SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
1.
SILVERIO VS SILVERIO Circle, Forbes Park, Makati was sold to Ocampo in 16
September 2010, which the latter sold to Zee2. Individual
DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction of Probate Court titles were issued under the buyers’ names respectively;
At the outset, we emphasize that the probate court having
jurisdiction over properties under administration has the
authority not only to approve any disposition or conveyance,
but also to annul an unauthorized sale by the prospective heirs
or administrator. x x x It being settled that property under
administration needs the approval of the probate court before
it can be disposed of, any unauthorized disposition does not
bind the estate and is null and void.
FACTS:
1. In 7 October 1987, Sr.’s wife Beatriz died intestate and
was survived by 6 heirs, Sr., Edmundo, Edgardo, Jr., Neilia
and Ligaya. This led the heirs to file an SP Proc. No. M-2629
under Rule 74;
2. The Intestate Court (IC) first appointed Edgardo as
administrator. The latter withdrew thru a motion in 3
November 1999 which then caused the appointment of Sr. as
new administrator;
3. On 3 January 2005, IC replaced Sr. with Jr. as
administrator and denied the MR challenging such order.
Thus, IC granted Jr.’s motion to take oath as administrator and
expunged Sr.’s inventor report;
4. On 12 December 2005, IC recalled the Order granting
letters of administration to Jr. upon Sr.’s motion, but the same
was reinstated through Jr.’s motion for partial consideration
for Sr.’s alleged gross violation of his duties and functions
under Section 1, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court;
5. Sr. filed an MR while Nelia filed a Petition for Certiorari
before the CA, leading to the reinstatement of Sr. as
administrator due to the declaration of nullity of certain
portions of the Orders, for which a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued and made the said portions permanent;
6. Jr. filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari (Rule 45)
before the SC challenging the CA Order but the same was
denied by SC for failure to show sufficient reversible error.
MR for the same was likewise denied;
7. With Sr.’s urgent motion, IC reinstated Sr. as
administrator. This order was challenged in the first of three
petitions (Rule 45);
8. The second petition challenges the denial of Jr.’s motion
for inhibition of Judge Guanlao (of IC) on the ground of the
latter’s partiality as he appeared once as counsel in the
intestate proceedings;
9. The third challenged order involves the sale made by Jr.
in favor of Citrine of a parcel of land in Intsia Road, Forbes
Park, Makati via a Deed of Absolute Sale (DOAS) executed
on 16 October 2007. Another parcel of land in Cambridge
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10. Nelia filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA with
prayer for injunction. A TRO was issued on 5 February 2007,
and later, a Writ of Prelim. Injunction conditioned upon the
posting of a bond of Php 2,000,000.00;
11. Nelia initially paid the said bond but failed to comply with
the other requirements of A.M. No. 04-7-02-SC. CA Ordered
Nelia to comply and increased the bond to Php 10,000,000.00
which the latter did;
12. However, with the issuance of the order reinstating Sr. as
administrator (see Fact No. 5), Sr. sought for a TRO/Pre.
Prohibitory Injunction v. Jr., Ocampo and Citrine and their
successors-in-interest from committing any act that would
affect the titles issued in their names. Likewise, Sr. sought the
IC to declare the DOAS executed as null and void. IC granted
said motions;
13. Jr. filed a consolidated petition for certiorari before the
CA challenging the reinstatement of Sr. as administrator, the
denial of Jr.’s motion for inhibition, and the declaration of
nullity of the DOAS. CA denied the first 2 but granted the
latter, thereby reversing IC’s declaration of nullity. Hence, the
instant petition (Rule 45).
ISSUES: WON the CA erred in reversing the IC’s declaration
that the DOAS and the titles issued to buyers are null and
void.
PROVISION: RULING + RATIO: No. The CA was correct
in reversing the IC Decision.
·
In reversing the IC, CA relied on Jr.’s arguments that the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction pertained only to
the portion of Sr.’s reinstatement as administrator. It ruled:
x x x In reversing the intestate court’s order annulling the sale
of the subject properties, the CA noted that said ruling is
anchored on the fact that the deeds of sale were executed at
the time when the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction
issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 was still in effect. It then
concluded that the eventual decision in the latter case making
the writ of preliminary injunction permanent only with respect
to the appointment of petitioner as administrator and not to
the grant of authority to sell mooted the issue of whether the
sale was executed at the time when the TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction were in effect. x x x
x x x The October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order of the testate [sic]
court in so far as it authorizes the sale of the three properties
in question was not declared by the Court of Appeals, Seventh
Division as null and void. x x x
x x x While it is true that petitioner was eventually reinstated
as Administrator pursuant to the August 28, 2008 decision in
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 (petition for certiorari filed by Nelia
Silverio-Dee), we agree with the CA that the permanent
injunction issued under the said decision, as explicitly stated
in its fallo, pertained only to the portions of the October 31,
2006 Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of
administration to and taking of an oath of administration by
respondent Silverio, Jr., as otherwise the CA would have
expressly set aside as well the directive in the same Omnibus
Order allowing the sale of the subject properties. Moreover,
the CA Decision attained finality only on February 11, 2011
when this Court denied with finality respondent Silverio, Jr.’s
motion for reconsideration of the February 11, 2009
Resolution denying his petition for review (G.R. No. 185619).
2. SAN LUIS VS SAN LUIS
FACTS: The instant case involves the settlement of the estate
of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former
governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime,
Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was
with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born
six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and
Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry
Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on
October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a
Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.),
which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and
Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973.
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad
San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William
Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire
Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no
children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from
the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18,
1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo's estate. On
December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the
children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a
cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in the Province of
Laguna because this was Felicisimo's place of residence prior
to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal
personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress
of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
legally married to Merry Lee. On February 15, 1994; Linda
invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in
seeking the dismissal
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition
for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his
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death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident
of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have
been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also
ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration because her marriage with
Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the
decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo's marriage to
Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind
Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights
of Felicisimo's legitimate children.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed
and set aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed
Decision dated February 4, 1998
ISSUE: whether or not the venue was properly laid
RULING: Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the
petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo
should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in
which he resides at the time of his death.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature - residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.
Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the
terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey
the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular
sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place,
while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of
time of residence is required though; however, the residence
must be more than temporary.
There is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of
election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue
of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are
treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the
Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal,
actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of
abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or
consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have his
residence in one place and domicile in another.
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of
Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial in another court for the probate of the will of Milagros,
Court which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang,
Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17,
1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the
branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over
Muntinlupa.
3. AGTARAP VS AGTARAP
FACTS: Joaquin Agtarap died intestate on November 21,
1964 in Pasay City without any known debts or obligations.
Joaquin contracted two marriages during his lifetime, with
Lucia Garcia (Lucia) and with Caridad Garcia (Caridad)
respectively. Joaquin and Lucia, who died on April 24, 1924,
had three children—Jesus (died without issue), Milagros, and
Jose (survived by three children, namely, Gloria, Joseph, and
Teresa). Joaquin married Caridad on February 9, 1926 and
also had three children—Eduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes
(survived by her daughter Cecile). At the time of his death,
Joaquin left two parcels of land with improvements in Pasay
City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 873-
(38254) and 874-(38255). Joseph, a grandson of Joaquin, had
been leasing and improving the said realties and had been
appropriating for himself P26, 000.00 per month since April
1994.
Eduardo asked to be appointed administrator and was granted
by the probate court, issuing him with letters of administrator.
Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their answer/opposition. They
alleged that the two subject lots belong to the conjugal
partnership of Joaquin with Lucia, and that, upon Lucia’s
death in April 1924, they became the pro indiviso owners of
the subject properties. They said that their residence was built
with the exclusive money of their late father Jose, and the
expenses of the extensions to the house were shouldered by
Gloria and Teresa, while the restaurant (Manong’s Restaurant)
was built with the exclusive money of Joseph and his business
partner.
Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order of Partition, holding that
considering that the bulk of the estate properties were acquired
during the existence of the second marriage as shown by TCT
No. (38254) and TCT No. (38255) which showed on its face
that decedent was married to Caridad Garcia, which fact
oppositors failed to contradict by evidence other than their
negative allegations, the greater part of the estate is perforce
accounted by the second marriage and the compulsory heirs
thereunder. It also declared that the real estate properties
belonged to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia. It
also directed the modification of the October 23, 2000 Order
of Partition to reflect the correct sharing of the heirs. However,
before the RTC could issue a new order of partition, Eduardo
and Sebastian both appealed to the CA. The CA settled,
together with the settlement of the estate of Joaquin, the
estates of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, Gloria, and Milagros.
Moreover, the CA the estate of Milagros in the intestate
proceedings despite the fact that a proceeding was conducted
bequeathing all to Eduardo whatever shares that she would
receive from Joaquin’s estate. CA also affirmed that the bulk
of the realties subject of this case belong to the first marriage
of Joaquin to Lucia, notwithstanding that the certificates of
title were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap casado
con ("married to") Caridad Garcia.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC, acting as an intestate court
with limited jurisdiction, is vested with the power and
authority to determine questions of ownership.
HELD: Yes. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the
trial court, either as a probate or an intestate court, relates only
to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not
extend to the determination of questions of ownership that
arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule
is that such court merely exercises special and limited
jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or one in
charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate,
cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be
a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside
parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his
estate. All that the said court could do as regards said
properties is to determine whether or not they should be
included in the inventory of properties to be administered by
the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no
problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and
the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before
a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination
of the conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified
by expediency and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an
intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion in,
or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without
prejudice to the final determination of ownership in a separate
action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the
estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or
the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the
probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired,
then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on
ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental
or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate,
such as the determination of the status of each heir and
whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive
property of the deceased spouse.
We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case
considering that the parties are all heirs of Joaquin and that no
rights of third parties will be impaired by the resolution of the
ownership issue. More importantly, the determination of
whether the subject properties are conjugal is but collateral to
the probate court’s jurisdiction to settle the estate of Joaquin.
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 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
4. SUNTAY III VS COJUANGCO-SUNTAY
FACTS: Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay died intestate on 4 June
1990. Cristina was survived by her spouse, Federico and five
grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including
respondent Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren,
including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico’s and Cristina’s In this case, both parties have interest to the estate and are
only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I) who predeceased.
Federico Cristina
Emilio 1 Isabel Cojuangco
Emilio III Nenita Emilio II Margarita Isabel
Illegitimate Legitimate
In 1965, the marriage between Emilio I and Isabel Cojuancgo
was declared null and void by a judicial decree. The
illegitimate children grew up with Grandparents Federico and
Cristina. The legitimates were raised by their mother, Isabel
Cojuangco.
In 1993, after Cristina’s death, Federico adopted his two
illegitimate grandchildren.
In 1995, Isabel filed for an application for letter of
administration. Federico opposed in that he is the nearest of
kin and the application did not include the two illegitimates as
heirs. Federico prayed that he be appointed as administrator or
Emilio III in his stead.
In November of 2000, Federico died. Emilio III was appointed
as administrator in 2001. On appeal, the appointment was
revoked and Isabel was appointed administrator.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Emilio III and Isabel were
appointed as co-administrators. Isabel filed for a Motion for
Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Who between Isabel and Emilio III is better qualified
as administrator.
RULING: Partially Granted. Letter of Administration is
issued solely to Isabel.
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an
administrator over the estate of a decedent is the prospective
administrator’s interest in the estate. This is the same
consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into account in
establishing the order of preference in the appointment of
administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is
that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and
economical administration of the estate, or, in the alternative,
suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or
mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential
motive to administer the estate correctly. Mere demonstration
of interest in the estate to be settled does not ipso facto entitle
an interested person to co-administration thereof. Neither does
squabbling among the heirs nor adverse interests necessitate
the discounting of the order of preference set forth in Section
6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the
estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration
reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be
appointed as administrator.
heirs of the decedent. Emilio III was reared by the decent and
was nominated by Federico as the administrator. On the other
hand, Isabel grew apart from the decedent and became only
interested with the estate upon her grandmother’s death.
