NICK ANGELO B.

CUNANAN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 9:00 AM -12:00 PM

THE CASE - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON.

ERNESTO M. MENDOZA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Branch 10, and JUAN MAGALOP y SALVACION,
respondents, G.R. No. 80845. March 14, 1994.

FACTS – Three accused were allegedly responsible for forcibly taking

things from the storeroom of the Bukidnon National School of Home
Industries. It was established by the prosecution that the storeroom of
the Bukidnon National School of Home Industries at Maramag, Bukidnon,
on January 20, 1987 was ransacked as shown by the testimonies of the
policemen and by the keepers of the storeroom. After on the spot
investigation, the policemen were at a loss to identify the person or
persons responsible thereof.
At the arraignment Magalop pleaded “guilty” while Fernandez pleaded
“not guilty.” The arraignment of Dahilan was deferred as he was “not
mentally well.”
Instead of pronouncing judgment on Magalop, the court a quo
conducted trial. The prosecution presented Pat. Jakosalem, INP, who
investigated the break-in, as well as a clerk and a storekeeper of the
BNSHI. The prosecution likewise offered in evidence colored pictures of
the ransacked storeroom, a pair of ordinary pliers, a pair of long-nose
pliers, and a coping saw. The last three items were said to have been
recovered by the police.
The defense having opted to waive its right to present evidence, the
case was submitted for decision. Respondent Judge render its decision
acquitted accused Fernandez as well as Magalop who earlier pleaded
guilty to the charge.
ISSUE - Is Respondent Judge correct in acquitting Fernandez and
Magalop?
RULING - No. The procedure followed by respondent judge was not
the normal course, as the better procedure would have been that set forth
in People v. Padernal, where the court sustained the exoneration of the
accused notwithstanding his plea of guilt. In that case, in view of the
exculpatory testimony of the accused who had earlier pleaded guilty to
the charge of homicide, the trial court correctly considered the plea as
withdrawn and, in its place, ordered a plea of not guilty entered. This was
not done by respondent judge. For even after finding that the plea of
Magalop was not intelligently made, Judge Mendoza proceeded to pass
judgment without requiring Magalop to plead anew to the charge.
Applying the principle laid down in the Padernal case, it can fairly be
concluded that there was no standing plea at the time the court rendered
its judgment of acquittal hence said acquittal was a nullity.
THE CASE -THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellant,
vs. AURELIO BALISACAN, defendant and appellee.

FACTS - This is an appeal by the prosecution from a decision of

acquittal. Defendant-appellee Aurelio Balisacan was charged with
homicide in the CFI of Ilocos Norte. The information alleged that on
December 3, 1964, in Nueva Era, Ilocos Norte, the accused assaulted and
stabbed to death Leonicio Bulaoat.

The accused, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of guilty. At

his counsel's petition, however, he was allowed to present evidence to
prove mitigating circumstances. The accused testified that he stabbed
Bulaoat in self-defense because the latter was strangling him. He further
stated that he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police after the
incident.

The court a quo rendered a decision acquitting the accused on the

basis of his testimony. Hence, the instant appeal.

ISSUES: 1. Is the Trial Court Correct in acquitting the accused othe

offense charged despite the latter pleads guilty? 2. Is the instant appeal
placed the accused in double jeopardy?

RULING: - 1. NO. Plea of guilty is an unconditional admission of

guilt with respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the right to defend
oneself from said charge and leaves the court with no alternative but to
impose the penalty fixed by law under the circumstances. Said testimony,
therefore, could not be taken as a trial on the merits, to determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused. In view of the assertion of self-defense
in the testimony of the accused, the proper course should have been for
the court a quo to take defendant’s plea anew and then proceed with the
trial of the case, in the order set forth in Section 3 of Rule 119 of the Rules
of Court.
2. NO. It is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential
requisite to double jeopardy. In the present case, it is true, the accused
had first entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in
the course of being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances, that he
acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony, therefore — as the court a
quo recognized in its decision — had the effect of vacating his plea of
guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead a new on
the charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for
him. This was not done. It follows that in effect there having been no
standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of
acquittal, there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal
herein. Furthermore, as foretasted, the court a quo decided the case upon
the merits without giving the prosecution any opportunity to present its
evidence or even to rebut the testimony of the defendant. In doing so, it
clearly acted without due process of law. And for lack of this fundamental
prerequisite, its action is perforce null and void. The acquittal, therefore,
being a nullity for want of due process, is no acquittal at all, and thus
cannot constitute a proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy.

DOCTRINE LEARNED - A plea of guilty must be unconditional save

to explain mitigating circumstances. Where the accused enters a
conditional plea in the sense that he admits his guilt provided that a
certain penalty be imposed upon him, he must be considered as, having
entered a plea of not guilty and proceeded to trial, but the trial court failed
to do such; rather it acquits the accused at the moment of its arraignment.
In deciding the case upon the merits without the requisite trial, the court
not only erred in procedure but also deprived the prosecution of its day
in court and right to be heard.

As assertion that the appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy,

existence of plea is requisite to double jeopardy. The said testimony of
the accused had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty, and the court
should have required him to plea anew on the charge, or at least it should
have directed that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This not
having been done, there was no standing plea at the time the court
rendered its judgment of acquittal, and it follows that there can be no
double jeopardy with respect to the present appeal.
 THE CASE - HUBERT J. P. WEBB, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE RAUL
E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque, Branch 258.

FACTS - On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)

filed with the Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners
Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other
persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her
mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in
their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes Paranaque, Metro
Manila on June 30, 1991.
Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors
headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct
the preliminary investigation.
Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They
assail the credibility of Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and
uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and
May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They criticize the procedure followed by
the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged
inconsistencies.
Also, petitioners charge the NBI with violating their right to discovery
proceedings during their preliminary investigation by suppressing the April
28, 1995 original copy of the sworn statement of Alfaro and the FBI
Report.
Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later,
respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against
them without conducting the required preliminary examination.
Petitioners complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due
process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They also
assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary
investigation.
ISSUE: Is the petitioner correct in claiming that the NBI violates
right to due process as the latter violates the right to discovery
proceedings during their preliminary investigation?
 RULING: The argument is novel in this jurisdiction and as it urges
an expansive reading of the rights of persons under preliminary
investigation it deserves serious consideration. The Rules on Criminal
Procedure do not expressly provide for discovery proceedings during the
preliminary investigation stage of a criminal proceeding. Sections 10 and
11 of Rule 117 do provide an accused the right to move for a bill of
particulars and for production or inspection of material evidence in
possession of the prosecution.
SEC. 10. Bill of particulars.—Accused may, at or before arraignment,
move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and to
prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects and
the details desired. (6a, R-116)
Preliminary investigation is not too early a stage to guard against
any significant erosion of the constitutional right to due process of a
potential accused. As aforediscussed, the object of a preliminary
investigation is to determine the probability that the suspect committed a
crime.
DOCTRINE LEARNED - Motion for bill of particulars applies after the
filing of the complaint or information in court and the rights are accorded
to the accused to assist them to make an intelligent plea at arraignment
and to prepare for trial. Denial of right to discovery of proceeding is not
per se a violation of due process. This failure to provide discovery
procedure during preliminary investigation does not, however, negate its
use by a person under investigation when indispensable to protect his
constitutional right to life, liberty and property.