FOR PRIVATE
ESTABLISHMENTS. – Private establishments, i.e., transport
services, hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants,
recreation centers, drugstores, theaters, cinema houses, concert halls,
circuses, carnivals and other similar places of culture[,] leisure and
amusement, giving 20% discounts to qualified senior citizens are
required to keep separate and accurate record[s] of sales made to senior
citizens, which shall include the name, identification number, gross
sales/receipts, discounts, dates of transactions and invoice number for
every transaction. The amount of 20% discount shall be deducted from
the gross income for income tax purposes and from gross sales of the
business enterprise concerned for purposes of the VAT and other
percentage taxes.
FACTS: RA 7432 was passed into law (amended by RA 9257),
granting senior citizens 20% discount on certain establishments.
To implement the tax provisions of RA 9257, the Secretary of Finance
and the DSWD issued its own Rules and Regulations.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners are not questioning the 20% discount granted to senior
citizens but are only assailing the constitutionality of the tax deduction
scheme prescribed under RA 9257 and the implementing rules and
regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF.
Petitioners posit that the tax deduction scheme contravenes Article III,
Section 9 of the Constitution, which provides that: "private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."
Respondents maintain that the tax deduction scheme is a legitimate
exercise of the State’s police power.
ISSUE: Whether the legally mandated 20% senior citizen discount is
an exercise of police power or eminent domain.
RULING: The 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police
power.
It may not always be easy to determine whether a challenged
governmental act is an exercise of police power or eminent domain.
The judicious approach, therefore, is to look at the nature and effects
of the challenged governmental act and decide on the basis thereof.
The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens
who, at their age, are less likely to be gainfully employed, more prone
to illnesses and other disabilities, and, thus, in need of subsidy in
purchasing basic commodities. It serves to honor senior citizens who
presumably spent their lives on contributing to the development and
progress of the nation.
In turn, the subject regulation affects the pricing, and, hence, the
profitability of a private establishment.
The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with substantial
distinctions from, price control or rate of return on investment control
laws which are traditionally regarded as police power measures.
The subject regulation differs there from in that (1) the discount does
not prevent the establishments from adjusting the level of prices of
their goods and services, and (2) the discount does not apply to all
customers of a given establishment but only to the class of senior
citizens. Nonetheless, to the degree material to the resolution of this
case, the 20% discount may be properly viewed as belonging to the
category of price regulatory measures which affect the profitability of
establishments subjected thereto. On its face, therefore, the subject
regulation is a police power measure.
Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works
Facts:1. Petitioner was the governor of Rizal, filed a petition assailing
the validity of R.A. 920 which contains an item providing for an
appropriation of P85,000.00 for the construction and repair of a feeder
road in Pasig. The said law was passed in Congress and approved by
the President.
2. The property over which the feeder road will be constructed is
however owned by Sen. Zulueta. The property was to be donated to the
local government, though the donation was made a few months after
the appropriation was included in RA 920. The petition alleged that the
said planned feeder road would relieve Zulueta the responsibility of
improving the road which is inside a private subdivision.
3. The lower court (RTC) ruled that the petitioner has standing to assail
the validity of RA 920, due to the public interest involved in the
appropriation. However, he does not have a standing with respect to
the donation since he does not have an interest that will be injured by
said donation, hence it dismissed the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has the standing to file the petition
YES.
1. Petitioner has standing. He is not merely a taxpayer but the governor
of the province of Rizal which is considered one of the most populated
biggest provinces during that time, its taxpayers bear a substantial
portion of the burden of taxation in the country.
2. Public funds can only be appropriated for a public purpose. The test
of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is
whether it is used to promote public interest. Moreover, the validity of
a stature depends on the powers of the Congress at the time of its
passage or approval, not upon events occurring, or acts performed
subsequent thereto, unless it is an amendment of the organic law.
legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything
but a public purpose
a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public
revenue for anything but a public purpose. . . . It is the essential
character of the direct object of the expenditure which must determine
its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interest to
be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the
community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited
by their promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state, which results
from the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private
enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use public
money
In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for
public purposes only, discussed supra sec. 14, money raised by
taxation can be expended only for public purposes and not for the
advantage of private individuals. (85 C.J.S. pp. 645-646; emphasis
supplied.)
Explaining the reason underlying said rule, Corpus Juris Secundum
states:
Generally, under the express or implied provisions of the constitution,
public funds may be used only for public purpose. The right of the
legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its right to tax, and,
under constitutional provisions against taxation except for public
purposes and prohibiting the collection of a tax for one purpose and the
devotion thereof to another purpose, no appropriation of state funds
can be made for other than for a public purpose.
The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public
funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the public interest,
as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although
each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public.
Punsalan vs. Municipal Board of Manila [G.R. No. L-4817, May
26, 1954]
This suit was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by
two lawyers, a medical practitioner, a public accountant, a dental
surgeon and a pharmacist, purportedly "in their own behalf and in
behalf of other professionals practising in the City of Manila who may
desire to join it." Object of the suit is the annulment of Ordinance No.
3398 of the City of Manila together with the provision of the Manila
charter authorizing it and the refund of taxes collected under the
ordinance but paid under protest.
The ordinance in question, which was approved by the municipal board
of the City of Manila on July 25, 1950, imposes a municipal occupation
tax on persons exercising various professions in the city and penalizes
non-payment of the tax "by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos
or by imprisonment of not more than six months, or by both such fine
and imprisonment in the discretion of the court." Among the
professions taxed were those to which plaintiffs belong. The ordinance
was enacted pursuant to paragraph (1) of section 18 of the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila (as amended by Republic Act No. 409),
which empowers the Municipal Board of said city to impose a
municipal occupation tax, not to exceed P50 per annum, on persons
engaged in the various professions above referred to.
Having already paid their occupation tax under section 201 of the
National Internal Revenue Code, plaintiffs, upon being required to pay
the additional tax prescribed in the ordinance, paid the same under
protest and then brought the present suit for the purpose already stated.
We do not think it is for the courts to judge what particular cities or
municipalities should be empowered to impose occupation taxes in
addition to those imposed by the National Government. That matter is
peculiarly within the domain of the political departments and the courts
would do well not to encroach upon it. Moreover, as the seat of the
National Government and with a population and volume of trade many
times that of any other Philippine city or municipality, Manila, no
doubt, offers a more lucrative field for the practice of the professions,
so that it is but fair that the professionals in Manila be made to pay a
higher occupation tax than their brethren in the provinces.
Double Taxation
The argument against double taxation may not be invoked where one
tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city (1
Cooley on Taxation, 4th ed., p. 492), it being widely recognized that
there is nothing inherently obnoxious in the requirement that license
fees or taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation, calling or
activity by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof
Lladoc vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Sometime in 1957, the M.B. Estate, Inc., of Bacolod City, donated
P10,000.00 in cash to Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz, then parish priest of
Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of herein petitioner, for
the construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality. The total
amount was actually spent for the purpose intended.
On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate, Inc., filed the donor's gift
tax return. Under date of April 29, 1960, the respondent Commissioner
of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for donee's gift tax against
the Catholic Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental, of which
petitioner was the priest. The tax amounted to P1,370.00 including
surcharges, interests of 1% monthly from May 15, 1958 to June 15,
1960, and the compromise for the late filing of the return.
Petitioner lodged a protest to the assessment and requested the
withdrawal thereof. The protest and the motion for reconsideration
presented to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue were denied. The
petitioner appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals on November 2, 1960.
In the petition for review, the Rev. Fr. Casimiro Lladoc claimed,
among others, that at the time of the donation, he was not the parish
priest in Victorias; that there is no legal entity or juridical person
known as the "Catholic Parish Priest of Victorias," and, therefore, he
should not be liable for the donee's gift tax. It was also asserted that the
assessment of the gift tax, even against the Roman Catholic Church,
would not be valid, for such would be a clear violation of the provisions
of the Constitution.
Tax Exemptions
It is a cardinal rule in taxation that exemptions from payment thereof
are highly disfavored by law, and the party claiming exemption must
justify his claim by a clear, positive, or express grant of such privilege
by law
The phrase "exempt from taxation" as employed in Section 22(3),
Article VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, should not be
interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. Statutes
exempting charitable and religious property from taxation should be
construed fairly though strictly and in such manner as to give effect to
the main intent of the lawmakers.
Section 22 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, exempts
from taxation cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents,
appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used
exclusively for religious purposes. The exemption is only from the
payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as property
taxes, as contra distinguished from excise taxes. In the present case,
what the Collector assessed was a donee's gift tax; the assessment was
not on the properties themselves. It did not rest upon general
ownership; it was an excise upon the use made of the properties, upon
the exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties (Phipps vs.
Com. of Int. Rec. 91 F 2d 627). Manifestly, gift tax is not within the
exempting provisions of the section just mentioned. A gift tax is not a
property tax, but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by
way of gift inter vivos, the imposition of which on property used
exclusively for religious purposes, does not constitute an impairment
of the Constitution. As well observed by the learned respondent Court,
the phrase "exempt from taxation," as employed in the Constitution
(supra) should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of
taxes. And there being no clear, positive or express grant of such
privilege by law, in favor of petitioner, the exemption herein must be
denied.
Abra Valley College vs. Aquino
Abra Valley College is an educational corporation and institution of
higher learning in Bangued, Abra. In 1974, the CFI ordered for the
seizure and sale of the subject school property for non-payment of real
estate taxes and penalties. Private respondents stated that the college
lot and building in question are not only used for educational purposes
of the college, but also as the permanent residence of the President and
Director, Mr. Pedro V. Borgonia, and his family including his in-laws
and grandchildren; while the ground floor of the college building is
being used and rented by a commercial establishment.
Abra Valley College vs. Aquino [G.R. No. L-39086, June 15, 1988]
Due to its time frame, the constitutional provision which finds
application in the case at bar is Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of
the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, which expressly grants
exemption from realty taxes for "Cemeteries, churches and parsonages
or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable or educational
purposes ...
Relative thereto, Section 54, paragraph c, Commonwealth Act No. 470
as amended by Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known as the
Assessment Law, provides:
The following are exempted from real property tax under the
Assessment Law:
(c) churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all
lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific or educational purposes.
Taxation and Incidental Use
Moreover, the exemption in favor of property used exclusively for
charitable or educational purposes is 'not limited to property actually
indispensable' therefor (Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 2, p. 1430), but
extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of said purposes, such as in the case of
hospitals, "a school for training nurses, a nurses' home, property use to
provide housing facilities for interns, resident doctors, superintendents,
and other members of the hospital staff, and recreational facilities for
student nurses, interns, and residents'
The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for
purposes mentioned in the Constitution (Apostolic Prefect v. City
Treasurer of Baguio, 71 Phil, 547 [1941]).
It must be stressed however, that while this Court allows a more liberal
and non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase "exclusively used for
educational purposes" as provided for in Article VI, Section 22,
paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, reasonable emphasis
has always been made that exemption extends to facilities which are
incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
main purposes. Otherwise stated, the use of the school building or lot
for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by
jurisprudence. Thus, while the use of the second floor of the main
building in the case at bar for residential purposes of the Director and
his family, may find justification under the concept of incidental use,
which is complimentary to the main or primary purpose—educational,
the lease of the first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing
Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered
incidental to the purpose of education.
Sison vs. Ancheta
The success of the challenge posed in this suit for declaratory relief or
prohibition proceeding 1 on the validity of Section I of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 135 depends upon a showing of its constitutional infirmity. The
assailed provision further amends Section 21 of the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1977, which provides for rates of tax on citizens or
residents on (a) taxable compensation income, (b) taxable net income,
(c) royalties, prizes, and other winnings, (d) interest from bank deposits
and yield or any other monetary benefit from deposit substitutes and
from trust fund and similar arrangements, (e) dividends and share of
individual partner in the net profits of taxable partnership, (f) adjusted
gross income. 2 Petitioner 3 as taxpayer alleges that by virtue thereof,
"he would be unduly discriminated against by the imposition of higher
rates of tax upon his income arising from the exercise of his profession
vis-a-vis those which are imposed upon fixed income or salaried
individual taxpayers. 4 He characterizes the above sction as arbitrary
amounting to class legislation, oppressive and capricious in character
5 7. Petitioner likewise invoked the kindred concept of uniformity.
Power to Tax
Chief Justice Makalintal thus: "The areas which used to be left to
private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called
upon to enter optionally, and only 'because it was better equipped to
administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group
of individuals,' continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to
be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its
sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of
the times." 11 Hence the need for more revenues. The power to tax, an
inherent prerogative, has to be availed of to assure the performance of
vital state functions. It is the source of the bulk of public funds. To
praphrase a recent decision, taxes being the lifeblood of the
government, their prompt and certain availability is of the essence. 12
Limitations
The power to tax moreover, to borrow from Justice Malcolm, "is an
attribute of sovereignty. It is the strongest of all the powers of of
government." 13 It is, of course, to be admitted that for all its plenitude
'the power to tax is not unconfined. There are restrictions. The
Constitution sets forth such limits . Adversely affecting as it does
properly rights, both the due process and equal protection clauses may
properly be invoked, all petitioner does, to invalidate in appropriate
cases a revenue measure. if it were otherwise, there would -be truth to
the 1803 dictum of Chief Justice Marshall that "the power to tax
involves the power to destroy."
. It is undoubted that the due process clause may be invoked where a
taxing statute is so arbitrary that it finds no support in the Constitution.
An obvious example is where it can be shown to amount to the
confiscation of property. That would be a clear abuse of power. It then
becomes the duty of this Court to say that such an arbitrary act
amounted to the exercise of an authority not conferred. That properly
calls for the application of the Holmes dictum. It has also been held
that where the assailed tax measure is beyond the jurisdiction of the
state, or is not for a public purpose, or, in case of a retroactive statute
is so harsh and unreasonable, it is subject to attack on due process
grounds. 19
equal protection.
The applicable standard to avoid the charge that there is a denial of this
constitutional mandate whether the assailed act is in the exercise of the
police power or the power of eminent domain is to demonstrated that
the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the
attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility,
or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. It
suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons
under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the
same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges
conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference
cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and
security shall be given to every person under circumstances which if
not Identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden
or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same
fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally
binding on the rest." 20 That same formulation applies as well to
taxation measures remedies. The Constitution does not require things
which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though
they were the same." 21 Hence the constant reiteration of the view that
classification if rational in character is allowable. As a matter of fact,
in a leading case of Lutz V. Araneta, 22 this Court, through Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, went so far as to hold "at any rate, it is inherent in the
power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and
it has been repeatedly held that 'inequalities which result from a
singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe
no constitutional limitation.'"
According to the Constitution: "The rule of taxation shag be uniform
and equitable." 24 This requirement is met according to Justice Laurel
in Philippine Trust Company v. Yatco,25 decided in 1940, when the
tax "operates with the same force and effect in every place where the
subject may be found. " 26 He likewise added: "The rule of uniformity
does not call for perfect uniformity or perfect equality, because this is
hardly attainable." 27 The problem of classification did not present
itself in that case. It did not arise until nine years later, when the
Supreme Court held: "Equality and uniformity in taxation means that
all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed
at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable
and natural classifications for purposes of taxation, ... . 28 As clarified
by Justice Tuason, where "the differentiation" complained of
"conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity”
Taxpayers may be classified into different categories
There is no legal objection to a broader tax base or taxable income by
eliminating all deductible items and at the same time reducing the
applicable tax rate. Taxpayers may be classified into different
categories. To repeat, it. is enough that the classification must rest upon
substantial distinctions that make real differences. In the case of the
gross income taxation embodied in Batas Pambansa Blg. 135, the,
discernible basis of classification is the susceptibility of the income to
the application of generalized rules removing all deductible items for
all taxpayers within the class and fixing a set of reduced tax rates to be
applied to all of them. Taxpayers who are recipients of compensation
income are set apart as a class. As there is practically no overhead
expense, these taxpayers are e not entitled to make deductions for
income tax purposes because they are in the same situation more or
less. On the other hand, in the case of professionals in the practice of
their calling and businessmen, there is no uniformity in the costs or
expenses necessary to produce their income. It would not be just then
to disregard the disparities by giving all of them zero deduction and
indiscriminately impose on all alike the same tax rates on the basis of
gross income. There is ample justification then for the Batasang
Pambansa to adopt the gross system of income taxation to
compensation income, while continuing the system of net income
taxation as regards professional and business income.
Phil. Blooming Mills Employees v. Phil. Blooming Mills Co., Inc 51
SCRA 189
1) The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization
(PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of
the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners
Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de
Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and
Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.
PBMEO decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of Malacañang
to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig
Police.
2) Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass
demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against
alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers
in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular
second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5
P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company
of their proposed demonstration.
3) The Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the
leaders of the PBMEO after learning about the planned mass
demonstration. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was
confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out by the union that the
demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in factual
exercise of the laborers inalienable constitutional right to freedom of
expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of
grievances.
4) The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would
interrupt the normal course of their business which may result in the
loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the possibility
that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the
rally.
5) A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their
appeal that while the workers may be allowed to participate, those from
the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate,
otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the
plan, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were
eventually dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’
clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.
6) The lower court decided in favour of Philippine Blooming Mills Co.,
Inc., and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining
in bad faith. The PBMEO’s motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed
two days late.
Issue:
Whether or not to regard the demonstration against police officers, not
against the employer, as a violation of freedom expression in general
and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances
Whether or not the collective bargaining agreement is an inhibition of
the rights of free expression, free assembly and petition of the
employers
Held:
1) Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human
rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the
passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the
power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the
tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and
of oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise.
The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before
Malacañang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not
against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said
demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom
expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for
redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental
agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers of the
municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights for
their mutual aid protection from what they believe were police
excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent
firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members from the
harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest herein private
respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for,
its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment,
vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their
respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits.
2) To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the
employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence
a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the
dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches
unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is “a potent
means of inhibiting speech” and therefore inflicts a moral as well as
mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of
peaceful assembly and of petition.
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of
the employees, according to the respondent Court Industrial Relations,
in effect imposes on the workers the “duty … to observe regular
working hours.” The strain construction of the Court of Industrial
Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to
stage mass demonstration against police abuses during working hours,
constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life the workers and
deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should
not be predicated on such a slender ground.
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice.
Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its
employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged
police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners
from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for
redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor
practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3
of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right “to engage
in concert activities for … mutual aid or protection”; while Section 4(a-
1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with,
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in
Section Three.
The Supreme Court set aside as null and void the orders of Court of
Industrial Relations. The Supreme Court also directed the re-
instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from
the date of their separation from the service until re-instated, minus one
day’s pay and whatever earnings they might have realized from other
sources during their separation from the service.
Simon v. CHR GR No. 100150, Jan 5, 1994
G.R. No. 100150 January 05, 1994
Facts :Petitioner Mayor Simon asks to prohibit CHR from further
hearing and investigating "demolition case" on vendors of North
EDSA.
Constitutional Issue : Whether the CHR is authorized to hear and
decide on the "demolition case" and to impose a fine for contempt.
Ruling : Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution empowered
the CHR to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights. The demolition of stalls, sari-sari stores and
carenderia cannot fall within the compartment of "human rights
violations involving civil and political rights".
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his
humanity and are the same in all parts of the world.
Human rights include civil rights (right to life, liberty and property;
freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, academic freedom; rights
of the accused to due process of law), political rights (right to elect
public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form political
associations and engage in politics), social rights (right to education,
employment and social services.
Human rights are entitlements that inhere in the individual person from
the sheer fact of his humanity...Because they are inherent, human rights
are not granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected
by it.
Human rights includes all the civil, political, economic, social and
cultural rights defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is
human. They are part of his natural birth, right, innate and inalienable.
CIVIL RIGHTS - are those that belong to every citizen and are not
connected with the organization or administration of the government.
POLITICAL RIGHTS - are rights to participate, directly or indirectly,
in the establishment or administration of the government.
Section I
Procedural Due Process
Judicial Proceedings
El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca
G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918
* JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property
which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of
the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual
custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal
proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power
ogfdcsxazf the court over the property is recognized and made
effective.
* The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi
in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly
speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is
substantially such.
* DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is
always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by
agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be
affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its
condemnation and sale.
FACTS: Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged
various parcels of real property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-
Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died on
January 29, 1810 without returning again to the Philippines. The
mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant
is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The
Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the
defendant’s last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not
shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement.
Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila,
the cause proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The
decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction
was held with the bank as the highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this
sale was confirmed by the court. However, about seven years after the
confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as
administrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein the
applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and the
judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The
basis of this application was that the order of default and the judgment
rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.
ISSUE: * Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant and the subject matter of the action
* Whether or not due process of law was observed
RULING: On Jurisdiction:The word “jurisdiction” is used in several
different, though related, senses since it may have reference (1) to the
authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to
administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the
court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to
the litigation.
The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature
and extent of its powers in general and thus fixes its competency or
jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the
relief it may grant.
How Jurisdiction is Acquired: Jurisdiction over the person is acquired
by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission to
its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process
exerted over the person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may
result either from a seizure of the property under legal process,
whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result
from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special
provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is
recognized and made effective. In the latter case the property, though
at all times within the potential power of the court, may never be taken
into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by
actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the property
is seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its
progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An
illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found
in the proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the
registration of land. Here the court, without taking actual physical
control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person
claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property
and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all the world.
In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage
is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea
that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of
that nature and is substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is,
in its narrow application, used only with reference to certain
proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated
as responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings
are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in
the circumstance that in the former an individual is named as
defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest
therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All
proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of
the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or
other form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The
judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the
parties.
It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom
publication is made appears, the action becomes as to him a personal
action and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the
proposition that where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi
in rem; and it should therefore be considered with reference to the
principles governing actions in rem.
Galvez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114046 October 24, 1994
Facts:On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the
incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and one Godofredo
Diego were charged in three separate informations with homicide and
two counts of frustrated homicide for allegedly shooting to death Alvin
Calma Vinculado and seriously wounding Levi Calma Vinculado and
Miguel Reyes Vinculado, Jr.
On December 15, 1993, before petitioners could be arraigned,
respondent prosecutor filed an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw
Informations of the original informations. This motion was granted by
Judge Villajuan also on December 15, 1993 and the cases were
considered withdrawn from the docket of the court. On the same day,
Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new informations against herein
petitioners for murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and violation
of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms.
Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the new informations for lack of
jurisdiction was filed by petitioners before Judge Pornillos on January
3, 1994. At the court session set for the arraignment of petitioners on
January 24, 1994, Judge Pornillos issued an order denying the motion
to quash.
In the meantime, and prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners
before Judge Pornillos, an order was issued on January 20, 1994 by
Judge Villajuan granting the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners, ordering the reinstatement of the original informations, and
setting the arraignment of the accused therein for February 8, 1994. On
said date, however, the arraignment was suspended and, in the
meanwhile, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with respondent Court of Appeals, assailing the order dated
January 24, 1994 issued by Judge Pornillos which denied petitioners’
motion to quash filed for the new informations. As earlier stated,
respondent court dismissed the petition in its questioned resolution of
February 18, 1994, hence this petition.
Issue: Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the original
informations is null and void on the ground that there was no notice
and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court.
Held: No, considering that in the original cases before Branch 14 of
the trial court petitioners had not yet been placed in jeopardy, and the
ex parte motion to withdraw was filed and granted before they could
be arraigned, there would be no imperative need for notice and hearing
thereof. In actuality, the real grievance of herein accused is not the
dismissal of the original three informations but the filing of four new
informations, three of which charge graver offenses and the fourth, an
additional offense. Had these new informations not been filed, there
would obviously have been no cause for the instant petition.
Accordingly, their complaint about the supposed procedural lapses
involved in the motion to dismiss filed and granted in Criminal Cases
Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93 does not impress us as a candid
presentation of their real position.
Petitioner’s contention that the dismissal of the original informations
and the consequent filing of the new ones substantially affected their
right to bail is too strained and tenuous an argument. They would want
to ignore the fact that had the original informations been amended so
as to charge the capital offense of murder, they still stood to likewise
be deprived of their right to bail once it was shown that the evidence
of guilt is strong. Petitioners could not be better off with amended
informations than with the subsequent ones. It really made no
difference considering that where a capital offense is charged and the
evidence of guilt is strong, bail becomes a matter of discretion under
either an amended or a new information.
Contrary to petitioners’ submission, the absence of notice and hearing
does not divest a trial court of authority to pass on the merits of the
motion. It has been held that—“The order of the court granting the
motion to dismiss despite absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of
service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot
deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the case. The court still
retains its authority to pass on the merits of the motion. The remedy of
the aggrieved party in such cases is either to have the order set aside or
the irregularity otherwise cured by the court which dismissed the
complaint or to appeal from the dismissal and not certiorari.”
State Prosecutors v. Muro 236 SCRA 505
Facts:
The state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of
Prosecution filed a complaint against respondent Judge Muro on the
ground of ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violation of the
provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct. The case at bar involves
the prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in violation
of the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank
Circular 960. The respondent judge dismissed all 11 cases solely on
the basis of the report published from the 2 newspapers, which the
judge believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that the Pres.
of the Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions. The
respondent’s decision was founded on his belief that the reported
announcement of the Executive Department in the newspaper in effect
repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the court of its jurisdiction
to further hear the pending case thus motu propio dismissed the case.
He further contends that the announcement of the President as
published in the newspaper has made such fact a public knowledge that
is sufficient for the judge to take judicial notice which is discretionary
on his part.
The complainants contend that the respondent judge erred in taking
judicial notice on matters he purported to be a public knowledge based
merely on the account of the newspaper publication that the Pres. has
lifted the foreign exchange restriction. It was also an act of inexcusable
ignorant of the law not to accord due process to the prosecutors who
were already at the stage of presenting evidence thereby depriving the
government the right to be heard. The judge also exercised grave abuse
of discretion by taking judicial notice on the published statement of the
Pres. In the newspaper which is a matter that has not yet been officially
in force and effect of the law.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in taking judicial notice on the statement of the president
lifting the foreign exchange restriction published in the newspaper as
basis for dismissing the case?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held the respondent judge guilty for gross
ignorance of the law. It cannot comprehend his assertion that there is
no need to wait for the publication of the circular no. 1353 which is the
basis of the President’s announcement in the newspaper, believing that
the public announcement is absolute and without qualification and is
immediately effective and such matter becomes a public knowledge
which he can take a judicial notice upon in his discretion. It is a
mandatory requirement that a new law should be published for 15 days
in a newspaper of general circulation before its effectivity. When the
President’s statement was published in the newspaper, the respondent
admitted of not having seen the official text of CB circular 1353 thus
it was premature for him to take judicial notice on this matter which is
merely based on his personal knowledge and is not based on the public
knowledge that the law requires for the court to take judicial notice of.
For the court to take judicial notice, three material requisites should be
present:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain;
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the
court.
The fact that should be assumed as judicially known must be on such
notoriety that such fact cannot be disputed. Judicial notice is not
judicial knowledge where the personal knowledge of the judge does
not amount to the judicial notice of the court. The common knowledge
contemplated by the law where the court can take judicial notice must
come from the knowledge of men generally in the course of ordinary
experiences that are accepted as true and one that involves
unquestioned demonstration. The court ruled that the information he
obtained from the newspaper is one of hearsay evidence. The judge
erred in taking cognizant of a law that was not yet in force and ordered
the dismissal of the case without giving the prosecution the right to be
heard and of due process. The court ordered for the dismissal of the
judge from service for gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of
discretion for dismissing the case motu proprio and for erring in
exercising his discretion to take judicial notice on matters that are
hearsay and groundless with a reminder the power to take judicial
notice is to be exercised by the courts with caution at all times.
Carvajal v. CA 280 SCRA 351
FACTS: Petitioner allegedly acquired portions of the parcel of land by
inheritance from his father Felix Carvajal who came to possess the
unregistered land in 1938, continuously, openly, adversely and
peacefully in the concept of an owner up to the time of his death.
The latter court upheld the trial court LRC Case No. 414(-A), LRC
Record No. N-60084 filed before Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City,
Branch 71. In dismissing petitioner's application for registration of title
of a parcel of land in Antipolo City. The Court recognized respondent
Solid Homes, Inc. as the registered owner of a parcel of land covered
by TCT No. N-7873, situated in Antipolo City.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the application for
registration, and denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this recourse to this Court via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner further maintains that he was denied due process when he,
as an applicant in a land registration case, was not able to take the
witness stand. According to petitioner, even his counsel hardly
participated in the proceeding except to propound clarificatory
questions during the examination of Engineer Silverio Perez of the
Land Registration Authority
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were denied due process of law
HELD: No. While petitioner claims that he was denied due process
because he was unable to take the witness stand. The court ruled that
the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. It is the
denial of this opportunity that is repugnant to due process.[19] In this
case, petitioner was afforded an opportunity to present witnesses, and
he did present three. However, petitioner did not invoke his right to
take the witness stand even when the trial court ordered the submission
of the parties’ memoranda which signified the termination of the
proceedings. Because he acquiesced to the termination of the case, he
forfeited his right to take the witness stand.
Perez v. Estrada AM. No. OI-4-O3-SC June 29, 2001 and Sept. 13,
2001
FACTS: On March 13, 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng
Pilipinas (KBP), an association representing duly franchised and
authorized television and radio networks throughout the country, sent
a letter requesting the Supreme Court to allow live media coverage of
the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against
former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order
"to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an
unprecedented case in our history." The request was seconded by Mr.
Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 5 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and,
still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo.
On 17 April 2001, the Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally
filed the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not media coverage be allowed to air Estrada’s trial
to the public.
HELD: No. In Estes v. Texas, US SC held that television coverage of
judicial proceedings involves an inherent denial of due process rights
of the criminal defendant: "Witnesses might be frightened, play to the
cameras, become nervous. They are then subject to extraordinary out-
of-court influences that might affect their testimony. Telecasting
increases the trial judge's responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the
defendant. For the defendant, telecasting is a form of mental
harassment and subjects him to excessive public exposure and distracts
him from an effective presentation of his defense. Finally, the
television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or
inadvertently can destroy an accused and his case in the eyes of the
public."
The right of people to information does not prescribe that TV cameras
be installed in the courtroom. This right might be fulfilled by less
distracting, degrading and more judicial means. In a criminal case, a
life is at stake, and the due process rights of the accused shall take
precedence over the people's right to information. The accused has the
right to a public trial, and the exercise of such a right is his to make,
because it is his life and liberty that is in the balance. A public trial is
not the same as a publicized trial.
IBP: "TV coverage can negate the rule on the exclusion of the witness
intended to ensure a fair trial...could allow the 'hooting throng' to
arrogate upon themselves the task of judging the guilt of the
accused...will not subserve the ends of justice, but will only pander to
the desire of publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers."
Court is not unmindful of the recent technological advances but to
chance forthwith the life and liberty of any person in a hasty bid to use
and apply them, even before ample safety nets are provided and the
concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high
to pay.
Perez v. Estrada
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC September 13, 2001
FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying
petitioners’ request for permission to televise and broadcast live the
trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The
motion was filed by the Secretary of Justice, as one of the petitioners,
who argues that there is really no conflict between the right of the
people to public information and the freedom of the press, on the one
hand, and, on the other, the right of the accused to a fair trial; that if
there is a clash between these rights, it must be resolved in favor of the
right of the people and the press because the people, as the repository
of sovereignty, are entitled to information; and that live media
coverage is a safeguard against attempts by any party to use the courts
as instruments for the pursuit of selfish interests.
On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his
objection to the live TV and radio coverage of his trial on the ground
that its allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that, based on his
experience with the impeachment trial, live media coverage will only
pave the way for so-called "expert commentary" which can trigger
massive demonstrations aimed at pressuring the Sandiganbayan to
render a decision one way or the other. Mr. Estrada contends that the
right of the people to information may be served through other means
less distracting, degrading, and prejudicial than live TV and radio
coverage.
ISSUE: Whether or not television and radio coverage of plunder case
be allowed.
HELD: No. The Court has considered the arguments of the parties on
this important issue and, after due deliberation, finds no reason to alter
or in any way modify its decision prohibiting live or real time broadcast
by radio or television of the trial of the former president. By a vote of
nine (9) to six (6) of its member, the Court denies the motion for
reconsideration of the Secretary of Justice.
In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by the vote
of eight (8) Justices, has resolved to order the audio-visual recording
of the trial for documentary purposes. Seven (7) Justices vote against
the audio-visual recording of the trial. Considering the significance of
the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the
importance of preserving the records thereof, the Court believes that
there should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings. The
recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but for
documentary purposes. Only later will they be available for public
showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its decision
in every case to which the recording pertains. The master film shall be
deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and
Archives Office for historical preservation and exhibition pursuant to
law.
Ang Tibay v. CIR 69 Phil. 635 .
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company
which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of
leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his employees.
However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the
validity of said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off
were members of NLU while no members of the rival labor union
National Workers Brotherhood (NWB) were laid off. NLU claims that
NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting
NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio
and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking
its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing
for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a
new trial.
HELD: Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or
documents obtained by NLU, which they attached to their petition with
the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the trial
that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected
to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial
Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-
reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily
mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered (said
newly obtained records include books of business/inventory accounts
by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but already
existing).
The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although
not strictly bound by the Rules of Court must also make sure that they
comply to the requirements of due process. For administrative bodies,
due process can be complied with by observing the following:
The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested
or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof.
Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case
and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts
but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide
right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached.
Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected.
The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on
its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision.
The administrative body should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding
can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.
OCA v. Pascual 259 SCRA 604
Before any member of the Judiciary could be faulted, it should be only
after due investigation and after presentation of competent evidence
derived from direct knowledge, especially since the charge is penal in
character.
Administrative Case against JUDGE FILOMENO PASCUAL
- One CEFERINO TIGAS wrote a letter, addressed to OCA
of SC, charging that irregularities and corruption were being
committed by the RESPONDENT Presiding Judge of MTC
- Letter was referred to NBI for “discreet investigation” of
respondent.
o Proceeded to Angat, Bulacan, in order to look for Ceferino
Tigas, the letter writer but realized was a fictitious character.
o Proceeded to the residence of CANDIDO CRUZ, an accused
in respondent’s sala.
- In affidavit, Cruz declared that he was the accused in a
criminal case for Frustrated Murder.
o Respondent judge decided that the crime he committed was
only physical injuries
o Cruz made to understand that, in view of such action, Cruz
was to give him P2,000
Respondent judge also believed to be a drunkard
- NBI entrapped Respondent judge with help of Cruz, for
which reason, the judge was thought to have been caught in flagrante
delicto.
- Result of investigation and Respondent referred to the
Inquest Prosecutor of the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
Ombudsman, with the recommendation that he be charged and
prosecuted for Bribery (Art. 210 RPC)
o Executive Judge NATIVIDAD G. DIZON submitted report
and recommendation that Respondent judge be penalized for violation
of Canons 2 and 3 of Code of Judicial Conduct (A Judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities and a
judge should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality
and diligence).
ISSUES AND HOLDING
1. Whether or not the evidences presented against Judge
Filomeno Pascual were strong enough to convict him. No
Respondent was not afforded right to open trial wherein respondent
can confront the witnesses against him and present evidence in his
defense. Only bases for the Report and Recommendation submitted
consist of: The Complaint, the Answer, the Memorandum of the
respondent, and the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing of
the bribery case of respondent judge at the Sandiganbayan. Before any
member of the Judiciary could be faulted, it should be only after due
investigation and after presentation of competent evidence derived
from direct knowledge, especially since the charge is penal in
character.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE IS DISMISSED
Lumiqued v. Exevea 282 SCRA 125
Arsenio Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was
charged by Jeannette Zamudio, the Regional Cashier, for dishonesty
due to questionable gas expenses under his office. It was alleged that
he was falsifying gas receipts for reimbursements and that he had an
unliquidated cash advance worth P116,000.00. Zamudio also
complained that she was unjustly removed by Lumiqued two weeks
after she filed the two complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ.
Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and
10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second
hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him
to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion,
but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself
had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for
resolution. The Investigating Committee recommended the dismissal
of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the recommendation. Fidel
Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued.
Lumiqued appealed averring that his right to due process was violated
as well as his right to security of tenure.
ISSUE: Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted
by counsel during an administrative inquiry?
HELD: No. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the
waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded
a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not an
absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal
proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the
case at bar, Lumiqued invoked the right of an accused in criminal
proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own
choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime. The
investigation conducted by the committee was for the purpose of
determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law
for the complaints filed against him. The right to counsel is not
indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the
law.
“. . . There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a
non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and
that, without such representation, he shall not be bound by such
proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not
indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due
process clause such that without the participation of its members, the
safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not
that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer
at his side.”
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to explain one’s side. Whatever irregularity attended the
proceedings conducted by the committee was cured by Lumiqued’s
appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration.
The Supreme Court also emphasized that the constitutional provision
on due process safeguards life, liberty and property. Public office is a
public trust. It is not a property guaranteed of due process. But when
the dispute concerns one’s constitutional right to security of tenure,
however, public office is deemed analogous to property in a limited
sense; hence, the right to due process could rightfully be invoked.
Nonetheless, the right to security of tenure is not absolute especially
when it was proven, as in this case, that the public officer (Lumiqued)
did not live up to the Constitutional precept i.e., that all public officers
and employees must serve with responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency.
Fabella V. CA 282 SCRA 256
On September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Carino issued a return-to-
work order to all public school teachers who had participated in walk-
outs and strikes on various dates during the period of September to
October 1990. The mass action had been staged to demand payment of
13th month pay, allowances and passage of debt cap bill in Congress.
On October 1990, Secretary Carino filed administrative cases against
respondents, who are teachers of Mandaluyong High School. The
charge sheets required respondents to explain in writing why they
should not be punished for having taken part in the mass action in
violation of civil service laws. Administrative hearings started on
December 1990. Respondents, through counsel assailed the legality of
the proceedings on the following due process grounds: first, they were
not given copies of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the
investigation and denied access to evidence; second, the investigation
placed the burden of proof on respondents to prove their innocence;
third, that the investigating body was illegally constituted, their
composition and appointment violated Sec.9 of the Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers. Pending the action assailing the validity of the
administrative proceedings, the investigating committee rendered a
decision finding the respondents guilty and ordered their immediate
dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents were denied due process?
HELD: YES. In administrative proceedings, due process has been
recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or
constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect
a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally
or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in
one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with
competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by
substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or
contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. The
legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta
for Public School Teachers, which specifically covers administrative
proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law
expressly provides that the committee to hear public schoolteachers’
administrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent
of the division as chairman, a representative of the local or any existing
provincial or national teachers’ organization and a supervisor of the
division. In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS
to hear the administrative charges against private respondents did not
include “a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing
provincial or national teacher’s organization” as required by Section 9
of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no
competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were
necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension
or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a representative
of a teachers’ organization in these committees was indispensable to
ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would have
given substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any
proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the
basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. Other
minor issues: Petitioners allege that Sec 9 of RA 4670 was complied
with because the respondents are members of Quezon City Teachers
Federation. We disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in their
respective teachers’ organizations does not ipso facto make them
authorized representatives of such organizations as contemplated by
Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this section, the teachers’ organization
possesses the right to indicate its choice of representative to be
included by the DECS in the investigating committee. Such right to
designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of education or the
director of public schools or their underlings. In the instant case, there
is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as
members of its investigating committee was ever designated or
authorized by a teachers’ organization as its representative in said
committee. Sec 9 of RA 4670 was repealed by PD 807. Statcon
principle, a subsequent general law cannot repeal a previous specific
law, unless there is an express stipulation. Always interpret laws so as
to harmonize them.
Summary Dismissal vs Torcita
FACTS: On 26 April 1994, a red Cortina Ford, driven by C/Insp.
Lazaro Torcita, with his aide, PO2 Java, in the front seat and his wife
with two ladies at the backseat, were overtaken by a Mazda pick-up
owned by Congressman Manuel Puey and driven by one Reynaldo
Consejo with four (4) passengers in the persons of Alex Edwin del
Rosario, Rosita Bistal, Carmen Braganza and Cristina Dawa. After the
Mazda pick-up has overtaken the red Cortina Ford, and after a
vehicular collision almost took place, it accelerated speed and
proceeded to Hacienda Aimee, a sugarcane plantation owned by the
congressman. The red Cortina Ford followed also at high speed until it
reached the hacienda where Torcita and Java alighted and the
confrontation with del Rosario and Jesus Puey occurred. Torcita
identified himself but the same had no effect.
PO2 Java whispered to him that there are armed men around them and
that it is dangerous for them to continue. That at this point, they radioed
for back-up.
Torcita, upon the arrival of the back-up force of PNP Cadiz City,
proceeded to the place where Capt. Jesus Puey and Alex Edwin del
Rosario were.
On 6 July 1994, 12 verified administrative complaints were filed
against Torcita for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal
Search, Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and
Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban.The 12
administrative complaints were consolidated into 1 major complaint
for conduct unbecoming of a police officer. The Summary Dismissal
Board, however, did not find sufficient evidence to establish that
Torcita threatened anybody with a gun, nor that a serious confrontation
took place between the parties, nor that the urinating incident took
place, and held that the charges of violation of domicile and illegal
search were not proven. Still, while the Board found that Torcita was
"in the performance of his official duties" when the incident happened,
he allegedly committed a simple irregularity in performance of duty
(for being in the influence of alcohol while in performance of duty)
and was suspended for 20 days and salary suspended for the same
period of time.
Torcita appealed his conviction to the Regional Appellate Board of the
Philippine National Police (PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City), but the
appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Whereupon, Torcita filed a petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City (Branch 31), questioning the legality of the
conviction of an offense for which he was not charged (lack of
procedural due process of law). The Board filed a motion to dismiss,
which was denied.
The RTC granted the petition for certiorari and annulled the dispositive
portion of the questioned decision insofar as it found Torcita guilty of
simple irregularity in the performance of duty.
The Board appealed from the RTC decision, by petition of review to
the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the same for the reason that the
respondent could not have been guilty of irregularity considering that
the 12 cases were eventually dismissed. The Board filed the petition
for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether Torcita may be proceeded against or suspended for
breach of internal discipline, when the original charges against him
were for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search,
Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of
Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban.
HELD: NO. Notification of the charges contemplates that the
respondent be informed of the specific charges against him. The
absence of specification of the offense for which he was eventually
found guilty is not a proper observance of due process. There can be
no short-cut to the legal process. While the definition of the more
serious offense is broad, and almost all-encompassing a finding of guilt
for an offense, no matter how light, for which one is not properly
charged and tried cannot be countenanced without violating the
rudimentary requirements of due process. Herein, the 12
administrative cases filed against Torcita did not include charges or
offenses mentioned or made reference to the specific act of being drunk
while in the performance of official duty. There is no indication or
warning at all in the summary dismissal proceedings that Torcita was
also being charged with breach of internal discipline consisting of
taking alcoholic drinks while in the performance of his duties. The
omission is fatal to the validity of the judgment finding him guilty of
the offense for which he was not notified nor charged. Further, the
cursory conclusion of the Dismissal Board that Torcita "committed
breach of internal discipline by taking drinks while in the performance
of same" should have been substantiated by factual findings referring
to this particular offense. Even if he was prosecuted for irregular
performance of duty, he could not have been found to have the odor or
smell of alcohol while in the performance of duty because he was not
on duty at the time that he had a taste of liquor because he was on a
private trip fetching his wife. Hence , the decision of the petitioners
Board was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction. Petition
dismissed.
Office of the Ombudsman v. Coronel
FACTS: Respondent Carmencita D. Coronel is a Senior Accounting
Processor B with Salary Grade 10 of the Linamon Water District,
Lanao del Norte. On September 26, 1997, the Board of Directors of
Linamon Water District, by virtue of Resolution No. 056[,] Series of
1997, designated [respondent] as Officer-in-Charge, effective October
1, 1997 until a General Manager shall have been appointed.
In the morning of October 14, 1998, respondent called for a meeting
the officers of the different Water Districts in Lanao del Norte and
Lanao del Sur, as well as their advisors from the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA). Since it was nearing lunchtime, the group
opted to continue their meeting at Marvillas Store at Barangay Bunu-
un, Iligan City. The luncheon meeting, attended by more or less ten
(10) persons, was presided over by Advisor Rhodora Gumban of the
LWUA. As the host of the said meeting, [respondent] paid for the lunch
in the amount of One Thousand Two [H]undred Thirteen [P]esos
(P1,213.00), as shown in cash Invoice No. 0736 dated October 14,
1998.
On November 13, 1998, respondent claimed for reimbursement of her
expenses covered by Voucher No. 98-11-23, chargeable against the
representation and entertainment account of her office. That very same
day, the voucher was approved and [respondent] got her
reimbursement in the amount of One Thousand Two Hundred Thirteen
Pesos (P1,213.00). On November 17, 1998, Pedro C. Sausal, Jr. was
appointed General Manager of Linamon Water District. On February
1999, he filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a sworn
letter-complaint against herein [respondent] for dishonesty. The case
was docketed as Case No. OMB-MIN-ADM 99-044. The complaint
alleges that [respondent] falsified the cash invoice she submitted for
reimbursement by making it appear that the luncheon bill was for One
Thousand Two [H]undred Thirteen [P]esos (P1,213.00) when in fact,
it was only Two [H]undred Thirteen [P]esos (P213.00), as reflected in
the photocopy of the original duplicate of cash invoice No. 0736 dated
October 14, 1998.
On November 27, 2000, Grace H. Morales, Graft Investigation Officer
I of the OMB-Mindanao, Davao City, rendered a decision holding that
respondent CARMENCITA D. CORONEL is guilty of
DISHONESTY and is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with
forfeiture of all leave credits and retirement benefits, pursuant to
Section 22 (a) in relation to Sec. 9 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. She is
disqualified from re-employment in the national and local
governments, as well as in any agency, including government-owned
or controlled corporations.
Respondent filed for MR to the Graft Investigation Officer and such
motion was granted. Herein, petitioner Ombudsman Aniano Desierto
DISAPPROVED the above order with a marginal note, the original
decision stands.
The appellate court reinstated the decision of the Graft Investigation
Officer where it nullified petitioner Ombudsman’s Disapproval Order.
The appellate court said that the OMBs disapproval was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. First, petitioner ombudsman did not consider
the credible evidence presented by respondent in her Motion for
Reconsideration. Second, he did not give any justification for his
disapproval of the investigating officers ruling. This shortcoming was
in contravention of the constitutional mandate that all decisions, even
if rendered by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, should clearly
and distinctly state the facts and the law on which they are based.
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman committed grave injustice for not
considering the evidence presented by respondent in her Motion for
Reconsideration.
HELD: YES. The SC find the evidence presented by the complainant
insufficient to support his serious charge that she was dishonest.
The original Decision of the ombudsman was not supported by the
evidence, but was grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and
conjectures. The evidence of the prosecution consisted merely of the
original Official Receipt (OR) No. 0736, and a photocopy of the
original duplicate of that receipt. The first was a bill for P1,213; and
the latter, for P213. Both pieces of evidence refer to one and the same
Official Receipt; yet, they contain different amounts. Obviously, one
of them was falsified. Unfortunately, Complainant Sausal, Jr., failed to
prove that it was indeed respondents receipt that was falsified. As it
stands, we do not know for certain if the number 1 was inserted in OR
No. 0736 or was deleted from the unauthenticated photocopy of the
original duplicate. The evidence is equivocal. Besides, given that there
were 8 to 10 attendees in the luncheon meeting, a bill of P1,213 for
meals was not entirely improbable, even in 1998.
In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding
of guilt is substantial evidence; that is, such relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In
the instant case, the complainant did not present evidence to support
his theory that the photocopy of the original duplicate reflected the true
amount, or that OR No. 0736 had indeed been falsified. That oversight
was fatal to the discharge of his burden of proof. A reasonable mind
will not carelessly jump to the conclusion that respondent is the guilty
party.
The complainants evidence to prove falsification consisted of an
unauthenticated photocopy of the original duplicate. He could have
obtained an affidavit from the restaurant proprietor or employee who
had issued the receipt, in order to attest to its due execution and
authenticity. Absent any proof of due execution and authenticity, the
alleged photocopy of the original duplicate of OR No. 0736 does not
convince us that it is an accurate reflection of the actual bill incurred.
While this Court adheres to a liberal view of the conduct of
proceedings before administrative agencies, it also consistently
requires some proof of authenticity or reliability as a condition for the
admission of documents. Absent any such proof of authenticity, the
photocopy of the original duplicate should be considered inadmissible
and, hence, without probative value. Given the flimsy charge and the
paucity of the evidence against respondent, there is no need for her to
present additional evidence to vindicate herself. The Office of the
Ombudsman should have dismissed the Administrative Complaint
against her in the first place. Clearly, her guilt was not proven by
substantial evidence.
Thus, Respondent Carmencita D. Coronel is hereby EXONERATED
of the charge against her for lack of substantial evidence.s
Sec. of Justice vs Lantion
FACTS: On 13 January 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Presidential Decree 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the
Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign
Country".
On 13 November 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon,
representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed
in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States
of America.
The Senate, by way of Resolution 11, expressed its concurrence in the
ratification of the said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the
Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the
admissibility of the documents accompanying an extradition request
upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the
requested state resident in the Requesting State).
On 18 June 1999, the Department of Justice received from the
Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale 0522 containing a
request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States.
Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the
warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of
Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition.
Jimenez was charged in the United States for violation of
(a) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the
United States, 2 counts),
(b) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax, 4 counts),
(c) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television, 2 counts),
(d) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries, 6 counts), and
(E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; 33 counts).
On the same day, the Secretary issued Department Order 249
designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and
to handle the case.
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Jimenez
(on 1 July 1999 requested copies of the official extradition request
from the US Government, as well as all documents and papers
submitted therewith, and that he be given ample time to comment on
the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers.
The Secretary denied the request.
On 6 August 1999, Jimenez filed with the Regional Trial Court a
petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation,
l for mandamus (to compel the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez the
extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him
an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and
thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively);
l certiorari (to set aside the Justice Secretary’s letter dated 13 July
1999); and prohibition (to restrain the Justice Secretary from
considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition
petition in court;
l and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the
NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of Jimenez to
the United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction.
The trial court ruled in favor of Jimenez. The Secretary filed a petition
for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
On 18 January 2000, by a vote of 9-6, the Supreme Court dismissed
the petition and ordered the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez copies
of the,extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting
evidence.
IN SUMMARY: The Department of Justice received from the
Department of Foreign Affairs a request from the United States for the
extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States pursuant to PD No.
1609 prescribing the procedure for extradition of persons who have
committed a crime in a foreign country. Jimenez requested for copies
of the request and that he be given ample time to comment on said
request. The petitioners denied the request pursuant to the RP-US
Extradition Treaty.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of
the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty.
HELD: NO. The human rights of person and the rights of the accused
guaranteed in the Constitution should take precedence over treaty
rights claimed by a contracting party, the doctrine of incorporation is
applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with a situation
where there is a conflict between a rule of the international law and the
constitution. Efforts must first be made in order to harmonize the
provisions so as to give effect to both but if the conflict is
irreconcilable, the municipal law must be upheld. The fact that
international law has been made part of the law of the land does not
pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over the municipal
law in the municipal sphere. In states where the constitution is the
highest law of the land, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if
they are in conflict with the constitution.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and
present danger of loss of property or employment but of liberty itself,
which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land.
The convergence of petitioners favorable action on the extradition
request and the deprivation of private respondents liberty is easily
comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that this Courts equity jurisdiction,
which is aptly described as "justice outside legality," may be availed
of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial
pronouncements.The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not
even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondents due
process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are
protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the
organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees
against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with
the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.
Thus, Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting
evidence.
Gov’t of USA v. Puruganan
FACTS: Petition is a sequel to the case “Sec. of Justice v. Hon.
Lantion”. The Secretary was ordered to furnish Mr. Jimenez copies of
the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter
a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting
evidence. But, on motion for reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice, it
reversed its decision but held that the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the
right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process. On May 18, 2001, the Government of the USA,
represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, filed with the
RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the issuance of an order
for his “immediate arrest” pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to
prevent the flight of Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on the petition,
Mr. Jimenez filed before it an “Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte
Motion” praying for his application for an arrest warrant be set for
hearing. After the hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez
submitted his Memorandum. Therein seeking an alternative prayer
that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the
amount of P100,000. The court ordered the issuance of a warrant for
his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash. After
he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond,
Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.
Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court to set aside the order for the issuance of a warrant
for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash
which the court deems best to take cognizance as there is still no local
jurisprudence to guide lower court.