However, Emilio III showed incompetence in administering
the properties. He failed to provide for a complete inventory of
the properties as required by the court. He likewise committed
fraud in transferring the properties to different names. With
this, the court sees that Isabel Emilio III is unfit to administer
the estate.
5. LEE VS RTC OF QC
FACTS:
 Rafael and Jose Ortaez were appointed by the RTC of
QS as the joint special administrators of their fathers
estate. As special administrators they submitted an
inventory of the estate of their father which included,
among other properties, shares of stock in Philippine
International Life Insurance Company (Philinterlife)
 During its pendency, the decedent’s wife claiming
that she owned some shares of stock as her conjugal
share in the estate, sold said shares in favor of herein
petitioner Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG),
likewise, Special Administrator Jose Ortaez acting in
his personal capacity also sold the remaining shares
of stocks as his inheritance share in the estate in favor
of herein petitioner FLAG.
 After being appointed as Special Administratix,
private respondent Enderes filed a motion to declare
void ab initio the deeds of sale of Philinterlife shares
of stock, which was opposed by Special
Administrator Jose Ortaez.
 Jose Ortaez filed an omnibus motion for the approval
of the deeds of sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock
but it was denied by the intestate court.
 Petitioners Lee and Aggabao (officers of the
Philinterlife) subsequently filed before the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari, alleging that the
intestate court gravely abused its discretion in (1)
declaring that the ownership of FLAG over the
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 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
Philinterlife shares of stock was null and void and (2)
ordering the execution of its order declaring such
nullity.
ISSUE (1): WON the intestate court committed a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or want of jurisdiction in
declaring that the ownership of FLAG over the Philinterlife
shares of stock was null and void.
HELD (1): NO.
The jurisprudence is clear that (1) any disposition of estate
property by an administrator or prospective heir pending final
adjudication requires court approval and (2) any unauthorized
disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate
court, there being no need for a separate action to annul the
unauthorized disposition. In a prevailing jurisprudence, an heir
can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be
allotted to him in the division of the estate by the probate or
intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors
shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have
been given their shares. This means that an heir may only sell
his ideal or undivided share in the estate, not any specific
property therein. In the present case, Juliana Ortaez and Jose
Ortaez sold specific properties of the estate in favor of
petitioner FLAG. This they could not lawfully do pending the
final adjudication of the estate by the intestate court because
of the undue prejudice it would cause the other claimants to
the estate, as what happened in the present case.
ISSUE (2): WON the intestate or probate court can execute an
order nullifying the invalid sale?
HELD (2): YES
The intestate court has the power to execute its order with
regard to the nullity of an unauthorized sale of estate property,
otherwise its power to annul the unauthorized or fraudulent
disposition of estate property would be meaningless.
Enforcement is a necessary adjunct of the intestate or probate
courts power to annul unauthorized or fraudulent transactions
to prevent the dissipation of estate property before final
adjudication.
In this case, the order of the intestate court nullifying the sale
was affirmed by the appellate courts. The finality of the
decision of the Supreme Court was entered in the book of
entry of judgments on February 23, 1999. Considering the
finality of the order of the intestate court nullifying the sale, as
affirmed by the appellate courts, it was correct for private
respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes to thereafter move
for a writ of execution and for the intestate court to grant it.
6. HEIRS OF HILARIO RUIZ VS EDMOND RUIZ
FACTS: Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming
as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter,
private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three
granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice
Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz.
The testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal
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and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his
estate.
Hilario Ruiz died for unknown reasons, Edmond, the named
executor, did not take any action for the probate of his father's
holographic will.
Four years after the testator's death, private respondent Maria
Pilar Ruiz Montes filed before the RTC, a petition for the
probate and approval of Hilario Ruiz's will and for the
issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz. Edmond
opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed
under undue influence.
One of the properties of the estate — the house and lot at No.
2 Oliva Street, Valle Verde IV, Pasig which the testator
bequeathed to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria
Angeline— was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons.
The probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch
Clerk of Court the rental deposit and payments totaling P540,
000.00 representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde
property. In compliance, Edmond turned over the amount of
P348, 583.56, representing the balance of the rent after
deducting P191, 416.14 for repair and maintenance expenses
on the estate.
Edmond moved for the release of P50, 000.00 to pay the real
estate taxes on the real properties of the estate. The probate
court approved the release of P7, 722.00.
The probate court admitted the will to probate and ordered the
issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon
the filing of a bond in the amount of P50, 000.00.
Petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as
executor, filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds." It
prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited with the
Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes opposed the
motion. Montes prayed for the release of the said rent
payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria
Angeline and for the distribution of the testator's properties,
specifically the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge
apartments, in accordance with the provisions of the
holographic will.
The probate court ordered the release of the rent payments to
the decedent's three granddaughters. It further ordered the
delivery of the titles to and possession of the properties
bequeathed to the three granddaughters and respondent
Montes upon the filing of a bond of P50, 000.00. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUES: Whether the probate court, after admitting the will
to probate but before payment of the estate's debts and
obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance from
the funds of the estate for the support of the testator's
grandchildren; (2) to order the release of the titles to certain
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
heirs; and (3) to grant possession of all properties of the estate a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the
to the executor of the will.
HELD 1: On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. — The widow and
minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person, during
the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the
direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law.
Petitioner contends that the testator's three granddaughters do
not qualify for an allowance because they are not incapacitated
and are no longer minors but of legal age, married and
gainfully employed. In addition, the provision expressly states
"children" of the deceased which excludes the latter's
grandchildren.
