Miller Park PDF

Project Management Institute
Case Studies in Project Management
Miller Park Stadium Project
By:
Scott Serich, PhD, PMP, Graham Bale, MSPM, PMP, Mary Kay Kwasny, MSPM, PMP,
Steven Patneaude, MSPM, ASCPM, Jeff Stack, MSPM, PMP
Edited by:
Frank T. Anbari, PhD, PMP
The George Washington University
This case study was originally prepared as part of Project Management Applications, the capstone
course of the Master of Science in Project Management in the Department of Decision Sciences at The George
Washington University, by the graduating students listed above with the supervision of Professor Serich.
This case study was adapted to make it a learning resource and might not reflect all historical facts
related to this project.
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Case Study

Table of Contents
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................. 3
The Inception Phase ............................................................................................................................................... 4
The Development Phase ........................................................................................................................................ 8
The Implementation Phase .................................................................................................................................. 11
The Closeout Phase ............................................................................................................................................... 15
Summary of Project Assessment and Analysis .................................................................................................. 18
References .............................................................................................................................................................. 19
Teaching Note ....................................................................................................................................................... 21
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Case Study
Introduction
Miller Park is a 42,500-seat baseball stadium and the result of a project undertaken to replace
County Stadium, home of the Milwaukee Brewers since 1953. Wisconsin Legislature created the Southeast
Wisconsin Professional Baseball Park District through the 1995 Wisconsin Act 56 to give it the authority
to issue revenue bonds and impose a local sales and use tax to provide public funding for the new stadium.
The official groundbreaking for the new stadium took place November 9, 1996. It was scheduled to be a
three-and-one-half-year project, with construction set to be completed by 1 March 2000. The stadium was
designed to have a natural grass playing field and convertible roof to make a more comfortable environment
for players and fans throughout the season.
Miller Park had a cost of US$400 million including US$72 million to improve the area surrounding
the park. Ownership of the completed project is divided. The Southeast Wisconsin Professional Baseball
Park District owns 64% of the park, and the Milwaukee Brewers owns 36% of the park. Miller Brewing
Company gave the Milwaukee Brewers more than $41 million for naming rights to the new stadium—
hence the name, Miller Park.
The Miller Park Joint Venture was created to manage the project consisting of three prime construc-
tion contractors: Hunzinger Construction Company, Clark Construction, and Hunt Construction (HCH).
Over the life of the project, there were 447 prime contracts and first-tier subcontracts. Of those, 180 were
targeted firms (minority owned, women owned, disadvantaged or small businesses). In total, there were
more than 5,000 personnel who contributed to the project, working more than 2.4 million worker-hours,
or 1,600 construction-worker years.
The stadium building has an area of 1.2 million square feet (111,484 m2), 70,000 cubic yards (53,519
m3) of concrete, 24,000 tons of structural steel, and 8,500 tons of rebar. For the fans, there are 70 luxury
suites, 550 television sets, 2,000 stereo speakers, and 33 restrooms each for men and women.
The project took a year longer to complete than originally planned, mostly the result of a crane
accident in July 1999. There was also a cost surprise. A Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau summary
revealed that to complete the project, taxpayers of Milwaukee and the surrounding counties would be in
part footing US$76 million more than originally projected in the 1995 Wisconsin Act 56, bringing the total
to $400 million.
This case study covers various Project Management Knowledge Areas (Project Management Insti-
tute, 2004) within four project phases: inception, development, implementation, and closeout. Within each
project phase, the activities, accomplishments, and performance shortcomings in the Initiating, Planning,
Executing, Monitoring and Controlling, and Closing Process Groups’ processes are discussed. The case
study is structured to allow an evaluation of the appropriate processes of various Project Management
Knowledge Areas at the end of each phase. An overall assessment of performance is then conducted, resulting
in a numeric evaluation of the management of this project, including areas of strength, opportunities for
improvement, and lessons learned.
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The Inception Phase
Scope management on the Miller Park Stadium project was evident throughout the project. How-
ever, there were some areas of scope management that were found lacking. These areas are associated
with the inception and implementation phases. There was no broad consensus regarding the sources of
funding, and no subsequent consensus on how ownership would change with a corresponding change in
cost. The funding issue is addressed as part of the scope section as well as the cost section because
stakeholder fiduciary interest should be specifically addressed in the project proposal and charter.
The project proposal team made significant efforts to build consensus and garner support for the
project in the year preceding the proposed start. Specific efforts included heavy use of media coverage
and 11 lobbyists costing over US$94,000. The park was twice proposed as a privately funded enterprise.
However, when the proposal grew, the project sponsors had to look for public sources of funding. Although
the officials involved got the stadium approved, it was not without political cost. The appeal for public
funding was not well received by the Milwaukee constituency as they voted it down twice. Regardless,
Governor Tommy Thompson implemented a five-county sales tax hike in 1996 to build Miller Park. The
voters responded by recalling the state senator whose vote secured the deal. (Kagan and Demause).
Given the political contention surrounding this project, the inception phase of scope was managed
