1. MMDA vs. Bel-air Village Association 328 SCRA 836 p19 - 20 1.
1. Has the MMDA the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic
2. Ganzon vs CA 200 SCRA 278 p.51
3. The Province of Batangas vs Romulo 429 SCRA 736
4. Mathay vs. CA 320 SCRA 703 p. 13
5. Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. CA 181 SCRA 495 p. 15 p. 16
6. Ordillo vs. COMELEC 192 SCRA 100 p16
7. Abbas vs. COMELEC 179 SCRA 287 p16 – 17, p33
8. Metropolitan Traffic Command vs. Gonong 187 SCRA 432 p. 17
9. Torralba vs. Municipality of Sibagat 147 SCRA 390 p. 23
10. Tobias vs. Abalos 239 SCRA 106 p. 32
11. Republic of the Philippines vs. City of Davao 389 SCRA 691 (2002)
1. MMDA vs Bel-Air Village Assoc. March 27, 2000
Puno, J.
Facts
Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic
services in Metro Manila.Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.
(BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members
arehomeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City.
Respondent BAVA is the registered ownerof Neptune Street, a road inside
Bel-Air Village.On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner,
through its Chairman, a notice dated December22, 1995 requesting
respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January
2, 1996.
Actions Filed:
1.BAVA – applied for injunction; trial court issued temporary restraining order
but after due hearing,trial court denied the issuance of a preliminary
injunction.
2. BAVA – appealed to CA which issued preliminary injunction and later
ruled that MMDA has noauthority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a
private subdivision road and cause the demolitionof its perimeter walls. It
held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.
3. MMDA – filed motion for reconsideration but was denied by CA; hence the
current recourse.
Issues
pursuant to its regulatory andpolice powers?
2. Is the passage of an ordinance a condition precedent before the MMDA
may order the opening of subdivision roads to public traffic?
Held: A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which
is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs." 16 The Local
Government Code of 1991 defines a local government unit as a "body politic
and corporate." 17 — one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of
the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the
inhabitants of its territory. 18 Local government units are the provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays. 19 They are also the territorial and political
subdivisions of the state. 20
The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development authority." All its
functions are administrative innature.The powers of the MMDA are limited to
the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a
system andadministration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants
the MMDA police power, let alone legislativepower.The MMDA has no power
to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local
governmentunits, acting through their respective legislative councils that
possess legislative power and police power. Inthe case at bar, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or
resolution orderingthe opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed
opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondentCourt of Appeals
did not err in so ruling.The MMDA was created to put some order in the
metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately thepowers granted by
its charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for public
use of aprivate street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. The
promotion of the general welfare is notantithetical to the preservation of the
rule of law.
Dispositive
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appealsare affirmed
2. Ganzon vs CA 200 SCRA 278
SARMIENTO, J.:
FACTS: The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President
(acting through the Secretary of Local Government), to suspend and/or
remove local officials.
The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and
a member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No. 93746),
respectively.
The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative
complaints, ten in number, filed against him by various city officials
sometime in 1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of authority,
oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct,
intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary
detention.1 The personalities involved are Joceleehn Cabaluna, a clerk at the
city health office; Salvador Cabaluna, her husband; Dr. Felicidad Ortigoza,
Assistant City Health Officer; Mansueto Malabor, Vice-Mayor; Rolando
Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong, and Eduardo Pefia
Redondo members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod; and Pancho Erbite, a
barangay tanod.
Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive
suspension order on August 11, 1988 to last until October 11,1988 for a
period of sixty (60) days.
In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in the arbitrary
detention case filed by Pancho Erbite so the respondent ordered the
petitioner's second preventive suspension dated October 11, 1988 for
another sixty (60) days. The petitioner was able to obtain a restraining order
and a writ of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of
Iloilo City. The second preventive suspension was not enforced. 5
Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action
for prohibition against the respondent Secretary of Local Government (now,
Interior) in the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in
obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. Presently, he instituted CA-G.R. SP
No. 16417, an action for prohibition, in the respondent Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order,
preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time
in twenty months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor
as acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced CA-G.R. SP No.
20736 of the Court of Appeals, a petition for prohibition, 6 (Malabor it is to be
noted, is one of the complainants, and hence, he is interested in seeing
Mayor Ganzon ousted.)
On September 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, dismissing
CA-G.R. SP No. 16417. On July 5, 1990, it likewise promulgated a decision,
dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 20736. In a Resolution dated January 24, 1990,
it issued a Resolution certifying the petition of Mary Ann Artieda, who had
been similary charged by the respondent Secretary, to this Court.
