Assignment For April 6

Module 4: Brief Overview of Environmental Laws
Constitution, Article XII, Sections 2- 3
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at
least 60 per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may provided by law. In cases of
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of waterpower, beneficial use may
be the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and
reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming,
with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for
large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms
and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its
execution.
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks. Agricultural
lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of
the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of
the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire
not more than twelve hectares thereof, by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian
reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or
leased and the conditions therefor.
Public Land Act, Sections 6-9
Section 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from
time to time classify the lands of the public domain into —
(a) Alienable or disposable

(b) Timber and
(c) Mineral lands
and may it any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their government and
disposition.
Section 7. For the purpose of the government and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the Governor-General, upon
recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to
disposition or concession under this, Act.
Section 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and classified
and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, not appropriated by the
Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act
or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the
Governor-General may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands of the public domain open to disposition before the same have
had their boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reasons, suspend their concession or disposition by
proclamation duly published or by Act of the Legislature.
Section 9. For the purposes of their government and disposition, the lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition
shall be classified, according to the use or purposes to which such lands are destined, as follows:
(a) Agricultural
(b) Commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes.
(c) Educational, charitable, and other similar purposes.
(d) Reservations for town sites, and for public and quasi-public uses.
The Governor-General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time make
the classification provided for in this section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one class to another.
Revised Administrative Code (E.O. 292), Chapter I, Title XIV
Title XIV
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
CHAPTER 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. -
(1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration,
development and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well
as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and environmental cost
implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.
Section 2. Mandate. -
(1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the
foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.
Section 3. Guidelines for Implementation. - In the discharge of its responsibility the Department shall be guided by the following
objectives:
(1) Assure the availability and sustainability of the country's natural resources through judicious use and systematic
restoration or replacement, whenever possible;
(2) Increase the productivity of natural resources in order to meet the demands for the products from forest, mineral, land and
water resources of a growing population;
(3) Enhance the contribution of natural resources for achieving national economic and social development;
(4) Promote equitable access to natural resources by the different sectors of the population; and
(5) Conserve specific terrestrial and marine areas representative of the Philippine natural and cultural heritage for present and
future generations.
Section 4. Powers and Functions. - The Department shall:
(1) Advise the President and the Congress on the enactment of laws relative to the exploration, development, use, regulation
and conservation of the country's natural resources and the control of pollution;
(2) Formulate, implement and supervise the implementation of the government's policies, plans and programs pertaining to
the management, conservation, development, use and replenishment of the country's natural resources;
(3) Promulgate rules and regulations in accordance with law governing the exploration, development, conservation,
extraction, disposition, use and such other commercial activities tending to cause the depletion and degradation of our
natural resources;
(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposable public lands, mineral resources and, in the
process of exercising such control, impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges, rentals and any such form of levy and collect
such revenues for the exploration, development, utilization or gathering of such resources;
(5) Undertake the exploration, assessment, classification and inventory of the country's natural resources, using ground
surveys, remote sensing and complementary technologies;
(6) Promote proper and mutual consultation with the private sector on matters involving natural resources exploration,
development, use and conservation;
(7) Undertake geological surveys of the whole country including its territorial waters;
(8) Issue licenses and permits for activities related to the use and development of aquatic resources, treasure hunting,
salvaging of sunken vessels and other similar activities:
(9) Establish policies and implement programs for the:
(a) Accelerated inventory, survey and classification of lands, forest and mineral resources, using appropriate technology,
to be able to come up with a more accurate assessment of resource quality and quantity;
(b) Equitable distribution of natural resources through the judicious administration, regulation, utilization, development
and conservation of public lands, forest, water and mineral resources (including mineral reservation areas), that would
benefit a greater number of Filipinos;
(c) Promotion, development and expansion of natural resource-based industries;
(d) Preservation of cultural and natural heritage through wildlife conservation and segregation of national parks and other
protected areas;
(e) Maintenance of a wholesome natural environment by enforcing environmental protection laws; and
(f) Encouragement of greater people participation and private initiative in rural resource management;
(10) Promulgate rules and regulations necessary to:
(a) Accelerate cadastral and emancipation patent surveys, land use planning and public land titling:
(b) Harness forest resources in a sustainable manner, to assist rural development, support forest-based industries, and
provide raw materials to meet increasing demands, at the same time keeping adequate reserves for environmental
stability;
(c) Expedite mineral resources surveys, promote the production of metallic and non-metallic minerals and encourage
mineral marketing;
(d) Assure conservation and judicious and sustainable development of aquatic resources.
(11) Assess, review and provide direction to, in coordination with concerned government agencies, energy research and
development programs, including identification of sources of energy and determination of their commercial feasibility for
development;
(12) Regulate the development, disposition, extraction, exploration and use of the country's forest, land, water and mineral
resources;
(13) Assume responsibility for the assessment, development, protection, licensing and regulation as provided for by law, where
applicable, of all energy and natural resources; the regulation and monitoring of service contractors, licensees, lessees,
and permit for the extraction, exploration, development and use of natural resources products; the implementation of
programs and measures with the end in view of promoting close collaboration between the government and the private
sector; the effective and efficient classification and subclassification of lands of the public domain; and the enforcement of
natural resources and environmental laws, rules and regulations;
(14) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of licenses, permits, concessions, lease agreements and
such other privileges concerning the development, exploration and utilization of the country's marine, freshwater, and
brackish water and over all aquatic resources of the country and shall continue to oversee, supervise and police our
natural resources; cancel or cause to cancel such privileges upon failure, non-compliance or violations of any regulation,
order, and for all other causes which are in furtherance of the conservation of natural resources and supportive of the
national interest;
(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public domain and serve as the sole
agency responsible for classification, sub-classification, surveying and titling of lands in consultation with appropriate
agencies;
(16) Implement measures for the regulation and supervision of the processing of forest products, grading and inspection of
lumber and other forest products and monitoring of the movement of timber and other forest products;
(17) Promulgate rules and regulations for the control of water, air and land pollution;
(18) Promulgate ambient and effluent standards for water and air quality including the allowable levels of other pollutants and
radiations;
(19) Promulgate policies, rules and regulations for the conservation of the country's genetic resources and biological diversity,
and endangered habitats;
(20) Formulate an integrated, multi-sectoral, and multi-disciplinary National Conservation Strategy, which will be presented to
the Cabinet for the President's approval;
(21) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.
Section 5. Organizational Structure. - The Department shall consist of the Department Proper, the Staff Offices, the Staff Bureaus,
and the Regional Offices, Provincial Offices and Community Offices.
 Cruz v DENR, GR 135385
G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, et al.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment.1 In compliance, respondents Chairperson and
Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to
implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the
IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor
General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to
indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano
Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples
(Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying
for the dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus
Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to
protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that
the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation
of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the
NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be
dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which
they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they
amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral
lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of water,
mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community property of the indigenous peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploration
of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into
agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding
25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral
domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness,
protected areas, forest cover or reforestation."2
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which
might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary
law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions
violate the due process clause of the Constitution.4
These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and which vest
on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain and upon
notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior
and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction
of said officials over said area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied first with
respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt
or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving indigenous
peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of the indigenous
peoples."5
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which
provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous
relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the President’s power of
control over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.6
Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional and invalid;
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist
from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
to cease and desist from implementing Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to cease and desist from
disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to comply
with his duty of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources."7
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo,
Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate
opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be
interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not
raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view
that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the
constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose
rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7,
and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions
of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However,
after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and
Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
Separate opinion of Justice Puno on separate doc.
 Ankron v Gov’t. G.R. 14213
G.R. No. L-14213 August 23, 1919
J. H. ANKRON, petitioner-appellee, vs.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, objector-appellant.
JOHNSON, J.:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu. Its purpose
was to have registered, under the Torrens system, a certain piece or parcel of land situated, bounded and particularly described in
the plan and technical description attached to the complaint and made a part thereof.
The only opposition which was presented was on the part of the Director of Lands. The oppositor [objector] alleged that the land in
question was the property of the Government of the United States under the control and administration of the Government of the
Philippine Islands.
During the trial of the cause two witnesses only were presented by the petitioner. No proof whatever was offered by the oppositor.
After hearing and considering the evidence, the Honorable Francisco Soriano, judge, reached the following conclusions of fact:
1. That the land sought to be registered consists of one parcel of land as marked and indicated on the plan and technical
description presented;
2. That all of said land, with the exception of a small part at the north, the exact description and extension of which does not
appear, has been cultivated and planted for more than forty-four years prior to the date of this decision;
3. That said land was formerly occupied, cultivated and planted by Moros, Mansacas and others, under a claim of ownership,
and that they lived thereon and had their houses thereon, and that portion of the land which was not planted or cultivated
was used as pasture land whereon they pastured their carabaos, cattle, and horses;
4. That all of said Moros and Mansacas sold, transferred and conveyed all their right, title and interest in said land to the
applicant, J. H. Ankron, some eleven years past, at which time all of the said former owners moved o n to adjoining lands
where they now reside;
5. That the possession under claim of ownership of the applicant and his predecessors in interest was shown to have been
open, notorious, actual, public and continuous for more than forty-four years past, and that their claim was exclusive of
any other right adverse to all other claims;
6. That the applicant now has some one hundred fifty (150) hills of hemp, some eight thousand (8,000) cocoanut trees, a
dwelling house, various laborers' quarters, store-building, large camarin (storehouse of wood, a galvanized iron and other
buildings and improvements on said land.
Upon the foregoing facts the lower court ordered and decreed that said parcel of land be registered in the name of the said
applicant, J. H. Ankron, subject, however, to the right of the Government of the Philippine Islands to open a road thereon in the
manner and conditions mentioned in said decision. The conditions mentioned with reference to the opening of the road, as found in
said decision, are that the applicant give his consent, which he has already done, to the opening of said road which should be
fifteen (15) meters wide and should follow approximately the line of the road as it now exists subject to the subsequent survey to be
made by the engineer of the province of Davao.
From that decree the Director of Lands appealed to this court.
The appellant argues, first, that the applicant did not sufficiently identify the land in question. In reply to that argument, the record
shows that a detained and technical description of the land was made a part of the record. The evidence shows that the boundaries
of the land in question were marked by monuments built of cement. The oppositor neither presented the question of the failure of
proper identification of the land in the lower court nor presented any proof whatever to show that said cement monuments did not
exist.
The appellant, in his second assignment of error, contends that the appellant failed to prove his possession and occupation in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926. The important prerequisites for registration of land
imposed by said section 54, paragraph 6, are (a) that the land shall be agricultural public land as defined by the Act of Congress of
July 1, 1902; (b) that the petitioner, by himself or his predecessors in interest, shall have been in the open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership for a period of ten years next
preceding the taking effect of said Act.
In the present case the applicant proved, and there was no effort to dispute said proof, that the land in question was agricultural
land and that he and his predecessors in interest had occupied the same as owners in good faith for a period of more than forty
years prior to the commencement of the present action. No question is raised nor discussed by the appellant with reference to the
right of the Moros to acquire the absolute ownership and dominion of the land which they have occupied openly, notoriously,
peacefully and adversely for a long period of years. (Cariño vs. Insular Government, 7 Phil. Rep., 132 [212 U. S., 449].)
Accepting the undisputed proof, we are of the opinion that said paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 has been fully complied
with and that the petitioner, so far as the second assignment of error is concerned, is entitled to have his land registered under the
Torrens system.
Under the third assignment of error the appellant contends that portions of said land cannot be registered in accordance with the
existing Land Registration Law for the reason that they are manglares. That question is not discussed in the present brief. The
appellant, however., refers the court to his discussion of that question in the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (39 Phil. Rep.,
560). By reference to the argument in the brief in the case, it is found that the appellant relied upon the provisions of section 3 of
Act No. 1148 in relation with section 1820 of Act No. 2711 (second Administrative Code). Section 3 of Act No. 1148 provides that
"the public forests shall include all unreserved lands covered with trees of whatever age." Said section 1820 (Act No. 2711)
provides that "for the purpose of this chapter 'public forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public
land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character."
In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), which decision has been follows in numerous other decision, the
phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined by Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, was held to mean "those public lands acquired
from Spain which are neither mineral nor timber lands" (forestry lands).
Paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 only permits the registration, under the conditions therein mentioned, of "public
agricultural lands." It must follow, therefore, that the moment that it appears that the land is not agricultural, the petition for
registration must be denied. If the evidence shows that it is public forestry land or public mineral land, the petition for registration
must be denied. Many definitions have been given for "agricultural," "forestry," and "mineral" lands. These definitions are valuable
so far as they establish general rules. In this relation we think the executive department of the Government, through the Bureau of
Forestry, may, and should, in view especially of the provisions of section 4, 8, and 20 of Act No. 1148, define what shall be
considered forestry lands, to the end that the people of the Philippine Islands shall be guaranteed in "the future a continued supply
of valuable timber and other forest products." (Sec. 8, Act No. 1148.) If the Bureau of Forestry should accurately and definitely
define what lands are forestry, occupants in the future would be greatly assisted in their proof and the courts would be greatly aided
in determining the question whether the particular land is forestry or other class of lands.
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted in effect that whether the particular land in
question belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral
within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the
extent and present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many definitions have been
given for "agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in
order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than
it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the land or that it
bears some mineral.Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral,
be classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable
minerals, lands classified as agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in
that particular case, having regard for its present or future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering
the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands, that the
courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until
the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore,
be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular
case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural,
forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of said classes of land. The Government, in the first instance,
under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestry
land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural,
forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act
(No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the "public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land.
(Ramos vs. Director of Lands (39 Phil. Rep., 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra.)
In view of the foregoing we are of the opinion, and so order and decree, that the judgment of the lower court should be and is
hereby affirmed, with the condition that before the final certificate is issued, an accurate survey be made of the lands to be
occupied by the road above mentioned and that a plan of the same be attached to the original plan upon which the petition herein
is based. It is so ordered, with costs.
 Heirs of Amunategui, G.R. L-27873
[G.R. No. L-27873. November 29, 1983.]
HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI, Petitioners, v. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, Respondent.
[G.R. No. L-30035. November 29, 1983.]
ROQUE BORRE and ENCARNACION DELFIN, Petitioners, v. ANGEL ALPASAN, HEIRS OF MELQUIADES
BORRE, EMETERIO BEREBER and HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI and THE CAPIZ COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
7. CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; FOREST LAND; CLASSIFICATION NOT LOST EVEN IF IT HAS BEEN STRIPPED
OF FOREST COVER; UNLESS RELEASED IN AN OFFICIAL PROCLAMATION AS DISPOSABLE LANDS, RULES ON
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE DO NOT APPLY. — A forested area classified as forest land of the public
domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by
kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other tress growing in brackish or sea
water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as
"forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
8. ID.; ID.; FOREST LANDS; ACQUISITIVE OWNERSHIP NOT ACQUIRED. — This Court ruled in the leading case
of Director of Forestry v. Muñoz (23 SCRA 1184) that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot
ripen into private ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on the ground
that the areas covered by the patent and title was not disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone
and any patent and title to said area is void ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is
needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes.
9. ID.; ID.; CONFIRMATION, OF IMPERFECT TITLE CASES; BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE REQUIREMENTS OF
THE LAW HAVE BEEN MET, RESTS ON THE APPLICANT. — In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the
applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act
No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is
applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in
his name because of an imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had
continuous, open, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application.
DECISION
The two petitions for review on certiorari before us question the decision of the Court of Appeals which declared
the disputed property as forest land, not subject to titling in favor of private persons.
These two petitions have their genesis in an application for confirmation of imperfect title and its registration filed
with the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The parcel of land sought to be registered is known as Lot No. 885 of the
Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of 645,703 square meters.
Roque Borre, petitioner in G.R. No, L-30035, and Melquiades Borre, filed the application for registration. In due
time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui, petitioners in G.R. No. L-27873 filed an opposition to the application of Roque
and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre
containing 527,747 square meters be confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui.
The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the application for
registration of title claiming that the land was mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of
the public domain.
Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956
square meters was concerned and prayed that title to said portion be confirmed and registered in his name.
During the progress of the trial, applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold whatever rights and interests he may have
on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan. The latter also filed an opposition, claiming that he is entitled to have said lot
registered in his name.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square meters to Emeterio Bereber and the
rest of the land containing 527,747 square meters was adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan
and 1/6 share to Melquiades Borre.
Only the Heirs of Jose Amunategui and the Director of Forestry filed their respective appeals with the Court of
Appeals, The case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 34190-R.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . the conclusion so far must have to be that as to the private litigants that have been shown to have a better
right over Lot 885 are, as to the northeastern portion of a little less than 117,956 square meters, it was Emeterio
Bereber and as to the rest of 527,747 square meters, it was the heirs of Jose Amunategui; but the last question
that must have to be considered is whether after all, the title that these two (2) private litigants have shown did
not amount to a registerable one in view of the opposition and evidence of the Director of Forestry; . . .
". . . turning back the clock thirty (30) years from 1955 when the application was filed which would place it at
1925, the fact must have to be accepted that during that period, the land was a classified forest land so much so
that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensee before 1926 and after that; that even Jose Amunategui
himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the area; and this can only mean that the Bureau
of Forestry had stood and maintained its ground that it was a forest land as indeed the testimonial evidence
referred to above persuasively indicates, and the only time when the property was converted into a fishpond was
sometime after 1950; or a bare five (5) years before the filing of the application; but only after there had been a
previous warning by the District Forester that that could not be done because it was classified as a public forest;
so that having these in mind and remembering that even under Republic Act 1942 which came into effect in 1957,
two (2) years after this case had already been filed in the lower Court, in order for applicant to be able to
demonstrate a registerable title he must have shown.
"‘open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years, preceding the filing of the
application;’
the foregoing details cannot but justify the conclusion that not one of the applicants or oppositors had shown that
during the required period of thirty (30) years prescribed by Republic Act 1942 in order for him to have shown a
registerable title for the entire period of thirty (30) years before filing of the application, he had been in
"‘open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain’,
it is evident that the Bureau of Forestry had insisted on its claim all throughout that period of thirty (30) years and
even before and applicants and their predecessors had made implicit recognition of that; the result must be to
deny all these applications; this Court stating that it had felt impelled notwithstanding, just the same to resolve
the conflicting positions of the private litigants among themselves as to who of them had demonstrated a better
right to possess because this Court foresees that this litigation will go all the way to the Supreme Court and it is
always better that the findings be as complete as possible to enable the Highest Court to pass final judgment;
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision must have to be as it is hereby reversed; the application as well as all the
oppositions with the exception of that of the Director of Forestry which is hereby sustained are dismissed; no more
pronouncement as to costs."
A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui contending that the disputed lot had
been in the possession of private persons for over thirty years and therefore in accordance with Republic Act No.
1942, said lot could still be the subject of registration and confirmation of title in the name of a private person in
accordance with Act No. 496 known as the Land Registration Act. On the other hand, another petition for review
on certiorari was filed by Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, contending that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing their complaint against the Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The Borre complaint was
for the annulment of the deed of absolute sale of Lot No. 885 executed by them in favor of the Heirs of
Amunategui. The complaint was dismissed on the basis of the Court of Appeals’ decision that the disputed lot is
part of the public domain. The petitioners also question the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in passing upon the
relative rights of the parties over the disputed lot when its final decision after all is to declare said lot a part of the
public domain classified as forest land.chanrobles law library : red
The need for resolving the questions raised by Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin in their petition depends on the
issue raised by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui, that is, whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable
of registration in the names of the private applicants.
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest land because it is not thickly
forested but is a "mangrove swamp." Although conceding that a "mangrove swamp" is included in the
classification of forest land in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners
argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of said Code as first, second and third groups are found on the
land in question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land
registration proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of private persons for many years,
and therefore, said land was already "private land" better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for
forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because
loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees
growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal
nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muñoz (23 SCRA 1184) that possession of forest
lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we
granted the petition on the ground that the area covered by the patent and title was not disposable public land, it
being a part of the forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a
positive act of Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable
or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
The findings of the Court of Appeals are particularly well-grounded in the instant petition.
The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885
does not divest such land of its being classified as forest land, much less as land of the public domain. The
appellate court found that in 1912, the land must have been a virgin forest as stated by Emeterio Bereber’s
witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as 1926, it must have been a thickly forested area as testified by
Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate court’s finding that
timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for
a license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the property was converted into
fishpond but only after a previous warning from the District Forester that the same could not be done because it
was classified as "public forest." chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the
requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942. He must
overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an interest
therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as those derived from old
Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands
of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the
filing of his application.
The decision of the appellate court is not based merely on the presumptions implicit in Commonwealth Act No. 141
as amended. The records show that Lot No. 88S never ceased to be classified as forest land of the public domain.
In Republic v. Gonong (118 SCRA 729) we ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"As held in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either
by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have
been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in-interests since time immemorial, for such
possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had
been a private property even before the Spanish conquest."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the instant petitions, the exception in the Oh Cho case does not apply. The evidence is clear that Lot No. 885
had always been public land classified as forest.
Similarly, in Republic v. Vera (120 SCRA 210), we ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The possession of public land however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto
upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the
State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the
required number of years to constitute a grant from the State. (Director of Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177,
195)."cralaw virtua1aw library
We, therefore, affirm the finding that the disputed property Lot No. 885 is part of the public domain, classified as
public forest land. There is no need for us to pass upon the other issues raised by petitioners Roque Borre and
Encarnacion Delfin, as such issues are rendered moot by this finding.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G. R. No. L-30035 and G. R. No. L-27873 are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
 Sta. Rosa Dev’t Corp v CA, GR 112526
G.R. No. 112526 October 12, 2001
STA. ROSA REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming the decision of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board2 (hereafter DARAB) ordering the compulsory acquisition of petitioner's property
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation (hereafter, SRRDC) was the registered owner of two parcels of land, situated
at Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna covered by TCT Nos. 81949 and 84891, with a total area of 254.6 hectares. According to
petitioner, the parcels of land are watersheds, which provide clean potable water to the Canlubang community, and that ninety (90)
light industries are now located in the area.3
Petitioner alleged that respondents usurped its rights over the property, thereby destroying the ecosystem. Sometime in December
1985, respondents filed a civil case 4 with the Regional Trial Court, Laguna, seeking an easement of a right of way to and from
Barangay Casile. By way of counterclaim, however, petitioner sought the ejectment of private respondents.
In October 1986 to August 1987, petitioner filed with the Municipal Trial Court, Cabuyao, Laguna separate complaints for forcible
entry against respondents.5
After the filing of the ejectment cases, respondents petitioned the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for the compulsory
acquisition of the SRRDC property under the CARP.
On August 11, 1989, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Cabuyao, Laguna issued a notice of coverage to petitioner
and invited its officials or representatives to a conference on August 18, 1989. 6 During the meeting, the following were present:
representatives of petitioner, the Land Bank of the Philippines, PARCCOM, PARO of Laguna, MARO of Laguna, the BARC
Chairman of Barangay Casile and some potential farmer beneficiaries, who are residents of Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna. It
was the consensus and recommendation of the assembly that the landholding of SRRDC be placed under compulsory acquisition.
On August 17, 1989, petitioner filed with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO), Cabuyao, Laguna a "Protest and Objection"
to the compulsory acquisition of the property on the ground that the area was not appropriate for agricultural purposes. The area
was rugged in terrain with slopes of 18% and above and that the occupants of the land were squatters, who were not entitled to any
land as beneficiaries.7
On August 29, 1989, the farmer beneficiaries together with the BARC chairman answered the protest and objection stating that the
slope of the land is not 18% but only 5-10% and that the land is suitable and economically viable for agricultural purposes, as
evidenced by the Certification of the Department of Agriculture, municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna.8
On September 8, 1989, MARO Belen dela Torre made a summary investigation report and forwarded the Compulsory Acquisition
Folder Indorsement (CAFI) to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (hereafter, PARO).9
On September 21, 1989, PARO Durante Ubeda forwarded his endorsement of the compulsory acquisition to the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform.
On November 23, 1989, Acting Director Eduardo C. Visperas of the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Development, DAR forwarded
two (2) Compulsory Acquisition Claim Folders covering the landholding of SRRDC, covered by TCT Nos. T-81949 and T-84891 to
the President, Land Bank of the Philippines for further review and evaluation.10
On December 12, 1989, Secretary of Agrarian Reform Miriam Defensor Santiago sent two (2) notices of acquisition 11 to petitioner,
stating that petitioner's landholdings covered by TCT Nos. 81949 and 84891, containing an area of 188.2858 and 58.5800
hectares, valued at P4,417,735.65 and P1,220,229.93, respectively, had been placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program.
On February 6, 1990, petitioner SRRDC in two letters12 separately addressed to Secretary Florencio B. Abad and the Director,
Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution, sent its formal protest, protesting not only the amount of compensation offered by DAR
for the property but also the two (2) notices of acquisition.
On March 17, 1990, Secretary Abad referred the case to the DARAB for summary proceedings to determine just compensation
under R. A. No. 6657, Section 16.
On March 23, 1990, the LBP returned the two (2) claim folders previously referred for review and evaluation to the Director of BLAD
mentioning its inability to value the SRRDC landholding due to some deficiencies.
On March 28, 1990, Executive Director Emmanuel S. Galvez wrote Land Bank President Deogracias Vistan to forward the two (2)
claim folders involving the property of SRRDC to the DARAB for it to conduct summary proceedings to determine the just
compensation for the land.
On April 6, 1990, petitioner sent a letter to the Land Bank of the Philippines stating that its property under the aforesaid land titles
were exempt from CARP coverage because they had been classified as watershed area and were the subject of a pending petition
for land conversion.
On May 10, 1990, Director Narciso Villapando of BLAD turned over the two (2) claim folders (CACF's) to the Executive Director of
the DAR Adjudication Board for proper administrative valuation. Acting on the CACF's, on September 10, 1990, the Board
promulgated a resolution asking the office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to first resolve two (2) issues before it
proceeds with the summary land valuation proceedings.13
The issues that need to be threshed out were as follows: (1) whether the subject parcels of land fall within the coverage of the
Compulsory Acquisition Program of the CARP; and (2) whether the petition for land conversion of the parcels of land may be
granted.
On December 7, 1990, the Office of the Secretary, DAR, through the Undersecretary for Operations (Assistant Secretary for Luzon
Operations) and the Regional Director of Region IV, submitted a report answering the two issues raised. According to them, firstly,
by virtue of the issuance of the notice of coverage on August 11, 1989, and notice of acquisition on December 12, 1989, the
property is covered under compulsory acquisition. Secondly, Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1990, Section IV D also supports
the DAR position on the coverage of the said property. During the consideration of the case by the Board, there was no pending
petition for land conversion specifically concerning the parcels of land in question.
On February 19, 1991, the Board sent a notice of hearing to all the parties interested, setting the hearing for the administrative
valuation of the subject parcels of land on March 6, 1991. However, on February 22, 1991, Atty. Ma. Elena P. Hernandez-Cueva,
counsel for SRRDC, wrote the Board requesting for its assistance in the reconstruction of the records of the case because the
records could not be found as her co-counsel, Atty. Ricardo Blancaflor, who originally handled the case for SRRDC and had
possession of all the records of the case was on indefinite leave and could not be contacted. The Board granted counsel's request
and moved the hearing to April 4, 1991.
On March 18, 1991, SRRDC submitted a petition to the Board for the latter to resolve SRRDC's petition for exemption from CARP
coverage before any administrative valuation of their landholding could be had by the Board.
On April 4, 1991, the initial DARAB hearing of the case was held and subsequently, different dates of hearing were set without
objection from counsel of SRRDC. During the April 15, 1991 hearing, the subdivision plan of subject property at Casile, Cabuyao,
Laguna was submitted and marked as Exhibit "5" for SRRDC. At the hearing on April 23, 1991, the Land Bank asked for a period of
one month to value the land in dispute.
At the hearing on April 23, 1991, certification from Deputy Zoning Administrator Generoso B. Opina was presented. The certification
issued on September 8, 1989, stated that the parcels of land subject of the case were classified as "industrial Park" per
Sanguniang Bayan Resolution No. 45-89 dated March 29, 1989.14
To avert any opportunity that the DARAB might distribute the lands to the farmer beneficiaries, on April 30, 1991, petitioner filed a
petition15 with DARAB to disqualify private respondents as beneficiaries. However, DARAB refused to address the issue of
beneficiaries.
In the meantime, on January 20, 1992, the Regional Trial Court, Laguna, Branch 24, rendered a decision,16 finding that private
respondents illegally entered the SRRDC property, and ordered them evicted.
On July 11, 1991, DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong issued a memorandum directing the Land Bank of the Philippines to open a
trust account in favor of SRRDC, for P5,637,965.55, as valuation for the SRRDC property.
On December 19, 1991, DARAB promulgated a decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the Board hereby orders:
"1. The dismissal for lack of merit of the protest against the compulsory coverage of the landholdings of Sta. Rosa Realty
Development Corporation (Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 81949 and 84891 with an area of 254.766 hectares) in
Barangay Casile, Municipality of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is
hereby affirmed;
"2. The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to pay Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation the amount of Seven Million
Eight Hundred Forty-One Thousand, Nine Hundred Ninety Seven Pesos and Sixty-Four centavos (P7,841,997.64) for its
landholdings covered by the two (2) Transfer Certificates of Title mentioned above. Should there be a rejection of the
payment tendered, to open, if none has yet been made, a trust account for said amount in the name of Sta. Rosa Realty
Development Corporation;
"3. The Register of Deeds of the Province of Laguna to cancel with dispatch Transfer certificate of Title Nos. 84891 and
81949 and new one be issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, free from liens and encumbrances;
"4 The Department of Environment and Natural Resources either through its Provincial Office in Laguna or the Regional
Office, Region IV, to conduct a final segregation survey on the lands covered by Transfer certificate of Title Nos. 84891
and 81949 so the same can be transferred by the Register of Deeds to the name of the Republic of the Philippines;
"5. The Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform through its Municipal and Provincial Agrarian Reform Office
to take immediate possession on the said landholding after Title shall have been transferred to the name of the Republic
of the Philippines, and distribute the same to the immediate issuance of Emancipation Patents to the farmer-beneficiaries
as determined by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office of Cabuyao, Laguna."17
On January 20, 1992, the Regional Trial Court, Laguna, Branch 24, rendered a decision in Civil Case No. B-2333 18ruling that
respondents were builders in bad faith.
On February 6, 1992, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the DARAB decision. 19 On November 5, 1993,
the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision affirming the decision of DARAB. The decretal portion of the Court of Appeals decision
reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the DARAB decision dated September 19, 1991 is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to
petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation ventilating its case with the Special Agrarian Court on the issue of
just compensation."20Hence, this petition.21
On December 15, 1993, the Court issued a Resolution which reads:
"G. R. Nos. 112526 (Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.) – Considering the
compliance, dated December 13, 1993, filed by counsel for petitioner, with the resolution of December 8, 1993 which
required petitioner to post a cash bond or surety bond in the amount of P1,500,000.00 Pesos before issuing a temporary
restraining order prayed for, manifesting that it has posted a CASH BOND in the same amount with the Cashier of the
Court as evidenced by the attached official receipt no. 315519, the Court resolved to ISSUE the Temporary Retraining
Order prayed for.
"The Court therefore, resolved to restrain: (a) the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board from enforcing its
decision dated December 19, 1991 in DARAB Case No. JC-R-IV-LAG-0001, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
in a Decision dated November 5, 1993, and which ordered, among others, the Regional Office of the Department of
Agrarian Reform through its Municipal and Provincial Reform Office to take immediate possession of the landholding in
dispute after title shall have been transferred to the name of the Republic of the Philippines and to distribute the same
through the immediate issuance of Emancipation Patents to the farmer-beneficiaries as determined by the Municipal
Agrarian Officer of Cabuyao, Laguna, (b) The Department of Agrarian Reform and/or the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board, and all persons acting for and in their behalf and under their authority from entering the properties
involved in this case and from introducing permanent infrastructures thereon; and (c) the private respondents from further
clearing the said properties of their green cover by the cutting or burning of trees and other vegetation, effective today until
further orders from this Court."22
The main issue raised is whether the property in question is covered by CARP despite the fact that the entire property formed part
of a watershed area prior to the enactment of R. A. No. 6657.
Under Republic Act No. 6657, there are two modes of acquisition of private land: compulsory and voluntary. In the case at bar, the
Department of Agrarian Reform sought the compulsory acquisition of subject property under R. A. No. 6657, Section 16, to wit:
"Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. – For purposes of acquisition of private lands, the following
procedures shall be followed:
a.) After having identified the land, the landowners and the beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice to acquire
the land to the owners thereof, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post the same in a conspicuous place
in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is located. Said notice shall contain
the offer of the DAR to pay corresponding value in accordance with the valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18, and
other pertinent provisions hereof.
b.) Within thirty (30) days from the date of the receipt of written notice by personal delivery or registered mail, the
landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer.
c.) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the LBP shall pay the landowner the purchase price of the land
within thirty (30) days after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and other
muniments of title.
d.) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to
determine the compensation for the land requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed
submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision.
e.) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment, or, in case of rejection or no response from the
landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in
LBP bonds in accordance with this act, the DAR shall make immediate possession of the land and shall request
the proper Register of Deeds to issue Transfer Certificate of Titles (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
f.) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court 23 of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation.
In compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding, the landowners and farmer beneficiaries must first be identified. After
identification, the DAR shall send a notice of acquisition to the landowner, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post it in a
conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is located.
Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice of acquisition, the landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the
DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer.
If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and surrenders the certificate of
title. Within thirty (30) days from the execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the
purchase price. If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and surrenders
the certificate of title. Within thirty days from the execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays the
owner the purchase price. If the landowner rejects the DAR's offer or fails to make a reply, the DAR conducts summary
administrative proceedings to determine just compensation for the land. The landowner, the LBP representative and other
interested parties may submit evidence on just compensation within fifteen days from notice. Within thirty days from submission,
the DAR shall decide the case and inform the owner of its decision and the amount of just compensation.
Upon receipt by the owner of the corresponding payment, or, in case of rejection or lack of response from the latter, the DAR shall
deposit the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds with an accessible bank. The DAR shall immediately take possession of the land
and cause the issuance of a transfer certificate of title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The land shall then be
redistributed to the farmer beneficiaries. Any party may question the decision of the DAR in the special agrarian courts
(provisionally the Supreme Court designated branches of the regional trial court as special agrarian courts) for final determination
of just compensation.
The DAR has made compulsory acquisition the priority mode of land acquisition to hasten the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Under Sec. 16 of the CARL, the first step in compulsory acquisition is the
identification of the land, the landowners and the farmer beneficiaries. However, the law is silent on how the identification process
shall be made. To fill this gap, on July 26, 1989, the DAR issued Administrative Order No. 12, series of 1989, which set the
operating procedure in the identification of such lands. The procedure is as follows:
A. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), with the assistance of the pertinent Barangay Agrarian Reform
Committee (BARC), shall:
1. Update the masterlist of all agricultural lands covered under the CARP in his area of responsibility; the masterlist should
include such information as required under the attached CARP masterlist form which shall include the name of the
landowner, landholding area, TCT/OCT number, and tax declaration number.
2. Prepare the Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title (OCT/TCT) or landholding covered under Phase
I and II of the CARP except those for which the landowners have already filed applications to avail of other modes of land
acquisition. A case folder shall contain the following duly accomplished forms:
a) CARP CA Form 1—MARO investigation report
b) CARP CA Form No 2 – Summary investigation report findings and evaluation
c) CARP CA Form 3—Applicant's Information sheet
d) CARP CA Form 4 – Beneficiaries undertaking
e) CARP CA Form 5 – Transmittal report to the PARO
The MARO/BARC shall certify that all information contained in the above-mentioned forms have been examined and
verified by him and that the same are true and correct.
3. Send notice of coverage and a letter of invitation to a conference/meeting to the landowner covered by the Compulsory
Case Acquisition Folder. Invitations to the said conference meeting shall also be sent to the prospective farmer-
beneficiaries, the BARC representatives, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) representative, and the other interested
parties to discuss the inputs to the valuation of the property.
He shall discuss the MARO/BARC investigation report and solicit the views, objection, agreements or suggestions of the
participants thereon. The landowner shall also ask to indicate his retention area. The minutes of the meeting shall be
signed by all participants in the conference and shall form an integral part of the CACF.
4. Submit all completed case folders to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO).
B. The PARO shall:
1. Ensure the individual case folders are forwarded to him by his MAROs.
2. Immediately upon receipt of a case folder, compute the valuation of the land in accordance with A.O. No. 6, series of
1988. The valuation worksheet and the related CACF valuation forms shall be duly certified correct by the PARO and all
the personnel who participated in the accomplishment of these forms.
3. In all cases, the PARO may validate the report of the MARO through ocular inspection and verification of the property.
This ocular inspection and verification shall be mandatory when the computed value exceeds P500,000 per estate.
4. Upon determination of the valuation, forward the case folder, together with the duly accomplished valuation forms and
his recommendations, to the Central Office.
The LBP representative and the MARO concerned shall be furnished a copy each of his report.
C. DAR Central Office, specifically through the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD), shall:
1. Within three days from receipt of the case folder from the PARO, review, evaluate and determine the final land valuation
of the property covered by the case folder. A summary review and evaluation report shall be prepared and duly certified by
the BLAD Director and the personnel directly participating in the review and final valuation.
2. Prepare, for the signature of the Secretary or her duly authorized representative, a notice of acquisition (CARP Form 8)
for the subject property. Serve the notice to the landowner personally or through registered mail within three days from its
approval. The notice shall include among others, the area subject of compulsory acquisition, and the amount of just
compensation offered by DAR.
3. Should the landowner accept the DAR's offered value, the BLAD shall prepare and submit to the Secretary for approval
the order of acquisition. However, in case of rejection or non-reply, the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) shall conduct a
summary administrative hearing to determine just compensation, in accordance with the procedures provided under
Administrative Order No. 13, series of 1989. Immediately upon receipt of the DARAB's decision on just compensation, the
BLAD shall prepare and submit to the Secretary for approval the required order of acquisition.
4. Upon the landowner's receipt of payment, in case of acceptance, or upon deposit of payment in the designated bank, in
case of rejection or non-response, the Secretary shall immediately direct the pertinent Register of Deeds to issue the
corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Once the property is
transferred, the DAR, through the PARO, shall take possession of the land for redistribution to qualified beneficiaries."
Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989 requires that the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) keep an updated master
list of all agricultural lands under the CARP in his area of responsibility containing all the required information. The MARO prepares
a Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title covered by CARP. The MARO then sends the landowner a "Notice of
Coverage" and a "letter of invitation" to a "conference/ meeting" over the land covered by the CACF. He also sends invitations to
the prospective farmer-beneficiaries, the representatives of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), the Land Bank of
the Philippines (LBP) and other interested parties to discuss the inputs to the valuation of the property and solicit views,
suggestions, objections or agreements of the parties. At the meeting, the landowner is asked to indicate his retention area.
The MARO shall make a report of the case to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) who shall complete the valuation of
the land. Ocular inspection and verification of the property by the PARO shall be mandatory when the computed value of the estate
exceeds P500,000.00. Upon determination of the valuation, the PARO shall forward all papers together with his recommendation to
the Central Office of the DAR. The DAR Central Office, specifically, the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD) shall
prepare, on the signature of the Secretary or his duly authorized representative, a notice of acquisition of the subject property. From
this point, the provisions of R. A. No. 6657, Section 16 shall apply.
For a valid implementation of the CARP Program, two notices are required: (1) the notice of coverage and letter of invitation to a
preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the representative of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested
parties pursuant to DAR A. O. No. 12, series of 1989; and (2) the notice of acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of
the CARL.
The importance of the first notice, that is, the notice of coverage and the letter of invitation to a conference, and its actual conduct
cannot be understated. They are steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process. The
implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the State's police power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent that the
CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private property in
accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of
the maximum area allowed, there is also a taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not mere
limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the excess and all
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary.
In the case at bar, DAR has executed the taking of the property in question. However, payment of just compensation was not in
accordance with the procedural requirement. The law required payment in cash or LBP bonds, not by trust account as was done by
DAR.
In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, we held that "The CARP Law, for its part,
conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt of the landowner of the corresponding
payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also
remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either."24
Consequently, petitioner questioned before the Court of Appeals DARAB's decision ordering the compulsory acquisition of
petitioner's property.25 Here, petitioner pressed the question of whether the property was a watershed, not covered by CARP.
Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (P. D. No. 1067) provides:
"Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or overlying any ground water may be declared
by the Department of Natural resources as a protected area. Rules and Regulations may be promulgated by such
Department to prohibit or control such activities by the owners or occupants thereof within the protected area which may
damage or cause the deterioration of the surface water or ground water or interfere with the investigation, use, control,
protection, management or administration of such waters."
Watersheds may be defined as "an area drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by a boundary or divide which separates
it from adjacent watersheds." Watersheds generally are outside the commerce of man, so why was the Casile property titled in the
name of SRRDC? The answer is simple. At the time of the titling, the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources had not
declared the property as watershed area. The parcels of land in Barangay Casile were declared as "PARK" by a Zoning Ordinance
adopted by the municipality of Cabuyao in 1979, as certified by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. On January 5, 1994,
the Sangguniang Bayan of Cabuyao, Laguna issued a Resolution 26 voiding the zoning classification of the land at Barangay Casile
as Park and declaring that the land is now classified as agricultural land.
The authority of the municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna to issue zoning classification is an exercise of its police power, not the power
of eminent domain. "A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes,
defines and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs."27
In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform28 we held that lands classified as non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of
the CARL may not be compulsorily acquired for distribution to farmer beneficiaries.
However, more than the classification of the subject land as PARK is the fact that subsequent studies and survey showed that the
parcels of land in question form a vital part of a watershed area.29
Now, petitioner has offered to prove that the land in dispute is a "watershed or part of the protected area for watershed purposes."
Ecological balances and environmental disasters in our day and age seem to be interconnected. Property developers and tillers of
the land must be aware of this deadly combination. In the case at bar, DAR included the disputed parcels of land for compulsory
acquisition simply because the land was allegedly devoted to agriculture and was titled to SRRDC, hence, private and alienable
land that may be subject to CARP.
However, the scenario has changed, after an in-depth study, survey and reassessment. We cannot ignore the fact that the disputed
parcels of land form a vital part of an area that need to be protected for watershed purposes. In a report of the Ecosystems
Research and Development Bureau (ERDB), a research arm of the DENR, regarding the environmental assessment of the Casile
and Kabanga-an river watersheds, they concluded that:
"The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is situated in the heartland of both watersheds. Considering the
barangays proximity to the Matangtubig waterworks, the activities of the farmers which are in conflict with proper soil and
water conservation practices jeopardize and endanger the vital waterworks. Degradation of the land would have double
edge detrimental effects. On the Casile side this would mean direct siltation of the Mangumit river which drains to the
water impounding reservoir below. On the Kabanga-an side, this would mean destruction of forest covers which acts as
recharged areas of the Matang Tubig springs. Considering that the people have little if no direct interest in the protection
of the Matang Tubig structures they couldn't care less even if it would be destroyed.
The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be considered a most vital life support system to thousands of inhabitants
directly and indirectly affected by it. From these watersheds come the natural God-given precious resource – water. x x x x
x
Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with sound watershed management. More so, the introduction of
earth disturbing activities like road building and erection of permanent infrastructures. Unless the pernicious agricultural
activities of the Casile farmers are immediately stopped, it would not be long before these watersheds would cease to be
of value. The impact of watershed degredation threatens the livelihood of thousands of people dependent upon it. Toward
this, we hope that an acceptable comprehensive watershed development policy and program be immediately formulated
and implemented before the irreversible damage finally happens.
Hence, the following are recommended:
7.2 The Casile farmers should be relocated and given financial assistance.
7.3 Declaration of the two watersheds as critical and in need of immediate rehabilitation.
7.4 A comprehensive and detailed watershed management plan and program be formulated and implemented by
the Canlubang Estate in coordination with pertinent government agencies."30
The ERDB report was prepared by a composite team headed by Dr. Emilio Rosario, the ERDB Director, who holds a doctorate
degree in water resources from U.P. Los Banos in 1987; Dr. Medel Limsuan, who obtained his doctorate degree in watershed
management from Colorado University (US) in 1989; and Dr. Antonio M. Dano, who obtained his doctorate degree in Soil and
Water management Conservation from U.P. Los Banos in 1993.
Also, DENR Secretary Angel Alcala submitted a Memorandum for the President dated September 7, 1993 (Subject: PFVR HWI
Ref.: 933103 Presidential Instructions on the Protection of Watersheds of the Canlubang Estates at Barrio Casile, Cabuyao,
Laguna) which reads:
"It is the opinion of this office that the area in question must be maintained for watershed purposes for ecological and
environmental considerations, among others. Although the 88 families who are the proposed CARP beneficiaries will be
affected, it is important that a larger view of the situation be taken as one should also consider the adverse effect on
thousands of residents downstream if the watershed will not be protected and maintained for watershed purposes.
"The foregoing considered, it is recommended that if possible, an alternate area be allocated for the affected farmers, and
that the Canlubang Estates be mandated to protect and maintain the area in question as a permanent watershed
reserved."31
The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a watershed. The most important product of a watershed is water which is
one of the most important human necessity. The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate supply of water for future
generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an
"intergenerational responsibility" that needs to be answered now.