as best as could be expected by the project proposal team. Although the proposal for the new stadium
was accepted, public funding was secured, and construction begun, the event created much public outcry.
Due to the protest and lawsuits, it is evident that the stakeholder interest alignment necessary during
inception did not occur, or could not be accomplished. This project was forced on the Milwaukee constitu-
ency. As such, it created enough controversy to garner national attention and legislative debate. The
Libertarian Party of Wisconsin filed an injunctive lawsuit to halt the project. Additionally, legislation was
proposed in the U.S. Congress, which would forever change the way stadium projects could be funded
across the country.
The funding of stadium projects across the United States is quite varied. Stadium projects use at
least some private money, but due to the extremely high cost of engineering projects done on this scale,
many require public funding as well. Public funding comes from sources such as state lotteries, bond
issues, sales tax levies, and use taxes. The Miller Park Stadium project cost was proposed several times as
the scope changed and features were added to the ballpark. Costs and sources of capital were well identified
for this project. However, as the groundbreaking grew closer in 1995, the cost escalated and the funding
structure changed.
The stadium project proposal was treated as an iterative process. The first proposal was an open-
air US$120 million stadium. However, as the project neared its start, the costs escalated as new information
was gained and features were added such as a convertible roof. The sources of funding were identified to
accommodate the new cost projections. However, problems that arose later in the project regarding owner-
ship rights and the definitions of what was to be included in cost estimates might have been avoided with
better planning. A quote from the Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau referring to a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) between the park district and the Brewers indicated that the specific problem was
how any cost escalations would be handled and how the securing of additional funding would affect the
ownership rights of the original investors. They stated:
Under the MOU and subsequent agreements signed by the District and the Brewers, the
Brewers are to have a 36% ownership in the stadium when it is completed. This percentage
was based on the proportion of the total cost of the stadium the Brewers were to finance.
However, when all expenditures are taken into account, the Brewers’ US$90 million contribu-
tion reflects only 29.7% of the $303.3 million now estimated to be expended on stadium
construction. If actual stadium construction expenditures reflect budgeted costs when the
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project is completed, then an adjustment to the Brewers’ percentage of ownership will need
to be made.
This scenario could have been anticipated in either inception or development for either scope or cost. It
most directly relates to cost, but scope directly addresses stakeholders’ interests in projects. Sadly, it was
not dealt with until the problem became apparent in the later stages of implementation as costs were
escalating. However, the funding and ownership issues were finally resolved during implementation and
closeout as the stakeholders negotiated and accepted contingency funding proposals.
Three construction firms worked together in a joint venture to manage the construction of Miller
Park stadium. The main project manager was from one of the construction firms. There were multiple
subcontractors, most notably the one which designed, built, and installed the stadium’s roof.
The Miller Park project was filled with holes and discrepancies during the inception phase, develop-
ment phase, and implementation phase with regards to how the project was contracted. Throughout the
project’s life cycle there were continuous disputes about who should cover the project’s cost overruns, the
Miller Park Joint Venture or the Milwaukee Brewer’s baseball organization. Implementing and communicat-
ing the appropriate contract structure to support the project from its inception to closeout would have
eliminated a tremendous amount of confusion and frustration for city officials, public taxpayers, and the
Brewer’s baseball organization. Ultimately, if the appropriate contract strategy would have been imple-
mented to support the Miller Park project, all parties supporting the project would have know when and
how much money would be spent to support the project and if the project would have met its expected
scope and schedule targets.
During the inception phase of the Miller Park project, it was clear that the proponents for the
stadium had conceived the strategy and architecture, and established the priorities to which the project’s
framework would be managed. What the Miller Park Joint Venture failed to do was to provide the proper
financial documentation to correspond to its strategy and architecture.
The Miller Park Joint Venture established a MOU, which outlined its strategic plan for integrating
the stadium, provided documentation, and forecasted cost elements. The MOU was misleading, incomplete,
and held no contractual relevance other than that it provided initial cost estimates that were to be paid
by Milwaukee County, the City of Milwaukee, and the Brewers. Although the MOU had legal significance
with regards to cost, it had become a model for a fixed-price lump-sum contract that was never generated.
At the center of this dispute is a document known formally as the memorandum of under-
standing, or MOU, which was signed in 1995 by representatives of the state, Milwaukee
County, the City of Milwaukee, and the Brewers. In that document, all parties agreed that
the cost of the stadium, set to open March 1, 2000, would be $322 million: US$250 million
for stadium construction and US$72 million for infrastructure improvements.
If the proper contract strategy had been implemented, contracts would have been generated to support
the MOU’s guidelines for cost; if costs associated with the Miller Park project began to escalate the
contracting manager could have negotiated price contingencies common to the MOU within the project’s
contract infrastructure. This concept never came to fruition.
Although the HCH Miller Park Joint Venture’s ability to clearly communicate the details associated
with the project’s contractual infrastructure at inception were dismal; they were able to clearly define and
document the core attributes Kerzner (2006) considers to be essential in the contractual planning phase:
● Define need;
● Develop the statement of work, specifications, and work breakdown structure;
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● Performing a make/buy process;
