EN BANC

DOLORES C. BELLEZA, A.C. No. 7815

Complainant,

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,

QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

CARPIO,

CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,

- v e r s u s - CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,*

PERALTA and

BERSAMIN, JJ.

ATTY. ALAN S. MACASA,

Respondent. Promulgated:

July 23, 2009

x----------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

Per Curiam:

This treats of the complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Dolores C. Belleza against
respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa for unprofessional and unethical conduct in connection with the
handling of a criminal case involving complainants son.
On November 10, 2004, complainant went to see respondent on referral of their mutual friend, Joe
Chua. Complainant wanted to avail of respondents legal services in connection with the case of her
son, Francis John Belleza, who was arrested by policemen of Bacolod City earlier that day for
alleged violation of Republic Act (RA) 9165.[1] Respondent agreed to handle the case for P30,000.

The following day, complainant made a partial payment of P15,000 to respondent thru their mutual
friend Chua. On November 17, 2004, she gave him an additional P10,000. She paid the P5,000
balance on November 18, 2004. Both payments were also made thru Chua. On all three occasions,
respondent did not issue any receipt.

On November 21, 2004, respondent received P18,000 from complainant for the purpose of posting a
bond to secure the provisional liberty of her (complainants) son. Again, respondent did not issue any
receipt. When complainant went to the court the next day, she found out that respondent did not
remit the amount to the court.

Complainant demanded the return of the P18,000 from respondent on several occasions but
respondent ignored her. Moreover, respondent failed to act on the case of complainants son and
complainant was forced to avail of the services of the Public Attorneys Office for her sons defense.

Thereafter, complainant filed a verified complaint[2]for disbarment against respondent in the Negros
Occidental chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Attached to the verified complaint
was the affidavit[3] of Chua which read:

I, JOE CHUA, of legal age, Filipino and resident of Purok Sawmill, Brgy. Bata, Bacolod City, after
having been sworn to in accordance with law, hereby depose and state:

1. That I am the one who introduce[d] Mrs. Dolores C. Belleza [to] Atty. Alan Macasa when she
looked for a lawyer to help her son in the case that the latter is facing sometime [i]n [the] first week of
November 2004;

2. That by reason of my mutual closeness to both of them, I am the one who facilitated the payment
of Mrs. DOLORES C. BELLEZA to Atty. Alan Macasa;

3. That as far as I know, I received the following amount from Mrs. Dolores Belleza as payment for
Atty. Alan Macasa:

Date Amount

November 11, 2004 P15,000.00

A week after 10,000.00

November 18, 2004 5,000.00

4. That the above-mentioned amounts which I supposed as Attorneys Fees were immediately
forwarded by me to Atty. [Macasa];

5. That I am executing this affidavit in order to attest to the truth of all the foregoing statements.

x x x x x x x x x[4]
In a letter dated May 23, 2005,[5] the IBP Negros Occidental chapter transmitted the complaint to
the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).[6]

In an order dated July 13, 2005,[7] the CBD required respondent to submit his answer within 15 days
from receipt thereof. Respondent, in an urgent motion for extension of time to file an answer dated
August 10, 2005,[8] simply brushed aside the complaint for being baseless, groundless and
malicious without, however, offering any explanation. He also prayed that he be given until
September 4, 2005 to submit his answer.

Respondent subsequently filed urgent motions[9] for second and third extensions of time praying to
be given until November 4, 2005 to submit his answer. He never did.

When both parties failed to attend the mandatory conference on April 19, 2006, they were ordered to
submit their respective position papers.[10]

In its report and recommendation dated October 2, 2007,[11] the CBD ruled that respondent failed to
rebut the charges against him. He never answered the complaint despite several chances to do so.

The CBD found respondent guilty of violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides:

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.

It also found him guilty of violation of Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.

Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those
others kept by him.

The CBD ruled that respondent lacked good moral character and that he was unfit and unworthy of
the privileges conferred by law on him as a member of the bar. The CBD recommended a
suspension of six months with a stern warning that repetition of similar acts would merit a more
severe sanction. It also recommended that respondent be ordered to return to complainant
the P18,000 intended for the provisional liberty of the complainants son and the P30,000 attorneys
fees.

The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the
CBD with the modification that respondent be ordered to return to complainant only the amount
of P30,000 which he received as attorneys fees.[12]

We affirm the CBDs finding of guilt as affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors but we modify the
IBPs recommendation as to the liability of respondent.

Respondent Disrespected

Legal Processes
Respondent was given more than enough opportunity to answer the charges against him. Yet, he
showed indifference to the orders of the CBD for him to answer and refute the accusations of
professional misconduct against him. In doing so, he failed to observe Rule 12.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do
so.

Respondent also ignored the CBDs directive for him to file his position paper. His propensity to flout
the orders of the CBD showed his lack of concern and disrespect for the proceedings of the CBD.
He disregarded the oath he took when he was accepted to the legal profession to obey the laws and
the legal orders of the duly constituted legal authorities. He displayed insolence not only to the CBD
but also to this Court which is the source of the CBDs authority.

Respondents unjustified disregard of the lawful orders of the CBD was not only irresponsible but
also constituted utter disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers.[13] His conduct was
unbecoming of a lawyer who is called upon to obey court orders and processes and is expected to
stand foremost in complying with court directives as an officer of the court.[14] Respondent should
have known that the orders of the CBD (as the investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases
against lawyers) were not mere requests but directives which should have been complied with
promptly and completely.[15]

Respondent Grossly Neglected

The Cause of His Client

Respondent undertook to defend the criminal case against complainants son. Such undertaking
imposed upon him the following duties:

CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

xxxxxxxxx

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

xxxxxxxxx

CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF
THE LAW.

A lawyer who accepts the cause of a client commits to devote himself (particularly his time,
knowledge, skills and effort) to such cause. He must be ever mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him, constantly striving to be worthy thereof. Accordingly, he owes full devotion to the
interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights and the exertion
of his utmost learning, skill and ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from his
client, save by the rules of law legally applied.[16]
A lawyer who accepts professional employment from a client undertakes to serve his client with
competence and diligence.[17] He must conscientiously perform his duty arising from such
relationship. He must bear in mind that by accepting a retainer, he impliedly makes the following
representations: that he possesses the requisite degree of learning, skill and ability other lawyers
similarly situated possess; that he will exert his best judgment in the prosecution or defense of the
litigation entrusted to him; that he will exercise reasonable care and diligence in the use of his skill
and in the application of his knowledge to his clients cause; and that he will take all steps necessary
to adequately safeguard his clients interest.[18]

A lawyers negligence in the discharge of his obligations arising from the relationship of counsel and
client may cause delay in the administration of justice and prejudice the rights of a litigant,
particularly his client. Thus, from the perspective of the ethics of the legal profession, a lawyers
lethargy in carrying out his duties to his client is both unprofessional and unethical.[19]

If his clients case is already pending in court, a lawyer must actively represent his client by promptly
filing the necessary pleading or motion and assiduously attending the scheduled hearings. This is
specially significant for a lawyer who represents an accused in a criminal case.

The accused is guaranteed the right to counsel under the Constitution.[20] However, this right can
only be meaningful if the accused is accorded ample legal assistance by his lawyer:

... The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically
means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process requirement is a
part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed
perfunctorily.

The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere
propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the accused is
amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the
defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the
proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of
the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures,
essential laws and existing jurisprudence.[21]

∞○∞

[T]he right of an accused to counsel is beyond question a fundamental right. Without counsel, the
right to a fair trial itself would be of little consequence, for it is through counsel that the accused
secures his other rights. In other words, the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of
counsel.[22]

The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn
duty of fidelity to his client.[23] Tersely put, it means an effective, efficient and truly decisive legal
assistance, not a simply perfunctory representation.[24]

In this case, after accepting the criminal case against complainants son and receiving his attorneys
fees, respondent did nothing that could be considered as effective and efficient legal assistance. For
all intents and purposes, respondent abandoned the cause of his client. Indeed, on account of
respondents continued inaction, complainant was compelled to seek the services of the Public
Attorneys Office. Respondents lackadaisical attitude towards the case of complainants son was
reprehensible. Not only did it prejudice complainants son, it also deprived him of his constitutional
right to counsel. Furthermore, in failing to use the amount entrusted to him for posting a bond to
secure the provisional liberty of his client, respondent unduly impeded the latters constitutional right
to bail.

Respondent Failed to Return

His Clients Money

The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a lawyer the duty to
account for the money or property collected or received for or from the client.[25]

When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such as for filing
fees, registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to the client
how the money was spent. If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must
immediately return it to the client.[26] His failure either to render an accounting or to return the
money (if the intended purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[27]

Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his clients funds or properties as they fall due or upon
demand.[28] His failure to return the clients money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that
he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in
him by the client.[29] It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it
impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.[30] Indeed, it may
border on the criminal as it may constitute a prima facie case of swindling or estafa.

Respondent never denied receiving P18,000 from complainant for the purpose of posting a bond to
secure the provisional liberty of her son. He never used the money for its intended purpose yet also
never returned it to the client. Worse, he unjustifiably refused to turn over the amount to complainant
despite the latters repeated demands.

Moreover, respondent rendered no service that would have entitled him to the P30,000 attorneys
fees. As a rule, the right of a lawyer to a reasonable compensation for his services is subject to two
requisites: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship and (2) the rendition by the lawyer of
services to the client.[31] Thus, a lawyer who does not render legal services is not entitled to
attorneys fees. Otherwise, not only would he be unjustly enriched at the expense of the client, he
would also be rewarded for his negligence and irresponsibility.

Respondent Failed to Uphold the Integrity and Dignity of the Legal Profession

For his failure to comply with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent failed
to obey Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
(emphasis supplied)

Indeed, a lawyer who fails to abide by the Canons and Rules of the Code of Professional
Responsibility disrespects the said Code and everything that it stands for. In so doing, he disregards
the ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.

Lawyers should always live up to the ethical standards of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Public confidence in law and in lawyers may be eroded by the
irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar.[32] Thus, every lawyer should act and
comport himself in a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession.[33]

Respondent was undeserving of the trust reposed in him. Instead of using the money for the bond of
the complainants son, he pocketed it. He failed to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his
dealings with his client.[34] He failed to live up to his fiduciary duties. By keeping the money for
himself despite his undertaking that he would facilitate the release of complainants son, respondent
showed lack of moral principles. His transgression showed him to be a swindler, a deceitful person
and a shame to the legal profession.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa is hereby found GUILTY not only of dishonesty but
also of professional misconduct for prejudicing Francis John Bellezas right to counsel and to bail
underSections 13 and 14(2), Article III of the Constitution, and for violating Canons 1, 7, 17, 18 and
19 and Rules 12.03, 16.01, 16.02, 16.03 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
therefore DISBARRED from the practice of law effective immediately.

Respondent is hereby ORDERED to return to complainant Dolores C. Belleza the amounts

of P30,000 and P18,000 with interest at 12% per annum from the date of promulgation of this
decision until full payment. Respondent is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of
payment of the amount within ten days from payment. Failure to do so will subject him to criminal
prosecution.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into the
records of respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa and the Office of the Court Administrator to be furnished
to the courts of the land for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

VALENTIN C. MIRANDA, A. C. No. 6281

Complainant, Present:

PERALTA, J., Acting Chairperson,

ABAD,
PEREZ,*
- versus- MENDOZA, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
Promulgated:

September 26, 2011

ATTY. MACARIO D. CARPIO,
Respondent.
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
This is a disbarment case against Atty. Macario D. Carpio filed by Valentin C.
Miranda.[1]

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

Complainant Valentin C. Miranda is one of the owners of a parcel of land consisting

of 1,890 square meters located at Barangay Lupang Uno, Las Pias, Metro Manila. In
1994, complainant initiated Land Registration Commission (LRC) Case No. M-226
for the registration of the aforesaid property. The case was filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Las PiasCity, Branch 275. During the course of the
proceedings, complainant engaged the services of respondent Atty. Carpio as
counsel in the said case when his original counsel, Atty. Samuel Marquez, figured
in a vehicular accident.

In complainant's Affidavit,[2]complainant and respondent agreed that complainant

was to pay respondent Twenty Thousand Pesos (PhP20,000.00) as acceptance fee
and Two Thousand Pesos (PhP2,000.00) as appearance fee. Complainant paid
respondent the amounts due him, as evidenced by receipts duly signed by the
latter. During the last hearing of the case, respondent demanded the additional
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (PhP10,000.00) for the preparation of a
memorandum, which he said would further strengthen complainant's position in
the case, plus twenty percent (20%) of the total area of the subject property as
additional fees for his services.

Complainant did not accede to respondent's demand for it was contrary to their
agreement. Moreover, complainant co-owned the subject property with his
siblings, and he could not have agreed to the amount being demanded by
respondent without the knowledge and approval of his co-heirs.As a result of
complainant's refusal to satisfy respondent's demands, the latter became furious
and their relationship became sore.

On January 12, 1998, a Decision was rendered in LRC Case No. M-226, granting the
petition for registration, which Decision was declared final and executory in an
Order dated June 5, 1998. On March 24, 2000, the Land Registration Authority
(LRA) sent complainant a copy of the letter addressed to the Register of Deeds (RD)
of Las Pias City, which transmitted the decree of registration and the original and
owner's duplicate of the title of the property.

On April 3, 2000, complainant went to the RD to get the owner's duplicate of the
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) bearing No. 0-94. He was surprised to discover
that the same had already been claimed by and released to respondent on March
29, 2000. On May 4, 2000, complainant talked to respondent on the phone and
asked him to turn over the owner's duplicate of the OCT, which he had claimed
without complainant's knowledge, consent and authority.Respondent insisted that
complainant first pay him the PhP10,000.00 and the 20% share in the property
equivalent to 378 square meters, in exchange for which, respondent would deliver
the owner's duplicate of the OCT. Once again, complainant refused the demand,
for not having been agreed upon.

In a letter[3] dated May 24, 2000, complainant reiterated his demand for the return
of the owner's duplicate of the OCT. On June 11, 2000, complainant made the same
demand on respondent over the telephone. Respondent reiterated his previous
demand and angrily told complainant to comply, and threatened to have the OCT
cancelled if the latter refused to pay him.

On June 26, 2000, complainant learned that on April 6, 2000, respondent

registered an adverse claim on the subject OCT wherein he claimed that the
agreement on the payment of his legal services was 20% of the property and/or
actual market value. To date, respondent has not returned the owner's duplicate
of OCT No. 0-94 to complainant and his co-heirs despite repeated demands to
effect the same.

In seeking the disbarment or the imposition of the appropriate penalty upon

respondent, complainant invokes the following provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Canon 20. A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.

Canon 16. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession.

Canon 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and properties of his client when due or
upon demand. x x x

In defense of his actions, respondent relied on his alleged retaining lien over the
owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94. Respondent admitted that he did not turn over
to complainant the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 because of complainant's
refusal, notwithstanding repeated demands, to complete payment of his agreed
professional fee consisting of 20% of the total area of the property covered by the
title, i.e., 378 square meters out of 1,890 square meters, or its equivalent market
value at the rate of PhP7,000.00 per square meter, thus, yielding a sum of
PhP2,646,000.00 for the entire 378-square-meter portion and that he was ready
and willing to turn over the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94, should complainant
pay him completely the aforesaid professional fee.

Respondent admitted the receipt of the amount of PhP32,000.00, however, he

alleged that the amount earlier paid to him will be deducted from the 20% of the
current value of the subject lot. He alleged that the agreement was not reduced
into writing, because the parties believed each other based on their mutual
trust. He denied that he demanded the payment of PhP10,000.00 for the
preparation of a memorandum, since he considered the same unnecessary.
In addition to the alleged agreement between him and complainant for the
payment of the 20% professional fees, respondent invoked the principle
of quantum meruit to justify the amount being demanded by him.

In its Report and Recommendation[4]dated June 9, 2005, the Integrated Bar

of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months
for unjustly withholding from complainant the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94
in the exercise of his so-called attorney's lien. In Resolution No. XVII-2005-
173,[5] dated December 17, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors adopting the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Pending the
resolution of his motion for reconsideration, respondent filed a petition for
review[6] with this Court. The Court, in a Resolution[7] dated August 16, 2006,
directed that the case be remanded to the IBP for proper disposition, pursuant to this
Court's resolution in Noriel J. Ramientas v. Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyala.[8]

In Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-672, dated December 11, 2008, the IBP
Board of Governors affirmed Resolution No. XVII-2005-173, dated December 17,
2005, with modification that respondent is ordered to return the complainant's
owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 within fifteen days from receipt of notice. Hence,
the present petition.
The Court sustains the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, which affirmed
with modification the findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD. Respondent's
claim for his unpaid professional fees that would legally give him the right to retain
the property of his client until he receives what is allegedly due him has been paid
has no basis and, thus, is invalid.
Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides:

Section 37. Attorneys liens. An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents
and papers of his client, which have lawfully come into his possession and may
retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may
apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same
extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in
pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from
and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien
to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such
execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client
and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over such
judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure
the payment of his just fees and disbursements.

