Case #1 Villanueva v.
Court of Appeals and Blue Cross and ordered the reinstatement of the appeal “in keeping with
Insurance(G.R. No. 99357. January 27, 1992)
TOPIC: Nature of the Right to Appeal (The right to appeal
is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a
statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party
who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the
requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal
is lost.)
FACTS:
Petitioner alleged that in consideration of the annual payment
of P7,535.00, private respondent (PR) executed a policy of
sickness and accident insurance. On August 12, 1989,
petitioner was admitted to a hospital where she was diagnosed
and operated on for cholecystitis. Petitioner paid bills in the
aggregate sum of P48,934.05. However, PR wrongfully
refused to pay petitioner which is entitled to recover under the
policy, reasoning that under the insurance policy, among the
exclusions or non-compensable sickness are those which have
pre-existed before the effective date of the insurance of which
the insured was aware or should reasonably be aware of; and
cholecystitis was a pre-existing condition, hence non-
compensable.
The Insurance Commission concluded that petitioner’s illness
was not a pre-existing disease and therefore, fully
compensable. Hence, it ordered PR to pay tha amount with
legal interest from date of filing of complaint until fully
satisfied plus P5,000 attorney’s fees.
According to the Court of Appeals (para dali ra masabtan kay
mga dates raba ni, take note lang sa mga gi-bold)
 September 27, 1990 - the copy of said decision was
received by private respondent
 October 15, 1990 – [more than fifteen (15) days
allowed by Section 2, Republic Act No. 5434] private
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which
petitioner opposed
 December 13, 1990 – the Insurance Commission
denied said motion for reconsideration
 December 17, 1990 – private respondent filed a notice
of appeal with the Insurance Commission
 March 15, 1991 – CA dismissed the appeal on the ground
that it was filed out of time and that private respondent
did not duly file a copy of its notice of appeal with
respondent court as mandated by RA 5434
Respondent court noted that under the aforesaid Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 5434, private respondent had ten (10) days
to file an appeal from receipt of order denying its motion for
reconsideration (mao ni ang Dec 13 order but received the
order the day after so Dec 14)
On its May 8, 1991 resolution after Motion for
Reconsideration was filed by PR, respondent court
subsequently agreed that PR filed its notice of appeal with the
Insurance Commission within the said 10-day period, but no
such notice was filed with the CA itself as required by Section
3, RA 5343. Nevertheless, the Special Third Division of
respondent court resolved to reconsider its original resolution
the ends of substantial justice.”
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the respondent court committed an
error in reinstating the appeal when it has no jurisdiction to do
so, there being no notice of appeal having been filed with it.
RULING:
The CA erred in reconsidering its previous resolution. The
dismissal of said appeal is proper and fully justified by private
respondent's failure to file a notice of appeal with the Court of
Appeals as required by Republic Act No. 5434 for the
perfection of its appeal from the decision of the Insurance
Commission.
The Court of Appeals has been vested with exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities,
boards or commissions, except those falling within the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. During
the period relevant to and involved in the appeal from the
Insurance Commission to respondent court, subject of the
present review, the appeal to the Court of Appeals from said
quasi-judicial body was governed by the provisions of
Republic Act No. 5434 insofar as the same are not inconsistent
with the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129:
"In an appeal from quasi-judicial bodies to the Court of
Appeals under Republic Act No. 5434 and Section 22(c) of the
Interim Rules, the appeal shall be taken by filing a notice of
appeal with the Court of Appeals and with the quasi-
judicial body within fifteen days from notice of the ruling,
award, order, decision or judgment; or in case a motion
for reconsideration is filed within said period, then within
ten days from notice of the resolution denying the motion
for reconsideration (Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 5434). No
extension of time to file such a notice of appeal is needed,
much less allowed."
It is, therefore, indubitable that to perfect an appeal, notice
must be filed both with the Court of Appeals and with the
board, commission or agency that made or rendered the ruling,
award, order, decision or judgment appealed from. In the
instant case, even assuming that a notice of appeal was
seasonably filed with the Insurance Commission, no such
notice of appeal was filed with the Court of Appeals. The
said failure of petitioner to comply with the requirements of
law for the perfection of its appeal is fatal to its present
remedial attempt. It renders the decision of the Insurance
Commission final and executory and the same can no longer
be a subject of review. The perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period laid down by law is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional. The failure to perfect an
appeal as required by the rules has the effect of defeating the
right of appeal of a party and precluding the appellate court
from acquiring jurisdiction over the case.