● Laying out the major milestones and the timing/schedule;
● Estimating cost;
● Obtaining authorization and approval to proceed.
Thus, the Miller Park Joint Venture was able to estimate the schedules and costs associated with building
the stadium. The problem was that they were not able to properly communicate the costs for the project
as estimates, and further inhibited their efforts by producing a MOU to the public that created the false
misconception that the estimates were fixed as the lump-sum total for building the stadium.
Risk management—the process of identifying, addressing, and responding to potential and real
project risk—appeared to be prevalent throughout most of the entire life cycle of the Miller Park Stadium
project. During the project’s inception, the business reasons and benefits for undertaking the project were
well defined. Brewer ticket sales had been sagging in recent years. The then-current ballpark, County
Stadium, was 40 years old, and other Milwaukee professional sports teams, the Bucks and the Admirals,
had the brand-new Bradley Center to call home. Market research showed the city wanted a new park to
keep both major league baseball and the Milwaukee Brewers in town, fearing losing them would cause
baseball dollars to go elsewhere. Other financial and political justifications included indications by major
area employers that they needed the stadium to help recruit employees to Milwaukee, asserting that
investments of this sort create a vibrant, growing community as opposed to a city that dies a slow death.
The organizations involved demonstrated the capacity to undertake the project. The HCH Miller
Park Joint Venture comprised three major construction companies that brought a good mix of strengths
and related experience, including recent stadium construction, to the project. Their discussions began
about a year prior to funding approval and they had worked out which firm would ultimately lead the
project and how the project management and engineering supervision would be divided among them.
Although no formal documentation could be found, the Miller Park project demonstrated good
project quality management during all phases of its life cycle. The project utilized the necessary processes
to ensure that it satisfied all the deliverables which it undertook. It can be assumed that the Miller Park
Joint Venture included the appropriate processes within the project management discipline that determine
quality policy, objectives, and responsibilities, and that they were implemented by means of quality planning,
quality control, quality assurance, and quality improvement. Project quality management must address
both the management of the project and the product of the project.
Although one might argue that the Miller Park project contained poor quality management practices
because of the ‘‘Big Blue Crane’’ incident of 1999, it needs to be noted that the crane operating company,
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, used poor risk mitigation planning and operated their crane in severe weather
conditions. Moreover, because the architectural design of Miller Park was complex to integrate, it can be
assumed that the Miller Park Joint Venture and its subcontractors utilized standard construction guidelines
and enforced Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requirements.
The Miller Park Joint Venture was comprised of three construction firms that were given the
authority to subcontract work to supporting firms. Given this authority, the companies that comprised the
Miller Park Joint Venture were able to partner with subcontractors and implement quality management
plans that detailed the procedures and processes that made certain the City of Milwaukee would receive
a quality stadium. The schedule that needed to be achieved to have the stadium ready for opening day
2000 was clearly defined within their expectations.
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Furthermore, the Miller Park Joint Venture was able to produce an MOU that was developed by
the City of Milwaukee, the District, and the Brewers. In addition, the MOU represented a legal understanding
of the cost all parties involved with the Miller Park project were obligated to support.
Although the MOU was perceived to be a formal contract by many parties involved with the project,
it really represented only a component of quality planning. The MOU, focused on delivering the stadium
to the public and the Brewers, specified what all parties wanted, when the project would be complete, and
what the forecasted budget would be. Because the Miller Park Joint Venture consistently reported its project
status to the public and reported the completion of major milestones, it can be assumed that the Miller
Park Joint Venture instituted the appropriate quality control measures to report the project’s progress and
mitigate quality insufficiencies.
Over 5,000 workers contributed to the successful completion of Miller Park, a feat that could not
have been accomplished without effective teamwork. The majority of funding for the park required cultural
and business diversity among the contractors, subcontractors, and workers. A tight schedule, new building
designs and techniques, and the need to work through brutal Wisconsin winters fostered the need for a
structured team-building and teamwork environment.
The three lead contractors for this project had each worked with the others on other projects in
the past. They had not all worked together on one project, but based on their previous working relationships,
had all moved past Tuckman’s (1965 and 1977) ‘‘forming’’ and ‘‘storming’’ stages of team development.
They needed to ‘‘norm’’ to this project, and moving on to the ‘‘performing’’ stage was a natural and quick
evolution. Also helping move this team forward were the regular discussions and meetings that they had
regarding this project for the year prior to formally creating their joint venture.
Communications planning generally takes place behind the scenes, yet is of vital importance,
particularly on a large construction project, such as the Miller Stadium project. Many people are concerned
with their piece of the project, and are unable to see the big picture (Foti, 2001). The project manager
must communicate sufficiently to make sure that each stakeholder is aware of the status of the project,
and when his or her contribution is required.
In the inception phase, there was a significant amount of public relations-type communication
needed. Although the project team used media specialists and lobbyists to handle the public relations
work, many of the citizens were not supportive of the project at taxpayer expense. So, one may question
the effectiveness of the communication strategy in this phase.
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Assessment and Analysis