ISSUES:
i. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a
potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of
PD No. 1069
ii. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail
iii. Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process
HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED.
Regional Trial Court of
Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it.
i. YES. By using the phrase “if it appears,” the law further conveys
that accuracy is not as important as speed at such early stage. From
the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is
expected merely to get a good first impression or a prima facie finding
sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest
and detention of the accused. The prima facie existence of probable
cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant
was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting
documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom that a
prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez.
The silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable
interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing
every little step in the entire proceedings. It also bears emphasizing at
this point that extradition proceedings are summary in nature. Sending
to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest
and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample
opportunity to prepare and execute an escape which neither the Treaty
nor the Law could have intended.
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked
by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance
of a warrant of arrest. To determine probable cause for the issuance
of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination
under oath or affirmation of complainants and the witnesses they may
produce.1
The Proper Procedure to “Best Serve The Ends Of Justice” In
Extradition Cases
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting
documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as possible,
a prima facie finding whether
a) they are sufficient in form and substance
b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law
c) the person sought is extraditable
At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further
documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses
of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima
facie finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion
of the judge. On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case
is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant
for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to
answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings.
Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify
the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter
be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings.
ii. Yes.
The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the
Constitution, as well
as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a
person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because
extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption
of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to
the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal,
unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In extradition, the
presumption of innocence is not at issue. The provision in the
Constitution stating that the “right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended” finds
application “only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.”
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are
bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the
present case. Extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from
the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for
bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before
the extradition court.
Exceptions to the “No Bail” Rule
Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. It is subject to
judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case. Bail
may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and
convincing showing
1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a
danger to the community; and
2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the
highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty
in extradition cases therein
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and
since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and
fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered
requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness.
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won
a congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public knowledge that
the United States was requesting his extradition. Therefore, his
constituents were or should have been prepared for the consequences
of the extradition case. Thus, the court ruled against his claim that his
election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him
bail.
Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance
for the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving him the power to
grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out and
unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more.
Extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed
to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and,
while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic
contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose.
That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean
that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our
government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the
Petition for Extradition.
iii. NO.
Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to
fundamental fairness. The doctrine of right to due process and
fundamental fairness does not always call for a prior opportunity to be
heard. A subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. He will be
given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition
court hears the Petition for Extradition. Indeed, available during the
hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard
and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary
nature of extradition.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the
extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in
that country. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state;
yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
Other Doctrines:
Five Postulates of Extradition
1) Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime
In this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and
an expanding ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an
isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to
improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.
2) The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused
By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have
reposed its trust
in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its
treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of the latter
to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case therein.
3) The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
An extradition proceeding is sui generis:
a) It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all
the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. It does not
involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His
guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he
will be extradited.
b) An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal
proceedings involve a full-blown trial.
c) In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case
requires proof “beyond reasonable doubt” for conviction while a
fugitive may be ordered extradited “upon showing of the existence of
a prima facie case”
d) Unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon
being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may
adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final
discretion to extradite him.
Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance
through which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored
to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. The ultimate
purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine
whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty,
and whether the person sought is extraditable.
4) Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
We are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our
obligations
under the Treaty. Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a
position to deliver the
accused, should it be found proper
5) There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused
were
willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein
respondent:
a) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his
indictment proceedings there; and
b) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting
state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are
bailable
Extradition is Essentially Executive
Extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility
arising out of the presidential power to conduct foreign relations and
to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of government
has broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation.
Gov’t of Hongkong v. Olalia
FACTS:
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court
with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as
agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery
Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of
the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of
Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted,
he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong
Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private
respondent. The RTC issued an Order of Arrest against private
respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
Private respondent filed a petition for bail which was opposed by
petitioner. After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying
the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting
bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight
risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing the
case, it was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order
denying his application for bail and this was granted by respondent
judge.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was
denied by respondent judge. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in
the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
HELD:
No. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the
premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary
detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is
based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice.
Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus
probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be
granted bail.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations,
committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value
the worth and dignity of every person. Clearly, the right of a
prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be
viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines
concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights.
Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty.
Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every
individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine
Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the removal of an accused
from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of
foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold
him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him
or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or
criminal law of the requesting state or government."
Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the
potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is
merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape
of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to
the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. It
does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations,
the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life,
liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed,
not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to
which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an
extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard
for the grant is satisfactorily met.
there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show
that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded
to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be
granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the
Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered
into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to
comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and
defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily
mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should
diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process.
More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our
Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the
Philippines is a party. This Court should not, therefore, deprive an
extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard
for the grant is satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof
required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond
reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in
character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative
cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which
is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In
his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he
termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail
in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower
than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of
evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing
evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders
and processes of the extradition court. In this case, there is no showing
that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a
flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial
court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on
the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
Ocampo vs. Abando
FACTS:A mass graveyard was found at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay
Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte by the43rd Infantry Brigade containing 67
skeletal remains of those believed to be victims of “Operation Venereal
Disease (VD)” by the Communist Party of the Philippines/ New
People’s Army/National Democratic Front (CPP/NPA/NPDF) of the
Philippines. This was done to purge their ranks of suspected military
informers.
Members of the Scene of the Crime Operation team conducted forensic
crime analysis to identify the bodies by way of DNA sample. The
initial report of the PNP Crime Laboratory on their identities remained
inconclusive, but, in a Special Report, the Case Secretariat of the
Regional and National Inter-Agency Legal Action Group came up with
ten names of possible victims after comparing the testimonies of
relatives and witnesses.
Police Chief Inspector George L. Almaden and Staff Judge Advocate
Captain Allan Tiu sent undated letters to Pros. Vivero, requesting for
legal action on the twelve attached complaint affidavits. These were
from relatives of the alleged victims of Operation VD who all swore
that their relatives had been abducted or last seen with members of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP.
Charging them with murder, the affidavits were directed to 71 named
members of the group, including the petitioners. Namely, the
petitioners were Ocampo, Echanis, Baylosis and Ladlad who were all
pointed out to be members of the Central Committee that ordered the
campaign to be carried out in 1985.
On this basis, Pros. Vivero issued a subpoena requiring them to submit
their counter-affidavits and Ocampo complied. However, Echanis and
Baylosis did not do so because allegedly they were not served the copy
of a subpoena. As for Ladlad, though his counsel made formal
appearance during the preliminary investigation, he also did not submit
for the same reason as the two.
Pros. Vivero, in a resolution, directed the filing of information for 15
counts of multiple murder against the 54 named members, including
the petitioners. He also caused some respondents to be used as state
witnesses for their testimony is vital to the prosecution. Said
information was filed before RTC Hilongos, Leyte branch 18 presided
by Judge Abando.
Prior to receiving the resolution, Ocampo filed an Ex Parte Motion to
Set Case for Clarificatory Hearing. Judge Obando found probable
cause and ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against them with
no recommended bail.
Ocampo went to the Supreme Court by way of special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 and asked for the
abovementioned order and the prosecutor’s resolution to be annulled.
He said that a case for rebellion against him and 44 others was then
already pending before RTC Makati and so, the crime of murder was
absorbed by the rebellion in line with the political offense doctrine.
The Court ordered the Solicitor General to comment on the issue and
also ordered the parties to submit their memoranda. From the oral
arguments, the Court found that the single Information charging them
all of 15 counts of murder was defective. The prosecution moved to
admit amended and new information, but Judge Abando suspended the
proceedings during the pendency of the case before the Court.
Meanwhile, Echanis was arrested and he, along with Baylosis, filed a
Motion for Judicial Reinvestigation/ Determination of Probable Cause
with Prayer to Dismiss the Case Outright and Alternative Prayer to
Recall/ Suspend Service of Warrant, but it was dismissed by Judge
Abando. Around this time, Ladlad filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss
with the RTC Manila.
Echanis and Baylosis moved to reconsider but it was not acted because,
as per request of the DOJ Secretary to change the venue of the trial, the
records were transmitted to RTC Manila. Echanis and Baylosis
continued to seek relief from the Supreme Court in response to Judge
Abando’s orders. Echanis also prayed for his release.
Both Ocampo and Echanis were granted provisional release by the
Supreme Court under cash bonds.
As to Ladlad’s Motion to Quash, it was denied by respondent judge
and the same happened to his Motion for Reconsideration. Ladlad
sought to annul the latter’s orders by way of special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65.
As to their bail, Ladlad filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail whereas
Baylosis filed a Motion to Allow Petitioner to Post Bail which were
granted, with no opposition from the OSG (bec. they’re consultants of
the NDFP negotiating team, then having talks with the GRP peace
panel).
ISSUE:Whether or not the petitioners’ right to due process was
violated.
HELD:NO. Petitioners were accorded due process during preliminary
investigation and in the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
A preliminary investigation is "not a casual affair." It is conducted to
protect the innocent from the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of
a public trial. While the right to have a preliminary investigation before
trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a substantive right and
a component of due process in the administration of criminal justice.
In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process
of law entails the opportunity to be heard. It serves to accord an
opportunity for the presentation of the respondent’s side with regard to
the accusation. Afterwards, the investigating officer shall decide
whether the allegations and defenses lead to a reasonable belief that a
crime has been committed, and that it was the respondent who
committed it. Otherwise, the investigating officer is bound to dismiss
the complaint.
"The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit evidence in support of one's defense." What is proscribed is
lack of opportunity to be heard. Thus, one who has been afforded a
chance to present one’s own side of the story cannot claim denial of
due process.
As to the claim of petitioners Echanis and Baylosis that they were
denied due process, we quote the pertinent portion of Prosecutor
Vivero’s Resolution, which states:
In connection with the foregoing and pursuant to the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure[,] the respondents were issued and served with
Subpoena at their last known address for them to submit their counter-
affidavits and that of their witnesses.
Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits
because they could no longer be found in their last known address, per
return of the subpoenas. On the other hand, Saturnino Ocampo Satur,
Fides Lim, Maureen Palejaro and Ruben Manatad submitted their
Counter-Affidavits. However, Vicente Ladlad and Jasmin Jerusalem
failed to submit the required Counter Affidavits in spite entry of
appearance by their respective counsels.
Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero
to resolve the complaint based on the evidence before him if a
respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a
respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity to present
countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation remains valid.
The rule was put in place in order to foil underhanded attempts of a
respondent to delay the prosecution of offenses.In this case, the
Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve subpoenas on
the named respondents at their last known addresses. This is sufficient
for due process. It was only because a majority of them could no longer
be found at their last known addresses that they were not served copies
of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence.
Moreover, Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had every
opportunity to secure copies of the complaint after his counsel’s formal
entry of appearance and, thereafter, to participate fully in the
preliminary investigation. Instead, he refused to participate.
We have previously cautioned that "litigants represented by counsel
should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await
the outcome of their case."106 Having opted to remain passive during
the preliminary investigation, petitioner Ladlad and his counsel cannot
now claim a denial of due process, since their failure to file a counter-
affidavit was of their own doing.
As to Ocampo’s claim that he was denied the right to file a motion for
reconsideration or to appeal the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero due
to the 19-day delay in the service of the Resolution, it must be pointed
out that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal
to the Secretary of Justice is reckoned from the date of receipt of the
resolution of the prosecutor, not from the date of the resolution. This
is clear from Section 3 of the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule
on Appeal:
Sec. 3. Period to appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the resolution, or of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration/ reinvestigation if one has been filed within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the assailed resolution. Only one motion for
reconsideration shall be allowed. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, when petitioner Ocampo received the Resolution of Prosecutor
Vivero on 12 March 2007,108 the former had until 27 March 2007
within which to file either a motion for reconsideration before the latter
or an appeal before the Secretary of Justice. Instead, petitioner Ocampo
chose to file the instant petition for certiorari directly before this Court
on 16 March 2007.
Estrada vs Ombudsman
FACTS:Sometime in November and December 2013, the Ombudsman
served on Sen. Estrada two (2) criminal complaints for plunder, among
others. Eighteen (18) of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two
complaints filed their counter-affidavits between 9 December 2013
and 14 March 2014.
On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be Furnished
with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents,
Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings” (the “Request”). Sen.
Estrada’s request was made “[p]ursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to
examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not
have been furnished’ (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court)
and to ‘have access to the evidence on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).”
The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s Request, which is not the
subject of the present certiorari case.
ISSUE:WON petitioner Estrada was denied due process of law
HELD:NO. The denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s constitutional
right to due process.
First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish
a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents.
The SC cited in its decision Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as Rule II of Administrative
Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, for
ready reference.
Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter-
affidavits of his co-respondents violates his constitutional right to due
process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule which
states that it is a compulsory requirement of due process in a
preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman furnish a respondent
with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Neither Section 3(b),
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c),
Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
supports Sen. Estrada’s claim. What the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to furnish the
respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting affidavits
and documents at the time the order to submit the counter-affidavit is
issued to the respondent. This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman when it states,
"[a]fter such affidavits [of the complainant and his witnesses] have
been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching
thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents,
directing the respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, his counter-affidavits x x x." At this point, there is still no
counter-affidavit submitted by any respondent. Clearly, what Section
4(b) refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, not
the affidavits of the co-respondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits
of the co-respondents are not part of the supporting affidavits of the
complainant. No grave abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to the
Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order which
denied Sen. Estrada’s Request.
Second, it should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary
investigation is only for the determination of probable cause, and
“probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be
determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a
part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand
the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-
examine his accusers to establish his innocence.” Thus, the rights of a
respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to those granted
by procedural law.
A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for
the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of evidence
now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient
to “engender a well-founded belief” as to the fact of the commission
of a crime and the respondent’s probable guilt thereof. A preliminary
investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of
the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as
may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. We are in
accord with the state prosecutor’s findings in the case at bar that there
exists prima facie evidence of petitioner’s involvement in the
commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the
evidence presented and the facts obtaining therein.
Third, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who
has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary investigation could be
waived by the accused, we find no compelling justification for a strict
application of the evidentiary rules.
Fourth, the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is not
akin to those in administrative proceedings as laid down in the
landmark doctrine of Ang Tibay. The quantum of evidence needed in
Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is greater than the evidence needed
in a preliminary investigation to establish probable cause, or to
establish the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the
prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay refers to “substantial evidence,”
while the establishment of probable cause needs “only more than ‘bare
suspicion,’ or ‘less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction’.”
In the United States, from where we borrowed the concept of probable
cause, the prevailing definition of probable cause is this:
In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we
deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and
prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is
accordingly correlative to what must be proved.
Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long
as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence
is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary
investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary, and
does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. However,
in administrative cases, where rights and obligations are finally
adjudicated, what is required is “substantial evidence” which cannot
rest entirely or even partially on hearsay evidence. Substantial basis is
not the same as substantial evidence because substantial evidence
excludes hearsay evidence while substantial basis can include hearsay
evidence. To require the application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in
GSIS, in preliminary investigations will change the quantum of
evidence required in determining probable cause from evidence of
likelihood or probability of guilt to substantial evidence of guilt.
Actually, the Ombudsman went beyond legal duty and even furnished
Sen. Estrada with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents
whom he specifically named, as well as the counter-affidavits of some
of other co-respondents. In the 4 June 2014 Joint Order, the
Ombudsman even held in abeyance the disposition of the motions for
reconsideration because the Ombudsman granted Sen. Estrada five
days from receipt of the 7 May 2014 Joint Order to formally respond
to the claims made by his co-respondents. The Ombudsman faithfully
complied with the existing Rules on preliminary investigation and even
accommodated Sen. Estrada beyond what the Rules required. Thus, the
Ombudsman could not be faulted with grave abuse of discretion. Since
this is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, the Petition fails in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman.
The constitutional due process requirements mandated in Ang Tibay,
as amplified in GSIS, are not applicable to preliminary investigations
which are creations of statutory law giving rise to mere statutory rights.
A law can abolish preliminary investigations without running afoul of
the constitutional requirements of due process as prescribed in Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. The present procedures for preliminary
investigations do not comply and were never intended to comply, with
Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. Preliminary investigations do not
adjudicate with finality rights and obligations of parties, while
administrative investigations governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in
GSIS, so adjudicate. Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, requires
substantial evidence for a decision against the respondent in the
administrative case.In preliminary investigations, only likelihood or
probability of guilt is required. To apply Ang Tibay, as amplified in
GSIS, to preliminary investigations will change the quantum of
evidence required to establish probable cause. The respondent in an
administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, has
the right to an actual hearing and to cross-examine the witnesses
against him. In preliminary investigations, the respondent has no such
rights.
Also, in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified
in GSIS, the hearing officer must be impartial and cannot be the fact-
finder, investigator, and hearing officer at the same time. In
preliminary investigations, the same public officer may be the
investigator and hearing officer at the same time, or the fact-finder,
investigator and hearing officer may be under the control and
supervision of the same public officer, like the Ombudsman or
Secretary of Justice. This explains why Ang Tibay, as amplified in
GSIS, does not apply to preliminary investigations. To now declare
that the guidelines in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are
fundamental and essential requirements in preliminary investigations
will render all past and present preliminary investigations invalid for
violation of constitutional due process. This will mean remanding for
reinvestigation all criminal cases now pending in all courts throughout
the country. No preliminary investigation can proceed until a new law
designates a public officer, outside of the prosecution service, to
determine probable cause. Moreover, those serving sentences by final
judgment would have to be released from prison because their
conviction violated constitutional due process.
Thus, petition dismissed for being premature and it constitutes forum
shopping.
C. Academic Discipline
Guzman v. NU
Facts: Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel
Ramacula, students of respondent National University, have come to
this Court to seek relief from what they describe as their school's
"continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol." In their
petition "for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction" dated August 7, 1984, they alleged
that they were denied due process due to the fact that they were active
participants in peaceful mass actions within the premises of the
University.
The respondents on the other hand claimed that the petitioners’ failure
to enroll for the first semester of the school year 1984-1985 is due to
their own fault and not because of their alleged exercise of their
constitutional and human rights. That as regards to Guzman, his
academic showing was poor due to his activities in leading boycotts of
classes. That Guzman “is facing criminal charges for malicious
mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in connection
with the destruction of properties of respondent University. The
petitioners have “failures in their records, and are not of good
scholastic standing.”
Issue: WON the petitioners were denied due process.
Held:Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment
and memorandum is the fact that they had never conducted
proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-
students had indeed led or participated "in activities within the
university premises, conducted without prior permit from school
authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein" 3 or perpetrated
acts of "vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage
and other acts showing disdain for and defiance of University
authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case for damages
and a criminal case for malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman,
cannot, without more, furnish sufficient warrant for his expulsion or
debarment from re-enrollment. Also apparent is the omission of
respondents to cite this Court to any duly published rule of theirs by
which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor
scholastic standing.
The school had violated the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools
that “no penalty shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as
defined in the manual and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly
promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been
conducted.
There are standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of
procedural due process; and these are, that
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of
any accusation against them; SMBIW NCAT
(2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with
the assistance of counsel, if desired; RTA CA WAC
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; SBI EAT
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;
and RAE ITOB
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and
decide the case. EMDC BTIC
Non v. Dames
Facts: Ariel Non, Rex Magana, Alvin Agura, Normandy Occiano,
Jorge Dayaon, Lourdes Banares, Bartolome Ibasco, Emmanuel Barba,
Sonny Moreno. Giovani Palma, Joselito Villalon, Luis Santos and
Daniel Torres, students in Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines
Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic
year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions
against the school in the preceding semester. They thus filed a petition
in the Regional Trial Court of Daet (Branch 38) seeking their
readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the trial court dismissed
the petition in an order dated 8 August 1988. A motion for
reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by the trial court on 24
February 1989; stating that they waived-their privilege to be admitted
for re-enrollment with respondent college when they adopted, signed,
and used its enrollment form for the first semester of school year 1988-
89. In addition, for the same semester, they duly signed pledges "to
abide and comply with all the rules and regulations laid down by
competent authorities in the College Department or School in which I
am enrolled." Hence, the affected students filed the petition for
certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction before the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the school exclude students because of failing grades
when the cause for the action taken against them relates to possible
breaches of discipline.
Held: The contract between the school and the student is not an
ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the
high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the
State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational
institutions. The authority for schools to refuse enrollment to a student
on the ground that his contract, which has a term of one semester, has
already expired, cannot be justified. Still, institutions' discretion on the
admission and enrollment of students as a major component of the
academic freedom guaranteed to institutions of higher learning. The
right of an institution of higher learning to set academic standards,
however, cannot be utilized to discriminate against students who
exercise their constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for
otherwise there will be a violation of their right to equal protection.
Thus, an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to afford
its students a fair opportunity to complete the course they seek to
pursue. However, when a student commits a serious breach of
discipline or fails to maintain the required academic standard, he
forfeits his contractual right; and the court should not review the
discretion of university authorities. Excluding students because of
failing grades when the cause for the action taken against them
undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not only is a
denial of due process but also constitutes a violation of the basic tenets
of fair play. Further, the failures in one or two subjects by some cannot
be considered marked academic deficiency. Neither can the academic
deficiency be gauged from the academic standards of the school due to
insufficiency of information. Herein, the students could have been
subjected to disciplinary proceedings in connection with the mass
actions, but
the penalty that could have been imposed must be commensurate to the
offense committed and it must be imposed only after the requirements
of procedural due process have been complied with (Paragraph 145,
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools). But this matter of
disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of administrative
sanctions have become moot and academic; as the students have been
refused readmission or re-enrollment and have been effectively
excluded from for 4 semesters, have already been more than
sufficiently penalized for any breach of discipline they might have
committed when they led and participated in the mass actions that
resulted in the disruption of classes. To still subject them to
disciplinary proceedings would serve no useful purpose and would
only further aggravate the strained relations between the students and
the officials of the school which necessarily resulted from the heated
legal battle.
ADMU vs Capulong
Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner
University, died of serious physical injuries at Chinese General
Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez
was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center. Petitioner Dean
Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student
Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a
report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of
Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to submit
their written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt.
Although respondent students received a copy of the written notice,
they failed to file a reply. In themeantime, they were placed on
preventive suspension. The Investigating Committee found a prima
facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the
Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline."
Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to
the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear
the charges against respondent students. The Board found respondent
students guilty of violating Rules on Discipline which prohibits
participation in hazing activities. However, in view of the lack of
unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of
dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University
Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of
dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent students filed with
RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled. This was granted.
A day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean del
Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the charges of hazing
against respondent students Abas and Mendoza. This was requested to
be stricken out by the respondents and argued that the creation of the
Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which
alleged lack of due process. This was granted and reinstatement of the
students was ordered.
Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students.
Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural
due process. The Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and
required respondent students to submit their written statement on the
incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested
through their counsel, copies of the charges. The nature and cause of
the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices.
Present is the twin elements of notice and hearing.
The Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner
university herein, thus:
(1) the students must be informed in WRITING of the nature and cause
of any accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them
with the assistance of counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;
and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and
decide the case.