The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due
process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the
same must comply with the requirements of the rules. Failing
to do so, the right to appeal is lost.
It is true that in some cases the filing of an appeal was allowed
where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it,
but only when it would serve the demands of substantial
justice and in the exercise of the court's equity jurisdiction. In
the case at bar, however, the interests of justice would not be
served by a policy of liberality, nor has the private respondent
advanced any compelling reason to warrant the same.
Moreover, relaxation of the rules is not called for since the
issues raised are mainly factual. For a party to seek exception
for its failure to comply strictly with the statutory
requirements for perfecting its appeal, strong compelling
reasons such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a
grave miscarriage thereof must be shown, in order to warrant
the Court's suspension of the rules.
Case #2 Teope v. People (G.R. No. 149687. April 14, 2004)
TOPIC: Nature of the Right to Appeal (Petitioner is barred
from availing of the remedies allowed by the rules against the
judgment of the RTC, one of which is the right to file an
appeal with the Court of Appeals, the reason for this rule is
because once an accused escapes from prison or confinement,
or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he loses his
standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the
jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any
right to seek relief from the court.)
FACTS:
(overview lang ning mga dates aron han-ay but TN sa mga
naka-bold)
 January 19, 1994 – Petitioner was charged with 2 counts
of violation of B.P. 22 before the RTC of Dumaguete
City.
 December 9, 1995 – After the prosecution rested its case,
petitioner filed a Demurrer to the Evidence
 January 9, 1995 – The RTC denied said demurrer
 January 21, 1999 – Notice of Appeal from the denial
was filed by petitioner
 February 5, 1999 – The RTC denied due course to the
Notice of Appeal
 March 16, 1999 – RTC denied motion for reconsideration,
which petitioner timely filed
 May 24, 1999 – Petitioner then filed a petition for
mandamus with the Court of Appeals
 On October 19, 2000 and August 6, 2001, respectively –
CA promulgated the assailed Decision and Resolution
dismissing the petition and denying the subsequent
motion for reconsideration.
Upon verification from the records of the case, it appears that
a lot has transpired between the bold dates above. (LABAD
JUD KAAYO NI NA PART, basta kaning blue kay what
transpired between those dates. Not that important but basa
lang gamay aron masabtan)
The RTC ordered that hearings for the reception of petitioner's
evidence be set. Petitioner's counsel himself suggested that the
hearings be held on April 17, 19, 21, 24, 25 and 26, 1995.
 April 17, 1995 – however, petitioner filed a "Motion
entreating Hon. Enrique C. Garrovillo to consider whether
to continue presiding over the cases and to inhibit Fiscal
Diosdado D. Hermosa from appearing as public
prosecutor in the cases."
 April 21, 1995 – motion to inhibit was denied by the RTC
and petitioner was ordered to present her evidence on
April 24 and 26, 1995 and on May 9 and 12, 1995.
 April 24, 1995 – petitioner failed to appear at the hearing
thus, RTC declared her bail bonds forfeited and ordered
the bondsman to produce petitioner within 30 days and
show cause why no judgment should be rendered against
her for the amount of the bonds
 April 27, 1995 – RTC received an urgent motion for
postponement from petitioner's counsel, asking for the
resetting of the May 9 and 12, 1995 hearings. Reasons
kay sa May 9, counsel was scheduled to attend to some
urgent family engagement while on May 12, counsel
already had prior engagements with other courts. The
RTC acceded to the motion and reset the hearings to June
6, 7, 8, 9 and 13, 1995, but declared these hearings to be
"intransferable considering the fact that the termination of
these cases has been much delayed by the frequent
absence and/or postponements made by the Accused.
 June 2, 1995 – petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the April 21, 1995 order (motion to
inhibit).
 July 5, 1995 – RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration.
 July 6, 1995 – RTC rendered judgment against the bonds
for failure of the bondsman to produce petitioner and
submit an explanation for the latter's failure to appear at
the April 24, 1995 hearing.