An attorney's retaining lien is fully recognized if the presence of the following

elements concur: (1) lawyer-client relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client's
funds, documents and papers; and (3) unsatisfied claim for attorney's fees.[9] Further,
the attorney's retaining lien is a general lien for the balance of the account between
the attorney and his client, and applies to the documents and funds of the client which
may come into the attorney's possession in the course of his employment.[10]

In the present case, complainant claims that there is no such agreement for the
payment of professional fee consisting of 20% of the total area of the subject
property and submits that their agreement was only for the payment of the
acceptance fee and the appearance fees.
As correctly found by the IBP-CBD, there was no proof of any agreement between
the complainant and the respondent that the latter is entitled to an additional
professional fee consisting of 20% of the total area covered by OCT No. 0-94. The
agreement between the parties only shows that respondent will be paid the
acceptance fee and the appearance fees, which the respondent has duly
received.Clearly, there is no unsatisfied claim for attorney's fees that would entitle
respondent to retain his client's property.Hence, respondent could not validly
withhold the title of his client absence a clear and justifiable claim.

Respondent's unjustified act of holding on to complainant's title with the obvious

aim of forcing complainant to agree to the amount of attorney's fees sought is an
alarming abuse by respondent of the exercise of an attorney's retaining lien, which
by no means is an absolute right, and cannot at all justify inordinate delay in the
delivery of money and property to his client when due or upon demand.[11]

Atty. Carpio failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer by unlawfully withholding and
failing to deliver the title of the complainant, despite repeated demands, in the guise
of an alleged entitlement to additional professional fees. He has breached Rule 1.01
of Canon 1 and Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which read:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE

LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESS.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND

PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due
or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so
much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements,
giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same
extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for
in the Rules of Court.
Further, in collecting from complainant exorbitant fees, respondent violated Canon

20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that a lawyer shall

charge only fair and reasonable fees. It is highly improper for a lawyer to impose

additional professional fees upon his client which were never mentioned nor

agreed upon at the time of the engagement of his services. At the outset,

respondent should have informed the complainant of all the fees or possible fees

that he would charge before handling the case and not towards the near conclusion

of the case. This is essential in order for the complainant to determine if he has the

financial capacity to pay respondent before engaging his services.

Respondent's further submission that he is entitled to the payment of additional

professional fees on the basis of the principle of quantum meruit has no

merit."Quantum meruit, meaning `as much as he deserved' is used as a basis for

determining the lawyer's professional fees in the absence of a contract but

recoverable by him from his client."[12]The principle of quantum meruit applies if a

lawyer is employed without a price agreed upon for his services. In such a case, he

would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services, as much as he has
earned.[13] In the present case, the parties had already entered into an agreement as

to the attorney's fees of the respondent, and thus, the principle of quantum

meruit does not fully find application because the respondent is already compensated

by such agreement.

The Court notes that respondent did not inform complainant that he will be the
one to secure the owner's duplicate of the OCT from the RD and failed to
immediately inform complainant that the title was already in his
possession.Complainant, on April 3, 2000, went to the RD of Las Pias City to get the
owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94, only to be surprised that the said title had
already been claimed by, and released to, respondent on March 29, 2000. A lawyer
must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a
manner that is beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients should be
characterized by the highest degree of good faith and fairness.[14] By keeping secret
with the client his acquisition of the title, respondent was not fair in his dealing with
his client. Respondent could have easily informed the complainant immediately of
his receipt of the owner's duplicate of the OCT on March 29, 2000, in order to save
his client the time and effort in going to the RD to get the title.

Respondent's inexcusable act of withholding the property belonging to his client and
imposing unwarranted fees in exchange for the release of said title deserve the
imposition of disciplinary sanction. Hence, the ruling of the IBP Board of
Governors, adopting and approving with modification the report and
recommendation of the IBP-CBD that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months and that respondent be ordered to return the
complainant's owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 is hereby affirmed. However, the
fifteen-day period from notice given to respondent within which to return the title
should be modified and, instead, respondent should return the same immediately
upon receipt of the Court's decision.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Macario D. Carpio isSUSPENDED from the practice of

law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this Decision. He is
ordered toRETURN to the complainant the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94
immediately upon receipt of this decision. He isWARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to the personal record of Atty. Macario D. Carpio as a member of the Bar;
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

JUDGE RENE B. BACULI, A.C. No. 8920

Complainant,
Present:

BRION, J.,*
Acting Chairperson,
DEL CASTILLO,**
- versus -
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,*** and
SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:

ATTY. MELCHOR A. BATTUNG,

September 28, 2011
Respondent.

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
 DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is the resolution[1] of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar

of the Philippines (IBP) finding Atty. Melchor Battung liable for violating Rule 11.03,
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommending that he be
reprimanded.The complainant is Judge Rene B. Baculi, Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Tuguegarao City. The respondent, Atty.
Battung, is a member of the Bar with postal address on Aguinaldo
St., Tuguegarao City.

Background

Judge Baculi filed a complaint for disbarment[2] with the Commission on

Discipline of the IBP against the respondent, alleging that the latter violated Canons
11[3] and 12[4] of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Judge Baculi claimed that on July 24, 2008, during the hearing on the
motion for reconsideration of Civil Case No. 2502, the respondent was shouting
while arguing his motion. Judge Baculi advised him to tone down his voice but
instead, the respondent shouted at the top of his voice. When warned that he
would be cited for direct contempt, the respondent shouted, Then cite
me![5] Judge Baculi cited him for direct contempt and imposed a fine of
P100.00. The respondent then left.

While other cases were being heard, the respondent re-entered the
courtroom and shouted, Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I am not
afraid of you![6] Judge Baculi ordered the sheriff to escort the respondent out of
the courtroom and cited him for direct contempt of court for the second time.

After his hearings, Judge Baculi went out and saw the respondent at the
hall of the courthouse, apparently waiting for him. The respondent again
shouted in a threatening tone, Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I am
not afraid of you! He kept on shouting, I am not afraid of you! and challenged
the judge to a fight. Staff and lawyers escorted him out of the building.[7]

Judge Baculi also learned that after the respondent left the courtroom,
he continued shouting and punched a table at the Office of the Clerk of Court.[8]

Violation of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

According to Judge Baculi, the respondent filed dilatory pleadings in Civil

Case No. 2640, an ejectment case.

Judge Baculi rendered on October 4, 2007 a decision in Civil Case No.

2640, which he modified on December 14, 2007. After the modified decision
became final and executory, the branch clerk of court issued a certificate of
finality. The respondent filed a motion to quash the previously issued writ of
execution, raising as a ground the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant for
lack of jurisdiction. Judge Baculi asserted that the respondent knew as a lawyer
that ejectment cases are within the jurisdiction of First Level Courts and the
latter was merely delaying the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
 The respondent filed his Answer,[9]essentially saying that it was Judge
Baculi who disrespected him.[10] We quote from his Answer:

23. I only told Judge Rene Baculi I will file Gross ignorance of the Law
against him once inside the court room when he was lambasting
me[.]

24. It was JUDGE BACULI WHO DISRESPECTED ME. He did not like that I
just submit the Motion for Reconsideration without oral argument
because he wanted to have an occasion to just HUMILIATE ME and
to make appear to the public that I am A NEGLIGENT LAWYER,
when he said YOU JUSTIFY YOUR NEGLIGENCE BEFORE THIS
COURT making it an impression to the litigants and the public that
as if I am a NEGLIGENT, INCOMPETENT, MUMBLING, and
IRRESPONSIBLE LAWYER.

25. These words of Judge Rene Baculi made me react[.]

xxxx

28. Since I manifested that I was not going to orally argue the Motion,
Judge Rene Baculi could have just made an order that the Motion
for Reconsideration is submitted for resolution, but what he did
was that he forced me to argue so that he will have the room to
humiliate me as he used to do not only to me but almost of the
lawyers here (sic).
 Atty. Battung asked that the case against him be dismissed.

The IBP conducted its investigation of the matter through Commissioner Jose
de la Rama, Jr. In his Commissioners Report,[11] Commissioner De la Rama stated
that during the mandatory conference on January 16, 2009, both parties merely
reiterated what they alleged in their submitted pleadings. Both parties agreed that
the original copy of the July 24, 2008 tape of the incident at the courtroom would
be submitted for the Commissioners review. Judge Baculi submitted the tape and
the transcript of stenographic notes on January 23, 2009.

Commissioner De la Rama narrated his findings, as follows:[12]

At the first part of the hearing as reflected in the TSN, it was

observed that the respondent was calm. He politely argued his case but
the voice of the complainant appears to be in high pitch. During the
mandatory conference, it was also observed that indeed, the
complainant maintains a high pitch whenever he speaks. In fact, in the
TSN, where there was already an argument, the complainant stated the
following:

Court: Do not shout.

Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting.
Court: This court has been constantly under this kind of
voice Atty. Battung, we are very sorry if you do not want to
appear before my court, then you better attend to your
cases and do not appear before my court if you do not want
to be corrected! (TSN, July 24, 2008, page 3)
 (NOTE: The underlined words we are very sorry [ were]
actually uttered by Atty. Battung while the judge was saying
the quoted portion of the TSN)

That it was during the time when the complainant asked the
following questions when the undersigned noticed that Atty. Battung
shouted at the presiding judge.

Court: Did you proceed under the Revised Rules on

Summary Procedure?

*
Atty. Battung: It is not our fault Your Honor to proceed
because we were asked to present our evidence ex
parte. Your Honor, so, if should we were ordered (sic) by
the court to follow the rules on summary procedure. (TSN
page 3, July 24, 2008)

It was observed that the judge uttered the following:

Court: Do not shout.

Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting.
(Page 3, TSN July 24, 2008)
Note: * it was at this point when the respondent shouted at
the complainant.

Thereafter, it was observed that both were already shouting at

each other.
 Respondent claims that he was provoked by the presiding judge
that is why he shouted back at him. But after hearing the tape, the
undersigned in convinced that it was Atty. Battung who shouted first at
the complainant.

Presumably, there were other lawyers and litigants present

waiting for their cases to be called. They must have observed the
incident. In fact, in the joint-affidavit submitted by Elenita Pacquing et
al., they stood as one in saying that it was really Atty. Battung who
shouted at the judge that is why the latter cautioned him not to shout.

The last part of the incident as contained in page 4 of the TSN

reads as follows:

Court: You are now ordered to pay a fine of P100.00.

Atty. Battung: We will file the necessary action against this court
for gross ignorance of the law.

Court: Yes, proceed.

(NOTE: Atty. Battung went out the courtroom)

Court: Next case.

Interpreter: Civil Case No. 2746.

(Note: Atty. Battung entered again the courtroom)
 Atty. Battung: But what we do not like (not finished)

Court: The next time

Atty. Battung: We would like to clear

Court: Sheriff, throw out the counsel, put that everything in

record. If you want to see me, see me after the court.
Next case.

Civil Case No. 2746 for Partition and Damages, Roberto Cabalza vs.
Teresita Narag, et al.
(nothing follows)

Commissioner De la Rama found that the respondent failed to observe

Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that requires a lawyer to
observe and maintain respect due the courts and judicial officers. The respondent
also violated Rule 11.03 of Canon 11 that provides that a lawyer shall abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the courts. The
respondents argument that Judge Baculi provoked him to shout should not be
given due consideration since the respondent should not have shouted at the
presiding judge; by doing so, he created the impression that disrespect of a judge
could be tolerated. What the respondent should have done was to file an action
before the Office of the Court Administrator if he believed that Judge Baculi did not
act according to the norms of judicial conduct.

With respect to the charge of violation of Canon 12 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, Commissioner De la Rama found that the evidence
submitted is insufficient to support a ruling that the respondent had misused the
judicial processes to frustrate the ends of justice.

Commissioner De la Rama recommended that the respondent be suspended

from the practice of law for six (6) months.

On October 9, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution

adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, with the modification that the respondent be reprimanded.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the IBPs finding that the respondent violated Rule 11.03,
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Battung disrespected
Judge Baculi by shouting at him inside the courtroom during court proceedings in
the presence of litigants and their counsels, and court personnel. The respondent
even came back to harass Judge Baculi. This behavior, in front of many witnesses,
cannot be allowed. We note that the respondent continued to threaten Judge
Baculi and acted in a manner that clearly showed disrespect for his position even
after the latter had cited him for contempt. In fact, after initially leaving the court,
the respondent returned to the courtroom and disrupted the ongoing proceedings.
These actions were not only against the person, the position and the stature of
Judge Baculi, but against the court as well whose proceedings were openly and
flagrantly disrupted, and brought to disrepute by the respondent.

Litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because of their position and
avowed duty to the courts, cannot be allowed to publicly ridicule, demean and
disrespect a judge, and the court that he represents. The Code of Professional
Responsibility provides:
 Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due
the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or

menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

We ruled in Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr.[13] that it is the duty of a lawyer, as

an officer of the court, to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts. Respect
for the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; without this
guarantee, the institution would be resting on very shaky foundations.

A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely disregards the

latters role, stature and position in our justice system. When the respondent
publicly berated and brazenly threatened Judge Baculi that he would file a case for
gross ignorance of the law against the latter, the respondent effectively acted in a
manner tending to erode the public confidence in Judge Baculis competence and
in his ability to decide cases. Incompetence is a matter that, even if true, must be
handled with sensitivity in the manner provided under the Rules of Court; an
objecting or complaining lawyer cannot act in a manner that puts the courts in a
bad light and bring the justice system into disrepute.

The IBP Board of Governors recommended that Atty. Battung be

reprimanded, while the Investigating Commissioner recommended a penalty of six
(6) months suspension.

We believe that these recommended penalties are too light for the offense.
 In Re: Suspension of Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, Former Senior State
Prosecutor,[14] we suspended Atty. Bagabuyo for one year for violating Rule 11.05,
Canon 11, and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
for violating the Lawyers Oath for airing his grievances against a judge in
newspapers and radio programs. In this case, Atty. Battungs violations are no less
serious as they were committed in the courtroom in the course of judicial
proceedings where the respondent was acting as an officer of the court, and before
the litigating public. His actions were plainly disrespectful to Judge Baculi and to
the court, to the point of being scandalous and offensive to the integrity of the
judicial system itself.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Melchor A. Battung is

found GUILTYof violating Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year
effective upon the finality of this Decision. He is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to the respondents personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines; the Department of Justice; and all courts in the country, for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 9608 November 27, 2012

MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The Court has often reminded members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms of the legal
profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also
of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public
eye and community approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct – both public and private –
fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized.1

Complainant Maria Victoria B. Ventura filed on July 29, 2004 a Complaint2 for Disbarment or
Suspension before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline against
respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson for "grossly immoral conduct."

In her complaint, complainant alleged that

2. The herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA executed a Sworn Statement

dated 19 April 2002 and a Supplemental-Complaint dated 10 May 2002 stating therein that
the crime of RAPE was committed against her person sometime in December, 2001 and on
19 March 2002 when she was merely thirteen (13) years of age by herein Respondent
ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON, then thirty eight (38) years old, married to Teresita B. Samson,
Filipino and resident of Barangay 5, San Francisco, Agusan Del Sur, Philippines….

3. In his Counter-Affidavit, herein Respondent ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON admitted that

sexual intercourse indeed transpired between the herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B.
VENTURA and himself….

4. After the conduct of preliminary investigation, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Agusan Del Sur, Philippines issued a RESOLUTION dated 10 June 2002 dismissing the
charge of RAPE and finding the existence of probable cause for the crime of QUALIFIED
SEDUCTION and issued the corresponding INFORMATION for QUALIFIED SEDUCTION on
04 July 2002….

5. Thereafter, the herein Complainant filed a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION dated 26

August 2002 which was denied in the RESOLUTION dated 02 October 2002 of the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan Del Sur….
 6. The aforesaid RESOLUTION dated 02 October 2002 was elevated to the Department of
Justice, by way of a PETITION FOR REVIEW, and is pending resolution by the Department
of Justice.

xxxx

8. The act/s committed by the herein Respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson against the herein
Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA as hereinbefore stated clearly constitute …
"grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court of the
Philippines which provides for a penalty of "DISBARMENT or SUSPENSION of an Attorney
by the SUPREME COURT."

Complainant narrated in her Sworn Statement3that sometime in December 2001, at around midnight,
she was sleeping in the maid’s room at respondent’s house when respondent entered and went on
top of her. Respondent kissed her lips, sucked her breast, and succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her. She felt pain and found blood stain in her panty. She stated that another
incident happened on March 19, 2002 at respondent’s poultry farm in Alegria, San Francisco,
Agusan del Sur. Respondent asked her to go with him to the farm. He brought her to an old shanty
where he sexually abused her. Thereafter, respondent gave her five hundred pesos and warned her
not to tell anyone what had happened or he would kill her and her mother.

In her Supplemental-Complaint,4 complainant averred that respondent allowed her to sleep in his
house after her mother agreed to let her stay there while she studied at the Agusan National High
School. She further stated that on the night she was sexually abused, she was awakened when
respondent went on top of her. She struggled to free herself and shouted, but respondent covered
her mouth and nobody could hear as nobody was in the house. Complainant also claimed that on
March 19, 2002, between 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 pm, respondent forced her to ride a multi-cab. When
they arrived at his poultry farm in Alegria, respondent dragged her to a dilapidated shack. She
resisted his advances but her efforts proved futile.