It cannot seriously be asserted that the above requirements were not
met. When, in view of the death of Leonardo Villa, petitioner Cynthia
del Castillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required
respondent students on February 11, 1991 to submit within twenty-four
hours their written statement on the incident, the records show that
instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their
counsel, copies of the charges. While of the students mentioned in the
February 11, 1991 notice duly submitted written statements, the others
failed to do so. Thus, the latter were granted an extension of up to
February 18, 1991 to file their statements . Indubitably, the nature and
cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners'
notices dated February 14 and 20, 1991. 30 It is to be noted that the
February 20, 1991 letter which quoted Rule No. 3 of its Rules of
Discipline as contained in the Ateneo Law School Catalogue was
addressed individually to respondent students. Petitioners'
notices/letters dated February 11, February 14 and 20 clearly show that
respondent students were given ample opportunity to adduce evidence
in their behalf and to answer the charges leveled against them.
The requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the very start
of the investigations before the Joint Administration Faculty- Student
Committee, the law firm of Gonzales Batiler and Bilog and Associates
put in its appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of respondent
students.
Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were
not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements
which became the basis of petitioners' February 14, 1991 order, they
were denied procedural due process. Granting that they were denied
such opportunity, the same may not be said to detract from the
observance of due process, for disciplinary cases involving students
need not necessarily include the right to cross examination. An
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING conducted to investigate
students' participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the
attributes of a judicial proceeding. A closer examination of the March
2, 1991 hearing which characterized the rules on the investigation as
being summary in nature and that respondent students have no righ t to
examine affiants-neophytes, reveals that this is but a reiteration of our
previous ruling in Alcuaz . Respondent students' contention that the
investigating committee failed to consider their evidence is far from
the truth because the February 14, 1992 ordered clearly states that it
was reached only after receiving the written statements and hearing the
testimonies of several witnesses. Similarly, the Disciplinary Board's
resolution dated March 10, 1991 was preceded by a hearing on March
2, 1991 wherein respondent students were summoned to answer
clarificatory questions.
UP v. Ligot-Telan
Facts: In an effort to make the University of the Philippines (U.P.) truly
the University of the People, U.P. administration conceptualized and
implemented the socialized scheme of tuition fee payments through
the Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program (STFAP),
popularly known as the "Iskolar ng Bayan" program. After broad
consultations with the various university constituencies, U.P.
President Jose V. Abueva, the U.P. Board of Regents issued on
April 28, 1988 a Resolution establishing the STFAP. A year later, it
was granted official recognition when the Congress of the Philippines
allocated a portion of the National Budget for the implementation of
the program. In the interest of democratizing admission to the State
University, all students are entitled to apply for STFAP benefits which
include reduction in fees, living and book subsidies and student
assistantships which give undergraduate students the opportunity to
earn P12.00 per hour by working for the University. Applicants are
required to accomplish a questionnaire where, among others, they state
the amount and source of the annual income of the family, their real
and personal properties and special circumstances from which the
University may evaluate their financial status and need on the basis of
which they are categorized into brackets. To further insure the integrity
of the program, a random sampling scheme of verification of data
indicated in a student's application form is undertaken. Among
those who applied for STFAP benefits for School
Year 1989-90 was Ramon P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the College
of Law. A team composed of Arsenio L. Dona and Jose Carlo
Manalo conducted a home investigation at the residence of Nadal. Ms.
Cristeta Packing, Nadal's aunt, was interviewed and the team
submitted a home visit report. Consolacion Urbino, Scholarship
Affairs Officer II, found discrepancies between the report and Nadal's
application form. Forthwith, she and Bella M. Villanueva, head of
the Office of Scholarships and Student Services, presented the
matter to the Diliman Committee on Scholarships and Financial
Assistance. In compliance with the said Committee's directive, Bella
Villanueva wrote Nadal informing him that the investigation showed
that he had failed to declare, not only the fact that he had been
maintaining a 1977 Corolla car which was owned by his brother but
also the income of his mother who was supporting his brothers Antonio
and Federico. Nadal was likewise informed that the Diliman
Committee had reclassified him to Bracket 9 (from Bracket 4),
retroactive to June 1989, unless he could submit "proofs to the
contrary." Nadal was required "to pay back the equivalent amount of
full school fees" with "interest based on current commercial rates."
Failure to settle his account would mean the suspension of his
registration privileges and the withholding of clearance and
transcript of records. He was also warned that his case might be
referred to the Student Disciplinary Tribunal for further
investigation. commercial rates." Failure to settle his account would
mean the suspension of his registration privileges and the withholding
of clearance and transcript of records. He was also warned that his case
might be referred to the Student Disciplinary Tribunal for further
investigation. Nadal issued a certification stating, among other things,
that his mother migrated to the United States in 1981 but because her
residency status had not yet been legalized, she had not been able to
find a "stable, regular, well-paying employment." U.P. charged
Nadal before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) that he
committed acts which find him guilty of willfully and deliberately
withholding information about the income of his mother, who is living
abroad and that he was maintaining a Toyota Corolla car. As such,
the SDT imposed upon Nadal the penalty of expulsion from the
University and required him to reimburse all STFAP benefits he had
received but if he does not voluntarily make reimbursement, it shall be
"effected” by the University thru outside legal action. The SDT
decision was thereafter automatically elevated to the Executive
Committee of U.P. Diliman for review pursuant to Sec. 20 of the U.P.
Rules on Student Conduct and Discipline. Board of regents modified
the penalty from Expulsion to One Year- Suspension, effective
immediately, plus reimbursement of all benefits received from the
STFAP, with legal interest. However the BOR also decided against
giving Nadal, a certification of good moral character. Nadal forthwith
filed a motion for reconsideration of the BOR decision, in the next
BOR meeting Regent Antonio T. Carpio raised the "material
importance" of the truth of Nadal's claim that earlier, he was a
beneficiary of a scholarship and financial aid from the Ateneo de
Manila University (AdeMU). Learning that the "certification issued by
the AdeMU that it had not given Nadal financial aid while he was a
student there was made through a telephone call," Regent Carpio
declared that there was as yet "no direct evidence in the records to
substantiate the charge." According to Carpio, if it should be disclosed
that Nadal falsely stated that he received such financial aid, it would
be a clear case of gross and material misrepresentation that would even
warrant the penalty of expulsion. Hence, he cast a conditional vote that
would depend on the verification of Nadal's claim on the matter.
U.P. President and concurrently Regent Jose V. Abueva countered
by stating that "a decision should not be anchored solely on one piece
of information which he considered irrelevant, and which would
ignore the whole pattern of the respondent's dishonesty and deception
from 1989 which had been established in the investigation and the
reviews."In the morning of March 29, 1993, the AdeMU issued a
certification to the effect that Nadal was indeed a recipient of a
scholarship grant from 1979 to 1983. That evening, the BOR met again
at a special meeting, according to Regent Carpio, in executive
session, the BOR found Nadal "guilty." However, on April 22, 1993,
Nadal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for
mandamus with preliminary injunction and prayer for a temporary
restraining order against President Abueva, the BOR, Oscar M.
Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura, Armand V. Fabella and Olivia C.
Caoili.
Issue: Whether or not the Board of Regent violated Nadal's right to due
process when it rendered a decision finding Nadal guilty of the charges
against him" during the March 29, 1993 meeting.
Held: With respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting, respondent
considers the same as "unquestionably void for lack of due process"
inasmuch as he was not sent a notice of said meeting, that imposition
of sanctions on students requires "observance of procedural due
process," the phrase obviously referring to the sending of notice of the
meeting. However BOR ruled that in any event it is gross error to
equate due process in the instant case with the sending of notice of the
March 29, 1993 BOR meeting to respondent. University rules do not
require the attendance in BOR meetings of individuals whose cases are
included as items on the agenda of the Board. This is not exclusive of
students whose disciplinary cases have been appealed to the Board of
Regents as the final review body. At no time did respondent
complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any of the regular and
special BOR meetings where his case was up for deliberation. Counsel
for Nadal charged before the lower court that Nadal was not given due
process in the March 29 meeting because the ground upon which he
was again convicted was not the same as the original charge.
Obviously, he was referring to the basis of the conditional votes on
March 28. Whether or not Nadal was telling the truth when he claimed
that he received a scholarship grant from the AdeMU. However,
Regent Carpio himself testified that the charge considered was
"exactly the same charge" of withholding information on the income
of Nadal's mother. It should be stressed that the reason why Regent
Carpio requested a verification of Nadal's claim that he was a scholar
at the AdeMU was that Regent Carpio was not "morally convinced"
yet as to the guilt of Nadal. In other words, he sought additional
insights into the character of Nadal through the information that
would be obtained from the AdeMU. The Court in this regard find
such information to be irrelevant and a mere superfluity. In his July,
12, 1991 certification aforementioned,
Nadal admitted, although inconsistently, that his mother was a "TNT"
who could not find a "stable, regular, well-paying employment" but
that she was supporting the education of his brothers with the help
of another son. The court constitutes this as a sufficient admission that
Nadal withheld information on the income, however measly and
irregular, of his mother. The court also sighted that respondent aspires
to join the ranks of the professionals who would uphold truth at all
costs so that justice may prevail. In those who exhibit duplicity in their
student days, one spots the shady character who is bound to sow the
seeds of chicanery in the practice of his profession. With this the court
ruled that it sufficiently shown that respondent has committed an act
of dishonesty in withholding vital information in connection with
his application for STFAP benefits, all in blatant violation of the Rules
and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of petitioner
University, the latter's inherent power and authority to impose
disciplinary sanction may be invoked and rightfully exercised.
Therefore deciding that the BOR did not violate Nadal’s right of due
process. The lower court is hereby ordered to DISMISS the
petition for mandamus.
Lao Gi v. CA
Facts: Filomeno Chia Jr. was made a Filipino citizen by virtue of
Opinion 191 by the Secretary of justice. However, this was revoked
when his father’s citizenship was cast aside due to fraud and
misrepresentation. Charges of deportation were filed against the Chias.
Charges also alleged that they refused to register as aliens and that they
committed acts of undesirability. The Chias said that the CID has no
authority to deport them which was denied by the CID. They filed a
petition with the Supreme Court for a writ of preliminary injunction
which was dismissed for lack of merit. Their MFR was also denied.
Earlier, Manuel Chia’s case of falsification of public documents in
alleging he was a Filipino citizen. He was alleged to have done this for
the sale of real property. The trial court acquitted him by saying that
Opinion 191 was res judicata and cant be contravened by Opinion 147.
The CID set the hearing for the deportation case against the Chias and
told them to register as aliens. The Chias tooks further action. Their
petition for injunctive relief was denied by the CFI of Manila. They
also lost the appeal in the CA. The Chias was denied.
In their SC petition, they seek to set aside the CA decision. They
argued that they weren’t subject to immediate deportation, the
presence of fraud in the citizenship, the CA’s overstepping of appellate
jurisdiction, and the resolution of the SC didn’t make a ruling that the
petitioner entered the Philippines by false pretenses.
Issue: Does the CID have the jurisdiction to determine the deportation?
Held: Yes. Petition granted Hearing must be continued to determine if
they are really aliens. Section 37 of the Immigration act states:
SEC. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant
of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated
by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as
charged against the alien:
(1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this
Act by means of false and misleading statements or without inspection
and admission by the immigration authorities at a designated port of
entry or at any place other than at a designated port of entry. (As
amended by Sec. 13, Rep. Act No. 503.) ...
There must be a determination of the existence of the ground charged,
particularly illegal entry into the country. Only after the hearing can
the alien be deported. Also, there must be appositive finding from the
CID that they are aliens before compelling them to register as such.
This power is the police power to protect the state from undesirable
aliens injurious to the public good.
Since the deportation is a harsh process, due process must be observed.
In the same law, it is provided that:
No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific
grounds for deportation nor without being given a hearing under rules
of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.
The acts or omissions that they are charged of must be in ordinary
language for the person to be informed and for the CID to make a
proper judgment. Also, the warrants of arrewst must be in accordance
with the rules on criminal procedure.
On the information of a private prosecutor in the case: Deportation is
the sole concern of the state. There is no justification for a private party
to intervene.
Domingo v. Scheer
FACTS: Herbert Markus Emil Scheer, a German, was given permanent
status to reside in the Philippines on July 18, 1986. He married a
Filipina and have 3 children. He also opened a restaurant in Puerto
Prinsesa.
One day, the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) received
information that Scheer was wanted by the German Federal Police that
a warrant of arrest had been issued against him.
The BOC thereafter issued a Summary Deportation against Scheer.
In issuing the said order, the BOC relied on the correspondence from
the German Vice-Consul on its speculation that it was unlikely that the
German Embassy will issue a new passport to the respondent; on the
warrant of arrest issued by the District Court of Germany against the
respondent for insurance fraud; and on the alleged illegal activities of
the respondent in Palawan. The BOC concluded that the respondent
was not only an undocumented but an undesirable alien as well.
When the respondent was apprised of the deportation order, he
forthwith aired his side to then BID Commissioner Leandro T.
Verceles. The Commissioner allowed the respondent to remain in the
Philippines, giving the latter time to secure a clearance and a new
passport from the German Embassy.
Respondent filed an MR. However, the BOC did not resolve the
respondent's motion. The respondent was neither arrested nor
deported.
Meanwhile, on February 15, 1996, the District Court of Straubing
rendered a Decision dismissing the criminal case against the
respondent for physical injuries. The German Embassy in Manila,
thereafter, issued a temporary passport to the respondent.
In a Letter dated March 1, 1996, the respondent informed
Commissioner Verceles that his passport had been renewed following
the dismissal of the said criminal case. He reiterated his request for the
cancellation of the Summary Deportation Order dated September 27,
1995, and the restoration of his permanent resident status.[19]
Subsequently, on March 12, 1996, the German Embassy issued to the
respondent a regular passport, to expire on March 11, 2006.
The BOC still failed to resolve the respondent's Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration. Commissioner Verceles did not respond to the
respondents March 1, 1996, Letter.
The respondent remained in the Philippines and maintained his
business in Palawan. On March 20, 1997, the Department of Labor and
Employment approved his application for Alien Employment
Registration Certificate as manager of the Bavaria Restaurant in Puerto
Princesa City.
In the meantime, petitioner Immigration Commissioner Andrea T.
Domingo assumed office. She wrote the German Embassy and
inquired if the respondent was wanted by the German police. On April
12, 2002, the German Embassy replied that the respondent was not so
wanted.
At about midnight on June 6, 2002, Marine operatives and BID agents
apprehended the respondent in his residence on orders of the petitioner.
He was whisked to the BID Manila Office and there held in custody
while awaiting his deportation. Despite entreaties from the
respondent's wife and his employees, the petitioner refused to release
the respondent.
Shocked at the sudden turn of events, the respondent promptly
communicated with his lawyer. The latter filed with the BID a motion
for bail to secure the respondent's temporary liberty.
On June 11, 2002, the respondent's counsel filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with a
prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction, to enjoin the petitioner from proceeding with the
respondent's deportation.
The respondent (petitioner therein) alleged, inter alia, that his arrest
and detention were premature, unjust, wrongful, illegal and
unconstitutional, effected without sufficient cause and without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. He asserted that there
was no speedy remedy open to him in the ordinary course of law and
that his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Summary
Deportation Order of the BOC had not yet been resolved despite the
lapse of more than six years.
The respondent averred that he was a fully documented alien, a
permanent resident and a law-abiding citizen.
CA issued a status quo order restraining the petitioner from deporting
the respondent on a bond of P100,000.00.
BOC issued an Omnibus Resolution dated June 14, 2002, pendente lite
denying the respondents Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, Motion
for Bail/Recognizance.
On August 20, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor
of the respondent granting his petition for certiorari and prohibition
and permanently enjoining the petitioner from deporting the
respondent.
ISSUE: 1. WON the Board of Commissioners is an indispensable
party.
2. WON the the Non-joinder of an Indispensable Party is a Ground for
the Dismissal of the Petition
3. WON The CA had Jurisdiction Over the Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition, and Mandamus
HELD: 2. YES. The BOC is an Indispensable Party. We agree with the
petitioner's contention that the BOC was an indispensable party to the
respondents' petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in the
Court of Appeals. The respondent was arrested and detained on the
basis of the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC. The petitioner
caused the arrest of the respondent in obedience to the said Deportation
Order. The respondent, in his Memorandum, prayed that the CA annul
not only the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC but also the
latter's Omnibus Resolution, and, thus, order the respondents
immediate release. The respondent also prayed that the CA issue a writ
of mandamus for the immediate resolution of his Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration. The said motion had to be resolved by the BOC as
the order sought to be resolved and reconsidered was issued by it and
not by the petitioner alone. The powers and duties of the BOC may not
be exercised by the individual members of the Commission.
2. NO. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, as amended, requires
indispensable parties to be joined as plaintiffs or defendants. The
joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the presence of
indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain
real finality. Strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment
rendered by the court. The absence of an indispensable party renders
all subsequent actions of the court null and void. Lack of authority to
act not only of the absent party but also as to those present. The
responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties rests on the
petitioner/plaintiff.
However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for
the dismissal of an action. Parties may be added by order of the court
on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action
and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to
implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter
may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiffs failure
to comply therefor.The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to
be indispensable. In this case, the CA did not require the respondent
(petitioner therein) to implead the BOC as respondent but merely relied
on the rulings of the Court in Vivo v. Arca, and Vivo v. Cloribel. The
CAs reliance on the said rulings is, however, misplaced. The acts
subject of the petition in the two cases were those of the Immigration
Commissioner and not those of the BOC; hence, the BOC was not a
necessary nor even an indispensable party in the aforecited cases.
3. YES. The settled rule is that the authority to exclude or expel aliens
by a power affecting international relation is vested in the political
department of the government, and is to be regulated by treaty or by an
act of Congress, and to be executed by the executive authority
according to the regulations so established, except in so far as the
judicial department has been authorized by treaty or by statute, or is
required by the Constitution to intervene. The judicial department
cannot properly express an opinion upon the wisdom or the justice of
the measures executed by Congress in the exercise of the power
conferred on it, by statute or as required by the Constitution. Congress
may, by statute, allow the decision or order of the Immigration
Commissioner or the BOC to be reviewed by the President of the
Philippines or by the courts, on the grounds and in the manner
prescribed by law.
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution has vested judicial power in
the Supreme Court and the lower courts such as the Court of Appeals,
as established by law. Although the courts are without power to
directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government and
are not empowered to execute absolutely their own judgment from that
of Congress or of the President, the Court may look into and resolve
questions of whether or not such judgment has been made with grave
abuse of discretion, when the act of the legislative or executive
department violates the law or the Constitution. In Harvy Bridges v.
I.F. Wixon, the United States Federal Supreme Court reversed an
Order of Deportation made by the Attorney General for insufficiency
of evidence and for improper admission of evidence. In Nging v.
Nagh,the United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit Court) held that
conclusions of administrative offices on the issues of facts are
invulnerable in courts unless when they are not rendered by fair-
minded men; hence, are arbitrary. In Toon v. Stump, the Court ruled
that courts may supervise the actions of the administrative offices
authorized to deport aliens and reverse their rulings when there is no
evidence to sustain them. When acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial
agency are involved, a petition for certiorari or prohibition may be filed
in the Court of Appeals as provided by law or by the Rules of Court,
as amended.
In this case, the respondent alleges that the petitioner acted arbitrarily,
contrary to law and with grave abuse of discretion in causing his arrest
and detention at a time when his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of
the BOCs Summary Deportation Order had yet to be resolved. There
was no factual or legal basis for his deportation considering that he was
a documented alien and a law-abiding citizen; the respondent, thus,
prayed for a writ of mandamus to compel the petitioner, the
Chairperson of the BOC, to resolve the said motion. The petition
before the CA did not involve the act or power of the President of the
Philippines to deport or exclude an alien from the country. This being
so, the petition necessarily did not call for a substitution of the
Presidents discretion on the matter of the deportation of the respondent
with that of the judgment of the CA.
Philcomsat vs Alcuaz
180 SCRA 218
Facts: By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, the Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) was granted
the authority to “construct and operate such ground facilities as needed
to deliver telecommunications services from the communications
satellite system and ground terminal or terminals” in the Philippines.
PHILCOMSAT provides satellite services to companies like Globe
Mackay (now Globe) and PLDT.
Under Section 5 of the same law, PHILCOMSAT was exempt from
the jurisdiction, control and regulation of the Public Service
Commission later known as the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC). However, Executive Order No. 196 was later
promulgated and the same has placed PHILCOMSAT under the
jurisdiction of the NTC. Consequently, PHILCOMSAT has to acquire
permit to operate from the NTC in order to continue operating its
existing satellites. NTC gave the necessary permit but it however
directed PHILCOMSAT to reduce its current rates by 15%. NTC based
its power to fix the rates on EO 546.
PHILCOMSAT now sues NTC and its commissioner (Jose Luis
Alcuaz) assailed the said directive and holds that the enabling act (EO
546) of the NTC, empowering it to fix rates for public service
communications, does not provide the necessary standards which were
constitutionally required, hence, there is an undue delegation of
legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC.
PHILCOMSAT asserts that nowhere in the provisions of EO 546,
providing for the creation of NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers,
nor of EO 196, placing PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of NTC,
can it be inferred that NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise of
its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers. PHILCOMSAT subsequently
clarified its said submission to mean that the order mandating a
reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of
quasi-judicial power to NTC, the exercise of which allegedly requires
an express conferment by the legislative body.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.
HELD: No. There is no undue delegation. The power of the NTC to
fix rates is limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest,
reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than
satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power.
Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be
sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is
provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has
prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power.
Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, NTC in this
case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non-confiscatory and must
have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature;
otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power
becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power,
the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the
guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable
and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an
express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be
implied.
However, in this case, it appears that the manner of fixing the rates was
done without due process since no hearing was made in ascertaining
the rate imposed upon PHILCOMSAT.
Globe Telecom vs NTC
FACTS: On 4 June 1999, Smart filed a Complaint with public
respondent NTC,praying that NTC order the immediate
interconnection of Smarts and Globes GSM networks. Smart alleged
that Globe, with evident bad faith and malice, refused to grant Smarts
request for the interconnection of SMS.
Globe filed its Answer with Motion to Dismiss on 7 June 1999,
interposing grounds that the Complaint was premature, Smarts failure
to comply with the conditions precedent required in Section 6 of NTC
Memorandum Circular 9-7-93,19 and its omission of the mandatory
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.
On 19 July 1999, NTC issued the Order now subject of the present
petition. Both Smart and Globe were equally blameworthy for their
lack of cooperation in the submission of the documentation required
for interconnection and for having unduly maneuvered the situation
into the present impasse. NTC held that since SMS falls squarely
within the definition of value-added service or enhanced-service given
3333
in NTC Memorandum Circular No. 8-9-95 (MC No. 8-9-95) their
implementation of SMS interconnection is mandatory.The NTC also
declared that both Smart and Globe have been providing SMS without
authority from it.
Globe filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition to nullify and set aside the Order and to prohibit NTC from
taking any further action in the case. Globe reiterated its previous
arguments that the complaint should have been dismissed for failure to
comply with conditions precedent and the non-forum shopping
rule.They claimed that NTC acted without jurisdiction in declaring that
it had no authority to render SMS, pointing out that the matter was not
raised as an issue before it at all.They alleged that the Order is a patent
nullity as it imposed an administrative penalty for an offense for which
neither it nor Smart was sufficiently charged nor heard on in violation
of their right to due process. The CA issued a TRO on 31 Aug 1999.
In its Memorandum, Globe called the attention of the CA in an earlier
NTC decision regarding Islacom, holding that SMS is a deregulated
special feature and does not require the prior approval of the NTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NTC’s order is not supported by
substantial evidence.
HELD: There is no legal basis under the PTA or the memorandum
circulars promulgated by the NTC to denominate SMS as VAS, and
any subsequent determination by the NTC on whether SMS is VAS
should be made with proper regard for due process and in conformity
with the PTA; the assailed Order violates due process for failure to
sufficiently explain the reason for the decision rendered, for being
unsupported by substantial evidence, and for imputing violation to, and
issuing a corresponding fine on, Globe despite the absence of due
notice and hearing which would have afforded Globe the right to
present evidence on its behalf.
CORONA VS. UHPAP
FACTS: The Philippine Ports Authority [PPA] was created through PD
505, as amended by PD857 to “control, regulate, supervise pilots and
the pilot age profession”.
After hearing from relevant government agencies, pursuant to said
charter, PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued
Administrative Order 04-92 [PPA-AO 04-92] and corresponding
Memorandum Order in 1992, stating that all existing regular
appointments which have been previously issued shall remain valid up
to 31 December 1992 only and that all appointments to harbor pilot
positions in all pilot age districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term
of one year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or
cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of
performance” to regulate and improve pilot services by instilling
discipline and give better protection to port users. PPA-AO 04-92
replaces PPA-AO 03-85 which succinctly provides that, aspiring pilots
must have a license and train as probationary pilots, and only upon
satisfactory performance, are given permanent and regular
appointments by the PPA itself and to exercise harbor pilot age until
they reach the age of 70.Upon learning of PPA-AO 04-92 only after
publication in the newspaper, the United Harbor Pilots Association of
the Philippines: (a) questioned said PPA-AO twice before the DOTC,
which Secretary Garcia said twice that only the PPA Board of
Directors [as governing body] has exclusive jurisdiction to review,
recall or annul PPA-AOs, (b) appealed to the Office of the President,
which first issued a restraining order to the PPA on the implementation
of the PPA-AO, and after PPA’s answer, then dismissed the
appeal/petition and lifted said order, stating, through Assistant
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona, that the PPA-
AO (i) merely implements PPA Charter, (ii) issuance is an act of PPA,
not of its General Manager, (iii) merely regulates, not forbids practice
of the profession, recognizing that such exercise is property right, and
(iv) sufficiently complied with the requirement in the PD to consult
only with relevant Government Agencies and (d) finally finding
affirmative relief with Manila RTC Br. 6. Court, which ruled that (i)
said PPA-AO is null and void (ii) PPA acted in excess of jurisdiction
with grave abuse of discretion and (iii) imposed a permanent
restraining order on PPA on its implementation.Assistant Executive
Secretary Corona thus filed petition for review [of the Manila RTC
Decision] to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents have acted in excess of
jurisdiction.
Whether or not the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) violate
respondents’ right to exercise their profession and their right to due
process of law.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, this Court hereby rules that:
Respondents (herein petitioners) have acted in excess of jurisdiction
and with grave abuse of discretion and in a capricious, whimsical and
arbitrary manner in promulgating PPA Administrative Order 04-92
including all its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders;
PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Circulars and
Orders are declared null and void;
The respondents are permanently enjoined from implementing PPA
Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Memoranda,
Circulars and Orders.
No costs. SO ORDERED
NPC vs. Zozobrado
FACTS: Agustin A. Zozobrado, herein respondent, is a permanent
employee of petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) assigned as
Pilot in the aviation group, received a letter from NPC President
Frederico C. Puno, informing him that he was being dropped from the
rolls.
Zozobrado filed an appeal before the CSC questioning NPCs
implementation of dropping him from the rolls.
CSC dismissed Zobrado’s appeal and MR.
Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court and was granted.
Petitioner filed for MR but was denied.
Respondent had been dropped by petitioner from the rolls due to
Unsatisfactory or Poor Performance.
CA ruled in favor of herein respondents finding that the separation was
made with utter lack of due process.
ISSUE: WON due process was followed in dropping respondent from
the rolls.
HELD: NO. Both the substantive and procedural aspect of due process
were violated by petitioner in dismissing respondent.
As to the procedural aspect, not even one requisites laid down by
Memorandum Circular No. 12 has been complied with. Respondent
was never notified in writing of his Unsatisfactory rating within 30
days from the end of the semester when the Unsatisfactory rating was
given.
Respondent was never warned in writing that a succeeding
Unsatisfactory performance shall warrant his separation from the
service. Even the allegation of the oral notice itself (that petitioner
claims and respondent categorically denies) is clearly an afterthought,
having been utilized for the first time in the Motion for
Reconsideration of the assailed Court of Appeals decision and was
never used as an argument in the administrative proceedings. The proof
of such notice, a self-serving affidavit of the very individual who
unilaterally gave the apparently groundless rating, deserves scant
consideration.
As to the substantive aspect, evidence shows that petitioner never
denied that respondents unsatisfactory rating was due to respondents
testimony in court concerning the graft charges against NPC
employees. On the day respondent was supposed to testify in court
under pain of contempt, Gen. Lagera suddenly sent him to fly the NPC
President despite the fact that another pilot was assigned to such
mission.
Moreover, Gen. Lagera’s ill motive is further proved by the fact that
respondent was kept in the dark as to the status of his employment even
though the same had already been terminated two months earlier. It
appears that the sad news was relayed to respondent only on his natal
day affair. We can see no reason for the two months delay other than
the devastation Gen. Lagera expected to cause by imparting the
shocking news on respondents birth anniversary, during a celebration
and in front of other people.
As further found by the Court of Appeals, when respondent brought to
the Grievance Committee the matter of his unsatisfactory ratings, the
Grievance Committee recommended a review thereof to take into
account respondents quantity of flying hours. Pilots have traditionally
been rated by the number of flying hours spent in their career, and
respondent had more than double the flying hours of the two other
pilots of the Aviation Group combined. However, Gen. Lagera blocked
such review, claiming that he had already considered the same, albeit
minimally. This is a clear indication that Gen. Lagera really wanted to
take it upon himself to solely give the Unsatisfactory ratings to
respondent, in violation of the approved Performance Appraisal
System (PAS) of the NPC.
Salaw v. NLRC
FACTS:Espero Santos Salaw was a credit investigator-appraiser of
hxerein respondent Associated Bank.
His duties included inspecting, investigating, appraising, and
identifying the company's foreclosed assets; giving valuation to its real
properties and verifying the genuineness and encumbrances of the
titles of properties mortgaged to the respondents.
Salaw and a fellow employee were alleged to have conspired in selling
twenty (20) sewing machines and electric generators which had been
foreclosed by the respondent bank from Worldwide Garment and L.P.
Money Garment, for P60,000.00, and divided the proceeds thereof in
equal shares of P30,000.00 between the two of them. The Criminal
Investigation Service (CIS) of the Philippine Constabulary extracted
Sworn Statement from them without the assistance of a counsel.
Rollie Tuazon, the bank manager, requested petitioner to appear before
the bank's Personnel Discipline and Investigation Committee (PDIC)
which petitioner attended and 3 months after, his termination became
effective for alleged serious misconduct or willful disobedience and
fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed on him by the private
respondents.
Petitioner filed an illegal dismissal case against respondent and
likewise submitted an affidavit recanting his Sworn Statement before
the CIS.
The labor arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioner.
Private respondents appealed to the NLRC and reversed the LA’s
decision.
Petitioner’s MR was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON petitioner’s dismissal was legally justified.
HELD: NO. Under the Labor Code, as amended, the requirements for
the lawful dismissal of an employee by his employer are two-fold: the
substantive and the procedural. Not only must the dismissal be for a
valid or authorized cause as provided by law (Articles 279, 281, 282-
284, New Labor Code), but the rudimentary requirements of due
process — notice and hearing — must also be observed before an
employee may be dismissed. One does not suffice; without their
concurrence, the terminate would, in the eyes of the law, be illegal.
As to the LA’s finding, petitioner was terminated without the benefit
of due process of law. The respondents' initial act in convening their
Personnel Discipline and Investigation Committee (PDIC) to
investigate complainant (after the CIS experience) would have
complied with the demands of due process had complainant been given
the opportunity to present his own defense and confront the witnesses,
if any, and examine the evidence against him. But as the records clearly
show, the complainant was denied that constitutional right when his
subsequent request refute the allegations against him was granted and
a hearing was set "without counsel or representative.
The investigation of petitioner Salaw by the respondent Bank'
investigating committee violated his constitutional right to due
process, in as much as he was not given a chance to defend himself, as
provided in Rule XIV, Book V of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Labor Code governing the dismissal of employees.
Section 5 of the said Rule requires that "the employer shall afford the
worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the
assistance of his representative if he so desires."11 (Emphasis
supplied.) Here petition was perfunctorily denied the assistance of
counsel during the investigation to be conducted by the PDIC. No
reasons preferred which vitiated the denial with irregularity and
unfairness.
As aptly observed by the labor arbiter, the respondents premised their
action in dismissing the complainant on his supposed admission of the
offense imputed to him by the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) in
its interrogation in November 1984. The said admission was carried in
a three-page Sworn Statement signed by the complainant. Aside from
this Statement, other evidence was presented by the respondents to
establish the culpability of the complainant in the fraudulent sale of
respondents' foreclosed properties. Even the minutes of proceeding
taken during the investigation conducted by respondents were not
presented. ... This is a glaring denial of due process.
Considering further that the admission by the petitioner which was
extracted from him by the Criminal Investigate Service of the
Philippine Constabulary (National Capital Region) without the
assistance of counsel and which was made the sole basis for his
dismissal, cannot be admitted in evidence against him, then, the finding
of guilt of the PDIC, which was affirmed by the public respondent
NLRC; has no more leg stand on. A decision with absolutely nothing
to support it is a nullity.
Significantly, the dismissal of the petitioner from his employment was
characterized by undue haste. The law is clear that even in the
disposition of labor cases, due process must not be subordinated to
expediency or dispatch. Otherwise, the dismissal of the employee will
be tainted with illegality.
Castillo Co vs Barbers
FACTS: Petitioner Josie Castillo-Co is a Governor of Quirino.
Congressman Junie Cua filed a complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman against Governor Castillo-Co and Provincial Engineer
Virgilio Ringor for alleged fraud against the public treasury and
malversation. (Sections 3(e) and 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, as amended, and Articles 213 and 217 of the Revised
Penal Code.)
Congressman Cua charged that the equipment purchased was
reconditioned instead of brand new as required by resolutions of the
provinces Sanggunian authorizing such purchase. Other irregularities
claimed to have been committed included overpricing, lack of public
bidding, lack of inspection, advance payment prior to delivery in
violation of Section 338 of the Local Government Code, and an attempt
to cover up such irregularities.
A week after the complaint was filed, Governor Castillo-Co and
Provincial Engineer Ringor were placed under preventive suspension
for a period of six (6) months.
Said order was signed by Emilio A. Gonzalez III, Director, and
approved by Jesus Guerrero, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.
Petitioners thereafter filed separate motions for reconsideration. Both
motions were denied in a Joint Order signed by Director Gonzales and
approved by Deputy Ombudsman Guerrero.
Petitioner file for special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with
a prayer for temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction,
seeks to nullify the Order of the Deputy Ombudsman directing her
preventive suspension and claiming that the Deputy Ombudsman has
no authority to issue the preventive suspension against them.
ISSUE: WON the Deputy Ombudsman has authority to issue the
preventive suspension
WON petitioner was denied due process because she was not afforded
the opportunity to controvert the evidence against her before the order
of preventive suspension was issued.
HELD: 1. YES. Petitioner claims that under Republic Act No. 7975,
only the Ombudsman has the authority to sign the order placing
officials with a 27 salary grade or above, like petitioner-governor,
under preventive suspension. In this case, the suspension order was
neither signed nor approved by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto. Rather,
said order was signed by Director Emilio Gonzales III and approved
by Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Jesus Guerrero.
There is nothing in RA 7975, however, that would remotely suggest
that only the Ombudsman, and not his Deputy, may sign an order
preventively suspending officials occupying positions classified as
grade 27 or above.
Moreover, Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770 and Section 9, Rule
III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of Ombudsman similarly
provides:
SEC. 24. Preventive Suspension. -- The Ombudsman or his Deputy
may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation, if in his judgment, the evidence of guilt is
strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or gross misconduct, or neglect in the
performance of duty; or (b) the charge would warrant removal from
the service; or (c) the respondents continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him. Xxx
SEC. 9. Preventive suspension. Pending investigation, the respondent
may be preventively suspended without pay for a period of not more
than six (6) months, if, in the judgment of the Ombudsman or his
proper deputy, the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against
such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or gross
misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, (b) the charge
would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondents
continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. xxx
Under these provisions, there cannot be any doubt that the Ombudsman
or his Deputy may preventively suspend an officer or employee, where
appropriate, as indicated by the word or between the Ombudsman and
his Deputy. The word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation
and independence of one thing from each of the other things
enumerated. The law does not require that only the Ombudsman
himself may sign the order of suspension.
2. NO. A preventive suspension, however, can be decreed on an
official under investigation after charges are brought and even before
the charges are heard since the same is not in the nature of a
penalty,[13] but merely a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation.
In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his
answer to the administrative complaint, suffice it to say that the
suspension was not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty
and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure. A
suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If
after such investigation, the charges are established and the person
investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is
removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing
improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before
the charges against him are heard and be given an opportunity to prove
his innocence.
The fact that the said order was issued seven days after the complaint
was filed did not constitute grave abuse of discretion. The immediate
issuance of such order is required in order to prevent the subject of the
suspension from committing further irregularities. Such prompt action,
moreover, is in consonance with Section 15 of RA 6770 which exhorts
the Ombudsman to:
xxx give priority to complaints filed against high ranking government
officials and/or those occupying supervisory positions, complaints
involving grave offenses as well as complaints involving large sums of
money and/or properties.
American Inter-Fashion v. OP
Facts: Glorious Sun Fashion was found guilty by Garments and Textile
Export Board GTEB of dollar salting and mis-declaration of
importations. As a result, its export quotas were cancelled. After GTEB
rendered its decision, Glorious filed with the Court a petition for
certiorari and prohibition contending that its right to due process of law
was violated and that GTEB decision was not supported by substantial
evidence. The Court then issued a resolution ordering GTEB to
conduct further proceedings. However, on July 25, 1984, Glorious
filed a manifestation of its intention to withdraw the petition. The Court
granted the motion for withdrawal. Glorious filed another motion to
dismiss with prejudice which the Court duly noted.
After two years, Glorious filed with GTEB a petition for restitution of
its export quota allocation and requested for a reconsideration of the
GTEB decision dated April 27, 1984. Glorious once again alleged that
the charges against them were not supported by evidence. Moreover,
it alleged that the GTEB decision cancelling its export quota was
rendered as a result of duress, threats, intimidation and undue influence
exercised by former Minister Roberto V. Ongpin in order to transfer
Glorious export quotas to “Marcos crony-owned” corporations.
Glorious further alleged that it was coerced by Mr. Roberto Ongpin to
withdraw its petition in G.R. No. 67180 and to enter into joint venture
agreements paving the way for the creation of De Soleil Apparel and
AIFC.
On Sept. 4, 1987, GTEB denied the petition of Glorious. An appeal
was then taken on Oct. 5, 1987 to the Office of the President. AIFC
filed its opposition to Glorious’ appeal claiming that the GTEB
decision dated April 27, 1984 has long been final. The Office of the
President ruled in favor of Glorious and remanded the case to GTEB
for further proceedings. The motion for reconsideration of AIFC was
subsequently denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue: 1. W/N the previous GTEB decision constituted res judicata to
the instant case on the ground that the former decision was a final
judgment on the merits. – NO
2. W/N Glorious was accorded due process in relation to the 1984
GTEB decision. – NO
Held:The petitioner contends that in entertaining the appeal of private
respondent Glorious, the Office of the President “had unwittingly
made itself a tool in a cunning move to resurrect a decision which had
become final and executory more than three years earlier. The
petitioner asseverates resolution dismissing G.R. No. 67180 was res
judicata on the matter.
The Supreme Court said that one of the requirements for a judgment to
be a bar to a subsequent case is that the it must be a judgment on the
merits. A judgment is upon the merits when it amounts to a declaration
of the law as to the respective rights and duties of the parties, based
upon the ultimate fact or state of facts disclosed by the pleadings and
evidence, and upon which the right of recovery depends, irrespective
of formal, technical or dilatory objection or contentions. Certainly, the
dismissal of G.R. No. 67180 cannot be categorized as a judgment on
the merits. The action in 1984 did not resolve anything. In fact, when
the court heard the parties during the oral arguments, GTEB was not
able to present any showing of mis-declaration if imports. The motion
to withdraw te petition arose from the fears of Mr. Nemesio Co that
not only Glorious Sun but his other businesses would be destroyed by
the martial law regime. The resolution dismissing G.R. No. 67180 was
based solely on the notice of withdrawal by the private respondent. The
dismissal of the petition was clearly based on a technical matter rather
than on the merits of the petition. Hence, it cannot constitute res
judicata.
With regards to the second issue, the Petitioner contend that Glorious
Sun was not denied due process. Although AIFC admits that the 1984
GTEB decision failed to disclose to Glorious vital evidence used by
GTEB in arriving at its conclusion that Glorious was guilty of dollar-
salting, it contends that the subsequent disclosure in 1987, where
relevant documents were given to Glorious and that the latter was
given an opportunity to comment thereon, cured the defect. This
contention by AIFC, the court holds, is MISLEADING. The SC
recognized that the instant petition involves the 1984 resolution of the
GTEB. AIFC cannot use as an excuse the subsequent disclosure of the
evidence used by the GTEB to Glorious in 1987 to justify the 1984
GTEB resolution. The glaring fact is that Glorious was denied due
process when GTEB failed to disclose evidence used by it in rendering
a resolution against Glorious. Moreover, the documents disclosed to
Glorious by GTEB in 1987 enhanced the charge that the former was
denied due process.
Attention was also brought to the Puno affidavit, wherein Puno, the
Chairman of the Investigating Panel created by the Ministry of Trade
and Industry admitted that he was pressured by Minister Ongpin to
look for ways and means to remove the quotas from Glorious. AIFC
claims that it is an inconsequential matter in that the GTEB Board did
not give credence to it and also, none of the members of the committee
would agree that there was any pressure or instruction from Minister
Ongpin.
The Supreme Court said that the fact that the other members would not
agree that there was pressure from Ongpin does not mean that Puno
was not telling the truth. Mr. Puno stated that he was pressured. He did
not state that the members of the investigating panel were pressured.
Mr. Puno was the Chairman of the Investigating Panel. Hence, it is
plausible that in view of his position he was the one pressured by
Minister Ongpin. There is every reason to suspect that even before
Glorious Sun was investigated, a decision to strip it of its quotas and
to award them to friends of their administration had already been made.
The Supreme Court also held that although factual findings of
administrative agencies are generally accorded respect, such factual
findings may be disregarded if they are not supported by evidence;
where the findings are initiated by fraud, imposition or collusion;
where the procedures which lead to the factual findings are irregular;
when palpable errors are committed; or when grave abuse of discretion
arbitrariness or capriciousness is manifest.
Contrary to the petitioners posture, the record clearly manifests that in
cancelling the export quotas of the private respondent GTEB violated
the private respondent’s constitutional right to due process. Before the
cancellation in 1984, Glorious had been enjoying export quotas
granted to it since 1977. In effect the private respondent’s export quota
allocation which initially was a privilege evolved into some form of
property right which should not be removed from it arbitrarily and
without due process only to hurriedly confer it on another.
The motion for reconsideration was GRANTED. The instant petition
is DISMISSED.
United States v. Toribio 15 Phil. 85
Facts: Sometime in the 1900s, in the town of Carmen, province of
Bohol, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be slaughtered.
His request was denied because his carabao is found to be fit for
agricultural work. Even so, he still slaughtered his carabao for the
purpose of human consumption. The trial court of Bohol found that the
respondent slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a carabao without
a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality, in violation
of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the
registration, branding, and slaughter of Large Cattle. The act prohibits
the slaughter of large cattle fit for agricultural work or other draft
purposes for human consumption.
The counsel for appellant contended that the provisions of Act No.
1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without
a permit of the municipal treasure if the slaughtering of large cattle
happened outside the municipal slaughterhouse. They said that the
prohibition and penalty is limited only to the large cattle slaughtered at
the municipal slaughterhouse for the prohibition contained in section
30 and the penalty imposed in section 33 stated only the phrase “at the
municipal slaughterhouse”.
They also contended that the act constitutes a taking of property for
public use in the exercise of the right of eminent domain without
providing for the compensation of owners, and it is an undue and
unauthorized exercise of police power of the state for it deprives them
of the enjoyment of their private property.
Ruling: The extent and limits of what is known as the police power
have been a fruitful subject of discussion in the appellate courts of
nearly every State in the Union. It is universally conceded to include
everything essential to the public safely, health, and morals, and to
justify the destruction or abatement, by summary proceedings, of
whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance. Under this power it
has been held that the State may order the destruction of a house falling
to decay or otherwise endangering the lives of passers‐by; the
demolition of such as are in the path of a conflagration; the slaughter
of diseased cattle; the destruction of decayed or unwholesome food;
the prohibition of wooden buildings in cities; the regulation of railways
and other means of public conveyance, and of interments in burial
grounds; the restriction of objectionable trades to certain localities; the
compulsary vaccination of children; the confinement of the insane or
those afficted with contagious deceases; the restraint of vagrants,
beggars, and habitual drunkards; the suppression of obscene
publications and houses of ill fame; and the prohibition of gambling
houses and places where intoxicating liquors are sold. Beyond this,
however, the State may interfere wherever the public interests demand
it, and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the
legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the public
require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such
interests. (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U. S., 27; Kidd vs. Pearson, 128
U. S., 1.) To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf
of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the
public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose
unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other
words, its determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police
powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of
the court.
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the
provisions of the statute under consideration was required by "the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class;" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos
for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural
work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on
private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the
services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners,
tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the
luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of
the community may be measurably and dangerously affected.
Chief Justice Redfield, in Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co.
(27 Vt., 140), said (p. 149) that by this "general police power of the
State, persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity
of the State; of the perfect right in the legislature to do which no
question ever was, or, upon acknowledge and general principles, ever
can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned."
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 74457, March 20,
1987]
FACTS: Petitioner in this case transported six carabaos in a pump boat
from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo
for the violation of E.O. No. 626-A which prohibits the slaughter of
carabaos except under certain conditions. Petitioner sued for recovery,
and the trial Court of Iloilo issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of
a supersedeas bond of twelve thousand pesos (P 12, 000.00). After
considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation
of the said carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced,
ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on
the constitutionality of the E.O, as raised by the petitioner, for lack of
authority and also for its presumed validity.
Issue: Whether or not the said Executive Order is unconstitutional.
Ruling: The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police
power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting
the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme
court said that The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned
measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition
of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere,
with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously,
retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter
there, any more than moving them to another province will make it
easier to kill them there
The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive
act defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately
imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process
was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were
arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned
to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and
given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once
and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be
heard, thus denying due process.
though police power was invoked by the government in this case for
the reason that the present condition demand that the carabaos and the
buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on
them for energy needs, it does not however, comply with the second
requisite for a valid exercise of the said power which is, "that there be
a lawful method." The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned
measure is missing.
The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of Police power because
the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.
To justify the State in the imposition of its authority in behalf of the
public, it must be:
1) The interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
a particular class, require such interference;
2) that the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
Churchill v. Rafferty 32 Phil. 580
Substantive due process -- whether an act of government has su
fficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or propert
y.
FACTS: This is an appeal of a judgement rendered perpetually res
training defendant and his deputies from collecting and enforcing ag
ainst plaintiffs and their property the annual tax prescribed in section
100 of Act No. 2339, from destroying or removing any sign on the
property of the plaintiffs for the sole reason that it may be offensive
to sight, and cancelling the bond given by the plaintiffs to secure the
issuance of the preliminary injunction granted after the comme
ncement of the action. The Act allows the Collector of Internal Re
venue to decide whether a sign or billboard displayed to the public is
offensive to sight or is otherwise a nuisance and empowers hi
m to order its removal. Plaintiffs billboards are posted on privat
e lands in Rizal. The Act also expressly forbids the use of an i
njunction to stay the collection of any internal revenue tax, and prov
ides a remedy for any wrong in connection to such taxes. This reme
dy was intended to be exclusive, thereby precluding the remedy by
injunction which should not issue as of course, but is granted only
upon the oath of a party and when there is no adequate remedy at la
w. These sections take away the preventive remedy of injunction,
leaving ordinary remedial actions available to taxpayers.
The Attorney-General contends that there is no provisions of the
paramount law which prohibit such a course, while the plaintiff
s urge that the two sections are unconstitutional because they att
empt to deprive aggrieved taxpayers of all substantial remedies for
the protection of their property, depriving them of it without due proc
ess.
ISSUES: 1.Whether or not portions of section 100 of Act No. 2
339, empowering the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove bil
lboards as nuisances if objectionable to sight, is unconstitutional
as it is a deprivation of property without due process of law.
HELD: 1.No. Offensive noises and smells have been for a long tim
e considered susceptible of suppression in thickly populated districts
. “Ostensibly located on private property, the real and sole value of
the billboard is its proximity to the public thoroughfares. Hence,
we conceive that the regulation of billboards and their restriction i
s not so much a regulation of private property as it is a regulation
of the use of the streets and other public thoroughfares.” The inquir
y is limited to the question of whether the enactment assailed by the
plaintiffs was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the Go
vernment, for all property is held subject to that power. The Court s
tates that the exercise of police power belongs to the Legislature, a
nd that power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those
principles which are the foundation of all republican forms of g
overnment, and where the Act is reasonably within the proper consi
deration of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort, it should
not be disturbed by the courts.
People. v. Fajardo 104 SCRA 443
Facts: Aug. 15, 1950 - Juan Fajardo was the mayor of Baoo, Camarines
Sur. During his term the municipal council passed Ordinance No. 7
which prohibited the construction or repair of any building without a
written permit from the mayor prior to construction or repairing.
1954 - Fajardo and Babillonia (Fajardo’s son-in-law) applied for a
permit to construct a building adjacent to their gas station, still on
Fajardo’s private land, separated from public plaza by a creek.
Jan. 16, 1954 – request denied because it would destroy the view of
the public plaza.
o Applicants appealed but were turned down again on Jan. 18, 1954.
Fajardo and Babillonia proceeded to construct even without a permit
because they claimed that they needed a residence badly due to a
typhoon destroying their previous place of residence
Feb. 26, 1954 – Fajardo et at., were charged and convicted by peace
court of Baoo for violating Ordinance no. 7
o CFI – Affirmed
 CA forwarded the case to the SC because “the appeal attacks
the constitutionality of the ordinance in question.”
Issue: Is the ordinance constitutional?
Held: No, petition granted. The ordinance doesn’t state any standard
that limits the grant of power to the mayor. It is an arbitrary and
unlimited conferment.
Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a discretion which is
purely arbitrary, and which may be exercised in the interest of a
favored few, are unreasonable and invalid. The ordinance should have
established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured.
All of the authorities cited above sustain this conclusion.
The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to
permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property;
hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking
of appellants property without just compensation.
While property may be regulated to the interest of the general welfare,
and the state may eliminate structures offensive to the sight, the state
may not permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their
property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure
the aesthetic appearance of the community.
Fajardo would be constrained to let the land be fallow and not be used
for urban purposes. To do this legally, there must be just compensation
and they must be given an opportunity to be heard.
An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it
can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond
regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property.
The validity was also refuted by the Admin Code which states:
SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary character. —
The municipal council shall have authority to exercise the following
discretionary powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of
buildings that may be constructed or repaired within them, and issue
permits for the creation or repair thereof, charging a fee which shall be
determined by the municipal council and which shall not be less than
two pesos for each building permit and one peso for each repair permit
issued. The fees collected under the provisions of this subsection shall
accrue to the municipal school fund.
Since, there was absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal
council had either established fire limits within the municipality or set
standards for the kind or kinds of buildings to be constructed or
repaired within them before it passed the ordinance in question, it is
clear that said ordinance was not conceived and promulgated under the
express authority of sec. 2243 (c)
Ermita-Manila Hotel 7 Motel Operator v. City of Manila 20 SCRA
849
Facts: Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one
of its members Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of
Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the city of Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila
City Board to regulate due to the fact that hotels were not part of its
regulatory powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of the challenged
ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and
violative of due process insofar because it would impose P6,000.00
license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second
class motels; there was also the requirement that the guests would fill
up a form specifying their personal information.
There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such
hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection from
city authorites. They claimed this to be violative of due process for
being vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and required the
maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as
a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry.
The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for being
arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof
more than twice every 24 hours.
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the
license of the hotels that violated the ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.
Issue:Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative
of the due process clause?
Held: No. Judgment reversed.
Ratio:"The presumption is towards the validity of a law.” However,
the Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there
is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of
police regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the
scope of police power. As underlying questions of fact may condition
the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual
foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual
foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the
matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of
validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.”
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely
enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals,
particularly fornication and prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the
licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind
from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to
increase "the income of the city government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the
people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection
and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the power
must not be unreasonable or violative of due process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a
standard to which the governmental action should conform in order
that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be
valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both
as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged
ordinance from legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy
of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put,
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.
Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances," decisions based
on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into
fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due process are
not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinance’s nullity for
an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also
incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be
implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount
of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much
wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from
applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances
must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a
general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. Eg. Sale of
liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the state’s
police power.
In one case- “much discretion is given to municipal corporations in
determining the amount," here the license fee of the operator of a
massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power
measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use
to twice every 24 hours- It was not violative of due process. 'Liberty'
as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by
law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the
individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society
and the general well-being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and
authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that
there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace
and order and happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living
principle, unlike in the sole case of People v Pomar. The policy of
laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the
government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations
affected with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were
freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of
governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the
liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible
scope of regulatory measure is wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the
maintenance of establishments, and the “full rate of payment”-
Holmes- “We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal
laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using common
sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."
White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, January
20, 2009
Facts: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into
law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled “An Ordinance
Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and
Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses,
Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila”
(the Ordinance).” The ordinance sanctions any person or corporation
who will allow the admission and charging of room rates for less than
12 hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a day.
The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium
Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development
Corporation (STDC), who own and operate several hotels and motels
in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached
complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the ordinance will affect
their business interests as operators. The respondents, in turn, alleged
that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it “strikes at the
personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by
the Constitution.” Reference was made to the provisions of the
Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to
needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises.
Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance
sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply
paying for a 12-hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a
valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the
Local Government Code which confers on cities the power to regulate
the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and
other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.
Also, they contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila
Charter, they have the power to enact all ordinances it may deem
necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of
the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order,
comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants
and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since
it violates the right to privacy and freedom of movement; it is an
invalid exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive
interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the
constitutionality of the ordinance. First, it held that the ordinance did
not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only
penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit
individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of
police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained
through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the ordinance is
satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful
method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the
adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its
constituents in general.
Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.
Issue: Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power
of the State.
Held: No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise
of police power, and as such, it is unconstitutional.
The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of
Manila v Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate
Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of
Manila. The common thread that runs through those decisions and the
case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under
the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a
view of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in
transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle
case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the
services offered by these establishments have been severely restricted.
At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the State can
intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of
decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be
valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must
be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.
The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business
practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more
than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police
power as conferred on local government units by the Local
Government Code through such implements as the general welfare
clause.
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and
its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police power has
been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State.
The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the
use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use
and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly
fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the
desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their
achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution.
SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an
ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the
petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by
the law that they were capacitated to act upon is the injury to property
sustained by the petitioners. Yet, they also recognized the capacity of
the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their
patrons – those persons who would be deprived of availing short time
access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question. The
rights at stake herein fell within the same fundamental rights to liberty.
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice
Malcolm to include “the right to exist and the right to be free from
arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere
freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which
he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as
are necessary for the common welfare,
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized
and the invasion of it should be justified by a compelling state interest.
Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the right to privacy
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should
stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.
An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving
patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in
with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the ordinance
as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require an interference with private rights and the means must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no
other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive
of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation
must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to
private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be
struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already
prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing
laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of
prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more
effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of
existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use.
These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the
petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that
the ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole
day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities.
Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates”
from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent
for motel rooms and even apartments.
SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to
the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of
public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be
restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens.
However well¬-intentioned the ordinance may be, it is in effect an
arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments
as well as their patrons. The ordinance needlessly restrains the
operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the
rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The ordinance
rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day
with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.
Balacuit v. CFI 163 SCRA 182
Facts:Petitioners, theater owners, assailed the constitutionality of
Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of
Butuan on April 21, 1969. This called for a reduction to ½ of the ticket
price given to minors from 7-12 years old. There was a fine from 200-
600 pesos or a 2-6 month imprisonment
The complaint was issued in the trial court. A TRO was then issued to
prevent the law from being enforced. The respondent court entered its
decision declaring the law valid.
Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No.
640 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police
power. Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is not within the
power of’ the Municipal Board to enact as provided for in Section
15(n) of Republic Act No. 523 where it states that the Muncipal board
can only fix license fees for theaters and not admission rates.
The respondent attempts to justify the enactment of the ordinance by
invoking the general welfare clause embodied in Section 15 (nn) of the
cited law.
Issue:W/N Ordinance 640 – prohibiting payment on theater tickets for
children below seven (7) is constitutional?
Ruling: NO, because it infringes theater owners’ right to property.
There is nothing pernicious in demanding equal price for both children
and adults. The petitioners are merely conducting their legitimate
businesses. The object of every business entrepreneur is to make a
profit out of his venture. There is nothing immoral or injurious in
charging the same price for both children and adults. In fact, no person
is under compulsion to purchase a ticket. It is a totally voluntary act on
the part of the purchaser if he buys a ticket to such performances.
Such ticket represents a right, Positive or conditional, as the case may
be, according to the terms of the original contract of sale. This right is
clearly a right of property. The ticket which represents that right is also,
necessarily, a species of property. As such, the owner thereof, in the
absence of any condition to the contrary in the contract by which he
obtained it, has the clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom he
pleases and at such price as he can obtain. So that an act prohibiting
the sale of tickets to theaters or other places of amusement at more than
the regular price was held invalid as conflicting with the state
constitution securing the right of property.
For the assailed ordinance be held constitutional it must pass the test
of police power. To invoke the exercise the police power, it must be
for the interest of the public without interfering with private rights and
adoptive means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that
such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the
regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be
oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or
calling subject of regulation. The right of the owner to fix a price at
which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the
property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process
clause. Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their
property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think
most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve
could stay away.
Carlos Superdrug v. DSWD GR No. 166494, June 29 2007
FACTS:Petitioners, belonging to domestic corporations and
proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines, are praying for
preliminary injunction assailing the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the “Expanded
Senior Citizens Act of 2003.” On February 26, 2004, R.A. No. 9257,
amending R.A. No. 7432, was signed into law by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and it became effective on March 21, 2004. Section
4(a) of the Act states:
SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The senior citizens shall
be entitled to the following:
(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments
relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging
establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of
medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of
senior citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death of
senior citizens;
Ÿ The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f),
(g) and (h) as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or
services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be
allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that
the discount is granted. Provided, further, That the total amount of the
claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be
included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be
subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
Ÿ The DSWD, on May 8, 2004, approved and adopted the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA No. 9275, Rule VI, Article
8 which contains the proviso that the implementation of the tax
deduction shall be subject to the Revenue Regulations to be issued by
the BIR and approved by the DOF. With the new law, the Drug Stores
Association of the Philippines wanted a clarification of the meaning of
tax deduction. The DOF clarified that under a tax deduction scheme,
the tax deduction on discounts was subtracted from Net Sales together
with other deductions which are considered as operating expenses
before the Tax Due was computed based on the Net Taxable Income.
On the other hand, under a tax credit scheme, the amount of discounts
which is the tax credit item, was deducted directly from the tax due
amount.
Ÿ The DOH issued an Administrative Order that the twenty percent
discount shall include both prescription and non-prescription
medicines, whether branded or generic. It stated that such discount
would be provided in the purchase of medicines from all
establishments supplying medicines for the exclusive use of the senior
citizens.
Ÿ Drug store owners assail the law with the contention that granting
the discount would result to loss of profit and capital especially that
such law failed to provide a scheme to justly compensate the discount.
ISSUE: WON Section 4(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act is
unconstitutional or not violative of Article 3 Section 9 of the
Constitution which provides that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation and the equal protection clause
of Article 3 Section 1.
HELD: The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced
subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use
or benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for which petitioners
would ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation. Just
compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s
gain but the owner’s loss. The word just is used to intensify the
meaning of the word compensation, and to convey the idea that the
equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full and ample.
Ÿ The law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for
medical and dental services, and diagnostic and laboratory fees;
admission fees charged by theaters, concert halls, circuses, carnivals,
and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement; fares for
domestic land, air and sea travel; utilization of services in hotels and
similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers; and
purchases of medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior
citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business
establishments extending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens
may claim the discount as a tax deduction.
Ÿ The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to
the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police
power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely
veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet
all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest
benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as “the most essential,
insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all
the great public needs.” It is “[t]he power vested in the legislature by
the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall
judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the
subjects of the same.”
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the
legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power
because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to
general welfare.[
National Development Corporation v. PVB 192 SCRA 257
Facts: The particular enactment in question is Presidential Decree No.
1717, which ordered the rehabilitation of the Agrix Group of
Companies to be administered mainly by the National Development
Company. The law outlined the procedure for filling claims against the
Agrix Companies and created a claims committee to process these
claims. Especially relevant to this case, and noted at the outset, is
section 4(1) thereof providing that “all mortgages and other liens
presently attaching to any of the assets of the dissolved corporations
are hereby extinguished.” Earlier, the Agrix Marketing Inc. had
executed in favor of private respondent Philippine Veterans Bank a real
estate mortgage dated July 7, 1978 over three parcels of land situated
in Los Baños, Laguna. During the existence of the mortgage, Agrix
went bankrupt. It was the expressed purpose of salvaging this and the
other Agrix companies that the aforementioned decree was issued by
President Marcos. A claim for the payment of its loan credit was filed
by PNB against herein petitioner, however the latter alleged and
invoked that the same was extinguished by PD 1717.
Issue: Whether or not Philippine Veterans Bank as creditor of Agrix is
still entitled for payment without prejudice to PD 1717.
Held: Yes. A mortgage lien is a property right derived from contract
and so comes under the protection of Bill of rights so do interests on
loans, as well s penalties and charges, which are also vested rights once
they accrue. Private property cannot simply be taken by law from one
person and given to another without just compensation and any known
public purpose. This is plain arbitrariness and is not permitted under
the constitution.
The court also feels that the decree impairs the obligation of the
contract between Agrix and the private respondent without
justification. While it is true that the police power is superior to the
impairment clause, the principle will apply only where the contract is
so related to the public welfare that it will be considered congenitally
susceptible to change by the legislature in the interest of greater
number.
Our finding in sum, is that PD 1717 is an invalid exercise of the police
power, not being in conformity with the traditional requirements of a
lawful subject and a lawful method. The extinction of the mortgage
and other liens and of the interest and other charges pertaining to the
legitimate creditors of Agrix constitutes taking without due process of
law, and this is compounded by the reduction of the secured creditors
to the category of unsecured creditors in violation of the equal
protection clause. Moreover, the new corporation being neither owned
nor controlled by the government, should have been created only by
general and not special law. And in so far as the decree also interferes
with purely private agreements without any demonstrated connection
with the public interest, there is likewise an impairment of the
obligation of the contract.
AgustIn v. Edu 88 SCRA 195
Facts: President Marcos issued the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which
states that all owners, users or drivers shall have at all times one pair
of early warning devise (EWD) in their cars acquire from any source
depending on the owner’s choice. The Letter of Instruction was
assailed by petitioner Leovillo Agustin to have violated the
constitution guarantee of due process against Hon Edu, Land
Transportation Commissioner, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of
national Defense, Hon. Juinio, Minister of Public Works,
Transportation and Communication and Hon. Aquino, Minister of
Public Highways. Because of such contentions, the Implementing
Rules and Regulation was ordered to be suspended for a period of 6
months. Petitioner alleges that EWD are not necessary because
vehicles already have hazard lights (blinking lights) that can be use as
a warning device. Also petitioner contest that the letter of instruction
violates the delegation of police power because it is deemed harsh,
oppressive and unreasonable for the motorists and those dealers of
EWD will become instant millionaires because of such law.
Issue: Whether or not Petitioner’s contentions possess merit.
Held: Petitioner’s contentions are without merit because the exercise
of police power may interfere with personal liberty or property to
ensure and promote the safety, health and prosperity of the State. Also,
such letter of instruction is intended to promote public safety and it is
indeed a rare occurrence that such contention was alleged in a
instruction with such noble purpose. Petitioner also failed to present
the factual foundation that is necessary to invalidate the said letter of
instruction. In cases where there is absence in the factual foundation,
it should be presumed that constitutionality shall prevail. Pres. Marcos
on the other hand possesses vital statistics that will justify the need for
the implementation of this instruction. As signatory to the 1968 Vienna
Conventions on Road Signs and Signals, our country must abide with
the standards given as stated in our Constitution that “the Philippines
adopts the generally accepted principles of International Law as part
of the law of the land. In the case at bar, the Vienna Convention also
requires the use of EWD. Vehicle owners are not obliged to buy an
EDW. They can personally create a EWD provided that it is in
accordance to the specifications provided by law. Petitioner’s
allegation against the manufacturers of EDW being millionaires is
deemed to be an unfounded speculation. Wherefore, the petition is
dismissed. The restraining order regarding the implementation of the
Reflector Law is lifted making the said law immediately executory.
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties 234 SCRA 255
Facts: The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help
centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land
and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. In Basco
v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, this Court
sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits
of the entity to the national economy as the third highest revenue-
earner in the government.
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City by
leasing a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties
Corporation Inc. for its casino.
On December 7, 1992, Sangguniang Panlungsod of CDO enacted
ordinance 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit and
cancelling existing business permit to any establishment for the using
and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation
of a casino.
On January 4, 1993, it enacted Ordinance 3375-93, prohibiting the
operation of casino and providing penalty for violation therefore.
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the CA, where it was joined by
PAGCOR as intervenor.
The Court found the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for
to prohibit their enforcement. CDO City and its mayor filed a petition
for review under Rules of Court with the Supreme Court.
Issue: WON the Sangguniang Panlungsod can prohibit the
establishment of casino operated by PAGCOR through an ordinance
or resolution.
Held: No. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally
considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in
the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or,
for that matter, even mentioning it at all. In the exercise of its own
discretion, the Congress may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it
without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow
others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient.
Under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units
are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, “gambling and
other prohibited games of chance.”
Ordinances should not contravene a statue as municipal governments
are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise
only delegated powers conferred on them by Congress as the national
lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of
decisions has held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the
following substantive requirements: CUOPDPRGCU
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
Dans v. People 285 SCRA 504
While respondent Court was duty-bound to be just and impartial, it
failed to give petitioner a fair trial, who was thereby denied due process
of law. Respondent Court was plainly biased against, if not downright
hostile to, petitioner; it unfairly allied itself with the prosecution, which
made it prosecutor and judge at the same time.
VII. Aside from the foregoing, the appealed decision is flawed by fatal
infirmities which have effectively denied petitioner due process of law.
G.R. No. 126995
A. The questioned Decision is a nullity because Section 3 (g) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, as amended) is
unconstitutional for being, on its face, void for vagueness.
B. The questioned Decision is a nullity because Section 3 (g) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, as amended) is
unconstitutional for being a rider.
C. The questioned Decision is a nullity because the Informations in SB
Criminal Cases Nos. 17450 and 17453 did not state all the essential
facts constituting the offense but instead stated conclusions of law,
thereby denying the Petitioner her constitutional right to be informed
of the nature and the cause of the accusation against her (Sec. 14 (2),
Bill of Rights).
D. The questioned Decision is a nullity because the Information in said
SB Criminal Cases Nos. 17450 and 17453 charged only two of the total
number of members in the Board of Directors of the LRTA and the
Board of Directors of the PGH Foundation, who had participated in the
collective acts, thereby singling Petitioner and her companion for
discriminatory prosecution, in violation of her right to Equal Protection
of the Laws, which violation existed from the filing of the information
and cannot be cured by post hoc proceedings.
E. The questioned Decision is a nullity, because of the participation
therein of Mr. Justice Garchitorena, whose long-standing bias and
hostility towards President Marcos and Petitioner Imelda R. Marcos
prevented him from having the requisite cold neutrality of an impartial
judge, in violation of her right as an accused person to Procedural Due
Process of Law.
F. The questioned Decision is a nullity because Petitioner was denied
of her Constitutional Right to counsel.
1. Facts of record showing that Petitioner was deprived of and denied
her Right to Counsel.
2. Under the circumstances of record, the absence of counsel resulting
from imposition of suspension from the practice of law upon her
retained counsel, constituted deprivation of or denial of the Right to
Counsel.
3. Facts of record showing legal representation of Petitioner Imelda
Marcos was not adequate.
G. The questioned Decision is premature and had disregarded the
constitutional right of the Petitioner to present evidence in her behalf.
Her right to testify in her own behalf is a guaranteed right, the exercise
of which is her personal choice alone, and which counsel had no
authority to waive in her behalf. Besides, counsel being suspended, he
could not have made a waiver. This constitutional right to be heard by
himself and counsel she is invoking now, as part of her right to due
process (Sec. 14 (1) and (2), Bill of Rights).
H. The questioned Decision is a nullity for it was rendered in
derogation of Petitioners subsisting right to be heard and to submit
evidence in her defense. The finding of waiver is a prejudicial error.
The evidence thereof on the record is tenuous. A waiver by an accused
person of the right to be heard in her defense, including her right to
testify in her own behalf must be indubitable, and is valid only if
personally exercised through her own manifestation in open court.
I. The questioned Decision is a nullity because the crime charged was
not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and the presumption of
innocence was not overcome, which is required by Due Process.
Corona v. UHPAP 283 SCRA 31
FACTS: The Philippine Ports Authority [PPA] was created through PD
505, as amended by PD857 to “control, regulate, supervise pilots and
the pilot age profession”.
After hearing from relevant government agencies, pursuant to said
charter, PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued
Administrative Order 04-92 [PPA-AO 04-92] and corresponding
Memorandum Order in 1992, stating that all existing regular
appointments which have been previously issued shall remain valid up
to 31 December 1992 only and that all appointments to harbor pilot
positions in all pilot age districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term
of one year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or
cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of
performance” to regulate and improve pilot services by instilling
discipline and give better protection to port users. PPA-AO 04-92
replaces PPA-AO 03-85 which succinctly provides that, aspiring pilots
must have a license and train as probationary pilots, and only upon
satisfactory performance, are given permanent and regular
appointments by the PPA itself and to exercise harbor pilot age until
they reach the age of 70.Upon learning of PPA-AO 04-92 only after
publication in the newspaper, the United Harbor Pilots Association of
the Philippines: (a) questioned said PPA-AO twice before the DOTC,
which Secretary Garcia said twice that only the PPA Board of
Directors [as governing body] has exclusive jurisdiction to review,
recall or annul PPA-AOs, (b) appealed to the Office of the President,
which first issued a restraining order to the PPA on the implementation
of the PPA-AO, and after PPA’s answer, then dismissed the
appeal/petition and lifted said order, stating, through Assistant
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona, that the PPA-
AO (i) merely implements PPA Charter, (ii) issuance is an act of PPA,
not of its General Manager, (iii) merely regulates, not forbids practice
of the profession, recognizing that such exercise is property right, and
(iv) sufficiently complied with the requirement in the PD to consult
only with relevant Government Agencies and (d) finally finding
affirmative relief with Manila RTC Br. 6. Court, which ruled that (i)
said PPA-AO is null and void (ii) PPA acted in excess of jurisdiction
with grave abuse of discretion and (iii) imposed a permanent
restraining order on PPA on its implementation.Assistant Executive
Secretary Corona thus filed petition for review [of the Manila RTC
Decision] to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents have acted in excess of
jurisdiction.
Whether or not the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) violate
respondents’ right to exercise their profession and their right to due
process of law.
HELD: the Court is convinced that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in
stark disregard of respondents' right against deprivation of property
without due process of law. The Supreme Court said that In order to
fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur,
namely, that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done
without proper observance of due process. As a general rule, notice and
hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process,
are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-
judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative
functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body
need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing
There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature
of a property right. It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92
unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession
before their compulsory retirement
People v. De la Piedra 350 SCRA 163
FACTS:Accused-appellant Carol M. dela Piedra was charged of illegal
recruitment in large scale by promising an employment abroad Maria
Lourdes Modesto y Gadrino, Nancy Araneta y Aliwanag and Jennelyn
Baez y Timbol, a job to Singapore without having previously obtained
from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, a license
or authority to engage in recruitment and overseas placement of
workers. In fact said Maria Lourdes Modesto had already advanced the
amount of P2,000.00 to the accused for and in consideration of the
promised employment which did not materialize. Thus causing
damage and prejudice to the latter in the said sum.
Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Agency (POEA), received a telephone call from an unidentified
woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitment conducted by
a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa. Ramos. An entrapment was then
planned by the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) headed by Capt.
Mendoza and successfully arrested the accused-appellant.
Later on, in the course of their investigation, the CIS discovered that
Carol Figueroa had many aliases, among them, Carol Llena and Carol
dela Piedra.
At the trial, the prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely, Erlie
Ramos, SPO2 Erwin Manalopilar, Eileen Fermindoza, Nancy Araneta
and Lourdes Modesto and all of them positively testified that the
accused offer them a job to Singapore.
The trial found the accused-appellant guilty of beyond reasonable
doubt of Illegal Recruitment committed in a large scale.
ISSUE: WON Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment
and placement is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process
clause.
HELD: NO. Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code is not a vague provision.
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and become an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
The court cannot sustain the Appellant argument that the acts that
constitute recruitment and placement suffer from overbreadth since by
merely referring a person for employment, a person may be convicted
of illegal recruitment.
Evidently,appellant has taken the penultimate paragraph in the excerpt
quoted above out of context. The Court, in Panis case, merely
bemoaned the lack of records that would help shed light on the
meaning of the proviso. The absence of such records notwithstanding,
the Court was able to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the proviso
by applying principles in criminal law and drawing from the language
and intent of the law itself. Section 13 (b), therefore, is not a perfectly
vague act whose obscurity is evident on its face. If at all, the proviso
therein is merely couched in imprecise language that was salvaged by
proper construction. It is not void for vagueness.
An act will be declared void and inoperative on the ground of
vagueness and uncertainty, only upon a showing that the defect is such
that the courts are unable to determine, with any reasonable degree of
certainty, what the legislature intended. x x x. In this connection we
cannot permit reference to the rule that legislation should not be held
invalid on the ground of uncertainty if susceptible of any reasonable
construction that will support and give it effect. An Act will not be
declared inoperative and ineffectual on the ground that it furnishes no
adequate means to secure the purpose for which it is passed, if men of
common sense and reason can devise and provide the means, and all
the instrumentalities necessary for its execution are within the reach of
those entrusted therewith.
That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considers
as customary and harmless acts such as labor or employment referral
(referring an applicant, according to appellant, for employment to a
prospective employer) does not render the law over broad. Evidently,
appellant misapprehends concept of over breadth.
A statute may be said to be over broad where it operates to inhibit the
exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by the
Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or religion. A generally
worded statute, when construed to punish conduct which cannot be
constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that
it fails to give adequate warning of the boundary between the
constitutionally permissible and the constitutionally impermissible
applications of the statute
In Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Commission on Elections,for instance, we
struck down as void for overbreadth provisions prohibiting the posting
of election propaganda in any place including private vehicles other
than in the common poster areas sanctioned by the COMELEC. We
held that the challenged provisions not only deprived the owner of the
vehicle the use of his property but also deprived the citizen of his right
to free speech and information. The prohibition in Adiong, therefore,
was so broad that it covered even constitutionally guaranteed rights
and, hence, void for over breadth.
In the present case, however, appellant did not even specify what
constitutionally protected freedoms are embraced by the definition of
recruitment and placement that would render the same constitutionally
over broad.
Estrada vs Sandiganbayan
Former President Estrada and co-accused were charged for Plunder
under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder), as amended by RA 7659.
On the information, it was alleged that Estrada have received billions
of pesos through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal
acts, or similar schemes or means thereby unjustly enriching himself
or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people
and the Republic of the Philippines.
Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for
him:
1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness
2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions
3. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable
under The Revised Penal Code.
Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate
Informations against petitioner.
Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack of preliminary
investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses and
opportunity to prove lack of probable cause but was denied.
Later on, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No.
26558 finding that a probable cause for the offense of plunder exists to
justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused.
Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 26558
on the ground that the facts alleged therein did NOT constitute an
indictable offense since the law on which it was based was
unconstitutional for vagueness and that the Amended Information for
Plunder charged more than one offense. Same was denied.
The questioned provisions of the petitioners are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and
4 of the Plunder Law which states that:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property,
business, enterprise or material possession of any person within the
purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or
indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or
business associates by any combination or series of the following
means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of
public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any
person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or
project or by reason of the office or position of the public office
concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any
shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise
or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies
or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders
intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public
officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates
or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described
in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at
least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime
of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any
person who participated with the said public officer in the commission
of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be
punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of
participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating
circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be
considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten
wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the
properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment
thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime
of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal
act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring
supplied).
ISSUE:
WON the crime of plunder is unconstitutional for being vague?
HELD:
NO. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that
would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render
them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The amended
information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating w/
reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the
petitioner is alleged to have committed.
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that
will confuse petitioner in his defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the
statutory definition of the terms “combination” and “series” in the key
phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These
omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and
deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due
process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general
terms are used herein, or because of the employment of terms without
defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence most necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is
repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects – it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one
which is overbroad because of possible “chilling effect” upon
protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility
that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived
grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly
broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in
the area of free speech.
ABAKADA v. Ermita 469 SCRA 1
Facts: Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List challenged the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 particularly Sections 4, 5 and 6,
amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). These questioned provisions contain
a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of
the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective
January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have been
satisfied, to wit:
. . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added
tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has
been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent
(2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous
year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 ½%).
Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes
abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of
taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. They further argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or
exchange of goods and services and cannot be included within the
purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to
customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the
government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They
also said that the President has powers to cause, influence or create the
conditions provided by law to bring about the conditions precedent.
Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made by law as to
how the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation. They
claim, nonetheless, that any recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance can easily be brushed aside by the President since the former
is a mere alter ego of the latter, such that, ultimately, it is the President
who decides whether to impose the increased tax rate or not.
Issues: Whether or not R.A. No. 9337 has violated the provisions in
Article VI, Section 24, and Article VI, Section 26 (2) of the
Constitution.