On June 26,1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order, barring the
respondent Secretary from implementing the suspension orders, and
restraining the enforcement of the Court of Appeals' two decisions.
In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we consolidated all three cases. In
our Resolutions of January 15, 1991, we gave due course thereto.
Mayor Ganzon's primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) is that the
Secretary of Local Government is devoid, in any event, of any authority to
suspend and remove local officials, an argument reiterated by the petitioner
Mary Ann Rivera Artieda (G.R. No. 93746).
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the
President's alter ego, can suspend and/or remove local officials.
Ruling: Yes. It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution 20 no
longer allows the President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to
exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials.
According to both petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen
self-rule by local government units and second, by deleting the phrase 21 as
may be provided by law to strip the President of the power of control over
local governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds support in the
debates of the Constitutional Commission. The provision in question reads
as follows:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to
component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities
with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of
their component units are within the scope of their prescribed
powers and functions.22
It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, which
we quote:
Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over
all Local governments as may be provided by law, and take care
that the laws be faithfully executed.23
The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be provided by law") is
significant, as their argument goes, since: (1) the power of the President is
"provided by law" and (2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer.
It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in
the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature
of its right or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing
legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our
opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing
more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from congress and to
break Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did
not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the
legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular,
concerning discipline.
It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-
executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of a local
government code,27 a local tax law,28 income distribution legislation,29 and a
national representation law,30 and measures31 designed to realize autonomy
at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the
Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of
the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to
include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials,
which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the
existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the
President. Thus:
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which
shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum, allocate among the different local government units
their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for the
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries,
powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other
matters relating to the organization and operation of the local
units.32
The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the
President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power
of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces
disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally,
"supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority as this Court has
held,34
xxx xxx xxx
"Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the
latter."36"Supervision" on the other hand means "overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties.37 As we held,38 however, "investigating" is not inconsistent with
"overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering".
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a
system of decentralization."53 The Constitution as we observed, does
nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the national government over
the affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents, to "liberate
the local governments from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however,
is not meant to end the relation of partnership and inter-dependence
between the central administration and local government units, or otherwise,
to user in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical
step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation,
however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit
paradoxically, to enhance self- government.
As we observed in one case,54 decentralization means devolution of national
administration but not power to the local levels. Thus:
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden
the base of government power and in the process to make local
governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them
more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and
social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it
to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises
"general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local
affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over
their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with
his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units
declared to be autonomous, In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with
minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a
constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-
immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government
becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.55
The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is
albeit another matter. What bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very
large, is the fact that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges,
the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the
event that all ten cases yield prima faciefindings. The Court is not of course
tolerating misfeasance in public office (assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty
of misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make him serve 600
days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him out of office. As we
held:56
The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held, 59 is simply "to prevent
the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his
influence and authority over possible witnesses" 60 or to keep him off "the
records and other evidence.61
It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any,
against an erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not
exceed sixty days,62 which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days
long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it
ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter
span.
Suspension finally is temporary and as the Local Government Code
provides, it may be imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held,63 a
longer suspension is unjust and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing
less than tyranny.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a
remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him
spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and
purposes, his suspension permanent.
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary
of Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the
Secretary of Interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to
say, with a grave abuse of discretion.
We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer the duration of
his third suspension and lifting, for the purpose, the Temporary Restraining
Order earlier issued. Insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned,
we are urging the Department of Local Government, upon the finality of this
Decision, to undertake steps to expedite the same, subject to Mayor
Ganzon's usual remedies of appeal, judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if
warranted, and meanwhile, we are precluding the Secretary from meting out
further suspensions based on those remaining complaints, notwithstanding
findings of prima facie evidence.
In resume the Court is laying down the following rules:
1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization
of administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to
the central government in the manner the law may provide;
2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;
3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision
clause) was meant but to deny legislative control over local governments; it
did not exempt the latter from legislative regulations provided regulation is
consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy;
4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the
latter may, by law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary
action against local officials;
5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms;
"investigation" does not signify "control" (which the President does not have);
6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon. may serve the suspension so far
ordered, but may no longer be suspended for the offenses he was charged
originally; provided:
a) that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault,
neglect or request, (the time of the delay) shall not be counted in
computing the time of suspension. [Supra, sec. 63(3)]
b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive
suspension, the petitioner commits another or other crimes and
abuses for which proper charges are filed against him by the
aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension shall not be a
bar to his being preventively suspended again, if warranted under
subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local Government Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The
Temporary Restraining Order issued is LIFTED.1âwphi1 The suspensions of
the petitioners are AFFIRMED, provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo
Ganzon, may not be made to serve future suspensions on account of any of
the remaining administrative charges pending against him for acts committed
prior to August 11, 1988. The Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to
consolidate all such administrative cases pending against Mayor Ganzon.