Respondent alleged in his Answer5 that

2. Respondent admits the allegations in paragraph 2 of the complaint to the effect that Maria
Victoria Ventura filed a complaint against him for Rape at the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office
with qualification that the said complaint for Rape was dismissed. Respondent, however, has
no knowledge or information as to the truth of the allegation that she was 13 years….

xxxx

5. Respondent vehemently denies the truth of the allegations in paragraph 8 of the complaint
to the effect that the acts of respondent in having sex with complainant constitute … grossly
immoral conduct. The truth is that the act of respondent in having sex with complainant was
done with mutual agreement after respondent gave money to complainant. Respondent
respectfully submits that his act of having sex with complainant once does not constitute…
grossly immoral conduct.

There is no human law that punishes a person who has sex with a woman with mutual
agreement and complainant accepts compensation therefore. Having sex with complainant
once with just compensation does not amount to immoral conduct….

xxxx
 6. The complaint is instigated by Corazon Ventura who was an employee at the Law Office
of respondent herein. The said Corazon Ventura entertained hatred and had a grudge
against the herein respondent who terminated her services due to misunderstanding….

7. The filing of the Criminal Case against respondent as well as this Administrative Case is a
well orchestrated and planned act of Corazon Ventura as vengeance against respondent as
a result of her separation from the employment in the Law Office of the respondent. This
claim is supported by the Affidavit of Natividad Ruluna, the former Office Clerk at the Law
Office of respondent….

8. To show that Corazon Ventura desires to get back at respondent, she demanded from
respondent to settle with her and demanded the payment of the amount of P2,000,000.00;
otherwise she will file a case against him in Court for Rape and for disbarment. Respondent
did not come across with Corazon Ventura, the latter made good her threats and filed the
criminal case for Rape. [sic] When the case for rape did not prosper because the Prosecutor
dropped the Rape Case, Corazon Ventura sent word to respondent that she is amenable for
the amount of P400,000.00. In effect, Corazon Ventura wanted to extort from respondent so
that she can get even with him and his wife for separating her from the employment;

9. Complainant is a woman of loose moral character. This is supported by the Affidavit of

Patronio Punayan, Jr. which is hereto attached as Annex "3". And Corazon Ventura can
afford to utilize Maria Victoria Ventura as her instrument in putting down the respondent
herein because Maria Victoria Ventura is not her biological daughter and she knows before
hand that her ward has a questionable reputation. The fact that Corazon Ventura is not the
biological mother of Maria Victoria Ventura is shown by the pre-trial order in Criminal Case
No. 5414….

xxxx

Respondent has not violated any grounds mentioned in this rule. Respondent respectfully submits
that his having sex with complainant with just compensation once does not amount to immoral
conduct. For who among men will not yield to temptation when a woman shall invite him for sex?

Attached to respondent’s Answer is his Counter-Affidavit6 which he submitted to the Provincial

Prosecutor. He alleged therein that complainant usually stayed late at night with her male friends
when her mother was out of the house. He claimed that he heard rumors that complainant had
sexual affairs with different boys. Respondent narrated that on March 19, 2002, he saw complainant
with some of her classmates near their rented house. Complainant told him that they wanted to go
out to swim but they did not have money. When she asked if he could spare some amount, he gave
her money. He told her in jest that he wanted to see her that afternoon and go to a place where they
could be alone, and he was surprised when she agreed. He just thought that for complainant, sex is
a common thing despite her age. At around 5:00 p.m., he fetched complainant at her house. She
casually walked towards the car and boarded it. He told her that they will not check in a lodging
house because people might recognize him. Upon reaching his poultry farm, respondent met his
farm worker and asked him if he could use the latter’s hut. The farm worker agreed and they went
straight to the hut.

Inside the farm worker’s hut, complainant did not hesitate in entering the room. Respondent did not
notice any involuntariness on her part as she undressed herself. He asserted that they had sexual
intercourse based on their mutual understanding. Thereafter, the complainant dressed up and
walked back to the multi-cab where she waited for him. He told her not to tell anyone about what had
happened, to which she replied "natural buang kay motug-an" meaning, she’s not crazy as to tell
anyone. He alleged that she accepted the money he gave because she needed to buy some things
but her mother did not give her any allowance. Respondent insisted that what happened between
them was the first and the last incident. He claimed that he was able to confirm that complainant is
no longer a virgin.

It likewise appears that the Investigating Prosecutors found that probable cause exists for
respondent to stand trial for qualified seduction.7 The charge of rape, however, was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence. An Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agusan del
Sur, Branch 6, but complainant who was not satisfied with the dismissal of the rape charge, filed a
motion for reconsideration. When said motion was denied, complainant filed a petition for review with
the Department of Justice (DOJ). However, the DOJ sustained the findings of the prosecutor.

Then, on December 14, 2006, complainant and her mother appeared before the public prosecutor
and executed their respective Affidavits of Desistance.8 Complainant stated that what happened
between respondent and her in March 2002 was based on mutual understanding. Thus, she was
withdrawing the complaint she filed against respondent before the RTC as well as the one she filed
before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. Accordingly, the criminal case against respondent
was dismissed.9

In its Report and Recommendation10 dated October 10, 2007, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of one year from the practice of law for
immorality with the warning that repetition of the same or similar act will merit a more severe penalty.

On November 10, 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVIII-2007-237, to
wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED

with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that
respondent is found guilty of immorality, the victim is a minor, respondent and his wife was victim’s
guardians and for being a married man, Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for five (5) years with Stern Warning that repetition of the same or similar act in the
future will be dealt with more severely.11

Complainant now moves to reconsider the IBP Resolution. She argues that the penalty imposed by
the IBP is not commensurate to the gravity and depravity of the offense. She contends that
respondent committed grossly immoral conduct by forcing himself to have sexual intercourse with a
young and innocent lass of 13 years of age. He also took advantage of his moral ascendancy over
complainant considering that she was then staying at respondent’s residence. Moreover, there was
a betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity considering that respondent was a married man. She insists
that this detestable behavior renders respondent unfit and undeserving of the honor and privilege
which his license confers upon him.Thus, complainant prays that the penalty of disbarment be
imposed.12

Meanwhile, respondent also filed a Motion for Reconsideration13 of the IBP Resolution. He asserts
that complainant has not presented any proof of her minority. Likewise, during the sexual encounter,
complainant was not under their custody. He contends that complainant’s mother even testified that
her daughter stayed at respondent’s house only until February 2002. He further stresses that
because of his admission and remorse, and since this is the first time he has been found
administratively liable, he is entitled to a reduction of the penalty to one year suspension from the
practice of law.
The pertinent provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxxx

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

xxxx

Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.

As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,14 the possession of good moral character is both a condition
precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in
the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of members of the bar to observe the highest degree of
morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar.15Consequently, any errant behavior on the part
of a lawyer, be it in the lawyer’s public or private activities, which tends to show said lawyer deficient
in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or
disbarment.

Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community.16Immoral
conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency.17

From the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of respondent himself,
we find that respondent’s act of engaging in sex with a young lass, the daughter of his former
employee, constitutes gross immoral conduct that warrants sanction. Respondent not only admitted
he had sexual intercourse with complainant but also showed no remorse whatsoever when he
asserted that he did nothing wrong because she allegedly agreed and he even gave her money.
Indeed, his act of having carnal knowledge of a woman other than his wife manifests his disrespect
for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. Moreover, the fact that he
procured the act by enticing a very young woman with money showed his utmost moral depravity
and low regard for the dignity of the human person and the ethics of his profession.

In Cordova v. Cordova,18 we held that the moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of
the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards
of the community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of
marriage.

Respondent has violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by complainant, then a 13-year-
old minor,19 who for a time was under respondent’s care. Whether the sexual encounter between the
respondent and complainant was or was not with the latter’s consent is of no moment. Respondent
clearly committed a disgraceful, grossly immoral and highly reprehensible act. Such conduct is a
transgression of the standards of morality required of the legal profession and should be disciplined
accordingly.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly states that a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any
deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to take before admission
to the practice of law. It bears to stress that membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can
be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyer’s lack of the essential qualifications
required of lawyers.20

Likewise, it was held in Maligsa v. Cabanting21that a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in
honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. Similarly, in
Dumadag v. Lumaya,22the Court pronounced:

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of
mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules
of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the
bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.

The fact that complainant filed an Affidavit of Desistance during the pendency of this case is of no
moment. Complainant’s Affidavit of Desistance cannot have the effect of abating the instant
proceedings in view of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of
disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern. A case of suspension or disbarment is sui
generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse
the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the
courts. A disbarment case is not an investigation into the acts of respondent but on his conduct as
1âw phi 1

an officer of the court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar.23

Illicit sexual relations have been previously punished with disbarment, indefinite or definite
suspension, depending on the circumstances.24In this case, respondent’s gross misbehavior and
unrepentant demeanor clearly shows a serious flaw in his character, his moral indifference to sexual
exploitation of a minor, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the
legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the
need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action.25

The Court is mindful of the dictum that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and
only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as
an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Thus, where a lesser penalty, such as temporary
suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed.26 However, in
the present case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it
appears to be the most appropriate penalty.27

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby DISBARRED for Gross Immoral
Conduct, Violation of his oath of office, and Violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of
respondent in the Office of the. Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of
the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

FELICITAS S. QUIAMBAO, Adm. Case No. 6708

Complainant, (CBD Case No. 01 -874)

Present:

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.,

(Chairman),

- versus - QUISUMBING,
SANTIAGO,
CARPIO, and
AZCUNA, JJ.

ATTY. NESTOR A. BAMBA , Promulgated:

Respondent.
August 25, 2005

X- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

We are aware of the hapless fact that there are not enough
lawyers to serve an exploding population. This unfortunate state of
affairs, however, will not seize this Court from exercising its
disciplinary power over lawyers culpable of serious indiscretions . The
incidence of public force must be deployed to bear upon the community
to eventually forge a legal profession that provides quality, ethical,
accessible, and cost-effective legal service to our people and whose
members are willing and able to answer t he call to public service.

In this administrative case for disbarment, complainant Felicitas

S. Quiambao charges respondent Atty. Nestor A. Bamba with violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting
interests when the latter filed a case against her while he was at that
time representing her in another case, and for committing other acts
of disloyalty and double -dealing.

From June 2000 to January 2001, the complainant was the

president and managing director of Allied In vestigation Bureau, Inc.
(AIB), a family-owned corporation engaged in providing security and
investigation services. She avers that she procured the legal services
of the respondent not only for the corporate affairs of AIB but also for
her personal case. Particularly, the respondent acted as her counsel of
record in an ejectment case against Spouses Santiago and Florita
Torroba filed by her on 29 December 2000 before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Paraaque City, which was docketed as Civil Case
No. 11928. She paid attorneys fees for respondents legal services in
that case. [ 1 ] About six months after she resigned as AIB president, or
on 14 June 2001, the respondent filed on behalf of AIB a complaint for
replevin and damages against her before the MeTC of Quezon City for
the purpose of recovering from her the car of AIB assigned to her as a
service vehicle. This he did without withdrawing as counsel of reco rd
in the ejectment case, which was then still pending. [ 2 ]

Apart from the foregoing litigation matter, the complainant, in

her Position Paper, charges the respon dent with acts of disloyalty and
double-dealing. She avers that the respondent proposed to her that she
organize her own security agency and that he would assist her in its
organization, causing her to resign as president of AIB. The
respondent indeed assi sted her in December 2000 in the formation of
another security agency, Quiambao Risk Management Specialists, Inc.,
(QRMSI), which was later registered under complainants name, with
the respondent as a silent partner represented by his associate Atty.
Gerardo P. Hernandez. The respondent was paid attorneys fees for his
legal services in organizing and incorporating QRMSI. He also planned
to steal or pirate some of the more important clients of AIB. While
serving as legal counsel for AIB and a silent partner of QRMSI, he
convinced complainants brother Leodegario Quiambao to organize
another security agency, San Esteban Security Services, Inc. (SESSI)
where he (the respondent) served as its incorporator, director, and
president. The respondent and Leodegario th en illegally diverted the
funds of AIB to fund the incorporation of SESSI, and likewise planned
to eventually close down the operations of AIB and transfer the
business to SESSI. [ 3 ]

For his part, the respondent admits that he represented the

complainant in the aforementioned ejectment case and later
represented AIB in the replevin case against her. He, however, denies
that he was the personal lawyer of the complai nant, and avers that he
was made to believe that it was part of his function as counsel for AIB
to handle even the personal cases of its officers. Even assuming that
the complainant confided to him privileged information about her
legal interests, the ejec tment case and the replevin case are unrelated
cases involving different issues and parties and, therefore, the
privileged information which might have been gathered from one case
would have no use in the other. At any rate, it was the complainant
herself who insisted that he stay as her counsel despite the perceived
differences among her, her brother, and AIB over the motor vehicle
subject of the replevin case. The complainant even asked him to assist
her in her monetary claims against AIB. [ 4 ]

The respondent also denies the charge raised by the complainant

in her position paper that he agreed to be a silent partner of QRMSI
through his nominee, Atty. Gerardo P. He rnandez, who was his former
law partner. He declined complainants offer to assume that role and
suggested Atty. Hernandez in his place; thus, 375 shares of stock were
registered in Atty. Hernandezs name as consideration of his (Atty.
Hernandezs) legal serv ices as corporate secretary and legal counsel of
QRMSI. The respondent also denies that he convinced complainants
brother Leodegario to organize another security agency and that the
funds of AIB were unlawfully diverted to SESSI. It was to complement
the business of AIB, which was then in danger of collapse, that SESSI
was established. Leodegarios wife and her son have the effective
control over SESSI. Respondents subscribed shareholdings in SESSI
comprise only 800 shares out of 12,500 subscribed shares. He serves
AIB and SESSI in different capacities: as legal counsel of the former
and as president of the latter. [ 5 ]

In his Report and Recommendation [ 6 ] dated 31 August 2004, the

investigating commissioner of the IBP found the respondent guilty of
representing conflicting interests based on the following undisputed
facts: first, the respondent was still complainants counsel of record in
the ejectment case when he filed, as legal counsel of AIB, the replevin
case against her; and second, the respondent was still the legal counsel
of AIB when he advised the complainant on the inco rporation of
another security agency, QRMSI, and recommended his former law
partner, Atty. Gerardo Hernandez, to be its corporate secretary and
legal counsel and also when he conferred with Leodegario to organize
another security agency, SESSI, where the r espondent became an
incorporator, stockholder, and president. Thus, the investigating
commissioner recommended that the respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for one year.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the

investigating commissioners report and recommendation, but reduced
the penalty from one year to a stern reprimand. [ 7 ]
 The issue in this case is whether the respondent is guilty of
misconduct for representing conflicting interests in contravention of
the basic tenets of the legal profession.

Rule 15.03, Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

provides: A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts. This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and
good taste. [ 8 ] In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer
learns all the facts connected with the clients case, including the weak
and strong points of the case. The nature of that relationship is,
therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. [ 9 ] It
behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence,
but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double -dealing for
only then can litigants be encou raged to entrust their secrets to their
lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of
justice. [ 1 0 ]

In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests

when, in behalf of one client, it is their duty to contend for that which
duty to another client requires them to oppose. [ 1 1 ] Developments in
jurisprudence have particularized various tests to determine whether
a lawyers conduct lies within this proscription. One test is whether a
lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one
client and, at the same time, t o oppose that claim for the other
client. [ 1 2 ] Thus, if a lawyers argument for one client has to be opposed
by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, th ere is a violation
of the rule.
 Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the
lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfuln ess or double-dealing in the performance of
that duty. [ 1 3 ] Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called
upon in the new relation to use against a form er client any confidential
information acquired through their connection or previous
employment. [ 1 4 ]

The proscription against representation of conflicting inte rests

applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in
the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no moment that the
lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which
the lawyer has to oppose for the othe r client, or that there would be no
occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the
disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is
enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose
the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyers
respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of
the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients. [ 1 5 ]

In this case, it is undisputed that at the time the respondent filed

the replevin case on behalf of AIB he was still the counsel of record of
the complainant in the pending ejectment case. We do not sustain
respondents theory t hat since the ejectment case and the replevin case
are unrelated cases fraught with different issues, parties, and subject
matters, the prohibition is inapplicable. His representation of
opposing clients in both cases, though unrelated, obviously constitut es
conflict of interest or, at the least, invites suspicion of double -dealing.
While the respondent may assert that the complainant expressly
consented to his continued representation in the ejectment case, the
respondent failed to show that he fully discl osed the facts to both his
clients and he failed to present any written consent of the complainant
and AIB as required under Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Neither can we accept respondents plea that he was duty -bound to

handle all the cases referred to him by AIB, including the personal
cases of its officers which had no connection to its corporate affairs.
That the representation of conflicting interest is in good faith and with
honest intention on the part of the lawye r does not make the
prohibition inoperative. [ 1 6 ] Moreover, lawyers are not obliged to act
either as an adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to
become their client. They have the right to decline such employment,
subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. [ 1 7 ] Although there are inst ances where lawyers cannot
decline representation, [ 1 8 ] they cannot be made to labor under conflict
of interest between a present client and a prospective one. [ 1 9 ]

Additionally, in his position paper, the respondent alleges that when

the complainant invited the respondent to join QRMSI, he vehemently
refused to join them due to his perception of conflicting interest as
he was then (and still is at present) the Legal Counsel of AIB, which is
also a security agency. [ 2 0 ] To bolster his allegation, he invoked the
affidavits of complainants witnesses which contained statements of his
apprehension of conflict of interest should he join QRMSI. [ 2 1 ]

Surprisingly, despite his apprehension or awareness of a possible

conflict of interest should he join QRMSI, the respondent later allowed
himself to become an incorporator, stockholder, and president of
SESSI, which is also a security agency. He justi fied his act by claiming
that that while both AIB and SESSI are engaged in security agency
business, he is serving in different capacities. As the in -house legal
counsel of AIB, he serves its legal interest the parameter of which
evolves around legal matte rs such as protecting the legal rights and
interest of the corporation; conducting an investigation or a hearing
on violations of company rules and regulations of their office
employees and security guards; sending demand letters in collection
cases; and representing the corporation in any litigation for or against
it. And as president of SESSI, he serves the operational aspects of the
business such as how does it operate[], how much do they price their
services, what kind or how do they train[] their secur ity guards, how
they solicit clients. Thus, conflict of interest is far -fetched.Moreover,
the respondent argues that the complainant, not being a stockholder
of AIB and SESSI, has no right to question his alleged conflict of
interest in serving the two sec urity agencies. [ 2 2 ]

While the complainant lacks personality to question the alleged

conflict of interests on the part of the respondent in serving both
security agencies, we cannot just turn a blind eye to respondents act.
It must be noted that the proscription against representation of
conflicting interests finds application where the conflicting interests
arise with respect to the same general matter however sl ight the
adverse interest may be. It applies even if the conflict pertains to the
lawyers private activity or in the performance of a function in a non -
professional capacity. [ 2 3 ] In the process of determining whether there
is a conflict of interest, an important criterion is probability, not
certainty, of conflict.