Whether or not there was an undue delegation of legislative power
in violation of Article VI Sec 28 Par 1 and 2 of the Constitution.
Whether or not there was a violation of the due process and equal
protection under Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
Discussions: Basing from the ruling of Tolentino case, it is not the
law, but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to
“originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives, but Senate has
the power not only to propose amendments, but also to propose its own
version even with respect to bills which are required by the
Constitution to originate in the House. the Constitution simply means
is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local
application must come from the House of Representatives on the
theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the
House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and
problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are
expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective.
Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was
complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the
legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other
appointee or delegate of the legislature.
The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that “no
person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of
laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same
place and in like circumstances.”
Rulings: R.A. No. 9337 has not violated the provisions. The revenue
bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate
was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to
the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950
amending corporate income taxes, percentage, excise and franchise
taxes. Verily, Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not
contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the amendments
that may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the
discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally
permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly
delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do
it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that
is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go
forward.
Supreme Court held no decision on this matter. The power of the
State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of
taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of
taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to
be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the
State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the
judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of
unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.
GSIS V. Monteclaros 434 SCRA 441
FACTS:Nicolas Montesclaros, a 72-year-old widower married
Milagros Orbiso, who was then 43 years old, on 10 July 1983. Nicolas
filed with the GSIS an application for retirement benefits under the
Revised Government Insurance Act of 1977.
In his retirement application, he designated his wife as his sole
beneficiary. GSIS approved Nicolas’ application for retirement
effective 17 February 1984, granting a lump sum payment of annuity
for the first five years and a monthly annuity after.
Nicolas died on 22 April 1992. Milagros filed with the GSIS a claim
for survivorship pension under PD 1146 but was denied the claim
because, under section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no
right to survivorship pension if the surviving spouse contracted the
marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner
qualified for the pension.
Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year from his date
of retirement on 17 February 1984. Milagros filed with the trial court
a special civil action for declaratory relief questioning the validity of
Sec. 18 of PD 1146.
The trial court rendered judgment declaring Milagros eligible for
survivorship pension and ordered GSIS to pay Milagros the benefits
including interest. Citing Articles 115and 117 of the Family Code, the
trial court held that retirement benefits, which the pensioner has earned
for services rendered and for which the pensioner has contributed
through monthly salary deductions, are onerous acquisitions. Since
retirement benefits are property the pensioner acquired through labor,
such benefits are conjugal property. The trial court held that the
prohibition in Section 18 of PD 1146 is deemed repealed for being
inconsistent with the Family Code, a later law. The Family Code has
retroactive effect if it does not prejudice or impair vested rights.
The trial court held that Section 18 of PD 1146 was repealed by the
Family Code, a later law. GSIS appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the trial court’s decision. Hence, this appeal.
In a letter dated 10 January 2003, Milagros informed the Court that she
has accepted GSIS’ decision disqualifying her from receiving
survivorship pension and that she is no longer interested in pursuing
the case. However, the Court will still resolve the issue despite the
manifestation of Milagros because social justice and public interest
demand the resolution of the constitutionality of the proviso.
ISSUE:Whether the proviso in Section 18 of PD 1146 is constitutional.
HELD:NO. The sole proviso Sec. 18 of PD 1146 is unconstitutional.
Under Section 18 of PD 1146, it prohibits the dependent spouse from
receiving survivorship pension if such dependent spouse married the
pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the
pension. The Court holds that such proviso is discriminatory and
denies equal protection of the law.
The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of the Constitution,
which provides that [n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws.
The proviso is unduly oppressive in outrightly denying a dependent
spouses claim for survivorship pension if the dependent spouse
contracted marriage to the pensioner within the three-year prohibited
period.
There is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse
without giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard.
The proviso undermines the purpose of PD 1146, which is to assure
comprehensive and integrated social security and insurance benefits to
government employees and their dependents in the event of sickness,
disability, death, and retirement of the government employees.
A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the
constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The
requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. Thus, the
law may treat and regulate one class differently from another class
provided there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one
class from another.
The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The
proviso discriminates against the dependent spouse who contracts
marriage to the pensioner within three years before the pensioner
qualified for the pension. Under the proviso, even if the dependent
spouse married the pensioner more than three years before the
pensioners death, the dependent spouse would still not receive
survivorship pension if the marriage took place within three years
before the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of the
prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the
means employed and the purpose intended. The law itself does not
provide any reason or purpose for such a prohibition. If the purpose of
the proviso is to prevent deathbed marriages, then we do not see why
the proviso reckons the three-year prohibition from the date the
pensioner qualified for pension and not from the date the pensioner
died. The classification does not rest on substantial distinctions.
Worse, the classification lumps all those marriages contracted within
three years before the pensioner qualified for pension as having been
contracted primarily for financial convenience to avail of pension
benefits.
Indeed, the classification is discriminatory and arbitrary. This is
probably the reason Congress deleted the proviso in Republic Act No.
8291 (RA 8291), otherwise known as the Government Service
Insurance Act of 1997, the law revising the old charter of GSIS (PD
1146). Under the implementing rules of RA 8291, the surviving spouse
who married the member immediately before the members death is still
qualified to receive survivorship pension unless the GSIS proves that
the surviving spouse contracted the marriage solely to receive the
benefit.
Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume that marriages contracted
within three years before retirement or death of a member are sham
marriages contracted to avail of survivorship benefits. The present
GSIS law does not automatically forfeit the survivorship pension of the
surviving spouse who contracted marriage to a GSIS member within
three years before the members retirement or death. The law
acknowledges that whether the surviving spouse contracted the
marriage mainly to receive survivorship benefits is a matter of
evidence. The law no longer prescribes a sweeping classification that
unduly prejudices the legitimate surviving spouse and defeats the
purpose for which Congress enacted the social legislation.
Wherefore, the proviso in Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 1146
is void for being violative of the constitutional guarantees of due
process and equal protection of the law.
Mirasol v. DPWH 490 SCRA 318
FACTS:Petitioners filed before the court a petition for declaratory
judgment with application for temporary restraining order and
injunction. It seeks the declaration of nullification of administrative
issuances for being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act
2000 (Limited Access Highway Act) which was enacted in 1957.
Previously, pursuant to its mandate under RA 2000, DPWH issued on
June 25, 1998 Dept. Order no. 215 declaring the Manila Cavite
(Coastal Road) Toll Expressway as limited access facilities.
Petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8, 2001 wherein
petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid
administrative issuances. Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an
administrative regulation banning the use of motorcycles at the toll
way on the ground that it is baseless and unwarranted for failure to
provide scientific and objective data on the dangers of motorcycles
plying the highways. Respondent avers that the toll ways were not
designed to accommodate motorcycles and that their presence in the
toll ways will compromise safety and traffic considerations.
The petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles along
NLEX, SLEX, Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) toll Expressway under
DO 15.
RTC, after due hearing, granted the petitioner’s application for
preliminary injunction conditioned upon petitioner’s filing of cash
bond in the amount of P100, 000 which petitioners complied.
DPWH issued an order (DO 123) allowing motorcycles with engine
displacement of 400 cubic centimeters inside limited access facilities
(toll ways).
Upon assumption of Hon. Presiding Judge Cornejo, both the
petitioners and respondents were required to file their Memoranda.
The court issued an order dismissing the petition but declaring invalid
DO 123.The petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
RTC ruled that DO 74 is valid but DO 123 is invalid being violative of
the equal protection clause of the Constitution
ISSUE:Whether RTC’s decision is barred by res judicata?
Whether DO 74, DO 215 and the TRB regulation contravene RA 2000.
Whether AO 1 is unconstitutional.
HELD:1. NO. The petitioners are mistaken because they rely on the
RTC’s Order granting their prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Since petitioners did not appeal from that order, the petitioners
presumed that the order became a final judgment on the issues.
The order granting the prayer is not an adjudication on the merits of
the case that would trigger res judicata. A preliminary injunction does
not serve as a final determination of the issues, it being a provisional
remedy.
2. YES. The petitioners claimed that DO 74, DO 215 and TRB’s rules
and regulation issued under them unduly expanded the power of the
DPWH in sec. 4 of RA 2000 to regulate toll ways.
They contend that DPWH’s regulatory authority is limited to acts like
redesigning curbings or central dividing sections.
They claim that DPWH is only allowed to redesign the physical
structure of toll ways and not to determine “who or what can be
qualifies as toll ways user”. The court ruled that DO 74 and DO 215
are void because the DPWH has no authority to declare certain
expressways as limited access facilities. Under the law, it is the DOTC
which is authorized to administer and enforce all laws, rules and
regulations in the field of transportation and to regulate related
activities. Since the DPWH has no authority to regulate activities
relative to transportation, the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) cannot
derive its power from the DPWH to issue regulations governing
limited access facilities. The DPWH cannot delegate a power or
function which it does not possess in the first place.
3. NO. The Court emphasized that the secretary of the then Department
of Public Works and Communications had issued AO 1 in February
1968, as authorized under Section 3 of Republic Act 2000, prior to the
splitting of the department and the eventual devolution of its powers to
the DOTC.
Because administrative issuances had the force and effect of law, AO
1 enjoyed the presumption of validity and constitutionality. The burden
to prove its unconstitutionality rested on the party assailing it, more so
when police power was at issue and passed the test of reasonableness.
The Administrative Order was not oppressive, as it did not impose
unreasonable restrictions or deprive petitioners of their right to use the
facilities. It merely set rules to ensure public safety and the uninhibited
flow of traffic within those limited-access facilities.
The right to travel did not mean the right to choose any vehicle in
traversing a tollway. Petitioners were free to access the tollway as
much as the rest of the public. However, the mode in which they
wished to travel, pertaining to their manner of using the tollway, was a
subject that could validly be limited by regulation. There was no
absolute right to drive; on the contrary, this privilege was heavily
regulated.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
People v. Cayat 68 Phil. 12
DOCTRINE: Protection of laws is not violated by a legislation based
on reasonable classification. The classification to be reasonable, (1)
must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only;
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
FACTS: Respondent Cayat, native of Baguio, Benguet and a member
of the non-Christian tribe was found guilty of violating sections 2 and
3 of Act No. 1639 for possessing an intoxicating liquor (one bottle of
gin) which is not a native wine.
Section 2 of the said act prohibits any native of the Philippines who
is a member of the non-Christian tribe to buy, receive and possess any
intoxicating liquor other than their so-called native wines.
Consequently, Section 3 thereof provides for its punishment.
Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act No. 1639 on the
grounds that it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the
laws, violative of the due process and it is an improper exercise of
police power.
ISSUES: Whether the Act No. 1639 violates the equal protection
clause?
RULING: No, the Act No. 1639 is not violative of the equal protection
clause.
Equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on
reasonable classifications. The classification to be reasonable, (1) must
rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of
the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; (4) must
apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. On the first requisite, the
classification rests on real and substantial distinctions. The non-
Christian tribes refer not to the religious belief, but in a way to the
geographical and more directly to the natives of the Philippines of a
low grade of civilization. Second, Act No. 1639 was designed to insure
peace and order among the non-Christian tribes. The experience of the
past and the lower court observed that the use of highly intoxicating
liquors by the non-Christian tribes often resulted in lawlessness and
crimes, which hamper the efforts of the Government to raise their
standard of life and civilization. Third, the said act is intended to apply
for all times as long as the conditions exist. Legislature understood that
civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it
must go measures of protection and security. Fourth, the act applies
equally to all members of same class.
Ichong vs. Hernandez [G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957]
Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien
residents corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the
provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, “An Act to Regulate the Retail
Business,” filed to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is
unconstitutional contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the
equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property
without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed
or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international
and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the
provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail
business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino
capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the
retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and
Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection
of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due
process of law
Held: No. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor
and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or
the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation,
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons
within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do
not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation
enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there public interest, a
public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature’s purpose; is it not
unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or
reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a
capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be
achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified
interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask
when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of
due process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real.
Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist.
The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable
means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic
society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that
would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that
would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of
life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and
persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone
is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always,
is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on
public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist
between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has
been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.
The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and
citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process
of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and
recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation
and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy
of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident
— as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually
necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the
prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the
Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the
provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers
from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of
the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for
supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually
been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be
curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional
agreement.
Association of Small Landowners vs. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform [G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989]
Facts: These are consolidated cases which involve common legal,
including serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several
measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential Proclamation
No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79777
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229
on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal
protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property
shall be taken for public use without just compensation. G.R. No.
79310
G.R. No. 79310
This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and
E.O. No. 229. They contend that taking must be simultaneous with
payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e.,
with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section
5 of the E.O. No. 229.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the
constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without
due process or just compensation.
G.R. No. 78742
Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to
enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian
Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the
above-quoted decree.
Held: The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied
equal protection because of the absence of retention limits has also
become academic under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. Significantly,
they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the
complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian
reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that
they belong to a particular class with particular interests of their own.
However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the
requisites of a valid classification have been violated.
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things
similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other
in these same particulars. 31 To be valid, it must conform to the
following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial
distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply
equally to all the members of the class. 32 The Court finds that all these
requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary
and discriminatory.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly
situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the
liabilities imposed. 33 The petitioners have not shown that they belong
to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument
that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be
made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be
rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of
owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is
no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is
allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its
decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice
except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill
of Rights. It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be
sustained under the police power only if there is a concurrence of the
lawful subject and the lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests of
the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class
require the interference of the State and, no less important, the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose
sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 34
As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by
the Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has been
satisfied. What remains to be examined is the validity of the method
employed to achieve the constitutional goal.
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the
rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the
means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also
necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the
Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts.
There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the
most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will
excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to
say that a, person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the
Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation
who would deny him that right.
That right covers the person's life, his liberty and his property under
Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. With regard to his property,
the owner enjoys the added protection of Section 9, which reaffirms
the familiar rule that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.
Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho 86 SCRA 270
FACTS: This case involves an ordinance prohibiting aliens from being
employed or engage or participate in any position or occupation or
business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual,
without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila
and paying the permit fee of P50.00. Private respondent Hiu Chiong
Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition to stop the
enforcement of such ordinance as well as to declare the same null and
void. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, hence
this case.
ISSUE: WON said Ordinance violates due process of law and equal
protection rule of the Constitution.
Held: The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive
but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation
among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal
protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is
imperative that the classification should be based on real and
substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of
the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being
collected from every employed alien whether he is casual or
permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or
a highly paid executive
Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to
guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. It has been held that
where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set
up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action, expresses no
purpose to be attained by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions
for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring
upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the
issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an
undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an
activity per se lawful.
Dumlao v. COMELEC 96 SCRA 392
Facts: Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of
Batas Pambansa Blg 52 as discriminatory and contrary to equal
protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Sec. 4
provides that any retired elective provicial or municipal official who
has received payments of retirement benefits and shall have been 65
years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he
seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective
local office from which he has retired. According to Dumlao, the
provision amounts to class legislation. Petitioners Igot and Salapantan
Jr. also assail the validity of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52, which
states that any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the
State, including those amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion,
or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified for any of the offices
covered by the act, or to participate in any partisan activity therein:
provided that a judgment of conviction of those crimes shall be
conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the
commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after
preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.
Issue: Whether or not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate
the Constitution and thus, should be declared null and void
Held: In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of
BP Blg 52 remains constitutional and valid. The constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational
classification. One class can be treated differently from another class.
In this case, employees 65 years of age are classified differently from
younger employees. The purpose of the provision is to satisfy the “need
for new blood” in the workplace. In regards to the second paragraph of
Sec. 4, it should be declared null and void for being violative of the
constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.
“Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel
(Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according
to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged
proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a
candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground
alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military
tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect,
except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a
person convicted of acts of dislotalty and one against whom charges
have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to
run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on
the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed
in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the
penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of
suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence
(Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).”
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie
evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet. there is "clear and
present danger" that because of the proximity of the elections, time
constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from
offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against
him.
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty
be aired before the Courts rather than before an administrative body
such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings between
two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged,
will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative
determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a
judicial determination.
Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of
nullity of only that objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable
from the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself.
Wherefore, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang
52 is hereby declared valid and that portion of the second paragraph of
section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared null and
void, for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence
guaranteed to an accused.
Ormoc Sugar Central v. Ormoc City L-23794; Feb 17 1968
FACTS: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4,
imposing "on any and all productions of sugar milled at petitioner's,
municipal tax of 1% per export sale. Petitioner paid but were under
protest.
Petitioner filed before the CFI contending that the ordinance is
unconstitutional for being in violation of the equal protection clause
and the rule of uniformity of taxation, aside from being an export tax
forbidden under Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code. It
further alleged that the tax is neither a production nor a license tax
which Ormoc City its charter and under Section 2 of Republic Act
2264, or the Local Autonomy Act, is authorized to impose; that it also
violates RA 2264 because the tax is on both the sale and export of
sugar.
ISSUE: Whether the ordinance is valid.
Held: A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned
ordinance does not meet them (requisites of classification), for it taxes
only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's
enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar
central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable,
should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing
ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any
subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff,
for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company
is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly
points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be
levied upon.
Basco v. PAGCOR 197 SCRA 52
Facts: A TV ad proudly announces: “The New PAGCOR –
Responding Through Responsible Gaming.” But the petitioners think
otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul
the PAGCOR charter – PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to
morals, public policy and order, and because –
a. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a
right recognized by law. It waived the Manila city government’s right
to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law;
b. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceeding paragraph,
the law has intruded into the local government’s right to impose local
taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally
enshrined principle of local autonomy;
c. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it
legalizes PAGCOR – conducted gambling, while most other forms of
gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and
other vices;
d. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from the
monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free enterprise and
privatization.
HELD: Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution, because "it legalized PAGCOR
— conducted gambling, while most gambling are outlawed together
with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices" (p. 82, Rollo).
We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The
petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause
"equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude
classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment
under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or
arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not have
to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R.
No. 89572, December 21, 1989).
The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from
establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules
shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The Constitution does
not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated
in law as though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA
827).
Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is
violative of the equal protection is not clearly explained in the petition.
The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D
449) horse racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes,
lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized
under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render
the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.
If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be
overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have
been applied. (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827)
The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean that
all occupations called by the same name must be treated the same way;
the state may do what it can to prevent which is deemed as evil and
stop short of those cases in which harm to the few concerned is not less
than the harm to the public that would insure if the rule laid down were
made mathematically exact. (Dominican Hotel v. Arizona, 249 US
2651).
Binay v. Domingo 201 SCRA 508
Facts: Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council,
approved Resolution No. 60 which extends P500 burial assistance to
bereaved families whose gross family income does not exceed
P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be taken out of the unappropriated
available funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila
Commission approved the resolution. Thereafter, the municipal
secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000.00 for the
implementation of the program. However, the Commission on Audit
disapproved said resolution and the disbursement of funds for the
implementation thereof for the following reasons: (1) the resolution
has no connection to alleged public safety, general welfare, safety, etc.
of the inhabitants of Makati; (2) government funds must be disbursed
for public purposes only; and, (3) it violates the equal protection clause
since it will only benefit a few individuals.
Issues:1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police
power under the general welfare clause
2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose
3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause
Held: 1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent
attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It
is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas
and "Salus populi est suprema lex. Its fundamental purpose is securing
the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations.
Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must
be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the
repository of the inherent powers of the State.
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare
clause. Pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such
ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out
and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such
as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety,
comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public
morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality
and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property
therein.
2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been,
purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all
comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the exigencies
of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been
said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide
for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and
convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to
all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation
and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a
wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with
whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general
welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to
deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest
welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general
prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of
comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed
inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely
indicate the limits of police power.
Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally
benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the
Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare
legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social
services, the promotion of the general welfare, social justice as well as
human dignity and respect for human rights." The care for the poor is
generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has
long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the
common good.
3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be
reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment.
Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors,
is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving
rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer
from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution
No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of
Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government
towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of
pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is
a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be
financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very
words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in
life, should have more in law." This decision, however must not be
taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal
governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs
for motives political or otherwise. (Binay vs Domingo, G.R. No.
92389, September 11, 1991)
NPC v. De Guzman 229 SCRA 801
FACTS: RA 6975, otherwise known as "An Act Establishing the
Philippine National Police Under a Reorganized Department of the
Interior and Local Government", took effect on January 2, 1991.
RA 6975 provides for a uniform retirement system for PNP members.
Section 39 reads:
"SEC. 39.Compulsory Retirement. — Compulsory retirement, for
officer and non-officer, shall be upon the attainment of age fifty-six
(56); Provided, That, in case of any officer with the rank of chief
superintendent, director or deputy director general, the Commission
may allow his retention in the service for an unextendible period of one
(1) year.
Based on the above provision, petitioners sent notices of retirement to
private respondents who are all members of the defunct Philippine
Constabulary and have reached the age of fifty-six.
Private respondents filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer
for the issuance of an ex parte restraining order and/or injunction
before the RTC of Makati. They aver that the age of retirement set at
fifty-six (56) by Section 39 of RA 6975 cannot be applied to them since
they are also covered by Sec. 89 thereof which provides:
"Any provision hereof to the contrary notwithstanding, and within the
transition period of four (4) years following the effectively of this Act,
the following members of the INP shall be considered compulsorily
retired:
"a)Those who shall attain the age of sixty (60) on the first year of the
effectivity of this Act.
"b)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-nine (59) on the second year
of the effectivity of this Act.
"c)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-eight (58) on the third year
of the effectivity of this Act.
"d)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-seven (57) on the fourth year
of the effectivity of this Act."
Respondents added that the term "INP" includes both the former
members of the Philippine Constabulary and the local police force who
were earlier constituted as the Integrated National Police (INP) by
virtue of PD 765 in 1975.
On the other hand, it is the belief of petitioners that the 4-year transition
period provided in Section 89 applies only to the local police forces
who previously retire, compulsorily, at age sixty (60) for those in the
ranks of Police/Fire Lieutenant or higher, while the retirement age for
the PC had already been set at fifty-six (56) under the AFP law.
Respondent judge De Guzman issued a restraining order followed by
a writ of injunction. He declared that the term "INP" in Section 89 of
the PNP Law includes all members of the present
Philippine National police, irrespective of the original status of the
present members of the Philippine National police before its creation
and establishment, and that Section 39 thereof shall become operative
after the lapse of the four-year transition period. Thus, the preliminary
injunction issued is made permanent. Moreover, he observed, among
others, that it may have been the intention of Congress to refer to the
local police forces as the "INP" but the PNP Law failed to define who
or what constituted the INP. The natural recourse of the court is to trace
the source of the "INP" as courts are permitted to look to prior laws on
the same subject and to investigate the antecedents involved
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 89 of the PNP Law includes all
members of the present
Philippine National police, irrespective of the original status of its
present members and that
Section 39 of RA 6975 shall become applicable to petitioners only after
the lapse of the four-year
transition period.
HELD: From a careful review of Sections 23 and 85 of RA 6975, it
appears that the use of the term INP is not synonymous with the PC.
Had it been otherwise, the statute could have just made a uniform
reference to the members of the whole Philippine National police
(PNP) for retirement purposes and not just the INP. The law itself
distinguishes INP from the PC and it cannot be construed that "INP"
as used in Sec. 89 includes the members of the PC.
Contrary to the pronouncement of respondent judge that “the law failed
to define who constitutes the INP”, Sec. 90 of RA 6975 has in fact
defined the same. Thus,
"SEC. 90. Status of Present NAPOLCOM, PC-INP. — Upon the
effectivity of this Act, the present National police Commisdion and the
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated
National police shall cease to exist. The Philippine Constabulary,
which is the nucleus of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated
National police shall cease to be a major service of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines. The Integrated National police, which is the civilian
component of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National police,
shall cease to be the national police force and lieu thereof, a new police
force shall be establish and constituted pursuant to this Act."
It is not altogether correct to state, therefore, that the legislature failed
to define who the members of the INP are. In this regard, it is of no
moment that the legislature failed to categorically restrict the
application of the transition period in Sec. 89 specifically in favor of
the local police forces for it would be a mere superfluity as the PC
component of the INP was already retirable at age fifty-six (56).
Having defined the meaning of INP, the trial court need not have
belabored on the supposed dubious meaning of the term. Nonetheless,
if confronted with such a situation, courts are not without recourse in
determining the construction of the statute with doubtful meaning for
they may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative
body. In case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the
meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberations may
be adopted. Courts should not give a literal interpretation to the letter
of the law if it runs counter to the legislative intent.
The legislative intent to classify the INP in such manner that Section
89 of R.A. 6975 is applicable only to the local police force is clear. The
question now is whether the classification is valid. The test for this is
reasonableness such that it must conform to the following
requirements:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only;
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the same class
Himagan v. People 237 SCRA 538
FACTS: Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao
City. He was charged for the murder of and attempted murder.
Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension
pending the murder case. The law provides that “Upon the filing of a
complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a
member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by
law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately
suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case
shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within
ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed
the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service
Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He
claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is
contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his
constitutional right to equal protection of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection
guaranteed by the Constitution.
HELD: No. The reason why members of the PNP are treated
differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or
administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive
suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge
of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against
them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. If a
suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is
reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the
witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and
thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in
uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over
90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended
policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.
Tablarin v. Gutierrez 152 SCRA 730
Facts:Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, and
Evangelina S. Labao sought admission into colleges or schools of
medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, they either did not
take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test
(NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education and
administered by the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM). On
5 March 1987, Tablarin, et. al., in behalf of applicants for admission
into the Medical Colleges who have not taken up or successfully
hurdled the NMAT, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment
and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
and Preliminary Injunction, to enjoin the Secretary of Education,
Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for
Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of
Republic Act 2382, as amended, and MECS Order 52 (series of 1985),
dated 23 August 1985 [which established a uniform admission test
(NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of
eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines,
beginning with the school year 1986-1987] and from requiring the
taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates
of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting
applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT
as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the
petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied
said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and
administered as previously scheduled. Tablarin, et. al. accordingly
filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to
set aside the Order of the RTC judge denying the petition for issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985,
is in conflict with the equal protection clause of the Constitution. More
specifically, petitioners assert that that portion of the MECS Order
which provides that "the cutoff score for the successful applicants,
based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by
the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association
of Philippine Medical Colleges." (Underscoring supplied)It infringes
the requirements of equal protection. They assert, in other words, that
students seeking admission during a given school year, e.g., 1987-
1988, when subjected to a different cutoff score than that established
for an, e.g., earlier school year, are discriminated against and that this
renders the MECS Order "arbitrary and capricious".
Held: Different cutoff scores for different school years may be dictated
by differing conditions obtaining during those years. Thus, the
appropriate cutoff score for a given year may be a function of such
factors as the number of students who have reached the cutoff score
established the preceding year; the number of places available in
medical schools during the current year; the average score attained
during the current year; the level of difficulty of the test given during
the current year, and so forth. To establish a permanent and immutable
cutoff score regardless of changes in circumstances from year to year,
may well result in an unreasonable rigidity. The above language in
MECS Order No. 52, far from being arbitrary or capricious, leaves the
Board of Medical Education with the measure of flexibility needed to
meet circumstances as they change.
We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain
minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical
schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional
imposition.
Lim v. Pacquing 240 SCRA 649
FACTS:The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on
18 June 1949 (R.A. No. 409).
On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring
the authority to regulate jai-alais from local government to the Games
and Amusements Board (GAB).
On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila
nonetheless passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled “An Ordinance
Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The Associated
Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain And Operate A Jai-
Alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And Conditions And
For Other Purposes.”
 On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then
President Marcos. The decree, entitled “Revoking All Powers and
Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License or
Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public On Horse And
Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other Forms Of
Gambling”, in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all existing
franchises and permits issued by local governments.
In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to
operate a Jai-Alai. The government through Games and Amusement
Board intervened and invoked Presidential Decree No. 771 which
expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all
forms of gambling facilities (including Jai-Alai) by local governments.
ADC assails the constitutionality of P.D. No. 771.
ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. No. 771 is violative of the equal
protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution.
HELD:NO. P.D. No. 771 is valid and constitutional.
On the alleged violation of the non-impairment and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution, it should be remembered that a franchise is
not in the strict sense a simple contract but rather it is more importantly,
a mere privilege specially in matters which are within the government's
power to regulate and even prohibit through the exercise of the police
power. Thus, a gambling franchise is always subject to the exercise of
police power for the public welfare.
In RCPI v. NTC (150 SCRA 450), we held that:
A franchise started out as a "royal privilege or (a) branch of the King's
prerogative, subsisting in the hands of a subject." This definition was
given by Finch, adopted by Blackstone, and accepted by every
authority since . . . Today, a franchise being merely a privilege
emanating from the sovereign power of the state and owing its
existence to a grant, is subject to regulation by the state itself by virtue
of its police power through its administrative agencies.
There is a stronger reason for holding ADC's permit to be a mere
privilege because jai-alai, when played for bets, is pure and simple
gambling. To analogize a gambling franchise for the operation of a
public utility, such as public transportation company, is to trivialize the
great historic origin of this branch of royal privilege.
As earlier noted, ADC has not alleged ever applying for a franchise
under the provisions of PD No. 771. and yet, the purpose of PD No.
771 is quite clear from its provisions, i.e., to give to the national
government the exclusive power to grant gambling franchises. Thus,
all franchises then existing were revoked but were made subject to
reissuance by the national government upon compliance by the
applicant with government-set qualifications and requirements.
There was no violation by PD No. 771 of the equal protection clause
since the decree revoked all franchises issued by local governments
without qualification or exception. ADC cannot allege violation of the
equal protection clause simply because it was the only one affected by
the decree, for as correctly pointed out by the government, ADC was
not singled out when all jai-alai franchises were revoked. Besides, it is
too late in the day for ADC to seek redress for alleged violation of its
constitutional rights for it could have raised these issues as early as
1975, almost twenty 920) years ago.
RATIO:Presumption against unconstitutionality. There is nothing on
record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed,
altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance
(when the executive still exercised legislative powers).
Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued existence
of ADC’s franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of PD No. 771
was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision of the Court’s First
Division in said case, aside from not being final, cannot have the effect
of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since only the Court En
Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the
Constitution.
And on the question of whether or not the government is estopped from
contesting ADC’s possession of a valid franchise, the well-settled rule
is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if
any, of its officials or agents. (Republic v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 209 SCRA 90)
Philippine Judges Association v. Prado 227 SCRA 703
Facts: Section 35 of RA 7354, the law creating the Philippine Postal
Corporation, withdraws the franking privileges from the judiciary,
along with certain other government offices. he Philippine Postal
Corporation issued circular No. 92-28 to implement Section 35 of RA
7354 withdrawing the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTCs,
MeTCs, MTCs and Land Registration Commission and with certain
other government offices. It is alleged that RA 7354 is discriminatory
becasue while withdrawing the franking privilege from judiciary, it
retains the same for the President & Vice-President of the Philippines,
Senator & members of the House of Representatives, COMELEC,
National Census & Statistics Office and the general public. The
respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is
based on a valid classification in accordance with the equal protection
clause.
Issue: Whether or Not Section 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.
Held: The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of
due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements
of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate
clause in Article III Section 1 of the Constitution to provide for amore
specific guarantee against any form of undue favoritism or hostility
from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on
the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed
partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon
to cut it down is the equal protection clause. Equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. What
the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according
to a valid classification. Section 35 of RA 7354 is declared
unconstitutional. Circular No. 92-28 is set aside insofar
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the
franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the
courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it
recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the
members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why
it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of
the Judiciary for such privilege.
Sison v. Ancheta 130 SCRA 654
Facts: Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Section 1 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 135. It amended
Section 21 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, which
provides for rates of tax on citizens or residents on (a) taxable
compensation income, (b) taxable net income, (c) royalties, prizes, and
other winnings, (d) interest from bank deposits and yield or any other
monetary benefit from deposit substitutes and from trust fund and
similar arrangements, (e) dividends and share of individual partner in
the net profits of taxable partnership, (f) adjusted gross income.
Petitioner as taxpayer alleged that "he would be unduly discriminated
against by the imposition of higher rates of tax upon his income arising
from the exercise of his profession vis-a-vis those which are imposed
upon fixed income or salaried individual taxpayers." He characterizes
the above section as arbitrary amounting to class legislation,
oppressive and capricious in character.
For petitioner, therefore, there is a transgression of both the equal
protection and due process clauses of the Constitution as well as of the
rule requiring uniformity in taxation.
Issue: Whether the imposition of a higher tax rate on taxable net
income derived from business or profession than on compensation is
constitutionally infirm.
(WON there is a transgression of both the equal protection and due
process clauses of the Constitution as well as of the rule requiring
uniformity in taxation)
Held: No. Petition dismissed
Ratio: The need for more revenues is rationalized by the government's
role to fill the gap not done by public enterprise in order to meet the
needs of the times. It is better equipped to administer for the public
welfare.
The power to tax, an inherent prerogative, has to be availed of to assure
the performance of vital state functions. It is the source of the bulk of
public funds.
The power to tax is an attribute of sovereignty and the strongest power
of the government. There are restrictions, however, diversely affecting
as it does property rights, both the due process and equal protection
clauses may properly be invoked, as petitioner does, to invalidate in
appropriate cases a revenue measure. If it were otherwise, taxation
would be a destructive power.
The petitioner failed to prove that the statute ran counter to the
Constitution. He used arbitrariness as basis without a factual
foundation. This is merely to adhere to the authoritative doctrine that
where the due process and equal protection clauses are invoked,
considering that they are not fixed rules but rather broad standards,
there is a need for proof of such persuasive character as would lead to
such a conclusion.
It is undoubted that the due process clause may be invoked where a
taxing statute is so arbitrary that it finds no support in the Constitution.
An obvious example is where it can be shown to amount to the
confiscation of property. That would be a clear abuse of power.
It has also been held that where the assailed tax measure is beyond the
jurisdiction of the state, or is not for a public purpose, or, in case of a
retroactive statute is so harsh and unreasonable, it is subject to attack
on due process grounds.
For equal protection, the applicable standard to determine whether this
was denied in the exercise of police power or eminent domain was the
presence of the purpose of hostility or unreasonable discrimination.
It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all
persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated
in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue
preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection
and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which
if not identical are analogous. If law be looks upon in terms of burden
or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same
fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally
binding on the rest.
The equal protection clause is, of course, inspired by the noble concept
of approximating the ideal of the laws's benefits being available to all
and the affairs of men being governed by that serene and impartial
uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea of law.
The equality at which the 'equal protection' clause aims is not a
disembodied equality. The Fourteenth Amendment enjoins 'the equal
protection of the laws,' and laws are not abstract propositions. They do
not relate to abstract units A, B and C, but are expressions of policy
arising out of specific difficulties, addressed to the attainment of
specific ends by the use of specific remedies. The Constitution does
not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in
law as though they were the same.
Lutz v Araneta- it is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to
select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that
'inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for
taxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.
Petitioner- kindred concept of uniformity- Court- Philippine Trust
Company- The rule of uniformity does not call for perfect uniformity
or perfect equality, because this is hardly attainable
Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or
kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The
taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural
classifications for purposes of taxation
There is quite a similarity then to the standard of equal protection for
all that is required is that the tax "applies equally to all persons, firms
and corporations placed in similar situation" There was a difference
between a tax rate and a tax base. There is no legal objection to a
broader tax base or taxable income by eliminating all deductible items
and at the same time reducing the applicable tax rate.
The discernible basis of classification is the susceptibility of the
income to the application of generalized rules removing all deductible
items for all taxpayers within the class and fixing a set of reduced tax
rates to be applied to all of them. As there is practically no overhead
expense, these taxpayers are not entitled to make deductions for
income tax purposes because they are in the same situation more or
less.Taxpayers who are recipients of compensation income are set
apart as a class.
On the other hand, in the case of professionals in the practice of their
calling and businessmen, there is no uniformity in the costs or expenses
necessary to produce their income. It would not be just then to
disregard the disparities by giving all of them zero deduction and
indiscriminately impose on all alike the same tax rates on the basis of
gross income.
There was a lack of a factual foundation, the forcer of doctrines on due
process and equal protection, and he reasonableness of the distinction
between compensation and taxable net income of professionals and
businessmen not being a dubious classification.
Telebap v. COMELEC 289 SCRA 337
Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio
and television broadcasting companies. Section 92 of Batas Pambansa
(BP) Blg. 881, as amended, reads as follows:
Sec. 92. Comelec time. — The commission shall procure radio and
television time to be known as “Comelec Time” which shall be
allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area
of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the
franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby
amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge,
during the period of the campaign.
Petitioners contend that §92 of BP Blg. 881 violates the due process
clause and the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by taking
airtime from radio and television broadcasting stations without
payment of just compensation. 1) have taken properties without due
process of law and without just compensation; (2) it denied the radio
and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws;
and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the Comelec to regulate
the operation of media communication or information during election
period. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio
and television stations is the sale of airtime to advertisers and that to
require these stations to provide free airtime is to authorize a taking
which is not “a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the
use of private property.” According to petitioners, in 1992, the GMA
Network, Inc. lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free airtime of one (1)
hour every morning from Mondays to Fridays and one (1) hour on
Tuesdays and Thursdays from 7:00 to 8:00 p.m. (prime time) and, in
this year’s elections, it stands to lose P58,980,850.00 in view of
COMELEC’s requirement that radio and television stations provide at
least 30 minutes of prime time daily for the COMELEC Time.
Held:Petitioners' argument is without merit, All broadcasting, whether
by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government.
Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals
who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. 9 A
franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amended
by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that "any
such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment,
alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so
requires."
Indeed, provisions for COMELEC Time have been made by
amendment of the franchises of radio and television broadcast stations
and, until the present case was brought, such provisions had not been
thought of as taking property without just compensation. Art. XII, §11
of the Constitution authorizes the amendment of franchises for "the
common good." What better measure can be conceived for the
common good than one for free air time for the benefit not only of
candidates but even more of the public, particularly the voters, so that
they will be fully informed of the issues in an election? "[I]t is the right
of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
paramount."
Nor indeed can there be any constitutional objection to the requirement
that broadcast stations give free air time. Even in the United States,
there are responsible scholars who believe that government controls on
broadcast media can constitutionally be instituted to ensure diversity
of views and attention to public affairs to further the system of free
expression. For this purpose, broadcast stations may be required to
give free air time to candidates in an election.
In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given
franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which
they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the
temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere
privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened
with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service.
On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The
television set is also becoming universal. Their message may be
simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of listeners
including the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be within reach
of a blaring radio or television set. The materials broadcast over the
airwaves reach every person of every age, persons of varying
susceptibilities to persuasion, persons of different I.Q.s and mental
capabilities, persons whose reactions to inflammatory or offensive
speech would be difficult to monitor or predict. The impact of the
vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the printed
work, the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate, analyze,
and reject the utterance.[30]
Petitioners assertion therefore that 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 denies them the
equal protection of the law has no basis. In addition, their plea that 92
(free air time) and 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 (ban on paid political ads)
should be invalidated would pave the way for a return to the old regime
where moneyed candidates could monopolize media advertising to the
disadvantage of candidates with less resources. That is what Congress
tried to reform in 1987 with the enactment of R.A. No. 6646. We are
not free to set aside the judgment of Congress, especially in light of the
recent failure of interested parties to have the law repealed or at least
modified.
Tiu v. CA 301 S `1CRA 278
Facts:
On March 13, 1992, Congress, with the approval of the President,
passed into law RA 7227. This was for the conversion of former
military bases into industrial and commercial uses. Subic was one of
these areas. It was made into a special economic zone.
In the zone, there were no exchange controls. Such were liberalized.
There was also tax incentives and duty free importation policies under
this law.
On June 10, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive
Order No. 97 (EO 97), clarifying the application of the tax and duty
incentives. It said that
On Import Taxes and Duties. — Tax and duty-free importations shall
apply only to raw materials, capital goods and equipment brought in
by business enterprises into the SSEZ
On All Other Taxes. — In lieu of all local and national taxes (except
import taxes and duties), all business enterprises in the SSEZ shall be
required to pay the tax specified in Section 12(c) of R.A. No. 7227.
Nine days after, on June 19, 1993, the President issued Executive Order
No. 97-A (EO 97-A), specifying the area within which the tax-and-
duty-free privilege was operative.
Section 1.1. The Secured Area consisting of the presently fenced-in
former Subic Naval Base shall be the only completely tax and duty-
free area in the SSEFPZ. Business enterprises and individuals
(Filipinos and foreigners) residing within the Secured Area are free to
import raw materials, capital goods, equipment, and consumer items
tax and duty-free.
Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of EO 97-A for allegedly
being violative of their right to equal protection of the laws. This was
due to the limitation of tax incentives to Subic and not to the entire area
of Olongapo. The case was referred to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court concluded that such being the case, petitioners
could not claim that EO 97-A is unconstitutional, while at the same
time maintaining the validity of RA 7227.
The court a quo also explained that the intention of Congress was to
confine the coverage of the SSEZ to the "secured area" and not to
include the "entire Olongapo City and other areas mentioned in Section
12 of the law.
Hence, this was a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
Issue: Whether the provisions of Executive Order No. 97-A confining
the application of R.A. 7227 within the secured area and excluding the
residents of the zone outside of the secured area is discriminatory or
not owing to a violation of the equal protection clause.
Held. No. Petition dismissed.
Ratio: Citing Section 12 of RA 7227, petitioners contend that the SSEZ
encompasses (1) the City of Olongapo, (2) the Municipality of Subic
in Zambales, and (3) the area formerly occupied by the Subic Naval
Base. However, they claimed that the E.O. narrowed the application to
the naval base only.
OSG- The E.O. Was a valid classification.
Court- The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not
absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one
class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The
classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must
apply to all those belonging to the same class.
Inchong v Hernandez- Equal protection does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2)
be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing
conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.
RA 7227 aims primarily to accelerate the conversion of military
reservations into productive uses. This was really limited to the
military bases as the law's intent provides. Moreover, the law tasked
the BCDA to specifically develop the areas the bases occupied.
Among such enticements are: (1) a separate customs territory within
the zone, (2) tax-and-duty-free importations, (3) restructured income
tax rates on business enterprises within the zone, (4) no foreign
exchange control, (5) liberalized regulations on banking and finance,
and (6) the grant of resident status to certain investors and of working
visas to certain foreign executives and workers. The target of the law
was the big investor who can pour in capital.e
Even more important, at this time the business activities outside the
"secured area" are not likely to have any impact in achieving the
purpose of the law, which is to turn the former military base to
productive use for the benefit of the Philippine economy. Hence, there
was no reasonable basis to extend the tax incentives in RA 7227.
It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not require
territorial uniformity of laws. As long as there are actual and material
differences between territories, there is no violation of the
constitutional clause.
Besides, the businessmen outside the zone can always channel their
capital into it.
RA 7227, the objective is to establish a "self-sustaining, industrial,
commercial, financial and investment center”. There will really be
differences between it and the outside zone of Olongapo.
The classification of the law also applies equally to the residents and
businesses in the zone. They are similarly treated to contribute to the
end gaol of the law.
Lacson v. Executive Secretary 301 SCRA 298
Facts: Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong
Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in bank
robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery
andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the
ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of
the Criminal Investigation Command, that what actually transpired
was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong
Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano
Desiertoformed a panel of investigators to investigate the said incident.
Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police operation.
However, a review board modified the panel’s finding and
recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six
respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and
herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a
reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations before
the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.
The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the
cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant
to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the
“principal accused” are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or
higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending
resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal”
from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249,
including Section 7 which provides that the said law shall apply to all
cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the
approval hereof.
Issues: (1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the
petitioners’ right to due process and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for the
Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong
Baleleng case.
(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto
statute.
(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the
Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation to the office of the
accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination whether
the case falls within the Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s
jurisdiction.
RULING: Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Sections 4 and 7 of
R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law is too
shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing
argument were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every
classification made by the law is presumed reasonable and the party
who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. The
classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the following
concur: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same
class; all of which are present in this case.
Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all cases
involving” certain public officials and under the transitory provision in
Section 7, to “all cases pending in any court.” Contrary to petitioner
and intervenors’ argument, the law is not particularly directed only to
the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only
cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”
There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law,
generally, provides retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not
apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in
character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit
certain acts and establish penalties for their violations or those that
define crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards
the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other
procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law,
but clearly a procedural statute, one which prescribes rules of
procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly
administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of
R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been
committed in relation to the office if it is intimately connected with the
office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance
of his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the
information which is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the amended
information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting
of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the
discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the
amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested
and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their
custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such
particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the
accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not
established.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the
charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of
official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in
the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the
Sandiganbayan.
Soriano v. CA, GR 123936, March 4, 1999
Facts: Petitioner Ronald Soriano was convicted of the crime of
Reckless Imprudence resulting to homicide, serious physical injuries
and damage to property on December 7, 1993.[2] His application for
probation was granted on March 8, 1994, and among the terms and
conditions imposed by the trial court were the following:[3]
"x x x x x x x x x
7. He shall meet his family responsibilities.
8. He shall devote himself to a specific employment and shall not
change employment without prior notice to the supervising officer;
and/or shall pursue a prescribed secular study or vocational training.
xxxxxxxxx
11. He is to indemnify the heirs of the victim Isidrino Daluyong in the
amount of P98,560.00 as ordered by the Court.
xxxxxxxxx
On April 26, 1994, Assistant Prosecutor Benjamin A. Fadera filed a
motion to cancel petitioners probation due to his failure to satisfy his
civil liability to the heirs of the victim, and a supplemental motion
alleging petitioners commission of another crime for which at that time
he was awaiting arraignment. The Zambales Parole and Probation
Office filed a comment recommending that petitioner be allowed to
continue with his probation and that he be required instead to submit a
program of payment of his civil liability.
Thereafter, probation officer Nelda Da Maycong received information
that petitioners father, who owned the vehicle involved in the accident
which killed Daluyong, received P16,500.00 as insurance payment.
This amount was not turned over to the heirs of Daluyong and Da
Maycong considered this a violation of the terms and conditions of the
probation. She submitted a manifestation to the trial court praying that
petitioner be made to explain his non-compliance with the courts order
of June 20, 1994, or that he be cited for contempt for such non-
compliance. Da Maycong also asked that petitioner be made to submit
a program of payment as soon as possible. The trial court granted her
prayers in an order dated August 15, 1994. Petitioner was once again
ordered to submit his program of payment. Petitioner instead filed a
motion for reconsideration explaining that he did not receive any notice
of the order dated June 20, 1994. His counsel received a copy of said
order on June 23, 1994 but failed to notify petitioner. Thus, the latter
failed to comply with said order.
On October 4, 1994, the trial court issued an order declaring petitioner
in contempt of court for his failure to comply with its orders of June
20, 1994 and August 15, 1994. The court likewise revoked the grant of
probation to petitioner and ordered that he be arrested to serve the
sentence originally imposed upon him.
Petitioner avers that to require him to satisfy his civil liability in order
to continue to avail of the benefits of probation is to violate the
constitutional proscription against unequal protection of the law. He
says only moneyed probationers will be able to benefit from probation
if satisfaction of civil liability is made a condition.
Held: Contrary to his assertion, this requirement is not violative of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. Note that payment of the
civil liability is not made a condition precedent to probation. If it were,
then perhaps there might be some basis to petitioners assertion that
only moneyed convicts may avail of the benefits of probation. In this
case, however, petitioners application for probation had already been
granted. Satisfaction of his civil liability was not made a requirement
before he could avail of probation, but was a condition for his
continued enjoyment of the same.
The trial court could not have done away with imposing payment of
civil liability as a condition for probation, as petitioner suggests. This
is not an arbitrary imposition but one required by law. It is a
consequence of petitioners having been convicted of a crime,[12] and
petitioner is bound to satisfy this obligation regardless of whether or
not he is placed under probation.
We fail to see why petitioner cannot comply with a simple order to
furnish the trial court with a program of payment of his civil liability.
He may, indeed, be poor, but this is precisely the reason why the trial
court gave him the chance to make his own program of payment.
Knowing his own financial condition, he is in the best position to
formulate a program of payment that fits his needs and capacity.
Loong v. COMELEC 305 SCRA 832
PUTANGINA NETO
Automated elections were held in arm, however the ballots failed to
correctly read the ballots in pata thus a manual count was ordered by
the Comelec. After the manual count was made, Tan was proclaimed
as governor-elect and Loong was 3rd and Jakiri was 2nd. Loong and
Jakiri questioned the results and claimed denial of due process and the
illegality of the manual count in light of RA 8346. They seeked special
re-elections.
Issue:w/n a re-election may be held
Ruling: NO. it cannot be held. Under the Omnibus code a special
election can only be ordered upon special circumstances such as force
majeure, terrorism, fraud and the like which only the COMELEC can
decide on. In the case at bar the people of Sulu were able to cast their
votes fairly and freely. A special election would also violate the equal
protection of Tan. The records show that all the elected officials were
now discharging their duties and that they were proclaimed on the
same basis of the manually counted votes. If manual counting is illegal
then those who were discharging their duties cannot hold office.
Intemational School v. Quisumbing 333 SCRA 13
FACTS: International School Alliance of Educators (the School) hires
both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying
the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.
In which, the School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded
local-hires including housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes,
home leave travel allowance and a salary rate 25% more than local
hires based on “significant economic disadvantages”
The labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all
faculty members of the School, contested the difference in salary rates
between foreign and local-hires.
The Union claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the
School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher
salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Union can invoke the equal protection
clause to justify its claim of parity.
RULING: Yes. The Labor Code’s and the Constitution’s provisions
impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal
truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with
substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under
similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.
If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the
presumption is that these employees perform equal work. If the
employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that
employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive
more. That would be adding insult to injury.
The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is
no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or
effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and
responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions.
Hence, the Court finds the point-of-hire classification employed by
respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of
foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no
reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires
and local-hires.
De Guzman v COMELEC, GR 129113,. July 19 2000
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order, assailing the validity of Section 44 of
Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known as "The Voters
Registration Act of 1996".
SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer
shall hold office in a particular city or municipality for more than four
(4) years. Any election officer who, either at the time of the approval
of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (4) years
in a particular city or municipality shall automatically be reassigned by
the Commission to a new station outside the original congressional
district.
Petitioners, who are either City or Municipal Election Officers, were
reassigned to different stations by the COMELEC.
Petitioners contend that the said law is unconstitutional because it
violates the equal protection clause guaranteed by the 1987
Constitution because it singles out the City and Municipal Election
Officers of the COMELEC as prohibited from holding office in the
same city or municipality for more than four (4) years. They maintain
that there is no substantial distinction between them and other
COMELEC officials, and therefore, there is no valid classification to
justify the objective of the provision of law under attack.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 44 of RA 8189 violates the equal
protection clause.
HELD:No. The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the
impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing
familiarity with the people of their place of assignment" does not
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Lutz vs. Araneta: "the legislature is not required by the Constitution to
adhere to a policy of all or none".
This is so for underinclusiveness is not an argument against a valid
classification. It may be true that all the other officers of COMELEC
referred to by petitioners are exposed to the same evils sought to be
addressed by the statute. However, in this case, it can be discerned that
the legislature thought the noble purpose of the law would be
sufficiently served by breaking an important link in the chain of
corruption than by breaking up each and every link thereof. Verily,
under Section 3(n) of RA 8189, election officers are the highest
officials or authorized representatives of the COMELEC in a city or
municipality. It is safe to say that without the complicity of such
officials, large-scale anomalies in the registration of voters can hardly
be carried out.
The petition is dismissed and upheld the constitutionality of Section 44
of RA 8189.
Dimaporo v. HRET , GR 158359, Mar. 23, 2004
DIMAPORO V. HRETFACTS:
This is a petition brought by Congressman Dimaporo seeking tonullify
the twin Resolutions of the HRET which denied his Motion for
Technical Evaluation of the Thumbmarks and Signatures Affixed in
theVoters Registration Records and Motion for Reconsideration of
ResolutionDenying the Motion for Technical Examination of Voting
Records.Pursuant to the 1998 HRET Rules Congressionalcandidate
Mangotara Petition of Protest (Ad Cautelam) seeking thetechnical
examination of the signatures and thumb the protested precinctsof the
municipality of Sultan Naga Dimaporo (SND). Mangotara alleged
thatthe massive substitution of voters and other electoral
irregularitiesperpetrated by Dimaporo’s supporters will be uncovered
and proven. Fromthis and other premises, he concluded that he is the
duly-electedrepresentative of the 2ndDistrict of Lanao del
Norte.Noting that “the Tribunal cannot evaluate the questionedballots
because there are no ballots but only election documents toconsider”
HRET granted Mangotara's motion and permitted the latter toengage
an expert to assist him in prosecution of the case, NBI conductedthe
technical examination.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Dimaporo was deprived by HRET of Equal Protection whenthe
latter denied his motion for technicalexamination.2. W/N Dimaporo
was deprived of procedural due processor the right to present scientific
evidence to show themassive substitute voting committed in counter
protested precincts.
RULING:
1.
Resolution of HRET did not offend equal protectionclause. Equal
protection simply means that all persons and thingssimilarly situated
must be treated alike both as to the rights conferredand the liabilities
imposed. It follows that the existence of a valid andsubstantial
distinction justifies divergent treatment.
According to Dimaporo since the ballot boxes subject of hispetition
and that of Mangotara were both unavailable for revision, hismotion,
like Mangotara’s, should be granted.The argument fails to take into
account the distinctionsextant in Mangotara’s protest
vis-à-vis
Dimaporo’s counter-protest whichvalidate the grant of Mangotara’s
motion and the denial of Dimaporo’s.
First.
The election results in SND were the sole subjects of Mangotara’s
protest. The opposite is true with regard to Dimaporo’scounter-protest
as he contested the election results in all municipalities
butSND.Significantly, the results of the technical examination of the
election recordsof SND are determinative of the final outcome of the
election protestagainst Dimaporo. The same cannot be said of the
precincts subject of Dimaporo’s motion.
It should be emphasized that the grant of a motion for technical
examination is subject to the sound discretion of the HRET.In this case,
the Tribunal deemed it useful in the conduct of therevision proceedings
to grant Mangotara’s motion for technicalexamination. Conversely, it
found Dimaporo’s motion unpersuasiveand accordingly denied the
same. In so doing, the HRET merely actedwithin the bounds of its
Constitutionally-granted jurisdiction. After all,the Constitution confers
full authority on the electoral tribunals of theHouse of Representatives
and the Senate as the
sole judges
of allcontests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective members. Such jurisdiction is original and exclusive.
2. Anent Dimaporo’s contention that the assailed
Resolutions
denied him the right to procedural due process and to present evidence
tosubstantiate his claim of massive substitute voting committed in
thecounter-protested precincts, suffice it to state that the HRET itself
mayascertain the validity of Dimaporo’s allegations without resort to
technicalexamination. To this end, the Tribunal declared that the
ballots, electiondocuments and other election paraphernalia are still
subject to its scrutinyin the appreciation of evidence.It should be noted
that the records are replete with evidence,documentary and
testimonial, presented by Dimaporo. Dimaporo’sallegation of denial of
due process is an indefensible pretense.The instant petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit
Central Bank Employees vs Bangko Sentral, G.R. No. 148208,
December 15 2004
Doctrines:
Elements of valid class legislation: (1) must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must
not be limited to existing conditions only; (4) must apply equally to all
members of the same class
Relative Constitutionality. The fact that a statute is constitutional at
first does not mean it is constitutional forever. The subsequent changes
in the original circumstance surrounding the law would affect its
validity.
Facts: The new Central Bank Act took effect and gave way for the
creation of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. Other Governmental
Financial Institutions (GFIs) also amended their charters.
After almost 8 years following the amendment of the GFIs’ charters,
BSP’s employees, through petitioner, filed a petition for prohibition
against the BSP and the Executive Secretary to restrain the respondents
from further implementing the last proviso in Sec. 15, Art. II of the
New Central Bank Act (i.e., the exemption from the Salary
Standardization Law (SSL) of all employees with salary grade of 19
and the non-exemption of those having a salary grade under 19). They
alleged its constitutionality for being an invalid “class legislation”.
Petitioner’s Contentions:
The said proviso violates equal protection clause because only the
officers of the BSP (those holding the salary grade of 19 and up) are
exempted from the SSL.
Those belonging from 19 and up and those 19 below do not really
differ from one other in terms of the nature of work and expertise.
Other GFIs, which are the same as the BSP, exempt all their rank-
and-file personnel from SSL without any distinction.
BSP’s contention:
The proviso is not unconstitutional as it can stand the constitutional
test, provided it is construed in harmony with other provisions of the
same law, such as the mandate of the Monetary Board to “establish
professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound
principles of management.”
Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary:
The proviso is not unconstitutional as the classification is based on
actual and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated
policy of the new SB Act to establish professionalism and excellence
within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the national
government.
Issue: WON the proviso is unconstitutional for being violative of equal
protection clause.
Held: YES, the proviso is unconstitutional for being violative of the
equal protection clause.
Equal protection clause does not prevent the Legislature from
establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules
shall operate – so long as the classification is not unreasonable.
Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate
operation on persons themselves, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of
rights.
In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the
exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended
to address the BSP’s lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting
competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate
against the rank-and-file and the resulting discrimination or distinction
has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary
in the legislative sense. However, in the subsequent passages of the
amendment on the charters of other GFI, the surrounding
circumstances of the case changed.
The subsequent amendments of the other GFIs’ charter (i.e., express
authorization to determine and institute its own compensation and
wage structure, and explicit exemption – without distinction as to
salary grade or position – all employees of the GFI from the SSL)
resulted to the oppressive results of Congress’ inconsistent and unequal
policy towards the BSP rank-and-file and those of the seven other GFI.
In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption
from the SSL, there are no characteristics peculiar only to the seven
GFIs or their rank-and-file so as to justify the exemption which BSP
rank-and-file employees were denied (not to mention the anomaly of
the SEC getting one). The distinction made by the law is not only
superficial, but also arbitrary. It is not based on substantial distinctions
that make real differences between the BSP rank-and-file and the seven
other GFIs.
 The subsequent grant to the rank-and-file of the seven other GFIs
and continued denial to the BSP rank-and-file employees of the
exemption from SSL breached the latter’s right to equal protection.
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but
it requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced.
Serrano vs. Gallant Maritime Service, G.R. No. 167614, March 24
2009
FACTS:
Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow
Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA)-approved Contract of
Employment with the following terms and conditions:
Duration of contract 12 months
Position Chief Officer
Basic monthly salary US$1,400.00
Hours of work 48.0 hours per week
Overtime US$700.00 per month
Vacation leave with pay 7.00 days per month
On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was
constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the
position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00,
upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be
made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief
Officer. Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was
repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998.
Petitioner’s employment contract was for a period of 12 months or
from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of his
repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months and
seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9)
months and twenty-three (23) days.
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against
respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money
claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73.
The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the
dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring that the dismissal of the complainant (petitioner) by the
respondents in the above-entitled case was illegal and the respondents
are hereby ordered to pay the complainant [petitioner], jointly and
severally, in Philippine Currency, based on the rate of exchange
prevailing at the time of payment, the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY U.S. DOLLARS (US $8,770.00),
representing the complainant’s salary for three (3) months of the
unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of employment.
The claims of the complainant for moral and exemplary damages are
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
In awarding petitioner a lump-sum salary of US$8,770.00, the LA
based his computation on the salary period of three months only —
rather than the entire unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of
petitioner’s employment contract – applying the subject clause.
However, the LA applied the salary rate of US$2,590.00, consisting of
petitioner’s “[b]asic salary, US$1,400.00/month + US$700.00/month,
fixed overtime pay, + US$490.00/month, vacation leave pay =
US$2,590.00/compensation per month.”
Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) to question the finding of the LA that petitioner was illegally
dismissed.
The NLRC modified the LA Decision and corrected the LA’s
computation of the lump-sum salary awarded to petitioner by reducing
the applicable salary rate from US$2,590.00 to US$1,400.00 because
R.A. No. 8042 “does not provide for the award of overtime pay, which
should be proven to have been actually performed, and for vacation
leave pay.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he
questioned the constitutionality of the subject clause. The NLRC
denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the
constitutional challenge against the subject clause. After initially
dismissing the petition on a technicality, the CA eventually gave due
course to it, as directed by this Court in its Resolution which granted
the petition for certiorari,filed by petitioner.
The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable
salary rate; however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue raised by
petitioner.
His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the CA,
petitioner brings his cause to this Court on the following grounds:
The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided the case in
a way not in accord with applicable decision of the Supreme Court
involving similar issue of granting unto the migrant worker back wages
equal to the unexpired portion of his contract of employment instead
of limiting it to three (3) months.
Even without considering the constitutional limitations [of] Sec. 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in
excluding from petitioner’s award the overtime pay and vacation pay
provided in his contract since under the contract they form part of his
salary.
The Court now takes up the full merit of the petition mindful of the
extreme importance of the constitutional question raised therein.
ISSUES:
Whether Section 10 (par 5) of RA 8042 is unconstitutional
Proper computation of the Lump-sum salary to be awarded to
petitioner by reason of his illegal dismissal
Whether the overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary
basis in the computation of his monetary award
The unanimous finding of the LA, NLRC and CA that the dismissal of
petitioner was illegal is not disputed. Likewise not disputed is the
salary differential of US$45.00 awarded to petitioner in all three fora.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the
lump-sum salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of US$1,400.00
covering the period of three months out of the unexpired portion of
nine months and 23 days of his employment contract or a total of
US$4,200.00.
Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner
contends that, in addition to the US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC
and the CA, he is entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total of
US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine months and
23 days left of his employment contract, computed at the monthly rate
of US$2,590.00.31
Arguments of the Petitioner
For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in
the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042,
violates the OFWs’ constitutional rights in that it impairs the terms of
their contract, deprives them of equal protection and denies them due
process.
The Arguments of Respondents
Respondents contend that the constitutional issue should not be
entertained, for this was belatedly interposed by petitioner in his appeal
before the CA, and not at the earliest opportunity, which was when he
filed an appeal before the NLRC.40
The Arguments of the Solicitor General
The Solicitor General (OSG)41 points out that as R.A. No. 8042 took
effect on July 15, 1995, its provisions could not have impaired
petitioner’s 1998 employment contract. Rather, R.A. No. 8042 having
preceded petitioner’s contract, the provisions thereof are deemed part
of the minimum terms of petitioner’s employment, especially on the
matter of money claims, as this was not stipulated upon by the parties.
The Court’s Ruling:
First Issue
Does the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on
Labor as protected sector?
The answer is in the affirmative.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the law.
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members
of the labor sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full
protection of their rights and welfare.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing
constitutional provisions translate to economic security and parity: all
monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar
category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in
equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws which
is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like
circumstances.
Imbued with the same sense of “obligation to afford protection to
labor,” the Court in the present case also employs the standard of strict
judicial scrutiny, for it perceives in the subject clause a suspect
classification prejudicial to OFWs.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for
it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the
subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious
impact on OFWs
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental
purpose; and it is for that precise reason that the clause violates not just
petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also her right to substantive
due process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.
Second Issue
It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract
periods or the unexpired portions thereof, were treated alike in terms
of the computation of their monetary benefits in case of illegal
dismissal. Their claims were subjected to a uniform rule of
computation: their basic salaries multiplied by the entire unexpired
portion of their employment contracts.
The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a
differentiated rule of computation of the money claims of illegally
dismissed OFWs based on their employment periods, in the process
singling out one category whose contracts have an unexpired portion
of one year or more and subjecting them to the peculiar disadvantage
of having their monetary awards limited to their salaries for 3 months
or for the unexpired portion thereof, whichever is less, but all the while
sparing the other category from such prejudice, simply because the
latter’s unexpired contracts fall short of one year.
Prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the
monetary awards of illegally dismissed OFWs was in place. This
uniform system was applicable even to local workers with fixed-term
employment.
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental
purpose; and it is for that precise reason that the clause violates not just
petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also her right to substantive
due process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.
The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his
salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of
his employment contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to
the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.
Third Issue
Petitioner contends that his overtime and leave pay should form part of
the salary basis in the computation of his monetary award, because
these are fixed benefits that have been stipulated into his contract.
Petitioner is mistaken.
The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave
pay. For seafarers like petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33,
series 1996, provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers,
in which salary is understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime,
leave pay and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay is compensation
for all work “performed” in excess of the regular eight hours, and
holiday pay is compensation for any work “performed” on designated
rest days and holidays.
In the same vein, the claim for the day’s leave pay for the unexpired
portion of the contract is unwarranted since the same is given during
the actual service of the seamen.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The subject clause
“or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever
is less” in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is
DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and the December 8, 2004
Decision and April 1, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
MODIFIED to the effect that petitioner is AWARDED his salaries for
the entire unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting of
nine months and 23 days computed at the rate of US$1,400.00 per
month.
Dlmayuga vs OMB 495 SCRA 461
Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R.No. 203335, February 18 2014
Facts: Petitioners assail the validity of several provision of the
Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012.
Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for
regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their
constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that the law
merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish
wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.
Held: Section 4(a)(6) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(a)(6) provides:
(6) Cyber-squatting. The acquisition of domain name over the internet
in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy the reputation, and deprive
others from registering the same, if such a domain name is:
(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark
registered with the appropriate government agency at the time of the
domain name registration;
(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than
the registrant, in case of a personal name; and
(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the
equal protection clausein that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause
a user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use
aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody, or any other
literary device.
The law is reasonable in penalizing the offender for acquiring the
domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or
deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of
registering the same.1
Hence, valid and constitutional.
Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 193036,
December 7 2010
FACTS: Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President
with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption
committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of
an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot
adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes
between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may
have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt,
much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot
determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the
filing of an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin
the PTC from performing its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power
of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its
operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the
delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the
Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency
does not include the power to create an entirely new public office
which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it
vested the “Truth Commission” with quasi-judicial powers
duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman
created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the
Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively
targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the
previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even
as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who
may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of
petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the
President’s executive power and power of control necessarily include
the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No.
9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or
form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate
funds because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds
already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the
functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding
body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate,
supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause
because it was validly created for laudable purposes.
ISSUES:1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the
petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by
usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for
public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the
DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise
of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result
of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must
be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the
Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To the extent
the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member
thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of
the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative,
powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain
inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official
action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as
legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in
danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the
implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question.” In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in
interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Real-party-in
interest is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the
plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal
official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has
to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make
out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the
securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason in
Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental
importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There
are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of
this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are
faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those
specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers
of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated
duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the
obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been
faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating
bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President
is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of
the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations
of existing funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the
part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds.
There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the
operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has
provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the
funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the
PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there
is no impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their
respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the
commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of
determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints
before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.
PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative
to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive
Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal
protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of
the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by
the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the
state’s duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a
valid classification. Equal protection clause permits classification.
Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests
on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the
class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to
investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft
and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to
single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of
past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle
for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do
not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC
must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation
to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all
private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws
that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for
being unconstitutional.
Garcia vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25 2013
Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of
Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband,
Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence
Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other
Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional,
psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation
of custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of
marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with
the conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed
another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court
issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed
to comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given
time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the
required comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.”
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for
injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA
9262 for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and
the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an
invalid law.”
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however,
denied the petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in
his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to
annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral
attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this
petition is filed.
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that
the issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity
and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the
law.

