Republic of the Philippines well as any complaint for or against you.

Come
SUPREME COURT or write to him in his town, Echague, Isabela.
Manila He offers free consultation, and is willing
to help and serve the poor.)
EN BANC
The respondent further admits that he is the author of
March 23, 1929 a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home
municipality written in Ilocano, which letter, in
In re LUIS B. TAGORDA, translation, reads as follows:

Duran & Lim for respondent.
Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose
for the Government.
MALCOLM, J.:
The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney
and a member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits
that previous to the last general elections he made use
of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano, which, in
translation, reads as follows:
LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela
(NOTE. — As notary public, he can execute for
you a deed of sale for the purchase of land
as required by the cadastral office; can renew
lost documents of your animals; can make your
application and final requisites for your
homestead; and can execute any kind of
affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help you
collect your loans although long overdue, as
ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928
MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform
you of the approaching date for our induction
into office as member of the Provincial Board,
that is on the 16th of next month. Before my
induction into office I should be very glad
to hear your suggestions or recommendations
for the good of the province in general and
for your barrio in particular. You can come
to my house at any time here in Echague, to
submit to me any kind of suggestion or
recommendation as you may desire.
I also inform you that despite my membership
in the Board I will have my residence here
in Echague. I will attend the session of the
Board of Ilagan, but will come back home on
the following day here in Echague to live and
serve with you as a lawyer and notary public.
Despite my election as member of the
Provincial Board, I will exercise my legal
profession as a lawyer and notary public. In
case you cannot see me at home on any week
day, I assure you that you can always find
me there on every Sunday. I also inform you
that I will receive any work regarding
preparations of documents of contract of
sales and affidavits to be sworn to before
me as notary public even on Sundays.
I would like you all to be informed of this
matter for the reason that some people are
in the belief that my residence as member of
the Board will be in Ilagan and that I would
then be disqualified to exercise my
profession as lawyer and as notary public.
Such is not the case and I would make it clear
that I am free to exercise my profession as
formerly and that I will have my residence
here in Echague.
I would request you kind favor to transmit
this information to your barrio people in any
of your meetings or social gatherings so that
they may be informed of my desire to live and
to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer
and notary public. If the people in your
locality have not as yet contracted the
services of other lawyers in connection with
the registration of their land titles, I would
be willing to handle the work in court and
would charge only three pesos for every
registration.
Yours respectfully,
(Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public.
The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write
down the applicable legal provisions. Section 21 of the
Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related
to disbarments of members of the bar. In 1919 at the
instigation of the Philippine Bar Association, said
codal section was amended by Act No. 2828 by adding at
the end thereof the following: "The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice."
The statute as amended conforms in principle to the
Canons of Professionals Ethics adopted by the American
Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar
Association in 1917. Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of
Ethics provide:
27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. — The most worthy
and effective advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot
be forced, but must be the outcome of character and
conduct. The publication or circulation of ordinary
simple business cards, being a matter of personal taste
or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is
not per se improper. But solicitation of business by
circulars or advertisements, or by personal
communications or interview not warranted by personal
relations, is unprofessional. It is equally
unprofessional to procure business by indirection
through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate
firms or trust companies advertising to secure the
drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in
exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be
influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for
business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments
concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude
of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's
position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the
traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and
are intolerable.
28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS.
— It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice
to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of
blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so.
Stirring up strife and litigation is not only
unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It
is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other
causes of action and inform thereof in order to the
employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by seeking
out those with claims for personal injuries or those
having any other grounds of action in order to secure
them as clients, or to employ agents or runners for like
purposes, or to pay or reward directly or indirectly,
those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases
to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or
prison officials, physicians, hospital attaches or
others who may succeed, under the guise of giving
disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the
criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or
others, to seek his professional services. A duty to
the public and to the profession devolves upon every
member of the bar having knowledge of such practices
upon the part of any practitioner immediately to inform
thereof to the end that the offender may be disbarred.
Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up
suits and quarrels between individuals was a crime at
the common law, and one of the penalties for this offense
when committed by an attorney was disbarment. Statutes
intended to reach the same evil have been provided in
a number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of
the bar itself, and have been upheld as constitutional.
The reason behind statutes of this type is not difficult
to discover. The law is a profession and not a business.
The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself
or through others for to do so would be unprofessional.
(State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas.,
625; People vs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2
R. C. L., 1097.)
It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms
the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers.
It is destructive of the honor of a great profession.
It lowers the standards of that profession. It works
against the confidence of the community in the integrity
of the members of the bar. It results in needless
litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise
peacefully inclined citizens.
The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground
for disbarment or suspension. That should be distinctly
understood.
Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics
to the admitted facts, the respondent stands convicted
of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and
those canons. Accordingly, the only remaining duty of
the court is to fix upon the action which should here
be taken. The provincial fiscal of Isabela, with whom
joined the representative of the Attorney-General in
the oral presentation of the case, suggests that the
respondent be only reprimanded. We think that our action
should go further than this if only to reflect our
attitude toward cases of this character of which
unfortunately the respondent's is only one. The
commission of offenses of this nature would amply
justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as
mitigating, circumstances working in favor of the
respondent there are, first, his intimation that he was
unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth
and inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise
not to commit a similar mistake in the future. A modest
period of suspension would seem to fit the case of the
erring attorney. But it should be distinctly understood
that this result is reached in view of the considerations
which have influenced the court to the relatively
lenient in this particular instance and should,
therefore, not be taken as indicating that future
convictions of practice of this kind will not be dealt
with by disbarment.

In view of all the circumstances of this case, the

judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B.
Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice
as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month from
April 1, 1929,

Street, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J., reserves his vote.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency
of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case
No. MDD-1)
R E S O L U T I O N
CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed
practicing attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in
Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon)
recommending to the Court the removal of the name of
the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn
refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since
the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President
Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the
Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to
paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of
the IBP, which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the
following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into
the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and
take whatever action it shall deem appropriate,
including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the
removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll
of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent
by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary
of the Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent
to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above;
he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976,
reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due
from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President
and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's
comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976.
After the hearing, the parties were required to submit
memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The
matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the
respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety
and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent,
however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court
139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 —
in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was
integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section
24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend
to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's
name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section
24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the
authority of the Court to issue the order applied for
is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to
the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in
the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default in such payment for one year shall be a ground
for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of
membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the
Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized
an official national body to be known as the 'Integrated
Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose
names now appear or may hereafter be included in the
Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the
following words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated
Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors
shall determine with the approval of the Supreme
Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above
provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional
rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a
pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in
good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this
compelled financial support of the said organization
to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he
is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court
Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal
force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of
the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys,
contending that the said matter is not among the
justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather
of an "administrative nature pertaining to an
administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached
the Court relating to constitutional issues that
inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface
whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of
law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke
the license granted for the exercise of the legal
profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues
raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled
"Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the
Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The
Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that
case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the
Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973.
The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that
it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing
conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm.
Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the
mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report
of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the
integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly
constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture
of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which
every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
associations organized by individual lawyers
themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which
every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to
do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar
as well as obliged to bear his portion of its
responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction
of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national
body of which all lawyers are required to be members.
They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed
for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement
of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective
discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to
a code of professional ethics or professional
responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient
reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper
cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously
dictated by overriding considerations of public
interest and public welfare to such an extent as more
than constitutionally and legally justifies the
restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal
interests and personal convenience of individual
lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all
legislation directing the integration of the Bar have
been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid
exercise of the police power over an important
profession. The practice of law is not a vested right
but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with
public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties
not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes
part in one of the most important functions of the State
— the administration of justice — as an officer of the
court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public
interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to
a degree of control for the common good, to the extent
of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme
Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the
expression "affected with a public interest" is the
equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police
power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No.
6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of
court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar
under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so
in the exercise of the paramount police power of the
State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of
the legal profession, improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress
in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the
integration of the Bar through its Resolution
promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of
the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the
IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree
No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental
considerations of public welfare and motivated by a
desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may
interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property
and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected
to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus,
31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi
est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law.
To this fundamental principle of government the rights
of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing
without which life is a misery, but liberty should not
be made to prevail over authority because then society
win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil.
726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain
some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals
from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the
constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in
the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of
precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of
Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines,
which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
pro. procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this
Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect
the integration of the Philippine Bar under such
conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even
without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and
looking solely to the language of the provision of the
Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that
this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court
with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission
to and supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal
profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the
said profession, which affect the society at large, were
(and are) subject to the power of the body politic to
require him to conform to such regulations as might be
established by the proper authorities for the common
good, even to the extent of interfering with some of
his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to
such reasonable interference and regulation, he should
not have clothed the public with an interest in his
concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must
already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however,
we now concisely deal with them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that
the Court is without power to compel him to become a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence,
Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it
impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to
associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To
compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar
is not violative of his constitutional freedom to
associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group
of which he is not already a member. He became a member
of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All
that integration actually does is to provide an official
national organization for the well-defined but
unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer
is a ready a member. 8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate
with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse
to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the
State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality
of professional legal services, may require that the
cost of improving the profession in this fashion be
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program — the lawyers.9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense
compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar,
such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police
power of the State. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the
provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a
membership fee is void. We see nothing in the
Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section
5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent
acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged
class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee
toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the
profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent
that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure,
designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives
and purposes of integration. 11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement
of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation
of property without due process and hence infringes on
one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice
of law is a property right, in the sense of its being
one that entitles the holder of a license to practice
a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length,
as it clear that under the police power of the State,
and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to
perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to
practise law before the courts of this country should
be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry.
And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory
measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce
its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether
by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is
not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such
must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court
to exact compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from
its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that
the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and
supervision have been and are indisputably recognized
as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities,
and the authorities holding such are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which
the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a
disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment
ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act
of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct
and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon
constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which
is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate,
indeed necessary, to the proper administration of
justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power
which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting
from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature
of the duty. It has limitations no less real because
they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in
judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly
where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave
responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination
to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable
profession and to protect the public from overreaching
and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a
guaranty that the power will not be misused or
prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our
1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the
Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice ... and the admission to the practice of law
and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5)
the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent
to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed
undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule
of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines complained of are neither
unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous
sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon
should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is
hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of
the Court.
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Republic of the Philippines
Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and SUPREME COURT
Guerrero, JJ., concur. Manila

EN BANC

Resolution March 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar

of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.

Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and

Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for
respondent.

DIOKNO, J.:

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused

so much public interest and concern as Republic Act No.
972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953."
Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar,
"in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar)
may be deemed to have passed his examinations
successfully, he must have obtained a general average
of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below
50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules
of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying
difficulties of the different bar examinations held
since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with
which the examination papers were graded, this court
passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had
obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per
cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in
1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to
75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law
as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and
feeling conscious of having been discriminated against
(See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful
candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage
lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress
for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No.
12 which, among others, reduced the passing general
average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective
since 1946. The President requested the views of this
court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven
members of the court subscribed to and submitted written
comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the
President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto.
Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying
substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill.
Although the members of this court reiterated their
unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed
the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his
signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in
an election year, reads in full as follows:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS
FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING
NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section
fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred twenty-seven of the
Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general
average of seventy per cent in any bar examinations after
July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to the
August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations;
seventy-one per cent in the nineteen hundred and
fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in the
in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations;
seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred and
fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in
the nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar examinations
without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per
cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member
of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That for the
purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a
fraction, shall be considered as one and included as
part of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of
seventy-five per cent in any subject in any bar
examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and
forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in such subject
or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included
in computing the passing general average that said
candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that
he may take.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive
approval.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar 1951 2,068 879 196
candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar
1952 2,738 1,033 426
invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for
the revision of their examination papers were still 1953 2,555 968 284
pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168
ground for admission. There are also others who have
sought simply the reconsideration of their grades Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in
without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed either
injustice to individual petitioners, the court first motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said
reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective Republic Act, or mere motions for reconsideration.
of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise (2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates
their grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, are to be benefited by section 2 of said Republic Act.
it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if These candidates had each taken from two to five
declared valid, should be applied equally to all different examinations, but failed to obtain a passing
concerned whether they have filed petitions or not. A average in any of them. Consolidating, however, their
complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, highest grades in different subjects in previous
affected by this decision, as well as a more detailed examinations, with their latest marks, they would be
account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are sufficient to reach the passing average as provided for
appended to this decision as Annexes I and II. And to by Republic Act No. 972.
realize more readily the effects of the law, the
following statistical data are set forth: (3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by
this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which only
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33
benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No. 972 total who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually presented
1,168, classified as follows: motions for reconsideration which were denied, while
125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953,
1946 (August) 206 121 18 had presented similar motions, which are still pending
1946 (November) 477 228 43 because they could be favorably affected by Republic
Act No. 972, — although as has been already stated, this
1947 749 340 0 tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their
1948 899 409 11 grades
1949 1,218 532 164
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
1950 1,316 893 26
Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching
effects on the practice of the legal profession and the
administration of justice, and because some doubts have
been expressed as to its validity, the court set the
hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission
on the sole question of whether or not Republic Act No.
972 is constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the study of this question
by the brilliant assistance of the members of the bar
who have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the
various aspects in which the question may be gleaned.
The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia,
Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura
Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law, and
of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor
General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando,
Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del
Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and
Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from the memoranda of
counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H.
de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton,
and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema
themselves, has greatly helped us in this task. The legal
researchers of the court have exhausted almost all
Philippine and American jurisprudence on the matter.
The question has been the object of intense deliberation
for a long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the
voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was
assigned to a new member in order to place it as humanly
as possible above all suspicion of prejudice or
partiality.
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to
its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and
inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of the
Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author
Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing
grade is the tremendous handicap which students during
the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has
to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading
materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of
students who took up law soon after the liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from
1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is claimed that
in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality
total 1,094), because they suffered from "insufficiency
of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of
preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public
interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who
confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice
of the profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal
in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest
demands of legal profession adequate preparation and
efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved
by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal
preparation is one of the vital requisites for the
practice of law that should be developed constantly and
maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted
the protection of property, life, honor and civil
liberties. To approve officially of those inadequately
prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a
delicate mission is to create a serious social danger.
Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency
of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There
were abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone
in mimeographed copies were made available to the public
during those years and private enterprises had also
published them in monthly magazines and annual digests.
The Official Gazette had been published continuously.
Books and magazines published abroad have entered
without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some
even with revised and enlarged editions have been
printed locally during those periods. A new set of
Philippine Reports began to be published since 1946,
which continued to be supplemented by the addition of
new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is
valid, it has to be enforced.
The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or
from the point of view of applicable principles, but
the resolution of the question would have been easier
had an identical case of similar background been picked
out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there
any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history,
from which has been directly derived the judicial system
established here with its lofty ideals by the Congress
of the United States, and which we have preserved and
attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous judicial
history of more than half a century? From the citations
of those defending the law, we can not find a case in
which the validity of a similar law had been sustained,
while those against its validity cite, among others,
the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon
(State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061),
of Guariña (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of
the President which is expressed in his vote of the
original bill and which the postponement of the
contested law respects.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar
laws in other countries had been promulgated, the
judiciary immediately declared them without force or
effect. It is not within our power to offer a precedent
to uphold the disputed law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined
carefully the case that has been cited to us as a
favorable precedent of the law — that of Cooper (22 NY,
81), where the Court of Appeals of New York revoked the
decision of the Supreme court of that State, denying
the petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice
of law under the provisions of a statute concerning the
school of law of Columbia College promulgated on April
7, 1860, which was declared by the Court of Appeals to
be consistent with the Constitution of the state of New
York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that
time provided:
They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office
of public trust. All votes for either of them for any
elective office except that of the Court of Appeals,
given by the Legislature or the people, shall be void.
They shall not exercise any power of appointment to
public office. Any male citizen of the age of twenty-one
years, of good moral character, and who possesses the
requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall
be entitled to admission to practice in all the courts
of this State. (p. 93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the
constitutional precept is as follows:
Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the
power of appointing them had previously rested with the
judges, and this was the principal appointing power
which they possessed. The convention was evidently
dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had
been exercised, and with the restrictions which the
judges had imposed upon admission to practice before
them. The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was
aimed directly at this power, and the insertion of the
provision" expecting the admission of attorneys, in this
particular section of the Constitution, evidently arose
from its connection with the object of this prohibitory
clause. There is nothing indicative of confidence in
the courts or of a disposition to preserve any portion
of their power over this subject, unless the Supreme
Court is right in the inference it draws from the use
of the word `admission' in the action referred to. It
is urged that the admission spoken of must be by the
court; that to admit means to grant leave, and that the
power of granting necessarily implies the power of
refusing, and of course the right of determining whether
the applicant possesses the requisite qualifications
to entitle him to admission.
These positions may all be conceded, without affecting
the validity of the act. (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the
decision seems to indicate that it provided that the
possession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia
College conferring the degree of Bachelor of Laws was
evidence of the legal qualifications that the
constitution required of applicants for admission to
the Bar. The decision does not however quote the text
of the law, which we cannot find in any public or
accessible private library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent
with the Constitution of New York, the Court of Appeals
said of the object of the law:
The motive for passing the act in question is apparent.
Columbia College being an institution of established
reputation, and having a law department under the charge
of able professors, the students in which department
were not only subjected to a formal examination by the
law committee of the institution, but to a certain
definite period of study before being entitled to a
diploma of being graduates, the Legislature evidently,
and no doubt justly, considered this examination,
together with the preliminary study required by the act,
as fully equivalent as a test of legal requirements,
to the ordinary examination by the court; and as
rendering the latter examination, to which no definite
period of preliminary study was essential, unnecessary
and burdensome.
The act was obviously passed with reference to the
learning and ability of the applicant, and for the mere
purpose of substituting the examination by the law
committee of the college for that of the court. It could
have had no other object, and hence no greater scope
should be given to its provisions. We cannot suppose
that the Legislature designed entirely to dispense with
the plain and explicit requirements of the Constitution;
and the act contains nothing whatever to indicate an
intention that the authorities of the college should
inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students
before granting a diploma. The only rational
interpretation of which the act admits is, that it was
intended to make the college diploma competent evidence
as to the legal attainments of the applicant, and nothing
else. To this extent alone it operates as a modification
of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in
connection with these statutes and with the Constitution
itself in order to determine the present condition of
the law on the subject. (p.89)
x x x x x x x x x
The Legislature has not taken from the court its
jurisdiction over the question of admission, that has
simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence in
certain cases upon that question. (p.93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the
case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearly seen.
Please note only the following distinctions:
(1) The law of New York does not require that any
candidate of Columbia College who failed in the bar
examinations be admitted to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very decision
of Cooper, has not taken from the court its jurisdiction
over the question of admission of attorney at law; in
effect, it does not decree the admission of any lawyer.
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that
of the Philippines are entirely different on the matter
of admission of the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved,
the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of
the profession and their supervision have been
disputably a judicial function and responsibility.
Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous
possession and exercise by the judicial power have been
demonstrated during more than six centuries, which
certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even
considering the power granted to Congress by our
Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to
the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition
that the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative
function, properly belonging to Congress, is
unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously
established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts,
whether past or present, affecting determinate
individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts
are governed by the rules and principles; in effect,
a judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes
more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if
previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these
same individuals are attempted to be revoked or
modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours
has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending,
disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the
practice of the profession is concededly judicial. A
comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter
had been undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932)
240 NW 441, in which the validity of a legislative
enactment providing that Cannon be permitted to practice
before the courts was discussed. From the text of this
decision we quote the following paragraphs:
This statute presents an assertion of legislative power
without parallel in the history of the English speaking
people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There
has been much uncertainty as to the extent of the power
of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate
qualifications of attorney at law has been expressly
committed to the courts, and the act of admission has
always been regarded as a judicial function. This act
purports to constitute Mr. Cannon an attorney at law,
and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of
legislative power. (p. 444)
Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested
in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In so
far as the prescribing of qualifications for admission
to the bar are legislative in character, the Legislature
is acting within its constitutional authority when it
sets up and prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)
But when the Legislature has prescribed those
qualifications which in its judgment will serve the
purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the
power of the court to impose other and further exactions
and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)
Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative
departments are distinct, independent, and coordinate
branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all
the powers of sovereignty which properly belongs to its
department. Neither department should so act as to
embarrass the other in the discharge of its respective
functions. That was the scheme and thought of the people
setting upon the form of government under which we exist.
State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex
rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)
The judicial department of government is responsible
for the plane upon which the administration of justice
is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is
exclusive. By committing a portion of the powers of
sovereignty to the judicial department of our state
government, under 42a scheme which it was supposed
rendered it immune from embarrassment or interference
by any other department of government, the courts cannot
escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers
of sovereignty thus committed to the judicial department
are exercised. (p. 445)
The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and
intimate relationship. The bar is an attache of the
courts. The quality of justice dispense by the courts
depends in no small degree upon the integrity of its
bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and
reproach to the administration of justice and bring the
courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)
Through all time courts have exercised a direct and
severe supervision over their bars, at least in the
English speaking countries. (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends
thus:
Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more
than six centuries prior to the adoption of our
Constitution, the courts of England, concededly
subordinate to Parliament since the Revolution of 1688,
had exercise the right of determining who should be
admitted to the practice of law, which, as was said in
Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases
235, "constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the
courts and judicial power be regarded as an entity, the
power to determine who should be admitted to practice
law is a constituent element of that entity. It may be
difficult to isolate that element and say with assurance
that it is either a part of the inherent power of the
court, or an essential element of the judicial power
exercised by the court, but that it is a power belonging
to the judicial entity and made of not only a sovereign
institution, but made of it a separate independent, and
coordinate branch of the government. They took this
institution along with the power traditionally exercise
to determine who should constitute its attorney at law.
There is no express provision in the Constitution which
indicates an intent that this traditional power of the
judicial department should in any manner be subject to
legislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought of
the framers of our constitution was to make the three
great departments of government separate and
independent of one another. The idea that the
Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by
prescribing inadequate qualifications for attorneys at
law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making
the judicial independent of the legislative department,
and such a purpose should not be inferred in the absence
of express constitutional provisions. While the
legislature may legislate with respect to the
qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely
to its general and unquestioned power to protect the
public interest. When it does legislate a fixing a
standard of qualifications required of attorneys at law
in order that public interests may be protected, such
qualifications do not constitute only a minimum standard
and limit the class from which the court must make its
selection. Such legislative qualifications do not
constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond which the
court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications
deemed necessary by the course of the proper
administration of judicial functions. There is no
legislative power to compel courts to admit to their
bars persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the
prerogatives of an attorney at law. (p. 450)
Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the
power of appointment. It is quite likely true that the
legislature may exercise the power of appointment when
it is in pursuance of a legislative functions. However,
the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power
to admit attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial
function. In all of the states, except New Jersey (In
re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our
investigation reveals, attorneys receive their formal
license to practice law by their admission as members
of the bar of the court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex
parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parteGarland,
4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall.
53, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115
P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43,
119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice having
been perpetually exercised by the courts, it having been
so generally held that the act of the court in admitting
an attorney to practice is the judgment of the court,
and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature
to confer such right upon any one being most exceedingly
uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an
attorney is and always has been a purely judicial
function, no matter where the power to determine the
qualifications may reside. (p. 451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the Senate
of that State, 180 NE 725, said:
It is indispensible to the administration of justice
and to interpretation of the laws that there be members
of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and
sound moral character. This arises from the need of
enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining
authority over the knavish, litigant. It is highly
important, also that the public be protected from
incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose
opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It was said by
Cardoz, C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242
N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851:
"Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with
conditions." One is admitted to the bar "for something
more than private gain." He becomes an "officer of the
court", and ,like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the end of justice. His cooperation
with the court is due "whenever justice would be
imperiled if cooperation was withheld." Without such
attorneys at law the judicial department of government
would be hampered in the performance of its duties. That
has been the history of attorneys under the common law,
both in this country and England. Admission to practice
as an attorney at law is almost without exception
conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that
end is filed in courts, as are other proceedings invoking
judicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and
made open and notorious by a decision of the court
entered upon its records. The establishment by the
Constitution of the judicial department conferred
authority necessary to the exercise of its powers as
a coordinate department of government. It is an inherent
power of such a department of government ultimately to
determine the qualifications of those to be admitted
to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work,
and to protect itself in this respect from the unfit,
those lacking in sufficient learning, and those not
possessing good moral character. Chief Justice Taney
stated succinctly and with finality in Ex parte Secombe,
19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled,
by the rules and practice of common-law courts, that
it rests exclusively with the court to determine who
is qualified to become one of its officers, as an
attorney and counselor, and for what cause he ought to
be removed." (p.727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed
a petition to secure license to practice the legal
profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54
NE 646), the court said in part:
In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed.
366, the court, holding the test oath for attorneys to
be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the
attorney's office as follows: "They are officers of the
court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of
their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair
private character. It has always been the general
practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an
examination of the parties. In this court the fact of
the admission of such officers in the highest court of
the states to which they, respectively, belong for,
three years preceding their application, is regarded
as sufficient evidence of the possession of the
requisite legal learning, and the statement of counsel
moving their admission sufficient evidence that their
private and professional character is fair. The order
of admission is the judgment of the court that the
parties possess the requisite qualifications as
attorneys and counselors, and are entitled to appear
as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the
parties become officers of the court, and are
responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold
their office during good behavior, and can only be
deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared
by the judgment of the court after opportunity to be
heard has been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, admission
or their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere
ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power,
and has been so held in numerous cases. It was so held
by the court of appeals of New York in the matter of
the application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22
N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and Counselors", said that court,
"are not only officers of the court, but officers whose
duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a
judicial nature; and hence their appointment may, with
propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter,
in performing his duty, may very justly considered as
engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial
functions." (pp. 650-651).
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent
portions:
Admission to practice of law is almost without exception
conceded everywhere to be the exercise of a judicial
function, and this opinion need not be burdened with
citations in this point. Admission to practice have also
been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers
of the court. — Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.
Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a
judicial function, and is an inherent power of the court.
— A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac.
1018; See Annotation on Power of Legislature respecting
admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction
between the functions of the judicial and legislative
departments of the government.
The distinction between the functions of the legislative
and the judicial departments is that it is the province
of the legislature to establish rules that shall
regulate and govern in matters of transactions occurring
subsequent to the legislative action, while the
judiciary determines rights and obligations with
reference to transactions that are past or conditions
that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial power,
and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to
alteration or change either by legislative action or
by judicial decree.
The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall
be invaded by either of the other departments of the
government. — 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the
action of the courts by requiring of them construction
of the law according to its own views, it is very plain
it cannot do so directly, by settling aside their
judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering
the discharge of offenders, or directing what particular
steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial
inquiry. — Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar
examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70
per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject,
be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed
law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment
revoking those promulgated by this Court during the
aforecited year affecting the bar candidates concerned;
and although this Court certainly can revoke these
judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no
less certain that only this Court, and not the
legislative nor executive department, that may be so.
Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would
be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case
with the law in question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the
power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule
promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission
to the practice of law, is no valid argument. Section
13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase
or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on
pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed
as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject
to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify
the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal,
alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure, and the admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines. — Constitution of
the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred
on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities
concerning the admission to the practice of law. the
primary power and responsibility which the Constitution
recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had
Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any
rule on the matter, it would have nothing over which
to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal,
alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court,
but the authority and responsibility over the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys
at law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme
Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the
rules does not signify nor permit that Congress
substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the
exercise of its primary power on the matter. The
Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may
admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys
at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the
practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify
or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if
according to its judgment the need for a better service
of the legal profession requires it. But this power does
not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit,
suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and
supervise the practice of the legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power
to promulgate and enforce rules for the admission to
the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal,
alter and supplement them may and should be exercised
with the respect that each owes to the other, giving
careful consideration to the responsibility which the
nature of each department requires. These powers have
existed together for centuries without diminution on
each part; the harmonious delimitation being found in
that the legislature may and should examine if the
existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to
the demands which public interest requires of a Bar
endowed with high virtues, culture, training and
responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal,
amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency
that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the
inherent responsibility for a good and efficient
administration of justice and the supervision of the
practice of the legal profession, should consider these
reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation of
the profession, and see to it that with these reforms
the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of
its traditional duty of admitting, suspending,
disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is realized.
They are powers which, exercise within their proper
constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather
complementary to each other in attaining the
establishment of a Bar that would respond to the
increasing and exacting necessities of the
administration of justice.
The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates
our criterion. Guariña took examination and failed by
a few points to obtain the general average. A recently
enacted law provided that one who had been appointed
to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice
of law without a previous examination. The Government
appointed Guariña and he discharged the duties of Fiscal
in a remote province. This tribunal refused to give his
license without previous examinations. The court said:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597,
the applicant in this case seeks admission to the bar,
without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground
that he holds the office of provincial fiscal for the
Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907,
is as follows:
Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered
One Hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act providing a
Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special
Proceedings in the Philippine Islands," is hereby
amended to read as follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and
orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of Spain
or of the United States and are in good and regular
standing as members of the bar of the Philippine Islands
at the time of the adoption of this code; Provided, That
any person who, prior to the passage of this act, or
at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the
authority of the United States, the position of justice
of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First
Instance, or judge or associate judge of the Court of
Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the
position of Attorney General, Solicitor General,
Assistant Attorney General, assistant attorney in the
office of the Attorney General, prosecuting attorney
for the City of Manila, city attorney of Manila,
assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal,
attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney
for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law
in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an
examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and
establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said
court.
The records of this court disclose that on a former
occasion this appellant took, and failed to pass the
prescribed examination. The report of the examining
board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he received an
average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of
legal learning upon which he was examined, thus falling
four points short of the required percentage of 75. We
would be delinquent in the performance of our duty to
the public and to the bar, if, in the face of this
affirmative indication of the deficiency of the
applicant in the required qualifications of learning
in the law at the time when he presented his former
application for admission to the bar, we should grant
him license to practice law in the courts of these
Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that
despite his failure to pass the examination on that
occasion, he now "possesses the necessary
qualifications of learning and ability."
But it is contented that under the provisions of the
above-cited statute the applicant is entitled as of
right to be admitted to the bar without taking the
prescribed examination "upon motion before the Supreme
Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has
held and now holds the office of provincial fiscal of
the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind
the object which the legislator apparently sought to
attain in enacting the above-cited amendment to the
earlier statute, and in view of the context generally
and especially of the fact that the amendment was
inserted as a proviso in that section of the original
Act which specifically provides for the admission of
certain candidates without examination. It is contented
that this mandatory construction is imperatively
required in order to give effect to the apparent
intention of the legislator, and to the candidate's
claim de jure to have the power exercised.
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of
the Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16 and
17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190,
the Court continued:
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this
court by the commission and confirmed to it by the Act
of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a
case such as that under consideration wholly destroyed,
by giving the word "may," as used in the above citation
from Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of
Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the power
conferred upon the commission is to that extent invalid
and void, as transcending its rightful limits and
authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who were
appointed to the positions enumerated, and with
particular emphasis in the case of Guariña, the Court
held:
In the various cases wherein applications for the
admission to the bar under the provisions of this statute
have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the
fact that such appointments had been made as
satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the
applicant. But in all of those cases we had reason to
believe that the applicants had been practicing
attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.
In the case under consideration, however, it
affirmatively appears that the applicant was not and
never had been practicing attorney in this or any other
jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment as
provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears
that he was deficient in the required qualifications
at the time when he last applied for admission to the
bar.
In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency
on that occasion, we do not think that his appointment
to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself
satisfactory proof if his possession of the necessary
qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude
therefore that this application for license to practice
in the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.
In view, however, of the fact that when he took the
examination he fell only four points short of the
necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice;
and in view also of the fact that since that time he
has held the responsible office of the governor of the
Province of Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of
such marked ability in the performance of the duties
of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent
and approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to
retain him in the Government service by appointing him
to the office of provincial fiscal, we think we would
be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act
No. 1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination
prescribed by general rule, provided he offers
satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special
examination which will be given him by a committee of
the court upon his application therefor, without
prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do, to present
himself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribed
by general rule. — (In re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to
grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress
on the matter is of permissive character, or as other
authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions
for the license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and
Cannon, has been found also to suffer from the fatal
defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has
intended to make a classification, it is arbitrary and
unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899
required of the Supreme Court, until December 31 of that
year, to grant license for the practice of law to those
students who began studying before November 4, 1897,
and had studied for two years and presented a diploma
issued by a school of law, or to those who had studied
in a law office and would pass an examination, or to
those who had studied for three years if they commenced
their studies after the aforementioned date. The Supreme
Court declared that this law was unconstitutional being,
among others, a class legislation. The Court said:
This is an application to this court for admission to
the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas from law
schools issued to the applicants. The act of the general
assembly passed in 1899, under which the application
is made, is entitled "An act to amend section 1 of an
act entitled "An act to revise the law in relation to
attorneys and counselors," approved March 28, 1884, in
force July 1, 1874." The amendment, so far as it appears
in the enacting clause, consists in the addition to the
section of the following: "And every application for
a license who shall comply with the rules of the supreme
court in regard to admission to the bar in force at the
time such applicant commend the study of law, either
in a law or office or a law school or college, shall
be granted a license under this act notwithstanding any
subsequent changes in said rules". — In re Day et al,
54 N.Y., p. 646.
. . . After said provision there is a double proviso,
one branch of which is that up to December 31, 1899,
this court shall grant a license of admittance to the
bar to the holder of every diploma regularly issued by
any law school regularly organized under the laws of
this state, whose regular course of law studies is two
years, and requiring an attendance by the student of
at least 36 weeks in each of such years, and showing
that the student began the study of law prior to November
4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs of good
moral character. The other branch of the proviso is that
any student who has studied law for two years in a law
office, or part of such time in a law office, "and part
in the aforesaid law school," and whose course of study
began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon
a satisfactory examination by the examining board in
the branches now required by the rules of this court.
If the right to admission exists at all, it is by virtue
of the proviso, which, it is claimed, confers
substantial rights and privileges upon the persons named
therein, and establishes rules of legislative creation
for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)
Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it
is clearly a special legislation, prohibited by the
constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature
had any right to admit attorneys to practice in the
courts and take part in the administration of justice,
and could prescribe the character of evidence which
should be received by the court as conclusive of the
requisite learning and ability of persons to practice
law, it could only be done by a general law, persons
or classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right
to practice law is a privilege, and a license for that
purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and
confers upon him the right to appear for litigants, to
argue causes, and to collect fees therefor, and creates
certain exemptions, such as from jury services and
arrest on civil process while attending court. The law
conferring such privileges must be general in its
operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing an
enactment for that purpose, may classify persons so long
as the law establishing classes in general, and has some
reasonable relation to the end sought. There must be
some difference which furnishes a reasonable basis for
different one, having no just relation to the subject
of the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147
Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98,
40 N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17
Sup. Ct. 255.
The length of time a physician has practiced, and the
skill acquired by experience, may furnish a basis for
classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E.
881); but the place where such physician has resided
and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis,
and is an arbitrary discrimination, making an enactment
based upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113,
18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to say
what shall serve as a test of fitness for the profession
of the law, and plainly, any classification must have
some reference to learning, character, or ability to
engage in such practice. The proviso is limited, first,
to a class of persons who began the study of law prior
to November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided into two
classes — First, those presenting diplomas issued by
any law school of this state before December 31, 1899;
and, second, those who studied law for the period of
two years in a law office, or part of the time in a law
school and part in a law office, who are to be admitted
upon examination in the subjects specified in the
present rules of this court, and as to this latter
subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for making
application for admission. As to both classes, the
conditions of the rules are dispensed with, and as
between the two different conditions and limits of time
are fixed. No course of study is prescribed for the law
school, but a diploma granted upon the completion of
any sort of course its managers may prescribe is made
all-sufficient. Can there be anything with relation to
the qualifications or fitness of persons to practice
law resting upon the mere date of November 4, 1897, which
will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not.
Those who began the study of law November 4th could
qualify themselves to practice in two years as well as
those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in the
proviso need spend only two years in study, while those
who commenced the next day must spend three years,
although they would complete two years before the time
limit. The one who commenced on the 3rd. If possessed
of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination
before December 31, 1899, and without any prescribed
course of study, while as to the other the prescribed
course must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly
useless. Such classification cannot rest upon any
natural reason, or bear any just relation to the subject
sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is for the
sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain
defined persons. (pp. 647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon,
240 N.W. 441, where the legislature attempted by law
to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court
also held with regards to its aspect of being a class
legislation:
But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it
be granted that the legislature has power to prescribe
ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which
courts must admit and license those applying as
attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in
the manner here attempted. That power must be exercised
through general laws which will apply to all alike and
accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right
of the Legislature to exact qualifications of those
desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field
in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114,
121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is
undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United
States to follow any lawful calling, business or
profession he may choose, subject only to such
restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like
age, sex, and condition." This right may in many respects
be considered as a distinguishing feature of our
republican institutions. Here all vocations are all open
to every one on like conditions. All may be pursued as
sources of livelihood, some requiring years of study
and great learning for their successful prosecution.
The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the "estate"
acquired in them — that is, the right to continue their
prosecution — is often of great value to the possessors
and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more than
their real or personal property can be thus taken. It
is fundamental under our system of government that all
similarly situated and possessing equal qualifications
shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes
regulating the practice of medicine, requiring
medications to establish the possession on the part of
the application of his proper qualifications before he
may be licensed to practice, have been challenged, and
courts have seriously considered whether the exemption
from such examinations of those practicing in the state
at the time of the enactment of the law rendered such
law unconstitutional because of infringement upon this
general principle. State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N.C. 643,
28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs.
Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom,
122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.
This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer
upon him the right to practice law and to constitute
him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of
legislative grace or favor. It is not material that he
had once established his right to practice law and that
one time he possessed the requisite learning and other
qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact
in no matter affect the power of the Legislature to
select from the great body of the public an individual
upon whom it would confer its favors.
A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424)
commanded the Supreme Court to admit to the practice
of law without examination, all who had served in the
military or naval forces of the United States during
the World War and received a honorable discharge
therefrom and who (were disabled therein or thereby
within the purview of the Act of Congress approved June
7th, 1924, known as "World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and
whose disability is rated at least ten per cent
thereunder at the time of the passage of this Act." This
Act was held |unconstitutional on the ground that it
clearly violated the quality clauses of the constitution
of that state. In re Application of George W. Humphrey,
178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179.
A good summary of a classification constitutionally
acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as
follows:
The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the
authorities that a classification to be valid must rest
upon material differences between the person included
in it and those excluded and, furthermore, must be based
upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes
avoided the constitutional prohibition, must be founded
upon pertinent and real differences, as distinguished
from irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore, any law
that is made applicable to one class of citizens only
must be based on some substantial difference between
the situation of that class and other individuals to
which it does not apply and must rest on some reason
on which it can be defended. In other words, there must
be such a difference between the situation and
circumstances of all the members of the class and the
situation and circumstances of all other members of the
state in relation to the subjects of the discriminatory
legislation as presents a just and natural cause for
the difference made in their liabilities and burdens
and in their rights and privileges. A law is not general
because it operates on all within a clause unless there
is a substantial reason why it is made to operate on
that class only, and not generally on all. (12 Am. Jur.
pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a
grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have obtained
a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar
examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952,
71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per
cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted
to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office
as members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules
require a minimum general average of 75 per cent, which
has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any
motive of the nature indicated by the abovementioned
authorities, for this classification ? If there is none,
and none has been given, then the classification is
fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941
or the years before, with the general average indicated,
were not included because the Tribunal has no record
of the unsuccessful candidates of those years. This fact
does not justify the unexplained classification of
unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952,
1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who
failed before said years under the same conditions
justified. The fact that this Court has no record of
examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no one
concerned may prove by some other means his right to
an equal consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared
unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it
is argued that it is curative, and that in such form
it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to
cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which
the Tribunal permitted admission to the bar of
candidates who did not obtain the general average of
75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent;
in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more; in
1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950
to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which was
considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent
as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of circumstances
deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes
in the passing averages during those years were all that
could be objected to or criticized. Now, it is desired
to undo what had been done — cancel the license that
was issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed
75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly
does not propose to do so. Concededly, it approves what
has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented
is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained
by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as
sufficient to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it
is the lack of will or defect of judgment of the Court
that is being cured, and to complete the cure of this
infirmity, the effectivity of the disputed law is being
extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing
each year the general average by one per cent, with the
order that said candidates be admitted to the Bar. This
purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof
that what the law attempts to amend and correct are not
the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the
Court, by means of simply taking its place. This is doing
directly what the Tribunal should have done during those
years according to the judgment of Congress. In other
words, the power exercised was not to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was
done was to stop or suspend them. And this power is not
included in what the Constitution has granted to
Congress, because it falls within the power to apply
the rules. This power corresponds to the judiciary, to
which such duty been confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing
of examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave
defect of this system is that it does not take into
account that the laws and jurisprudence are not
stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his
certificate, it may happen that the existing laws and
jurisprudence are already different, seriously
affecting in this manner his usefulness. The system that
the said law prescribes was used in the first bar
examinations of this country, but was abandoned for this
and other disadvantages. In this case, however, the
fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in
the title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to
1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent
system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to
Section 21 (1), article VI of the Constitution, which
vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because
it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that
its nullity affect the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds:
first, because they are not within the legislative
powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded
its powers; second, because they create or establish
arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles; and third, because their purposes or effects
violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As
has already been seen, the contested law suffers from
these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare
that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and
therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for
the following reasons, to wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810
candidates who failed in the bar examinations of
1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly
inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly
found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees
the admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving
this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they
are at present already prepared to become members of
the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something
contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is
a manifest encroachment on the constitutional
responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the
resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810
candidates, without having examined their respective
examination papers, and although it is admitted that
this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time
for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other
may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it
directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its
legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the
rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or
amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to
regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should
tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and
this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum
norms towards that end in the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar,
inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily
performance of judicial functions and is essential to
a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the
primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court
to render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted
and may continue in the practice of law according to
existing rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification
of candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to facts
which are of general knowledge and does not justify the
admission to the Bar of law students inadequately
prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary.
It is undoubtedly a class legislation.
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced
in the title of the law, contrary to what the
Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the
provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that
part of article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953
to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns
the examinations in those years, shall continue in
force.
R E S O L U T I O N
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing
and availing of the magnificent and impassioned
discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice
at the opening and close of the debate among the members
of the Court, and after hearing the judicious
observations of two of our beloved colleagues who since
the beginning have announced their decision not to take
part in voting, we, the eight members of the Court who
subscribed to this decision have voted and resolved,
and have decided for the Court, and under the authority
of the same:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act
No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952,
and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional
and, therefore, void and without force and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices,
that part of article 1 which refers to the examinations
subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953
to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be
in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII
of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of
the candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946
to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates
who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general
average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade
below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as
having passed, whether they have filed petitions for
admission or not. After this decision has become final, Number of candidates who failed 121
they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on Number of those affected by 18
the date or dates that the chief Justice may set. So Republic Act No. 972
ordered. Percentage of success (per 41.62
cent)
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla,
and Reyes, JJ., concur. Percentage of failure (per 58.74
cent)
Passing grade (per 72
cent)
ANNEX I November, 1946
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972 Board of Examiners: The same as that of August, 1946,
except Hon. Jose Teodoro who was substituted by Atty.
A resume‚ of pertinent facts concerning the bar Honesto K. Bausan.
examinations of 1946 to 1953 inclusive follows: Number of candidates 481

August, 19461 Number of candidates whose grades 19

were raised
Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman,
Prof. Gerardo Florendo, Atty. Bernardino Guerrero, (72 per cent and above 73 per cent
Atty. Joaquin Ramirez, Atty. Crispin Oben, Hon. Jose ---
Teodoro, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Jose Perez Minutes of March 31, 1947)
Cardenas, and Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, members. Number of candidates who passed 249
Number of candidates 206
Number of candidates who failed 228
Number of candidates whose grades 12
were raised Number of those affected by 43
Republic Act No. 972
73'S 6
Percentage of success (per 52.20
72'S 6 cent)
Percentage of failure (per 47.80
Number of candidates who passed 85 cent)
Passing grade (per 72
 (By resolution of the cent) cent and 68.1 per cent respectively, the Court found
Court). out that they were not benefited at all by the bonus
October, 1947 of 12 points given by the Examiner in Civil Law.
Board of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Chairman, August, 1948
Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty. Antonio Araneta, Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano R. Montemayor,
Atty. Simon Cruz, Hon. Sixto de la Costa, Atty. Celso Chairman Hon. Luis P. Torres, Hon. Felipe Natividad,
B. Jamora, Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Federico Agrava, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Sr., Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty.
Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Members. Macario Peralta, Sr., Hon. Jesus G. Barrera, Hon.
Number of candidates 749 Rafael Amparo, Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Members.
Number of candidates 899
Number of candidates whose grades 43
were raised Number of candidates whose grades 64
70.55 per cent with 2 1 were raised
subject below 50 per cent 71's 29
69 per cent 40
70's 35
68 per cent 2
Number of candidates who passed 490
Number of candidates who passed 409
Number of candidates who failed 409
Number of candidates who failed 340
Number of those affected by 11
Number of those affected by 972 Republic Act No. 972
Republic Act No. 972 Percentage of success (per 62.40
Percentage of success (per 54.59 cent)
cent) Percentage of failure (per 37.60
Percentage of failure (per 45.41 cent)
cent) Passing grade (per 70
Passing grade (per 69 cent)
cent) (by resolution of the Court).
(by resolution of the Court). August, 1949
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman,
Note.--In passing the 2 whose grades were 68.95 per Hon. Fernando Jugo, Hon. Enrique Filamor, Atty.
Salvador Araneta, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. recommendation and authority
Federico Agrava, Hon. Mariano H. de Joya, Hon. Felipe of the examiner in Remedial Law, Atty. Francisco
Natividad, Atty. Emeterio Barcelon, Members. Delgado).
Number of candidates 1,218 Number of candidates who passed 432

Number of candidates whose grades 55 Number of candidates who failed 894

were raised (74's)
Number of those affected by 26
Number of candidates who passed 686
Republic Act No. 972
Number of candidates who failed 532 Percentage of success (per 32.14
cent)
Number of those affected by 164
Percentage of failure (per 67.86
Republic Act No. 972
cent)
Percentage of success (per 56.28
Passing grade (per 75
cent)
cent)
Percentage of failure (per 43.72
August, 1951
cent)
Board of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo,
Passing grade (per 74
Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Enrique
cent)
Altavas, Hon. Manuel Lim, Hon. Felipe Natividad,
(by resolution of the Court). Hon. Vicente Albert, Atty. Arturo Alafriz, Hon.
August, 1950 Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Members.
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo,2 Chairman, Number of candidates 2,068
Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty. Enrique Altavas,
Atty. Marcial P. Lichauco, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Number of candidates whose grades 112
Atty. J. Antonio Araneta, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, were raised (74's)
Hon. Francisco A. Delgado, Hon. Antonio Horrilleno, Number of candidates who passed 1,189
Members.
Number of candidates who failed 879
Number of candidates 1,316
Number of those affected by 196
Number of candidates whose grades 38
Republic Act No. 972
were raised
Percentage of success (per 57.49
(The grade of 74 was raised to 75 per cent by
cent)
Percentage of failure (per 42.51 Members.
cent) Number of candidates 2,555
Passing grade (per 75
cent) Number of candidates whose grades 100
were raised (74's)
August, 1952
Number of candidates who passed 1,570
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman,
Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Number of candidates who failed 986
Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty.
Emilio P. Virata, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Number of those affected by 284
Natividad, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Members. Republic Act No. 972
Number of candidates 2,738 Percentage of success (per 61.04
cent)
Number of candidates whose grades 163
were raised (74's) Percentage of failure (per 38.96
cent)
Number of candidates who passed 1,705
Passing grade (per 75
Number of candidates who failed 1,033 cent)