It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of
Rule 83 should not be limited to the "minor or incapacitated"
children of the deceased. Article 188of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the substantive law in force at the time of the
testator's death, provides that during the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership, the deceased's legitimate spouse and
children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful
employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds
of the estate. The law is rooted on the fact that the right and
duty to support, especially the right to education, subsist even
beyond the age of majority.
Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional
support from the funds of the decedent's estate. The law
clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does
not extend it to the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of
their minority or incapacity.It was error, therefore, for the
appellate court to sustain the probate court's order granting an
allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending
settlement of his estate.
HELD 2: Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the
release of the titles of the bequeathed properties to private
respondents six months after the date of first publication of
notice to creditors. An order releasing titles to properties of the render an accounting of such funds.
estate amounts to an advance distribution of the estate which
is allowed only under the following conditions:
Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. —
Nothwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal in
proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in
its discretion and upon such terms as it may deem proper and
just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be affected
by the controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or
legatees, upon compliance with the conditions set forth in
Rule 90 of these Rules.
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the
estate properties can only be made: (1) after all the debts,
funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the
widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment
of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives
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payment of said obligations within such time as the court
directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the
titles to the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge
apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six
months from the date of first publication of the notice to
creditors. The questioned order speaks of "notice" to creditors,
not payment of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly
left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not
hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is one
of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of
the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees
post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax
obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the
inheritance. Notably, at the time the order was issued the
properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and
appraised.
HELD 3: Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that
the assailed order deprived him of his right to take possession
of all the real and personal properties of the estate. The right
of an executor or administrator to the possession and
management of the real and personal properties of the
deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised "so long as
it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of
administration, "Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of
Court explicitly provides:
Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay
debts and to administer estate not willed. — An executor or
administrator shall have the right to the possession and
management of the real as well as the personal estate of the
deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the
debts and expenses for administration.
It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had
deposited with it only a portion of the one-year rental income
from the Valle Verde property. Petitioner did not deposit its
succeeding rents after renewal of the lease. Neither did he
Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over
the properties of his father is merely inchoate as long as the
estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. As executor,
he is a mere trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the
estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to the duties
and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order. He cannot
unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his parents'
properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an
inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of
the deceased, rendering a true account of his administration,
the expenses of administration, the amount of the obligations
and estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by
the court as to their veracity, propriety and justness.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33045 affirming the order
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
dated December 22, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
156, Pasig in SP Proc. No. 10259 are affirmed with the
modification that those portions of the order granting an
allowance to the testator's grandchildren and ordering the
release of the titles to the private respondents upon notice to
creditors are annulled and set aside.
7. UNION BANK VS SANTIBANEZ
FACTS: The deceased, Efraim Santibañez entered into a loan
agreement with First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC)
for the payment of Agricultural Tractors. Efraim died,
leaving a holographic will. Testate proceedings commenced
before the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund was appointed as the
special administrator of the estate. In the meantime, FCCC
assigned all its assets and liabilities to petitioner Union Bank.
Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the
latter refused to pay. Thus, Union Bank filed a Complaint for
sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibañez, before
the RTC of Makati City. Union Bank asserts that the
obligation of the deceased had passed to his legitimate heirs.
ISSUE: W/N the claim of Union Bank should have been filed
with the probate court before which the testate estate of the
late Efraim Santibañez was pending.
HELD: Yes. Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has
the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased,
to determine whether they should or should not be included in
the inventory or list of properties to be administered. The said
court is primarily concerned with the administration,
liquidation and distribution of the estate.
The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in
the probate court is mandatory. This requirement is for the
purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing
the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus
enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether
it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and
obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the
affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to
the distributees, legatees, or heirs.
8. GARCIA-QUIAZON VS BELEN
FACTS: Elise Quiazon is the daughter of Eliseo Quiazon and
his common-law wife Ma. Lourdes Belen. When Eliseo died
intestate, Elise represented by her mother, Lourdes, filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration before the RTC of Las
Piñas City in order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to
prevent the dissipation of its value. She likewise sought her
appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate.
Amelia Quiazon, to whom Eliseo was married, together with
her two children, filed an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of improper venue asserting that Eliseo was a
resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City. In addition
to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that
there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed
administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
RTC rendered a decision directing the issuance of Letters of
Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. On
appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by
the Court of Appeals. In validating the findings of the RTC,
the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that
Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by
establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road,
Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the
time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals
upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent
was a resident of Las Piñas City.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Las Pinas City was the proper venue.
2. Whether or not Elise is qualified to be administrator
of the estate.
HELD:
1. YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the
petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent
should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent
resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he
is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which
he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his
estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in
an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence"
as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term
"resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose
of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application
of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than
domicile is the significant factor.13 Even where the statute
uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence
and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but
as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
7
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual
or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special
proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined,
"residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing
more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode,
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of
Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC
that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was
properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records
that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting
Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason,
the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the
said city.
2. Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by
the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested rights thereto.
party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by
Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding The heirs of Maximino knew he died on 1 May 1952. They
on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent’s
estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse to why they had waited 33 years from Maximino’s death
the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of
Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino on 21
good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir,
who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts Maximino was already settled in a special proceeding, they
of the estate are satisfied. Having a vested right in the
distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children,
Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within
the purview of the law.
9. PILAPIL VS HEIRS OF MAXIMINO R.
BRIONES
FACTS: Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-
Briones, consisting of her surviving sister, Rizalina Ortiz-
Aguila; Rizalina’s daughter, Erlinda Pilapil; and the other
nephews and nieces of Donata. Respondents are the heirs of
the late Maximino Briones, composed of his nephews and
nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, in representation
of the deceased siblings of Maximino.
Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not
produce any children. When Maximino died, Donata instituted
intestate proceedings to settle her husband’s estate, which
appointed Donata as the administratrix of Maximino’s estate.
Donata died. Erlinda instituted a petition for the administration
of the intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and her husband,
Gregorio, were appointed as administrators of Donata’s
intestate estate.