The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and
Davide, Jr., JJ concur.
3. The Province of Batangas vs Romulo 429 SCRA 736
FACTS: In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the
“Program for Devolution Adjustment and Equalization” to enhance the
capabilities of LGUs in the discharge of the functions and services devolved
to them through the LGC.
The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora
passed Resolutions No. OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which
were approved by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The guidelines
formulated by the Oversight Committee required the LGUs to identify the
projects eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF and submit the
project proposals and other requirements to the DILG for appraisal before
the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the subsequent release of the
corresponding funds.
Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare
unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the General
Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as they
uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of P5billion for
the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service
Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed conditions for the release thereof.
ISSUE: Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001,
and the OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution and the LGC of 1991.
HELD: Yes. The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001,
and the OCD resolutions constitute a “withholding” of a portion of the IRA –
they effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by LGUs and must
be struck down.
According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution, “the State shall ensure
the local autonomy of local governments“. Consistent with the principle of
local autonomy, the Constitution confines the President’s power over the
LGUs to one of general supervision, which has been interpreted to exclude
the power of control. Drilon v. Limdistinguishes supervision from
control: control lays down the rules in the doing of an act – the officer has
the discretion to order his subordinate to do or redo the act, or decide to do it
himself; supervision merely sees to it that the rules are followed but has no
authority to set down the rules or the discretion to modify/replace them.
The entire process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is
constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or “just share”
of the LGUs in the national taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of the
Constitution mandates that the “just share” shall be automatically released
to the LGUs. Since the release is automatic, the LGUs aren’t required to
perform any act to receive the “just share” – it shall be released to them
“without need of further action“. To subject its distribution & release to the
vagaries of the implementing rules & regulations as sanctioned by the
assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999-2001 and the OCD Resolutions would
violate this constitutional mandate.
The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs
IRA is if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is
less than 40% of the collections of the 3rd preceding fiscal year. The
exception does not apply in this case. The Oversight Committee’s authority
is limited to the implementation of the LGC of 1991 not to supplant or
subvert the same, and neither can it exercise control over the IRA of the
LGUs. Congress may amend any of the provisions of the LGC but only
through a separate lawand not through appropriations laws or
GAAs. Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters
that should be more properly enacted in a separate legislation.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation,
whose content is limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific
purpose or a separate fiscal unit – any provision therein which is intended to
amend another law is considered an “inappropriate provision“.
Increasing/decreasing the IRA of LGUs fixed in the LGC of 1991 are matters
of general & substantive law. To permit the Congress to undertake these
amendments through the GAAs would unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy of
the LGUs.
The value of LGUs as institutions of democracy is measured by the
degree of autonomy they enjoy. Our national officials should not only
comply with the constitutional provisions in local autonomy but should also
appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are based.
4. Mathay vs. CA 320 SCRA 703
FACTS: During his administration, Brigido Simon appointed the three private
respondents for the Civil Service Units pursuant to a Presidential Decree
creating such units. It was later held in an opinion of the Ministry of Justice
that the PD wasn’t published in the Official Gazette and therefore, didn’t
become a proper law. Pursuant to this, the CSC issued an order for the
revocation of same appointments. The then mayor Simon remedied this by
issuing an ordinance calling for the automatic absorption of the appointees to
the created Department of Public Order and Safety. The said department
didn’t quite reach fruition due to insufficiency of funds and lack of regular and
permanent positions to be filled. The mayor then issued contractual
appointments, which was carried over by the next mayor Mathay. But at
the expiration of the said contractual appointments, it was no longer
approved, prompting the private respondents to file a complaint with the
CSC. The CSC ordered Mathay to reinstate the private respondents
pursuant to the previous ordinance issued.
Issue: W/N the CSC has authority to direct the mayor to reinstate the private
respondents.
HELD: NO. Applying the old LGC, the CSC erred in applying the provisions
of the ordinance in ordering the mayor to reinstate the private respondents.