Number of those affected by 426 A list of petitioners for admission to the Bar under
Republic Act No. 972 Republic Act No. 972, grouped by the years in which they
Percentage of success (per 62.27 took the bar examinations, with annotations as to who
cent) had presented motions for reconsideration which were
denied (MRD), and who filed mere motions for
Percentage of failure (per 37.73
reconsideration without invoking said law, which are
cent)
still pending, follows:
Passing grade (per 75
cent) PETITIONER UNDER THE BAR FLUNKERS' LAW
August, 1953 Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Re
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman,
Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, MRD- 1. Agunod, Filemon 66 71 61 76 80 83 73
Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr., Hon. Emilio Peña, L.
Atty. Jose S. de la Cruz, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon.
Felipe Natividad, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, MRD- 2. Cunanan, Albino 76 72 74 75 70 70 65
MRD- 3. Mejia, Flaviano 64 64 65 68 83 74 19.
68 80 Bandon,
69.85 Alawadin 74 79 69 77 91 73 60
V. L.
1948 20. Baquero, 76 79 64 77 85 72 65
MRD- 4. Orlina, Soledad 71 68 66 75 63 75 70 88 Benjamin
69.9
R. 21. Blanco, Jose 75 75 70 75 77 76 60
MRD- 5. Vivero, Antonio 75 73 73 65 63 66 22.
65 80 Buenaluz,
69.95 75 71 72 78 67 82 60
Lu. Victoriano T.
MRD- 6. Gatchalian, 72 66 71 75 78 68 23.
65 50 Canda,
69.65 Benjamin 75 72 75 82 76 77 65
Salud S.
1949 24. Canon, Guillermo 77 86 67 88 75 69 70
7. Abaya, Jesus A. 69 79 75 75 71 89 25.
55 75 Carlos,
70.8 Estela S. 75 81 81 79 72 73 65
MRD- 8. Advincula, David 76 80 62 86 81 72 26.
60 65 Cerezo,
70.5 Gregorio 69 76 76 79 71 80 55
D. O.
9. Agraviador, 63 85 70 77 80 81 27.
65 80 Clarin,
71.8 Manuel L. 75 82 76 81 73 69 70
Alfredo L. 28. Claudo, Conrado 76 62 78 77 73 72 60
10. Alacar, Pascual 61 63 83 79 71 85 65 80 O.
72.05
C. 29. Condevillamar, 68 65 74 80 85 75 60
11. Amog, Pedro M. 75 66 76 78 81 74 55 85 Antonio
72.2 V.
12. Apolinario, 75 84 78 78 70 70 MRD-
60 75
30. Cornejo,
71.95 72 75 69 82 83 79 65
Miguel S. Crisanto R.
13. Aquino, Maximo G. 82 77 71 77 76 77 31.
60 75 Corona,
73.15 Olvido D. 68 76 73 81 81 72 60
14. Asinas, Candido 75 83 69 80 81 83 32.
55 85 Dizon,
72.65 Marcial C. 76 86 69 83 75 74 65
D. 33. Enriquez, 75 77 70 81 81 77 65
15. Baldivino, Jose 75 65 72 82 82 69 60 80 Agustin
71.95 P.
B. 34. Espiritu, Irineo 80 88 69 75 76 77 65
16. Balintona, 75 80 64 78 74 67 65 70 E.
70
Bernardo 35. Fernandez, 63 82 76 75 81 84 65
17. Banawa, Angel L. 78 70 70 75 81 83 60 60 Macario
72.3 J.
18. Bandala, 66 80 66 71 93 72 36.
55 70 Gallardo,
69.6 Amando 78 79 67 77 76 75 60
Anacleto A. C.
37. Garcia, 76 80 66 75 72 70 56.
60 75 Linao,
69.7 Mariano M. 66 84 76 78 80 75 60
Freidrich M. 57. Lopez, Angelo P. 67 81 75 72 79 81 55
38. Garcia, Julian L. 64 77 68 82 89 77 65
58. 75 72.15 Eliezar M. 77
Lopez, 75 60 75 77 85 60
39. Garcia, Leon Mo. 77 86 71 80 60 82 65
59. 75 71.85 Nicanor S. 72
Lopez, 71 70 78 77 84 60
40. Garcia, Pedro V. 76 82 73 81 74 83 60
60. 85 73.6
Manoleto, 72 70 65 78 81 90 60
41. Garcia, Santiago 62 91 79 75 72 75 65 80 Proceso
71.8 D.
C. 61. Mancao, Alfredo 67 64 71 83 76 76 65
42. Genoves, Pedro 75 83 70 78 87 76 55 80 P.
72.7
43. Gonzales, Amado 75 71 71 75 86 75 62.
60 75 Manera,
72.65 Mariano 75 78 75 75 68 79 60
P. A.
44. Guia, Odon R. de 77 76 66 81 74 76 63.
60 75 Mercado,
70.9 Arsenio 67 64 71 83 76 76 65
45. Fernandez, 62 68 71 80 74 90 65 75 N.
70.85
Simeon 64. Miranda, 76 81 67 82 74 77 65
46. Jakosalem, 82 83 73 82 61 87 65 70 Benjamin
73.6 G.
Filoteo 65. Manad, Andres B. 77 75 68 82 69 72 65
47. Jesus, Felipe D. 75 83 67 79 78 85 1948
60 75 72.45
de 66. Orosco, Casimiro 72 84 69 81 70 82 65
48. Jocom, Jacobo M. 77 77 74 77 74 64 55 85 P.
70.65
49. Juares, Nicolas 77 84 56 76 73 82 67.
60 85 Padua,
70 Manuel C. 76 76 68 80 79 79 50
50. Kalalang, 65 75 74 80 70 70 68.
65 85 Palang,
70.3 Basilio 71 75 82 71 55 87 55
Remigio S.
51. Layumas, Vicente 67 84 65 75 89 66 69.
60 80 Palma,
70.3 Cuadrato 62 75 69 93 80 79 55
L. 70. Pañganiban, Jose 67 83 61 81 91 74 60
52. Leyson, Amancio 69 83 75 76 81 75 65 75 V.
73.15
F. 71. Pareja, Felipe 66 71 75 81 67 74 60
53. Libanan, 71 83 61 77 80 81 65
72. 85 71.75
Patalinjug, 73 77 78 73 78 71 55
Marcelino Eriberto
54. Lim, Jose E. 77 77 72 76 72 64 65
73. 70 71.15 Jose C. 66
Paulin, 69 71 77 83 82 65
55. Lim, Jose F. 70 75 62 83 80 71 65
74. 80 70.4 Serafin C. 72
Pido, 78 63 80 71 85 70
75. Pimentel, Luis P. 77 75 76 81 76 68 92.
55 80 Torres,
71.6 Ariston 78 71 72 81 61 84 55
76. Plantilla, 72 78 68 89 79 81 65 85 L.
73.55
Rodrigo C. 93. Veyra, Zosimo C. 70 75 71 79 65 80 65
77. Regalario, 72 80 64 80 75 81 55 80 de
69.55
Benito B. 94. Viado, Jose 67 70 74 75 75 90 55
78. Robis, Casto P. 62 77 74 73 68 80 95.
70 80 Villacarlos,
70.9 73 87 71 82 69 70 75
79. Rodil, Francisco 68 69 70 81 76 75 65 75 Delfin
70.75 A.
C. 96. Villamil, Leonor 73 81 76 86 86 73 55
80. Rodriguez, 80 75 69 80 72 80 65 80 S.
73.35
Mariano I. 97. Zabala, Amando A. 76 70 67 75 76 76 60
81. Romero, Crispulo 78 75 66 77 76 83 1950
65 75 72.85
P. MRD-98. Cruz, Filomeno de 70 71 78 81 76 72 64
82. Saez, Porfirio D. 75 75 72 81 69 77 60 75 la
71
83. Saliguma, 79 79 74 78 69 65 99.
65 70 Española,
71.8 Pablo 71 78 55 76 85 69 65
Crisogono D. S.
84. Samano, 75 84 72 77 70 82 100.
60 75 Foronda,
71.9 60 78 68 79 84 88 62
Fortunato A. Clarencio J.
85. Santos, Faustina 71 68 68 76 75 85 101.
55 75 Hechanova,
69.5 59 76 75 75 69 68 75
C. Vicente
86. Santos, Josefina 68 69 76 71 77 82 MRD-102.
65 75 Peñalosa,
72.3 Osias 80 78 61 76 61 77 66
R. R.
87. Seludo, Ananias 75 80 69 79 77 82 103.
65 75 Sarmiento,
73.25 Floro 65 86 63 82 89 72 60
G. A.
88. Semilia, Rafael 68 85 55 83 89 79 MRD-104.
65 80 Torre,
71.25 Catalino 75 85 68 78 69 67 65
I. P.
89. Telan, Gaudencio 77 79 70 75 70 75 105.
60 75 Ungson,
70.85 Fernando 61 87 75 70 57 85 83
90. Tesorero, 75 71 63 75 82 62 65 63 S.
69.65
Leocadio T. 1951
91. Torre, Valentin 85 81 71 76 69 65 106.
55 70 Abasolo,
70.4 Romulo 77 70 64 65 76 70 76
S. de la 107. Adeva, Daniel G. 75 59 74 65 69 51 78
108. Aguilar, Vicente 73 63 68 75 70 69 MRD-126.
75 75 Calimlim,
71.25 Jose B. 64 73 73 80 73 57 75
Z. 127. Calimlim, Pedro 66 82 69 60 69 52 83
109. Amodia, Juan T. 75 76 66 75 76 60 77 76 B.
72.35
MRD-110. Añosa, Pablo S. 76 78 63 75 74 61 128.
75 79 Camello,
71.6 Sotero 70 77 63 65 75 66 84
111. Antiola, 68 76 75 70 71 70 81 66 H.
73.05
Anastacio R. 129. Campos, Juan A. 71 88 70 75 64 69 71
112. Aquino, S. Rey A. 70 71 71 60 74 62 130.
76 77 Castillo,
71.1 78 78 70 60 79 67 69
113. Atienza, Manuel 71 78 68 80 86 51 82 75 Antonio
73.85 del
G. MRD-131. Castillo, 75 61 72 75 74 71 67
114. Avanceña, 71 71 65 75 70 72 78 80 Dominador
71.8 Ad.
Alfonso MRD-132. Castro, Jesus B. 72 86 72 75 65 75 76
MRD-115. Balacuit, Camilo 75 73 75 70 72 65 133.
75 76 Casuga,
73.25 75 72 72 70 69 61 75
N. Bienvenido B.
116. Barinaga, 68 69 73 70 74 50 134.
80 79 Cabangbang,
71.2 77 67 61 80 73 59 83
Jeremias L. Santiago B.
MRD-117. Barrientos, 76 60 67 55 74 63 135.
77 62 Cruz,
70.25Federico S. 69 74 75 75 68 65 76
Ambrosio D. 136. Dacanay, Eufemio 70 73 62 75 72 69 85
MRD-118. Benitez, Tomas P. 67 75 75 60 73 72 75 78 P.
72.2
119. Biason, Sixto F. 73 82 67 65 66 72 137.
77 68 Deysolong,
71.25 66 62 72 75 70 62 83
MRD-120. Briñas, Isagani 71 69 74 70 76 52 79 72 Felisberto
71.95
A. MRD-138. Dimaano, Jr., 78 79 63 75 73 75 81
121. Buela, Arcadio P. 72 77 61 70 71 58 79 71 Jose
69.75N.
122. Cabilao, 73 50 75 75 75 60 139.
71 79 Espinosa,
71.25 78 63 58 70 70 67 87
Leonardo S. Domingo L.
123. Cabrera, Ireneo 75 66 70 65 72 81 MRD-140.
70 79 Farol,
72.4 Evencia C. 80 78 66 75 81 72 62
M. 141. Felix, Conrado S. 71 71 75 65 70 58 75
124. Cacacho, Emilio 142. Fernan, Pablo L. 67 88 66 85 73 68 78
V. 143. Gandioco, 64 58 66 65 76 70 89
125. Calilung, 64 73 73 80 73 57 75 59 Salvador
69.65 G.
Soledad C.
144. Gastardo, 70 69 68 75 78 66 86 72 Priscilla
73.9
Crispin B. 160. Machachor, Oscar 68 59 78 70 67 57 75
145. Genson, Angelo B. 75 57 73 65 67 54 78 56 Magsino,
MRD-161. 69.55 77 66 70 70 76 71 75
146. Guiani, Guinald 68 60 75 65 74 67 75 77 Encarnacion
71.5
M. MRD-162. Maligaya, 70 61 75 65 75 50 91
147. Guina, Graciano 66 69 67 60 78 52 83 61 Demetrio
69.6 M.
P. 163. Manio, Gregorio 67 67 69 80 71 67 75
MRD-148. Homeres, 74 74 75 75 71 69 75
164. 71 73.35 Eduardo S. 72
Puzon, 82 60 60 69 70 68
Praxedes P.
MRD-165. Marcial, 66 75 74 70 75 67 81
149. Ibarra, Venancio 60 75 74 70 74 70 80 75 Meynardo
71.9 R.
M.
166. Martin, Benjamin 68 72 63 75 69 63 84
150. Imperial, Monico 72 78 75 75 72 56 82 77 73.7
S.
L.
MRD-167. Monterroyo, 70 80 75 80 76 66 82
MRD-151. Ibasco, Jr., 71 70 63 85 71 60 85 53 Catalina
70.85 S.
Emiliano M.
MRD-168. Montero, 73 67 66 80 81 65 81
152. Inandan, 77 77 67 53 73 75 79 57 Leodegario
72.5 C.
Fortunato C.
169. Monzon, Candido 70 72 74 75 67 70 77
153. Jimenez, 75 70 70 75 72 61 75 78 72.05
T.
Florencio C.
170. Natividad, 73 79 68 65 73 69 75
154. Kintanar, 70 83 72 65 76 73 75 69 72.95 M.
Alberto
Woodrow M.
MRD-171. Navallo, 70 72 68 85 81 66 71
155. Languido, Cesar 63 71 63 85 70 61 85 79 Capistrano
70.55 C.
V.
172. Nisce, Camilo Z. 66 66 75 65 79 68 85
156. Lavilles, Cesar 61 89 75 55 73 63 75 78 70.55
L. MRD-173. Ocampo, Antonio 75 81 76 65 74 67 75
F. de
157. Llenos, 64 70 65 60 72 65 92 75 71.75
Francisco U. 174. Olaviar, Jose O. 72 70 69 55 66 70 77

158. Leon, Marcelo D. 63 73 60 85 75 75 MRD-175.

90 70 Perez,
72.75 Cesario Z. 75 76 66 80 72 63 82
de 176. Pogado, Causin O. 70 66 65 70 75 64 75
159. Llanto, 72 68 60 65 76 67 177.
84 68 Ramos-Balmori,
71.35 75 73 62 65 78 59 75
 Manuela 195. Tapayan, Domingo 69 72 69 70 76 73 82
178. Recinto, Ireneo 73 76 68 75 74 68 80 53 A.
72.3
I. MRD-196. Tiausas, Miguel 67 60 71 75 79 67 84
MRD-179. Redor, Francisco 62 77 73 75 69 64 76 69 V.70
K. 197. Torres, Carlos P. 68 71 71 70 70 63 82
MRD-180. Regis, 76 74 68 65 65 65 198.
88 75 Tria,
73.35 Hipolito 69 72 75 60 69 54 78
Deogracias A. 199. Velasco, Avelino 65 72 75 75 71 67 78
181. Rigor, Estelita 67 78 61 80 71 77 79 65 A.
70.9
C. 200. Villa, Francisco 65 80 73 75 68 79 65
MRD-182. Rimorin-Gordo, 70 72 62 60 88 66 67 79 C.
70.15
Estela 201. Villagonzalo, 78 67 74 65 72 51 69
183. Rosario, Prisco 70 64 70 70 72 73 85 57 Job
72.65
R.
del 202. Villarama, Jr., 75 74 75 55 75 66 67
184. Rosario, Vicente 75 91 65 75 68 68 79 62 Pedro
72.2
D. del 1952
185. Saavedra, Felipe 73 80 63 75 76 73 68
203. 62 70.35 Pablo
Abacon, 75 72 78 81 78 72 64
186. Salazar, Alfredo 66 72 73 75 67 68 77 69 Abad,
MRP-204. 70.85 Agapito 73 76 73 85 75 63 62
N.
MRP-205. Abella, Ludovico 70 81 76 81 70 66 77
187. Salem, Romulo R. 77 81 72 65 73 60 76 75 B.73
188. Foz, Julita A. 75 72 75 75 65 70 76 64 Abellera,
MRP-206. 72.5 75 79 79 87 76 51 63
189. Santa Ana, 77 69 65 75 81 75 70 75 Geronimo
73 F.
Candido T. MRP-207. Abenojar, 71 72 78 84 70 75 69
190. Santos, Aquilino 72 66 69 65 68 70 81 71 Agapito
71.7 N.
191. Santos, 76 72 75 75 68 62 208.
76 79 Alandy,
73.1 Doroteo 64 83 93 91 68 59 60
Valeriano V. R.
192. Suico, Samuel 73 79 72 75 71 59 209.
84 65 Alano,
73.3 Fabian T. 70 83 61 83 72 87 72
193. Suson, Teodorico 74 68 66 80 66 59 MRP-210.
79 67 Alcantara,
70.35 Pablo 71 79 80 81 73 70 72
194. Tado, Florentino 64 76 67 65 76 72 76 53 V.
69.7
P. 211. Arcangel, 75 85 71 73 76 65 68
Agustin Ag.
212. Acosta, Dionisio 75 81 78 87 56 65 77 70 N.
72.8
N. MRP-230. Baclig, Cayetano 77 84 83 80 69 70 61
MRP-213. Abinguna, 66 85 80 84 75 58 76 75 S.73.65
Agapito C. 231. Balcita, Oscar C. 75 77 79 90 64 60 67
214. Adove, Nehemias 76 86 78 77 66 78 69
232. 62 73.55
Barilea, 71 67 82 77 64 61 65
C. Dominador Z.
215. Adrias, 75 83 61 88 76 67 79 75 Banta,
MRP-233. 73.4 Jose Y. 75 80 77 81 75 63 71
Inocencio C.
MRP-234. Barrientos, 76 70 67 80 67 65 70
216. Aglugub, Andres 75 83 73 88 72 62 72 62 Ambrosio
72.65 D.
R.
235. Batucan, Jose M. 66 76 78 88 62 76 67
217. Andrada, Mariano 76 85 66 87 63 77 75 77 73.
L. 236. Bautista, 70 82 84 85 58 61 71
Atilano C.
MRP-218. Almeda, Serafin 72 72 75 81 61 67 73 65 70.75
V. 237. Bautista, Celso 71 68 63 87 80 67 80
J.
219. Almonte-Peralta, 73 71 72 91 75 67 65 53 70.7
Felicidad 238. Belderon, Jose 76 81 76 92 70 66 67

MRP-220. Amodia, Juan T. 75 79 68 85 62 64 MRP-239.

75 78 Belo,
71.4 Victor B. 76 77 64 73 75 71 76

MRP-221. Antonio, Felino 71 76 81 83 79 52 MRP-240.

72 70 Bejec,
73.3 Conceso D. 79 80 73 82 63 77 75
A. MRP-241. Beltran, 72 75 81 73 75 57 75
MRP-222. Antonio, Jose S. 75 92 90 68 65 64 68 60 Gervasio
73.75 M.

223. Añonuevo, Ramos 71 87 78 81 64 63 MRP-242.

74 76 Benaojan,
72.7 74 84 77 84 75 63 68
B. Robustiano O.

224. Aquino, S. Rey A. 67 77 57 78 69 70 MRP-243.

69 80 Beriña,
67.7 Roger C. 70 80 79 79 68 72 64

225. Arteche, 78 83 50 89 76 77 MRP-244.

70 70 Bihis,
70.8 Marcelo M. 75 86 65 92 64 64 84
Filomeno D. MRP-245. Binaoro, Vicente 73 69 78 83 73 59 70
MRP-226. Arribas, Isaac M. 75 78 70 81 73 70 67 78 M.72.2
MRP-227. Azucena, 72 67 78 89 72 67 MRP-246.
77 65 Bobila,
73.95 Rosalio 76 86 76 83 68 59 71
Ceferino D. B.

228. Atienza, Ricardo 72 87 70 79 66 55 247.

75 75 Buenafe,
70.85 Avelina 78 80 75 75 70 55 72
R.
229. Balacuit, Camilo 75 78 89 75 70 54 66 75 73.3
248. Bueno, Anastacio 73 78 71 78 71 67 MRP-265.
71 60 Campanilla,
71.15 80 75 78 77 73 71 63
F. Mariano B.
249. Borres, Maximino 67 85 62 91 72 63 MRP-266.
76 80 Campos,
70.9 Juan A. 66 85 83 84 67 61 80
L. 267. Cardoso, 78 71 73 76 79 56 69
MRP-250. Cabegin, Cesar V. 72 71 76 75 74 70 71 60 Angelita
72.2 G.
MRP-251. Cabello, Melecio 72 78 78 89 58 70 268.
67 71 Cartagena,
70.5 71 72 65 89 64 73 80
F. Herminio R.
MRP-252. Cabrera, Irineo 79 88 53 91 71 85 MRP-269.
75 76 Castro,
73.3 Daniel T. 65 75 77 76 85 60 75
M. 270. Cauntay, 70 78 72 73 77 69 64
253. Cabreros, 71 79 83 84 60 62 71 50 Gaudencio
70.85 V.
Paulino N. 271. Castro, Pedro L. 70 68 69 87 76 75 72
254. Calayag, 69 79 66 88 69 75 68 76 de
70.6
Florentino R. 272. Cerio, Juan A. 75 82 75 86 60 54 76
MRP-255. Calzada, Cesar de 76 72 80 67 62 71 66
273. 62 70.85
Colorado, 68 75 80 74 77 66 67
la Alfonso R.
256. Canabal, Isabel 70 82 81 77 78 51 75
274. 75 73.7
Chavez, Doroteo 73 65 79 84 73 69 66
MRP-257. Cabugao, Pablo N. 76 87 69 80 58 64 78 75 M.
71.8
258. Calañgi, Mateo C. 73 93 71 87 70 66 275.
69 62 Chavez,
71.8 Honorato 77 76 79 86 74 53 71
259. Canda, Benjamin 72 71 77 90 62 75 66 82 A.
71.95
S. MRP-276. Cobangbang, 69 81 74 82 76 61 78
260. Cantoria, 71 80 71 89 70 55 72 75 Orlando
71 B.
Eulogio 277. Cortez, Armando 78 60 88 86 60 66 69
261. Capacio, Jr., 67 78 71 90 65 75 72 60 R.
70.65
Conrado 278. Crisostomo, 76 87 74 76 62 55 76
262. Capitulo, 75 70 53 87 78 63 76 91 Jesus
71.2 L.
Alejandro P. MRP-279. Cornejo, 68 87 78 86 79 50 80
MRP-263. Calupitan, Jr., 75 93 81 76 64 75 68 56 Crisanto
73.15 R.
Alfredo MRP-280. Cruz, Raymundo 75 81 79 85 72 57 68
MRP-264. Caluya, Arsenio 75 86 70 87 77 52 MRP-281.
77 82 Cunanan,
73.9 Jose C. 78 92 63 83 76 72 68
V. 282. Cunanan, 70 82 64 92 67 75 73
 Salvador F. 300. Edisa, Sulpicio 65 77 75 89 75 62 75
283. Cimafranca, 71 76 76 80 70 71 301.
75 71 Edradan,
73.35 Rosa C. 70 75 84 84 71 59 69
Agustin B. MRP-302. Enage, Jacinto N. 66 70 88 93 72 67 65
284. Crisol, Getulio 70 91 78 85 68 55 71 50 Encarnacion,
MRP-303. 70.8 75 86 73 81 63 77 69
R. Alfonso B.
MRP-285. Dusi, Felicisimo 76 82 69 82 66 62 80
304. 71 72.85
Encarnacion, 65 78 58 68 66 64 75
R. Cesar
MRP-286. Datu, Alfredo J. 70 75 72 86 80 55 68
305. 79 Estoista,
71.5 78 76 74 86 58 67 70
287. Dacuma, Luis B. 71 67 87 83 71 50 65 70 Agustin
71.25 A.
MRP-288. Degamo, Pedro R. 73 80 82 74 80 67 MRP-306.
67 57 Fabros,
73.65 Jose B. 66 75 80 82 80 71 67
289. Delgado, Vicente 70 84 82 84 77 52 MRP-307.
73 50 Fajardo,
72.65 Balbino 77 69 82 83 65 60 75
N. P.
MRP-290. Diolazo, Ernesto 75 83 86 73 54 54 308.
75 75 Fajardo,
72.25 Genaro 70 79 77 79 79 50 73
A. P.
291. Dionisio, Jr., 73 84 64 89 71 78 309.
75 66 Evangelista,
72.8 75 75 72 87 63 63 77
Guillermo Felicidad P.
MRP-292. Dichoso, Alberto 71 77 71 81 69 75 310.
80 70 Familara,
73.65 68 75 87 83 64 65 68
M. Raymundo Z.
MRP-293. Dipasupil, 70 76 82 73 79 70 311.
72 56 Fariñas,
73.9 70 78 89 66 65 75 70
Claudio R. Dionisio
MRP-294. Delgado, Abner 75 84 63 67 64 60 312.
70 72 Favila,
68.35 Hilario 71 84 74 70 75 67 73
MRP-295. Domingo, 70 69 81 82 68 63 71 75 B.
72.2
Dominador T. MRP-313. Feliciano, 71 69 70 85 69 81 72
296. Ducusin, Agapito 70 78 53 88 75 77 62 76 Alberto
68.05 I.
B. MRP-314. Fernando, Lope F. 73 77 86 79 70 76 64
MRP-297. Duque, Antonio S. 75 77 78 86 76 72 MRP-315.
64 75 Flores,
73.9 Dionisio 78 72 77 83 67 60 68
298. Duque, Castulo 75 80 73 83 66 67 65 66 S.
70.65
299. Ebbah, Percival 70 80 85 76 66 63 MRP-316.
76 75 Fortich,
73.95 70 82 70 70 78 65 64
B. Benjamin B.
MRP-317. Fuente, Jose S. 76 88 72 74 60 71 79
 de la Lorenzo V.
318. Fohmantes, 72 79 71 77 68 61 MRP-337.
76 60 Gonzales,
70.9 Rafael 77 75 71 89 55 70 70
Nazario S. C.
MRP-319. Fuggan, Lorenzo 76 81 74 69 71 71 MRP-338.
73 60 Gracia,
72.85 Eulalia 66 68 90 84 77 59 69
B. L. de
320. Gabuya, Jesus S. 70 83 82 83 70 63 339.
75 65 Grageda,
73.75 Jose M. 70 85 72 67 70 60 73
321. Galang, Victor N. 69 83 84 76 70 57 71 60 A.
71.95
322. Gaerlan, Manuel 73 87 77 90 67 61 340.
72 75 Guzman,
73.15 Juan de 75 86 69 84 64 79 75
L. MRP-341. Guzman, Mateo de 76 79 79 73 72 69 68
323. Galem, Nestor R. 72 79 86 78 60 61 342.
75 70 Guzman,
73.05 Salvador 71 61 74 72 61 66 78
324. Gallardo, Jose Pe 75 88 75 75 63 70 70 65 B.
71.85
B. 343. Guzman, Salvador 75 84 64 81 74 61 78
MRP-325. Gallos, Cirilo B. 70 78 84 91 80 51 65 70 T. de
72.85
326. Galindo, Eulalio 70 89 87 65 78 71 344.
62 62 Habelito,
73.4 71 76 71 87 73 60 67
D. Geronimo E.
327. Galman, 72 72 80 85 71 56 345.
70 53 Hedriana,
71.15 75 68 84 76 66 58 76
Patrocinio G. Naterno G.
328. Gamalinda, 76 79 81 86 67 63 346.
69 55 Hernandez,
72.55 67 75 72 81 72 72 66
Carlos S. Quintin B.
329. Gamboa, Antonio 71 67 70 72 76 60 1952
75 68 70.95
G. 347. Homeres, Agustin 73 84 65 86 70 77 63
330. Gannod, Jose A. 69 80 75 81 68 62 73 68 R.
71.25
MRP-331. Garcia, Matias N. 67 78 74 90 79 59 348.
76 65 Ines,
72.8 Leonilo F. 65 88 71 88 77 73 61
MRP-332. Ganete, Carmelo 75 87 77 82 74 57 349.
68 81 Jamer,
73.3 Alipio S. 68 75 83 89 80 61 65
333. Gilbang, 75 67 80 82 67 57 MRP-350.
64 70 Ibasco,
70.5 Jr., 75 65 68 85 76 70 83
Gaudioso R. Emiliano M.
334. Gofredo, Claro C. 68 78 72 86 78 52 MRP-351.
70 76 Jardinico,
70.9 Jr., 73 86 72 78 82 67 67
Emilio
335. Gomez, Jose S. 71 76 71 81 76 63 69 62 70.85
MRP-352. Jaen, Justiniano 76 75 78 84 71 66 70
MRP-336. Gosiaoco, 68 93 85 78 64 69 70 54 F.72.35
353. Jaring, Antonio 72 77 79 70 72 57 371.
71 50 Maniquis,
70.75 Daniel 75 80 73 91 69 71 65
S. R.
MRP-354. Javier, Aquilino 75 84 79 78 77 61 372.
66 66 Maraña,
73.05 Arsenio 65 79 60 72 73 51 75
M. 373. Marasigan, 75 71 83 75 69 62 69
355. Jomuad, 75 75 72 88 78 58 76 43 Napoleon
72.4
Francisco MRP-374. Marco, Jaime P. 75 67 74 76 64 75 75
MRP-356. Jose, Nestor L. 78 61 64 73 68 76 64 80 Martir,
MRP-375. 69.7 Osmundo 70 86 76 78 72 71 75
357. La Q, Jose M. 75 71 75 72 70 67 81 59 P.73.5
358. Leon, Brigido C. 67 75 78 91 78 51 MRP-376.
72 80 Masancay,
72.55 Amando 73 87 75 77 72 50 78
de E.
359. Leones, 68 81 79 84 73 60 MRP-377.
77 60 Mati-ong,
73 62 87 72 79 73 76 69
Constante B. Ignacio T.
360. Liboro, Horacio 72 69 80 87 73 62 378.
70 61 Mara,
72.4 Guillermo 70 78 78 89 75 67 66
T. L.
361. Llanera, Cesar L. 77 81 80 78 64 59 MRP-379.
75 63 Mercado,
73 Felipe 73 77 82 82 78 52 69
362. Lomontod, Jose P. 75 76 69 70 73 76 74 75 A.
73.2
363. Luna, Lucito 70 75 69 83 59 53 MRP-380.
74 75 Miculob,
68.4 Eugenio 70 82 73 86 77 52 79
P.
MRP-364. Luz, Lauro L. 76 90 78 88 64 58 75 77 73.95
381. Mison, Rafael M. 79 78 73 75 71 68 69
MRP-365. Macasaet, Tomas 73 81 72 83 66 75 72 70 Jr.,
72.5
S.
MRP-382. Monponbanua, 79 79 68 88 64 78 69
366. Magbiray, 80 67 84 76 70 62 65 68 Antonio
73.05 D.
Godofredo V.
MRP-383. Montero, 72 89 69 89 70 68 70
367. Majarais, 70 62 64 82 88 75 71 79 Leodegario
72.85 C.
Rodolfo P.
384. Morada, 75 76 67 71 65 66 75
MRP-368. Makabenta, 75 90 77 83 59 71 72 78 73.3
Servillano S.
Eduardo
385. Mocorro, 78 84 78 84 60 73 68
MRP-369. Malapit, 74 83 74 89 58 60 72 76 71.1
Generoso
Justiniano S.
MRP-386. Mosquera, 75 78 75 85 72 55 77
370. Maloles, 70 87 73 76 77 50 76 76 Estanislao
72.3 L.
Iluminado M.
387. Motus, Rodentor 80 78 70 94 72 75 MRP-405.
70 57 Paderna,
73.75 75 69 72 75 78 58 75
P. Perfecto D.
388. Macario, Pedro R. 70 67 74 86 78 63 406.
72 66 Padlan,
72.15 Crispin 71 66 76 79 68 67 74
MRP-389. Nadela, Geredion 72 64 64 81 73 50 75 75 M.
69.15
T. 407. Padilla, Jose C. 70 65 67 82 78 75 78
MRP-390. Nazareno, Romeo 67 70 71 76 76 79 408.
75 57 Padilla,
72.05 Jr., 71 88 78 86 59 75 78
P. Estanislao E.
391. Nieto, Benedicto 69 79 77 77 72 62 MRP-409.
76 76 Palma,
72.9 Bartolome 67 81 80 82 71 75 69
S. MRP-410. Papa, Angel A. 75 72 85 85 77 59 63
MRP-392. Noguera, 71 86 81 80 73 56 72 70 73.15
MRP-411. Parayno, Mario V. 71 88 74 89 69 66 76
Raymundo
412. Pariña, Santos L. 70 87 85 77 64 67 63
MRP-393. Nodado, 70 70 69 73 57 37 64 72 63.6
Domiciano R. MRP-413. Pasion, 63 80 68 81 82 79 76
Anastacio
394. Nono, Pacifico G. 67 77 78 67 75 59 71 76 71.35
414. Pastrana, Rizal 69 76 71 76 68 63 77
MRP-395. Nuval, Manuel R. 78 72 67 90 72 68 78 67 R.73.65
396. Ocampo, Augusto 75 90 77 72 69 55 65 67 Paulin,
MRP-415. 60.7 Jose O. 70 66 80 87 75 50 65
397. Oliveros, Amado 72 75 68 72 84 50 75 79 Pelaez,
MRP-416. 71.9 Jr., 79 87 73 83 69 71 68
A. Vicente C.
398. Opiña, Jr., Pedro 76 77 74 67 73 66 68
417. 70 Peña,
71.85 Jesus 75 75 75 62 75 70 60
MRP-399. Olaviar, Jose O. 70 62 85 81 74 50 68
418. 79 Perez,
71.8 Toribio R. 71 64 81 92 69 58 67
MRP-400. Olandesca, Per O. 70 91 76 87 72 66 70
419. 79 73.45
Pestaño, 77 81 74 87 59 68 76
401. Orden, Apolonio 72 65 84 86 66 50 72 68 Melquiades
71.45
J. MRP-420. Pido, Serafin C. 77 81 72 82 69 71 60
402. Ortiz, Melencio 71 75 78 81 66 67 70
421. 78 Pinlac,
72.1 Filemon 67 76 74 86 65 79 65
T.
422. Poblete, Celso B. 72 79 82 76 66 64 74
MRP-403. Pablo, Fedelino 72 64 76 86 72 61 76 75 72.95
S. MRP-423. Piza, Luz 68 70 75 87 74 67 64

