Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al vs Commission on Elections

270 SCRA 106 (1997)

FACTS:
In this case, petitioners sought to amend certain provisions of the Constitution,
specifically lifting the limit of terms of elective officials, through people’s initiative.
Santiago opposed on the ground that the constitutional provision on people’s initiative
to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress.
There is no law passed yet and RA 6735, which provides for initiative on statues and
local legislation but not initiative on the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether RA 6735 adequately provided for people’s initiative on Constitution

RULING:
RA 6735 was intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. However, contrary to the assertion of public respondents COMELEC, Sec. 2
of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The Act
does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Third.
While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local
Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the
Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust
of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws.
Thus, RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its
lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by “empowering” the
COMELEC “to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the purposes of the Act.”
The rule that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a
Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest has recognized exceptions which are
as follows: (1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President; (2) Delegation of emergency
powers to the President; (3) Delegation to the people at large; (4) Delegation to local
governments; and (5) Delegation to administrative bodies.
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial
functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative
authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there
must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is
complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard – the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate and determinable – to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy,
marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It
indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected.
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, RA 6735
miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation
of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.

Blas Ople vs Ruben Torres, et al

293 SCRA 141

FACTS:
On December 12, 1996, A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos for the
Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System. It was published
in four newspapers of general circulation. Petitioner filed the instant petition against
respondents, on the grounds that it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate
and that it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of privacy.

ISSUES:
Whether there is a violation of the Right to Privacy as enshrined in the Bill of Rights.
Whether the issuance of the President of AO No. 308 is an unconstitutional
usurpation of the legislative powers of the Congress.

HELD:
The Court prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O.
No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn.
It is debatable whether the interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance
of the said order. The broadness, vagueness, and overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if
implemented will put our people’s right to privacy in clear and present danger. In the
case at bar, the threat comes from which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people
to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it
will facilitate delivery of basic services.
Furthermore, A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered
by an administrative order. Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution,
to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." The Constitution, as the will of the people
in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress
of the Philippines. While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President
executes the laws. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification
Reference System. Moreover, even assuming that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject
of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation
because facially, it violates the right to privacy. The act of promulgating AO no. 308 is an
act of legislation rather than enforcement of a law, thus, should be struck down as
unconstitutional exercise of legislative power.
Petition is granted. A.O. No. 308 is unconstitutional.

Arnel Misolas vs Hon. Benjamin Panga

181 SCRA 648 (1990)

FACTS:
The Philippine Constabulary raided a suspected "underground house"after receiving
information from an unidentified informant that members of NPA were resting therein.
Three persons were inside the house, Arnel Misolas and two women, but the women
were able to escape. The house was searched and the raiders found in a red bag under a
pillow allegedly used by Misolas a Remington shotgun and 4 live rounds of ammunition.
Petitioner was arrested and brought to the PC headquarters.
 The State charged him with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition used in
furtherance of subversion under PD No. 1866. Petitioner filed a motion to quash alleging
that the law was unconstitutional for violation of the due process clause.

ISSUE:
Whether PD 1866 constitutes a bill of attainder and thus, unconstitutional.

RULING:
The Court defined a bill of attainder as a legislative act which inflicts punishment on
individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. The element, the
total lack of court intervention in the finding of guilt and the determination of the actual
penalty to be imposed, is the most essential. PD 1866 does not possess the elements of
a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. Nowhere
in the measure is there a finding of guilt and an imposition of a corresponding
punishment. What the decree does is to define the offense and provide for the penalty
that may be imposed, specifying the qualifying circumstances that would aggravate the
offense.
Before a statute may be declared unconstitutional it must be shown tat the statute
violated the constitution clearly, palpably and in such manner as to leave no doubt or
hesitation in the mind of the Court. Absent a clear showing that the challenged measure
ousts the courts from the function of passing upon the question of guilt or innocence of
the accused and an unequivocal demonstration that PD No. 1866, by legislative fiat,
declares the petitioner guilty of a crime and imposes directly the penalty prescribe
thereunder, the challenge will have to be rejected.
The Court dismissed the petition.
 Solicitor General Rodolfo Malapira,et al vs Metropolitan Manila Authority
204 SCRA 837 (1991)

FACTS
The Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1992
authorizing itself to detach the license plate/tow and impound
attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow
of traffic in Metro Manila. Later on, the Court held that the confiscation of the license
plates of motor vehicles and confiscation of drivers license for traffic violations were not
among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD
1605.Several complaints were filed before the Court as to the said confiscations by
police authorities or traffic enforcers as sanction/s for traffic violations. In defense, one
of the defendants justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the
Local Government Code authorizing the said confiscations for traffic violations.