 January 30, 1996 – as prayed for by petitioner's counsel,
the RTC issued an order again resetting the hearing to
April 7, 1997.
 February 4, 1997, the RTC issued another order declaring
petitioner as a fugitive from justice and a warrant of arrest
was issued against her (tagam!!!)
Petitioner's counsel then filed an Omnibus Motion on May 19,
1997 asserting that petitioner cannot be tried in absentia
because she was not notified of the subsequent trials after the
forfeiture of her bail bonds. Consequently, petitioner's counsel
prayed that the two criminal cases against her be archived and
that an alias warrant of arrest be issued. The RTC denied the
Omnibus Motion for lack of merit on October 30, 1998. In the
same order, the criminal cases were deemed submitted for
decision and an alias warrant of arrest was issued. It was only
on January 18, 1999 that RTC rendered a Joint Judgment
finding petitioner guilty on both counts of violation of BP 22.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to which the RTC denied
due course on the ground that, being a fugitive from justice,
petitioner has lost her right to appeal. Unable to convince the
RTC to give due course to her appeal, petitioner's counsel
sought redress with the Court of Appeals by filing a petition
for mandamus.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not CA committed error for dismissing
the case for mandamus

RULING:
NO. There was no error on the part of CA. Section 6 of Rule
120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly
provides that:
“If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the
accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose
the remedies available in these Rules against the judgment
and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days
from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may
surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these
remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the
scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was
for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said
remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.”
There is no question as it is very obvious that petitioner
escaped after her arraignment. Subsequently, the trial was
ordered to continue but after the accused failed to appear, the
RTC terminated the trial and, thereafter, promulgated the Joint
Judgment of conviction. During that time petitioner was at
large. She remains at large even while her counsel continues to
file various pleadings on her behalf before the RTC, the Court
of Appeals and this Court.
Under the Rules of Court, petitioner is barred from availing of
the remedies allowed by the rules against the judgment of the
RTC, one of which is the right to file an appeal with the Court
of Appeals. The reason for this rule is because once an
accused escapes from prison or confinement, or jumps bail or
flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court and
unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court,
he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the
court.
Thus, having no right to appeal the RTC decision to the Court
of Appeals, the petition for mandamus cannot prosper.
Mandamus will only lie to compel the performance of a
ministerial duty and the petitioner must show a well-defined,
clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.
Case #3 Madrigal Transport Inc v. Lapanday Holdings
(G.R. No. 156067. August 11, 2004)
TOPIC: Appeal as Distinguished from Certiorari (GR:
Where appeal is available, action for certiorari will not be
entertained)
FACTS:
Petitioner ("Madrigal") filed a Petition for Voluntary
Insolvency before the RTC of Manila Branch 49.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Complaint for damages
against Respondents Lapanday, et al before the RTC of
Manila branch 36.
In the latter action, Madrigal alleged (1) that it had entered
into a joint venture agreement with Lapanday for the primary
purpose of operating vessels to service the shipping
requirements of Del Monte Philippines, Inc.; (2) that it had
done so on the strength of the representations of Lorenzo, in
his capacity either as chairman of the board or as president of
Del Monte, Lapanday and Macondray; (3) that Macondray had
thereafter been appointed — allegedly upon the insistence of
Lapanday — as broker, for the purpose of securing charter
hire contracts from Del Monte; (4) that pursuant to the joint
venture agreement, Madrigal had purchased a vessel by
obtaining a P10,000,000 bank loan; and (5) that contrary to
their representations and guarantees and despite demands,
Lapanday and Lorenzo had allegedly been unable to deliver
those Del Monte charter hire contracts.
The insolvency court (Branch 49) declared petitioner
insolvent. The respondents filed their respective Motions to
Dismiss the complaint in Branch 36.
Branch 36 granted the motion for failure of the complaint to
state a cause of action. The court opined that when petitioner
was declared insolvent, it lost its right to file a complaint for
damages since the exclusive right to institute said actions is
now vested with the court-appointed assignee.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied. Petitioner then went to the CA on a petition for
certiorari. CA then issued a Resolution requiring petitioner to
explain why its Petition should not be dismissed outright, on
the ground that the questioned Orders should have been
elevated by ordinary appeal. It subsequently ruled that since
the main issue in the instant case was purely legal, the Petition
could be treated as one for review as an exception to the
general rule that certiorari was not proper when appeal was
available. Thus, the respondents moved for reconsideration.