Silverio Briones, a nephew of Maximino, filed for Letters of
Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino, which
was initially granted. The trial court also issued an order,
allowing Silverio to collect rentals from Maximino’s
properties. But then, Gregorio filed with the RTC a Motion to
Set Aside the Order, claiming that the said properties were
already under his and his wife’s administration as part of the
intestate estate of Donata. Silverio’s Letters of Administration
for the intestate estate of Maximino was subsequently set aside
by the RTC.
The heirs of Maximino filed a complaint against the heirs of
Donata for the partition, annulment, and recovery of
possession of real property. They alleged that Donata, as
administratrix of the estate of Maximino, through fraud and
misrepresentation, in breach of trust, and without the
knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in registering in her
name the real properties belonging to the intestate estate of
Maximino. Furthermore, the facts show that after Donata’s
death, Erlinda took possession of the real properties, and
continued to manage the same and collect the rental fees
thereon. Donata and, subsequently, Erlinda, were so obviously
exercising rights of ownership over the real properties, in
exclusion of all others, which must have already put the heirs
of Maximino on guard if they truly believed that they still had
even attended his wake. They did not offer any explanation as
before one of them, Silverio, filed a Petition for Letters of
January 1985. After learning that the intestate estate of
waited another two years, before instituting, on 3 March 1987,
a complaint for partition, annulment and recovery of the real
property belonging to the estate of Maximino.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents’ right to recover
possession of the disputed properties, based on implied trust,
is also barred by laches.
HELD: Yes. Respondents’ right to recover possession of the
disputed properties, based on implied trust, is also barred by
laches.
Considering the circumstances in the afore-quoted paragraphs,
as well as respondents’ conduct before this Court, particularly
the belated submission of evidence and argument of new
issues, respondents are consistently displaying a penchant for
delayed action, without any proffered reason or justification
for such delay.
It is well established that the law serves those who are vigilant
and diligent and not those who sleep when the law requires
them to act. The law does not encourage laches, indifference,
negligence or ignorance. On the contrary, for a party to
deserve the considerations of the courts, he must show that he
is not guilty of any of the aforesaid failings.
10. SABIDONG VS SOLAS
FACTS: Trinidad Sabidong, complainant’s mother, is one of
the longtime occupants of a parcel of land, designated as Lot
11 originally registered in the name of C. N. Hodges and
8
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
situated at Barangay San Vicente, Jaro, Iloilo City. The
Sabidongs are in possession of one-half portion of Lot 11 of
the said Estate (Hodges Estate), as the other half-portion was
occupied by PriscilaSaplagio. Lot 11 was the subject of an
ejectment suit filed by the Hodges Estate, docketed as Civil
Case No. 14706 of the MTCC Iloilo City, Branch 4. On May
31, 1983, a decision was rendered in said case ordering the
defendant to immediately vacate the portion of Lot 11 leased
to her and to pay the plaintiff rentals due, attorney’s fees,
expenses and costs. At the time, respondent was the Clerk of
Court III of MTCC, Branch 3, Iloilo City.
Sometime in October 1984, respondent submitted an Offer to
Purchase on installment Lots 11 and 12. The Administratrix of
the Hodges Estate rejected respondent’s offer in view of an
application to purchase already filed by the actual occupant of prohibits court officers such as clerks of court from acquiring
Lot 12, "in line with the policy of the Probate Court to give
priority to the actual occupants in awarding approval of
Offers". While the check for initial down payment tendered by
respondent was returned to him, he was nevertheless informed
that he may file an offer to purchase Lot 11 and that if he
could put up a sufficient down payment, the Estate could
immediately endorse it for approval of the Probate Court so
that the property can be awarded to him "should the occupant
fail to avail of the priority given to them."
The following day, respondent again submitted an Offer to
Purchase Lot 11 with an area of 234 square meters for the
amount of P35,100. Under the Order issuedby the probate
court (RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27) in Special Proceedings No.
1672, respondent’s Offer to Purchase Lot 11 was approved
upon the court’s observation that the occupants of the subject
lots "have not manifested their desire to purchase the lots they profession.
are occupying up to this date and considering time restraint
and considering further, that the sales in favor of the x
xxofferors are most beneficial to the estate x xx". The probate disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship
court issued another Order granting respondent’s motion for
issuance of a writ of possession in his favor. The writ of
possession over Lot 11 was eventually issued. Consequently,
TCT No. T-11836 in the name of C. N. Hodges was cancelled
and a new certificate of title, TCT No. T-107519 in the name
of respondent was issued.
On June 14, 1999, this Court received the sworn letter-
complaint asserting that as court employee respondent cannot
buy property in litigation (consequently he is not a buyer in
good faith), commit deception, dishonesty, oppression and
grave abuse of authority.
Court Administrator Benipayo issued an Evaluation and
Recommendation finding respondent guilty of violating
Article 1491 of the Civil Code. Said rule prohibits the
purchase by certain court officers of property and rights in
litigation within their jurisdiction.
On September 10, 2007, respondent compulsorily retired from
service. Eventually, the case was assigned to Judge Roger B.
Patricio, the new EJ of the Iloilo City RTC for investigation,
report and recommendation. Judge Patricio submitted his final
Report and Recommendation finding respondent liable for
grave misconduct and dishonesty under or the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel.
The Court noted Judge Patricio’s Investigation Report and
referred the same to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation. Then Court Administrator Jose P. Perez
found respondent liable for serious and grave misconduct and
dishonesty and recommended the forfeiture of respondent’s
salary for six months, which shall be deducted from his
retirement benefits.
ISSUE: Whether Clerk of Court Solas violated the rule on
disqualification to purchase property in litigation
HELD: NO. Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code
property involved in litigation within the jurisdiction or
territory of their courts. Said provision reads:
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by
purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person
or through the mediation of another:
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior
and inferior courts, and other officers and employees
connected with the administration of justice, the property and
rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court
within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their
respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of
acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with
respect to the property and rights which may be the object of
any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy
involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the
peculiar control exercised by these persons. "In so providing,
the Code tends to prevent fraud, or more precisely, tends not to
give occasion for fraud, which is what can and must be done."