The questioned ordinance ordered the absorption of the personnel of the
defunct CSU into the new DPOS. The ordinance refers to personnel and not
to positions. Hence, the city council is in effect through the ordinance
dictating who shall occupy the newly created DPOS positions. However, a
review of the old Local Government Code shows that the power to appoint
rests exclusively with the local chief executive and thus cannot be usurped
by the city council through a simple expedient of enacting an ordinance that
provides for the absorption of specific persons to certain positions.
In upholding the provisions of the ordinance on the automatic absorption of
the personnel without allowance for the exercise of discretion on the part of
the mayor, the CA in turn makes the sweeping statement that the doctrine of
separation of powers doesn’t apply to local governments, which is wrong.
The powers of the city council and the mayor are expressly enumerated
separately and delineated in the old LGC. The power to appoint belongs to
the city mayor while the power to create, consolidate, and reorganize city
officers and positions supported by local funds belongs to the city council.
By ordering petitioner to “reinstate” private respondents pursuant to Section
3 of the Ordinance, the Civil Service Commission substituted its own
judgment for that of the appointing power. This cannot be done. In a long line
of cases, 11 we have consistently ruled that the Civil Service Commission’s
power is limited to approving or disapproving an appointment. It does not
have the authority to direct that an appointment of a specific individual be
made. Once the Civil Service Commission attests whether the person
chosen to fill a vacant position is eligible, its role in the appointment process
necessarily ends. The Civil Service Commission cannot encroach upon the
discretion vested in the appointing authority.
5. Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. COA 181 SCRA 495
Ponente: Cortes
Facts: In April 1986, just after the EDSA Revolution, Fr. Conrado M. Balweg,
S.V.D., broke off on ideological grounds from the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) and its military arm the New People's Army. (NPA).
After President Aquino was installed into office by People Power, she
advocated a policy of national reconciliation. She called on all revolutionary
forces to a peace dialogue. The CPLA heeded this call of the President.
After the preliminary negotiations, President Aquino and some members of
her Cabinet flew to Mt. Data in the Mountain Province on September 13,
1986 and signed with Fr. Conrado M. Balweg (As Commander of the CPLA
and Ama Mario Yag-ao (as President of Cordillera Bodong Administration,
the civil government of the CPLA a ceasefire agreement that signified the
cessation of hostilities (WHEREAS No. 7, E.O. 220).
The parties arrived at an agreement in principle: the Cordillera people shall
not undertake their demands through armed and violent struggle but by
peaceful means, such as political negotiations. The negotiations shall be a
continuing process until the demands of the Cordillera people shall have
been substantially granted.
On March 27, 1987, Ambassador Pelaez [Acting as Chief Negotiator of the
government], in pursuance of the September 13, 1986 agreement, flew to
the Mansion House, Baguio City, and signed with Fr. Balweg (as Chairman
of the Cordillera panel) a joint agreement, paragraphs 2 and 3 of which state:
Par. 2- Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory
body that could perform policy-making and administrative functions and
undertake consultations and studies leading to a draft organic act for the
Cordilleras.
Par. 3- Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group
of the R.P. Panel in drafting the Executive Order.
Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of
the Philippine government and of the representatives of the Cordillera
people.
On July 15, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed the joint draft into
law, known now as E.O. 220. [Rejoinder G.R. No. 82217, pp. 2-3].
EO 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers
under Art. XVIII,sec. 6 of the Constitution, created the CAR. It was created
to accelerate economic and socialgrowth in the region and to prepare for the
establishment of the autonomous region in theCordilleras. Its main function
is to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs andservices in
the region, particularly, to coordinate with the local government units as well
as withthe executive departments of the National Government in the
supervision of field offices and inidentifying, planning, monitoring, and
accepting projects and activities in the region. It shall alsomonitor the
implementation of all ongoing national and local government projects in the
region. The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy-
formulating body and a CordilleraExecutive Board as an implementing arm.
The CAR and the Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such
time as the autonomous regional government is established and
organized.In these cases, petitioners principally argue that by issuing E.O.
No. 220 the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers prior to
the convening of the first Congress under the 1987Constitution, has virtually
pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organicact and
created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras.
Issue 1: Whether or not E.O. 220 is constitutional
Ruling: A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually
envisions is the consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services of
line departments and agencies of the National Government in the areas
covered by the administrative region as a step preparatoryt o the grant
of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous region
contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures
in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an
autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does
not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on
autonomous regions.