1. Please complete your evaluation of project management during this phase, using the following grid:
Rating Scale: 5–Excellent, 4–Very Good, 3–Good, 2–Poor, 1–Very Poor.
Project Management Area Inception Phase

Scope Management
Time Management
Cost Management
Quality Management
Human Resource Management
Communications Management
Risk Management
Procurement Management
Integration Management
2. Please highlight the major areas of strength in the management of this phase of the project:
3. Please highlight the major opportunities for improvement in the management of this phase of the project:
The Development Phase
Scope development appeared to proceed without contention as there were no major scope changes
related to the construction of the stadium save those caused by the crane accident in 1999 during implemen-
tation that pushed back the completion date almost a full year. The accident is not considered a part of
scope development because changes to the project stemming from the accident are under the purview of
contracts and risk.
As the start date of the project was approaching, the state legislature passed a plan to build a
US$250 million stadium. However, cost estimates rose to US$322 million before construction even began
due to site preparation costs of US$72 million being omitted. To restore the price tag to the original
estimate, the builders then cut costs and pushed the opening date back from 1999 to 2000. As the costs
and funding sources were identified, mechanisms were designed to procure those funds. However, there
seemed to be ongoing contention among stakeholders as to what constituted costs in the original budget.
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The cause of the cost squabbles was blamed on the MOU, which was never intended to be a summary of
all project costs. For example, the following is a quote from the Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau:
The total budgeted cost for a new stadium included in a memorandum of understanding
(MOU) signed by representatives of the State, Milwaukee County, the City of Milwaukee,
and the Brewers before enactment of Act 56 is $322 million: $250 million for stadium
construction, and $72 million for infrastructure improvements. Although the provisions of
Act 56 were based on the MOU, the District believes that it is an inappropriate benchmark
because it is a generally worded, out-of-date document. Nevertheless, because the District’s
current stadium project budget includes amounts similar to those included in the MOU—
$249.5 million for stadium construction and $71.9 million for infrastructure improvements—
the District asserts the project is within its established budget.
The District has, however, budgeted additional amounts for leased equipment and opera-
tions, management, and administration. Although the District asserts the budget included
in the MOU was never intended to cover these costs, many of them are directly associated
with stadium construction and infrastructure improvements. When the costs for which the
District has budgeted separately and costs associated with issuing revenue bonds are taken
into account, a total of $397.6 million will be spent, including $303.3 million for stadium
construction, $82.5 million for infrastructure improvements, and $11.8 million for the Dis-
trict’s day-to-day operating costs.
One assumption on the Miller Park project scheduling related to the roof. The roof is one of a kind and it
opens radially. It helps shield the crowd and the batters from the sun, as well as helps keep the stadium
warm in cold weather. Because it’s one of a kind, the risk was great for the length of time it would take
to construct. The lead-time to get the roof parts was seven to eight months. This became a factor when
one part of the roof folded in half and needed to be replaced. There was no time to wait seven to eight
months for a replacement, so an alternate source was identified in the United States to make the roof with
lesser quality materials in four months.
Perhaps the Miller Park Joint Venture’s biggest downfall was its pursuit of establishing an end date
for the project that focused solely on accommodating opening day for the Brewers in 2000. Their blind
pursuit of meeting the end date significantly hampered their leverage of incorporating the proper facets
of a formal contract agreement during the project’s development phase.
For example, incorporating procurement risk mitigation plans to manage the uncontrolled escala-
tion of the project’s cost would have been beneficial. The contract manager overseeing the project’s contracts
could have conducted trade-off analysis against the risks associated with the project’s escalation in cost.
Knowing that the costs associated with the stadium project were growing, the contract manager could have
utilized cost-benefit analysis to recommend what items were detrimental to the project’s incorporation;
hence, dropping deliverables that were nonvalue-added to complete. Not having these measures in place
allowed the project to grow nearly US$76 million or 23% in cost, which significantly contradicted the cost
figures that were outlined and bought-off in association with the project’s memorandum of understanding.
There is evidence that extensive risk management was performed during the development stage
including the establishment of a site safety team to develop, implement, and enforce safety programs. This
was a four-member team with 60 years of construction and safety experience that wrote an extensive site
safety manual that all contractors and workers were obligated to comply with if they did not have their
own ‘‘safety-team approved’’ manual. There were regular weekly safety meetings held prior to breaking
ground (Hunzinger Construction Company, 1999). These meetings were to evolve into weekly ‘‘toolbox
talks’’ once construction began with all workers required to attend.
The property and accident risks were identified and analyzed. To mitigate these risks, the stadium
board secured US$325 million in property damage insurance policies, coordinated through the Milwaukee
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offices of the Chubb group of insurance companies. For a US$400 million project, this was termed to be
adequate by the board chairman. The Milwaukee Brewers realized their risk exposure and further insured
themselves from losses due to a delayed opening of the stadium. This policy was for US$20 million.
During the development phase of the Miller Park project, there was a letdown in the quality
control measures that the project management team supporting the project should have identified and
implemented. Clearly, the project team was focused on its completion date and had structured its quality
control measures to report the progress of the project in terms of its progress to completion date. However,
the project team forgot to measure financial attributes pertaining to the project’s scope and deliverables
that coincided with its scheduled completion dates. Implementing a quality control auditing system that
measured both financial and schedule progress would have prevented some problems that arose during
the implementation phase that were concerned with the overall financial escalation of the project.
It would have been interesting to know if the Miller Park Joint Venture had implemented earned
value during the development phase, but no information could be found. Implementing earned value to
support the project would have provided the proper quality control and audit structure to know if the
project was being completed within its forecasted schedule and budget; and it would have supported the
financial understanding of the project’s cost that public representatives were looking for from the Miller
Park Joint Venture.
Weekly ‘‘toolbox talks’’ provided evidence that the management team was concerned with creating
a cooperative environment conducive to team building during the development phase. These weekly talks
were a carry-over from meetings initiated by the lead contractors during the inception phase and were
organized to get and keep all workers and contractors informed of their roles and responsibilities, especially
as these roles and responsibilities changed throughout the project.
There were thousands of stakeholders to communicate with, the most notable being city and
county taxpayers, city, county, and state governments, the Miller Brewing Company, the many construction
companies and workers that participated, the Milwaukee Brewers’ owners, the Southeast Wisconsin Profes-
sional Baseball District, various subcontractors who handled the lights, sound, and furnishings inside the
park, and the media.
Although there was no evidence of the development of a communications plan, one was likely
developed in this phase due to the apparent success of workers knowing when to show up. One of the
largest communications tasks was communicating with the thousands of workers who were needed to
perform the project work. Keeping the many contractors, subcontractors, and other players in the stadium’s
construction in the loop on the schedule and what exactly they were being asked to do was a significant
task. There was success in the area of human resources knowing where to be and when to perform their
work on the stadium project.
By virtue of the fact that three construction companies formed a joint venture to build Miller
Stadium, they were able to apply their combined experience in the planning and implementation, and use
the best practices among them. They also had the benefit of their combined years of experience and past
projects for a variety of lessons learned.
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Project Management Area Development Phase