Since the respondent has financial or pecuniary interest in SESSI,

which is engaged in a business c ompeting with his clients, and, more
importantly, he occupies the highest position in SESSI, one cannot
help entertaining a doubt on his loyalty to his client AIB. This kind of
situation passes the second test of conflict of interest, which is whether
the acceptance of a new relationship would prevent the full discharge
of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double -dealing in the
performance of that duty. The close relationship of the maj ority
stockholders of both companies does not negate the conflict of
interest. Neither does his protestation that his shareholding in SESSI
is a mere pebble among the sands.

In view of all of the foregoing, we find the respondent guilty of

serious misconduct for representing conflicting interests.

Furthermore, it must be noted that Republic Act No. 5487,

otherwise known as the Private Security Agency Law , prohibits a
person from organizing or having an interest in more than one security
agency. From respondents position paper, it can be culled that
Leodegario Quiambao is the president and managing director of AIB,
holding 60% of the outstanding shares; while his four other siblings
who are permanent residents in the United States own the remaining
40%. [ 2 4 ] This prohibition notwithstanding, the respondent organized
SESSI, with Leodegarios wife and son as majority stockholders holding
about 70% of the outstanding sha res and with him (the respondent),
as well as the rest of the stockholders, holding minimal shares. [ 2 5 ] In
doing so, the respondent virtually allowed Leodegario a nd the latters
wife to violate or circumvent the law by having an interest in more
than one security agency. It must be noted that in the affidavit [ 2 6 ] of
Leodegarios wife, she mentioned of their conjugal property. In the
absence of evidence to the contrary, the property relation of
Leodegario and his wife can be presumed to be that of conjugal
partnership of gains; hence, the majority shares in AIB and SESSI are
the conjugal property of Leodegario and his wife, thereby placing
themselves in possession of an interest in more than one security
agency in contravention of R.A. No. 5487. Thus, in organizing SESSI,
the respondent violated Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code o f Professional
Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to promote respect for the law
and refrain from counseling or abetting activities aimed at defiance of
the law.

As to the recommendation that the penalty be reduced from a

suspension of one year to a st ern warning, we find the same to be
without basis. We are disturbed by the reduction made by the IBP
Board of Governors of the penalty recommended by the investigating
commissioner without clearly and distinctly stating the facts and
reasons on which that reduction is based.

Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court reads in part

as follows:

SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors .

(a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be
reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record
and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his
report. The decision of the Board upon such review shall
be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the
facts and the reasons on which it is based.

We may consider the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors as

a memorandum decision adopting by reference the report of the
investigating commissioner. However, we look with disfavor the
change in the recommended penalty without any explanation therefor.
Again, we remind the IBP Board of Governors of the importance of the
requirement to announce in plain terms its legal reasoning, since the
requirement that its decision in disciplinary proceedings must state
the facts and the reasons on which its decision is based is akin to what
is required of the decisions of courts of record. [ 2 7 ] The reasons for
handing down a penalty occupy no lesser station than any other
portion of the ratio.

In similar cases where the respondent was found guilty of

representing conflicting interests a penalty ranging from one to three
years suspension was imposed. [ 2 8 ] In this case, we find that a
suspension from the practice of law for one year is warranted.
 WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nestor A. Bamba is hereby
held GUILTYof violation of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 and Rule 1.02 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1)
YEAR effective from receipt of this Resolution, with a warning that a
similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar

Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

FERNANDO MARTIN O. PENA, A.C. No. 7298

Complainant, [Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1565]

Present:

- versus - QUISUMBING, J.,

Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO, VELASCO, JR.,JJ.
Respondent.
Promulgated:
June 25, 2007

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:

In this administrative complaint, a lawyer is charged with violation of Rule

19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for writing a demand
letter the contents of which threatened complainant with the filing of criminal
cases for tax evasion and falsification of documents.

Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio (respondent) appeared as legal counsel for Grace C.

Hufana in an illegal dismissal case before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). Sometime in August 2005, complainant Fernando Martin O. Pena, as
President of MOF Company, Inc. (Subic), received a notice from the Conciliation
and Mediation Center of the NLRC for a mediation/conciliation conference. In the
conference, respondent, in behalf of his client, submitted a claim for separation
pay arising from her alleged illegal dismissal. Complainant rejected the claim as
being baseless. Complainant thereafter sent notices to Hufana for the latter to
explain her absences and to return to work. In reply to this return to work notice,
respondent wrote a letter to complainant reiterating his clients claim for separation
pay. The letter also contained the following threat to the company:

BUT if these are not paid on August 10, 2005, we will be constrained to file and claim
bigger amounts including moral damages to the tune of millions under established
precedence of cases and laws. In addition to other multiple charges like:

1. Tax evasion by the millions of pesos of income not reported to the

government.

2. Criminal Charges for Tax Evasion

 3. Criminal Charges for Falsification of Documents

4. Cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws.

These are reserved for future actions in case of failure to pay the above amounts as
settlements in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).[1]

Believing that the contents of the letter deviated from accepted ethical
standards, complainant filed an administrative complaint[2] with the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Respondent filed an
Answer with Impleader (Motion to Dismiss and Counterclaims)[3] claiming that Atty.
Emmanuel A. Jocson, complainants legal counsel, also played an important part in
imputing the malicious, defamatory, and fabricated charges against him.
Respondent also pointed out that the complaint had no certification against forum
shopping and was motivated only to confuse the issues then pending before the
Labor Arbiter. By way of counterclaim, respondent asked for damages and for the
disbarment of Atty. Jocson. Respondent also asked the IBP to endorse the
prosecution of Atty. Jocson for Usurpation of Public Functions[4] and for violation of
the Notarial Law.[5]

A mandatory conference was held on 6 December 2005 but respondent

failed to appear.[6] Both parties were thereafter required to submit their position
papers.

The Report and Recommendation[7] of Investigating Commissioner Milagros

V. San Juan found that complainant, failed to file his position paper and to comply
with Administrative Circular No. 04-94 requiring a certificate against forum
shopping and, accordingly, recommended the dismissal of the complaint against
respondent. On 26 May 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.[8] On 10 July
2006, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted to the Supreme Court the
notice of said Resolution and the records of the case.[9] Thereafter, on 18 August
2006, respondent filed with the IBP a Motion for Reconsideration (for Modification
of Decision)[10] reiterating his claim of damages against complainant in the amount
of four hundred million pesos (P400,000,000.00), or its equivalent in dollars, for
filing the false, malicious, defamers [sic], fraudulent, illegal fabricators [sic],
malevolent[,] oppressive, evasive filing [of] a groundless and false suit.[11]

Complainant thereafter filed this Petition for Review (of the Resolution of
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline)[12] alleging that he personally submitted and
filed with the IBP his position paper, after serving a copy thereof on respondent by
registered mail. He further alleges that he was deprived of his right to due process
when the IBP dismissed his complaint without considering his position paper and
without ruling on the merits thereof.

Complainant accordingly prays for the reversal and setting aside of the 26
May 2006 Resolution[13] of the IBP Board of Governors and the remand of the case
to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline for proper adjudication and disposition on
the merits.

Based on the records, there is truth to complainants assertion that he filed

his position paper on 21 December 2005, after serving a copy of the same to
respondent. The IBP stamp on the front page of said document shows that it was
received by the IBP on 21 December 2005. The registry receipt attached to the
same document also shows that it was sent by registered mail to respondent on
the same date. [14]

Complainant, however, omitted to offer any explanation in his petition

before this Court for his failure to attach a certification against forum shopping in
his complaint against respondent.
 The requirement of a certification against forum shopping was originally
required by Circular No. 28-91, dated 8 February 1994, issued by this Court for
every petition filed with the Court or the Court of Appeals. Administrative Circular
No. 04-94, made effective on 1 April 1994, expanded the certification requirement
to include cases filed in courts and quasi-judicial agencies below this Court and the
Court of Appeals. Ultimately, the Court adopted paragraphs (1) and (2) of
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 to become Section 5, Rule 7 of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[15] Said rule states that a violation thereof would
constitute contempt of court and be cause for the summary dismissal of both
petitions without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel
of the party concerned.[16]

The Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors took against
complainant his failure to attach the certification against forum shopping to his
complaint and consequently dismissed his complaint. This Court, however,
disagrees and, accordingly, grants the petition. However, a remand of the case to
the IBP would unduly prolong its adjudication.

The Courts determination is anchored on the sui generis nature of

disbarment proceedings, the reasons for the certification against forum shopping
requirement, complainants subsequent compliance with the requirement, and the
merit of complainants complaint against respondent.

The Court, in the case of In re Almacen,[17] dwelt on the sui generis character
of disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, thus:

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by
 the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment,
it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its
primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such.Hence, in the exercise of
its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for
his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of
the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of
an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant
or a prosecutor.[18] [Emphasis supplied]

In view of the nature of disbarment proceedings, the certification against

forum shopping to be attached to the complaint, if one is required at all in such
proceedings, must refer to another administrative case for disciplinary proceedings
against the same respondent, because such other proceedings or action is one that
necessarily involves the same issues as the one posed in the disbarment complaint
to which the certification is supposedly to be attached.

Further, the rationale for the requirement of a certification against forum

shopping is to apprise the Court of the pendency of another action or claim
involving the same issues in another court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, and
thereby precisely avoid the forum shopping situation. Filing multiple petitions or
complaints constitutes abuse of court processes,[19] which tends to degrade the
administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds
to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.[20] Furthermore,
the rule proscribing forum shopping seeks to promote candor and transparency
among lawyers and their clients in the pursuit of their cases before the courts to
promote the orderly administration of justice, prevent undue inconvenience upon
the other party, and save the precious time of the courts. It also aims to prevent
the embarrassing situation of two or more courts or agencies rendering conflicting
resolutions or decisions upon the same issue.[21]
 It is in this light that we take a further look at the necessity of attaching a
certification against forum shopping to a disbarment complaint. It would seem that
the scenario sought to be avoided, i.e., the filing of multiple suits and the possibility
of conflicting decisions, rarely happens in disbarment complaints considering that
said proceedings are either taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any
person.[22] Thus, if the complainant in a disbarment case fails to attach a
certification against forum shopping, the pendency of another disciplinary action
against the same respondent may still be ascertained with ease. We have
previously held that the rule requiring a certification of forum shopping to
accompany every initiatory pleading, should not be interpreted with such absolute
literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all
rules of procedurewhich is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as
possible.[23]

At any rate, complainants subsequent compliance with the requirement

cured the supposed defect in the original complaint. The records show that
complainant submitted the required certification against forum shopping on 6
December 2006 when he filed his Comment/Opposition to respondents Motion to
Dismiss the present petition.

Finally, the intrinsic merit of complainants case against respondent justifies

the grant of the present petition. Respondent does not deny authorship of the
threatening letter to complainant, even spiritedly contesting the charge that the
letter is unethical.

Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall

represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law, reminding legal
practitioners that a lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice; to that end, his clients success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought
to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. [24] In particular,
Rule 19.01 commands that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to
attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in
presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an
improper advantage in any case or proceeding. Under this Rule, a lawyer should
not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against
the adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage to compel the
adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyers client.[25]

In the case at bar, respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule
proscribe. Through his letter, he threatened complainant that should the latter fail
to pay the amounts they propose as settlement, he would file and claim bigger
amounts including moral damages, as well as multiple charges such as tax evasion,
falsification of documents, and cancellation of business license to operate due to
violations of laws. The threats are not only unethical for violating Canon 19, but
they also amount to blackmail.

Blackmail is the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation

or exposure or opposition in the public prints,obtaining of value from a person as a
condition of refraining from making an accusation against him, or disclosing some
secret calculated to operate to his prejudice. In common parlance and in general
acceptation, it is equivalent to and synonymous with extortion, the exaction of
money either for the performance of a duty, the prevention of an injury, or the
exercise of an influence. Not infrequently, it is extorted by threats, or by operating
on the fears or the credulity, or by promises to conceal or offers to expose the
weaknesses, the follies, or the crime of the victim.[26]

In Sps. Boyboy v. Atty. Yabut, Jr.,[27] we held that [a]n accusation for
blackmail and extortion is a very serious one which, if properly substantiated,
would entail not only respondents disbarment from the practice of law, but also a
possible criminal prosecution.[28] While the respondent in Boyboy was exonerated
for lack of evidence, the same may not be said of respondent in the present case
for he admits to writing the offensive letter.
In fact, respondent does not find anything wrong with what he wrote, dismissing
the same as merely an act of pointing out massive violations of the law by the other
party, and, with boldness, asserting that a lawyer is under obligation to tell the
truth, to report to the government commission of offenses punishable by the
State.[29] He further asserts that the writing of demand letters is a standard practice
and tradition and that our laws allow and encourage the settlement of disputes.

Respondents assertions, however, are misleading, for it is quite obvious that

respondents threat to file the cases against complainant was designed to secure
some leverage to compel the latter to give in to his clients demands. It was not
respondents intention to point out complainants violations of the law as he so
gallantly claims. Far from it, the letter even contains an implied promise to keep
silent about the said violations if payment of the claim is made on the date
indicated.

Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in

this jurisdiction. It is usually done by a lawyer pursuant to the principal-agent
relationship that he has with his client, the principal. Thus, in the performance of
his role as agent, the lawyer may be tasked to enforce his clients claim and to take
all the steps necessary to collect it, such as writing a letter of demand requiring
payment within a specified period. However, the letter in this case contains more
than just a simple demand to pay. It even contains a threat to file retaliatory
charges against complainant which have nothing to do with his clients claim for
separation pay. The letter was obviously designed to secure leverage to compel
complainant to yield to their claims. Indeed, letters of this nature are definitely
proscribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Respondent cannot claim the sanctuary provided by the privileged

communication rule under which a private communication executed in the
performance of a legal duty is not actionable. The privileged nature of the letter
was removed when respondent used it to blackmail complainant and extort from
the latter compliance with the demands of his client.
 However, while the writing of the letter went beyond ethical standards, we
hold that disbarment is too severe a penalty to be imposed on respondent,
considering that he wrote the same out of his overzealousness to protect his clients
interests. Accordingly, the more appropriate penalty is reprimand.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted. The 26 May

2006Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio is hereby found liable for violation of Rule 19.01
of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is accordingly meted
out the penalty of REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED
 SECOND DIVISION

RURAL BANK OF CALAPE, A.C. No. 5736

INC. (RBCI) BOHOL,
Complainant, Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
PEREZ,* JJ.

ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT

FLORIDO, Promulgated:
Respondent.
June 18, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by the members of the Board of

Directors[1] of the Rural Bank of Calape, Inc. (RBCI) Bohol against respondent Atty.
James Benedict Florido (respondent) for acts constituting grave coercion and
threats when he, as counsel for the minority stockholders of RBCI, led his clients in
physically taking over the management and operation of the bank through force,
violence and intimidation.

The Facts

On 18 April 2002, RBCI filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent.[2]RBCI

alleged that respondent violated his oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code).

According to RBCI, on 1 April 2002, respondent and his clients, Dr. Domeciano
Nazareno, Dr. Remedios Relampagos, Dr. Manuel Relampagos, and Felix Rengel
(Nazareno-Relampagos group), through force and intimidation, with the use of
armed men, forcibly took over the management and the premises of RBCI. They
also forcibly evicted Cirilo A. Garay (Garay), the bank manager, destroyed the banks
vault, and installed their own staff to run the bank.