Issue 2: WON CAR is a territorial and political subdivision
The CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It
does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and
municipalities. Neither is itvested with the powers that are normally granted
to public corporations, e.g. the power to sueand be sued, the power to own
and dispose of property, the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc.
As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning
andimplementation of programs and services in the covered areas
Issue 3: WON the creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional
guarantee of the local autonomy for the provinces.
It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the
Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local
government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of
government authority [Villegas v. Subido, G.R. No. L-31004, January 8,
1971, 37 SCRA 1]. Local autonomy is not unique to the 1987 Constitution, it
being guaranteed also under the 1973 Constitution [Art. II, sec. 10]. And
while there was no express guarantee under the 1935 Constitution, the
Congress enacted the Local Autonomy Act (R.A. No. 2264) and the
Decentralization Act (R.A. No. 5185), which ushered the irreversible march
towards further enlargement of local autonomy in the country [Villegas v.
Subido, supra.]
The creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the
grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these
regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional
government with a basic structure consisting of an executive department and
a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and property
law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions.
6. Ordillo v. COMELEC G.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990
Gutierrez, J.
FACTS: January 30, 1990, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled “An
Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region”, the
people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and
Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite.
Results of plebiscite: approved by majority of 5,889 votes in Ifugao, rejected
by 148,676 in the rest provinces and city. The province of Ifugao makes up
only 11% of total population,and as such has the second smallest number of
inhabitants, of the abovementioned areas. February 14, 1990, COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region has
been approved and/or ratified by majority of votes cast only in the province
of Ifugao. Secretary of Justice also issued a memorandum for the President
reiterating COMELEC resolution, stating that “…Ifugao being the only
province which voted favorably then. Alone, legally and validly constitutes
CAR.” March 8, 1990, Congress ebacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting
elections in CAR of Ifugao on first Monday of March 1991. Even before
COMELEC resolution, Executive Secretary issued February 5, 1990 a
memorandum granting authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera
Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly created under Executive
Order No. 220. March 30, 1990, President issued Administrative Order No.
160 declaring among others that the Cordillera Executive Board and
Cordillera Regional Assembly and all offices under Executive Order No. 220
were abolished in view of the ratification of Organic Act. Petitioners: there
can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be
composed of more than one constituent unit. Petitioners therefore pray that
the court: a.declare null and void COMELEC resolution No. 2259, the
memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, Administrative Order No. 160, and
Republic Act No. 6861 andprohibit and restrain the respondents from
implementing the same and spending publicfunds for the purpose. b.declare
Executive Order No. 220 constituting the Cordillera Executive Board and the
Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices to be still in force and effect
until another organic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been
enacted by Congress and thesame is duly ratified by the voters in the
constituent units.
ISSUE: WON the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted
favorably for thecreation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone,
legally and validly constitute suchregion.
HELD: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera
Autonomous Region.
a. The keyword in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution – provinces,
cities,municipalities and geographical areas connote that “region” is to be
made up of more than one constituent unit. The term “region” used in its
ordinary sense means two or more provinces. rule in statutory construction
must be applied here: the language of the Constitution,as much as possible
should be understood in the sense it has in common use and that the
words used in constitutional provisions are
to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed.
b. The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous
Region is infused with provisions which rule against the sole province of
Ifugao constituting the Region.- It can be gleaned that Congress never
intended that a single province may constitute the autonomous region.- If
this were so, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets
of officials: a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials
exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small
area. (Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-
wise) (Art III sec 1 and 2; Art V,sec 1 and 4; Art XII sec 10 of RA 6766)-
Allotment of Ten Million Pesos to Regional Government for its initial
organizational requirements can not be construed as funding only a lone and
small province [Art XXIsec 13(B)(c)]- Certain provisions of the Act call for
officials “coming from different provinces and cities” in the Region,
as well as tribal courts and the development of a common regional language.
(Art V sec 16; Art VI sec 3; Art VII; Art XV RA 6766)- Thus, to contemplate
the situation envisioned by the COMELEC would not only violate the letter
and intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would be
impractical and illogical.