Scope Management
Time Management
Cost Management
Quality Management
Risk Management
The Implementation Phase
Until the crane accident, the project was on schedule and progressing according to plan. An
argument had been levied that there may have been some scope pressure that translated into schedule
pressure that caused the construction accident to occur. However, no specific information to support this
claim has been found from either public or private sources.
Cost control during implementation had mixed results. As was previously mentioned, there was
contention surrounding what costs should or should not have been included in the original budget. Also,
there were cost overruns not related to the stadium accident. With the rise in cost came a commensurate
rise in funding source requirements. This escalation triggered problems of ownership rights and responsibili-
ties. This scenario was not anticipated or planned for, as noted earlier.
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The project team did take some measures to control the costs as they were escalating by exercising
an option to cap project cost (Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau, 1999). This option awarded the contractor
25% of the cost savings if the project was completed for less than the contract maximum price. However,
this was not considered an effective cost containment measure because the option was not exercised until
75% of the work had been contracted. Its effectiveness as a cost control measure was negligible.
The groundbreaking for the Miller Park stadium took place on November 9, 1996. The goal was
to open the stadium in time for the opening game of the 2000 baseball season.
The biggest impact to the schedule, if not the most notable, was the crane accident on 14 July
1999, that killed three and injured five workers. There were accusations that the cause of the accident was
due to the rush to complete the stadium on time while sacrificing safety. Work on the stadium was suspended
and the accident took months to clean up.
The weather in Milwaukee can be extreme: hot in the summer and below zero in the winter, with
snow and frozen ground the norm. Milwaukee’s climate was considered in the orientation of the stadium,
as well as in the design of the field’s irrigation system.
The field construction was supposed to start in September or early October. Due to schedule delays,
it did not start until 4 December 1996. Brossard said, ‘‘No one has ever installed a field in the winter,
myself included. There were many times we took two steps forward and one step back. When you get 14
inches of snow while you’re in the middle of putting in drain tile, you suddenly become snow removal
experts for a few days. We used a machine called ditch witch to put in drain tile. It has a chain on it and
it digs the ditch. By the beginning of December the frost line was about 14 to 16 inches down. We had to
come in with a bulldozer with a frost tooth first. We had to let him dig down and loosen up the soil so we
could come with the ditch witch and lay the drain tile.’’ (Midwest Construction. A modern field).
Additional accommodations had to be made to complete the playing field in the winter. After the
drainage system was installed, clay was installed on the infield. Because clay has a high moisture content,
it was impossible to work with it in the freezing weather. A 45-foot high, 25,600 square foot (2,378 m2)
inflatable dome tent was erected over the entire infield to warm the clay enough to install.
The nature of the project meant that workers would be high off the ground at times, on scaffolding,
ladders, or cranes. Weather was a safety consideration, particularly the wind. Hunt Construction Company
had 30 years of experience building sports facilities, which meant that they had the benefit of many projects
before this one to learn lessons from. ‘‘Safety Programs’’ is listed as one of the construction phase services
on the Hunt Construction Group Web site, yet Miller Park Joint Venture and multiple subcontractors were
issued citations and fined for alleged workplace safety violations (not related to the fatal crane accident)
during the Miller Park construction. Prior to the fatal crane accident in July 1999, several workers were
injured when a steel girder being lowered into position collided with an aerial basket, and a worker fell 60
ft (18 m) from the retractable roof and sustained multiple injuries.
The playing field had to be the final item on the construction agenda. The roof work was a
mandatory dependency (predecessor) that needed to be complete before the fieldwork could begin. The
significant delay due to the crane accident pushed the installation of the playing field to the winter months.
The turf superintendent planned an infield that included 5,000 tons of sand, five and two-thirds miles of
drainage pipe under the field, about a half-mile of irrigation pipe, pea gravel, and athletic turf.
During the implementation phase of the Miller Park project, one of the state representatives called
for an audit to be conducted on the costs associated with implementing the stadium. The audit revealed
that the project was more than US$50 million over budget. The state representatives posed a legitimate
question: ‘‘Clearly the stadium is going to be built, there’s no question about that, but where do the
taxpayers go for an answer?’’ Because the MOU issued in 1995 defined that the Brewers were responsible
for providing only US$90 million of the project’s financing, were taxpayers going to cover the project’s cost
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overruns? No documentation existed within the contracts governing the project other than what had been
drafted in the MOU.
Although the provisions of Act 56 were based on the MOU, the District believes that it is an
inappropriate benchmark because it is a generally worded, out-of-date document. Neverthe-
less, because the District’s current stadium project budget includes amounts similar to those
included in the MOU—US$249.5 million for stadium construction, and US$71.9 million for
infrastructure improvements—the District asserts the project is within its established budget.
What the District failed to account for were lease costs associated with the project that escalated
the cost an additional US$76 million. One significant item that was leased was Miller Park’s scoreboard.
Establishing the proper risk mitigation tools into the project’s contractual infrastructure during the develop-
ment phase of the project would have definitely benefited the circumstances that came into fruition
when the audit was conducted on the Miller Park project during the implementation phase. The lack of
coordination between communicating the cost overruns associated with the project directly reflect on the
contract manager’s ability to communicate the variances from the MOU and what was actually being
expended. The project manager overseeing the project should have been communicating this information
as well, via schedule and cost control analysis. Working together, the contract manager and project manager