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA
9262 is discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection
clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262
runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the
policy of the state to protect the family as a basic social institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and
unconstitutional because it allows an undue delegation of judicial
power to Brgy. Officials.
Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority
and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue of
constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to
consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if
not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not
raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the
laws. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make
for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each
member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid
classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by
favouring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom
the Senate extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the
Constitution. The essence of due process is in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be
impugned as violative of the right to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified.
Petitioner’s contention that by not allowing mediation, the law violated
the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum
of the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue
therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject for
compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any
part of any branch of the Government while executive power is the
power to enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary
investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a
judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO.
Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement agencies is
consistent with their duty executive function.
SECTION 2 - SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Section 2 - Searches and Seizures
Valmonte v. General de Villa, 178 SCRA 211 and 185 SCRA 665
Facts: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District
Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction
02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission
of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and
peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial
defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere
conducive to the social, economic and political development of the
National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and
order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners aver that because of the institution of said checkpoints, the
Velanzuela residents are worried of being harassed and of their safety
being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of
the military manning the checkpoints considering that their cars and
vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups
especially at night or at dawn without a search warrant or a court order.
Their alleged fear for their safety increased when Benjamin Parpon
was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by members of the NCRDC
for ignoring and/or continuing to speed off inspite of warning shots
fired in the air.
Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s
Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela,
Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative,
they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital
Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate
guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of
the people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the
respondents blanket authority to make searches and seizures without
search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.
Held: Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the
facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a
vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply
looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute
unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and
probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to
enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective
territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of
the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart
plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security.
In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to
urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly
reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men
by NPA “sparrow units,” not to mention the abundance of unlicensed
firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such
urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely
brought about by deteriorating economic conditions – which all sum
up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal
times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence
and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a
warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former
should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of
abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental
power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the
checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within
reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society
and a peaceful community.
Guazon v. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623
FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction
to prohibit the military and police officers represented by public
respondents from conducting "Areal Target Zonings" or "Saturation
Drives" in Metro Manila.
The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "areal target
zoning" that were conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were
unconstitutional.
The alleged acts committed during the raid are the following:
1. Petitioners alleged that there is no specific target house to search and
that there is no search warrant or warrant of arrest served.
2. Most of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and without
nameplates or identification cards.
3. The residents were rudely roused from their sleep by banging on the
walls and windows of their houses.
4. The residents were at the point of high-powered guns and herded
like cows.
5. Men were ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police to
examine their tattoo marks.
6. The residents complained that they're homes were ransacked, tossing
their belongings and destroying their valuables. Some of their money
and valuables had disappeared after the operation.
7. The residents also reported incidents of maulings, spot-beatings, and
maltreatment. Those who were detained also suffered mental and
physical torture to extract confessions and tactical information.
l The respondents said that such accusations mentioned above were
total lies.
l Respondents contends that the Constitution grants to the government
the power to seek and cripple subversive movements for the
maintenance of peace in the state.
l The aerial target zoning was intended to flush out subversives and
criminal elements coddled by the communities were the said drives
were conducted.
l Respondents averred that they have intelligently and carefully
planned months ahead for the actual operation and that local and
foreign media joined the operation to witness and record such event.
ISSUE:WON the areal target zoning and the saturation drive is legal
HELD:YES. The conduct of areal target zoning or saturation drive is a
valid exercise of the military powers of the President.
According to the Supreme Court, everything stated before them
consists only of allegations. According to petitioners, more than 3,407
persons were arrested in the saturation drives covered by the petition.
No estimates are given for the drives in Block 34, Dagat-dagatan,
Navotas; Apelo Cruz Compound, Pasig; and Sun Valley Drive near the
Manila International Airport area. Not one of the several thousand
persons treated in the illegal and inhuman manner described by the
petitioners appears as a petitioner or has come before a trial court to
present the kind of evidence admissible in courts of justice. Moreover,
there must have been tens of thousands of nearby residents who were
inconvenienced in addition to the several thousand allegedly arrested.
None of those arrested has apparently been charged and none of those
affected has apparently complained.
The areal target zonings in this petition were intended to flush out
subversives and criminal elements particularly because of the blatant
assassinations of public officers and police officials by elements
supposedly coddled by the communities where the "drives" were
conducted.
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution which denies the
authority of the Chief Executive, to order police actions to stop
unabated criminality, rising lawlessness, and alarming communist
activities.
Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the police or
military may go in force to the combat areas, enter affected residences
or buildings, round up suspected rebels and otherwise quell the mutiny
or rebellion without having to secure search warrants and without
violating the Bill of Rights.
The Constitution grants the Government the power to seek and cripple
subversive movements which would bring down constituted authority
and substitute a regime where individual liberties are suppressed as a
matter of policy in the name of security of the State.
People vs. Andre Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991)
FACTS: On 14 August 1987, appellant Andre Marti and his common-
law wife went to the booth of the Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders to send four (4) packages to a fiend in Zurich, Switzerland.
When asked if the packages could be examined and inspected,
appellant refused, assuring that they were simply gifts of books cigars,
and gloves. The packages were then placed in a box and was sealed
with masking tape for shipment.
As a standard operating procedure before delivering packages to the
Bureau of Customs and/or Burueau of Posts, the proprietor of the
forwarding agency opened the box for final inspection. A peculiar odor
emitted therefrom and he found dried leaves inside. He brought
samples to NBI, and informed them that the rest of the shipment was
still in his office. Agents of the NBI went to his office and found the
shipment containing bricks of dried marijuana leaves, some of which
were packed inside the gloves and neatly stocked underneath
tabacalera cigars. Thereafter, an information was filed against the
appellant in violation of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), for which
he was found guilty. Appellant assailed the decision, claiming that the
evidence was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against
unreasonable search and seizure, and further, that the court erred in
admitting in evidence the illegally searched and seized packages.
ISSUE:May an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of
appellant’s constitutional rights be invoked against the State?
HELD:No. As the Court held in several other cases, the liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State in
the absence of governmental interference. This constitutional right
(against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity of
one’s person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by
government; and the search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the
government and its agents, not upon private individuals. In the present
case, it was the proprietor of the forwarding agency who made
search/inspection of the packages and the contraband came into
possession of the Government without the latter transgressing
appellant’s rights against unreasonable search and seizure. The NBI
agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one. Thus, the
alleged act of the private individual in violation of a constitutional right
cannot be invoked against the State.
NB:The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and
seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law.
Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint
against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must
generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality.
However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the
proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes,
as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities,
the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked
for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved.
In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to
bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.
Bache and Co. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 323 (1971)
Fact: Respondent Commissioner, wrote a letter to respondent Judge
Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for
violation of the Sec. 46 (a) National Internal Revenue Code, in relation
to all other pertinent provisions thereof, and authorizing a Revenue
Examiner to make and file the application for search warrant which
was attached to the letter. In the afternoon of the following day,
respondent De Leon and his witness, respondent Logronio, went to the
Court of First Instance of Rizal. They brought with them the following
papers: respondent Vera’s aforesaid letter-request; an application for
search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by respondent De
Leon; an affidavit of respondent Logronio subscribed before
respondent De Leon; a deposition in printed form of respondent
Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not yet
subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished but still
unsigned by respondent Judge. At that time respondent Judge was
hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy
Clerk of Court to take the depositions of respondents De Leon and
Logronio. After the session had adjourned, respondent Judge was
informed that the depositions had already been taken. The
stenographer, upon request of respondent Judge, read to him her
stenographic notes; and thereafter, respondent Judge asked respondent
Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was
found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for
perjury. Respondent Judge signed respondent de Leon’s application for
search warrant and respondent Logronio’s deposition, Search Warrant
was then sign by respondent Judge and accordingly issued. Three days
later, the BIR agents served the search warrant petitioners at the offices
of petitioner corporation. Petitioners’ lawyers protested the search on
the ground that no formal complaint or transcript of testimony was
attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with their
search which yielded six boxes of documents. Petitioners filed a
petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal praying that the search
warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory
and mandatory writs of injunction be issued, that the search warrant be
declared null and void, and that the respondents be ordered to pay
petitioners, jointly and severally, damages and attorney’s fees. On
March 18, 1970, the respondents, thru the Solicitor General, filed an
answer to the petition. After hearing, the court, presided over by
respondent Judge, issued on July 29, 1970, an order dismissing the
petition for dissolution of the search warrant. Hence, Petitioners came
to this Court.
Held: A corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under
an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In organizing itself
as a collective body it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate
to such body. Its property cannot be taken without compensation. It
can only be proceeded against by due process of law, and is protected
against unlawful discrimination. we are of the opinion that an officer
of a corporation which is charged with a violation of a statute of the
state of its creation, or of an act of Congress passed in the exercise of
its constitutional powers, cannot refuse to produce the books and
papers of such corporation, we do not wish to be understood as holding
that a corporation is not entitled to immunity, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
The petition for Certiorari, prohibition and Mandamus are granted.
Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by respondent Judge is declared
null and void.
RATIONALE:
Personal examination by the Judge of the complainant and the
witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the existence or non-
existence of a probable cause, the determination of whether or not a
probable cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment after a judicial
appraisal of facts and should not be allowed to be delegated in the
absence of any rule to the contrary.
In this case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted by
respondent Judge of the complainant and his witnesses.
The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to
the issuance of Search Warrant 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to
the stenographer’s readings of her notes to a few words of warning
against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the
complainant and his witness. This cannot be considered a personal
examination. If there was an examination at all of the complainant and
his witness, it was one conducted by the Deputy Clerk of Court
Section 4 (Examination of the Applicant):
The Judge or Justice of the peace must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine on oath or affirmation the complaint and any
witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and
attached them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to
him.
Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967)
FACTS: Upon application of the officers of the government,
Respondents-Judges — issued on different dates a total of 42 search
warrants against petitioners herein and/or the corporations of which
they were officers, directed to the any peace officer, to search the
persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses
and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following
personal property to wit: Books of accounts, financial records,
vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets
and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers) as "the
subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of
the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of
committing the offense," which is described in the applications
adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as
contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court — because, inter
alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books
and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants,
were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence
against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed
against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal
manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were
not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of
in accordance with law, the said petitioners filed with the Supreme
Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and
injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present
case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from
using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the
deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course,
thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants
and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the
respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners
herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court,
the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated
under the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, (1) that the contested
search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law;
(2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners'
consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in
evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality
of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
ISSUE: WON the search warrants issued are valid.
HELD: With regard the search issued in the corporation – valid; with
regard the search in the houses – void.
RATIO: As regards the first group(In the offices), we hold that
petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the
contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for
the simple reason that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein
petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest
of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold
therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure
can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is
purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10
Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in
evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from
the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since
the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs
exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and
may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against
them in their individual capacity.
Second in their houses: Indeed, the same were issued upon applications
stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had
committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other
words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract.
As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the
warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against
whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific
omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter
of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific
acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of
the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications —
without reference to any determinate provision of said laws. the
warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to
all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the
transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure
of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations,
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command
of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly
described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the
elimination of general warrants.
Notes: SCATTER-SHOT WARRANT- It is a warrant of arrest that is
issued for more than one offense. It is void for the law requires that a
warrant of arrest should only be issued in connection with one specific
offense.
GENERAL WARRANT- A general warrant refers to a warrant
providing a law-enforcement officer with broad discretion or authority
to search and seize unspecified places or persons. A general warrant
lacks a sufficiently particularized description of the person or thing to
be seized or the place to be searched.
Probable Cause
Alvarez v. CFI, 64 Phil. 33
● The provisions of the constitution require that there be not only
probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the
search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of
the applicant and the witnesses he may produce.
● It is not mandatory to present affidavits of witnesses to corroborate
the applicant or a complainant in cases where the latter has personal
knowledge of the facts.
● A detailed description of the person and place to be searched and the
articles to be seized is necessary, but where, by the nature of the articles
to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is not required
that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no
warrant could issue.
Facts: Mariano Almeda, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-
Usury Board, applied for a search warrant and presented to Judge
David of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas an affidavit alleging
that according to reliable information, petitioner Alvarez kept in his
house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and
other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money-
lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In his
oath at the end of the affidavit, Almeda stated that his answers to the
questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did
not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own knowledge of the
facts but upon the information received by him from a reliable person.
On the basis of such affidavit, Judge David issued a warrant ordering
the search of the petitioner’s house at any time of the day or night, the
seizure of the books and documents above-mentioned and the
immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in accordance with
the law.
With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the
petitioner’s store and residence at 7:00 pm and seized articles such as
internal revenue license, ledger, journals, cash bonds, check stubs,
memorandums, blackboards, contracts, inventories, bill of lading,
credit receipts, correspondence, receipt books, promissory notes and
checks.
Alvarez filed a petition praying that the search warrant be declared
illegal and that all the articles in question be returned to him. He
claimed that the search warrant was illegal for the following reasons:
(a) it was based solely upon the affidavit of the petitioner who had no
personal knowledge of the facts of probable cause; (b) it was not
supported by other affidavits aside from that made by the applicant; (c)
it authorized its execution at night; (d) lack of an adequate description
of the books and documents to be seized; and (e) it was issued for the
sole purpose of seizing evidence which would later be used in the
criminal proceedings that might be instituted against him for violation
of the Anti-Usury Law.
The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the petitioner
cannot now question the validity of the search warrant or the
proceedings had subsequent to the issuance thereof, because he has
waived his constitutional rights in proposing a compromise whereby
he agreed to pay a fine of P200 for the purpose of evading the criminal
proceeding or proceedings.
The CFI ruled against the Alvarez and upheld the validity of the search
warrant.
Issues:1. Is the search warrant illegal when the affidavit is based on
hearsay?
2. Is there a need for affidavit of another witnesses to support the
application for search warrant?
3. Can the search warrant be executed at night?
4. Did the search warrant satisfy the particularity of description as
required by the law?
5. Is fishing evidence is valid?
6. Did Alvarez waived his constitutional right to question the validity
of the search warrant or the proceedings when he offered a compromise
or settlement of the case?
Held: 1. Yes. The provisions of the constitution require that there be
not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that
the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by
oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. The oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose
thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual
making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the
existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit
to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in
such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held
liable for damages caused.
It appears that the affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the
search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the
manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, it is hereby held
that the search warrant in question and the subsequent seizure of the
books, documents and other papers are illegal and do not in any way
warrant the deprivation to which the petitioner was subjected.
2. No. It is not mandatory to present affidavits of witnesses to
corroborate the applicant or a complainant in cases where the latter has
personal knowledge of the facts. However, when the applicant's or
complainant's knowledge of the facts is merely hearsay, it is the duty
of the judge to require affidavits of other witnesses so that he may
determine whether probable cause exists.
3. Yes. The search be made at night when it is positively asserted in
the affidavits that the property is on the person or in the place ordered
to be searched. In this case, it does not appear positively in the affidavit
that the articles were in the possession of the petitioner and in the place
indicated; hence, the search and seizure could not be made at night.
4. Yes. A detailed description of the person and place to be searched
and the articles to be seized is necessary, but where, by the nature of
the articles to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is
not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean
that no warrant could issue. The only description of the articles given
in the affidavit presented to the judge was as follows: "that there are
being kept in said premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and
other papers used by him in connection with his activities as money-
lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law."
Taking into consideration the nature of the article so described, it is
clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could have
been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular
description of the contents thereof. The description so made
substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of
the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position
enabling him to identify the articles, which he did.
5. At the hearing of the incidents of the case raised before the court it
clearly appeared that the books and documents had really been seized
to enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct an investigation and later
use all or some of the articles in question as evidence against the
petitioner in the criminal cases that may be filed against him. The
seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant, for the
purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person
in whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional because it
makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of
the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused
to testify against himself. Therefore, it appearing that at least nineteen
of the documents in question were seized for the purpose of using them
as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal proceeding or
proceedings for violation against him, we hold that the search warrant
issued is illegal and that the documents should be returned to him.
6. No. The petitioner did not waive his constitutional rights because
the offer of compromise or settlement attributed to him, does not mean,
if so made, that he voluntarily tolerated the search and seizure. The
waiver would have been a good defense for the respondents had the
petitioner voluntarily consented to the search and seizure of the articles
in question, but such was not the case because the petitioner protested
from the beginning and stated his protest in writing in the insufficient
inventory furnished him by the agents.
Notes: Probable Cause (Search Warrant)- Probable cause for a search
is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense
are in the place sought to be searched.
Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 (1984)
Facts: Petitioners assail the validity of 2 search warrants issued on
December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Cruz-Pano of the then Court
of First Instance of Rizal, under which the premises known as No. 19,
Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building,
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan
Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and
office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor
vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and
distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the
possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor
of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized. As a consequence of the
search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the
further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were
discontinued. Respondents contend that petitioners should have filed a
motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them before
impugning the validity of the same before this Court. Respondents also
assail the petition on ground of laches (Failure or negligence for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it). Respondents further state that
since petitioner had already used as evidence some of the documents
seized in a prior criminal case, he is stopped from challenging the
validity of the search warrants.
Petitioners submit the following reasons to nullify the questioned
warrants:
1. Respondent Judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the
above-quoted constitutional provision as well as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court.
2. The search warrants pinpointed only one address which would be
the former abovementioned address.
3. Articles belonging to his co-petitioners were also seized although
the warrants were only directed against Jose Burgos, Jr.
4. Real properties were seized.
5. The application along with a joint affidavit, upon which the warrants
were issued, from the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group could
not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause
upon which a warrant may be validly issued in accordance with Section
3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.
Respondents justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on
the ground that they have been sequestered under Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which authorizes
sequestration of the property of any person engaged in subversive
activities against the government in accordance with implementing
rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National
Defense.
Issue: Whether or Not the 2 search warrants were validly issued and
executed.
Held: In regard to the quashal of warrants that petitioners should have
initially filed to the lower court, this Court takes cognizance of this
petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional
Issue raised, not to mention the public interest generated by the search
of the "We Forum" offices which was televised in Channel 7 and
widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this
special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power
to suspend its rules. With the contention pertaining to laches, the
petitioners gave an explanation evidencing that they have exhausted
other extra-judicial efforts to remedy the situation, negating the
presumption that they have abandoned their right to the possession of
the seized property.
On the enumerated reasons:
1. This objection may properly be considered moot and academic, as
petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983,
that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge
of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.
2. The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely,
two search warrants were applied for and issued because the purpose
and intent were to search two distinct premises. It would be quite
absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants
intended for one and the same place.
3. Section 2, Rule 126, of the Rules of Court, does not require that the
property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the
search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him.
4. Petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building
on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the
machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground, remain
movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
5. The broad statements in the application and joint affidavit are mere
conclusions of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. Deficient of such particulars as would justify a finding of the
existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for
the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent
judge to have done so. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, this Court
ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within
the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant,
of the existence of probable cause." Another factor which makes the
search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is
that they are in the nature of general warrants. The description of the
articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question are
too general.
With regard to the respondents invoking PD 885, there is an absence
of any implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister
of National Defense. Furthermore, President Marcos himself denies
the request of military authorities to sequester the property seized from
petitioners. The closure of the premises subjected to search and seizure
is contrary to the freedom of the press as guaranteed in our fundamental
law. The search warrants are declared null and void.
Personal determination
Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 394 (1988)
Facts: Soliven broadcasted the statement that President Aquino hid
under her bed during a coup d' etat. The case at bar is a petition raised
by one of the petitioners, Beltran, who wants to call for an
interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of
warrants of arrest.
The petitioner assailed that his constitutional right was violated when
respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without
personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
determine probable cause.
Beltran's interpretation of the words "determined personally"
convinced him that the judge is solely responsible to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when the warrant
of arrest was issued.
HELD: No. The Court did not find any grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the respondent
judge.
Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
DOCTRINE:What the Constitution requires is that the issuing judge
must satisfy himself first with the criteria in finding probable cause.
And to satisfy himself doesn't mean to he is required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Constitution mandates
that he shall:
(1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and,
on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or(2) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report
and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid
him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Silva vs. Presiding Judge of RTC, Negros
FACTS:
l RTC judge Nickarter Ontal issued a search warrant filed by M/Sgt.
Ranulfo Villamor, chief of the PC NARCOM Detachment in
Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, to be served against Petitioner
Nicomedes Silva.
l The application was accompanied by “deposition of witness”
executed by Arthur Alcoran and Pat. Leon Quindo.
l The search warrant stated that “You are hereby commanded to make
an immediate search at any time of the day (night) of the room of Tama
Silva residence of his father Comedes Silva to open aparadors, lockers,
cabinets, cartoons, containers, forthwith seize and take possession of
the following property Marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes, joint and
bring the said property to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law
directs.”
l During the raid, the officers seized money belonging to Antonieta
Silva in the amount of P1,231.40.
l Petitioners alleged that the enforcement of the search warrant was
illegal because it was issued on the sole basis of mimeographed and
the judge failed to personally examine the complainant and witness by
searching questions and answers.
l Antoinette Silva also filed a motion the return of the said amount
because her name is not included in the search warrant. Thus, her
belongings shouldn’t be subject of the warrant.
l Acting on the said motion to return the money, Judge Ontal issued an
order stating that the court “holds in abeyance the disposition of the
said amount pending the filing of appropriate charges in connection
with the search warrant.
l RTC’s new judge, replacing judge Ontal, ruled against petitioners.
l MR was likewise denied by Judge Cruz (new judge).
l Hence, this special civil action for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the search warrant is validly issued by then Judge Ontal
HELD: NO. In the case at bar, we have carefully examined the
questioned search warrant as well as the "Application for Search
Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", and found that Judge Ontal
failed to comply with the legal requirement that he must examine the
applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and
answers in order to determine the existence of probable cause. The
joint "Deposition of Witness" executed by Pfc. Alcoran and Pat.
Quindo, which was submitted together with the "Application for
Search Warrant" contained, for the most part, suggestive questions
answerable by merely placing "yes" or "no" in the blanks provided
thereon.
The above deposition did not only contain leading questions but it was
also very broad. The questions propounded to the witnesses were in
fact, not probing but were merely routinary. The deposition was
already mimeographed and all that the witnesses had to do was fill in
their answers on the blanks provided.
Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with
the constitutional and statutory requirement that he must determine the
existence of probable cause by personally examining the applicant and
his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. His
failure to comply with this requirement constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
The officers implementing the search warrant clearly abused their
authority when they seized the money of Antonieta Silva. This is
highly irregular considering that Antonieta Silva was not even named
as one of the respondents, that the warrant did not indicate the seizure
of money but only of marijuana leaves, cigarettes and joints, and that
the search warrant was issued for the seizure of personal property (a)
subject of the offense and (b) used or intended to be used as means of
committing an offense and NOT for personal property stolen or
embezzled or other proceeds of fruits of the offense. Thus, the then
presiding Judge Ontal likewise abused his discretion when he rejected
the motion of petitioner Antonieta Silva seeking the return of her
seized money.
Lim v. Felix, G.R. No. 94054-7, February 19, 1991
FACTS:l Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr., together with his
security escorts were attacked and killed by a lone assassin at the
airport vicinity in Masbate.
l Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr.
survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot
wound.
l Herein petitioners were alleged to be behind the crime of multiple
murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident.
l After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an
order finding probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of
herein petitioners.
l In the same Order, the court ordered the arrest of the petitioners and
recommended the amount of P200,000.00 as bail for the provisional
liberty of each of the accused.
l Respondent Acting Fiscal Antonio C. Alfane was designated to
review the case containing 261 pages.
l Fiscal Alfane issued a Resolution which affirmed the finding of a
prima facie case against the petitioners but differed in the designation
of the crime in that the ruled that ". . . all of the accused should not only
be charged with Multiple Murder With Frustrated Murder" but for a
case of MURDER for each of the killing of the four victims and a
physical injuries case for inflicting gunshot wound on the buttocks of
Dante Siblante."
l MR’s of the petitioner’s Lim was also denied.
l Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4)
separate information of murder against the twelve (12) accused with a
recommendation of no bail.
l Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us a verified
petition for change of venue and was granted to avoid a miscarriage of
justice. (from Masbate to Makati RTC)
l The cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge
Nemesio S. Felix.
l Petitioners questioned the validity of the warrant of arrest because it
was not personally determined by the judge as he relied solely on the
certification or recommendation of a prosecutor that a probable cause
exists.
l RTC dismissed their petition upholding the validity of the arrest
warrants.
ISSUE: WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by
simply relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation
that a probable cause exists.
HELD: NO. If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the
Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the investigation are
in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause.
The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The
constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits
a grave abuse of discretion.
The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the
Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal
were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants
of arrest against the petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent
Judge to make his own personal determination regarding the existence
of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated
by the Constitution. He could not possibly have known what transpired
in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification. Significantly, the
respondent Judge denied the petitioners' motion for the transmittal of
the records on the ground that the mere certification and
recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists
is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.
Hence, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification and
investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for the
complainant and witnesses themselves to answer the court's probing
questions when the circumstances of the case so require.
Mata v. Bayona , 128 SCRA 388 (1984)
FACTS: Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD)
810, as amended by PD 1306, the information against him alleging that
Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by
“selling illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority
from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the
government authorities concerned.” Mata claimed that during the
hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of the
said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers
connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from
the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge Josephine
K. Bayona, presiding Judge of the City Court of Ormoc replied, “it is
with the court”. The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who
attached them to the records. This led Mata to file a motion to quash
and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized,
citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The motion was denied by the Judge on 1
March 1979, stating that the court has made a thorough investigation
and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T.
Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police
District II INP; that in fact the court made a certification to that effect;
and that the fact that documents relating to the search warrant were not
attached immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no
moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these
documents are to be attached to the records. Mata’s motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied, he came to
the Supreme Court, with the petition for certiorari, praying, among
others, that the Court declare the search warrant to be invalid for its
alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the
Rules of Court, and that all the articles confiscated under such warrant
as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the
matter.
ISSUE: WON the judge must before issuing the warrant personally
examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he
may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to
the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him?
HELD:YES. Under the Constitution “no search warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce”. More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the
constitutional injunction, The Rules provide that the judge must before
issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their
depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any
affidavits presented to him. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take
depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is
necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the
existence or nonexistence of the probable cause, to hold liable for
perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations
are false. We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with
illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential
requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the
record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
Particularity of description
20th Century Fox Film Corp. v. CA, 164 SCRA 655 (1988)
THE FACTS:Petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation sought
the assistance of the NBI in conducting searches and seizures in
connection with the NBI’s anti-film piracy campaign. Petitioner
alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are
engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films
in violation of PD No. 49 (the old Intellectual Property Law).
The NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets
pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently filed three (3)
applications for search warrants against the video outlets owned by the
private respondents. The lower court issued the desired search
warrants. The NBI, accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided the
video outlets and seized the items described in the three warrants.
Private respondents later filed a motion to lift the search warrants and
release the seized properties, which was granted by the lower court.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the lower court.
The CA affirmed the trial court.
II. THE ISSUE:Did the judge properly lift the search warrants he
issued earlier?
III. THE RULING:[The Court DISMISSED the petition and
AFFIRMED the questioned decision and resolution of the CA.]
YES, the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier.
The lower court lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the
absence of probable cause that the private respondents violated P.D.
49. NBI agents who acted as witnesses during the application for
search warrant did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter
of their testimony, which was the alleged commission of the offense of
piracy by the private respondents. Only the petitioner’s counsel who
was also a witness during the application stated that he had personal
knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the private respondents
were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner.
The lower court lifted the warrants, declaring that the testimony of
petitioner’s counsel did not have much credence because the master
tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court during
the application.
The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films, from
which the pirated films were allegedly copied, was necessary for the
validity of search warrants against those who have in their possession
the pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the effect that the
presentation of the master tapes at the time of application may not be
necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature and not
determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the
issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot
presume that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced
from master tapes that it owns.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least
substantial similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted
work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court the copyrighted
films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes
allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized
reproduction of the former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the
pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of
probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted
films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
Nolasco v. Cruz Pano, 132 SCRA 152 (1985)
FACTS: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia
Nolasco by the Constabulary Security Group (CSG). Milagros had
been wanted as a high ranking officer of the CPP. The arrest took place
at 11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. At noon of the same day, her premises
were searched and 428 documents, a portable typewriter and 2 boxes
were seized.
Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Paño issued a search warrant to be served
at Aguilar-Roque’s leased residence allegedly an underground house
of the CPP/NPA. On the basis of the documents seized, charges of
subversion and rebellion by the CSG were filed by but the fiscal’s
office merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal possession of
subversive materials. Aguilar-Roque asked for suppression of the
evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained and that the search
warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not
sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search
and seizure, and that probable cause has not been properly established
for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant’s witness.
ISSUE: WON the search warrant was valid?
HELD: NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose. It also specifically provides that no Search
Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by
the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by
law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the things to be seized.
It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the
seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not particularized.
It is an all- embracing description which includes everything
conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the
National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive
books and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available
to the public contain to make them subversive or to enable them to be
used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to
the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus
giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they
should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2
wooden boxes.
It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the
constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things to
be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar
description were considered null and void for being too general.
Valid Warrantless searches
People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401 (1991)
Facts:Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first regional
command (NARCOM) stationed at camp Dangwa, ordered his men to
set up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose of checking all vehicles
coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint
was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada
were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. And an
information also was received about a Caucasian coming from Sagada
had in his possession prohibited drugs.
In the afternoon the bus where accused was riding stopped. Sgt. Fider
and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were
members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection.
During the inspection CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused waist.
Suspecting the bulge on accused waist to be a gun, the officer asked
for accused’s passport and other identification papers. When accused
failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was
that was bulging o his waist. And it turned out to be a pouched bag and
when accused opened the same bag the officer noticed four suspicious
looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape. It contained hashish,
a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for
questioning. But before he alighted from the bus accused stopped to
get two travelling bags. The officer inspects the bag. It was only after
the officers had opened the bags that the accused finally presented his
passport. The two bags contained a stuffed toy each, upon inspection
the stuff toy contained also hashish.
Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court provides:
“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporary confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another”
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited
drugs. A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he
was caught in flagrante delicto, thus the search made upon his personal
effects falls squarely under paragraph 1 of the foregoing provision of
law, which allows a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which
could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and that the object sought in connection
with the offense are in the placed sought to be searched.
When NARCOM received the information that a Caucasian travelling
from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him a prohibited drug,
there was no time to obtain a search warrant.
Nolasco v. Cruz Pano, G.R. No. L-69803, January 30, 1987
FACTS: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia
Nolasco by the Constabulary Security Group (CSG). Milagros had
been wanted as a high ranking officer of the CPP. The arrest took place
at 11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. At noon of the same day, her premises
were searched and 428 documents, a portable typewriter and 2 boxes
were seized.
Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Paño issued a search warrant to be served
at Aguilar-Roque’s leased residence allegedly an underground house
of the CPP/NPA. On the basis of the documents seized, charges of
subversion and rebellion by the CSG were filed by but the fiscal’s
office merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal possession of
subversive materials. Aguilar-Roque asked for suppression of the
evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained and that the search
warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not
sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search
and seizure, and that probable cause has not been properly established
for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant’s witness.
Held: The majority pronouncement that "as an incident to (petitioner
Mila Aguilar- Roque's) arrest, her dwelling at No. 239-B Mayon Street,
Quezon City could have been searched, even without a warrant, for
evidence of rebellion" is patently against the constitutional
proscription and settled law and jurisprudence. Mr. Justice Cuevas
amply discusses this in the dissenting portion of his separate opinion.
Suffice it to add and stress that the arresting CSG Group themselves
knew that they needed a search warrant and obtained the void warrant
in question. The exception of Rule 126, sec. 12 which allows a
warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested is absolutely
limited to his person, at the time of and incident to his arrest and to
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of the offense." Such warrantless search obviously cannot
be made in a place other than the place of arrest. In this case, petitioner
Aguilar-Roque was arrested at 11:30 a.m. on board a public vehicle on
the road (at Mayon and P. Margall Streets). To hold that her dwelling
could "later on the same day" be searched without warrant is to
sanction an untenable violation, if not nullification, of the cited basic
constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Plain view doctrine
People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597 (1993)
Facts: A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was
engaged in selling marijuana in Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani
was ordered by NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct a
surveillance and test buy on Musa. The civilian informer guided Ani
to Musa’s house and gave the description of Musa. Ani was able to buy
one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00.
The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand
if he successfully buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to the
house, the NARCOM team positioned themselves about 90 to 100
meters away. From his position, Belarga could see what was going on.
Musa came out of the house and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said
he wanted more marijuana and gave Musa the P20.00 marked money.
Musa went into the house and came back, giving Ani two newspaper
wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened and inspected it. He
raised his right hand as a signal to the other NARCOM agents, and the
latter moved in and arrested Musa inside the house. Belarga frisked
Musa in the living room but did not find the marked money (gave it to
his wife who slipped away). T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the
kitchen and found a ‘cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at
the corner of the kitchen.’ They asked Musa about its contents but
failed to get a response. So they opened it and found dried marijuana
leaves inside. Musa was then placed under arrest.
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana
inside it is unreasonable, hence, inadmissible as evidence.
Held: Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may
not be admitted as evidence. The warrantless search and seizure, as an
incident to a suspect’s lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of
the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control. Objects in the ‘plain view’ of an officer who has
the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure
and may be presented as evidence. The ‘plain view’ doctrine is usually
applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object. It will not justify the seizure of the object where the
incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the ‘plain view’
of the object.
In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the ‘plain view’ of the
police. They arrested the accused in the living room and moved into
the kitchen in search for other evidences where they found the plastic
bag. Furthermore, the marijuana inside the plastic bag was not
immediately apparent from the ‘plain view’ of said object.
Therefore, the ‘plain view’ does not apply. The plastic bag was seized
illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III
Section 3 (2) of the Constitution.
Notes: Plain view Doctrine Requisites:
1. There must have been a prior valid intrusion based on the
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties
2. The evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had
the right to be where they are
3. The evidence must be immediately apparent
4. There was no need for further search
“Stop and frisk”
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
Facts: Officer McFadden observed two men outside of a store walking
up to the window then away several times. A third man met up with
the initial two and engaged in conversation. The plainly clothed officer
developed suspicion that the men may be planning to rob the store.
McFadden approached the men and after identifying himself as an
officer asked what they were doing. The men mumbled back a
response. McFadden then grabbed Terry, turned him around and patted
him down to determine if he was armed. The search revealed a gun in
Terry’s coat pocket. After conducting the same search on the second
man, another gun was revealed. Once at trial, the officer testified he
thought the men may have been armed.
Procedural History: An Ohio trial court convicted Terry with carrying
a concealed weapon. Terry appealed to the Supreme Court of the
United States.
Issues and Holding: May a police officer detain an individual on the
street absent probable cause and conduct a limited search to find
weapons? Yes.
Judgment:Officers may conduct a search limited for weapons when
they observe unusual conduct leading them to reasonably suspect
criminal activity is afoot and the individual(s) involved is/are armed.
An officer may identify himself as the police and make initial inquiries.
This conduct is proper when the officer observes conduct leading him
to develop reasonable suspicion that a crime is occurring or about to
occur. If the officer believes a threat to himself of others still exists
after such an inquiry, a limited search may be performed to find
weapons.
The Court held that an individual is seized when stopped by a police
officer on the street because he is not free to walk away. As a result,
the Fourth Amendment protections prohibiting unreasonable searches
and seizures apply. The Court also stated that a “pat down” of outer
clothing constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.
The Court held that the constitutionality of the search depended on
whether or not the scope of the search was reasonable in light of the
circumstances. The test used to determine reasonableness is that the
interest in officer safety must outweigh the suspect’s Fourth
Amendment right to privacy.
The Court held that an officer’s interest in the safety of himself and
others outweighs an individual’s Fourth Amendment right. In addition,
when an individual is stopped on the street, the police may conduct a
proper search for weapons if based on the facts and circumstances, the
officer reasonably believes the person is armed.
Here, considering the circumstances, it was reasonable for the
experienced officer to suspect the two men were planning a robbery.
In addition, the government’s interest in law enforcement trumps any
minimal invasion of privacy each may have experienced when
approached by the officer. The Court also determined the pat-down
was reasonable as the officer’s initial concerns were not abated as a
result of the responses given. The officer stated that the pat down was
conducted under the belief either men could have been armed.
As a result, it was proper for the officer to conduct a searched for
weapons, as the interest in the safety of the officer and the public
outweighed any privacy right the individuals had under the 4th
Amendment.
People v. Solayao, 262 SCRA 255 (1996)
FACTS:l SPO3 Nio and his team of CAFGU went to Brgy.
Caulangohan, Caibiran, Biliran to conduct an investigation regarding
reports on the presence of armed men roaming around barangays of
Caibiran.
l Upon arriving in Brgy. Onion, the agents became suspicious to the
group of Solayao because the accused-appellant himself is drunk and
wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit. What’s more suspicious
is when they noticed the team of SPO3 Nio, the group fled leaving
behind Solayao, herein accused-appellant.
l According to Solayao, he’s not aware that he is carrying a “latong”
(49-inch firearm) wrapped in dried coconut leaves. He thought that it’s
only a torch which Hermogenes Cenining gave to him and that he is
not aware that there’s a concealed weapon inside. He further claimed
that this was the third torch handed to him after the others had been
used up.
l Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao was charged before the RTC of
Biliran, with the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition
defined and penalized under PD No. 1866.
l The lower court found that accused-appellant did not contest the fact
that SPO3 Nino confiscated the firearm from him and that he had no
permit or license to possess the same. It hardly found credible accused-
appellant's submission that he was in possession of the firearm only by
accident and that upon reaching Barangay Onion, he followed four
persons, namely, Hermogenes Cenining, Antonio Sevillano, Willie
Regir and Jovenito Jaro when he earlier claimed that he did not know
his companions.
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in admitting the subject firearm in
evidence as it was the product of an unlawful warrantless search.
HELD:NO. There was no error on the part of the trial court when it
admitted the homemade firearm as evidence nor violation of the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The SC ruled that the search and seizure conducted in this case be
likened to the Posadas case where the suspicious conduct of Posadas
himself can be likened to a "stop and frisk" situation. There was a
probable cause to conduct a search even before an arrest could be
made.
In the present case, after SPO3 Nino told accused-appellant not to run
away, the former identified himself as a government agent.[16] The
peace officers did not know that he had committed, or was actually
committing, the offense of illegal possession of firearm. Tasked with
verifying the report that there were armed men roaming around in the
barangays surrounding Caibiran, their attention was understandably
drawn to the group that had aroused their suspicion. They could not
have known that the object wrapped in coconut leaves which accused-
appellant was carrying hid a firearm.
As with Posadas, the case at bar constitutes an instance where a search
and seizure may be effected without first making an arrest. There was
justifiable cause to "stop and frisk" accused-appellant when his
companions fled upon seeing the government agents. Under the
circumstances, the government agents could not possibly have
procured a search warrant first.
However, the prosecution failed to produce evidence that the accused-
appellant has no license to carry the firearm by merely relying on the
lone witness’ (SPO3 Nio) testimony that accused-appellant admitted
to them during the time he was apprehended that he has no license to
carry such weapon.
The prosecution should have presented a certification from the
Firearms and Explosives Unit of the Philippine National Police that
accused-appellant was not a licensee of a firearm of any kind or caliber
would have sufficed for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the second element of the crime of illegal possession of firearm.
Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159 (1997)
Facts:Petitioner was arrested for having in his possession a hand
grenade after he was searched by a group of policemen when he was
said to be acting suspiciously when he was hanging around Plaza
Miranda with his eyes moving fast together with other Muslim-looking
men. When the policemen approached the group of men, they scattered
in all directions which prompted the police to give chase and petitioner
was then apprehended and a search was made on his person.
He was then convicted under PD 1866 in the lower court. Hence, the
present petition wherein petitioner contended that the lower court erred
in holding that the search made on him and the seizure of the hand
grenade from him was an appropriate incident to his arrest and that it
erred in admitting the hand grenade as evidence since it was admissible
because it was a product of an unreasonable and illegal search.
Issue: WON the search and seizure conducted by the police was valid.
Held:The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that
a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. 31 The
Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and
seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, 32
subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests,
these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which
reads, in part:
Sec. 5. — Arrest, without warrant; when lawful — A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . .
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under
Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while
that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following:
(1) customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; 33 (5) a search incidental
to a lawful arrest;34 and (6) a "stop and frisk.’
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a
"stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two
types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum
of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable
scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest
is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest
was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. 36 In this
instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made — the process cannot be reversed. 37 At bottom,
assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of
the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon
or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found
which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the
crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish
the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-
and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer clothing for
weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in
the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the
initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for
his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and
others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which
might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search
under the Fourth Amendment . .
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not
required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine
reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained
has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a
two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention
and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer
may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing
interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer
to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is
not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally
be used against the police officer.
Search of moving vehicles
Papa v. Mago, 22 SCRA 857 (1968)
Facts: Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-
intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting upon a
reliable information received on November 3, 1966 to the effect that a
certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and
undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs
zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders
of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly
deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at
gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks left gate No. 1 at about
4:30 in the afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements of the counter-
intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the
Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks consisting
of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions
of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership
of the goods and showed to the policemen a “Statement and Receipts
of Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501”, issued by the
Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit.
Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the
two trucks and their cargo, Private Respondents filed with the Court of
First Instance of Manila a petition “for mandamus with restraining
order. That the goods were seized by members of the Manila Police
Department without search warrant issued by a competent court;
Respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte
restraining the petitioners from opening the nine bales in question, and
at the same time set the hearing of the petition for preliminary
injunction on November 16, 1966. However, when the restraining
order was received by herein petitioners, some bales had already been
opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of
officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city fiscal and a
representative of herein respondent Remedios Mago.
Issue: Whether a warrant issued by a competent court is required to
search and seize a moving cargo or vehicle.
Held: No, The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant
in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police
authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter,
pass through or search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store or
building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and
examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or
any person on board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle,
beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or
prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law,
without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. But in
the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said “dwelling
house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a
judge or justice of the peace. The court view, therefor, that except in
the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police
authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without
a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws. the court defined
the difference made as to the necessity for a search warrant between
goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a dwelling house of
similar place, and like goods in course of transportation and concealed
in a movable vessel, where readily they could be put out of reach of a
search warrant. In the instant case, we note that petitioner Martin
Alagao and his companion policemen did not have to make any search
before they seized the two trucks and their cargo. In their original
petition, and amended petition, in the court below Remedios Mago and
Valentin Lanopa did not even allege that there was a search. But even
if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no search
warrant would be needed under the circumstances obtaining in the
instant case. he guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures is construed as recognizing a necessary difference between a
search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a
search warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship,
motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought.
Emergency circumstances
People v. De Gracia 233 SCRA 716 (1994)
Facts: The records show that in the early morning of December 1,
1989, Maj. Efren Soria of the Intelligence Division, National Capital
Region Defense Command, was on board a brown Toyota car
conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office located at EDSA,
together with his team and was conducted pursuant to an intelligence
report received by the division that said establishment was being
occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a communication command
post. After a while, a group of five men disengaged themselves from
the crowd and walked towards the car of the surveillance team drew
their guns and fired at the team, which attack resulted in the wounding
of Sgt. Sagario on the right thigh. Nobody in the surveillance team was
able to retaliate because they sought cover inside the car and they were
afraid that civilians or bystanders might be caught in the cross-fire. As
a consequence, at around 6:30 A.M. of December 5, 1989, a searching
team raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and
confiscate contrabands inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain
Col. Matillano which is located at the right portion of the building. On
February 22, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment found him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of
firearms in furtherance of rebellion and sentenced him to serve the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. That judgment of conviction is now
challenged before us in this appeal.
Issue: Whether in a state of emergency circumstances exist, the arrest
of the accused involved in rebellious act is valid without securing a
arrest and search warrant.
Held: Yes, Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered
opinion that the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the
prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military
operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had
reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There
was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their
action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding
team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from
the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on December 5,
1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under such
urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully
be dispensed with. While it is true that the officers were not armed with
a search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects
of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was
sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was
then and there committing a crime. Probable cause has been defined as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched. The required probable cause that will justify a
warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula
but is resolved according to the facts of each case.
Checkpoints
Valmonte v. De Villa G.R. No. 83988, May 24, 1990
Facts: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District
Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction
02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission
of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and
peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial
defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere
conducive to the social, economic and political development of the
National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and
order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners aver that because of the institution of said checkpoints, the
Velanzuela residents are worried of being harassed and of their safety
being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of
the military manning the checkpoints considering that their cars and
vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups
especially at night or at dawn without a search warrant or a court order.
Their alleged fear for their safety increased when Benjamin Parpon
was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by members of the NCRDC
for ignoring and/or continuing to speed off inspite of warning shots
fired in the air.
Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s
Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela,
Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative,
they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital
Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate
guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of
the people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the
respondents blanket authority to make searches and seizures without
search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.
Held: Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the
facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a
vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply
looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute
unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and
probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to
enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective
territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of
the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart
plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security.
In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to
urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly
reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men
by NPA “sparrow units,” not to mention the abundance of unlicensed
firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such
urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely
brought about by deteriorating economic conditions – which all sum
up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal
times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence
and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a
warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former
should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of
abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental
power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the
checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within
reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society
and a peaceful community.
Aniag v. Comelec, 237 SCRA 424 (1994)
Facts: In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections,
the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2323, “Gun Ban”, promulgating
rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of firearm
or other deadly weapons on security personnel or bodyguards, on
bearing arms by members of security agencies or police organizations,
and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the election
period. COMELEC also issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the
summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning, using
and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and
establishing spot checkpoints. Pursuant to the “Gun Ban”, Mr. Serrapio
Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives, wrote
petitioner for the return of the two firearms issued to him by the House
of Representatives. Petitioner then instructed his driver, Arellano, to
pick up the firearms from petitioner’s house and return them to
Congress. The PNP set up a checkpoint. When the car driven by
Arellano approached the checkpoint, the PNP searched the car and
found the firearms. Arellano was apprehended and detained. He then
explained the order of petitioner. Petitioner also explained that
Arellano was only complying with the firearms ban, and that he was
not a security officer or a bodyguard. Later, COMELEC issued
Resolution No.92-0829 directing the filing of information against
petitioner and Arellano for violation of the Omnibus Election Code,
and for petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified from
running for an elective position. Petitioner then questions the
constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues that “gunrunning,
using or transporting firearms or similar weapons” and other acts
mentioned in the resolution are not within the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code. Thus, according to petitioner, Resolution No.
2327 is unconstitutional. The issue on the disqualification of petitioner
from running in the elections was rendered moot when he lost his bid
for a seat in Congress in the elections.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for
instructing his driver to return the firearms issued to him on the basis
of the evidence gathered from the warrant less search of his car
Held: A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by
an appropriate authority. However, a warrantless search is not violative
of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its
occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle
is merely limited to a visual search. In the case at bar, the guns were
not tucked in Arellano’s waist nor placed within his reach, as they were
neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the
car. Given these circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly
searched the car lawfully as well as the package without violating the
constitutional injunction. Absent any justifying circumstance
specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the
search could not have been valid. Consequently, the firearms obtained
from the warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any
proceeding. It was also shown in the facts that the PNP had not
informed the public of the purpose of setting up the checkpoint.
Petitioner was also not among those charged by the PNP with violation
of the Omnibus Election Code. He was not informed by the City
Prosecutor that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation.
Such constituted a violation of his right to due process. Hence, it cannot
be contended that petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet
the accusation against him as he was not informed that he was himself
a respondent in the case. Thus, the warrantless search conducted by the
PNP is declared illegal and the firearms seized during the search cannot
be used as evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner.
Resolution No. 92-0829 is unconstitutional, and therefore, set aside.
Warrantless arrests
Espano v. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 558 (1998)
Facts: Pat. Pagilagan together with other police officers went to
Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug
pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling something to another
person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached petitioner,
identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search
yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he
had more marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house. The
policemen went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane
tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the police
headquarters where he was charged of possession of prohibited drugs.
Issue: Whether or not the pieces of evidence were inadmissible
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court provides:
“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense . . . “
Petitioner’s arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He
was caught in flagrante as a result of a buy bust operation conducted
by police officers on the basis of information received regarding the
illegal trade of drugs within the area. The police officer saw petitioner
handling over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they
searched him and discovered two cellophane of marijuana. His arrest
was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bag of marijuana seized
were admissible in evidence, being fruits of the crime.
People vs. Del Rosario [G.R. No. 109633, July 20, 1994]
A raiding team was organized to buy shabu from appellant and after
buying from appellants’ house, the raiding team will implement search
warrant. PO1 Luna with a companion proceeded to appellant's house
to implement the search warrant. Barangay Capt. Maigue, Norma del
Rosario and appellant witnessed the search at appellant's house. They
found black canister constaining shabu and a paltik .22 caliber. At
police station, the seized items were taped and initialed. In addition,
the search warrant implemented by the raiding party authorized only
the search and seizure of shabu and paraphernalia for the use thereof
and no other.
ISSUE: Whether or not police officers can seize items not mentioned
in search warrant.
RULING: NO. The Constitution itself (Section 2, Article III) and the
Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 126) specifically mandate that the
search warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. Thus,
the search warrant was no authority for the police officers to seize the
firearm which was not mentioned, much less described with
particularity, in the search warrant. Neither may it be maintained that
the gun was seized in the course of an arrest, for as earlier observed,
accused-appellant's arrest was far from regular and legal. Said firearm,
having been illegally seized, the same is not admissible in evidence.
The Constitution expressly ordains the exclusion in evidence of
illegally seized articles.
Umil vs. Ramos [G.R. No. 81567, July 9, 1990]
Facts: on 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit
of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential
information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation
squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in
Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification, it was found that
the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie
Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation
squad, responsible for the killing of two (2) CAPCOM soldiers the day
before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was
transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for
security reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988,
Rolando Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the
gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol
car, and fired at the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car.
As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural was
referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and
thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an
information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the
crime of “Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in
Authority.” The case was docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-
30112 and no bail was recommended. On 15 February 1988, the
information was amended to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr.
who, at the filing of the original information, was still unidentified. As
to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in
the act of shooting the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor
was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his
arrest came a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest
without warrant is unjustified. However, Rolando Dural was arrested
for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed
subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the
arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said
that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes,
and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in
connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are
in the nature of continuing crimes
Issue: Whether an arrest and search warrant is required for the crimes
of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in
connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State.
Held: No, the claim of the petitioners that they were initially arrested
illegally is, therefore, without basis in law and in fact. The crimes of
insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit
such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the
furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in
connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all
in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the
common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive
conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the
herein detainees was well within the bounds of the law and existing
jurisprudence in our jurisdiction. The arrest of persons involved in the
rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for committing
non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of
capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion,
than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a
statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual
procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the
determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the
issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the
offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no
legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt
acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts
but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or
capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves
the very survival of society and its government and duly constituted
authorities. If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels find
justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which is of the
essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case
of invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them while any
of these contingencies continues cannot be less justified. In this case,
whatever may be said about the manner of his arrest, the fact remains
that the defendant was actually in court in the custody of the law on
March 29, when a complaint sufficient in form and substance was read
to him. To this he pleaded not guilty. The trial followed, in which, and
in the judgment of guilty pronounced by the court, we find no error.
Whether, if there were irregularities in bringing him personally before
the court, he could have been released on a writ of habeas corpus or
now has a civil action for damages against the person who arrested him
we need not inquire. It is enough to say that such irregularities are not
sufficient to set aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient
complaint and after a trial free from error.
Webb v. De Leon 247 SCRA 652
Hubert Webb was one of the accused in the high-profile case Vizconde
massacre. Preliminary investigation was provided by NBI and the case
was raffled to Judge Zosimo Escano who inhibited himself from the
case for being employed with NBI before. His pair Judge Escano
issued warrant of arrest to defendants. The case was re-raffled to
Branch 274, presided by Judge Amelita Tolentino who issued new
warrants of arrest. Webb and the others voluntarily surrendered. They
files before the court petition of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
They contend that (1) respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino
gravely abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a
preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against
them: (2) the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in
holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of
rape with homicide; (3) the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional
right to due process during their preliminary investigation; and (4) the
DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed
to charge Jessica Alfaro in the Information as an accused.
FACTS: On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
filed with the Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging
petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and
six (6) other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela
N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister
Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF
Homes Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.
Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors
headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to
conduct the preliminary investigation.
ARGUMENTS: Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of
probable cause. They assail the credibility of Jessica Alfaro as
inherently weak and uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies
between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They
criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not
examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies.
Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later,
respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against
them without conducting the required preliminary examination.
Petitioners complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due
process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They
also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary
investigation.
ISSUES:1. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its
discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge them with
the crime of rape and homicide
2. Whether or not respondent Jud”””ges de Leon and Tolentino gravely
abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary
examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them
3. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right
to due process during their preliminary investigation
4. Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial
prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information
as an accused.
HELD:1. NO.
2. NO.
3. NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were
given all the opportunities to be heard.
4. NO.
REASONS:1. The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not gravely
abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the
petitioners. A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing
that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was
committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear
and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt.
2. The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their
discretion. In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime
has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it.
Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that “upon filing of an
information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the
accused. Clearly the, our laws repudiate the submission of petitioners
that respondent judges should have conducted “searching examination
of witnesses” before issuing warrants of arrest against them.
3. The DOJ Panel precisely ed the parties to adduce more evidence in
their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more
fully.
4. Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty
assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function,
the sole prerogative of the courts and beyond executive and legislative
interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the
executive department of government whose principal power and
responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A
necessary component of this power is the right to prosecute their
violators (See R.A. No. 6981 and section 9 of Rule 119 for legal basis).
With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn statements of Jessica
Alfaro, the Court believes that these have been sufficiently explained
and there is no showing that the inconsistencies were deliberately made
to distort the truth.
With regard to the petitioners’ complaint about the prejudicial
publicity that attended their preliminary investigation, the Court finds
nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the
publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected
the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just
rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of
the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing
People vs. Sucro [G.R. No. 93239, March 18, 1991]
Facts: On March 21, 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP,
Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station
Commander of the INP Kalibo, Aklan) to monitor the activities of
appellant Edison Sucro, because of information gathered by Seraspi
that Sucro was selling marijuana. As planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on
said date, Pat. Fulgencio Positioned himself under the house of a
certain Arlie Regalado at C. Quimpo Street. Adjacent to the house of
Regalado, about 2 meters away, was a chapel. Thereafter, Pat.
Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel, taking something which
turned out later to be marijuana from the compartment of a cart found
inside the chapel, and then return to the street where he handed the
same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a while appellant went back to
the chapel and again came out with marijuana which he gave to a group
of persons. It was at this instance that Pat. Fulgencio radioed P/Lt.
Seraspi and reported the activity going on. P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat.
Fulgencio to continue monitoring developments. At about 6:30 P.M.,
Pat. Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later
Identified as Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with appellant. At
that point, the team of P/Lt. Seraspi proceeded to the area and while
the police officers were at the Youth Hostel at Maagma St., Pat.
Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and appellant.
P/Lt. Seraspi and his team caught up with Macabante at the crossing of
Mabini and Maagma Sts. in front of the Aklan Medical Center. Upon
seeing the police, Macabante threw something to the ground which
turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana. When confronted, Macabante
readily admitted that he bought the same from appellant (Edison
Sucro) in front of the chapel. The police team was able to overtake and
arrest appellant at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The
police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart
inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante, The teabags of
marijuana were sent to the PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service, at Camp
Delgado, Iloilo City for analysis. The specimens were all found
positive of marijuana.
Issue: Whether the police officer can arrest the accused without any
arrest and search warrant when the latter committed the crime in front
of the former.
Held: Yes, Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides for the instances where arrest without warrant is considered
lawful. The rule states that arrest without warrant, when lawful. Is
when a peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a
person (a)When in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; When an offense is committed in the
presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the
rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the
offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created
thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof.
The records show that Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado’s house at C.
Quimpo Street to monitor the activities of the accused who was earlier
reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel two (2) meters away from
Regalado’s house. Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw
Sucro conduct his nefarious activity. He saw Sucro talk to some
persons, go inside the chapel, and return to them and exchange some
things. These, Sucro did three times during the time that he was being
monitored. Fulgencio would then relay the on-going transaction to
P/Lt. Seraspi.
People vs. Rodrigueza [G.R. No. 95902, February 4, 1992]
Facts: NARCOM agents staged a buy-bust operation, after gaining
information that there was an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs
in Tagas, Albay. The participating agents were given money treated
with ultraviolet powder. One of the agents went to said location, asked
for a certain Don. Thereafter, the Don, herein accused, met with him
and “a certain object wrapped in a plastic” later identified as marijuana
was given in exchange for P200. The agent went back to headquarters
and made a report, based on which, a team was subsequently organized
and a raid was conducted in the house of the father of the accused.
During the raid, the NARCOM agents were able to confiscate dried
marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe among others. There was no
authorization by any search warrant. The accused was found positive
of ultraviolet powder. The lower court, considering the evidences
obtained and testimonies from the prosecution, found him guilty of
violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua.
Issue: Whether or Not the lower court was correct in its judgment.
Held: The NARCOM agents’ procedure in the entrapment of the
accused failed to meet the qualification that the suspected drug dealer
must be caught red-handed in the act of selling marijuana to a person
posing as a buyer, since the operation was conducted after the actual
exchange. Said raid also violated accused’ right against unreasonable
search and seizure, as the situation did not fall in the circumstances
wherein a search may be validly made even without a search warrant,
i.e. when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; when it involves
prohibited articles in plain view. The NARCOM agents could not have
justified their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation
because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the
place had already been put under surveillance for quite some time. Had
it been their intention to conduct the raid, then they should, because
they easily could, have first secured a search warrant during that time.
The Court further notes the confusion and ambiguity in the
identification of the confiscated marijuana leaves and other prohibited
drug paraphernalia presented as evidence against appellant:
CIC Taduran, who acted as the poseur buyer, testified that appellant
sold him 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic bag.
Surprisingly, and no plausible explanation has been advanced therefor,
what were submitted to and examined by the PCCL and thereafter
utilized as evidence against the appellant were the following items:
One (1) red and white colored plastic bag containing the following:
Exh. "A"—Thirty (30) grams of suspected dried marijuana fruiting
tops contained inside a transparent plastic bag.
Exh. "B"— Fifty (50) grams of suspected dried marijuana leaves and
seeds contained inside a white colored plastic labelled "Robertson".
Exh. "C"— Four (4) aluminum foils each containing suspected dried
marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of seven grams then
further wrapped with a piece of aluminum foil.
Exh. "D"— Five (5) small transparent plastic bags each containing
suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of
seventeen grams.
Exh. "E"— One plastic syringe.
Evidently, these prohibited articles were among those confiscated
during the so-called follow-up raid in the house of Rodrigueza’s father.
The unanswered question then arises as to the identity of the marijuana
leaves that became the basis of appellant's conviction. In People vs.
Rubio, this Court had the occasion to rule that the plastic bag and the
dried marijuana leaves contained therein constitute the corpus delicti
of the crime. As such, the existence thereof must be proved with
certainty and conclusiveness. Failure to do so would be fatal to the
cause of the prosecution. Conviction is reversed and set aside and
accused is acquitted.
Go. vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992]
Facts: Rolito Go while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way
street, nearly bumped Eldon Maguan’s car. Go alighted from his car,
shot Maguan and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant
was able to take down petitioner’s car plate number. The police arrived
shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting. A manhunt ensued.
Six days after, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police
Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police;
he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained
him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at
that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman.
Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court,
setting and commencing trial without preliminary investigation.
Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to
preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such
situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully,
falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and
procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests.
Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant
because he went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting
which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime
had not been “just committed” at the time that he was arrested.
Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had been an
eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the
“personal knowledge” required for the lawfulness of a warrantless
arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest, Section 7,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only exception to
the right to preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of
petitioner.
Issue/s:Whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by
the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go;
Whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary
investigation
Held:1. No. The Court does not believe that the warrantless “arrest” or
detention of petitioner in the instant case falls within the terms of
Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which
provides as follows:
“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police
station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with
Rule 112, Section 7.”
Petitioner’s “arrest” took place six (6) days after the shooting of
Maguan. The “arresting” officers obviously were not present, within
the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot
Maguan. Neither could the “arrest” effected six (6) days after the
shooting be reasonably regarded as effected “when [the shooting had]
in fact just been committed” within the meaning of Section 5 (b).
Moreover, none of the “arresting” officers had any “personal
knowledge” of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had
shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been
derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting
— one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take
down the alleged gunman’s car’s plate number which turned out to be
registered in petitioner’s wife’s name. That information did not,
however, constitute “personal knowledge.”
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest
of petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113.
2. No. In the circumstances of this case, the Court does not believe that
by posting bail, petitioner had waived his right to preliminary
investigation. In People v. Selfaison, the Court held that appellants
there had waived their right to preliminary investigation because
immediately after their arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to trial
“without previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a
preliminary investigation.”
In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or
on bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He
had thus claimed his right to preliminary investigation before
respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and
ordered his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, the Court cannot
reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation on the part of
petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking
for leave to conduct preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly
recognized that petitioner’s claim to preliminary investigation was a
legitimate one.
Posadas vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 89139, August 2, 1990]
FACTS:
While conducting a surveillance, the two policemen spotted petitioner
carrying a “buri” bag and acting suspiciously. He attempted to flee
when the policemen approached him and identified themselves but his
attempt was thwarted. Found inside the “buri” bag were one (1) caliber
.38 Smith & Wesson revolver, a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2)
rounds live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. Petitioner failed to show
the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions
found in his possession. He was subsequently prosecuted for and found
guilty of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions
ISSUE(S):Whether or not there was probable cause to justify the
warrantless search and arrest of the petitioner.
RULING:YES. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted
suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a
probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and
it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
People v. Mengote, G.R. No. 87059, June 22, 1992
Facts: a telephone call was by Western Police district that here were
three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North
Bay Boulevard in Tondo Manila. A surveillanve team of
plainclothesmen was dispatch to the place. They saw two men “looking
from side to side” one of whom is holding his abdomen. They
approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen,
whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape because
the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then
searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused was found
with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in
the chamber. His companion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken
from them.
Issue: Whether or not the accused constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure is violated
Ruling: The Supreme court held that par(a) section 5 Rule 113 of rules
of court requires that a person be arrested 1 After he has committed or
while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an
offense 2 In the presence of the arresting officer.
 These requirements have not been established in the case at bar
at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the accused was merely
“looking from side to side” and “holding his abdomen”. There was
apparently no offense that has just been committed or was being
actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their
presence.
Par. B. is no less applicable because it’s no less stringent
requirements have not been satisfied. The prosecution has not shown
that at the time of arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and
that the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating
that Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay information
from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be
committed.
People vs. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402 (1988)
Facts: The PC (Philippine Constabulary) officer received a tip from
one of their informers that the accused was on board a vessel bound for
Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He was identified by name.
Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening and approached
him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer pointed at
him. They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was
found to contained three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana
leaves by the NBI forensic examiner. On the basis of the finding, the
corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
Wilcon 9 The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply
accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked
marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The
two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later
taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified
as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act was filed against him. However, and it is Aminnudin’s
claim that he was arrested and searched without warrant, making the
marijuana allegedly found in his possession inadmissible in evidence
against him under the Bill of Rights.
Issue: Whether the accused was caught in flagrante delicto hence
justifies the warrantless arrest
Held: No, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a
crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the
warrantless arrest allowed under the Rules of Court. The present case
presented no such urgency. It is clear that they had at least two days
within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search
Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name
was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was
certain. And from the information they had received, they could have
persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the
issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to
comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because
the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had
determined on his own authority that a “search warrant was not
necessary.” In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the
moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was
about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no
outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was
like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the
vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of
the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to
apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The
Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by
the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him. While this is not to say that
the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words
suggest that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that
he is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that he is innocent, and
he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the
prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.
Rules 113 and 126 of the Revised Rules of Court
Section 3 - Privacy of Communication and Correspondence
Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 93833, September 28 1995]
Facts: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner in the RTC alleging
that the private respondent in a confrontation in the latter’s office,
allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious
mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and
personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.” In
support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the
event and sought moral damages, attorney’s fees and other expenses of
litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests
and other reliefs awardable at the trial court’s discretion. The transcript
on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of
the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the
said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private
respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to
prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes. Petitioner filed a Motion
to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. the RTC
granted the Motion. From the RTC’s order, the private respondent filed
a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith
referred the case to the CA. Respondent CA declared the RTC’s order
null and void, and holding that the allegations sufficiently constitute
an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. Petitioner filed a
MR which the CA denied. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue: Whether the recording of a “Private Conversation” without the
consent of both of the party is a violation of R.A. 4200.
Held: Yes, Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and
Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private
Communication and Other Purposes,” provides that it shall be
unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by
using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept,
or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described. The
aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication
to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder.
The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be
penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from
those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to
penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as
respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a (person)
privy to a communication who records his private conversation with
another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator.
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, therefore
plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the
provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not
distinguish.
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 107383, February 20 1996]
Facts:
Cecilia Zulueta is the Petitioner who offset the private papers of his
husband Dr. Alfredo Martin. Dr. Martin is a doctor of medicine while
he is not in his house His wife took the 157 documents consisting of
diaries, cancelled check, greeting cards, passport and photograph,
private respondents between her Wife and his alleged paramours, by
means of forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet. Cecilia Zulueta filed
the papers for the evidence of her case of legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents and papers
and for damages against Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch X. the trial court rendered judgment for Martin,
declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described
in paragraph 3 of Martin’s Complaint or those further described in the
Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person
acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin
and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral
damages and attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Zulueta filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
The papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion and
from unlawful means are admissible as evidence in court regarding
marital separation and disqualification from medical practice.
Ruling/Held:
The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and
correspondence to be inviolable is no less applicable simply because it
is the wife who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity,
who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced.
The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a
lawful order from a court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders
the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of
them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in
ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his
right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is
ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of
communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may
be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save
for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication;
quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows
with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that
each owes to the other.
Navarro vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. NO. 121087, August 26, 1999]
FACTS:
Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan, in
Lucena City wnet to the police station to report alledged indecent show
in one of the night establishment shows in the City. At the station, a
heated confrontation followed between victim Lingan and accused
policeman Navarro who was then having drinks outside the
headquarters, lead to a fisticuffs. The victim was hit with the handle of
the accused's gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a fist blow,
resulted the victim to fell and died under treatment. The exchange of
words was recorded on tape, specifically the frantic exclamations made
by Navarro after the altercation that it was the victim who provoked
the fight. During the trial, Jalbuena, the other media man , testified.
Presented in evidence to confirm his testimony was a voice recording
he had made of the heated discussion at the police station between the
accused police officer Navarro and the deceased, Lingan, which was
taken without the knowledge of the two.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence in
view of RA 4200, which prohibits wire tapping.
2. Whether the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation
or threat on the part of the offended party and lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong may be appreciated in favor of the accused.
HELD:
1. The answer is affirmative, the tape is admissible in view of RA
4200, which prohibits wire tapping. Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed
by the voice recording he had made.
The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of
private communications (Ramirez v Cpourt of Appeals, 248 SCRA
590 [1995]). Snce the exchange between petitioner Navarro and
Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
Tape Recording in the present case is not prohibited
SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized
by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap
any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken
word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or
however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in
the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly
possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such
record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word
secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the
manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other
person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either
verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether
complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such
record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall
not be covered by this prohibition.
....
SEC. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence,
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part
thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by
any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not
be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.

Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of
private communications. Since the exchange between petitioner
Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not
prohibited.
Authentication of a voice recording
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated.
A voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a witness
(1) that he personally recorded the conversation;
(2) that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and
(3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are
claimed to belong.
In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice
recording; that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and
that the speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A
sufficient foundation was thus laid for the authentication of the tape
presented by the prosecution.
Ople vs. Torres {GR No, 127685, July 23, 1998]
FACTS: A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on
December 12, 1996 for the Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System. It was published in four newspapers
of general circulation on January. Petitioner filed the instant petition
against respondents, on the grounds that:
1. it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate,
2. it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of
privacy.
ISSUE: Whether there is a violation of the Right to Privacy as
enshrined in the Bill of Rights.
HELD: The essence of privacy is the “right to be left alone.” The right
to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection.
The Court prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the
burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308
is predicated on two considerations:
1. the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the facility
to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security
providers and other government instrumentalities and ;
2. the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions
and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services.
It is debatable whether the interests are compelling enough to warrant
the issuance of the said order. The broadness, vagueness, and
overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our
people’s right to privacy in clear and present danger. In the case at bar,
the threat comes from which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the
people to surrender their privacy by giving information about
themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic
services.
Petition is granted. A.O. No. 308 is unconstitutional.
Doctrines: Section 3(1) of the Bill of Rights:
"Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall
be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public
safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law."
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions
of the Bill of Rights, viz:[34]
"Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection
of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
x x x.
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of
the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law.
x x x.
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public
and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself."
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws.
The Civil Code provides that "[e]very person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of
meddling and prying into the privacy of another.[35] It also holds a
public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages
for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person,[36] and
recognizes the privacy of letters and other private
communications.[37] The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the
violation of secrets by an officer,[38] the revelation of trade and
industrial secrets,[39] and trespass to dwelling.[40] Invasion of privacy
is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law,[41] the
Secrecy of Bank Deposit Act[42] and the Intellectual Property
Code.[43] The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise
recognize the privacy of certain information.[44]
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to
privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence,
it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified
by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O.
No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide
our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact
business with basic service and social security providers and other
government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally
eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons
seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are
compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what
is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O.
No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in
clear and present danger.
The reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy depends on a
two-part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited
an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that
society recognizes as reasonable.[67] The factual circumstances of the
case determines the reasonableness of the expectation.[68] However,
other factors, such as customs, physical surroundings and practices of
a particular activity, may serve to create or diminish this
expectation.[69] The use of biometrics and computer technology in
A.O. No. 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable expectation
of privacy.[70] As technology advances, the level of reasonably
expected privacy decreases.[71] The measure of protection granted by
the reasonable expectation diminishes as relevant technology becomes
more widely accepted.[72] The security of the computer data file
depends not only on the physical inaccessibility of the file but also on
the advances in hardware and software computer technology. A.O. No.
308 is so widely drawn that a minimum standard for a reasonable
expectation of privacy, regardless of technology used, cannot be
inferred from its provisions.
Pollo vs Constantino-David G.R. No. 181881, October 18 2011
Facts: Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an
anonymous letter complaint alleging of an anomaly taking place in the
Regional Office of the CSC. The respondent then formed a team and
issued a memo directing the team “to back up all the files in the
computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal
divisions.”
Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard
disk of PALD and LSD computers were turned over to Chairperson
David. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSC’s
Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in
the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to
and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents,
were draft pleadings or lettersin connection with administrative cases
in the CSC and other tribunals. On the basis of this finding,
Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order, requiring the
petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation
or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.
In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against him and
accused the CSC Officials of “fishing expedition” when they
unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer.
He was charged of violating R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). He assailed the
formal charge and filed an Omnibus Motion ((For Reconsideration, to
Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis
having proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the authority
of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court.
The CSC denied the omnibus motion and treated the motion as the
petitioner’s answer to the charge. In view of the absence of petitioner
and his counsel, and upon the motion of the prosecution, petitioner was
deemed to have waived his right to the formal investigation which then
proceeded ex parte.
The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a petition to the
CA which was dismissed by the latter on the ground that it found no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents. He filed a
motion for reconsideration which was further denied by the appellate
court. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of the
petitioner constituted an illegal search and was a violation of his
constitutional right to privacy
Ruling: The search conducted on his office computer and the copying
of his personal files was lawful and did not violate his constitutional
right.
Ratio Decidendi: In this case, the Court had the chance to present the
cases illustrative of the issue raised by the petitioner.
Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 437 (1967), the US Supreme Court held
that the act of FBI agents in electronically recording a conversation
made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone booth violated his
right to privacy and constituted a “search and seizure”. Because the
petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in using the enclosed
booth to make a personal telephone call, the protection of the Fourth
Amendment extends to such area. Moreso, the concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Harlan noted that the existence of privacy right under prior
decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a person has
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable (objective).
Mancusi v. DeForte 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed2d 1154
(1968),thus “recognized that employees may have a reasonable
expectation of privacy against intrusions by police.”
O’Connor v. Ortega 480 U.S. 709 (1987), the Court categorically
declared that “[i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights
merely because they work for the government instead of a private
employer.” In O’Connor the Court recognized that “special needs”
authorize warrantless searches involving public employees for work-
related reasons. The Court thus laid down a balancing test under which
government interests are weighed against the employee’s reasonable
expectation of privacy. This reasonableness test implicates neither
probable cause nor the warrant requirement, which are related to law
enforcement.
Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board G.R. Nos.
157870, 158633 and 161658, November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410, 427,
(citing Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, 293 SCRA
141, 169), recognized the fact that there may be such legitimate
intrusion of privacy in the workplace.
The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his office and computer files.
As to the second point of inquiry, the Court answered in the
affirmative. The search authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of
the contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s computer reasonable in
its inception and scope.
The Court noted that unlike in the case of Anonymous Letter-
Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila A.M. Nos. P-08-2519 and P-08-2520, November
19, 2008, 571 SCRA 361, the case at bar involves the computer from
which the personal files of the petitioner were retrieved is a
government-issued computer, hence government property the use of
which the CSC has absolute right to regulate and monitor.
Doctrines: Existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a
two-fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be
one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).
the correct analysis has two steps: first, because some government
offices may be so open to fellow employees or the public that no
expectation of privacy is reasonable, a court must consider [t]he
operational realities of the workplace in order to determine whether an
employees Fourth Amendment rights are implicated; and next, where
an employee has a legitimate privacy expectation, an employers
intrusion on that expectation for noninvestigatory, work-related
purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct,
should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the
circumstances.[36]
On the matter of government employees reasonable expectations of
privacy in their workplace, OConnor teaches:
x x x Public employees expectations of privacy in their offices, desks,
and file cabinets, like similar expectations of employees in the private
sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual office practices and
procedures, or by legitimate regulation. x x x The employees
expectation of privacy must be assessed in the context of the
employment relation. An office is seldom a private enclave free from
entry by supervisors, other employees, and business and personal
invitees. Instead, in many cases offices are continually entered by
fellow employees and other visitors during the workday for
conferences, consultations, and other work-related visits. Simply put,
it is the nature of government offices that others such as fellow
employees, supervisors, consensual visitors, and the general public
may have frequent access to an individuals office. We agree with
JUSTICE SCALIA that [c]onstitutional protection against
unreasonable searches by the government does not disappear merely
because the government has the right to make reasonable intrusions in
its capacity as employer, x x x but some government offices may be so
open to fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy
is reasonable. x x x Given the great variety of work environments in
the public sector, the question of whether an employee has a reasonable
expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.
In sum, we conclude that the special needs, beyond the normal need
for law enforcement make theprobable-cause requirement
impracticable, x x x for legitimate, work-related noninvestigatory
intrusions as well as investigations of work-related misconduct. A
standard of reasonableness will neither unduly burden the efforts of
government employers to ensure the efficient and proper operation of
the workplace, nor authorize arbitrary intrusions upon the privacy of
public employees. We hold, therefore, that public employer intrusions
on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government
employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for
investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the
standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under this
reasonableness standard, both the inception and the scope of the
intrusion must be reasonable:
Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold
inquiry: first, one must consider whether theaction was justified at its
inception, x x x ; second, one must determine whether the search as
actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place, x x x
Ordinarily, a search of an employees office by a supervisor will be
justified at its inception when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is
guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a
noninvestigatory work-related purpose such as to retrieve a needed
file. x x x The search will be permissible in its scope when the
measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search
and not excessively intrusive in light of the nature of the [misconduct]
In this inquiry, the relevant surrounding circumstances to consider
include (1) the employees relationship to the item seized; (2) whether
the item was in the immediate control of the employee when it was
seized; and (3) whether the employee took actions to maintain his
privacy in the item. These factors are relevant to both the subjective
and objective prongs of the reasonableness inquiry, and we consider
the two questions together.[44] Thus, where the employee used a
password on his computer, did not share his office with co-workers and
kept the same locked, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy and
any search of that space and items located therein must comply with
the Fourth Amendment.[45]
We answer the first in the negative. Petitioner failed to prove that he
had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or
government-issued computer which contained his personal files.
Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which
he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and
not open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he
used passwords or adopted any means to prevent other employees from
accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he submits that being in
the public assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would have
visitors in his office like friends, associates and even unknown people,
whom he even allowed to use his computer which to him seemed a
trivial request. He described his office as full of people, his friends,
unknown people and that in the past 22 years he had been discharging
his functions at the PALD, he is personally assisting incoming clients,
receiving documents, drafting cases on appeals, in charge of
accomplishment report,
in the absence of allegation or proof of the aforementioned factual
circumstances, that petitioner had at least a subjective expectation of
privacy in his computer as he claims, such is negated by the presence
of policy regulating the use of office computers, as in Simons.
The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees
on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they
create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and that the CSC
may monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated
or human means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be
done to ensure that the computer resources were used only for such
legitimate business purposes.
One of the factors stated in OConnor which are relevant in determining
whether an employees expectation of privacy in the workplace is
reasonable is the existence of a workplace privacy policy
Vivares vs. St. Theresa's College G.R. No. 202666, September 29
2014
FACTS:Julia and Julienne, both minors, were graduating high school
students at St. Theresa’s College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in
January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party
they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others,
took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments.
These pictures were then uploaded by Angela on her Facebook profile.
At STC, Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school
department, learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted
pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only
in brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they knew who the
girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia and
Julienne, among others.
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their
respective personal Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the
identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard
liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne
along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show
virtually the entirety of their black brassieres.
Also, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access
to or the availability of the identified students’ photos was not confined
to the girls’ Facebook friends, but were, in fact, viewable by any
Facebook user.
Investigation ensued. Then Julia, Julienne and other students involved
were barred from joining the commencement exercises.
Petitioners, who are the respective parents of the minors, filed a
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data. RTC dismissed the
petition for habeas data on the following grounds:
Petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened
violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for
the issuance of the writ of habeas data.
The photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions
as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some way.
STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal
purpose, that is, the implementation of the school’s policies and rules
on discipline.
ISSUE:Whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the
minors involved in this case. (Is there a right to informational privacy
in online social network activities of its users?)
HELD: (Note that you can skip the preliminary discussions and check
the ruling at the latter part)
Nature of Writ of Habeas Data
It is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of
the aggrieved party.
It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an
individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth
and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to
control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in
which such information is being collected through unlawful means in
order to achieve unlawful ends.
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an
individual’s right to informational privacy, among others. A
comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas data as “a
procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the
information age.”
Issuance of writ of habeas data; requirements
The existence of a person’s right to informational privacy
An actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life,
liberty or security of the victim (proven by at least substantial
evidence)
Note that the writ will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged
unauthorized access to information about a person.
The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances
The writ of habeas data can be availed of as an independent remedy to
enforce one’s right to privacy, more specifically the right to
informational privacy. The remedies against the violation of such right
can include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of
the database or information or files in possession or in control of
respondents. Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data
may also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances.
Meaning of “engaged” in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information
Habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public
officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in gathering,
collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her
correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or entity
need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.
To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business
endeavour. To “engage” means “to do or take part in something.” It
does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of
a business. What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering,
collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party
or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of
regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a
personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all,
is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said
person or entity.
As such, the writ of habeas data may be issued against a school like
STC.
Right to informational privacy
Right to informational privacy is the right of individuals to control
information about themselves. Several commentators regarding
privacy and social networking sites, however, all agree that given the
millions of OSN users, “in this Social Networking environment,
privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in
some theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking.” So the
underlying question now is: Up to what extent is the right to privacy
protected in OSNs?
Facebook Privacy Tools
To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose,
Facebook was armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate
the accessibility of a user’s profile as well as information uploaded by
the user. In H v. W, the South Gauteng High Court recognized this
ability of the users to “customize their privacy settings,” but did so with
this caveat: “Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes
every effort to protect a user’s information, these privacy settings are
not foolproof.”
For instance, a Facebook user can regulate the visibility and
accessibility of digital images (photos), posted on his or her personal
bulletin or “wall,” except for the user’s profile picture and ID, by
selecting his or her desired privacy setting:
Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their
friends can view the photo;
Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or
networks of the Facebook user; and
Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed
to set up barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific
profile content, statuses, and photos, among others, from another user’s
point of view. In other words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to
make the availability of their Facebook activities reflect their choice as
to “when and to what extent to disclose facts about themselves – and
to put others in the position of receiving such confidences.”
LONE ISSUE:NONE. The Supreme Court held that STC did not
violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy as the subject digital
photos were viewable either by the minors’ Facebook friends, or by the
public at large.
Without any evidence to corroborate the minors’ statement that the
images were visible only to the five of them, and without their
challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to view
the photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving
scant consideration.
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn
account that her students, who are the minors’ Facebook “friends,”
showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only
goes to show that no special means to be able to view the allegedly
private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students, and that it
is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality,
viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at
large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it
can be surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to
everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children
positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the
case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to
informational privacy.
US v. Gines-Perez: A person who places a photograph on the Internet
precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such
imagery, particularly under circumstances such as here, where the
Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices that would
have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.
United States v. Maxwell: The more open the method of transmission
is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the
public at large in the chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from
correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy.
The Honorable Supreme Court continued and held that setting a post’s
or profile detail’s privacy to “Friends” is no assurance that it can no
longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the
source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share said
content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of
whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with
the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged,
the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or
who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set
at “Friends.” Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even a post, with
visibility set at “Friends Only” cannot easily, more so automatically,
be said to be “very private,” contrary to petitioners’ argument.
No privacy invasion by STC; fault lies with the friends of minors
Respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy
invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the
pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what were
posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the
information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had
legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with
the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the
minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the
students who showed the images to Escudero.
Different scenario of setting is set on “Me Only” or “Custom”
Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited
to the original uploader, through the “Me Only” privacy setting, or that
the user’s contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few,
through the “Custom” setting, the result may have been different, for
in such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post,
instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s
friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.
Doctrines: The Common Right to Privacy,20 where he explained the
three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational
privacy;21 (2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy.22 Of
the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to informational
privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to control
information about themselves.23
Alejano vs. Cabuay G.R. No. 160792, August 25 2005
Facts: Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by
the now detained junior officers, entered and took control of the
Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments (“Oakwood”). The soldiers
disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive
devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly
renounced their support for the administration and called for the
resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet
members. Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily
surrendered to the authorities after several negotiations with
government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive
devices they had earlier planted. The soldiers then returned to their
barracks. Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a
directive to all the Major Service Commanders to turn over custody of
ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center. The transfer took
place while military and civilian authorities were investigating the
soldiers’ involvement in the Oakwood incident. Government
prosecutors filed an Information for coup d’etat with the RTC against
the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident. the CA rendered its
decision ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was in charge of implementing the
regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center, to uphold faithfully the
rights of the detainees in accordance with Standing Operations
Procedure No. 0263-04. The appellate court directed Gen. Cabuay to
adhere to his commitment made in court regarding visiting hours and
the detainees’ right to exercise for two hours a day. The appellate court
declared that while the opening and reading of Trillanes’ letter is an
abhorrent violation of his right to privacy of communication, this does
not justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The violation does
not amount to illegal restraint, which is the proper subject of habeas
corpus proceedings.
Issue: Whether the opening, inspection and reading of the letter of the
detainees is an infringement of a citizen’s privacy rights.
Held: No, the SC do not agree with the CA that the opening and reading
of the detainees’ letters violated the detainees’ right to privacy of
communication. The letters were not in a sealed envelope. The
inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same
purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection of
contraband. The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP
authorities were not confidential letters between the detainees and their
lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from detainees
Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees’
personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters
for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials
of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are
marked confidential communication between the detainees and their
lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open
the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees. The right involved, we should defer to the regulations adopted by the military
to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well custodian in the absence of patent arbitrariness.
as to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By
the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted Rules on Habeas Data
prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy rights. The
Section 1. Habeas Data. - The writ of habeas data is a remedy available
detainees in the present case are junior officers accused of leading 300
to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
soldiers in committing coup d’etat, a crime punishable with reclusion
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
perpetua. The junior officers are not ordinary detainees but visible
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
leaders of the Oakwood incident involving an armed takeover of a
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
civilian building in the heart of the financial district of the country. As
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
members of the military armed forces, the detainees are subject to the
Articles of War. Moreover, the junior officers are detained with other
high-risk persons from the Abu Sayyaf and the NPA. Thus, we must
give the military custodian a wider range of deference in implementing Sec. 2. Who May File. - Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the
the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center. The military custodian writ of habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and
is in a better position to know the security risks involved in detaining enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by: chanrobles
the junior officers, together with the suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA virtual law library
members. Since the appropriate regulations depend largely on the
security risks involved, we should defer to the regulations adopted by
the military custodian in the absence of patent arbitrariness.
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party,
Doctrines: The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP namely: the spouse, children and parents; or chanrobles virtual law
authorities were not confidential letters between the detainees and their library
lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from detainees
Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees
personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters (b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved
for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or chanrobles
of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are virtual law library
marked confidential communication between the detainees and their
lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open
the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees.
Sec. 3. Where to File. - The petition may be filed with the Regional
That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a Trial Court where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which
citizens privacy rights[62] is a guarantee that is available only to the has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is
public at large but not to persons who are detained or imprisoned. The gathered, collected or stored, at the option of the petitioner. chanrobles
right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, virtual law library
as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or
imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees
and convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy
rights. The petition may also be filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of
Appeals or the Sandiganbayan when the action concerns public data
In assessing the regulations imposed in detention and prison facilities files of government offices.
that are alleged to infringe on the constitutional rights of the detainees
and convicted prisoners, U.S. courts balance the guarantees of the
Constitution with the legitimate concerns of prison administrators.[63]
Sec. 4. Where Returnable; Enforceable. - When the writ is issued by a
The deferential review of such regulations stems from the principle
Regional Trial Court or any judge thereof, it shall be returnable before
that:
such court or judge.
[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an
inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability
to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the When issued by the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of
intractable problems of prison administration.[64] its justices, it may be returnable before such court or any justice
thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner
The detainees in the present case are junior officers accused of leading
or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place
300 soldiers in committing coup detat, a crime punishable with
where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored.
reclusion perpetua.[65] The junior officers are not ordinary detainees
but visible leaders of the Oakwood incident involving an armed
takeover of a civilian building in the heart of the financial district of
the country. As members of the military armed forces, the detainees When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be
are subject to the Articles of War.[66] returnable before such Court or any justice thereof, or before the Court
of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, or to any
Moreover, the junior officers are detained with other high-risk persons Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or respondent
from the Abu Sayyaf and the NPA. Thus, we must give the military resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or
custodian a wider range of deference in implementing the regulations information is gathered, collected or stored.
in the ISAFP Detention Center. The military custodian is in a better
position to know the security risks involved in detaining the junior
officers, together with the suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA members.
Since the appropriate regulations depend largely on the security risks The writ of habeas data shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines.