7. Abbas v. COMELEC, 179 SCRA 287
Facts: Datu Firdausi Abbas, et.al. challenged the constitutionality of R.A. 673
4 on thefollowing grounds:1) R. A. 6734 conflicts with the Tripoli Agreement
(what conflicts the case doesn’t say)2) R. A. 6734 provides for the
unconditional creation of the ARMM and not through the mode of a plebiscite
as provided in the Constitution3) The Constitution provides that ARMM shall
be approved by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite by all voters residing
in the provinces and cities affected, but R.A. 6734 says “by a majority or
votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite and only those provinces
andcities where a majority of votes cast in favor of the Organic Act shall be
included in the Autonomous Region. R.A. 6734 thus conflicts the
Constitution4) R. A. 6734 includes provinces and cities which do not have
the same cultural and historical heritage and other relevant characteristics
needed for admission to the ARMM5) R. A. 6734 violates constitutional
guarantee on freedom of exercise of religion as some its provisions run
counter to the Koran6) The creation of an Oversight Committee to supervise
the transfer of power to the ARMM is contrary to the constitutional mandate
that the creation of the autonomous region hinges solely on the result of
the plebiscite7) R. A. 6734 says “…that only the provinces and cities voting
favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the ARMM. The provinces
and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote
for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administr
ative regions: Provided however, that the President may, by administrative
determination, merge the existing regions. This provision, Abbas claims, is
contrary to the Constitutional mandate that, “No province city, municipality or
barangay may be created, divided, merged,abolished or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established with
the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the units directly affected.” (Art. 10, Sec. 10, 1987
Constitution)
Issue: Whether or not certain provisions of the Organic Act
are unconstitutional.
Held: The petition has no merit and the law is constitutional.
The creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total
majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the
constituent units and the proviso underscores this. for if the intention of the
framers of the Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of the votes
cast, they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used for
the ratification of the Constitution, i.e. "the creation of the autonomous region
shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite called for the purpose."
It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of
votes approving the organic Act in individual constituent units and not a
double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in
the individual constituent units.
Issue 2: W/N President has the power to merge regions, a power which is
not conferred by the Constitution upon the President.
Administrative regions are not territorial and political subdivisions like
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays [see Art. X, sec. 1 of the
Constitution]. While the power to merge administrative regions is not
expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally
been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of
general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, sec. 4 of the
Constitution]. There is no conflict between the power of the President to
merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision requiring a
plebiscite in the merger of local government units because the requirement
of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities,
municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions.
8. Metropolitan Traffic Command vs. Gonong 187 SCRA 432
Facts: The original complaint was filed with the said court on August 10,
1989, by Dante S. David, a lawyer, who claimed that the rear license plate,
of his car was removed by the Metropolitan Traffic Command while the
vehicle was parked on Escolta. He questioned the petitioner's act on the
ground not only that the car was not illegally parked but, more importantly,
that there was no ordinance or law authorizing such removal. He asked that
the practice be permanently enjoined and that in the meantime a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued.
Judge Arsenio M. Gonong issued a temporary restraining order on August
14, 1989, and hearings on the writ of preliminary injunction were held on
August 18, 23, and 25, 1989. The writ was granted on this last date. The
parties also agreed to submit the case for resolution on the sole issue of
whether there was a law or ordinance authorizing the removal of the license
plates of illegally parked vehicles. The parties then submitted simultaneous
memoranda in support of their respective positions, following which the
respondent judge rendered the assailed decision.
In ruling for the complainant, Judge Gonong held that LOI 43, which the
defendant had invoked, did not empower it "to detach, remove and
confiscate vehicle plates of motor vehicles illegally parked and unattended
as in the case at bar. It merely authorizes the removal of said vehicles when
they are obstacles to free passage or continued flow of traffic on streets and
highways." At any rate, he said, the LOI had been repealed by PD 1605.
Moreover, the defendant had not been able to point to any MMC rule or
regulation or to any city ordinance to justify the questioned act. On the
allegation that the practice was "the root cause of graft and corruption or at
the very least the equivalent of street racket among defendant's deployed
agents.
Issue: Whether there was a law or ordinance authorizing Petitioner for
removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles.
Held: The Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor
vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be
imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was
permitted only under the conditions laid dowm by LOI 43 in the case of
stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was there also observed that
even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly
prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by
the Commission.
9. Torralba vs. Municipality of Sibagat 147 SCRA 390
Facts: Batas Pambansa 56, enacted February 1980, created the Municipality
of Sibagat, Province of Agusan del Sur. Petitioners assail its validity for
being violative of Section 3, Article XI, 1973 Constitution:
Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and
subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
unit or units affected.
Petitioners argued that the LGC must first be enacted to determine the
criteria for the creation of any province, city, municipality, or barrio and since
no LGC had yet been enacted as of the date BP 56 was passed, the latter
could not have possibly complied with any criteria when the Municipality was
created.