In his comment, respondent denied RBCIs allegations. Respondent explained that

he acted in accordance with the authority granted upon him by the Nazareno-
Relampagos group, the lawfully and validly elected Board of Directors of
RBCI.Respondent said he was merely effecting a lawful and valid change of
management. Respondent alleged that a termination notice was sent to Garay but
he refused to comply. On 1 April 2002, to ensure a smooth transition of managerial
operations, respondent and the Nazareno-Relampagos group went to the bank to
ask Garay to step down. However, Garay reacted violently and grappled with the
security guards long firearm. Respondent then directed the security guards to
prevent entry into the bank premises of individuals who had no transaction with
the bank. Respondent, through the orders of the Nazareno-Relampagos group, also
changed the locks of the banks vault.
Respondent added that the criminal complaint for malicious mischief filed against
him by RBCI was already dismissed; while the complaint for grave coercion was
ordered suspended because of the existence of a prejudicial question.Respondent
said that the disbarment complaint was filed against him in retaliation for the
administrative cases he filed against RBCIs counsel and the trial court judges of
Bohol.

Moreover, respondent claimed that RBCI failed to present any evidence to prove
their allegations. Respondent added that the affidavits attached to the complaint
were never identified, affirmed, or confirmed by the affiants and that none of the
documentary exhibits were originals or certified true copies.

The Ruling of the IBP

On 28 September 2005, IBP Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner

Villadolid, Jr.) submitted his report and declared that respondent failed to live up
to the exacting standards expected of him as vanguard of law and
justice.[3]Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. recommended the imposition on
respondent of a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six months to
one year with a warning that the repetition of similar conduct in the future will
warrant a more severe penalty.

According to Commissioner Villadolid, Jr., respondent knew or ought to have

known that his clients could not just forcibly take over the management and
premises of RBCI without a valid court order.Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. noted that
the right to manage and gain majority control over RBCI was one of the issues
pending before the trial court in Civil Case No. 6628. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.
said that respondent had no legal basis to implement the take over of RBCI and that
it was a naked power grab without any semblance of legality whatsoever.
Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. added that the administrative complaint against
respondent before the IBP is independent of the dismissal and suspension of the
criminal cases against respondent.Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. also noted that RBCI
complied with the IBP Rules of Procedure when they filed a verified complaint and
submitted duly notarized affidavits. Moreover, both RBCI and respondent agreed
to dispense with the mandatory conference hearing and, instead, simultaneously
submit their position papers.

On 20 March 2006, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2006-
120 which declared that respondent dismally failed to live up to the exacting
standards of the law profession and suspended respondent from the practice of
law for one year with a warning that repetition of similar conduct will warrant a
more severe penalty.[4]

On 5 July 2006, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 11 December

2008 Resolution, the IBP denied respondents motion.[5]

The Ruling of the Court

We affirm the IBP Board of Governorsresolution.

The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land.[6]Likewise,
it is the lawyers duty to promote respect for the law and legal processes and to
abstain from activities aimed at defiance of the law or lessening confidence in the
legal system.[7]

Canon 19 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal
within the bounds of the law. For this reason, Rule 15.07 of the Code requires a
lawyer to impress upon his client compliance with the law and principles of
fairness. A lawyer must employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client.[8] It is his duty to counsel his clients to use peaceful and
lawful methods in seeking justice and refrain from doing an intentional wrong to
their adversaries.[9]

We agree with Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.s conclusion:

Lawyers are indispensable instruments of justice and peace. Upon taking their
professional oath, they become guardians of truth and the rule of law. Verily, when they
appear before a tribunal, they act not merely as representatives of a party but, first and
foremost, as officers of the court.Thus, their duty to protect their clients interests is
secondary to their obligation to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice.While they are obliged to present every available legal remedy or defense, their
fidelity to their clients must always be made within the parameters of law and ethics,
never at the expense of truth, the law, and the fair administration of justice.[10]

A lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice. To that end,
his clients success is wholly subordinate.His conduct ought to and must always be
scrupulously observant of the law and ethics.[11] Any means, not honorable, fair and
honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his
clients cause, is condemnable and unethical.[12]

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido GUILTY of violating

Canon 19 and Rules 1.02 and 15.07 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPENDrespondent from the practice of law for
one year effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondents personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and in all courts in the country
for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED
 FIRST DIVISION

SPOUSES DAVID and A.C. No. 6353

MARISA WILLIAMS,
Complainants,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

ATTY. RUDY T. ENRIQUEZ,Promulgated:

Respondent.
February 27, 2006

x--------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez stands charged with unlawful, dishonest, immoral and
deceitful acts in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons
of Professional Ethics, and with conduct unbecoming an attorney. The charges are
contained in the Joint Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment[1]filed by the spouses
David W. Williams and Marisa B. Williams.

It appears that respondent is the counsel of record of the plaintiffs in Civil

Case No. 13443[2] pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
33, Dumaguete City where complainants are the defendants. According to the
complainant-spouses, Marisa Williams bought the lot subject of the controversy. A
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was then issued in her favor, stating that she is
Filipino, married to David W. Williams, an American citizen.[3] On January 8, 2004,
respondent charged her with falsification of public documents before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No.
2004-34.[4]

The spouses Williams further alleged, thus:

21. That, in malicious violation of the rules governing the practice of law,
Attorney Rudy T. Enriquez cited outdated material in his complaint-affidavit (Annex A-1)
and in his comments to counter-affidavit (Annex A-2). He then knowingly applied this
stale law in a perverse fashion to argue that Marisa Batacan Williams automatically lost
her Filipino citizenship when she married an American, and was thus prohibited to own
land in the Philippines, thereby making her guilty of falsification in the Deed she
executed to buy property in Negros Oriental.

2.2. That in paragraph #1 of her counter-affidavit (Annex A-2) Marisa cites

Article IV, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that she would not lose her
citizenship when she married an American unless she renounced it in a specific act.

2.3 That, in reply, Attorney Enriquez, quotes more outdated law, declaring that
her act of marrying her husband was equivalent to renouncing her citizenship. He also
doggedly attempts to show that the 1987 Constitution supports his position, not Marisas
(Annex A-4).[5]

Complainants pointed out that the respondent is a retired judge, who knows
that the false charge (that Marisa Williams is an American) will not prevail in the
end.[6]

In his Comments by Way of Motion to Dismiss,[7] respondent enumerated

matters which to his mind were evidence of the acts of falsification of complainant
Marisa Williams. He insisted that the complaint for disbarment was a mere tactic
to divert attention from the criminal charges against the complainants, and that
the charges against him were bereft of any factual basis.

On December 1, 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[8] Forthwith, the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline scheduled the case for mandatory
conference/hearing. However, only the respondent appeared. The parties were
then directed to submit their verified position papers.

In their Position Paper, complainants claimed that respondent had

maliciously and knowingly filed fabricated cases against them and that his acts
were forms of attempted extortion. They also adopted their joint complaint-
affidavit by way of incorporation, along with their other pleadings.

For his part, respondent maintained that complainant Marisa Williams was
no longer a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines as a result of her marriage to
David Williams.

In her Report and Recommendation dated June 10, 1995, Commissioner

Rebecca Villanueva-Maala ruled that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of
the law and should be suspended for six (6) months. The IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline adopted the foregoing recommendation in its Resolution No. XVII-2005-
114 dated October 22, 2005, with the modification that respondent be
reprimanded, with a warning and advice to study each and every opinion he may
give to his clients.

The Court agrees that respondent is administratively liable for his actuations.
As found by the Investigating Commissioner:
 There is no evidence shown by respondent that complainant
Marisa Bacatan-Williams has renounced her Filipino citizenship except
her Certificate of Marriage, which does not show that she has
automatically acquired her husbands citizenship upon her marriage to
him. The cases cited by respondent are not applicable in this case as it is
clear that they refer to aliens acquiring lands in the Philippines.

The Bar has been integrated for the attainment of the following objectives: (a)
elevate the standards of the legal profession, (b) improve the administration of justice,
and (c) to enable the bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively (In re:
Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 49 SCRA 22). In line with these objectives of the
Integrated Bar,lawyers must keep themselves abreast of legal developments. To do
this, the lawyer must walk with the dynamic movements of the law and jurisprudence. He
must acquaint himself at least with the newly promulgated laws, the recent decisions
of the Supreme Court and of the significant decisions of the Court of Appeals. There are
other executive orders, administrative circulars, regulations and other rules promulgated
by other competent authorities engaged in the administration of justice. The lawyers life
is one of continuous and laborious study, otherwise, his skill and knowledge of the law
and related disciplines will lag behind and become obscure due to obsoleteness (Canon
5, Code of Professional Responsibility.)[9]

As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, Canon 5 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility requires that a lawyer be updated in the latest laws and
jurisprudence.[10] Indeed, when the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as
if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[11] As a retired judge,
respondent should have known that it is his duty to keep himself well-informed of
the latest rulings of the Court on the issues and legal problems confronting a
client.[12] In this case, the law he apparently misconstrued is no less than the
Constitution,[13] the most basic law of the land.[14] Implicit in a lawyers mandate to
protect a clients interest to the best of his/her ability and with utmost diligence is
the duty to keep abreast of the law and legal developments, and participate in
continuing legal education programs.[15] Thus, in championing the interest of clients
and defending cases, a lawyer must not only be guided by the strict standards
imposed by the lawyers oath, but should likewise espouse legally sound
arguments for clients, lest the latters cause be dismissed on a technical
ground.[16] Ignorance encompasses both substantive and procedural laws.[17]

We find too harsh the recommended penalty of the Investigating

Commissioner. It must be stressed that the power to disbar or suspend must be
exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously
affects the standing and character of a lawyer as an officer of the Court and
member of the bar will disbarment or suspension be imposed as a
penalty.[18]Pursuant to the IBP Commission on Bar Disciplines Guidelines for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions,[19] and considering further that this is respondents first
infraction, we find that the penalty of reprimand as recommended by the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, will suffice.

We likewise note that in their pleadings in this case, the parties repeatedly
invoked their arguments in their pending cases below. Thus, we find it unnecessary
to rule over such arguments, which have yet to be determined on the merits in the
courts a quo.

WHEREFORE, for gross ignorance of the law, Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez

is REPRIMANDED and ADVISED to carefully study the opinions he may give to his
clients. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar act shall be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

EMILIA R. HERNANDEZ, A.C. No. 9387

(Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1562)
Complainant,
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
PEREZ,
- versus -
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

June 20, 2012

ATTY. VENANCIO B. PADILLA,
Respondent.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

RESOLUTION
SERENO, J.:

This is a disbarment case filed by Emilia Hernandez (complainant) against her

lawyer, Atty. Venancio B. Padilla (respondent) of Padilla Padilla Bautista Law
Offices, for his alleged negligence in the handling of her case.

The records disclose that complainant and her husband were the respondents in
an ejectment case filed against them with the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC).

In a Decision[1] dated 28 June 2002, penned by Judge Rosmari D. Carandang (Judge

Carandang), the RTC ordered that the Deed of Sale executed in favor of
complainant be cancelled; and that the latter pay the complainant therein, Elisa
Duigan (Duigan), attorneys fees and moral damages.

Complainant and her husband filed their Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Thereafter,
the Court of Appeals (CA) ordered them to file their Appellants Brief. They chose
respondent to represent them in the case. On their behalf, he filed a Memorandum
on Appeal instead of an Appellants Brief. Thus, Duigan filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Appeal. The CA granted the Motion in a Resolution[2] dated 16 December 2003.

No Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the Resolution dismissing the appeal was
filed by the couple. Complainant claims that because respondent ignored the
Resolution, he acted with deceit, unfaithfulness amounting to malpractice of
law.[3] Complainant and her husband failed to file an appeal, because respondent
never informed them of the adverse decision. Complainant further claims that she
asked respondent several times about the status of the appeal, but despite
inquiries he deliberately withheld response [sic], to the damage and prejudice of
the spouses.[4]

The Resolution became final and executory on 8 January 2004. Complainant was
informed of the Resolution sometime in July 2005, when the Sheriff of the RTC
came to her house and informed her of the Resolution.

On 9 September 2005, complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint[5] with the

Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), seeking
the disbarment of respondent on the following grounds: deceit, malpractice, and
grave misconduct. Complainant prays for moral damages in the amount of
₱350,000.

Through an Order[6] dated 12 September 2005, Director of Bar Discipline Rogelio A.

Vinluan ordered respondent to submit an answer to the Complaint. In his Counter-
Affidavit/Answer,[7] respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the Complaint.

Respondent explained that he was not the lawyer of complainant. He averred that
prior to the mandatory conference set by the IBP on 13 December 2005, he had
never met complainant, because it was her husband who had personally transacted
with him. According to respondent, the husband despondently pleaded to me to
prepare a Memorandum on Appeal because according to him the period given by
the CA was to lapse within two or three days.[8] Thus, respondent claims that he
filed a Memorandum on Appeal because he honestly believed that it is this pleading
which was required.[9]

Before filing the Memorandum, respondent advised complainants husband to

settle the case. The latter allegedly gestured approval of the advice.[10]

After the husband of complainant picked up the Memorandum for filing,

respondent never saw or heard from him again and thus assumed that the husband
heeded his advice and settled the case. When respondent received an Order from
the CA requiring him to file a comment on the Motion to Dismiss filed by Duigan,
he instructed his office staff to contact Mr. Hernandez thru available means of
communication, but to no avail.[11] Thus, when complainants husband went to the
office of respondent to tell the latter that the Sheriff of the RTC had informed
complainant of the CAs Resolution dismissing the case, respondent was just as
surprised. The lawyer exclaimed, KALA KO BA NAKIPAG AREGLO NA KAYO.[12]

In his 5 January 2009 Report,[13] IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid,

Jr. found that respondent violated Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (the Code). He recommended that respondent be suspended from
practicing law from 3 to 6 months.
The board of governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XIX-2010-452 on 28 August
2010. Therein, they resolved to adopt and approve the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Respondent was suspended
from the practice of law for six months.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[14] He prayed for the relaxation of

the application of the Canons of the Code. On 14 January 2012, the IBP board of
governors passed Resolution No. XX-2012-17[15] partly granting his Motion and
reducing the penalty imposed to one-month suspension from the practice of law.

Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, acting Director for Bar Discipline
Dennis A.B. Funa, through a letter[16]addressed to then Chief Justice Renato C.
Corona, transmitted the documents pertaining to the disbarment Complaint
against respondent.

We adopt the factual findings of the board of governors of the IBP. This Court,
however, disagrees with its Decision to reduce the penalty to one-month
suspension. We thus affirm the six-month suspension the Board originally imposed
in its 28 August 2010 Resolution.

Respondent insists that he had never met complainant prior to the mandatory
conference set for the disbarment Complaint she filed against him. However, a
perusal of the Memorandum of Appeal filed in the appellate court revealed that he
had signed as counsel for the defendant-appellants therein, including complainant
and her husband.[17] The pleading starts with the following sentence:
DEFENDANT[S]-APPELLANTS, by counsel, unto this Honorable Court submit the
Memorandum and further allege that: x x x.[18] Nowhere does the document say
that it was filed only on behalf of complainants husband.

It is further claimed by respondent that the relation created between him and
complainants husband cannot be treated as a client-lawyer relationship, viz:

It is no more than a client needing a legal document and had it prepared by a lawyer for
a fee. Under the factual milieu and circumstances, it could not be said that a client
entrusted to a lawyer handling and prosecution of his case that calls for the strict
application of the Code; x x x[19]
As proof that none of them ever intended to enter into a lawyer-client relationship,
he also alleges that complainants husband never contacted him after the filing of
the Memorandum of Appeal. According to respondent, this behavior was very
unusual if he really believed that he engaged the formers services.[20]

Complainant pointed out in her Reply[21]that respondent was her lawyer, because
he accepted her case and an acceptance fee in the amount of ₱7,000.

According to respondent, however, [C]ontrary to the complainants claim that he

charged ₱7,000 as acceptance fee, the fee was only for the preparation of the
pleading which is even low for a Memorandum of Appeal: x x x.[22]

Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and

gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause.[23] Once a lawyer agrees to
handle a case, it is that lawyers duty to serve the client with competence and
diligence.[24] Respondent has failed to fulfill this duty.

According to respondent, he merely drafted the pleading that complainants

husband asked from him. Respondent also claims that he filed a Memorandum of
Appeal, because he honestly believed that this was the pleading required, based
on what complainants husband said.

The IBP Investigating Commissioners observation on this matter, in the 5 January

2009 Report, is correct. Regardless of the particular pleading his client may have
believed to be necessary, it was respondents duty to know the proper pleading to
be filed in appeals from RTC decisions, viz:

Having seen the Decision dated 18 June 2002 of the trial court, respondent should have
known that the mode of appeal to the Court of Appeals for said Decision is by ordinary
appeal under Section 2(a) Rule 41 of the1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In all such
cases, Rule 44 of the said Rules applies.[25]

When the RTC ruled against complainant and her husband, they filed a Notice of
Appeal. Consequently, what should apply is the rule on ordinary appealed cases or
Rule 44 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Rule 44 requires that the appellants brief
be filed after the records of the case have been elevated to the CA. Respondent, as
a litigator, was expected to know this procedure. Canon 5 of the Code reads:

CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing

legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well
as in the practical training of law students and assist in disseminating information
regarding the law and jurisprudence.