ISSUE
Whether the exercise of Metro Manila Authoritys delegated power is valid.

RULING
The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as
agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and
conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity of such acts, a municipal
ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must
not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general
and consistent with public policy.
The decision shows that the measures under consideration do not pass the first
criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD
1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's
licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the
following provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission
(and now the Metropolitan Manila Authority) to impose such sanctions. In fact, its
provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila.The
requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself.
Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of
legislative power from the national legislature.They are mere agents vested with what is
called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local
government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal.
In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin,
cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute. The
following are the requisites of a valid delegation, completeness of the statute making
the delegation and the presence of a sufficient standard.
The Court granted the petition and declared the ordinance as null and void.

People of the Philippines vs Hon. Judge Auxencio Dacuycuy

173 SCRA 90 (1989)

FACTS:
Private respondents, public school officials were charged for violating Republic
Act No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers). The respondents pleaded not
guilty and petitioned for certeriori and prohibition with preliminary injuction before the
Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch VII alleging that the Municipal Court of Hindang
has no jurisdiction over the case and that Section 32 of R.A. No. 4670 is unconstitutional
because, (1) the term of imprisonment is unfixed and may run to reclusion perpetua;
and (2) it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the
penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter
were the legislative department of the Government.
The petition was transferred to Branch IV where the respondent Judge, Judge
Dacuycuy ruled that R.A. No. 4670 is valid and constitutional but cases for its violation
fall outside of the jurisdiction of municipal and city courts.

ISSUES:
Whether Republic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional.
Whether the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
Republic Act No. 4760 is unconstitutional. Section 32 violates the constitutional
prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power by vesting in the court the
responsibility of imposing a duration on the punishment of imprisonment, as if the
courts were the legislative department of the government.
The municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over the case. Republic Act. No.
296, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828, considers crimes punishable by fine of not
more than Php 3,000.00 fall under the original jurisdiction of municipal courts.
The Court granted the petition and reversed the decision of the CFI.

Abakada Guro Party List vs Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al

469 SCRA 14 (2005)
FACTS:
Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed
a petition for prohibition on May 27, 2005 questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4,
5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods
and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6
imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties. These questioned
provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation
of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after
specified conditions have been satisfied.
Petitioners also contend that Republic Act No. 9337 grossly violates the
constitutional imperative on exclusive origination of revenue bills under Section 24 of
Article VI of the Constitution when the Senate introduced amendments not connected
with VAT. Petitioners reiterate that R.A. No. 9337’s stand- by authority to the Executive
to increase the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted
to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power.
Petitioners also reiterate their argument that the input tax is a property or a property
right. Petitioners also contend that even if the right to credit the input VAT is merely a
statutory privilege, it has already evolved into a vested right that the State cannot
remove.

ISSUES:
Whether there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.
Whether there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec
28(2) of the Constitution.
Whether there is a violation of the due process and equal protection under Article
III Sec. 1 of the Constitution.

RULING:
Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the
House of Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to
introduce amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No.
1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, and excise and franchise taxes.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to
the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate
its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who
must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is
frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.
The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the
purposes of taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of
taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the
methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the State’s power is entitled to
presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent
a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.

Maximo Calalang vs A.D. Williams, et al

70 Phil 726 (1940)

FACTS:
The National Traffic Commission, in pursuance of Commonwealth Act 548 which
mandates the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets to promote safe
transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads,
the Director of Public Works adopted the resolution of the National Traffic Commission,
prohibiting the passing of animal drawn vehicles in certain streets in Manila. Petitioner
questioned this as it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.

ISSUES:
Whether there is a undue delegation of legislative power.
Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people.

RULING:
There is no undue delegation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548 does not
confer legislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred upon
them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is
not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative
policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act. The delegated power is not the
determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and
circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate
rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long
a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the
traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an
administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly.
 It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is
confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the
law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.
Social justice is the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the
welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally
justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema
lex.

Kuyas and Ates,

Naulit na po ang 728 SCRA 1 (Arraullo vs Aquino). Mahaba po ang ibang cases for
recitation purposes lang at para iba iba ang pag summarize natin. Chat nyo lang po ako
pag may problema. Thank you po.

Chrissa ^^,