For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the
property must take place during the pendency of the litigation
involving the property. Where the property is acquired after
the termination of the case, no violation of paragraph 5,
Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.
In the case at bar, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on
November 21, 1994, the Decision in Civil Case No. 14706
which was promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long become
final. Be that as it may, it cannot be said that the property is no
longer "in litigation" at that time considering that it was part of
the Hodges Estate then under settlement proceedings (Sp.
Proc. No. 1672).
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some
contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the moment
that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. A
property forming part of the estate under judicial settlement
9
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
continues to be subject of litigation until the probate court
issues an order declaring the estate proceedings closed and
terminated. The rule is that as long as the order for the
distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the
probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated.
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts and the
remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the present evidence and for Teresita to be examined to enable the
same. Since there is no evidence to show that Sp. Proc. No.
1672 in the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27, had already been closed
and terminated at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale leave of court to examine Teresita on the inventory. The RTC
With Mortgage dated November 21, 1994, Lot 11 is still
deemed to be "in litigation" subject to the operation of Article the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties
1491 (5) of the Civil Code.
This notwithstanding, we hold that the sale of Lot 11 in favor
of respondent did not violate the rule on disqualification to
purchase property because Sp. Proc. No. 1672 was then
pending before another court (RTC) and not MTCC where he
was Clerk of Court.
11. ARANAS VS MERCADO
FACTS: Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on
January 12, 1991, survived by his second wife, Teresita V.
Mercado (Teresita), and their five children, namely: Allan V.
Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M. Sutherland,
Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his
two children by his first marriage, namely: respondent
Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas
(Thelma). Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties
during his lifetime. He owned corporate shares in Mervir
Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson
Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned his
real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir
Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir
Realty. Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Cebu City a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the
administrator of Emigdio's estate. The RTC granted the
petition considering that there was no opposition. The letters
of administration in favor of Teresita.
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the
estate of Emigdio for the consideration and approval by the
RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time of his
death, Emigdio had "left no real properties but only personal
properties" worth P6, 675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of
P32, 141.20; furniture and fixtures worth P20, 000.00; pieces
of jewelry valued at P15, 000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of
Mervir Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of stock of
Cebu Emerson worth P22,708.25. Claiming that Emigdio had
owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory,
Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the
inventory, and to be examined regarding it. Teresita filed a
compliance with the order of January 8, 1993, 3 supporting
her inventory with copies of three certificates of stocks
covering the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares of stock; 4 the deed
of assignment executed by Emigdio on January 10, 1991
involving real properties with the market value of
P4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407 Mervir Realty shares of
stock with total par value of P4,440,700.00; 5 and the
certificate of stock issued on January 30, 1979 for 300 shares
of stock of Cebu Emerson worth P30,000.00. Thelma again
moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on the
inventory.
The RTC issued an order expressing the need for the parties to
court to resolve the motion for approval of the inventory.
Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked
issued on March 14, 2001 an order finding and holding that
that should be included. The RTC denied the administratrix's
motion for approval of inventory and orders the said
administratrix to re-do the inventory of properties which are
supposed to constitute as the estate of the late Emigdio S.
Mercado. The RTC also directed the administratrix to render
an account of her administration of the estate of the late
Emigdio S. Mercado which had come to her possession.
Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the
reconsideration of the order of March 14, 2001 on the ground
that one of the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353 located
in Badian, Cebu, had already been sold to Mervir Realty, On
appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision insofar as the
inclusion of the inclusion of parcels of land known as Lot No.
3353 located at Badian, Cebu with an area of 53,301 square
meters subject matter of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
November 9, 1989 and the various parcels of land subject
matter of the Deeds of Assignment dated February 17, 1989
and January 10, 1991 in the revised inventory to be submitted
by the administratrix is concerned.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory
notwithstanding that such properties had been either
transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in
Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime?
RULING: No.
The CA's conclusion of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the RTC was unwarranted and erroneous. WHEREFORE,
the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari;
REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on
May 15, 2002; REINSTATES the orders issued on March 14,
2001 and May 18, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court in Cebu;
DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court in Cebu to proceed with
dispatch in Special Proceedings No. 3094-CEB entitled
Intestate Estate of the late Emigdio Mercado, Thelma Aranas,
petitioner, and to resolve the case; and ORDERS the
respondents to pay the costs of suit.
RATIO: The probate court is authorized to determine the
issue of ownership of properties for purposes of their inclusion
or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the
administrator, but its determination shall only be provisional
unless the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent, or the
question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
10
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court
and the rights of third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction patently grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected
extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty. There is
distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the
status of each heir and whether property included in the
inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased
spouse.
Under Section 6 (a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters
of administration may be granted at the discretion of the court
to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve
when the person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of
administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes
duty-bound to direct the preparation and submission of the
inventory of the properties of the estate, and the surviving
spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to
submit the inventory within three months from the issuance of
letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of
Court, viz.:
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three
months. - Within three (3) months after his appointment every
executor or administrator shall return to the court a true
inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of
the deceased which has come into his possession or
knowledge. In the appraisement of such estate, the court may
order one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his
or their assistance.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the
inclusion of all the real and personal properties of the decedent administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there
in the inventory. However, the word all is qualified by the
phrase which has come into his possession or knowledge,
which signifies that the properties must be known to the
administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her
possession as the administrator.
Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory
implies that no properties appearing to belong to the decedent
can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being
in the possession of another person or entity. The objective of
the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of
the estate of the decedent is "to aid the court in revising the
accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or the
administrator, and in malting a final and equitable distribution
(partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the
administration of the estate." Hence, the RTC that presides
over the administration of an estate is vested with wide
discretion on the question of what properties should be
included in the inventory.