RULING OF THE CA:
Granted respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration and
dismissing Madrigal's Petition for Certiorari. The CA opined
that an order granting a motion to dismiss was final and thus
the proper subject of an appeal, not certiorari. Furthermore,
even if the Petition could be treated as an appeal, it would still
have to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, according to the
CA. The appellate court held that the issues raised by
petitioner involved pure questions of law that should be
brought to the Supreme Court, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule
50 and Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not certiorari was the proper
remedy
RULING:
NO, ORDINARY APPEAL is the proper remedy and NOT
CERTIORARI.
Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for
certiorari will not be entertained. Remedies of appeal
(including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually
exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is
not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one's
own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned
such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that
there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not
prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of
discretion.

A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of
errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ cannot be used for any
other purpose, as its function is limited to keeping the inferior
court within the bounds of its jurisdiction.
For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or
any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2)
such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.
"Without jurisdiction" means that the court acted with absolute
lack of authority. There is "excess of jurisdiction" when the
court transcends its power or acts without any statutory
authority. "Grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent
or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to
a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at
all in contemplation of law.
Appeal and Certiorari Distinguished
As to the purpose – Certiorari is a remedy designed for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a
writ of certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of
reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower
court — on the basis either of the law or the facts of the
case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision.
Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has
jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond
the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of
jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact — a mistake of
judgment — appeal is the remedy.
As to the manner of filing – Over an appeal, the CA exercises
its appellate jurisdiction and power of review. Over a
certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in
accordance with its power of control and supervision over the
proceedings of lower courts. An appeal is thus a continuation
of the original suit, while a petition for certiorari is an original
and independent action that was not part of the trial that had
resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained
of. The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the
action. In contrast, the parties to a petition for certiorari are the
aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against
the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing
parties (the public and the private respondents, respectively).
As to the subject matter – Only judgments or final orders and
those that the Rules of Court so declare are appealable. Since
the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be
directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior
to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or
any plain, speedy or adequate remedy.
As to the period of filing – Ordinary appeals should be filed
within fifteen (15) days from the notice of judgment or final
order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant must file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal
within thirty days from the said notice of judgment or final
order. 4A petition for review should be filed and served within
fifteen days from the notice of denial of the decision, or of the
petitioner's timely filed motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the petition should
be filed also within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or
final order, or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not
later than sixty (60) days from the notice of judgment, order,
or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration was timely filed, the period shall be counted
from the denial of the motion.
As to the need for a motion for reconsideration – A motion for
reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a
petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an
opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note also that this
motion is a plain and adequate remedy expressly available
under the law. Such motion is not required before appealing a
judgment or final order.
Exception to the Rule
Not Established by Petitioner
We are not unaware of instances when this Court has granted
certiorari despite the availability of appeal. Where the
exigencies of the case are such that the ordinary methods of
appeal may not prove adequate — either in point of
promptness or completeness, so that a partial if not a total
failure of justice could result — a writ of certiorari may still
be issued. Petitioner cites some of these exceptions to justify
the remedy it has undertaken with the appellate court, but
these are not applicable to the present factual milieu.
Even assuming that the Order of the RTC was erroneous,
its error did not constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioner asserts that the trial court should not have dismissed
the Complaint or should have at least allowed the substitution
of the assignee in petitioner's stead. These alleged errors of
judgment, however, do not constitute a despotic, capricious, or
whimsical exercise of power. On the contrary, petitioner
availed of certiorari because the 15-day period within which to
file an appeal had already lapsed. Basic is the rule that
certiorari is not a substitute for the lapsed remedy of appeal.
As previously stressed, appeal — not certiorari — was the
correct remedy to elevate the RTC's Order granting the Motion
to Dismiss. The appeal, which would have involved a pure
question of law, should have been filed with the Supreme
Court pursuant to Section 2(c) of Rule 41 and Section 2 of
Rule 50, Rules of Court.
Case #4 Heirs of Reterta v. Sps Mores (G.R. No. 159941.