The obligations of lawyers as a consequence of their Canon 5 duty have been

expounded in Dulalia, Jr. v. Cruz,[26]to wit:

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for the law and legal processes. They are expected to be in the
forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it
the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal
developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be
conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they
may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of
the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.

In his MR, respondent begged for the consideration of the IBP, claiming that the
reason for his failure to file the proper pleading was that he did not have enough
time to acquaint himself thoroughly with the factual milieu of the case. The IBP
reconsidered and thereafter significantly reduced the penalty originally imposed.

Respondents plea for leniency should not have been granted.

The supposed lack of time given to respondent to acquaint himself with the facts
of the case does not excuse his negligence.

Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter
without adequate preparation. While it is true that respondent was not
complainants lawyer from the trial to the appellate court stage, this fact did not
excuse him from his duty to diligently study a case he had agreed to handle. If he
felt he did not have enough time to study the pertinent matters involved, as he was
approached by complainants husband only two days before the expiration of the
period for filing the Appellants Brief, respondent should have filed a motion for
extension of time to file the proper pleading instead of whatever pleading he could
come up with, just to beat the deadline set by the Court of Appeals.[27]

Moreover, respondent does not deny that he was given notice of the fact that he
filed the wrong pleading. However, instead of explaining his side by filing a
comment, as ordered by the appellate court, he chose to ignore the CAs Order. He
claims that he was under the presumption that complainant and her husband had
already settled the case, because he had not heard from the husband since the
filing of the latters Memorandum of Appeal.

This explanation does not excuse respondents actions.

First of all, there were several remedies that respondent could have availed
himself of, from the moment he received the Notice from the CA to the moment
he received the disbarment Complaint filed against him. But because of his
negligence, he chose to sit on the case and do nothing.

Second, respondent, as counsel, had the duty to inform his clients of the status of
their case. His failure to do so amounted to a violation of Rule 18.04 of the Code,
which reads:

18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.

If it were true that all attempts to contact his client proved futile, the least
respondent could have done was to inform the CA by filing a Notice of Withdrawal
of Appearance as counsel. He could have thus explained why he was no longer the
counsel of complainant and her husband in the case and informed the court that
he could no longer contact them.[28] His failure to take this measure proves his
negligence.

Lastly, the failure of respondent to file the proper pleading and a comment on
Duigans Motion to Dismiss is negligence on his part. Under 18.03 of the Code, a
lawyer is liable for negligence in handling the clients case, viz:
 Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them, otherwise their
negligence in fulfilling their duty would render them liable for disciplinary action.[29]

Respondent has failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer. When a lawyer violates
his duties to his client, he engages in unethical and unprofessional conduct for
which he should be held accountable.[30]

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Venancio Padilla is found guilty of violating Rules

18.02, 18.03, 18.04, as well as Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Hence, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6)
MONTHS and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar offense
will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent as
a member of the bar and furnished to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country
for their information and guidance.

No costs.

SO ORDERED
 FIRST DIVISION
JUAN DE LA CRUZ A.M. No. RTJ-07-2043
(CONCERNED CITIZEN OF
LEGAZPI CITY),
Complainant, Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.

JUDGE RUBEN B. CARRETAS,

Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court of Legazpi City,
Branch 9,
Respondent. Promulgated:

September 5, 2007

x---------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:

This administrative case stems from an anonymous complaint by Juan de la

Cruz, a concerned citizen of Legazpi City, against respondent Judge Ruben B.
Carretas, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City, Branch 9.
The letter-complaint[1] read:

The Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court

and The Honorable Court Administrator

Supreme Court, Manila

Sir and Madam,

Kami po ay sumulat sa inyo dahil po sa reklamo sa masamang ugali at asal ni Judge Ruben
Car[r]etas ng RTC, Branch 9, Legazpi City.

Siya po ay isang mayabang na Judge at mahilig mang insulto sa pamamagitan ng side

comments sa mga testigo, abogado at fiscal, parang siya na lang ang may alam sa batas.
Bilang Judge siya na po ang nagdirect, at cross-examine sa mga testigo.

Dahil sa kanyang ginagawa napapahiya ang mga testigo, abogado at fiscal sa harap
ng publiko. Nawawala din po ang respeto ng publiko sa justice system.

Kami po ay umaasa at nanalangin sa madaliang aksyon ng inyong opisina para

malutas ang problemang ito.

Salamat at mabuhay po kayong lahat.

 Ang gumagalang,
(Sgd. Juan de la Cruz)
Concern[ed] citizen of Legazpi [City]

In his comment,[2] respondent judge surmised that the complaint was

initiated by a lawyer whose petition for declaration of nullity of marriage was not
granted. He denied the accusation and claimed that he had not insulted anyone.
He then narrated that, in his first few months in office, he experienced the following
exasperating and somewhat amusing incidents: a lawyer insisting on further
examining a witness he had already subjected to re-cross examination; a
prosecutor proceeding with the presentation of evidence when the accused had
not yet been arraigned; a lawyer appearing for an absent counsel de parte and
manifesting that he was appearing in corroboration with the latter; lawyers
appearing without observing the proper dress code; a lawyer offering the
testimony of his witness to collaborate the testimony of another witness; a lawyer
manifesting that he was ready for trial but turning out to be unprepared with his
documentary evidence, prompting the court to call a recess; a case for unjust
vexation committed against a minor being raffled to his sala when the records
showed that the victim was waylaid, boxed and dragged to a forested area where
the accused touched her private part and mashed her breasts; a case being filed for
kidnapping and serious illegal detention only despite the fact that the girl was raped
while in captivity. Respondent judge stated that he never encountered these
mistakes in all his years of law practice in Manila. Thus, he was shocked because he
thought that these things happened only in anecdotes.
Respondent judge observed that due to their familiarity with each other, lawyers
appearing in his sala hardly objected even to obviously objectionable questions. In
such instances, he called the attention of counsels because, to his mind, they were
making a moro-moro[3]out of the proceedings.

Respondent judge also stated that, while he may have used harsh word
sometimes, they were made out of exasperation and with the intention merely to
right the wrong committed in his presence, not to insult anyone. Nonetheless, he
apologized to those who may have been offended by his remarks.

In connection with the complaint, Judge Romeo S. Daas, executive judge of

the RTC of Legazpi City, conducted a discreet investigation.[4] He interviewed
lawyers who appeared in the sala of respondent judge. He requested them to
submit their respective written comments on the decorum of respondent judge
when holding trial. Among these comments were the following:
1. Atty. Mariano B. Baranda, Jr.

Respondent judge should avoid making embarrassing, insulting and abrasive

remarks. He should also limit himself to asking clarificatory questions.[5]

2. Atty. Expedito P. Nebres

If not in open court respondent judge is kind, courteous and respectful.
However, in open court he is arrogant and boastful. He has a bad habit in making
embarrassing or insulting remarks when presiding over cases. Most of the time, he was
the one conducting direct and cross-examination of witnesses. He used to scold, harass
and embarrass witnesses, litigants, lawyers, prosecutors and PAO[6] lawyers for just a
slight mistake in procedure.[7]
 3. Atty. Alexis C. Albao

In the course of presentation of evidence for his client, he was insulted and
subjected to sarcastic remarks by respondent judge, not once but for several occasions.
This traumatized him and made him avoid reading the transcript of stenographic notes
of the said hearing until now. In one occasion, respondent judge proceeded to cut short
the proceedings. When he manifested that he would cross-examine the defendant,
respondent judge stood from his seat and in a sarcastic manner looked backward
manifesting that he was not interested or not listening to the cross-examination. Thus,
he was discouraged from proceeding with his cross-examination. Most of the time,
respondent judge would unduly intervene in the presentation of evidence and asked
more questions than counsel. Respondent judge showed apathy to those who were
subjected to his insults. He insisted that others submit to his way of doing things. He
showed inflexibility to minor mistakes.[8]

4. Atty. Ricardo V. de Jesus

While he was in the process of conducting direct examination, respondent judge

instructed him to ask questions which respondent judge thought to be material. When
he was through with his direct examination, respondent judge asked him in open court
how long he had been in private practice. He replied that he had been practicing for only
a period of one and a half (1) years. Respondent judge then told him to prepare supposed
direct questions and expected answers. He felt embarrassed.[9]

On October 6, 2005, the members of the Provincial Prosecution Office of

Albay held a meeting to discuss the matter of assigning a public prosecutor to the
sala of respondent judge. During the meeting, the prosecutors raised their concern
about the behavior of respondent judge. Provincial prosecutor Benigno L. Tolosa
furnished Judge Daas with a copy of the minutes of the meeting.[10] The relevant
portions of the minutes[11] were:
II. DISCUSSION
The Provincial Prosecutor informed the group about the purpose of the
meeting. He said that the prosecutor assigned in RTC Branch 9, Prosecutor
Maria Miranda-Gojar will soon be transferring to the Office of the Regional
State Prosecutor. He asked suggestions from the group on how to go about
the matter of assigning a prosecutor in Branch 9 considering that all
prosecutors have their own court assignment and considering further that
the Presiding Judge of said Branch has a behavioral and attitudinal problem.

Considering that the matter to be discussed involves the problem with the
Presiding Judge, the Provincial Prosecutor requested those prosecutors
[present] to share their experiences in the court with the Presiding Judge.

Prosecutor [Eduardo B.] Quinzon remarked that the judge has a sudden burst
of temper and wild moods, insulting and humiliating lawyers in front of their
clients even in the presence of other people.

Prosecutor Gojar added that the Presiding Judge has a volatile temper and is
fond of insulting and humiliating witnesses and also lawyers. She also said
that during arraignment or trial of cases, he would even call her attention
and would insult the prosecutor who made the Information and Resolution
of the case and even the Chief who approved the same.

Prosecutor [Maria Teresa A.] Mahiwo added that she observed one hearing
[where] the Presiding Judge [scolded] the two private lawyers who [were]
much older than him. She said that being assigned in Branch 9 will not be
good for the health of any prosecutor.

III. RECOMMENDATION/AGREEMENT
 Prosecutor [Elmer M.] Lanuzo opined that because the judge is
temperamental, he should be given a fiscal who is not temperamental.

It was resolved by the group that no prosecutor will be assigned at RTC

Branch 9 considering that all prosecutors have their own court assignment.

It was also agreed that the Presiding Judge can request from the Department
of Justice a prosecutor who would attend to the cases in his sala.[12]

Judge Daas also received a letter[13]from city prosecutor Palmarin E. Rubio of

Legazpi City. City prosecutor Rubio stated that the prosecutor assigned to the sala
of respondent judge did not want to comment on the conduct of respondent judge.
He suggested that members of an audit team from this Court be made to observe
the proceedings in Branch 9 to see and feel the tension[-]charged atmosphere in
the sala once the trial started.[14]

To his report, Judge Daas attached copies of the comments of the lawyers he
interviewed, the letter of provincial prosecutor Tolosa enclosing the minutes of the
meeting of the public prosecutors in Albay and the letter of city prosecutor
Rubio.[15] He concluded that the charges against respondent judge were true.
However, he refrained from recommending any definite action against him and left
the matter to the sound discretion of the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA).[16]

In its report,[17] the OCA adopted the findings of Judge Daas and made the
following recommendation:
 RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the
Honorable Court is our recommendation that respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Legazpi City be ADVISED to observe proper judicial
decorum and to conscientiously abide by the mandates of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics in the exercise of his official functions.[18]

We disagree. Respondent judge deserves more than mere advice.

Respondent judge should be reminded of Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 and

Section 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary:[19]
CANON 2

INTEGRITY

Integrity is essential not only in the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the
personal demeanor of judges.

SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but
that it is perceived to be so in view of a reasonable observer.

SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the
integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be
done.

xxx xxx xxx

CANON 4
 PROPRIETY

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge.

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.

A judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. He should be learned in the

law, dignified in demeanor, refined in speech and virtuous in character. Besides

having the requisite learning in the law, he must exhibit that hallmark judicial

temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint.[20] In this connection, he should

be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court.[21]A judge

who is inconsiderate, discourteous or uncivil to lawyers, litigants or witnesses who

appear in his sala commits an impropriety and fails in his duty to reaffirm the

peoples faith in the judiciary. He also violates Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code

of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which provides:

SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the
court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers
and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar
 conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence,
direction or control.[22] (emphasis supplied)

It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer,[23] litigant or witness. The

act betrays lack of patience, prudence and restraint.[24] Thus, a judge must at all
times be temperate in his language.[25] He must choose his words, written or
spoken, with utmost care and sufficient control. The wise and just man is esteemed
for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his persuasiveness.[26]

Equanimity and judiciousness should be the constant marks of a dispenser of

justice.[27] A judge should always keep his passion guarded. He can never allow it to
run loose and overcome his reason. He descends to the level of a sharp-tongued,
ill-mannered petty tyrant when he utters harsh words, snide remarks or sarcastic
comments. As a result, he degrades the judicial office and erodes public confidence
in the judiciary.

Against this backdrop, respondent judge indeed appears arrogant and

boastful not only in the eyes of the anonymous complainant but also to the lawyers
who practice in his sala. He revealed a hint of arrogance in his comment when he
professed exasperation over minor procedural mistakes[28] or even negligible
lapses (such as the confusion in the use of collaborate and corroborate). He also
displayed a condescending attitude toward lawyers in the provinces when he
implied that they were inferior to lawyers from Manila. As a judge, he should
ensure that his conduct is always above reproach and perceived to be so by a
reasonable observer. He must never show conceit or even an appearance thereof,
or any kind of impropriety.
 The dispensation of justice is a joint responsibility of the judge and the
lawyer.[29] A sense of shared responsibility which is a crucial factor in the
administration of justice is expected of them.[30] They should co-exist in a spirit of
cooperation and mutual respect, not animosity and derision. Respondent judge
antagonized the lawyers (private practitioners, public attorneys and public
prosecutors alike) appearing in his sala by his perceived arrogance and insulting
remarks. Consequently, he impaired the administration of justice.

Respondent judge unduly intervened in the presentation of evidence. He

asked more questions than counsel and conducted direct and cross-examination of
witnesses. In so doing, he contravened Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
and Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:[31]

RULE 3.06 While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste of time or clear
up some obscurity, properly intervene in the presentation of evidence during the trial, it
should be borne in mind that undue interference may prevent the proper presentation
of the cause or the ascertainment of truth.

∞∞∞

14. Interference in conduct of trial

While a judge may properly intervene in a trial of a case to promote expedition

and prevent unnecessary waste of time, or to clear up some obscurity, nevertheless, he
should bear in mind that his undue interference, impatience, or participation in the
 examination of witnesses, or a severe attitude on his part toward witnesses, especially
those who are excited or terrified by the unusual circumstances of trial, may tend to
prevent the proper presentation of the cause, or the ascertainment of the truth in
respect thereto.

Conversation between the judge and counsel in court is often necessary, but the
judge should be studious to avoid controversies which are apt to obscure the merits of
the dispute between litigants and lead to its unjust disposition. In addressing counsel,
litigants or witnesses, he should avoid a controversial tone.

He should avoid interruptions of counsel in their arguments except to clarify his

mind as to their positions, and he should not be tempted to an unnecessary display of
learning or a premature judgment.

A judge may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite

and prevent unnecessary waste of time and clarify obscure and incomplete details
in the course of the testimony of the witness or thereafter.[32] Questions designed
to clarify points and to elicit additional relevant evidence are not improper.[33]But
the judge should limit himself to asking clarificatory questions and the power
should be sparingly and judiciously used. The rule is that the court should stay out
of it as much as possible, neither interfering nor intervening in the conduct of the
trial.[34] A judge must always maintain cold neutrality and impartiality for he is a
magistrate, not an advocate.[35]

In fine, the over-all conduct of respondent judge has been unbecoming of a

magistrate. It is classified as a light charge[36] for which a fine of not less than P1,000
but not exceeding P10,000 may be imposed.[37]
 Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,[38] this administrative case against
respondent judge shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him
as a member of the bar.

Violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the New

Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct
and the Canons of Judicial Ethics constitutes a breach of Canons 1[39] and 11[40] of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Certainly, a judge who falls short of the
ethics of the judicial office tends to diminish the peoples respect for the law and
legal processes. He also fails to observe and maintain the esteem due to the courts
and to judicial officers.

Respondent judge also transgressed Canon 8[41] and Rule 8.01[42] of the Code
of Professional Responsibility when he humiliated, insulted or embarrassed lawyers
appearing in his sala. Instead of establishing a cordial and collaborative atmosphere
with lawyers, respondent judge alienated them and effectively disregarded their
significant role in the administration of justice.

Accordingly, respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas is hereby found GUILTY of

conduct unbecoming of a judge. In particular, he violated Sections 1 and 2, Canon
2, Section 1, Canon 4 and Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary, Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 14
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. He is FINED in the amount of P7,500.
Respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas is also hereby found GUILTY of violating
Canons 1, 8 and 11 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
which he is FINED in the amount of P7,500.

Judge Carretas is further STERNLY WARNED that the commission of the

same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent

judge.