could have been able to make the necessary recommendations to limit cost overruns and improve the
contracts to support required changes. Instead, the project’s cost grew and was paid for by the public.
The risk picture changed, however, during implementation. Most notable of those that led to the
change were the events that preceded the collapse of a 567-foot crane on 14 July 1999. Ten weeks before
the incident, the site safety coordinator for the project quit both the project and his position as field safety
director with his construction company, citing that he was given inadequate authority to carry out his
safety responsibilities. In addition, iron workers were threatening to stay home—a clear violation of the
union’s ‘‘no walk-out or strike’’ agreement for this project—until an official who helped supervise the roof
lifts was removed. Other workers were quitting the project and one subcontractor was fired only days prior
to the accident for being unwilling to make the lift during high winds. It was also noted after the accident
that the crane had been extended from 467 ft (142 m) to 567 ft (173 m) two weeks prior to the accident
without any additional ballast added to offset the additional boom.
On the day of the accident, the subcontractor doing the lifting did not ensure the crane operators
were present for pre-lift meetings, something of no surprise given the lack of enforced mandatory ‘‘toolbox
talk’’ meeting attendance. It was also revealed there were no lift calculations made for the ill-fated lift to
assess the effect of the 26-mph winds blowing just prior to the lift.
To the credit of the project managers, there were few accidents prior to the crane incident, the
most significant of which involved a worker who survived a 60-foot fall on May 10, 1999. Also, the operator
of the crane that collapsed had 47 years of experience with cranes, and 15 years of experience with the
crane that toppled. Unfortunately, however, the crane operator carrying the three men who were killed
was far less experienced.
The project managers reacted effectively by agreeing to bring in outside consulting services to
assess the status of the project and monitor the work being performed. They also re-phased the construction
of the project to keep workers idled by the accident from moving on to other jobs. Also agreed to were
the insurance companies’ demands for more authority to be given to the project’s safety officers as well
as insurance company oversight of all future project safety issues.
As early as 1997, the Miller Park Joint Venture knew that the Miller Park project was severely over
budget. The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel reported on 13 November 1997, that ‘‘Miller Park, the Milwaukee
Brewer’s new stadium, will cost nearly US$398 million, almost US$76 million more than originally agreed
upon, a new state audit released Wednesday concludes’’ (Walker, 1997). To ensure the project’s costs were
being properly reported to the public, a state representative had called the audit.
13
The Miller Park Joint Venture and the District supporting and monitoring the stadium’s build
progress maintained that the audit left out information and that the budget for the project was being met.
Although the ability to effectively implement a solid contract structure was not evident in the
audit’s findings, the Miller Park Joint Venture could have alleviated numerous problems by committing to
improved tracking of the project’s costs with enhanced quality control measures that examined cost and
schedule. Unbelievably, even after the 1997 audit, everyone involved with the project, including the state
representative, did not demand cost elements to be monitored or reported by the Miller Park Joint Venture.
Therefore, the focus remained on implementing the schedule to meet its expected completion date of
opening day 2000.
Ironically, it should be considered that the Miller Park Joint Venture maintained good quality
planning and control standards through the implementation phase because they were meeting their custom-
er’s needs in terms of schedule completion. Ultimately, the implementation of Miller Park would cost
US$562.7 million, all of which, with the exception of US$90 million would be paid by taxpayers. From a
credibility standpoint, the companies implementing the project should have been reporting these costs
even though their customer turned a blind eye on the costs being expended.
During the implementation phase of this project, there was a growing sense of fragmentation among
team members, mostly a result of the mounting tension created from being asked to meet unreasonable and
perceived unsafe deadlines to keep the project on track. In one sense, there was an ironic sense of teamwork
resulting from the iron workers’ growing concern for safety, yet being contractually barred from any type
of work slowdown or walkout. The resulting frustration led some workers to resign the project and/or the
company they worked for.
Once the crane accident occurred, the project managers were being held to greater safety standards,
which helped reunite workers and management. The managers also made serious efforts to rephase the
project to minimize the possibility of losing workers to other jobs due to construction delays. This helped
to bolster morale and team spirit that held through the completion of the project, which was a year later
than originally planned.
There were many formal reports required for the use of taxpayer funds. Additionally, there were
reports required for the U.S. Department of Labor and other governmental oversight agencies. Evidence
of governmental audits indicates that the project manager was supplying project reports as needed.
What was questionable was the regular status reporting that should have been provided to a large
percentage of the project’s stakeholders regarding whether the project was on track schedule- and cost-
wise. If schedule and cost variances were being measured, they weren’t distributed widely, and there did
not appear to be any corrective action taken. Given the serious schedule and cost problems, consistent
corrective action beginning early in the project might have prevented some of the cost and schedule overruns.
The project managers did not do a good job of communicating in other areas, such as contract
structure and cost responsibilities. There was a lack of details communicated to the people who needed
the information.
The focus on the end date seemed to rob other areas of attention. The lack of communication
caused concern among the workers, and some quit. On a positive note, there were the weekly ‘‘Toolbox
Talk’’ meetings for the workers. Unfortunately, although they were mandatory, attendance wasn’t monitored.
There should have been a better forum for worker feedback to management.
Given the serious problems encountered in this project, one wonders why the project management
office didn’t intervene with consultative advice, or why this office didn’t insist on regular schedule and
cost variance reports, and suggest corrective action.
14