Sec. 5. Docket Fees. - No docket and other lawful fees shall be required
from an indigent petitioner. The petition of the indigent shall be docked
and acted upon immediately, without prejudice to subsequent
submission of proof of indigency not later than fifteen (15) days from
the filing of the petition. chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 6. Petition. - A verified written petition for a writ of habeas data
should contain:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how
it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
chanrobles virtual law library
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data
or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government
office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data
or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating,
rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information
or files kept by the respondent.
In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining
the act complained of; and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.
Sec. 7. Issuance of the Writ. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court,
justice or judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on
its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under
the seal of the court and cause it to be served within three (3) days from
the issuance; or, in case of urgent necessity, the justice or judge may
issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer
or person serve it.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the
petition which shall not be later than ten (10) work days from the date
of its issuance. chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 8. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. - A clerk of
court who refuses to issue the writ after its allowance, or a deputized
person who refuses to serve the same, shall be punished by the court,
justice or judge for contempt without prejudice to other disciplinary
actions. chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 9. How the Writ is Served. - The writ shall be served upon the
respondent by a judicial officer or by a person deputized by the court,
justice or judge who shall retain a copy on which to make a return of
service. In case the writ cannot be served personally on the respondent,
the rules on substituted service shall apply.
Sec. 10. Return; Contents. - The respondent shall file a verified written
return together with supporting affidavits within five (5) working days
from service of the writ, which period may be reasonably extended by
the Court for justifiable reasons. The return shall, among other things,
contain the following:
(a) The lawful defenses such as national security, state secrets,
privileged communications, confidentiality of the source of
information of media and others;
(b) In case of respondent in charge, in possession or in control of the
data or information subject of the petition;
(i) a disclosure of the data or information about the petitioner, the
nature of such data or information, and the purpose for its collection;
(ii) the steps or actions taken by the respondent to ensure the security
and confidentiality of the data or information; and chanrobles virtual
law library
(iii) the currency and accuracy of the data or information held; and,
(c) Other allegations relevant to the resolution of the proceeding.
A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.
Sec. 11. Contempt. - The court, justice or judge may punish with
imprisonment or fine a respondent who commits contempt by making
a false return, or refusing to make a return; or any person who
otherwise disobeys or resist a lawful process or order of the court.
Sec. 12. When Defenses May be Heard in Chambers. - A hearing in
chambers may be conducted where the respondent invokes the defense
that the release of the data or information in question shall compromise
national security or state secrets, or when the data or information
cannot be divulged to the public due to its nature or privileged
character.
Sec. 13. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The following pleadings
and motions are prohibited:
(a) Motion to dismiss;
(b) Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit,
position paper and other pleadings; chanrobles virtual law library
(c) Dilatory motion for postponement;
(d) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(e) Counterclaim or cross-claim;
(f) Third-party complaint;
(g) Reply;
(h) Motion to declare respondent in default;
(i) Intervention;
(j) Memorandum;
(k) Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief
orders; and
(l) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any
interlocutory order.
Sec. 14. Return; Filing. - In case the respondent fails to file a return,
the court, justice or judge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte,
granting the petitioner such relief as the petition may warrant unless
the court in its discretion requires the petitioner to submit evidence.
chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 15. Summary Hearing. - The hearing on the petition shall be
summary. However, the court, justice or judge may call for a
preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the
possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.
chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 16. Judgment. - The court shall render judgment within ten (10)
days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the
allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court
shall enjoin the act complained of, or order the deletion, destruction,
or rectification of the erroneous data or information and grant other
relevant reliefs as may be just and equitable; otherwise, the privilege
of the writ shall be denied.
Upon its finality, the judgment shall be enforced by the sheriff or any
lawful officers as may be designated by the court, justice or judge
within five (5) working days.
Sec. 17. Return of Service. - The officer who executed the final
judgment shall, within three (3) days from its enforcement, make a
verified return to the court. The return shall contain a full statement of
the proceedings under the writ and a complete inventory of the
database or information, or documents and articles inspected, updated,
rectified, or deleted, with copies served on the petitioner and the
respondent.
The officer shall state in the return how the judgment was enforced and
complied with by the respondent, as well as all objections of the parties
regarding the manner and regularity of the service of the writ.
Sec. 18. Hearing on Officer-s Return. - The court shall set the return
for hearing with due notice to the parties and act accordingly.
chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the final judgment or
order to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise
questions of fact or law or both. chanrobles virtual law library
The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date of
notice of the judgment or final order.
The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus and
amparo cases.
Sec. 20. Institution of Separate Actions. - The filing of a petition for
the writ of habeas data shall not preclude the filing of separate criminal,
civil or administrative actions.
Sec. 21. Consolidation. - When a criminal action is filed subsequent to
the filing of a petition for the writ, the latter shall be consolidated with
the criminal action.
When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent
to a petition for a writ of habeas data, the petition shall be consolidated
with the criminal action.
After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to
govern the disposition of the reliefs in the petition.
Sec. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. - When a criminal action
has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed.
The relief under the writ shall be available to an aggrieved party by
motion in the criminal case.
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the
reliefs available under the writ of habeas data.
Sec. 23. Substantive Rights. - This Rule shall not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights.
Section 4 - Freedom of Expression
US v. O’Brien 391 US 367 (1963)
Brief Fact Summary. The Defendant, O’Brien (Defendant), was
convicted for symbolically burning his draft card under a federal
statute forbidding the altering of a draft card. His conviction was
upheld after the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court)
found the law constitutional.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. First, a government regulation is sufficiently
justified if it is within the constitutional power of the government.
Second, if it furthers a substantial or important governmental interest.
Third, if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression. Fourth, if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment constitutional freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.
Facts. The Defendant was convicted under Section:462(b)(3) of the
Universal Military Training and Service Act (UMTSA) of 1948,
amended in 1965 to include the applicable provision that made it an
offense to “alter, knowingly destroy, knowingly mutilate”� a
Selective Service registration certification. Defendant knowingly
burned his draft card on the front steps of the local courthouse. The
Court of Appeals held the 1965 amendment unconstitutional as a law
abridging the freedom of speech.
Issue. Whether the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional as applied to
Defendant because his act of burning the draft card was protected
“symbolic speech”� within the First Amendment?
Whether the draft cards are merely pieces of paper designed only to
notify registrants of their registration or classification, to be retained or
tossed into the waste basket according to the convenience of the
registrant?
Whether the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional as enacted because
it was intended to “suppress freedom of speech?”
Held. No. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. It cannot be
accepted that there is an endless and limitless variety of conduct that
constitutes “speech”� whenever the person engaging in the conduct
intends to express an idea. However, even if the alleged
communicative element of Defendant’s conduct is sufficient to bring
into play the First Amendment of the United States Constitution
(Constitution), it does not necessarily follow that the destruction of a
draft card is constitutionally protected activity. First, a government
regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power
of the government. Second, if it furthers a substantial or important
governmental interest. Third, if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression. Fourth, if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment constitutional freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. The 1965
Amendment meets all these requirement
s. Therefore, the 1965 Amendment is constitutional as applied to
Defendant.
No. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. Although the initial
purpose of the draft card is to notify, it serves many other purposes as
well. These purposes would be defeated if the card were to be mutilated
or destroyed.
No. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. The purpose of
Congress is not a basis for declaring this legislation unconstitutional.
Therefore, the 1965 Amendment is constitutional as enacted.
Doctrines: Warren wrote that when a regulation prohibits conduct that
combines "speech" and "nonspeech" elements, "a sufficiently
important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element
can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms". The
regulation must 1) be within the constitutional power of the
government to enact, 2) further an important or substantial government
interest, 3) that interest must be unrelated to the suppression of speech
(or "content neutral", as later cases have phrased it), and 4) prohibit no
more speech than is essential to further that interest. The Court ruled
that § 462(b)(3) satisfied this test.[10]
Schenck v. US 249 US 47 (1919)
Facts: During World War I, socialists Charles Schenck and Elizabeth
Baer distributed leaflets declaring that the draft violated the Thirteenth
Amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude. The leaflets
urged the public to disobey the draft, but advised only peaceful action.
Schenck was charged with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of
1917 by attempting to cause insubordination in the military and to
obstruct recruitment. Schenck and Baer were convicted of violating
this law and appealed on the grounds that the statute violated the First
Amendment.
Issue: Did Schenck's conviction under the Espionage Act for criticizing
the draft violate his First Amendment right to freedom of speech?
Ruling: The Court held that the Espionage Act did not violate the First
Amendment and was an appropriate exercise of Congress’ wartime
authority. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes concluded that courts owed greater deference to the
government during wartime, even when constitutional rights were at
stake. Articulating for the first time the “clear and present danger test,”
Holmes concluded that the First Amendment does not protect speech
that approaches creating a clear and present danger of a significant evil
that Congress has power to prevent. Holmes reasoned that the
widespread dissemination of the leaflets was sufficiently likely to
disrupt the conscription process. Famously, he compared the leaflets
to shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theatre, which is not permitted under
the First Amendment.
United States vs. Bustos [G.R. No. L-12592, March 8, 1918]
Facts: In 1915, numerous citizens of Pampanga assembled, and
prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary (privileged
communication) through the law office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and
five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of
the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in
office and asking for his removal. The petition transmitted by these
attorneys was signed by thirty-four citizensThe specific charges:
o Francisca Polintan asked for money and kept her in the house for
four days as a servant and took from her two chickens and twelve
"gandus;"
o Valentin Sunga asked for P50
o Leoncio Quiambao: Punsalan gave him P30 and his complaint was
shelved.
Now, Punsalan alleged that accused published a writing which was
false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous against him.
Issue: WON accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue
of his right to free speech and free press.
Held: Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the
right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a
matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly
enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people
cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other
public officer, public opinion will be effectively suppressed. It is a duty
which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the
investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all
who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the
wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of
those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them.
Doctrines: The interest of society and the maintenance of good
government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Completely
liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case
of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of
officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust
accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear
conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with
reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the
intelligence and the dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course,
criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as the
individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for
the common good. Rising superior to any official or set of officials, to
the Chief of Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary — to any or
all the agencies of Government — public opinion should be the
constant source of liberty and democracy.
The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to
criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of
vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is,
therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot
criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public
officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. Attempted
terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be
tyranny of the basest sort. The sword of Damocles in the hands of a
judge does not hang suspended over the individual who dares to assert
his prerogative as a citizen and to stand up bravely before any official.
On the contrary, it is a duty which every one owes to society or to the
State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct.
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of
republican institutions and the complement of the part of free speech.
Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person
or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the
appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of
grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course,
assume responsibility for the charges made.
Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of
government have demanded protection for public opinion. The
inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and
adoption of the doctrine of privilege.
The doctrine of privileged communications rests upon public policy,
'which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice,
though, as an incidental result, it may in some instances afford an
immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer.' (Abbott vs.
National Bank of Commerce, Tacoma [1899], 175 U. S., 409, 411.)
Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified. With the first, we
are not concerned. As to qualified privilege, it is as the words suggest
a prima facie privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. The rule
is thus stated by Lord Campbell, C. J.
A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which
the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which has
a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding
interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter which
without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable.
A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a
complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to the
character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer
or a board having some interest or duty in the matter. Even when the
statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in
their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of
privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. But the
statements must be made under an honest sense of duty; a self-seeking
motive is destructive. Personal injury is not necessary. the usual case
malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroy that
presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff. The
plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the existence of malice as
the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of probable
cause will amount to proof of malice. (See White vs. Nicholls [1845],
3 How., 266
A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic
examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive
scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over
privileged communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides.
People vs. Alarcon [G.R. No. 46551, December 12, 1939]
As an aftermath of the decision rendered by the Court of first Instance
of Pampanga in criminal case No. 5733, The People of the Philippines
vs. Salvador Alarcon, et al., convicting the accused therein — except
one — of the crime of robbery committed in band, a denunciatory
letter, signed by Luis M. Taruc, was addressed to His Excellency, the
President of the Philippines. A copy of said letter found its way to the
herein respondent, Federico Mañgahas who, as columnist of the
Tribune, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, quoted
the letter in an article published by him in the issue of that paper of
September 23, 1937. The objectionable portion is inserted in the
following petition of the provincial fiscal of Pampanga, filed with the
Court of First Instance of that province on September 29, 1937
Ruling: Elements of Contempt by Newspaper Publications
The elements of contempt by newspaper publications are well defined
by the cases adjudicated in this as in other jurisdictions. Newspaper
publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the
courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding
constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by the
courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended.
It must, however, clearly appear that such publications do impede,
interfere with, and embarrass the administration of justice before the
author of the publications should be held for contempt. What is thus
sought to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments is
the all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision
of a pending case.
There is no pending case to speak of when and once the court has come
upon a decision and has lost control either to reconsider or amend it.
That, we believe, is the case at bar, for here we have a concession that
the letter complained of was published after the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga had decided the aforesaid criminal case for robbery in
band, and after that decision had been appealed to the Court of
Appeals.
The fact that a motion to reconsider its order confiscating the bond of
the accused therein was subsequently filed may be admitted; but, the
important consideration is that it was then without power to reopen or
modify the decision which it had rendered upon the merits of the case,
and could not have been influenced by the questioned publication.
Lagunzad vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. L-32066 August 6, 1979
FACTS
Petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, a newspaperman, began the production
of a movie entitled "The Moises Padilla Story" portraying the life of
Moises Padilla, a mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the
Municipality of Magallon, Negros Occidental and for whose murder,
Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the Liberal Party then in power
and his men were tried and convicted. The emphasis of the movie was
on the public life of Moises Padilla, there were portions which dealt
with his private and family life including the portrayal in some scenes,
of his mother, Maria Soto, private respondent herein, and of one
"Auring" as his girl friend. Padilla’s half sister, for and in behalf of her
mother, Vda.de Gonzales, objected to the "exploitation" of his life and
demanded in writing for certain changes, corrections and deletions in
the movie. After some bargaining as to the amount to be paid Lagunzad
and Vda. de Gonzales, executed a "Licensing Agreement" whereby the
latter as LICENSOR granted Lagunzad authority and permission to
exploit, use, and develop the life story of Moises Padilla for purposes
of producing the picture for consideration of P20,000.00.Lagunzad
paid Vda. de Gonzales the amount of P5,000.00. Subsequently, the
movie was shown indifferent theaters all over the country. Because
petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts pursuant to the
Agreement, Vda. de Gonzales instituted the present suit against him
praying for judgment in her favor ordering petitioner 1) to pay her the
balance of P15,000.00, with legal interest from of the Complaint; and
2) to render an accounting of the proceeds from the picture and to pay
the corresponding 2-1/2% royalty there from, among others. Petitioner
contended in his Answer that the episodes in life of Moises Padilla
depicted in the movie were matters of public knowledge and occurred
at or about the same time that the deceased became and was a public
figure; that private respondent has no property right over those
incidents; that the Licensing Agreement was without valid cause or
consideration and constitutes an infringement on the constitutional
right of freedom of speech and of the press; and that he paid private
respondent the amount of P5,000.00 only because of the coercion and
threat employed upon him. As a counterclaim, petitioner sought for the
nullification of the Licensing Agreement, Both the trial court and the
CA ruled in favor of Vda. deGonzales.
ISSUES
Whether or not the fictionalized representation of Moises Padilla is an
intrusion upon his right to privacy notwithstanding that he was a public
figure.
Whether or not Vda. de Gonzales., the mother, has any property right
over the life of Moises Padilla considering that the latter was a public
figure.
Whether or not the Licensing Agreement constitutes an infringement
on the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press.
HELD
YES, being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in
toto a person's right to privacy. The right to invade as person's privacy
to disseminate public information does not extend to a fictional or
novelized representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he
or she may be. In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted
efforts to present a true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner
admits that he included a little romance in the film because without it,
it would be a drab story of torture and brutality.
YES, Lagunzad cannot dispense with the need for prior consent and
authority from the deceased heirs to portray publicly episodes in said
deceased's life and in that of his mother and the members of his family.
As held in Schuyler v. Curtis" a privilege may be given the surviving
relatives of a deceased person to protect his memory, but the privilege
exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings and to
prevent a violation of their own rights in the character and memory of
the deceased."
NO, Lagunzad claims that as a citizen and as a newspaperman, he had
the right to express his thoughts in film on the public life of Moises
Padilla without prior restraint. The right of freedom of expression,
indeed, occupies a preferred position in the "hierarchy of civil
liberties." It is not, however, without limitations. One criterion for
permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press is the
"balancing-of-interests test." The principle requires a court to take
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests
observable in a given situation or type of situation."
In the case at bar, the interest’s observable are the right to privacy
asserted by respondent and the right of -freedom of expression invoked
by petitioner. Taking into account the interplay of those interests, and
considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement
entered into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to
be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are
reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially private
concern
Ayer Productions PTY Ltd. vs. Capulong [G.R. No. L—82380,
April 29, 1988]
Facts: Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie
production company, Ayer Productions, envisioned, sometime in
1987, for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international
release, the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The
proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was
endorsed by the MTRCB as and other government agencies consulted.
Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production.
It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play,
presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four fictional characters
interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage
as background. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright
and Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an
American historian have developed a script.
Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation,
reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any
member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or
other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation. petitioners
acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the
movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion
picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to
privacy. RTC ordered for the desistance of the movie production and
making of any reference to plaintiff or his family and from creating
any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is based
on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the
appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated.
Held: Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom
to film and produce motion pictures and exhibit such motion pictures
in theaters or to diffuse them through television. Furthermore the
circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a
commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a
disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression.
The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not
exhibited to any audience. Neither private respondent nor the
respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely
look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of
any violation of any right to privacy. Subject matter is one of public
interest and concern. The subject thus relates to a highly critical stage
in the history of the country.
At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of
public concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place,
Enrile was a "public figure:" Such public figures were held to have
lost, to some extent at least, their right to privacy.
The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case
between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and
the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that
the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its
presentation of events.
Doctrines: Freedom of Speech and of Expression includes the freedom
to film and produce motion pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures
Considering first petitioners' claim to freedom of speech and of
expression the Court would once more stress that this freedom includes
the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and to exhibit such
motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television. In our
day and age, motion pictures are a univesally utilized vehicle of
communication and medium Of expression. Along with the press,
radio and television, motion pictures constitute a principal medium of
mass communication for information, education and entertainment
Motion Pictures
Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the
communication of Ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse.
Their effect on the perception by our people of issues and public
officials or public figures as well as the pre cultural traits is
considerable. Nor as pointed out in BURSTYN V. WILSON is the
Importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion lessened
by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform' .
There is no clear dividing line between what involves knowledge and
what affords pleasure. If such a distinction were sustained, there is a
diminution of the basic right to free expression.
Monetary profit is not a disqualification
This freedom is available in our country both to locally-owned and to
foreign-owned motion picture companies. Furthermore, the
circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a
commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a
disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression.
In our community as in many other countries, media facilities are
owned either by the government or the private sector but the private
sector-owned media facilities commonly require to be sustained by
being devoted in whole or in part to revenue producing activities.
Indeed, commercial media constitute the bulk of such facilities
available in our country and hence to exclude commercially owned and
operated media from the exercise of constitutionally protected om of
speech and of expression can only result in the drastic contraction of
such constitutional liberties in our country.
The Right to Privacy is not an Absolute Right
The right of privacy or "the right to be let alone," like the right of free
expression, is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a person's
privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a
public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to
be published about him constitute of a public character. Succinctly put,
the right of privacy cannot be invoked resist publication and
dissemination of matters of public interest.
The interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy is the right
to be free
1. from unwarranted publicity,
2. from the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs
3. and activities of an individual which are outside the realm of
legitimate public concern.
Tests for Permissible Limitation
1. The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger
rule is such a limitation.
2. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of
speech and the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media
as radio, television and the movies, is the "balancing of interest test"
The principle "requires a court to take conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interests observable in given situation
or type of situation"
Whether the "balancing of interests test" or the clear and present
danger test" be applied in respect of the instant Petitions, the Court
believes that a different conclusion must here be reached: The
production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture
"The Four Day Revolution" does not, in the circumstances of this case,
constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right of
privacy."
Borjal vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999]
Facts: A civil action for damages based on libel was filed before the
court against Borjal and Soliven for writing and publishing articles that
are allegedly derogatory and offensive against Francisco Wenceslao,
attacking among others the solicitation letters he send to support a
conference to be launch concerning resolving matters on transportation
crisis that is tainted with anomalous activities. Wenceslao however
was never named in any of the articles nor was the conference he was
organizing. The lower court ordered petitioners to indemnify the
private respondent for damages which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. A petition for review was filed before the SC contending that
private respondent was not sufficiently identified to be the subject of
the published articles.
Issue: Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to constitute guilt of
petitioners for libel.
Held: In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be
identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not
sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person
attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person
could identify him as the object of the libelous publication. These
requisites have not been complied with in the case at bar. The element
of identifiability was not met since it was Wenceslaso who revealed he
was the organizer of said conference and had he not done so the public
would not have known.
The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom
of the press and that privileged communications must be protective of
public opinion. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are
privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or
slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general
every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because
every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and
every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his
public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such
discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must
either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on
established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be
mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.
The questioned article dealt with matters of public interest as the
declared objective of the conference, the composition of its members
and participants, and the manner by which it was intended to be funded
no doubt lend to its activities as being genuinely imbued with public
interest. Respondent is also deemed to be a public figure and even
otherwise is involved in a public issue. The court held that freedom of
expression is constitutionally guaranteed and protected with the
reminder among media members to practice highest ethical standards
in the exercise thereof.
A privileged communication may be either:
1. Absolutely privileged communication à those which are not
actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. An example is
found in Sec. 11, Art.VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a
member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any Committee thereof.
2. Qualifiedly privileged communications à those containing
defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been
made without good intention justifiable motive. To this genre belong
"private communications" and "fair and true report without any
comments or remarks."
Reyes vs. Bagatsing [G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983]
Facts
Retired Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, in behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition,
sought for a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march
and rally on October 26, 1983 starting from Luneta to the gates of the
United States embassy. The objective of the rally was to peacefully
protest the removal of all foreign military bases and to present a
petition containing such to a representative of the Embassy so it may
be delivered to the United States Ambassador. This petition was to
initially compel the Mayor of the City of Manila to make a decision on
the application for a permit but it was discovered that a denial has
already been sent through mail. It also included a provision that if it be
held somewhere else, permit may be issued. The respondent mayor
alleges that holding the rally in front of the US Embassy is a violation
of the resolutions during the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations adopted in 1961 and of which the Philippines is a signatory.
In the doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines has to comply with
such generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land. The petitioner, on the other hand, contends that the
denial of the permit is a violation of the constitutional right of the
freedom of speech and expression.
Issue
Whether or not the Anti-Bases Coalition should be allowed to hold a
peaceful protest rally in front of the US Embassy
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled to allow the rally in front of the US Embassy
to protect the exercise of the rights to free speech and peaceful
assembly and on the ground that there was no showing of the existence
of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the
denial of the permit. These rights are not only assured by our
constitution but also provided for in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Between the two generally accepted principles of
diplomatic relations and human rights, the former takes higher ground.
The right of the freedom of expression and peaceful assembly is highly
ranked in the scheme of constitutional values.
Miller v. California 413 US 15 (1973)
In 1971, Marvin Miller, an owner/operator of a California mail-order
business specializing in pornographic films and books, sent out a
brochure advertising books and a film that graphically depicted sexual
activity between men and women. The brochure used in the mailing
contained graphic images from the books and the film. Five of the
brochures were mailed to a restaurant in Newport Beach, California.
The owner and his mother opened the envelope and seeing the
brochures, called the police.[3]
Miller was arrested and charged with violating California Penal Code
666.2(a) which says in part, "Every person who knowingly sends or
causes to be sent, or brings or causes to be brought, into this state for
sale or distribution, or in this state possesses, prepares, publishes,
produces, or prints, with intent to distribute or to exhibit to others, or
who offers to distribute, distributes, or exhibits to others, any obscene
matter is for a first offense, guilty of a misdemeanor."[4] California
lawmakers wrote the statute based on two previous Supreme Court
obscenity cases, Memoirs v. Massachusetts and Roth v. United
States.[5]
Miller was tried by jury in the Superior Court of Orange County. At
the conclusion of the evidence phase, the judge instructed the jury to
evaluate the evidence by the community standards of California, i.e.,
as defined by the statute.[6] The jury returned a guilty verdict.
Miller appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court,
arguing that the jury instructions did not use the standard set in
Memoirs v. Massachusetts which said that in order to be judged
obscene, materials must be "utterly without redeeming social value".
Miller argued that only a national standard for obscenity could be
applied.[7] The appellate division rejected the argument and affirmed
the jury verdict. Miller then filed an appeal with the California Court
of Appeal for the Third District, which declined to review. Miller
applied to the Supreme Court for certiorari, which was granted. Oral
arguments were heard in January 1972.[7]
Issue: Is the sale and distribution of obscene materials by mail
protected under the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantee?
Ruling: No. Judgment of the lower court vacated and remanded for
further proceedings. In determining whether speech is obscene, the
basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether “the average
person, applying contemporary community standards” would find the
material, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest of sex, (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literacy, artistic,
political, or scientific value. The Supreme Court of the Untied States
(Supreme Court) does not adopt as a constitutional standard the
“utterly without redeeming social value” test. If a state law that
regulates obscene material is thus limited, as written or construed, First
Amendment constitutional values are adequately protected by the
ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an independent review
of constitutional claims when necessary.
Pita vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 80806, October 5, 1989]
Facts:
In 1983, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, and the Manila
Police, seized and confiscated from dealers along Manila sidewalks,
magazines believed to be obscene. These were later burned. One of
the publications was Pinoy Playboy published by Leo Pita.
He filed an injunction case against the mayor of manila to enjoin him
from confiscating more copies of his magazine and claimed that this
was a violation of freedom of speech. The court ordered him to show
cause. He then filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary
restraining order against indiscriminate seizure.
Defendant Mayor Bagatsing admitted the confiscation and burning of
obscence reading materials but admitted that these were surrendered
by the stall owners and the establishments were not raided.
The other defendant, WPD Superintendent, Narcisco Cabrera, filed no
answer.
On January 11, 1984, the trial court issued an Order setting the case for
hearing on January 16, 1984 "for the parties to adduce evidence on the
question of whether the publication 'Pinoy Playboy Magazine alleged
(sic) seized, confiscated and/or burned by the defendants, are obscence
per se or not".
On February 3, 1984, the trial court promulgated the Order appealed
from denying the motion for a writ of preliminary injunction, and
dismissing the case for lack of merit
The CA also dismissed the appeal due to the argument that freedom of
the press is not without restraint.
In the SC, the petitioner claimed that:
1. The CA erred in holding that the police officers could without any
court warrant or order seize and confiscate petitioner's magazines on
the basis simply of their determination that they are obscene.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court
and, in effect, holding that the trial court could dismiss the case on its
merits without any hearing thereon when what was submitted to it for
resolution was merely the application of petitioner for the writ of
preliminary injunction.
Issue: Was the seizure constitutional?
Held: No. Petition granted
Ratio:
Test for obscenity: "whether the tendency of the matter charged as
obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such
immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article
charged as being obscene may fall
Also, "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the
circumstances of the case, and that ultimately, the question is to be
decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community
reached by it." (Kottinger)
When does a publication have a corrupting tendency, or when can it be
said to be offensive to human sensibilities?
The issue is a complicated one, in which the fine lines have neither
been drawn nor divided.
Katigbak- "Whether to the average person, applying contemporary
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals
to prurient interest."
Kalaw-Katigbak represented a marked departure from Kottinger in the
sense that it measured obscenity in terms of the "dominant theme" of
the work, rather than isolated passages, which were central to Kottinger
(although both cases are agreed that "contemporary community
standards" are the final arbiters of what is "obscene"). Kalaw-Katigbak
undertook moreover to make the determination of obscenity essentially
a judicial question and as a consequence, to temper the wide discretion
Kottinger had given unto law enforcers.
The latest say on American jurisprudence was Miller v. California,
which expressly abandoned Massachusettes, and established "basic
guidelines," to wit: "(a) whether 'the average person, applying
contemporary standards' would find the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest . . .; (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
The lack of uniformity in American jurisprudence as to what
constitutes "obscenity" has been attributed to the reluctance of the
courts to recognize the constitutional dimension of the problem.
Apparently, the courts have assumed that "obscenity" is not included
in the guaranty of free speech, an assumption that, as we averred, has
allowed a climate of opinions among magistrates predicated upon
arbitrary, if vague theories of what is acceptable to society.
In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the State, in the
legitimate exercise of police power, to suppress smut provided it is
smut. For obvious reasons, smut is not smut simply because one insists
it is smut. So is it equally evident that individual tastes develop, adapt
to wide-ranging influences, and keep in step with the rapid advance of
civilization. What shocked our forebears, say, five decades ago, is not
necessarily repulsive to the present generation.
But neither should we say that "obscenity" is a bare (no pun intended)
matter of opinion. As we said earlier, it is the divergent perceptions of
men and women that have probably compounded the problem rather
than resolved it.
Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of
free expression, although not its protection. In free expression cases,
this Court has consistently been on the side of the exercise of the right,
barring a "clear and present danger" that would warrant State
interference and action. But the burden to show this lies with the
authorities.
"There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural,
proof of the existence of such clear and present danger."
As we so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery
of a political speech, the presumption is that the speech may validly be
said. The burden is on the State to demonstrate the existence of a
danger, a danger that must not only be: (1) clear but also, (2) present,
to justify State action to stop the speech.
The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown
the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the
literature for which mandatory injunction had been sought below. First
of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the
said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out
a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant.
Has petitioner been found guilty for publishing obscene works under
Presidential Decrees Nos. 960 and 969? This not answered, one can
conclude that the fact that the former respondent Mayor's act was
sanctioned by "police power" is no license to seize property in
disregard of due process. The PD’s don’t give the authorities the
permission to execute high-handed acts.
It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a
judicial warrant, otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to
challenge.
There is of course provision for warrantless searches under the Rules
of Court but as the provision itself suggests, the search must have been
an incident to a lawful arrest and it must be on account fo a crime
committed.
The Court rejected the argument that "[t]here is no constitutional nor
legal provision which would free the accused of all criminal
responsibility because there had been no warrant, and there is no
"accused" here to speak of, who ought to be "punished".
Second, to say that the respondent Mayor could have validly ordered
the raid (as a result of an anti-smut campaign) without a lawful search
warrant because, in his opinion, "violation of penal laws" has been
committed, is to make the respondent Mayor judge, jury, and
executioner rolled into one.
Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA [G.R. No. 119673, July 26 1996]
Facts: Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every
Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious
beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with
other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of
Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV
program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the
series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend
and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly
prohibited by law." On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the Office
of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128 which
allowed it through a letter of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A.
Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the decision
of the respondent Board. According to the letter the episode in is
protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression
and no indication that the episode poses any clear and present danger.
Petitioner also filed Civil Case. Petitioner alleged that the respondent
Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in
x-rating them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and
128. In their Answer, respondent Board invoked its power under PD
No. 19861 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. The
Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says
that our (Catholic) veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned
because nowhere it is found in the bible. The board contended that it
outrages Catholic and Protestant's beliefs. RTC ruled in favor of
petitioners. CA however reversed it hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or Not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is not
constitutionally protected as a form of religious exercise and
expression.
Held: Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with
presumption of invalidity. It is the burden of the respondent Board to
overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act
of censorship will be struck down. This is true in this case. So-called
"attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and
tenets of other religions. RTC’s ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's
freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of
religion. “attack” is different from “offend” any race or religion. The
respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions
by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms,
however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is
not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against
an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often
at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the
fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the
State from leaning towards any religion. Respondent board cannot
censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it
attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most
numerous church in our country. The basis of freedom of religion is
freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the
marketplace of dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably
necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and
welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may
be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the
danger. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes
will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened
harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be
justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive
and imminent evil. It is inappropriate to apply the clear and present
danger test to the case at bar because the issue involves the content of
speech and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless
the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the
causal connection between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot
be established. The determination of the question as to whether or not
such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside
the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function
which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board
of Censors." A system of prior restraint may only be validly
administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies.
Social Weather Stations, Inc. vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 147571,
May 5, 2001]
Facts : Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private
non-stock, non-profit social research institution conducting surveys in
various fields, including economics, politics, demography, and social
development, and thereafter processing, analyzing, and publicly
reporting the results thereof. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan
Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of
general circulation, which features news- worthy items of information
including election surveys Petitioners brought this action for
prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing §5.4
of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides: Surveys affecting
national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an
election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published
seven (7) days be- fore an election. Petitioner SWS states that it wishes
to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections
both at the national and local levels and release to the media the results
of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioner Kamahalan
Publishing Corporation, on the other hand, states that it intends to
publish election survey results up to the last day of the elections on
May 14,2001
Issue : WON §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional
abridgment of freedom of speech, expression, and the press.
HELD : What test should then be employed to determine the
constitutional validity of §5.4? The United States Supreme Court,
through Chief Justice Warren, held in United States v. O 'Brien: [A]
Government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech,
expression and press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest. This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing
content-based from content neutral regulations and is said to have
"become canonical in the review of such laws." is noteworthy that the
O 'Brien test has been applied by this Court in at least two cases First.
Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O 'Brien test because the causal
connection of expression to the asserted governmental interest makes
such interest "not related to the suppression of free expression." By
prohibiting the publication of election survey results because of the
possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity of the
election, §5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while
allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter
by newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair
theorists, and other opinion takers Even if the governmental interest
sought to be promoted is unrelated to the suppression of speech and the
resulting restriction of free expression is only incidental, §5.4
nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of the O'Brien test, namely, that
the restriction be not greater than is necessary to further the
governmental interest. As already stated, §5.4 aims at the prevention
of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect,
"junking" of weak or "losing" candidates, and resort to the form of
election cheating called "dagdag-bawas." Praiseworthy as these aims
of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of
the fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be more
narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than
speechbecause of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of
such evils To summarize then, we hold that §5.4 is invalid because (1)
it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a
direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though
such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental
interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than
suppression of freedom of expression.
Re: Request for TV Coverage of the Trial of President Estrada
[A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC, June 29 2001]
Facts: On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng
Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letter requesting this Court to allow live media
coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases
filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan. The petitioners invoked other than the freedom of the
press, the constitutional right of the people to be informed of matters
of public concern which could only be recognized, served and satisfied
by allowing live radio and television coverage of the court
proceedings. Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the
proceedings will also serve the dual purpose of ensuring the desired
transparency in the administration of justice.
However, in the Resolution of the Court on October 1991, in a case for
libel filed by then President Corazon C. Aquino read that the Court
resolved to prohibit live radio and television coverage of court
proceedings in view of protecting the parties’ right to due process, to
prevent distraction of the participants in the proceedings and to avoid
miscarriage of justice.
Issue: Whether the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press
and right to information of public concern be given more weight than
the fundamental rights of the accused.
Ratio: The petition is denied.
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the
press and the right to public information. It also approves of media's
exalted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive means
of conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the
public with the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the
courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of
the accused to due process which must never be allowed to suffer
diminution in its constitutional proportions.
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until
the contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual
settings nor made an object of public's attention and where the
conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence
but only by evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting
dignity and calm ambiance is demanded."Television can work
profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses on."The
conscious or unconscious effect that such coverage may have on the
testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated
but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or
innocence to yield to it.
Although an accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that
belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be
held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly
dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are
not compromised. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized
trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who
wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with
decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a
courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of
the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the
openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants
from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report
what they have observed during the proceedings.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former
President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be
made, for the account of the Sandiganbayan, under the following
conditions: (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such
portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may determine should not be
held public under Rule 119, 21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b)
cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and
the movement of TV crews shall be regulated consistent with the
dignity and solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the audio-visual
recordings shall be made for documentary purposes only and shall be
made without comment except such annotations of scenes depicted
therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast of
the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its
decision in all the cases against the former President shall be prohibited
under pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in case of
violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the conditions are
observed, the audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made
under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division
concerned and shall be made pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and
(f) simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual recordings for
public broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in the National
Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for
preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.
MTRCB vs. ABS-CBN [G.R. No. 155282, January 17 2005]
Facts:
Respondent abs-cbn aired “Prosti-tuition”, an episode of the TV
program “The Inside Story” produced and hosted by respondent
Legarda. It depicted female students moonlighting as prostitutes to
enable them to pay for their tuition fees.
PWU was named as the school of some of the students involved and
the façade of the PWU building served as the background of the
episode. This caused upsoar in the PWU community and they filed a
letter-complaint to the MTRCB.
MTRCB alleged that respondents
1) Did not submit “the inside story” to petitioner for review
2) Exhibited the same without its permission, thus violating sec 7 of
PD 1986 and some sections of MTRCB rules and regulations
ABS-CBN averred:
1) The Inside Story is a public affairs program, news documentary and
socio-political editorial, its airing is protected by the constitutional
provision on freedom of expression and of the press
2) Petitioners has no power, authority and jurisdiction to impose any
form of prior restraint upon respondents.
After hearing and submission of the parties’ memoranda, MTRCB
investigating committee ordered the respondents to pay P20,000 for
non-submission of the program
MTRCB affirmed the ruling
Respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari with RTC QC.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents, annulling and setting
aside the decision and resolution of the MTRCB and declaring and
decreeing that certain sections of PD 1986 & MTRCB do not cover the
TV program “Inside Story”, they being a public affairs programs which
can be equated to a newspaper
Hence, this petition
Doctrines: The present controversy brings into focus the provisions of
Section 3 of P. D. No. 1986, partly reproduced as follows:
SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. The BOARD shall have the following
functions, powers and duties:
b) To screen, review and examine all motion pictures as herein defined,
television programs, including publicity materials such as
advertisements, trailers and stills, whether such motion pictures and
publicity materials be for theatrical or non-theatrical distribution, for
television broadcast or for general viewing, imported or produced in
the Philippines, and in the latter case, whether they be for local viewing
or for export.
c) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portions from and/or
prohibit the importation, exportation, production, copying,
distribution, sale, lease exhibition and/or television broadcast of the
motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials subject of
the preceding paragraph, which, in the judgment of the BOARD
applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard, are
objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good
customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or
its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission
of violence or of a wrong or crime, such as but not limited to:
d) To supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the
importation, exportation, production, copying, distribution, sale, lease,
exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures,
television programs and publicity materials, to the end and that no such
pictures, programs and materials as are determined by the BOARD to
be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be
imported, exported, produced, copied, reproduced, distributed, sold,
leased, exhibited and/or broadcast by television
Vis-a-vis the foregoing provisions, our task is to decide whether or not
petitioner has the power to review the television program The Inside
Story. The task is not Herculean because it merely resurrects this Court
En Bancs ruling in Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals.[26] There,
the Iglesia ni Cristo sought exception from petitioners review power
contending that the term television programs under Sec. 3 (b) does not
include religious programs which are protected under Section 5,
Article III of the Constitution.[27] This Court, through Justice Reynato
Puno, categorically ruled that P.D. No. 1986 gives petitioner the power
to screen, review and examine all television programs, emphasizing
the phrase all television programs, thus:
The law gives the Board the power to screen, review and examine all
television programs. By the clear terms of the law, the Board has the
power to approve, delete x x x and/or prohibit the x x x exhibition
and/or television broadcast of x x x television programs x x x. The law
also directs the Board to apply contemporary Filipino cultural values
as standard to determine those which are objectionable for being
immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to
the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a
dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a
wrong or crime.
Settled is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not
make any exception, courts may not except something therefrom,
unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it.[28]
Ubi lex non distinguit nec distinguere debemos. Thus, when the law
says all television programs, the word all covers all television
programs, whether religious, public affairs, news documentary,
etc.[29] The principle assumes that the legislative body made no
qualification in the use of general word or expression.[30]
It then follows that since The Inside Story is a television program, it is
within the jurisdiction of the MTRCB over which it has power of
review.
Here, respondents sought exemption from the coverage of the term
television programs on the ground that the The Inside Story is a public
affairs program, news documentary and socio-political editorial
protected under Section 4,[31] Article III of the Constitution. Albeit,
respondents basis is not freedom of religion, as in Iglesia ni Cristo,[32]
but freedom of expression and of the press, the ruling in Iglesia ni
Cristo applies squarely to the instant issue. It is significant to note that
in Iglesia ni Cristo, this Court declared that freedom of religion has
been accorded a preferred status by the framers of our fundamental
laws, past and present, designed to protect the broadest possible liberty
of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs x
x x. Yet despite the fact that freedom of religion has been accorded a
preferred status, still this Court, did not exempt the Iglesia ni Cristos
religious program from petitioners review power.
Respondents claim that the showing of The Inside Story is protected
by the constitutional provision on freedom of speech and of the press.
However, there has been no declaration at all by the framers of the
Constitution that freedom of expression and of the press has a preferred
status.
If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo, did not exempt religious programs
from the jurisdiction and review power of petitioner MTRCB, with
more reason, there is no justification to exempt therefrom The Inside
Story which, according to respondents, is protected by the
constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press, a
freedom bearing no preferred status.
The only exceptions from the MTRCBs power of review are those
expressly mentioned in Section 7 of P. D. No. 1986, such as (1)
television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine
Government and/or its departments and agencies, and (2) newsreels.
Thus:
SEC. 7. Unauthorized showing or exhibition. It shall be unlawful for
any person or entity to exhibit or cause to be exhibited in any
moviehouse, theatre, or public place or by television within the
Philippines any motion picture, television program or publicity
material, including trailers, and stills for lobby displays in connection
with motion pictures, not duly authorized by the owner or his assignee
and passed by the BOARD; or to print or cause to be printed on any
motion picture to be exhibited in any theater or public place or by
television a label or notice showing the same to have been officially
passed by the BOARD when the same has not been previously
authorized, except motion pictures, television programs or publicity
material imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or
its departments and agencies, and newsreels.
Still in a desperate attempt to be exempted, respondents contend that
the The Inside Story falls under the category of newsreels.
Their contention is unpersuasive.
P. D. No. 1986 does not define newsreels. Websters dictionary defines
newsreels as short motion picture films portraying or dealing with
current events.[33] A glance at actual samples of newsreels shows that
they are mostly reenactments of events that had already happened.
Some concrete examples are those of Dziga Vertovs Russian Kino-
Pravda newsreel series (Kino-Pravda means literally film-truth, a term
that was later translated literally into the French cinema verite) and
Frank Capras Why We Fight series.[34] Apparently, newsreels are
straight presentation of events. They are depiction of actualities.
Correspondingly, the MTRCB Rules and Regulations[35]
implementing P. D. No. 1986 define newsreels as straight news
reporting, as distinguished from news analyses, commentaries and
opinions. Talk shows on a given issue are not considered
newsreels.[36] Clearly, the The Inside Story cannot be considered a
newsreel. It is more of a public affairs program which is described as
a variety of news treatment; a cross between pure television news and
news-related commentaries, analysis and/or exchange of opinions.[37]
Certainly, such kind of program is within petitioners review power.
Chavez vs. Gonzales [G.R. No. 168338, February 15 2008]
Facts: As a consequence of the public release of copies of the “Hello
Garci” compact disc audiotapes involving a wiretapped mobile phone
conversation between then-President Gloria Arroyo and Comelec
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary
Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD and
those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under
the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons possessing or
airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to
arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that he had ordered the NBI to go
after media organizations “found to have caused the spread, the playing
and the printing of the contents of a tape.” Meanwhile, respondent
NTC warned TV and radio stations that their broadcast/airing of such
false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause
for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or
authorizations issued to the said media establishments. Petitioner
Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary
Gonzales and the NTC directly with the Supreme Court.
Issues: (1) Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-
Wiretapping Law justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of
speech and of the press? (2) Did the mere press statements of
respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constitute a form of content-
based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution?
Held: (1) No, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-
Wiretapping Law will not justify straitjacketing the exercise of
freedom of speech and of the press. A governmental action that
restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given
the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present
danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including
broadcast media. Respondents, who have the burden to show that these
acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press, failed to hurdle
the clear and present danger test. For this failure of the respondents
alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the
Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free
press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-
wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State.
(2) Yes, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and
the NTC constituted a form of content-based prior restraint that has
transgressed the Constitution. It is not decisive that the press
statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up
with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements
were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official
functions. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of
the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior
restraint. The concept of an “act” does not limit itself to acts already
converted to a formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non
formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in
the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint.
Doctrines: When the issue involves freedom of expression, as in the
present case, any citizen has the right to bring suit to question the
constitutionality of a government action in violation of freedom of
expression, whether or not the government action is directed at such
citizen.
Overview of Freedom of Expression, Prior Restraint and Subsequent
Punishment
Freedom of expression is the foundation of a free, open and democratic
society. Freedom of expression is an indispensable condition to the
exercise of almost all other civil and political rights. No society can
remain free, open and democratic without freedom of expression.
Freedom of expression guarantees full, spirited, and even contentious
discussion of all social, economic and political issues. To survive, a
free and democratic society must zealously safeguard freedom of
expression.
Freedom of expression allows citizens to expose and check abuses of
public officials. Freedom of expression allows citizens to make
informed choices of candidates for public office. Freedom of
expression crystallizes important public policy issues, and allows
citizens to participate in the discussion and resolution of such issues.
Freedom of expression allows the competition of ideas, the clash of
claims and counterclaims, from which the truth will likely emerge.
Freedom of expression allows the airing of social grievances,
mitigating sudden eruptions of violence from marginalized groups who
otherwise would not be heard by government. Freedom of expression
provides a civilized way of engagement among political, ideological,
religious or ethnic opponents for if one cannot use his tongue to argue,
he might use his fist instead.
Section 4, Article III of the Constitution prohibits the enactment of any
law curtailing freedom of expression:
“No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.”
Thus, the rule is that expression is not subject to any prior restraint or
censorship because the Constitution commands that freedom of
expression shall not be abridged. Over time, however, courts have
carved out narrow and well defined exceptions to this rule out of
necessity.
Exceptions:
The exceptions, when expression may be subject to prior restraint,
apply in this jurisdiction to only four categories of expression namely:
pornography,
false or misleading advertisement,
advocacy of imminent lawless action, and
danger to national security.
All other expression is not subject to prior restraint. The history of
press freedom has been a constant struggle against the censor whose
weapon is the suspension or cancellation of licenses to publish or
broadcast. The NTC warning resurrects the weapon of the censor. In
sum, the NTC press release constitutes an unconstitutional prior
restraint on protected expression. There can be no content-based prior
restraint on protected expression. This rule has no exception.
Diocese of Bacolod vs Comelec [G.R. No. 2015]
FACTS:On February 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within
the compound of San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin
was approximately 6×10 in size. They were posted on the front walls
of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the
message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health
Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the
subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading
“Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH)/ Team
Buhay” or “(Pro-RH)/Team Patay”.
The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the
adoption of the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law
were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those
who voted against it form “Team Buhay”:
TEAM BUHAY TEAM PATAY
Estrada, JV Angara, Juan Edgardo
Honasan, Gregorio Casiño, Teddy
Magsaysay, Mitos Cayetano, Alan Peter
Pimentel, Koko Enrile, Jackie
Trillanes, Antonio Escudero, Francis
Villar, Cynthia Hontiveros, Risa
*Party List Legarda, Loren
Party List Buhay Gabriela, Akbayan, Bayan Muna, Anak Pawis
Party List Ang Pamilya
Respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, as Election Officer of Bacolod
City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials addressed to
petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra, otherwise,
COMELEC will be constrained to file an election offense against the
petitioners.
Doctrines:
Exhaustion of administrative remedies will prolong the violation of
freedom of expression in the case at bar;
Hierarchy of Protected Expressions
Political speech enjoys preferred protection within our constitutional
order. In Chavez v. Gonzales, Justice Carpio in a separate opinion
emphasized: "[i]f ever there is a hierarchy of protected expressions,
political expression would occupy the highest rank, and among
different kinds of political expression, the subject of fair and honest
elections would be at the top." Sovereignty resides in the people.
Political speech is a direct exercise of the sovereignty. The principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies yields in order to protect this
fundamental right.
Even assuming that the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is applicable, the current controversy is within the exceptions
to the principle.
When is prior exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed
with and judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately?
(a) when there is a violation of due process;
(b) when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
(c) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
(d) when there is estoppel on the part ofthe administrative
agency concerned;
(e) when there is irreparable injury;
(f) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as
analter ego of the President bear the implied and assumed approval of
the latter;
(g) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies
would be unreasonable;
(h) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
(i) when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings;
(j) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; or
(k) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention.
COMELEC had no legal basis to regulate expressions made by private
citizens
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support
their position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin.
However, all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political
parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do theybelong to any
political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the
enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by
a non-candidate in this case.
Tarpaulin
Respondents considered the tarpaulin as a campaign material in their
issuances. The above provisions regulating the posting of campaign
materials only apply to candidates and political parties, and petitioners
are neither of the two.
The tarpaulin was not paid for by any candidate or political party.
There was no allegation that petitioners coordinated with any of the
persons named in the tarpaulin regarding its posting. On the other hand,
petitioners posted the tarpaulin as part of their advocacy against the
RH Law.
True, there is no mention whether election campaign is limited only to
the candidates and political parties themselves. The focus of the
definition is that the act must be "designed to promote the election or
defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office."
In this case, the tarpaulin contains speech on a matter of public
concern, that is, a statement of either appreciation or criticism on votes
made in the passing of the RH law. Thus, petitioners invoke their right
to freedom of expression.
Does Article III Section 4 of the Constitution also apply to other
governmental acts even if it expressly states that “NO LAW…”? YES
While it is true that the present petition assails not a law but an opinion
by the COMELEC Law Department, this court has applied Article III,
Section 4 of the Constitution even to governmental acts.
. . . shall be passed abridging. . .
All regulations will have an impact directly or indirectly on expression.
The prohibition against the abridgment of speech should not mean an
absolute prohibition against regulation. The primary and incidental
burden on speech must be weighed against a compelling state interest
clearly allowed in the Constitution. The test depends on the relevant
theory of speech implicit in the kind of society framed by our
Constitution.
Of Expression explained
Our Constitution has also explicitly included the freedom of
expression, separate and in addition to the freedom of speech and of
the press provided in the US Constitution. The word "expression" was
added in the 1987 Constitution by Commissioner Brocka for having a
wider scope:
MR. BROCKA: This is a very minor amendment, Mr. Presiding
Officer. On Section 9, page 2, line 29, it says: "No law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech." I would like to recommend to the
Committee the change of the word "speech" to EXPRESSION; or if
not, add the words AND EXPRESSION after the word "speech,"
because it is more expansive, it has a wider scope, and it would refer
to means of expression other than speech.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.Bengzon): What does the
Committee say?
FR. BERNAS: "Expression" is more broad than speech. We accept it.
MR. BROCKA: Thank you.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.Bengzon): Is it accepted?
FR. BERNAS: Yes.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.Bengzon): Is there any objection?
(Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment is approved.
FR. BERNAS: So, that provision will now read: "No law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech, expression or of the press . . .
." Speech may be said to be inextricably linked to freedom itself as
"[t]he right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be
protected from the government because speech is the beginning of
thought."
Communication
Communication is an essential outcome of protected speech.
Communication exists when "
(1) a speaker, seeking to signal others, uses conventional actions
because he or she reasonably believes that such actions will be taken
by the audience in the manner intended; and
(2) the audience so takes the actions." "
[I]n communicative action[,] the hearer may respond to the claims by
. . . either accepting the speech act’s claims or opposing them with
criticism or requests for justification."
Speech
Speech is not limited to vocal communication. "[C]onduct is treated as
a form of speech sometimes referred to as ‘symbolic speech[,]’"such
that "‘when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the
same course of conduct,’ the ‘communicative element’ of the conduct
may be ‘sufficient to bring into play the [right to freedom of
expression].’"
The right to freedom of expression, thus, applies to the entire
continuum of speech from utterances made to conduct enacted, and
even to inaction itself as a symbolic manner of communication.
Freedom of Expression includes the Right to be Silent
Freedom of speech includes the right to be silent. Aptly has it been said
that the Bill of Rights that guarantees to the individual the liberty to
utter what is in his mind also guarantees to him the liberty not to utter
what is not in his mind.
Citing EBRALINAG vs. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF CEBU:
The democratic system provides for the accommodation of diverse
ideas, including the unconventional and even the bizarre or eccentric.
The will of the majority prevails, but it cannot regiment thought by
prescribing the recitation by rote of its opinions or proscribing the
assertion of unorthodox or unpopular views as inthis case. The
conscientious objections of the petitioners, no less than the impatience
of those who disagree with them, are protected by the Constitution.
The State cannot make the individual speak when the soul within
rebels.
Size Matters
Size does matter
The form of expression is just as important as the information
conveyed that it forms part of the expression. The present case is in
point.
It is easy to discern why size matters.
First, it enhances efficiency in communication. A larger tarpaulin
allows larger fonts which make it easier to view its messages from
greater distances.
Second, the size of the tarpaulin may underscore the importance of the
message to the reader. From an ordinary person’s perspective, those
who post their messages in larger fonts care more about their message
than those who carry their messages in smaller media.
Third, larger spaces allow for more messages. Larger spaces, therefore,
may translate to more opportunities to amplify, explain, and argue
points which the speakers might want to communicate.
Large tarpaulins, therefore, are not analogous to time and place. They
are fundamentally part of expression protected under Article III,
Section 4 of the Constitution.
Theories and Schools of Thought for the protection of this right
First, this relates to the right of the people to participate in public
affairs, including the right to criticize government actions.
Proponents of the political theory on "deliberative democracy" submit
that "substantial, open, [and] ethical dialogue is a critical, and indeed
defining, feature of a good polity." This theory may be considered
broad, but it definitely "includes [a] collective decision making with
the participation of all who will be affected by the decision."
It anchors on the principle that the cornerstone of every democracy is
that sovereignty resides in the people. To ensure order in running the
state’s affairs, sovereign powers were delegated and individuals would
be elected or nominated in key government positions to represent the
people. On this note, the theory on deliberative democracy may evolve
to the right of the people to make government accountable.
Necessarily, this includes the right of the people to criticize acts made
pursuant to governmental functions.
Speech that promotes dialogue on public affairs, or airs out grievances
and political discontent, should thus be protected and encouraged.
Borrowing the words of Justice Brandeis, "it is hazardous to discourage
thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that
repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the
path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed
grievances and proposed remedies."
In this jurisdiction, this court held that "[t]he interest of society and the
maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public
affairs." This court has, thus, adopted the principle that "debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust,and wide open . . .
[including even] unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials.”
Second, free speech should be encouraged under the concept of a
market place of ideas.
This theory was articulated by Justice Holmes in that "the ultimate
good desired is better reached by [the] free trade in ideas:"
When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations
of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached
by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that
truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried
out.
The way it works, the exposure to the ideas of others allows one to
"consider, test, and develop their own conclusions." A free, open, and
dynamic market place of ideas is constantly shaping new ones. This
promotes both stability and change where recurring points may
crystallize and weak ones may develop. Of course, free speech is more
than the right to approve existing political beliefs and economic
arrangements as it includes, "[t]o paraphrase Justice Holmes, [the]
freedom for the thought that we hate, no less than for the thought that
agrees with us." In fact, free speech may "best serve its high purpose
when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger." It is in this context
that we should guard against any curtailment of the people’s right to
participate in the free trade of ideas.
Third, free speech involves self-expression that enhances human
dignity.
This right is "a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment," among
others. In PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES
ORGANIZATION V. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC,
this court discussed as follows:
The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only
civil rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his
life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru
these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic
establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive
public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can
appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress
and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on
erring public officers and employees. (Emphasis supplied)
Fourth, expression is a marker for group identity.
For one, "[v]oluntary associations perform [an] important democratic
role [in providing] forums for the development of civil skills, for
deliberation, and for the formation of identity and community spirit[,]
[and] are largely immune from [any] governmental interference." They
also "provide a buffer between individuals and the state - a free space
for the development of individual personality, distinct group identity,
and dissident ideas - and a potential source of opposition to the state."
Free speech must be protected as the vehicle to find those who have
similar and shared values and ideals, to join together and forward
common goals.
Fifth, the Bill of Rights, free speech included, is supposed to "protect
individuals and minorities against majoritarian abuses perpetrated
through [the] framework [of democratic governance]."
Federalist framers led by James Madison were concerned about two
potentially vulnerable groups:
1. "the citizenry at large - majorities - who might be tyrannized
or plundered by despotic federal officials" and
2. the minorities who may be oppressed by "dominant factions
of the electorate [that] capture [the] government for their own selfish
ends[.]"
According to Madison, "[i]t is of great importance in a republic not
only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to
guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part." We
should strive to ensure that free speech is protected especially in light
of any potential oppression against those who find themselves in the
fringes on public issues.
Lastly, free speech must be protected under the safety valve theory.
This provides that "nonviolent manifestations of dissent reduce the
likelihood of violence[.]" "[A] dam about to burst . . . resulting in the
‘banking up of a menacing flood of sullen anger behind the walls of
restriction’" has been used to describe the effect of repressing
nonviolent outlets.
In order to avoid this situation and prevent people from resorting to
violence, there is a need for peaceful methods in making passionate
dissent. This includes "free expression and political participation"in
that they can "vote for candidates who share their views, petition their
legislatures to [make or] change laws, . . . distribute literature alerting
other citizens of their concerns[,]"and conduct peaceful rallies and
other similar acts. Free speech must, thus, be protected as a peaceful
means of achieving one’s goal, considering the possibility that
repression of nonviolent dissent may spill over to violent means just to
drive a point.
Free speech and other intellectual freedoms
This court has held free speech and other intellectual freedoms as
"highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values.” These rights
enjoy precedence and primacy.
Are Human Rights can be lost through prescriptions?
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human
rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the
passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the
power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the
tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and
of oligarchs - political, economic or otherwise.
Hierarchy of Civil Liberties
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of
assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such
priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions."
This primordial right calls for utmost respect, more so "when what may
be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more
meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage."
Are all speech treated the same? NO
Not all speech are treated the same. In CHAVEZ V. GONZALES, this
court discussed that some types of speech may be subject to regulation:
Some types of speech may be subjected to some regulation by the State
under its pervasive police power, in order that it may not be injurious
to the equal right of others or those of the community or society. The
difference in treatment is expected because the relevant interests of one
type of speech, e.g., political speech, may vary from those of another,
e.g., obscene speech. Distinctions have therefore been made in the
treatment, analysis, and evaluation of the permissible scope of
restrictions on various categories of speech. We have ruled, for
example, that in our jurisdiction slander or libel, lewd and obscene
speech, as well as "fighting words" are not entitled to constitutional
protection and may be penalized.
Political and Commercial Speech distinguished
Political speech refers to speech "both intended and received as a
contribution to public deliberation about some issue," "foster[ing]
informed and civicminded deliberation."
On the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that
does "no more than propose a commercial transaction."
In the case at bar: The expression resulting from the content of the
tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.
In Justice Brion’s dissenting opinion, he discussed that "[t]he content
of the tarpaulin, as well as the timing of its posting, makes it subject of
the regulations in RA 9006 and Comelec Resolution No. 9615." He
adds that "[w]hile indeed the RH issue, by itself,is not an
electoralmatter, the slant that the petitioners gave the issue converted
the non-election issue into a live election one hence, Team Buhay and
Team Patay and the plea to support one and oppose the other."
Debate on public issues
We have adopted the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide open and that it may well include
vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials. Too many restrictions will deny to
people the robust, uninhibited, and wide open debate, the generating of
interest essential if our elections will truly be free, clean and honest.
Speech with political consequences
Speech with political consequences is at the core of the freedom of
expression and must be protected by this court.
Justice Brion pointed out that freedom of expression "is not the god of
rights to which all other rights and even government protection of state
interest must bow."
Is the Freedom of Expression absolute? NO
The right to freedom of expression is indeed not absolute. Even some
forms of protected speech are still subject to some restrictions. The
degree of restriction may depend on whether the regulation is content-
based or content-neutral. Content-based regulations can either be based
on the viewpoint of the speaker or the subject of the expression.
Content-based Regulation
Size limitations during elections hit at a core part of expression. The
content of the tarpaulin is not easily divorced from the size of its
medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and
this court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure. Thus,
in CHAVEZ V. GONZALES:
A content-based regulation, however, bears a heavy presumption of
invalidity and is measured against the clear and present danger rule.
The latter will pass constitutional muster only if justified by a
compelling reason, and the restrictions imposed are neither overbroad
nor vague.
Under this rule, "the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be
substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high.’" "Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and
present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the
government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality."
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to
justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state
interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulinas to justify
curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason
for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post
the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does
not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.
Content-based restraint or censorship
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions "based on
the subject matter of the utterance or speech." In contrast, content-
neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the
speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.
Intermediate Approach & Content-neutral government regulation
This intermediate approach is based on the test that we have prescribed
in several cases.
A content-neutral government regulation is sufficiently justified:
(1) if it is within the constitutional power of the Government;
(2) if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest;
(3) if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression; and
(4) if the incident restriction on alleged [freedom of speech &
expression] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
On the first requisite, it is not within the constitutional powers of the
COMELEC to regulate the tarpaulin. As discussed earlier, this is
protected speech by petitioners who are non-candidates. On the second
requirement, not only must the governmental interest be important or
substantial, it must also be compelling as to justify the restrictions
made.
The third requisite is likewise lacking. We look not only at the
legislative intent or motive in imposing the restriction, but more so at
the effects of such restriction, if implemented. The restriction must not
be narrowly tailored to achieve the purpose. It must be demonstrable.
It must allow alternative avenues for the actor to make speech.
In this case, the size regulation is not unrelated to the suppression of
speech. Limiting the maximum sizeof the tarpaulin would render
ineffective petitioners’ message and violate their right to exercise
freedom of expression.
The restriction in the present case does not pass even the lower test of
intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral regulations.
In relation to the possibility of abuse
The guarantee of freedom of expression to individuals without any
relationship to any political candidate should not be held hostage by
the possibility of abuse by those seeking to be elected. It is true that
there can be underhanded, covert, or illicit dealings so as to hide the
candidate’s real levels of expenditures. However, labelling all
expressions of private parties that tend to have an effect on the debate
in the elections as election paraphernalia would be too broad a remedy
that can stifle genuine speech like in this case. Instead, to address this
evil, better and more effective enforcement will be the least restrictive
means to the fundamental freedom.
Satirical elements of the tarpaulins
The twin tarpaulins consist of satire of political parties. Satire is a
"literary form that employs such devices as sarcasm, irony and ridicule
to deride prevailing vices or follies," and this may target any individual
or group in society, private and government alike. It seeks to
effectively communicate a greater purpose, often used for "political
and social criticism""because it tears down facades, deflates stuffed
shirts, and unmasks hypocrisy. . . . Nothing is more thoroughly
democratic than to have the high-and-mighty lampooned and spoofed."
Northrop Frye, well known in this literary field, claimed that satire had
two defining features:
"one is wit or humor founded on fantasy or a sense of the grotesque
and absurd,
the other is an object of attack." Thus, satire frequently uses
exaggeration, analogy, and other rhetorical devices.
Two paradigms of free speech
1. Equality
2. Liberty
Speech and Equality
In an equality-based approach, "politically disadvantaged speech
prevails over regulation[,] but regulation promoting political equality
prevails over speech." This view allows the government leeway to
redistribute or equalize ‘speaking power,’ such as protecting, even
implicitly subsidizing, unpopular or dissenting voices often
systematically subdued within society’s ideological ladder. This view
acknowledges that there are dominant political actors who, through
authority, power, resources, identity, or status, have capabilities that
may drown out the messages of others. This is especially true in a
developing or emerging economy that is part of the majoritarian world
like ours.
Speech and Libertarian Tolerance
This balance between equality and the ability to express so as to find
one’s authentic self or to participate in the self determination of one’s
communities is not new only to law. It has always been a philosophical
problematique.
In his seminal work, Repressive Tolerance, philosopher and social
theorist Herbert Marcuse recognized how institutionalized inequality
exists as a background limitation, rendering freedoms exercised within
such limitation as merely "protect[ing] the already established
machinery of discrimination." In his view, any improvement "in the
normal course of events" within an unequal society, without
subversion, only strengthens existing interests of those in power and
control.
In other words, abstract guarantees of fundamental rights like freedom
of expression may become meaningless if not taken in a real context.
This tendency to tackle rights in the abstract compromises liberties. In
his words:
Liberty is self-determination, autonomy—this is almost a tautology,
but a tautology which results from a whole series of synthetic
judgments. It stipulates the ability to determine one’s own life: to be
able to determine what to do and what not to do, what to suffer and
what not. But the subject of this autonomy is never the contingent,
private individual as that which he actually is or happens to be; it is
rather the individual as a human being who is capable of being free
with the others.
And the problem of making possible such a harmony between every
individual liberty and the other is not that of finding a compromise
between competitors, or between freedom and law, between general
and individual interest, common and private welfare in an established
society, but of creating the society in which man is no longer enslaved
by institutions which vitiate self-determination from the beginning. In
other words, freedom is still to be created even for the freest of the
existing societies.
Regulation of speech made by non-candidates
Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by
persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a
political party which are, taken as a whole, principally advocacies of a
social issue that the public must consider during elections is
unconstitutional. Such regulation is inconsistent with the guarantee of
according the fullest possible range of opinions coming from the
electorate including those that can catalyze candid, uninhibited, and
robust debate in the criteria for the choice of a candidate.
Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid
if it reaches into speech of persons who are not candidates or who do
not speak as members of a political party if they are not candidates,
only if what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole,
has for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only.
The regulation
(a) should be provided by law,
(b) reasonable,
(c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the
opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy
of the guarantee of free expression, and
(d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that
object.
The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and manner
of the rendition of the message. In no situation may the speech be
prohibited or censored on the basis of its content. For this purpose, it
will not matter whether the speech is made with or on private property.
Tarpaulins in this case do not pertain to religious speech
With all due respect to the Catholic faithful, the church doctrines relied
upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of the
Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not
suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as
religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates
on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as
speech with political consequences and not religious speech.
Tolentino v. Sec of Finance GR No. 115455, Aug 25 1994
FACTS: The valued-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or
exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of
services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value
in money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the
gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services. Republic Act No.
7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and
enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue
Code.
RULING: VI. Claims of press freedom and religious liberty. We have
held that, as a general proposition, the press is not exempt from the
taxing power of the State and that what the constitutional guarantee of
free press prohibits are laws which single out the press or target a group
belonging to the press for special treatment or which in any way
discriminate against the press on the basis of the content of the
publication, and R.A. No. 7716 is none of these.
Now it is contended by the PPI that by removing the exemption of the
press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law
discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred, "even
nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is
unconstitutional."
With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since
the law granted the press a privilege, the law could take back the
privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution. The reason is
simple: by granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the
exercise of its sovereign prerogative.
Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the
press to the same tax burden to which other businesses have long ago
been subject. It is thus different from the tax involved in the cases
invoked by the PPI. The license tax in Grosjean v. American Press Co.,
297 U.S. 233, 80 L. Ed. 660 (1936) was found to be discriminatory
because it was laid on the gross advertising receipts only of newspapers
whose weekly circulation was over 20,000, with the result that the tax
applied only to 13 out of 124 publishers in Louisiana. These large
papers were critical of Senator Huey Long who controlled the state
legislature which enacted the license tax. The censorial motivation for
the law was thus evident.
On the other hand, in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota
Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 75 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1983), the tax
was found to be discriminatory because although it could have been
made liable for the sales tax or, in lieu thereof, for the use tax on the
privilege of using, storing or consuming tangible goods, the press was
not. Instead, the press was exempted from both taxes. It was, however,
later made to pay a special use tax on the cost of paper and ink which
made these items "the only items subject to the use tax that were
component of goods to be sold at retail." The U.S. Supreme Court held
that the differential treatment of the press "suggests that the goal of
regulation is not related to suppression of expression, and such goal is
presumptively unconstitutional." It would therefore appear that even a
law that favors the press is constitutionally suspect. (See the dissent of
Rehnquist, J. in that case)
Nor is it true that only two exemptions previously granted by E.O. No.
273 are withdrawn "absolutely and unqualifiedly" by R.A. No. 7716.
Other exemptions from the VAT, such as those previously granted to
PAL, petroleum concessionaires, enterprises registered with the Export
Processing Zone Authority, and many more are likewise totally
withdrawn, in addition to exemptions which are partially withdrawn,
in an effort to broaden the base of the tax.
The PPI says that the discriminatory treatment of the press is
highlighted by the fact that transactions, which are profit oriented,
continue to enjoy exemption under R.A. No. 7716. An enumeration of
some of these transactions will suffice to show that by and large this is
not so and that the exemptions are granted for a purpose. As the
Solicitor General says, such exemptions are granted, in some cases, to
encourage agricultural production and, in other cases, for the personal
benefit of the end-user rather than for profit. The exempt transactions
are:
(a) Goods for consumption or use which are in their original state
(agricultural, marine and forest products, cotton seeds in their original
state, fertilizers, seeds, seedlings, fingerlings, fish, prawn livestock and
poultry feeds) and goods or services to enhance agriculture (milling of
palay, corn, sugar cane and raw sugar, livestock, poultry feeds,
fertilizer, ingredients used for the manufacture of feeds).
(b) Goods used for personal consumption or use (household and
personal effects of citizens returning to the Philippines) or for
professional use, like professional instruments and implements, by
persons coming to the Philippines to settle here.
(c) Goods subject to excise tax such as petroleum products or to be
used for manufacture of petroleum products subject to excise tax and
services subject to percentage tax.
(d) Educational services, medical, dental, hospital and veterinary
services, and services rendered under employer-employee relationship.
(e) Works of art and similar creations sold by the artist himself.
(f) Transactions exempted under special laws, or international
agreements.
(g) Export-sales by persons not VAT-registered.
(h) Goods or services with gross annual sale or receipt not exceeding
P500,000.00.
(Respondents' Consolidated Comment on the Motions for
Reconsideration, pp. 58-60)
The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the law does not
discriminate against the press because "even nondiscriminatory
taxation on constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional."
PPI cites in support of this assertion the following statement in
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 87 L. Ed. 1292 (1943):
The fact that the ordinance is "nondiscriminatory" is immaterial. The
protection afforded by the First Amendment is not so restricted. A
license tax certainly does not acquire constitutional validity because it
classifies the privileges protected by the First Amendment along with
the wares and merchandise of hucksters and peddlers and treats them
all alike. Such equality in treatment does not save the ordinance.
Freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in
preferred position.
The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike an
ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press is
unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its
right. Hence, although its application to others, such those selling
goods, is valid, its application to the press or to religious groups, such
as the Jehovah's Witnesses, in connection with the latter's sale of
religious books and pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the U.S.
Supreme Court put it, "it is one thing to impose a tax on income or
property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax on him
for delivering a sermon."
A similar ruling was made by this Court in American Bible Society v.
City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 (1957) which invalidated a city ordinance
requiring a business license fee on those engaged in the sale of general
merchandise. It was held that the tax could not be imposed on the sale
of bibles by the American Bible Society without restraining the free
exercise of its right to propagate.
The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on
the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is
imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties
or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely
for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to
burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay
income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its
freedom under the Constitution.
Additionally, the Philippine Bible Society, Inc. claims that although it
sells bibles, the proceeds derived from the sales are used to subsidize
the cost of printing copies which are given free to those who cannot
afford to pay so that to tax the sales would be to increase the price,
while reducing the volume of sale. Granting that to be the case, the
resulting burden on the exercise of religious freedom is so incidental
as to make it difficult to differentiate it from any other economic
imposition that might make the right to disseminate religious doctrines
costly. Otherwise, to follow the petitioner's argument, to increase the
tax on the sale of vestments would be to lay an impermissible burden
on the right of the preacher to make a sermon.
On the other hand the registration fee of P1,000.00 imposed by §107
of the NIRC, as amended by §7 of R.A. No. 7716, although fixed in
amount, is really just to pay for the expenses of registration and
enforcement of provisions such as those relating to accounting in §108
of the NIRC. That the PBS distributes free bibles and therefore is not
liable to pay the VAT does not excuse it from the payment of this fee
because it also sells some copies. At any rate whether the PBS is liable
for the VAT must be decided in concrete cases, in the event it is
assessed this tax by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
DATA PRIVACY ACT.
[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10173]
SECTION 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known as the “Data
Privacy Act of 2012”.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – Whenever used in this Act, the
following terms shall have the respective meanings hereafter set forth:
(a) Commission shall refer to the National Privacy Commission
created by virtue of this Act.
(b) Consent of the data subject refers to any freely given, specific,
informed indication of will, whereby the data subject agrees to the
collection and processing of personal information about and/or relating
to him or her. Consent shall be evidenced by written, electronic or
recorded means. It may also be given on behalf of the data subject by
an agent specifically authorized by the data subject to do so.
(c) Data subject refers to an individual whose personal information is
processed.
(d) Direct marketing refers to communication by whatever means of
any advertising or marketing material which is directed to particular
individuals.
(e) Filing system refers to any act of information relating to natural or
juridical persons to the extent that, although the information is not
processed by equipment operating automatically in response to
instructions given for that purpose, the set is structured, either by
reference to individuals or by reference to criteria relating to
individuals, in such a way that specific information relating to a have been committed by such person, the disposal of such proceedings,
particular person is readily accessible. or the sentence of any court in such proceedings;