According to Peralta v. Peralta, the CA cannot impose its
judgment in order to supplant that of the RTC on the issue of
which properties are to be included or excluded from the
inventory in the absence of "positive abuse of discretion," for
in the administration of the estates of deceased persons, "the
judges enjoy ample discretionary powers and the appellate
courts should not interfere with or attempt to replace the
action taken by them, unless it be shown that there has been a
11
positive abuse of discretion." As long as the RTC commits no
no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate
court is special and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate
title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are
claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the
decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of
inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court can do
regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they
should be included in the inventory of properties to be
administered by the administrator. Such determination is
provisional and may be still revised.
As the Court said in Agtarap v. Agtarap: The general rule is
that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court
or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with
the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of
deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The
patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises
special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a
probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether
testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are
claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right
of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of
the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do as
regards said properties is to determine whether or not they
should be included in the inventory of properties to be
poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an
ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction
for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified
by expediency and convenience. The probate court may
provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding
the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory
of a piece of property without prejudice to final determination
of ownership in a separate action.
Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or
the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court
and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the
probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership.
Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or
collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such
as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the
property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of
the deceased spouse.
The inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and
submitted for the important purpose of resolving the difficult
issues of collation and advancement to the heirs. Article 1061
of the Civil Code required every compulsory heir and the
surviving spouse, herein Teresita herself, to "bring into the
mass of the estate any property or right which he (or she) may
have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in
order that it may be computed in the determination of the
legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition."
Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also provided that any
advancement by the decedent on the legitime of an heir "may
be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of
the estate proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon
shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the
heir."
Rule 90 thereby expanded the special and limited jurisdiction
of the RTC as an intestate court about the matters relating to
the inventory of the estate of the decedent by authorizing it to the subject properties before the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu
direct the inclusion of properties donated or bestowed by
gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the decedent. The
determination of which properties should be excluded from or
included in the inventory of estate properties was well within
the authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In Petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint on the
making its determination, the RTC acted with circumspection,
and proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best to
include all properties in the possession of the administrator or during trial, petitioner Francisco contended that what they
were known to the administrator to belong to Emigdio rather
than to exclude properties that could turn out in the end to be
actually part of the estate. As long as the RTC commits no
patent grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected
as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty. Grave
abuse of discretion means either that the judicial or quasi-
judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the
respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or
virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or
board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a
capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.
12. BUTIONG VS PLAZO
FACTS: In 1989, Pedro Riñoza died intestate, leaving several
heirs, including his children with his first wife, who are also
the respondents in this case; (Ma. Gracia and Ma. Fe). Pedro
also left several properties including a resort and a family
home both located in Nasugbu, Batangas.
The respondents alleged that in 1991, their co-heirs - Pedro's
second wife Benita, and other children had sold the subject
properties to the petitioner spouses, Francisco Villafria and
Maria Butiong without their knowledge and consent. The
spouses are now deceased and substituted by their son, Ruel.
They confronted Benita about the sale, and she acknowledged
the same, showing a document, she believed to be as a receipt
of her share in the sale. However, said document did not refer
to any sort of sale but to a previous loan obtained by Pedro
(decedent) and Benita from a bank. The document actually
evidenced receipt from Banco Silangan of the amount of P87,
352.62 releasing Pedro and Benita's indebtedness therefrom.
12
Upon inquiry, the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu informed
respondents that he has no record of any sale transaction
involving the subject properties, giving them certified true
copies of the titles to the same. When respondents went to the
subject properties, they discovered that 4 out of the 8 cottages
in the resort had been demolished. They were not able to enter
as the premises were padlocked.
Respondents learned that in July 1991, a notice of an
extrajudicial settlement of estate of their late father was
published in a tabloid called "Balita". Because of this,
respondents caused the annotation of their adverse claims over
and filed their complaint praying, among others, for the
annulment of all documents conveying the subject properties
to the petitioners and certificates of title issued to them.
ground of lack of personal knowledge and good faith in
acquiring the subject properties. In the course of his testimony
purchased was only the resort. He also presented an
Extrajudicial Settlement with Renunciation, Repudiations and
Waiver of Rights and Sale which provides that respondents'
co-heirs sold the family home to a certain spouses Bondoc for
P1M as well as a Deed of Sale whereby Benita sold the resort
to petitioners for P650K.
In 2001, the trial court nullified the transfer of the subject
properties to petitioners (Butiong; Villafria) and the spouses
Bondoc due to irregularities in the documents of conveyance
offered by petitioners; as well as the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the same. The Extrajudicial
Settlement was notarized by a notary public who was not duly
commissioned as such on the date it was executed. The Deed
of Sale was undated, the date of the acknowledgment therein
was left blank, and the typewritten name "Pedro Riñoza,
Husband" on the left side of the document was not signed.
Also, both documents were never presented to the Office of
the Register of Deeds for registration and that the titles to the
subject properties were still in the names of Pedro and his
second wife Benita. In addition, the supposed notaries and
buyers of the subject properties were not even presented as
witnesses who supposedly witnessed the signing and
execution of the documents of conveyance. On the basis
thereof, the trial court ruled in favor of respondents. The CA
affirmed the trial court’s ruling which was grounded on the
premise that the complaining heirs are insisting that the
settlement of the family home and the resort deed are void as
their signatures thereon are forgeries as opposed to the
Villafrias who profess the deeds' enforceability. And that after
the complaining heirs presented proofs in support of their
claim that their signatures were forged, the burden then fell
upon the Villafrias to disprove the same, or conversely, to
prove the authenticity and due execution of the said deeds.
The Villafrias failed in this regard.
The Villafrias did not present as witnesses (a) the notary
public who purportedly notarized the questioned instrument,
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
(b) the witnesses who appeared in the instruments as
eyewitnesses to the signing, or (c) an expert to prove the
authenticity and genuineness of all the signatures appearing on
the said instruments. Verily, the rule that, proper foundation
must be laid for the admission of documentary evidence; that
is, the identity and authenticity of the document must be
reasonably established as a prerequisite to its admission, was
prudently observed by the lower court when it refused to
admit the settlement of the family home and the resort deeds
as their veracity are doubtful.