Another factor that needs to be mentioned is the fact that during the DARAB hearing, petitioner presented proof that the Casile
property has slopes of 18% and over, which exempted the land from the coverage of CARL. R. A. No. 6657, Section 10, provides:
"Section 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. – Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for
parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestration, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves, national
defense, school sites and campuses including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for
educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot production centers, church sites and convents appurtenent
thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by the inmates,
government and private research and quarantine centers, and all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over,
except those already developed shall be exempt from coverage of this Act."
Hence, during the hearing at DARAB, there was proof showing that the disputed parcels of land may be excluded from the
compulsory acquisition coverage of CARP because of its very high slopes.
To resolve the issue as to the true nature of the parcels of land involved in the case at bar, the Court directs the DARAB to conduct
a re-evaluation of the issue.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 27234.
In lieu thereof, the Court REMANDS the case to the DARAB for re-evaluation and determination of the nature of the parcels of land
involved to resolve the issue of its coverage by the Comprehensive Land Reform Program.
In the meantime, the effects of the CLOAs issued by the DAR to supposed farmer beneficiaries shall continue to be stayed by the
temporary restraining order issued on December 15, 1993, which shall remain in effect until final decision on the case.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Collado v CA, GR 107764
G. R. No. 107764 October 4, 2002
EDNA COLLADO, et al. vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This Petition1 seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals, 2 dated June 22, 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 25597, which
declared null and void the Decision3 dated January 30, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, in LRC No.
269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-59179, confirming the imperfect title of petitioners over a parcel of land.
The Facts
On April 25, 1985, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the land registration court an application for registration of a parcel of land
with an approximate area of 1,200,766 square meters or 120.0766 hectares ("Lot" for brevity). The Lot is situated in Barangay San
Isidro (formerly known as Boso-boso), Antipolo, Rizal, and covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620. Attached to the application was
the technical description of the Lot as Lot Psu-162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division,
Bureau of Lands, which stated, "[t]his survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed." On March 24, 1986, petitioner Edna T. Collado
filed an Amended Application to include additional co-applicants. 4 Subsequently, more applicants joined (collectively referred to as
"petitioners" for brevity).5
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, and the Municipality of Antipolo, through its Municipal Attorney and
the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners’ application. In due course, the land registration court issued an order
of general default against the whole world with the exception of the oppositors.
Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since time immemorial. Their possession has been open, public, notorious and
in the concept of owners. The Lot was surveyed in the name of Sesinando Leyva, one of their predecessors-in-interest, as early as
March 22, 1902. Petitioners declared the Lot for taxation purposes and paid all the corresponding real estate taxes. According to
them, there are now twenty-five co-owners in pro-indiviso shares of five hectares each. During the hearings, petitioners submitted
evidence to prove that there have been nine transfers of rights among them and their predecessors-in-interest, as follows:
"1. SESINANDO LEYVA was the earliest known predecessor-in-interest of the Applicants who was in actual, open,
notorious and continuous possession of the property in the concept of owner. He had the property surveyed in his name
on 22 March 1902 (Exhibit "W" and "W-1" testimonies of J. Torres on 16 December 1987 and Mariano Leyva on 29
December 1987).
2. DIOSDADO LEYVA, is the son of Sesinando Leyva, who inherited the property. He had the property resurveyed in his
name on May 21-28, 1928 (Exhibit "X" and "X-1"; testimony of Mariano Leyva, a son of Diosdado Leyva).
3. GREGORIO CAMANTIQUE bought the property from Diosdado Leyva before the Japanese Occupation of the
Philippines during World War II. He owned and possessed the property until 1958. He declared the property for tax
purposes, the latest of which was under Tax Declaration No. 7182 issued on 3 February 1957 (Exhibit "I" and testimony of
Mariano Leyva, supra).
4. ANGELINA REYNOSO, bought the property from Gregorio Camantique by virtue of a Deed of Sale on 3 February 1958
(Exhibit "H"). During the ownership of the property by Angelina Reynoso, Mariano Leyva the grandson of Sesinando
Leyva, the previous owner, attended to the farm. (Testimony of Mariano Leyva, supra). Angelina Reynoso declared the
property in her name under Tax Declaration No. 7189 in 4 February 1958, under Tax Declaration No. 8775 on 3 August
1965, under Tax Declaration No. 16945 on 15 December 1975, and under Tax Declaration No. 03-06145 on 25 June 1978.
5. MYRNA TORRES bought the property from Angelina Reynoso on 16 October 1982 through a Deed of Sale (Exhibit
"G").
6. EDNA COLLADO bought the property from Myrna Torres in a Deed of Sale dated 28 April 1984 (Exhibit "P-1" to "P-3").
7. Additional owners BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO TORRES, JOSE AMO, VICENTE TORRES and SERGIO
MONTEALEGRE who bought portions of the property from Edna Collado through a Deed of Sale on 6 November 1985
(Exhibit "Q" to "Q-3").
8. And more additional Owners JOSEPH NUNEZ, DIOSDADO ARENOS, DANILO FABREGAS, FERNANDO TORRES,
LUZ TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD TUTANA, JOSE TORRES JR., RODRIGO TUTANA, ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA
ASTORIAS, MYRNA LANCION, CHONA MARCIANO, CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO BRIONES, REMEDIOS
BANTIQUE, DANTE MONTEALEGRE, ARMANDO TORRES, AIDA GADON and AMELIA M. MALAPAD bought portions
of the property in a Deed of Sale on 12 May 1986 (Exhibit "S" to "S-3").
9. Co-owners DIOSDADO ARENOS, RODRIGO TUTANA, CHONA MARCIANO and AMELIA MALAPAD jointly sold their
shares to new OWNERS GLORIA R. SERRANO, IMELDA CAYLALUAD, NORBERTO CAMILOTE and FIDELITO ECO
through a Deed of Sale dated 18 January 1987 (Exhibit "T" to "T-9")."6
During the hearing on January 9, 1991, only the assistant provincial prosecutor appeared without the Solicitor General. For failure
of the oppositors to present their evidence, the land registration court issued an order considering the case submitted for decision
based on the evidence of the petitioners. The court later set aside the order and reset the hearing to January 14, 1991 for the
presentation of the evidence of the oppositors. On this date, counsel for oppositors failed to appear again despite due notice.
Hence, the court again issued an order submitting the case for decision based on the evidence of the petitioners.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
After appraisal of the evidence submitted by petitioners, the land registration court held that petitioners had adduced sufficient
evidence to establish their registrable rights over the Lot. Accordingly, the court rendered a decision confirming the imperfect title of
petitioners. We quote the pertinent portions of the court’s decision, as follows:
"From the evidence presented, the Court finds that from the testimony of the witnesses presented by the Applicants, the property
applied for is in actual, open, public and notorious possession by the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest since time
immemorial and said possession had been testified to by witnesses Jimmy Torres, Mariano Leyva, Sergio Montealegre, Jose Amo
and one Chona who were all cross-examined by Counsel for Oppositor Republic of the Philippines.
Evidence was likewise presented that said property was declared for taxation purposes in the names of the previous owners and
the corresponding taxes were paid by the Applicants and the previous owners and said property was planted to fruit bearing trees;
portions to palay and portions used for grazing purposes.
To the mind of the Court, Applicants have presented sufficient evidence to establish registrable title over said property applied for
by them.
On the claim that the property applied for is within the Marikina Watershed, the Court can only add that all Presidential
Proclamations like the Proclamation setting aside the Marikina Watershed are subject to "private rights."
In the case of Municipality of Santiago vs. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 734, 1983 "private rights" is proof of acquisition through
(sic) among means of acquisition of public lands.
In the case of Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 193-195, by "private rights" means that applicant should show clear and
convincing evidence that the property in question was acquired by applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the
Spanish government or by Possessory Information title, or any other means for the acquisition of public lands xxx" (underscoring
supplied).
The Court believes that from the evidence presented as above stated, Applicants have acquired private rights to which the
Presidential Proclamation setting aside the Marikina Watershed should be subject to such private rights.
At any rate, the Court notes that evidence was presented by the applicants that as per Certification issued by the Bureau of Forest
Development dated March 18, 1980, the area applied for was verified to be within the area excluded from the operation of the
Marikina Watershed Lands Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904 per Proclamation No. 1283 promulgated on June 21, 1974
which established the Boso-boso Town Site Reservation, amended by Proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18, 1977 known as the
Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation. (Exhibit "K")."7
In a motion dated April 5, 1991, received by the Solicitor General on April 6, 1991, petitioners alleged that the decision dated
January 30, 1991 confirming their title had become final after the Solicitor General received a copy of the decision on February 18,
1991. Petitioners prayed that the land registration court order the Land Registration Authority to issue the necessary decree in their
favor over the Lot.
On April 11, 1991, the Solicitor General inquired from the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal whether the land registration court had
already rendered a decision and if so, whether the Provincial Prosecutor would recommend an appeal. However, the Provincial
Prosecutor failed to answer the query.
According to the Solicitor General, he received on April 23, 1991 a copy of the land registration court’s decision dated January 30,
1991, and not on February 18, 1991 as alleged by petitioners in their motion.
In the meantime, on May 7, 1991, the land registration court issued an order directing the Land Regulation Authority to issue the
corresponding decree of registration in favor of the petitioners.
On August 6, 1991, the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment pursuant to Section
9(2) of BP Blg. 129 on the ground that there had been no clear showing that the Lot had been previously classified as alienable and
disposable making it subject to private appropriation.
On November 29, 1991, Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an association of holders of certificates of stewardship issued
by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR" for brevity) under its Integrated Social Forestry Program ("ISF"
for brevity), filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-Intervention. They likewise
opposed the registration and asserted that the Lot, which is situated inside the Marikina Watershed Reservation, is inalienable.
They claimed that they are the actual occupants of the Lot pursuant to the certificates of stewardship issued by the DENR under
the ISF for tree planting purposes.
The Court of Appeals granted the motion to intervene verbally during the preliminary conference held on April 6, 1992. During the
preliminary conference, all the parties as represented by their respective counsels agreed that the only issue for resolution was
whether the Lot in question is part of the public domain.8
The Court of Appeals’ Ruling
In a decision dated June 22, 1992, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and declared null and void the decision dated January
30, 1991 of the land registration court. The Court of Appeals explained thus:
"Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is enshrined in the 1935 (Art. XIII, Sec. 1), 1973 (Art. XIV, Sec. 8), and 1987 Constitution (Art.
XII, Sec. 2), all lands of the public domain belong to the State. An applicant, like the private respondents herein, for registration of a
parcel of land bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain (Director of Lands vs. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296).
A positive Act of government is needed to declassify a public land and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural
or other purposes (Republic vs. Bacas, 176 SCRA 376).
In the case at bar, the private respondents failed to present any evidence whatsoever that the land applied for as described in Psu-
162620 has been segregated from the bulk of the public domain and declared by competent authority to be alienable and
disposable. Worse, the technical description of Psu-162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge, Survey Division,
Bureau of Lands, which was attached to the application of private respondents, categorically stated that "This survey is inside IN-12
Mariquina Watershed.""
That the land in question is within the Marikina Watershed Reservation is confirmed by the Administrator of the National Land Titles
and Deeds in a Report, dated March 2, 1988, submitted to the respondent Court in LR Case No. 269-A. These documents readily
and effectively negate the allegation in private respondent Collado’s application that "said parcel of land known as Psu-162620 is
not covered by any form of title, nor any public land application and are not within any government reservation (Par. 8, Application;
Emphasis supplied). The respondent court could not have missed the import of these vital documents which are binding upon the
courts inasmuch as it is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department to classify public lands. They should have
forewarned the respondent judge from assuming jurisdiction over the case.
"x x x inasmuch as the said properties applied for by petitioners are part of the public domain, it is the Director of Lands who has
jurisdiction in the disposition of the same (subject to the approval of the Secretary of Natural Resources and Environment), and not
the courts. x x x Even assuming that petitioners did have the said properties surveyed even before the same was declared to be
part of the Busol Forest Reservation, the fact remains that it was so converted into a forest reservation, thus it is with more reason
that this action must fail. Forest lands are inalienable and possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot convert the same into
private property. And courts are without jurisdiction to adjudicate lands within the forest zone. (Heirs of Gumangan vs. Court of
Appeals. 172 SCRA 563; Emphasis supplied).
Needless to say, a final judgment may be annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, fraud or that it is contrary to law (Panlilio vs.
Garcia, 119 SCRA 387, 391) and a decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time
(Suarez vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 339)."9
Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues
The issues raised by petitioners are restated as follows:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF
THE TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE APPLICATION OF THE PETITIONERS FOR CONFIRMATION OF TITLE;
II
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE
PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT FILED BY THE REPUBLIC LONG AFTER THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
HAD BECOME FINAL;
III
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE
INTERVENORS’ PETITION FOR INTERVENTION WHICH WAS FILED OUT OF TIME OR LONG AFTER THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME FINAL.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
First Issue: whether petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.
There is no dispute that Executive Order No. 33 ("EO 33" for brevity) dated July 26, 1904 10 established the Marikina Watershed
Reservation ("MWR" for brevity) situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioners even concede that the Lot, described as
Lot Psu-162620, is inside the technical, literal description of the MWR. However, the main thrust of petitioners’ claim over the Lot is
that "all Presidential proclamations like the proclamation setting aside the Marikina Watershed Reservation are subject to private
rights." They point out that EO 33 contains a saving clause that the reservations are "subject to existing private rights, if any there
be." Petitioners contend that their claim of ownership goes all the way back to 1902, when their known predecessor-in-interest,
Sesinando Leyva, laid claim and ownership over the Lot. They claim that the presumption of law then prevailing under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926 was that the land possessed and claimed by individuals as their own are
agricultural lands and therefore alienable and disposable. They conclude that private rights were vested on Sesinando Leyva
before the issuance of EO 33, thus excluding the Lot from the Marikina Watershed Reservation.
Petitioners’ arguments find no basis in law.
The Regalian Doctrine: An Overview
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State.11 The Spaniards first introduced the doctrine to the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,
specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias 12which laid the foundation that "all lands
that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain." 13 Upon the Spanish
conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all "lands, territories and possessions" in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.14
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for
the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The Royal Decree of 1894 or the "Maura Law" partly
amended the Mortgage Law as well as the Law of the Indies. The Maura Law was the last Spanish land law promulgated in the
Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands would revert to the state.15
Four years later, Spain ceded to the government of the United States all rights, interests and claims over the national territory of the
Philippine Islands through the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. In 1903, the United States colonial government, through the
Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, which was described as follows:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed
the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of
portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their
titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the
establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of
Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in
the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the government’s title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris
and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public
domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the
patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands."16
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by
private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.
Act 2874, the second Public Land Act, superseded Act No. 926 in 1919. After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, Commonwealth
Act No. 141 ("CA 141" for brevity) amended Act 2874 in 1936. CA 141, as amended, remains to this day as the existing general law
governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands.17
In the meantime, in order to establish a system of registration by which recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible and
imprescriptible, the legislature passed Act 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, which took effect on February 1,
1903. Act 496 placed all registered lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system. 18 The Torrens system requires the
government to issue a certificate of title stating that the person named in the title is the owner of the property described therein,
subject to liens and encumbrances annotated on the title or reserved by law. The certificate of title is indefeasible and
imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are quieted upon issuance of the certificate. 19 PD 1529, known as the Property
Registration Decree enacted on June 11, 1978,20 amended and updated Act 496.
The 1935, 1973, 1987 Philippine Constitutions
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine substituting, however, the state, in lieu of the King, as the
owner of all lands and waters of the public domain.21 Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his separate opinion in Cruz vs. Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources,22 explained thus:
"One of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the
natural resources of the country. There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor of the principle of state
ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine. State ownership of natural resources was seen as a
necessary starting point to secure recognition of the state’s power to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of State ownership of land and natural
resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether it was continued and applied by the
Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine."
Thus, Section 1, Article XIII23 of the 1935 Constitution, on "Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources" barred the alienation
of all natural resources except public agricultural lands, which were the only natural resources the State could alienate. The 1973
Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV 24 on the "National Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation".
The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII25 on "National Economy and Patrimony".
Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except agricultural lands of the public
domain. The 1987 Constitution readopted this policy. Indeed, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources
enumerated in the Philippine Constitution belong to the State.
Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource
The term "natural resource" includes "not only timber, gas, oil coal, minerals, lakes, and submerged lands, but also, features which
supply a human need and contribute to the health, welfare, and benefit of a community, and are essential to the well-being thereof
and proper enjoyment of property devoted to park and recreational purposes."26
In Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 27 the Court had occasion to discourse on watershed areas. The
Court resolved the issue of whether the parcel of land which the Department of Environment and Natural Resources had assessed
to be a watershed area is exempt from the coverage of RA No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law ("CARL" for
brevity).28 The Court defined watershed as "an area drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by a boundary or divide
which separates it from adjacent watersheds." However, the Court also recognized that:
"The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a watershed. The most important product of a watershed is water which
is one of the most important human necessit(ies). The protection of watershed ensures an adequate supply of water for future
generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but also cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an
"intergenerational" responsibility that needs to be answered now."
Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067) provides:
"Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or overlying any ground water may be declared by the
Department of Natural Resources as a protected area. Rules and Regulations may be promulgated by such Department to prohibit
or control such activities by the owners or occupants thereof within the protected area which may damage or cause the
deterioration of the surface water or ground water or interfere with the investigation, use, control, protection, management or
administration of such waters."
The Court in Sta. Rosa Realty also recognized the need to protect watershed areas and took note of the report of the Ecosystems
Research and Development Bureau (ERDB), a research arm of the DENR, regarding the environmental assessment of the Casile
and Kabanga-an river watersheds involved in that case. That report concluded as follows:
"The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is situated in the heartland of both watersheds. Considering the barangays
proximity to the Matangtubig waterworks, the activities of the farmers which are in conflict with proper soil and water conservation
practices jeopardize and endanger the vital waterworks. Degradation of the land would have double edge detrimental effects. On
the Casile side this would mean direct siltation of the Mangumit river which drains to the water impounding reservoir below. On the
Kabanga-an side, this would mean destruction of forest covers which acts as recharged areas of the Matangtubig springs.
Considering that the people have little if no direct interest in the protection of the Matangtubig structures they couldn’t care less
even if it would be destroyed.
The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be considered a most vital life support system to thousands of inhabitants directly and
indirectly affected by it. From these watersheds come the natural God-given precious resource – water. x x x
Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with sound watershed management. More so, the introduction of earth
disturbing activities like road building and erection of permanent infrastructures. Unless the pernicious agricultural activities of the
Casile farmers are immediately stopped, it would not be long before these watersheds would cease to be of value. The impact of
watershed degradation threatens the livelihood of thousands of people dependent upon it. Toward this, we hope that an acceptable
comprehensive watershed development policy and program be immediately formulated and implemented before the irreversible
damage finally happens."
The Court remanded the case to the Department of Agriculture and Adjudication Board or DARAB to re-evaluate and determine the
nature of the parcels of land involved in order to resolve the issue of its coverage by the CARL.
Sta. Rosa Realty gives us a glimpse of the dangers posed by the misuse of natural resources such as watershed reservations
which are akin to forest zones. Population growth and industrialization have taken a heavy toll on the environment. Environmental
degradation from unchecked human activities could wreak havoc on the lives of present and future generations. Hence, by
constitutional fiat, natural resources remain to this day inalienable properties of the State.
Viewed under this legal and factual backdrop, did petitioners acquire, as they vigorously argue, private rights over the parcel of land
prior to the issuance of EO 33 segregating the same as a watershed reservation?
The answer is in the negative.
First. An applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48 of CA
141, as amended. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain and that he has
an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name arising from an imperfect title. An imperfect title may have been
derived from old Spanish grants such as a titulo real or royal grant, a concession especial or special grant, a composicion con el
estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through purchase. 29 Or, that he has had continuous, open and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty years
preceding the filing of his application as provided by Section 48 (b) CA 141.
Originally, Section 48(b) of CA 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This
was superseded by RA 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial
confirmation of an imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on
January 25, 1977, the law prevailing at the time petitioners’ application for registration was filed on April 25, 1985. 30 As amended,
Section 48 (b) now reads:
"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force
majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter."
Interpreting Section 48 (b) of CA 141, the Court stated that the Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove the following:
"(a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law
are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued."31
Petitioners do not claim to have documentary title over the Lot. Their right to register the Lot is predicated mainly upon continuous
possession since 1902.
Clearly, petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and enforceable right or title because of the failure to complete the required
period of possession, whether under the original Section 48 (b) of CA 141 prior to the issuance of EO 33, or under the amendment
by RA 1942 and PD 1073.
There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, petitioners had acquired ownership or title to the Lot either by deed or
by any other mode of acquisition from the State, as for instance by acquisitive prescription. As of 1904, Sesinando Leyva had only
been in possession for two years. Verily, petitioners have not possessed the parcel of land in the manner and for the number of
years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.
Second, assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, EO 33 reserved the Lot
as a watershed. Since then, the Lot became non-disposable and inalienable public land. At the time petitioners filed their
application on April 25, 1985, the Lot has been reserved as a watershed under EO 33 for 81 years prior to the filing of petitioners’
application.
The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in 1904 could no longer be counted because as a watershed reservation, the
Lot was no longer susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation. Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended, applies
exclusively to alienable and disposable public agricultural land. Forest lands, including watershed reservations, are excluded. It is
axiomatic that the possession of forest lands or other inalienable public lands cannot ripen into private ownership. In Municipality of
Santiago, Isabela vs. Court of Appeals,32 the Court declared that inalienable public lands -
"x x x cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, does not run against the State.
‘The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor
because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove
possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the
State.’ "
Third, Gordula vs. Court of Appeals33 is in point. In Gordula, petitioners did not contest the nature of the land. They admitted that
the land lies in the heart of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, which Proclamation No. 573 classified as inalienable. The
petitioners in Gordula contended, however, that Proclamation No. 573 itself recognizes private rights of landowners prior to the
reservation. They claim to have established their private rights to the subject land. The Court ruled:
"We do not agree. No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied from the government; it
is indispensable that there be a showing of a title from the state. The facts show that petitioner Gordula did not acquire title to the
subject land prior to its reservation under Proclamation No. 573. He filed his application for free patent only in January, 1973, more
than three (3) years after the issuance of Proclamation No. 573 in June, 1969. At that time, the land, as part of the Caliraya-Lumot
River Forest Reserve, was no longer open to private ownership as it has been classified as public forest reserve for the public
good.
Nonetheless, petitioners insist that the term, "private rights," in Proclamation No. 573, should not be interpreted as requiring a title.
They opine that it suffices if the claimant "had occupied and cultivated the property for so many number of years, declared the land
for taxation purposes, [paid] the corresponding real estate taxes [which are] accepted by the government, and [his] occupancy and
possession [is] continuous, open and unmolested and recognized by the government. Prescinding from this premise, petitioners
urge that the 25-year possession by petitioner Gordula from 1944 to 1969, albeit five (5) years short of the 30-year possession
required under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, as amended, is enough to vest upon petitioner Gordula the "private rights"
recognized and respected in Proclamation No. 573.
The case law does not support this submission. In Director of Lands vs. Reyes, we held that a settler claiming the protection of
"private rights" to exclude his land from a military or forest reservation must show "x x x by clear and convincing evidence that the
property in question was acquired by [any] x x x means for the acquisition of public lands."
In fine, one claiming "private rights" must prove that he has complied with C.A. No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the
Public Land Act, which prescribes the substantive as well as the procedural requirements for acquisition of public lands. This law
requires at least thirty (30) years of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and possession of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition, immediately preceding the filing of the application for free patent. The
rationale for the 30-year period lies in the presumption that the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and/or
possessors claim an interest therein only by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open and notorious possession."
Next, petitioners argue that assuming no private rights had attached to the Lot prior to EO 33 in 1904, the President of the
Philippines had subsequently segregated the Lot from the public domain and made the Lot alienable and disposable when he
issued Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974. Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1283 expressly excluded an area of
3,780 hectares from the MWR and made the area part of the Boso-boso Townsite Reservation. Petitioners assert that Lot Psu-
162620 is a small part of this excluded town site area. Petitioners further contend that town sites are considered alienable and
disposable under CA 141.
Proclamation No. 1283 reads thus:

"PROCLAMATION NO. 1283
EXCLUDING FROM THE OPERATION EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33, DATED JULY 26, 1904, AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE
ORDERS NOS. 14 AND 16, BOTH SERIES OF 1915, WHICH ESTABLISHED THE WATERSHED RESERVATION SITUATED IN
THE MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON, A CERTAIN PORTION OF THE LAND
EMBRACED THEREIN AND RESERVING THE SAME, TOGETHER WITH THE ADJACENT PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN, FOR TOWNSITE PURPOSES UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER XI OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I,
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do hereby, exclude from the operation of Executive Order No. 33 dated
July 26, 1904, as amended by Executive Orders Nos. 14 and 16, both series of 1915, which established the Watershed
Reservation situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon, certain portions of land embraced therein
and reserve the same, together with the adjacent parcel of land of the public domain, for townsite purposes under the provisions of
Chapter XI of the Public Land Act, subject to private rights, if any there be, and to future subdivision survey in accordance with the
development plan to be prepared and approved by the Department of Local Government and Community Development, which
parcels are more particularly described as follows:
Lot A (Part of Watershed Reservation)
A parcel of land (Lot A of Proposed Poor Man’s Baguio, being a portion of the Marikina Watershed, IN-2), situated in the
municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon, beginning at a point marked "1" on sketch plan, being N-74’-30 E,
8480.00 meters more or less, from BLLM 1, Antipolo, Rizal; thence N 33’ 28 W 1575.00 m. to point 2; thence N 40’ 26 W 1538.50
m. to point 3; thence N 30’ 50W 503.17 m. to point 4; thence N 75’ 02 W 704.33 m. to point 5; thence N 14’ 18 W 1399.39 m. to
point 6; thence N 43’ 25 W 477.04 m. to point 7; thence N 71’ 38 W 458.36 m. to point 8; thence N 31’ 05 W 1025.00 m. to point 9;
thence Due North 490.38 m. to point 10; thence Due North 1075.00 m. to point 11; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 12; thence
Due East 1000.00 m. to point 13; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 14; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 15; thence Due
East 1000.00 m. to point 16; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 17; thence Due East 1075.00 m. to point 18; thence Due South
1000.00 m. to point 19; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 20; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 21; thence Due South
1000.00 m. to point 22; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 23; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 24; thence Due South
1075.00 m. to point 25; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 26; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 27; thence Due West
636.56 m. to point of beginning. Containing an area of three thousand seven hundred eighty (3,780) Hectares, more or less.
Lot B (Alienable and Disposable Land)
A parcel of land (Lot B of Proposed Poor Man’s Baguio, being a portion of alienable and disposable portion of public domain)
situated in the municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon. Beginning at a point marked "1" on sketch plan being N
74’ 30 E., 8430.00 m., more or less, from BLLM 1. Antipolo, Rizal; thence Due West 363.44 m. to point 2; thence Due West 1000.00
m. to point 3; thence Due West 100.00 m. to point 4; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 5; thence Due West 1075.00 m. to point
6; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 7; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 8; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 9;
thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 10; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 11; thence Due North 509.62 m. to point 12;
thence S. 31’ 05 E 1025.00 m. to point 13; thence S 71’ 38 E 458.36 m. to point 14; thence S 43’ 25 E 477.04 m. to point 15; thence
S 14’ 18 E 1399.39 m. to point 16; thence S 75’ 02 E 704.33 m. to point 17; thence S. 30’ 50 E 503.17 m. to point 18; thence S 40’
26 E 1538.50 m. to point 19; thence s 33’ 23 e 1575.00 m to point of beginning. Containing an area of one thousand two hundred
twenty five (1,225) Hectares, more or less.
Note: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future survey.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I Have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 21st day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-four.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