404. Pacifico, 76 79 69 80 76 52 424.

72 80 Puzon,
71.95 Eduardo S. 72 80 81 69 72 53 67
Vicente V. 425. Quetulio, 75 90 60 93 64 78 76
Josefina D.
MRP-426. Quipanes, 69 88 79 82 65 62 447.
71 66 Rosario,
71.55 80 75 65 70 68 72 80
Melchor V. Adelaida R. del
MRP-427. Quietson, Bayani 73 75 76 77 70 81 448.
71 53 Rosario,
72.85 75 75 79 90 68 65 66
R. Restituto F. del
428. Racho, Macario D. 68 75 81 82 78 53 MRP-449.
66 54 Sabelino,
70.55 71 81 69 75 77 71 75
429. Ramirez, Sabas P. 71 80 73 87 62 62 75 80 Conrado
71.65 S.
MRP-430. Raffiñan, Jose A. 80 83 79 79 62 72 450.
68 65 San Juan, Damaso 77
73.25 86 72 89 59 76 65
MRP-431. Ramos, Patricio 75 87 76 75 72 72 451.
61 75 Sañiel,
72.25 Felix L. 72 93 76 80 67 75 66
S. 452. Samaniego, Jesus 75 80 76 72 60 67 68
MRP-432. Ramos-Balmori, 78 84 76 90 48 75 80 65 B.
73.45
Manuela MRP-453. Sandoval, 75 83 70 83 77 67 77
MRP-433. Raro, Celso 75 81 76 67 75 77 55 77 Emmanuel
71.4 M.
MRP-434. Rayos, Victor S. 75 86 79 91 71 67 MRP-454.
67 70 Sanidad,
73.9 71 75 81 90 62 64 76
Emmanuel Q.
435. Revilla, Mariano 75 78 81 90 70 54 69 81 73.35
S. 455. Santiago, Jr., 75 76 84 93 63 65 59
Cristobal
436. Reyes, Abdon L. 72 64 81 78 76 73 69 53 72.85
456. Santillan, 76 89 83 83 63 58 65
437. Reyes, Domingo B. 72 87 78 83 72 75 62 70 Juanito
72.7 Ll.
438. Reyes, Francisco 75 85 84 68 75 71 68 50 Santos,
MRP-457. 73.9 Rodolfo 75 75 78 82 73 76 66
M. C.
439. Reyes, Lozano M. 80 57 78 79 78 65 64 79 73.35
MRP-458. Santos, Ruperto 67 54 69 76 63 64 71
MRP-440. Reyes, Oscar R. 75 75 82 82 76 64 68 60 M.73.65
441. Rigonan, Cesar V. 71 85 65 86 75 70 76 70 Santos,
MRP-459. 72.7 Aquilino 72 71 73 79 73 79 71
442. Rivera, Honorio 71 56 70 90 71 65 75 71 C.71.2
MRP-443. Rivero, 72 88 72 94 68 73 MRP-460.
66 80 Santos,
72.6 Rufino A. 75 81 79 85 74 72 66
Buenaventura A. 461. Suanding, Bantas 75 67 67 92 79 59 76
MRP-444. Robles, Enrique 75 77 75 77 82 64 69 70
MRP-462. 73.7 Feliz M. 76
Sulit, 79 76 78 72 75 68
445. Rodriguez, 76 75 76 63 69 77 65
463. 78 72.25
Songco, 70 68 82 84 60 69 76
Orestes Arellano Felicisimo G.
446. Roldan, Jose V. 67 80 79 83 73 71 75
464. 70 73.9
Soriano, Aniceto 64 79 77 80 80 53 70
 S. MRP-482. Usita, Gelacio U. 75 72 75 74 73 76 71
465. Suarez, Pablo D. 73 85 70 87 76 70 483.
64 70 Valino,
71.9 72 81 80 84 62 78 71
MRP-466. Sybico, Jesus L. 79 70 70 72 75 75 72 60 Francisco
73.05 M.
467. Tabaque, 69 68 77 79 74 68 484.
72 60 Varela,
71.85 67 75 81 86 72 57 81
Benjamin R. Dominador M.
MRP-468. Tan Kiang, 81 79 72 80 62 75 485.
73 80 Vega,
73.95Macairog L. 78 62 79 87 70 70 71
Clarita de
MRP-469. Tando, Amado T. 71 82 78 83 71 61 MRP-486.
71 60 Velasco,
72 71 80 74 85 60 66 76
Emmanuel D.
470. Tasico, Severo E. 71 69 75 89 70 75 67 63 71.65
487. Velez, Maria E. 73 70 89 80 56 50 72
471. Tiburcio, Ismael 73 82 72 93 76 57 68 54 71.15
P. MRP-488. Venal, Artemio V. 78 91 58 67 76 55 75
MRP-472. Tiongson, 70 70 76 84 77 75 489.
75 50 Venus,
73.45 Conrado B. 69 81 74 85 62 66 72
Federico T. MRP-490. Verzosa, 75 79 72 88 76 68 74
MRP-473. Tolentino, Jesus 75 89 63 84 85 73 73 50 Federico
73.4 B.
C. MRP-491. Villafuerte, 75 83 70 76 64 64 75
474. Torrijas, 77 66 67 83 68 75 71 63 Eduardo
71.3 V.
Alfredo A. MRP-492. Villanueva, 75 85 79 88 66 77 67
MRP-475. Tobias, Artemio 69 58 74 81 71 55 65 57 Cecilio
67.55 C.
M. 493. Villar, Custodio 73 69 70 88 76 66 69
MRP-476. Trillana, Jr., 76 86 76 86 70 68 75 50 R.
73.8
Apolonio MRP-494. Villaseñor, 80 85 67 77 62 75 76
MRP-477. Trinidad, Manuel 66 91 83 75 63 66 67 65 Leonidas
70.8 F.
O. 495. Viterbo, Jose H. 80 77 65 93 70 65 65
478. Trinidad, Pedro 66 78 78 85 78 51 496.
64 75 Yaranon,
70.8 Pedro 70 77 76 85 72 50 75
O. MRP-497. Yasay, Mariano R. 75 75 72 76 63 77 70
MRP-479. Udarbe, Flavio J. 80 82 77 82 67 56 68 75 Ygay,
MRP-498. 72.6 Venancio M. 73 80 83 84 62 59 72
480. Umali, Osmundo C. 68 75 81 80 71 69 68
499. 60 Yulo,
71.7 Jr., 73 82 78 75 60 81 75
481. Umayam, Juanito 77 75 87 85 56 56 66 60 Teodoro
71
C. 500. Zamora, Alberto 70 65 76 79 62 77 69
501. Rigonan, Felipe 70 79 69 89 76 62 71 64
Mateo 71.2
C.
1950 71 80 62 75 75 81 55 92 6
A list of those who petitioned for the consolidation 1951 70 60 61 65 77 64 67 81 6
of their grades in subjects passed in previous 5. Ducusin,
examinations, showing the years in which they took the Agapito B.
examinations together with their grades and averages,
and those who had filed motions for reconsideration MRD-1949 69 70 76 73 76 71 55 60 6
which were denied, indicated by the initials MRD, 1950 60 71 55 67 67 75 56 89 6
follows:
6. Garcia,
Manuel N.
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 72
MRD-1949 60 70 82 79 70 69 60 80 6
Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg.1950
Gen. 57 65 51 69 54 85 56 84 6
Av.
7. Luna,
1. Amao, Lucito A.
Sulpicio M.
1946 63 53 69 76 75 76 57 69 6
1946 68 67 76 76 73 73 49 50 66.5
1952 70 75 69 83 59 53 74 75 6
1950 59 80 67 77 62 80 71 57 67.4
8. Maraña,
2. Baldo, Arsenio s.
Olegario
1949 72 68 68 75 75 72 60 75 6
Ga.
1952 65 79 60 72 73 51 75 86 6
1951 65 76 58 55 59 63 75 72 64.9
9. Montano,
1952 65 68 75 84 72 59 73 57 69.75
Manuel M.
1953 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 66.7
1951 61 60 58 60 70 63 75 64 6
3. Blanco,
1952 70 77 65 79 66 52 70 50 6
Jose B.
1953 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 78 7
MRD-1949 75 75 70 75 77 76 60 90 72.15
10. Peña, Jesus
1951 64 71 58 65 68 70 75 71 66.95
S.
4. Condeno,
1950 25 75 45 75 45 52 46 71 46.2
Constantino
1951 70 77 65 79 66 52 70 50 1952
66.4 62 76 54 82 72 77 66 65 6
1952 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 66 1953
70.4 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 7
11. Placido, 17. Santos,
Sr., Isidro Salvador H.
1950 68 78 70 75 69 70 58 69 1951
67.75 60 64 55 70 68 52 70 75 6
1951 65 62 75 60 73 57 75 71 1952
66.8 75 64 70 81 76 55 61 75 6
12. Rementizo, 1953 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 7
Filemon S. 18. Sevilla,
1949 65 75 72 75 60 75 55 85 66.65
Macario C.
1951 68 57 48 60 91 66 55 75 MRD-1948
64.05 50 64 76 66 66 69 60 52 6
1952 68 53 68 67 58 56 75 64 MRD-1949
65.7 47 66 78 64 71 86 65 85 6
13. Amao, 1950 35 65 40 75 63 57 27 49 4
Sulpicio M. MRD-1951 68 59 72 55 69 65 75 75 6
1952 67 80 51 69 69 77 73 53 1953
66.35 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71 7
1953 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9
14. Rodulfa, Finally, with regards to the examinations of 1953, while
Juan T. some candidates--85 in all--presented motions for
reconsideration of their grades, others invoked the
1951 67 60 70 65 68 56 75 66 provisions
67.75 of Republic Act No. 972. A list of those
1952 70 71 67 78 67 75 71 70 candidates
70.1 separating those who filed mere motions for
reconsideration (56) from those who invoked the
15. Sanchez,
aforesaid Republic act, is as follows:
Juan J.
1948 39 69 82 75 76 72 55 50 1953
63.5PETITIONERS FOR RECONSIDERATION
MRD-1949 67 56 69 75 72 77 60 75 68
Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. G
1951 70 59 55 60 68 57 78 67 65.8 A
16. Santos, 1. Acenas, 73 70 68 62 82 51 67 77 7
 Calixto R. Benjamin R.
2. Alcantara, 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80 17.
72.8
Fabunan, 70 72 68 69 77 60 76 74 7
Pedro N. Edilberto C.
3. Alejandro, 67 72 71 75 80 76 75 77 18.
73.4
Feril, 75 71 84 65 70 60 65 70 7
Exequiel Domingo B.
4. Andres, 70 73 86 58 79 50 71 78 19.
72.7
Fernandez, 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 7
Gregorio M. Alejandro G.
5. Arnaiz, 66 80 76 58 79 68 77 81 20.
73.4
Gapus, Rosita 76 80 86 77 64 74 66 69 7
Antonio E. S. (Miss)
6. Asis, 66 78 75 81 77 55 73 69 21.
71.25
Garcia, 70 86 70 75 73 63 73 75 7
Floriano U. de Rafael B.
7. Bacaiso, 71 65 76 68 76 50 75 70 22.
70.95
Gracia, 73 68 75 59 80 51 72 71 7
Celestino M. Miguel L. de
8. Bala, 64 82 47 70 82 58 75 82 23.
67 Gungon, 68 76 76 84 77 57 77 83 7
Florencio F. Armando G.
9. Baldo, 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 24.
66.7
Gutierrez, 68 77 66 70 72 59 71 74 6
Olegario A. Antonio S.
10. Barrios, 65 71 76 75 80 62 83 73 25.
73.95
Ilejay, 77 70 76 77 81 62 70 68 7
Benjamin O. Abraham I.
11. Buhay, 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 26.
73.35
Leon, 66 66 75 70 77 55 71 82 7
Eduardo L. Benjamin La.
12. Burgos, 72 80 89 61 66 37 69 68 De
70.05
Dominador C. 27. Lugtu, Felipe 62 70 78 65 78 56 69 81 6
13. Cariño, Eldo 79 81 60 75 74 74 76 74 73 L.
J. 28. Lukman, 76 64 67 69 73 59 73 75 7
14. Casar, 67 73 84 79 77 61 71 74 Abdul-Hamid
73.35
Dimapuro 29. Maloles, Jr., 77 76 68 68 71 51 75 78 7
15. Castañeda, 70 73 80 71 75 70 73 78 Benjamin G.
73.95
Gregorio 30. Maloles, 77 71 60 71 79 62 68 72 6
16. Estrellado, 67 79 64 73 82 62 71 74 Julius G.
70.2
31. Mandi, 65 76 70 61 79 68 75 72 46.
71.1
Radaza, 75 78 76 61 77 50 71 86 7
Santiago P. Leovigildo
32. Margete, 70 76 66 75 85 73 71 75 47.
72.75
Ramos, 64 62 75 93 81 52 66 80 7
Rufino C. Bernardo M.
33. Melocoton, 70 81 73 78 83 52 72 75 48.
72.35
Rabaino, 68 72 75 73 78 55 69 76 7
Nestorio B. Andres D.
34. Molina, 75 78 70 61 75 63 66 85 49.
70.95
Ravanera, 70 77 80 71 82 62 69 78 7
Manuel C. Oscar N.
35. Muñoz, 75 80 86 67 74 57 68 76 50.
73.75
Renovilla, 65 75 80 68 79 52 62 78 6
Mariano A. Jose M.
36. Navarro, 80 75 65 75 83 55 73 79 51.
73 Sabaot, 69 73 80 69 82 69 69 79 7
Buenaventura Solomon B.
M. 52. Sumaway, 66 76 69 76 74 56 72 68 6
37. Nodado, 60 67 67 50 70 50 56 75 61.7
Ricardo S.
Domiciano R. 53. Torrefiel, 70 77 74 75 73 50 68 72 6
38. Papas, 65 62 71 61 70 56 66 67 66 Sofronio O.
Sisenando B. 54. Vera, 60 61 47 77 69 50 67 77 6
39. Pagulayan-Sy, 63 75 71 62 83 67 70 72 70.4
Federico V. de
Fernando 55. Viray, 65 67 67 52 73 64 71 65 6
40. Padula, 70 77 54 62 74 78 75 68 69.05
Venancio
Benjamin C. Bustos
41. Pasno, 78 72 66 54 71 58 72 78 56.
69.85
Ylaya, Angela 63 70 56 75 68 54 70 77 6
Enrique M. P. (Miss)
42. Peña, Jr., 70 95 81 78 67 66 67 73 72.55
Narciso PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
43. Peralta, 70 70 52 81 68 63 59 69 63.7
Rodolfo P. Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg.