August 17, 2011)
TOPIC: Appeal as Distinguished from Certiorari (EXC:
Certiorari can still be the proper remedy despite the
availability of appeal or other remedy if warranted by
exceptional reasons such as: (a) when it is necessary to
prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party; (b) where
the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his
judgment; (c) where there may be danger of a failure of
justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate and
insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one purely of law; (f)
where public interest is involved; and (g) in case of urgency.)
FACTS:
Teofilo Retera was granted a friar land in Cavite by virtue of
his open, exclusive and continued occupation for more than
thirty (30) years. He died in 1983, leaving behind the land to
his heirs, herein petitioners. The petitioners discovered in
1999 that there was an affidavit purportedly executed by their
father waiving his rights and interest over the land, and by
virtue of such affidavit, a Sale Certificate and TCT was issued
in favor of the respondents.
The petitioners filed an action for quieting of title and
reconveyance with the RTC, alleging that such affidavit was a
forgery and the sale certificate and TCT were procured
fraudulently.
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss, insisting that the
RCT had no jurisdiction on the ground that the Director of
Lands had the exclusive power to the propriety of grant of
Friar lands, and to determine whether or not there is fraud in
procuring the sales certificate.
Agreeing with the ground, RTC granted the Motion to
Dismiss. Upon receiving the Order of Dismissal on Nov 16,
2001, petitioner filed an MR on November 26, 2001.
However, the RTC denied the MR in its order, which was
received by the petitioners on March 20, 2002 thus prompting
them to file a petition for certiorari with the CA on May 15,
2002.
The CA dismissed the petition, holding that certiorari cannot
be used as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal,
considering that the order granting the Motion to Dismiss was
a final order against which the proper remedy was an appeal in
due course. Hence, the appeal to the SC.
ISSUE/S: WON the Petition for Certiorari was proper
RULING:
Yes, certiorari was proper.
At first, the SC held that the contention of the petitioners that
their proper remedy was certiorari by virtue of Rule 41 was
misplaced. According to Sec. 1, Rule 41 (not yet amended by
AM 7-7-12 during the decision of the CA) an Order denying a
Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration is one of the cases
where no appeal may be taken from and the proper remedy is
to avail of Certiorari under rule 65. However, in this case,
what the petitioners really wanted to obtain relief from was the
Order of Dismissal which finally disposed of the case, and not
the denial of their MR. the general rule is that certiorari is
precluded as a remedy against the final order when appeal is
available.
Nonetheless, SC considered Certiorari as the proper remedy
despite the availability of appeal or other remedy if warranted
by exceptional reasons such as: (a) when it is necessary to
prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party; (b) where
the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his
judgment; (c) where there may be danger of a failure of
justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate and
insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one purely of law; (f)
where public interest is involved; and (g) in case of urgency.
Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal
as a remedy does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent or
preclude a party from making use of certiorari if appeal is not
an adequate remedy, or an equally beneficial, or speedy
remedy. It is inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other
legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without
the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of
certiorari. A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will
promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the
judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency. It
is understood, then, that a litigant need not mark time by
resorting to the less speedy remedy of appeal in order to have
an order annulled and set aside for being patently void for
failure of the trial court to comply with the Rules of Court.
Nor should the petitioner be denied the recourse despite
certiorari not being available as a proper remedy against an
assailed order, because it is better on balance to look beyond
procedural requirements and to overcome the ordinary
disinclination to exercise supervisory powers in order that a
void order of a lower court may be controlled to make it
conformable to law and justice. Verily, the instances in which
certiorari will issue cannot be defined, because to do so is to
destroy the comprehensiveness and usefulness of the
extraordinary writ. The wide breadth and range of the
discretion of the court are such that authority is not wanting to
show that certiorari is more discretionary than either
prohibition or mandamus, and that in the exercise of
superintending control over inferior courts, a superior court is
to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case
"as the ends of justice may require." Thus, the writ will be
granted whenever necessary to prevent substantial wrong
or to do substantial injustice.
Case #5 Madarang v. Morales (G.R. No. 199283. June 9,
2014)
TOPIC: Appeal as Distinguished from Petition for Relief
(A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy
and is allowed only in exceptional cases. It is not available if
other remedies exist, such as a motion for new trial or appeal.)