SO ORDERED
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 6903 April 16, 2012

SUZETTE DEL MUNDO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ARNEL C. CAPISTRANO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint1for disbarment filed by complainant Suzette Del
Mundo (Suzette) charging respondent Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano (Atty. Capistrano) of violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Facts

On January 8, 2005, Suzette and her friend Ricky S. Tuparan (Tuparan) engaged the legal services
of Atty. Capistrano to handle the judicial declaration of nullity of their respective marriages allegedly
for a fee of PhP140,000.00 each. On the same date, a Special Retainer Agreement2 was entered into
by and between Suzette and Atty. Capistrano which required an acceptance fee of PhP30,000.00,
appearance fee of PhP2,500.00 per hearing and another PhP2,500.00 per pleading. In addition,
Atty. Capistrano allegedly advised her to prepare amounts for the following expenses:

PhP11,000.00 Filing fee

PhP5,000.00 Summons

PhP15,000.00 Fiscal

PhP30,000.00 Psychiatrist

PhP15,000.00 Commissioner

In accordance with their agreement, Suzette gave Atty. Capistrano the total amount of
PhP78,500.00, to wit:

January 8, 2005 PhP30,000.00 Acceptance fee

January 15, 2005 PhP11,000.00 Filing fee

February 3, 2005 PhP5,000.00 Filing fee

May 4, 2005 PhP2,500.00 Filing fee

June 8, 2005 PhP30,000.00 Filing fee

For every payment that Suzette made, she would inquire from Atty. Capistrano on the status of her
case. In response, the latter made her believe that the two cases were already filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Malabon City and awaiting notice of hearing. Sometime in July 2005, when
she could hardly reach Atty. Capistrano, she verified her case from the Clerk of Court of Malabon
and discovered that while the case of Tuparan had been filed on January 27, 2005, no petition has
yet been filed for her.

Hence, Suzette called for a conference, which was set on July 28, 2005, where she demanded the
refund of the total amount of PhP78,500.00, but Atty. Capistrano instead offered to return the
amount of PhP63,000.00 on staggered basis claiming to have incurred expenses in the filing of
Tuparan’s case, to which she agreed. On the same occasion, Atty. Capistrano handed to her copies
of her unfiled petition,3 Tuparan’s petition4and his Withdrawal of Appearance5 in Tuparan’s case with
instructions to file them in court, as well as a list6 containing the expenses he incurred and the
schedule of payment of the amount of PhP63,000.00, as follows:

PhP20,000.00 August 15, 2005

PhP20,000.00 August 29, 2005

PhP23,000.00 September 15, 2005

However, Atty. Capistrano only returned the amount of PhP5,000.00 on August 15, 2005 and
thereafter, refused to communicate with her, prompting the institution of this administrative complaint
on September 7, 2005.

In his Comment/Answer7 dated November 14, 2005, Atty. Capistrano acknowledged receipt of the
amount of PhP78,500.00 from Suzette and his undertaking to return the agreed sum of
PhP63,000.00. He also admitted responsibility for his failure to file Suzette’s petition and cited as
justification his heavy workload and busy schedule as then City Legal Officer of Manila and lack of
available funds to immediately refund the money received.

In the Resolution8 dated January 18, 2006, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The Action and Recommendation of the IBP

For failure of respondent Atty. Capistrano to appear at the mandatory conference set by
Commissioner Lolita A. Quisumbing of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), the
conference was terminated without any admissions and stipulations of facts and the parties were
ordered to file their respective position papers to which only Atty. Capistrano complied.

In the Report and Recommendation9 dated April 11, 2007, the IBP-CBD, through Commissioner
Quisumbing, found that Atty. Capistrano had neglected his client’s interest by his failure to inform
Suzette of the status of her case and to file the agreed petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. It
also concluded that his inability to refund the amount he had promised Suzette showed deficiency in
his moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor. Hence, he was held guilty of violating
Rule 18.03, and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended
the penalty of suspension for two years from the practice of law.
On September 19, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of Commissioner Quisumbing through Resolution No. XVIII-2007-9810 with
modification ordering the return of the sum of PhP140,000.00 attorney’s fees to Suzette.

However, upon Atty. Capistrano’s timely motion for reconsideration, the IBP Board of Governors
passed Resolution No. XIX-2011-26311 on May 14, 2011 reducing the penalty of suspension from two
years to one year, to wit:

RESOLVED to PARTIALLY GRANT Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, and unanimously

MODIFY as it is hereby MODIFIED Resolution No. XVIII-2007-98 dated 19 September 2007 and
REDUCED the penalty against Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano to SUSPENSION from the practice of law
for one (1) year and Ordered to Return the amount of One Hundred Forty Thousand Pesos
(P140,000.00) to complainant with thirty (30) days from receipt of notice.

The Issue

The sole issue before the Court is whether Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

The Ruling of the Court

After a careful perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the findings and recommendation of the
IBP-CBD but takes exception to the amount of PhP140,000.00 recommended to be returned to
Suzette.

Indisputably, Atty. Capistrano committed acts in violation of his sworn duty as a member of the bar.
In his Manifestation and Petition for Review,12 he himself admitted liability for his failure to act on
Suzette’s case as well as to account and return the funds she entrusted to him. He only pleaded for
the mitigation of his penalty citing the lack of intention to breach his lawyer’s oath; that this is his first
offense; and that his profession is the only means of his and his family’s livelihood. He also prayed
that the adjudged amount of PhP140,000.00 be reduced to PhP73,500.00 representing the amount
of PhP78,500.00 he received less his payment of the sum of PhP5,000.00. Consequently,
Commissioner Quisumbing and the IBP-CBD Board of Governors correctly recommended the
appropriate penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law for violating the pertinent
provisions of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, thus:

CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

RULE 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.

RULE 16.02 – A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and
those of others kept by him.

xxx

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

xxx
 RULE 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable.

RULE 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.

Indeed, when a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in
protecting the latter’s rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a
good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his client and
makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and
society.13 His workload does not justify neglect in handling one’s case because it is settled that a
lawyer must only accept cases as much as he can efficiently handle.14

Moreover, a lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money of his client that may come to his possession.
As trustee of such funds, he is bound to keep them separate and apart from his own. Money
entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the filing and processing of a case if not
utilized, must be returned immediately upon demand. Failure to return gives rise to a presumption
that he has misappropriated it in violation of the trust reposed on him. And the conversion of funds
entrusted to him constitutes gross violation of professional ethics and betrayal of public confidence in
the legal profession.15

To stress, the practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal
proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their
fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the
values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.16 Falling short of this standard, the Court will not hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer
by imposing an appropriate penalty based on the exercise of sound judicial discretion in
consideration of the surrounding facts.17

With the foregoing disquisition and Atty. Capistrano’s admission of his fault and negligence, the
Court finds the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law, as recommended by the
IBP-CBD, sufficient sanction for his violation. However, the Court finds proper to modify the amount
to be returned to Suzette from PhP140,000.00 to PhP73,500.00.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano, having clearly violated Canons 16 and 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He
is ORDERED to return to Suzette Del Mundo the full amount of PhP73,500.00 within 30 days from
notice hereof and DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of such payment.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the
Philippine Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION
ROLANDO SAA, G.R. No. 132826
Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE

PHILIPPINES, COMMISSION
ON BAR DISCIPLINE, BOARD
OF GOVERNORS, PASIG CITY
and ATTY. FREDDIE A. VENIDA,
Respondents. Promulgated:
September 3, 2009

x---------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
 Petitioner Rolanda Saa filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent
Atty. Freddie A. Venida on December 27, 1991 in this Court. In his complaint, Saa
stated that Atty. Venidas act of filing two cases[1] against him was oppressive and
constituted unethical practice.[2]

In a resolution dated February 17, 1992,[3] Atty. Venida was required to

comment on the complaint against him. In his belated and partial
compliance[4] with the February 17, 1992 resolution, Atty. Venida averred that Saa
did not specifically allege his supposed infractions. He asked to be furnished a copy
of the complaint. He also prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.

Despite receipt of a copy of the complaint,[5] Atty. Venida still did not file his
complete comment within 10 days as required in the February 17, 1992 resolution.
Consequently, we issued the June 14, 1995 resolution[6] requiring Atty. Venida to
show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for
failure to comply with the February 17, 1992 resolution.

Finally, Atty. Venida filed his full comment[7] on September 4, 1995 which,
without doubt, was a mere reiteration of his partial comment. Atty. Venida also
added that he was merely performing his duty as counsel of Saas adversaries.[8]

The matter was thereafter referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In a report dated August 14,
1997, Commissioner George S. Briones recommended the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit.[9] It found no evidence that the two cases filed by Atty.
Venida against Saa were acts of oppression or unethical practice.[10]

The Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve the
investigating commissioners report and dismissed the complaint.[11] Saa filed a
motion for reconsideration but was denied.[12]

Saa now questions the resolution of the IBP in this petition for
certiorari.[13] He ascribes grave abuse of discretion to the IBP when it adopted and
affirmed the report of the investigating commissioner dismissing his complaint.
According to him, the investigating commissioners report did not at all mention the
dismissal of OMB 1-90-1118 and A.C. P-90-513, even if the existence of both cases
was admitted by the parties. The dismissal of his complaint for disbarment was
therefore grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures.

We disagree.

Grave abuse of discretion refers to a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or

despotic exercise of judgment by reason of passion or personal hostility as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[14] It must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law.[15] A decision is not deemed tainted with grave abuse of
discretion simply because a party affected disagrees with it.
 There was no grave abuse of discretion in this case. There was in fact a dearth
of evidence showing oppressive or unethical behavior on the part of Atty. Venida.
Without convincing proof that Atty. Venida was motivated by a desire to file
baseless legal actions, the findings of the IBP stand.

Nonetheless, we strongly disapprove of Atty. Venidas blatant refusal to

comply with various court directives. As a lawyer, he had the responsibility to follow
legal orders and processes.[16] Yet, he disregarded this very important canon of
legal ethics when he filed only a partial comment on January 26, 1993 or 11 months
after being directed to do so in the February 17, 1992 resolution. Worse, he filed
his complete comment only on June 14, 1995 or a little over three years after due
date. In both instances, he managed to delay the resolution of the case, a clear
violation of Canon 12[17] and Rules 1.03[18] and 12.04[19] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Yet again, Atty. Venida failed to file a memorandum within the period
required in our May 17, 2004 resolution.[20]Despite the 30-day deadline to file his
memorandum,[21] he still did not comply. As if taunting authority, he continually
ignored our directives for him to show cause and comply with the May 17, 2004
resolution.[22]

Atty. Venida apologized for the late filing of both his partial and full
comments. But tried to exculpate himself by saying he inadvertently misplaced the
complaint and had a heavy workload (for his partial comment). He even had the
temerity to blame a strong typhoon for the loss of all his files, the complaint
included (for his full comment). His excuses tax the imagination. Nevertheless, his
apologies notwithstanding, we find his conduct utterly unacceptable for a member
of the legal profession. He must not be allowed to evade accountability for his
omissions.

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an

attorney for violation of the lawyers oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the
legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.[23] We
reiterate our ruling in Catu v. Atty. Rellosa:[24]

Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards
legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.

Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible
and improper conduct of a member of the bar. Every lawyer should act and comport
himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The charge of

oppressive or unethical behavior against respondent is dismissed. However, for
violation of Canons 1 and 12 and Rules 1.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as well as the lawyers oath, Atty. Freddie A. Venida is
herebySUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, effective immediately
from receipt of this resolution. He is further STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and
entered into the records of respondent Atty. Freddie A. Venida. The Office of the
Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED
 EN BANC

ATTY. ILUMINADA M. VAFLOR- A.C. No. 6273

FABROA,
Complainant,
Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
- versus -
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
ATTY. OSCAR PAGUINTO,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
Respondent.
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:
March 15, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

An Information for Estafa[1] was filed on June 21, 2001 against
Atty. IluminadaM. Vaflor-Fabroa (complainant) along with others based on a joint
affidavit-complaint which Atty. Oscar Paguinto(respondent) prepared and
notarized. As the joint affidavit-complaint did not indicate the involvement of
complainant, complainant filed a Motion to Quash the Information which the trial
court granted.[2] Respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the quashal of the
Information was denied[3]

Respondent also filed six other criminal complaints against complainant for
violation of Article 31 of Republic Act No. 6938 (Cooperative Code of the Philippines)
before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, but he eventually filed a Motion
to Withdraw them.[4]

On October 10, 2001, complainant, who was Chairperson of the General

Mariano Alvarez Service Cooperative, Inc. (GEMASCO), received a Notice of Special
General Assembly of GEMASCO on October 14, 2001 to consider the removal of four
members of the Board of Directors (the Board), including her and the General
Manager.[5] The notice was signed by respondent.

At the October 14, 2001 Special General Assembly presided by respondent

and PNP Sr. Supt. Angelito L. Gerangco(Gerangco), who were not members of the
then current Board,[6] Gerango, complainants predecessor, as Chair of the
GEMASCO board, declared himself Chair, appointed others to replace the removed
directors, and appointed respondent as Board Secretary.
 On October 15, 2001, respondent and his group took over the GEMASCO
office and its premises, the pumphouses, water facilities, and operations. On even
date, respondent sent letter-notices to complainant and the four removed
directors informing them of their removal from the Board and as members of
GEMASCO, and advising them to cease and desist from further discharging the
duties of their positions.[7]

Complainant thus filed on October 16, 2001 with the Cooperative

Development Authority (CDA)-Calamba a complaint for annulment of the
proceedings taken during the October 14, 2001 Special General Assembly.

The CDA Acting Regional Director (RD), by Resolution of February 21, 2002,
declared the questioned general assembly null and void for having been conducted
in violation of GEMASCOs By-Laws and the Cooperative Code of the
Philippines.[8] The RDs Resolution of February 21, 2002 was later vacated for lack of
jurisdiction[9] of CDA.

In her present complainant[10] against respondent for disbarment,

complainant alleged that respondent:

X X X PROMOTED OR SUED A GROUNDLESS, FALSE OR UNLAWFUL SUIT,

AND GAVE AID AND CONSENT TO THE SAME[11]

X X X DISOBEYED LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE[D] DISRESPECT FOR

LAW AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION[12]

X X X DID NOT CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND

CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUE AND ENGAGED IN
HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL[13]
 X X X VIOLATED CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT
WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW[14]

X X X RUINED AND DAMAGED NOT ONLY THE GEN. MARIANO ALVAREZ

SERVICES COOPERATIVE, INC. (GEMASCO, INC.) BUT THE ENTIRE WATER-
CONSUMING COMMUNITY AS WELL[15]

Despite the Courts grant,[16] on respondents motion,[17] of extension of time

to file Comment, respondent never filed any comment. The Court thus required
him to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with,[18] but just the
same he failed to comply.[19]

The Court thus referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.[20]

It appears that during the mandatory conference before the IBP,

complainant proposed the following issues:

1. Whether or not the acts of respondent constitute violations of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, particularly the following:

1.1 Canon 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal [processes].

1.2 Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel.

1.3 Canon 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
 1.4 Canon 19 A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of
the law.

1.5 Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting
the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.

2. Whether or not the above acts of respondent constitute violations of his lawyers oath,
particularly the following:

2.1 support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities therein

2.2 will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court

2.3 will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same

2.4 will delay no man for money or malice

3. Whether or not the above acts of [respondent] complained of are grounds for
disbarment or suspension of attorneys by the Supreme Court as provided for in
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.[21]

Respondents counsel who represented him during the conference proposed

the issue of whether, on the basis of the allegations of the complaint, misconduct
was committed by respondent.[22]
 After the conclusion of the conference, both parties were ordered to submit
position papers.[23] Complainant filed hers,[24] but respondent, despite grant, on his
motion, of extension of time, did not file any position paper.

In her Report and Recommendation,[25] Investigating Commissioner Lolita

A. Quisumbing found respondent guilty of violating the Lawyers Oath as well as
Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Noting
that respondent had already been previously suspended for six months, the
Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended for two years.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) Board of Governors opted for the
dismissal of the complaint, however, for lack of merit.[26]

On Motion for Reconsideration,[27] the IBP-CBD Board of Governors

recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six
months.
The Court finds that by conniving with Gerangco in taking over the Board of
Directors and the GEMASCO facilities, respondent violated the provisions of the
Cooperative Code of the Philippines and the GEMASCO By-Laws. He also violated
the Lawyers Oath, which provides that a lawyer shall support the Constitution and
obey the laws.

When respondent caused the filing of baseless criminal complaints against

complainant, he violated the Lawyers Oath that a lawyer shall not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or
consent to the same.

When, after obtaining an extension of time to file comment on the complaint,

respondent failed to file any and ignored this Courts subsequent show cause order,
he violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that
A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda
or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so.Sebastian v. Bajar[28] teaches:

x x x Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the

Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution.Respondents
conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A Courts Resolution is not to be
construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or
selectively. Respondents obstinate refusal to comply with the Courts orders not only
betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the
Courts lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof.

Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondents
deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer
not only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver
responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the
courts and to show respect to their processes.[29](Citations omitted).