Project Management Area Implementation Phase

Scope Management
Time Management
Cost Management
Quality Management
Risk Management
The Closeout Phase
The closeout of scope was fairly well managed. The follow-up audit conducted by the State of
Wisconsin in June 1999 is devoid of any language that would indicate remaining contention regarding the
scope of the project. Additionally, little information could be located on this project at the state government’s
websites. It is peculiar that there would be so little information considering that the state was responsible
for oversight of the project. Possibly, the State chose to not make certain facts concerning scope pub-
licly available.
Although problems arose with the funding and ownership percentages, cost escalations, and bridge
financing for forthcoming insurance payments, it appears that these issues were managed and resolved
prior to the completion of the project. There is no specific mention of these items in the audit bureau’s
archives or lawsuits being filed following the last audit report. However, some subcontractors still had
financial claims following closeout.
There was an imposed date for the stadium completion date of 1 March 2000, to be ready for the
2000 baseball season. The time frame was tight, and there were expectations that corners would be cut,
15
including the possibility of eliminating the retractable roof (it wasn’t). In the end, schedule challenges such
as the delay due to the crane accident and winter weather conditions resulted in the stadium not being
ready until the season’s opening game in April 2001.
Lessons learned would include that planning to cut corners has the potential to cause more
problems than opportunities, and should be avoided. Certainly, there should not have been any compromise
on the safety of workers for any reason, including the schedule. Taking a chance on that windy day in July
1999 cost the project loss of life, and serious losses of time and money.
Miller Park opened for the 2001 baseball season. Had it not been for the tragic crane accident, it
is likely that the stadium would have been completed as originally scheduled in 2000. Two important
occurrences should have taken place during the project closeout phase: First, the Miller Park Joint Venture
should have closed out and paid all its contractual obligations to subcontractors. Second, the Miller Park
Joint Venture should have documented its lessons learned. The primary lesson learned should have been
that the proper detailed planning to support the project’s scope should have been done and carried over
into the project’s contractual infrastructure. This project team had important challenges in handling the
contractual aspects of this project.
The most significant evidence that risk closeout functions were performed involves the proposal
of the ‘‘Safe Building Act’’ in Wisconsin by the two unions involved in the project—Local 8 and Operating
Engineers Local 139. This act addresses the OSHA and American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
standards shortcomings for the on-site erection process and operation of cranes, specifically the lack of
certification or licensure by these organizations to operate a construction crane. This, of course is a direct
outcome of the lessons learned from the crane accident. The irony cited includes the need to be licensed
to cut hair or serve liquor in Wisconsin, or, to drive a car to a Wisconsin job site, yet once there, no
qualification is given to rig or lift 450 tons of steel 300 ft (91 m) into the air.
In addition, there were lessons learned from OSHA and insurance company reports from the
accident, as well as the incident being filed with construction and crane accident tracking organizations
such as CraneAccidents.com.
The contractors leading this project were allowed considerable cost overruns because their customer
was more focused on the schedule pertaining to Miller Park’s completion date. In due course, it could be
considered that the District supporting the Miller Park project was not concerned with the project’s cost.
The inception and development phases contained the quality parameters expected by the Miller Park Joint
Venture’s customers. They may have performed better if they had included control features that monitored
the projects costs. The implementation phase of the Miller Park project demonstrated the lack of connection
of instilling the proper quality infrastructure in relation to monitoring of the project’s schedule and cost.
This became evident when a financial audit was conducted on the project in 1997 and it revealed cost
overruns of nearly US$76 million. The contractors managing the project could have had the foresight to
begin reporting costs to their customers.
In the closeout phase, the bottom line of completing the project by the replanned completion date
was successfully met. The customer could have requested the contractors to implement the appropriate
quality planning and control measures to accurately report the project’s schedule and completion statistics;
however, the Joint Venture’s customers never made such demands. There was no clear documentation of
the administrative closeout and the lessons learned from this project.
Relevant to Miller Park project’s closeout phase it should be considered that the project satisfied
the quality elements that had been governed from the Miller Park Joint Venture’s customers. Barring that
the project was delayed one year because of the tragic occurrence of the ‘‘Big Blue Crane’’ incident of
1999, the project was delivered within the specifications of its replan date and was ready for opening day
2001. Although the costs of the project grew wildly, the customers obtaining the stadium were focused
only on the project’s schedule and not on its costs.
16
There is minimal evidence suggesting how teamwork was managed during the closeout phase.
One gesture that does stand out is the creation of a tribute to all the workers involved in the project titled,
‘‘Worker’s Walkway.’’ It also memorializes those who lost their lives in the 14 July 1999, crane accident.
This tribute and memorial was not a direct result of the efforts of the project management team, but rather
donated to Miller Park by a charitable foundation organized by the attorneys who represented the widows
of the three workers who died.
The Big Blue Crane case involving the death of the three ironworkers was settled. Separately, the
Miller Park stadium district filed a lawsuit in January 2002 alleging that Mitsubishi Heavy Industries of
America (Mitsubishi) and HCH mismanaged the Miller Park project and were negligent in construction.
Mitsubishi countersued, arguing that it had to spend millions of dollars more to finish the roof (Walker,
2005). After a three-year legal battle, Mitsubishi and the stadium district reached an out-of-court settlement
on the costs to build and repair the stadium’s roof. Court documents unsealed in 2006 revealed that the
settlement between the stadium district and Mitsubishi was in the amount of US$44.95 million. The legal
fees and costs of the warring parties were US$37 million. The insurance company responsible for some of
the legal fees is contesting them claiming that there was little or no overview of how the money was spent
(Walker, 2006). Taxpayers are being assessed a 0.1% sales tax until 2014 (or beyond) to pay for the stadium.