FACTS:
Sps. Morales filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City
for judicial foreclosure of a house and lot located in Bago
Bantay, Quezon City.

Sps Morales alleged that the Sps. Bartolome loaned P500,000
from them. Petitioners agreed to pay within two (2) months
the loan with an interest of five percent (5%) per month. To
secure the loan, petitioners mortgaged the Bantay property to
herein respondents. However, the period to pay lapsed without
the petitioners having paid their loan. After demand, they only
paid part of the loaned amount without the interest.
In the meantime, the Sps Bartolome died. The sps PR thus,
filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure of the Bago Bantay
property against Juliet Vitug Madarang, Romeo Bartolome,
and the Spouses Rodolfo and Ruby Anne Bartolome
(petitioners).
PR sued Madarang as the latter allegedly represented herself
as Lita Bartolome and convinced the Spouses Morales to lend
money to the Sps Bartolome. Romeo and Rodolfo Bartolome
were sued in their capacities as legitimate heirs of the Spouses
Bartolome. Ruby Anne Bartolome is Rodolfo Bartolome's
wife.
In their answer, the petitioners of the present case assailed the
authenticity of the deed of real estate mortgage covering the
Bago Bantay property, specifically, the Sps Bartolome's
signatures on the instrument. They added that the complaint
was already barred since it had been dismissed in another
branch of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for failure
to comply with an order of the trial court.
In its decision dated December 22, 2009, the trial court
ordered petitioners to pay the Spouses Morales P500,000.00
plus 7% interest per month and costs of suit within 90 days but
not more than 120 days from entry of judgment. Should
defendants fail to pay, the Bago Bantay property shall be sold
at public auction to satisfy the judgment.
Defendants received a copy of the trial court's decision on
January 29, 2010. Hence, on February 8, 2010, petitioners
filed their motion for reconsideration of the trial court's
decision, amended their motion for reconsideration, and filed a
request for a Philippine National Police handwriting expert to
examine the authenticity of the sps Bartolome’s alleged
signatures on the deed of real estate mortgage.
According to the trial court, the motion for reconsideration
and its amendment were pro forma as petitioners failed to
specify the findings and conclusions in the decision that were
not supported by the evidence or contrary to law. As to the
request for a handwriting expert, the trial court ruled that the
"reasons given therein [were] not well taken."
Thus, in its order dated May 25, 2010, the trial court denied
the motion for reconsideration, its amendment, and the request
for a handwriting expert. Defendants received copy of such
order on June 24, 2010.
(NAA NA SAD TA ANING MGA DATES NA
UNNECCESSARY PERO KAILANGAN BASAHON ARON
MASABTAN, take note sa Jan 29 2010 date na naa sa taas)
 August 11, 2010, defendants filed a notice of appeal
 August 13, 2010, the trial court denied due course the
notice of appeal for having been filed out of time.
According to the trial court, defendants, through their
counsel, Atty. Arturo F. Tugonon, received a copy of the
order denying the motion for reconsideration on June 24,
2010. This is evidenced by the registry return receipt on
file with the court. Consequently, they had 15 days from
June 24, 2010, or until July 9, 2010, to appeal the trial
court's decision. However, they filed their notice of appeal
only on August 11, 2010, which was beyond the 15-day
period to appeal.
 September 24, 2010 – petitioners filed a petition for
relief from judgment blaming their 80-year-old lawyer
who failed to file the notice of appeal within the
reglementary period. ( kaluoy pud uy  )
 April 27, 2011 – trial court denied the petition for relief
from judgment. The trial court held that the petition for
relief was filed beyond 60 days from the finality of the
trial court's decision, contrary to Section 3, Rule 38 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
 July 13, 2011 – petitioners filed petition for certiorari with
CA.
 July 27, 2011 – CA denied outright the petition. CA found
that they did not file an MfR denying the petition for
relief from judgment, a prerequisite for filing a petition
for certiorari.
 November 10, 2011 – CA denied petitioner’s MfR
Petitioners filed the petition for review on certiorari with this
court. They argue that they need not file a motion for
reconsideration of the order denying their petition for relief
from judgment because the questions they raised in the
petition for relief were pure questions of law. Petitioners add
that the trial court erred in denying their notice of appeal.