(f) Information and Communications System refers to a system for
generating, sending, receiving, storing or otherwise processing
electronic data messages or electronic documents and includes the
computer system or other similar device by or which data is recorded,
transmitted or stored and any procedure related to the recording,
transmission or storage of electronic data, electronic message, or
electronic document.
(3) Issued by government agencies peculiar to an individual which
includes, but not limited to, social security numbers, previous or
current health records, licenses or its denials, suspension or revocation,
and tax returns; and
(4) Specifically established by an executive order or an act of Congress
to be kept classified.

(g) Personal information refers to any information whether recorded in

a material form or not, from which the identity of an individual is
SEC. 4. Scope. – This Act applies to the processing of all types of
apparent or can be reasonably and directly ascertained by the entity
personal information and to any natural and juridical person involved
holding the information, or when put together with other information
in personal information processing including those personal
would directly and certainly identify an individual.
information controllers and processors who, although not found or
established in the Philippines, use equipment that are located in the
Philippines, or those who maintain an office, branch or agency in the
(h) Personal information controller refers to a person or organization Philippines subject to the immediately succeeding paragraph:
who controls the collection, holding, processing or use of personal Provided, That the requirements of Section 5 are complied with.
information, including a person or organization who instructs another
person or organization to collect, hold, process, use, transfer or disclose
personal information on his or her behalf. The term excludes:
This Act does not apply to the following:

(1) A person or organization who performs such functions as instructed

(a) Information about any individual who is or was an officer or
by another person or organization; and
employee of a government institution that relates to the position or
functions of the individual, including:

(2) An individual who collects, holds, processes or uses personal

information in connection with the individual’s personal, family or
(1) The fact that the individual is or was an officer or employee of the
household affairs.
government institution;

(i) Personal information processor refers to any natural or juridical

(2) The title, business address and office telephone number of the
person qualified to act as such under this Act to whom a personal
individual;
information controller may outsource the processing of personal data
pertaining to a data subject.

(3) The classification, salary range and responsibilities of the position

held by the individual; and
(j) Processing refers to any operation or any set of operations
performed upon personal information including, but not limited to, the
collection, recording, organization, storage, updating or modification,
retrieval, consultation, use, consolidation, blocking, erasure or (4) The name of the individual on a document prepared by the
destruction of data. individual in the course of employment with the government;

(k) Privileged information refers to any and all forms of data which (b) Information about an individual who is or was performing service
under the Rules of Court and other pertinent laws constitute privileged under contract for a government institution that relates to the services
communication. performed, including the terms of the contract, and the name of the
individual given in the course of the performance of those services;

(l) Sensitive personal information refers to personal information:

(c) Information relating to any discretionary benefit of a financial
nature such as the granting of a license or permit given by the
government to an individual, including the name of the individual and
(1) About an individual’s race, ethnic origin, marital status, age, color,
the exact nature of the benefit;
and religious, philosophical or political affiliations;

(d) Personal information processed for journalistic, artistic, literary or

(2) About an individual’s health, education, genetic or sexual life of a
research purposes;
person, or to any proceeding for any offense committed or alleged to

(e) Information necessary in order to carry out the functions of public
authority which includes the processing of personal data for the
performance by the independent, central monetary authority and law
enforcement and regulatory agencies of their constitutionally and
statutorily mandated functions. Nothing in this Act shall be construed
as to have amended or repealed Republic Act No. 1405, otherwise
known as the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act; Republic Act No. 6426,
otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act; and Republic
Act No. 9510, otherwise known as the Credit Information System Act
(CISA);
(f) Information necessary for banks and other financial institutions
under the jurisdiction of the independent, central monetary authority
or Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to comply with Republic Act No. 9510,
and Republic Act No. 9160, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Money Laundering Act and other applicable laws; and
(g) Personal information originally collected from residents of foreign
jurisdictions in accordance with the laws of those foreign jurisdictions,
including any applicable data privacy laws, which is being processed
in the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Protection Afforded to Journalists and Their Sources. –
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as to have amended or repealed
the provisions of Republic Act No. 53, which affords the publishers,
editors or duly accredited reporters of any newspaper, magazine or
periodical of general circulation protection from being compelled to
reveal the source of any news report or information appearing in said
publication which was related in any confidence to such publisher,
editor, or reporter.
SEC. 6. Extraterritorial Application. – This Act applies to an act done
or practice engaged in and outside of the Philippines by an entity if:
(a) The act, practice or processing relates to personal information about
a Philippine citizen or a resident;
(b) The entity has a link with the Philippines, and the entity is
processing personal information in the Philippines or even if the
processing is outside the Philippines as long as it is about Philippine
citizens or residents such as, but not limited to, the following:
(1) A contract is entered in the Philippines;
(2) A juridical entity unincorporated in the Philippines but has central
management and control in the country; and
(3) An entity that has a branch, agency, office or subsidiary in the
Philippines and the parent or affiliate of the Philippine entity has access
to personal information; and
(c) The entity has other links in the Philippines such as, but not limited
to:
(1) The entity carries on business in the Philippines; and
(2) The personal information was collected or held by an entity in the
Philippines.
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CHAPTER II
THE NATIONAL PRIVACY COMMISSION
SEC. 7. Functions of the National Privacy Commission. – To
administer and implement the provisions of this Act, and to monitor
and ensure compliance of the country with international standards set
for data protection, there is hereby created an independent body to be
known as the National Privacy Commission, winch shall have the
following functions:
(a) Ensure compliance of personal information controllers with the
provisions of this Act;
(b) Receive complaints, institute investigations, facilitate or enable
settlement of complaints through the use of alternative dispute
resolution processes, adjudicate, award indemnity on matters affecting
any personal information, prepare reports on disposition of complaints
and resolution of any investigation it initiates, and, in cases it deems
appropriate, publicize any such report: Provided, That in resolving any
complaint or investigation (except where amicable settlement is
reached by the parties), the Commission shall act as a collegial body.
For this purpose, the Commission may be given access to personal
information that is subject of any complaint and to collect the
information necessary to perform its functions under this Act;
(c) Issue cease and desist orders, impose a temporary or permanent ban
on the processing of personal information, upon finding that the
processing will be detrimental to national security and public interest;
(d) Compel or petition any entity, government agency or
instrumentality to abide by its orders or take action on a matter
affecting data privacy;
(e) Monitor the compliance of other government agencies or
instrumentalities on their security and technical measures and
recommend the necessary action in order to meet minimum standards
for protection of personal information pursuant to this Act;
(f) Coordinate with other government agencies and the private sector
on efforts to formulate and implement plans and policies to strengthen
the protection of personal information in the country;
(g) Publish on a regular basis a guide to all laws relating to data
protection;
(h) Publish a compilation of agency system of records and notices,
including index and other finding aids;
(i) Recommend to the Department of Justice (DOJ) the prosecution and
imposition of penalties specified in Sections 25 to 29 of this Act;
(j) Review, approve, reject or require modification of privacy codes
voluntarily adhered to by personal information controllers:Provided,
That the privacy codes shall adhere to the underlying data privacy
principles embodied in this Act: Provided, further,That such privacy
codes may include private dispute resolution mechanisms for
complaints against any participating personal information controller.
For this purpose, the Commission shall consult with relevant
regulatory agencies in the formulation and administration of privacy
codes applying the standards set out in this Act, with respect to the
persons, entities, business activities and business sectors that said
regulatory bodies are authorized to principally regulate pursuant to the
law: Provided, finally. That the Commission may review such privacy
codes and require changes thereto for purposes of complying with this
Act;
(k) Provide assistance on matters relating to privacy or data protection
at the request of a national or local agency, a private entity or any
person;
(l) Comment on the implication on data privacy of proposed national
or local statutes, regulations or procedures, issue advisory opinions and
interpret the provisions of this Act and other data privacy laws;
(m) Propose legislation, amendments or modifications to Philippine
laws on privacy or data protection as may be necessary;
(n) Ensure proper and effective coordination with data privacy
regulators in other countries and private accountability agents,
participate in international and regional initiatives for data privacy
protection;
(o) Negotiate and contract with other data privacy authorities of other
countries for cross-border application and implementation of
respective privacy laws;
(p) Assist Philippine companies doing business abroad to respond to
foreign privacy or data protection laws and regulations; and
(q) Generally perform such acts as may be necessary to facilitate cross-
border enforcement of data privacy protection.
SEC. 8. Confidentiality. – The Commission shall ensure at all times
the confidentiality of any personal information that comes to its
knowledge and possession.
SEC. 9. Organizational Structure of the Commission. – The
Commission shall be attached to the Department of Information and
Communications Technology (DICT) and shall be headed by a Privacy
Commissioner, who shall also act as Chairman of the Commission.
The Privacy Commissioner shall be assisted by two (2) Deputy Privacy
Commissioners, one to be responsible for Data Processing Systems
and one to be responsible for Policies and Planning. The Privacy
Commissioner and the two (2) Deputy Privacy Commissioners shall
be appointed by the President of the Philippines for a term of three (3)
years, and may be reappointed for another term of three (3) years.
Vacancies in the Commission shall be filled in the same manner in
which the original appointment was made.
The Privacy Commissioner must be at least thirty-five (35) years of
age and of good moral character, unquestionable integrity and known
probity, and a recognized expert in the field of information technology
and data privacy. The Privacy Commissioner shall enjoy the benefits,
privileges and emoluments equivalent to the rank of Secretary.
The Deputy Privacy Commissioners must be recognized experts in the
field of information and communications technology and data privacy.
They shall enjoy the benefits, privileges and emoluments equivalent to
the rank of Undersecretary.
The Privacy Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioners, or any person
acting on their behalf or under their direction, shall not be civilly liable
for acts done in good faith in the performance of their duties. However,
he or she shall be liable for willful or negligent acts done by him or her
which are contrary to law, morals, public policy and good customs
even if he or she acted under orders or instructions of superiors:
Provided, That in case a lawsuit is filed against such official on the
subject of the performance of his or her duties, where such
performance is lawful, he or she shall be reimbursed by the
Commission for reasonable costs of litigation.
SEC. 10. The Secretariat. – The Commission is hereby authorized to
establish a Secretariat. Majority of the members of the Secretariat must
have served for at least five (5) years in any agency of the government
that is involved in the processing of personal information including,
but not limited to, the following offices: Social Security System (SSS),
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Land Transportation
Office (LTO), Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth), Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Department of
Justice (DOJ), and Philippine Postal Corporation (Philpost).
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CHAPTER III
PROCESSING OF PERSONAL INFORMATION
SEC. 11. General Data Privacy Principles. – The processing of
personal information shall be allowed, subject to compliance with the
requirements of this Act and other laws allowing disclosure of
information to the public and adherence to the principles of
transparency, legitimate purpose and proportionality.
Personal information must, be:,
(a) Collected for specified and legitimate purposes determined and
declared before, or as soon as reasonably practicable after collection,
and later processed in a way compatible with such declared, specified
and legitimate purposes only;
(b) Processed fairly and lawfully;
(c) Accurate, relevant and, where necessary for purposes for which it
is to be used the processing of personal information, kept up to date;
inaccurate or incomplete data must be rectified, supplemented,
destroyed or their further processing restricted;
(d) Adequate and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which
they are collected and processed;
(e) Retained only for as long as necessary for the fulfillment of the
purposes for which the data was obtained or for the establishment,
exercise or defense of legal claims, or for legitimate business purposes,
or as provided by law; and
(f) Kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no
longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the data were
collected and processed: Provided, That personal information collected
for other purposes may lie processed for historical, statistical or
scientific purposes, and in cases laid down in law may be stored for
longer periods: Provided, further,That adequate safeguards are
guaranteed by said laws authorizing their processing.
The personal information controller must ensure implementation of
personal information processing principles set out herein.
SEC. 12. Criteria for Lawful Processing of Personal Information. – The
processing of personal information shall be permitted only if not
otherwise prohibited by law, and when at least one of the following
conditions exists:
(a) The data subject has given his or her consent;
(b) The processing of personal information is necessary and is related
to the fulfillment of a contract with the data subject or in order to take
steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract;
(c) The processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation
to which the personal information controller is subject;
(d) The processing is necessary to protect vitally important interests of
the data subject, including life and health;
(e) The processing is necessary in order to respond to national
emergency, to comply with the requirements of public order and safety,
or to fulfill functions of public authority which necessarily includes the
processing of personal data for the fulfillment of its mandate; or
(f) The processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate
interests pursued by the personal information controller or by a third
party or parties to whom the data is disclosed, except where such
interests are overridden by fundamental rights and freedoms of the data
subject which require protection under the Philippine Constitution.
SEC. 13. Sensitive Personal Information and Privileged Information. –
The processing of sensitive personal information and privileged
information shall be prohibited, except in the following cases:
(a) The data subject has given his or her consent, specific to the purpose
prior to the processing, or in the case of privileged information, all
parties to the exchange have given their consent prior to processing;
(b) The processing of the same is provided for by existing laws and
regulations: Provided, That such regulatory enactments guarantee the
protection of the sensitive personal information and the privileged
information: Provided, further, That the consent of the data subjects
are not required by law or regulation permitting the processing of the
sensitive personal information or the privileged information;
(c) The processing is necessary to protect the life and health of the data
subject or another person, and the data subject is not legally or
physically able to express his or her consent prior to the processing;
(d) The processing is necessary to achieve the lawful and
noncommercial objectives of public organizations and their
associations: Provided, That such processing is only confined and
related to the bona fide members of these organizations or their
associations: Provided, further, That the sensitive personal information
are not transferred to third parties: Provided, finally, That consent of
the data subject was obtained prior to processing;
(e) The processing is necessary for purposes of medical treatment, is
carried out by a medical practitioner or a medical treatment institution,
and an adequate level of protection of personal information is ensured;
or
(f) The processing concerns such personal information as is necessary
for the protection of lawful rights and interests of natural or legal
persons in court proceedings, or the establishment, exercise or defense
of legal claims, or when provided to government or public authority.
SEC. 14. Subcontract of Personal Information. – A personal
information controller may subcontract the processing of personal
information: Provided, That the personal information controller shall
be responsible for ensuring that proper safeguards are in place to
ensure the confidentiality of the personal information processed,
prevent its use for unauthorized purposes, and generally, comply with
the requirements of this Act and other laws for processing of personal
information. The personal information processor shall comply with all
the requirements of this Act and other applicable laws.
SEC. 15. Extension of Privileged Communication. – Personal
information controllers may invoke the principle of privileged
communication over privileged information that they lawfully control
or process. Subject to existing laws and regulations, any evidence
gathered on privileged information is inadmissible.
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CHAPTER IV
RIGHTS OF THE DATA SUBJECT
SEC. 16. Rights of the Data Subject. – The data subject is entitled to:
(a) Be informed whether personal information pertaining to him or her
shall be, are being or have been processed;
(b) Be furnished the information indicated hereunder before the entry
of his or her personal information into the processing system of the
personal information controller, or at the next practical opportunity:
(1) Description of the personal information to be entered into the
system;
(2) Purposes for which they are being or are to be processed;
(3) Scope and method of the personal information processing;
(4) The recipients or classes of recipients to whom they are or may be
disclosed;
(5) Methods utilized for automated access, if the same is allowed by
the data subject, and the extent to which such access is authorized;
(6) The identity and contact details of the personal information
controller or its representative;
(7) The period for which the information will be stored; and
(8) The existence of their rights, i.e., to access, correction, as well as
the right to lodge a complaint before the Commission.
Any information supplied or declaration made to the data subject on
these matters shall not be amended without prior notification of data
subject: Provided, That the notification under subsection (b) shall not
apply should the personal information be needed pursuant to a
subpoena or when the collection and processing are for obvious
purposes, including when it is necessary for the performance of or in
relation to a contract or service or when necessary or desirable in the
context of an employer-employee relationship, between the collector
and the data subject, or when the information is being collected and
processed as a result of legal obligation;
(c) Reasonable access to, upon demand, the following:
(1) Contents of his or her personal information that were processed;
(2) Sources from which personal information were obtained;
(3) Names and addresses of recipients of the personal information;
(4) Manner by which such data were processed;
(5) Reasons for the disclosure of the personal information to recipients;
(6) Information on automated processes where the data will or likely
to be made as the sole basis for any decision significantly affecting or
will affect the data subject;
(7) Date when his or her personal information concerning the data
subject were last accessed and modified; and
(8) The designation, or name or identity and address of the personal
information controller;
(d) Dispute the inaccuracy or error in the personal information and
have the personal information controller correct it immediately and
accordingly, unless the request is vexatious or otherwise unreasonable.
If the personal information have been corrected, the personal
information controller shall ensure the accessibility of both the new
and the retracted information and the simultaneous receipt of the new
and the retracted information by recipients thereof: Provided, That the
third parties who have previously received such processed personal
information shall he informed of its inaccuracy and its rectification
upon reasonable request of the data subject;
(e) Suspend, withdraw or order the blocking, removal or destruction of
his or her personal information from the personal information
controller’s filing system upon discovery and substantial proof that the
personal information are incomplete, outdated, false, unlawfully
obtained, used for unauthorized purposes or are no longer necessary
for the purposes for which they were collected. In this case, the
personal information controller may notify third parties who have
previously received such processed personal information; and
(f) Be indemnified for any damages sustained due to such inaccurate,
incomplete, outdated, false, unlawfully obtained or unauthorized use
of personal information.
SEC. 17. Transmissibility of Rights of the Data Subject. – The lawful
heirs and assigns of the data subject may invoke the rights of the data
subject for, which he or she is an heir or assignee at any time after the
death of the data subject or when the data subject is incapacitated or
incapable of exercising the rights as enumerated in the immediately
preceding section.
SEC. 18. Right to Data Portability. – The data subject shall have the
right, where personal information is processed by electronic means and
in a structured and commonly used format, to obtain from the personal
information controller a copy of data undergoing processing in an
electronic or structured format, which is commonly used and allows
for further use by the data subject. The Commission may specify the
electronic format referred to above, as well as the technical standards,
modalities and procedures for their transfer.
SEC. 19. Non-Applicability. – The immediately preceding sections are
not applicable if the processed personal information are used only for
the needs of scientific and statistical research and, on the basis of such,
no activities are carried out and no decisions are taken regarding the
data subject: Provided, That the personal information shall be held
under strict confidentiality and shall be used only for the declared
purpose. Likewise, the immediately preceding sections are not
applicable to processing of personal information gathered for the
purpose of investigations in relation to any criminal, administrative or
tax liabilities of a data subject.
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CHAPTER V
SECURITY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION
SEC. 20. Security of Personal Information. – (a) The personal
information controller must implement reasonable and appropriate
organizational, physical and technical measures intended for the
protection of personal information against any accidental or unlawful
destruction, alteration and disclosure, as well as against any other
unlawful processing.
(b) The personal information controller shall implement reasonable
and appropriate measures to protect personal information against
natural dangers such as accidental loss or destruction, and human
dangers such as unlawful access, fraudulent misuse, unlawful
destruction, alteration and contamination.
(c) The determination of the appropriate level of security under this
section must take into account the nature of the personal information
to be protected, the risks represented by the processing, the size of the
organization and complexity of its operations, current data privacy best
practices and the cost of security implementation. Subject to guidelines
as the Commission may issue from time to time, the measures
implemented must include:
(1) Safeguards to protect its computer network against accidental,
unlawful or unauthorized usage or interference with or hindering of
their functioning or availability;
(2) A security policy with respect to the processing of personal
information;
(3) A process for identifying and accessing reasonably foreseeable
vulnerabilities in its computer networks, and for taking preventive,
corrective and mitigating action against security incidents that can lead
to a security breach; and
(4) Regular monitoring for security breaches and a process for taking
preventive, corrective and mitigating action against security incidents
that can lead to a security breach.
(d) The personal information controller must further ensure that third
parties processing personal information on its behalf shall implement
the security measures required by this provision.
(e) The employees, agents or representatives of a personal information
controller who are involved in the processing of personal information
shall operate and hold personal information under strict confidentiality
if the personal information are not intended for public disclosure. This
obligation shall continue even after leaving the public service, transfer
to another position or upon termination of employment or contractual
relations.
(f) The personal information controller shall promptly notify the
Commission and affected data subjects when sensitive personal
information or other information that may, under the circumstances, be
used to enable identity fraud are reasonably believed to have been
acquired by an unauthorized person, and the personal information
controller or the Commission believes (bat such unauthorized
acquisition is likely to give rise to a real risk of serious harm to any
affected data subject. The notification shall at least describe the nature
of the breach, the sensitive personal information possibly involved, and
the measures taken by the entity to address the breach. Notification
may be delayed only to the extent necessary to determine the scope of
the breach, to prevent further disclosures, or to restore reasonable
integrity to the information and communications system.
(1) In evaluating if notification is unwarranted, the Commission may
take into account compliance by the personal information controller
with this section and existence of good faith in the acquisition of
personal information.
(2) The Commission may exempt a personal information controller
from notification where, in its reasonable judgment, such notification
would not be in the public interest or in the interests of the affected
data subjects.
(3) The Commission may authorize postponement of notification
where it may hinder the progress of a criminal investigation related to
a serious breach.
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CHAPTER VI
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR TRANSFER OF PERSONAL
INFORMATION
SEC. 21. Principle of Accountability. – Each personal information
controller is responsible for personal information under its control or
custody, including information that have been transferred to a third
party for processing, whether domestically or internationally, subject
to cross-border arrangement and cooperation.
(a) The personal information controller is accountable for complying
with the requirements of this Act and shall use contractual or other
reasonable means to provide a comparable level of protection while the
information are being processed by a third party.
(b) The personal information controller shall designate an individual
or individuals who are accountable for the organization’s compliance
with this Act. The identity of the individual(s) so designated shall be
made known to any data subject upon request.
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CHAPTER VII
SECURITY OF SENSITIVE PERSONAL
INFORMATION IN GOVERNMENT
SEC. 22. Responsibility of Heads of Agencies. – All sensitive personal
information maintained by the government, its agencies and
instrumentalities shall be secured, as far as practicable, with the use of
the most appropriate standard recognized by the information and
communications technology industry, and as recommended by the
Commission. The head of each government agency or instrumentality
shall be responsible for complying with the security requirements
mentioned herein while the Commission shall monitor the compliance
and may recommend the necessary action in order to satisfy the
minimum standards.
SEC. 23. Requirements Relating to Access by Agency Personnel to
Sensitive Personal Information. – (a) On-site and Online Access –
Except as may be allowed through guidelines to be issued by the
Commission, no employee of the government shall have access to
sensitive personal information on government property or through
online facilities unless the employee has received a security clearance
from the head of the source agency.
(b) Off-site Access – Unless otherwise provided in guidelines to be
issued by the Commission, sensitive personal information maintained
by an agency may not be transported or accessed from a location off
government property unless a request for such transportation or access
is submitted and approved by the head of the agency in accordance
with the following guidelines:
(1) Deadline for Approval or Disapproval – In the case of any request
submitted to the head of an agency, such head of the agency shall
approve or disapprove the request within two (2) business days after
the date of submission of the request. In case there is no action by the
head of the agency, then such request is considered disapproved;
(2) Limitation to One thousand (1,000) Records – If a request is
approved, the head of the agency shall limit the access to not more than
one thousand (1,000) records at a time; and
(3) Encryption – Any technology used to store, transport or access
sensitive personal information for purposes of off-site access approved
under this subsection shall be secured by the use of the most secure
encryption standard recognized by the Commission.
The requirements of this subsection shall be implemented not later than
six (6) months after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 24. Applicability to Government Contractors. – In entering into
any contract that may involve accessing or requiring sensitive personal
information from one thousand (1,000) or more individuals, an agency
shall require a contractor and its employees to register their personal
information processing system with the Commission in accordance
with this Act and to comply with the other provisions of this Act
including the immediately preceding section, in the same manner as
agencies and government employees comply with such requirements.
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CHAPTER VIII
PENALTIES
SEC. 25. Unauthorized Processing of Personal Information and
Sensitive Personal Information. – (a) The unauthorized processing of
personal information shall be penalized by imprisonment ranging from
one (1) year to three (3) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred
thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than Two million pesos
(Php2,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons who process personal
information without the consent of the data subject, or without being
authorized under this Act or any existing law.
(b) The unauthorized processing of personal sensitive information
shall be penalized by imprisonment ranging from three (3) years to six
(6) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(Php500,000.00) but not more than Four million pesos
(Php4,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons who process personal
information without the consent of the data subject, or without being
authorized under this Act or any existing law.
SEC. 26. Accessing Personal Information and Sensitive Personal
Information Due to Negligence. – (a) Accessing personal information
due to negligence shall be penalized by imprisonment ranging from
one (1) year to three (3) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred
thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than Two million pesos
(Php2,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons who, due to
negligence, provided access to personal information without being
authorized under this Act or any existing law.
(b) Accessing sensitive personal information due to negligence shall
be penalized by imprisonment ranging from three (3) years to six (6)
years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(Php500,000.00) but not more than Four million pesos
(Php4,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons who, due to
negligence, provided access to personal information without being
authorized under this Act or any existing law.
SEC. 27. Improper Disposal of Personal Information and Sensitive
Personal Information. – (a) The improper disposal of personal
information shall be penalized by imprisonment ranging from six (6)
months to two (2) years and a fine of not less than One hundred
thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) but not more than Five hundred
thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) shall be imposed on persons who
knowingly or negligently dispose, discard or abandon the personal
information of an individual in an area accessible to the public or has
otherwise placed the personal information of an individual in its
container for trash collection.
(b) The improper disposal of sensitive personal information shall be
penalized by imprisonment ranging from one (1) year to three (3) years
and a fine of not less than One hundred thousand pesos
(Php100,000.00) but not more than One million pesos
(Php1,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons who knowingly or
negligently dispose, discard or abandon the personal information of an
individual in an area accessible to the public or has otherwise placed
the personal information of an individual in its container for trash
collection.
SEC. 28. Processing of Personal Information and Sensitive Personal
Information for Unauthorized Purposes. – The processing of personal
information for unauthorized purposes shall be penalized by
imprisonment ranging from one (1) year and six (6) months to five (5)
years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(Php500,000.00) but not more than One million pesos
(Php1,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons processing personal
information for purposes not authorized by the data subject, or
otherwise authorized under this Act or under existing laws.
The processing of sensitive personal information for unauthorized
purposes shall be penalized by imprisonment ranging from two (2)
years to seven (7) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred
thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than Two million pesos
(Php2,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons processing sensitive
personal information for purposes not authorized by the data subject,
or otherwise authorized under this Act or under existing laws.
SEC. 29. Unauthorized Access or Intentional Breach. – The penalty of
imprisonment ranging from one (1) year to three (3) years and a fine
of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not
more than Two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) shall be imposed on
persons who knowingly and unlawfully, or violating data
confidentiality and security data systems, breaks in any way into any
system where personal and sensitive personal information is stored.
SEC. 30. Concealment of Security Breaches Involving Sensitive
Personal Information. – The penalty of imprisonment of one (1) year
and six (6) months to five (5) years and a fine of not less than Five
hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than One
million pesos (Php1,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons who,
after having knowledge of a security breach and of the obligation to
notify the Commission pursuant to Section 20(f), intentionally or by
omission conceals the fact of such security breach.
SEC. 31. Malicious Disclosure. – Any personal information controller
or personal information processor or any of its officials, employees or
agents, who, with malice or in bad faith, discloses unwarranted or false
information relative to any personal information or personal sensitive
information obtained by him or her, shall be subject to imprisonment
ranging from one (1) year and six (6) months to five (5) years and a
fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but
not more than One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00).
SEC. 32. Unauthorized Disclosure. – (a) Any personal information
controller or personal information processor or any of its officials,
employees or agents, who discloses to a third party personal
information not covered by the immediately preceding section without
the consent of the data subject, shall he subject to imprisonment
ranging from one (1) year to three (3) years and a fine of not less than
Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than One
million pesos (Php1,000,000.00).
(b) Any personal information controller or personal information
processor or any of its officials, employees or agents, who discloses to
a third party sensitive personal information not covered by the
immediately preceding section without the consent of the data subject,
shall be subject to imprisonment ranging from three (3) years to five
(5) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(Php500,000.00) but not more than Two million pesos
(Php2,000,000.00).
SEC. 33. Combination or Series of Acts. – Any combination or series
of acts as defined in Sections 25 to 32 shall make the person subject to
imprisonment ranging from three (3) years to six (6) years and a fine
of not less than One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00) but not more than
Five million pesos (Php5,000,000.00).
SEC. 34. Extent of Liability. – If the offender is a corporation,
partnership or any juridical person, the penalty shall be imposed upon
the responsible officers, as the case may be, who participated in, or by
their gross negligence, allowed the commission of the crime. If the
offender is a juridical person, the court may suspend or revoke any of
its rights under this Act. If the offender is an alien, he or she shall, in
addition to the penalties herein prescribed, be deported without further
proceedings after serving the penalties prescribed. If the offender is a
public official or employee and lie or she is found guilty of acts
penalized under Sections 27 and 28 of this Act, he or she shall, in
addition to the penalties prescribed herein, suffer perpetual or
temporary absolute disqualification from office, as the case may be.
SEC. 35. Large-Scale. – The maximum penalty in the scale of penalties
respectively provided for the preceding offenses shall be imposed
when the personal information of at least one hundred (100) persons is
harmed, affected or involved as the result of the above mentioned
actions.
SEC. 36. Offense Committed by Public Officer. – When the offender
or the person responsible for the offense is a public officer as defined
in the Administrative Code of the Philippines in the exercise of his or
her duties, an accessory penalty consisting in the disqualification to
occupy public office for a term double the term of criminal penalty
imposed shall he applied.
SEC. 37. Restitution. – Restitution for any aggrieved party shall be
governed by the provisions of the New Civil Code.
BP880
AN ACT ENSURING THE FREE EXERCISE BY THE PEOPLE OF
THEIR RIGHT PEACEABLY TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION
THE GOVERNMENT FOR OTHER PURPOSES
(d) "Modification of permit" shall include the change of the place and
time of the public assembly, rerouting of the parade or street march,
the volume of loud-speakers or sound system and similar changes.
Section 4.Permit when required and when not required - A written
permit shall be required for any person or persons to organize and hold
a public assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be
required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park
duly established by law or ordinance or in private property, in which
case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal
possession is required, or in the campus of a government-owned and
operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and
regulations of said educational institution. Political meetings or rallies
held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are
not covered by this Act.

Section 5.Application requirements - All applications for a permit shall

Section 1.Title - This Act shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act
comply with the following guidelines:
of 1985."

(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of
Section 2.Declaration of policy - The constitutional right of the people
the leaders or organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
date, time and duration thereof, and place or streets to be used for the
grievances is essential and vital to the strength and stability of the
intended activity; and the probable number of persons participating,
State. To this end, the State shall ensure the free exercise of such right
the transport and the public address systems to be used.
without prejudice to the rights of others to life, liberty and equal
protection of the law.

(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of

applicant under Section 8 hereof.
Section 3.Definition of terms - For purposes of this Act:

(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the
(a) "Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march, parade,
city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be
procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a
held, at least five (5) working days before the scheduled public
public place for the purpose of presenting a lawful cause; or expressing
assembly.
an opinion to the general public on any particular issue; or protesting
or influencing any state of affairs whether political, economic or social;
or petitioning the government for redress of grievances.
(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged
in writing, the office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the
same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or
The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings and
municipal building.
assemblages for religious purposes shall be governed by local
ordinances: Provided, however, That the declaration of policy as
provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be faithfully observed.
Section 6.Action to be taken on the application -

The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other
concerted action in strike areas by workers and employees resulting
from a labor dispute as defined by the Labor Code, its implementing
rules and regulations, and by the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227.
(b) "Public place" shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road,
street, bridge or other thoroughfare, park, plaza, square, and/or any
open space of public ownership where the people are allowed access.
(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the
military, police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe
during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same.
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf
to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence
that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public
order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public
health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the
application within two (2) working days from the date the application
was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should
for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to
accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by
the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be
deemed to have been filed.

(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger
of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the
permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard
on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the
application within twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the
application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant
may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the
Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional
Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court, its decisions may be
appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after
receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be
required. A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms
satisfactory to the applicant shall, be immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within
twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall
be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in
his absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby
allowed.
Section 7.Use of public thoroughfare - Should the proposed public
assembly involve the use, for an appreciable length of time, of any
public highway, boulevard, avenue, road or street, the mayor or any
official acting in his behalf may, to prevent grave public
inconvenience, designate the route thereof which is convenient to the
participants or reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction so that
there will be no serious or undue interference with the free flow of
commerce and trade.
Section 8.Responsibility of applicant - It shall be the duty and
responsibility of the leaders and organizers of a public assembly to take
all reasonable measures and steps to the end that the intended public
assembly shall be conducted peacefully in accordance with the terms
of the permit. These shall include but not be limited to the following:
(a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit;
(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent non-
demonstrators from disrupting the lawful activities of the public
assembly;
(c) To confer with local government officials concerned and law
enforcers to the end that the public assembly may be held peacefully;
(d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go beyond
the time stated in the permit; and
(e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any person
or do any act unduly interfering with the rights of other persons not
participating in the public assembly.
Section 9.Non-interference by law enforcement authorities - Law
enforcement agencies shall not interfere with the holding of a public
assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law
enforcement contingent under the command of a responsible police
officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one hundred
(100) meter away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace and
order at all times.
Section 10. Police assistance when requested - It shall be
imperative for law enforcement agencies, when their assistance is
requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties always
mindful that their responsibility to provide proper protection to those
exercising their right peaceably to assemble and the freedom of
expression is primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement agencies
shall observe the following guidelines:
(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the
demonstrators shall be in complete uniform with their nameplates and
units to which they belong displayed prominently on the front and
dorsal parts of their uniform and must observe the policy of "maximum
tolerance" as herein defined;
(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any
kind of firearms but may be equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields,
crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots or ankle high shoes with
shin guards;
(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot
device shall not be used unless the public assembly is attended by
actual violence or serious threats of violence, or deliberate destruction
of property.
Section 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit - No
public assembly with a permit shall be dispersed. However, when an
assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public
assembly as follows:
(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the
law enforcement contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of the
public assembly and ask the latter to prevent any possible disturbance;
(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful
objects from the participants are thrown at the police or at the non-
participants, or at any property causing damage to such property, the
ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly warn
the participants that if the disturbance persists, the public assembly will
be dispersed; 3 the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares;

(c) If the violence or disturbances prevailing as stated in the preceding
subparagraph should not stop or abate, the ranking officer of the law
enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a warning to the
participants of the public assembly, and after allowing a reasonable
period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse;
4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;
5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public
assembly by the use of a motor vehicle, its horns and loud sound
systems.

(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made

during the public assembly unless he violates during the assembly a Section 14. Penalties - Any person found guilty and convicted
law, statute, ordinance or any provision of this Act. Such arrest shall of any of the prohibited acts defined in the immediately preceding
be governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended: Section shall be punished as follows:

(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or branch of the peace during (a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment of
the public assembly shall not constitute a group for dispersal. one month and one day to six months;

Section 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit - (b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4,
When the public assembly is held without a permit where a permit is subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and
required, the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed. one day to six years;

Section 13. Prohibited acts - The following shall constitute (c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by
violations of this Act: imprisonment of six months and one day to six years without prejudice
to prosecution under Presidential Decree No. 1866;
(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any
leader or organizer without having first secured that written permit
where a permit is required from the office concerned, or the use of such
permit for such purposes in any place other than those set out in said (d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall be
permit: Provided, however, That no person can be punished or held punished by imprisonment of one day to thirty days.
criminally liable for participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful
assembly;

(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in
violation of the provisions of this Act by the mayor or any other official
acting in his behalf.
(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge
receipt of the application for a permit by the mayor or any official
acting in his behalf;
Section 15. Freedom parks - Every city and municipality in the
country shall within six months after the effectivity of this Act
establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or mall in
their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be
centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and
meetings may be held at any time without the need of any prior permit.

(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the

exercise of the right to peaceful assembly;

(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law

enforcement agency or any person to disperse the public assembly;

(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;

(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100)

meters from the area of activity of the public assembly or on the
occasion thereof;

1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as

firearm, pillbox, bomb, and the like;

2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;