The Court notes that respondent had previously been suspended from the
practice of law for six months for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,[30] he having been found to have received an acceptance fee and
misled the client into believing that he had filed a case for her when he had not.[31] It
appears, however, that respondent has not reformed his ways. A more severe
penalty this time is thus called for.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto,

is SUSPENDED for two yearsfrom the practice of law for violation of Canons 1, 8, 10,
and Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyers Oath,
effective immediately.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondents personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED
 THIRD DIVISION

JONAR SANTIAGO, A.C. No. 6252

Complainant,
Present:

Panganiban, J.,
Chairman,
- versus - Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona, and
Carpio Morales,* JJ
Promulgated:
Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN,
Respondent. October 5, 2004

x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:
 N
otaries public are expected to exert utmost care in the
performance of their duties, which are impressed with public
interest. They are enjoined to comply faithfully with the
solemnities and requirements of the Notarial Law. This Court will not
hesitate to mete out appropriate sanctions to those who violate it or neglect
observance thereof.
__________________
*
On leave.
The Case and the Facts

Before us is a verified Complaint[1] filed by Jonar Santiago, an

employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), for the

disbarment of Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The Complaint was filed with the

Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines (IBP) on January 16, 2001. It charged Atty. Rafanan with deceit;

malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27 of Rule

138[2] of the Rules of Court; and violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and 1.03 [3],
Canon 5[4], and Canons 12.07[5] and 12.08

of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr.

summarized the allegations of the complainant in this wise:

x x x. In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged, among
others, that Respondent in notarizing several documents on different
dates failed and/or refused to: a)make the proper notation regarding
the cedula or community tax certificate of the affiants; b) enter the
details of the notarized documents in the notarial register; and c) make
and execute the certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in
the documents he had notarized, all in violation of the notarial
provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.

Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an

Affidavit in favor of his client and offered the same as evidence in the
case wherein he was actively representing his client. Finally,
Complainant alleges that on a certain date, Respondent accompanied
by several persons waited for Complainant after the hearing and after
confronting the latter disarmed him of his sidearm and thereafter
uttered insulting words and veiled threats.[6]

On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of the
CBD,[7] Atty. Rafanan filed his verified Answer.[8] He admitted having administered the oath to the affiants whose
Affidavits were attached to the verified Complaint. He believed, however, that the

non-notation of their Residence Certificates in the Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits was allowed.

He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied only to

documents acknowledged by a notary public and was not mandatory for
affidavits related to cases pending before courts and other government
offices. He pointed out that in the latter, the affidavits, which were sworn to
before government prosecutors, did not have to indicate the residence
certificates of the affiants. Neither did other notaries public in Nueva Ecija
-- some of whom were older practitioners -- indicate the affiants residence
certificates on the documents they notarized, or have entries in their notarial
register for these documents.

As to his alleged failure to comply with the certification required by

Section 3 of Rule 112[9] of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, respondent explained that as counsel of the affiants,
he had the option to comply or not with the certification. To nullify the Affidavits, it was complainant who was duty-bound to

bring the said noncompliance to the attention of the prosecutor conducting the preliminary investigation.

As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR, respondent argued

that lawyers could testify on behalf of their clients on substantial matters, in
cases where [their] testimony is essential to the ends of justice. Complainant
charged respondents clients with attempted murder. Respondent averred
that since they were in his house when the alleged crime occurred, his
testimony is very essential to the ends of justice.

Respondent alleged that it was complainant who had threatened and

harassed his clients after the hearing of their case by the provincial
prosecutor on January 4, 2001. Respondent requested the assistance of the
Cabanatuan City Police the following day, January 5, 2001, which was the
next scheduled hearing, to avoid a repetition of the incident and to allay the
fears of his clients. In support of his allegations, he submitted
Certifications[10]from the Cabanatuan City Police and the Joint Affidavit[11] of the two police officers who had assisted
them.

Lastly, he contended that the case had been initiated for no other
purpose than to harass him, because he was the counsel of Barangay Captain
Ernesto Ramos in the cases filed by the latter before the ombudsman and
the BJMP against complainant.

After receipt of respondents Answer, the CBD, through

Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca, set the case for hearing on June 5,
2001, at two oclock in the afternoon. Notices[12] of the hearing were sent to the parties by
registered mail. On the scheduled date and time of the hearing, only complainant appeared. Respondent was unable to do so,

apparently because he had received the Notice only on June 8, 2001.[13] The hearing was reset to July 3, 2001 at two oclock in

the afternoon.
 On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his Reply[14] to the verified
Answer of respondent. The latters Rejoinder was received by the CBD on July 13, 2001.[15] It also received complainants Letter-

Request[16] to dispense with the hearings. Accordingly, it granted that request in its Order[17] dated July 24, 2001, issued through

Commissioner Cimafranca. It thereby directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within fifteen days from receipt

of the Order, after which the case was to be deemed submitted for resolution.

The CBD received complainants Memorandum[18] on September 26, 2001.Respondent did not
file any.

The IBPs Recommendation

On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued

Resolution No. XVI-2003-172[19] approving and adopting the Investigating Commissioners Report that
respondent had violated specific requirements of the Notarial Law on the execution of a certification, the entry of such

certification in the notarial register, and the indication of the affiants residence certificate. The IBP Board of Governors found

his excuse for the violations unacceptable. It modified, however, the recommendation[20] of the investigating commissioner by

increasing the fine to P3,000 with a warning that any repetition of the violation will be dealt with a heavier penalty.
 The other charges -- violation of Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court; and Canons 1.01 to 1.03, 12.07 and 12.08 of the CPR -- were
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

Respondents Administrative Liability

Violation of the Notarial Law

The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries

public.They are required to certify that the party to every document
acknowledged before them has presented the proper residence certificate (or
exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue
and date as part of such certification.[21]They are also required to maintain
and keep a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by
them; and to give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged
before [them] a number corresponding to the one in [their] register [and to
state therein] the page or pages of [their] register, on which the same is
recorded.[22] Failure to perform these duties would result in the revocation of
their commission as notaries public.[23]

These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected,

considering the degree of importance and evidentiary weight attached to
notarized documents. Notaries public entering into their commissions are
presumed to be aware of these elementary requirements.

In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,[24] the Court explained the value and

meaning of notarization as follows:
The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be
overemphasized.Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary
act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those
who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public.Notarization converts a private document into a public
document thus making that document admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled
to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies
and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment
executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.
 For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn
duties pertaining to their office. Slipshod methods in their performance of
the notarial act are never to be countenanced. They are expected to exert
utmost care in the performance of their duties,[25] which are dictated by
public policy and are impressed with public interest.

It is clear from the pleadings before us -- and respondent has readily

admitted -- that he violated the Notarial Law by failing to enter in the
documents notations of the residence certificate, as well as the entry number
and the pages of the notarial registry.

Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance with those

requirements is not mandatory for affidavits relative to cases pending before
the courts and government agencies. He points to similar practices of older
notaries in Nueva Ecija.

We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his claim. His belief that
the requirements do not apply to affidavits is patently irrelevant. No law
dispenses with these formalities. Au contraire, the Notarial Law makes no
qualification or exception. It is appalling and inexcusable that he did away
with the basics of notarial procedure allegedly because others were doing
so.Being swayed by the bad example of others is not an acceptable
justification for breaking the law.
We note further that the documents attached to the verified Complaint
are the Joint Counter-Affidavit of respondents clients Ernesto Ramos and
Rey Geronimo, as well as their witnesses Affidavits relative to Criminal Case
No. 69-2000 for attempted murder, filed by complainants brother against
the aforementioned clients. These documents became the basis of the
present Complaint.

As correctly pointed out by the investigating commissioner, Section 3

of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly requires
respondent as notary -- in the absence of any fiscal, state prosecutor or
government official authorized to administer the oath -- to certify that he
has personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. Respondent failed to
do so with respect to the subject Affidavits and Counter-Affidavits in the
belief that -- as counsel for the affiants -- he was not required to comply with
the certification requirement.
 It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.[26] They
are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the
rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of
the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent
enactments and jurisprudence.[27] It is imperative that they be conversant
with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they
may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as
members of the bar.Worse, they may become susceptible to committing
mistakes.

Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is placed

upon them by reason of their solemn oath to obey the laws.[28] No custom
or age-old practice provides sufficient excuse or justification for their failure
to adhere to the provisions of the law. In this case, the excuse given by
respondent exhibited his clear ignorance of the Notarial Law, the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and the importance of his office as a notary public.
Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar
respondent from the practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised
with great caution.[29] Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty only in a clear
case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of
the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Where any
lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be
decreed.[30] Considering the nature of the infraction and the absence of deceit
on the part of respondent, we believe that the penalty recommended by the
IBP Board of Governors is a sufficient disciplinary measure in this case.

Lawyer as Witness for Client

Complainant further faults respondent for executing before

Prosecutor Leonardo Padolina an affidavit corroborating the defense of alibi
proffered by respondents clients, allegedly in violation of Rule 12.08 of the
CPR: A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client.

Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:

Rule 12.08 A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his
client, except:

a) on formal matters, such as the mailing,

authentication or custody of an instrument and the like;

b) on substantial matters, in cases where his

testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which
event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of
the case to another counsel.
 Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being
a witness,[31]except only in certain cases pertaining to privileged
communication arising from an attorney-client relationship.[32]

The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by
the task of dissociating their relation to their clients as witnesses from that
as advocates.Witnesses are expected to tell the facts as they recall them. In
contradistinction, advocates are partisans -- those who actively plead and
defend the cause of others. It is difficult to distinguish the fairness and
impartiality of a disinterested witness from the zeal of an advocate. The
question is one of propriety rather than of competency of the lawyers who
testify for their clients.

Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness

for the client will provoke unkind criticism and leave many people to suspect
the truthfulness of the lawyer because they cannot believe the lawyer as
disinterested. The people will have a plausible reason for thinking, and if
their sympathies are against the lawyers client, they will have an opportunity,
not likely to be neglected, for charging, that as a witness he fortified it with
his own testimony. The testimony of the lawyer becomes doubted and is
looked upon as partial and untruthful.[33]
 Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses
and at the same time counsels for a cause, the preference is for them to
refrain from testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely have to; and
should they do so, to withdraw from active management of the case.[34]

Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed

by Atty. Rafanan in favor of his clients, we cannot hastily make him
administratively liable for the following reasons:
First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and
defense that is authorized by law for the benefit of the client, especially in a
criminal action in which the latters life and liberty are at stake.[35] It is the
fundamental right of the accused to be afforded full opportunity to rebut the
charges against them. They are entitled to suggest all those reasonable doubts
that may arise from the evidence as to their guilt; and to ensure that if they
are convicted, such conviction is according to law.

Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent, as defense

counsel, was thus expected to spare no effort to save his clients from a wrong
conviction.He had the duty to present -- by all fair and honorable means --
every defense and mitigating circumstance that the law permitted, to the end
that his clients would not be deprived of life, liberty or property, except by
due process of law.[36]

The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the
defense of his clients, since it pointed out the fact that on the alleged date
and time of the incident, his clients were at his residence and could not have
possibly committed the crime charged against them. Notably, in his
Affidavit, complainant does not dispute the statements of respondent or
suggest the falsity of its contents.

Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which

lawyers give their testimonies during the trial. In this instance, the Affidavit
was submitted during the preliminary investigation which, as such, was
merely inquisitorial.[37] Not being a trial of the case on the merits, a
preliminary investigation has the oft-repeated purposes of securing innocent
persons against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions; protecting
them from open and public accusations of crime and from the trouble as
well as expense and anxiety of a public trial; and protecting the State from
useless and expensive prosecutions.[38] The investigation is advisedly called
preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by the trial proper.
 Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to
refrain from accepting employment in any matter in which he knows or has
reason to believe that he may be an essential witness for the prospective
client. Furthermore, in future cases in which his testimony may become
essential to serve the ends of justice, the canons of the profession require
him to withdraw from the active prosecution of these cases.

No Proof of Harassment

The charge that respondent harassed complainant and uttered insulting

words and veiled threats is not supported by evidence. Allegation is never
equivalent to proof, and a bare charge cannot be equated with liability.[39] It
is not the self-serving claim of complainant but the version of respondent
that is more credible, considering that the latters allegations are corroborated
by the Affidavits of the police officers and the Certifications of the
Cabanatuan City Police.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the

Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
hereby FINED P3,000 with a warning that similar infractions in the future
will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED
 EN BANC

Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC

entitled Restoring Integrity: A
Statement by the Faculty of the
Present:
University of the Philippines College
of Law on the Allegations of
Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in CORONA, C.J.,
the Supreme Court.
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:
 October 19, 2010
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RESOLUTION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Plagiarism is the act of appropriating the literary composition of another, or parts

or passages of his writings, or the ideas or language of the same, and passing them
off as the product of ones own mind.[1]

Allegations of this intellectual offense were hurled by Atty. Harry L. Roque, Jr. and
Atty. Romel R. Bagares against Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo for his ponencia in
the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010. In said
case, the Court denied the petition for certiorari filed by Filipino comfort women
to compel certain officers of the executive department[2] to espouse their claims
for reparation and demand apology from the Japanese government for the abuses
committed against them by the Japanese soldiers during World War II. Attys. Roque
and Bagares represent the comfort women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, which
is presently the subject of a motion for reconsideration.

The authors and their purportedly plagiarized articles are: (1) Evan J. Criddle and
Evan Fox-Decent from their article, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens published in
2009 in the Yale Journal of International Law; (2) Christian J. Tams from his book,
Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law published by the Cambridge
University Press in 2005; and (3) Mark Ellis from his article, Breaking the Silence:
On Rape as an International Crime published in the Case Western Reserve Journal
of International Law in 2006. The allegations of plagiarism centered on Justice Del
Castillos discussion of the principles of jus cogens and erga omnes.

On August 9, 2010, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan,

Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison,
Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay,
Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba,
Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa
Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie
O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Via, Carina
C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M.
Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul V.
Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva, and Dina D. Lucenario, members of the faculty of the
University of the Philippines College of Law published a statement on the
allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation relative to the Courts decision
in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary.Essentially, the faculty of the UP College of Law,
headed by its dean, Atty. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, calls for the resignation of Justice
Mariano C. Del Castillo in the face of allegations of plagiarism in his work.

Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators opinion on
the allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such
allegation not only as an established fact, but a truth. In particular, they expressed
dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillos explanation on how he cited the primary
sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of
the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.

Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise
concern for the Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the
institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave
Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war.

The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v.

Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by
the Highest Court of the land. The authors also not only assumed that Justice Del
Castillo committed plagiarism, they went further by directly accusing the Court of
perpetrating extraordinary injustice by dismissing the petition of the comfort
women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary.They further attempt to educate this Court
on how to go about the review of the case.
 The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of
deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of
polluted sources, the Courts alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners, as well
as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the
most basic values of decency and respect. Paragraph 9 of their published statement
reads,

But instead of acting with urgency on this case, the Court delayed its resolution for
almost seven years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners seeking justice from the
Court. When it dismissed the Vinuyapetition based on misrepresented and plagiarized
materials, the Court decided this case based on polluted sources. By doing so, the Supreme Court
added insult to injury by failing to actually exercise its power to urge and exhort the Executive
Department to take up the claims of the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition, coupled with
false sympathy and nonchalance, belies (sic) [betrays] a more alarming lack of concern for even
the most basic values of decency and respect.(Emphasis supplied).

The publication of a statement by the faculty of the

UP College of Law regarding the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in
the Supreme Court was totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act of
misplaced vigilance. Of public knowledge is the ongoing investigation precisely to
determine the truth of such allegations. More importantly, the motion for
reconsideration of the decision alleged to contain plagiarized materials is still
pending before the Court. We made it clear in the case of In re Kelly[3] that any
publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the jury, the parties, the
officers of the court, the counsel with reference to the suit, or tending to influence
the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable.

While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to
maintaining a free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that
healthy criticism only goes so far.Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary
cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially
devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the
judiciary.[4] The court must insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition
of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of
its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice.[5]
 The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the facultys less
than objective comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in
the Vinuya case and undermine the Courts honesty, integrity and competence in
addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort
womens claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the
flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said
decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the
Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they
owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice.[6] Their actions likewise constitute
violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13[7] and Rules 1.02 and 11.05[8] of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[9]

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan

M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo
V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin
T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F.
Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P.
Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig,
Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M.
La Via, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo,
Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua,
Raul V. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva, and Dina D. Lucenario, members of the faculty
of the University of the Philippines College of Law, are directed to SHOW
CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this Resolution, why they
should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of Canons 10, 11, and
13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Further, Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen is directed to SHOW CAUSE, within ten
(10) days from receipt of this Resolution, why he should not be disciplinarily dealt
with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting, through
his letter dated August 10, 2010, during the pendency of G.R. No. 162230, Vinuya
v. Executive Secretary and of the investigation before the Committee on Ethics and
Ethical Standards, for the consideration of the Court En Banc, a dummy which is
not a true and faithful reproduction of the purported statement, entitled Restoring
Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of
Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court.
Enclosed are copies of the said dummy and signed statement, respectively,
attached to the said letter dated August 10, 2010 and to the Compliance
dated August 31, 2010 filed by Roque & Butuyan Law Offices with the Committee
on Ethics and Ethical Standards.

Let this matter be DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter.

Let service of this Resolution upon the above-named

UP College of Law faculty members be effected by personal delivery.

SO ORDERED