They argue that the period to file an appeal must be counted
from August 11, 2011, not on the day their "ailing counsel"
received a copy of the decision.
ISSUE/S: WON Court of Appeals erred in dismissing outright
petitioners' petition for certiorari for failure to file a motion for
reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief
from judgment.
RULING:
A petition for relief from judgment must be filed within 60
days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or
proceeding and within six (6) months from entry of judgment
or final order
This court agrees that the petition for relief from judgment
was filed out of time. However, the trial court erred in
counting the 60-day period to file a petition for relief from the
date of finality of the trial court's decision. Rule 38, Section 3
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear that the 60-day
period must be counted after petitioner learns of the
judgment or final order. The period counted from the finality
of judgment or final order is the six-month period. Section 3,
Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
“A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of
this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after
petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other
proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months
after such judgment or final order was entered, or such
proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with
affidavits, showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence relied upon and the facts constituting the
petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as
the case may be.”
Although petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and
amended motion for reconsideration, these motions were pro
forma for not specifying the findings or conclusions in the
decision that were not supported by the evidence or contrary
to law. Their motion for reconsideration did not toll the 15-day
period to appeal.
Petitioners cannot argue that the period to appeal should be
counted from August 11, 2011, the day petitioners personally
received a copy of the trial court's decision. Notice of
judgment on the counsel of record is notice to the client. Since
petitioners' counsel received a copy of the decision on January
29, 2010, the period to appeal shall be counted from that date.
Thus, the decision became final 15 days after January 29,
2010, or on February 13, 2010. Petitioners had six (6)
months from February 13, 2010, or until August 12, 2010,
to file a petition for relief from judgment.
Since petitioners filed their petition for relief from judgment
on September 24, 2010, the petition for relief from judgment
was filed beyond six (6) months from finality of judgment.
The trial court should have denied the petition for relief from
judgment on this ground.
As to the issue of relief from judgment
Even if we assume that petitioners filed their petition for relief
from judgment within the reglementary period, petitioners
failed to prove that their former counsel's failure to file a
timely notice of appeal was due to a mistake or excusable
negligence.
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy and
is allowed only in exceptional cases. It is not available if other
remedies exist, such as a motion for new trial or appeal.
To set aside a judgment through a petition for relief, the
negligence must be so gross "that ordinary diligence and
prudence could not have guarded against." This is to prevent
parties from "reviving the right to appeal [already] lost
through inexcusable negligence."
Petitioners argue that their former counsel's failure to file a
notice of appeal within the reglementary period was "a
mistake and an excusable negligence due to [their former
counsel's] age." This argument stereotypes and demeans senior
citizens. It asks this court to assume that a person with
advanced age is prone to incompetence. This cannot be done.
There is also no showing that the negligence could have been
prevented through ordinary diligence and prudence. As such,
petitioners are bound by their counsel's negligence.
Petitioners had until July 9, 2010 to file a notice of appeal,
considering that their former counsel received a copy of
the order denying their motion for reconsideration of the
trial court's decision on June 24, 2010. Since petitioners
filed their notice of appeal only on August 11, 2010, the trial
court correctly denied the notice of appeal for having been
filed out of time.
As to the denial of petition for certiorari for petitioner’s
failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the order
denying petition for relief from judgment
The court ruled that a motion for reconsideration is the plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
alluded to in Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. A motion for reconsideration is required before a
petition for certiorari is filed "to grant [the court which
rendered the assailed judgment or order] an opportunity . . . to
correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-
examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the
case."
In this case, a motion for reconsideration of the order
denying the petition for relief from judgment is the plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Petitioners failed to avail themselves of this remedy.
Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners'
petition for certiorari.
Contrary to petitioners' claim, the questions they raised in their
petition for relief from judgment were not pure questions of
law. They raise the authenticity of the Spouses Bartolome's
signatures on the deed of real estate mortgage and the
allegedly excusable negligence of their counsel. These are
questions of fact which put at issue the truth of the facts
alleged in the petition for relief from judgment.
"[t]he filing of the motion for reconsideration before availing
of the remedy of certiorari is not sine qua non when the issues
raised is one purely of law."