Project Management Area Closeout Phase

Scope Management
Time Management
Cost Management
Quality Management
Risk Management
17
Summary of Project Assessment and Analysis

1. Please complete your evaluation of project management for this project and calculate the average rating,
using the following grid:
Project Management Area Inception Development Implementation Closeout Average

Phase Phase Phase Phase
Scope Management
Time Management
Cost Management
Quality Management
Human Resource
Management
Communications
Management
Risk Management
Average
2. Please highlight the major areas of strength in the management of this project:
3. Please highlight the major opportunities for improvement in the management of this project:
4. Please highlight the major project management lessons learned from this project:
18
References
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krtbn/0000-0234-MW-INSURERS.asp
Lamke, Kenneth R. (1999, October 14). Stadium board’s Miller Park cost: $562.7 million. Milwaukee Journal
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080347.htm1
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20000112.htm1
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19
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fatal crane collapse, Milwaukee, OSHA Regional News Release. Retrieved on 30 October 2001 from http://
www.osha.gov/media/oshnews/jan00/reg520000112a.html
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story/index.aspx?id⳱290119
Walker, Don. (2006, March 4). Legal fees in Miller Park case go through the roof: Attorneys spent $37 million in
battle, one estimate shows. Milwaukee Journal Sentinel Online. Retrieved on 27 April 2006 from http://
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20

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Project Management Institute

Case Studies in Project Management

Miller Park Stadium Project

Miller Park Stadium Project

Miller Park Stadium Project

The Inception Phase

● Develop the statement of work, specifications, and work breakdown structure;

● Performing a make/buy process;

● Laying out the major milestones and the timing/schedule;

● Obtaining authorization and approval to proceed.

Assessment and Analysis

Rating Scale: 5–Excellent, 4–Very Good, 3–Good, 2–Poor, 1–Very Poor.

Project Management Area Inception Phase

The Development Phase

Assessment and Analysis

Rating Scale: 5–Excellent, 4–Very Good, 3–Good, 2–Poor, 1–Very Poor.

Project Management Area Development Phase

The Implementation Phase

Assessment and Analysis

Rating Scale: 5–Excellent, 4–Very Good, 3–Good, 2–Poor, 1–Very Poor.

Project Management Area Implementation Phase

The Closeout Phase

Assessment and Analysis

Rating Scale: 5–Excellent, 4–Very Good, 3–Good, 2–Poor, 1–Very Poor.

Project Management Area Closeout Phase

Summary of Project Assessment and Analysis

Rating Scale: 5–Excellent, 4–Very Good, 3–Good, 2–Poor, 1–Very Poor.

Project Management Area Inception Development Implementation Closeout Average

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