President
Republic of the Philippines"
Proclamation No. 1283 has since been amended by Proclamation No. 1637 issued on April 18, 1977. Proclamation No. 1637
revised the area and location of the proposed townsite. According to then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos, Proclamation No.
1637 excluded Lot A (of which the Lot claimed by petitioners is part) for townsite purposes and reverted it to MWR
coverage.34 Proclamation No. 1637 reads:
"PROCLAMATION NO. 1637
AMENDING PROCLAMATION NO. 1283, DATED JUNE 21, 1974, WHICH ESTABLISHED THE TOWNSITE RESERVATION IN
THE MUNICIPALITIES OF ANTIPOLO AND SAN MATEO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON BY INCREASING THE
AREA AND REVISING THE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE LAND EMBRACED THEREIN, AND REVOKING
PROCLAMATION NO. 765 DATED OCTOBER 26, 1970 THAT RESERVED PORTIONS OF THE AREA AS RESETTLEMENT
SITE.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E.
MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do hereby amend Proclamation No. 1283, dated June 21, 1974 which established the
townsite reservation in the municipalities of Antipolo and San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon, by increasing the area and
revising the technical descriptions of the land embraced therein, subject to private rights, if any there be, which parcel of land is
more particularly described as follows:
(Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite)
A PARCEL OF LAND (Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation amending the area under SWO-41762 establishing the
Bagong Silangan Townsite Reservation) situated in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo, and Montalban, Province of Rizal,
Island of Luzon. Bounded on the E., along lines 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15-16-17-18-19-20-21-22-23 by the Marikina
Watershed Reservation (IN-12); on the S., along lines 23-24-25 by the portion of Antipolo; on the W., along lines 25-26-27-28-29-30
by the Municipalities of Montalban, San Mateo; and on the N., along lines 30-31-32-33-34-35-36-37-38-39-40-41-42-43-44 by the
Angat Watershed Reservation. Beginning at a point marked "1" on the Topographic Maps with the Scale of 1:50,000 which is the
identical corner 38 IN-12, Marikina Watershed Reservation.
xxx xxx xxx
NOTE: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future survey.
Proclamation No. 765 dated October 26, 1970, which covered areas entirely within the herein Lungsod Silangan Townsite, is
hereby revoked accordingly.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of April, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-seven.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