Aggrieved, Ruel then filed a Motion for Reconsideration
raising the trial court's lack of jurisdiction. He alleged that
when the Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of
Title and Recovery of Possession was filed, there was yet no
settlement of Pedro's estate, determination as to the nature
thereof, nor was there an identification of the number of
legitimate heirs. As such, the trial court ruled on the settlement
of the intestate estate of Pedro in its ordinary jurisdiction when
the action filed was for Judicial Partition. Considering that the
instant action is really one for settlement of intestate estate, the Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between
trial court, sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction, exceeded
its jurisdiction when it ruled upon the issues of forgery and
ownership. Thus, petitioner argued that said ruling is void and
has no effect for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
Petitioner asserts that while the complaint filed by respondents
was captioned as "Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title
and Recovery of Possession," the allegations therein show that
the cause of action is actually one for settlement of estate of
decedent Pedro. Considering that settlement of estate is a
special proceeding cognizable by a probate court of limited
jurisdiction while judicial partition with annulment of title and
recovery of possession are ordinary civil actions cognizable by
a court of general jurisdiction, the trial court exceeded its
jurisdiction in entertaining the latter while it was sitting
merely in its probate jurisdiction. This is in view of the
prohibition found in the Rules on the joinder of special civil
actions and ordinary civil actions. Thus, petitioner argued that
the ruling of the trial court is void and has no effect for having
been rendered in without jurisdiction.
Petitioner also reiterates the arguments raised before the
appellate court that since the finding of forgery relates only to
the signature of respondents and not to their co-heirs who
assented to the conveyance, the transaction should be
considered valid as to them. Petitioner also denies the findings
of the courts below that his parents are builders in bad faith for
they only took possession of the subject properties after the
execution of the transfer documents and after they paid the
consideration on the sale.
The Motion for Reconsideration was, however, denied by the
CA.
ISSUE: WON the CA committed reversible error in not ruling
that the trial court acted without jurisdiction in entertaining the Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. — A
special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Pedro and
13
the civil action for annulment of title of the heirs and third
persons in one proceeding
RULING: NO.
Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of respondents'
causes of action pertaining to the properties left behind by the
decedent Pedro, his known heirs, and the nature and extent of
their interests thereon, may fall under an action for settlement
of estate. However, a complete reading of the complaint would
readily show that, based on the nature of the suit, the
allegations therein, and the reliefs prayed for, the action is
clearly one for judicial partition with annulment of title and
recovery of possession.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 74
Summary Settlement of Estate
heirs. — If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs
are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or
legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the
parties may without securing letters of administration, divide
the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a
public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds,
and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action
of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to
himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filled in the
office of the register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial
settlement, whether by public instrument or by stipulation in a
pending action for partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates
the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file,
simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing
of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for
partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register of
deeds, a bond with the said register of deeds, in an amount
equivalent to the value of the personal property involved as
certified to under oath by the parties concerned and
conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may be
filed under section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the
decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters
of administration within two (2) years after the death of the
decedent.
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall
be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no
extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who
has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
In this relation, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court
provides:
RULE 69
person having the right to compel the partition of real estate
may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (RULE 72 - RULE 90)
complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate
description of the real estate of which partition is demanded
and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the
property.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the
allegations of respondents in their complaint are but
customary, in fact, mandatory, to a complaint for partition of
real estate. Particularly, the complaint alleged: (1) that Pedro
died intestate; (2) that respondents, together with their co-
heirs, are all of legal age, with the exception of one who is
represented by a judicial representative duly authorized for the
purpose; (3) that the heirs enumerated are the only known
heirs of Pedro; (4) that there is an account and description of
all real properties left by Pedro; (5) that Pedro's estate has no
known indebtedness; and (6) that respondents, as rightful heirs
to the decedent's estate, pray for the partition of the same in
accordance with the laws of intestacy. It is clear, therefore, that
based on the allegations of the complaint, the case is one for
judicial partition. That the complaint alleged causes of action
identifying the heirs of the decedent, properties of the estate,
and their rights thereto, does not perforce make it an action for
settlement of estate.
It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person
dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his
will or the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the
trust, or. fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of
Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially
administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified
administrator in the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78
of the Rules of Court. An exception to this rule, however, is
found in the aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 74 wherein the
heirs of a decedent, who left no will and no debts due from his
estate, may divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an
ordinary action for partition without submitting the same for
judicial administration nor applying for the appointment of an
administrator by the court. The reason is that where the
deceased dies without pending obligations, there is no
necessity for the appointment of an administrator to administer
the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their
possession to which they are immediately entitled.
compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a
different course of action. It should be noted that recourse to
an administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is
sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not
resorting to an action for partition. Where' partition is possible,
either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with
an administration proceeding without good and compelling
reasons.
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies
without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs,
whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to
a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or
to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the Court.
It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial
administration and the appointment of an administrator are
superfluous and unnecessary proceedings.
Thus, respondents committed no error in filing an action for
judicial partition instead of a special proceeding for the
settlement of estate as the same is expressly permitted by law.
That the complaint contained allegations inherent in an action
for settlement of estate does not mean that there was a
prohibited joinder of causes of action for questions as to the
estate's properties as well as a determination of the heirs, their
status as such, and the nature and extent of their titles to the
estate, may also be properly ventilated in partition proceedings
alone.
--- END OF MIDTERMS ---

In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was

not disputed, that Pedro died without a will, leaving his estate
without any pending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner's
contention, respondents were under no legal obligation to
submit me subject properties of the estate to a special
proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and are, in fact,
encouraged to have the same partitioned, judicially or
extrajudicially.

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however,

does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration
proceedings, even if the estate has no" debts or obligations, if
they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary
action for partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to divide
the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to
an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not
14