The Local Government Code came into being only on 10 February 1983 so
that when BP 56 was enacted, the code was not yet in existence.
Issue: W/N the Local Government Code must first be enacted to determine
the criteria for the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of the boundary of any province, city, municipality, or barrio.
Held: The absence of the Local Government Code at the time of its
enactment did not curtail nor was it intended to cripple legislative
competence to create municipal corporations. Section 3, Article XI of the
1973 Constitution does not proscribe nor prohibit the modification of
territorial and political subdivisions before the enactment of the Local
Government Code. It contains no requirement that the Local Government
Code is a condition sine qua non for the creation of a municipality, in much
the same way that the creation of a new municipality does not preclude the
enactment of a Local Government Code. What the Constitutional provision
means is that once said Code is enacted, the creation, modification or
dissolution of local government units should conform with the criteria thus
laid down. In the interregnum before the enactment of such Code, the
legislative power remains plenary except that the creation of the new local
government unit should be approved by the people concerned in a plebiscite
called for the purpose.
The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed to said requisite.
A plebiscite was conducted and the people of the unit/units affected
endorsed and approved the creation of the new local government unit. In
fact, the conduct of said plebiscite is not questioned herein. The officials of
the new Municipality have effectively taken their oaths of office and are
performing their functions. A dejure entity has thus been created.
10. Tobias vs Abalos Gr No. L-114783. December 8, 1994
Facts: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 7675, “An Act Converting
the municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as
the City of Mandaluyong”. Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the
Munnicipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one
legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional
representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually
became RA 7675, President Ramos signed it into law. Pursuant to Local
Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held. The people of
Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved the conversion. The
turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population.
Nevertheless, 18,621 voted “yes” whereas 7, 911 voted “no”. By virtue of
these results, RA 7675 was deemed ratified in effect.
Petitioners contention were that RA 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 46
thereof, is unconstitutional. They alleged that it contravenes the “one subject
– one bill” rule. They also alleged that the subject law embraced two
principal subjects, namely: 1. the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city; and 2. the division of the congressional district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
Petitioners argue that the division has resulted in an increase in the
composition of the House of Representative beyond that provided in the
Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was not
made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have
attained the minimum population requirements.
Issue: 1. Whether or not RA 7675 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not the number of the members of the House of
Representative may increase.
3. Whether or not the people of San Juan should have been made to
participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change
in their legislative district

Ruling: 1. No. The conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city
with a population of not less than 250, 000 indubitably ordains compliance
with the “one city – one representative” as provided in Article VI, Section 5,
par.3 of the Constitution. The creation of separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural ang logical
consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. It should be given
a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient
compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject
and all provisions are germane to that general subject. It suffices if the title
should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the
legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of
the nature, scope and consequence of the proposed law and its operation.
2. Yes. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless
otherwise provided by law. The present composition of the Congress may be
increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment.
3. No. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in
the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized
city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto.
Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said
plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring
Mandaluyong.
11. Republic of the Philippines vs. City of Davao 389 SCRA 691
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review1 on certiorari assailing the decision 2 dated
May 28, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 33, which
granted the writ of mandamus and injunction in favor of respondent, the City
of Davao, and against petitioner, the Republic, represented by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The trial court
also directed petitioner to issue a Certificate of Non-Coverage in favor of
respondent.
Facts: On August 11, 2000, respondent filed an application for a Certificate
of Non-Coverage (CNC) for its proposed project, the Davao City Artica
Sports Dome, with the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), Region
XI. Attached to the application were the required documents for its issuance,
namely, a) detailed location map of the project site; b) brief project
description; and c) a certification from the City Planning and Development
Office that the project is not located in an environmentally critical area
(ECA). The EMB Region XI denied the application after finding that the
proposed project was within an environmentally critical area and ruled that,
pursuant to Section 2, Presidential Decree No. 1586, otherwise known as
the Environmental Impact Statement System (EIS), in relation to Section
4 of Presidential Decree No, 1151, also known as the Philippine
Environment Policy, the City of Davao must undergo the environmental
impact assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC), before it can proceed with the construction of its project.