President of the Philippines"
A positive act (e.g., an official proclamation) of the Executive Department is needed to declassify land which had been earlier
classified as a watershed reservation and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. 35 Unless
and until the land classified as such is released in an official proclamation so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.36
The principal document presented by petitioners to prove the private character of the Lot is the Certification of the Bureau of Forest
Development dated March 18, 1986 that the Lot is excluded from the Marikina Watershed (Exh. R). The Certification reads:
"Republic of the Philippines

Ministry of Natural Resources
BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT

REGION IV
EL – AL Building
100 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City
MAR 18 1986
VERIFICATION ON THE STATUS OF LAND:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the tract of land situated in Barangay San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, containing an area of 1,269,766 square
meters, as shown and described on the reverse side hereof, surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Telesforo Cabading for Angelina C.
Reynoso, is verified to be within the area excluded from the operation of Marikina Watershed Reservation established under
Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904 per Proclamation No. 1283, promulgated on June 21, 1974, which established the
Boso-Boso Townsite Reservation, amended by proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18, 1977 known as Lungsod Silangan Townsite
Reservation.
Subject area also falls within the bounds of Bagong Lipunan Site under P.D. 1396 dated June 2, 1978 under the sole jurisdiction of
the Ministry of Human Settlements, to the exclusion of any other government agencies.
This verification is made upon the request of the Chief, Legal Staff, R-4 as contained in his internal memorandum dated March 18,
1986.
Verified by:
(Sgd) ROMEO C. PASCUBILLO