44. Pigar, 76 75 78 61 72 72 71 79 73.75

Leopoldo R. 1. Ala, Narciso 70 71 73 59 73 74 81 77
45. Publico, 68 69 76 76 70 59 74 67 2.70.6
Alcantara, 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80
Paciano L.
 Pedro N. 17. Macalindong, 67 77 79 79 74 72 68 77
3. Arellano, 74 66 73 60 78 63 78 72 Reinerio L.
72.9
Antonio L. 18. Mangubat, 70 70 78 61 80 74 62 70
4. Buhay, Eduardo 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 Antonio M.
73.35
L. 19. Montano, 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 78
5. Calautit, 71 78 84 75 75 61 68 72 Manuel M.
73.2
Celestino R. 20. Plomantes, 73 67 74 58 68 70 76 71
6. Casuncad, 61 73 82 69 81 68 71 84 Marcos
73.05
Sulvio P. 21. Ramos, Eugenio 70 80 76 67 72 69 72 79
7. Enriquez, 84 69 76 75 82 50 58 79 R.
72.05
Pelagio y 22. Reyes, Juan R. 71 73 77 76 81 59 72 74
Concepcion 23. Reyes, 65 78 83 60 76 75 70 70
8. Estonina, 80 74 64 89 81 56 68 82 72.4
Santiago R.
Severino 24. Rivera, 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80
9. Fernandez, 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 72.8
Eulogio J.
Alejandro Q. 25. Santos, 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78
10. Fernandez, 70 75 77 75 78 67 72 73 73.35
Constantino P.
Luis N. 26. Santos, 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80
11. Figueroa, 70 75 87 78 75 50 68 68 72.3
Salvador H.
Alfredo A. 27. Sevilla, 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71
12. Formilleza, 65 75 89 68 83 51 70 75 73.25
Macario C.
Pedro 28. Villavicencio, 78 75 70 67 69 77 64 77
13. Garcia, Manuel 69 68 83 83 73 62 62 70 71Jose A.
M. 29. Viray, Ruperto 76 73 76 73 80 58 68 83
14. Grospe, 68 75 78 66 79 61 69 82 71.6
G.
Vicente E.
15. Galema, Nestor 72 79 86 78 60 61 75 70 There are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604
73.05
R. (1952) directly affected by this resolution. Adding 490
candidates who have not presented any petition, they
16. Jacobo, Rafael 76 76 75 74 76 50 72 76 72.3
reach a total of 1,094.
F.
The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972
As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced
to 72 per cent the passing general average in the bar
examination of august and November of 1946; 69 per cent
in 1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74 per cent in 1949;
maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but
raising to 75 per cent those who obtained 74 per cent
since 1950. This caused the introduction in 1951, in
the Senate of the Philippines of Bill No. 12 which was
intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of Rule
127 of the Rules of Court, concerning the admission of
attorneys-at-law to the practice of the profession. The
amendments embrace many interesting matters, but those
referring to sections 14 and 16 immediately concern us.
The proposed amendment is as follows:
SEC. 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate
may be deemed to have passed the examinations
successfully, he must have obtained a general average
of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any
subject. In determining the average, the foregoing
subjects shall be given the following relative weights:
Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land Registration and Mortgages,
5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law,
10 per cent; Political Law, 10 per cent; International
Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics
and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation,
5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent. Unsuccessful
candidates shall not be required to take another
examination in any subject in which they have obtained
a rating of 70 per cent or higher and such rating shall
be taken into account in determining their general
average in any subsequent examinations: Provided,
however, That if the candidate fails to get a general
average of 70 per cent in his third examination, he shall
lose the benefit of having already passed some subjects
and shall be required to the examination in all the
subjects.
SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants.
— Any applicant who has obtained a general average of
70 per cent in all subjects without falling below 50
per cent in any examination held after the 4th day of
July, 1946, or who has been otherwise found to be
entitled to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to
take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the
corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No.
12).
With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion
pertinent to the matter before us being:
It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at
bar examinations should be compelled to repeat even
those subjects which they have previously passed. This
is not the case in any other government examination.
The Rules of Court have therefore been amended in this
measure to give a candidate due credit for any subject
which he has previously passed with a rating of 75 per
cent or higher."
Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on
May 3, 1951, the President requested the comments of
this Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment
was signed by seven Justices while three chose to refrain
from making any and one took no part. With regards to
the matter that interests us, the Court said:
The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One
part of this amendment provides that if a bar candidate
obtains 70 per cent or higher in any subject, although
failing to pass the examination, he need not be examined
in said subject in his next examination. This is a sort
of passing the Bar Examination on the installment plan,
one or two or three subjects at a time. The trouble with
this proposed system is that although it makes it easier
and more convenient for the candidate because he may
in an examination prepare himself on only one or two
subjects so as to insure passing them, by the time that
he has passed the last required subjects, which may be
several years away from the time that he reviewed and
passed the firs subjects, he shall have forgotten the
principles and theories contained in those subjects and
remembers only those of the one or two subjects that
he had last reviewed and passed. This is highly possible
because there is nothing in the law which requires a
candidate to continue taking the Bar examinations every
year in succession. The only condition imposed is that
a candidate, on this plan, must pass the examination
in no more that three installments; but there is no
limitation as to the time or number of years intervening
between each examination taken. This would defeat the
object and the requirements of the law and the Court
in admitting persons to the practice of law. When a
person is so admitted, it is to be presumed and
presupposed that he possesses the knowledge and
proficiency in the law and the knowledge of all law
subjects required in bar examinations, so as presently
to be able to practice the legal profession and
adequately render the legal service required by
prospective clients. But this would not hold true of
the candidates who may have obtained a passing grade
on any five subjects eight years ago, another three
subjects one year later, and the last two subjects the
present year. We believe that the present system of
requiring a candidate to obtain a passing general
average with no grade in any subject below 50 per cent
is more desirable and satisfactory. It requires one to
be all around, and prepared in all required legal
subjects at the time of admission to the practice of
law.
x x x x x x x x x
We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16
of Rule 127. This amendment provides that any
application who has obtained a general average of 70
per cent in all subjects without failing below 50 per
cent in any subject in any examination held after the
4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office. In other
words, Bar candidates who obtained not less than 70 per
cent in any examination since the year 1946 without
failing below 50 per cent in any subject, despite their
non-admission to the Bar by the Supreme Court because
they failed to obtain a passing general average in any
of those years, will be admitted to the Bar. This
provision is not only prospective but retroactive in
its effects.
We have already stated in our comment on the next
preceding amendment that we are not exactly in favor
of reducing the passing general average from 75 per cent
to 70 per cent to govern even in the future. As to the
validity of making such reduction retroactive, we have
serious legal doubts. We should not lose sight of the
fact that after every bar examinations, the Supreme
Court passes the corresponding resolution not only
admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a passing
general average grade, but also rejecting and denying
the petitions for reconsideration of those who have
failed. The present amendment would have the effect of
repudiating, reversing and revoking the Supreme Court's
resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of those
who may have obtained an average of 70 per cent or more
but less than the general passing average fixed for that
year. It is clear that this question involves legal
implications, and this phase of the amendment if finally
enacted into law might have to go thru a legal test.
As one member of the Court remarked during the discussion,
when a court renders a decision or promulgate a
resolution or order on the basis of and in accordance
with a certain law or rule then in force, the subsequent
amendment or even repeal of said law or rule may not
affect the final decision, order, or resolution already
promulgated, in the sense of revoking or rendering it
void and of no effect.
Another aspect of this question to be considered is the
fact that members of the bar are officers of the courts,
including the Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is
admitted to the Bar, the Supreme Court impliedly regards
him as a person fit, competent and qualified to be its
officer. Conversely, when it refused and denied
admission to the Bar to a candidate who in any year since
1946 may have obtained a general average of 70 per cent
but less than that required for that year in order to
pass, the Supreme Court equally and impliedly considered
and declared that he was not prepared, ready, competent
and qualified to be its officer. The present amendment
giving retroactivity to the reduction of the passing
general average runs counter to all these acts and
resolutions of the Supreme Court and practically and
in effect says that a candidate not accepted, and even
rejected by the Court to be its officer because he was
unprepared, undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless
and in spite of all, must be admitted and allowed by
this Court to serve as its officer. We repeat, that this
is another important aspect of the question to be
carefully and seriously considered.
The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating
the following:
I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the
bill, namely, to elevate the standard of the legal
profession and maintain it on a high level. This is not
achieved, however, by admitting to practice precisely
a special class who have failed in the bar examination,
Moreover, the bill contains provisions to which I find
serious fundamental objections.
Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained
a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without
failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any
examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall
be allowed to take and subscribed the corresponding oath
of office. This provision constitutes class legislation,
benefiting as it does specifically one group of persons,
namely, the unsuccessful candidates in the 1946, 1947,
1948, 1949 and 1950 bar examinations.
The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside
final resolutions of the Supreme Court made in
accordance with the law then in force. It should be noted
that after every bar examination the Supreme Court
passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting
to the Bar those who have obtained a passing general
average but also rejecting and denying the petitions
for reconsideration of those who have failed. The
provision under consideration would have the effect of
revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and
rejecting the petitions of those who may have failed
to obtain the passing average fixed for that year. Said
provision also sets a bad precedent in that the
Government would be morally obliged to grant a similar
privilege to those who have failed in the examinations
for admission to other professions such as medicine,
engineering, architecture and certified public
accountancy.
Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of
the Philippines, but it was not repassed by 2/3 vote
of each House as prescribed by section 20, article VI
of the Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371 was presented
in the Senate. It reads as follows:
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS
FROM 1946 UP TO AND INCLUDING 1953
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section
14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate
who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any
bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to the August
1951 Bar examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar
examinations; 72 per cent in the 1953 bar examinations;
73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; 74 per cent
in 1955 bar examinations without a candidate obtaining
a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed
to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office
as member of the Philippine Bar; Provided, however, That
75 per cent passing general average shall be restored
in all succeeding examinations; and Provided, finally,
That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half
or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and
included as part of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75
per cent in any subject in any bar examination after
July 4, 1945 shall be deemed to have passed in such
subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be
included in computing the passing general average that
said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations
that he may take.
SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.
With the following explanatory note:
This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of
the President and to afford another opportunity to those
who feel themselves discriminated by the Supreme Court
from 1946 to 1951 when those who would otherwise have
passed the bar examination but were arbitrarily not so
considered by altering its previous decisions of the
passing mark. The Supreme Court has been altering the
passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74 in 1951. In order
to cure the apparent arbitrary fixing of passing grades
and to give satisfaction to all parties concerned, it
is proposed in this bill a gradual increase in the
general averages for passing the bar examinations as
follows; For 1946 to 1951 bar examinations, 70 per cent;
for 1952 bar examination, 71 per cent; for 1953 bar
examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar examination, 73
percent; and for 1955 bar examination, 74 per cent. Thus
in 1956 the passing mark will be restored with the
condition that the candidate shall not obtain in any
subject a grade of below 50 per cent. The reason for
relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade, is the
tremendous handicap which students during the years
immediately after the Japanese occupation has to
overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials
and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who
took up law soon after the liberation. It is believed
that by 1956 the preparation of our students as well
as the available reading materials will be under normal
conditions, if not improved from those years preceding
the last world war.
In this will we eliminated altogether the idea of having
our Supreme Court assumed the supervision as well as
the administration of the study of law which was objected
to by the President in the Bar Bill of 1951.
The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated
among his objections that the bill would admit to the
practice of law "a special class who failed in the bar
examination". He considered the bill a class legislation.
This contention, however, is not, in good conscience,
correct because Congress is merely supplementing what
the Supreme Court have already established as precedent
by making as low as 69 per cent the passing mark of those
who took the Bar examination in 1947. These bar
candidates for who this bill should be enacted,
considered themselves as having passed the bar
examination on the strength of the established precedent
of our Supreme Court and were fully aware of the
insurmountable difficulties and handicaps which they
were unavoidably placed. We believe that such precedent
cannot or could not have been altered, constitutionally,
by the Supreme Court, without giving due consideration
to the rights already accrued or vested in the bar
candidates who took the examination when the precedent
was not yet altered, or in effect, was still enforced
and without being inconsistent with the principles of
their previous resolutions.
If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered
as a simple curative act or corrective statute which
Congress has the power to enact. The requirement of a
"valid classification" as against class legislation,
is very expressed in the following American
Jurisprudence:
A valid classification must include all who naturally
belong to the class, all who possess a common disability,
attribute, or classification, and there must be a
"natural" and substantial differentiation between
those included in the class and those it leaves untouched.
When a class is accepted by the Court as "natural" it
cannot be again split and then have the dissevered
factions of the original unit designated with different
rules established for each. (Fountain Park Co. vs.
Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).
Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its
tides brings new conditions which must be cared for by
new laws. Sometimes the new conditions affect the
members of a class. If so, the correcting statute must
apply to all alike. Sometimes the condition affect only
a few. If so, the correcting statute may be as narrow
as the mischief. The constitution does not prohibit
special laws inflexibly and always. It permits them when
there are special evils with which the general laws are
incompetent to cope. The special public purpose will
sustain the special form. . . . The problem in the last
analysis is one of legislative policy, with a wide margin
of discretion conceded to the lawmakers. Only in the
case of plain abuse will there be revision by the court.
(In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,
286 U. S. 36, 77 L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct. 431). (1932)
This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute
which always retroacts to the extent of the care of
correction only as in this case from 1946 when the
Supreme Court first deviated from the rule of 75 per
cent in the Rules of Court.
The President allowed the period within which the bill
should be signed to pass without vetoing it, by virtue
of which it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art.
VI, Constitution) numbered 972 (many times erroneously
cited as No. 974).
It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election
year, and that both the President and the author of the
Bill were candidates for re-election, together, however,
they lost in the polls.

For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill Republic of the Philippines
is earnestly recommended. SUPREME COURT
Manila
(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID
EN BANC
Senator

Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by

Congress as above transcribed. The President again asked G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970
the comments of this Court, which endorsed the
following: IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION
AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting H. CALERO,
Executive Secretary, Manila, with the information that,
with respect to Senate Bill No. 371, the members of the vs.
Court are taking the same views they expressed on Senate
Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in May, 1951, contained VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
in the first indorsement of the undersigned dated June
5, 1951, to the Assistant Executive Secretary. R E S O L U T I O N

(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS

CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to
Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on
September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein
asserts is "a great injustice committed against his
client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court,
in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who
are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore
without reasons their own applicable decisions and
commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply
aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become
"one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of
hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the
classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of
this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the
present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind,
but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause
of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the
people may know of the silent injustice's committed by
this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and
injustices that were committed must never be repeated."
He ends his petition with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to
receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney and
counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any
time in the future and in the event we regain our faith
and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the
practice of the noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents
of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on September 26,
1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed
to him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said
he did it to expose the tribunal's "unconstitutional
and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying
petitions or appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen
deplored, his client was condemned to pay P120,000,
without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen
said in this petition, "where our Supreme Court is
composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for
justice, who ignore without reason their own applicable
decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his
title by which he earns his living, the present members
of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all
cases brought to its attention without discrimination,
and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and
obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions.
(Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are
calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice, who ignore their
own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations
of the Constitution with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue
of the Manila Chronicle of September 28, 1967. In
connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty.
Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of offenses so
serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "his
charge is one of the constitutional bases for
impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil
case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H.
Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the
defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered
judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty.
Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty days
later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its
reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy
of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time
and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July
18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the
judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court
denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the
adverse party a copy of his first motion for
reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966
a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached
the required registry return card. This second motion
for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by
the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion
of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on
August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal.
Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the
record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this
Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc.
vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965,
dismissed the appeal, in the following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967,
filed by plaintiff-appellee praying that the appeal be
dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by
defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as
it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that
the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp.
90-113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a
notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is,
therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R.
No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which did not interrupt
the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently,
the appeal was perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution,
urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive.
At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest
decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines
vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this
Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again,
the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated
May 9, 1967 and the supplement thereto of the same date
filed by defendant- appellant, praying for
reconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967,
dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important
distinctions between this case and that of Manila Surety
and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R.
No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court
in its resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further
states that in the latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza,
L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court
concerning the question raised by appellant's motion,
the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the
Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case
and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution
denying the motion to dismiss the appeal, based on
grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on
November 26, 1962, which was much earlier than the date
of promulgation of the decision in the Manila Surety
Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution
in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme
Court issued it "without prejudice to appellee's
restoring the point in the brief." In the main decision
in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court
passed upon the issue sub silencio presumably because
of its prior decisions contrary to the resolution of
November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the Manila
Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs.
Venturanza is no authority on the matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari.
We refused to take the case, and by minute resolution
denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his
motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for
leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and
for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on
September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for
reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was
ordered expunged from the records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent
to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to
Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already
adverted to — a pleading that is interspersed from
beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore
reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual
members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is
unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September
28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition until he
shall have actually surrendered his certificate.
Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer.
No word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over
his certificate, which he had earlier vociferously
offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on
his petition. To said reminder he manifested "that he
has no pending petition in connection with Case G.R.
No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now
final and executory;" that this Court's September 28,
1967 resolution did not require him to do either a
positive or negative act; and that since his offer was
not accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a
member of the bar for contumely and gross misconduct,
this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty.
Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action should
be taken against him." Denying the charges contained
in the November 17 resolution, he asked for permission
"to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action
should be taken against him ... in an open and public
hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to
require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from
notice hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise,
oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident
submitted for decision." To this resolution he
manifested that since this Court is "the complainant,
prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to
answer questions "in person and in an open and public
hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity
and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written
explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear
him in person." To give him the ampliest latitude for
his defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation
and thereafter was heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it
is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from being
contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his
jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with
abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible,
Chapter 7, St. Matthew: —
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what
judgment you judge, you shall be judged, and with what
measure you measure, it shall be measured to you. But
why dost thou see the speck in thy brother's eye, and
yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how
can thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the speck
from thy eye"; and behold, there is a beam in thy own
eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy
own eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the
speck from thy brother's eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to
do you also to them: for this is the Law and the
Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the
statements mentioned in his petition. On the contrary,
he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with
his lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court. But he vigorously
DENY under oath that the underscored statements
contained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous,
grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the individual
members of the Court; that they tend to bring the entire
Court, without justification, into disrepute; and
constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the noble
profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is
borne by TRUTH and has been asserted with NO MALICE
BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the
highest interest of justice that in the particular case
of our client, the members have shown callousness to
our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear
us on this matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility,
appeals for charity, generosity, fairness,
understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest
interest of JUSTICE, — what did we get from this COURT?
One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and
insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court
towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is
plain callousness towards our particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members
of the Court that notwithstanding the violation of the
Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in
the reverse order of natural things, is now in the
attempt to inflict punishment on your respondent for
acts he said in good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and
supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY and
FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their
stubborn denial with any semblance of reason, NEVER.
Now that your respondent is given the opportunity to
face you, he reiterates the same statement with emphasis,
DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the Philippines
today, that even our own President, said: — "the story
is current, though nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still
being circulated that justice in the Philippines today
is not what it is used to be before the war. There are
those who have told me frankly and brutally that justice
is a commodity, a marketable commodity in the
Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS,
not the ACTOR. We attack the decision of this Court,
not the members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled
by force of necessity. We were angry but we waited for
the finality of the decision. We waited until this Court
has performed its duties. We never interfered nor
obstruct in the performance of their duties. But in the
end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed
finality on your judgment against our client and sensing
that you have not performed your duties with
"circumspection, carefulness, confidence and wisdom",
your Respondent rise to claim his God given right to
speak the truth and his Constitutional right of free
speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court
and the further violations we sought to be prevented
is impliedly shared by our President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things
that were applied to us. Recalling Madam Roland's famous
apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty,
what crimes are committed in thy name", we may dare say,
"O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in thy
name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices
are committed in thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission
of any abuses, but who would correct such abuses
considering that yours is a court of last resort. A
strong public opinion must be generated so as to curtail
these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings
that can be found in all courts and government offices.
We have added only two more symbols, that it is also
deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this
Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity,
fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb
in the sense, that inspite of our beggings,
supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our
appeal has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or
given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the
above statement. We only describe the. impersonal state
of things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence
in the members of this Court and for which reason we
offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST
ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be regained
tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed
sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must
end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between
forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the
members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and
to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the
members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold
the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff
which he claims is not intended as a studied disrespect
to this Court, let us examine the grain of his
grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition
for review. We are quite aware of the
criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of
rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have been
asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the
law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We have
given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know
the abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously
collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously
marshalls his arguments, only to have his efforts
rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell,
however, most petitions rejected by this Court are
utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged
at all.3 The rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency,
but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large,
this Court has been generous in giving due course to
petitions for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write
a full opinion for every petition we reject, we would
be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed
upon us by the Constitution. The proper role of the
Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S.
Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those
cases which present questions whose resolutions will
have immediate importance beyond the particular facts
and parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore
Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ,
and as to the same petition different reasons may read
different justices to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the
uninformed, even confusing reasons for denying
petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from
time to time that the Court indicate its reasons for
denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order
that the Court may be enabled to discharge its
indispensable duties, Congress has placed the control
of the Court's business, in effect, within the Court's
discretion. During the last three terms the Court
disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on their
merits. For the same three terms the Court denied,
respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for
discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work
it would not be feasible to give reasons, however brief,
for refusing to take these cases. The tune that would
be required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that
as already indicated different reasons not infrequently
move different members of the Court in concluding that
a particular case at a particular time makes review
undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals,
et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court,
through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon,
articulated its considered view on this matter. There,
the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit"
resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the
Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same
question has been raised before; and we held that these
"resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above
constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the
petition for review should not be entertained in view
of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and
even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood
it. It should be remembered that a petition to review
the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter
of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there
is no need to fully explain the court's denial. For one
thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in
the Court of Appeals' opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended —
helped the Court in alleviating its heavy docket; it
was patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme
Court, wherein petitions for review are often merely
ordered "dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court
on petitions for certiorari from the Court of Appeals
have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the
need for compelling reasons to buttress such petitions
if this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For
it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested
upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended
to give every losing party another hearing. This axiom
is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.—A
review is not a matter of right but of sound judicial
discretion, and will be granted only when there are
special and important reasons therefor. The following,
while neither controlling nor fully measuring the
court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons
which will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question
of substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme
Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord
with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme
Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings,
or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower court,
as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found,
upon a thoroughgoing examination of the pleadings. and
records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and
correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the
light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court.
Far from straying away from the "accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings," it traced the
procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of
decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court
to exercise its supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as
far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew — or ought to have
known — that for a motion for reconsideration to stay
the running of the period of appeal, the movant must
not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse
party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party
of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he
did not). This rule was unequivocally articulated
in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co.,
supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed
for motions in general by Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5
(formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice
shall state the time, and place of hearing and shall
be served upon all the Parties concerned at least three
days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same
Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court without
proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in
such a case the motion is nothing but a useless piece
of paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638,
Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81;
Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan,
41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil.
117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets the
time and place of hearing the Court would have no way
to determine whether that party agrees to or objects
to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his
objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any
period within which he may file his reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to
review the lower court's judgment, he has only himself
to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of
the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a
matter of right. To shift away from himself the
consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a
"whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the
posture of a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his
professional certificate, he took the liberty of
vilifying this Court and inflicting his exacerbating
rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that
there is no justification for his scurrilous and
scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty.
Almacen the most circumspect consideration. We know that
it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction
each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be
a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide
latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval
of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the manner
in which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon
and criticize the actuations of public officers. This
right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism
is aimed at a judicial authority,4 or that it is
articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is especially
recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded
litigation,6 because then the court's actuations are
thrown open to public consumption.7 "Our decisions and
all our official actions," said the Supreme Court of
Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press and the
people have the undoubted right to comment on them,
criticize and censure them as they see fit. Judicial
officers, like other public servants, must answer for
their official actions before the chancery of public
opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction
to an attack on one's integrity, competence and honesty,
with "imminent danger to the administration of justice,"
is the reason why courts have been loath to inflict
punishment on those who assail their actuations.9 This
danger lurks especially in such a case as this where
those who Sit as members of an entire Court are
themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a
lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For
courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that
weave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence,
as citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is
expected not only to exercise the right, but also to
consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and
indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and
expect critical evaluation of their performance. 13 For
like the executive and the legislative branches, the
judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society,
nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom
it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both
as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize
in properly respectful terms and through legitimate
channels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is
that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the
important place accorded to him in the administration
of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the
decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner,
and the independence of the bar, as well as of the
judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts.
(In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important
part of the traditional work of the bar. In the
prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower
courts. In written for law journals he dissects with
detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and
fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that flaws and
inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS
2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex
Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope
in the expansion or publication of opinions as to the
capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than
members of the bar. They have the best opportunities
for observing and forming a correct judgment. They are
in constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that
an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under
liability to be called to account and to be deprived
of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges
whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose,
is a position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer
is expected not only to exercise the right, but also
to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law
may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally
answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of
the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am.
Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat
Opportunity to become conversant with the character and
efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to
abuse the privilege, as no other class has as great an
interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench.
(State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212,
216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the
foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of those
in the best position to give advice and who might
consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under
such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits
of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his
demerits there must be profound silence." (State v.
Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism
that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over
the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists
between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and
slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation
of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct
that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person
obligations and duties which are not mere flux and
ferment. His investiture into the legal profession
places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more
exacting and more imperative than that of respectful
behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct
himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and
the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe
and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and
judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics
enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent
of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume,
if they do not by express declaration take upon
themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not
merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but
to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of
justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not
discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous
demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of
court from all insulting language and offensive conduct
toward judges personally for their judicial acts.
(Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination
to the courts is essential to the orderly administration
of justice. Hence, in the — assertion of their clients'
rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior
intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or
more learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his
patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards
as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as
necessary to the orderly administration of justice as
they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions
of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal
appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times
be the foremost in rendering respectful submission. (In
Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his
intellectual endowment That is his privilege. And he
may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack
of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind,
however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief
that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated
to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are
the temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of
the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide
his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and
a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an
attorney in private conversations or
communications 16 or in the course of a political,
campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to
bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of
justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary
action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an
examination of relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is
neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of
his conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida
in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless
declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into
scorn and disrepute the administration of justice
demands condemnation and the application of appropriate
penalties," adding that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold
that a judge or a court is beyond bona fide comments
and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency
and truth or which are not aimed at. the destruction
of public confidence in the judicial system as such.
However, when the likely impairment of the
administration of justice the direct product of false
and scandalous accusations then the rule is otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was
suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet
entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a
municipal judge of having committed judicial error, of
being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial
on appeal and of being subject to the control of a group
of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote:
"They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal
Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!"
The court did not hesitate to find that the leaflet went
much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right
to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part
Of the accused to belittle and besmirch the court and
to bring it into disrepute with the general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court
of California affirmed the two-year suspension of an
attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who
at that time was a candidate for re-election to a
judicial office. The circular which referred to two
decisions of the judge concluded with a statement that
the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said bank
to keep that money." Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which
place no limit to the criticism members of the bar may
make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity
of the courts, even though it extends to the deliberate
publication by the attorney capable of correct reasoning
of baseless insinuations against the intelligence and
integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc.
v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas
197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep.
637. In the first case mentioned it was observed, for
instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous
publication by an attorney, directed against a judicial
officer, could be so vile and of such a nature as to
justify the disbarment of its author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case
were of graver character than those made by the
respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is
that which requires of those who are permitted to enjoy
the privilege of practicing law the strictest observance
at all times of the principles of truth, honesty and
fairness, especially in their criticism of the courts,
to the end that the public confidence in the due
administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity
and usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re Collins,
81 Pac. 220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123
N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman who had been
granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the
decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a
threatening letter and gave the press the story of a
proposed libel suit against the judge and others. The
letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is
cleared up so that my name is protected from the libel,
lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I
shall be compelled to resort to such drastic action as
the law allows and the case warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not
intend to allow such dastardly work to go unchallenged,"
and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and
not irresponsible political manikins or appearances of
men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme
Court of Illinois declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and
whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint
against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer
to submit his grievances to the proper authorities, but
the public interest and the administration of the law
demand that the courts should have the confidence and
respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting
language, and offensive conduct toward the judges
personally by attorneys, who are officers of the court,
which tend to bring the courts and the law into disrepute
and to destroy public confidence in their integrity,
cannot be permitted. The letter written to the judge
was plainly an attempt to intimidate and influence him
in the discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing
of the unauthorized suit, together with the write-up
in the Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to
bring the court into disrepute with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused
the courts of the state of being influenced by corruption
and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court
were bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had
criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court.
The lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct, and
was ordered suspended for a period of two years. The
Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend
to weaken the authority of the court against whose
members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt,
undermine its influence as an unbiased arbiter of the
people's right, and interfere with the administration
of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not,
under the guise of disciplinary proceedings, deprive
him of any part of that freedom of speech which he
possesses as a citizen. The acts and decisions of the
courts of this state, in cases that have reached final
determination, are not exempt from fair and honest
comment and criticism. It is only when an attorney
transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he
will be held responsible for an abuse of his liberty
of speech. We well understand that an independent bar,
as well as independent court, is always a vigilant
defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was
suspended for six months for submitting to an appellate
court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial
integrity of the court from which the appeal was taken.
Such action, the Court said, constitutes unprofessional
conduct justifying suspension from practice,
notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew
the statements, and asserted that the affidavit was the
result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave
injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a
growing habit in the profession of criticising the
motives and integrity of judicial officers in the
discharge of their duties, and thereby reflecting on
the administration of justice and creating the
impression that judicial action is influenced by corrupt
or improper motives. Every attorney of this court, as
well as every other citizen, has the right and it is
his duty, to submit charges to the authorities in whom
is vested the power to remove judicial officers for any
conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show
a violation of his duties, or would justify an inference
that he is false to his trust, or has improperly
administered the duties devolved upon him; and such
charges to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable
inferences, will be encouraged, and the person making
them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right
of an attorney in a case decided against him, or the
right of the Public generally, to criticise the
decisions of the courts, or the reasons announced for
them, the habit of criticising the motives of judicial
officers in the performance of their official duties,
when the proceeding is not against the officers whose
acts or motives are criticised, tends to subvert the
confidence of the community in the courts of justice
and in the administration of justice; and when such
charges are made by officers of the courts, who are bound
by their duty to protect the administration of justice,
the attorney making such charges is guilty of
professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published
this statement:
I accepted the decision in this case, however, with
patience, barring possible temporary observations more
or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as
my clients were foreigners, it might have been expecting
too much to look for a decision in their favor against
a widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only transcend
the bounds of propriety and privileged criticism, but
are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation
and innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of this
court, and make out a prima facie case of improper
conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license
from this court and who is under oath to demean himself
with all good fidelity to the court as well as to his
client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney
apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac.
747, an attorney published in a newspaper an article
in which he impugned the motives of the court and its
members to try a case, charging the court of having
arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court suspended
the respondent for 30 days, saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to members of the
bar is one most subversive of the public good, if the
conduct of such members does not measure up to the
requirements of the law itself, as well as to the ethics
of the profession. ...
The right of free speech and free discussion as to
judicial determination is of prime importance under our
system and ideals of government. No right thinking man
would concede for a moment that the best interest to
private citizens, as well as to public officials,
whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise,
would be served by denying this right of free speech
to any individual. But such right does not have as its
corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act
honestly and honorably both with their client and with
the courts where justice is administered, if
administered at all, could ever properly serve their
client or the public good by designedly misstating facts
or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and honesty of
purpose by members of the bar in such discussion is
necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less
impaired by a polluted water supply than is the health
of the thought of a community toward the judiciary by
the filthy wanton, and malignant misuse of members of
the bar of the confidence the public, through its duly
established courts, has reposed in them to deal with
the affairs of the private individual, the protection
of whose rights he lends his strength and money to
maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part
of the members of the bar the law itself demands
retribution — not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac.
440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a
pending action using in respect to the several judges
the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,,"
"criminal confederates," "colossal and confident
insolence," "criminal prosecution," "calculated
brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases,
was considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the
bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered
stricken from the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215,
the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude should
be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally
adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer wrote
a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and
the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his
associates in the decisions of certain appeals in which
he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The
letters were published in a newspaper. One of the letters
contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has
no better right to it than the burglar to his plunder.
It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with
the court acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and
vigilant that the widow got no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive
for the decisions discoverable, short of assigning to
the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation
of morals and faithlessness to duty? If the state bar
association, or a committee chosen from its rank, or
the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the
researches of its hundreds of bright, active students,
or if any member of the court, or any other person, can
formulate a statement of a correct motive for the
decision, which shall not require fumigation before it
is stated, and quarantine after it is made, it will
gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read
it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the
suspension of the attorney for six months, delivered
its opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of
professional misconduct in sending to the Chief Justice
the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have
found, for the very purpose of insulting him and the
other justices of this court; and the insult was so
directed to the Chief Justice personally because of acts
done by him and his associates in their official capacity.
Such a communication, so made, could never subserve any
good purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to
gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate
the officers so assailed. It would not and could not
ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial
capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the
accused of any constitutional right, or of any privilege
which any reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion,
could ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No
judicial officer, with due regard to his position, can
resent such an insult otherwise than by methods
sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written,
however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly
to the judge alone, he can have no redress in any action
triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous
communication or libelous matter to the person defamed
does not constitute an actionable publication." 18 Am.
& Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the
sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief
Justice was wholly different from his other acts charged
in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different
principles are applicable thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable;
but so far as he exercised the rights of a citizen,
guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by
considerations of public policy, to which reference has
been made, he was immune, as we hold, from the penalty
here sought to be enforced. To that extent his rights
as a citizen were paramount to the obligation which he
had assumed as an officer of this court. When, however
he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice
personally, he exercised no right which the court can
recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully violated his
obligation to maintain the respect due to courts and
judicial officers. "This obligation is not discharged
by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in
open court, but it includes abstaining out of court from
all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the
judges personally for their official acts." Bradley v.
Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there
appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle
involved, between the indignity of an assault by an
attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act, and
a personal insult for like cause by written or spoken
words addressed to the judge in his chambers or at his
home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct
wholly different from criticism of judicial acts
addressed or spoken to others. The distinction made is,
we think entirely logical and well sustained by
authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra.
While the court in that case, as has been shown, fully
sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings
of the court in actions which are ended, it held that
one might be summarily punished for assaulting a
judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of the
court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is
it in the power of any person," said the court, "by
insulting or assaulting the judge because of official
acts, if only the assailant restrains his passion until
the judge leaves the building, to compel the judge to
forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of
the people by tame submission to the indignity, or else
set in his own person the evil example of punishing the
insult by taking the law in his own hands? ... No
high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office under
such conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge
personally, constitutes professional delinquency for
which a professional punishment may be imposed, has been
directly decided. "An attorney who, after being defeated
in a case, wrote a personal letter to the trial justice,
complaining of his conduct and reflecting upon his
integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct and will
be disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim 133 App.
Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in Re Griffin
(City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y.
In the latter case it appeared that the accused attorney
had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City
Court of New York, in which it was stated, in reference
to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it common
sense. The result is I have been robbed of 80." And it
was decided that, while such conduct was not a contempt
under the state, the matter should be "called to the
attention of the Supreme Court, which has power to
discipline the attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel
learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled
at the heads of judges, to charge them with ignorance,
with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as
principals or accessories, it will not be long before
the general public may feel that they may redress their
fancied grievances in like manner, and thus the lot of
a judge will be anything but a happy one, and the
administration of justice will fall into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South.
671, was in this respect much the same as the case at
bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed
a letter to the circuit judge, which the latter received
by due course of mail, at his home, while not holding
court, and which referred in insulting terms to the
conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the accused had
been one of the attorneys. For this it was held that
the attorney was rightly disbarred in having "willfully
failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge] as
a judicial officer, and thereby breached his oath as
an attorney." As recognizing the same principle, and
in support of its application to the facts of this case,
we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.)
364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark.
149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People
v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep.
351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's
Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused
have been so far sustained as to make it our duty to
impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to
him and a suitable warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court
affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for
publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused
a judge of being under the sinister influence of a gang
that had paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that
an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the official
acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral
turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred for
criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in
general claiming that the judge was dishonest in
reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct
of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published
newspaper articles after the trial of cases,
criticising the court in intemperate language. The
invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the
court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the
legal profession into disrepute with the public, for
which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney,
dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared over a
period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such gross
moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the
bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he
expressed an intention to resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and
impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements is
indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or
publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts
and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a
crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds
of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby
tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public
confidence in their integrity and in the orderly
administration of justice, constitute grave
professional misconduct which may be visited with
disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary
sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the
prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted
guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal
fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary
powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of counsel
such as those catalogued in the above-cited
jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have
generally been disposed of under the power of courts
to punish for contempt which, although resting on
different bases and calculated to attain a different
end, nevertheless illustrates that universal
abhorrence of such condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances
may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel
branded the denial of his motion for reconsideration
as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage
to the rigths of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a
mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls,"
this Court, although conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending
the cause and rights of his client, should do so with
all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but
it is not, and never will be so for him to exercise said
right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without
the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts
requires. The reason for this is that respect for the
courts guarantees the stability of their institution.
Without such guaranty, said institution would be resting
on a very shaky foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its
opinion, the statements made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the
court and an intentional contempt of its dignity,
because the court is thereby charged with no less than
having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the
rights to the parties, and 'of the untoward consequences,
or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted
the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's
client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and
the author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to, the
imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who,
invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a
news item carried in his paper, caused to be published
in i local newspaper a statement expressing his regret
"that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously
interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in
evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the
majority of its members," and his belief that "In the
wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately
committed during these last years, ... the only remedy
to put an end to go much evil, is to change the members
of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as
"a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far
cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those
memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa,
Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the
honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there
also announced that one of the first measures he would
introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress would
have for its object the complete reorganization of the
Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his
avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee
of free speech, this Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written statement which he
caused to be published in the press, the respondent does
not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the
Parazo case, which was then and still is pending
consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel
Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members
of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the
next Congress, of which he is one of the members,
reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number
of Justices from eleven, so as to change the members
of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who
according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow
minded, in order to influence the final decision of said
case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the
administration of justice. But the respondent also
attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the
apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court
into disrepute and degrading the administration. of
justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for
the last years committing deliberately so many blunders
and injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding
in favor of Que party knowing that the law and justice
is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one
in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases
decided during the last years, would tend necessarily
to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty
and integrity of the members of this Court, and
consequently to lower ,or degrade the administration
of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the
Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark
to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief
for their grievances or protection of their rights when
these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their
confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members
of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice
therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into
their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might
be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer
of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is
in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of
this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the
oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to
the courts guarantees the stability of other
institutions, which without such guaranty would be
resting on a very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to
emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under
special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and
communication to the courts; he may be removed from
office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being
guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586,
594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re
Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra,
where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly
fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to its
previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of
the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial
Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was
unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the Court,
Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted)
employed in the motion for reconsideration,
implications there are which inescapably arrest
attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this Court
has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That
pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on its
own pronouncements in disregard of the law on
jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the
decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier
rulings without as much as making any reference to and
analysis of the pertinent statute governing the
jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import
of all these is that this Court is so patently inept
that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial
court, it has committed error and continuously repeated
that error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures
this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn
by the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in
the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of this
Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are
not entitled to respect. Those statements detract much
from the dignity of and respect due this Court. They
bring into question the capability of the members — and
some former members of this Court to render justice.
The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm
which counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against
splitting of jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in
other cases 18 which, in the interest of brevity, need
not now be reviewed in detail.
Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited
cases — all of them involved contumacious statements
made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that,
in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective
mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only
against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes
while a court mulls over a pending case and not after
the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek
to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his
studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now
called upon to account were made only after this Court
had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding
has terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For
sometime, this was the prevailing view in this
jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof,
however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then
Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding
of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel,
which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete
disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made
in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding, where the
editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt
for publishing an editorial which asserted that the 1944
Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner
after the question of the validity of the said
examinations had been resolved and the case closed.
Virtually, this was an adoption of the view expressed
by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the
effect that them may still be contempt by publication
even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice
Moran in Alarcon:
A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass
or influence the courts in administering justice in a
pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal
contempt which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A
publication which tends to degrade the courts and to
destroy public confidence in them or that which tends
to bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes
likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable
by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt,
to be shielded against the influence of newspaper
comments, is the all-important duty of the courts to
administer justice in the decision of a pending case.
In the second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of
justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any
act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor
or to destroy public confidence in them. In the first
there is no contempt where there is no action pending,
as there is no decision which might in any way be
influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second,
the contempt exists, with or without a pending case,
as what is sought to be protected is the court itself
and its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if
public confidence in them is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by
the circumstance that his statements and actuations now
under consideration were made only after the judgment
in his client's appeal had attained finality. He could
as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had
been perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or
not he could be held liable for contempt for such post
litigation utterances and actuations, is here
immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of November
17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here
presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's
professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and
his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise
of the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our
authority and duty to safeguard and ethics of the legal
profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions
of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest
of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or
non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of no
consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is
to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by
removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has
proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office
of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do.
By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn duty,
amongst others, to determine the rules for admission
to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative
is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude
from the practice of law those who have proved themselves
unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus —
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of
the court, is an inherent and incidental power in courts
of record, and one which is essential to an orderly
discharge of judicial functions. To deny its existence
is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of
attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to
restraint. Such a view is without support in any
respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any
court having the right to admit attorneys to practice
and in this state that power is vested in this court-has
the inherent right, in the exercise of a sound judicial
discretion to exclude them from practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice
of law is a representation to all that he is worthy of
their confidence and respect. So much so that —
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an
attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence
of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only
the right, but the duty, of the court which made him
one of its officers, and gave him the privilege of
ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege.
Therefore it is almost universally held that both the
admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts,
and that one is admitted to the bar and exercises his
functions as an attorney, not as a matter of right, but
as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior and the
exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or
suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or
incidental power. It has been elevated to an express
mandate by the Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being
unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment of
whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty.
Almacen here in question are properly the object of
disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is,
of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's part.
Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands
in its way. Beyond making the mere offer, however, he
went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he
actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his
vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated
entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all
calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect
to the Court and its members. Picturing his client as
"a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he
categorically denounces the justice administered by
this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb."
With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court
and its members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court
the perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut
justice" while at the same time branding its members
as "calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his
announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in
the people's forum," he caused the publication in the
papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated
effort ;to startle the public, stir up public
indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called upon
to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered
no apology. Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he
rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and,
alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred and
feathered the Court and its members as inveterate
hypocrites incapable of administering justice and
unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's
petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for
itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous
innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible
bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve
any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney,
attract public attention to himself and, more important
of all, bring ;this Court and its members into disrepute
and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment
of the orderly administration of justice. Odium of this
character and texture presents no redeeming feature,
and completely negates any pretense of passionate
commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a
classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation
of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the
Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed
to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our
disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need
therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of
immunity from criticism. Like any other Government
entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and
should not be, above criticism. But a critique of the
Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting
to its high function as the court of last resort. And
more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no
means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment
and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only
through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism
of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness
and must be informed -by perspective and infused by
philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the
exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as
Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court
are the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all
rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter
misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only
of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our
role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary
proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is
not — and does not involve — a trial of an action or
a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into
the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to.
inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff
nor a prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to
be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise
of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon
a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as
an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving
the purity of the legal profession and the proper and
honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have
proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office
of an attorney. 29 In such posture, there can thus be
no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain
degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court
as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so
against the individual members thereof. But in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as
an entity separate and distinct from the individual
personalities of its members. Consistently with the
intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual
members act not as such individuals but. only as a duly
constituted court. Their distinct individualities are
lost in the majesty of their office. 30So that, in a very
real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at
bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual
members thereof — as well as the people themselves whose
rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would
be placed at grave hazard should the administration of
justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of
men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of
membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice
of law is but a necessary incident of the power to admit
persons to said practice. By constitutional precept,
this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This
duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot
unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested
upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the
members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved
parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify
them from the exercise of that power because public
policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise
the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action.
The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined
anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities
of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely
inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent
of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty. Almacen
for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of
Court, these may range from mere suspension to total
removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under
the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course,
primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court
which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor
motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should
ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity
and independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and
the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously
maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of
considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized. However,
heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should
never be decreed where a lesser sanction would
accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may
not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light
of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that
abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an
advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there
is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our Fernando, J., took no part.
view that suspension will suffice under the
circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his
misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor
offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining
how long that suspension should last and, accordingly,
we are impelled to decree that the same should be
indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone
because jurisprudence grants us discretion on the lSECOND DIVISION
matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting
support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have [A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000]
authority to completely exclude a person from the
practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite LESLIE UI, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS
suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can BONIFACIO, respondent.
be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that
authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by D E C I S I O N
the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to
determine for himself how long or how short that DE LEON, JR., J.:
suspension shall last. For, at any time after the
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment
suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court
that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law. against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on
an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. complainant, Leslie Ui.
Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from
The relevant facts are:
the practice of law until further orders, the suspension
to take effect immediately.
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos
L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the
City[1] and as a result of their marital union, they had
Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the
Court of Appeals for their information and guidance. four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and
Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987,
Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, however, complainant found out that her husband, Carlos
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor JJ., Ui, was carrying on an illicit relationship with
concur. respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a
daughter sometime in 1986, and that they had been living
together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang
Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate
of the College of Law of the University of the
Philippines was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.
Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with
the respondent. Complainant then visited respondent at
her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced
herself as the legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon,
respondent admitted to her that she has a child with
Carlos Ui and alleged, however, that everything was over
between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the
representations of respondent and thought things would
turn out well from then on and that the illicit
relationship between her husband and respondent would
come to an end.
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit
relationship between her husband and respondent
continued, and that sometime in December 1988,
respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a second child.
Complainant then met again with respondent sometime in
March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue
her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail.
The illicit relationship persisted and complainant even
came to know later on that respondent had been employed
by her husband in his company.
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No.
3319, was then filed on August 11, 1989 by the
complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio
before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter,
Commission) on the ground of immorality, more
particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship
with the complainants husband, Carlos Ui. In her
Answer,[2] respondent averred that she met Carlos Ui
sometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a
bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui
had children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from
whom he had long been estranged. She stated that during
one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his
intention to marry her and they in fact got married in
Hawaii, USA in 1985[3]. Upon their return to Manila,
respondent did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter
continued to live with his children in their Greenhills
residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to
let the children gradually to know and accept the fact
of his second marriage before they would live
together.[4]
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in
Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only return occasionally
to the Philippines to update her law practice and renew
legal ties. During one of her trips to Manila sometime
in June 1988, respondent was surprised when she was
confronted by a woman who insisted that she was the
lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her
discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui,
respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in
July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her two
(2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after she
reported to work with the law firm[5] she was connected
with, the woman who represented herself to be the wife
of Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to know
if Carlos Ui has been communicating with her.
It is respondents contention that her relationship with
Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married abroad
and that after June 1988 when respondent discovered
Carlos Uis true civil status, she cut off all her ties
with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived
with her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam
Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was
respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged
to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said
house was built exclusively from her parents funds.[6] By
way of counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages
in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00)
against complainant for having filed the present
allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case
against respondent.
In her Reply[7] dated April 6, 1990, complainant states,
among others, that respondent knew perfectly well that
Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children
with her even at the start of her relationship with
Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went abroad
was to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos
Ui.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the
Integrated Bar, complainant also charged her husband,
Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage
before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal,
docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed
for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable
cause for the offense charged. The resolution dismissing
the criminal complaint against respondent reads:
Complainants evidence had prima facie
established the existence of the "illicit
relationship" between the respondents
allegedly discovered by the complainant in
December 1987. The same evidence however show
that respondent Carlos Ui was still living
with complainant up to the latter part of 1988
and/or the early part of 1989.
It would therefore be logical and safe to
state that the "relationship" of respondents
started and was discovered by complainant
sometime in 1987 when she and respondent
Carlos were still living at No. 26 Potsdam
Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan,
MetroManila and they, admittedly, continued
to live together at their conjugal home up
to early (sic) part of 1989 or later 1988,
when respondent Carlos left the same.
From the above, it would not be amiss to
conclude that altho (sic) the relationship,
illicit as complainant puts it, had been prima
facie established by complainants evidence,
this same evidence had failed to even prima
facie establish the "fact of respondents
cohabitation in the concept of husband and
wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang
house, proof of which is necessary and
indispensable to at least create probable
cause for the offense charged. The statement
alone of complainant, worse, a statement only
of a conclusion respecting the fact of
cohabitation does not make the complainants
evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S.
vs. Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).
It is worth stating that the evidence
submitted by respondents in support of their
respective positions on the matter support
 and bolster the foregoing
conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully
recommended that the instant complaint be
dismissed for want of evidence to establish
probable cause for the offense charged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[8]
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary of Justice,
but the same was dismissed [9] on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence to prove her allegation that
respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as husband and
wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila.
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to Cite
Respondent in Contempt of the Commission [10] wherein
she charged respondent with making false allegations
in her Answer and for submitting a supporting document
which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that
in the Answer of respondent filed before the Integrated
Bar, respondent averred, among others, that she was
married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and attached
a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment.
However, the Certificate of Marriage [11] duly certified
by the State Registrar as a true copy of the record on
file in the Hawaii State Department of Health, and duly
authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in
Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of marriage
between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio
was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed
by respondent in her Answer. According to complainant,
the reason for that false allegation was because
respondent wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the
birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the
wedlock.[12] It is the contention of complainant that
such act constitutes a violation of Articles 183[13] and
184[14] of the Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of
the Commission; and that the act of respondent in making
false allegations in her Answer and submitting an
altered/intercalated document are indicative of her
moral perversity and lack of integrity which make her
unworthy to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in
Contempt),[15] respondent averred that she did not have
the original copy of the marriage certificate because
the same was in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that
she annexed such copy because she relied in good faith
on what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate
in her possession.
Respondent filed her Memorandum [16] on February 22,
1995 and raised the lone issue of whether or not she
has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which
she deserves to be barred from the practice of law.
Respondent averred that the complaint should be
dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a
manner consistent with the requirement
of good moral character for the practice
of the legal profession; and
 (ii) Complainant failed to prove her
allegation that respondent conducted
herself in an immoral manner.[17]
In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that
it was she who was the victim in this case and not Leslie
Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already
married, and that upon learning of this fact, respondent
immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She
stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at that
time that the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a
bachelor because he spent so much time with her, and
he was so open in his courtship.[18]
On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate,
respondent alleged that it was highly incredible for
her to have knowingly attached such marriage certificate
to her Answer had she known that the same was altered.
Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling
reason for her to make it appear that her marriage to
Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or 1987, because
the fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got
married before complainant confronted respondent and
informed the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos
Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent stated that it was
Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that he was the
person responsible for changing the date of the marriage
certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not
present evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui
on this matter.
Respondent posits that complainants evidence,
consisting of the pictures of respondent with a child,
pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a
garage with cars, a picture of a light colored car with
Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and portion
of the house and ground, and another picture of the same
car bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the house
and the garage,[19] does not prove that she acted in an
immoral manner. They have no evidentiary value according
to her. The pictures were taken by a photographer from
a private security agency and who was not presented
during the hearings. Further, the respondent presented
the Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S.
Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed by
Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of evidence to
establish probable cause for the offense
charged [20] and the dismissal of the appeal by the
Department of Justice [21] to bolster her argument that
she was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act because
of her relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent
claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos
Ui in good faith and that her conduct cannot be
considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can
it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with
Carlos Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that upon
her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways
with him.
In the Memorandum [22] filed on March 20, 1995 by
complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for the disbarment
of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent
committed immorality by having intimate relations with
a married man which resulted in the birth of two (2)
children. Complainant testified that respondents
mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally knew
complainant and her husband since the late 1970s because
they were clients of the bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was
the Branch Manager.[23] It was thus highly improbable
that respondent, who was living with her parents as of
1986, would not have been informed by her own mother
that Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant likewise
averred that respondent committed disrespect towards
the Commission for submitting a photocopy of a document
containing an intercalated date.
In her Reply to Complainants Memorandum [24], respondent
stated that complainant miserably failed to show
sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent
insists that contrary to the allegations of complainant,
there is no showing that respondent had knowledge of
the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The
allegation that her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married
man does not prove that such information was made known
to respondent.
Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission
on Bar Discipline submitted its Report and
Recommendation, finding that:
In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the
time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, the
latter represented himself to be single. The
Commission does not find said claim too
difficult to believe in the light of
contemporary human experience.
Almost always, when a married man courts a
single woman, he represents himself to be
single, separated, or without any firm
commitment to another woman. The reason
therefor is not hard to fathom. By their very
nature, single women prefer single men.
The records will show that when respondent
became aware the (sic) true civil status of
Carlos Ui, she left for the United States (in
July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with
him. When she returned to the Philippines in
March of 1989, she lived with her brother,
Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and
respondent only talked to each other because
of the children whom he was allowed to visit.
At no time did they live together.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the
Commission fails to find any act on the part
of respondent that can be considered as
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure,
she was more of a victim that (sic) anything
else and should deserve compassion rather
than condemnation. Without cavil, this sad
episode destroyed her chance of having a
normal and happy family life, a dream
cherished by every single girl.
x..........................x.......................
...x"
Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice of Resolution
dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
 herein made part of this Resolution/Decision
as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, the complaint
for Gross Immorality against Respondent is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris
Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and
willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified
Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same will merit a
more severe penalty."
We agree with the findings aforequoted.
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does
not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal
profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It
is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the
mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath
and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for
admission to the practice of law are:
a. he must be a citizen of the
Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against
him involving moral turpitude, are
filed or pending in court;
f. possess the required educational
qualifications; and
g. pass the bar
examinations. [25] (Italics supplied)
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions
prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must
possess good moral character. More importantly,
possession of good moral character must be continuous
as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of
law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground
for the revocation of such privilege. It has been held
-
If good moral character is a sine qua non for
admission to the bar, then the continued
possession of good moral character is also
a requisite for retaining membership in the
legal profession. Membership in the bar may
be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have
good moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117
Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude". A member
of the bar should have moral integrity in
addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and
to fix an inflexible standard as to what is
"grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the
moral delinquency and obliquity which render
a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member
 of the bar. The rule implies that what appears
to be unconventional behavior to the
straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct
that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that
conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community." (7
C.J.S. 959).[26]
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty.
Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she knew and
believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with
him and they got married and as a result of such marriage,
she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge
of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him.
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects
of the actuations of respondent are not only far from
simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the
standard norms of our legal practitioners should be
defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today
is a far cry from what it used to be before. This
permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of
public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social
responsibility and thus must handle their personal
affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case
lead us to believe that perhaps respondent would not
have found herself in such a compromising situation had
she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding
out more about Carlos Uis personal background prior to
her intimate involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least
aroused respondents suspicion that something was amiss
in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to
ask probing questions. For instance, respondent
admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with
a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never
exerted the slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui
and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite
their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with
respondent and their first child, a circumstance that
is simply incomprehensible considering respondents
allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable
conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing
her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that
her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with
what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot
be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct
that shows indifference to the moral norms of society
and the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community.[27] Moreover, for such conduct to warrant
disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral,"
that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute
a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible
to a high degree.[28]
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of
the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships x x x but must also so behave himself as
to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief
that he is flouting those moral
standards." [29] Respondents act of immediately
distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his
true civil status belies just that alleged moral
indifference and proves that she had no intention of Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand
flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the no less than the highest degree of morality.
legal profession. Complainants bare assertions to the
contrary deserve no credit. After all, the burden of WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against
proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged
exercise its disciplinary powers only if she establishes immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.
her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory
evidence.[30] This, herein complainant miserably failed However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching
to do. to her Answer a photocopy of her Marriage Certificate,
with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a
On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage STERNWARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed
attached by respondent to her Answer, we find improbable on her for any repetition of the same or similar offense
to believe the averment of respondent that she merely in the future.
relied on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate
which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as SO ORDERED.
significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride
would verily recall the date and year of her marriage.
It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a
lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the year when
she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human
experience and highly improbable. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the Manila
information contained in an attachment to her pleading,
especially so when she has personal knowledge of the EN BANC
facts and circumstances contained therein. In attaching
such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated date, G.R. No. L-1179 January 8, 1913
the defense of good faith of respondent on that point
cannot stand. In re application of MARIO GUARIÑA for admission to the
bar.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly
to the highest standards of morality. The legal Mario Guariña in his behalf.
profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers
are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, CARSON, J.:
free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice.
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597,
the applicant in this case seeks admission to the bar,
without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground
that he holds the office of provincial fiscal for the
Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907,
is as follows:
SEC. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered
One hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act providing a
Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special
Proceedings in the Philippine Islands," is hereby
amended to read as follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and
orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of Spain
or of the United States and are in good and regular
standing as members of the bar of the Philippine Islands
at the time of the adoption of this Code: Provided, That
any person who, prior to the passage of this Act, or
at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the
authority of the United States, the position of justice
of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First
Instance, or judge or associate judge of the Court of
Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the
position of Attorney-General, Solicitor-General,
Assistant Attorney-General, assistant attorney in the
office of the Attorney-General, prosecuting attorney
for the city of Manila, assistant prosecuting attorney
for the city of Manila, city attorney of Manila,
assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal,
attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney
for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law
in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an
examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and
establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said
court."
The records of this court disclose that on a former
occasion this applicant took, and failed to pass the
prescribed examination. The report of the examining
board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he received an
average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of
legal learning upon which he was examined, thus falling
four points short of the required percentage of 75. We
would be delinquent in the performance of our duty to
the public and to the bar, if, in the face of this
affirmative indication of the deficiency of the
applicant in the required qualifications of learning
in the law at the time when he presented his former
application for admission to the bar, we should grant
him a license to practice law in the courts of these
Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that
despite his failure to pass the examination on that
occasion, he now "possesses the necessary
qualifications of learning and ability."
But it is contended that under the provisions of the
above-cited statute the applicant is entitled as of
right to be admitted to the bar without taking the
prescribed examination "upon motion before the Supreme
Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has
held and now holds the office of provincial fiscal of
the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind
the object which the legislator apparently sought to
attain in enacting the above-cited amendment to the
earlier statute, and in view of the context generally
and especially of the fact that the amendment was
inserted as a proviso in that section of the original
Act which specifically provides for the admission of
certain candidates without examination, the clause "may
be licensed to practice law in the courts of the
Philippine Islands without and examination" should be
construed so as to mean "shall be licensed to practice
law in the Philippine Islands without an examination."
It is contended that this mandatory construction is
imperatively required in order to give effect to the
apparent intention of the legislator, and to the
candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.
It must be confessed that were the inquiry limited
strictly to the provisions of local law touching this
matter, the contentions of the applicant would have
great weight . For it is well settled that in statutory
interpretation the word "may" should be read "shall"
where such construction is necessary to give effect to
the apparent intention of the legislator. In Rock Island
County Supervisors vs. United States (71 U.S., 435,
446), Mr. Justice Swayne says:
The conclusion to be deduced from the authorities is
that where power is given to public officers, in the
language of the Act before us, or in equivalent language,
whenever the public interest or individual rights call
for its exercise, the language used, though permissive
in form, is in fact peremptory. What they are empowered
to do for a third person the law requires shall be done.
The power is given, not for their benefit, but for his.
It is placed with the depository to meet the demands
of right, and to prevent a failure of justice. It is
given as a remedy to those entitled to invoke its aid,
who would otherwise be remediless. In all such cases
it is held that the intent of the Legislature, which
is the test, was not to devolve a mere discretion, but
to impose a positive and absolute duty.
Whether the word "may" in a statute is to be construed
as mandatory and imposing a duty, or merely as permissive
and conferring discretion, is to be determined in each
case from the apparent intention of the statute as
gathered from the context, as well as from the language
of the particular provision. The question in each case
is whether, taken as a whole and viewed in the light
of surrounding circumstances, it can be said that a
purpose existed on the part of the legislator to enact
a law mandatory in its character. If it can, then it
should be given a mandatory effect. (Colby
University vs. Village of Canandaigua (U.S.), 69 Fed.,
671, 673; Kansas Pacific Ry. Co. vs. Reynolds, 8 Kan.,
623, 628; Kemble vs. McPhaill, 60 Pac., 1092, 1093, 128
Cal., 444; Inhabitants of Worcester
County vs.Schlesinger, 82 Mass. (16 Gray), 166, 168;
People vs. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 56 N.E., 953, 956,
184 Ill., 597; State vs. Withrow (Mo.), 24 S.W., 638,
641; Leavenworth & D. M.R. Co. vs. Platte County Court,
42 Mo., 171, 174.)
Applying these canons of construction to the statute
under consideration, and limiting ourselves strictly
to the provisions of local law touching the admission
of candidates to the bar, we might, as we have said,
be inclined to give the statute the mandatory effect
which applicant claims should be placed upon it. But
we are of opinion that such a construction is precluded
by the provisions of the Act of Congress enacted July
1, 1902, which confirm and secure to this court the
jurisdiction theretofore conferred upon it. Section 9
of that Act is as follows:
That the Supreme Courts of First Instance of the
Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise
jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional
jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by the
Government of said Islands, subject to the power of said
Government to change the practice and method of
procedure. The municipal courts of said Islands shall
possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore
provided by the Philippine Commission, subject in all
matters to such alteration and amendment as may be
hereafter enacted by law; and the Chief Justice and
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court shall hereafter
be appointed by the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, and shall receive the
compensation heretofore prescribed by the Commission
until otherwise provided by Congress. The judges of the
Court of First Instance shall be appointed by the Civil
Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the
Philippine Commission: Provided, That the admiralty
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and Courts of First
Instance shall not be changed except by Act of Congress.
Prior to the passage of this Act the power and
jurisdiction of this court in relation to the admission
of candidates to the bar of the Philippine Islands had
been fixed by the provisions of the Organic Act (No.
136) and the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190); and
as we understand these provisions this court was vested
thereby with authority, and charged with a duty to pass
upon the "moral character" and the "qualifications and
ability" of all candidates for admission to the bar.
The pertinent provisions of these statutes are as
follows:
(Act No. 136.) "SEC . 2. Constitution of judiciary. —
The judicial power of the Government of the Philippine
Islands shall be vested in a Supreme Court, Courts of
First Instance, and courts of justices of the peace,
together with such special jurisdictions of municipal
courts, and other special tribunals as now are or
hereafter may be authorized by law. The two courts first
named shall be courts of record.
(Act No. 136.) "SEC. 16. Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. — The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall
be of two kinds:
1. Original; and
2. Appellate.
SEC. 17. Its original jurisdiction. — The Supreme Court
shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs
of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas
corpus, and quo warranto in the cases and in the manner
prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, and to hear
and to determine the controversies thus brought before
it, and in other cases provided by law.
(Act No. 190.) "SEC. 13. Who may practice as lawyers. —
The following persons, if not specially declared
ineligible, are entitled to practice law in the courts
of the Philippine Islands:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and
orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of Spain
or of the United States and are in good and regular
standing as members of the bar of the Philippine Islands
at the time of the adoption of this Code;
2. Those who are hereafter licensed in the manner herein
prescribed.
SEC. 14. Qualifications of applicants. — Any resident
of the Philippine Islands, not a subject or citizen of
any foreign government, of the age of twenty-three years,
of good moral character, and who possesses the necessary
qualifications of learning and ability, is entitled to
admission as a member of the bar of the Islands and to
practice as such in all their courts.
SEC. 15. Certificate of good character required. — Every
applicant for admission as a member of the bar must
produce the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of
good moral character, and must satisfactorily pass a
proper examination upon all the codes of law and
procedure in force in the Philippine Islands, and upon
such other branches of legal learning as the Supreme
Court by general rule shall provide. . . .
SEC. 16. Place and manner of examinations. — Such
examinations shall be conducted at Manila, by the judges
of the Supreme Court or by a committee of competent
lawyers by them to be appointed, and shall be held at
such times as the judges of the court shall provide by
general or special rules.
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this
court by the Commission and confirmed to it by the Act
of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a
case such as that under consideration wholly destroyed,
by giving the word "may," as used in the above citation
from Act No. 1597, a mandatory rather than a permissive
effect. But any Act of the Commission which has the
effect of setting at naught in whole or in part the Act
of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress
prescribing, defining or limiting the power conferred
upon the Commission is to that extent invalid and void,
as transcending its rightful limits and authority.
The Act of Congress was the creator of the Commission
and indeed of the Government of these Islands, which
is the creature of its creator. Its powers are defined,
prescribed and limited by the Act which created it, and
by such other lawful acts of its creator as may further
define, prescribe, limit or expand these powers. It
cannot lawfully transcend or infringe upon the limits
thus prescribed, and any Act of the Commission repugnant
to the Act of Congress which created it, or which is
repugnant to any other lawful Act of its creator defining,
prescribing or limiting its authority is void and
invalid. The various Acts of Congress conferring power
upon the Philippine Legislature, and defining,
prescribing and limiting this power, especially the Act
of Congress of July 1, 1902, are to that Legislature
in the nature of an organic act with its amendments,
binding on it in like manner as is the Constitution of
the United States upon Congress itself.
In the great case of Marbury vs. Madison (1 Cranch, 175),
the Supreme Court of the United States, in a decision
written by Chief Justice Marshall, laid down the
doctrine in this regard which has been followed by that
court unhesitatingly ever since. In that case the court
held that an Act of Congress repugnant to the
Constitution cannot become law, and that the courts of
the United States are bound to take notice if the
Constitution.
Applying the reasoning of that case to the question of
the validity of an Act of the Philippine Commission
enacted since the date of the passage of the Philippine
Bill which is found to be in conflict with the provisions
of the Act of Congress dealing with the same subject
matter, and especially with the provisions of the
Philippine Bill itself, we think there can be no doubt
as to the result. The Act of the Commission in so far
as it is in conflict with or in any wise repugnant to
the various Acts of Congress dealing with the same
subject matter must be held to be void and of no effect.
Paraphrasing slightly the language used in the early
case of Kemper vs. Hawkins (1 Va. Cases, 20-24), it may
be said that the Acts of the Congress of the United States
are to the Commission, or rather to all the departments
of the Philippine Government, what a law is to
individuals; nay, they constitute not only a rule of
action to the various branches of the Government, but
it is from them that the very existence of the power
of the Government flows, and it is by virtue of the Acts
of Congress that the powers (or portions of the right
to govern) which may have been committed to this
Government are prescribed. The Act of Congress was the
Commission's commission; nay, it was its creator.
Section 9 of the Act of Congress, set out above, placed
it beyond the power of the local Legislature to deprive
this court of the jurisdiction or power theretofore
granted to it; leaving however, to local legislative
authority the right to confer additional jurisdiction,
or to change the practice and method of procedure. The
above-cited provisions of Act No. 190, in force at the
time when the Act of Congress was enacted, conferred
upon this court the power and jurisdiction to deny
admission to candidates for the bar unless, in addition
to certain other prescribed conditions, they satisfy
the court that they possess the necessary learning in
the law, by passing an examination prescribed by general
rule. It seems clear, therefore, that the Commission,
while it was undoubtedly authorized to modify the
provision requiring the holding of examinations under
general rules (that being merely the prescribed mode
of procedure whereby the court was required to ascertain
the qualifications of the candidate), had no authority
to deprive this court of its power to deny admission
to any candidate who fails to satisfy it that he
possesses the necessary qualifications for admission
to the bar of the Philippine Islands.
In construing a statute enacted by the Philippine
Commission we deem it our duty not to give it a
construction which would be repugnant to an Act of
Congress, if the language of the statute is fairly
susceptible of another construction not in conflict with
the higher law. In doing so, we think we should not
hesitate to disregard contentions touching the apparent
intention of the legislator which would lead to the
conclusion that the Commission intended to enact a law
in violation of the Act of Congress. However specious
the argument may be in favor of one of two possible
constructions, it must be disregarded if on examination
it is found to rest on the contention that the legislator
designed an attempt to transcend the rightful limits
of his authority, and that his apparent intention was
to enact an invalid law.
Black on Interpretation of Laws at page 87 says: "In
construing a doubtful or ambiguous statute, the courts
will presume that it was the intention of the legislature
to enact a valid, sensible, and just law, and one which
should change the prior law no further than may be
necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the act
in question. The construction should be in harmony with
this assumption whenever possible."
The same author, at pages 93 and 94, says: "Hence it
follows that the courts will not so construe the law
as to make it conflict with the constitution, but will
rather put such an interpretation upon it as will avoid
conflict with the constitution and give it full force
and effect, if this can be done without extravagance.
If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of
the legislature, if the words of provisions of the
statute are obscure, or if the enactment is fairly
susceptible of two or more constructions, that
interpretation will be adopted which will avoid the
effect of unconstitutionality, even though it may be
necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual
or apparent import of the language employed."
Without undue straining of the language used in the
statute under consideration, the word "may" may be
construed as either mandatory or permissive in its
effect. But to construe it as mandatory would bring it
in direct conflict with the Act of Congress, and we
conclude therefore, despite the contentions of the
applicant as to the apparent intention of the legislator,
that it should be given its permissive and not its
mandatory effect, and that the true intention of the
legislator was to leave it within the discretion of the
court to admit to the bar without examination the
officials mentioned in the Act in any case wherein the
court is otherwise satisfied that they possess the
necessary qualifications.
Ordinarily, and in the absence of any showing to the
contrary, it may fairly be assumed that an applicant
who has held one of the offices mentioned in the statute,
and who, prior to his appointment, had been admitted
to the practice of law in the courts of these Islands
under the former sovereign or in some other jurisdiction
is duly qualified for admission to the bar of these
Islands. In the case In re Du Fresne (20 Phil. Rep.,
488, 492), speaking of the provisions of this Act, we
said:
Appointments to the positions mentioned in Act No. 1597
are made either by the President of the United States
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, or
by the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands by
and with the advice and consent of the Philippine
Commission, and the legislator evidently conceived that
the fact that such an appointment is made is a sufficient
guaranty that after due inquiry the appointee has been
found to be possessed of at least the necessary
qualifications for admission to the bar.
In the various cases wherein applications for admission
to the bar under the provisions of this statute have
been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact
that such appointments had been made as satisfactory
evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. But
in all of those cases we had reason to believe that the
applicants had been practicing attorneys prior to the
date of their appointment.
In the case under consideration, however, it
affirmatively appears that the applicant was not and
never had been a practicing attorney in this or any other
jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment as
provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears
that he was deficient in the required qualifications
at the time when he last applied for admission to the
bar.

In the light of this affirmative proof of his deficiency

on that occasion, we do not think that his appointment
to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself
satisfactory proof of his possession of the necessary
qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude
therefore that this application for license to practice
in the courts of the Philippines should be denied.

In view, however, of the fact that when he took the

examination he fell only four points short of the
necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice;
and in view also of the fact that since that time he
has held the responsible office of governor of the
Province of Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of
such marked ability in the performance of the duties
of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent
and approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to
retain him in the Government service by appointing him
to the office of provincial fiscal, we think we would
be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act
No. 1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination
prescribed by general rule, provided he offers
satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special
examination which will be given him by a committee of
the court upon his application therefor, without
prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do, to present
himself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribed
by general rule. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, and Trent, JJ., concur. EN BANC

[B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004]
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE
HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND
FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE
SHARIA BAR,
ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,
R E S O L U T I O N
TINGA, J.:
The Court is here confronted with a Petition that
seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while the other
has been rendered moot by a supervening event.
The antecedents follow.
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez
(Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) a Petition[1] to disqualify Haron S. Meling
(Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to
impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as
a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did
not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal
cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa.
15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and
Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical
Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident
which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly
uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife
in front of media practitioners and other people. Meling
also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez
wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been
using the title Attorney in his communications, as
Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the
fact that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to
the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that
Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to
have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod
of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this
Courts Resolution[2] dated December 3, 2002, Meling
filed his Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer,[3] Meling explains that he did not
disclose the criminal cases filed against him by
Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their
former professor, advised him to settle his
misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good
faith that the case would be settled because the said
Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their
former professor in the College of Law, Meling
considered the three cases that actually arose from a
single incident and involving the same parties as closed
and terminated. Moreover, Meling denies the charges and
adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral
turpitude.
As regards the use of the title Attorney, Meling
admits that some of his communications really contained
the word Attorney as they were, according to him, typed
by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation[4] dated December
8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of non-disclosure
against Meling in this wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal
cases filed against him in his petition to take the Bar
Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that
only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss
cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact,
the cases filed against Meling are still
pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these
cases were already dismissed, he is still required to
disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good
moral character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations
are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly
by an applicant.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material
in this case. What matters is his act of concealing them
which constitutes dishonesty.
In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:
It has been held that good moral character is what a
person really is, as distinguished from good reputation
or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the
estimate in which he is held by the public in the place
where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective
term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The
standard of personal and professional integrity is not
satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person
to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral
character includes at least common honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed
against him makes him also answerable under Rule 7.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states
that a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making
a false statement or suppressing a material fact in
connection with his application for admission to the
bar.[5]
As regards Melings use of the title Attorney, the
OBC had this to say:
Anent the issue of the use of the appellation Attorney
in his letters, the explanation of Meling is not
acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the Bar,
there was no valid reason why he signed as attorney
whoever may have typed the letters.
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in
the practice of law, the fact is, he is signing his
communications as Atty. Haron S. Meling knowing fully
well that he is not entitled thereto. As held by the
Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the
appellation attorney may render a person liable for
indirect contempt of court.[6]
Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not
be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and sign the Roll
of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar
Examinations. Further, it recommended that Melings
membership in the Sharia Bar be suspended until further
orders from the Court.[7]
We fully concur with the findings and recommendation
of the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar
Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it
seeks to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath
and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.
On the other hand, the prayer in the
same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate
sanctions upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar is ripe
for resolution and has to be acted upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the
Sharia Court, is not a matter of right but merely a
privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only
learned in the law but who are also known to possess
good moral character.[8] The requirement of good moral
character is not only a condition precedent to admission
to the practice of law, its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law.[9]
The standard form issued in connection with the
application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations requires
the applicant to aver that he or she has not been charged
with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or
regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or
administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or
convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or
crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any
pending case or charge against him/her. Despite the
declaration required by the form, Meling did not reveal
that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate
silence constitutes concealment, done under oath at
that.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court
to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of
good moral character of the applicant.[10] The nature of
whatever cases are pending against the applicant would
aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed with
the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing
the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks
the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately
proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or
affect the good moral character of the applicant.
Melings concealment of the fact that there are three
(3) pending criminal cases against him speaks of his
lack of the requisite good moral character and results
in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him
as a member of the Sharia Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation Attorney,
knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use,
cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,[11] the Court
had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use
of the title Attorney by members of the Sharia Bar who
are not likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The
respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of the
4thJudicial Sharia District in Marawi City, used the
title Attorney in several correspondence in connection
with the rescission of a contract entered into by him
in his private capacity. The Court declared that:
persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged
members of the Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice
law before Sharia courts. While one who has been
admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one who has been admitted
to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered counselors,
in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an
attorney. The title attorney is reserved to those who,
having obtained the necessary degree in the study of
law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have
been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is
they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.[12]
The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers
of the court, such as Meling in this case. The solemn
task of administering justice demands that those who
are privileged to be part of service therein, from the
highest official to the lowliest employee, must not only
be competent and dedicated, but likewise live and
practice the virtues of honesty and integrity. Anything
short of this standard would diminish the public's faith
in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the
constitutional tenet that a public office is a public
trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed
the fact of his marriage in his application to take the
Bar examinations and made conflicting submissions
before the Court. As a result, we found the respondent
grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the practice
of law and suspended him therefrom until further orders
from the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it
seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron
S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Sharia EN BANC
Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in
the Philippine Sharia Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until [A.C. No. 6492. November 18, 2004]
further orders from the Court, the suspension to take MELANIO L. ZORETA, complainant, vs. ATTY. HEHERSON
effect immediately. Insofar as the Petitionseeks to ALNOR G. SIMPLICIANO, respondent.
prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath
and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the D E C I S I O N
Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become
moot and academic. CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all
the Sharia Courts in the country for their information
and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
This is a complaint for disbarment filed against Atty.
Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano for allegedly notarizing
several documents during the year 2002 after his
commission as notary public had expired.
Complainant Melanio L. Zoreta alleged that on 02
August 2001, he filed before Branch 4 of the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo City, a complaint for Breach
of Contract and Damages against Security Pacific
Assurance Corporation (SPAC) dated 22 June 2001 due to
the latters failure to honor SPACs Commercial Vehicle
Policy No. 94286, where respondent Atty. Heherson Alnor
G. Simpliciano was the latters counsel. In said cases,
respondent who was not a duly commissioned Notary Public
in 2002 per Certifications[1] issued by the Clerk of
Court of Quezon City Mercedes S. Gatmaytan, performed
acts of notarization, as evidenced by the following
documents, viz:
1. Verification[2] executed by Aurora C. Galvez,
President of defendant SPAC, subscribed and
sworn to before Atty. Heherson Alnor G.
Simpliciano on February 18, 2002 as alleged
notary public, in Quezon City and attached
to defendants Very Urgent Motion (1) To Lift
the Order of Default; and (2) To defer
Plaintiffs Presentation of Evidence Ex-Parte
dated February 18, 2002;
2. Affidavits of Merit[3] signed by Aurora Galvez
attached to the pleading mentioned in par.
1 hereof, likewise notarized by Atty.
Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano as alleged
Notary Public in Quezon City, on February 18,
2002;
3. The Affidavit of Service[4] signed by a certain
Renee L. Ramos, a Legal Assistant in
Simpliciano and Capela Law Office, and
subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson
Alnor G. Simpliciano on February 19, 2002 as
alleged Notary Public in Quezon City. Said
Affidavit of Service was attached to the
pleading mentioned in Par. 1 hereof;
4. The Affidavit of Service[5] of one Nestor Abayon,
another Legal Assistant of Simpliciano and
Capela Law Office, subscribed and sworn to
before Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano
on 01 April 2002 at Quezon City, as Notary
Public. This Affidavit of Service was
attached to defendants Motion (1) For
Reconsideration of the Order dated 05 March
2002; and (2) To allow defendants to Present
Defensive Evidence dated 27 March 2002.
5. The Verification and Certification Against
Forum Shopping[6] signed this time by a
certain Celso N. Sarto, as affiant, notarized
on 16 August 2002 by Atty. Heherson Alnor G.
Simpliciano. This Verification and
Certification Against Forum Shopping was
attached to defendants Motion For Extension
of Time To File Petition Under Rule 65 before
the Court of Appeals;
6. The Affidavit of Service[7] signed by a certain
Joseph B. Aganan, another Legal Assistant in
Simpliciano and Capela Law Office subscribed
and sworn to before Atty. Heherson Alnor G.
Simpliciano as Notary Public on 16 August 2002.
This Affidavit of Service signed by Aganan
was also attached to that Motion For Extension
of Time To File Petition under Rule 65 before
the Court of Appeals;
 7. Verification and Certification Against Forum
Shopping[8] executed by one Celso N. Sarto,
alleged Executive Vice President and Claims
Manager of defendant SPAC and notarized by
Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on 19
August 2002, attached to the Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition, etc., filed
before the Court of Appeals; and
8. Affidavit of Service[9] signed by a certain
Joseph B. Aganan, Legal Assistant of
Simpliciano and Capela Law Office,
subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson
Alnor G. Simpliciano on 19 August 2002, as
alleged Notary Public for Quezon City with
notarized commission to expire by December
31, 2002.
On 23 April 2003, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) of Pasig required respondent Atty.
Simpliciano to submit his answer within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the Order.[10]
On 26 May 2003, counsel of respondent filed
an ex-parte motion[11] for extension of time to file
answer.
On 30 June 2003, petitioner filed a motion[12]
to
resolve the complaint after the extension requested by
respondent ended on 30 May 2003, and almost a month had
lapsed from 30 May 2003, with no comment or pleading
filed by respondent.
On 17 July 2003, Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro issued
an order,[13] giving respondent a last chance to file his
answer, otherwise the case shall be deemed submitted
for resolution. Respondent failed to do so.
Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro submitted her report
and recommendation[14] dated 12 February 2004, pertinent
portions of which read:
A careful examination and evaluation of the evidence
submitted by the petitioner showed that respondent
notarized up to Document No. 590, Page 118, Book No.
II, Series of 2002 and his commission expires December
31, 2002 which referred to the Affidavit of Service
signed and executed by Joseph B. Aganan Legal Assistant
of Simpliciano and Capela Law Office subscribed and
sworn to before Notary Public Heherson Alnor G.
Simpliciano whose commission expires December 31, 2002.
All the other documents aforementioned were entered in
Book II of respondents alleged notarial book which
reflected that his commission expires on December 31,
2002 as notary public.
However, the Clerk of Court of Quezon City in her
certification dated October 4, 2002 stated that as per
records on file with their office respondent was not
duly commissioned notary public for and in Quezon City
for the year 2002.
Another certification issued by the Clerk of Court of
RTC Quezon City dated April 15, 2003 showed that as per
records on file with their office respondent was
commissioned notary public for and in Quezon City from
January 14, 2000 to December 31, 2001 and for the year
2002 and 2003 he did not apply for notarial commission
for Quezon City.
It is evident from the foregoing that when respondent
notarized the aforementioned documents, he was not
commissioned as notary public, which was in violation The eight (8) notarized documents for the year 2002
of the Notarial Law; for having notarized the 590 submitted by complainant, consisting of affidavits of
documents after the expiration of his commission as merit, certifications and verifications against
notary public without having renewed said commission non-forum shopping, and affidavits of service, were used
amounting to gross misconduct as a member of the legal and presented in the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo
profession. City, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 01-6240, and in
respondents petition for certiorari filed in the Court
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing the Undersigned of Appeals.
respectfully recommends the revocation of respondents
Against the evidence presented by complainant,
commission as notary public permanently if he is
respondent did not even attempt to present any evidence.
commissioned as such at present and his suspension from
His counsel filed an ex-parte motion for extension to
the practice of law for a period of three (3) months
file answer, which was granted, but no answer was
from receipt hereof furnishing the IBP Chapter where
forthcoming. Still, Hearing Commissioner Lydia A.
he is a registered member a copy hereof for
Navarro gave respondent a last chance to file his answer;
implementation should this recommendation be approved
which was again unheeded. Thus, respondent was unable
by the Honorable members of the Board of Governors.[15]
to rebut complainants evidence that he was not so
commissioned for the year in question. His lack of
Per Resolution No. XVI-2004-236 dated 16 April 2004,
interest and indifference in presenting his defense to
the Board of Governors modified the report and
the charge and the evidence against him can only mean
recommendation of Commissioner Navarro of suspension
he has no strong and valid defense to offer. Conclusively,
of three (3) months to a suspension of six (6) months.[16]
respondent Atty. Simpliciano is not a duly commissioned
We concur in the finding of the Investigating Notary Public for and in Quezon City for the year 2002.
Commissioner that respondent Atty. Simpliciano did not
At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the
have a commission as notary public in 2002 when he
practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed
notarized the assailed documents as evidenced by the
by the State on those who show that they possess, and
two (2) certifications issued by the Clerk of Court of
continue to possess, the qualifications required by law
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City dated 04 October
for the conferment of such privilege.[19] Membership in
2002.[17] Records also show, and as confirmed by IBP
the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer
Commissioner Navarro, that as of 02 August 2002,
has the privilege and right to practice law only during
respondent had already notarized a total of 590
good behavior and can only be deprived of it for
documents.[18] The evidence presented by complainant
misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the
conclusively establishes the misconduct imputed to
court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded
respondent.
him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or
right, an attorneys right to practice law may be resolved
by a proceeding to suspend him, based on conduct
rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise
the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must
be understood that the purpose of suspending or
disbarring him as an attorney is to remove from the
profession a person whose misconduct has proved him
unfit to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to an office of attorney,
and thus to protect the public and those charged with
the administration of justice, rather than to punish
an attorney.[20] Elaborating on this, we said in Maligsa
v. Cabanting[21] that [t]he bar should maintain a high
standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and
fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.
To this end a member of the legal fraternity should
refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any
degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public
in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal
profession.[22] Towards this end, an attorney may be
disbarred, or suspended for any violation of his oath
or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which
include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, all of these being broad enough
to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his
professional or private capacity.[23]
Apropos to the case at bar, it has been emphatically
stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public
interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public. The protection
of that interest necessarily requires that those not
qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from
imposing upon the public, the courts, and the
administrative offices in general. It must be
underscored that the notarization by a notary public
converts a private document into a public document
making that document admissible in evidence without
further proof of authenticity. A notarial document is
by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
For this reason, notaries public must observe with
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance
of their duties.[24]
The requirements for the issuance of a commission
as notary public must not be treated as a mere casual
formality. The Court has characterized a lawyers act
of notarizing documents without the requisite
commission therefore as reprehensible, constituting as
it does not only malpractice but also x x x the crime
of falsification of public documents.[25] For such
reprehensible conduct, the Court has sanctioned erring
lawyers by suspension from the practice of law,
revocation of the notarial commission and
disqualification from acting as such, and even
disbarment.[26]
In the case of Nunga v. Viray,[27] the Court had
occasion to state that where the notarization of a
document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at
a time when he has no authorization or commission to
do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary
action. For one, performing a notarial without such
commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey
the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then,
too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned
when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes,
indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers
oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall
squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
By such misconduct as a notary public, the lawyer
likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs
every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession.
On different occasions, this Court had disbarred or
suspended lawyers for notarizing documents with an
expired commission:
1. In Flores v. Lozada,[28] the court disbarred a
lawyer who notarized six documents such as the
extrajudicial partition of an estate, deed of
sale with right of repurchase, and four (4) deeds
of absolute sale - all involving unregistered
lands, after his commission as Notary Public
expired;
2. In Joson v. Baltazar,[29] the court suspended the
lawyer for three (3) months since only one (1)
instance of unauthorized notarization of a deed
of sale was involved.
3. In Nunga v. Viray,[30] the court suspended the
lawyer for three (3) years when he notarized an
absolute deed of sale of the buyer minor, who
was his son and, at the same time, he was a
stockholder and legal counsel of the vendor bank,
and when he entered in his notarial registry an
annotation of the cancellation of the loan in
favor of a certain bank, at a time when he was
not commissioned as a Notary Public. What
aggravated respondents unlawful notarization
was the fact that the transaction involved was
in favor of his son, who was then only eighteen
years old and, therefore, a minor.
4. In Buensuceso v. Barrera,[31] the lawyer was
suspended for one (1) year when he notarized five
(5) documents such as a complaint for ejectment,
affidavit, supplemental affidavit, a deed of
sale and a contract to sell, after his commission
as Notary Public expired.
Needless to state, respondent cannot escape from
disciplinary action in his capacity as a notary public
and as a member of the Philippine Bar. However, the
penalty recommended by the Board of Governors of the
IBP must be increased. Respondent must be barred from
being commissioned as a notary public permanently and
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby adopts the findings of
Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro, which the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines adopted and approved, but hereby MODIFIES
the penalty recommended by the Board of Governors. As
modified, respondent ATTY. HEHERSON ALNOR G.
SIMPLICIANO is hereby BARRED PERMANENTLY from being
commissioned as Notary Public. He is furthermore
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years,
effective upon receipt of a copy of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the
courts of the land through the Court Administrator as
well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office
of the Bar Confidant, and recorded in the personal files
of respondent himself.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 3910. August 14, 2000]
JOSE S. DUCAT, JR., complainant, vs. ATTYS.
ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. and CRISPULO
DUCUSIN, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a verified
letter-complaint [1] for disbarment against Attys.
Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr.; Andres Canares, Jr. and
Crispulo Ducusin for deceit and gross misconduct
in violation of the lawyers oath. Investigation
proceeded only against respondent Villalon
because it was discovered that Andres Canares was
not a lawyer while Atty. Crispulo Ducusin passed
away on February 3, 1996.[2]
In the letter-complaint,[3] complainant
alleged that on October 29, 1991, respondent
Villalon, as counsel for the family of complainant,
spoke to the father of complainant and asked that
he be given the title over a property owned by
complainant located in Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal
and covered by TCT No. M-3023, Emancipation Patent
No. 410414, because he allegedly had to verify
the proper measurements of the subject
property. Sometime in November, 1991, however,
complainant and his family were surprised when
several people entered the subject property and,
when confronted by the companions of complainant,
the latter were told that they were workers of
Canares and were there to construct a
piggery. Complainant complained to the barangay
authorities in Pinugay and narrated the incident
but respondent Canares did not appear before it
and continued with the construction of the piggery
in the presence of armed men who were watching
over the construction. Complainant then went to
respondent Villalon to complain about the people
of respondent Canares but nothing was done.
Complainant then filed a case for ejectment
against respondent Canares. In his Reply however,
the latter answered that the subject property was
already sold by complainant to respondent Canares
in the amount of P450,000.00 as evidenced by the
Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated
December 5, 1991 and notarized by respondent Atty.
Crispulo Ducusin. Complainant, however, averred
that he never sold the property, signed any
document nor received any money therefor, and he
also denied having appeared before respondent
Ducusin who was the notary public for the Deed
of Absolute Sale. Complainant discovered that
respondent Villalon claimed that complainants
father allegedly gave the subject property to him
(respondent Villalon) as evidenced by a document
of sale purportedly signed by complainant.
 In his Comment,[4] respondent Villalon denied
that allegations of the complainant and in turn,
he alleged that the property was given voluntarily
by Jose Ducat, Sr. to him out of close intimacy
and for past legal services rendered. Thereafter,
respondent Villalon, with the knowledge and
consent of Jose Ducat, Sr., allowed the subject
property to be used by Andres Canares to start
a piggery business without any monetary
consideration. A Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land
was then signed by Jose Ducat, Sr. to evidence
that he has conveyed the subject property to
respondent Villalon with the name of respondent
Canares included therein as protection because
of the improvements to be introduced in the
subject property. Upon presenting the title
covering the subject property, it was discovered
that the property was registered in the name of
Jose Ducat, Jr. and not Jose Ducat, Sr., but the
latter told respondents Villalon and Canares not
to worry because the land was actually owned by
him and that he merely placed the name of his son,
Jose Ducat, Jr. Jose Ducat, Sr. then suggested
that the subject property be transferred directly
from Jose Ducat, Jr. to respondent Canares; hence,
he (Ducat, Sr.) got the title and guaranteed that
he would return the document already signed and
notarized, which he did the following
day. According to respondent Canares, the
trouble began when Jose Ducat, Sr. came to his
office demanding to know why he was not allowed
to cut the trees inside the subject property by
the caretaker of respondent Canares.
On January 21, 1993, Jose Ducat, Jr. wrote[5] to
this Court and averred that he neither signed the
Deed of Sale covering the subject property nor
did he appear before the notary public Crispulo
Ducusin, who notarized the same. He averred that
respondents Villalon and Ducusin should be
disbarred from the practice of law and respondent
Villalon be imprisoned for forging his signature
and selling the subject property without his
consent.
In his Rejoinder[6], respondent Villalon
denied the allegations of complainant and
maintained that he is a member of good standing
of the Integrated Bar and that he has always
preserved the high standards of the legal
profession. Respondent Villalon expressed his
willingness to have the Deed of Sale examined by
the National Bureau of Investigation and
reiterated that the subject property was orally
given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr. and it was only
in October, 1991 that the conveyance was reduced
in writing. He added that the complainant knew
that his father, Jose Ducat, Sr., was the person
who signed the said document for and in his behalf
and that this was done with his consent and
knowledge.
This Court referred[7] the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation.
On May 17, 1997, the IBP Board of Governors
passed a resolution adopting and approving the
report and recommendation of its Investigating
Commissioner who found respondent Atty. Villalon
guilty, and recommended his suspension from the
practice of law for two (2) years and likewise
directed respondent Atty. Villalon to deliver to
 the complainant his TCT No. M-3023 within ten (10) believe considering the fact that he (Jose Ducat, Sr.)
days from receipt of notice, otherwise, this will is not the owner of said property.
result in his disbarment.
SECOND, being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know
The findings of IBP Investigating
that conveyance of a real property, whether gratuitously
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez are as follows:
or for a consideration, must be in writing. Accordingly,
it is unbelievable that he would consider himself the
Complainant and his witness, Jose Ducat, Sr., testified
owner of the subject property on the basis of the verbal
in a straightforward, spontaneous and candid
or oral giving of the property by Jose Ducat, Sr. no
manner. The sincerity and demeanor they displayed while
matter how many times the latter may have said that.
testifying before the Commission inspire belief as to
the truth of what they are saying. More importantly,
THIRD, the Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land (Exh. 1 for
respondent failed to impute any ill-motive on the part
the respondent and Exh. A-2 for the complainant)
of the complainant and his witness which can impel them
allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Sr. in favor of
to institute the instant complaint and testify falsely
respondent Atty. Arsenio Villalon and/or Andres Canares,
against him. To be sure, the testimony of the
Jr. covering the subject parcel of land which respondent
complainant and his witness deserves the Commissions
prepared allegedly upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr.
full faith and credence.
is of dubious character. As earlier adverted to, Jose
Ducat, Sr. is not the owner of said property. Moreover,
Respondents evidence, on the other hand, leaves much
said Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land is a falsified
to be desired. His defense (that he considered himself
document as admitted by the respondent himself when he
the owner of the subject property which was allegedly
said that the signature over the typewritten name Maria
given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr.) rings hollow in the
Cabrido (wife of Jose Ducat, Sr.) was affixed by Jose
face of a welter of contravening and incontrovertible
Ducat, Sr. Being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to
facts.
know that the act of Jose Ducat, Sr. in affixing his
wifes signature is tantamount to a forgery. Accordingly,
FIRST, the registered owner of the subject property is
he should have treated the said Deed of Sale of Parcel
complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. Accordingly, respondent
of Land has (sic) a mere scrap of worthless paper instead
(being a lawyer) knew or ought to know that Jose Ducat,
of relying on the same to substantiate his claim that
Sr. could not possibly give to him the said property
the subject property was given to him by Jose Ducat,
unless the former is duly authorized by the complainant
Sr. Again, of note is the fact that Jose Ducat, Sr. has
through a Special Power of Attorney. No such
vigorously denied having executed said document which
authorization has been given. Moreover, Jose Ducat, Sr.
denial is not too difficult to believe in the light of
has vigorously denied having given the subject property
the circumstances already mentioned.
to the respondent. This denial is not too difficult to
FOURTH, the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property (Exh.
2 for the respondent and Exh. A-3 for the complainant)
allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Jr. in favor of Andres
Canares, Jr. over the subject property (which respondent
claims he prepared upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr.)
is likewise of questionable character. Complainant
Jose Ducat, Jr. has vigorously denied having executed
said document. He claims that he has never sold said
property to Andres Canares, Jr. whom he does not know;
that he has never appeared before Atty. Crispulo Ducusin
to subscribe to the document; and that he has never
received the amount of P450,000.00 representing the
consideration of said transaction. More importantly,
the infirmity of the said Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property was supplied by the respondent no less when
he admitted that there was no payment of P450,000.00
and that the same was placed in the document only to
make it appear that the conveyance was for a
consideration. Accordingly, and being a lawyer,
respondent knew or ought to know the irregularity of
his act and that he should have treated the document
as another scrap of worthless paper instead of utilizing
the same to substantiate his defense.[8]
After a careful consideration of the record
of the instant case, it appears that the findings
of facts and observations of the Investigating
Commissioner, Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
which were all adopted by its Board of Governors,
are well-taken, the same being supported by the
evidence adduced.
The ethics of the legal profession rightly
enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards
of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the
course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be
disciplined or suspended for any misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character,
in honesty, in probity and good demeanor, thus
rendering unworthy to continue as an officer of
the court.[9] Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall at
all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession. The trust and confidence
necessarily reposed by clients require in the
lawyer a high standard and appreciation of his
duty to them. To this end, nothing should be done
by any member of the legal fraternity which might
tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of
the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity
of the profession.[10]
It has been established that the subject parcel
of land, with an area of five (5) hectares located
in Barrio Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal, is owned by
and registered in the name of complainant herein,
Jose Ducat, Jr. Respondent Villalon insists
nonetheless that the property was orally given
to him by complainants father, Jose Ducat, Sr.,
allegedly with the complete knowledge of the fact
that the subject property belonged to his son,
Jose Ducat, Jr. It is basic law, however, that
conveyance or transfer of any titled real property
must be in writing, signed by the registered owner
or at least by his attorney-in-fact by virtue of
a proper special power of attorney and duly
notarized. Respondent Villalon, as a lawyer, is
presumed to know, or ought to know, this
process. Worse, when the transfer was first
reduced in writing in October, 1991 per Deed of
Sale of Parcel of Land,[11] purportedly in favor
of Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon and/or Andres Canares,
Jr., respondent Villalon knew that it was Jose
Ducat, Sr. who signed the said document of sale
without any Special Power of Attorney from the
registered owner thereof, Jose Ducat, Jr.; and
that Jose Ducat, Sr. also signed it for his wife,
Maria Cabrido, under the word Conforme. As
regards the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale of
Real Property dated December 5, 1991, covering
the same property, this time purportedly in favor
of Andres Canares, Jr. only, respondent Villalon
admitted that there was in fact no payment
of P450,000.00 and that the said amount was placed
in that document only to make it appear that the
conveyance was for a consideration.
All these taken together, coupled with
complainant Jose Ducat, Jr.s strong and credible
denial that he allegedly sold the subject property
to respondent Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr.
and that he allegedly appeared before respondent
notary public Ducusin, convince us that
respondent Villalons acts herein complained of
which constitute gross misconduct were duly
proven.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be
eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct
of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should
act and comport himself in such a manner that would
promote public confidence in the integrity of the
legal profession. Members of the Bar are expected
to always live up to the standards of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility inasmuch as the relationship
between an attorney and his client is highly
fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity
and good faith.[12]
We find, however, the IBPs recommended penalty
of two (2) years suspension to be imposed upon
respondent Atty. Villalon too severe in the light
of the facts obtaining in the case at
bar. In Cesar V. Roces vs. Atty. Jose G.
Aportadera,[13] this Court suspended therein
respondent Atty. Aportadera for a period of two
(2) years from the practice of law for two main
reasons:
(i)....His dubious involvement in the
preparation and notarization of the falsified
sale of his clients property merits the penalty
of suspension imposed on him by the IBP Board
of Governors; and
(ii)....The NBI investigation reveals that: (1)
respondent misrepresented himself to Gregorio
Licuanan as being duly authorized by Isabel
Roces to sell her property; (2) it was
respondent who prepared the various deeds of
sale over Isabels subdivision lots; (3) Isabel
was already confined at a hospital in Metro
Manila on January 4, 1980, the deeds date of
execution; (4) respondent knew that Isabel was
hospitalized in Metro Manila when he subscribed
the deed; (5) he knew that Isabel died in Metro
Manila soon after her confinement; and (6) he
did not give the seller a copy of the questioned
deed of sale.[14]
Unlike the circumstances prevailing in the said
case of Aportadera, the record does not show that
respondent Villalon had any direct participation
in the notarization by respondent notary public
Crispulo Ducusin of the Deed of Absolute Sale of
Real Property dated December 5, 1991,[15] which
was supposedly signed by complainant Jose Ducat,
Jr. who, however, strongly denied having signed
the same. The earlier Deed of Sale of Parcel of
Land dated this ___day of October 1991, allegedly
signed by Jose S. Ducat, Sr., as vendor, covering
the same property, in favor of respondent Arsenio
S. Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr. was not
notarized. The record also shows that Jose Ducat,
Sr. and complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. are father
and son and that they live in the same house at
912 Leo Street, Sampaloc, Manila. It is not also
disputed that respondent Villalon has been the
lawyer for a number of years of the family of Jose
Ducat, Sr.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ARSENIO C.
VILLALON, JR. is hereby found guilty of gross
misconduct, and he is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act will
be dealt with more severely. Respondent Villalon
is further directed to deliver to the registered
owner, complainant Jose Ducat Jr., the latters
TCT No. M-3023 covering the subject property
within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt
of this Decision, at his sole expense; and that
failure on his part to do so will result in his
disbarment.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty.
Villalons personal record in the Office of the
Bar Confidant and copies thereof be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6288 June 16, 2006
MARILI C. RONQUILLO, ALEXANDER RONQUILLO and JON
ALEXANDER RONQUILLO, represented by their
Attorney-in-Fact SERVILLANO A.
CABUNGCAL, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. HOMOBONO T. CEZAR, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
Complainants seek the disbarment or suspension of
respondent from the practice of law for unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. They allege
that respondent sold them a piece of property over which
he has no right nor interest, and that he refuses to
return to them the amount they have paid him for it.
Complainant Marili C. Ronquillo is a Filipino citizen
currently residing in Cannes, France, together with her
minor children, Alexander and Jon Alexander.
In May 1999, complainants and respondent entered into
a Deed of Assignment.1 For the price of P1.5M,
respondent transferred, in favor of the complainants,
his rights and interests over a townhouse unit and lot,
located at 75 Granwood Villas Subd., BF Homes, Quezon
City. Respondent also obligated himself to deliver to
complainants a copy of the Contract to Sell he executed
with Crown Asia, the townhouse developer, dated April
19, 1996. Upon full payment of the purchase price,
respondent further undertook to have Crown Asia execute
a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor of
the complainants.
Respondent received from complainants P750,000.00 upon
execution of the Deed of Assignment. The balance was
to be paid by complainants in four equal quarterly
installments of P187,500.00 each. Thus, complainants
issued in favor of respondent four postdated checks in
the amount of P187,500.00 each. Respondent was able to
encash the first check dated August 17, 1999.2
Complainants subsequently received information from
Crown Asia that respondent has not paid in full the price
of the townhouse at the time he executed the Deed of
Assignment. Respondent also failed to deliver to
complainants a copy of the Contract to Sell he allegedly
executed with Crown Asia. For these reasons, complainant
Marili Ronquillo ordered the bank to stop payment on
the second check she issued to respondent in the amount
of P187,500.00.
On March 6, 2000, complainants, through their counsel,
wrote respondent, informing him that they were still
willing to pay the balance of the purchase price of the
townhouse on the condition that respondent work on Crown
Asia’s execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in their
favor. In the alternative, complainants demanded the
return of the amount of P937,500.00, plus legal interest,
within ten days.3 The amount of P937,500.00 represents
the P750,000.00 down payment and the first quarterly
installment of P187,500.00 which complainants paid
respondent.
In a letter dated May 2, 2000, addressed to
complainants,4 respondent claimed that he was "working
now on a private project which hopefully will be realized
not long from now," and requested for "a period of twenty
days from May 15, 2000 within which to either completely
pay Crown Asia or return the money at your (complainants’)
option." The period lapsed but respondent did not make
good his promise to pay Crown Asia in full, or return
the amount paid by complainants.
On February 21, 2002, complainants’ counsel sent
respondent a second letter5 demanding the return of the
amount of P937,500.00, including legal interest, for
failing to comply with his promise. The demand was
unheeded.
Hence, this administrative complaint6 that respondent
engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. Allegedly, respondent violated his oath under
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and he ought to be disbarred or suspended
from the practice of law.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating
Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, to whom the instant
disciplinary case was assigned for investigation,
report and recommendation, found respondent guilty of
dishonest and deceitful conduct proscribed under Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In her Report dated October 9, 2003, she recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of three (3) years. The IBP Board of
Governors, through Resolution No. XVI-2003-226, dated
October 25, 2003, approved the recommendation of
Commissioner San Juan.
We agree.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court,
a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on
any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2)
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office;
(3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer’s
oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of
a superior court; and (7) willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party without authority. Rule 1.01, Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that "A lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." "Conduct," as used in this rule, does not refer
exclusively to the performance of a lawyer’s
professional duties. This Court has made clear in a long
line of cases7 that a lawyer may be disbarred or
suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional
or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor,
or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
In the instant case, respondent may have acted in his
private capacity when he entered into a contract with
complainant Marili representing to have the rights to
transfer title over the townhouse unit and lot in
question. When he failed in his undertaking, respondent
fell short of his duty under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. It cannot be
gainsaid that it was unlawful for respondent to transfer
property over which one has no legal right of ownership.
Respondent was likewise guilty of dishonest and
deceitful conduct when he concealed this lack of right
from complainants. He did not inform the complainants
that he has not yet paid in full the price of the subject
townhouse unit and lot, and, therefore, he had no right
to sell, transfer or assign said property at the time
of the execution of the Deed of Assignment. His
acceptance of the bulk of the purchase price amounting
to Nine Hundred Thirty-Seven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P937,500.00), despite knowing he was not entitled to
it, made matters worse for him.
Respondent’s adamant refusal to return to complainant
Marili Ronquillo the money she paid him, which was the
fruit of her labor as an Overseas Filipino Worker for
ten (10) years, is morally reprehensible. By his
actuations, respondent failed to live up to the strict
standard of morality required by the Code of
Professional Responsibility and violated the trust and
respect reposed in him as a member of the Bar, and an
officer of the court.
Respondent’s culpability is therefore clear. He
received a letter from complainants’ counsel demanding
the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
the complainants, or, in the alternative, the return
of the money paid by complainants. In reply to said
letter, respondent acknowledged his obligation, and
promised to settle the same if given sufficient time,
thus:
x x x
I am working now on a private project which hopefully
will be realized not long from now but I need a little
time to fix some things over. May I please request for
a period of 20 days from May 15, 2000 within which to
either completely pay Crown Asia or return the money
at your option. (Emphasis supplied)
In no uncertain terms, respondent admitted not having
full ownership over the subject townhouse unit and lot,
as he has yet to completely pay Crown Asia. Respondent
even failed to produce the Contract to Sell he allegedly
executed with Crown Asia over the subject unit, which
would show the extent of his right of ownership, if any,
over the townhouse unit and lot in question.
To be sure, complainants gave respondent sufficient time
to fulfill his obligation. It was only after almost two
years had passed, after respondent promised to pay Crown
Asia or return to complainants the amount they paid him,
that complainants sent respondent a second
letter demanding solely the return of the amount
8
Be that as it may, we cannot grant complainants’ prayer
that respondent be directed to return the money he
received from them in the amount of P937,500.00.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not involve
a trial of an action, but rather investigations by the
court into the conduct of one of its officers. The only
question for determination in these proceedings is
whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed
to continue as a member of the Bar.13 Thus, this Court
cannot rule on the issue of the amount of money that
should be returned to the complainants.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Homobono T. Cezar
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of THREE (3) YEARS, effective immediately. Let a copy
of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
all courts for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

of P937,500.00, including legal interest. By this time,

it was indubitable that respondent would not be able
to perform his end of their agreement.

The practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It

is granted only to those of good moral character.9 The
Bar must maintain a high standard of honesty and fair
dealing.10 Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond
reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with
their clients or the public at large,11 and a violation
of the high moral standards of the legal profession
justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty,
including suspension and disbarment.12