Believing that it was entitled to a Certificate of Non-Coverage, respondent
filed a petition for mandamus and injunction with the Regional Trial Court of
Davao, docketed as Civil Case No. 28,133-2000. It alleged that its proposed
project was neither an environmentally critical project nor within an
environmentally critical area; thus it was outside the scope of the EIS
system. Hence, it was the ministerial duty of the DENR, through the EMB-
Region XI, to issue a CNC in favor of respondent upon submission of the
required documents.
The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of respondent. The trial
court ratiocinated that there is nothing in PD 1586, in relation to PD 1151
and Letter of Instruction No. 1179 (prescribing guidelines for compliance with
the EIA system), which requires local government units (LGUs) to comply
with the EIS law. Only agencies and instrumentalities of the national
government, including government owned or controlled corporations, as well
as private corporations, firms and entities are mandated to go through the
EIA process for their proposed projects which have significant effect on the
quality of the environment. A local government unit, not being an agency or
instrumentality of the National Government, is deemed excluded under the
principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The trial court also
declared, based on the certifications of the DENR-Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)-West, and the data gathered from
the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS), that the
site for the Artica Sports Dome was not within an environmentally critical
area. Neither was the project an environmentally critical one. It therefore
becomes mandatory for the DENR, through the EMB Region XI, to approve
respondents application for CNC after it has satisfied all the requirements for
its issuance. Accordingly, petitioner can be compelled by a writ of
mandamus to issue the CNC, if it refuses to do so.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the same was denied.
Hence, the instant petition for review.
Issue: WON the LGU’s are excluded from the coverage of PD 1586, one
which requires an environmental impact assessment (EIA) process to secure
an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC)
Held: Section 15 of Republic Act 7160,5 otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, defines a local government unit as a body politic and
corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law.
As such, it performs dual functions, governmental and proprietary.
Governmental functions are those that concern the health, safety and the
advancement of the public good or welfare as affecting the public
generally.6 Proprietary functions are those that seek to obtain special
corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit and intended for private
advantage and benefit.7 When exercising governmental powers and
performing governmental duties, an LGU is an agency of the national
government.8When engaged in corporate activities, it acts as an agent of the
community in the administration of local affairs.9cräläwvirtualibräry
Found in Section 16 of the Local Government Code is the duty of the LGUs
to promote the peoples right to a balanced ecology.10 Pursuant to this, an
LGU, like the City of Davao, cannot claim exemption from the coverage of
PD 1586. As a body politic endowed with governmental functions, an LGU
has the duty to ensure the quality of the environment, which is the very same
objective of PD 1586.
The trial court, in declaring local government units as exempt from the
coverage of the EIS law, failed to relate Section 2 of PD 1586 Section 4 of
the same law.
Section 4 of PD 1586 clearly states that no person, partnership or
corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared environmentally
critical project or area without first securing an Environmental Compliance
Certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized
representative.13 The Civil Code defines a person as either natural or
juridical. The state and its political subdivisions, i.e., the local government
units14 are juridical persons.15 Undoubtedly therefore, local government units
are not excluded from the coverage of PD 1586.
Lastly, very clear in Section 1 of PD 1586 that said law intends to implement
the policy of the state to achieve a balance between socio-economic
development and environmental protection, which are the twin goals of
sustainable development. The above-quoted first paragraph of the Whereas
clause stresses that this can only be possible if we adopt a comprehensive
and integrated environmental protection program where all the sectors of the
community are involved, i.e., the government and the private sectors. The
local government units, as part of the machinery of the government, cannot
therefore be deemed as outside the scope of the EIS system. 16cThe
foregoing arguments, however, presuppose that a project, for which an
Environmental Compliance Certificate is necessary, is environmentally
critical or within an environmentally critical area. In the case at bar,
respondent has sufficiently shown that the Artica Sports Dome will not have
a significant negative environmental impact because it is not an
environmentally critical project and it is not located in an environmentally
critical area.
The Artica Sports Dome in Langub does not come close to any of the
projects or areas enumerated above. Neither is it analogous to any of them.
It is clear, therefore, that the said project is not classified as environmentally
critical, or within an environmentally critical area. Consequently, the DENR
has no choice but to issue the Certificate of Non-Coverage. It becomes its
ministerial duty, the performance of which can be compelled by writ of
mandamus, such as that issued by the trial court in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED. The
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 33, in Civil Case
No. 28,133-2000, granting the writ of mandamus and directing the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources to issue in favor of the
City of Davao a Certificate of Non-Coverage, pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 1586 and related laws, in connection with the construction of the
Artica Sports Dome, is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J.,
(Chairman), Vitug, and Carpio, JJ., concur.