Cartographer II
Checked by:
(Sgd) ARMENDO R. CRUZ

Supervising Cartographer
ATTESTED:
(Sgd) LUIS G. DACANAY

Chief, Forest Engineering & Infrastructure Section"
The above certification on which petitioners rely that a reclassification had occurred, and that the Lot is covered by the
reclassification, is contradicted by several documents submitted by the Solicitor General before the land registration court.
The Solicitor General submitted to the land registration court a Report 37 dated March 2, 1988, signed by Administrator Teodoro G.
Bonifacio of the then National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration, confirming that the Lot described in Psu-162620
forms part of the MWR. He thus recommended the dismissal of the application for registration. The Report states:
"COMES NOW the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Commission and to this Honorable Court
respectfully reports that:
1. A parcel of land described in plan Psu-162620 situated in the Barrio of San Isidro, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of
Rizal, is applied for registration of title in the case at bar.
2. After plotting plan Psu-162620 in our Municipal Index Map it was found that a portion of the SW, described as Lot 3 in
plan Psu-173790 was previously the subject of registration in Land Reg. Case No. N-9578, LRC Record No. N-55948 and
was issued Decree No. N-191242 on April 4, 1986 in the name of Apolonia Garcia, et al., pursuant to the Decision and
Order for Issuance of the Decree dated February 8, 1984 and March 6, 1984, respectively, and the remaining portion of
plan Psu-162620 is inside IN-12, Marikina Watershed. x x x
"WHEREFORE, this matter is respectfully submitted to the Honorable Court for its information and guidance with the
recommendation that the application in the instant proceedings be dismissed, after due hearing (Underlining supplied)."
Likewise, in a letter38 dated November 11, 1991, the Deputy Land Inspector, DENR, Region IV, Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office, Antipolo, Rizal, similarly confirmed that the Lot is within the MWR. The letter states:
"That the land sought to be registered is situated at San Isidro (Boso-boso), Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of ONE HUNDRED
TWENTY SIX POINT ZERO SEVEN SIXTY SIX (126.0766) hectares, more particularly described in Psu-162620, which is within
the Marikina Watershed Reservation under Executive Order No. 33 dated July 2, 1904 which established the Marikina Watershed
Reservation (IN-12) x x x.
"x x x
"That the land sought to be registered is not a private property of the Registration Applicant but part of the public domain, not
subjected to disposition and is covered by Proclamation No. 585 for Integrated Social Forestry Program hence, L.R.C. No. 269-A is
recommended for rejection (Underlining supplied)." Copy of the letter is attached herewith as Annex "3" and made an integral part
hereof."
Lastly, the Solicitor General pointed out that attached to petitioner Edna T. Collado’s [as original applicant] application is the
technical description39 of the Lot signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division of the Bureau of Lands.
This technical description categorically stated that the Lot "is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed."
The evidence of record thus appears unsatisfactory and insufficient to show clearly and positively that the Lot had been officially
released from the Marikina Watershed Reservation to form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. We hold
that once a parcel of land is included within a watershed reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation, as in the instant
case, a presumption arises that the land continues to be part of such Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of
subsequent declassification is shown.
It is obvious, based on the facts on record that neither petitioners nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the Lot for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title. Even if they submitted sufficient proof that the Lot had been excluded from the MWR upon the
issuance of Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974, petitioners’ possession as of the filing of their application on April 25, 1985
would have been only eleven years counted from the issuance of the proclamation in 1974. The result will not change even if we
tack in the two years Sesinando Leyva allegedly possessed the Lot from 1902 until the issuance of EO 33 in 1904. Petitioners’ case
falters even more because of the issuance of Proclamation No. 1637 on April 18, 1977. According to then DENR Secretary Victor
Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637 reverted Lot A or the townsite reservation, where petitioners' Lot is supposedly situated, back to the
MWR.
Finally, it is of no moment if the areas of the MWR are now fairly populated and vibrant communities as claimed by petitioners. The
following ruling may be applied to this case by analogy:
"A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers
may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to
crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy
areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest
land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks
like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply."40
Second Issue: Whether the petition for annulment of judgment
should have been given due course.
Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for giving due course to the Republic’s petition for annulment of judgment which was filed long
after the decision of the land registration court had allegedly become final and executory. The land registration court rendered its
decision on January 30, 1991 and the Solicitor General received a copy of the decision on April 23, 1991.41 Petitioners point out that
the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals the petition for annulment of judgment invoking Section 9(2) of BP Blg.
12942 only on August 6, 1991, after the decision had supposedly become final and executory. Moreover, petitioners further point out
that the Solicitor General filed the petition for annulment after the land registration court issued its order of May 6, 1991 directing
the Land Registration Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration.
The Solicitor General sought the annulment of the decision on the ground that the land registration court had no jurisdiction over
the case, specifically, over the Lot which was not alienable and disposable. The Solicitor General maintained that the decision was
null and void.
Petitioners argue that the remedy of annulment of judgment is no longer available because it is barred by the principle of res
judicata. They insist that the land registration court had jurisdiction over the case which involves private land. They also argue that
the Republic is estopped from questioning the land registration court’s jurisdiction considering that the Republic participated in the
proceedings before the court.
It is now established that the Lot, being a watershed reservation, is not alienable and disposable public land. The evidence of the
petitioners do not clearly and convincingly show that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, ceased to be a portion of the area
classified as a watershed reservation of the public domain. Any title to the Lot is void ab initio. In view of this, the alleged procedural
infirmities attending the filing of the petition for annulment of judgment are immaterial since the land registration court never
acquired jurisdiction over the Lot. All proceedings of the land registration court involving the Lot are therefore null and void.
We apply our ruling in Martinez vs. Court of Appeals,43 as follows:
"The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable properties, such as public navigable rivers which are parts of
the public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of private applicant. Hence, the judgment of the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga as regards the Lot No. 2 of certificate of Title No. 15856 in the name of petitioners may be attacked
at any time, either directly or collaterally, by the State which is not bound by any prescriptive period provided for by the Statute of
Limitations."
We also hold that environmental consequences in this case override concerns over technicalities and rules of procedure.
In Republic vs. De los Angeles, 44 which involved the registration of public lands, specifically parts of the sea, the Court rejected the
principle of res judicata and estoppel to silence the Republic’s claim over public lands. The Court said:
"It should be noted further that the doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when the Government sues as a sovereign or
asserts governmental rights, nor does estoppel or laches validate an act that contravenes law or public policy, and that res judicata
is to be disregarded if its application would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality."
The Court further held that "the right of reversion or reconveyance to the State of the public properties registered and which are not
capable of private appropriation or private acquisition does not prescribe."
Third issue: Whether the petition-in-intervention is proper.
The Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an association of holders of certificates of stewardship issued by the DENR under
its Integrated Social Forestry Program, filed with the Court of Appeals on November 29, 1991 a Motion for Leave to Intervene and
to Admit Petition-In-Intervention.
According to intervenors, they are the actual occupants of the Lot which petitioners sought to register. Aware that the parcels of
land which their forefathers had occupied, developed and tilled belong to the Government, they filed a petition with then President
Corazon C. Aquino and then DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, to award the parcels of land to them.
Secretary Factoran directed the Director of Forest Management Bureau to take steps for the segregation of the aforementioned
area from the MWR for development under the DENR’s ISF Programs. Subsequently, then President Aquino issued Proclamation
No. 585 dated June 5, 1990 excluding 1,430 hectares from the operation of EO 33 and placed the same under the DENR’s
Integrated Social Forestry Program. Proclamation No. 585 reads:
PROCLAMATION NO. 585
AMENDING FURTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33, DATED JULY 26, 1904 WHICH ESTABLISHED THE MARIKINA
WATERSHED RESERVATION (IN-12) AS AMENDED, BY EXCLUDING CERTAIN PORTIONS OF LANDS EMBRACED THEREIN
SITUATED AT SITIOS BOSOBOSO, KILINGAN, VETERANS, BARANGAYS SAN JOSEPH AND PAENAAN, MUNICIPALITY OF
ANTIPOLO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I,
CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, do hereby exclude from the operation of Executive Order No. 33, which
established the Marikina Watershed Reservation, certain parcel of land of the public domain embraced therein situated in Sitios
Bosoboso, Veterans, Kilingan and Barangay San Joseph and Paenaan, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal and place the
same under the Integrated Social Forestry Program of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in accordance with
existing laws, rules and regulations, which parcel of land is more particularly described as follows:
"A PARCEL OF LAND, within the Marikina Watershed Reservation situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal,
beginning at point "1" on plan, being identical to corner 1 of Marikina Watershed Reservation; thence
xxx xxx xxx
Containing an area of One Thousand Four Hundred Thirty (1,430) Hectares.
All other lands covered and embraced under Executive Order No. 33 as amended, not otherwise affected by this Proclamation,
shall remain in force and effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO

President of the Philippines"
Pursuant to Proclamation No. 585, the chief of the ISF Unit, acting through the Regional Executive Director of the DENR (Region
IV), issued sometime between the years 1989 to 1991 certificates of stewardship contracts to bona fide residents of the barangays
mentioned in the proclamation as qualified recipients of the ISF programs. Among those awarded were intervenors. The certificates
of stewardship are actually contracts of lease granted by the DENR to actual occupants of parcels of land under its ISF programs
for a period of twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another twenty-five (25) years. 45 The DENR awarded contracts of stewardship
to ISF participants in Barangay San Isidro (or Boso-boso) and the other barangays based on the Inventory of Forest Occupants the
DENR had conducted.46
According to intervenors, they learned only on July 31, 1991 about the pendency of LRC Case No. 269-A before the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo, Rizal. On August 8, 1991, they filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Opposition in Intervention
before the land registration court to assert their rights and to protect their interests.
However, shortly after the filing of their opposition, intervenors learned that the land registration court had already rendered a
decision on January 30, 1991 confirming petitioners’ imperfect title. Intervenors’ counsel received a copy of the decision on August
9, 1991.
On August 14, 1991, intervenors filed a motion to vacate judgment and for new trial before the land registration court. According to
intervenors, the land registration court could not act on its motions due to the restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals on
August 8, 1991, enjoining the land registration court from executing its decision, as prayed for by the Solicitor General in its petition
for annulment of judgment. The intervenors were thus constrained to file a petition for intervention before the Court of Appeals
which allowed the same.
Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure47 provides in pertinent parts:
Section 1. Who may intervene. – A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in
the custody of the court, or an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The Court shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and
whether or not the inertvenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Sec. 2. Time to intervene. – The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy
of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties.
As a rule, intervention is allowed "before rendition of judgment by the trial court," as Section 2, Rule 19 expressly provides.
However, the Court has recognized exceptions to this rule in the interest of substantial justice. Mago vs. Court of
Appeals48 reiterated the ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, where the Court allowed the motions for intervention even
when the case had already reached this Court. Thus, in Mago the Court held that:
"It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the movants at this stage of the proceedings where trial had
already been concluded x x x and on appeal x x x the same affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the instant petition for certiorari to
review said judgment is already submitted for decision by the Supreme Court, are obviously and, manifestly late, beyond the period
prescribed under x x x Section 2, Rule 12 of the rules of Court.
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated, is simply a rule of procedure, the whole purpose and
object of which is to make the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice. The purpose of procedure is not to
thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to
hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are
always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to
an end."
To be sure, the Court of Appeals did not pass upon the actual status of intervenors in relation to the Lot as this was not in issue.
Neither was the validity of the certificates of stewardship contracts which intervenors allegedly possessed inquired into considering
this too was not in issue. In fact, intervenors did not specifically seek any relief apart from a declaration that the Lot in question
remains inalienable land of the public domain. We cannot fault the Court of Appeals for allowing the intervention, if only to provide
the rival groups a peaceful venue for ventilating their sides. This case has already claimed at least five lives due to the raging
dispute between the rival camps of the petitioners on one side and those of the DENR awardees on the other. It also spawned a
number of criminal cases between the two rival groups including malicious mischief, robbery and arson. A strict application of the
rules would blur this bigger, far more important picture.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 22, 1992 declaring null and void the
Decision dated January 30, 1991 of Branch 71, Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-59179 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 Director of Forestry v Villareal, GR L-32266
G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner

vs.
RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The basic question before the Court is the legal classification of mangrove swamps, or manglares, as they are commonly known. If
they are part of our public forest lands, they are not alienable under the Constitution. If they are considered public agricultural
lands, they may be acquired under private ownership. The private respondent's claim to the land in question must be judged by
these criteria.
The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto
Villareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession
of the land for more than forty years. He was opposed by several persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines. After trial, the application was approved by the Court of First Instance. of Capiz. 1 The decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. 2 The Director of Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari claiming that the land in
dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private appropriation. He asks that the registration be reversed.
It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner and the private respondent agree that the land is mangrove land. There is
no dispute as to this. The bone of contention between the parties is the legal nature of mangrove swamps or manglares. The
petitioner claims, it is forestal and therefore not disposable and the private respondent insists it is alienable as agricultural land. The
issue before us is legal, not factual.
For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to the Philippine Bill of 1902, one of the earlier American organic acts in
the country. By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three grand divisions, to wit,
agricultural, mineral and timber or forest lands. This classification was maintained in the Constitution of the Commonwealth,
promulgated in 1935, until it was superseded by the Constitution of 1973. That new charter expanded the classification of public
lands to include industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, and grazing lands and even permitted the legislature to provide
for other categories. 3 This provision has been reproduced, but with substantial modifications, in the present Constitution. 4
Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was the charter in force when this case arose, only agricultural lands were allowed to
be alienated. 5 Their disposition was provided for under C.A. No. 141. Mineral and timber or forest lands were not subject to private
ownership unless they were first reclassified as agricultural lands and so released for alienation.
In the leading case of Montano v. Insular Government, 6 promulgated in 1909, mangrove swamps or manglareswere defined by the
Court as:
... mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grows various kindred plants which will not live except
when watered by the sea, extending their roots deep into the mud and casting their seeds, which also germinate there.
These constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics, which exist naturally, but which are also, to some extent cultivated by
man for the sake of the combustible wood of the mangrove and like trees as well as for the useful nipa palm propagated
thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion that they cannot be so regarded in the sense
in which that term is used in the cases cited or in general American jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them are not
available for purpose of navigation, and they may be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what remains.
xxx
Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the law, the custom had grown of converting manglares
and nipa lands into fisheries which became a common feature of settlement along the coast and at the same time of the
change of sovereignty constituted one of the most productive industries of the Islands, the abrogation of which would
destroy vested interests and prove a public disaster.
Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural lands and so susceptible of private ownership.
Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared, despite the above-cited case, that mangrove swamps form part of
the public forests of this country. This it did in the Administrative Code of 1917, which became effective on October 1 of that year,
thus:
Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. - For the purpose of this chapter 'public forest' includes, except as
otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest
reserves of whatever character.
It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this definition, the Court maintained the doctrine in the Montano case when two years
later it held in the case of Jocson v. Director of Forestry: 7
...the words timber land are always translated in the Spanish translation of that Act (Act of Congress) as terrenos
forestales. We think there is an error in this translation and that a better translation would be 'terrenos madereros.' Lumber
land in English means land with trees growing on it. The mangler plant would never be called a tree in English but a bush,
and land which has only bushes, shrubs or aquatic plants growing on it cannot be called 'timber land.
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglare or nipa swamps does not change the general character of the
land from manglare to timber land.
More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-quoted Section 1820, the Court declared:
'In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this Court said that the phrase agricultural lands as used
in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.
Whatever may have been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under the Spanish law, the Act of Congress of July 1st 1902,
classifies the public lands in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not
timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares,
fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative Code of 1917 cannot affect rights which
vested prior to its enactment.
These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands, the trial court should have considered them agricultural lands. If they
are agricultural lands, then the rights of appellants are fully established by Act No. 926.
The doctrine was reiterated still later in Garchitorena Vda. de Centenera v. Obias, 8 promulgated on March 4, 1933, more than
fifteen years after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1917. Justice Ostrand declared for a unanimous Court:
The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that the land covered by the application there are mangrove
lands as shown in his opponent's Exh. 1, but we think this opposition of the Director of Forestry is untenable,
inasmuch as it has been definitely decided that mangrove lands are not forest lands in the sense in which this
phrase is used in the Act of Congress.
No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was merely based on the cases of Montano and Jocson. And in 1977, the
above ruling was reaffirmed in Tongson v. Director of Forestry, 9 with Justice Fernando declaring that the mangrove lands in
litis were agricultural in nature. The decision even quoted with approval the statement of the trial court that:
... Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow, where the trees are small and sparse, fit only for
firewood purposes and the trees growing are not of commercial value as lumber do not convert the land into public land.
Such lands are not forest in character. They do not form part of the public domain.
Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan, 10 the Court, citing Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 11 reiterated the ruling in the Mapa case
that "all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa
swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens, there is also a line of decisions holding the contrary view.
In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 12 promulgated in 1983, the Court ruled "that the Bureau of Fisheries
has no jurisdiction to dispose of swamp lands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still
classified as forest lands.
13
Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, the Court was more positive when it held, again through Justice
Gutierrez:
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest land because it is not thickly
forested but is a 'mangrove swamps.' Although conceding that 'mangrove swamp' is included in the classification of forest
land in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees classified
in Section 1821 of the said Code as first, second and third groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they
contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land registration proceedings because the property
had been in actual possession of private persons for many years, and therefore, said land was already 'private land' better
adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept
under forest classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or
settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass
or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. 'Forested lands' do not have to be on mountains or in out-of-
the-way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water
may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classsified as 'forest' is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply.'
The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 14 where this Court agreed with the Solicitor General's
submission that the land in dispute, which he described as "swamp mangrove or forestal land," were not private properties and so
not registerable. This case was decided only twelve days after the De Porkan case.
Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court feels there is a need for a categorical pronouncement that should resolve once
and for all the question of whether mangrove swamps are agricultural lands or forest lands.
The determination of this question is a function initially belonging to the legislature, which has the authority to implement the
constitutional provision classifying the lands of the public domain (and is now even permitted to provide for more categories of
public lands). The legislature having made such implementation, the executive officials may then, in the discharge of their own role,
administer our public lands pursuant to their constitutional duty " to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed' and in accordance
with the policy prescribed. For their part, the courts will step into the picture if the rules laid down by the legislature are challenged
or, assuming they are valid, it is claimed that they are not being correctly observed by the executive. Thus do the three
departments, coordinating with each other, pursue and achieve the objectives of the Constitution in the conservation and utilization
of our natural resources.
In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the President of the Philippines the function of making periodic classifications
of public lands, thus:
Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to
time classify the lands of the public domain into:
(a) Alienable or disposable,

(b) Lumber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their
administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable lands, the President, upon
recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time declare what lands are
open to disposition or concession under this Act.
With particular regard to alienable public lands, Section 9 of the same law provides:
For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition shall
be classified, according to the use or purposes to which such lands are destined, as follows:
(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and
(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time make
the classifications provided for in this section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one class
to another.
As for timber or forest lands, the Revised Administrative Code states as follows:
Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest reserves- Revocation of same. - Upon there commendation of the Director of
Forestry, with the approval of the Department Head, the President of the Philippines may set apart forest reserves from
the public lands and he shall by proclamation declare the establishment of such reserves and the boundaries thereof, and
thereafter such forest reserves shall not be entered, sold, or otherwise disposed of, but shall remain as such for forest
uses, and shall be administered in the same manner as public forest.
The President of the Philippines may in like manner by proclamation alter or modify the boundaries of any forest reserve
from time to time, or revoke any such proclamation, and upon such revocation such forest reserve shall be and become
part of the public lands as though such proclamation had never been made.
Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for agricultural purposes. - Lands in public forest, not including forest reserves, upon
the certification of the Director of Forestry that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for
forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest, shall be declared by the Department Head
to be agricultural lands.
With these principles in mind, we reach the following conclusion:

Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests of the Philippines as defined in the
aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The legislature having so determined, we have no authority to ignore
or modify its decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The statutory definition remains unchanged to date
and, no less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the executive department. More importantly, the said provision has not been
challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional assuming the requisite conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and
scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid and so must be respected. We repeat our statement in the Amunategui case that the
classification of mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of
what the land actually looks like. That determination having been made and no cogent argument having been raised to annul it, we
have no duty as judges but to apply it. And so we shall.
Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining to our agricultural lands should be understood as covering only those
lands over which ownership had already vested before the Administrative Code of 1917 became effective. Such lands could not be
retroactively legislated as forest lands because this would be violative of a duly acquired property right protected by the due
process clause. So we ruled again only two months ago in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 15 where the
possession of the land in dispute commenced as early as 1909, before it was much later classified as timberland.
It follows from all this that the land under contention being admittedly a part of the mangrove swamps of Sapian, and for which a
minor forest license had in fact been issued by the Bureau of Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be considered forest land. It could
therefore not be the subject of the adverse possession and consequent ownership claimed by the private respondent in support of
his application for registration. To be so, it had first to be released as forest land and reclassified as agricultural land pursuant to the
certification the Director of Forestry may issue under Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove swamps approved by the Director of Lands, 16 to prove that the
land is registerable. It should be plain, however, that the mere existence of such a plan would not have the effect of converting the
mangrove swamps, as forest land, into agricultural land. Such approval is ineffectual because it is clearly in officious. The Director
of Lands was not authorized to act in the premises. Under the aforecited law, it is the Director of Forestry who has the authority to
determine whether forest land is more valuable for agricultural rather than forestry uses, as a basis for its declaration as agricultural
land and release for private ownership.
Thus we held in the Yngson case:
It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that until timber or forest lands are
released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease,
grant, sell or otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes,
fishpond leases and other modes of utilization.
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamp lands or mangrove lands forming part of
the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest land or timber land and not released for fishery or other
purposes.
The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus:
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not
registerable. The adverse possession which can be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases
cannot commence until after the forest land has been declared alienable and disposable. Possession of forest land, no
matter bow long cannot convert it into private property.'
We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were agricultural in nature, the proof the private respondent offers of prescriptive
possession thereof is remarkably meager and of dubious persuasiveness. The record contains no convincing evidence of the
existence of the informacion posesoria allegedly obtained by the original transferor of the property, let alone the fact that the
conditions for acquiring title thereunder have been satisfied. Nowhere has it been shown that the informacion posesoria has been
inscribed or registered in the registry of property and that the land has been under the actual and adverse possession of the private
respondent for twenty years as required by the Spanish Mortgage Law. 17 These matters are not presumed but must be established
with definite proof, which is lacking in this case.
Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private respondent were practically the only basis used by the appellate court in
sustaining his claim of possession over the land in question. Tax declarations are, of course, not sufficient to prove possession and
much less vest ownership in favor of the declarant, as we have held in countless cases. 18
We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not established his right to the registration of the subject land in his name.
Accordingly, the petition must be granted.
It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the legislative definition embodied in Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917, which remains unamended up to now, mangrove swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the
Philippines. As such, they are not alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of private ownership until and unless
they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the application for registration of title of private respondent
is DISMISSED, with cost against him. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

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Module 4: Brief Overview of Environmental Laws

Constitution, Article XII, Sections 2- 3

Public Land Act, Sections 6-9

(a) Alienable or disposable

(c) Mineral lands

Revised Administrative Code (E.O. 292), Chapter I, Title XIV

ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES

Section 1. Declaration of Policy. -

Section 4. Powers and Functions. - The Department shall:

(9) Establish policies and implement programs for the:

(c) Promotion, development and expansion of natural resource-based industries;

(10) Promulgate rules and regulations necessary to:

(21) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.

 Cruz v DENR, GR 135385

G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,

These provisions are:

Petitioners pray for the following:

Separate opinion of Justice Puno on separate doc.

 Ankron v Gov’t. G.R. 14213

G.R. No. L-14213 August 23, 1919

J. H. ANKRON, petitioner-appellee, vs.

From that decree the Director of Lands appealed to this court.

 Heirs of Amunategui, G.R. L-27873

[G.R. No. L-27873. November 29, 1983.]

HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI, Petitioners, v. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, Respondent.

[G.R. No. L-30035. November 29, 1983.]

In its decision, the Court of Appeals held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

The petition is without merit.

In Republic v. Gonong (118 SCRA 729) we ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

Similarly, in Republic v. Vera (120 SCRA 210), we ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

 Sta. Rosa Dev’t Corp v CA, GR 112526

G.R. No. 112526 October 12, 2001

STA. ROSA REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

"WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the Board hereby orders:

On December 15, 1993, the Court issued a Resolution which reads:

a) CARP CA Form 1—MARO investigation report

b) CARP CA Form No 2 – Summary investigation report findings and evaluation

c) CARP CA Form 3—Applicant's Information sheet

d) CARP CA Form 4 – Beneficiaries undertaking

e) CARP CA Form 5 – Transmittal report to the PARO

B. The PARO shall:

Hence, the following are recommended:

 Collado v CA, GR 107764

G. R. No. 107764 October 4, 2002

EDNA COLLADO, et al. vs.

The Trial Court’s Ruling

The Court of Appeals’ Ruling

Hence, the instant petition.

The issues raised by petitioners are restated as follows:

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Petitioners’ arguments find no basis in law.

The Regalian Doctrine: An Overview

The 1935, 1973, 1987 Philippine Constitutions

Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource

Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067) provides:

The answer is in the negative.

Proclamation No. 1283 reads thus:

"PROCLAMATION NO. 1283

Lot A (Part of Watershed Reservation)

Lot B (Alienable and Disposable Land)

(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS