PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y.

2008-2009
Page 1 of 170
Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012

PERSONS
& FAMILY
RELATION
S
Professor E. A.
Pangalangan

Karichi Santos |UP Law

B2012
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009
Page 2 of 170
Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012

Beware of false knowledge;

it is more dangerous than
ignorance.
- George Bernard Shaw

Caveat lector.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009
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Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Intersection of Modern
Constitutional Developments
and Traditional Family Law
Provisions of the 1987
Constitution
Sec 12, Art II
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and thecontraceptives and not manufacture or sale and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character
shall receive the support of the Government.
Sec 14, Art II
The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building and shall ensuremarital
and men.
Art XV (The Family), 1987 Constitution
Sec 1 The State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen
its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Sec 2 Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.
Sec 3 The State shall defend:
(1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance
with their religious convictions and the demands of
responsible parenthood;
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper
care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms
of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development;
(3) The right of the family to a family living wage and
income;
(4) The right of families or family associations to
participate in the planning and implementation of
policies and programs that affect them.
Sec 4 The family has the duty to care for its elderly
members but the State may also do so through just
Sec 1, Art III
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without the
equal protection of the laws.
Overview of Due Process and
Equal Protection Cases
GRISWOLD v CONNECTICUT (1964)
381 U.S. 479
- Griswold, Executive Director of the planned
Parenthood League of Connecticut and its medical
director as accessories for giving married persons
information and medical advice on how to prevent
conception and, following examination prescribing a
contraceptive device or material for the wife’s use.
- Griswold said the statute violates the 14th
Amendment (due process clause)
- Purpose of the statute was to discourage extra
strengthen
marital the family
relations and itasonly
a basic autonomous
prohibits social of
distribution
life of the unborn from conception. The natural
ISSUES:
1. WON the appellants have the standing to
assert constitutional rights of people to
the fundamental
privacy equality before the law of women
2. WON the contraceptive ban statute violates
right of marital privacy (from the right of
liberty)
HELD: Although not stated in the Bill of Rights, it is
included in the penumbra of rights afforded to the
citizens. It also sweeps unnecessarily broadly and
does not prove to be a sufficient method of family
planning. It deprived married people the due process
of law by including people who are not meant to be
included. Statute struck down as unconstitutional.
* What if the couples’ intention for using
contraceptive was for medical purposes and family
planning?
* Does it mean that people only use contraceptive
when they are having extra-marital affairs? And that
if they don’t have access to contraceptives, they will
no longer engage in extra-marital affair?
EISENSTADT v BAIRD (1971)
405 US 438
- Baird was arrested for violation of Massachusetts law
bydueexhibiting
process of law, nor shall anydevices
contraceptive person beand
denied the a
giving
contraceptive foam to a woman when he ended his
lecture at Boston University.
- The statute prohibited the sale, lending or giving
away of contraceptives unless prescribed by a
physician to married people. Its purpose is to
discourage fornication (pre-marital sex) and prevent
spread of sexually transmitted disease.
- However, the “medical policy” was a mere
afterthought, amended after the Griswold decision in
1966
ISSUE: WON the statute is unconstitutional for
denying equal protection to unmarried people
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HELD: Yes. It violates due process clause by

providing dissimilar treatment for married and
unmarried persons who are similarly situated. The
deterrence of fornication cannot reasonably be
regarded as the purpose of the statute since it is
riddled with exceptions making contraceptives freely
available for use in premarital sexual relations and
its scope and penalty structure is inconsistent with
that purpose. The protection of public health cannot
also be reasonably regarded as the purpose of the
statute since if this were the case, it would be
discriminatory and overbroad. It would appear that
only married people are protected from the evil
which it intends to suppress i.e. STD.

- Depriving unmarried people with contraceptive

devices is tantamount to punishing them with the
risk of having illegitimate children for fornication. So
all the more that unmarried people should be given
access to contraceptives.

2 TESTS THAT JUSTIFY LAWFUL STATE INTRUSION

INTO THE FAMILY

1. Is there a compelling state interest in

regulating people’s rights?
2. Is there a fit between the state interest and
the measure taken?

*In both Griswold and Eisenstadt cases, there was no

fit between the state interest and the measure
taken. The means employed are not sufficient
deterrent of the evils sought to avoid.
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II. CIVIL Juridical Capacity <- CIVIL CAPACITY -> Capacity to Act
Art 37
Aptitude to holding and Aptitude to exercise of

PERSONALITY enjoyment of rights rights

Fitness to be subject of Power to do acts with legal
legal relations effects
STATUS – the legal condition or class to which one Indivisible and inherent Conditional and voidable
Can exist without capacity Requires both (1)
belongs in society; the legal or juridical position of
to act intelligence and (2) will.
the individual in the society; determines the nature Capacity is always
and number of his rights and obligation presumed

KINDS OF STATUS KINDS OF PERSONS

A. as a member of society
- resident or non-resident - alien or NATURAL JURIDICAL
non-citizen - human beings - artificial, abstract
B. as a member of family
- products of - product of legal
- single, married or divorced
procreation fiction
- parent or child; brother or sister
- legitimate, illegitimate or adopted
Natural Persons
C. as himself
- age - sex - mental condition
- occupation (not a status because not CC, Art 40 Birth determines personality; but the conceived shall b
inherent) it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the followin

CHARACTERISTICS OF STATUS CHARACTERISTICS OF FETAL PERSONALITY

1. inalienable 1. limited – because it only has rights for purposes
2. imprescriptible favorable to it
3. can’t be renounced
4. can’t be subject to compromise 2. provisional/conditional – because it should be
5. rights arise from it cannot be exercised by born alive later before the rights can be claimed.
creditors But when is it considered born alive? Refer to
Art. 41, CC

Birth = total separation from the mother or removal

A. Concept and Classes of of fetus in from mother’s womb by cutting off the
Persons umbilical cord

CHARACTERISTICS OF CIVIL PERSONALITY
1. not a being, but a quality of certain beings
2. not a physical element, but a juridical
concept
3. not an object of contract, or of possession,
cannot be impaired by agreement
4. matter of public interest
3. But it can enjoy rights like inherit from will or
intestacy and be given donations even before
birth
CC, Art 41 For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive
mother’s womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less
within 24 hours after its complete delivered from the maternal womb.

PERSONALITY v CAPACITY
(These two concepts are intimately related but not
identical)
Personality is:
- is product of capacity in law
- external manifestation of capacity
- synonymous to juridical capacity
- Generally, cannot be limited
- Specifically, may suffer limitations because it’s
merely the result of capacity to act
CC, Art 37 Juridical capacity, which is fitness to be
the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural
person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act,
which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is
acquired and may be lost.
- If intrauterine life < 7 months, then the fetus must
live for 24 hours (even if life is machine sustained
only)
- Otherwise, even if death is by accident without
which fetus could have survived (e.g. the janitor
accidentally tripped on the incubator or life support’s
plug and caused the fetus’ death), kahit 22 hours pa
yan, it will not be considered alive
- No special sign of life required. Though complete
respiration may be indicated by crying or floating of
lungs (which you can only do in case of death)
- Viability (complete and independent functioning of
internal organs) not required
- In case of doubt, there is presumption that the
child was born alive
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hacked him and his wife and 7 children. His wife and
GELUZ v CA (1961) six of the kids died.
2 SCRA 801 - Of the 14 suspects, only 2 were apprehended,
- Nita Villanueva had three abortions with Dr. Antonio Ciriaco Baldesco and Bonifacio Tirol. After they were
Geluz which Oscar Lazo, the husband, is not aware found guilty of the crime of murder of the 7 persons,
of they filed an appeal, during which Baldesco died.
- Husband filed for damages of P3000 by virtue of Art
2206 which CA sustained ISSUE: WON Baldesco can still be held liable for his
offense
ISSUE: WON husband can claim damages for the
death of the unborn fetus? HELD: Court dismissed the criminal case since
Baldesco is already dead. However, Baldesco’s
HELD: No. The fetus was not yet born and thus does personality is continued in his estate (Art 42) hence
not have civil personality. According to Article 40, the civil liabilities will be recovered from his estate.
birth determines personality. In this case, the fetus
does not yet possess a personality to speak of CC, Art 43 If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who ar
because it was aborted in uterus. The child should died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other,
be born before the parents can seek any recovery for presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no t
damages. Action for pecuniary damages on account
of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the
Rule 123 of Sec 60 of Revised Rules of Court 
one injured. There could be no action for such
resorted to only if there are no
damages that can be instituted on behalf of the
inferential/circumstantial evidences to be inferred
unborn child for the injuries it received because it
from
lacked juridical personality. The damages which the
parents of an unborn child can recover are limited to
1. Both under 15 older
moral damages, in this case, for the act of the
2. Both over 60 younger
appellant Geluz to perform the abortion. However,
3. Under 15 and over 60 younger
moral damages cannot also be recovered because
4. Between 15 – 60 male or if same sex,
the wife willingly sought the abortion, and the
older
husband did not further investigate on the causes of
the abortion. Furthermore, the husband did not seem 5. Under 15/over 60 & bet between the
to have taken interest in the administrative and 15 and 60
criminal cases against the appellant, but was more
concerned in obtaining from the doctor a large • Applicable only when (1) calamity & (2) involves
money payment. succession
*According to Ma’am: In the Philippines, people who • Weakness of Rule 123 according to Ma’am: Since
seek pecuniary damages for loss of relatives are this presumption is based on strength, age and
seen in a negative light. It gives the impression that sex of individuals  discrimination between
“you’re just after the money.” But it should not be close ages is not accurately represented e.g.
the case. who will survive between 12 and 15 years old
considering they have approximately the same
level of strength?
CC, Art 42 Civil personality is extinguished by death.

JOAQUIN v NAVARRO (1953)

- Death means natural or physical death, as there no
such thing as civil death in the Philippines
- Rights and obligations are completely extinguished,
while others are transmitted to his successors
- After the death, personality is deemed to continue to
estate
PEOPLE v TIROL (1981)
102 SCRA 558
- Kosain Manipol and his family were sleeping when he
heard the dog bark. When he went to investigate,
two persons have already come up to their house,
asking if they can borrow his land. After he gave his
consent, Kulas arrived, flashed the light in his face
and punched him. When he fell, the assailant’s
companions (more than 10 armed men) came in
93 Phil 7
- Summary proceeding to resolve the order of deaths
of Joaquin Navarro, JR and his mother Angela
Navarro
- Setting: World War II. Battle of Manila is considered
as a calamity. Also mentioned in the story was the
neighbor Francisco Lopez and three other daughters
who were shot while trying to escape
- It is necessary to establish succession because if JN
Jr. died first, his heirs are not entitled to inherit from
their grandparents.
- Refer to the case for explanation of the probable
causes and speculated circumstances of their death
(too many to enumerate here, refer to original!)
ISSUE: Who between the mother and the son died
first?
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HELD: Inference can be derived from the evidences
so no need to use presumption. That the mother
(Angela) died before her son was based on
speculations, not evidence. Gauged by the doctrine
of preponderance of evidence by which civil cases
are decided, this inference should prevail. Evidence
of survivorship may be (1) direct (2) indirect (3)
circumstantial or (4) inferential. Art 43 speaks about
resolving doubt when 2 or more persons are called
to succeed each other as to which of them died first.
In the Civil Code, in the absence of proof, it is
presumed that they died at the same time, and
there shall be no transmission of rights from one
to another. In the Rules of Court, in cases of
calamity, there is a hierarchy of survivorship.
Juridical Persons
Kinds of Juridical Persons (CC, Art 44) and laws governing them (CC, A
1) state and its political subdivisions – governed by the laws creating
2) other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest cr
recognizing them
3) corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or
separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or
provisions of this Code concerning partnership
CC, Art 47 Dissolution of No 2 - in pursuance of law or the charter crea
B. Capacity to Act and
Restrictions Thereon
1. Presumption of Capacity
STANDARD OIL CO. v ARENAS (1911)
19 Phil 363
1908 Vicente Villanueva signed a bond as surety
for Codina Arenas in favor of plaintiff
1909 The plaintiff sued on the bond; Villanueva did
not appear, and was declared in default.
- Wife appeared when judgment was about to be
executed and asked that he be relieved from the
bond and the judgment because he was insane
(declared insane by July 24, 1909) with his wife
as his guardian.
- Case was reopened and tried and the evidence
showed that Villanueva executed the bond with
full understanding of the nature and
consequences of the act performed by him
although he was suffering from a monomania of
great wealth.
- He was, therefore, held liable on the bond.
Hence appealed to the SC.
ISSUE:
1. WON monomania of wealth necessarily
warrants that the person does not have
capacity to act
2. WON Villanueva was actually incapable of
entering into contract at the time the bond
was executed
HELD: SC affirmed the judgment of the CA. It would
have been necessary to show that
1. such monomania was habitual and constituted
a veritable mental perturbation in the patient;
2. that the bond executed was the result of such
monomania, and not the effect of any other
cause, that is, that there was not, or could
there have been any other cause for the
contract than the ostentation of wealth and
this was purely an effect of such monomania of
wealth;
3. that the monomania existed on the date the
bond in question was executed. Monomania of
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wealth does not necessarily imply that the
person is incapable of executing a bond such
as that in question.
4. Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to
a person who has not previously been declared
incapable, and such capacity is presumed to
continue for so long as the contrary is not
proved, that is, at the moment of his acting he
was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his
mind; which, in the opinion of the court, has
not been proved in this case.
2. Restrictions
CC, Art 6 Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
CC, Art 38 Minority, insanity/imbecility, state of being
deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere
restriction on capacity to act, and do not exempt the
incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when
the latter arise from his acts of from property relations.
 still civilly liable although criminally not liable
 can have obligation except for contracts
SOURCES OF OBLIGATIONS (obligations arise from…)
1. law 4. crimes/delicts
2. contracts 5. quasi-delicts
3. quasi-contracts 6. torts
REINTEGRATION OF CAPACITY
1. upon reaching age of majority
2. civil interdiction, extinction of principal penalty
3. judicially determined competence without
guardian (for the first two, no need for court
proceeding)
An incapacitated person is not exempt from
obligations – civilly liable but not criminally liable. 
This is kind of confusing because he is excluded from
“all except contracts”, BUT what exactly is “not a
contract”
CC, Art 39 Modify, limit or restrict capacity to act
1. age (minority) 7. alienage
2. insanity 8. absence
3. imbecility 9. family relations
4. state of being deaf-mute 10. trusteeship
5. penalty 11. insolvency
6. prodigality
A. Minority
RA 6809 - Lowers the age of majority from 21 to 18
Contracts
Art 1327 (1) unemancipated minors cannot
give consent to contract  no more
concept of uneman-cipated minors
because age of emancipation = majority
Art 1390 (1) if one is incapable of contract,
valid unless courts says otherwise 
VOIDABLE
Art 1403 (3) if both is incapable 
UNENFORCEABLE unless ratified
Art 1397 capacitated party cannot allege the
incapacity of other parties
Art 1399 restitution not obliged if not benefited
MERCADO v ESPIRITU (1917)
37 Phil 215
- Domingo Mercado and Josefa Mercado were
minors (under the Civil Code), 18 and 19 years
old respectively, on the date the instrument
(sale of land to their uncle) was executed so they
seek for annulment of contract.
- However, in the deed of sale they stated that
they were of legal age at the time they executed
and signed it; and they made the same
manifestation before the notary public when the
document was prepared.
ISSUE: WON the dead of sale was invalid because
the contractors are minors
HELD: No. The courts have laid down the rule that
the sale of real estate, effected by minors who have
already passed the age of puberty and
adolescence and are near the adult age, when they
pretend to have already reached their majority, while
in fact, they have not, is valid, and they cannot be
permitted afterwards to excuse themselves from
compliance with the obligation assumed by them or
seek their annulment.
- Their misrepresentation estopped them from
claiming the invalidity of the contract.
- Art 1390, CC binding at the discretion of the
Court. It does not favor the offender, come to
Court with clean hands.
BAMBALAN v MARAMBA (1966)
51 Phil 417
- Isidro Bambalan, a minor, executed a deed of
sale of a piece of land to the defendant,
Genoveva Muerong.
- Bambalan made no representation as to his age,
which was well known to the defendant,
inasmuch as the latter was the one who
purchased the plaintiff’s cedula to be used in the
acknowledgement of the document before a
notary public.
- Plaintiff now seeks to annul the sale.
ISSUE: WON a minor’s non-representation of his age
and knowledge of the other contracting party as to
the incapacity of the minor may render the sale void
HELD: Yes. The sale is void as to the plaintiff,
because he was a minor at the time of execution.
Mercado v Espiritu doctrine is not applicable in this
case, because the plaintiff did not pretend to be
of age, and the defendant knew him to be a minor.
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BRAGANZA v VILLA ABRILLE (1959)

105 Phil 456
- Rosario along with her two sons (Guillermo and
Rodolfo) loaned 70,000 Mickey Mouse money
from respondent saying they’ll pay him
equivalent amount after the war.
- They did not disclose the age of the sons so the
respondent willingly gave them the amount they
were asking for.

ISSUES: WON non-disclosure of a minor’s age may

render the deed void and WON the recipients are
obliged to restitute what they earned

HELD: There was no misrepresentation of age, so it

cannot constitute fraud. But since they benefited
from the amount, they should return it because of
Art 1399, CC.

Marriage Art 35 (1), FC void ab initio

Art 5, FC male or female of the age
of 18 may contract
marriage

Crimes Art 12, RPC Periods of responsibility

9 and below* absolute irresponsibility
9 to 15* conditional responsibility
*raised to 15 such that age of discernment is 15-18
-- unless with discernment: (a) manner of
committing
(b) conduct of the offender
-- for mitigated responsibility, penalty is one degree
lower

B. Insanity
Contracts
Art 1327 (2) insane/demented cannot give
consent to contract
Art 1328 (1) contracted in a lucid interval is
valid, but burden to prove lucid interval
on prosecution
Art 1399 restitution not obliged if not benefited
Crime
Art 12(1) not exempt from criminal liability if lucid
interval

PRESUMPTION OF SANITY
a) circumstantial evidence is sufficient
b) insanity must prove to precede the act

C. State of being deaf-mute

Art 1327 deaf-mute who are no read, no write
cannot give consent to contract
Art 807 deaf-mute may write a will but if no read,
no write can designate two (2) persons
who would communicate to him the
contents
Art 820 deaf-mute cannot witness a will 
because he won’t be able to testify
properly in court if ever the need arises
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D. Prodigality indispensable, who for this purpose shall

Art 92 (2), RC wanton waste of one’s estate; be designated by a competent court, in
without regard for family exposing accordance with the provisions of the
them to want and depriving Rules of Court.
inheritance; morbid state of mind
and disposition to spend Art 11.2, RPC Justifying circ: in defense of family
Art 13.5, RPC Mitigating circ: immediate vindication
MARTINEZ v MARTINEZ (1902)
1 Phil 182 F. Family Relations
- Pedro Martinez Ilustre appeal after CA rejected Art 37, FC incestuous marriage
his petition for declaring his dad, Francisco, a Art 87, FC donation inter vivos not allowed bet
prodigal spouses
- He was given by dad special powers of attorney Art 215, FC disqualified to testify against each other
but dad revoked it because son is mismanaging unless indispensable to crime against
their estate him/another grand/parent
- Son accused dad of splurging and squandering Art 1109, CC prescription does not run
their properties by giving donation to his second between husband and wife, parent and
wife and her family child (minority or insanity), guardian and
ward
ISSUE: WON Francisco should be declared prodigal Art 1490, CC spouses cannot sell property to
each other unless:
HELD: Since prodigality is not defined in our law, it (a) separation of property in marriage
may be inferred that the acts of prodigality must settlement
show a morbid state of bind and a disposition to (b) judicial separation of property
spend, waste, and lessen the estate to such an
extent as is likely to expose the family to want of G. Absence
support, or to deprive the forced heirs of their Art 390, CC after 7 years a person is presumed dead
undisposable part of the estate. The testimony of for all purposes except succession; if 75,
the plaintiff was insufficient to support his 5 yrs only
allegations against his father. There was no Art 391, CC if there is a danger of death (4 yrs only)
evidence to show his father has been transferring by (a) vessel lost at sea or missing airplane
sale or mortgage any property, which will reflect in (b) member of military or armed force in
the city record of public deeds. The court found the war
defendant is far from being prodigal, and is still in (c) other circumstances of danger of
the full exercise of his faculties and still possess the death
industry, thrift and ability in managing the estate. In Art 124, FC if one spouse is incapacitated, other
fact, the father has increased profit while the son spouse may assume power of
himself possesses propensity to be prodigal. administration

E. Civil Interdiction
Art 34, RPC Civil interdiction. — Civil interdiction
shall deprive the offender during the
time of his sentence of the rights of
parental authority, or guardianship,
either as to the person or property of any
ward, of marital authority, of the right to
manage his property and of the right to
dispose of such property by any act or
any conveyance inter vivos.

Art 54, CC Any male of the age of sixteen years or

upwards, and any female of the age of
fourteen years or upwards, not under
any of the impediments mentioned in
Articles 80 to 84, may contract marriage.
(2)

Art 123, CC For the validity of marriage settlements

executed by any person upon whom a
sentence of civil interdiction has been
pronounced, the presence and
participation of the guardian shall be
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III. PRE-MARITAL ISSUE: Whether or not breach of promise to marry is

actionable

CONTROVERSY HELD: This is not the case of mere breach of promise

to marry. Mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and
go through all the preparations publicity, only to
Breach of promise to marry walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized is quite different. This is contrary to good
customs
CC Art 19 Every person must, in exercise of rights and performance for duties,
of his whichactthe
withdefendant
justice, givemust be else
everyone heldhis
due, and observe honesty and good faith. answerable in damages in accordance with Art. 21
NCC. Defendant is liable for actual damages, as well
CC Art 20 Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently
as tocauses
moral damage
and to another shall
exemplary indemnify Judgment
damages. the latter for
the same. affirmed with modifications (on amount of damages).
CC Art 21 Any person who willfully causes loss o injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for damage.
TANJANCO v CA (1966)
18 SCRA 994
CC Art 2176Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, - Arceli Santos
there being and
fault or Apolinario
negligence, Tanjanco
is obliged are
to pay for the
sweethearts.
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual Because
relation betweenofthe
the man’s
parties, promise
is called to
a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provision of this Chapter. marry the woman, they continually had sexual
relationship with each other for a span of one
BASIS FOR HEARTBALM STATUTE year with the woman’s consent.
(1) property - When she got pregnant, he refused to marry her.
(2) expectation (cultural and societal) they used - The prayer was for a decree compelling the
to value marriage as the only goal. Impairs defendant to recognize the unborn child to give
honor and purity of the deserted party her support plus moral and exemplary damages
of P100,000. The CFI dismissed the complaint for
Why is there no success in claiming damages for no cause of action. The CA set aside the CFI
breach of promise to marry? decision.
- No source of obligation because marriage is
ISSUE: WON man seduced the woman entitling her
purely voluntary and not compulsory. It should
to the rewards set forth in Art 21
be freely entered into without any threat.
- People marry because of love, so it cannot be HELD: No. In Art 21, the essential feature is
imposed and thus there is no legal basis for seduction, that in law is more than sexual
action. intercourse or breach of promise to marry, but
- In the olden days, women are seen as used connoting essentially the idea of deceit, enticement,
merchandise when their sweethearts abandon or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to
them. Their chances of getting married after which the woman has yielded. The facts stand out
being rejected become slimmer. Marriage was that for one whole year, the plaintiff, a woman of
the only goal of women. Things are different adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with
now, especially since women can have careers. defendant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such
No more pressure to marry! conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction.
Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual
• Breach of promise to marry is a quasi-delict passion. If she had been deceived, she would not
have again yield to his embraces, much less for one
(refer back to “Sources of Obligations” in
year. Besides, she is old enough to know better.
Restrictions on Capacity to Act)
Hence no case is made under Art 21.
WASSMER v VELEZ (1964)
DE JESUS v SYQUIA (1933)
12 SCRA 648
58 Phil 866
- Two days before the wedding (meaning - Cesar Syquia courted Antonia de Jesus who was
everything about the wedding was already set, 20 years old. Amorous relations resulted in de
as well as bridal showers and gifts) the groom Jesus giving birth to a baby boy on June 17,
Francisco Velez suddenly flew to his home in 1931. They lived together for one year until
Cagayan de Oro, leaving the bride, Beatriz Antonio got pregnant again after which Cesar left
Wassmer, only this note: “will have to postpone to marry another woman.
wedding – my mother opposes it.” - Cesar recognized his paternity of first child in
- The next day (day before the wedding) he sent writing with a letter to the priest and
this message through telegram: “Nothing uninterrupted possession of natural child status
changed rest assured returning soon.” But he for one year
never returned and was never heard from again.
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- Woman files for action for damages for breach of

promise and recognition of the child.

ISSUE: WON Antonia is entitled to damages for

breach of promise to marry and kids to paternal
support

HELD: Promise to marry not satisfactorily proved so

the trial court was right in refusing to grant De Jesus’
prayer. Also, action for breach of promise to marry
has no standing for civil law, apart from the right to
recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff
upon the faith of such promise. This case exhibits
none of the features necessary to maintain such
action.
- Antonia de Jesus only entitled to the support of the
first child because of Cesar’s prior recognition. No
support for the second child because no proof of
paternity or recognition presented.

PICCININNI v HAJUS (1980)

180 Conn. 369
- Marie Hajus fraudulently induced Robert
Piccininni (yes, the tennis player) to transfer
properties to her name for their mutual benefit
and enjoyment as future husband and wife.
- Husband does not sue for her not marrying him
but for cajoling him into transferring property in
her name

ISSUE: WON the property is recoverable under

Heartbalm statute because the wife did not marry
him

HELD: Yes because marital gifts are conditional until

after marriage so recoverable. Ban on Heartbalm
statutes only for issues of the heart like anguish,
moral damages, failed expectation of financial and
social gains. In this case, the petition is for recovery
of unjust enrichment of deferring wife.
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IV. DEFINITION &
NATURE OF
MARRIAGE
FC, Art 1 Marriage is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with the law, for the establishment of family
and conjugal life. It is the foundation of family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences
and incidents are governed by the law and not subject
to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix
property relations during the marriage within the limits
provided by this Code.
 COMMIT TO MEMORY!!!
LOVING v VIRGINIA (1967)
388 US 1, 12
- Mildred Loving (of African and Native American
descent) marries Richard Perry Loving (a
Caucasian) in violation of Virginia’s “Racial
Integrity Act” which is an anti-miscegenation
statute that prohibits Whites from marrying into
other races
- Interesting phrase: “Almighty God created the
races white, black, yellow, Malay and red and he
placed them on separate continents. And but for
the interference with his arrangement there
would be no cause for such marriages. The fact
that he separated the races shows that he did
not intend for the races to mix.”
- The statute fuels “White Supremacy” because
only Whites are forbidden to intermarry, other
races can marry anyone
ISSUE: WON the statute is unconstitutional for
violation of both the equal protection and due
process clauses of 14th Amendment
HELD: Yes. The freedom to marry has long been
recognized as one of the vital personal rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men. Marriage is one of the basic civil rights of man,
fundamental to our very existence and survival.
Decisions SC and CA of Virginia are reversed.
ZABLOCKI v REDHAIL (1978)
434 US 374, 384
- Thomas Zablocki was denied marriage license
because of non-support to prior children. Even if
he marries outside their state, it will still not be
valid.
- The state interest of this statute was to protect
the welfare of out of custody children and
prevent incurrence of new obligation by the
illegitimate parent. The parent must first prove
that he can sustain his two families and should
undergo counseling.
ISSUE: WON statute is unconstitutional for violation
of equal protection and due process clauses
HELD: Unconstitutional for many reasons. As for the
state interests:
1) Counseling also is not even an assurance of
permission
2) Protect welfare of out custody children to compel
collection and incentive to delivery of money to prior
children  but there are also other means like wage
assignment, civil contempt proceedings or criminal
penalty
3) Prevent incurring of new obligation  under
inclusive because new marriage is not the only way
people spend their resources, over inclusive because
they could be marrying to a better financed couple.
Also it only adds more children out of wedlock.
*According to Ma’am Beth: implication of the ban 
only those economically stable may marry and this
violates equal protection clause
A. Marriage Models
CHARACTERISTICS OF MARRIAGE
1. civil (independent of any religion)
2. institute of public order and policy
3. natural (organic perpetuation of man)
PRINCIPAL EFFECTS OF A VALID MARRIAGE
1. emancipation from parental authority
2. personal and economic relations between
spouses
3. personal and economic relations between
parent & child
4. family relationship
5. legitimacy of sexual union and family
6. modification of criminal liability
7. incapacity to make donations to each other
8. disqualification to testify against each other
ORDINARY
MARRIAGE
CONTRACTS
Only between man and May be same sex
woman
Specified duties and Have the force of law
rights of spouses between them
May not be subject to Can be terminated at the
stipulation or terminated
agreement of parties
Breech of obligation notBreach of contract gives
actionable rise to action for
damages
*In both marriage and ordinary contracts, party’s
consent is necessary
TERMS OF A TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE CONTRACT
(1) husband as head of family – name and domicile
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(2) husband responsible for support
(3) wife responsible for domestic and childcare
services
GRAHAM v GRAHAM (1940) (pronounced as
/grahm/)
33 F. Supp. 936
- James Sebastian Graham, plaintiff sues his
former wife, Margrethe, defendant, to recover
what he was allegedly entitled by a written
agreement wherein defendant agreed to pay the
plaintiff a certain some of money.
- The agreement was that the wife asked husband
to quit his job so that he can accompany her to
his travels, to which he agreed as long as she
will pay him $300 each month. The monthly
payment is to be in force until the parties no
longer desire the agreement.
ISSUE: WON the agreement compels the wife to
continue paying her husband the $300
HELD: No, the contract is not valid. Marriage contract
specifies that it’s the husband’s duty or obligation to
support and live with his wife, and the wife must
contribute her services and society to the husband
and follow him in his choice of domicile. Also, a
private agreement between persons married or
about to be married whereby they attempt to
change the essential obligations of the marriage
contract is contrary to public policy.
BRADWELL v ILLINOIS (1872)
93 US (16 wall) 130
- Myra Bradwell was denied license to practice law
JUST BECAUSE SHE IS A FEMALE.
- “That God designed the sexes to occupy
different spheres of action and that it belonged
to men to make, apply and execute the laws,
was regarded as an almost axiomatic truth” 
Amazing… they were able to talk to God directly.
- Prescribe the qualifications for admission to the
bar of its own courts is unaffected by the 14th
amendment
DUNN v PALERMO (1975)
522 S. W. 2d 679
- Rose Palermo is a Nashville lawyer who married
Denty Cheatham, also a Nashville lawyer. She
has continued to use and enjoy her maiden
name, Palermo, professionally, socially and for
all purposes. Tennessee had a state-wide
compulsory Registration Law. Subsequent to her
marriage, she lodged with the Registrar a
change of address form listing her name as
Palermo.
- She was advised that she was required to
register anew under the surname of her
husband, or have her name purged from the
registration list. Upon her refusal to so register,
her name was purged from the registration list.
Hence this action.
ISSUE: WON compulsory/mandatory to change name
upon marriage
HELD: No. Woman upon marriage, may elect to
retain her own surname or she may adopt the
surname of her husband and the choice is hers. So
long as a person’s name remains constant and
consistent, and unless until changed in prescribed
manner, and in absence of any fraudulent or legally
impermissible intent, state has no legitimate concern
as to name used.
*According to Ma’am Beth  the legal name of any
person is the one written on the birth certificate (CC,
Art 370)
IN RE SANTIAGO (1940)
70 Phil 66
- Ernesto Baniquit and Soledad Colares separated
for 9 consecutive years, want to remarry so they
sought the aid of Atty. Roque Santiago
- He instituted a document that waives whatever
right of action one might have against each
other but realized mistake after 19 days and
cancelled the document
ISSUE: WON the document signed by the spouses
legitimately terminated the marital tie between
them.
HELD: No. Termination of the marriage cannot be
stipulated by the parties. Santiago guilty of
malpractice and suspended for 1 year.
SELANOVA v MENDOZA (1975)
64 SCRA 69
- Respondent Judge Alejandro Mendoza prepared a
document extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal
partnership of Saturnino Selanova and Avelina
Ceniza.
- One condition of the liquidation was that either
spouse would withdraw the complaint for
adultery or concubinage which each had filed
against the other and they waived their right to
prosecute each other for whatever acts of
infidelity either one would commit against the
other.
- This document was also acknowledged before
him as “City Judge and Notary Public Ex Officio.”
- Selanova charged Judge Mendoza with gross
ignorance of the law.
ISSUE: WON marriage is valid
HELD: Agreement is void because it contravenes the
provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of CC Art 221.
Even before the enactment of the NCC, this court
held that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal
partnership during the marriage without judicial
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approval “secured beforehand” was void. While
adultery and concubinage are private crimes, they
shall remain crimes, and a contract legalizing their
commission is contrary to law and consequently not
judicially recognizable. Respondent is severely
censured.
ASSUMPTIONS OF FAMILY LAW (Weitzman article)
1. Marriage is a permanent, indissoluble,
lifetime commitment
2. First marriages (young & no previous
marriages)
3. Main reason is procreation
4. Strict division of labor
5. White middle-class family (property and
inheritance)
6. Judeo-Christian tradition (monogamy)
B. Requisites of Marriage
1. ESSENTIAL REQUISITES
intrinsic (Art 2)
A. Legal capacity
a. Sex – (must be between man and woman)
b. Age – 18 and above (Art 5)
c. No impediment which means:
(1) no previous marriage
(2) family relations (not incestuous)
JONES v HALLAHAN (1973)
501 S. W. 2d 588
- Marjorie Jones and her female partner were not
issued a license to marry each other in the state
of Kentucky.
- They contend that the failure of the clerk to
issue the marriage license deprived them of
three (3) basic constitutional rights, namely, the
right to marry; the right of association; and the
right to free exercise of religion.
- Appellants also contend that the refusal subjects
them to cruel and unusual punishment.
ISSUE: WON same sex marriage violates
constitutional rights to marry
HELD: No, it does not violate any constitutionally
protected right. Two females cannot marry for
marriage has always been considered as the union of
a man and a woman. It appears that appellants are
prevented from marrying not by the statute of
Kentucky but rather by their own incapacity of
entering into marriage as the term is defined. A
license to enter into a status or a relationship which
the parties are incapable of entering is a nullity.
Definition of marriage says, “union of a man and a
woman.” Thus, in the court’s opinion, there is not
constitutional issue involved, since there is no
constitutional sanction which protects the right of
marriage between persons of the same sex.
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GOODRIDGE v DEPT OF PUBLIC HEALTH (2003)
440 Mass. 309
- 14 individuals (7 couples) were deprived of
marriage license because they were the same
sex
- They are professionals and active in socio-civic
activities, there was longevity in the relationship
and defendants were involved (adopted children
and parents)
- They met all facial qualifications, list of
impediment was not presented by civil registrar
(to prove that same sex marriage is one of them)
- LEGISLATIVE RATIO:
1. favorable setting for procreation
2. optimal setting for child rearing
3. conserving scarce state and private financial
resources
ISSUE:
1. WON licensing law treats same sex as
impediment – presented by the plaintiff
– 2. WON bar of same sex couple is a legitimate
exercise of the State’s authority to regulation
conduct – Court
HELD:
- Marriage is a secular institution. No religious
ceremony is required. There are only 3 partners
(2 spouses and the State who defines the entry
and exit terms)
- PURPOSE NOT TAILOR FIT:
1. law does not distinguish children’s family
background so why deprive children the
rights when they did not choose to be
born/grow up in such a family (coitus v non
coitus, e.g. adoption or assisted), failed to
address the changing realities of American
society
2. best interest of the child ≠ parent’s sexual
orientation
3. homosexuals are well off and economically
independent, anyway, the same is not
condition/requirement for heterosexual
couples.
- IMPLICATION OF PROHIBITION: deprivation of
protection, benefits, obligations and rights
exclusive to married people  same reason why
these couples want the benefit of marriage
- They do not undermine marriage, In fact, they
appreciate/ show high esteem for of marriage by
asking for it! Statute declared unconstitutional
SILVERIO v REPUBLIC (2007)
537 SCRA 273
- Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio wants to change
his name to Mely and sex entry in his birth
certificate from male to female because of his
sex reassignment (transgender).
RTC granted in 2003
CA reversed in 2006
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ISSUE: WON he is entitled to the change of name
action
HELD: NO!
1. Names are for purposes of identification: Art
376, CC (no change of name without judicial
declaration), RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law), Rule
103 (change of name) and Rule 108
(Cancellation of Correction of Entries; substantial
change)
2. Grounds for Change of Name (Sec 4, RA 9048)
a. Difficult and ridiculous, dishonorable name
b. Habitual and continual use
c. To avoid confusion
3. Petitioner has not shown any reasonable cause
and does not show that his name may prejudice
him
4. Case is administrative rather than judiciary
5. Change of sex not allowed because civil status is
immutable and inherent
6. No special law yet for sex change, until then sex
is determined by the sex at the time of birth as
resulted by visual inspection of medical
attendant.
7. Though we get your point and sympathize with
you, it’s not within the province of the Court to
amend laws. You’re barking at the wrong tree.
Go to the Congress and ask them to pass a bill
for you.
B. Consent freely given in the
presence of solemnizing officer
PEOPLE v SANTIAGO (1927)
51 Phil 68
- Felipe Santiago asked his deceased wife’s niece
Felicita Masilang, 18, to accompany him on an
errand
- Upon crossing a river and reaching municipality
of San Leonardo, Satinago expressed his sexual
desire to which girl declined, but he persisted on
with force against her will
- The two proceeded to accused’s uncle house,
Agapito Santiago who called a Protestant
minister to conduct a wedding. After the
wedding, Santiago sent home the girl with some
money to buy bread.
ISSUE: WON the marriage exempted him from
criminal liability
HELD: No! Taking into consideration Santiago’s
behavior before and after the marriage, there is no
serious intention to marry the girl except for
to avoid criminal liability for the rape case.
- Girl was under duress and therefore, lack of
consent (essential requisite) which makes the
marriage void
BUCCAT v MANGONON DE BUCAT (1941)
72 Phil 19
- Godofredo married Luida with the belief that she
was a virgin. 89 days after the marriage
celebration, Luida gave birth. Her husband
Godofredo herein appellant filed for annulment
on the ground that she concealed her non-
virginity.
ISSUE: WON marriage is valid
HELD: Where there has been no misrepresentation
or fraud, that is, when the husband at the time of the
marriage knew that the wife was pregnant, the
marriage cannot be annulled. Here, the child was
born less than 3 months after the celebration of
marriage. Court refuses to annul the marriage for the
reason that the woman was at an advanced stage of
pregnancy at the time of the marriage and such
condition must have been patent to the husband.
EIGENMANN v GUERRA (1964)
5 C.A. Rep. 836
- Eduardo Eigenmann married Maryden Guerra on
1957.
- Two years later, Eigenmann filed an action to
annul his marriage with Guerra on the ground
that he was between ages 16-20 at that time
and his mother did not give her consent to the
marriage.
ISSUE: WON there was parental consent, the
absence of which could render the marriage void.
HELD: Consent may be given in any form be it
written, oral or even by implication. Eigenmann’s
mother was present at the time of the celebration of
marriage and did not object thereto, such that
consent can be gleaned from such act.
- Eigenmann is also estopped from asserting that he
was a minor at the time of the marriage celebration,
having represented himself to be over 25 years of
age.
Art 4
- Absence of any essential or formal – void, except
Art 35(2)
- Defect in the essential requirement – voidable
(Art 45)
- Irregularity in the formal requirement – no effect
in validity, but the parties responsible will be
civilly, criminally or administratively liable
2. FORMAL REQUISITES – extrinsic
(Art 3)
A. Authority of solemnizing officer
- Who may authorize the marriage (Art 7)
a. incumbent member of judiciary
b. priest, rabbi, imam or minister of any
religious sect
- duly recognized by the religion,
- registered in Civil Registry
- acting within the limit of his authority
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- at least one of the spouses is member
of the sect
c. ship captain and airplane chief only in Art 31
d. military commander to which chaplain is
assigned in Art 32
e. consul-general, consul, vice-consul for
Filipinos abroad
*Mayors are authorized by LGC to solemnize
marriage
NAVARRO v DOMAGTOY (1996)
259 SCRA 129
- Judge Hernando Domagtoy solemnized the
marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma
del Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction.
- He has jurisdiction in MCTC of Sta. Monica-
Burgos, but the marriage was solemnized in
Dapa which does not fall under his jurisdictional
area.
- Mayor Rodolfo Navarro filed this administrative
complaint.
ISSUE: WON respondent judge should be held liable,
and whether this will render the marriage void.
HELD: Marriage may be solemnized by, among
others, any incumbent member of the judiciary
within the court’s jurisdiction. Solemnization outside
the judge’s territorial jurisdiction will not
invalidate the marriage. What results is an
irregularity in the formal requisites of a valid
marriage. Respondent judge, by citing Art 8 of the FC
as defense for the exercise of his misplaced
authority, acted in gross ignorance of the law and
was therefore held administratively liable –
suspension of 6 months.
- Irregularity in formal requisite – no effect in
marriage validity
ARAÑES v OCCIANO (2002)
380 SCRA 402
- Petitioner Mercedita Arañes charged respondent
judge Salvador Occiano for gross ignorance of
the law. Occiano solemnized the marriage
between herein petitioner and the late
Dominador Orobia without the requisite marriage
license and outside his territorial jurisdiction.
- Couple lived together as husband and wife until
the death of Orobia. But then since the marriage
was a nullity, petitioner’s right to inherit the vast
property left by Orobia was not recognized.
Respondent explained that he solemnized the
marriage out of human compassion and because
the parties promised to present their license the
afternoon after the wedding.
ISSUE: WON the respondent judge administratively
liable.
HELD: Yes. He was faulted for solemnizing a
marriage without the requisite marriage license and
for exceeding his territorial jurisdiction. He was fined
P5000 and was given a stern warning by the SC that
repetition of the same or similar offense would be
dealt more severely. The absence of a marriage
license made the marriage void. And even if the
plaintiff retracted her complaint, that’s not how it is
done. Withdrawal of complaint ≠ exoneration
B. Valid marriage license except
for marriages of exceptional
character
Art 9 ML obtained in habitual residence of one of
the parties
Art 10 Requirements of Filipino marriages abroad
settled in the consular office which will take
over the duties of local civil registry
Art 11 Two separate application for one marriage
license which shall specify the following:
1. full name
2. place of birth
3. age and date of birth
4. civil status
5. if previously married, how, when, where
the previous marriage was dissolved or
annulled
6. present residence and citizenship
7. degree of relationship of the contracting
parties
8. full name, residence and citizenship of the
father
9. full name, residence and citizenship of the
mother
10. full name, residence and citizenship of the
guardian, person having charge, in case
orphaned
Art 12 Proof of age
a. original or certified copy of birth
certificate
b. original or certified copy of baptismal
certif
c. residence certificate witnessed by 2
witnesses preferably next of kin
Proof of age dispensed with if:
a. parents appear personally
b. local civil registrar convinced by mere
looking (read: mukhang matanda na)
c. previously married
Art 13 If previous marriages, not birthcert is
required but:
a. death certificate of deceased spouse
 if no death certificate is available,
affidavit about circumstance and civil
status
b. judicial decree of absolute
divorce/judicial decree of
annulment/declaration of nullity
c. declaration of presumptive death
Art 14 if 18-21, then parental consent
Art 15 if 21-25, then parental advice
Art 16 if anyone is required with parental consent
or advice, both shall undergo marriage
counseling. Failure to attach certificate of
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accomplishment suspends issuance for 90 The following are exempted from obtaining marriage
days. license
PD 965 (1976) mandatory family planning and Art 27 When either or both of the parties are in
responsible parenthood articulo mortis, even if the ailing survives
Art 17 10 consecutive days of posting in bulletin (e.g. screenplay Walang Sugat)
board Art 28 If the residence of either party is in a
Art 18 impediments noted in the application for remote location and transportation is
marriage impossible (horse ride and distant walking
Art 19 pay for issuance of ML; indigents exempted does not count)
Art 20 valid for 120 days anywhere in the Art 31 Marriage in articulo mortis between
Philippines, automatically cancelled at passengers or crews by ship captain or
expiration airplane chief, whether in sea, in flight or
Art 21 Either or both are foreigners: certificate of stopovers
legal capacity to marry from consular Art 32 Military commander of a unit, in articulo
officials mortis, between civilians or members of
Stateless persons or refugees: affidavit armed forces within the zone of military
showing capacity to marry operations
Art 22 Marriage certificate should state the Art 33 Among Muslims and ethnic communities
following: as long as in accordance with their custom
a. full name, sex and age of each law
contracting party Art 34 Man and woman who have lived together
b. citizenship, religion and habitual as husband and wife for five years and no
residence legal impediment
c. date and precise time of the
celebration of marriage REPUBLIC v CA and Angelina Castro (1994)
d. marriage license number 236 SCRA 257
e. secured parental consent if needed - Angelina Castro and Edwin Cardenas were
f. complied with parental advice if married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge
needed Pablo Malvar. Their marriage was unknown to
g. if entered into marriage settlement, Castro’s parents aka secret marriage.
attach copy
- Defendant Cardenas was personally responsible
Art 23 Duties of solemnizing officer
for the processing of the documents, including
a. furnish couple with original marriage
the procurement of marriage license.
certificate
- Couple did not immediately live together, but
b. furnish local civil registrar with
only until Castro became pregnant. They parted
duplicate and triplicate within 15 days
ways after 4 months, thereafter she gave birth.
after the marriage
Baby was adopted by her brother with the
c. keep with him the original marriage
consent of Cardenas, and is now in US.
license, quadruplicate of the marriage
certificate and affidavit of the - In trying to put into marital status in order before
contracting party to hold marriage leaving to the US to follow her daughter, she
elsewhere as said in Art 8 sought a judicial declaration of nullity, having
Art 24 Duties of local civil registrar discovered that there was no marriage license
a. prepare documents required by this issued to Cardenas prior to marriage celebration.
Title - As proof Castro offered in evidence a
b. administer oaths to all interested certification (due search and inability to find
parties without any charge despite diligence) from Pasig Civil Register that
c. exempt from documentary stamp tax license number does not appear in the records.
Art 25 log in registry book every marriage and Cardenas failed to answer the complaint, thus
details was declared in default.
Art 26 marriages validly solemnized in other
countries are valid here except for the ISSUE: WON proof of absence of marriage license
following: presented by Castro as evidence is sufficient to
35 (1) under 18 render marriage void.
35 (4) bigamous/polygamous except for Art
41 HELD: Yes.
35 (5) mistake of identity 1. The certification of “due search and inability to
35 (6) void under Art 53 find” issued by civil registrar of Pasig enjoys
36 psychological incapacity probative value. It was then sufficiently proved that
37 incestuous civil registrar’s office did not issue marriage license
38 public policy no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
2. The failure of Castro to offer any other witness to
MARRIAGES OF EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTER corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the
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peculiar circumstances of the case – “secret
marriage.”
3. For his failure to answer despite notices, Cardenas
was declared in default. Private respondent Castro
cannot be faulted for her husband’s lack of interest
to participate in the proceedings.
MORENO v BERNABE (1995)
246 SCRA 120
- Marilou Moreno filed this administrative
complaint against Judge Jose Bernabe for grave
misconduct and ignorance of the law.
- She and Marcelo Moreno were married before
Judge Bernabe. She averred the Bernabe assured
her that the marriage contract will be released
10 days after October 4, 1993. She found out
that she could not get her marriage contract
because the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
failed to issue a marriage license.
- She claimed that respondent judge connived
with relatives of private respondent Marcelo
Moreno to deceive her.
ISSUE: WON the marriage is valid and judge liable
HELD: The marriage was void due to the absence of
a marriage license. The Court affirmed the
recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator which investigated on the case that
respondent judge was liable for misconduct for
solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license.
It also said that the respondent judge’s claim of good
intentions could never justify violation of the law.
PEOPLE v BORROMEO (1984)
133 SCRA 106
- Elias Borromeo guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of parricide, claiming that he should only be
charged with homicide since he and his partner
were not legally married, there being no
marriage contract executed during their church
wedding.
ISSUE: WON the absence of a marriage contract is
sufficient to render a marriage void.
HELD: The Court ruled in the negative, for the fact
that no record of the marriage existed in the registry
is not enough to invalidate the marriage. For as long
as all the requisites for the marriage were
present in the celebration thereof, the
marriage subsists. Presumption is always for the
validity of the marriage.
- Also, during the trial, Elias Borromeo admitted that
he was married to the victim. The Court took
cognizance of this fact and articulated that there
was no better proof of marriage than the admission
of one of the parties of the existence of such
marriage. Furthermore, the accused and victim have
lived together as husband and wife and even had
one child. Since the presumption of law is in favor of
the marriage, all evidence points to Elias Borromeo's
conviction of parricide.
SEGUISABAL v CABRERA (1981)
106 SCRA 67
- Judge Cabrera charged with gross ignorance of
the law for having solemnized the marriage of
Jaime Sayson and Marlyn Jagonoy without a
marriage license.
- Judge's story: Contracting parties and their
families came to him bearing a marriage
contract. Their request to have the marriage
officiated was of such urgency that the judge
conceded after making them promise to deliver
the marriage license that same afternoon.
- Unfortunately, no marriage license was
delivered.
- About a year later, Marlyn Jagonoy went to see
the judge, telling him she needed proof of her
marriage to Jaime Sayson in order to secure the
benefits accorded to Jaime's family after his
death as a soldier.
- The judge gave a copy of the marriage contract
to Jagonoy and told her to present the same to
the local civil registrar and to have them issue
her a marriage license.
- Local civil registrar naturally refused to issue
said license ("for the reason that the parties
have not attended the Family Planning seminar")
HELD: Absent the formal requisite of a marriage
license, the marriage was void. Judge should not
have solemnized the marriage without first securing
said license. Despite the assertions of good faith, the
judge was fined an equivalent of his three months’
salary.
ALCANTARA v ALCANTARA (2007)
531 SCRA 446
- Restituto and Rosita Alcantara went to the
Manila City Hall in 1982 to look for someone who
could "fix" the marriage for them, as they had
not then secured a marriage license.
- A “fixer” conducted the ceremony right then and
there and also contracted a priest who
solemnized the marriage in 1983.
- ML was issued by the local civil registrar of
Carmona, Cavite to which neither of them
resides. The parties were given a marriage
contract bearing a marriage license number that,
obviously because of a typographical error, did
not accurately coincide with the original
marriage license number.
ISSUE: WON the irregularities in the issuance of the
marriage license are sufficient to render the
marriage void.
HELD: Since the marriage was contracted before the
effectivity of the Family Code, Article 53 of the Civil
Code applies. It states that "no marriage shall be
solemnized the following requisites are complied
with: (1) legal capacity of the contracting parties; (2)
their consent, freely given; (3) authority of the
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person performing the marriage; and (4) a marriage
license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character. In this case, a marriage contract bearing
the marriage license number and a certification from
the civil registrar were presented as evidence.
- The inconsistency between the number (7054033)
in the license indicated in the certification of the
municipal civil registrar and the number (7054133)
typed onto the marriage contract was considered a
typographical error and therefore had no bearing.
- The fact that neither of the contracting parties was
a resident of Carmona, Cavite was seen as an
irregularity that cannot invalidate the marriage.
- Plaintiff should not be made to benefit from his own
action and be allowed to extricate himself when
situation is no longer palatable to his taste/lifestyle
(he has three children with mistress and chargeable
of concubinage)
- They contracted second marriage (religious) after
less than a year which used the same ML and
marriage contract
C. Ceremony
- No prescribed form of ceremony, what matters is:
(Art 6)
a. personal appearance of spouses (No proxy
allowed. Marriage via webcam, unlikely to be
valid.)
b. take each other as husband and wife in
presence of solemnizing officer
c. sign marriage certificate
d. at least two witnesses of legal age
- Where can the marriage be solemnized? (Art 8)
a. chambers of judge, open court, church, chapel or
temple
b. office of consul-general, consul, vice consul
c. EXCEPT
- articulo mortis (Art 27)
- remote place, no means of transportation (Art
28)
- both parties’ written request, sworn statement
(Art 8)
MARTINEZ v TAN (1909)
12 Phil 731
- Rosalia Martinez and Angel Tan sent a petition to
the justice of the peace stating that they wanted
to enter into a contract of marriage.
- The justice of the peace, the two contracting
parties, and two witnesses of legal age, then
signed a document ratifying the above petition
and affirming that the signatories were actually
present on the day indicated in the justice's
office.
- Martinez and Tan were then issued a certificate
of marriage. The justice pronounced them man
and wife.
- Martinez and Tan did not live together as
husband and wife after the ceremony because
Martinez parents were against the relationship.
ISSUE: WON the ceremony herewith described
fulfilled the formal requisite of a marriage ceremony.
HELD: Yes. There was a proper ceremony: signing a
statement that declares that they take each other as
husband and wife is sufficient. In short, the
declaration of the parties need not be verbal. Article
6 of the Family Code clearly articulates that no
particular form of marriage ceremony is required. For
as long as the contracting parties personally appear
before a solemnizing officer and make a declaration
in the presence of not less than two witnesses of
legal age that they take each other as husband and
wife, the formal requisite of ceremony is complied
with.
MADRIDEJO v DE LEON (1930)
55 Phil 1
Flaviana Perez was married to Pedro Madridejo in
articulo mortis. She died the day after the wedding.
The priest who solemnized the marriage failed to
send a copy of the marriage certificate to the
municipal secretary.
ISSUE: WON the failure to send the copy of marriage
certification would render the marriage void.
HELD: No. The failure of the priest to send a copy of
the marriage certificate is a mere irregularity.
Consequently, the marriage was valid.
3. PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE
CC, Art 220 In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solida
or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolub
children, the community of property during marriage, the au
validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unla
Sec 3 (aa), Rule 131 of Rules of Court That a man and wom
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
- Marriage contract is only of evidentiary value,
there are also other means to prove the
existence of marriage:
a. birth or baptismal certificate of children
bearing the name of the spouses as parents
b. couple’s public cohabitation as spouses
c. testimonies from witnesses
d. documentary photos and videos of the
wedding
TRINIDAD v CA, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad
(1998)
289 SCRA 188
- Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the
parents of Inocentes, Lourdes, and Felix.
- When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the
above named children, he left four parcels of
land. Arturo Trinidad, born July 1943, claimed to
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be the legitimate son of Inocentes making him a
compulsory heir.
- Lourdes and Felix, on the other hand, denied
Arturo's claim, contending that Inocentes died
single.
- Arturo now has to prove that Inocentes and his
mother were validly married and that he was
born during the subsistence of said marriage.
ISSUE: WON Inocentes and Arturo’s mother were
validly married
HELD: The Court cited a particular case which ruled
that when the question of whether a marriage has
been contracted arises in litigation, said marriage
may be proven by (a) the testimony of a witness to
the matrimony, (b) the couple's public and open
cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged
wedlock, (c) the birth and the baptismal certificates
of children born during such union, and (d) the
mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents.
- For his part, Arturo was only able to present a
certificate from the local civil registrar that all
documents of birth, marriage, and death (in
Aklan) were either burned, lost, or destroyed
during the Japanese occupation of the
municipality.
- In place of the marriage contract, petitioner
presented two witnesses, one testified that she
was present during the nuptials, and the other
that the couple cohabited as husband and wife.
This last witness also stated that she visited the
couple's house at the time of petitioner's birth.
Tolentino's annotation to Article 23 of the Family
Code might prove relevant to this case: There is a
prima facie presumption that a man and a
woman living maritally under the same roof
are legally married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not
what they held themselves out as being, they would
be living in constant violation of decency and law.
The presumption of marriage is rebuttable only by
cogent proof to the contrary. Since Arturo's
witnesses attested to his parents' public cohabitation
as husband and wife, marriage can be presumed.
The other party then bears the burden of proof in
contesting the marriage of Arturo's parents.
VDA. DE JACOB v CA and Pedro Pilapil (1999)
312 SCRA 772
- Tomasa Vda. de Jacob claims to be the surviving
spouse of Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed
Special Administratrix of his estates by virtue of
a reconstructed marriage contract between
them.
- Pedro Pilapil, the doctor's alleged adopted son,
claims that the marriage between Tomasa and
Dr. Jacob was void since (1) no marriage license
and (2) only a reconstructed marriage contract.
HELD: Regarding the first issue, the Court recognized
that the contracting parties have been living
together as husband and wife for more than five
years before the solemnization of the marriage so
that they were exempt from the marriage license
requirement. In answer to the second issue, the
Court explained that though the primary evidence of
a marriage must be an authentic copy of the
marriage contract, secondary evidence proving the
same is admissible provided that (1) due execution
of the document and (2) subsequent loss of the
original instrument are first proven. Both (1) and (2)
were in fact established from the preponderance of
evidence presented during the trial; photographs of
the wedding, letter of the solemnizing officer,
statement of the officer that the marriage certificate
was lost, etc. Also, the testimony of one of the
parties to the marriage has been held admissible as
proof of the fact of marriage. Furthermore, the
presumption in cases like this is always in favor of
marriage. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter-presumption or evidence special to the case,
to be in fact married.
SEVILLA v CARDENAS (2006)
497 SCRA 428
- Sevilla asks for a declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Cardenas on the ground that the
marriage was solemnized without the parties'
first securing a marriage license.
- Cardenas argued to the contrary, saying that
they were married in civil rites with Marriage
License No. 2770792. The local civil registrar
was asked to furnish evidence affirming the
existence of said marriage license.
- The representative who appeared in court
claimed that they could not find the registry
book supposedly containing the relevant
information to this case because the person in
charge has already retired.
- Irrelevant but interesting facts: Intertuhod sex
and knee fetish. Guy’s mom sent guy to Spain to
go to med school, but while he was there he
didn’t really study
HELD: Loss of the registry book cannot be taken as
proof of the non-issuance of a marriage license. No
certification like in Alcantara case saying that due
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search was conducted. Instead, the letter said that

“no full attention given bec of loaded work”
- The presumption of the law is in favor of the
validity of the marriage so that in the absence of
sufficient evidence against it, the marriage subsists.
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1936 Arturo Mendoza married Jovita De Asis

1941 Mendoza married Olga Lema, with subsisting

V. VOID & 1943

1949
marriage
Jovita died in 1943
Mendoza married Carmencita Panlilio, it was

VOIDABLE for this last marriage that he was prosecuted

for bigamy.

MARRIAGE HELD: Mendoza is not guilty of bigamy for the third

marriage because marriage with Lema was void for
bigamy, being contracted when De Asis was still
alive. When he wed Panlilio, his marriage with De
A. Void Marriages Asis was no longer subsisting by reason of the
latter's death.
TOLENTINO v PARAS (1983)
1. GROUNDS G.R. No. L-43905
- Serafia Tolentino files for rectification of
I. Art 4 – Absence of formal or essential deceased husband’s death certificate to place
requisite her as surviving spouse
- Tolentino contracted a marriage with Maria
II. Art 35 – Marriages void ab initio Clemente during the subsistence of a prior
marriage. He was convicted of and served
1. one is under 18 years old Age – essential sentence for bigamy. After completing the term
requisite for his conviction, he went back to his second
2. solemnized by a person not Solemnizing wife.
authorized to perform marriage, Officer – formal - Tolentino's death certificate had the name of the
except when either or both requisite
Maria Clemente as the surviving spouse instead
spouses believe in good faith that
he has the power to do so of Serafia.
3. solemnized without a valid Marriage License
marriage license – formal requisite HELD: Serafia, the first wife, is Tolentino's surviving
4. bigamous or polygamous except Legal spouse. Tolentino's conviction for bigamy is the best
under Art 41 impediment – proof that his second marriage was void.
essential
requisite WIEGEL v SEMPIO-DY (1986)
5. mistake of identity Consent – 143 SCRA 499
essential
requisite
- Karl Wiegel files for annulment of marriage with
6. subsequent marriage void under Lilia Olivia because she previously married
Art 53 Eduardo Maxion.
- However Lilia says that the marriage was
contracted under duress.
FC, Art 40 Absolute nullity of the previous marriage for
the purpose of remarriage may be invoked only through - Although woman believes the marriage is void,
a judicial declaration of nullity when the husband learned about Olivia's
previous marriage, he filed for a declaration of
nullity.
- This provision is retroactive, regardless when the
marriage was celebrated. (See Atienza v HELD: Olivia's first marriage is merely voidable, her
Brillantes.) consent being vitiated by force. Her second marriage
- Judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage is void because it was contracted while a prior
protects the spouse and prevents a subsequent marriage was subsisting.
marriage contracted by him/her from becoming - Although the marriage is void, Sempio-Diy says
bigamous. Also, so that everything will be crystal that there should be legal declaration of nullity
clear between the two ex-spouses. for void marriages or final judgment of
- Other uses of judicial declaration of nullity of annulment for voidable marriages
marriage: - SC dismisses case saying marriage is not a
o Liquidation, partition and distribution matter of private contract and personal
o Separation of property between spouses adventure.
o Custody and support of children
o Delivery of children’s presumptive *The decision laid down in this case had NO
legitime LEGAL BASIS. The Civil Code does not require a
final judgment of nullity in marriages void ab initio.
PEOPLE v MENDOZA (1954) To quote Ma’am Beth: “Inimbento lang yan ni
95 Phil 845 Sempio-Diy!”
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TERRE v TERRE (1992)
211 SCRA 6
- Dorothy and Jordan Terre met when the latter
was in law school. Jordan was persistent in
asking for Dorothy's hand in marriage, even
explaining to her that her marriage to a certain
Mercelito Bercinilla was void ab initio because
they were first cousins.  enveigled the woman
- He further reiterated that there was no need for
Dorothy to secure a court declaration regarding
the nullity of that marriage. Convinced with
Jordan's word, the two entered into a contract of
marriage.
- Years later, Jordan suddenly disappeared. It was
found out that he married a certain Vilma
Malicdem, giving Dorothy a ground for filing
against him a case of bigamy. Btw, Dorothy
spent for his law school expenses and even gave
him allowances.
ISSUE: WON Jordan may be charged of bigamy
HELD: A judicial declaration that the first marriage is
void is essential for contracting a subsequent
marriage. Dorothy's marriage to Terre is void for
being bigamous. Even if the court were to assume
for the sake of argument that Jordan Terre held in
good faith the mistaken belief that Dorothy's
marriage to Bercenilla was void ab initio, a case of
bigamy will still follow.
- His first marriage to complainant Dorothy must
be deemed valid and his second marriage to
Vilma Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous.
- Even if void marriage, it still needs judicial
declaration.
*Ma’am Beth: “Jordan is very inconsistent. Whatta
lousy lawyer.”
ATIENZA v BRILLANTES (1995)
243 SCRA 32
- Judge Brillantes and Zenaida Ongkiko went
through a marriage ceremony solemnized by a
town mayor and without a marriage license.
- They went through another marriage ceremony,
again without securing the necessary marriage
license.
- Judge Brillantes then married Yolanda De Castro,
saying that he was free to marry because under
the Civil Code his first marriage was void.
HELD: Judge's marriage to Ongkiko was void, but
using Article 40 of the Family Code, he should have
first secured a judicial declaration of the nullity of his
previous marriage.
- Judge Brillantes argued that the provision does
not apply to him since his first marriage was
contracted in 1965 and was still governed by the
Civil Code (which came into effect August 30,
1950; the Family Code became effective August
03, 1988).
- The Court answered this by stating that Article
40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after
the effectivity of the Family Code, regardless of
the date of the first marriage. Besides, under
Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is
given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
- Judge Brillantes has not shown any vested right
that was impaired by the application of Article 40
to his case.
BORJA-MANZANO v SANCHEZ (2001)
354 SCRA 1
- Complaint filed by lawful wife of late David
Manzano whom respondent wed with Luzviminda
Payao despite status of “separated”
HELD: That the contracting parties have been living
apart from their respective spouses for years did not
dissolve those marriage bonds. Even free and
voluntary cohabitation cannot severe the ties of a
subsisting previous marriage. Furthermore, marital
cohabitation for a long period of time between two
individuals who are legally capacitated to marry
each other is merely a ground for exemption from
marriage license. It cannot serve as a justification for
solemnizing a subsequent marriage. Manzano and
Payao's marriage is void for being bigamous.
Respondent judge demonstrated gross ignorance of
the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous
marriage.
APIAG v CANTERO (1997)
268 SCRA 47
- Maria Apiag and Judge Cantero were married in a
ceremony supposedly set up by their parents.
Two children were born out of their union.
- The judge then left Apiag with no financial
support whatsoever for her and the children.
- Maria learned later on that the judge had
contracted a second marriage. She then filed a
case of bigamy and falsification of document
against the judge.
HELD: The Court reiterated the rule that a marriage
though void still needs a judicial declaration of such
fact before any party thereto can marry again,
otherwise the second marriage will also be void
(Article 40 of the Family Code).
- However, Judge Cantero's second marriage took
place before the promulgation of Wiegel v.
Sempio-Dy (1986) and before the effectivity of
the Family Code (1988). Hence, the doctrine in
Odayat v. Amante, where no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of void
marriages, is applicable to his case.
- The judge was free to contract a second
marriage without court declaration of the nullity
of the first marriage. And since the charge of
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falsification is based on a finding of guilt in the
bigamy charge, failure of the bigamy aspect
would likewise render the falsification angle
invalid.
- The conduct of the respondent judge in his
personal life falls short of court standards.
However, this mistake should not totally destroy
his career and deprive him or his heirs of the
fruits of his labor. For such conduct, the court
would have imposed a penalty. But in view of his
death, dismissal of the case was ordered.
- It turns out Apiag and Cantero were only
childhood sweethearts and married to save face
because the woman got pregnant. Speculatively,
the Apiags were after their share in Cantero’s
retirement benefits.
- Interesting phrase: “Youthful mistake should not
forever haunt judge. Man is not perfect.”
III. Art 36 – Psychological incapacity
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
- An innovation of the Family Code, derived from
Art 1095 of the Canon Law
- Psychological incapacity is not a vice of
consent. In fact, a psychologically incapacitated
party does give a valid consent. The problem lies
in his or her inability to fulfill the obligations
arising from that consent. An example of vice of
consent is insanity.
- No examples given of psychological incapacity
because doing so would limit the applicability of
Article 36 under the principle of ejusdem
generis.
- The psychologically incapacitated person is not
disqualified from marrying again, especially
if he/she can find a partner who would be able to
accept his personality. The fact of his or her
psychological incapacity would be revealed
anyway in the application for a marriage license
for the second marriage and the other party is
thus placed on guard to conduct discreet
investigation about the matter.
- The following grounds may be mentioned as
manifestations of psychological incapacity,
according to Dr. Veloso of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of
Manila;
(1) homosexuality or lesbianism,
(2) satyriasis or nymphomania,
(3) extremely low intelligence,
(4) immaturity,
(5) epilepsy,
(6) habitual alcoholism, and
(7) criminality.
- Other manifestations, according to other experts
on church annulment, would be
(1) refusal of the wife to dwell with the
husband after the marriage,
(2) compulsive gambling or unbearable
jealousy,
(3) sociopathic anomalies like sadism or
infliction of physical violence,
constitutional laziness or indolence, drug
dependence, or some kind of
psychosexual anomaly.
- Either party to the marriage can file for a
declaration of nullity. A spouse's psychological
incapacity does not bar him or her from initiating
the action for the declaration of nullity.
GUIDELINES LAID DOWN IN REPUBLIC v MOLINA
1. burden of proof is on the plaintiff, subject to
investigation for collusion
2. root cause must be medically/clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint and
explained in the decision
3. exist at the time of the marriage
4. incurable
5. grave enough to bring about the incapability to
fulfill marital obligation
6. cannot perform Art 68-71, 220-221 and 225
7. decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of Catholic Church should be observed
8. state participation to protect sanctity of
marriage through the fiscal or prosecuting
attorney
MAIN REQUIREMENTS FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY
1. juridical antecedence (prior to the marriage)
2. incurability
3. gravity
SANTOS v BEDIA-SANTOS (1995)
240 SCRA 20
- Leouel Santos and Julia Bedia contracted a
marriage in 1986. They often had quarrels
because of their living arrangement. They lived
with the wife’s parents who always intervened in
their conjugal affairs.
- Julia then left for the United States as a nurse.
After seven months, she called her husband to
tell him she will return the following year. She
never went home though.
- Leouel tried to locate her when he was assigned
in US for training (he wa member of the Armed
Force) but his search was to no avail.
- Leouel then filed for a declaration of nullity of
marriage, arguing that Julia's failure to return
home and communicate with him for more than
five years clearly shows her being
psychologically incapacitated.
ISSUE: WON Julia is psychologically incapacitated
HELD: NO. The facts were not enough to show
psychological incapacity. What was shown was lack
of willingness to comply with marital obligations.
Through dicta, the Court also explained that:
(1) There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of
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psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
(2) That the provision is open to abuse. To prevent
this, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State
to take steps to prevent the collusion between
parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.
(3) In deciding the case, the judge must be guided
by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not
binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive
effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.
REPUBLIC v CA and Roridel Molina (1997)
268 SCRA 198
- Roridel Molina filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.
- She claimed that a year after their marriage,
Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility (i.e. spent all his time with his
friends, depended on his parents for support,
was dishonest about their finances, was
habitually quarrelsome).
- He also lost his job and from then on Roridel
became the family's breadwinner. The couple
had been living separately for more than three
years as of the commencement of this hearing.
HELD: What existed in this case were irreconcilable
differences or conflicting personalities, which in no
wise constitute psychological incapacity. Court
further said that it is not enough to prove that the
parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they
must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due
to some psychological illness.
- “Mild characterological peculiarities, mood
changes and occasional emotional outbursts
cannot be accepted as root causes of
psychological incapacity. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there should be a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.”
TSOI v CA (1997)
266 SCRA 324
- The case of the two incher Chinese (3 in when
erect)
- Ten months after marriage, Chi Ming Tsoi and
Gina Lao still did not engage in sexual
intercourse even if neither party is impotent. The
wife wanted to annul (instead of declaration of
nullity?) the marriage but the husband did not.
HELD: The Court first explained that the action to
declare a marriage void can be initiated by either
party, even by the one who's incapacitated. This
makes it immaterial to determine which spouse
refuses to have sex with the other. It then went on to
articulate that "one marital obligation is to procreate
based on the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the basic end
of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this
obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage." Insofar as the case
presented a breach of marital obligation, there is
psychological incapacity.
*According to Ma’am Beth: Abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate marriage is strongly
indicative of a serious personality disorder. It
demonstrates utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. Senseless
and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill
marital obligations is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
*Also: Tsoi’s love for his wife is exceptional. He
doesn’t mind the risk of divulging to the public his
package size to be discussed by law students in
perpetuity if only to save their marriage. Poor guy. 
MARCOS v MARCOS (2000)
343 SCRA 755
- Both spouses are members of AFP and PSG for
Marcos
- Brenda married Wilson Marcos and had five
children with him. Marcos was discharged from
his job and this led to a series of quarrels with
his wife, in which he did her physical harm. He
was also wont to mistreating his own children.
- The couple then started living separately. At one
time, the wife went to her husband's house to
look for their son. He was gravely angered by
this ran after her with a samurai.
- For failing to find work and treating his family
violently, the Regional Trial Court found the
husband psychologically incapacitated. This
decision was denied by the Court of Appeals,
reasoning that, taking the totality of the pieces
of evidence presented, psychological incapacity
was not manifest.
HELD: Supreme Court referred to the guidelines laid
out in Republic vs. Molina. It ruled the case in the
negative, stating that (1) (based on juridical
antecedence) there was absolutely no showing that
Marcos' defects were already present at the
inception of the marriage. It was only after he lost
his job that he became intermittently drunk, failed to
give material and moral support, and even left the
family home. Also, (2) (based on incurability) there
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was no showing that his defects were incurable, lack of medical, psychiatric or psychological
especially now that he's been gainfully employed as examination only worsens the situation.
a taxi driver.

Through dicta, the Court further articulated that

Republic vs. Molina included the "medical and
clinical identification" of the root cause of the
psychological incapacity. What is important is the
presence of evidence that can adequately establish
the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to.

The Court even declared that Article 36 should not

be equated with a divorce law or legal separation. It
is not a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It is
not legal separation, in which the grounds need not
be rooted on psychological incapacity but on
physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption,
civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. (At best,
the evidence presented by the wife in this case
refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for
declaring a marriage void.)

CHOA v CHOA (2002)

392 SCRA 198
- Case of the incompetent psychologist;
incompatibility
- Alfonso Choa filed for a declaration of nullity of
marriage based on his wife's psychological
incapacity.
- The case went to trial with the Alfonso
presenting evidence. To this the wife replied with
a Motion to Dismiss or Demurrer to Evidence
(which is an objection or exception by one of the
parties in an action at law, to the effect that the
evidence which his adversary produced is
insufficient in point of law (whether true or not)
to make out his case or sustain the issue). The
RTC and CA denied the wife's Motion to Dismiss.

ISSUE: WON wife's (1) immaturity, (2) lack of

attention to their children, and (3) lack of intention of
pro-creative sexuality constitute psychological
incapacity.

HELD: The evidence adduced by Alfonso merely

shows that he and his wife could not get along.
There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or
juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems
besetting their marital union. The Court here is of
the opinion that a medical examination is not a
condition sine qua non to a finding of
psychological incapacity, so long as the totality of
evidence presented is enough to establish the
incapacity adequately. Here the totality of evidence
presented by respondent was completely insufficient
to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity - the
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ANTONIO v REYES (2006)
484 SCRA 353
- Case of the pathological liar
- Antonio filed for a declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Reyes, whom he alleged is
psychologically incapacitated, as manifested in
her habitual lying (that one brother-in-law
attempted to rape and kill, that she was a
psychiatrist and free-lance voice talent who's
distinguished performer, etc.)
- There were psychiatrists who testified for both
parties. One used the Comprehensive Psych-
Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) and said that
Reyes passed the test and so was not
psychologically incapacitated. The doctor from
the opposing party countered the finding, saying
that the test was not reliable.
- TC declared the marriage null and void. Before
its announcement of its decision, the
Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of
Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of
petitioner and respondent on the ground of lack
of due discretion of both parties. This decision
was upheld by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal but stipulated that only
Reyes was impaired by a lack of due discretion.
Same decision was upheld by the Roman Rota of
the Vatican. CA held otherwise, saying there was
insufficient evidence.
HELD:
(1) The root cause of respondent's psychological
incapacity has been medically or clinically identified,
alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by
experts (there was no personal examination, but
Court cited Molina ruling saying that the personal
examination of the subject by the physician is not
required), and clearly explained in the trial court's
decision.
(2) That the psychological incapacity was
established to have clearly existed at the time of and
even before the celebration of the marriage.
(3) That the gravity of respondent's psychological
incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. The
lies attributed to the respondent indicate a failure on
her part to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least
abide by the truth. One unable to adhere to reality
cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or
emotional commitments.
(4) That the Court of Appeals erred when it did not
consider the fact that the marriage was annulled by
the Catholic Church.
Through dicta, the Court also draw a distinction
between the wife's pathological lying and the
implications of Article 45(3) of the Family Code
which states that a marriage may be annulled if the
consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and
Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances
constituting fraud under the previous article,
clarifying that "no other misrepresentation or deceit
as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall
constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action
for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper
to draw linkages between misrepresentations made
by Reyes and misrepresentation under Articles 45(3)
and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the
consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not
allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this
case, the misrepresentations of Reyes point to her
own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations,
kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
REPUBLIC v CUISON-MELGAR (2006)
486 SCRA 177
- The wife filed for declaration of nullity of
marriage based on her husband's psychological
incapacity as manifested in his immaturity,
habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy,
maltreatment, continual laziness, and
abandonment of the family.
HELD: The totality of evidence presented by the wife
was completely insufficient to establish
psychological incapacity.
(1) The wife alone testified in support of her
complaint.
(2) She failed to establish the fact that at the time of
the celebration of the marriage her husband was
already suffering from a psychological defect.
(3) There was no evidence showing that the husband
was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. At
best, the circumstances relied upon by the wife are
ground for legal separation.
*Ma’am Beth points out the inconsistency in the
rules: No need for expert psychological opinion but
presenting such will “strengthen” your case, as the
court decision said something like “could have
increased her chances of winning”
PARAS v PARAS (2007)
529 SCRA 81
- Rosa Paras filed for a declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Justo Paras on the ground of
psychological incapacity as manifested in his
infidelity, failure to support his children,
abandonment of the family, and falsification of
documents.
- Death of their two children, the family flew to
States to recover. When they family return, Justo
said that Rosa became cold to him
- They had a gasoline station which the husband
usually gives for free for the city government
since he used to be the mayor
- The existence of an illegitimate child Cyndee
Rose Paras with an alleged concubine named
Loida Ching.
HELD: While the above allegations were true, there
was nothing in the records showing that they were
caused by psychological incapacity. Justo's acts
appeared to have been the result of irreconcilable
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differences between him and his wife caused by the
death of their children and his failure in his
professional endeavors. There was then no evidence
that Justo's defects were present at the time of
the marriage and only after he lost the mayoralty
election.
TONGOL v TONGOL (2007)
537 SCRA 135
- Husband filed for a declaration of nullity of
marriage based on his wife's psychological
incapacity as manifested in her being given to
tantrums, irritability, and want of dominance.
- A certain Dr. Villegas examined the wife and
concluded that she was suffering from an
“Inadequate Personality Disorder” with hysterical
coloring which rendered her psychologically
incapacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of marriage.
HELD: Dr. Villegas failed to link the wife's
personality disorder to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity since (1) he was not able
to satisfactorily explain if her personality disorder
was grave enough to bring about disability to comply
with marital obligations, (2) there was no evidence
that such incapacity was incurable.
- Also, the psychological incapacity considered
under Article 36 is not meant to comprehend all
possible cases of psychoses - here, the spouses'
differences and misunderstandings basically
revolve around and are limited to their
disagreement regarding the management of
their business. In sum, it was not disputed that
the wife was suffering from a psychological
disorder. However, the totality of the evidence
presented did not show that her personality
disorder is of the kind contemplated in Article
36.
IV. Art 37 – Incestuous marriage
1. between ascendants and descendants
2. between brothers and sisters, whether half-
blood or full-blood
V. Art 38 – Violation of public policy
1. between collateral relatives up to the 4
degree, illegitimate or legitimate
2. between step-parent and step-children
3. between parent-in-law and child-in-law
4. between adopter and adopted
5. surviving spouse of adopter and adopted
6. between surviving spouse of adopted and
adopter
7. between legitimate children of adopter and
adopted
8. between adopted children of same adopted
9. if one kills own or other wife with the
intention to marry another or the victim’s
spouse
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*Stepbrothers and stepsisters are not included in the
list.
Reasons why above mentioned marriages
contravene public policy:
1. Recessive genes of families get expressed
2. Causes confusion in the family tree (what is
the relationship of a father to his child with
his daughter?)
3. Legit child and adopted child are presumed
to have been raised as real siblings
4. For Par 9 -> complete moral perversion.
Ethics!
VI. Art 41 – subsequent marriage UNLESS there
is a “declaration of presumptive death” of
spouse in appropriate cases
VII. Art 44 – if both spouses contracted
remarriage from absence in bad faith (as to
absence of one spouse)
2. PERIOD TO FILE ACTION OR
RAISE DEFENSE
FC, Art 39 The action or defense for the declaration of
absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. (As
amended by RA 8533, approved Feb. 23, 1998)
- Under E.O. 277, for marriages contracted before
the Family Code took effect, the action for the
declaration of nullity based on psychological
incapacity prescribed in ten years - that is, ten
years after 1988, or 1998. But R.A. 8533 now
makes all actions under Article 36
imprescriptible. It’s gonna be here forever, at
least, until this law gets repealed.
- Mere lapse of time cannot give effect to
marriage or any other contract that is null and
void.
3. EFFECTS OF NULLITY
*For provisions refer to the table in the appendix
th
NIÑAL v BADAYOG (2000)
328 SCRA 122
- Niñal and Badayog were married in 1974.
- Niñal shot his wife Bellones in 1985, causing her
death (why didn’t they convict him of
parricide???). After a year and a half, Ninal
contracted a second marriage with Badayog
without a marriage license. They executed an
affidavit stating they have cohabited for at least
five years.
- Ninal died in 1997. His children with Bellones
seek a declaration of nullity of Ninal's marriage
with Badayog.
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- It is assumed that the validity or invalidity of the
second marriage would affect the children's
successional rights.
HELD: Niñal and Badayog's marriage is void for lack
of marriage license. They are not exempt from
acquiring a marriage license because their five-year
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated
by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect
union that is valid under the law but rendered
imperfect only by the absence of the marriage
contract. Of the five years that they had cohabited,
only 20 months were without any legal impediment.
Other than for purposes of remarriage (see Article
40 of the Family Code), no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy
of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
same so long as it is essential to the determination
of the case.
* This is weird Niñal should have been disqualified to
marry Badayog because of Art 38 Par 9 (kills own or
other wife with the intention to marry another or the
victim’s spouse)
DOMINGO v CA and Delia Soledad Avera (1993)
226 SCRA 572
- Soledad Domingo filed for separation of property
and declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Roberto Domingo.
- They were married 1976, but unknown to
Soledad, Roberto was previously married to a
certain Emerlinda de la Paz.
- She came to know of the first marriage only after
Emerlinda sued them for bigamy.
- Roberto claimed that Soledad's petition for a
declaration of nullity was superfluous in that
their marriage was void ab initio.
- On the other hand, Soledad insisted on the
necessity of the judicial declaration of nullity, not
for purposes of remarriage, but in order to
provide a basis for the separation and
distribution of the properties acquired during
coverture.
HELD: Judicial declaration of nullity can be invoked
for purposes other than remarriage. Separation
of property is also one of the effects of judicial
declaration of nullity. The Court further asserted that
a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage
to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void. In fact, the
requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a
marriage is also for the protection of the spouse
who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and
void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of
nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who
marries again cannot be charged of bigamy.
*Emphasis on the word “ONLY” / “SOLELY” in Art 40,
FC
*Ma’am Beth thinks this is a weird case because
usually it’s the first wife that files bigamy against
husband. Here, it’s the second wife.
DE CASTRO v ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO (2008)
GR No. 160172
- Reinelle Anthony De Castro impregnated
Annabelle Assidao, a government dentist. Their
marriage license expired so they (falsely)
executed an affidavit stating that they had been
living together as husband and wife for five
years.
- By virtue of this affidavit, they contracted a
marriage. The parties, however, lived separately
after the marriage's celebration.
- Assidao filed a complaint for child support,
asserting that she was validly married to De
Castro and that her daughter was De Castro's
legitimate child.
HELD: The execution of the false affidavit stating
that the parties had been living together as husband
and wife cannot be considered as a mere
irregularity. They were married without a valid
marriage license and so their marriage was void ab
initio.
- The child born to them was illegitimate; however, it
does not free De Castro from the duty of providing
financial support since he has been declaring her as
a dependent in tax exemption and even signed in
her birth certificate.
B. Voidable Marriages
- Valid until annulled by a competent court
- Can be convalidated (ratified or annulled)
either by free cohabitation or prescription
- Cannot be impugned upon death of either
party
1. Grounds for Annulment
FC, Art 45 Grounds for voidable marriages
1. 18-21 yrs old but no parental consent
2. any party of unsound mind
3. consent obtained by fraud
4. consent obtained by force, intimidation, undue influence
5. incurable physical incapacity to consummate the marriage (im
6. incurable and serious STD, existing at the time of the marriag
gonorrhea are curable)
For Par 4:
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- Violence – use of serious or irresistible force to
wrest consent (Art 1335, CC)
- Undue influence – improper advantage of
power over the will of the other, depriving the
latter of reasonable freedom of choice, threat
to enforce a legal claim does not invalidate
consent to a marriage
- Reverential fear – fear of causing distress,
disappointment or anger on part of the victim
For Par 5:
- IMPOTENCY is different from STERILITY.
Impotency cannot harden up, so no sex is
possible. Sterility, on the other hand, is
characterized by low spermatozoa count.
However, the fact that intercourse is possible,
there remains a possibility, no matter how low or
tiny, for the husband to sire a child.
- Old age is not a ground because one who
marries an old person should have been
prepared for the other’s impotence.
- DOCTRINE OF TRIENNIAL COHABITATION: If wife
remains a virgin after three years of living
together, the presumption of impotency
commences unless proven otherwise.
FC, Art 46 What do you mean by fraud in Art 45 (3)? Concealment of:
1. final conviction of moral turpitude
2. pregnancy by man other than husband
3. STD
4. Drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism
*for Nos 3 and 4:
- Incurability of the STD does not factor in
because the main issue is the concealment
of the fact of having an STD
- Can be a ground for Art 36 if proven to exist
at the time of marriage
Art 47 Who may file the action and when (see
Table)
RATIFICATION cures defect existing at the time of
marriage and validates the marriage
PRESCRIPTION bars the remedy because of the lapse
of the period provided by the law for bringing the
action to annul
FC, Art 48 The need for a prosecuting attorney to prevent collusion or suppression/fabrication of evidence between parties.
Stipulation of fact or confession of judgment not to be accepted.
FC, Art 49 Pendency of the decree
a. support of the spouse (pendent elite)
b. custody and support of the children
c. visitation rights of the other parent
RPC, Art 344 Prosecution of the crimes adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction,
MOE v DINKINS (1981)
533 F. Supp. 623
Maria Moe and Raoul Roe, together with their child
Richard Roe sought the declaration of a New York
Domestic Relations Law requiring parental consent
as unconstitutional. Relevant portions of the said law
provides that all male applicants for a marriage
license between 16 and 18, and all female applicants
between 14 and 18 must obtain the written consent
of both of their parents. Maria was 15 and Raoul, 18,
when this case was initiated. They continue to be
prevented from marrying because Marias' mother
refuses to give her consent to their union. Plaintiffs
contend that the NY Law was unconstitutional since
it deprived them of liberty guaranteed to them by
the Due Process Clause.
HELD: The constitutional rights of children
cannot be equated to that of adults because of:
(1) the peculiar vulnerability of children,
(2) their inability to make critical decisions in an
informed and mature manner,
(3) the importance of parental role in child-rearing.
Court also explained that the State interests
espoused in the NY Law are the protection of minors
from immature decision-making and the prevention
of unstable marriages. The law also assumes that
parents naturally act in the best interest of their
children,
so that parental consent cannot be
dispensed with.
KATIPUNAN v TENORIO (1937)
38 OG 71
- Marcos Katipunan sought annulment of his
marriage to Rita Tenorio on the ground of latter's
insanity.
- There was no proof that Tenorio was insane at
the time of the celebration of the marriage.
HELD: No ground for annulment. Insanity that occurs
after the celebration of the marriage does not
constitute a cause for nullity.
SUNTAY v COJUANGCO SUNTAY (1998)
300 SCRA 760
- Emilio Suntay married Isabel Cojuangco. Prior to
the marriage, Emilio was already suffering from
schizophrenia. The trial court declared their
marriage null and void on the ground of Emilio's
insanity.
- Now, Isabel Aguinaldo Suntay wants to assert
her claim as Emilio's legitimate heir.
HELD: The marriage was voidable, unsound mind
being a ground for annulment and not for
declaration of nullity. Isabel Aguinaldo Suntay should
thus be accorded the same rights as acknowledged
natural children. She was a legitimate heir of Emilio
and their grandmother.
- There was a difference in the dispositive (fallo) and
the body of the court decision. In case of
discrepancy rape and
(voidable andacts
notof void),
lasciviousness
the decision
should be read as a whole.
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BUCCAT v BUCCAT (1941) SUPRA
Godofredo Buccat married Luida Mangonon with the
belief that she was a virgin. Luida gave birth 89 days
after the celebration of the marriage. Godofredo
then filed for annulment on the ground that she
concealed her non-virginity.
HELD: It was not believable for the husband to not
have known his wife's state, her pregnancy being in
the advanced stage (sixth month). The Court refused
to annul the marriage, saying that there was no
misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the wife.
AQUINO v DELIZO (1960)
109 Phil 21
- Fernando Aquino married Conchita Delizo, four
months after the celebration of the marriage,
Delizo gave birth.
- Aquino then filed for annulment on the ground of
fraud or concealment of pregnancy.
HELD: Since Delizo was naturally plump, Aquino
could not have known that she was four months
pregnant at the time of the marriage. According to
medical opinion, even on the fifth month of
pregnancy, the enlargement of the woman's
abdomen is still below the umbilicus and hardly
noticeable. It is only on the sixth month of
pregnancy that the roundness of the woman's
abdomen becomes apparent. REMANDED FOR
RETRIAL
ANAYA v PALAROAN (1970)
36 SCRA 97
- Aurora Anaya wanted to annul her marriage to
Fernando Palaroan on the basis of his failure to
disclose his relationship with another woman
prior to their marriage.
- Only married her to evade a premarital affair
with a close relative and no intention to become
husband and wife.
ISSUE: WON disclosure of previous relationship is
fraud
HELD: NO because fraud as a vice of consent in
marriage is limited to those enumerated by
law, which in this case would be those mentioned in
Article 86 of the Civil Code. If we were to read the
later provision of the Family Code into this scenario,
the clause "no other misrepresentation or deceit as
to character, health, rank, fortune, or chastity" of
Article 46 would bar Anaya's action for annulment.
RUIZ v ATIENZA (1941)
40 OG 1903
- Jose Ruiz impregnated Pelagia Atienza. He was
fetched from his residence by Atienza's relatives
who allegedly intimidated him into marrying her.
- An uncle of Atienza was even said to have
threatened to file immorality charges against
Ruiz that would prevent his admission to the Bar.
HELD: There was no ground for annulment. Neither
violence nor duress attended the marriage
celebration. Also, threat cannot come from lawful
actions such as threat to obstruct his admission to
the Bar based on immorality. He was also not
kidnapped by his wife's relatives, there being many
occasions for him to escape.
- If guilty of seduction, a man cannot avoid marriage
by duress (come to Court with clean hands)
MARRIAGE NOT ANNULLABLE.
JIMENEZ v CANIZARES (1960)
109 Phil 273
- Joel Jimenez filed for annulment on the ground of
his wife's impotency, claiming that her vagina
was too small to allow penetration.
- Remedios Canizares refused to have physical
exam despite repeated orders by the court 
contempt of court for noncompliance and
constitutes collusion
HELD: Since the only evidence presented was
Jimenez's testimony, there was no sufficient basis to
establish the wife's impotency. For all intents and
purposes actually, because only the testimony of the
husband, the presumption of the law is in favor of
potency. REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
SARAO v GUEVARRA (1940)
40 OG 15 Supp 263
- In the afternoon of their wedding, Sarao tried to
have carnal knowledge of Pilar Guevarra, but the
latter showed reluctance and begged him to wait
until evening.
- When night came, he again approached the wife,
but through he found the orifice of her vagina
sufficiently large of his organ, she complained of
pains in her private parts and he noticed oozing
there from some matter offensive to the smell.
- Because of this, coitus had not been successful,
and after the first night every attempt the
plaintiff’s part to have a carnal act with his wife
proved a failure, because she complained of
pains in her genital organs and he did not want
her to suffer.
- Upon the advice of a physician and with the
plaintiff’s consent, an operation was performed
in which the uterus and ovaries were removed.
- The surgery rendered her incapable of
procreation, but she could copulate.
- Plaintiff, however, since witnessing the
operation, lost all desire to have access with his
wife. Now, he asks for annulment.
ISSUE: WON their marriage can be annulled based
on the defendant’s incapacity to procreate
HELD: The incapacity for copulation was only
temporary. The defect must be lasting to be a
ground for annulment, because the test of
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impotence is not the capacity to reproduce, but the FC, Art 43 Effects of termination by reappearance:
capacity to copulate. ANNULMENT DENIED.
(1) children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termi
PEOPLE v SANTIAGO SUPRA (2) ACP/CPG dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse cont
share of the net profits of the ACP/CPG property shall be forfeite
a) common children
2. Marriage when one spouse is b) if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a pr
absent c) in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(3)Donations by reason of marriage remain valid, except that i
faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operat
FC, Art 41 Is null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse absent for
consecutive years, the spouse had a well-founded belief that the(4) Thespouse
absent innocent
wasspouse
alreadymay
dead.revoke the designation of the
beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if stipulated as irrevoca
Where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in(5)
theThe
provisions
spouse of
in Art
bad391 ofdisqualified
faith the Civil Code,
toan absence
inherit from innocent s
of only two years shall be sufficient  spouse present must institute a
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
FC, Art 44 If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad
*In CC, seven years is required for presumptive donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions
by operation of law.
death and four years if there is presence of danger
of death. Period of time decreased in FC because of
modernized and faster means of communication
technology. There is virtually little or no excuse for a
spouse not to contact his family for a long time.

*In CC, there has to be a “general belief” which

includes the belief of one’s community regarding the
whereabouts of one spouse. Now in the FC, it is only
“well-founded” belief because people today no
longer care much about their neighbors like in the
yesteryears.

FC, Art 42 The subsequent marriage  automatically terminated

absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it

A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the
parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person
subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is
disputed.

- No matter how long it took the spouse absent to

appear, the subsequent marriage will still
become void. Because you only presumed
him/her to be dead, and that is a rebuttable
presumption.
- If the reappearing spouse did not file the
“affidavit of reappearance” he/she cannot
remarry because he is “dead” until he declares
he’s alive. (So the two spouses couldn’t possibly
come to an agreement to not file an affidavit so
the subsequent marriage may subsist.)
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009
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OLD RULES IN THE CC the marriage. Furthermore, the court also pointed
out that ME and even AJ herself believed Arthur was
CC, Art 83 Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person dead,
duringas
theevidenced by first
lifetime of the her spouse
treating FH as
of such her with
person step
father.
any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or YU v YU (2006)

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at SCRA
484 the time
485of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee,
- though heof
Custody has been
child absent for
pending less than case
annulment seven years,
is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
- Eric Jonathan Yu files for an annulment case in
marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid
Pasig
in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court. RTC for wife’s psychological incapacity
-Caroline Yu seeks custody of their child, Bianca,
in Pasay RTC  litis pendentia (pending case)
CC, Art 85 May be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
- Pasig
(2) In a subsequent marriage under Article 83, Number 2, that the former RTC has
husband jurisdiction
or wife because
believed to be ofinArt
dead was fact 49
living and the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in (incidents
force; of a pending decree shall be specified
by court wherein the declaration for nullity was
filed)
JONES v HORTIGUELA (1937)
64 Phil 179 - Custody goes to father because mother is unfit
- Step-daughter versus step-father
- Marciana Escaño died and a proceeding TAMANO v ORTIZ (1998)
regarding her estate was commenced. Her 291 SCRA 584
second husband Felix Hortiguela), the petitioner 1958 Senator Mamintal Abudul Jabar Tamano
and daughter of her first marriage, Angelita married Haja Putri Zorayda Tamano in civil
Jones, the respondent, were appointed as the rites.
heirs. 1993 Tamano married Estrelita Tamano in civil
- The partition of her estate was approved by the rites too
court. A year later, AJ filed a motion to declare 1994 Tamano died
her the only heir, since she claims that the
marriage between ME and FH was null and void. - Zorayda and son filed for the declaration of nullity
Jan 1918 ME’s first husband, Arthur Jones (Arthur), because of bigamy
went abroad and was never heard from - Misrepresentations of Tamano as divorced (they
again. never divorced) and Estrelita as single (annulment
Oct. 1919ME asked her husband to be judicially was not final and executory for non-compliance with
declared an absentee. On the 25th of the Art 53)  indicates lack of intention to invoke
said month, the court issued and order Muslim practice of polygamy
declaring that Arthur is an absentee and - Estrelita contends that RTC has no jurisdiction
the declaration will not take effect until 6 because they were Muslims, hence jurisdiction
months after its publication. It was then belongs to Shari’a Courts
published in the succeeding months.
April 1921 Court issued another order, saying HELD: Shari’a Courts have jurisdiction only over
that the judicial decree has taken effect. marriages solemnized in Muslim rites. Law is silent
May 1927FH and ME got married. as to marriages performed both civilly and Muslim.
- AJ now contends that the decree should be On the other hand, exclusive jurisdiction of all kinds
understood as not having taken effect from Oct of marriage (civil and Muslim) belongs to RTC.
1919, the date it was first published, but in April Besides, they did not perform wedding ceremony in
1921, the date the court held that the decree accordance to Muslim customs.
has taken effect.
- Therefore, from that date until the time of the
second marriage, only 6 yrs and 14 days has
elapsed, thus, in accordance with sec 3 par 2 of
GO no. 68, their marriage was void.

ISSUE: WON the second marriage was void.

HELD: No. For the celebration of marriage, the law

only requires that the former spouse be absent for 7
consecutive yrs at the time of the 2 nd marriage. The
date that should be considered therefore, is Jan
1918, when Arthur left and was never heard from
again. Therefore, when the 2nd marriage was
celebrated, Arthur was already absent for more than
9 yrs. Also, the fact that their marriage doesn’t
appear in the register does not affect the validity of
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009
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VI. LEGAL
SEPARATION
A. Grounds for Legal
Separation
FC, Art 57
1. Repeated physical violence against
a. petitioner
b. petitioner’s child
c. common child of petitioner and respondent
2. Moral or physical pressure to convert religious or political beliefs
3. Attempt to corrupt or induce (a) petitioner, (b) petitioner’s child 1986Teresita
respondent into prostitution or connivance in such a practice
4. Respondent’s final judgment of conviction for more than six years, evenconcubinage,
5. Habitual alcoholism, drug addiction
6. Lesbianism or homosexuality
7. Bigamous marriage, here or abroad
8. Sexual infidelity or perversion
9. Attempt at the life of the petitioner
10. Abandonment without justifiable cause for one year
OLD RULE IN THE CC
CC, Art 97
1. adultery (wife) or concubinage (husband)
2. attempt at the life of the other
*Compare CC with FC grounds. The FC expanded the
grounds for legal separation and liberated the bias in
concubinage by changing it to “sexual infidelity.”
PEOPLE v ZAPATA AND BONDOC (1951)
88 Phil 688
- Andres Bondoc filed against wife Guadalupe
Zapata and Dalmacio Bondoc
- Wife and paramour repeatedly engaged in
sexual intercourse during 1946
- Wife pleaded guilty and served sentence
- Husband filed another case, which defendants
allege as double jeopardy
HELD: Adultery not a continuous crime. Each
commission is a different count which can be
punished separately.
1) plurality of facts performed during separate
period of time
2) unity of penal provisions infringed upon
3) unity of aim or purpose
What Andres forgave/condoned was the previous
acts and not the subsequent acts. Besides excuse of
the paramour that he doesn’t know the woman is
already married is untenable because they were
previously reprimanded. He shouldn’t have tolerated
her when she approached him for the second time.
MUNOZ v DEL BARRIO (1955)
51 OG 5217
- Jose del Barrio maltreats the wife
- Judge attempts to reconcile but wife declines,
she pushes for her petition for legal separation
on the ground that husband attempted at her life
HELD: Petition of legal separation not granted
because there was intent to kill was not established.
The man only used his bare hands/fists.
*Ma’am Beth finds this ruling ridiculous because
Arnold Schwarzenegger’s bare hands are in itself
lethal weapons. Likewise, what about martial artists?
GANDIONGCO v PEÑARANDA (1987)
155 SCRA 725
Mayand
filedofpetition
(c) common child for
petitioner legal separation
and
on the ground of husband Froilan’s
if pardoned petition for support and
payment of damages
Oct 1986 Teresita filed a criminal suit
For which Froilan files certiorari that civil and
pendente lite should be suspended because of
criminal charges. That they should wait until the
decision in criminal case comes, before civil can
proceed.
HELD: Denied Froilan’s certiorari. 1986 Rules on
Criminal Procedure states that civil may proceed
ahead of or simultaneously with criminal
charge. Likewise, no criminal proceeding is
necessary in the action for legal separation. All that
is needed for legal separation is preponderance of
evidence.
LAPUZ SY v EUFEMIO SY (1972)
43 SCRA 177
- Carmen filed petition for legal separation against
husband Eufemio Eufemio
- Discovered that he cohabits with Go Hiok
- Eufemio countered that marriage with Carmen is
void ab initio because he was married to Go Hiok
first, under Chinese customs
- Carmen died and her father took over the case in
her place
HELD: Carmen’s death extinguished the claim for
nullity of marriage. Action for legal separation is
purely personal even if property relations are
involved. These rights are mere effects of a decree
of separation, their source being the decree itself;
without the decree such rights do not come into
existence, so that before the finality of a decree,
these claims are merely rights in expectation.
DELA CRUZ v DELA CRUZ (1968)
22 SCRA 333
- Case of the mahjongera wife and overworked
husband
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- Estrella files petition of separation of property

against husband Severino because of
B. Defenses against Legal
mismanagement of business enterprise Separation
- Husband never slept in conjugal dwelling, would
rather stay in his office  alleged abandonment FC, Art 56
- Wife even alleged that husband has concubine 1. Condonation (forgiveness)
named Nenita Hernandez 2. Consent (permission)
- RTC grants Nenita’s petition for legal separation 3. Connivance (involvement of 3rd party and active participation
and division of conjugal assets considered as connivance
4. Recrimination (both has given grounds for legal separation, co
HELD: Mere physical separation does not 5. Collusion (agreement between spouses)
constitute abandonment. Husband continues to 6. Prescription (Art 57)
support wife and children despite absence. She was
even able to play mahjong from the husband’s *Ma’am Beth’s mnemonics: 4C and RP (Raul
sustenance. Abandonment defined in Art 178 & in Pangalangan)
Gay v State: for desertion of one spouses to
constitute abandonment, there must be absolute STIPULATION OF FACTS v CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT
cessation of marital relations and duties and rights - Stipulation of facts is the agreement between
with intention of perpetual separation. To abandon is spouses of certain details and circumstances. It
to forsake entirely. Emphasis is on its finality, hence is not accepted because it can be tantamount to
it means giving up absolutely and with intent never collusion
again to resume or claim one’s rights or interests.
Concubinage and mismanagement of business was - Confession of judgment, on the other hand, is
not established either because he actually increased when one party admits guilt from which decision
the assets. is solely based

ONG ENG KIAM v ONG (2006)
505 SCRA 76
Lucita files a petition for legal separation against
Chinese husband on the grounds of repeated
physical abuse. He would usually beat her up or
utter abusive language to her in front of customers.
After 20 years of marriage and 3 kids, she decides to
separate from her husband and went to her family.
Husband retorted:
- Denied all allegations of Lucita, they only fight
over the discipline of children
- Ulterior motives of Lucita’s family was to
encumber their conjugal properties
- It was her who abandoned them when she left
the conjugal home
- His son, Kingston and other of his employees
testified for him
To which wife answered:
- Positive identification is always stronger than
mere denial
- She would not sacrifice/trade her comfortable
life and love of her children with the interests of
her family if nothing’s really wrong
- she left with justifiable cause, because if she
didn’t, the beating will continue
- Kingston has been with his father since he was
child while the other witnesses’ livelihood
depends on the husband.
- PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION GRANTED.
PEOPLE v SANSANO & RAMOS (1933)
58 Phil 73
- 1919: Mariano Ventura and Ursula Sansano got
married and had a child. Shortly after that,
Mariano disappeared to Cagayan and abandoned
his family.
- Wife did not have any means of survival so she
resorted to cohabiting with Marcelo Ramos.
- 1924: Mariano returned and filed for adultery, to
which both Sansano and Ramos were sentenced
- After conviction, Ursula begs for forgiveness and
for Mariano to take her back.
- The latter denied and told her to go do what she
wants to do, so she returned to Ramos while he
went to Hawaii.
- Mariano went back to file for divorce (under Act
2710)
ISSUE: WON husband consented to adultery and
therefore barred from action
HELD: YES. Because he gave wife freedom to do
whatever she would like to do.
OCAMPO v FLORENCIANO (1960)
107 Phil 35
1938 - Jose de Ocampo and Serafina got married
1951 - Serafina ♥ Jose Arcalas
Husband sends wife to Manila to study cosmetology
for a year where she also had relationship with other
men.
1952 - Left the husband and lived separately
1955 - Husband caught wife in the arms of Nelson
Orzame and then told her he wanted legal
separation to which the wife agreed as long as she
will not be criminally charged
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ISSUE: WON there had been collusion in the form of
confession of judgment by the wife
HELD: Though the wife admitted her guilt, which
constitutes confession of judgment, the husband
also presented other evidences to support the
allegation. Refusing to answer is not necessarily
collusion. Also, the husband had no duty to search
for wife because it was her who left the house and so
it was her duty to return or at least inform the
husband of her whereabouts. Hence, collusion may
not bar the action for legal separation.
SARGENT v SARGENT (1920)
114 A. 428
Husband suspects the wife to be committing
adultery with their driver, Charles Simmons. To
support his allegations, he hired several detectives
and enjoined his servants to keep a close eye on the
actions of his wife. They staged a raid to catch the
wife red handed of the crime alleged of her.
ISSUE: WON the husband connived with his
employees to set-up his wife’s adultery
HELD: YES. Petitioner could have taken steps which
would prevent him from casting doubts on the
fidelity of his wife but instead it appeared that he
even facilitated his wife’s wrongdoing. It is to be
inferred from his conduct that he did desire his wife
to commit the offense in his absence, and that
helping as he did to afford the opportunity which
brought about the desired result, he was consenting
thereto.
*What could have Mr. Sargent done to prevent
occurrence of connivance? He could have just
fired Simmons or brought his wife with him on his
business trips.
BROWN v YAMBAO (1957)
102 Phil 168
- William Brown files a petition for legal separation
against his wife Juanita Yambao who got
pregnant by a certain Carlos Field while he was
interred in Intramuros (ground: adultery)
- Wife did not reply, so fiscal intervened and found
that there was no collusion. However, the fiscal
also found that the petitioner was barred from
filing the action because he had a concubine
(Lilia Delito) himself
- Petitioner says that the fiscal’s only duty was to
ensure no collusion took place and not stand in
place of the wife
- Fiscal further added that petitioner was also
prescribed from action because he learned about
the cause in 1945 but only file ten years later.
- COURT DENIED LEGAL SEPARATION.
WILLAN v WILLAN (1960)
2 A11 E.R. 463
- Case of the battered husband
- Demobilized military man files a petition for legal
separation against his wife for her cruelty and
abusive behavior
- He says she tortures him at night, forcing him to
have sex with him and if he declines, she would
resort to ear pinching, hair pulling and using of
obscene language
- This deprived him of rest and sleep so he had no
choice but to give in to her wishes
ISSUE: WON having sex constitutes condonation
HELD: YES. Because in his case, everything was
done voluntarily. Sharing the same bed and
continual sexual relations is a conclusive evidence of
condonation. Decision would have been different if
he was the wife because of physiological difference
in the strength of man and woman.
BUGAYONG v GINEZ (1956)
100 Phil. 620
- Benjamin was a US serviceman, he left his wife
Leonila in the care of his sisters as she goes to
school
- Valeriana Polangco wrote to him about rumors of
wife’s adultery; wife then goes away from the
sister-in-law’s house and stayed at her mom’s
place
- Leonila wrote to Benjamin as well about a certain
Eliong who kissed her in school
- Benjamin went home and searched for her
- They stayed together for 2 nights and 1 day at
his cousin, Pedro’s house
- Verified the truth which made her pack up and
walk away
ISSUE: WON Benjamin’s act of searching for and
sleeping with his wife constitutes condonation
HELD: Yes. Because even if not yet proven, he had a
belief in mind that his wife was already unfaithful yet
he still tried to take her back. The ponencia relied
mostly on US cases. COURT DENIED PETITION FOR
LEGAL SEPARATION.
MATUBIS v PRAXEDES (1960)
109 Phil. 789
- Socorro Matubis and Zoilo Praxedes agreed to
live separately from each other, they even
instituted a document that allows them to get
themselves a new mate without the intervention
of the other.
Jan 1955: Man cohabited with Asuncion Rebulado
April 1956: Wife filed for concubinage
- TC dismissed because of prescription and
consent  the decision appealed from in the SC
HELD: SC affirmed RTC because there was express
consent, hence she deserved no sympathy from the
court. Also, the action was not instituted within a
year of cognizance.
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C. When to file/try actions

REQUISITES FOR LEGAL SEPARATION
Art 57 The petition must be filed within 5 years
from the time of occurrence of cause (as
compared to the double period of CC)
Art 58 6 months cool off (but does not override
provisions of Art 49 regarding pendency of
decree i.e. support pendente lite, support of
spouse and children and visitation rights)
Art 59 steps taken towards reconciliation
Art 60 stipulation of facts and confession of
judgment should not be accepted in court or
participation of fiscal or prosecuting attorney
to prevent collusion

CONTRERAS v MACARAIG (1970)

33 SCRA 222
1952 Elena and Cesar were married, had three
children
1961 Cesar met Lily while working for his father’s
business
Sept 62 Lubos, the driver, told her that husband
was living with a woman in Singalong
Apr 63 More rumors about her husband being
seen with a pregnant woman
May 63 Husband was usually away and back for
only 2-3 days; Elena declined to raise the
issue lest it drive her husband away more
- Asked father-in-law and sister-in-law to talk top
and convince her husband to come back to her
- Employee saw him with a baby on his arms
- Elena talked to Lily who said that it was Cesar
who refuses to leave her
Apr 63 Elena, with of their two children, tried to
convince Cesar to go home, the latter
refused to return to legitimate family
Dec 63 Plaintiff filed petition for legal separation

RTC said that wife became cognizant of husband’s

infidelity on Sept 1962 (Lubos’ report)

SC granted legal separation because wife was only

cognizant of husband’s infidelity when she
confronted him and got told that he doesn’t intend
to return to them anymore. Hence, there was no
prescription.

SOMOSA-RAMOS v VAMENTA (1972)

46 SCRA 11
- Lucy Somosa Ramos files petition for legal
separation concubinage and attempt on her life
by husband Clemente (1972 so CC was
applicable)
- She seeks preliminary mandatory injunction to
recover her paraphernal and exclusive property

ISSUE: WON Art 103 bars judge from such an action

HELD: No. It is not an absolute bar. Management of

property may be decided right away especially if the
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009
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other spouse may encumber or alienate the

petitioner from her rightful share in the assets.
D. Effects of Filing of Legal
Separation
Art 61 a) entitled to live separately
b) third person may be appointed
manage their ACP/CPG
HELD: Wife not asking for support from husband’s
personal funds, rather from the conjugal
properties. Also, the allegation of her adulterous
relationship was not sufficiently established. It is
enough for the court to ascertain the kind and
amount of evidence even by affidavits only or other
documentary evidence appearing in the records. It
was also shown that he was capable of providing the
to said amount.

Art 62 pendency of the case, Art 49 applies

a) support of the spouses
b) support and custody of children
c) visitation rights for children

DE LA VINA v VILLAREAL (1920)

41 Phil 13
- Narcisa Geopano files divorce complaint against
husband who committed concubinage with Ana
Calog and booted her out of the conjugal home
in Negros Occidental
- She lived with her daughters in Iloilo, and now
seeks divorce (this case is in 1920), partition of
property and alimony
- Husband rebuts that the court has no jurisdiction
over the case since their domicile was in Negros
Occidental  invokes husband’s right to fix the
marital domicile and wife’s duty to follow.
Likewise, the husband’s right to administer
marital assets (since wife wants separation of
property)

WON the wife’s domicile is still the same with

husband’s.  No. Husband abolishes this right the
moment he furnishes cause for the wife to leave him
and ground for divorce. She may acquire separate
domicile from her husband. Also, he displaced her
from the conjugal dwelling in the first place. Thus,
court had jurisdiction over the case.

WON the wife can obtain preliminary injunction

against husband’s encumbering and alienating of
their conjugal property.  Yes. The husband’s
administrative power must be curtailed to protect
the interest of the wife. Even though wife doesn’t
have the right to administer, she has the right to
share.

REYES v INES-LUCIANO (1979)

88 SCRA 03
- Celia Ilustre-Reyes files petition for legal
separation on husband Manuel Reyes on the
ground of attempt to her life. (Attacked twice,
would have been dead if not saved by father and
driver.)
- Husband does not want to give her pedente lite
because he allege that she has adulterous
relationship with her physician and the price she
was asking was too high
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BAÑEZ v BAÑEZ (2002)
374 SCRA 340
- RTC granted legal separation to Aida and Gabriel
for husband’s sexual infidelity, dissolution of CPG
and division of conjugal assets
- Wife kept on asking things and damages from
her husband through the court
- RTC denied the damages but gave due course to
the execution pending appeal.
- CA set aside the RTC ruling for husband to
vacate the residential house and surrender the
motor vehicle.
HELD: Legal separation is not subject to multiple
appeals. Its effects are incidents of the final
judgment and not distinct matters.
LA RUE v LA RUE (1983)
304 S. E. 2d 312
- Plain housewife’s contribution to the CPG
- 1950 husband and wife got married, wife worked
for the first seven years but stopped at the request
of her husband
- Married for 30 years, housewife performed her
duties like caring for the children and attending to
husband’s needs until the relationship went sour
- Obtained divorce but wife was awarded only with
alimony and health insurance
- Court denied her claim to one half of the conjugal
assets because she made no contributions thereto
ISSUE: WON wife is entitled to equitable distribution
HELD: Yes, because she contributed her earnings in
the early days of the marriage and then her service
as a frugal homemaker in the subsequent years.
E. Effects of Legal Separation
Decree
Art 63 1) Live separately from each other
2) ACP/CPG dissolved; offender no right to
any share in the net profits, forfeit in
favor of common children, children of
guilty, and innocent spouse
3) Custody of minor children goes to
innocent spouse (subject to Art 213)
4) Guilty spouse disqualified as intestate
heir
Art 64 revoke all donations, beneficiary in any
insurance policy within 5 years
MATUTE v MACARAIG (1956)
99 Phil 340
- Armando files petition for legal separation
against wife Rosario because of adultery with
brother and brother-in-law
- Legal separation granted; custody of four minor
children to father
- Father left them in sister’s care in Davao and
then went to US; Rosario lived with them there
- Upon his return, he took them to Cebu
- Rosario asked permission to bring them to
Manila for grandfather’s funeral, were given 2
weeks
- Rosario did not return them but instead filed for
civil case for custody grant, because he is
already living with another woman and the kids
want to stay with her
- RTC orders her to return the kids to him within
24 hours
HELD: Custody of children is never final and
always subject to review for the best interest
of the children. However, until decision is
modified, the custody is to the fathers. Besides,
Rosario is just living in the charity of her brothers.
LAPERAL v REPUBLIC (1962)
6 SCRA 357
- Elisea obtained legal separation decree from
husband Enrique Santamaria, so now she wants
to revert to her maiden name.
- She is a businesswoman and afraid that
confusion as to the name will lead her finances
to the dissolution of conjugal property.
- Art 372 mandates that woman retains the name
used prior to legal separation, because it is
indicative of status and legal separation affected
no change to her status.
HELD: SC denied her petition because she relied on
the fact of her legal separation and that there was
no conjugal property to fear of because it has been
dissolved with the decree of legal separation.
Likewise, they cannot allow easy circumvention of
Art 372. CASE DISMISSED.
F. Reconciliation
- There should be voluntary and mutual
consent of the spouses to reconcile.
- CPG not automatically revived. Art 67 applies.
Art 65 Joint manifestation under oath in the same
court as legal separation
Art 66 Consequences of reconciliation:
1) legal separation proceedings shall be
terminated if still pending
2) final decree set aside, but the separation
of property and forfeiture remains,
unless they revive former regime
Art 67 Agreement to revive former regime shall
specify:
1) what to contribute anew to restored
property regime
2) what to retain in separate property
3) names of all the creditors
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009
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VII. DIVORCES
Is there divorce in the Philippines?
There is just relative divorce. BUT BUT! It recognizes
two kinds of divorce: foreign divorce and Muslim
divorces.

A. Foreign Divorces
FC, Art 15 Nationality theory applies in the Philippines. Philippine laws follow Filipinos anywhere they go.

FC, Art 26 Marriages valid where celebrated are valid everywhere except when
1) one is below 18
2) bigamous, not under Art 41
3) mistake as to identity of other party
4) void under 53 for non-compliance
5) psychological incapacity
6) incestuous
7) public policy

PROOFS FOR FOREIGN LAWS TO APPLY/ BE

RECOGNIZED IN OUR JURISDICTION
1) Provision of the foreign law
2) Celebration of marriage in accordance to those
provisions

VAN DORN v ROMILLO (1985)

134 SCRA 139
- Alicia married Upton, US citizen in Hong Kong.
Later on in 1982, they obtained divorce in
Nevada. Shortly after that, Alicia contracted
another marriage with Van Dorn.
- 1983 Upton files suit in Pasay RTC for non-
application of divorce decree to Alicia and hence
his right to administer the conjugal property in
Ermita, the Galleon Shop
- Alicia files for dismissal which the RTC denied 
decision assailed in SC

HELD: Upton is estopped from the claim because he

declared in Nevada that there were no conjugal
assets. He is American and US law applies to him,
therefore, Alicia is no longer his wife. “The marriage
tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to
bind either.” Petition of Alicia granted. Upton’s case
dismissed. Prevents the situation wherein you are
married to your husband but your husband is no
longer married to you.

*Ma’am Beth likes this decision because it proves

that we don’t need new laws. We only have to think
out of the box. A change of focus is all we need.
Philippine laws apply to Filipino, ergo, foreigners
cannot use our laws against our citizens. Their own
laws shall apply to them. Bravo!
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QUITA v CA & DANDAN (1998) - Validity of the will is governed by laws of the
300 SCRA 592 country in which they are executed  remand to
1941 Fe and Arturo got married, no children the court for further clarification
1954 Fe got final judgment of divorce with Arturo; - SC recognizes the divorce decree and upholds
woman remarried twice the marriage of Alice and Lorenzo
1972 Husband dies without will
- Blandina Dandan and her six children with Arturo
Padlan presents themselves as heir of the decedent
- Ruperto Padlan intervened
- RTC grants succession to Quita and Padlan

HELD: RTC failed to establish Quita’s citizenship

which is material to the resolution of case. If proven
that she was no long a Filipino citizen, then she was
no longer the wife of Padlan and divorce decree
binding on her (application of Van Dorn)
- Time of divorce is the most material and not the
time of the marriage
- Remanded the case to determine the citizenship
of Quita at the time of divorce

LLORENTE v CA & LLORENTE (2000)

345 SCRA 592
1927-57 Lorenzo enlisted as US Navy
1937 Paula married Lorenzo
1943 Lorenzo’s naturalization in the US
1945 Lorenzo went home to find out that Paula got
pregnant by his brother Ceferino
1945 birth of Crisologo Llorente who was
illegitimate and fatherless in his birth
certificate

- Lorenzo refused to lived with Paula and instead

drew a written agreement witnessed by her dad
and stepmom that they will dissolve the marital
union and she will have no claims to the conjugal
assets, without charges for criminal act

1952 Divorce decree became final in the States

1958 Lorenzo married Alicia who’s unaware of his
previous marriage with Paula; begot 3
children
1981 Lorenzo drafted his last will and testament
1985 Lorenzo died

RTC Assigned Paula as administratrix, she being

the legal surviving wife
CA Alicia declared as co-owner
SC Remand for ruling on the intrinsic validity of
the will. There were four significant point in
time:
1) divorce
2) marriage to Alice
3) execution of will
4) death

- Citing Quita, once proven that Lorenzo’s

citizenship is American at the time of divorce,
then the divorce will be valid and should be
recognized
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GARCIA v RECIO (2001)
366 SCRA 437
- Rederick and Editha Samson married in Australia
VIII. DE FACTO
SEPARATION
in 1987, then divorced in 1989
- 1992 Rederick became US citizen
- 1994 Rederick married Grace
- 1995 Grace and Rederick lived separately and
then Grace files for nullity on ground of Red’s
bigamy
RTC recognized the divorce obtained in Australia and
did not question respondent’s lack of capacity to
marry
HELD: Respondent’s legal capacity to marry cannot
be determined because he failed to produce the
foreign law as well as the decree proving his
capacity to marry. Not sure if he was granted
absolute or probationary divorce.
B. Muslim Divorces
- Governed by Code of Muslim Personal Laws of
the Philippines (Presidential Decree No. 1083)
- Divorce or Talaq (Chapter 3)
1. Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq)
2. Vow of abstinence by the husband (ila)
3. Injurious assimilation of the wife by the
husband (zihar)
4. Acts of imprecation (li’an)
5. Redemption by the wife (khul’)
6. Exercise by the wife of the delegated right to
repudiate (tafwid)
7. judicial decree (faskh)
YASIN v JUDGE, SHARI’A (1995)
241 SCRA 606
- Hatima Yasin seeks to use her maiden name
again after being divorced to Hajin Idris Yasin,
who has already remarried.
- Shari’a court dismissed her petition because
there has to be change of name.
HELD: No need to have court proceedings for change
of name because her legal name is the one entered
in the civil register. When the marriage ties no longer
exists as in the case of death of husband or Muslim
divorce, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial
confirmation of the change in her civil status in order
to revert to her maiden name as the use of her
husband's name is optional and not obligatory for
her.
FC, Art 100 The separation in fact between husband
and wife shall not affect the regime of ACP except that:
1. The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or
refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall
not have the right to be supported
2. When the consent of one spouse to any
transaction of the other is required by law,
judicial authorization shall be obtained in a
summary proceeding
3. In the absence of sufficient community
property, the separate property of both
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
support of the family. The spouse present shall,
upon proper petition in a summary proceeding,
be given judicial authority to administer or
encumber any specific separate property of the
FC, Art 127 The separation in fact between husband
and wife shall not affect the regime of CPG except that:
1. The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or
refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall
not have the right to be supported
2. When the consent of one spouse to any
transaction of the other is required by law,
judicial authorization shall be obtained in a
summary proceeding
3. In the absence of sufficient community
property, the separate property of both
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support
of the family. The spouse present shall, upon
proper petition in a summary proceeding, be
given judicial authority to administer or
encumber any specific separate property of the
other spouse sand use the fruits or proceeds
FC, Art 239 When a husband and wife are separated
in fact, or one has abandoned the other and one of
them seeks judicial authorization for a transaction
where the consent of the other spouses is
required by law but such consent is withheld or
cannot be obtained, a verified petition may be filed in
court alleging the foregoing facts.
The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any,
embodying the transaction and if none shall describe in
detail the said transaction and state the reason why the
required consent thereto cannot be secured. In any
case, the final deed duly executed by the parties shall
be submitted to and approved by the court.
FC, Art 242 Upon filing of the petition, the court shall
notify the other spouse, whose consent to the
transaction is required, of said petition, ordering said
spouse to show cause why the petition should not be
granted, on or before the date set in the said notice for
the initial conference. The notice shall be accompanied
by a copy of the petition and shall be served at the last
known address of the spouse concerned.
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FC, Art 246 If the petition is not resolved at the initial
conference, said petition shall be decided in a summary
hearing on the basis of affidavits, documentary
evidence or oral testimonies at the sound discretion of
the court. If testimony is needed, the court shall specify
the witnesses to be heard and the subject-matter of
their testimonies, directing the parties to present said
witnesses.
being considered as immoral and gross
misconduct
- The only thing resolved in this case is that they
cannot be considered immoral in the eyes of
their own religious group but it does not deny
the fact that the relationship is still not legally
binding on them.

FC, Art 247 The judgment of the court shall be

immediately final and executory.

PEREZ v CA and Ray Perez (1996)

255 SCRA 661
1996 Ray and Nerissa got married in Cebu.
1992 After 6 miscarriages, 2 operations and a high
risk pregnancy, she finally gave birth to Ray Jr.
1993 The family went to Cebu but only Nerissa went
back to the US although they all had round trip
tickets because Ray had to stay behind and
take care of ill mother.
- She came back no longer in good terms with
husband
RTC followed tender years presumption
CA reversed and gave custody to father

Art 213 can be taken to mean separation (legal or de

facto) and should take into account all relevant info
(material, social, moral)
 “shall not be separated” from mother is
mandatory unless unfit to exercise sole parental
authority
 financial capacity not determinative as long as
both have ample means of support

When husband questioned wife’s nature of work and

it’s incapability to care for child:
- It’s nothing that can’t be handled. Shifts can be
adjusted so she can attend to the child. There
are also daycare centers and she could always
take a leave until the child can manage on its
own. Petitioner also invites mother to join them
in the States so she could look after the child.
- Husband will also just leave the care of the child
to his mother because of the nature of his work
as a doctor
- Besides, nothing can be more heart rendering
that the wife’s situation who waited so long to
have a child only to be deprived from her before
the first year.
- PETITION GRANTED. CA SET ASIDE AND
REVERSED. RTC REINSTATED. For immediate
execution.

ESTRADA v ESCRITOR (2006)

492 SCRA 1
- Administrative case against an employee of the
Supreme Court who is living with a man not her
husband
- Declaration of Pledge of Faithfulness practice of
the Jehovah’s Witnesses immunized them from
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IX. RIGHTS &

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman
or her child to engage in conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to desist from
or desist from conduct which the woman or her

OBLIGATIONS child has the right to engage in, or attempting to

restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's
freedom of movement or conduct by force or

BETWEEN threat of force, physical or other harm or threat

of physical or other harm, or intimidation
directed against the woman or child. This shall

HUSBAND & WIFE

include, but not limited to, the following acts
committed with the purpose or effect of
controlling or restricting the woman's or her
child's movement or conduct:
(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm
on oneself for the purpose of controlling her
A. Cohabitation, Mutual Love actions or decisions;
(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or
and Respect her child to engage in any sexual activity which
does not constitute rape, by force or threat of
force, physical
RPC, Art 247 Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. harm,married
— Any legally or through
personintimidation
who having
surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another directed
person,against theany
shall kill woman
of themororher
bothchild
of themor
in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious her/his immediate
physical family;
injury, shall suffer the penalty of
destierro. (h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless
conduct, personally or through another, that
alarms from
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt or punishment.
causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to the woman or her child.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parentsThis withshall include,
respect to their butdaughters
not be limited to, the
under eighteen
following
years of age, and their seducer, while the daughters are living with their parents. acts:
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public
ridicule or
Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or humiliation
shall otherwiseto the woman
have or her child,
consented to the
including,
infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article. but not limited to, repeated verbal
and emotional abuse, and denial of financial
support or custody of minor children of access to
the woman's child/children.
Sec 26 Battered Woman Syndrome as a Defense. –
Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be
suffering from battered woman syndrome do not incur
any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the
absence of any of the elements for justifying
circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal
Code.
In the determination of the state of mind of the woman
FC, Art 68 The husband and the wife are obliged to live together, who was mutual
observe suffering from
love, battered
respect andwoman
fidelity syndrome
and renderatmutual
the
help and support. time of the commission of the crime, the courts shall be
assisted by expert psychiatrists/ psychologists.
Sec 28 Custody of children. – The woman victim of
violence shall be entitled to the custody and support of
CC, Art 34 When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case
her child/children. Children below seven (7) years old
of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be
older but with mental or physical disabilities shall
subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a
automatically be given to the mother, with right to
preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.
support, unless the court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise.
RA 8353 (Anti-Rape Law)
A victim who is suffering from battered woman syndrome
Sec 2 Rape as a Crime Against Persons. — The crime of rape shall hereafter be classified as a Crime Against Persons under
shall not be disqualified from having custody of her
Title Eight of Act No. 3815, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code.
children. In no case shall custody of minor children be
given to the perpetrator of a woman who is suffering
RA 9262 (Anti VAWC Act of 2004) from battered woman syndrome.
Sec 5 Acts of Violence Against Women and Their
Children. - The crime of violence against women and NARAG v NARAG (1998)
their children is committed through any of the following 291 SCRA 451
acts:
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her - Dominador was a teacher at St. Louis College of
child; Tuguegarao when he met Gina Espita, a 1st year
(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child 17 yo student. They had a relationship and
physical harm; Dominador abandoned his family to live with
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child Gina.
physical harm; - Dominador used power as Sangguniang
(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of
imminent physical harm;
Panlalawigan to secure employment for Gina at
the DTI.
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- Dominador’s wife instituted a disbarment
proceeding against him for immorality, but after
one year she wanted to withdraw her complaint
saying
1. She fabricated allegations in complaint to
humiliate and spite husband
2. Love letters between two guilty were forged
3. She suffered from emotional confusing due to
extreme jealousy
4. Denied Gina and Dominador ever had a
relationship
5. Dominador never left the family
- But a year later, Julieta filed the same case
again due to her husband’s continuous threat.
- Dominador filed his answer
1. He never threatened, harassed, or intimidated
her
2. He never abandoned family, he loves them. He
protected & preserved family. Julieta and two
sons drove him out of their house.
3. Julieta is emotionally disturbed – incurably
jealous and possessive, violent, vindictive,
scandalous.
4. Julieta’s rich and she abhors poor, he is poor
5. he was beaten, battered, brutalized, tortured,
abused and humiliated by Julieta in public and at
home so he filed for annulment because they
cannot exist together
6. She has disgraced, shamed and humiliated him
by telling everyone everywhere that he’s
worthless, good-for-nothing, evil and immoral
7. Denied relationship with Gina. No kids either.
8. Love letters: inadmissible as evidence
9. He is old thus, unfit to do things alleged by
Julieta.
- Investigating officer: indefinite suspension from
practice of law. He never denied love letters,
didn’t disprove adulterous relationship. Denying
two kids (Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador)
ground for disciplinary action.
- IBP: affirmed investigating officer’s
recommendation & granted disbarment
ISSUE: WON Dominador should be disbarred
HELD: Yes. A lawyer should not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral (shameless showing indifference
to opinion of good members of society) or deceitful
conduct, should not behave in scandalous manner,
in public or in private to the discredit of the legal
profession. These are continuing
requirements/qualification of all members of bar.
This includes prohibition against adulterous
relationships.
Burden of proof of gross immorality for abandoning
his family proved when Julieta presented witnesses
who attested to adulterous relationship between
Gina & Dominador. Even Gina’s brother admitted
that Gina and Dominador had two children. Even
though Julieta has burden of proof, he needs to show
that he is morally fit to remain a member of bar. His
denials without proof are insufficient. His accusations
against Julieta were not proven. Providing for his
family, giving them a comfortable life, his being a
successful lawyer and seasoned politician do not
necessarily mean that he’s morally fit.
He has duties to his children (support, educate,
instruct according to right precepts and good
example, give love, companionship, understanding,
moral & spiritual guidance) and to his wife (observe
mutual love, respect & fidelity & render help and
support). He failed to fulfill these duties. He was
away most of the time because of his paramour not
because of work as he alleges. Son’s testimony
proved that he abandoned his family which even
affected his son’s own family. Dominador did not
merely contract a marriage, he should have been a
partner who lived up to his promise to love & respect
his wife & remain faithful to her until death.
GOITIA v CAMPOS RUEDA (1916)
35 Phil 252
Elisa Goitia and Jose Campos Rueda were married on
January 7, 1915. They established their residence,
where they lived together for a month after which
plaintiff returned to her parents. She alleged that
defendant demanded of her that she perform
unchaste and lascivious acts on his genitals. She
refused to perform any act other than legal and valid
cohabitation. Defendant continued demanding such
acts from her. Her continued refusal exasperated
him, inducing him to maltreat her by word and deed
and inflict injuries upon her lips, face and different
body parts. Thus, she was obliged to leave the
conjugal abode and is now asking for support.
CFI held that defendant cannot be compelled to
support wife, except in his own house, unless it be
by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce
or separation from the defendant.
ISSUE: WON wife is entitled to support outside
conjugal abode
HELD: Yes. The rule established in Art. 149 of the
Civil Code is not absolute. The doctrine that neither
spouse cannot be compelled to support the other
outside the conjugal abode, unless it be by virtue of
a judicial decree granting them a divorce or
separation is not controlling in cases where one of
the spouses was compelled to leave the conjugal
abode by the other or where the husband voluntarily
abandons such abode and the wife seeks to force
him to furnish support. The nature of the duty of
affording mutual support is compatible and
enforceable in all situations, so long as the needy
spouse does not create any illicit situation. A
judgment for separate maintenance is a judgment
calling for the performance of a duty made specific
by the mandate of the sovereign.
Moreland, concurring: A husband cannot, by his own
wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to
support his wife imposed by law; and where a
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husband, by wrongful, illegal and unbearable
conduct, drives his wife from the domicile fixed by
him, he cannot take advantage of her departure to
abrogate the law applicable to the marital relation
and repudiate his duties thereunder.
Cohabitation includes normal sexual intercourse
only. Husband has to support wife because she had
just cause for leaving.
*Who determines what is acceptable form of
sex? The spouses! Not the judge nor the society!
* Why is missionary position prescribed by the
church? Because it gives the least satisfaction. Sex
is not meant to be for pleasure but for procreation
only.
WARREN v STATE (1985)
255 Ga. 151
- Daniel Warren was convicted for rape and
aggravated sodomy of his wife while they were
living together as husband and wife. He
appealed to dismiss the indictment.
- His grounds:
1. Rape statute implies marital exclusion thus
husband cannot be guilty of raping wife.
2. Aggravated sodomy statute provides for marital
exclusion, too.
3. Interpreting the above-mentioned laws otherwise
would be tantamount to new interpretations &
application of such would deny him of his due
process rights.
ISSUE: WON marital exclusion is implied in the rape
and aggravated sodomy statutes
HELD: No. There has never been an express marital
exemption in Georgia rape statute. Theories/bases
for thinking that marital exclusion exists in rape
statute:
(a) Lord Hale – by giving matrimonial consent, wife
gave up herself in this kind unto husband and
she can’t take that back
(b) Subsequent marriage doctrine of English law - if
marriage between a rapist and his victim
extinguishes criminal liabilities then corollary,
rape within marital relationship should be given
that immunity
(c) Medieval time – wife is husband’s chattel or
property thus rape, thus man is merely using his
own property
(d) Unity of person theory – husband and wife
become one, with wife incorporating her
existence to that of the husband, thus husband
cannott be convicted of raping himself.
Justifications:
(a) prevent fabricated charges
(b) prevent wives from using rape charges for
revenge
(c) prevent state intervention so as not to thwart
possible reconciliation
 All of these theories and justifications are passé.
Equal protection of the laws is being practiced now.
Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge with
a female forcibly and against her will. It violates the
moral sense and personal integrity and autonomy of
the female victim. Implied consent to such in
marriage conflicts is absurd and against the
constitution. During era of slavery, rape was seen
negatively and not acceptable even to chattels.
Sodomy is the carnal knowledge and connection
against the order of nature by man with man or in
same unnatural manner with woman. There has
been no implied marital exemption under this
statute even in earlier times. Consent is not a
defense unlike in rape. Anyone who voluntarily
participates is guilty.
There is due process. Due process merely requires
that law give sufficient warning so men may avoid
what is forbidden. Statutes concerned are plain and
broadly written. This may be the first application to
this particular set of facts but it is not an
unforeseeable judicial enlargement of criminal
statutes that are narrowly drawn.
There is no marital exemption in rape. A person
commits rape when he has carnal knowledge of a
female forcibly and against her will.
THURMAN v CITY OF TORRINGTON (1984)
595 F. Supp. 1521
Between early October 1982 and June 10, 1983,
Tracey Thurman notified the police officers of the
City of repeated threats upon her life and the life of
her child, Charles Thurman, Jr., made by her
estranged husband, Charles Thurman. This includes
breaking her windshield while she was in the car,
where he was convicted of breach of peace, and
stabbing her repeatedly. Attempts to file complaints
by wife against husband based on threats of death
and maiming her were ignored and rejected by the
police because of an alleged administrative
classification that affords lesser protection when the
victim is a woman abused by a spouse or boyfriend,
or a child abused by a father or stepfather.
ISSUES: WON the administrative classification
violates the equal protection clause
HELD: Yes. A man is not allowed to physically abuse
or endanger a woman merely because he is her
husband. A police officer may not knowingly refrain
from interference in such violence, and may not
automatically decline to make an arrest simply
because the assaulter and his victim are married to
each other. Whatever may be said as to the positive
values of avoiding intra-family controversy, the
choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated
solely on the basis of sex.
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SUB-ISSUES
1. Dismissal of claims of son - Correct. Condition to
stay away from son is not one of the conditions
after arrest. There is failure to adequately allege
denial of equal protection
2. Allegation of custom or policy - A pattern
emerges that evidences deliberate indifference
on the part of the police department to the
complaints of Tracey and its duty to protect her.
Such indifference raises an inference of custom
or policy on the part of municipality.
3. Unidentified police officers - Okay because case
was dismissed even before plaintiff had an
opportunity to discover identity of unidentified
defendants.
4. Pendent Jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law
claim- The court has discretion to exercise this
power. At the instant case, court declines to
exercise because needless decisions of state law
should be avoided both as a matter of comity
and to promote justice between the parties, by
procuring for them a surer-footed reading of
applicable law.
PEOPLE v LIBERTA (1984)
64 NY 2d 152
- Mario and Denise were married but when he
started beating her she sought temporary
protection from her husband.
- The order was granted and Mario was directed to
move out, stay away from the family home, stay
away from Denise and he may only visit their
child once a week.
- Mario wanted to visit son but Denise did not
allow him to go the house so they met instead in
the motel where Mario was staying on the
condition that they be accompanied by a friend.
However, the friend left upon their arrival at the
motel. Mario then attacked Denise, threatened to
kill her and forced her to perform fellatio on him
and to engage in sexual intercourse w/him. 2 ½
year old son was there all the time and Mario
even forced Denise to tell their son to watch
what was happening. They were allowed to leave
afterwards.
- Mario was convicted for rape and sodomy both
in their 1st degrees. However, Mario contends
that:
o They are married thus he is covered by
marital exemption to rape and sodomy.
o Rape and sodomy statutes are
unconstitutional because it treats married
and unmarried persons differently.
ISSUES:
1. WON Mario is covered by the marital
exemption
2. WON the statutes are unconstitutional for
violating equal protection clause
HELD:
1. NO. Male guilty of rape when he engages in
sexual intercourse with female by forcible
compulsion. Female is any female person not
married to actor.
Sodomy means engaging in deviate sexual
intercourse (sexual conduct between persons not
married to each other consisting of contact
between penis and anus, mouth and penis, or
mouth and vulva. Not married phrase means
there is marital exemption for both. But it has
exemptions. One of which is when spouses are
living apart pursuant to a valid and effective (a)
order issued by court of competent jurisdiction
requiring such living apart (b) decree of
separation (c) written agreement of separation,
they are considered to be not married. Thus,
forcible rape or sodomy in this instance would be
punishable. In this case, Denise and Mario were
technically, not married, by virtue of the
temporary order of protection.
2. Constitutionality of Marital Exemption -
Married man ordinarily cannot be convicted of
forcibly raping or sodomizing his wife (marital
exemption). State is allowed to make
classifications as long as there is a rational basis
for doing so and it does not arbitrarily burden a
particular group. No rational basis for
distinguishing between marital and non-marital
rape. Rationales are archaic. (See People v
Liberta explanations on theories). Imposing a
marital exemption does not further the cause it
purportedly protects which is marital privacy
(e.g. Prevent state interference to protect
privacy – not justified by allowing husband to
forcibly rape his wife; Disrupt marriage – the act
of rape/sodomy in itself would disrupt the
marriage and reconciliation is quite impossible;
wife will present fabricated info – criminal justice
system can take care of this). Marital rape is
more violent and traumatic than non-marital
one. IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
3. Constitutionality of Exemption for Females
– Only males can be convicted of rape in the 1 st
degree. Reason: It aims to protect chastity of
women and their property value to
father/husbands. Treating people differently
based on gender can only be justified by its
substantial relation to the achievement of an
important governmental obligation. State
defense:
(a) only females can become pregnant – it’s not
the main purpose
(b) female faces probability of medical,
sociological and psychological problems
unique to her gender – archaic and
overbroad generalization
(c) women cannot actually rape men or if it
happens, it’s rare – not tenable either.
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They need to present an exceedingly persuasive
justification for classification. Show that gender-
based law serves the government’s interest better
than a gender-neutral one. As it is, only females who
forcibly rape males benefit from the present statute.
LIKEWISE, IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
4. Strike out only the unconstitutional parts since
the statute is of major importance. It’s not
entirely void anyway.
5. Due process is observed. His act was already
criminal when he attacked Denise.
B. Fixing the Family Domicile
FC, Art 69 The husband and the wife shall fix the family domicile. In caseWON
TENCHAVEZ v ESCANO (1966)
17 SCRA 674
- Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño were
married in 1948. In 1950, defendant Escaño
obtained a foreign divorce in Nevada. She
further sought papal dispensation of the
marriage although no document proving the
same was presented.
- Escaño’s marriage to American Rusell Leo Moran
in the US in 1954, which was later blessed with
three children
ISSUES:
1. WON divorce is valid
2. WON Court may then compel Escaño to cohabit
with Tenchavez
HELD:
1. Divorce is invalid for a foreign divorce decree
cannot be recognized in the Philippines
especially if it was granted by court of the place
which was not the parties’ bona fide domicile
and on a ground not recognized by our law,
which does not allow absolute divorce. Even in
private international law, foreign decrees
(especially those confirming or dissolving a
marriage) cannot be enforced or recognized if
they contravene public policy.
2. No. It is not within the province of courts
to attempt to compel one of the spouses to
cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to
the other. However, a spouse who unjustifiable
deserts the conjugal abode can be denied
support.
DADIVAS v VILLANUEVA (1929)
54 Phil. 92
- Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva married Rafael
Villanueva and they had three children. (18, 10,
9)
- After 22 years, Aurelia filed a case for separate
maintenance due to infidelity and cruelty. 10
years prior to the institution of the case, Rafael
was guilty of repeated acts of infidelity with four
different women. Even after the institution of
the case it was shown that he has had an illicit
relation with another woman.
- The incorrigible nature of the defendant in his
relations with other women coupled with his lack
of consideration and even brutality caused
Aurelia to leave the conjugal home and for her to
establish her own abode. Their final separation
occurred on April 1947.
- There was no sufficient evidence to establish the
cruelty of the husband but there were sufficient
evidence to establish the infidelity of the
husband.
ISSUE:
the wife is entitled
of disagreement, the courtfor separate
shall decide. support
from her husband.
HELD: YES
- In order to entitle a wife to maintain a separate
home and to require separate maintenance from
the husband it is not necessary that the husband
should bring a concubine into the home.
Perverse and illicit relations with women
outside the conjugal home are sufficient
grounds.
- Ruling in Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo is not
applicable because in the Arroyo case the only
grounds that were alleged was cruelty and that
charge was not proven. In the present case, the
charge of cruelty was also not proven but the
Aurelia also accused her husband of infidelity
and that charge has been proven (repeated acts
of conjugal infidelity) and the husband appears
to be a recurrent, if not incurable offender. This
fact gives the wife an undeniable right to relief.
- Goitia v. Campos Rueda – husband cannot by his
own wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty
to support his wife. When he drives his wife
from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take
advantage of her departure to abrogate the law
applicable to the marital relations and repudiate
his duties.
GARCIA v SANTIAGO (1928)
53 Phil. 952
- 1910 Cipriana Garcia ♥ Isabelo Santiago married
- 1925 Cipriana compelled to leave conjugal
dwelling:
1. continued family dissensions
2. Alejo, Isabelo’s son by his first wife seduced
Prisca Aurelio, Cipriana’s daughter by her
first husband. Prisca gave birth to a child.
Isabelo, instead of requiring his son to marry
Prisca, refused to interfere and he seemed to
tolerate their illicit relationship.
3. Isabelo has conveyed/been conveying their
conjugal properties to Alejo to foster latter’s
whims and caprices and thus, damaging and
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prejudicing Cipriana’s rights. Some of these
properties include lands acquired during
their marriage with money belonging to the
conjugal partnership. Land annually
produces 4,500 cavanes of palay at
P4.00/cavan.
- Other allegations of Cipriana/Prayers to the
Court:
1. Their separation is necessary to avoid
personal violence. She could not live in the
conjugal dwelling due to the illicit
relationship of Alejo and Prisca tolerated by
Isabelo.
2. She is entitled to P500 pendente lite monthly
pension from conjugal partnership. However,
Isabelo refused to provide for her support
despite her demands.
3. She should be in-charge of the
administration of the property of their
conjugal partnership because Isabelo is unfit
to do so. He exhibits immoral conduct and
acts by publicly maintaining an illicit
relationship with Geronima Yap.
- Isabelo answered with a general denial.
- CFI dismissed
ISSUES/HELD:
1. WON their separation is justified - YES. They
were having a stormy life prior to the separation
due to the frequent fights. Isabelo ordered her to
leave the house and threatened to ill-treat her if
she returned. Prisca’s situation is embarrassing
for her mother. Highly possible that Alejo caused
Prisca’s pregnancy. Compelling them to cohabit
could lead to further quarrels.
2. WON transfers of property from Isabelo to Alejo
are illegal - NO. Failed to prove that property was
community property. Documentary evidences
even show that it was acquired by him before
their marriage.
3. WON Cipriana is entitled to P500 monthly
maintenance = NO. That’s too much. P50 is
enough.
ATILANO v CHUA CHING BENG (1958)
103 Phil. 255
Pilar Atilano (plaintiff-appellee), 19 years old,
married Chua Ching Beng (defendant-appellant) on
May 1951. They lived in Manila with the parents of
the Ching Beng. In October of that year, the couple
went back to Zamboanga for a vacation in Pilar’s
parents. She stayed behind, telling the defendant
that she would go back to him later. On September
1953, however, she filed a complaint of support
against her husband, alleging estrangement since
October 1952, incessant bickering and his inability to
provide a home for them without his parents.
Defendant did not disclaim obligation to support;
however, he expressed his desire to fulfil his
obligation if she returns to Manila and lives with him
in a domicile separate from his parents. As the
husband, he claims the right to fix the residence of
the family. After plaintiff filed a petition for pendente
lite with the CFI. CFI granted a monthly allowance of
P75.
The defendant then filed a petition wherein he
elected to fulfil his obligation as fixed by the trial
court to receive and maintain plaintiff at his
residence in Pasay City. CFI denied the petition. CA
presented to SC for Adjudication.
ISSUE: WON a wife is entitled to receive support
from her husband where she refused to live with him
on account of some misunderstanding she had with
the husband’s immediate relatives.
HELD: No. Defendant-appellant gave the option to
support wife at conjugal dwelling apart from his
parents’ home. Should plaintiff refuse, he is under no
obligation to give any support. The wife cannot be
compelled to live with her husband but support can
be denied to the spouse who left.
DEL ROSARIO v DEL ROSARIO (1949)
46 OG 6122
Plaintiff Genoveva del Rosario, a widow with 2 kids
and defendant Teoderico del Rosario, a mechanic,
widower with a son got married. They lived together
in the house of defendant's mother. Because of petty
quarrels, plaintiff left the conjugal home in 1942.
ISSUE: WON plaintiff is justified in leaving and is
entitled to support
RATIO: Yes. As the marriage vow does not
include making sacrifices for the in-laws, there
is legal justification for wife’s refusal to live with
husband, taking into account the “traditional hatred
between wife and her mother-in-law” (nyahaha). It
is true that wife is obliged to follow her husband
wherever he wishes to establish the residence (Art
58, CC), but this right does not include compelling
wife to live with mother-in-law, if they cannot get
along together. Alimony will be set according to
husband’s ability to pay.
C. Mutual Help and Support
FC, Art 68 The husband and the wife are obliged to:
1. live together,
2. observe mutual love,
3. respect and fidelity,
4. render mutual help and support
FC, Art 70 The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the fa
obligations shall be paid from the community property and in the abse
properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits
properties.
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allowance
CC, Art 111 The husband is responsible for the support of the wife and the rest ofofthe
wife of $50
family. a month;
These expensesawarded $800
shall be met
for
first from the conjugal property, then from the husband's capital, and wife’s
lastly fromattorney;
the wife'sand as an alternative,
paraphernal buy a
property. In case
modern house
there is a separation of property, by stipulation in the marriage settlements, the elsewhere.
husband and wife shall contribute
proportionately to the family expenses.
ISSUE: WON wife is entitled to relief
FC, Art 199 Whenever 2 or more persons are obliged to give support,
HELD:the liability
No. shall devolve
To maintain upon the
an action ff persons
such as theinone
the at
order herein provided:
bar, the parties must be separated or living apart
1. spouse
2. descendants in the nearest degree from each other. Parties are not living apart and
3. ascendants in the nearest degree wife has been supported in the same manner
4. brothers and sisters without complaint. As long as home is maintained
and the parties are living as husband and wife it may
be said that the husband is legally supporting his
wife
FC, Art 200 When the obligation to give support falls upon two or and
more the purpose
persons, of theof
the payment marriage
the sameisshall
beingbe carried
divided
between them in proportion to the resources of each. out. As for attorney’s fees, it is only allowed to the
successful party in litigation only where allowance is
However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances, the judge may
provided by order only one of them to furnish the support
the statute.
provisionally, without prejudice to his right to claim form the other obligors the share due from them.
PELAYO v LAURON (1909)
When two or more recipients at the same time claim support from one and the same person legally obliged to give it, should
12 Phil
the latter not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the order 453
established in the preceding Article shall be followed,
- Arturo
unless the concurrent obliges should be the spouse and a child subject Pelayo
to parental is a physician
authority, whothe
in which case was called
child on
shall be
preferred. by the defendants (parents of the husband) to
attend to their daughter in law who was about to
MCGUIRE v MCGUIRE (1953) undergo labor. Plaintiff tried his best to help her
157 Neb. 226 deliver, but she died due to childbirth.
- Plaintiff is now asking for due compensation for
- Lydia (66) and Charles (80) McGuire were his services amounting to P500. Defendants
married. They have known each other for 3 years
claim that her delivery at their domicile was only
and wife knew of husband’s extraordinary
incidental, and that it was her husband who
frugality.
should pay for the services rendered by the
- She has two daughters from previous marriage, plaintiff.
whose education was supported by the second
marriage. They are now married and living in ISSUE: Who between the parents-in-law and the
different states. husband is liable for the payment of Pelayo?
- They inherited an 80-acre farm from first
husband and Lydia transferred her interest to her HELD: The husband, because rendering of medical
daughters but she can have the rent money assistance in case of illness comprises one of the
which she uses to visit her daughters. mutual obligations to which spouses are bound by
- Wife testified that she used to raise chickens and way of mutual support. It is improper for plaintiff to
her profits were used to buy clothing and have brought action against the defendants simply
groceries because husband gave her very little because they were the parties who called the
money, did not give her clothes except for a plaintiff. The defendants were not, nor are they now,
single coat and never took her to a movie. Their under any obligation by virtue of any legal provision,
house was not equipped with a bathroom and to pay the fees claimed, nor in consequence of any
kitchen was not modern. The furnace was not in contract entered into between them and the plaintiff.
good condition and she had a hard time They are strangers with respect to the obligation
scooping coal for it. The car did not have an that devolves upon the husband to provide support.
efficient heater. She could not raise chickens
anymore due to the 3 abdominal operations she
went through which her husband paid for.
- Because of these, wife filed an action for equity
to recover suitable maintenance and support
money, and for costs and attorney’s fees. District
Court decreed that wife was legally entitled to
use the credit of the husband and obligate him
to pay for certain items in the nature of
improvements and repairs, furniture, and
appliances for the household; purchase a new
automobile with an effective heater in 30 days;
pay travel expenses of wife to visit each
daughter at least once a year; wife be entitled in
the future to pledge the credit of the husband for
what may constitute necessities of life; personal
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D. Management of the
Household
FC, Art 71 The management of the household shall be the right and duty of both spouses. The expenses shall for such
management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Art 70.

CC, Art 115 The wife manages the affairs of the household. She may purchase things necessary for the support of the family,
and the conjugal partnership shall be bound thereby. She may borrow money for this purpose, if the husband fails to deliver
the proper sum. The purchase of jewelry and precious objects is voidable, unless the transaction has been expressly or tacitly
approved by the husband, or unless the price paid is from her paraphernal property.

YOUNG v HECTOR ()
740 So. 2d 1153

E. Exercise of Profession
FC, Art 73 Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity without the consent of the
other. The latter may object only on valid, serious and moral grounds

In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:

1. the objection is proper
2. benefit has accrued to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection,
the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained
consent

The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith.

CC, Art 117 The wife may exercise any profession or occupation or engage in business. However, the
provided:
1. His income is sufficient for the family, according to its social standing, and
2. His opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds.

In case of disagreement on this question, the parents and grandparents as well as the family council, if any, shall be
consulted. If no agreement is still arrived at, the court will decide whatever may be proper and in the best interest of the
family.
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RA 7192
Women in Development and Nation-building
Act
AN ACT PROMOTING THE INTEGRATION OF WOMEN
AS FULL AND EQUAL PARTNERS OF MEN IN
DEVELOPMENT AND NATION BUILDING AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.
Section 1. Title. — This Act shall be cited as the "Women in
Development and Nation Building Act."
Sec 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State recognizes the role
of women in nation building and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
The State shall provided women rights and opportunities
equal to that of men.
To attain the foregoing policy:
1. A substantial portion of official development assistance
funds received from foreign governments and
multilateral agencies and organizations shall be set
aside and utilized by the agencies concerned to
support programs and activities for women;
2. All government departments shall ensure that women
benefit equally and participate directly in the
development programs and projects of said
department, specifically those funded under official
foreign development assistance, to ensure the full
participation and involvement of women in the
development process; and
3. All government departments and agencies shall review
and revise all their regulations, circulars, issuances and
procedures to remove gender bias therein.
Sec 3. Responsible Agency. — The National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) shall primarily be
responsible for ensuring the participation of women as
recipients in foreign aid, grants and loans. It shall
determine and recommend the amount to be allocated for
the development activity involving women.
Sec 4. Mandate. — The NEDA, with the assistance of the
National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women, shall
ensure that the different government departments,
including its agencies and instrumentalities which, directly
or indirectly, affect the participation of women in national
development and their integration therein:
1. Formulate and prioritize rural or countryside
development programs or projects, provide income
and employment opportunities to women in the rural
areas and thus, prevent their heavy migration from
rural to urban or foreign countries;
2. Include an assessment of the extent to which their
programs and/or projects integrate women in the
development process and of the impact of said
programs or projects on women, including their
implications in enhancing the self-reliance of women in
improving their income;
3. Ensure the active participation of women and women's
organizations in the development programs and/or
projects including their involvement in the planning,
design, implementation, management, monitoring and
evaluation thereof;
4. Collect sex-disaggregated data and include such data
in its program/project paper, proposal or strategy;
5. Ensure that programs and/or projects are designed so
that the percentage of women who receive assistance
is approximately proportionate to either their
traditional participation in the targeted activities or
their proportion of the population, whichever is higher.
Otherwise, the following should be stated in the
program/project paper, proposal or strategy;
(a) The obstacle in achieving the goal;
(b) The steps being taken to overcome those
obstacles; and
(c) To the extent that steps are not being taken to
overcome those obstacles, why they are not
being taken.
6. Assist women in activities that are of critical
significance to their self-reliance and development.
Sec 5. Equality in Capacity to Act. — Women of legal age,
regardless of civil status, shall have the capacity to act and
enter into contracts which shall in every respect be equal
to that of men under similar circumstances.
In all contractual situations where married men have the
capacity to act, married women shall have equal rights.
To this end:
1. Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain
loans and execute security and credit arrangement
under the same conditions as men;
2. Women shall have equal access to all government and
private sector programs granting agricultural credit,
loans and non-material resources and shall enjoy equal
treatment in agrarian reform and land resettlement
programs;
3. Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators
and enter into insurance contracts; and
4. Married women shall have rights equal to those of
married men in applying for passport, secure visas and
other travel documents, without need to secure the
consent of their spouses.
In all other similar contractual relations, women shall enjoy
equal rights and shall have the capacity to act which shall
in every respect be equal to those of men under similar
circumstances.
Sec 6. Equal Membership in Clubs. — Women shall enjoy
equal access to membership in all social, civic and
recreational clubs, committees, associations and similar
other organizations devoted to public purpose. They shall
be entitled to the same rights and privileges accorded to
their spouses if they belong to the same organization.
Sec 7. Admission to Military Schools. — Any provision of
the law to the contrary notwithstanding, consistent with the
needs of the services, women shall be accorded equal
opportunities for appointment, admission, training,
graduation and commissioning in all military or similar
schools of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police not later than the fourth
academic year following the approval of this Act in
accordance with the standards required for men except for
those minimum essential adjustments required by
physiological differences between sexes.
Sec 8. Voluntary Pag-IBIG, GSIS and SSS Coverage. —
Married persons who devote full time to managing the
household and family affairs shall, upon the working
spouse's consent, be entitled to voluntary Pag-IBIG
(Pagtutulungan — Ikaw, Bangko, Industriya at Gobyerno),
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) or Social
Security System (SSS) coverage to the extent of one-half
(1/2) of the salary and compensation of the working
spouse. The contributions due thereon shall be deducted
from the salary of the working spouse.
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The GSIS or the SSS, as the case may be, shall issue rules executed. The only evidence offered was
and regulations necessary to effectively implement the testimonies of the defendant and her counsel.
provisions of this section.

Sec 9. Implementing Rules. — The NEDA, in consultation
with the different government agencies concerned, shall
issue rules and regulations as may be necessary for the
effective implementation of Sections 2, 3 and 4, of this Act
within six (6) months from its effectivity.
Sec 10. Compliance Report. — Within six (6) months from
the effectivity of this Act and every six (6) months
thereafter, all government departments, including its
agencies and instrumentalities, shall submit a report to
Congress on their compliance with this Act.
Sec 11. Separability Clause. — If for any reason any
section or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional
or invalid, the other sections or provisions hereof which are
not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and
effect.
Sec 12. Repealing Clause. — The provisions of Republic Act
No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the
Philippines, as amended, and of Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, and
all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules
and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are
hereby repealed.
Sec 13. Effectivity Clause. — The rights of women and all
the provisions of this Act shall take effect immediately upon
its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.
F. Use of Surname
CC, Art 370 A married woman may use:
1. Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname
2. Her maiden first name and her husband's surname (e.g. Loi Ejercito)
3. Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she Isabel.
CC, Art 373 A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in accordance with Article 370.
- Appellant Silva, however, was married to one
Priscilla Isabel of Australia during such time. It
was only after May 1945, when he was sent back
to US for medical treatments of his battle
wounds, did he divorce Priscilla. To add, on May
9, 1948, he contracted another marriage with co-
plaintiff Elenita Ledesma Silva.
ISSUES:
1. WON appellant’s deception and fraud
justified award of damages to defendant -
Yes
2. WON defendant misrepresented herself as
Mrs. Silva - Yes
HELD:
1. Yes. If appellant revealed his true situation,
appellee would never have agreed to be with
appellant. Esther’s loss of employment in the
Girl Scout’s Davao Council was ultimately a
result of Silva’s deception and she should be
indemnified therefor. His concealment of his real
status was not mere dolo but actual fraud. He
should then stand solely liable for any and all
damages arising therefrom. Moreover, Esther
acted in good faith since Silva formerly
introduced her as Mrs. Silva, sent her letters thus
addressed which implied authority to use his
name.
2. Yes. In the face of evidence, it is safe to conclude
that no marriage had really taken place. It is not
proper for Esther to continue representing
herself
(e.g.as the wife
Miriam of Saturnino considering that
Defensor-Santiago)
at the time, he was still married to Priscilla
is his wife,
Andsuch
as as "Mrs."
per (e.g. CC,
Art 370 Mrs.aFrancis Pangilinan)
married woman
is authorized to use husband’s surname,
impliedly, it also excludes others from doing
likewise.

TOLENTINO
CC, Art 377 Usurpation of a name and surname may be the subject of an actionvfor
CAdamages
(1988)and other relief.
162 SCRA 66
- Private respondent Consuelo David ♥ Arturo
CC, Art 378 The unauthorized or unlawful use of another person's surname gives a right of action to the latter.
Tolentino (yes, the one who annotated the law)
in 1931.
SILVA v PERALTA (1960) - Marriage was dissolved and terminated in 1943
110 Phil 57 pursuant to the law during the Japanese
- Defendant Esther Peralta accompanied younger occupation by a decree of absolute divorce on
sister Florence in the latter’s arrest and the grounds of desertion and abandonment by
investigation. the wife for at least 3 continuous years.
- There, defendant met plaintiff Saturnino Silva, a
US citizen and officer of the US Army. Silva then - Arturo Tolentino married Pilar Adorable but she
started courting Esther and she later accepted died soon after the marriage.
his proposal of marriage having been made to - Constancia married Arturo Tolentino on April 21,
believe that he was single. They started living 1945 and they have 3 children. Constancia
together as common-law husband and wife and Tolentino is the present legal wife of Arturo
bore a son, Saturnino Silva, Jr. Tolentino.
- They were married on Jan 14, 1945. However, - Consuelo David continued using the surname
no documents of marriage were prepared nor Tolentino after the divorce and up to the time
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that the complaint was filed. Her usage of the interests of the owner of the name. It consists
surname Tolentino was authorized by the family with the possibility of confusion of identity
of Arturo Tolentino (brothers and sisters). - Element of usurpation
- RTC: Consuelo David should discontinue her o Actual use of another’s name
usage of the surname of Tolentino o Use is unauthorized
- CA: reversed RTC o Use of another’s name is to designate
personality or identity of a person
ISSUES: - None of these elements were present in the case
1. WON the petitioner’s cause of action has already - Silva v Peralta was cited by the petitioner but
prescribed
the case is not applicable. In Silva, it was not
2. WON the petitioner can exclude by injunction
mere use of the surname that was enjoined but
Consuelo David from using the surname of her
the defendant’s representation that she was
former husband from whom she was divorced.
the wife of Saturnino Silva, there was
usurpation of the status of the wife.
HELD:
1. Yes
YASIN v SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT (1995)
- Art 1150 CC The time for prescription of all kinds 241 SCRA 606 - SUPRA
of actions, when there in no special provision No need to file petition to revert to use of maiden
which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from name after divorce since marital ties have been
the day they may be brought. completely severed.
- Art 1149 CC Period of prescription is 5 years
from the right of action accrues.
- The action has long prescribed because she
married Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945; Civil
Code took effect on August 30, 1950; She
acquired knowledge that Consuelo David was
still using the surname Tolentino in 1951.
- She should have filed the case after she
obtained knowledge that Consuelo David was
still using the surname Tolentino. The case was
filed on November 23, 1971 or 20 years after she
obtained knowledge.

2. No
- Philippine law is silent whether or not a divorced
woman may continue to use the surname of her
husband because there are no provisions for
divorce under Philippine law.
- Commentary of Tolentino as regards Art 370 of
the CC: the wife cannot claim an exclusive right
to use the husband’s surname. She cannot be
prevented from using it, but neither can she
restrain others from using it (bias much?).
- Art 371 is not applicable because it
contemplates annulment while the present case
refers to absolute divorce where there is
severance of valid marriage ties. Effect of
divorce more akin to death of the spouse where
the deceased woman is continued to be referred
to as “Mrs. of the husband” even if he has
remarried.
- If the appeal would be granted the respondent
would encounter problems because she was able
to prove that she entered into contracts with
third persons, acquired properties and entered
into other legal relations using the surname
Tolentino. Petitioner failed to show the she
would suffer any legal injury or deprivation of
right.
- There is no usurpation of the petitioner’s name
and surname. Usurpation implies injury to the
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G. Relief from Courts 1. On sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home.
Cruelty done by plaintiff to defendant was greatly
exaggerated. The wife was inflicted with a
FC, Art 72 When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties todisposition
the conjugalof
union or commits
jealousy acts which
towards tend to bring
her husband in an
danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may
aggravated apply to
degree. Nothe court for relief.
sufficient cause was present.
Courts should move with caution in enforcing the
PEREZ v PEREZ (1960) duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the
109 Phil 657 wife since this recognizes the de facto separation of
- Antonio Perez, as guardian ad litem of his son, the two parties. Continued cohabitation of the pair
must be seen as impossible, and separation must be
filed a civil case against defendant Angela
necessary, stemming from the fault of the husband.
Tuason de Perez at the CFI Manila.
She is under obligation to return to the domicile.
- He wants to declare his wife as prodigal and
place under guardianship based on the following
“When people understand that they must live
allegations:
together…they learn to soften by mutual
o she was squandering her estate on a young
accommodation that yoke which they know they
man named Jose Boloix
cannot shake off; they become good husbands and
o she was spending the conjugal partnership
wives…necessity is a powerful master in teaching
of gain the duties which it imposes…”
o defendant has expressed her desire to marry (Evans v. Evans)
and have children with Jose Boloix, if only to
embarrass her husband 2. On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is
- CFI dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction not within the province of the courts to compel one
of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal
ISSUE: WON the case falls under the jurisdiction of rights to, the other. In the case of property rights,
the CFI or the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court. such an action may be maintained. Said order, at
best, would have no other purpose than to compel
HELD: RTC has no jurisdiction. It is the Juvenile and the spouses to live together. Other countries, such
Domestic Relation Court which has jurisdiction. as England and Scotland have done this with much
Material injury pertains to personal injury (personal criticism.
relations between man and wife) and not patrimonial
or financial. Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration that the
defendant absented herself without sufficient cause
ARROYO v VASQUEZ (1921) and it is her duty to return. She is also not entitled to
42 Phil 54 support.
- Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were
married in 1910, and lived in Iloilo City. They
lived together with a few short intervals of
separation. On July 4, 1920, defendant Dolores
went away from their common home and
decided to live separately from plaintiff. She
claimed that she was compelled to leave on the
basis of cruel treatment on the part of her
husband. She in turn prayed for a decree of
separation, a liquidation of their conjugal
partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees
and permanent separate maintenance.
- CFI ruled in favor of the defendant and she was
granted alimony amounting to P400, also other
fees
- Plaintiff then asked for a restitution of conjugal
rights, and a permanent mandatory injunction
requiring the defendant to return to the conjugal
home and live with him as his wife.

ISSUES:
1. WON defendant had sufficient cause for
leaving the conjugal home
2. WON plaintiff may be granted the restitution
of conjugal rights or absolute order or
permanent mandatory injunction

HELD:
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X. PROPERTY FC, Art 77 The form of marriage settlement:

1. in writing
2. signed by the parties

RELATIONS
3. before the celebration of the marriage
Prejudice against third persons: registered in the local civil registry
the proper registries of property.

BETWEEN FC, Art 78 A minor, who according to law, may contract marriage may
shall be valid only if the persons designated in Art 14 to give c

SPOUSES agreement, subject to the provisions of the Title IX of this Code.

* Art 14 FC – father, mother, surviving parent or

MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT is an agreement
entered into before marriage and, in consideration
thereof, between an intended husband and wife, by
which the enjoyment or devolution of property is
regulated. A contract entered into by those who are
to be united in marriage, in order to establish the
conditions of their conjugal partnership with respect
to present and future property.
guardian, or persons having legal charge of them
* Title IX – Parental authority
* By applying principles of statutory construction, Art
14 which is specific provision for marriage shall
prevail
FC, Art 79 For the validity of any marriage settlements executed by a
been pronounced or who is subject to any other disability, it shall b
competent court to be made a party thereto.

A. General Provisions
FC, Art 80 In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage set
governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the place of the celebration
FC, Art 74 The property relations between husband
and wife shall be governed in the following order: This rule shall not apply:
1. by marriage settlements executed before the 1. Where both spouses are aliens
marriage 2. With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting p
2. by the provisions of this Code the country where the property is located
3. by the local customs 3. With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered int
foreign country whose laws require different formalities for its
FC, Art 75 The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree upon the regime of ACP, CPG, complete separation of
property or any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlement
system of absolute community property as established in this Code shall81
FC, Art govern.
Everything stipulated in the settlement or contracts referre
future marriage, including donations between the prospective spous
marriage does not take place. However, stipulations that do not depe
FC, Art 76 In order that any modification in the marriage settlement may be valid, it must be
valid.
of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Art 66, 67 , 128, 135 and 136.

COLLECTOR v FISHER (1961)

Art 66 Reconciliation after legal separation: 110 Phil 686
Separation of property and forfeiture of the
Walter and Beatrice Stevenson, both British citizens
share of the guilty spouse shall subsist, unless
spouses agree to revive their former property were married in Manila where they lived until they
regime established permanent residence in California in
Art 67 Agreement to revive former property regime 1945. Walter died in 1951 and instituted his wife as
shall be executed under oath and specify sole heiress to real and personal properties in the
1. Properties to be contributed anew to the Philippines, which were assessed for estate and
restored regime inheritance tax.
2. Those to be retained as separated
properties of each spouse
ISSUE: WON in determining the taxable net estate of
3. Names of all their creditors, address and
amount owing to each the decedent, the net estate should be deducted as
the share of the surviving spouse in accordance with
Art If spouse without just cause abandons the our law on conjugal partnership.
128 other OR fails to comply with his/her
obligations to the family: Petition for judicial HELD: Yes. It should be deducted from net estate. It
separation of property or authority to be the is a well-known doctrine in our civil law that in the
sole administrator of the conjugal partnership absence of any ante-nuptial agreement, the
Art Sufficient causes for voluntary judicial contracting parties are presumed to have adopted
135 separation of property the system of conjugal partnership as to the
properties acquired during their marriage.
Art Spouses joint filing of petition for voluntary
136 dissolution of ACP/CPG/separation of their
common properties WHARTON’S PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTIONS apply.
Property relations of the Stevensons should be
determined by the rational laws of the husband.
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Under Art 1325 OCC, one spouse is a foreigner and
there is no ante-nuptial agreement, it is the national
law of the husband that becomes the dominant law
in determining the property relations of such
spouses. But since both spouses are foreigners, it is
British law that should apply. However, as there is no
proof of what the law of England is in this matter and
the court is justified to indulge in processual
presumption, that the law of England on this matter
is the same as our law.
B. Donation Propter Nuptias
1. Requisites for donations
FC, Art 82 Donations by reason of marriage are those which are made before its celebration,
and in favor of one or both of the future spouses.
REQUISITES FOR DONATIONS PROPTER NUPTIAS
(DPN)
1. made before celebration of the marriage
2. made in consideration of the marriage
3. made in favor of one or both of the future
spouses
FC, Art 85 Donation by reason of marriage of property subject to en
the encumbrance, and the property is sold for less than the total amo
liable for the deficiency. If the property is sold for more than the total
to the excess.
DOMALAGAN v BOLIFER (1916)
33 Phil. 471
- Jorge Domalagan and Carlos Bolifer entered into
a verbal contract wherein the former was to pay
defendant the sum of P500 upon the marriage of
the former’s son Cipriano Domalagan with the
defendant’s daughter, Bonifacia.
- Jorge Domalagan paid the sum of P500 plus P16
as hansel or token of future marriage. However,
the Bonifacia married one Laureano Sisi.
- Upon learning of the marriage, Domalagan
demanded return of the said sum of P516 plus
interest and damagesinarising
consideration of the
from the same,
fact that
he was obliged to sell his real property in Bohol
to come up with the sum.
- Defendant denied complaint and alleged that it
did not constitute a cause of action.
- RTC: No evidence to show that plaintiff suffered
any addtl damages. Ruled in favor of plaintiff for
the return of P516 plus 6% interest from Dec 17,
1910 plus costs.

DONATIONS EXCLUDED ISSUE: WON Domalagan can demand his P516 since
1. in favor of the spouses after the marriage no marriage took place
(ordinary wedding gifts)
2. in favor of future spouses, made before the HELD: YES. The amount constitutes DPN since it
celebration of marriage, but not in fulfills all the requirements, thus it may be revoked.
consideration Verbal contracts are valid even if it not clothed in the
3. in favor of persons other than the spouses, necessary form.
even though they may be founded on the
marriage SERRANO v SOLOMON (1959)
* governed by provisions on ordinary donations 105 Phil 998
- Melchor Solomon executed a supposed deed of
WHO MAY DONATE DPN, stating among others that if there are no
1. the spouses to each other children and wife dies first, all of his properties
2. the parents to one or both of the spouses and all properties acquired during the union will
3. by third persons to one or both of the be inherited by those who reared the wife.
spouses - The wife Alejandria Solomon died less than 9
months later without issues, upon which
DONATION PROPTER
Estanislao Serrano, the uncle who reared her
ORDINARY DONATIONS instituted this action to enforce the deed.
NUPTIAS
Does not require express Express acceptance - CFI: Donation was not a donation propter
acceptance necessary nuptias because it was not made in
May be made by minors
Cannot be made by minors
consideration of marriage and it was not made
(Art 78) to one or both parties of the marriage
If present property is
No limit to donation of
donated and property ISSUE: WON the donation made by Melchor can be
present property provided
regime is not ACP, limited
legitimes are not impaired considered as a donation propter nuptias.
to 1/5
Grounds for revocation in Grounds for revocation are
Art 86 found in law on donations HELD: NO and the alleged donation is null & void.
CFI decision affirmed. Estanislao won’t get anything.
Whether you apply Art 1327 of the old CC or Art. 126
FC, Art 83 These donations are governed by the rules on ordinary donations established in CC, insofar as they are not
of the new CC, the result would be the same,
modified by the following articles.
donations propter nuptias are only those bestowed
(1) before the celebration of marriage, (2) in
consideration of the same and (3) upon one or both
of the spouses. Melchor’s donation violated
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conditions 2 and 3. It was not in consideration solely a private instrument, it is not valid and does
of the marriage, it had additional terms like the not confer any rights.
marriage had to be childless and one of the spouses
had to die before the other. Also, it was not in favor
of Alejandria. Instead, it was in favor of her parents
and those who raised her. Based on Manresa’s
commentary, donations granted to persons
other than the spouses even though founded
on the marriage are excluded. It’s not a donation
inter vivos (during their lifetime) either, because
donee never accepted it by same instrument of
donation or in separate document as required by
law. It’s not a donation mortis causa (upon death)
either. It has to be governed by provisions on the
disposition execution of wills to be appreciated as
such. Besides, donor is still alive. It will only be
operational upon his death.

SOLIS v BARROSO (1928)

53 Phil 912
- Spouses Juan Lambino and Maxima Barroso
made a DPN of certain lands in a private
document in favor of their son Alejo and his
soon-to-be-wife Fortunata Solis, in consideration
of their upcoming marriage. One condition of the
donation is that in case one of the donees dies,
half of the lands thus donated would revert to
the donors while the surviving donee would
retain the other half.
- On the same month, Alejo and Fortunata got
married and immediately thereafter the donors
delivered the possession of the donated lands to
them. A month later, Alejo died. In the same
year, Juan also died. After Juan’s death, Maxima
recovered possession of the donated lands.
Surviving donee, Fortunata filed an action
against Maxima (surviving donor) et al and
demanded:
1. the execution of the proper deed of donation
according to law,
2. transfer of one-half of the donated property
to her
3. to proceed to the partition of the donated
property and its fruits
- CFI granted the plaintiff’s prayer, basing its
judgment on Art 1279 of the Civil Code. It
ordered the defendants to execute a deed of
donation in favor of Fortunata, valid in form to
transfer to her the legal title to the part of the
donated lands assigned to her in the original
donation.

ISSUE: WON the private document is valid as DPN

HELD: NO. DPN is governed by laws on

donation. Art 633 provides that for a donation of a
real property to be valid, it must be made in a
public instrument. The only exception to the rule
are onerous and remuneratory contracts, in so far as
they do not exceed the value of the charge imposed,
which are then governed by the rules on contracts.
Because the DPN by the spouses were made in
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MATEO v LAGUA (1969)
29 SCRA 864
- Spouses Lagua donated half of their owned land
to their son Alejandro in consideration of his
marriage to Bonifacia Mateo. This was executed
in a public document.
- Alejandro died so his son would succeed in the
ownership of the land.
- The father in law continued tending the farm and
giving the wife her share in the fruits. Until the
sustenance stopped and the wife discovered that
the father-in-law sold the land.
- The wife successfully moved for the annulment
the sale in a court proceeding.
- However, the Laguas subsequently filed for the
annulment of the donation because it neglected
their own support as well as the legitime of their
other son.
- Alejandro’s younger brother, Gervacio, filed a
suit for annulment on the ground that it
prejudiced his legitime.
- Bonifacia (the wife) appealed the decision raising
the following errors:
o Validity of the DPN have been determined
in a previous case
o Action to annul the donation has already
prescribed since the case was filed 41
years after the donation
o DPN is revocable only for any grounds
enumerated in Art 132 of the New Civil
Code
o Determining the legitime of the Lagua
brothers in the hereditary estate of
Cipriano the CA should have applied the
provisions of the Civil Code of 1889 and
not Art 888 NCC
ISSUE: WON an onerous DPR may be revoked
* Art 765, CC – Acts of ingratitude
HELD: YES, DPN is without onerous condition
and based on liberalities are subject to
annulment due to inofficiousness. If proved that
the value of the DPN exceeds the disposable free
portion of the donor, it may be revoked. However, in
this case, no evidence was adduced as to the
burdensome nature of the DPN.
2. Donation propter nuptias of
present or future property
FC, Art 84 If the future spouses agree upon a regime other than thesupport to community
donate to each other in their marriage settlements more than 1/5 of their present property
considered void.
Donations of future property shall be governed by the provisions on the
wills.
DONATIONS OF
- present property  takes effect upon
celebration of marriage
- future property  takes effect upon death
(by will or mortis causa)
3. Grounds for revocation of
DPN
FC, Art 86 Donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by the don
1. if the marriage is not celebrated or judicially declared voi
settlements, which shall be governed by Art 81
2. when the marriage takes place without the consent of the par
3. when the marriage is annulled and the donee acted in bad fai
4. upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty spouse
5. if it is with a resolutory condition and the condition is complied
6. when the donee has committed and act of ingratitude as spec
* What does Par 2 mean? The donor is not the
parent who did not give consent.
* What is a resolutory condition? The DPN is
already received which enjoyment is subject to
termination upon happening of the future and
uncertain event. In other words done is forbidden to
do something. (E.g. Car is given but it will be
revoked if you use it anywhere outside NCR.)
* Grounds of revocation in this article is not by
operation of law. Those which revokes by
operation of law are the ff:
1. if the DPN is stipulated in the marriage
settlement and no marriage took place (Art
81)
2. for void ab initio and subsequent marriages
in a spouse’s presumptive death, provided
the donee acted in bad faith (Art 43 (3) in
relation to Art 50)
(1) If the donee should commit some offense
against the person, the honor or the property
of the donor, or of his wife or children under
his parental authority;
(2) If the donee imputes to the donor any criminal
offense, or any act involving moral turpitude,
even though he should prove it, unless the
crime or the act has been committed against
the donee himself, his wife or children under
his authority;
(3) If he unduly refuses him support when the
donee is legally or morally bound to give
absolute the donor. of property
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4. Void donations
WHAT ARE VOID DONATIONS
1. between spouses during marriage
2. direct or indirect (e.g. stepchild or child of
the other spouse and a person whom the
spouses is presumptive heir at the time of
donation)
REASONS FOR PROHIBITION
1. donation inter vivos is dictated by principle
of unity of personality of spouses during
marriage
2. prevent weaker spouses from being abused
by stronger spouse, whether by abuse of
affection or threats of violence
3. protect creditors
4. prevent indirect modification of the marriage
settlement
PROHIBITION IS ALSO APPLICABLE TO
1. common-law marriages
2. parties living in a state of adultery or
concubinage
* Reasons: possibility of undue influence and that if
ruled otherwise, those living in guilt would be better
off than those in legal union
NAZARENO v BIROG (1947)
45 OG 11 Supp 268
- Andrea Rodriguez ♥ Juan Aben Alberta Aben
- Daughter Alberta ♥ Mariano Meleno Nazareno 
Bonifacio Nazareno (plaintiff)
- When Juan Aben died, Andrea got married to
Cirilo Braganza. Andrea and her second husband
Cirilo had no offspring.
Cirilo executed a deed of donation of land to his then
six-year old step-grandson Bonifacio. The donation
was accepted in the same deed by Alberta and
Mariano, parents of Bonifacio. Cirilo continued to
possess and enjoy the land.
Beginning in 1930, Cirilo sold portions of the land:
1930 71 ares and 30 centares to Birog for
1, 100 (paid)
1933 2 hectares to Birog for 2, 200
(initially with remaining balance of
300, later paid 275, wrote
promissory note for 25)
1934 1 hectare and 70 ares to Ariola for 1,
600 (balance of 600, promissory
note for that sum payable at end of
Feb or March 1935)
These two buyers immediately took possession of
the land and cultivated them. Cirilo died on
Dec.1934 and since Ariola had not paid by Feb1935,
plaintiff wrote him a letter demanding the payment.
Pedro Braganza (brother of Cirilo) collected balance
of 25 from Birog in March 1935).
ISSUE: WON plaintiff, Nazareno, may recover title
and possession of a parcel of land described here?
HELD: NO. Not only did he lose ownership of the two
portions of the land that the Birogs and Ariolas
possess, he signed a deed in favor of Ariola on the
third and last portion; therefore, he is estopped from
claiming the land.
More importantly, appeal must be dismissed since
plaintiff has no cause of action. The deed of donation
upon which he bases his claim to land is null and
void since it is made by the donor to a grandchild of
his wife by the wife’s previous marriage. The
donation falls under the prohibition in
Art.1335, CC. Neither has the plaintiff acquired the
land by prescription for there is no evidence that he
ever possessed it or claimed it against his
grandfather (as evidence in deed in favor of Ariola,
signed by Nazareno as witness).
MATABUENA v CERVANTES (1971)
38 SCRA 284
- While Felix Matabuena and Petronila Cervantes
were living as common law spouses, the man
donated to her a parcel of land.
- They eventually got married and Felix died,
leaving behind his properties to his wife
Petronila.
- Felix’s sister Cornelia questions the validity of
the donation and claims ownership over her
brother’s estate.
ISSUE: WON the ban on donation inter vivos applies
when the donation was made during common law
relationship
HELD: Yes, common law spouses fall within the
prohibition hence the donation is null and void as
contrary to public policy.
HARDING v COMMERCIAL UNION (1918)
38 Phil 464
- Mrs. Harding bought an insurance policy for the
car her husband gave her. A few days later, the
car was totaled in a fire.
- The insurance company refused to pay saying
that the donation of husband to the wife was
void.
ISSUE: WON the car was validly donated by the
husband to the wife
HELD: YES. The car may be considered as a
moderate gift. Whether a gift is moderate or not
would depend upon the circumstances of the parties,
in this case, nothing was disclosed by the record.
Also, the insurance company is not the proper party
to question the moderateness of the gift. It can
only be raised by persons who bear such a
relation to the parties making the transfer
interfere with their rights or interest.
SUMBAD v CA (1999)
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308 SCRA 75
- Agata Tait died in 1936. Afterwards, Agata’s
husband, George Tait, Sr., lived in a common-law
marriage with Maria Tait. In 1974, he donated a
certain parcel of unregistered land in Sitio Sum-
at, Bontoc. George died in 1977. From 1982 to
1983, Maria Tait sold lots included within the
Sum-at property in favor of the private
respondents who purchased the lots on the
strength of a Tax Declaration over the Sum-at
property showing the seller, Maria, to be the
owner of the property in question.
- In 1989, petitioners Emilie Sumbad and Beatrice
Tait brought an action for quieting of title,
nullification of deeds of sale, and recovery of
possession with damages against private
respondents, alleging that they are the children
and compulsory heirs of George and Agata. They
claim that after the death of their mother, their
father sold the Otucan property and used the
proceeds thereof to purchase a residential lot in
Sum-at, Bontoc and that from 1982 to 1983,
Maria sold lots included within the Sum-at
property to private respondents without their
knowledge and consent. They further alleged
that although the private respondents were
warned that the Sum-at property did not belong
to Maria they still purchased the lots from Maria
and that Maria had no right to sell the Sum-at
property so the deeds of sale are null and void
and did not transfer title to private respondents.
During the trial, petitioners and defense
presented several witnesses.
ISSUES:
1. WON the testimony of Shirley Eillenger with
respect to the forgery of the deed of donation
should be given credence.
NO. The court agreed with the trial and appellate
court’s decision that Eillenger’s testimony is “vague
and incredible” and incapable of impugning the
validity of the public document. Forgery should be
proven by clear and convincing evidence, and
whoever alleges it has the burden of proving the
same. Not only is Shirley Eillenger’s testimony
difficult to believe, it shows is had been rehearsed as
she anticipated the questions of petitioner’s counsel.
Petitioner’s should have presented handwriting
experts to support their claim that George’s
signature on the deed of donation was indeed a
forgery.
2. WON the deed of donation is invalid under Art
749 CC, which requires a public instrument as a
requisite for the validity of donations of
immovable property.
NO. Petitioners contend that the person who
notarized the deed had no authority to do so.
However, the acknowledgment clause states that the
person who notarized it was the deputy clerk of
court who acted “for and in the absence of the clerk
of court who is authorized, under Sec. 21 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as amended
by C.A. Nos. 270 and 641, to administer oaths. In
accordance with the presumption that official duty
has been regularly performed, it is to be presumed
that the deputy clerk of court who notarized the
deed of donation in this case was duly authorized by
the clerk of court.
3. WON deed of donation contravenes Art 133, CC
NO. Art 133 provides that “every donation between
spouses during the marriage shall be void.” This
prohibition does not apply when the donation
takes effect after the death of the donor.
Neither does this prohibition apply to moderate
gifts which the spouses may give each other on the
occasion of any family rejoicing.” This prohibition
extends to common-law relations (Matabuena v
Cervantes). In fact, Art 87, FC provides that “every
donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or
indirect, between the spouses during the marriage
shall be void, except moderate gifts which the
spouses may give each other on the occasion of any
family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to
persons living together as husband and wife without
a valid marriage.” However, this point is being raised
for the first time in the SC. Litigants cannot raise an
issue for the first time on appeal as this would
contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice.
Even assuming that they are not thus precluded,
petitioners were unable to present evidence in
support of such a claim. The evidence on record
does not show whether George was married to Maria
and, if so, when the marriage took place. If Maria
was not married to George, evidence should have
been presented to show that at the time the deed
of donation was executed, George and Maria
were still maintaining common-law relations.
Beatrice Tait’s (one of the witnesses presented)
testimony is only to the effect that in 1941, Maria
became their stepmother. There is no evidence on
record that George and Maria continuously
maintained common-law relations until the date
when the donation was made (April 2, 1974).
* In short, the donation was valid because there
was no evidence to support the allegation that
George was married to Maria. There was also no
evidence that the two were still living as common-
law spouses at the time the donation was made.
CHING v GOYANKO JR. (2006)
506 SCRA 735
- Joseph Goyanko Sr ♥ Epifania dela Cruz  had
seven children who are the respondents in this
case
- Respondents claim that their property was
named after their aunt Sulpicia Goyanko
because their father was a foreigner so Sulpicia
had to sell it to Joseph first before Joseph was
able to sell it to his common law wife petitioner
herein Maria Ching
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009
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- Ching claims to be the owner who purchased the

property for a certain price
C. System of Absolute
- RTC and CA dismissed the case because of Community
overwhelming evidence that she was concubine

ISSUE: WON the sale to the concubine was valid

1. General Provisions

HELD: NO. It falls under the prohibited donation FC, Art 88 The absolute community of property between spouses shal
between spouses. marriage is celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied, for the c
other time shall be void.

FC, Art 89 No waiver of rights, interests, shares and effects of

case of judicial separation of property.

When the waiver takes place upon a judicial separation of property, or

same shall appear in a public instrument and shall be recorded as prov
such waiver may petition the court to rescind the waiver to the extent
credits.

FC, Art 90 The provisions on co-ownership shall apply to the ACP b

this Chapter.

2. What constitutes community

property
FC, Art 91 Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriag
all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebr

FC, Art 92 The ff shall be excluded from the ACP:

1. acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title, by either spo
any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or
property
2. for personal and exclusive use of either spouse. However, jew
3. acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legi
fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property

FC, Art 93 Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to

one of the excluded therefrom.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009
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3. Charges upon the ACP separate

property,
deductible for his
FC, Art 94 The ACP shall be liable for: share upon
liquidationchildren of either spouse; however, the support of
(1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and legitimate
illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated
* Example administrator-spouse
of ante-nuptial debt in Parfor9:the benefit of the
amortization
community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of conjugal dwelling or family vehicle
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent
* Difference between Par 1 and Par 2
may have been benefited;
* Difference between Par 4 and Par 5
(4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or minor repairs
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during marriage upon the
by the family; FC, Art 95 Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete agambling, professional or vocational
whether course,
permitted or other activity
or prohibited by law,forshall
self- be borne
improvement; community but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the commu
(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive
purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational * To discourage
course or other gambling, giving double loss to the
activity for self-improvement;
gambler
(9) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling under  reflection
paragraph of Catholic
(7) of this virtues
Article, the support of illegitimate
children of either spouse, and liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or a quasi-delict, in case of absence or
insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the payment
* If of which
the winning shall
ticket in be considered as advances
a lottery/sweepstakes to be
given
deducted from the share of the debtor-spouse upon liquidation ofto the community;
spouse by a and
friend, it is considered a donation
(10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be groundless.
under Art 92 (1) and winnings will not form part of
ACP unless
If the community property is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, expressly
except provided
those falling under by donor. (9), the
paragraph
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their

TABULAR FORM OF ART. 94 (Ma’am Beth’s

Lecture)

DEBTS & TAXES &

SUPPORT
OBLIGATIONS EXPENSES
2 incurred by: 4 including minor 1 of spouse,
- administrator or major repairs common children,
-spouse, upon community legitimate
- both property children
spouses, or - For illegit: 
- by one exclusive/
spouse with separate OR ACP
the consent advance, subject
of the other to reimbursement
upon liquidation
3 incurred by one 5 mere 6 commence or
without the preservation of complete
consent of the separate education
other to the property used (professional or
extent that family by the family vocational) e.g.
may have been language, speech
benefited power,
(E.g. failed leadership, law,
business which culinary
was initially ok) - by either spouse
7 antenuptial 10 litigation 8 value
debts of either between spouses, donated/promised
spouse insofar as unless groundless to children for
benefited the commencement
family (no and completion of
consent of other education
spouse needed) - no age limit
9 antenuptial
debts, that do not
benefit family, for
support of
illegitimate
children or
crime/quasi-delict
 in case of
insufficiency of
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4. Ownership and disposition of 5. Dissolution

the ACP
FC, Art 99 The ACP terminates
1. death of either spouse (Art 103)
FC, Art 96 The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall
2. legal belong to(Art 63 & 64)
separation
of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the or
3. annulled court by thevoid
declared wife(Art
for50
a proper
to 52) remedy,
which must be availed of within 5 years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
4. judicial separation of property during the marriage (Art 134 to
138)
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority
FC, Art 100 The separation in fact between husband and wife shall
or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person 1. The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live t
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before theto be is
offer supported
withdrawn by either or both offerors.
2. When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the o
* Ma’am Beth thinks this is wrong because it does obtained in a summary proceeding
not take into consideration the expertise of the 3. In the absence of sufficient community property, the separa
husband and the woman. What if the wife is a BA liable for the support of the family. The spouse-present sha
major while the husband does not know a damn given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specifi
thing about economics, shall his economic decision fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter’s share
still prevail?
FC, Art 101 If a spouse without a just cause abandons the other or fai
* Okay, you say that it’s not totally unfair because the aggrieved spouse may petition to the court:
she can go to Court and assert her views. But is that 1. receivership
sufficient remedy for the wife? Unless you really 2. judicial separation of property
want to escalate the fight, resorting to judicial 3. authority for sole administration of ACP, subject to precaution
settlement is like raging a war. It will only turn minor
agreements into major brawl. Plus the cost of The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph ref
lawsuit, it just makes matters worse! 1. marital
2. parental
3. property relations
FC, Art 97 Either spouse may dispose by will of his or her interest in the community property.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she ha
returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period o
give any
FC, Art 98 Neither spouse may donate any community property without theinformation as to
consent of the his/her
other. whereabouts
However, shall be prima facie
either spouse
may, without the consent of the other, make moderate donations the conjugal dwelling.
occasions of family rejoicing or family distress.
* Remedies of spouse present in case of
abandonment
(Art 101)
1. receivership
2. judicial separation of property
3. authority to be the sole administrator of ACP

* Presumption of abandonment
- Absent from conjugal dwelling for three months
- Failed to inform other of whereabouts for three
months
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6. Liquidation of assets and 3. extra-judicial agreement (only if there are no

debts)
liabilities
* 1 year prescription period is not practical. Filipinos
FC, Art 102 Upon dissolution of the ACP, the following procedurehave
shall a tradition of one year of mourning (babang
apply:
luksa).
1. An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive
properties of each spouse.
* Who may challenge validity? Heirs of the deceased
2. The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be
spouse
said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties in accordance
with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94.
* If no liquidation, any encumbrance or disposition is
3. Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses voidshall
(youthereafter beit, you keep it forever)
can’t sell
4. * Mandatory for subsequent
The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its marriage to be separate
divided equally between husband and wife, unless a differentpropertyproportion
 no logical reason was
or division for this according
agreed upon intothe
marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purpose
Tolentino
of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said
profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and the market value at the timeFC, Art
of its 104 Whenever the liquidation of the community properties of
dissolution
person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out simultan
5. The presumptive legitimes of the common children each community shall be determined upon such proof as may be c
Article 51. of doubt as to which community the existing properties belong,
6. Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partitioncommunities in proportion
of the properties, the to the capital and duration of each.
on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the
choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years
* The
court has decided otherwise. In case there in no such majority, theclause “before
court shall thetaking
decide, effectivity of this Code”
into consideration the is
best interests of said children. there because simultaneously liquidation of two or
more marriages is no longer legally possible under
FC which imposes a mandatory requirement for
* How to apply the forfeitures in Art 43(2) and Art marriages subsequent to an unliquidated
63(2) marriage to have complete separation of
- NET ASSETS what remains after payment of properties.
community debts and obligations
- NET PROFITS in Par 4 above, “shall be the ONAS v JAVILLO (1934)
increase in value between the market value of 59 Phil 733
the community property at the time of the - Crispulo Javillo married Ramona Levis and they
celebration of the marriage and the market had 5 children. After Ramona’s death, he
value at the time of its dissolution” married Rosario Onas and they had 4 children.
- During his first marriage 11 parcels of land were
How to compute net acquired; while in his 2nd marriage 20 parcels of
profit: land were acquired.

Market value
- Partition was made on the claim that the
– debt of community properties of the 2nd marriage were products of
net assets or remainder the first marriage.
– market value at marriage - Rosario Onas was opposing the partition that
was made by the administrator of the estate of
NET PROFIT her husband. She alleges the following errors:
o All the properties acquired during the second
FC, Art 103 Upon the termination of the marriage by death marriage were acquired with the properties
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. of the first marriage.
o TC erred in approving the partition dated
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the community property
or extra-judicially within six months from the death of the deceased September
spouse 9, 1931, notwithstanding that the
same did not
period, no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the community property includeofall
theproperties
terminated of the
marriage
shall be void. deceased.

Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriageISSUES and RULING:

mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.
1) WON the community partnership shall continue to
* Liquidate CP within 1 year from death of spouse. exist between the surviving spouse and the heirs of
How? the deceased husband or wife - NO
1. judicial settlement in testate or intestate - When the marriage is dissolved, the cause that
proceedings brought about the community ceases, for the
2. judicial action, or ordinary action for partition principles of an ordinary partnership are not
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applicable to this community, which is governed
by special rules.
- Provisions of law governing the subject should
cease to have any effect for community of
property is admissible and proper in so far as it
conforms to unity of life, to the mutual affection
between husband and wife, and serves as a
recompense for the care of preserving and
increasing the property; all of which terminates
by the death of one of the partners.
- Community terminates when the marriage is
dissolved or annulled or when during the
marriage and agreement is entered into to divide
the conjugal property. The conjugal partnership
exists as long as the spouses are united.
- 1/26 to each of the children of the 2nd marriage
2. All other properties acquired during the 2nd
marriage 
- 19/195 to each children of the 1st marriage;
- 2/65 to each children of the 2nd marriage;
- 28/65 to the surviving spouse
HELD: Since the capital of either marriage or the
contribution of each spouse cannot be determined
with mathematical precision, the total mass of these
properties should be divided between the two
conjugal partnerships in proportion to the
duration of each partnership

2) WON the properties of the second marriage can 1.
be claimed as products of the properties of the first
marriage - NO
- Whatever is acquired by the surviving spouse on 2.
the dissolution of the partnership by death or
presumption of death whether the acquisition be 3.
made by his or her lucrative title, it forms a part
of his or her own capital, in which the other
consort, or his or her heirs, can claim no share.
1st conjugal partnership entitled to 18/64 of the
whole estate (18 yrs)
2nd conjugal partnership entitled to 46/64 of
the whole estate (46 yrs)
The share of Nicolas Delizo is of the net
remainder of CPG of both marriages or 32/64,
divided into equal shares among all his heirs
(all 13 of the kids)

3) WON the partition that was approved by the lower
court is valid - NO
- Was based on the erroneous assumption that the
properties of the second marriage were
produced by the properties of the first marriage.
** The property corresponding to the first marriage
consists of the 11 parcels of land. The remaining 20
parcels of land were acquired during the second
marriage.
Thus… the final sharing scheme is 
1. Rosa’s share: 9/64 of the whole estate, to be
divided among their 3 kids (142/1664 each)
2. Dorotea’s share: 23/64 of the whole estate + her
share in Nicolas’ estate (662/1664)
3. Nicolas’ share: 32/64 of the whole estate to be
divided into 13 equal parts (64/1664 each)

VDA DE DELIZO v DELIZO (1976)

69 SCRA 216
- This is about two cases involving the partition of
the conjugal properties two marriages
contracted by Nicolas Delizo.
- He first married Rosa Villasfer which lasted for 18
yrs (1891-1909) and they had 3 children.
- He then married Dorotea de Ocampo which
lasted for 46 yrs (1911-1957) and they had 9
children. In 1957 Nicolas died (90 yrs old).
- Court originally adjudicated of the land to the 3
children from the 1st marriage, to the surviving
spouse and in equal shares to the children of
both marriages.
This was modified in consideration of the fact that,
only the Caanawan property (67 hectares) was
shown to be acquired during the first marriage and
only 20 hectares of which was made productive
during this time. However, it is from the fruits of this
property that enabled the spouses in the 2 nd
marriage to acquire all other future property.

1. Caanawan property and on P.Campa 

- 8/39 (1/6 + 1/26) to each of the children from
the 1st marriage;
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009
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D. Conjugal Partnership of 2. Exclusive Property

Gains
FC, Art 109 The following shall be exclusive property of each spouse:

1. General Provisions (BY DIRECT ACQUISITION OR ORIGINALLY EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY

1. brought to the marriage as his or her own
2. acquired during marriage by gratuitous title
FC, Art 105 In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements
shall govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions(BY
in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.
SUBSTITUTION)
3. acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by exchange w
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships ofspouses
gains
before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights 4. purchased with the exclusive money of the wife or the husban
other laws, as provided in Article 256.

E.g. of OWNED PRIOR TO THE MARRIAGE

FC, Art 106 . Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband
proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties 2. acquired prior to marriage under defective
spouses through their efforts or by chance, and, upon dissolution of the titlemarriage or of the
gains or benefits obtained by either or both spouses shall be
agreed in the marriage settlements.
FC, Art 107 The rules applied in Art 88 and 89 also apply to CPG.
Art 88 – ACP begins at precise moment of
celebration of marriage
Art 89 – prohibition on waiver of rights, interest,
shares and effects of ACP during marriage
NATURE OF INTEREST
1. There is no co-ownership, instead
partnership
2. Each spouse has mere inchoate rights or
expectancy over partnership property during
marriage
FC, Art 108 The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the
conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by the spouses
1. property
owned before the marriage
and wife
where defect waspartnership, the the
cured during
marriage
3. those alienated by spouse prior to marriage
but reacquired during due to annulment,
rescission or resolution of the contract, or
revocation of donation, by virtue of which it
was alienated
4. property actually delivered to spouse during
marriage where cause or consideration came
from such spouse prior to the marriage
5. property bought by installment prior and
fully paid only during marriage but
ownership already vested on buyer-spouse
prior to the marriage; amount paid by CPG
must be reimbursed upon liquidation
E.g. of ACQUISITION BY GRATUITOUS TITLE
1. property acquired during marriage through
testate (heir, devisee or legatee) or intestate
succession or by donation
in their marriage
2. proceeds settlements.
of insurance where received as
beneficiary of another person’s policy
3. gratuity given as bounty or out of pure
liberality by employer for long dedicated
service (distinguished from pension which is
conjugal property under Art 117, FC)
4. unearned increment (increase in value due
to ordinary course of time e.g. modernization
of a parcel of land)
5. moral damages awarded for personal injury
sustained

E.g of OTHER SEPARATE PROPERTY

1. collection of credits belonging to one spouse
exclusively
2. money through mortgage, if not used for
benefit of CPG
3. properties in co-ownership

FC, Art 110 The spouses retain the ownership, possession, adm
properties.  strict dominion

Either spouse may, during the marriage, transfer the administration

means of a public instrument (notarized) which shall be recorded in
property is located.
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FC, Art 111 A spouse of age may mortgage, encumber, alienate, or otherwise dispose of his/her exclusive property,
without the consent of the other spouse, and appear alone inHELD:
court The land belongs to Rodriguez. She is allowed
to retain ownership of the property she brought into
the second marriage (Art 36 CC). She merely had
Hilarion administer her property for her. There is no
law that prohibits this but it cannot be
FC, Art 112 The alienation of any exclusive property of a spouse administered
concluded that the by wife’s
the other property that he is
terminates the administration over such property and the proceeds of the alienation
administering shall be
becomes turned
his overbecause
simply to the he
owner-spouse.
has done so for a long time.

FC, Art 113 Property donated or left by will to the spousesPEOPLE’S BANK AND TRUST CO v REGISTER OF
pertain to the donee-spouse as his or her own exclusive propertyDEEDS (1934)
without prejudice to the right of accretion when proper.
FC, Art 114 If the donation are onerous, the amount of the charges
donee-spouse, whenever they have been advanced by the CPG.married to Manuel Sandoval living in Palawan,
FC, Art 115 Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities, gratuities, was
on gratuitous or onerous acquisitions as may be proper in each
LIM v GARCIA (1907)
7 Phil 320
- Hilario Lim died in 1903 leaving a widow
(defendant) and 9 children (plaintiffs) and an
interest in P50000 estate. The children contend
that certain properties should not be included in
the conjugal property because Lim bought these
into the marriage. The children also allege that
the RTC erred in including from the inventory
three parcels of land which Lim’s widow claim to
be paraphernal property acquired by exchanging
properties exclusively belonging to her.
- There is a presumption in Art 1407 CC that all
estate of the married couple will be considered
CPG property unless it is proven that is was part
of the separate estate of husband or wife.
HELD: The three parcels of land were acquired by the
widow through exchanging properties which she
inherited from her father. Thus they are paraphernal.
The evidence presented by the children was not
sufficient to overcome the presumption that the
properties included in the conjugal property belong
there. Unless it is proven that the property is
part of the separate estate of one of the
spouses, it will be considered conjugal
property.
RODRIGUEZ v DELA CRUZ (1907)
8 Phil 665
- Plaintiff Matea Rodriguez is second wife of
Hilarion dela Cruz while defendants are Hilarion’s
children by his first wife; this is an action to
recover parcels of land in question from
defendants.
- Matea claims that property given to her by her
deceased father but in prior action by
defendants for partition of Hilarion’s property,
lower court adjudged lands in question to them
on theory that such lands were acquired during
Hilarion’s first marriage.
60 Phil 167
Appeal from CFI Manila judgment denying
registration of instrument entitled “Agreement and
shall be of Trust” in which Dominga Angeles,
Declaration
conveyed in trust her paraphernal property, trustee
to and
usufructs redeem
similar mortgage
benefits constituted on such
property
case. with funds derived from the rents or sale
thereof, grant a loan of P10000 with which to
redeem mortgage and collect the rents to be derived
from said property while remained unsold.
ISSUES:
1. WON the rents collected are fruits of the
wife’s property which therefore belongs to
CPG,
2. WON management belongs to husband
3. WON contract is null and void since husband
did not give consent
HELD: Wife, as owner and administratrix of her
paraphernal property, may appoint trustee to collect
the fruits of her property. The fruits are not yet
conjugal property since they still have to answer to
expenses in the administration and preservation of
the paraphernal property. She may likewise do such
without consent of the husband, subject to recourse
by husband or his heirs, thus rendering such
contract merely voidable or void.
PHILIPPINE SUGAR ESTATES v POIZAT (1925)
48 Phil 536
- Gabriela Andrea de Costen executed in favor of
her husband, Juan Poizat a general power of
attorney which among other things authorized
him “in her name, place and stead, and making
use of her rights and actions” to borrow money
and execute a mortgage over he properties now
in question.
- Defendant secured a loan of P10,000 from
plaintiff to pay a mortgage; however mortgage
executed by husband signed merely in his own
name and not as attorney-in-fact. For failure to
pay loan, property foreclosed and later sold at
auction to plaintiff.
- Wife opposes confirmation of auction sale on
ground that mortgage was null and void since
husband was unauthorized.
HELD: The husband exceeded the scope of his
authority. Defendant may have had authority to
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borrow money and mortgage real property of wife
but law specifies how and in what manner it should
be done, which was not duly complied with in this
case. Mortgage in question executed by him only
and not on behalf of wife, thus it is not binding on his
wife.
* One word could have changed everything: “for” or
“by”
CASTRO v MIAT (2003)
397 SCRA 271
- Spouses Moises and Concordia Miat bought a
piece of land in Paco on installment basis on May
17, 1977. Concordia died the following year.
- However, it was only on December 14, 1984 that
Moises was able to pay its balance because he
went to UAE to work. He secured his title over
the property in his name as a widower.
- There was also a dispute to the ownership of the
two children (Romeo and Alexander) of the
property.
HELD: Since the spouses were married before the
effectivity of the FC, the provisions of CC apply.
Records show that the Paco property was acquired
by onerous title during the marriage out of the
common fund, hence it is clearly conjugal. Art 160 of
CC provides that all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains to the husband or
the wife. The presumption applies even when
the manner in which the property was
acquired does not appear.
3. Conjugal Partnership of Gains
a. Presumption that property is
conjugal
FC, Art 116 All property acquired during the marriage wh
made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spou
the contrary is proved.
Important points regarding conjugal nature of
properties:
1. presumption applies even if manner in which
property was acquired is not shown
2. the party invoking this presumption must
first prove that the party was acquired
during the marriage
3. proof of acquisition during marriage is a
condition for the operation of this
presumption
4. presumption of prevails over ordinary rules
of accession
5. presumption is rebuttable by strong, clear
and convincing evidence
6. presumption is stronger when creditors are
involved
7. the burden of proof is on the party asserting
that the property is exclusively owned by a
spouse
In overthrowing the conjugal character…
• RECITALS IN DEED OF SALE is not sufficient
because to permit such would make a
spouse a sole arbiter of character of property
acquired during marriage
• PROPERTY IN NAME OF ONE SPOUSE is
likewise not enough to dispute the
conjugality of a property BUT if there is no
date of acquisition, the fact that the title is
named after the spouse makes the property
exclusive
o That’s why you should keep not only
the title but also the deed of sale
• PROOFS OF PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY
o possession of some paraphernal
funds under her administration and
available for investment
o sufficiency of such funds for price of
property
o investment of such funds in property
in question
• SOURCE OF FUNDS is not material to the
conjugality or exclusivity of property
because it is rather difficult to determine
• ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF ONE SPOUSE that
the property in question is conjugal is a
strong evidence against the party making
admission or his/her heirs
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JOCSON v CA (1989)
170 SCRA 333
- Emilio Jocson ♥ Alejandra Poblete  Moises
Jocson & Agustina Jocson-Vasquez. Agustina is
married to Ernesto Vasquez. The mother
Alejandra died intestate, and so did the father
Emilio in 1972.
- June 20, 1973: Moises filed complaint, assailing
validity of 3 documents executed by Emilio (their
father) during his lifetime. He prays that the
following be declared null and void and that the
properties involved be partitioned between him
andhis sister:
1. Deed of Sale executed July 27, 1968 wherein
Emilio sold to Agustina 6 parcels of land in
Naic, Cavite for P10,000.00. Deed included
Emilio’s manifestation that the lands were
sold at a low price because it was his loving,
helpful and thoughtful daughter who bought
the property. He says his son possesses such
qualities too. He further claims that the sale
did not violate any law and that he did not
touch his wife’s properties. He acknowledged
receipt of payment.
2. Deed of Sale executed July 27, 1968, selling
2 rice mills and a camalig in Naic, Cavite to
Agustina for P5,000.00. Emilio acknowledged
receipt too.
3. Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and
Adjudication with Sale executed March 9,
1969 wherein Emilio and Agustina, excluding
Moises, extrajudicially partitioned unsettled
estate of Alejandra dividing such into 3.
Emilio sold his share to Agustina.
- All documents were executed before a notary
public. Nos. 1 and 2 were registered with the
Register of Deeds. Old certificates were
cancelled and new certificates issued in the
name of Agustina.
- Moises allegations:
1. #1 is null and void because his father’s
consent was obtained by fraud, deceit,
undue pressure, influence and other illegal
machinations. He also alleges that property
was sold for a simulated price considering
that his sister had no work or livelihood of
her own. Also, he claims that the contract is
fictitious, simulated and fabricated.
2. Same allegations re #2 and #3 with
additional allegation that he was deliberately
excluded and they intended to defraud him
of his legitimate share. He also claims that
defendants were employed in their parents’
business and they must have used business
earnings or simulated consideration in order
to purchase the properties.
3. No real sale between dad and daughter
living under same roof.
4. Dad didn’t need money since sold properties
were all income-producitng.
5. #1 and #2 are unliquidated conjugal
properties that Emilio can’t validly sell.
6. #3: he only questions sale of dad’s share to
sister but not extrajudicial partition.
- RTC decided in favor of petitioner.
- Documents were simulated and fictitious
because: 1) no proof that Agustina did pay for
the properties, 2) prices were grossly inadequate
tantamount to lack of consideration at all, 3)
improbability of sale considering circumstances.
Designed to exclude Moises.
- RTC further declared #1 and #2 properties as
conjugal by virtue of registration papers which
declared: “Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra
Poblete.” Ordered registration of propertiy to two
children.
- CA reversed. Nos. 1 and 2 barred by prescription
because annulment of contract based on fraud
must be filed 4 years from discovery of such
which begins on the date of the registration with
the Register of Deeds. All documents actually
and intended to be binding and effective against
Emilio.
- Proof of such: issuance of new titles. Partition
with sale in Number 3 is valid since it was done
in accordance with New CC Art. 996 on intestate
succession and Moises’ 1/3 share has not been
prejudiced.
ISSUES & RULING:
1. WON suit is solely based on fraud and as such is
barred by prescription.
- NO. Contract tainted by vitiated consent such as
when consent’s obtained by fraud is voidable
(CC, Art. 1330) and action for annulment must
be filed within 4 years from time of discovery of
fraud (CC Art. 1391 par.4). Discovery means the
time when contract was registered with Register
of Deeds (Gerona v. De Guzman).
- If this was the only consideration, then it is
barred by prescription. But he further assailed
that sale was without consideration since
amount paid were merely simulated. Contracts
witho cause or consideration produce no effect
whatsoever (CC, Art 1352). A sale with simulated
price is void (CC, Art 1471 and 1409[3]) and
action for declaration of its nullity does not
prescribe (CC, Art 1410).
2. WON sales were without consideration.
- NO. Since Moises alleges such, it is incumbent
upon him to prove his allegations, especially
since documents show that his dad (vendor)
acknowledged receipt of price and they are
notarized. He failed to do so and thus he was not
able to overcome the presumption that a
contract is with consideration (CC Art. 1354).
Even his own witness contradicted his claim that
his sister and her husband had no source of
income. Witness Bagnas said that Agustina and
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Ernesto were into buy and sell of palay and rice.
Even he himself said that he didn’t know if his
sister had other businesses. Agustina testified
that she was into buy and sell even prior to her
marriage.
3. WON prices were simulated
- NO. No proof of inadequacy of price. In fact,
purchase price was higher than assessed value
(#1: P10k vs. P8920.00, #2 P5k vs. P3,500, and
#3 P8k vs. P24,840.00). Besides difference
between market value and purchase price is
understandable considering father’s filial love for
his daughter. Gross inadequacy of price alone
does not affect the contract except perhaps an
indication of defect in consent (CC Art. 1470). No
proof of defective consent.
4. WON sale is improbable.
- NO. Improbability of sale is purely speculative.
Not relevant considering that all essential
requirements for contract are clearly present:
consent, object and cause.
5. WON properties in #1 and #2 were conjugal
properties of Emilio and his wife.
- NO. CC, Art. 160 provides that all property of
marriage is presumed to belong to CP unless
proven otherwise. Condition sine qua non (main
thing) would be for party who invokes this to
prove that properties were indeed acquired
during the marriage (Cobb-Perez v Lantin). Thus,
Moises has to present proof that properties
in question were indeed obtained during
the marriage of their parents before he can
invoke the presumption. However, titles used
by RTC in declaring properties as CP (see RTC
decision in bold letters) are insufficient proof.
Doesn’t say when properties were obtained.
Acquisition of title (actual owning of land) is
different from registration. Possible that Emilio
acquired properties when he was still a bachelor
and only registered such after marriage.
- “Married to” phrase is a mere description
of Emilio’s civil status at the time of
registration (Litam v Rivera). It should be
interpreted as Emilo is the owner, property
registered in his name alone and that he is
married. Consistent with the principle that
registration of property in name of only one
spouse doesn’t negate possibility of it being
conjugal (Bucoy v Paulino). Both require
sufficient, clear and convincing proof to rebut
the presumption. Moises should have presented
sufficient proof to show that properties were
acquired during the marriage so that he may
enjoy the presumption under Art. 160. Due to
lack of proof, presumption does not exist, thus,
properties are considered exclusive to Emilio.
FRANCISCO v CA (1998)
299 SCRA 188
- Case of the sickly man
- Teresita (petitioner) is Eusebio’s (private
respondent) legal second wife. Conchita
Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and Antonio
Francisco (private respondents) are children of
Eusebio by his first marriage.
- Teresita’s allegations:
1. Since their marriage on Feb. 10, 1962, they
have acquired properties in Barangay Balite,
Rodriguez, Rizal, and in Barrio San Isidro,
Rodriguez, Rizal which were administered by
Eusebio until he was invalidated on account
of tuberculosis, heart disease and cancer,
which rendered him unfit to administer
them.
2. Private respondents succeeded in convincing
their father to sign a general power of
attorney which authorized Conchita to
administer the house and lot together with
the apartments situated in Rodriguez, Rizal.
- Teresita filed suit for damages and for annulment
of said general power of attorney, thus enjoining
its enforcement and sought to be declared
administratrix of properties in dispute.
- RTC ruled in favor of private respondents holding
that Teresita did not show that said properties
were acquired during the second marriage, or
that they pertained exclusively to her. As such,
those properties belong exclusively to Eusebio,
and he has the capacity to administer them. On
appeal, CA affirmed this decision.
- Teresita files this petition, claiming that:
1. CA erred in applying arts 160 and 158, title
VI of new CC as said title has already been
repealed by art. 253, FC
2. It further erred in not applying art. 124, FC
 However, issue in Teresita’s reply: WON Art. 116,
FC applies to this case as Art. 253 of the same
Code [which] expressly repeals Arts. 158 and 160
of the Civil Code" 4
ISSUE: WON properties are not conjugal but capital
properties of Eusebio exclusively.
HELD:
- YES. Petition denied. Arts 158 and 160 CC have
been repealed by the FC, specifically by Art 254,
FC (not Art 253). Even so, pursuant to Art. 256 in
relation to Art 105 (2nd par.), FC, repeal of Art.
158 and 160 does not operate to prejudice or
otherwise affect prior vested rights. Rights
accrued and vested while these articles were in
effect survive their repeal. Issue shall then be
resolved based on provisions of CC.
- Art 160 provides that "all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife".
However, the party who invokes this
presumption must first show proof of
acquisition during the coverture
(marriage). The presumption refers only to the
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property acquired during the marriage and title and registration thereof are two different
does not operate when there is no showing as to acts. Registration merely confirms title already
when property alleged to be conjugal was existing and the phrase “married to” is
acquired. Moreover, presumption in favor of merely descriptive of the civil status of
conjugality is rebuttable with strong, clear Eusebio.
and convincing evidence showing exclusive - Lastly, it follows that Eusebio shall remain
ownership of one of the spouses. administrator of the properties considering that
- In this case, petitioner failed to adduce ample the assets are exclusively his capital. Even if the
evidence to show that the properties which she properties are conjugal, petitioner cannot
claimed to be conjugal were acquired during her administer them inasmuch as Eusebio is not so
marriage with Eusebio. ill as to incapacitate him to administer property.
- As regards land in Bgy. Balite, petitioner failed to
rebut Eusebio’s testimony that he inherited the
same from his parents. She even admitted that
Eusebio brought into their marriage the said
land, albeit in the concept of a possessor only as
it was not yet registered in his name.
- Whether Eusebio inherited the property before or
after his 2nd marriage is inconsequential as the
property should be regarded as his own
exclusively, pursuant to Art 148, CC.
- Acquisitions by lucrative title refer to properties
acquired gratuitously and include those acquired
by either spouse during the marriage by
inheritance, devise, legacy, or donation. Hence,
even if it be assumed that Eusebio's acquisition
by succession of the land took place during his
second marriage, the land would still be his
“exclusive property” because it was acquired by
him, “during the marriage, by lucrative title.”
- As regards property in Bgy. Balite, petitioner
showed building permits for the house and the
apartment, with her as the applicant although in
the name of Eusebio and the business license for
the sari-sari store issued in her name alone in
support of her claim that it was conjugal
property. These, however, do not prove that the
improvements were acquired during the second
marriage. The fact that one is the applicant or
licensee is not determinative of the issue as to
whether or not the property is conjugal or not.
They even counter her claim as her documents
all described Eusebio as the owner of the
structures (Art 1431, CC; Rule 129(4), Revised
Rules on Evidence).
- Further, she cannot argue that the sari-sari store
constructed on the land of Eusebio has thereby
become conjugal for want of evidence to sustain
the proposition that it was constructed at the
expense of their partnership (Art 158(2), CC).
Presumption of conjugality for lack of absence of
evidence on the source of funding (Art. 160, CC)
cannot be invoked because there is also lack in
proof that it was erected during the alleged
second marriage.
- Certificate of title upon which petitioner anchors
her claim over the property at San Isidro is
inadequate. The fact that the land was
registered in the name of “Eusebio
Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco,”
is no proof that the property was acquired
during the spouses coverture. Acquisition of
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b. Properties that compose the
CPG
FC, Art 117 The following are CP properties
1. acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense income
the partnership or for only one of the spouses
2. labor, industry, work or profession of either or both
3. fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the
fruits from the exclusive property
4. share of either spouses in the hidden treasure which the law awards to the finder or owner of the property where the
treasure is found
5. occupation such as fishing or hunting
6.
livestock existing upon the dissolution of the partnership in excess
marriage by either spouse
7. by chance, e.g. winnings from gambling or betting. Losses shall - be
ONEROUS TITLE
- TEST: origin of the money invested in the
purchase, e.g. if it came from the conjugal fund,
the property acquired is conjugal
- SPECIAL RULES ON LIFE INSURANCE:
If the beneficiary is the insured himself or his
estate
o If the premiums were paid with the conjugal
funds, the proceeds are conjugal
o If the premiums were paid with separate
funds, proceeds are separate
o If the premiums were paid partly with
conjugal funds, and partly with separate
funds, the proceeds will be partly conjugal
and party separate
If the beneficiary is the other spouse
o If one spouse gets insurance, assigned as
beneficiary himself and the other spouse:
Proceeds belong to the other spouse even if
the premiums are paid out of conjugal funds
but he/she should also reimburse half to the
conjugal partnership
o If spouses are insured, the surviving spouse
gets the proceed with no obligation to
reimburse (considered reciprocal donations)
o If the insurance comes from a third person,
exclusive property of the beneficiary-spouse
- Reconcile this provision with Art 114 which says
that onerous titles are separate property even if
CPG funds were used, subject to reimbursement.
LABOR, INDUSTRY, WORK OR PROFESSION OF
EITHER OR BOTH OF THE SPOUSES
- includes all income whether in form of wages,
pensions or retirement pay, honoraria, salaries,
commission, bonuses, back pays, practice of
profession, income from business even if capital
comes from the exclusive properties of one of
the spouses
- teacher’s gratuity under special law is not
conjugal because it is remuneratory
FRUITS FROM COMMON AND EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY
Page 75 of 170
-
Only net income or fruits of exclusive property of
the spouses become conjugal. Expenses for
production, administration and preservation
should be taken from the gross fruits and the
owner-spouse is entitled to retain the gross
until these
of the common fund, expenses are
whether the paid.
acquisition be for
- Circumstances under Art 119 FC
SHARE OF SPOUSES IN HIDDEN TREASURE
- marriage
hidden treasure found by the spouses on the
property of either of them is conjugal
- if property where the treasure is found is owned
by one of the spouses and found by a stranger,
one-half
share
of the of theofowner
number of the
each kind property
brought goes
to the
to the conjugal partnership
if borne
property wherebytreasure
exclusively is found
the loser-spouse, owned by
though.
stranger and found by one of the spouses, one-
half share of finder is conjugal
FC, Art 119 Whenever an amount or credit payable within a period
may be collected during the marriage in partial payments or by i
property of the spouse. However, the interests falling due during
conjugal partnership.
* Illustration of Art 119: The wife lent money to
another before her marriage at interest, payable in
installment for 10 years. The interests falling due
during the marriage are conjugal, but the installment
payments on the principal loan belong to the wife
exclusively.
ZULUETA v PAN-AM (1973)
49 SCRA 1
- Spouses Rafael and Carolina Zulueta together
with their daughter were passengers of Pan Am.
Mr. Zulueta left the terminal and went to the
beach in search for a place where he could
relieve himself (where it would not be visible for
the people in the plane and in the terminal). He
came to a place abound 400 yards away from
the terminal. He was gone for almost one hour
(but before the plane left) and PanAm was
contending that it could have not taken him that
long relieve himself and that there were eight
commodes at the terminal toilet for men.
- Capt. Zentner claims that Mr. Zulueta has been
off-loaded “due to drinking” and belligerent
attitude but according to plaintiff (Zulueta) the
order to off-load all Zuluetas, their luggage and
overcoats and other effects hand-carried by
them came as a result of the altercation that
happened between Capt. Zentner and Mr.
Zulueta when the latter was not cowed by the
arrogant tone of Capt. Zentner.
- After Mr. Zulueta was off-loaded, Capt. Zentner
had the intention of keeping him stranded for a
minimum period of one week at a cost of $13.30
per day.
- In an action for damages against PanAm, the
Zuluetas were awarded moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney fees. This was
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based on a breach of contract of carriage
coupled with a quasi-delict.
- Pending appeal, the spouses separated and Mrs.
Zulueta entered into a compromise agreement
with PanAm, wherein she settled for P50,000.
She filed for the dismissal of the case which was
denied since a wife cannot bind conjugal
partnership without the husband’s consent,
except in cases provided by law.
ISSUE: WON the award for damages is part of the
conjugal partnership
HELD: YES. The damages arose from a breach of the
Zulueta’s contract of carriage with PanAm from
which they paid their fare with funds presumable
belonging to the conjugal property. The damages
therefore, fall under Art 153 CC, the right thereto
having been acquired by onerous title during the
marriage. The damages do not fall under Art 148 CC
as exclusive property of each spouse.
Further, “that which is acquired by right of
redemption or by exchange with other property
belong to only one of the spouses” and “that which
is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or
husband” belong exclusively to such wife or
husband, it follows necessarily that what is
acquired with money of the conjugal
partnership belongs thereto or forms part
thereof.
MENDOZA v REYES (1983)
124 SCRA 154
- Ponciano Reyes is the husband of Julia de Reyes
who executed a deed of sale of 2 parcels of land
with their improvements in favor of (petitioners)
spouses Mendoza. The land in question was
bought on installment basis from JM Tuazon &
Co. represented by G. Araneta.
- Since the spouses were always in arrears in the
payment of the said land because of lack of
money, they had to borrow from RFC
(Rehabilitation Finance Corporation). Thus, they
loaned money for purposes of completing the
construction of a one-storey building and paying
balance of price of lot.
- A corresponding deed of absolute sale, in which
Julia Reyes was named as vendee and her
husband signed under the phrase, “with my
marital consent,” was executed by Araneta on
Nov 1948. From thereon, the spouses secured
another loan for the payment of balance of lot
and additional security, for the defrayment of
the expenses incurred in the repairs, etc. As a
result the transfer certificates of said lots issued
by Registry of Deeds were in the name of “Julia
Reyes married to Ponciano Reyes.”
- The mortgage contracts executed by spouses in
favor of RFC were duly registered as well.
Spouses put up a school and a camarin in the
lots. When the school was transferred
someplace else, the camarin was leased to
Mendoza spouses in 1952 for ten years. The
contract of lease was signed by Julia as lessor
with marital consent of Ponciano. Because of
failure to pay their obligations to RFC, spouses
asked for extension on their obligation and was
granted such.
- On March 1961, while they were separated in
fact and her husband was in Pampanga, Julia
sold the lots to the Mendoza spouses without the
knowledge and consent of Ponciano.
- Thus, he filed a case for the annulment of the
deed of sale, stating that the properties were
conjugal properties and that she sold them
without his knowledge or consent.
ISSUES:
1. WON the deed of sale was null and void on
grounds that the property is conjugal property,
which means Julia is prohibited from selling such
without consent of spouse.
2. WON issue of estoppel can be raised against
Ponciano.
HELD:
1. YES. Property is conjugal following the
presumption found in Art 160 CC, which states
that all property of the marriage must be
presumed to belong to the CP unless it be
proved that it pertains to exclusive
property of spouses. This presumption is
strong as stated in Art 153, CC, which provides
that such presumption must be overcome by one
who contends otherwise. The only character that
they could come up with to rebut the
presumption is Julia’s testimony, which is
contrary to Araneta’s records as well as info on
mortgage contracts (which are favorable to her
husband).
Precedent states that it is sufficient to prove that
the property was acquired during the marriage
in order that the same may be deemed
conjugal property. That proof of acquisition of
property in dispute during the marriage suffices to
render the statutory presumption operative.
Thus, the property was acquired by onerous title
during the marriage. The records show that the
funds used to buy the lot and build the
improvements came from loans obtained by the
spouses. Art 161 states that all debts and
obligations contracted by the husband and
wife for the benefit of the conjugal partnership
are liabilities of the partnership. Thus, the lands
are conjugal properties of both spouses.
2. NO. The principle of estoppel rests on rule that
whenever a party has intentionally led the other to
believe a particular thing true to act upon such
belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising from his
act, declaration or omission, falsify it. It can be
invoked only between persons making the
misrepresentation and person to whom such
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misrepresentation is addressed. There is no own exclusive, private property because it

showing that Ponciano led the Mendozas to believe was acquired during the marriage by
that the land wasn’t conjugal. It cannot be lucrative title.
considered to have acted in good faith because the 2. NO. If improvements on Lot 13-C were conjugal,
RFC mortgages were already registered in Registry Villanueva may have acquired a right over them
of Deeds by the time the contract of lease was by succession. However, proof as regards when
registered. Moreover, they initially demanded the improvements were made on the
Ponciano’s consent when they leased the property exclusive property and the source of funds
but dismissed it upon sale. used was not presented. Therefore, the
presumption that it belongs exclusively to the
VILLANUEVA v TAC (1990) husband stands.
192 SCRA 21
- Spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa
were owners in fee simple of Lot 13. Upon their
death, their children, Modesto and Federico
Aranas, adjudicated the land to themselves
under a deed of extrajudicial partition. North
portion belonged to Federico, and south portion,
described as Lot 13-C under Torrens title in
Modesto’s name.
- Modesto’s wife Victoria died in July 1971.
Modesto himself died in April 1973. They had no
children.
- However, it appeared that Modesto was survived
by two illegitimate children named Dorothea
Aranas Ado and Teodoro Aranas who borrowed
P18,000 from respondent Jesus Bernas.
- In the loan, as security, they, as absolute co-
owners, mortgaged to Bernas Lot 13-C.
Raymundo Aranas, a relative was there as
witness.
- The siblings failed to pay the loan. Bernas then
acquired ownership over the land, cancelled the
siblings’ title and issued another in his name.
- About a month later, witness Raymundo Aranas
and his spouse Consolacion Villanueva filed a
complaint with RTC of Roxas City asking that
they be declared co-owners of the land and title
of Jesus Bernas over Lot 13-C be cancelled on
the ground of their alleged discovery of 2 wills.
- Modesto’s will: bequeathed to his illegitimate
children all his own capital property and all
interest in his conjugal partnership with his wife
Victoria .
- Victoria’s will: bequeathed to spouses Aranas
and Villanueva, and to the illegitimate children of
her husband all of her interests, rights and
properties, real and personal, as her net share
from conjugal partnership with husband.

ISSUES:
1. WON Villanueva had right over Lot 13-C and
improvements thereon by virtue of Victoria’s will.
2. WON improvements on said lot was conjugal.

HELD:
1. NO, Victoria died 2 yrs ahead of her husband.
She never inherited any part of Lot 13-C which
she could bequeath by will to anybody.
Moreover, even if Modesto’s acquisition by
succession of Lot 13-C took place during the
marriage, the lot would still be regarded as his
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c. Property Purchased by
Installment
FC, Art 118 Property bought on installment paid partly from
conjugal funds belongs to the buyer/s if full ownership was vested The
such ownership was vested during the marriage. In either case, any amount
spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner/s upon liquidation of joint the partnership
SIMPLIFIED: FC does not look at the source of funds.
In cases where the property is partly paid by either
the CPG or exclusive property, the time of vesting
ownership is what matters. Though under CC, the
basis was “who paid more”.
* How do you reconcile this provision with Art 109
(4) which that which includes anything “purchased
with the exclusive money of the wife or the
husband” in the exclusive property of the spouse?
CASTILLO v PASCO (1964)
11 SCRA 102
- Marcelo Castillo Sr., a widower ♥ Macaria Pasco,
a widow who had survived 2 previous husbands.
- 1932 The Gonzales couple, as co-owners of the
litigated fishpond, executed a deed of sale
conveying said property to spouses Marcelo
Castillo and Macaria Pasco for P6,000 which was
payable in 3 installments: P1,000 upon execution
of the deed, P1,000 within 1 month without
interest and P3,000 after 1 year with 11%
interest.
- 1933 Marcelo died and his widow married her 4 th
husband, Luis San Juan in June 1934. The
petitioners, children and grandchildren of
Marcelo by his previous marriage, a filed a
complaint for partition and accounting of the
fishpond in CFI of Bulacan.
- LC declared the fishpond as paraphernal
property, since even before the marriage,
Macaria was a woman of means while Marcelo
had a salary of only P80 a month. CA affirmed
the CFI decision.
Installments were paid in the ff manner:
1) paid by Macaria with her exclusive
money
2) paid with proceeds from a loan from Dr.
Jacinto, to whom the fishpond was
mortgaged by both spouses
3) paid from a loan secured by a mortgage
on 2 parcels of land assessed in the
name of Macaria
ISSUE: WON the 2nd and 3rd installments were paid
with conjugal funds.
HELD:
- Under the Spanish CC, the law applicable here,
the property acquired for onerous consideration
during the marriage was deemed conjugal or
separate property depending on the source of
the funds employed for its acquisition,
irrespective of in whose name the property was
acquired.
- The initial P1000 payment was paid exclusively
with money belonging to Macaria. But the 2
other payments were paid by conjugal funds.
before the marriage
deeds show that the loans used to pay both
advanced
installments by the
were madepartnership or by spouses
out to both either or both
as
borrowers. Loans thus become obligations
of CPG and money loaned is conjugal property.
- While the mortgage is on Macaria’s paraphernal
property, the mortgage to secure the loan is a
purely accessory obligation that the lenders
could waive if they so chose, without affecting
the principal debt which was owned by the
conjugal partnership, and which the creditors
can enforce exclusively against the conjugal
property if they so desired.
- Since the fishpond was purchased partly with
conjugal and partly with separate funds, justice
requires that the property be held to belong to
both patrimonies in common, in proportion
to the contributions of each to the total
purchase price. An undivided 1/6 is
paraphernal and the remaining 5/6 is conjugal.
- Payment by the widow of the mortgage debt
after Marcelo’s death does not result in an
increase in her share in the property but merely
creates a lien in her favor.
- Since the fishpond is undivided property of
Macaria and the conjugal partnership with
Marcelo, his heirs are entitled to ask for its
partition and liquidation. The ultimate interest of
each party must be resolved after due hearing,
taking into account:
a) Macaria’s 1/6 direct share
b) Her half of the community property
c) Her successional rights to a part of
Marcelo’s share pursuant to the
governing law of succession when he
died
d) Her right to reimbursement for any
amount advance by her in paying the
mortgage debt.
LORENZO v NICOLAS (1952)
- 91 Phil 686
- Magdalena Clemente ♥ Manuel Lorenzo
- Manuel died in 1929 and Magdalena died five
years later. During their marriage, they had no
children. However, they had children in their
previous marriages.
- Plaintiffs are Manuel’s kids from his first
marriage, while the defendants are Magdalena’s
grandchildren from her first marriage.
- Subject of the petition is 2 parcels of land, the
sale of which (to respondents) the petitioner
prays to be declared null and void since they are
part of CPG.
- These lots were friar land which Magdalena
bought on an installment basis:
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a) Lot 6: she paid P169.16 before her marriage CC, Art 158 Improvements, whether for utility or adornment, mad
to Manuel. The P833.32 balance was payable advancements from the partnership or through the industry of eithe
in installment – P25.32 on the 1st year and partnership.
P42 each year after.
Buildings constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during the
b) Lot 5: she paid P116.84 before her marriage pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbu
with Manuel. The P850.32 balance was
payable by installment of P52.32 on the 1st
* CC has a rule for (1) ordinary improvements made
and P42 on each succeeding year.
by the spouses on separate property of each of
- The receipts of the subsequent payment were
them, and another rule if (2) the conjugal
made in the name of Magdalena only.
partnership constructs a building on land belonging
- CA found them to be her paraphernal property.
to either spouse. Land which is separate property
becomes CPG if conjugal funds built anything on it.
ISSUE: WON Lots 5 and 6 are conjugal property. NO
…ON THE OTHER HAND
RATIO: They are her paraphernal property, thus
petitioners are not entitled to the land.
* FC provides for a uniform rule for the two
Lot 6 was purchased in her own name and for
circumstances.
her own exclusive benefit before her marriage to
Manuel. She paid the initial installment before the
A. cost of improvement made by CPG on separate
marriage and the balance was paid during the
property
marriage. All the receipts for the installments paid,
+ resulting increase in the value of improved
even during Manuel’s lifetime, were issued in
separate property > value of the principal property
Magdalena’s name and the deed of sale of Lot 6 was
at the time of the improvement
made in her name despite the fact that Manuel was
still alive. The acquisition of Lot 5 was the same as ∴ entire property becomes CPG, CPG
Lot 6. reimburses spouse at liquidation
Under Act No. 1120 of the alienation of Friar
Lands, the certificate is only an agreement to sell B. cost of improvement + resulting increase in value
and does not vest ownership of the land. of the improved principal property < value of the
Since the receipts for the installments paid were principal property at the time of improvement
issued in her name and the deed of sale in her ∴ principal property and improvement
name, this shows that the property belonged to her; belongs to owner-spouse, subject to
ownership had been vested on the buyer- reimbursement
spouse BEFORE the marriage.
Since the installments paid during the
marriage are deemed conjugal, there being no CPG – accessory
If improvement
evidence that they were paid out of funds belonging
i.e. the house, is
exclusively to Magdalena, such amounts should be worth 2 M
reimbursed to the CPG.
Exclusive –
principal
* Ma’am Beth says that this is more correct than
Castillo v Pasco Then the estimated value
of house and lot is at 10.5
d. Rules on Improvement M

Value of the
FC, Art 120 The ownership of improvements, whether for utilityCost or adornment,
of made Resulting
on the principal
spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of increase in value
improveme + either or both spouses property at the
following rules: of the improved
the conjugal partnership or to the original owner-spouse, subject to the nt time of the
principal property
improvement
When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal partnership and 10.5 M – (2 M + 5
the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the
conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the
M)
2 Mproperty of the owner-spouse at the10.5
timeMof the
improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained 3.5 M
reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. 5.5 M
∴ Principal property and
In either case, the ownership of the entire property shall be vested upon thebelongs
reimbursemen 10.5 M
improvement to owner-
the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. spouse

* Ma’am Beth’s take on this: This is unjust (luge to

use her term), because you only get the value of the
property at the time of improvement. Plus the fact
that the reimbursement happens at the liquidation of
the CPG which is roughly 20-40 years later, thus
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because of the delay of payment, the amount has
already devaluated.
* Nevertheless, later reimbursement is pragmatic in
this case because when a person engages in any
construction or improvement in properties, the cash
is usually wiped out.
CALIMLIM-CANULLAS v FORTUN (1984)
129 SCRA 675
- Petitioner Mercedes Calimlim-Canullas ♥
Fernando Canullas were married on Dec 19,
1962 and had 5 kids.
- They lived in a small house on a residential land
in question located at Bacabac, Pangasinan.
After Fernando’s dad died in 1965, Fernando
inherited the land.
- In 1978, Fernando abandoned his family and was
living with private respondent, Corazon
Daguines. During the pendency of this appeal,
they were convicted of concubinage in a
judgment rendered on Oct 21, 1981 by the then
CFI of Pangasinan which judgment has become
final.
- On April 15, 1980, Fernando sold the property
with the house on it to Daquines, for P2000. In
the document of sale, Fernando described the
house as “also inherited by me from my
deceased parents.”
- Unable to take possession of the lot and house,
Daguines initiated a complaint on June 18, 1980
for quieting of title and damages against
Mercedes. The latter resisted and claimed that
the house where she and her kids lived,
including the coconut trees on the land, were
built and planted with conjugal funds and
through her industry; that the sale of the land
together with the house and improvements to
Daguines was null and void because they are
conjugal properties and she had not given her
consent to the sale.
ISSUE:
1. WON the construction of a conjugal house on the
exclusive property of the husband ipso facto
gave the land the character of a conjugal
property - YES
2. WON the sale of the land together with the
house & improvements thereon was valid under
the circumstances surrounding the transaction.
HELD:
1. Under Art 158 CC, the land and building belong
to the CPG but CPG is indebted to the husband
for the value of the land. The spouse owning
the lot becomes a creditor to the conjugal
partnership for the value of the lot, which
value would be reimbursed at the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership. Conversion of land
from exclusive to conjugal property should be
deemed to retroact to the time the conjugal
buildings were first constructed thereon; thus,
the land and house are conjugal property
and could not have been sold to Daguines
without Mercedes consent.
2. The contract of sale is null and void for being
contrary to morals and public policy. Under the
law, spouses are prohibited from selling property
to each other, subject to certain exceptions. This
prohibition also applies to common-law
relationships.
e. Charges upon the CPG
FC, Art 121 The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
1. support: spouse, common children, legitimate children
of either spouse; support of illegitimate children
governed by the provisions of on Support
2. all debts and obligations contracted during the
marriage
a. by the designate administrator-spouse for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains,
b. by both spouses
c. by one of them with the consent of the other
3. debts and obligations contracted by either spouse
without the consent of the other to the extent that the
family may have been benefited
4. all taxes, liens, charges and expenses including major
or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership
property
5. all taxes and expenses for mere preservation made
during the marriage upon the separate property of
either spouse
6. expenses to enable their spouse to commence or
complete a professional , vocational or other activity
for self-improvement
7. ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they
have redounded to the benefit of the family
8. value of what is donated or promised by both spouses
in favor of their common legitimate children for the
exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a
professional or vocational course or other activity for
self-improvement
9. expenses of litigation between spouses unless the suit
is found to be groundless
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the
foregoing liabilities, the spouse shall be solidarily liable for
the unpaid balance with their separate properties.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OBLIGATIONS OF ACP AND
CPG
1. Art 94 (5) and Art 121 (5): In obligation to
taxes and expenses pertaining to preservation
of separate property, ACP provides that it
should be “used by the family” while CPG does
not have such qualification.
- The reason behind this is that CPG has interest in
the preservation of separate properties since its
fruits belong to the conjugal funds. On the other
hand, a separate property of the spouses is
usually beyond the reach of ACP hence, the
express requirement.
2. Art 94 (9) does not have a counterpart in Art
121: Ante-nuptial debts, liabilities and support of
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illegitimate children. Spouse can only resort to a

financially capable ACP in case of absence or The conjugal properties shall be liable for all debts
insufficiency of exclusive property. CPG instead and obligations contracted during the marriage by
has Art 123. the husband for the support of the family. The
husband’s creditor may bring his action not, as a
FC, Art 122 The payment of personal debts contracted by thegeneral
husbandrule, against
or the wife the paraphernal properties, but
not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar asagainst the fruits
they redounded toand incomeofof
the benefit such
the property of the
family.
wife. Since the fruits of exclusive property belong to
Neither shall the fines and indemnities imposed upon them bethe CP. to the partnership.
charged

However, the payment of personal debts contracted by eitherThe spouse

debts contracted by the husband during the
imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse,
marriage, for andmay
inbe enforced
the against
exercise of the
an partnership
industry
asset AFTER the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should
have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient
or profession by which he contributes toward the
spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes support of the family are not his personal and
above-mentioned.
private debts and the products or income from the
wife’s own property, which, like those of her
FC, Art 123 Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any gamehusband’s are
of change, liable
or in for
betting, the payment
sweepstakes of kind
or any other the
of gambling whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser
marriage and shallcannot
expenses, not be be
charged to thefrom
excepted conjugal
the
partnership but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the CPG.
payment of such debts.

JAVIER v OSMEÑA (1916) As to whether the defendant’s prayer for an

34 Phil 336
- Florentino Collantes was married to Petrona
Javier who inherited from her parents 2 parcels
of land. To perfect her ownership, she acquired
from her father’s second wife the usufructuary
right on properties for P3,000.
- Florentino (husband), who succeeded Petrona’s
father as a commission merchant in their family
business in Manila, acquired the debt of
Petrona’s father and became indebted to Tomas
Osmeña (one of the chief clients) in sum of
P4,000-P5,000.
- Unable to pay, judgment was rendered in favor
of debtor Osmena. The sheriff despite the
protests of Petrona sold off the two parcels
(separate property of Petrona) of land at an
auction where Osmeña was the successful
bidder.
- Petrona sought to have the sale annulled and to
recover her property. The defendant Osmeña
contended that even though land was separate
property of Petrona, the usufructuary right
belongs to the CP since it was purchased using
CP funds. Defendant prayed that the revenues
from both properties, being CP, should be made
liable for the debt.
ISSUE: WON debts should be paid out of fruits and
revenue of the parcels of land which belong to wife
exclusively.
HELD: Art 141 OCC says the fruits, revenues or
interest collected or accrued during the marriage
relation, coming from the conjugal properties or from
that which belongs to one of the spouses, are
community property.
Art 1358 OCC states that the fruits of paraphernal
properties form part of the assets of the conjugal
partnership and are liable for the payment of the
expenses of the married couple.
appointment of a receiver is to be granted, Art 1984
says that the wife has the right to manage her
paraphernal property and (Art 1412) says that the
husband is the administrator of the CCP. Thus,
appointment of a receiver shall deprive the spouses
of these rights; moreover, there is no need for it.
COBB-PEREZ v LANTIN (1968)
23 SCRA 637
- Damaso Perez purchased leather materials from
Ricardo Hermoso for his shoe manufacturing
business. Unable to pay his debt to the latter, a
civil case was filed by Hermoso.
- Consequently, the Sheriff of Manila levied upon
the shares of common stock in Republic Bank
registered in the name of Mr. Perez.
- Mercedes Ruth Perez claims that said shares are
conjugal assets and that the debt acquired by
her husband was a personal one, not being able
to benefit the CPG.
ISSUES:
1. WON the debt of Mr. Perez is a personal debt –
NO.
2. WON the CPG is liable for the said obligation –
YES.
HELD: Fruits of the shoe manufacturing business
went to the support of the family/benefit of
the CPG. The debts incurred by the husband for and
in the exercise of industry (shoe manufacturing, in
this case) or profession by which he contributed to
the welfare of the family cannot be considered
as his personal debt. As the CPG benefited, the
said shares are liable. (It was conceded that the
shares are conjugal property even if they are
registered under the name of Mr. Perez, having no
evidence as to when they were acquired.)
DBP v ADIL (1988)
161 SCRA 307
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- Spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte
obtained an agricultural loan of P2000 from
Agricultural and Industrial Bank (AIB which is
now DBP), which is evidenced by a promissory
note payable in 10 equal yearly amortizations.
- After 10 years, they were still unable to pay the
loan. Thus, Confesor, who was a member of
Congress, issued a second promissory note
acknowledging the loan and promising to pay on
or before June 15, 1961.
- He further agreed to the foreclosure of the
mortgage if and when he fails to pay. Another
stipulation is that if he secures a certificate of
indebtedness from the government for his back
pay, he will be allowed to pay amount out of it.
- The amount remained unpaid on the specified
date. Thus DBP filed a complaint against the
spouses on Sept. 11, 1970. The City Court of
Iloilo decided in favor of DBP and ordered the
spouses to pay the debt with interest.
- CFI of Iloilo reversed this decision and dismissed
the complaint against the spouses.
ISSUES:
1. WON the right of prescription may be waived or
renounced - YES
2. WON the second promissory note it binding on
the conjugal partnership - YES
HELD: Yes on both issues. Art 1112, CC right to
prescription may be tacitly renounced resulting from
acts which imply abandonment of such right. The
prescription with regard to the first promissory note
had set it. However, the second promissory note
acknowledged the debt and even promised to pay
the same thus, the right to prescription was
effectively and expressly renounced.
- In Villaroel v. Estrada – the debt barred by
prescription cannot be enforced by the creditor.
But a new contract recognizing and assuming
the prescribed debt would be valid and
enforceable.
- Prescription only bars the remedy, which is the
payment of the debt, but it does not bar the debt
itself. The new promise made by Confesor
constitutes a new cause of action.
CFI claims the second promissory note is not binding
pursuant to Art 166 NCC: unless wife is spendthrift,
serving civil interdiction or confined in leprosarium,
the husband cannot alienate or encumber real
property of the CP without her consent. Thus, the CFI
held that in signing the new promissory note alone,
Confesor cannot thereby bind his wife. HOWEVER,
Art 165 CC states that the husband is the
administrator of CP. Thus, all debts and
obligations which he contracts for the benefit
of the CP are chargeable to the CP. He,
Confesor, signed the second promissory note for the
benefit of the CP, thus, CP is liable for obligation.
LUZON SURETY v DE GARCIA (1969)
30 SCRA 111
- Ladislao Chavez (as principal) and petitioner
Luzon Surety Co., Inc. (as surety) executed a
surety bond in favor of PNB to guaranty a crop
loan granted to Ladislao Chavez in the sum of
P9,000. Vicente Garcia, Ladislao Chavez and
Ramon B. Lacson, as guarantors, signed an
indemnity agreement wherein they bound
themselves, jointly and severally, to indemnify
Luzon Surety Co., Inc. against any and all
damages, losses, costs, stamps, taxes, penalties,
charges and expenses of whatsoever kind and
nature which it may incur.
- PNB filed a complaint against Ladislao Chavez
and Luzon Surety to recover the amount of
P4,577.95, in interest, attorney’s fees, and costs
of the suit.
- A third party complaint against Ladislao Chavez,
Ramon Lacson and Vicente Garcia was instituted
by Luzon Surety.
- A writ of execution against Vicente Garcia for the
satisfaction of the claim of petitioner in the sum
of P8,839.97. Then a writ of garnishment was
issued levying and garnishing the sugar quedans
of the Garcia spouses, from their sugar
plantation registered in their names.
- Garciasfiled a suit for injunction and the TC ruled
in their favor.
ISSUE: WON the CPG, in the absence of any showing
of benefits received, can be held liable on an
indemnity agreement executed by the husband to
accommodate a 3rd party in favor of a surety
agreement. -NO
HELD: A CP under Art 161 is liable only for such
‘debts and obligations contracted by the husband for
the benefit of the CP.’ The husband is the
administrator of the conjugal property, however,
only obligations incurred by the him that are
chargeable against the conjugal property are
those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his
career, profession or business with the honest
belief that he is doing right for the benefit of
the family. Thus, there must be the requisite
showing then of some advantage which clearly
accrued to the welfare of the spouses. And in this
case there is none. Nor can there be, considering
that the benefit was clearly intended for a third party
– Ladislao Chaves. Acting as guarantor or surety for
another in an indemnity agreement is not an act that
would benefit the conjugal partnership.
While the husband, by signing the indemnity
agreement may be said to have added to his
reputation or esteem and to have earned the
confidence of the business community, such benefit
even if hypothetically accepted, is too remote and
fanciful to come within the express terms of
the provision. To make a CP respond for a liability
that should appertain to the husband alone is to
defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the
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NCC which is to show the utmost concern for the
solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.
AYALA INVESTMENT v CHING (1998)
286 SCRA 272
- Philippine Blooming Mills obtained a loan of
P50,300,000 from Ayala Investment and
Development Corporation (AIDC).
- Alfredo Ching, the Executive VP of PBM signed a
surety to the loan, making himself liable with
PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC. Upon PBM’s failure
to pay the loan, AIDC filed a case to recover the
sum of money from PBM and Ching.
- A writ of execution was issued wherein the
properties of Ching were to be levied and
scheduled for auction. The 3 properties involved
were conjugal properties of Ching and his wife;
thus, Ching asked that the auction sale upon
said properties be enjoined because such are
part of the CPG and could not be held liable to
answer for a loan that did not redound to the
benefit of his family.
- The auction still took place and AIDC being the
only bidder acquired the properties. As such,
Ching instituted an action in the court to declare
the sale null and void.
- RTC and CA ruled in his favor, giving the sale no
legal effect.
ISSUES:
1. WON the CP is liable for a surety agreement
entered into by the husband in favor of his
employer. - NO
2. Was act of the husband, in securing the loan,
part of his industry, business or career from
which he supports his family? - NO
HELD:
1. The execution of the surety agreement did not
redound to the benefit of the family since it was
a corporate loan extended and used by PBM. Art
161(1), CC and Art 121 (2), FC are clear in
requiring that the loan obtained should be for
the benefit of the partnership or should redound
to the benefit of the CP in order for the CPG to
be held liable. Burden of proof of showing that it
does lies in creditor-party litigant and the AIDC
presented no such proof.
Moreover, actual benefits must redound to CPG
and it’s not enough that the transaction be one
that would normally produce benefit for the
partnership. It must do so, in fact where such
benefits directly result from the loan; such are
what is contemplated by the law.
2. Signing as a surety is not an exercise of an
industry or profession of Ching. Neither is it an
embarking in a business or an act of
administration for the benefit of the family.
CARLOS v ABELARDO (2002)
280 SCRA 361
- Oct 89: Manuel Abelardo and his wife Maria
Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached the wife’s
father Honorario Carlos and requested him to
advance $25,000 for the purchase of house and
lot in Parañaque.
- Petitioner issued a check in the said full amount
to the seller of the property to enable and assist
the spouses conduct their married life
independently and on their own
- July 91: Carlos inquired about the status of the
loan. The spouses acknowledged their obligation
but pleaded that they were not yet ready to
settle it. Respondent expressed violent
resistance to petitioner’s inquiries by making
various threats against the petitioner.
- Aug 94: Formal demand was made by Carlos but
spouses failed yet again to comply
- Oct 94: Petitioner filed a complaint for collection
of the sum and damages against spouses in
Valenzuela RTC
- Spouses having been separated in fact for more
than a year prior to filing of complaint, submitted
separate answers.
- Wife admitted securing a loan together with
husband but claimed that loan was payable on a
staggered basis. Husband claimed that sum was
not a loan but his share of income on contracts
in reviving the petitioner’s construction business
- RTC ruled in favor of petitioner Carlos
- CA reversed decision and dismissed the
complain for insufficiency of evidence
ISSUE:
- WON $25,000 or its equivalent PhP625K was in
the nature of a loan. - YES
- WON loan is liability of both spouses. - YES
HELD:
1. The petitioner was able to prove it as a loan by a
preponderance of evidence in providing the
check he issued, the acknowledgement of the
wife of their accountability, and the petitioner’s
demand letter sent and received by respondent.
Husband’s claim that it is his rightful share as
income, profit or salary is untenable because
there is no showing that he is a stockholder, an
employee or an agent of the corporation.
2. The acknowledgement of the loan made by the
wife binds the conjugal partnership since its
proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family
because it was used to purchase the house and
lot which became their conjugal home. Pursuant
to Art 121 No. 2 & 3, even with the alleged lack
of consent of respondent-husband, defendant-
husband and wife are jointly and severally liable
in the payment of the loan.
CARANDANG v HEIRS OF DE GUZMAN (2006)
508 SCRA 469
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- Quirino de Guzman and Arcadio and Luisa
Carandang are corporate officers of Mabuhay
Broadcasting System (MBS)
- MBS increased its capital stock and was
subscribed by Arcadio and Luisa Carandang
- Quirino de Guzman claims that these
subscriptions were paid by him, so he sent a
demand letter to Arcadio and Luisa
- Arcadio and Luisa refused to pay claiming that
they had a pre-incorporation agreement where
Quirino promised to pay for stock subscriptions
by Arcadio and Luisa without costs in exchange
for Arcadio’s technical expertise, etc.
- RTC and CA ruled in favor of Quirino and ordered
Arcadio and Luisa Carandang to pay Quirino
ISSUE: WON the purported liability of Arcadio and
Luisa Carandang were joint and solidary
HELD: YES, for marriages governed by CPG, an
obligation entered into by the husband and
wife is chargeable against their conjugal
partnership and it is the partnership, which is
primarily bound for its repayment. When the
spouses are sued for the enforcement if the
obligation entered into by them, they are being
impleaded in their capacity as representatives of
the conjugal partnership and not as
independent debtors, such that the concept of
joint and solidary liability, as between them, does
not apply. Either of them may be sued for the whole
amount, similar to that of a solidary liability,
although the amount is chargeable against their
conjugal partnership property
f. Administration of the CPG
FC, Art 124 The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal p
jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail,
remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of admin
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be p
the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withd
FC, Art 125 Neither spouses may donate any conjugal property witho
may without the consent of the other, make moderate donations f
occasions of family rejoicing or family distress.
FELIPE v HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALDON (1983)
120 SCRA 628
- Maximo Aldon ♥ Gimena Almosara. They bought
several parcels of land which were divided into 3.
- Gimena, sold an unregistered 16 ha conjugal
land in San Jacinto, Masbate without the consent
of her husband, Maximo, to Eduardo and
Hermogena Felipe.
- Maximo’s heirs filed an action for annulment of
the sale in 1976, claiming they were the rightful
owners of the properties. They claim that they
orally mortgaged the lands to the spouses and
an offer to redeem the mortgage was refused by
the Felipes. The Felipes contend that they
purchased the land and it was delivered to them.
- TC declared the Felipes as the lawful owners and
the complaint was dismissed for lack of merit.
- CA reversed TC and declared the sale as invalid
and ordered an accounting of the produce of the
land since 1951 and payment of the net
monetary value of the profits after deducting
P1800.
- CA ratio:
1. if transfer was through an oral contract of
mortgage: redemption allowed anytime upon
repayment of P1,800.00
2. if it was done through sale: redemption is
improper
3. what really transpired: Deed of Purchase &
Sale executed by Gimena in favor of the
Felipe spouses
4. sale was not forged but invalid since deed
was executed without the consent of Maximo
since the lots were conjugal (presumed as
such because were purchased during
marriage). This was properly raised in the
pleading considering the fact that complaint
alleges that lands were purchased from
Gimena and Maximo.
• Felipe’s claim: since deed is not a forgery, it
authenticity and due execution is beyond
question. This is a question of fact that SC
cannot consider. They’re only concerned with
questions of law.
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ISSUES:
1. WON the sale made by Gimena to the Felipes is
valid - NO
2. WON Gimena and her children can ask for an
annulment of contract - NO
3. WON petitioners have acquired the land by
acquisitive prescription - NO
4. WON the right of action of Sofia and Salvador
Aldon is barred by the statute of limitations - NO
HELD:
1) WON the sale made by Gimena to the Felipes is
valid. NO
• Note the following elementary rules:
1. CC, Art 165: husband is administrator of CP
2. CC, Art 166: subject to certain exceptions,
husband cannot alienate or encumber any
real property of the CP without wife’s
consent
3. CC, Art 172: wife cannot bind CP without
husband’s consent except in cases provided
by law
• Since Gimena sold lands belonging to CP without
husband’s consent and such sale is not covered
by instances “except in cases provided by law”,
the sale is defective. Not invalid, as held by the
CA, because that term is imprecise when used in
relation to contracts because the CC uses
specific names in designating defective
contracts. It can either be:
1. rescissible (art. 1380) – when all essential
elements are untainted (Gimena’s consent
was tainted)
2. voidable (art. 1390)
3. unenforceable (art. 1403)
4. void/inexistent (art. 1409)
• Deed of sale is a voidable contract. Under
A1390 CC, among the voidable contracts are –
“those where one of the parties is incapable of
giving consent to the contract.” Gimena had no
capacity to give consent to the contract of
sale since the consent of both spouses is
needed.
• This is further supported by CC, Art 173, which
provides that contracts entered by husband
without wife’s consent when such is required,
are annullable at her instance during
marriage and within 10 yrs from
questioned transaction.
• The contract is not rescissible for in such a
contract all the essential elements are untainted
but Gimena’s consent was tainted. Neither can
the contract be classified as unenforceable,
since it does not fit any of those described in Art
1403 CC. Finally, it cannot be void or inexistent
because it is not one of those in Art 1409 CC.
Thus, it must be a voidable contract.
2. WON Gimena and her children can ask for
annulment of contract - NO
• GIMENA - It’s only subject to annulment of
husband during marriage because he was the
victim who had interest in contract, whereas
Gimena was partly responsible for defect.
Gimena is barred from doing this during and
even after the marriage.
• CHILDREN – While marriage was still
subsisting, they could NOT seek for its
annulment since their right to the lands was
merely inchoate or expectant. But upon
death of Maximo, they acquired the right to
question the defective contract in so far as it
deprived them of their hereditary rights in their
dad’s share in lands. Maximo’s share is ½ and
they are entitled to 2/3 of such; remaining 1/3
belongs to Gimena.
3. WON petitioners have acquired land by
acquisitive prescription - NO
They bought lands in bad faith proven by ff
instances:
a. Vicente, son of the Felipe spouses, attempted to
have Gimena sign a ready-made document
purporting to sell the disputed lands to the
Felipes in Dec. 1970. They knew land did not
belong to them.
b. Said document was for purpose of obtaining
Gimena’s consent to the construction of
irrigation pumps on the lands. If they were the
owners, why did they have to get her consent?
c. Improvements were only being made in 1970
when sale was in 1951.
d. Declaration of prop made only in 1974.
e. No attempt to obtain Maximo’s signature despite
fact that Gimena and Hermogena were close
relatives.
Given that they did possess the lands, possession in
bad faith is covered by extraordinary prescription
which lapses in 30 yrs. Sale was in 1951 and case
filed in 1976, 30 yrs had not yet lapsed.
4. WON the right of action of Sofia and Salvador
Aldon is barred by the statute of limitations - NO
Their right of action accrued from death of father in
1959 and they are given 30 yrs to institute it (CC Art.
1141). Action filed in 1976, thus still within allowed
time.
* CONTRACT WITHOUT CONSENT: merely voidable
under CC, but under FC it is void (Art 125 FC)
TINITIGAN v TINITIGAN (1980)
100 SCRA 619
- Severino Tinitigan Sr, on Sept. 17, 1975 filed a
motion in a pending case seeking judicial
approval of the sale of a 2-storey residential
house and lot which are conjugal properties
located at Pasay City.
- Tinitigan contends that the proposed sale of the
property for P300,000 to Quintin Lim, was
necessary to pay outstanding conjugal
obligations that were overdue in the amount of
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P256,137.79 and to forestall the foreclosure of
mortgaged conjugal properties.
- CFI issued an order granting Tinitigan “authority
to sell the house and lot in Pasay City, in favor of
Quintin Lim, if he is a Filipino citizen, for
P300,000.”
- CA upheld orders of respondent Judge that
approves the sale of the conjugal property.
ISSUE: WON the order to sell the conjugal property
rendered by Judge Navarro is valid.
HELD: Petitioners Teofista Tinitigan, et al, argue that
the order authorizing Severino to sell the property is
void, because he had no authority to sell it, they
being under the administration of his wife Teofista.
This has no legal basis.
Art 165 CC states: “the husband is the administrator
of the CP,” which is the general rule. Though Art
1658 states that “the wife may be express authority
of the husband embodied in a public instrument,
administer the conjugal partnership property.” Other
provisions in the Code also speak of administration
by the wife pursuant to a judicial decree. However,
such provisions are not applicable in this case.
The judicial decree on Oct 29, 1975, appointing
Teofista as administratrix of the CP cannot be treated
as an exception because it was issued only after the
CFI of Rizal granted Severino the authority to sell the
property. Besides, her appointment was not absolute
since it was subject to certain conditions that were
agreed upon.
Thus, the conclusion is that Severino did not cease
being the administrator of their conjugal properties
at the time the motion for judicial approval of the
sale was granted. Being the administrator, however,
does not give him the outright authority to alienate
or encumber assets. This would require the express
or implied consent of Teofista subject to certain
exceptions. Art 166 NCC states that “unless the wife
has been declared incapacitated, the husband
cannot alienate or encumber any property of the CP
without her consent” wherein the court may compel
her to grant it if she unreasonably refuses to give
consent. This is why Severino sought judicial
approval.
The sale was necessary to answer for a big, conjugal
liability which might endanger the family’s economic
standing. The case at hand actually is one wherein
the wife’s consent is not required and impliedly, no
judicial intervention is necessary.
According to Art 171 NCC, “the husband may
dispose of the CP for the purposes specified in Art
161 and 162.” In general, these articles deal with the
obligations of the CP. Art 161, Par 1 provides that
“the CP shall be liable for all debts and
obligations contracted by the husband for the
benefit of the CP, and those contracted by the
wife, also for the same purpose, in the case
where she may legally bind the partnership.”
GUIANG v CA (1998)
291 SCRA 372
- Gilda Corpuz left for Manila to find a job as an
Overseas Filipino Worker in June 1989 but she
fell victim to illegal recruiters and had to stay in
Manila. A year later she successfully found a job
in the Middle East. Her husband Judie Corpuz
since then rarely went home and stayed most of
the time at his workplace.
- After hearing about her father’s plan to sell the
remaining half of the lot, daughter Harriet wrote
to inform her mother. Gilda expressed her
disapproval but Judie pushed through with the
sale to the Guiangs.
- When she returned, Gilda gathered her children
who were staying in different households and
stayed in their house in Negros. She also
discovered that her now ex-husband had another
wife. Guiangs charged Gilda of trespassing for
staying in their house wherefore the Corpuzes
later agreed to leave the house in an amicable
settlement.
- Gilda then instituted against seeking to annul
the sale of land between Judie Corpuz and the
Guiang couple.
- RTC ruled in Gilda’s favor, declaring the sale null
and void; the CA upheld this decision. Hence this
appeal.
ISSUE:
1. Whether Judie’s execution of ‘Deed of Transfer of
Right’ for the Guiangs was void or merely
voidable
2. WON Gilda ratified the said contract when she
entered into the amicable settlement with the
Guiangs.
HELD:
1. The deed was void. The property was acquired
during the marriage of Judie and Gilda Corpuz.
When Judie offered to sell the remaining half,
Gilda’s consent was totally lacking, contrary to
the claim of the Guiangs invoking Art 1390(2) CC
that it was only vitiated hence merely voidable.
The case at bar falls under Art 124, FC which
states ‘xxx the absence of such authority
or consent, the disposition or encumbrance
shall be void’.
2. No, void contracts cannot be ratified. The entry
into amicable settlement would not have any
effect in the contract since it was void.
**FC applied in this case since the sale was done in
1990
RELUCIO v LOPEZ (2002)
373 SCRA 578
- Imelda Relucio, the mistress of Alberto Lopez,
assails the appointment of Alberto’s legitimate
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009
Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012
wife’s (Angelina Mejia Lopez) as the sole
administratix of conjugal partnership
properties, forfeiture, etc.
- Alberto allegedly abandoned Angela and their
four children and had maintained illicit
relationship with the petitioner, Relucio. In the
course of their cohabitation, they have amassed
a fortune consisting mainly of stockholdings in
Lopez-owned or controlled corporations,
residential, agricultural, commercial lots, houses,
apartments and properties through the actual
contribution of money, property, industry of
Alberto and Relucio
- Angela, the wife and the four children did not
benefit from the said properties
- Alberto has also sold, disposed of, transferred
assigned, cancelled, removed, stashed away and
alienated their conjugal properties from Angela,
hence the petition to become the administratix
of the said partnership
- Angela prays that Alberto do the following:
o Account their conjugal partnership
property
o Give support to respondent and her
children
o Turn over his share in the co-ownership
with petitioner (Relucio)
o Dissolve his conjugal partnership or
absolute community property with
respondent
ISSUE: WON the petitioner has cause of action
(affected in anyway) by the respondent’s petition for
appointment as sole administratix of conjugal
properties?
HELD: NO! The petitioner (Alberto’s mistress) is not
an indispensable party nor a real party-in-interest
because Alberto can fulfill the relief sought by
Angela even without the participation of Relucio. The
cause of action arises only between the
husband and the wife who have right-duty
obligation between each other. The mistress is a
complete stranger to them. Any judgment would be
valid and enforceable against Alberto. The
administration of the property of marriage is entirely
between the spouses to the exclusion of other
persons.
Or simply put: No need for Relucio to intervene, she
has nothing to do with the affairs of the spouse.
JADER-MANALO v CAMAISA (2002)
374 SCRA 498
- Petitioner Thelma Jader-Manalo came across
respondent spouses’ ad in Bulletin Today selling
their 10-door apartment in Makati and another
property in Taytay, Rizal.
- Interested in both properties, petitioner
negotiated for its purchase through the spouses’
real estate broker, Mr. Proceso Ereno.
Page 87 of 170
- After a visual inspection of the lots, petitioner
of met with both the spouses and made a definite
offer to buy the properties.
- After negotiation, Edilberto (only) and petitioner
agreed upon the purchase price of P1.5M for
Taytay property and P2.1M for Makati property.
- Agreement was handwritten by petitioner and
signed by Edilberto. Purchase was on installment
basis and down payment through checks was
made by petitioner.
- The following day, Norma, the spouses and the
real estate broker met to incorporate notations
and revise contracts to sell.
- At yet another meeting, petitioner was surprised
to learn that spouses were backing out of the
agreement because they needed “spot cash” for
the purchase price. Norma Camaisa refused to
sign contract to sell.
ISSUES:
1. WON sale of real properties of the spouses have
already been perfected. - NO
2. WON the husband may validly dispose of a
conjugal property without his wife’s written
consent. - NO
3. WON Court may intervene to authorize the
transaction. - NO
HELD: According to Art 124 FC, the law requires that
the disposition of a conjugal property by the
husband as administrator in appropriate cases
requires the written consent of the wife. Otherwise,
the disposition is void. Even though Norma was
aware of, even caused the advertisement in the
newspaper, and participated in the negotiations for
the sale, mere awareness of a transaction is not
consent and her written consent to the sale is
required by law for its validity.
Art 124, FC also states that court authorization is
only resorted to in cases where the spouse
who does not give consent is incapacitated.
Petitioner failed to allege and prove that respondent
Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to the
contracts. In the absence of such, court
authorization cannot be sought.
g. Dissolution of the CPG
FC, Art 126 The conjugal partnership terminates:
1. upon the death of either souse
2. when there is a decree of legal separation
3. when the marriage is annulled or declared void
4. in case of judicial separation of property during the marriage
to 138
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h.not
FC, Art 127 The separation in fact between husband and wife shall Liquidation
affect the regimeof Assets
of CPG and
except that:
1. spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to liveLiabilities
therein, without just cause, shall not have the
be supported
2. consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained
in a summary proceeding FC, Art 129 Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, t

3. 1. An inventory
absence or insufficient community property, the separate property shall be shall be prepared,
solidarily liable listing separately all the prop
of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a properties of each spouse.
summary proceeding, be given judicial authority
to administer or encumber any specific separate property 2.
of the other spouse
Amounts sand
advanced byuse
the the fruits partnership
conjugal or proceedsin payment of p
thereof to satisfy the latter’s share be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereo
3. Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her e
the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership o
FC, Art 128 If a spouse without a just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family,
partnership.
the aggrieved spouse may petition
1. for receivership 4. The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall
2. for judicial separation of property insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily li
3. for authority for sole administration of ACP properties, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of
5. Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses sha
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph: 6. Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source
1. marital benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse, even due to fo
2. parental conjugal funds, if any.
3. property relations.
7. The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties sh
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left equally between
the conjugal husband
dwelling and any
without wife,intention
unless aofdifferent propo
returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of 3settlements
months or orhasunless
failedthere has
within thebeen
samea voluntary
period to waiver or forfe
give any information as to his/her whereabouts shall be prima facie8.presumed to have no legitimes
The presumptive intention ofofreturning to thechildren shall b
the common
conjugal dwelling. Article 51.
9. In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and t
agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse wi
choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are d
has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the c
interests of said children.

When is inventory not necessary? (Tolentino, p.

472)
1. when one of the spouses, or his heirs, should
renounce the benefits of partnership
2. when separation of property has preceded
the dissolution of the marriage
3. when partnership is dissolved by death of
one of the spouses and the deceased leaves
no heir except the surviving spouse
4. when dissolution is caused by legal
separation, and the share of the guilty
spouse is forfeited to the innocent spouse,
there being no children

* Par 2 and 3 are called “mutual restitution” which

cannot be found in the dissolution of ACP (Art 102)

* Dissolution of CPG has 9 steps, while ACP only has

6, and it’s all because of the mutual restitution part.

FC, Art 130 Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the c
same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.

If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse s

judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death of the
period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involvin
marriage shall be void.

Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage with

mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall gove
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FC, Art 131 Whenever the liquidation of the conjugal partnership during the liquidation
properties of two or of themarriages
more estate of deceased,
such
by the same person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out right cannot be impaired by Rule 83, Sec. 3
simultaneously
of the
income of each partnership shall be determined upon such proof as may Rules of according
be considered Court which
to theisrules
a procedural
of evidence.
rule.the same shall be divided between the different
In case of doubt as to which partnership the existing properties belong,
partnerships in proportion to the capital and duration of each.
- Be it noted however that with respect to
“spouse”, the same must be the “legitimate
spouse”
FC, Art 132 The Rules of Court on the administration of estates of deceased (notshall
persons common-law
be observed spouses who and
in the appraisal are
mothers of the children here).
sale of property of the conjugal partnership, and other matters which are not expressly determined in this Chapter.

FC, Art 133 From the common mass of property support shall be given to the
during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered
shall be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them.
SANTERO v CFI OF CAVITE (1987)
153 SCRA 728
- Petitioners Princesita Santero-Morales, Federico
Santero and Willy Santero are the children
begotten by the late Pablo Santero with
Felixberta Pacursa while private respondents
Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all
surnamed Santero are four of the seven children
begotten by the same Pablo Santero with
Anselma Diaz.
- Both sets of children are the natural children of
the late Pablo Santero since neither of their
mothers, was married to their father Pablo.
- Even before the Court could act on the instant
petition, private respondents filed another
Motion for Allowance dated March 25, 1985 with
the respondent court to include Juanita, Estelita
and Pedrito all surnamed Santero as children of
the late Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz praying
that an order be granted directing the
administrator Reynaldo C. Evaristo to deliver the
sum of P6,000 to each of the seven children of
Anselma Diaz as their allowance from the estate
of Pablo Santero.
ISSUE: WON the natural children Victor, Rodrigo,
Anselmina and Miguel should be granted an
allowance out of the hands of the property
administrator of Pablo Santero?
HELD: YES. The fact that private respondents are of
age, gainfully employed, or married is of no
moment and should not be regarded as the
determining factor of their right to allowance
under Article 188.
- While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the
widow and minor or incapacitated children of the
deceased, the New Civil Code gives support to
the surviving spouse and his/her children without
distinction.
- Hence, the private respondents Victor, Rodrigo,
Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are
entitled to allowances as advances from their
shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo
Santero.
- Since the provision of the Civil Code, a
substantive law, gives the surviving spouse
and to the children the right to receive support
E. Separation of Property and
Administration of Common
Property by One Spouse
1. Judicial separation of
property for sufficient cause
FC, Art 134 In the absence of an express declaration in the marria
spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judic
either be voluntary or for sufficient cause.
COMPLETE SEPARATION OF PROPERTY may be had
thru:
1. conventional  in the marriage settlement
2. judicial decree
a. voluntary (Art 136)
b. sufficient cause (Art 135)
3. compulsory  by operation of law (Art 103
and Art 130) when there is no liquidation of
property regime of first marriage
FC, Art 135 Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause
(BY PRESENTATION OF FINAL JUDGMENT)
1. civil interdiction
2. judicially declared an absentee
3. loss of parental authority by court decree (Art 228 and 229)
(PROOF OF CAUSE IS NEEDED)
4. abandonment or failure to comply with family and marital obli
5. abuse of power of administration granted in the marriage sett
6. de facto separation for at least one year and reconciliation is h
In the cases provided for in Number 1, 2 and 3, the presentation of t
shall be enough basis to grant of the decree of judicial separation of pr
GARCIA v MANZANO (1958)
103 Phil 798
- Gonzalo Garcia filed an action against his wife,
Consolacion Manzano, for the declaration of the
separation of their conjugal partnership property
on the ground that they have been living
separately since 1948 and that all attempts at
reconciliation between them have failed.
- As a result of their joint efforts, they
accumulated real and personal properties. That
since their separation, Consolacion assumed
complete management and administration of the
CP.
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- He alleges mismanagement of the CPG since she
was exclusively enjoying the fruits of it, she
refused to turn over to Gonzalo his rightful share
or allow him participation in the partnership, she
conducted fictitious transfers and alienation of
property to third persons and that she neglected
to file income tax returns.
- TC dismissed complaint for failure to state a
cause of action upon motion of Consolacion
ISSUE: WON Garcia is entitled to a judicial
declaration of separation of properties. - NO
HELD: His complaint did not establish a case for
separation of properties. Consistent with its policy of
discouraging a regime of complete separation as not
harmonious with the unity of the family and the
mutual affection and help expected of the spouses,
the OCC and NCC require that separation of
properties shall not prevail unless expressly
stipulated in marriage settlements before the union
is solemnized or by formal judicial decree during the
existence of the marriage; and in the latter case, it
may only be ordered by the court for the causes
specified in Art 191, CC.
In the system established by the NCC, the wife does
not administer the conjugal property unless with the
consent of the husband, or by decree of the court
and under its supervision with such limitations as the
court may deem advisable. In the event of such
maladministration by the wife, the remedy of the
husband does not lie in a judicial separation of
properties but in revoking the power granted to
the wife and resuming the administration of
the communal property and the conduct of the
affairs of the CP.
He may enforce his right of possession and control of
the conjugal property against his wife, and seek such
ancillary remedies as may be required by the
circumstances, even to the extent of annulling or
rescinding any unauthorized alienations or
encumbrances, upon proper action filed for that
purpose. For this reason, Art 167, 172 and 178 CC
contemplate exclusively the remedies available to
the wife against the abuses of her husband because
normally, only the latter can commit such abuses.
Therefore, he cannot claim that he should be entitled
to the same remedies.
PARTOSA-JO v CA (1992)
216 SCRA 692
- Jose Jo cohabitated with three women and he
fathered 15 children. The petitioner in this case
claims to be his legal wife (Prima) with whom he
had a daughter named Monina Jo.
- Prima claims that when she left Dumaguete City
it was their agreement that she was temporarily
live with her parents during the initial period of
her pregnancy and for Jose to visit and support
her.
- In 1980 – Prima filed an action for judicial
separation of conjugal property and this was
consolidated with her earlier petition for support.
- In the disposition of the trial court it was held
that Prima was legally married to Jose Jo and
therefore entitled to support as the lawfully
wedded wife and Jose Jo was ordered to give a
monthly support of P 500. There was no definite
disposition as to the judicial separation of
conjugal property.
- CA upheld the TC decision but complaint for the
judicial separation of conjugal properties was
dismissed for lack of cause of action on the
ground that separation by agreement was not
covered by Art 178, CC.
- However, the penultimate paragraph of the
decision provides: “It is, therefore, hereby
ordered that all properties in question are
considered properties of Jose Jo, the defendant in
this case, subject to separation of property under
Art 178, Par 3 CC, which is subject of separate
proceedings as enunciated herein.”
ISSUES:
1. WON a final judgment rendered by the LC may
be modified if the dispositive portion did not
contain the decision extensively discussed in the
body of the decision. - YES
2. WON the separation of the parties was due to
their agreement. - NO
3. WON Prima is entitled to judicial separation of
property. - YES
HELD:
1. The dispositive portion of the decision was
incomplete insofar as it carried no ruling on the
complaint for judicial separation of conjugal
property although it was extensively discussed in
the body of the decision.
- The penultimate paragraph of the decision of the
trial court ruling should have been embodied in the
dispositive portion. It was based upon the findings
that Prima and Jose were legally married and the
properties mentioned were acquired during the
marriage although they were registered in the name
of a dummy.
2. The CA ruling that an agreement to live
separately without just cause was void under Art
221 of the CC and could not sustain any claim of
abandonment by the aggrieved spouse. Thus,
the only remedy available was that of legal
separation.
- However, the separation was due to
abandonment. They merely agreed that she would
live with her parents while she was pregnant, and
when she returned, he refused to accept her. This
clearly demonstrates that he had no intention of
resuming their conjugal relationship; moreover,
from 1968-1988 when the court finally decided to
award support, Jose never gave financial support.
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3. On the grounds of abandonment and also failure
without just cause to comply with his obligations
as husband and father; apart from refusing to
admit Prima his lawful wife, to their conjugal
home, she is entitled to a judicial separation of
property. Court held that, “abandonment is the
departure by one spouse with the avowed intent
never to return, followed by a prolonged absence
without just cause, and without in the meantime
providing in the least for one’s family although
able to do so.” And the FC states that the
aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial
separation when there is:
- Abandonment by a spouse of the other
without just cause
- Failure of one spouse to comply with his
or her obligations to the family without
just cause, even if said spouse does not
leave the other spouse.
- The physical separation of the parties coupled
with the refusal by Jose to give support sufficed
to constitute abandonment as a ground for the
judicial separation of their conjugal property.
- FC allows judicial separation of property when
the spouses have been separated in fact for at
least one year and reconciliation is highly
improbable.
- Since the LC found that Jose is the real owner of
the properties, these must be divided between
them on the assumption that they were acquired
during their marriage.
DELA CRUZ v DELA CRUZ (1968)
22 SCRA 333 - SUPRA
- Estrella ♥ Severino dela Cruz and blessed with
six children. They acquired seven parcels of land
at Bacolod Cadastre and three parcels at Silay
Cadastre. These are all registered in their names.
They are also engaged in various business
ventures.
- She filed a complaint praying for the separation
of property, monthly support and payment of
attorney fees and costs.
- In 1949, she claims that she already suspected
that Severino was sleeping around which was
only confirmed by a note she found in his shirt in
1951. She confronted him about it and he
promised her to forsake his mistress which he
failed to do
- Since 1955, he never slept in conjugal dwelling,
but only paid short visits. She contends that he
abandoned her and their children to live in
Manila with his mistress, Nenita Hernandez. And
that after 1955 until the time of the trial, he had
never visited the conjugal abode and when he
was in Bacolod, she was denied communication
with him.
- RTC ordered separation and division of the
conjugal assets (valued at P500,000), directing
the Severino to pay to Estrella P20,000 as
attorney’s fees, with legal interest form date of
original complaint until fully paid plus costs.
ISSUES:
1. WON separation of husband from his wife
constitutes abandonment in law that would
justify the separation of conjugal partnership
property - NO
2. WON the husband’s failure and/or refusal to
inform his wife of the state of their business is an
abuse of his powers of administration of the CP
as to warrant a division of matrimonial assets -
NO
HELD:
1) There was only mere physical separation and
not real abandonment. Abandonment
contemplated by the law must be of physical
estrangement, moral and FINANCIAL desertion.
Based on how abandonment was used in Art 178, in
order for desertion of one spouse to constitute
abandonment, there must be absolute cessation
of marital relations and duties and rights with
intention of perpetual separation. To abandon is
to forsake entirely. Emphasis is on its finality, hence
it means giving up absolutely and with intent never
again to resume or claim one’s rights or interests.
- Here, Severino did not seem to have the intention
to leave his family permanently since he continued
to give support despite his absence which thus
negates any intent not to return and resume his
marital duties and rights.
- Since separation in fact between spouses does not
affect the CP except if the husband abandons his
wife without just cause, (Art 178, CC) claims of the
Estrella of concubinage on part of Severino must be
regarded as efforts at bolstering her claim of
abandonment which shall justify, under the law, a
judicial separation of conjugal assets. There is no
strong corroborated evidence that demonstrates the
existence of illicit relations between Nenita and
Severino. Neither has he been mismanaging funds
since he actually increased the value of their assets
by over a million pesos.
2) For abuse to exist, it is not enough that the
husband perform acts prejudicial to his wife or
commit acts injurious to the partnership. There
must be an act willfully performed and with utter
disregard of the partnership by the husband that
would be prejudicial to the wife, evidenced by the
repetition of deliberate acts and/or omissions. It is
not condoning the husband’s separation from his
wife. Instead, is that there is an insufficiency or
absence of cause of action. Remedies of Art 167 and
178 are aimed at protecting the CP. And they must
exercise restraint since they are trying to preserve
union of spouses; a judgment ordering a separation
of assets where there’s no real abandonment may
eradicate the possibility of reconciliation.
Alimony increased from P2000 to P3000. Attorney’s
fees must also be borne by defendant since he left
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the conjugal abode and has given cause for plaintiff
to seek redress in courts.
2. Voluntary separation of
property
FC, Art 136 The spouses may jointly file a verified petition with
CPG and for the separation of their common properties.
All creditors of the ACP or of the CPG, as well as the listed personal
notified of the filing thereof. The court shall take measures to protect and the
interests.
IN RE VOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION OF CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP OF SPOUSES BERNAS (1965)
14 SCRA 327
- Jose and Pilar Bernas were married in Dec 1932
and they had 2 kids. During the marriage they
acquired 12 parcels of land and two buildings.
- 30 years later, they executed an “Agreement for
Dissolution of conjugal partnership
separation of property” believing that this will
redound to their mutual advantage, benefit and
gain, and preserve peace and harmony and
prevent friction, dissension and confusion
between their heirs since Jose had 2 sets of
children. After the execution of this contract,
they filed with the court the aforementioned
petition.
- LC denied the petition since under Art 192 CC, a
CP can only be dissolved once legal separation
has been ordered, which can only happen upon
civil interdiction, declaration of absence or
abandonment (Art 191, CC).
- The spouses claim that Art 191 allows voluntary
judicial separation or property during the
marriage subject to judicial approval.
ISSUE: WON voluntary separation of property during
marriage is allowed by law
HELD: YES. The CP may be dissolved by agreement
of the spouse if it has judicial approval. But even
though Jose has kids by his first marriage, their
names were not included in the agreement or
approval of the petition whereas his kids by second
marriage and his second wife are. Neither were the
kids by first marriage notified of such. In fact, no
notice appears to have been given to the kids by
second marriage, although the danger of substantial
injury to their rights would seem remote.
- Also, the dissolution of the CPG of the second
marriage cannot take place without first
dissolving the CPG of the first marriage wherein
the kids of that marriage have an interest. The
agreement may affect the rights of the kids by
first marriage since Art 189 CC states that “in
case of doubt, the partnership property shall be
divided between the different partnerships in
proportion to the duration of each and to the
prop belonging to the respective spouses.”
Page 92 of 170
- The kids by first marriage should be notified of
the proceedings and their names and addresses,
as well as the names and addresses of the kids
by second marriage, be furnished by them.
LACSON v SAN JOSE (1968)
24 SCRA 837
- theAlfonso
court forLacson
the ♥ Carmen San-Jose Lacson on
Feb 14, 1953 with 4 children.
- creditors
On Janof9,the1963 Carmen
spouse shall beleft the
listed conjugal
in the petitionhome
and
began livingand
creditors in Manila. She filed
other persons witha pecuniary
complaint
on March 12, 1963, in the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court for custody of the kids and their
support.
- An amicable settlement was however reached
between the spouses with regard to custody of
the kids (wherein the 2 older kids go to their dad
and the 2 younger ones to their mom), support
and separation of property. This was later
approved by the CFI, stating that it was
conformable to law.
and - Later, Carmen filed a complaint praying for the
custody of all the kids. This was granted by the
CA who declared the agreement null and void
insofar as the custody of the kids was concerned.
ISSUE: WON the compromise agreement and the
judgment of the CFI grounded on the said agreement
are conformable to law. - YES
HELD: It is valid with respect to the separation of
property between the spouses and the dissolution of
the CP since this is allowed by law provided judicial
sanction is secured beforehand. Such approval was
obtained and it does not appear that they have
creditors who will be prejudiced by the
arrangements.
Further, the spouses have been separated in fact for
at least 5 years and it is but proper to sever their
financial and proprietary interests. Court cannot
force them to live with each other and render
conjugal rights to the other (Arroyo v Vasquez de
Arroyo).
However, in the approval of the regime and
dissolution, the court doesn’t accord recognition nor
legalize de facto separation. It’s abnormal and
fraught with grave danger to all concerned (Arroyo v.
Vasquez de Arroyo). Spouses are obliged to live
together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and
render mutual help and support (CC, Art 109).
There’s virtue in making it as difficult as possible for
married couples to abandon each other merely due
to whims and caprices. General happiness of married
life is secured by its indissolubility. When people
understand that they must live together, they
become good spouses from necessity of remaining
such. Necessity is a powerful master in teaching
duties which it imposes. (Arroyo v Vasquez de
Arroyo).
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With regard to the custody and support of the thus it is not a ground for judicial separation of
children: all the children, including the Enrique and property.
Teresa, were below 7 year old then Art 363 CC
specifically commands that no mother shall be
separated from her child under 7 year old
unless court finds compelling reasons for such
measure.

Ratio for Art 363: Avoid tragedy where mom has

seen her baby torn away from her. Compelling
reasons must be rare if mom’s heart is not to be
unduly hurt. If mom has erred such as in
adultery, imprisonment and divorce will be
sufficient punishment. Her moral dereliction
will not affect the baby who has yet to
understand situation.

Provision is mandatory and the compromise

judgment by separating 2 elder children who were
below 7 year old from their mom was null and void
for violating the provision. No compelling reason was
given for taking away 2 children from Carmen. CFI
decision on MFR regarding compromise judgment
only presented a mere hint. Courts cannot proceed
on mere insinuations.

Enrique and Maria are now above 7 yo, thus issue

regarding awarding their custody to their mom has
become moot and academic. But, Court should still
uphold their agreement regarding custody. Art 356
CC provides that every child is entitled to:
1. parental care
2. receive at least elementary education
3. moral and civic training by
parents/guardians
4. right to live in atmosphere conducive to his
physical, moral and intellectual development

Child’s welfare should not be subject to parents’ say-

so or mutual agreement alone. Court should
ascertain in whose custody the child can
better be assured the rights granted by law.
Evidence should be presented and court should not
merely rely on compromise judgment in determining
fitness of each parent to be custodian of children.
Besides, Enrique (11), since he’s now over 10,
should be given the choice of the parent he wishes
to live with.

If any child will be finally awarded to mom, P150

monthly support is insufficient considering that
prices of commodities and services have increased
and kids are now of school age. CFI may increase
such amount according to need of each child.

MAQUILAN v MAQUILAN (2007)

524 SCRA 166
DOCTRINE: Voluntary separation of property
may take place while other cases are pending.
Proceedings for the same do not require the
intervention of the Solicitor General. Final judgment
of adultery is not punished with civil interdiction,
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3. Liquidation and dissolution of 4. Sole administration of other

property spouse’s property
FC, Art 137 Once the separation of property has been decreed, the
FC, Art 142 The administration of all classes of exclusive proper
this code (Art 102 and 129). to the other spouse (only acts as a trustee)

During the pendency of the proceedings for separation of property, the1. guardian of the other
spouses and their children. 2. judicially declared an absentee
3. civil interdiction
4. fugitive from justice or in hiding as an accused in a criminal ca

If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence, con

FC, Art 138 After dissolution of the ACP or the CPG, the provisions appoint a suitable
on complete personoftoproperty
separation be the administrator.
shall apply.

In previous cases (ACP/CPG), common property

FC, Art 139 The petition for separation of property and final judgment granting the same shall be
local civil registries and registries of property.
administration is given in case of incapacity.
Exclusive property may be administered by the other
spouse but court proceeding is required.
FC, Art 140 The separation of property shall not prejudice the rights previously acquired by creditors

E. Regime of Separate
FC, Art 141 The spouses may, in the same proceedings where separation of property was decreed, file a motion in court for a
Property
decree reviving the property regime that existed between them before the separation of property
following instances:
1. civil interdiction terminates
2. absentee spouse reappears ADVANTAGES:
3. when the court is satisfied that the spouse granted the power 1. ofsimple; no common
administration in the properties hence no will not
marriage settlements
liquidation
again abuse that power, authorizes the resumption of said administration
2. neither
4. when the spouse who has left the conjugal home without a decree spouse
of legal can resumes
separation be accused of being
common life with the
other interested in other’s properties
5. when parental authority is judicially restored to the spouse previously deprived thereof
6. when the spouses who have been separated in fact for a least one year, reconcile and resume common life
DISADVANTAGES:
7. when after voluntary dissolution of the ACP or CPG has been judicially decreed upon the joint petition of the spouses,
they agree to the revival of the former property regime. No 1. voluntary
inconsistent with the
separation of community
property mayofthereafter
life and be
granted. interest which marriage is supposed to
create
2. 67.
The revival of the former property regime shall be governed by Art based on distrust and not favorable to the
family
Art 67 Agreement to revive former regime shall 3. ordinarily unfavorable to the wife who
specify: usually is unemployed and dependent on the
1) what to contribute anew to restored property husband for support
regime 4. may lead to constant disputes on sharing
2) what to retain in separate property and family expenses
3) names of all the creditors 5. against Filipino custom which is trust and
sharing in the spouses

WHEN MAY SEPARATION OF PROPERTY EXIST?

1. by agreement in marriage settlement
2. decree by court in proper cases
3. separation of property cannot be converted
to any other property regime during
marriage

FC, Art 143 Should the future spouses agree in the marriage settle
shall be governed by the regime of separation of property, the provisio

FC, Art 144 Separation of property may refer to present or future p

latter case, the property not agreed upon as separate shall pertain

KINDS OF SEPARATE PROPERTY

1. as to extent
a. total
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b. partial * Does not include fruits of their exclusive properties

2. as to kinds of property
a. present property This provision applies to:
b. future property 1. live-in partners
c. both present and future property a. no legal impediment to marry
b. hence, not applicable to concubinage
* Coexistence of CSP and ACP/CPG is possible. and adulterous relationships
However, in default of a stipulation to the regime of c. exclusive to each other
properties outside the CSP, ACP shall apply. d. real continuous cohabitation
e. the goal is to encourage future
FC, Art 145 Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy marriage
his or her own separate estate
without the need of the consent of the other. To each spouse shall 2.belong
void marriages
all earnings from his or her profession,
a. the
business, industry and all fruits, natural, industrial or civil, due or received during public policyfrom his or her separate
marriage
property. b. absence of requisites
c. except bigamous marriages
FC, Art 146 Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in proportion to their income
FC, Art 148 In cases of cohabitation not falling under the precedin
default thereof, to the current market value of their separate properties
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property
proportion
The liability of the spouses to the creditors for family expenses shall, however,to
betheir respective contributions. In the absence of proof t
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption sh
credit.
F. Property Regimes of Unions If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the
Without Marriage or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party w
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in th
FC, Art 147 When a man and a woman who are The foregoing rules shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and YAPTINCHAY v TORRES (1969)
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and 28 SCRA 489
the property acquired by both of them through their work - Isidro Yaptinchay and Teresita Yaptinchay have
or industry shall be governed by the rules on co- been living together openly and publicly as
ownership.
husband and wife for 19 years
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties - Isidro’s alleged legitimate wife is Josefina
acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to Yaptinchay with whom he has a daughter named
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or Virginia Yaptinchay.
industry and shall be owned by them in equal - Isidro died intestate and upon his death, Teresita
shares. (The next line was not in the CC, an innovation sought her appointment as special administratrix
of FC in favor of housewives.) For purposes of this article, and then as regular administratrix of Isidro’s
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the estate
other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
- A few days later, the lower court appointed
former’s efforts consisted in the care and Teresita as administratrix. Josefina then
maintenance of the family and of the household. registered her opposition saying that Teresita is
not a legitimate heir of Isidro and had no right to
(Unlike ordinary partnership) Neither party can institute the proceeding for the settlement of
encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her Isidro’s estate, much less procure the
share in the property acquired during cohabitation and appointment as administratrix. At the same time,
owned in common, without the consent of the other,
Josefina and her children sought the
until after the termination of their cohabitation.
appointment of Virginia as special administratrix
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is and Josefina as the regular administratrix.
in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the - LC granted Josefina and her children’s petition
co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common and appointed Virginia as special administratrix.
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of Teresita then filed a petition seeking action for
the common children or their descendants, each vacant liquidation of the partnership supposedly formed
share shall belong to the respective surviving during her cohabitation with Isidro.
descendant. In the absence of descendant, such share
- LC issued a restraining order to withhold the
shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the Virginia and Josefina from disposing any of the
cohabitation. properties, specifically including a house in
Forbes Park
* Compared with Art 98 and Art 125, this Article does - Virginia and Josefina resisted the restraining
not provide for donations by reason of charity or order and posited that Teresita was not entitled
occasion of family rejoicing or family distress. to the injunction because her right to the
properties is still doubtful and is in dispute
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- LC lifts the restraining order and orders Teresita
not to divest Virginia her possession of the
Forbes Park property; however it also enjoined
Virginia from selling, disposing or encumbering
said property in any matter pending resolution of
the disputes
- Teresita alleges that the Forbes Park property
was undertaken jointly by her and Isidro and she
even contributed using her own exclusive funds
- Josefina and Virginia dispute this claim and say
the house was built with Isidro’s funds alone and
without Teresita’s intervention. Teresita presents
proof that she obtained loans when the Forbes
Park house was under construction.
ISSUES:
1. WON the preliminary injunction could be granted
in favor of Teresita
2. WON Teresita can claim that she co-owned the
house with Isidro by the fact that they were
common-law spouses
HELD:
1. Injunction rests upon the sound discretion of the
court, in the exercise of which appellate courts
will not interfere except in a clear case of abuse.
Although Teresita presented loans that she had
contracted during the period when said house
was under construction as proof of ownership,
evidence was wanting which would correlate
such loans to the construction work. Thus,
assertion that the North Forbes Park house is
petitioner's exclusive property is unsupported
and may not be permitted to override the prima
facie presumption that house, having been
constructed on Isidro’s lot at his instance, and
during his marriage with Josefina, is part of the
estate that should be under the control of the
Virginia
2. Before a common-law spouse can claim co-
ownership of their spouse’s properties, there
must be a clear showing that the common-
law spouse had, during cohabitation, really
contributed to the acquisition of the
property involved.
JUANIZA v JOSE (1979)
89 SCRA 306
- Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro
Ramos but had been cohabiting with defendant-
appelant Rosalia Arroyo for 16 yrs.
- Jose was the registered owner and operator of a
passenger jeepney involved in an accident of
collision with a freight train resulting in the death
of 7 and physical injuries to 5 of its passengers.
- In the resulting case for damages, the CFI
rendered decision ordering Jose and Rosalia (the
mistress) to jointly and severally pay.
- Rosalia filed MFR praying that she should not be
liable to pay for damages since the decision was
based on the erroneous theory that she was
living together with Jose as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage, are co-owners of
the jeepney. The motion was denied.
- The court based their decision on Article 144 CC
which provides that when a man and a woman
living together as husband and wife, but they are
not married, or their marriage is void from the
beginning, the property acquired by either or
both of them through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership
ISSUES:
1. WON Art 144 is applicable in a case where one of
the parties in a common-law relationship is
incapacitated to marry - NO
2. WON Rosalia, who is not a registered owner of
the jeep can be held solidarily liable for damages
with the registered owner - NO
HELD:
1. It has been consistently ruled that the co-
ownership contemplated in Art 144, requires that
the man and woman living together must not
be incapacitated to contract marriage. Since
Jose is legally married to Socorro, there is an
impediment for him to contract marriage with
Rosalia. Thus, Rosalia cannot be a co-owner of
the jeep. The jeep belongs to the CP of Jose and
Socorro. There is therefore no basis for the
liability of Rosalia for damages arising from the
death of and physical injuries suffered by the
passengers.
2. Rosalia, who is not the registered owner can
neither be liable for damages caused by its
operation, because only the registered owner is
responsible.
VDA DE CONSUEGRA v GSIS (1971)
37 SCRA 315
- Jose Consuguera contracted 2 marriages. 1st
marriage was with Rosario Diaz where they had
2 children. 2nd marriage was with Basilia Berdin
with 7 children. Later he died. Both marriages
were contracted in good faith.
- As a member of GSIS, he was entitled to both a
retirement insurance and life insurance. The life
insurance was paid to Berdin and her children
who were the designated beneficiaries named in
the policy. The retirement policy did not
designate a beneficiary. Hence, the petition.
- GSIS: ½ to Rosario (8/16) and ½ to Basilia (1/16
between Basilia and their seven children).
- CFI: Same with GSIS.
ISSUE: WON Basilia is entitled to the proceeds of the
retirement benefits because she was just the second
wife.
HELD: Yes. The marriage was contracted in good
faith and so it is just and fair for them to receive it.
Not just because the retirement does not name a
beneficiary, means that it should follow what was
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written in the life insurance benefits. It is just and
fair to recognize the second wife it being that the
marriage was done in GOOD FAITH. Provisions on
retirement came when Com Act 186 was amended
by RA 660 on 1951 which means that there was no
intention for the life insurance beneficiaries to
automatically be the retirement beneficiaries also.
Besides, it is also required for the member to
specifically write the name of the beneficiary.
*Ma’am Beth asks: When do you consider good
faith in marriages? Only with regard to belief in
the authority of the solemnizing officer.
MAXEY v CA (1984)
129 SCRA 187
- Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started
living together in 1903 in ‘military fashion’
according to their children (which the courts did
not recognize). They had 6 children: John Carlos,
Lucille, Margaret, Florence, Fred, and George.
Except for the youngest son, all the children
were born before the disputed properties were
acquired. They had their church marriage in
1919, and sometime after, Regina Morales died.
- The disputed properties were acquired in 1911
and 1912 before the 1919 church marriage.
Regina Morales Maxey died in 1919 sometime
after the church wedding. The husband
remarried in 1953, his second wife Julia
Pamatluan Maxey, using a power of attorney,
sold the properties to the respondent spouses,
Mr. and Mrs. Beato C. Macayra. This sale
according to the petitioners was unknown to
them until in 1961.
- Petitioners sought to annul the sale arguing that
the properties were common properties of their
parents. Trial court applied Art. 144 of the Civil
Code stating that “When a man and a woman
live together as husband and wife, but they are
not married, or their marriage is void from the
beginning, the property acquired by either or
both of them through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership.”
- Trial court ruled in their favor annulling the sale
and order the return of the land to them plus
other costs. Court of Appeals reversed stating
that lands in question were exclusive properties
of Melbourne Maxey since Regina Morales was in
no position to be able to contribute jointly to the
acquisition of property.
ISSUES:
1. WON properties were Melbourne Maxey’s
exclusive property
2. WON the phrase “joint efforts” was limited and
pertained only to monetary contributions
HELD:
1. NO. The said properties were products of the
joint efforts and industry of Melbourne and
Regina even if they were not legally married at
the time of its acquisition.
2. NO. SC ruled contrary to CA, stating that CA
limitedly construed the phrase “joint efforts” and
confined them to mean financial effort. SC
recognized that even without the benefit of
marriage, Melbourne and Regina lived together
and assumed the roles of husband and wife,
Regina as ‘administrator’ of their domestic
affairs while Melbourne works in the colonial
government.
3. SC recognizes woman’s contribution to the
co-ownership of unmarried couples even if
she is not working outside the home. SC
said that this was the correct interpretation of
the Civil Code because the woman cannot be
expected to give up her role as homemaker and
go out to earn an income.
VALDES v RTC (1998)
260 SCRA 221
- Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were
married on Jan 5, 1971. In 1992, Valdez sought
the declaration of nullity of the marriage in the
QC RTC, pursuant to Art 36, FC (mutual
psychological incapacity to comply with their
essential marital obligations) which RTC granted.
- Ex-spouses were directed to start proceedings on
the liquidation of their common properties as
defined by Art 147, FC, and to comply with the
provisions of Art 50-52, FC, within 30 days from
notice of this decision.
- Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of the
direction of compliance with Arts 50-52 asserting
that the FC contained no provisions on the
procedure for the liquidation of common
property in "unions without marriage."
- RTC thus clarified that considering that Art 147
explicitly provides that the property acquired by
both parties during their union, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, are presumed to have
been obtained through the joint efforts of the
parties and will be owned by them in equal
shares, ex-spouses will own their family home
and all their properties for that matter in equal
shares.
- In the liquidation and partition of properties
owned in common by the ex-spouses, the
provisions on ownership found in the CC shall
apply. And on the issue of disposing the family
dwelling, considering that this Court has already
declared the marriage as null and void ab initio,
pursuant to Art 147, the property regime of
petitioner and respondent shall be governed by
the rules on ownership and provisions of Arts.
102 and 129 of the FC finds no application.
Petitioner’s MFR was denied and in his recourse
to the SC, he submits that Art 50-52 should be
controlling.
ISSUE: WON provisions Art 50-52 are controlling –
NO.
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HELD: TC correctly applied the law. In a void
marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by the provisions of
Art 147 (a remake of Art 144, CC) or Art 148, FC.
- The particular kind of co-ownership in Art 147
applies when a man and a woman, suffering no
illegal impediment to marry each other, so
exclusively live together as husband and wife
under a void marriage or without the benefit of
marriage. The term "capacitated" in the
provision refers to the legal capacity of a party
to contract marriage. Under this property
regime, property acquired by both spouses
through their work and industry shall be
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership.
Art 147 has clarified Art 144, CC and now
expressly provides that:
o Neither party can dispose or encumber by act
inter vivos his or her share in co-ownership
property, without consent of the other, during
the period of cohabitation; and
o In the case of a void marriage, any party in
bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the
co-ownership in favor of their common
children; in default thereof or waiver by any
or all of the common children, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants, or still in default thereof, to the
innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place
upon the termination of the cohabitation (Art
147) or declaration of nullity of the marriage
(Arts 43, 50, 51, FC).
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal
impediment to marry or when they do not live
exclusively with each other (as husband and wife),
only the property acquired by both of them
through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned in
common and in proportion to their respective
contributions. Such contributions and corresponding
shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be
equal. The share of any party who is married to
another shall accrue to the ACP or CPG, as the case
may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the
party who has acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited
in the manner already heretofore expressed.
- The rules set up to govern the liquidation of
either the ACP or the CPG, the property
regimes recognized for valid and voidable
marriages (in the latter case until the contract is
annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of
the co-ownership that exists between
common-law spouses.
- In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that
the law has also meant to have coincident
property relations, on the one hand, between
spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before
annulment) and, on the other, between
common-law spouses or spouses of void
marriages, leaving to ordain, on the latter case,
the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the
provisions of the Family Code on the "family
home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V,
Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force
and effect regardless of the property regime of
the spouses.
NICDAO CARINO v LEE CARINO (2001)
351 SCRA 127
- Case of the Susan-loving police
- 1969 Santiago Carino ♥ Susan Nicdao, had 2
daughters
- 10 Nov 1992 Santiago Carino married Susan Yee,
no child after almost 10 years of cohabitation
- 23 Nov 1992 he passed away under the care of
Susan Yee who likewise spent for his medical and
burial expense
- Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from MBAI,
PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM and PAG-IBIG
while Yee received a total of P21,000 from GSIS
Life and Burial as well as burial benefit from SSS.
- Yee filed a petition to order Nicdao to return to
her ½ of the P146,000 collectively dominated as
“death benefits”
- RTC find in favor of the petitioner based on the
ground that the deceased marriage to Nicdao is
void ab initio for wanting of a marriage license
ordering the respondent to pay P73,000 and cost
of litigation
- CA upheld RTC
ISSUE: WON Yee is entitled to half of the “death
benefits” of Carino given to Nicdao
HELD: No. Yee (second wife) is not entitled to the
said share of the death benefits given to Nicdao.
Since both marriages are void, the first marriage
lacking marriage license and the latter characterized
as subsequent marriage contracted without judicial
declaration of nullity of the previous marriage. The
property regime applicable to both marriages is
governed by Art 147 and 148 FC.
Marriage to Nicdao: covered by Art 147 which
covers unions of two parties and not barred from
contracting said marriage but whose marriage is
nonetheless declared void for other reason, such in
this case when the marriage of the petitioner to the
deceased is to be declared void due to lack of
marriage license. Under the said provision the
properties acquired during the subsisting
cohabitation is deemed to be obtained by the
parties’ joint efforts, work or industry and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. THUS: half of the
disputed “death benefits” of the deceased shall be
given to Nicdao and the other half shall pass by
intestate succession to his legal heirs who are his
children with Nicdao.
Marriage to Yee: governed by Art 148 which refers
to the property regime of unions between parties
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who are cohabiting without marriage and is likewise
barred to contract marriage since a judicial
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Nicdao is not
obtained before obtaining said marriage to Yee. In
this property regime the properties acquired by the
parties through their actual joint contribution
shall belong to the co-ownership, however wages,
salaries earned by each party is regarded as
his exclusive property; it follows therefore that
since these benefits were accrued by the deceased
through his contributions to these agencies while he
was serving as a policeman then these benefits
exclusively belong to him—unless respondent Yee
gives proof to the contrary and thus she claim these
said benefits.
RIVERA v HEIRS OF VILLANUEVA (2006)
496 SCRA 135
- 1913 or 1914, Romualdo Villanueva ♥ Amanda
Musngi
- Amanda died on April 20, 1963. While
Romualdo’s marriage with Amanda was still
subsisting, he cohabited with Pacita Gonzales
and both lived as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage from 1927 to 1963.
- In the course of their cohabitation, Pacita and
Romualdo acquired several properties.
ISSUE: WON the real properties acquired by Pacita
and Romualdo were equally owned by them –
Depends on the date of acquisition (relative to
Amanda’s death) and proof of Pacita’s contribution
HELD:
- Because the cohabitation of Pacita and
Romualdo from 1927 to 1963 was adulterous,
their property relations during those 36 years
were not governed by Article 144 CC, which
applies only if the couple living together is not in
any way incapacitated from getting married.
- According to the doctrine laid down by Juaniza v.
Jose, no co-ownership exists between
parties to an adulterous relationship.
- In Agapay v. Palang, Court expounded this
doctrine by declaring that in such a relationship,
it is necessary for each of the partners to prove
his or her actual contribution to the acquisition
of property in order to be able to lay claim to any
portion of it.
- Presumption of co-ownership and equal
contribution do not apply. Here, the records show
only four properties acquired by Pacita and
Romualdo between 1927 and 1963 which they
registered in both their names.
- The records are devoid of any evidence that
Pacita contributed anything to the acquisition of
these properties. None of these four parcels
should accrue to the petitioners.
- There is only one parcel of land that is registered
solely in Pacita’s name. Because Romualdo
never actually challenged the validity of the
registration of this land under Pacita’s name, this
land should accrue entirely to her heirs.
- There is also one property acquired by both
Pacita and Romualdo after Amanda’s death in
1963. This must be governed by rules on co-
ownership pursuant to Article 144 CC. Hence,
half of it should pertain to Pacita’s heirs and the
other half, to Romualdo’s.
- The rest of the properties registered in
Romualdo’s name were also acquired after
Amanda’s death, and therefore pursuant to
Article 144 CC, half of it should pertain to
Pacita’s heirs, the other half, to Romualdo’s.
SAGUID v CA (2003)
403 SCRA 678
- Gina was then 17 years old and legally married,
when she met Jacinto. Since she was separated
in fact from her husband, she cohabited with
Jacinto. They lived in the house built on the lot of
Jacinto’s father.
- Jacinto worked as a patron of their fishing vessel.
Gina first worked as a fish dealer (in
Marinduque), then as an entertainer in Japan.
After 9 years, the couple decided to separate.
- Gina asks that she be declared the sole owner of
the personal properties (appliances, furniture),
which she purchased with her income as fish
dealer during their cohabitation, and that 70,000
be reimbursed to her as her share in the
construction of their house. The latter’s funding
being fruits of her income as an entertainer.
- Jacinto, on the other hand, claims that the
petitioner had no share in the construction of the
house and that she couldn’t have bought the
mentioned personal properties as selling fish
was just a pastime for her. It was resolved that
both parties contributed to their joint
account (from which the funds for acquiring
said properties came from), but there is no
sufficient proof of their respective shares.
ISSUE: WON the properties in dispute shall be
adjudicated in favor of Gina alone - NO
HELD: Gina is not legally capacitated to marry, but
she nonetheless cohabited with Jacinto. As such, Art
148 of the FC shall apply to the properties acquired
during their cohabitation. Their share in the common
property shall be determined by the each of the
parties’ “actual” contribution. Therefore, since the
receipt presented as evidence only stated P11,413
was spent for the purchase of construction materials,
then this is amount which shall be given to Gina.
With regard to the personal properties, since there is
an absence of proof, it is presumed that Gina and
Jacinto’s actual contributions are of equal
amount. The amount of P111,375, said amount
shall be divided equally. Thus entitling Gina to a
reimbursement of P55,687.50 as her share.
SAN LUIS v SAN LUIS-SAGALONGOS (2007)
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514 SCRA 294

- Felicisimo San Luis, a former governor of Laguna,
contracted three marriages in his lifetime.
- 1st: Virginia Sulit with 6 children (Rodolfo, Mila
Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel, petitioners).
- 5 years after his first wife’s death, he married an
American citizen named Merry Lee who begot
him an only son. However, Lee obtained a
divorce decree in Hawaii after five years of
marriage.
- One year after the divorce decree was granted,
he married the respondent Felicidad Sagalongos
San Luis, they had no children.
- Upon Felicisimo’s death, Felicidad applied for the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership asset
and the settlement of the decedent’s estate with
her as the administrator in Makati RTC.
- The children from the first marriage opposed this
petition. Their contentions are as follows:
o Case should have been filed at Sta. Cruz,
Laguna
o Marriage between them is null and void
because it is bigamous, the marriage
between their father and Merry Lee was still
subsisting
- In response, Felicidad adduced the decree of
divorce in order to prove Felicisimo’s capacity to
marry. She also invokes the Quita and Van Dorn
ruling wherein divorce by alien spouses is
likewise valid to the Filipino spouse.
- Notwithstanding the divorce decree she offers,
the evidentiary value as laid down in the Garcia
case was not complied with.

ISSUE: WON pending the determination of validity of

the foreign divorce, Felicidad has legal standing to
apply for letters of administration.

HELD: YES. She may request for letters of

administration because she qualifies as an
“interested person” by virtue of their cohabitation. If
she proves the validity of Felicisimo’s divorce and
consequentially, his capacity to marry but fails to
prove the validity of their own marriage, she may be
considered as a co-owner under Art 144 of CC (Art
147 FC). Likewise, if in the case she fails to prove the
validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the
applicable provision would be Art 148 CC (regime of
limited co-ownership).
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009
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XI. THE FAMILY
FAMILY may be defined as a natural and social
institution founded on the conjugal union, binding
together the individuals composing it, for the
common accomplishment of the individual and
spiritual ends of life, under the authority of the
original ascendant heading it. (Tolentino, Sempio-
Diy)
BASES OF THE FAMILY
1. matrimonial union
2. relationship within the degree determined by
law, whether illegitimate or legitimate
3. adoption
IMPORTANCE OF THE FAMILY
1. the family is an essential factor in the
general, social and even political life
2. constant living together of husband and wife,
and of parents and children, contributes to
the development of a strong sense of duty
an aptitude for heroic sacrifice and of the
love by future generations of the traditions
and moral concepts of those who preceded
them
3. it is an indispensable element of social
cohesion and equilibrium
4. the vitality and strength of the State
depends upon the solidarity of its nucleus
which is the family
A. Members of the Family
1. Nature and Scope of Family
Relations
FC, Art 149 The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic
protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law training for some professional, trade or vocation, even beyond age of
the family shall be recognized or given effect.
It is only the external aspect of family relations
that is governed by law
1. Internal aspect
- sacred to the family and inaccessible to law
- E.g. spiritual relations, sexual relations of the
spouses, career or profession that parents
should choose for their children, practice or
customs in the domestic life, distribution of
children’s inheritance (although law provides
for equal legitimes of children)
- BASIS: law must respect the freedom of action
of man within his spheres
2. External aspect
- BASIS: it is only here that third persons and
public interest are concerned
- E.g. spiritual relations, sexual relations of the
spouses, career or profession that parents
should choose for their children, practice or
customs in the domestic life, distribution of
children’s inheritance (although law provides
FC, Art 150 Family relations include:
1. Between husband and wife
2. Between parents and children
3. Among other ascendants and descendants
4. Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-
blood
* Half-blood means having one common parent
CLASSES OF FAMILY RELATIONS
1. Natural – by consanguinity or affinity
2. Civil – created by law e.g. adoption
3. Religious – created by sacraments such as
baptism and confirmation (ninong & ninang)
- Family relations exist even when they are not
living together
- Other relatives living with the family are
members of the household, but not of the
family
- Nephews, nieces, cousins, aunts or uncles
are not relatives  inconsistent with the
Filipino culture
- Illegitimate children are included at least in
the family of their mother -> Sempio-Diy is
wrong!
- Relatives include both the husband’s and the
wife’s
2. Support
FC, Art 194 Support = everything indispensable for sustenance, dwe
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
Thesocial institution
education of thewhich public
person policy
entitled cherishes
to be andreferred to in the
supported
going to and from school, or to and from place of work.
* CC didn’t include transportation, but FC did
because it is possible for one to save up on other
expenses like food and clothing but not on
transportation expenses, especially if the place is not
reachable by walking.
* Full extent means “indispensable” and “financial
capacity”. This phrase is also seen in the two
succeeding provisions for support of family members
and illegitimate brothers and sisters.
* “Even beyond age of majority”
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FC, Art 195 Obligation to support each other to the whole extentFC, Art 199 Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give s
1. spouses persons in this order:
2. legitimate ascendants and descendants 1. spouse
3. parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate 2. and descendants
illegitimate in
children
nearest of
degree
the latter
(grandchildren) 3. ascendants in nearest degree
4. parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate4. or brothers
illegitimate
and sisters
children of the latter
(grandchildren)
5. legitimate brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood
FC, Art 200 When the obligation to give support falls upon two or mo
between them in proportion to the resources of each.
* Rule on support is different from rule on
inheritance In case of urgent need and by special circumstances, judge may order
to his right to claim from the other obligors the share due from them.
FC, Art 196 Brothers and sisters, not legitimately related, whether full or half-blood
If two
each other to the full extent EXCEPT only when the need for support ofrecipients claim
the brother support at the same time from one obligor, follo
or sister,
imputable to the claimant’s fault or negligence. child will be preferred.
* The spouse has better opportunity to look for other
* The exception does not apply to legitimate siblings means to support him/herself than the child.
so in a nutshell, if you have a lazy and irresponsible
brother, he can lawfully ask for your support which FC, Art 201 Proportion of support stipulated in Art 195 and Art 196: re
you are obliged to give.
FC, Art 202 Support may be increased or reduced according to the red
FC, Art 197 For the support of legitimate ascendants by: of obligor.
(1) descendants, legit/illegitimate; and
(2) brothers and sisters, legit/illegitimate
FC, Art 203 The obligation to give support shall be demandable from
needs it for maintenance, but is payable only upon demand.
- only separate property of person obliged to give support shall be answerable
- in default of separate property, ACP and CPG will advance support,
liquidation
* No obligation to pay arrears in support. Support is
not retroactive. It is no longer indispensable since
one has survived even without the support (although
What properties are liable for the support of refer to Art 206 and 208). In other words, no
the following relatives? reimbursement can be done with support.

1. spouse ACP/CPG * Ma’am Beth says: If you’re a legitimate child,

2. common ACP/CPG everything just trickles down to you. You don’t have
children of to ask for support or anything because you just go to
spouse the dining table and there’s food waiting for you.
3. children of ACP/CPG (because they are
spouse by still legitimate!)
FC, Art 204 The supporter have the option to fulfill the obligation
another 1. paying the allowance fixed
marriage 2. maintaining in the dwelling the person who has the right to
4. Illegitimate CPG: separate property of the thereto
children of parent-spouse, but if the
either spouse same is insufficient, the CPG
if financially capable (read: all *Example of a moral obstacle:
legal obligations of the - a wife does not want the husband to keep an
community are covered). The illegitimate child with them
support paid to the child shall - stepbrother and stepsister has affair
be deducted from the share
of the parent-spouse at the
time of liquidation of the FC, Art 205 The right to receive support under this Title shall not be le
partnership
*Creditors cannot go after the support because it is
FC, Art 198 Pendente lite of legal separation, annulment “indispensable,” hence essential to survival of
supported from properties of ACP/CPG.
recipient.
After final judgment, duty to mutual support between spouses ceases
court says guilty spouse should support innocent spouse, specifyingFC,
terms
Art of such
206 order.
When, without knowledge of the person obliged to g
have a right to claim the same from the former, unless it appear
reimbursed.
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FC, Art 207 When the person obliged to support another unjustlyCC,
by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual,
obliged to give support. This Article shall apply particularly when case
unjustly refuses to support or fails to give support to the child when urgently needed.
FC, Art 208 In case of contractual support or that given by will
support shall be subject to levy on attachment or execution.
CC, Art 306 Every funeral shall be in keeping with the social position
Furthermore, contractual support shall be subject to adjustment
circumstances manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties.
SPECIAL RULES ON CONVENTIONAL SUPPORT
1. by contract (inter vivos) or by will (mortis
causa)
2. subject to modifications as circumstances
may arise beyond the contemplation of the
parties
LACSON v LACSON (2006)
499 SCRA 677
- Edward (petitioner) ♥ Lea Daban-Lacson
(respondent)  legitimate children: Maowee and
Maonaa
- Father abandons the family but mother did not
badger him for support, relying on his note in
1975 saying he would support his daughters
- Despite being gainfully employed and owning
several pieces of valuable lands, Edward did not
support the family since 1976
- To provide for her daughters, Lea borrowed from
her brother, Noel Daman the amount of P400K-
P600K
- In 1995, Lea filed an action for support and the
RTC ordered Edward to compensate plaintiffs
support of P2.496 M which is total of 18 years of
support in arrears
- CA dismissed Edward’s appeal
ISSUE:
1. WON the support should be computed from
1976 to 1994/WON his obligation began
upon a legitimate demand in 1995 wherein
the action for support was filed (Art 203 FC)
2. WON the amount advanced by Noel Daban
should be reimbursed
HELD:
1. YES. As early as 1975, Lea already requested or
plead for support from her husband, which was no
less a demand.
2. YES. Pursuant to Art 207 FC, Daban can rightfully
exact reimbursement. Failure on the part of the
father is established. It is also necessary to avoid
unjust enrichment.
CA and RTC affirmed.
3. Funerals
refuses
Art 305
or fails
Duty to
andgive
right
support
to make funeral arrangement shall be i
support. In case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers
the father
of ascendants,
or motherthe
of paternal
a child under
shallthe
have
age
better
of majority
right.
* How would you reconcile CC, Art 25 (i.e.
thoughtless extravagance in expenses for leasure or
display during a period of acute public want or
emergency) with CC Art 306? Ma’am Beth says they
are in conflict but didn’t explain any further.
CC, Art 307 The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed w
expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine the
funeral shall be decided upon by the person obliged to make arra
other members of the family.
CC, Art 308 No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed o
mentioned in the support provision.
CC, Art 309 Any person who shows disrespect to the dead, or wro
family of the deceased for damages, material and moral.
CC, Art 310 The construction of a tombstone or mausoleum shall b
chargeable to the conjugal partnership property, if the deceased is
PENOBSCOT AREA HOUSING DEVELOPMENT
CORP. v CITY OF BREWER (1981)
438 A. 2D. 14
- Plaintiff wants to build a house for six retarded
adults/older minors in an area zoned for a single
family residential use
- The city prohibited the plaintiffs because six
retarded adults do not fall within the definition of
“family”
- According to the ordinance, the requirements for
classification as a family are:
1) does his own cooking  according to Ma’am Beth,
this is significant because of the assumption that
families have meals together
2) domestic bond exists  which means a traditional
family-like structure of household authority. The staff
of the “nut house” cannot be considered as central
figure of “resident” authority because they
a. would not necessarily reside in the home
b. would serve in a rotating basis
3) quality of cohesiveness and permanence
a. the average stay of a resident would be
one and one-half years
b. they would not control “the choice of who
the incoming residents would be nor when
other residents would leave”
*Ma’am Beth’s obiter: A house with six nuts in it in a
middle of a peaceful suburbia would undermine the
community’s serenity.
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*Applicability of definition of family in the
Philippines: The presence of a permanent figure of
household authority may be problematic in families
with OFW parents. (And then she goes on to tell
stories about their family, with Dean Pangalangan
being in HK now for some professorial tasks, she
goes there almost every two weeks to visit him. That
the airplane fare costs just as much as the ticket to
Davao. Or roughly P12,000! Whoa!) And so the
Congress should craft a definition that reflects our
culture and the demand of the times.
FC, Art 151 No suit between members of the same family shall HELD:
or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have beensamemade
no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed earnest efforts toward a compromise are needed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise
HONTIVEROS
*CC, Art 2035 – uncompromisable matters:
a) civil status of persons (e.g. paternity and
filiation)
b) validity of a marriage or legal separation
c) any ground for legal separation
d) future support
e) future legitime
f) jurisdiction of courts
”…because it is difficult to imagine a sadder and
more
tragic spectacle than a litigation between
members of the same family.”
MENDOZA v CA (1967)
19 SCRA 756
- Luisa de la Rosa Mendoza (private resp)
instituted the case against her husband Cecilio
(plaintiff)
- When husband departed to US to further his
medical studies and profession, he did not
provide his pregnant and sickly wife with
maintenance and support
- Wife filed action but husband moves for its
dismissal on the grounds no efforts to
compromise were made
HELD: No valid compromise can be made with
matters regarding future support.
MENDEZ v BIONSON & EUGENIA (1977)
80 SCRA 82
- Mendez and 11 others argue that the court erred in
dismissing their complaint against the Bionsons for
lack of earnest efforts being exerted by the parties
to arrive at an amicable settlement before the action
was instituted, the parties being members of the
same family.
HELD: The litigants are not family members
within the contemplation of the law. The parties
are collateral relatives who are not brothers
and sisters. Only members of the same family are
required to exert efforts to arrive at a settlement
before an action is instituted.
GUERRERO v RTC & HERNANDO (1994)
229 SCRA 274
- Gaudencio Guerrero and Pedro Hernando are
brothers-in-law because their wives are half-sisters.
They both claim ownership of a lot.
- RTC ruled that the parties should have alleged in
the complaint that earnest efforts towards a
compromise was exerted since they are members of
the same family.
prosperBrothers-in-law are from
unless it should appear not members of the
the verified complaint
family as enumerated in Art 150. No
under
v RTC CC
(1999)
309 SCRA 340
- Spouses Agusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a
complaint for damages in their land registration
against Agustos’s brother Gregorio and the
latter’s wife, Teodora Ayson.
- Teodora and Gregorio denied they are married.
- RTC: dismissed case because it did verify as
required by Art 151 FC and therefore it did not
believe that earnest efforts had been made to
arrive at a compromise.
HELD: Whenever a stranger is party to a case,
Art 151 will not apply. Maria, a sister-in-law of
Gregorio is considered a stranger since the law does
not consider in-laws as members of the same family.
Teodora, is also a stranger to Augusto. Remanded to
RTC for further proceedings.
B. The Family Home
FC, Art 152 The family home, constituted jointly by the husband an
the dwelling house where they and their family reside and the land on
- Unmarried head can mean live-in partners,
eldest sibling/child or widow
- Cannot be a family home if you do not own the
land it is situated on
- Beneficiaries cannot constitute his own
family home; otherwise they can migrate from
one place to another and have lots of family
home to the prejudice of creditors
- There should be actual occupancy. It does not
matter if a portion of the house is devoted for
commercial purposes as long as the family
resides on it.
FC, Art 153 The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lo
From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its bene
continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or
extent of the value allowed by the law.
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* Difference between CC and FC rules on
constitution of family home: CC requires judicial
declaration (done by filing a petition and with the
approval of the proper court) OR extrajudicial (done
recording of a public instrument in the proper
registry) for the constitution of a family home. But no
one does that, so the FC makes the constitution
of a family home automatic.
FC, Art 154 The beneficiaries of a family home:
1. husband & wife or an unmarried head of family
2. parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, illegitimate or legitimate, who
are:
a. living in the family home
b. depend upon the head of the family for legal
- All three requirements (family relations, actual
residence and dependence for legal support)
must be present to become a beneficiary
- So if the wife dies, the mother-in-law becomes a
stranger to the husband and is no longer
considered as beneficiary of the family home.
FC, Art 160 When a creditor whose claim is not among those me
and has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actual
apply to court for an order directing the sale of the property under e
actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum am
constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum all
improvements introduced by the person/s constituting the family hom
beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply.
At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for the family hom
1 be applied first to the amount mentioned in Art 157
2 then to liabilities under the judgment and costs (A155)
3 delivered to the judgment debtor
* Judgment debtor is not a preferred debtor like in
Art 155
* Ma’am Beth does not think it’s a wise move for
creditors to go after the family home because he
puts his debtor in a more financially precarious
situation and the creditor is not a priority.
FC, Art 161 For the purposes of availing of the benefits of a famil
constitute, or be the beneficiary of only one family home.

FC, Art 155 The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced FC, Artsale, or attachment
162 The provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing
1. non-payment of taxes applicable.
2. debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home
3. debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution
4. debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished
material for the construction of the building

* According to Tolentino, Par 4 may also apply to

repairs and improvements done to the family
home to avoid redundancy of Par 2 since
construction of the home would always be before the
constitution of the family home.

FC, Art 156 Family home must be part of the ACP or CPG or of the exclusive properties either spouse with consent. It may
also be constituted by an unmarried head of the family on his or her own property.

Subject of conditional sale on installments: where ownership is reserved by the vendor only to guarantee payment of the
purchase price, it may be constituted as a family home.

FC, Art 157 The actual value of family home shall not exceed
municipalities) and P200,000 in rural, as may fixed by law.

* Considering this “price tag” imposed on family

homes, realistically speaking, there is no family
home in the Philippines anymore. The law must first
seek actuarial computation to update the equivalent
value in today’s economy.

FC, Art 158 It may be sold, alienated, donated, assigned or encumbered by the owner/s with the
person constituting the same, the latter’s spouse and majority of beneficiaries of legal age

FC, Art 159 Family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses
family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary
a compelling reason. Rule shall regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.
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SIARI VALLEY ESTATES v LUCASAN (1960)

109 Phil 294
- Parcels of land owned by Filemon Lucasan were
sold by the sheriff at a public auction to satisfy a
judgment rendered against him.
- Lucasan opposed with respect to one parcel. He
contends that the land is where he and his wife
extrajudicially constituted a family home hence
the land is exempt from execution.

ISSUE: WON the property is a family home and

exempt from execution for money judgment?

HELD: NO. A family home constituted after a

debt has been incurred is not exempt from
execution. Even if the declaration of family home
predates the money judgment, the family home may
still be liable as long as it is for payment of a debt
incurred before the constitution. Otherwise, debtors
who aim to circumvent the law may prejudice
creditors.

MODEQUILLO v BREVA (1990)

185 SCRA 766
- Jose Modequillo is to indemnify the relatives of
Audie Salinas who died in a vehicular accident
(1976 Mar 16) involving the former.
- In 1988 January 29, CA held that the damages
are to be satisfied on his goods and chattels
which include a parcel of residential land.
- Modequillo executed a motion to quash and/or
set aside since the same residential land is
where the family home is built since 1969 prior
to the commencement of this case and as such
is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment under Art 152 and 153 of the FC
except for the liabilities enumerated in Article
155. Also, the said judgment debt is not one of
those listed in Article 155.

ISSUE: WON the said residential land has the

characteristic of a family home and thus is exempted
from execution

HELD: NO.
- The plaintiff misinterpreted Art 162 of the FC
which provides that “all existing family
residences at the time of the effectivity of FC are
considered family homes and entitled to benefits
of a family home” to be retroactive. Art 152
and Art 153 cannot be applied
retroactively.
- Art. 152, which pertains to the automatic
constitution of family home by mere actual
occupation, cannot be invoked by the plaintiff.
- Also, the debt or liability which was the basis of
the judgment arose or was incurred at the time
of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and
the money judgment arising therefrom was
rendered by the appellate court on January 29,
1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the
FC on August 3, 1988.
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TANEO v CA (1999)
304 SCRA 308
- Pablito Taneo filed an action against the
conveyance of his land to private respondent.
The money judgment of RTC was affirmed by CA.
- Taneo alleges that the lands in question are
exempt from execution for being a family home
(extrajudicially constituted by his father as early
as 1964).
ISSUE: WON the family home is exempt from
execution
HELD: NO. Art 153 does not apply to family homes
occupied prior to the effectivity of FC and exempted
from obligations incurred prior to that same date
(Aug 3, 1988). Art 162 is not retroactive
considering that the debt preceded the FC (1964).
Also, a family home should be erected on the
land owned by the members of the family
(owned by Plutarco Vacalares).
VERSOLA v MADOLARIA (2006)
497 SCRA 385
- Dr. Ong Oh granted P1M loan to Dolores
Ledesma
- Ledesma sold her house and lot located in
Tandang Sora to spouses Eduardo and Elsa
Versola for P2.5M. Spouses paid Ledesma P1M as
downpayment with remaining balance in
monthly installments
- Spouses Versola applied for a 2M loan with
Asiarust Bank in order to raise the full amount
that Ledesma demanded
- However, the spouses were not able to get the
loan because Asiatrust Bank discovered a notice
of levy on execution was annotated on the title
in connection with Ledesma’s obligation to a
certain Miladay’s Jewels, Inc., in the amount of
P214,284. Because of this annotated
encumbrance, Asiatrust did not register said Real
Estate Mortgage and refused to release the P2M
loan of petitioners.
- Dr. Ong Oh filed Complaint after the trial, the
RTC and CA ordered spouses Versola to pay Dr.
Ong Oh 1.5M with legal interest
- Dr. Ong Oh filed a Motion for Execution and
because of this, the sheriff sold at public auction
the property of spouses Versola.
- Spouses Versola failed to redeem said property,
thus a Sheriff’s Final Deed of Sale was issued in
favor of Dr. Ong Oh.
- Dr. Ong Oh filed and Ex Parte Motion for Issuance
of Confirmation of Judicial Sale of Real Property
of spouses
- Spouses Versola opposed said motion on the
ground that the property sold is the family home
of petitioners which according to them is exempt
from execution pursuant to Art. 155 of the Family
Code.
ISSUE: WON petitioners timely raised and proved
that their property is exempt from execution?
HELD: NO
- Court finds that petitioner’s assertion for
exemption is a mere afterthought.
- It was only after almost two years from the time
of the execution of sale and after the Sheriff’s
Final Deed of Sale was issued did petitioners
rigorously claim that the property in question is
exempt from execution.
- Such claim for exemption should be set up
and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of
property at public auction. Failure to do so
would estop the party from later claiming
exemption.
- There was also no showing that petitioners
adduced evidence to prove that it is indeed
a family home. Instead of substantiating their
claim, petitioners languidly presupposed that the
sheriff had prior knowledge that the said
property was constituted by them as their family
home.
Note: A family home is a real right which is
gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment,
constituted over the dwelling place and the land in
which it is situated and it cannot be seized by
creditors except in certain special cases.
VENERACION v MANCILLA (2006)
495 SCRA 712
- In 1995, Elizabeth Mendinueta secured a P1.2M
loan from Charlie Mancilla. She mortgaged her
residential house and lot. The title indicated that
she was “single”
- Mendinueta failed to pay upon maturity so the
property was foreclosed. She admitted her
failure but claims that she secured a loan from
Banco Filipino to pay Mancilla. All she’s asking
for now is the reduction of the monthly interest.
- It turns out that Elizabeth is cohabiting with a
certain Geronimo Veneracion with whom she has
three kids, one of whom is Mary Grace
(petitioner).
- Mary Grace seeks the nullity of judgment against
the mortgage based on the following facts:
o Geronimo paid for the monthly
installments of property since Elizabeth
had no source of income
o Family home is not liable for the execution
bec Geronimo did not consent in mortgage
(FC 154)
o Decision of RTC prejudiced their right to
their family home and hereditary rights
ISSUE: WON the family home may be executed with
the spouse’s consent wanting
HELD: NO. First there should be proof that it was
indeed a conjugal home and that their father
spent for the acquisition. They failed to append
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receipts of payments made by the father. exclusive properties and stayed there for 20 years,
Unsubstantial claim of mother’s lack of source of by operation of FC Art 153 the house is
income because she was able to borrow from Banco automatically constituted as family home. FC
Filipino. Mother never alleged that said property Art 152 extends the scope of family home not
was conjugal and was the family home, she only only to the dwelling structure but also on the
wanted reduction of accrued interests. lot on which it stands. Petitioners and
respondents should not touch the house until 10
PATRICIO v DARIO III (2006) years has lapsed (2013). All other lands outside the
507 SCRA 438 family home are subject to immediate partition
- Marcelino Dario died intestate. He survived his through public auction.
wife Perla (petitioner) and two sons Marcelino
Marc and Marcelino III (respondent) who
extrajudicially settled the estate of their father.
- Marc wants to partition the property and
terminate co-ownership.
- RTC ordered the partition: 1/6 to Marc and
Marcelino III then 4/6 to Perla
- CA family home should continue despite the
death of one or both spouses as long as there is
a minor beneficiary
- Marcelino III has a minor son named Marcelino
Lorenzo Dario IV who is a grandson of Marcelino
and Perla, hence, a minor beneficiary of the
family home

ISSUE:
WON a family home can be partition at the death of
the head of the household notwithstanding the
presence of a minor beneficiary (Art 154 and 159)

HELD: YES. The minor beneficiaries of a family

home contemplated in Art 159 must not only
actually reside in the home but must also be
dependent on the head of the family for legal
support. Although a grandson is included in the
family relationship required of beneficiaries
stipulated in Art 154, the grandson cannot be viewed
as dependent on his grandparents for support
because his ascendants of nearest degree, the
parents are capable of providing him support.
The law imposes primary obligation of child support
to parents, in default of which the grandparents take
place.

ARRIOLA v ARRIOLA (2008)

GR No. 177703
- Fidel Arriola had two marriages. After his death,
his sons John Nabor Arriola (respondent – son
with the first wife) and Anthony Ronald Arriola
(petitioner – son with the second wife, Vilma)
wanted to partition his estate through public
auction.
- Petitioner refused to include in the auction the
house standing on the subject land because he
says that it is their family home.

ISSUE: WON the land on which the house stands may

be included in the public auction

HELD: NO. Although the subject house is covered by

the judgment of partition postulated by the CA,
suspensive proscription imposed by FC Art 159 shall
be observed. Since Fidel built the house out of his
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009
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XII. PATERNITY
AND FILIATION
A. Legitimate Children
1. Kinds of Filiation
FC, Art 163 The filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption.living
1. By nature
a. Legitimate
b. Illegitimate
2. By adoption
FC, Art 164 Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parentsLiyao are
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of
likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, - that
in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil
registry together with the birth certificate of the child.
Who are legitimate children? And what does
conceived OR born mean?
1. conceived before M, born during M
2. conceived during M, born during M
3. conceived during M, born after dissolution of
M
a. BIOLOGICAL - NATURAL
PERIDO v PERIDO (1975)
63 SCRA 97
- LUCIO ♥ BENITA TALORONG  Felix, Ismael and
Margarita
- But Benita died, so Lucio remarried
- LUCIO ♥ MARCELINA BALIGUAT  Eusebio, Juan,
Maria, Sofronio and Gonzalo
- Lucio died in 1942 and Marcelina died in 1943
- Margarita is the only living child in the first
marriage. Felix survived by his 8 children. Ismael
had 5 children.  they are the petitioners in this
case
- Lucio Perido’s heirs from both marriages
executed an extrajudicial partition of his estate
- The first marriage heirs had second thoughts
about the illegitimacy and successional rights of
the second marriage heirs
- Their reason was that the children of the 2nd
marriage were born out of wedlock even before
the death of Lucio’s first wife and that the land
certificate did not indicate that Lucio is not
married to another.
ISSUE: WON the children by the second marriage are
illegitimate
HELD: No. No cogent proof that Lucio and Marcelina
were not married, so the presumption of marriage
shall prevail. There was no legal impediment for
Perido to marry at the time of the birth of his eldest
child by his second marriage. Perido’s first wife died
long before.
LIYAO, Jr. v LIYAO et al (2002)
378 SCRA 563
- Corazon Garcia was married to Ramon Yulo but
Natural filiation may
separately forbe
10legitimate or had
years, but legitimate.
two
children Bernadette and Enrique
- William Liyao Sr was married to Juanita Tanhoti
Liyao, with two daughters Tita Rose and Linda
Christina
- Corazon cohabited with Liyao and begot a son,
William Liyao Jr. in White Plains
-
Jr. claims that he is the illegitimate child of
Liyao Sr. and asks the latter’s legal family for
recognition
asthe
compulsory
husband or heir
that of a donor or both are
both of them
Proofs:
a. Liyao Senior paid medical and hospital
expenses, food and clothing during Junior’s
birth
b. Liyao Senior asked his confidential
secretary to secure a copy of Liyao Junior’s
birth certificate and open a bank account
for him wherein he deposited amounts on
a weekly basis
c. Liyao Senior would bring Liyao Junior to the
office and introduce him as the “good
looking son” and had their pictures taken
together
d. Continuous possess and enjoyment of the
status of a recognized and/or acknowledge
child through direct and overt acts
e. A note saying “To Cora, Love From William”
f. Testimony of neighbors saying that he is
the son of Cora and William
- RTC declared William as spurious illegitimate son
for preponderance of evidence
- CA reversed because of presumption of
legitimacy so long as marital intimacy between
the husband and the wife was physically
possible. Gave weight to the testimonies that
Corazon and Ramon Yulo were seen together
when she was supposed to be cohabiting with
Yulo.
- Birth certificate and baptismal certificate saying
Yulo as the father is not sufficient to establish
paternity in absence of evidence that Yulo had
direct involvement in placing his name there.
There was no signature in the said documents
even in the passbook of the bank account he
opened for Corazon and Junior.
HELD: The law favors the legitimacy rather than
the illegitimacy of the child. Liyao Jr cannot
choose his own filiation. If Corazon’s husband, Yulo,
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does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the
status of the child is fixed and the child cannot
choose to be the child of his mother’s alleged
paramour.
SSS v AGUAS (2006)
483 SCRA 383
- Pablo Aguas died so his wife Rosanna Aguas
claims death benefits from SSS, stating as minor
beneficiary their daughter Jeylnn.
- Leticia Macapinlac, Pablo’s sister, objected to
Rosanna’s claim alleging that:
a. Rosanna abandoned their family 6 yrs
before
b. Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna
c. Rosanna had several children with a
certain Romeo dela Peña
- SSS suspended the pension benefits Rosanna
and Jeylnn were receiving
- SSS, upon investigation, concluded that:
a. Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna &
Jenelyn (Jeylnn) were Rosanna’s children
with Romeo
b. Rosanna abandoned her husband more
than six years before and lived with Romeo
while pregnant with Jenelyn (Jeylnn)
c. Pablo was not capable of having a child
with Rosanna as he was under treatment
- SSS refused to resume pension benefits and
ordered refunds from Rosanna
- Rosanna filed claim for restoration of pension
benefits at the Social Security Commission (SSC)
- Rosanna added Janet Aguas to the petition for
claims
- SSC summoned several people for clarificatory
questions regarding the case. Further
investigation, it upheld the order to suspend
Rosanna’s pension and have her refund the paid
benefits due to their conclusion that Rosanna
married Romeo during the subsistence of her
marriage with Pablo, and that Jeylnn was her
daughter with Romeo
- CA reversed the SSC decision and ordered
resumption of Rosanna’s pension benefits
ISSUE: WON Jeylnn, Janet and Rosanna were entitled
to the SSS death benefits of Pablo as Pablo’s children
and spouse
HELD:
YES to Jeylnn
 Only Jeylnn has sufficiently established her right
to a monthly pension. As proved by the
photocopy of her birth certificate which bears
the certified signature of Pablo and was certified
by the civil registrar, she was born during
Rosanna and Pablo’s marriage. Art 164
provides that children conceived or born
during the marriage of the parents are
legitimate.
 In the absence of proof to establish
impossibility of access between the
spouses during the first 120 days of the
300 days which immediately precedes the birth
of the child, the presumption of legitimacy
shall subsist and is conclusive. Doctor only
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treated Pablo for tuberculosis, he cannot say if
he was infertile.
 Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly
personal right of the husband or, in exceptional
cases, his heirs.
NO to Janet
 Janet’s date of birth was not substantially proven
 Civil registrar did not certify the presented birth
certificate of Janet which could have proved that
Janet was born during the subsistence of
Rosanna’s marriage with Pablo
NO to Rosanna
 Rosanna passed the first qualifying factor for
claims, that she is the legitimate spouse
 Rosanna did not pass the second qualifying
factor, that she was dependent on Pablo for
support since they were separated in fact
b. BIOLOGICAL – ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION is the impregnation of a
female with the semen from male without sexual
intercourse.
- Even without the initial consent, the child
can still be legitimated so long as the
husband subsequently gives his consent
BEFORE the child is born through AI
- Can be homologous (sperm of the husband),
heterologous (sperm of a donor) or
combined (a combination of the two)
- That the child was born of AI is not reflected
in the birth certificate
A child can have as much as five parents:
FATHER MOTHER
1. Biological (source of 1. Legal/social
sperm) 2. Genetic (egg donor)
2. Legal/Social 3. Gestational (not
surrogate)
*Ma’am Beth hates the word “surrogate” because it
is a misnomer.
IN RE BABY M. (1988)
109 N.J. 396
- Mary Beth Whitehead agreed for a fee of
$10,000 to be artificially inseminated with the
semen of another woman’s husband (William
Stern), to carry the child so conceived to term,
and after its birth, to surrender it to the natural
father and his wife  Surrogacy contract means
absolute termination of parental ties to the
gestational mother upon birth
- Elizabeth Stern was not infertile, like was was
stated in the contract, rather she had multiple
sclerosis which may have serious implication on
her pregnancy
- After the birth of the child, the Whiteheads
wished not to go through the surrogacy contract.
- The Sterns filed a complaint for possession and
ultimate custody of the child.
- Lower court granted the Sterns custody and
ordered termination of Whitehead’s maternal
rights
- Whiteheads immediately fled to different places
to evade the surrendering Baby M for custody
and named her Sara Elizabeth Whitehead
ISSUE: WON the surrogacy contract was enforceable
and valid
HELD: No. The contract was in direct conflict with
existing statutes and public policies regarding 1)
involvement of money in connection with adoption
(tantamount to baby-selling) 2) laws requiring proof
of parental unfitness or abandonment before
termination of parental rights is ordered or adoption
is granted and 3) making surrender of custody and
consent to adoption revocable in private placement
adoptions. Secondly, although the custody was
properly granted to the father since evidence clearly
proved it to be in the best interest of the child, the
termination of maternal rights and visitation rights is
contrary to law.
*M stands for Melissa. Wiki tells us that Melissa Stern
formally terminated Whitehead's parental rights and
formalized Elizabeth Stern's maternity through
adoption proceedings.
JOHNSON v CALVERT (1993)
851 P.2d 776
- Mark and Crispina was a married couple.
Crispina had to undergo hysterectomy so she
couldn’t bear children anymore. The couple
considered surrogacy. By a common friend, they
were able to meet such person by the name of
Anna Johnson who was a nurse.
- They entered into a contract wherein:
o Anna would be implanted with an embryo
containing the sperm and egg cells of the
couple.
o Anna will turn over all rights over the child.
o Couple will pay 10,000 in installments.
o Couple will pay 200,000 life insurance for
Anna.
o Relations deteriorated between the couple
and Anna.
- Blood tests show that Anna IS NOT the genetic
mother.
- TC ruled: Couple was the “genetic, biological,
and natural” parents.
- CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON Anna can claim custody of the child
HELD: NO. Since both parties gave acceptable proof
of maternity: Anna as the gestational mother.
Crispina is the genetic mother. The case will be
decided on the parties’ intention or from whom the
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mental concept of the child emanated. In this case,
the couple was considered the “prime-movers”. The
agreement was not inconsistent with Public Policy.
Gestational surrogacy differs from adoption:
- Child was not born.
- Anna wasn’t the genetic mother.
- The payment was for the “service”
Judgment of CA affirmed.
IN RE ADOPTION OF ANONYMOUS (1973)
345 N.Y.S. 2d 430
- During the first marriage, husband A and wife B
had a baby born of consensual AID (Artificial
Insemination Donor). Husband A and wife B were
registered parents in the birth certificate.
- A and B separated and later divorced but their
decree declared the child to be legitimate. Wife
B and child got support while husband A had
visitation rights. They were not remiss on their
parental duties.
- Wife B later remarried husband D. Husband D
wanted to adopt wife B’s daughter but husband
a refused to give consent.
ISSUE: WON husband A’s consent is required for
husband D’s petition for adoption considering that
the child was conceived through artificial
insemination from an unknown third party donor.
HELD: YES. The Domestic Relations Law requires
consent of both ‘parents’ over the adoption of a child
born in wedlock. The dispensary circumstances
(abandonment, divorce due to adultery, insanity,
etc.) were not present in the case. The term ‘father’
is not limited to the biological or natural father, for
what is considered is the legal relationship of father
and child and vice versa. The child cannot be
considered illegitimate since it was born during the
marriage and not in circumstances of infidelity since
it was a medically-assisted procedure where the
husband and wife freely consented.
LEGAL ISSUES IN HUMAN EGG DONATION AND
GESTATIONAL SURROGACY
- Is it possible to ask a woman to carry a child in
her womb for nine months without giving
anything in return? Unless you can find
someone whose hobby is to get pregnant and
give birth, it is quite an impossibility to have
free surrogacy. This is vulnerable to abuse of
women in lower social economic classes.
- Ma’am Beth tells about the travails of
pregnancy and even asked a pregnant student
in the class to share her prenatal experiences.
- What would be the relationship if a woman
carries the embryo formed by her daughter
and her daughter’s husband? This was an
actual case in an African country wherein the
grandmother bore the child of her daughter.
2. Impugned Legitimacy
FC, Art 166 Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the follow
1. physical impossibility for the husband to have sex with w
immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:
a. physical incapacity (impotence)
b. living separately
c. serious illness
2. biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not ha
provided in Par 2 Art 164
3. conceived through artificial insemination, the written autho
through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influen
What’s so important about the first 120 days?
It refers to the first trimester when it cannot be
known if a woman is pregnant. She may not even be
aware that she is pregnant. During the second
trimester, the tummy begins to bulge and so
pregnancy becomes evident.
*The presumption is based on the assumption that
there is sexual union in marriage, particularly during
the period of conception. Proof to the contrary would
have to be clearly and convincingly established.
*Serious illness of the husband in Par 1C must be of
such a nature as to exclude the possibility of his
having sexual intercourse with his wife.
*Biological reasons pertain to blood typing and DNA
testing
Mother’s blood type
BLOOD TYPE
O A B AB
O O O, A O, B A, B
A O, A O, A
O, A, B,
A, B, AB
Father’s AB
blood type O, A, B,
B O, B O, B A, B, AB
AB
AB A, B A, B, AB A, B, AB A, B, AB
Blood typing is conclusive only in non-paternity,
wherein a child’s blood type is not a possible product
of the blood types of the mother and the alleged
father. In regard to confirming paternal ties, it can
only go as far as saying that a man is a possible
father.
*Ma’am Beth’s friends from UP Med thinks that the
law that only fathers can impugn legitimacy despite
scientific proof that he is not the father, is dumb. The
law should do away with its presumptions if there is
convincing proof to overturn it! Everybody knows
what happened, but law is not about truth but what
can be proven.
Why is it all about “paternity” and not
“maternity”? Because mothers are with their
babies since birth. Fathers are essentially
unattached to their child, so there’s a lot of room for
doubts. There is no maternity because who will know
better than the woman if a child is not hers.
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ANDAL v MACARAIG (1951)
89 Phil 165
- The legitimacy of Mariano Andal is assailed by
his paternal grandmother Eduvigis Macaraig. The
action was to impugn the child’s ownership as
legitimate heir of the land given by defendant to
the deceased father (Emiliano) of the child as
donation propter nuptias.
- If the son was illegitimate, the land would revert
back to Eduvigis. If legitimate, the land remains
with the child.
- The grounds for said illegitimacy is as follows:
o Emiliano was afflicted with tuberculosis
such that he could hardly move and get up
from his bed.
o Wife had illicit sexual relationship with her
husband’s brother, Felix when the latter
came to live with them and help Emiliano
work his farm.
o Eventually, Maria Dueñas eloped with
Felix.
o Emiliano died without the presence of the
wife who didn’t even attend the funeral.
ISSUE: WON the son was Emiliano’s legitimate child
and thus entitled to inherit from his estate.
HELD: YES.
- Mariano Andal was legitimate son of Emiliano, he
having been born within three hundred days
following dissolution of marriage. (January 1,
1943 – June 17, 1943)
- Presumption of legitimacy can only be rebutted
by proof that it was physically impossible for the
husband to have had access to his wife during
the first 120 days of the 300 next preceding the
birth of the child.
- According to Manresa, impossibility of access
means:
o Absence during initial period of conception
o Impotence which is patent, continuing and
incurable
o Imprisonment, unless cohabitation took
place through corrupt violation of prison
regulations.
- Also, the fact that wife committed adultery is not
sufficient to overturn legitimacy. Husband still
had access to the wife. His sickness does not
prevent carnal intercourse. Further, cases show
that tuberculous patients are inclined to be more
sexually active (because they are “bedridden”).
JAO v CA (1987)
152 SCRA 359
- Perico Jao (private respondent) and Arlene
Salgado (petitioner) lived together as husband
and wife.
- Arlene gives birth to Janice Marie and claims that
Perico is the father. Perico denies paternity of the
child.
- They both subjected to blood typing test which
eliminated Perico as the possible father of Janice.
However, RTC still ruled that Janice is child of
Perico and entitled to support from him.
- CA reversed following the conclusive and
indisputable evidence of Perico’s non-paternity
and discrepancies in the time when the two
began cohabiting. What can be inferred from the
dates is the possibility of Janice being conceived
prior to cohabitation of Salgado and Jao.
- Jao also previously filed a complaint to delete his
name as the father of the child.
ISSUE: WON blood grouping test is admissible and
conclusive to prove non-paternity.
HELD: Yes. Blood grouping test can establish
conclusively that a man is not a father of the child,
but not necessarily that a man is the father of a
particular child. Cohabitation of the supposed father
and the mother cannot be a ground for compulsory
recognition, if such cohabitation could not have
produced the conception of the child.
FC, Art 167 The child shall be considered legitimate although the mot
have been sentenced an adulteress.
*Why would a woman do that? Because she just
wants to scorn or humiliate her husband.
*The rule is to protect the children and secure their
status from the passions of their parents. As long as
there is access between husband and wife, mere fact
that the wife was an adulteress or she was raped will
not throw presumption of legitimacy.
*Ma’am Beth quote: “Why would you do that to
make your husband jealous? There must be some
other way! Yes, you’ll make him jealous but he’ll kill
you too! Congratulations!”
MACADANGDANG v CA & MEJIAS (1980)
100 SCRA 73
- Elizabeth Mejias is married to Crispin Anahaw.
She had an affair with Antonio Macadangdang in
March 1967. Mejias and Anahaw separated after
that.
- In October 1967 (or after 210 days), Mejias gave
birth to a boy named Rolando Macadangdang as
reflected in the baptismal certificate. Mejias sued
Macadangdang to recognize Rolando as his son
ISSUE:
- WON Rolando is conclusively presumed the
legitimate child of Mejias and Anahaw
- WON Mejias may institute an action that would
bastardize her child without giving her husband,
the legally presumed father, an opportunity to
be heard
HELD: Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate child
of Mejias and Anahaw. The child was born within 300
days after the spouses separated. No proof was
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present to show that sexual intercourse between - the child is registered in other municipalities
them was impossible. In fact, the wife continuously - the child is given other names
visits her four children in her mother’s house where
her husband also stays. Only the husband can *Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a
impugn the legitimacy of the child. child born to his wife. It is only in exceptional cases
that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy.
FC, Art 168 If the marriage is terminated and the mother contractedIf the husband
another clearly
marriagedidn’t
withinmake use of
300 days such
after right
such
orcontrary:
termination, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the has desisted from such intention, the heirs cannot
bring the action.
1. Born before 180 days after solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived
during the former marriage, provided it be born within 300 days after the termination of the former marriage.
FC, Art 171 When can heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation o
2. A child born after 180 days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been
1. if the husband should die before the expiration of the period fi
conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the 300 days after the termination of the former
action
marriage.
2. if he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having d
3. if the child was born after the death of the husband
Illustration:

1st 2nd
300 days
CABATBAT-LIM v IAC (1988)
166 SCRA 451
- Dra. Esperanza Frianeza-Cabatbat’s estate is
Terminatio 2nd 180 days fought over by her sisters and the children of her
n marriage deceased brothers and her allegedly only child
So in a nutshell, the critical point is the 180 days with Proceso Cabatbat, Violeta Cabatbat-Lim
after the subsequent marriage. (petitioner)
- RTC: Violeta is not the offspring and hence, not
the legal heir
FC, Art 169 The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after 300
- days following the
Esperanza’s termination
brothers andof the marriage
sisters shall be
allege that
proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy. Violeta was merely a ward (ampun-ampunan),
and neither a natural child nor legally adopted so
* State of Limbo, wherein the child is statusless she is not a legitimate heir entitled to own
Calasiao Bihon Factory
FC, Art 170 When to bring the action to impugn the legitimacy of the child:
Evidence by Proofs by Petitioner
WITHIN: Respondents
I. NO CONCEALMENT 1. absence of any 1. birth record stating
1 year from knowledge of birth or recording in the civil register - if husband, orrecord
hospital any of his heirs reside in the
that shesame
is theplace
where the birth took place regarding legitimate child of
2 years Not the same place but within the Philippines
Esperanza’s giving Proceso and
3 years Abroad
birth Esperanza
II. CONCEALED OR UNKNOWN TO HUSBAND OR HEIRS: period for filling 2. absence of Violeta’s
of action shall be counted2.from
testimony
discoveryof
or Proceso
knowledge
of the birth of the child OR of the fact of registration of said birth birth certificate in that she is his child
Pangasinan 3. testimony of Benita
Provincial Hospital Lastimosa (alleged
*Legitimacy of a child must be attacked in a direct
3. certificate from the bio mother) that she
action, not collaterally.
Civil Registry of the is not her child
absence of Violeta’s 4. marriage contract
Why did the law impose a time limit to impugn
birth record where Esperanza
legitimacy of the child? Because it is in the best
4. certificate of was the mother
interest of the child to avoid putting his/her status in
Principal that 5. Deed of Sale when
a state of uncertainty for a long time.
Proceso and Violeta was still a
Esperanza are minor and
*Ma’am Beth gave a sample situation, when to start
registered only as represented by her
computing
guardians and not mother Esperanza
parents 6. Deed of Absolute
2 Jan 1988 birthday
5. testimony of the Sale where Proceso
3 Feb 1988 fact of registration
cousin of Violeta’s represented her as
4 Feb 1989 discovery of birth
biological mother father
-- This is vague to me. -_-
ISSUES:
What does it mean to be “unknown”?
- the child is registered as the child of other
persons
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1. WON TC and CA finding that Violeta is not
born of Esperanza Cabatbat is concluding on
SC
2. WON complaint is an action to impugn
legitimacy and Art 263 CC (action to impugn
legitimacy) can be applied
HELD:
1. YES. The factual findings of the courts are
entitled to great respect. Moreover, the
absence of a record of birth of petitioner
Violeta in the Office of the CivReg General
puts a cloud on the genuiness of her birth
record. The records of the hospital show that
only one woman by the name of Benita
Lastimosa gave birth to an illegitimate child
on the date of Violeta’ birth.
2. NO. Because this is an action to claim
inheritance of the respondents as legal heirs
of their childless deceased aunt. They do not
claim that Violeta is an illegitimate child, but
that she is not a child at all.
CHUA KENG GIAP v IAC & CHUA LIAN KING
(1988)
166 SCRA 451
- Petitioner insists that he is the son of deceased
Sy Kao. As such, he filed a petition for the
settlement of the estate of the latter.
- Private respondent moved to dismiss, due to lack
of action as well as petitioner’s capacity to file
such a case. It has been declared before that
petitioner is not the son of Chua Bing guan and
Sy Kao.
- The latter flatly and unequivocally declared that
she was not petitioner’s mother. Therefore he
had no lawful interest in the estate of Sy Kao.
ISSUE: WON Sy Kao is the mother of the petitioner
HELD: No. Who better than Sy Kao herself would
know if Chua Keng Giap was really her son? More
than anyone else, it was her who could say that
petitioner was not begotten of her womb.
REPUBLIC v LABRADOR (1999)
305 SCRA 438
- A child’s birth certificate lists her name as Sarah
Zita Cañon Erasmo, and her parents Rosemarie
Cañon married to Degoberto Erasmo.
- On March 1998, her aunt Gladys petitioned the
RTC Cebu to change Sarah’s surname to Cañon,
dropping Erasmo, and the first name of her
mother to Maria Rosario since her parents were
not married.
- Gladys said Sarah’s mother, her sister, lived
abroad with her foreigner husband.
- The RTC granted the petition based on Rule 108
of the Rules of Court. The solicitor-general
appealed.
ISSUES:
1. WON a change in the record of birth in a civil
registry, which affects the civil status of the
person, may be granted in summary
proceedings
2. WON Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court
is the proper action to impugn the legitimacy
of the child, or change filiation
HELD: No, only clerical mistakes can be made and
significant changes may only be granted in direct,
adversarial action. The change sought will result not
only in the substantial correction in the child’s record
of birth but also in the child’s status thereby
affecting her rights which cannot be done in a
summary action. Although “Maria Rosario” is the real
name of the mother, Sarah will become an
illegitimate child by virtue of the change. Also,
adversarial proceedings are required in such
allegations. Rule 108 may only be used to correct or
change clerical or innocuous errors.
Also, Sarah and her purported parents should have
been parties to the proceedings. There is also no
sufficient legal explanation why the Gladys, without
appointment as guardian, was the petitioner.
Effects:
• Sarah’s successional and other rights may
change
• Illegitimacy may bring social stigma and
embarrass Sarah
• Rights of her parents over her and over each
other will be affected
• A change of name will affect mother and
creditors
TAN v TROCIO (1990)
191 SCRA 764
- School owner and directress, Felicidad Barañan
Tan filed an administrative complaint seeking
disbarment of Atty. Galileo Trcio for immorality
and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.
- She alleged that Trocio, who is the legal counsel
of the school overpowered her inside the office
and against her will, succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of her. And as a result, she begot a
son whom she named Jewel Tan. She further
alleged that he used to support Jewel but
subsequently lost interest and stopped.
- She claimed she filed the complaint only after 8
years from the incident because Trocio
threatened her with the deportation of her alien
husband and due to the fact that she was
married and has eight children.
- Trocio files his answer stating that he was indeed
a counsel of the school as well as of Tan and her
family but denies he sexually assaulted her. He
adds that the principal was a in a revenge trip
when he declined her request to commit a
“breach of trust”.
ISSUE: WON Trocio had sexually assaulted Tan as a
consequence of which the latter begot a child by him
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(and is thus a ground for Trocio’s disbarment for
immoral conduct)
HELD: No. Disbarment complaint dismissed for
insufficiency of basis of the allegations. The alleged
threat to deport her husband could not hold because
she admitted having lost contact with her husband
when he learned of the respondent’s transgression
that very same evening. The fear had thus become
inexistent. She also maintained her transactions with
Tan as if nothing had happened. Such actions can be
construed as condonation of his alleged immoral act.
Physical likeness and unusual closeness between
Trocio and Jewel is not conclusive proof of paternity,
much less violation of Tan’s person and honor.
Jewel was born during the wedlock of Tan and her
husband as such, the presumption of legitimacy
prevails.
*What’s the big deal about naming the son Jewel?
For all we know, the name is pronounced as “Joel.”
*Why is there an expected reaction from sexually-
abused woman? Different people have different ways
of reacting!
*If she aborts it, she’s wrong. If she learns to love it,
she wasn’t raped. There’s no option!!!
PEOPLE v TUMIMPAD (1994)
235 SCRA 483
- Moreno L. Tumimpad and Constable Ruel C.
Prieto are charged with the crime of rape of
Sandra Salcedo, a 15 years old, had a mind of a
five year old child. The accused are two of the
four security men assigned to the victim’s father.
- Sandra first complained of constipation but after
medical aid was sought, her condition did not
improve. However, upon seeing Tumimpad
coming out from the kitchen she told her mother
“Mama, patayin mo ‘yan, bastos”. The mother
became suspicious so she brought Sandra to the
hospital where they found out that she was
pregnant. Nine months later, Sandra gave birtb
to a baby boy who was named Jacob.
- Sandra was able to pick the pictures of
Tumimpad and Prieto and in the police line-up
she pointed to the accused.
- The accused moved that a blood test be
conducted on the offended party, her child Jacob
and the two accused. The result of the test
showed that Jacob has a type ‘O” blood, Sandra
type “B”, Prieto type “A” and Tumimpad type “O”.
- RTC convicted Tumimpad but acquitted Prieto.
The acquittal of Prieto was on reasonable doubt
stating that he has a different type of blood with
the child Jacob.
ISSUE: WON it was impossible for Tumimpad to have
committed the crime of rape because most of the
time he and his co-accused were together with Col.
Salcedo.
HELD: No. It was proven that they were not always
with Col. Salcedo. There were instances that they
would even play with Sandra. Based on this it is not
physically impossible for the accused to have access
to Sandra.
Tumimpad argued that his conviction was
erroneously based on the medical finding that he
and the victim have the same blood type “O”.
In Jao vs. Court of Appeals it was held that
Paternity – Science has demonstrated that by the
analysis of blood samples of the mother, the child
and the alleged father, it can be established
conclusively that the man is not the father of a
particular child. But group blood testing cannot
show only a possibility that he is.
BENITEZ-BADUA v CA (1994)
229 SCRA 468
- Vicente Benitez & Isabel Chipongian owned
various properties. On April 25, 1982 Isabel died
& her estate was settled extra-judicially. ON Nov.
13, 1989 Vicente died intestate.
- Private respondents, Victoria Benitez-Lirio
(Vicente’s sister) & Feodor Benitez Aguilar
(Vicente’s nephew) filed a case in the RTC,
praying for the issuance of letters of
administration of Vicente’s estate in favor of
Aguilar. They allege that Vicente is survived by
no other heirs or relatives. That the spouses
were w/o issue & without descendants
whatsoever and that Marissa Benitez Badua who
was raised and cared for by the spouses was not
related to them by blood nor legally adopted, &
therefore not an heir. On Nov. 2, 1990 Marissa
opposed the petition stating that she was the
sole heir of Vicente.
- If Marissa was really a biological and legitimate
daughter, there would be no need for
TC received evidence regarding the matter:
• Marissa tried to prove she was the legitimate
child of the spouses, presenting
documentary evidence:
o Her certificate of live birth
o Baptismal certificate
o Income tax returns & information
sheet for membership w/ GSIS of
Vicente, naming her his daughter
o School records
o She also testified that they raised
her as their legit daughter
• Private respondents presented testimonial
evidence that the spouses failed to have a
child & that Isabel was referred to Dr.
Manahan (an ob-gyne) for treatment
TC ruled in favor of Marissa, relying on Art 166 and
Art 170 FC. CA however reversed their decision
stating that Marissa is not the biological child of the
spouses and therefore not a legal heir. The CA also
held that the TC erred in applying Art 166 and Art
170 FC
ISSUES:
1. WON Art 164, 166, 170 & 171 FC is
applicable to the case, as the petitioner
contends.
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2. WON Marissa is the biological child of the
spouses and therefore a legal heir.
HELD: No. The following DO NOT contemplate a
situation like the instant case, where a child is
alleged not to be the biological child of a certain
couple. These articles govern a situation where a
husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of
his wife. The CA correctly refused to apply these
articles to the case. Since this case doesn’t contend
that Marissa is not the child of Vicente by Isabel; but
that she wasn’t born to the spouses. Cabatbat-Lim v
IAC is appropriate to the case. The totality of
contrary evidence presented by the respondents
sufficiently rebutted the truth of the content of
petitioner’s birth certificate.
LUMAIN DE APARICHO v PARAGUYA (1987)
150 SCRA 279
- Trinidad Montilde had a love affair with Reverend
Father Felipe Lumain, a priest, and in the process
she conceived. When she was 4 months
pregnant, in order to conceal her disgrace from
the public, she decided to marry one Anastacio
Mamburao.
- Father Lumain himself solemnized their marriage
in March 1924. However, the couple never lived
together as husband and wife. Trinidad gave
birth to daughter Consolacion Lumain in Sept,
192 days or 6 mos after the marriage.
- Father Lumain eventually died but he left a last
will & testament wherein he acknowledged
Consolacion as his daughter and instituted her
as the sole and universal heir of all his property
rights and interests. This was duly probated in
CFI and on appeal was affirmed by the CA.
- After reaching age of majority, daughter
Consolacion filed an action in CFI against one
Hipolito Paraguya for the recovery of certain
parcels of land she claims to have inherited from
her father, the priest.
- Hipolito Paraguya was declared owner of
portions A, B, H, F and G and all its
improvements. The land in question is portion
G. Hipolito assails also that Consolacion is not a
natural child of the late Fr Lumain.
- TC: Bearing in mind the date of the birth of the
plaintiff, it is evident that her mother Trinidad
was still single at the time she was conceived. It
is a legal presumption that plaintiff is the
daughter of the spouses Anastacio and Trinidad.
However, this was disputable and Trinidad
successfully overcame it.
- Consolacion is therefore the natural child of
Father Lumain and she is entitled to claim the
disputed property, she having been instituted in
the will as universal heir.
ISSUE: WON Consolacion is the natural child of
Lumain and if so, WON she is entitled to the
possession of Portion G
HELD: SC finds it unnecessary to determine the
paternity of appellee Consolacion. As Father Lumain,
who died w/o any compulsory heir, Consolacion is
therefore his lawful heir as duly instituted in his will.
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by
will all of his estate or any part of it in favor of any
person having capacity to succeed. Portion G and its
improvement declared to be owned by Consolacion.
No award of moral damages to be given to Hipolito
for Consolacion was acting in her belief that she was
legal heir of the land. Judgment affirmed.
B. Proof of Filiation
1. How to prove filiation
FC, Art 172 The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of
(PRIMARY EVIDENCE FOR VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION)
1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgm
2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a p
parent concerned
In the absence of which:
(SECONDARY EVIDENCE FOR INVOLUNTARY RECOG)
1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimat
2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws
* Defense against Art 166 (grounds for impugning)
It is the husband or his heirs who must present
proofs to overcome the presumption of legitimacy.
* Necessary for Art 169 (“statusless”) – The Family
Code gives children their status from the moment of
their birth. But such status may be questioned or in
the case of a child born after 300 days following the
termination of the marriage of the mother, the law
does not give him any status so that the child or
someone in his behalf will have to prove his status
for him.
* Secondary evidence not admissible if primary
exists!
My question: In this case, can a man voluntarily
recognize the child to be his illegitimate child at the
opposition of the biological mother?
RECORD OF BIRTH
- The books making up the civil register and all
the documents relating thereto shall be
considered public documents and shall be prima
facie evidence of the truth of the facts therein
- If the alleged father did not intervene in the
making of the birth certificate, the putting of his
name by the mother or doctor or registrar is
void. The father’s signature is necessary.
*Ma’am Beth says that the rule requiring father’s
signature on the birth certificate to prove
participation is ridiculous since there is no blank or
provided space for the father to sign. The only
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chance a father can sign on the birth certificate is if
he is the informant.
ADMISSION IN A DOCUMENT
- A public document is one which is 1) issued by a
public office and 2) private document that is
notarized
- A typewritten document containing an admission
of the legitimate filiation is not admissible, as
the signature therein may be super-imposed and
may not be the true signature of the parent
- Also, for handwritten documents, the intent to
recognize the child must be sufficiently
apparent.
OPEN AND CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE
STATUS OF A LEGITIMATE CHILD
- E.g. bearing the father’s surname, treatment by
the parents and of the family of the child as
legitimate, constant attendance to the child’s
support and education and giving the child the
reputation of being the child of his parents
- BASIS: the admission of the parents themselves
and the concurrence therein of the family and of
the society
- Continuous = uninterrupted and consistent
o Tolentino: idea of possesory status of some
duration
o Sempio-Diy: no required particular length
of time
o Pangalangan: distinguished from
“continually” which allows for interruption
as long as it is in a regular basis,
continuously may be translated to “walang
humpay”
- Maybe enjoyed by a child conceived but not yet
born
OTHER MEANS ALLOWED BY THE RULES OF COURT
AND SPECIAL LAWS
A. Baptismal certificate: is a presumptive
evidence only, especially when people often
have different names in their birth certificate
and baptismal
B. Judicial admission
C. Family bible where child’s name is entered:
As explained by Ma’am Beth, this is given
importance because a Bible is presumed to
have been there for generations and is
handed down to children. As the family
grows, the names of the children are added
in the list. This is biased to Catholics though.
D. Common reputation respecting pedigree.
E. Admission by silence
F. Testimonies of witnesses
G. Other kinds of proofs admissible under Rule
130 of RRC
RRC, Rule 130
Declaration against interest
Act or declaration about pedigree
Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree
Common reputation
Entries in official records
Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding
Opinion of expert witness
Opinion of ordinary witnesses
CC, Art 220 In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of t
toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children
family in case of unlawful aggression.
****For cases under Proof of Filiation, focus on the
pieces of evidence established in each case
CONSTANTINO v MENDEZ (1992)
209 SCRA 18
Amelia Constantino filed an action for
acknowledgment, support of her child Michael, and
damages against Ivan Mendez, a married man.
Mendez denied having sexual intercourse with
Constantino.
HELD: Filiation was not proven by clear and
convincing evidence. The burden of proof to
establish the allegation is on Constantino.
Constantino’s testimony as to when she had
intercourse with Mendez is contradicted by evidence.
The date was crucial to determine whether Michael
was conceived during the time Amelia and Ivan were
having sexual relations. There was also no clear and
convincing proof that Amelia did not have any sexual
encounter with other men.
MENDOZA v MELIA (1966)
17 SCRA 788
- Father versus son’s common law wife and her
son
- Paciano Pareja owned lot No. 3390-B in
Sorsogon. He donated it to his son Gavino in
1939. Gavino during that time had been living
with his common-law spouse Catalina Mendoza,
and their only son Rodolfo who was born in 1935.
- Gavino disappeared in 1943 and had not been
heard of since. Paciano Pareja sold the disputed
property to Temistocles Mella in 1948 who then
told herein petitioners to vacate the said land in
1952.
- With the notice remaining unheeded, Mella filed
and action in 1955. Petitioners claim ownership
of said land, claiming Rodolfo as the rightful
successor being the son of Gavino, and for
having adverse possession of the land for 10
years. Trial and appellate courts ruled for Mella,
hence this challenge by Catalina and Rodolfo.
- As to the issue of possession, petitioners invoke
Art. 390 of Civil Code but the respondent argued
that this was never raised in the trial court nor
the appellate court thus could not be considered
at the SC.
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- With the issue of Rodolfo as successor, he
showed a coy of his birth certificate.
ISSUE: WON Rodolfo can be considered
acknowledged natural child by virtue of his birth
certificate as evidence.
HELD: No. The appellate court deemed the birth
certificate insufficient because it did not have the
signatures of the parents, it being only a certified
copy of the registry. The court ruled that in the
absence of such signatures, there was no clear proof
that the parent recognizes the child.
LIM v CA (1975)
65 SCRA 160
- In 1962, Felisa Lim brought suit against Francisco
Miguel Romualdez Uy Chen Hong for the
declaration of nullity of the affidavit Uy executed in
which he adjudicated to himself (120 square
meters located in Tayabas), as the only son and
heir of Susana Lim.
- Uy and Lim fights over the inheritance of Susana
Lim’s property, to the exclusion of each other
- Lim claims that she is the natural daughter of
Susana. Her evidence are as follows:
o baptismal certificate which stated the her
mother was Susana
o marriage contract wherein Susana gave
consent to the marriage of Felisa
- On the other hand, Uy claims that he is the only
son and heir of Susana. His evidence:
o application form for alien registration which
stated that his mother was Susana
o order of the BOI cancelling his alien
registration, by derivation from his Filipina
mother
o his identification certificate which describes
him as the son of Susana.
- RTC: In 1967, Felisa Lim was held as the daughter
and only heir of Susana Lim to which Uy filed a
motion for reconsideration and new trial but the
court denied it.
- CA: Upon Uy’s appeal, CA ruled that neither Felisa
Lim nor Uy is entitled to the inheritance because:
o neither of them been recognized by Susana
Lim as her child by any means provided for
by law
o neither of them been declared in a judicial
proceeding to be the child of Susana Lim
- They both assailed the decision of the CA
- Lim says that Susana’s consent to her marriage
constitutes recognition as natural daughter and
was even executed in a public document in the
form of her marriage contract (Sec 131 of CC of
1889 says that “be made in the record of birth, in
a will or some other public document”
- Guadalupe Uy contended that her husband
purchased the property in question with his own
money prior to his mother’s death and took
conveyance and title. There was an existence of
implied trust. His mother gave him a little money
to complete the purchase price.
ISSUES & HELD:
1. WON Felisa Lim is entitled to the inheritance. NO
- Felisa Lim alleges that she was recognized by
Susana Lim during 1943 which means that it was
during the effectivity of the Civil Code of 1889.
Sec. 131 of CC of 1889 requires that the
recognition of a natural child be made in the
record of birth, in a will, or in some other public
document.
- Public documents are those authenticated by a
notary or by a competent public official, with
formalities required by law. The two classes of
public documents are:
o Executed by private individuals which must
be authenticated by notaries (MARRIAGE
CONTRACTS WOULD FALL UNDER THIS
CATEGORY)
o Those issued by competent public officials
by reason of their office
- Marriage contract presented by Felisa does not
satisfy the requirements of solemnity prescribed
by article 131 of the CC of 1889. There was no
intervention of a notary.
- The marriage contract is a mere declaration by the
contracting parties, in the presence of the person
solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of
legal age, that they take each other as husband
and wife, signed by signature or mark by the said
contracting parties and the said witnesses, and
attested by the person solemnizing the marriage.
2. WON Uy is entitled to the inheritance. NO
- The title is in the name of Susana Lim, and oral
testimony cannot overcome the fact that the sale
was made to Susana Lim and title issued in her
favor
- Implied trust arises where a person purchases land
with his own money and takes conveyance thereof
in the name of another. The property is held on a
resulting trust in favor of the one furnishing the
consideration for the transfer unless a different
intention or understanding appears.
- Uy raised the theory of implied trust in favor of her
husband for the first time in her motion for
reconsideration filed with the appellate court and
evidence regarding the purchase by her husband
is altogether unconvincing.
HEIRS OF RAYMUNDO BAÑAS v HEIRS OF
BIBIANO BAÑAS (1985)
134 SCRA 260
- Raymundo was the child of Dolores Castillo and
an unknown father. Upon Raymundo’s death, his
heirs filed for partition of recovery of hereditary
share against the heirs of Bibiano, claiming that
Raymundo was a recognized natural son of
Bibiano.
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Faustina Bibiano Pedro ♥ Dolores
♥ marriages with three different women and sired
Trinidad, niece of Raymund
Faustina ♥ o - Maria del Rosario
PETITIONER’S C O U R T
EVIDENCE S A Y S
CC 278 provides for “authentic
handwriting” which is a private
document thus acknowledgement
Handwritten note of the child in such instrument
alledgedly written by should not be incidental but
Bibiano to the 18 yo explicit. The complimentary ending
Raymundo with a might be due to the close relations
complimentary Raymundo enjoyed with his
ending “su padre” uncle/guardian Bibiano; there is no
clear expression of
acknowledgement of filiation.
Paternal solicitude ≠ paternity
Bibiano signed these documents as
guardian of Raymundo while he is
School records, growing up since the latter spent
report cards, school for his education because Pedro
receipts for (the real father) is unable to
matriculation all support him; thus it is natural that
signed and paid by Bibiano signs as the guardian even
Bibiano more so that Raymundo spent
most his lifetime in Bibiano and
Fautina’s care
Typewritten letters to
Atty. Faustino alleging
This typewritten evidence taken
his personal
into account the contradicting
circumstance; as well
testimony of Raymundo’s wife
as typewritten
Trinidad casts doubt to the
autobiography
authenticity of these “personal
asserting that his
accounts” of Raymundo
father is a surgeon
Bibiano Bañas
RESPONDENT’S C O U R T
EVIDENCE S A Y S
A public instrument
A sworn affidavit duly explicitly stating Pedro is the
notarized and executed by father of Raymundo is
Bibiano Banas declaring strong evidence that he
that Raymundo Banas is his does not acknowledge or
brother, Pedro’s son have the intention thereof
that the latter is his son
A sworn JOINT affidavit duly If Raymundo really believed
notarized and executed by that he is indeed the son of
Raymundo and Pedro Banas Bibiano he could not have
correcting an error made on consented to executing such
the marriage certificate of declaration; Trinidad’s
the former changing the contention of the document
father of Raymundo from was contradictory and
“Bibiano” to “Pedro” therefore set aside.
*Ma’am Beth does not buy the interpretation of “Your
Father” as a reference term for an uncle.
UYGUANGCO v CA – See Illegitimate Filiation
MARIATEGUI v CA (1992)
205 SCRA 675
Lupo Mariategui during his lifetime contracted three
three sets of children.
First: with Eusebia Montellano, 4 kids
- Baldomera: died, survived by kids surnamed
Espina
- Urbana
- Ireneo: died, left a son, Ruperto
Second: with Flaviana Montellano, one daughter,
Cresciana
Third: with Felipa Velasco, 3 kids: Jacinto, Julian,
Paulina
He died intestate and the children from his 1st and
2nd marriages excluded the children from the 3rd
marriage in the extra-judicial partition of Lupo’s
properties.
ISSUES:
1. WON prescription barred private respondents’
right to demand partition of Lupo’s estate.
2. WON the private respondents, who belatedly
filed the action for recognition, were able to
prove their successional rights of over the
estate.
 What is the nature of the complaint filed by the
private respondents.
HELD: The children from the third marriage
continuously possessed the status of legitimate
children. Filiation of legitimate children may be
established by the record of birth appearing in the
civil registrar, a final judgment or by the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child.
1) WON prescription barred private respondents’
right to demand partition of Lupo’s estate.
Since they are legit kids and heirs of Lupo, the
time limitation prescribed in Art 258 for filing an
action for recognition is inapplicable. Prescription
doesn’t run against private respondents w/ respect
to the filing of the action for partition so long as the
heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked,
haven’t expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-
ownership. Prescription of an action for partition
doesn’t lie except when the co-ownership is properly
repudiated by the co-owner.
A co-owner can’t acquire by prescription the
share of the other co-owner absent a clear
repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to
the other co-owners.
Also, an action to demand partition is
imprescriptible & can’t be barred by laches. It is at
once an action for declaration of co-ownership & for
segregation & conveyance of a certain property.
No valid repudiation was made by the
petitioners. Assuming the petitioner’s registration of
the subject lot was an act of repudiation of co-
ownership, prescription hasn’t set in when private
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respondents filed in 1973 the present action for
partition. The registration didn’t operate as a valid
repudiation of the co-ownership.
SC stated that “prescription, as a mode of
terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have
been preceded by repudiation w/c subject to certain
conditions:
1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership
2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made
known to the other co-owners
3) the evidence thereon is clear & conclusive
4) he has been in possession thru open,
continuous, exclusive & notorious
possession of the prop for a period
required by law
Inasmuch as petitioners registered the prop in
their names in fraud of their co-heirs, prescription
can only be deemed to have commenced from the
time private respondents discovered the petitioner’s
act of defraudation. And this action was commenced
2 months after learning petitioners had registered in
their names the lots involved to the prejudice of
private respondents.
2) WON the private respondents, were able to prove
their successional rights over the estate. YES
FC has to apply since it is effective already. And
under Art 172, filiation of legit kids may be
established by the record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment or by the open &
continuous possession of the status of a legit kid.
Evidence proves the private respondents legit
filiation. Jacinto’s birth cert was presented. Though
Julian and Paulina didn’t present evidence required
by Art 172, they continuously enjoyed the status as
kids of Lupo in the same manner as Jacinto. And for a
considerable length of time & despite the death of
their mom, they lived with Lupo until his death.
ACEBEDO v ARQUERO (2003)
399 SCRA 10
- Edwin Acebedo charged Eddie Arquero for
immorality in an administrative complaint. He
alleged that his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo and
respondent unlawfully cohabited as husband and
wife as a result of which a girl, Desiree May
Irader Arquero, was born to the two.
- Attached was the birth certificate of the girl
indicating her parents to be Arquero and Dedjoe.
He also presented a copy of their marriage
contract.
- Arquero vehemently denied the charge of
immorality, claiming that it is “just a mere
harassment and a product of complainant’s
hatred and extreme jealousy to his wife.” He
presented a sworn statement wherein Edwin
Acebedo (complainant) acknowledged paternity
of a child born out of wedlock, which documents,
respondent claims, support his contention that
the complaint filed against him is but a malicious
scheme concocted by complainant to harass
him. He also said that the complainant was
cohabiting with another woman.
- MTC recommended that the complaint be
dismissed for failure to adduce adequate
evidence to show that respondent is guilty of the
charge
- Memorandum by the Office of the Court
Administrator disagreeing with the
recommendation of the Investigating Judge that
the case should be dismissed, recommends that
respondent be held guilty of immorality and that
he be suspended from office for a period of one
(1) year without pay.
ISSUE: WON Arquero can be suspended due to
immorality.
RATIO: Yes.
- The entry of respondent’s name as father in the
baptismal certificate of Desiree May I. Arquero
cannot be used to prove her filiation and,
therefore, cannot be availed of to imply that
respondent maintained illicit relations with Dedje
Irader Acebedo.
- A baptismal certificate merely attests to the fact
which gave rise to its issue, and the date
thereof, to wit, the fact of the administration of
the sacrament on the date stated, but not the
truth of the statements therein as to the
parentage of the child baptized.
- Arquero admitted that he had an illicit
relationship with the wife of the complainant
- Arquero justified his pursuing a relationship with
complainant’s wife with the spouses having
previously entered into a settlement with respect
to their marriage which was embodied in a
“Kasunduan”.
- This justification fails because Arquero, being an
employee of the judiciary, knows that the
Kasunduan has no force and effect because
Article 1 of the FC provides: marriage is “an
inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation.” It is an
institution of public order or policy, governed by
rules established by law which cannot be made
inoperative by the stipulation of the parties.
- RA 6713, otherwise known as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees, enunciates the State’s policy of
promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service
- Although every office in the government service
is a public trust, no position exacts a greater
demand for moral righteousness and uprightness
from an individual than in the judiciary.
- Arguero’s act of having illicit relations with the
complainant’s wife is a disgraceful and immoral
conduct.
- Under Rule IV, Section 52A (15) of the Revised
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, an immoral conduct is classified as
a grave offense which calls for a penalty of
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to
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one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal is
imposed for the second offense. Since it is his
first offense, his suspension for six (6) months
and one (1) day is in order.
HERRERA v ALBA (2005)
460 SCRA 197
- Armi Alba instituted an action for support,
damages and compulsory recognition against
Rosendo Herrera on behalf of her 13 year old son
Rosendo Alba.
- Respondent requested for DNA testing to
determine her son’s paternal relation to Herrera,
which RTC granted.
- Herrera appealed assailing that compulsory DNA
testing violates his constitutional right against
self-incrimination
- CA: right against self-incrimination applies only
to testimonial compulsion and affirmed the order
to DNA
ISSUE: WON DNA testing is a valid test for paternity
in this jurisdiction
HELD: Yes. DNA testing has probative value in this
jurisdiction owing to its growing accuracy in
establishing matches between a parent and an
offspring. However, it should take not of the
following things:
1. how the samples were collected and handled
2. the possibility of contamination of samples
3. the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples
4. whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the
tests
5. qualification of the analysts who conducted
the test
The policy of the FC to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of the paternity and filiation of children,
especially legitimate children is without prejudice to
the right of the putative parent to claim his or her
own defenses.
FOUR SIGNIFICANT PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF A
TRADITIONAL PATERNITY
1. prima facie case – that the woman had
sexual relation with the putative father
2. affirmative defense – show physical
incapability or sexual relations OR sexual
relation with other men at the time of
conception
3. presumption of legitimacy
4. physical resemblance between father and
child
2. Action to claim legitimacy
FC, Art 173 The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by
transmitted to the heirs should the child die during the minor
heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute a
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notw
parties.
The right of a child to claim legitimacy may only be
transferred to the heirs under two cases and within 5
years:
1. if the child dies during minority
2. if the child dies in a state of insanity
*The effect of legitimacy claim extends the
successional rights
3. Rights of legitimate children
FC, Art 174 Legitimate children shall have the right:
1. to bear the surnames of the father and the mother,
surname
2. to receive support from their parents, their ascendants
in conformity with the provisions of this Code on Suppo
3. to be entitled to the legitimate and other successional
*Ma’am Beth’s mnemonics: 3s - support, surname,
succession
*The child’s use of his/her father’ surname indicates
the family to which he/she belongs. Hence, it is
mandatory for the child to do so.
REPUBLIC v CA & VICENCIO (1998)
300 SCRA 138
- Cynthia Vicencio was born on 19 January 1971 at
the Capitol Medical Center, Quezon City to
spouses Pablo Castro Vicencio and Fe Esperanza
de Vega Leabres.
- They lived in Meycauayan, Bulacan and Pablo
left the said abode on 10 January 1972 after a
quarrel with Fe and from then on was never seen
or heard from. Neither was any support for his
family ever received from him.
- 29 June 1976, Fe Esperanza petitioned for the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership which
was granted. On 11 July 1977 Fe petitioned to
drop the surname of her estranged husband, it
was approved. On 26 April 1986, Pablo was
judicially declared as an absentee.
- Fe married Ernesto Yu on 15 April 1986, with
then Mandaluyong City Mayor Benjamin Abalos
Sr. solemnizing the ceremony.
- Cynthia grew up treating Yu as her father and Yu
treated her as his own daughter. Confusion and
embarrassment was caused by her use of the
surname Vicencio when his stepfather is
surnamed Yu.
- She was made to use the surname Yu when she
joined two beauty pageants, where the use was
with the consent of her stepfather. – When
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Cynthia petitioned for a change in surname, the
stepfather openly declared his consent. The Trial
Court decided in her favor and Appellate Court
upheld, both saying that granting her request
would be for the best interest of Cynthia
- SG opposed saying that even if it would ‘improve
her personality,’ there was no valid, proper, and
reasonable cause to grant her request. It would
generate complicated problems especially with
regards to problems of inheritance since her
status will be affected. They say, Ernesto could
have adopted her instead of Cynthia coming to
court with this petition.
ISSUE: WON appellate court erred in affirming trial
court’s decision allowing the change of private
respondent’s surname with that of her stepfather.
HELD: Yes. A change of name is a privilege, not a
matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of
the court, which has the duty to consider carefully
the consequences of a change of name and to deny
the same unless weighty reasons are shown.
Confusion might arise with regard to private
respondent’s parentage because of her surname.
But even more confusion with grave legal
consequences could arise if we allow private
respondent to bear her step-father’s surname, even
if she is not legally adopted by him. A legitimate
child must use the surname of his/her father.
DE ASIS v CA (1999)
303 SCRA 176
- Vircel Andres, mother and legal guardian of her
son Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action
for support and maintenance against the alleged
father Manuel de Asis. Manueld denied filiation.
Vircel agreed to compromise that she would not
pursue the case if Manuel will withdraw his
counterclaim. After six years, Vircel filed an
action for support and maintenance of her son.
HELD: The right to support cannot be the subject of
compromise. The action for support cannot be
barred by res judicata. The ratio behind the
prohibition against waving the right to future support
is the need to maintain one’s existence. Paternity
and filiation (or lack of it) must be judicially
established and it is for the court to declare its
existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or
agreement of the parties. The agreement entered
into by the petitioner and respondent’s mother for
the dismissal of the complaint for maintenance and
support, which is in the nature of a compromise,
cannot be countenanced. The right to receive
support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to
a third person as per Art 301 CC. Also, future support
cannot be the subject of a compromise as in Art
2035.
** Legitime of a legitimate child: half of the parents’
estate divided by the number of legitimate children.
C. Illegitimate Children
Generally, illegitimate children are those born of
parents who are not united by a valid marriage.
Under the CC, there were three main groups of
illegitimate children:
1. Natural children
2. Natural children by legal fiction
3. Spurious children
o adulterous
o incestuous
o sacrilegious – born of persons who are
disqualified to marry by reason of
religious profession
o manceres – those born of prostitutes
Under our law, there is no disqualification to marry
on the ground of religious profession. And we also
have no law which automatically classifies children
of prostitutes as illegitimate.
FC abolished all distinctions between illegitimate
children such that there are only two categories of
children today: legitimate and illegitimate.
However, an informal distinction between two groups
of illegitimate children was established:
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1. those conceived of parents who have no
legal impediment to marry at the time of the
conception  may be legitimated
2. all other illegitimate children
1. Proof of filiation
FC, Art 175 Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation indaughter
evidence as legitimate children. (Art 172)
The action must be brought within the same period specifiedthat in Art Alicia’s evidences
extinguished by death of either parties), except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Art
172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime
Why must the action be brought during the
lifetime of the putative parent in Par 2? Since
there might still be a question as to whether the
child is really the illegitimate child of the alleged
parent or not, the latter must be given an
opportunity to contest the action, and this he or she
can only do if the action is filed during his or her
lifetime.
Ma’am Beth asks: “How would illegitimate children
know they are illegitimate if they have always been
living with the family? The only time they’d learn
they do are not entitled to their parent’s estate is
when they die. Only Sempio-Diy knows that rule,
mortals don’t!”
COMPARED WITH THE CC PROVISION ON PROVING
ILLEGITIMATE FILIATION: Art 285 provided for
exceptions in the prescription for recognition of
natural children, FC removed this provision in Par 2,
Art 175. (Uyguangco v CA)
1. If the father or the mother died during the
minority of the child, in which case the latter
may file the action before the expiration of
four years from the attainment of his
majority.
2. If after the death of the father or of the
mother a document should appear of which
nothing had been heard and in which either
or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within 4
years from the finding of the document.
HOW TO BRING ACTION TO CLAIM FILIATION
1. File a separate action
2. Intervene in the settlement of estate of
his/her alleged parent
LEUTERIO v CA (1991)
197 SCRA 369
- Ma. Alicia Leuterio claims that she is the natural
daughter of Pablo Leuterio and Ana Maglangque,
who was the servant of the former.
- Alicia claims that she was conceived at the time
when her parents were not disqualified to marry
each other and that she was legitimated by the
marriage of her parents nine years after her
birth.
- Around four months after Pablo’s marriage to
Ana, Pablo died so she took possession of Pablo’s
estate and its administration,
- Pablo’s siblings objected and prayed for the
administration and succession rights be
transferred to them alleging that Pablo died a
widower and that the allegation that Alicia was a
legitimated
the same is
waywithout
and onfoundation
the same in
fact and law.
- The lower court affirmed this conclusion and said
173 (lifetime arechild,
of the insufficient, being
will not be
forged and incompetent
- There
wasalleged
of the no document
parent. to show that petitioner
had been supported by the deceased in his
lifetime. There were neither receipts of payment
of school fees in the name of Pablo nor
signatures in school cards and letters to relatives
or friends naming Maria Alicia as daughter.
- The baptismal certificate and birth certificate do
not bear express acknowledgment of petitioner
as a child of the deceased.
- As proof of filiation, petitioner claimed that she
was in the uninterrupted possession of the status
of a natural child of the decedent and her
mother.
- CA affirmed the lower court’s findings
ratiocinating that it is not unusual if Pablo looked
upon Maria as if she were his own daughter
because he had no child in his previous
marriage.
ISSUE: WON Alicia is the legitimated daughter of
Pablo and Ana
HELD: No. CA decision was affirmed. The relief of
petitioner is that of involuntary recognition which
may be given if there is incontrovertible paper
written by the parent expressly recognizing his
paternity. The recognition must be precise, express
and solemn. The photographs she presented likewise
did not bear the decedent’s signature. She was also
not a legitimated daughter.
UYGUANGCO v CA (1989)
178 SCRA 684
- Graciano Uyguangco claims that he is the
illegitimate son of the late Apolinario Uyguangco
who died intestate. Graciano admits having no
documents to prove his filiation but claims to be
in continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child.
- He moved to Misamis Oriental where Apolinario
supported his education and even hired him as a
storekeeper in their store without objection of
the family. He was allowed to use the surname
and shared in the profits of the copra business.
ISSUE: WON he should be allowed to prove that he is
an illegitimate child of his claimed father, who is
already dead, in the absence of the documentary
evidence required by the CC.
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HELD: The action to prove illegitimate filiation is
barred. Since Graciano seeks to prove filiation based
on Par 2 of Art 172 FC, it should take place during
the lifetime of the parent. His action is barred
because of the death of his father. Art 283 CC which
gives weight to “continuous possession of the status
of a child of his alleged father by the direct acts of
the latter or his family” has been superseded by Art
175 FC.
RODRIGUEZ v CA (1995)
245 SCRA 150
- On Oct. 15, 1986, Clarito Agbulos filed a case
against Bienvenido Rodriguez. He presented his
mother as witness to reveal the identity of his
father.
- Counsel for Rodriguez objected and the Trial
Court sustained.
- Clarito filed a petition in the SC and the SC
referred the case to the CA. That decision is
assailed in this case.
- Petitioner: Felicitas shouldn’t be allowed to
reveal the name of the father as stated in Art.
280 of the Civil Code:
When the father or the mother
makes the recognition separately, he
or she shall not reveal the name of
the person with whom he or she had
the child; neither shall she state any
circumstance whereby the other
party may be identified.
- Respondent: Fecilitas should be allowed by :
1. Art 283(4) CC: The father is obliged to
recognize the child as his natural child when
the child has in his favor any evidence or
proof that the defendant is his father
2. Sec 30, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court: A witness can testify only to those
facts which he knows of his own knowledge,
that is, which are derived from his own
perception, except as otherwise provided in
these rules
ISSUE: WON the testimony of the mother
admissible for compulsory recognition.
HELD: Yes. Prohibition in A280, against the
identification of the father or mother of a child apply
only in voluntary & not in compulsory recognition.
The said laws were repealed by the FC. Art 172 FC
states that filiation may be proved by any evidence
and proof that the defendant is his father.
ARUEGO v CA (1996)
254 SCRA 711
- Jose Aruego while married had an extra-marital
relationship with Luz Fabian in 1959 until his
death in March 1982. Allegedly born to this
amorous relationship were Antonia and Evelyn,
both surnamed Aruego.
Page 125 of 170
- In 1983, Luz Fabian filed a complaint for the
compelled recognition of her children as
compulsory heirs of the deceased on the
grounds of open and continuous possession of
the status of illegitimate children.
- RTC declared only Antonia as the illegitimate
daughter of Jose Aruego and entitled to her
share in the estate
ISSUE:
1. WON Family Code provisions apply in instant
case
2. WON application of Family Code in this case
prejudice or impair vested right of respondent
should FC be given retroactive effect
3. WON trial court lost jurisdiction when FC took
effect.
HELD:
1. No. The suit was filed prior to the effectivity of
FC, thus CC provisions still apply. Art 285 CC
governs the case and not Art 175 Par 2 FC.
2. YES. If FC prevails over CC in the choice of
which should govern, it would prejudice
Antonia’s right which was vested upon her by
virtue of Art. 285, through the above-
mentioned suit for recognition.
3. NO. Since CC still governs the case, trial court
never lost its original jurisdiction.
What is your understanding of a vested right?
It is not defined in Art 256 FC because it should be
on a case to case basis, taking into account all the
circumstances and facts. Subsequent change of law
should not affect the available cause of action.
JISON v CA (1998)
286 SCRA 495
- Monina Jison alleged that she is the illegitimate
daughter of Francisco Jison. Francisco denied
paternity.
- While married to Lilia Jison, Francisco
impregnated the nanny of his eldest daughter,
Esperanza Amolar. The child was born and
enjoyed the continuous and implied recognition
as an illegitimate child.
is - Francisco spent for her education until she
became a CPA and eventually worked as Central
Bank examiner. It was her father who paid for
the burial expenses for her mother’s death. And
it was through filiation with her father that she
previously was able to seek employment at
Miller & Cruz in Bacolod City.
- She was able to name the members of the Jison
household as well as the staff in her father’s
office. She also claimed knowing the 3 children
of Francisco and Lilia. The last time she saw her
father was when she sought his blessings to get
married.
- In sum, Monina’s evidence and testimonies
showed that
a. she was close with Francisco’s relatives
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b. she received P15 as monthly allowance from
her father coursed through accountants of
his office
c. her filiation was known in the Jison office &
household
d. her allowance was not recorded in the books
but in a separate cash book because it had
to be hidden from Mrs Jison and children
e. that she even asked for a Christmas gift from
her godfather, Don Vicente, father of Mrs
Jison
- When Monina wanted to go to Spain, her father
negotiated that in exchange for the expenses,
she would sign a document that denies her
being a daughter.
HELD: Monina proved her filiation. She has open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child. Her witnesses (she had 11) established her
claims. However, Monina cannot rely on her birth
certificate in the Local Registrar where Francisco is
named as her father. Neither can she rely on her
baptismal certificate naming Francisco as her father.
There was no showing that Francisco had anything to
do with the filing of said certificates. Moreover, Art
172 provides the various forms of evidence w/c may
be presented. Monina was able to present a “high
standard of proof” which was coherent, logical and
natural as compared to Francisco’s evidence which
was barren and mostly denials.
As regards the issue that there was opportunity for
Monina’s mother to have slept with other men during
the time she conceived Monina, Francisco had the
burden of proof which he failed to deliver. The issue
of whether sexual intercourse actually occurred
inevitably redounds to the victim’s or mother’s word,
as against the protestation of the accused or
putative’s father. Although Pansay unfortunately
passed away and therefore cannot testify, this does
not mean that Monina could no longer prove her
filiation. Since it was established that Pansay was
still employed under Francisco at the time Monina
was conceived, sexual contact between Pansay and
him was not at all impossible, especially in the light
of the overwhelming evidence. Francisco is Monina’s
father and she was conceived at the time Pansay
worked for him. He recognized Monina as his child
through his overt acts and conduct as was found by
CA and such recognition has been consistently
shown and manifested throughout the years publicly,
spontaneously, continuously and in an uninterrupted
manner. Moreover, if Monina were not his illegitimate
daughter, it would have been unnecessary for
Francisco to have gone to such great lengths in order
that Monina denounce her filiation. Monina filed her
action well within the period granted her by a
positive provision of law. A denial of her action on
ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and
unjust. Petition denied. Challenged CA decision
affirmed.
ALBERTO v CA (1994)
232 SCRA 745
Ma. Theresa Alberto claims that she has been in
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child of the late Juan Alberto and is entitled to a
share in his estate. The following are the proofs
used:
1. Juan & Aurora were sweethearts prior to
Juan’s marriage to Yolanda
2. Juan gave money to Aurora thru Fr. Arcilla,
Juan’s first cousin
3. Juan gave Theresa money for her schooling
4. Juan made known to his friends & relatives
that she was his daughter
5. He made known to personnel of International
School where Theresa was enrolled that she
was his daughter
6. Juan’s younger sister, Mrs. Aurita Solidum,
asked Theresa to be sent to her house to
meet her dad for the first time when Theresa
was 9.
7. Fr. Arcilla brought Theresa to Juan’s bedside
in the hospital when he was shot & asked
guards to give way to her as she was a
member of the family.
8. Juan’s step mom, Saturnina Alberto,
introduced Theresa to one of Juan’s daughter
(her half-sister). She was introduced as an
elder sister.
9. Aurora testified that her giving birth to
Theresa was due to an indiscretion and that
Mrs. Solidum did arrange mtg bet Theresa &
Juan
10. Theresa testified that:
a. her dad gave her P500.00 on their first
meeting along with two phone numbers
where he could be reached.
b. She met him several times after the first
meeting and he gave him money during
those times too
c. Dad visited her in IS twice. IS is very
strict when it comes to visitors & by
allowing Juan to see Theresa, this shows
that he was identified by the school
personnel as Theresa’s dad.
d. Dad promised to see her in school during
her 14th birthday which didn’t happen
because he was gunned down.
e. Her uncles and aunts (bros and sis) of
her dad regarded her as their niece &
she was introduced as Juan’s eldest
daughter. The children of Juan’s bros and
sis likewise recognized her as their
cousin.
11. Jose Tablizo testified that there was a strong
physical resemblance bet Juan & Theresa &
they wrote similarly too. He further stated
that it was known among Juan’s friends (the
Breeze Gang) that Theresa was Juan’s
daughter and that Juan proudly showed him
Theresa’s report card w/high grades.
12. Atty. Martiniano Vivo testified that Juan’s
lawyer, Immigrations Commissioner
Edmundo Reyes discussed w/him Juan’s
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letter saying that he was not denying that he
was Theresa’s dad and due to his marital
status & since he was a public official, he
wanted to avoid public scandal thus support
will be given quietly thru Fr. Arcilla.
- CA reversed decision. It was not satisfied that
Theresa was in continuous possession of status
of natural child of deceased. Bases:
1. Case wherein 2 nurses took care of kids at
the expense of alleged dad, that he kissed
kids, called them sons, gave money for their
necessities, they called him dad & was
publicly regarded as dad of the children but
Court held that they were insufficient basis
for a declaration of paternity. CA finds
Theresa’s evidence weaker than this. Dad
may have been convinced of his paternity
but they don’t show his intent to place kids
in possession of status of natural children.
2. Theresa’s letter to Jose Tablizo wherein she
wrote of how proud she is of her dad & how
she only knew him as a big man & that his
friends like Tablizo who knew him well & she
envied them for having that privilege. (see p.
751). CA claims that the letter gave the
impression that Juan distanced himself from
Theresa.
- Yolanda denied that Juan ever recognized
Theresa as his daughter. She presented letters
sent by Aurora to Juan & Fr. Arcilla as proof that
Juan refused to recognize Theresa. In one letter
Aurora complained that Juan didn’t give a damn
to Theresa & she mentioned that the child was
graduating from Prep School. Letter likewise
stated that she waited for the money for support
& that she was grateful for the P300 he sent.
HELD: Theresa was able to prove her open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child.
1. Letters from Aurora: did not prove that Juan
refused to recognize Theresa, it only proved that
Aurora was having a hard time raising child on
her own and she asked for Juan’s assistance.
2. Juan never stopped Theresa from using his last
name.
3. Report card story: being discredited for hearsay
but according to SC this is w/in the exception of
the hearsay rule (Sec. 38, Rule 130, ROC).
4. Relatives of Juan recognized Theresa too.
Yolanda could have presented any of these
relatives to negate Theresa’s claims but she
failed to do so.
5. Re Theresa’s letter to Tablizo: What a poignant
novel she can now author as she seeks to
establish her parental links with her dad. There
must be questions as to why his dad didn’t
marry her mom when there were no legal
impediments at the time of her conception. Note
that under the different categories of illegitimate
children under the CC, the natural child occupies
the highest position since her parents were not
disqualified to marry during her conception.
Child is often the fruit of first love & is
entrenched firmly in her parents’ hearts. Juan
could’ve not resisted manifesting signs of
concern & care in so far as his first born is
concerned especially since child has much talent
& great promise. It’s expected that dad would
proudly step forward to claim his paternity.
Discreetness is understandable considering the
straight-laced mores of the times & the social &
political stature of Juan. But despite that, he
openly visited his daughter in school and met
with her in several occasions. Though letter may
imply lack of association, it’s understood
because their relationship was far from normal.
There’s sufficient proof that Juan acted in such
manner as to show his intent to recognize
Theresa as his own & not that he distanced
himself from her.
6. CC Art. 285: Action for recognition of natural
children may be brought only during the lifetime
of presumed parents except (1) if dad/mom died
during child’s minority, in w/c case, child may file
action before the expiration of 4 yrs from
attainment of his majority. Theresa falls w/in this
exception since she was only 14 when her dad
died. So can file an action before she reaches 25
(4 years after age of majority w/c was 21 then).
So she had until Sept. 18, 1978 to file the action.
And she filed the present action on Sept. 15,
1978, 3 days before the expiration of the 4-year
period.
GUY v CA (2006)
502 SCRA 151
- Sima Wei died intestate in Makati City on
October 1992, leaving 10M worth of real and
personal properties
- His known heirs are his surviving spouse and
Shirley Guy and children
- Private respondents (minors Karen and Kamille
Wei), represented by their mother Remedios filed
a petition and prayed for the appointment of a
regular administrator for the orderly settlement
of Sima Wei’s estate.
- Petitioners prayed for the dismissal of the
petition of Remedios on the following grounds:
1. That Sima Lei left no debts and there is
therefore no need to secure letters of
administration
2. That private respondents should have
established their status as illegitimate
children during the lifetime of Sima Wei
3. That private respondent’s claim had been
paid, waived and abandoned or otherwise
extinguished by reason of Remedios’
RELEASE AND WAIVER CLAIM stating that in
exchange for the financial educational
assistance received from petitioner,
Remedios and her minor children discharge
the estate of Sima Wei from any and all
liabitilities
ISSUES:
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1. WON the Release and Waiver of Claim
precludes private respondents from claiming
their successional rights
2. WON private respondents are barred by
prescription from proving their filiation
HELD:
1. No. A waiver may not be attributed to a person
when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an
intent to abandon a right. The document does not
state with clarity the purpose for its execution.
Parents and guardians may not also repudiate the
inheritance of their wards without judicial approval.
Not having been judicially authorized, the Release
and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and
will not bar private respondents from asserting their
rights as heirs of the deceased. It must also be
emphasized that waiver is the intentional
relinquishment of a known right. Private respondents
could not have possible waived their successional
rights because they are yet to prove their status as
acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased.
2. A ruling in the same would be premature
considering respondents have yet to present
evidences to prove their filiation. It is the duty of the
trial court.
AGUSTIN v CA (2005)
460 SCRA 315
- Arnel Agustin had an extramarital affair with Fe
Prollamante which produced the child named
Martin. Arnel suggested to have the pregnancy
aborted which Fe refused.
- Arnel allegedly took care of all the medical bills
in Martin’s birth and even signed his birth
certificate as the father. However, in the long
run, Arnel failed to give sustenance despite his
adequate financial capacity.
- Fe, afflicted with leukemia, sues Arnel for
support. They also moved for DNA testing to
prove their cause of action.
ISSUES:
1. WON complaint for support can be converted
to a petition for recognition
2. WON DNA paternity testing can be ordered
in a proceeding for support without violating
petitioner’s constitutional right to privacy
and right against self-incrimination
HELD:
1. The action does not amount to conversion.
Rather, the DNA was necessity to establish
the respondent’s cause of action. Also, even
if the order would effect the establishment of
filiation, the integration of the two actions is
still lawful because the resolution of one
issue necessary in the determination of the
other issue.
2. No. Right to self-incrimination is considered
only in written and verbal compulsion.
IN RE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF
DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO
RUSTIA (2006)
480 SCRA 334
Lucio Felisa Ramon Osorio
Campo
Guillerm Josefa Nazario Luis
o Edilberta
Jose
Guillermina & Nanie
Jacoba
Guillerma
Gorgonio
(illegitimate child
with Amparo
Sagarbarria)
This case involves the partition of the estate of
decedent Guillermo and Josefa Delgado. The two
groups contending the right of inheritance are the
heirs of Josefa Delgado (her half and full-blood
siblings and their descendants) and the heirs of
Guillermo Delgado (his siblings and their
descendants, his illegitimate child and de facto
adopted child). Josefa died before Guillermo, both
intestate. The existence of their marriage is also
under question.
1. HEIRS OF JOSEFA DELGADO. Felisa had seven
children fathered by two men, all the births were out
of wedlock. In effect the children belong to the
illegitimate line.
2. HEIRS OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA. He had an
illegitimate child named Guillerma with Amparo
Sagarbarria. However, in his petition for adoption of
his ampun-ampunan Guillermina, he declared that
he had “no legitimate, legitimated or acknowledge
natural child.”
ISSUES:
1. WON Guillermo and Josefa were validly
married
2. Who the legal heirs of the decedents are
1. Their cohabitation of 50 years cannot be
doubted. By presumption of law, there
existed valid marriage between them.
Marriage contract is not the only proof of
marriage. The baptismal certificate wherein
Josefa was referred to as “señorita” has no
legal bearing.
2. Because of the declaration of Luis as the
“natural child of Felisa”, it was established
that no marriage took place between Ramon
Osorio and her. Given that, illegitimate
siblings, whether half or full blood can
reciprocally inherit from each other. Only the
collateral relatives (and their heirs by their
right of representation) of Josefa who are
alive at the time of her death are entitled to
a share in her estate.
3. Guilllerma’s right to compulsory recognition
prescribed upon the death of her putative
father because her open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate
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child is only a ground for compelling
acknowledgement. The obituary written by
Guillermo for Josefa which includes her as his
child does not pass as genuine writing. Same
goes for the ampun-ampunan Guillermina.
As a result, Guillermo’s compulsory heirs are
his collateral relatives.
ESTATE OF ROGELIO ONG v DIAZ (2007)
540 SCRA 480
- Jinky sued for the determination of her minor
child Joanne’s filiation via DNA testing for claim
of support.
- Despite her marriage with Hasegawa Katsuo, she
maintained illicit affair with Rogelio Ong. She got
impregnated, and Rogelio Ong covered all the
medical bills and baptismal expenses until he cut
off the support and said that the child was not
his.
- During the pendency of the case, Rogelio died.
ISSUES:
1. WON the court erred in not declaring Joanne
as the legitimate child of Hasegawa and
Jinky
2. WON DNA analysis is still feasible
notwithstanding the death of Rogelio Ong
HELD:
1. No. The presumption of legitimacy of the child is
not conclusive and may be overthrown by evidence
to the contrary. Further, the resolution of the second
issue will render the issue moot.
2. Yes. Rogelio’s death does not ipso facto negate
the application of DNA testing for as long as there
exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.
Biological samples means any organic material
originating from a person’s body, even if found in
inanimate objects.
*This was decided differently, deviated from the rule
that only the husband can raise or impugn the
child’s legitimacy. Mam is in favor of this ruling.
2. Rights of illegitimate children
FC, Art 176 Illegitimate children shall use the surname and sh
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expres
record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an ad
handwritten instrument is made by the father. PROVIDED, the
before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifeti
shall consist one-half of the legitimate child. *As amended by R
IN CC: recognition of the father was required before
illegitimate child can use his surname.
IN FC: regardless of recognition, illegitimate child
shall use mother’s surname.
RA 9255: reverts to the CC rule which allows
illegitimate children to use father’s surname subject
to the father’s recognition.
* RA 9255 was authored by Sen. Ramon Revilla who
is known for having at least 85 children of legal age.
(Read: the number does not include minor children.)
* The problem with this law is that it takes out of the
picture the role of women.
DAVID v CA (1995)
250 SCRA 82
Ramon villar, a married man, had three children with
his secretary Daisie David. Ramon recognized the
children as his. Ramon refused to return Christopher
then 6 years old and his youngest child after a trip to
Boracay. He also enrolled him in a school. Daisy filed
a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher.
HELD: Christopher, as an illegitimate child, is under
the parental authority of his mother. That the
husband can provide the needs of the son better is
not an argument against the mother’s custody. The
fact that Ramon recognized the child may be a
ground for him to give support but not for giving him
custody of the child.
PEOPLE v NAMAYAN (1995)
246 SCRA 646
- The accused Tortillano Namayan raped Margie
Pagaygay, 21 years old but is slightly retarded
with a mental age of 3-7 years old.
- The bulging stomach indicating pregnancy
became evident. Margie says that Namayan
raped her on several occasions while she was
fetching water from the artesian well.
- Namayan denied all allegations purporting that
at the time specified, he was serving time in jail.
However, the jail warden admitted that he
cannot confirm WON Namayan was indeed in jail
because it was not his responsibility to look after
the prisoners. In fact, some of the detainees are
allowed to go out at the discretion of the guard.
ISSUES & RULING:
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1. WON it was physically impossible for Namayan to
be the father of the child. NO
- On July 30, 1991 Margie was found to be 4-5
months pregnant therefore sexual intercourse
might have happened during the period between
March 15, 1991 to April 15, 1991. It was proven
that Namayan was seen outside the Municipal
Jail during the town fiesta (March 19, 1991).
Namayan was detained in a minimum security
prison and it was also stated that some prisoners
were able to go out depending on the discretion
of the guard. These facts disprove the claim of
Namayan that it could not have physically
possible for him to commit the act. Also, even if
he was released only on April 12, 1991 it would
have still been possible for him to impregnate
Margie.
2) WON compulsory acknowledgement and support
for the child is a proper remedy in this case. YES
- No legal impediment
- The crime of rape committed by Namayan
carries with it among others the obligation to
acknowledge the offspring if the character of its
origin doe not prevent it and to support the
same.
MOSSESGELD v CA (1998)
300 SCRA 464
Eleazar Calasan, a married man, signed the birth
certificate of his illegitimate son, Jonathan
Mossesgeld CAlsan. The local civil registrar refused
to register the birth certificate of Jonathan using the
surname Calasan.
HELD: Illegitimate children must use the surname of
their mother regardless of whether or not they had
been acknowledged by their fathers in the record of
birth. The father may however choose to legally
adopt the child. Once adopted, the child may use the
father’s surname.
REPUBLIC v ABADILLA (1999)
302 SCRA 358
- Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino begot
two children during their common law
relationship. The children’s birth certificate
indicated their surnames as Abadilla. They filed a
petition for correction/cancellation of entries to
rectify “Herson” to “Gerson” and delete the entry
in the parents’ marriage date and place. RTC
granted the petition.
- OSG interposed the RTC decision’s reversible
error in not ordering the change of minors’
surname from “Abadilla” to “Celestino”, as effect
of the deletion of the entry on marriage.
HELD: Illegitimate children shall use the surname of
their mother. The surname of the children in the
birth certificates should be changed to Celestino.
** Under RA 9255 (2004) illegitimate children may
use their father’s surname if he consents to it.
GONZALES v CA (1998)
298 SCRA 322
- Ricardo Abad died intestate. The sisters and
brothers of Ricardo alleged that they are the only
heirs of the deceased. Honoria Empaynado
(partner for 27 years), Cecilia Abad Empaynado
and Marian Abad Empaynado filed a motion
alleging that they are the acknowledged natural
children of Ricardo. There was also another
illegitimate child with Dolores Sancho named
Rosemarie Abad.
- The collateral relatives adduced the following
proofs:
o Mapua Institute of Technology enrollment
forms which did not state Jose as dead.
o Affidavits of Quiambao & Ramos claiming
that they know Jose died in 1971 & that he
was buried at the Loyola Memorial Park.
o A doctor who said Ricardo had gonorrhea
so he was sterile.
HELD: The Best evidence is Jose’s death certificate
which was not presented. Loyola Memorial Park
showed a certain JOSE BAUTISTA LIBUNAO married to
a JOSEFA REYES and not JOSE SANTOS LIBUNAO
married to HONORIA EMPAYNADO. Also, Dr. Arenas’
affidavit is inadmissible for tending to blacken
Ricardo’s reputation. The privilege of secrecy is not
abolished because of death. Respondents presented
his ITR where he declared Honoria as his legitimate
wife & the 3 as his legitimate dependents. He also
opened bank accounts for them and paid insurance
premiums. The evidence presented proved that the
three sisters are the illegitimate children of Ricardo.
Hence, they are entitled to inherit Ricardo’s estate.
Art 988 CC provides that “in the absence of
legitimate descendants and ascendants, illegitimate
children succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased.
REPUBLIC v VICENCIO (1998)
300 SCRA 138 - SUPRA
GAN v REYES (2002)
382 SCRA 357
Bernadette Pondevida wrote Augustus Caezar Gan
demanding for support for the their love child, 3 year
old Francheska Joy Pondevida, in order that she may
send the child to school. Gan denied paternity of the
chld, prompting Bernadette to institute in behalf of
her daughter a complaint for support.
HELD: In all cases involving a child, his interest and
welfare are always the paramount concerns. There
may be instances where, in view of the poverty of
the child, it would be a travesty of justice to refuse
him support until the decision of the trial court
attains finality. Cases involving child support are final
and immediately executory, even more so, cannot
be stayed by an appeal.
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TONOG v CA (2002)
376 SCRA 523
- Petitioner Dinah Tonog, a nursing student begot
a child with a physician Edgar Daguimol. The
child named Gardin Faith Tonog and the mother
resided with the Daguimol’s parents. Then, Dina
left for the US to work and the child was left in
the care of paternal grandparents and her father.
- Daguimol applied for legal guardianship of the
child, which was subsequently granted.
- Dina instituted action for remand of custody
ISSUE: WON Dina can claim custody of the child on
TYP and Art 176 FC
HELD: The custody case is not yet concluded,
meaning the court can only rule on temporary
custody. The CA did not err in allowing Edgar to
retain in the meantime parental custody over Gardin.
A child should not be wrenched from her familiar
surroundings and thrust into a strange environment
away from the people and places to which she had
apparently formed an attachment. Gardin Faith is
already 12 years old, her choice should also be given
weight. However, the decision should not be taken
against the fitness of the mother or the preference
or the father.
DE GUZMAN v PEREZ (2006)
496 SCRA 474
- Petitioner Roberto and private respondent
Shirley became sweethearts while STUDYING
LAW in UST. Their studies were interrupted when
Shirley became pregnant and gave birth to
Robby. The two, nonetheless, never got married.
- Roberto married another woman later on. He
never provided any financial support for Robby
except in two instances (1992 & 1993) when he
sent money for the schooling and when he gave
P7000.00 for the kid’s hospitalization expenses.
- Shirley, at one instance, demanded support for
Robby’s education since she was suffering some
financial problems. Roberto did not give anything
despite his fabulous wealth. He managed the De
Guzman corporations, has five luxurious cars,
owns a house in Ayala Heights Quezon City and
regularly travels abroad with his family.
- Shirley then filed criminal complaint for
abandonment against Roberto.
- Respondent’s evidence: Notarized copy of the
Gen Info Sheet of RNCD Development
Corporation showed that Roberto owned
P750,000 worth of paid-up corporate shares.
- The city prosecutor of Lipa found probable cause
to charge petitioner with neglect of child under
Art 59(4) of PD 603 in relation to Sec 10(a) of RA
7610
- Roberto filed a petition for review with the Sec of
Justice who then affirmed City Prosecutor’s
resolution
- Petitioner’s claims: (1) He is financially incapable
as all the alleged properties belong to his father.
His share was also in reality his dad’s; (2) Robby
is not a neglected child since his education was
provided by Shirley and her relatives
ISSUE: WON a parent who fails/refuses to do his part
in providing his child the education his financial
station in life and condition may permit, be charged
criminally for neglect of child under Art 59(4) of PD
603 in relation to RA 7610
HELD: Petitioner acknowledged Robby as his son. He
had not denied that he never contributed for his
education except in two instances. He admitted that
the boy’s education was being financed by Shirley
and her relatives. There is also a prima facie
evidence that he is financially capable as shown by
the notarized GIS.
- Roberto’s argument that "neglect attaches only
if BOTH parents are guilty of neglect does not
hold. The law is clear. The crime may be
committed by ANY parent. The law intends to
punish the neglect of any parent. The
irresponsible parent cannot exculpate himself
from the consequences of his neglect by
invoking the other parent’s faithful compliance
with his/her own parental duties.
- Petitioner, however, cannot be indicted for
violation of PD 603 in relation to RA 7610 as the
latter covers only those cases of neglect under
the former which are not covered by the RPC.
“Neglect of child” under PD 603 is also a crime
under Art 277 of the RPC. Hence, it is excluded
from the coverage of 7610
- Presumption of innocence is his favor still stands.
What has been ascertained is simply the
existence of probable cause for petitioner’s
indictment for the charge against him.
Petitioner’s guilt should still be proven beyond
reasonable doubt in a criminal case.
ZEPEDA v ZEPEDA (1963)
41 Ill App 2d 240
Plaintiff Joseph Dennis Zepeda sued his father for
causing him to be an adulterine bastard. The father
induced the mother to have sexual relations with
him with the promise of marriage despite his full
knowledge of its impossibility because he is already
married. As a result, the plaintiff suffers the
consequences of being an illegitimate child like
social stigma, inability to inherit from paternal
ancestors and deprived of the right to have a normal
home. An illegitimate very birth placed him under a
disability.
ISSUE: WON the plaintiff has cause of action
HELD: Recognition of the plaintiff’s claim means
creation of a new tort: a cause of action for a
wrongful life. Courts must take into consideration the
consequences of opening the doors of litigation
wider. Lawmaking, though inherent in the judicial
process, should not be indulged in where the result
could be as sweeping as here. The interest of the
society is so involved, the action needed to redress
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the tort could be so far-reaching, that the policy of
the State should be declared by the representatives
of the people.
ALBA v CA (2005)
465 SCRA 495 (same parties as in 460 SCRA 197)
- Rosendo Herrera seeks to delete his name as a
father and his surname from the birth certificate
of Armi Alba’s son Rosendo Alba, Jr. RTC granted
the petition and duly notified Armi of the said
decision. However, the decision notice was sent
to the wrong address.
- Armi now avers that Rosendo deliberately
provided the wrong address to prevent her from
appealing in the case. That he is well aware of
her present address because they used to live
there as common law spouses. As a result,
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction was
committed by the court.
ISSUE: WON the RTC grant to correct the entries in
Rosendo Alba’s birth certificate should be annulled
HELD: No. The petition for correction of birth
certificate is in rem so it does not require the
presence of Armi. Also, no extrinsic fraud occured
because although Armi claims that the address in
the birth certificate was erroneously entered by her
sister, her signature signifies her approval in the
entries provided. Rosendo Herrera’s payment of the
condominium unit only proves his previous
ownership and fails to establish any intimate
relations between them. The photocopied love notes
also do not have any probative value and never
proven to be the respondent’s authentic writing.
Finally, even if the court annuls the decision,
Rosendo Herrera Jr is still not eligible to retain his
surname because RA 9255 provides that an
illegitimate child shall only use his father’s surname
if the latter acknowledges his filitiation, which is not
the circumstance in this case. Therefore, Rosendo
Herrera must use his mother’s surname.
REPUBLIC v CAPOTE (2007)
514 SCRA 76
- Trinidad Capote filed a petition for the change of
name of one Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni
Nadores, a minor under her guardianship being
that the mother is in abroad.
- The minor was the illegitimate child of Corazon
Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso, born July 9,
1982, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
and as such used the name of his father despite
the absence of marriage between them
- The father never gave any support and failed to
take up his responsibilities towards the said
minor from his birth. The minor is now fully
aware of his position and likewise prays for the
same, since his mother would like to petition him
to join her in abroad, and having a different
surname without a father would cause and
inconvenience in the processing of document.
- RTC granted petition and CA affirm
ISSUE: WON the guardian may rightfully change the
minor’s name
HELD: Yes. Since private respondent has complied
with the requirements of Rule 103. Art 366 CC states
that he should take the surname of the recognizing
parent, who in the present case is the mother. Art
176 FC mandates that illegitimate children shall use
the surname of the mother. Being that the name
established filial relations it is of importance that he
change his name to affirm his status. It will erase the
impression that he was recognized by his father. The
SOG has likewise misapplied Rule 108 RC, because
such action is separate and distinct from the action
at hand. This is for the best interest of the child since
it will facilitate the reunion between him and his
mother, once she successfully petitions him.
Petitioner’s Contention: Is should be tried as an
adversarial proceeding and not a summary
proceeding. *To this the respondent has already
complied with such requirement by posting it in a
newspaper of general circulation, no opposing
petitions were put forward.
D. Legitimated Children
FC, Art 177 Only when conceived and born outside of the wed
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impe
legitimated.
LEGITIMATION remedy by means of which
illegitimate children are considered legitimate, it
being supposed that they were born in lawful
wedlock.
LEGITIMATED CHILDREN illegitimate children who are
considered legitimate because of the subsequent
marriage of their parents
In legitimation, the law makes legal what exists by
nature, while in adoption, the law creates by fiction a
relation that did not in fact exist by nature.
REQUISITES FOR LEGITIMATION
1. child was conceived AND born out of wedlock
2. the parents were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other at the time
of conception
CHILDREN WHO CANNOT BE LEGITIMATED
1. adulterous
2. incestuous
3. of marriages against public policy
4. of bigamous marriages  but can be
ADOPTED to elevate their status
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Why can’t children of adulterous relationships
cannot be legitimated?
1. rational of legitimation would be destroyed
2. unfair to legitimate children in terms of
successional rights
3. problem of public scandal
4. will destroy the sanctity of marriage
5. very scandalous, especially if the parents
marry years after the birth of the child
6. it is tantamount to tolerating what would
have been a wrong act, it would seem to be
more beneficial to the erring spouse
FC, Art 178 Legitimation shall take place by subsequent validWhen-
voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation.
CC: legitimation takes place through subsequent
marriage (Art 270) provided that the parents have
acknowledge the child before or after the marriage
FC: legitimation takes place through subsequent
marriage as long as the requisites of Art 177 are
met. The length of time between child’s birth and
the parents’ marriage does not matter.
* The status of legitimated children in void ab initio
marriages are likewise affected because no marriage
exists at all.
FC, Art 179 Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as legitimate
- Tomasa married and had a daughter, Maria
Luciano. When she was widowed, she took her
daughter with her and lived in the house that
Leon Escobar built for them. Leon visited them
almost everyday.
- He sent his sons Antonio and Fortunato to keep
them company at night. When Tomasa died,
Leon took Maria into his home until she married
and was taken by her husband to the province.
Leon Escobar died, then Fortunato became ill.
Antonio wrote to Maria to return to Manila to
nurse Fortunato, even sending money for
passage.
Fortunato
marriage died,
between AntonioThe
parents. took Maria into
annulment ofhis
a
home, where she lived until Antonio’s death.
Maria claims that she is entitled to inherit from
the estate of Antonio by virtue of her being the
legitimate daughter of Tomasa, who is a
legitimated sister of Antonio
ISSUE: WON Maria Luciano is entitled to inherit from
Antonio
HELD: YES. A child that enjoys continuous possession
of the status of a natural child is considered
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of the
parents. Maria Luciano’s mother Tomasa was
legitimated by the Maria of her parents hence a
legitimate sister of Antonio. A legitimate daughter of
a legitimated sister is entitled to inherit from her
mother’s children.
legitimate daughter - Maria may inherit
from Antonio.

FC, Art 180 The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the time RAMIREZ
of the child’sv birth.
GMUR (1919)
* To protect not only the child but also the child’s 42 Phil 855
descendants because it can happen that at the time
of the marriage of the child’s parents, the child Samuel
already had married and died is survived by children Doña Ana Bischoff Felisa Castro
who should benefit from the legitimation of their Ramirez Wertmuller
deceased parent. Leona
Castro
Frederick Dr. Ernest
FC, Art 181 The legitimation of children who died before the celebration of the marriage shall benefit their descendants.
von Emil Mory
Kauffman
FC, Art 182 Legitimation may be impugned only by those who are prejudiced in theirElena
rights, within five years from the time
Leontina
their cause of action accrues. Elizabeth
Federico
Ernesto Carmen Maria
DE LOS SANTOS v LUCIANO (1934) Esther
- Samuel, a Swiss, is married to Ana Ramirez
60 Phil 328 without children. He died in 1913 and left a will
- Tomasa Escobar was born to Leon Escobar and which declares that he has no forced heir. He
Josefa Esguerra before they were married. After bequeaths all his properties to his wife, to the
her parents got married, they begot two more exclusion of properties in Switzerland which are
children: Antonio and Fortunato Escobar. adjudicated to his brothers and sisters.
- All the while, Tomasa lived with the spouses and - His declaration of absence of force heirs ignores
their two legitimate children. The children called the possibility of his descendants from Leona.
the spouses “Tatay” and “Nanay”. The other - Leona is born to Felisa Castro and an unknown
children called Tomasa “Manang,” which is an father. However, on the margin of her original
appellation given to elder sisters. baptismal certificate was an annotation by Fr.
- Tomasa grew up and lived under the care of the Ferrero that Samuel recognized her as his
spouses until she married. The spouses natural daughter.
supported her, treated and presented her as
their daughter, and was publicly known as such.
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- Leona grew up in Samuel’s family and brought
up as a family member, which effected a tacit
admission of paternity.
- 1895 Leona ♥ Frederick, a Brit born in HK with
whom she had three children.
- 1899 Leona goes to Switzerland to recuperate in
a sanatorium (did not specify illness). After
sometime, she told Fred that she does not want
to be his wife anymore. So in 1904 Fred went to
France and obtained a decree of divorce which
was granted in 1905.
- Leona fell for her doctor Emil. They begot a child
in 1900 and married after Leona got divorced
from Fred. Two more daughters issued in the
married.
- 1910 Leona died
- The heirs of Leona seeks participation in the
estate of their alleged grandfather Samuel.
- Otto Gmur (respondent) appeared as guardian of
3 Mory children while Fred appeared for his own
children.
- Ana insists that Samuel did not recognized
Leona.
ISSUES:
1. WON Leona is a recognized natural child of
Samuel
2. WON the divorce between Fred and Leona is
valid
3. WON Leontina should be considered as a
legitimate daughter of Fred and Leona (being
born before the divorce decree, hence while their
marriage is subsisting)
4. WON the Mory and the Kaufmann children are
entitled to their share in the estate.
5. WON the probate of a will affects the rights of
forced heirs who don’t appear to contest the
probate.
HELD:
1. Yes. Prior to her first marriage, she was in an
uninterrupted enjoyment of de facto status of
natural child & treated as such by Samuel.
- Document presented by Fr. Ferrero admissible
since he’s the custodian of church records.
Original document not needed since they have
shown that diligent search was made to find it,
to no avail. Thus, secondary evidence presented
by the priest is sufficient.
- Applicable provision: Law 11 of Toro which
became Law 1, Title 5, Book 10 of the Novisima
Recopilacion which provides that recognition
could be established by proof of acts on part of
the parent unequivocally recognizing the status
of his child. This is different from CC Art 131
provision which provides that acknowledgment
must be made in the record of birth, by will or in
other public instrument. Regardless of what
provision is applied, it’s sufficiently shown that
Leona was recognized.
- Ana’s contention that only kids born of persons
free to marry may possess status of recognized
natural child. There being no evidence to show
Felisa Castro’s status at the time Leona was
born, she will be presumed single or widow.
Court cannot entertain contrary presumption
that Felisa’s guilty of adultery.
- As a recognized natural daughter, had she
survived her dad, she would have been his
forced heir (CC Art 807 (3) & 939) and entitled to
1/3 of the inheritance (CC Art 842).
2. No. French tribunal has no jurisdiction to
entertain an action for dissolution of marriage
contracted in the Phil by persons domiciled here
especially since such marriage is indissoluble
under Philippine laws. Although the spouses (first
marriage) have traveled to different places, all
those stays were limited & thus we can’t say
that they have established their domicile
elsewhere. It has been established that court of
a country in w/c neither spouse is domiciled &
w/c one/both spouses may resort merely for the
purpose of obtaining divorce has no jurisdiction
to determine their matrimonial status & a
divorce granted by such court is not entitled to
recognition anywhere. Going to one place for the
sole purpose of obtaining divorce w/o intention
to remain in that place is not sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on courts of that state especially if
cause of divorce is not recognized by the laws of
the state of that person’s own domicile. During
the time they obtained divorce decree, the Phil
law provided that a valid marriage can only be
dissolved by death of one of the parties. The law
invoked in obtaining the divorce allowed divorce
where wife has been guilty of adultery/husband
guilty of concubinage. Evidently, this should not
be upheld since it is repugnant to the moral
sensibilities of our people & it’s contrary to law.
3. Leontina’s status: The first marriage was still
subsisting when she was born thus she’s an
offspring of an adulterous intercourse w/c is not
capable of legitimation (CC Art 119).
4. WON the Mory and the Kaufman children are
entitled to inherit. Frederick’s children are
legitimate & entitled to inherit, thus no need to
discuss. The divorce being invalid, the claims of
the Mory children should then be rejected. The
right to inherit is limited to legitimate,
legitimated & acknowledged natural children,
excluding kids of adulterous relations.
“Descendants” under CC Art. 941 can’t include
illegitimates born of adulterous relations.
5. No. Rights of forced heirs to their legitime are
not divested by decree admitting a will to
probate, regardless of fact that no provision has
been made for them in the will. Decree of
probate is conclusive only as regards due
execution of will. Code of Civil Procedure Sec.
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753: forced heirs can’t be prejudiced by failure of

testator to provide for them in his will. And even
if testator intended to leave everything to his
wife, will is intrinsically invalid if it would cut off
the rights of his forced heirs.

IN RE JULIAN WANG (2005)

454 SCRA 155
- The mother, Anna Lisa Wang, wants to change
her minor child’s name from Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang to Julian Lin Wang, in effect dropping his
middle name.
- The mother explains that the family will be
migrating to Singapore where middle names or
the maiden surname of the mother are not
carried in a person’s name. She fears that this
will cause discrimination and embarrassment to
her son as “Carulasan” sounds funny in Mandarin
(they pronounce R as L).
- There will also be difference in Julian and her
sister’s (Wang Mei Jasmine) name. They might
be confused because they have different
surnames.
- RTC: denied, the reason they purported does not
fall within the grounds provided by law
- OSG: No proof that change of name is in the best
interest of the child; Mere convenience is not a
valid reason for petition for change of name;
Singaporean law does not prohibit the use of
middle name; There will be no confusion to
parentage because they both use their father’s
surname

ISSUE: WON the change of the minor’s name should

be allowed

HELD: No. SC adopts the same reason as OSG and

added that such change of name would make his
integration into the Singaporean society is not
sufficiently establish. Also, petitioner is only a minor.
The matter of change of name should be left to his
judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of
majority.

Cute trivia: Did you know that Pepe is the nickname for
Jose because Joseph is the padre putative (putative/foster
father) of Jesus, shorted to P.P. which is pronounced “pe-pe”
in Spanish? 
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XIII. ADOPTION
relation to the but not with the
legitimizing relatives of the
parents, but also latter
in relation to
ADOPTION is a juridical act which creates between other relatives
two persons a relationship similar to that which of the latter
results from legitimate paternity and filiation.
WHAT DOES ONLY BY A JUDICIAL DECREE MEAN?
PURPOSE OF ADOPTION - Only an adoption made through the court is
- Originally: mainly for the benefit of the valid.
adopter, who are usually people who had no - The fact of adoption is never presumed, but
children, so that they may experience the must be affirmatively proved by the person
joys of parenthood claiming its existence
- Modern view: for the benefit of the children - Proof required: judicial decree of adoption
to be adopted o Absence of proof of order of adoption by
o It has both social and moral purpose: court cannot by substituted by oral
to extend to the orphan or to the evidence
child of the indigent, the o Secondary evidence admissible where
incapacitated or the sick, the the records of adoption were actually
protection of society in the person of lost or destroyed
the adopter o Pedigree testimony is not admissible
o The adopted child remains an heir of - Mere agreement of adoption between the
his parents by nature adopters and the biological parents of the
child is not valid
CONSTRUCTION OF ADOPTION LAW: construed so as - Mere fact that the child has lived with the
to encourage the adoption of unfortunate children by alleged adopter who had treated him like his
persons who can properly read and educate them own child is not sufficient to establish a valid
adoption (Lazatin v Campos)
CHILD WELFARE PARAMOUNT: In determining - Neither is the mere registration of the child
whether adoption shall be allowed, the welfare of the in his or her birth certificate as the child of
child is the primary consideration. the supposed adopters a valid adoption
(simulated birth)
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Petition for adoption is
done through proceeding in rem. No court may A. Pre-adoption and Adoption
entertain such a petition unless it has jurisdiction
over: Procedure
- the subject matter of the case and over the
parties There are no provisions on pre-adoption procedures
- the res, which is the personal status of the in FC, it is only introduced in RA 8552 (Domestic
person to be adopted as well as that of the Adoption Act of 1998).
petitioners
FC, Art 184 The following persons may not adopt:
ADOPTION AND LEGITIMATION similar in the sense 1. The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of
that in both of them the child is given the status of guardianship relations;
the child born in lawful wedlock of the parents 2. Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral t
adopting or legitimizing it 3. An alien, except:
a. a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by con
b. One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Fil
LEGITIMATION ADOPTION c. One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt
Persons Only natural Strangers of the latter
affected children (generally)
Procedure May take place Always by
by extrajudicial judicial decree GUARDIAN: To prevent a guardian who has misused
act of parents or misappropriated the funds or properties of his
(marriage) ward to resort to adopting his ward to avoid an
accounting of such funds or properties and possible
Carried out by Only by both May be made by
criminal prosecution. Guardianship must be
whom parents of the one parent
terminated first in accordance with the Rules of
child
Court and the final accounts of the guardian
Benefits Child receives Creates a
approved, before said guardian can be allowed to
the same status relationship only
adopt his or her ward.
and rights as a between the
legitimate child, child and the
MORAL TURPITUDE: Adoption demands that the
not only in adopting parent,
adopter be morally qualified to do so, and a
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conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude months to adjustment period (Sec

shows lack of good moral character on the part of reconsider 12)
the person convicted. The disqualification is not 8.Recommendation and
**but if no DVC was signed consent of DSWD
removed by a pardon given to the offender, since
(in cases where the child 9. File a petition for
the lack of necessary moral qualification remains was abandoned or left to
even if criminal liability has been removed. adoption  Lawyers only
strangers)
come in at this point
i. locate unknown parents
*The fact that adopter has legitimate or illegitimate (dahil pampagulo lang
through trimedia (TV, radio
sila)
children is no longer a barrier to adopting. This was or newspaper) (Sec 5)
10. Decree of adoption (Sec
prohibited by CC and removed in PD 603, FC and RA ii. after 3 months of no
13)
8552. claiming, petition for
11. Issuance of Travel
Declaration of
Authority if foreign
Abandonment (DA)  now
FC, Art 187 The following persons may not be adopted adoption
becomes a ward of the
1. A person of legal age, UNLESS, he or she is government
- A child by nature of the adopter or his or her spouse2. Declare the child
- Prior to the adoption, said person had been consistently legally
considered and treated
available for by the adopter as his or
her own child during minority adoption
2. An alien with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has no diplomatic relations
3. A person who has already been adopted unless such adoption has been previously
*Preparation of Home revoked or rescinded
Study Report
1. Visit to adopter’s home
ADOPTION OF ADULTS 2. Will include documents of adopter (locals)
1. No need to adopt adults because they are a. authenticated birth certificate
b. Marriage contract
old enough to take care of themselves. c. Written consent of children
2. If the only reason someone wishes to adopt d. Physical and mental evaluations
and adult is to share his material advantages e. NBI/Police clearances
with another, he can do so by simply giving f. financial proofs
the latter financial assistance and leaving g. character references
him something in his will. h. pictures
3. Rational of adoption: to give poor, orphaned, i. Certificate of attendance to pre-adoption fora
abandoned little children the advantages of 3. For foreigners (on top of item 2)
a. certification of legal capacity to adopt
having parents who would love, support, b. certificate that country will allow entry of and
protect, rear and educate them until they are permanent residence of adoptee into the country
old enough to take care of themselves. c. Certificate of Philippine residents from BID
4. EXCEPTIONS d. Two character references from non-relatives from
a. If the adult is the parent in nature home country
because this would raise the status e. Police clearances from all places where adopter
of the illegitimate child lived
b. If in the custody since
childhood/minority, there is the BIOLOGICAL PARENT: Does not provide exception for
presumption that adopter really age. This means that a minor mother does not need
wants to adopt the child but only the consent of her parents to give up her child for
neglected to do so before the latter adoption. Even if the parents are against the
reached majority. adoption of their grandchild, they cannot prevent the
biological parent from doing so.
PROCEDURE FOR ADOPTION ACCORDING TO RA
8552 GRACE PERIOD: This is an innovation of RA 8552. The
(Ma’am Beth tabulated the procedure during lecture) biological parent is given the right to reconsider
his/her decision to relinquish his/her child within six
months from signing the Deed of Voluntary
PROSPECTIVE Commitment
CHILD
ADOPTIVE PARENTS - This grace period is what makes it impossible to
1. Biological parent goes 1. Inquiry adopt a newly born infant. However, if adoptive
to DSWD for: 2. Attend adoption forum parents insist, they can be given “risk placement”
a. counseling (Sec 4) 3. Application wherein the adopters get custody of the child,
- importance of providing 4. DSWD makes a case subject to the biological parent’s change of mind
relevant info on the child,
medical history and family study report  home within 6 months.
study report (Sec 14)
background
5. Matching MATCHING: The adoptive parents are allowed for
- possibility of child to be
placed for adoption 6. Placement  issuance of certain preference, for instance, they could specify
b. signs a Deed of pre-adoption placement sex.
Voluntary authority (PAPA) - Females are generally more adoptible
Commitment or
DVC**
7. Supervised trial custody because they are easier to take care of. The
c. give the parent 6 for 6 months or less 
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notion is adopting a boy is like bringing in a
male stranger.
- The peak season for adoption is during
Christmas.
- Parents prefer younger children because
they have no values yet. They are relatively
more convenient to shape and rear in a way
the adoptive parents want to. Not much
mannerisms or habits yet.
- Regarding physical attributes, Ma’am Beth
noticed that the adoptive parents want the
child to have a resemblance with the
husband.
B. Who may adopt/be adopted
FC, Art 183 A person of age, and in possession of full civil capacity an
support and care for his children, legitimate or illegitimate in keeping w
Only minors may be adopted, except in the cases when the adoption o
In addition, the adopter must be at least sixteen years older than the p
nature of the adopted or is the spouse of the legitimate parent of the p
*The age gap ensures that the relationship between
the adopter and the adoptee will be a parent child
relationship (approximate natural filiation) and that
the adopter has sufficient maturity to fulfill the role
of a parent to the adopted child. (Think Daddy Long
Legs)
ADOPTION OF SEVERAL CHILDREN: A person may
legally adopt two or more children.
FC, Art 185 Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the follow
1. When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child
2. When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the ot
* Under CC and PD 603, spouses can adopt solely.
* But what if one spouse seeks to adopt the
illegitimate child of the other?
FC, Art 186 In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse ado
shall be exercised by the spouses in accordance with this Code.
* Consent not required in case of legal separation
because it terminates the common life between the
spouses and the reason for requiring the consent of
one spouse for the adoption made by the other no
longer exists  this was made explicit in RA 8552
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the child’s sickness, he was entrusted to the

Art 183 (who may adopt), Art 184 (who may not adopt), Art 185 (joint adoption of spouses) and Art
petitioners since birth. The natural parents of the
186 (parental authority) have been amended by Art III Sec 7, RA 8552
minor voluntarily gave their consent and written
WHO MAY ADOPT conformity to the adoption. The SG opposed the
petition on the ground that relatives by blood or by
I. For Filipino citizens affinity are prohibited from adopting one another bec
1. of legal age of the incongruous dual relationship that will result.
2. full capacity and legal rights TC dismissed the petition, hence this appeal.
3. good moral character, no conviction for crime involving moral turpitude
4. emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children
ISSUE: WON an elder sister may adopt her younger
5. at least 16 years older than the adoptee UNLESS biological parent of the adoptee or the spouses of the adoptee’s
brother
parent
II. For aliens
1. qualifications for Filipino citizens HELD: Yes. There is no provision in the law
2. the country has diplomatic relations with the Philippinesprohibiting relatives by blood from adopting one
3. another.
has been living in the Philippines for at least 3 years prior A. 335
to the filing NCC enumerates those persons who
of application
4. certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any may not adopt,
appropriate and agency
government it hasthat
been shown
he/she has thethat
legal
capacity to adopt in his/her country petitioners aren’t among those prohibited from
5. his/her government allows the adoptee to enter the country adopting. A. adopted
as his/her 339 NCC names those who can’t be
son/daughter
6. adopted
requirements for residency and certification of qualification andforthe
is waived minor Edwin isn’t one of those
the following
a. former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relativeexcluded
within the 4by law. A. 338 NCC on the other hand
b. seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/herallows the
Filipino adoption of a natural child by the natural
spouse
c. father or mother, of other illegitimate kids by their
married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the 4
consanguinity OR affinity of the Filipino spouse father or mother, and a stepchild by the stepdad or
III. Guardian with respect to the ward after the termination stepmom.
of the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial
accountabilities To say that adoption shouldn’t be allowed when
the adopter and the adopted are related to each
IV. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
a. if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of theexcept
other, other in those cases enumerated Art 338 CC
b. if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter
is to precludePROVIDED thatamong
adoption the other spouse has
relatives no signified
mater
his/her consent thereto how removed or in whatever degree that relationship
c. if the spouses are legally separated from each other
might be, w/c isn’t the policy of the law. Adoption
If spouses jointly adopted or one spouse adopted the illegitimatestatutes, being
child of the other,humane and salutary,
Joint parental and be
authority shall designed
exercised
by parents. to provide homes, care and education for
unfortunate kids, should be construed so as to
encourage the adoption of such kids by persons who
* Qualifications for exemption in residency can properly rear and educate them.
requirements of RA 8552 (Number 6 in box above) is The fact that adoption in this case will result in a
the exemption to the general rules for adoption by dual relationship between the parties, that the
aliens in Art 184 Par 3. One difference is that RA adopted brother will also be the son of the adopting
8552 allowed for adoption of “relatives by affinity” sister, shouldn’t prevent the adoption. One is by
nature, while the other is by fiction of law. The
relationship established by adoption is limited to the
adopting parents and doesn’t extend to their other
relatives, except as expressly provided by law.
Petition for adoption granted.
Art III Sec 8, RA 8662
REPUBLIC v CA and BOBILES (1992)
WHO MAY BE ADOPTED 205 SCRA 356
Any person: - Private respondent Zenaida Bobiles filed a
1. below 18 years of age who has been administratively or judicially declared
petition available
to adopt for adoption
Jason Condat, then 6 yo and
2. legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other spouse who had been living with her family since he was
3. illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter to improve his/her
4 mosstatus
old. to that of legitimacy
4. a person of legal age IF prior to the adoption said person has been consistently considered and treated by the
adopter(s) as his/her own child since minority
- The court a quo, finding the petition to be
5. a child whose adoption has been previously rescinded sufficient in form and substance, issued and
order setting
6. a child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has died PROVIDED that nothe petition shall
proceedings for hearing. Thewithin
be initiated order6
months from the time of death of said parent was duly published and posted with copies
seasonably served to interested parties. Nobody
appeared to oppose the petition. Subsequently,
IN RE ADOPTION OF EDWIN VILLA (1967) the RTC granted the petition which was affirmed
aka SANTOS Jr. v REPUBLIC by the CA.
21 SCRA 299 - During the pendency of her petition, the FC took
Spouses Luis Santos Jr a lawyer and Edipola Villa a effect which makes mandatory the joint adoption
nurse, having no child of their own, filed a petition of spouses.
praying that the minor Edwin Villa, a younger brother
of Edipola, be declared their son by adoption. Due to
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- Petitioner now contends that the petition for
adoption should have been dismissed outright as
it was filed solely by private respondent without
joining her husband Dioscoro Bobiles, in violation
of Art 185 FC. It argues that FC must be applied
retroactively to the petition of Mrs. Bobiles. And
that even if the FC is not applied, the court still
erred by granting adoption to both the spouses
instead of Zenaida alone.
ISSUE: WON the FC provision regarding joint
adoption of spouses should apply
HELD: No. Art 256 FC provides for the retroactive
effect of appropriate relevant provisions thereof
subject to the qualification that such retroactive
application will not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights. Zenaida had rightfully commenced
the petition prior to the effectivity of the FC. Her
right to that action is not subject to subsequent
modification of the law.
Art 185 FC is remedial in nature. Technical rules
should not be stringently applied to adoption
proceedings because it involves the future condition
and paramount welfare of the adoptee. Petition for
adoption granted.
REPUBLIC v TOLEDANO and SPS. CLOUSE
(1994)
233 SCRA 9
Spouses Alvin and Evelyn Clouse filed a petition to
adopt Solomon, Evelyn’s 12 yo brother. Alvin is a
natural born American citizen while Evelyn was a
former Filipno who became naturalized American
citizen in Guam. Solomon Joseph Alcala and his
mother, Nery Alcala consented to the adoption due
to her inability to support the boy’s education.
HELD: The Clouse may not adopt Filipino children.
Alvin is not qualified to adopt under FC because he is
not a former Filipino citizen and Solomon is not his
relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of
his spouse. Evelyn, as a former Filipino citizen, is
qualified to adopt but the FC requires spouses to
jointly adopt. Hence, the spouses may not adopt
Solomon.
** Under RA 8552 qualified resident aliens may
adopt Filipino citizens
REPUBLIC v MILLER (1999)
306 SCRA 183
- Claude Miller, formerly a member of the US Air
Force assigned at Clark Air Base, and his wife,
Jumrus Miller, both US citizens but residing in
Angeles City, filed before RTC a verified petition
to adopt minor Michael Magno Madayag.
- Poverty and deep concern for his future
prompted Michael’s natural parents to give their
irrevocable consent to the adoption.
- RTC granted petition for adoption finding
petitioners to possess all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications for adoption.
Michael was freed from all obligations of
obedience and support with respect to natural
parents. He was then declared child of the
Millers by adoption. His surname was to be
changed from “Madayag” to “Miller”.
ISSUE: WON the Court may allow aliens to adopt a
Filipino child despite the prohibition under FC,
effective on Aug 3, 1988, when the petition for
adoption was filed before FC, on July 29, 1988, under
the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
which allowed aliens to adopt.
HELD: Yes. The enactment of FC will not impair the
right of alien respondents to adopt a Filipino child
because the right has become vested at the time of
filing of the petition for adoption and shall be
governed by the law then in force. A vested right is
one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not
depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder.
The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of
the action. Adoption statues, being humane and
salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child
to be of paramount consideration. Every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and
fulfill the compassionate and noble objectives of the
law.
C. Nature of adoption
proceedings
LAZATIN v CAMPOS (1979)
92 SCRA 250
- Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin died intestate and was
survived by his wife, Margarita de Asis, and his
adopted twin daughters Nora L. De Leon
(married to Bernardo de Leon) and Irma Lazatin
(married to Francisco Veloso)
- A month after Mariano Lazatin’s death, Margarita
de Asis commenced an intestate proceeding
before the CFI of Pasay. To the said proceeding,
Mariano, Oscar, Virgilio and Yvonne intervened
since they claimed to be admitted illegitimate
(not natural) children of Mariano with a woman
named Helen Muñoz. Subsequently, one Lily
Lazatin also intervened, claiming to be another
illegitimate (not natural) child
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- 2 months after the intestate proceeding,

Margarita de Asis died but left a holographic will ISSUE: WON Renato is an adopted child
(a will written entirely in the testator’s hand),
which provided, among others, for: HELD: Renato has not established his status as an
o a legacy of cash, jewelry and stocks to adopted child. Secondary evidence is not admissible
Arlene De Leon, a granddaughter unless the existence of the records are proven along
o a legacy of support to Rodolfo Gallardo, with the contents of the records and its loss.
Adoption is a juridical act and the statutory
a son of her late sister
requirements must be strictly carried out otherwise it
o a legacy of education to Ramon Sta.
is a nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed,
Clara (petitioner’s son)
but must be affirmatively proven by the person
- During Margarita de Asis’ lifetime, she kept a
claiming its existence.
safety deposit box at the People’s Bank and Trust
Company, which either she or Nora could open.
- Five days after Margarita’s death, Nora opened
the said box and removed its contents (shares of
stock, adoption papers of hers and her sister’s,
jewelry belonging to her and to her mother)
- Her sole reason for opening the box was to get
the stock certificates and other small items. A
bank personnel informed her that she needed an
authority from the court to open the box in view
of her mother’s death. So, she decided to
remove everything from it
- On June 3, 1974, the private respondents filed a
petition to probate the will of Margarita
- Days after learning that Nora opened the box,
Ramon Sta. Clara filed a motion in the probate
court, claiming:
o that Margarita had executed a will
subsequent to that submitted for
probate
o demanded its production
o prayed for the opening of the box
- Of course, when the court ordered its opening,
the box was already empty.

- Seven months after Margarita’s death, Renato

Lazatin intervened for the first time as an
admitted illegitimate child. Then he also filed a
motion to intervene in the estate of Margarita de
Asis, this time as an adopted child on the basis
of an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin,
brother of Mariano, stating that Renato was an
illegitimate child of Mariano who has later
adopted by him. The affidavit was later modified
to state that Renato was adopted by both
Mariano and Margarita
- Renato’s motion to intervene in the settlement
of the estate of Margarita was denied by the
lower court on the ground that the evidence
presented tend to prove that he was a
recognized natural child of Mariano, but not a
legally adopted child of Margarita. He never
presented a decree of adoption in his favor.
- Likewise, Renato’s motion for reconsideration
was denied by the court unless he presented
some documentary evidence to prove his
adoption
- Renato Lazatin filed a motion for intervention in
the probate proceedings of the estate of
Margarita de Asis as an adopted child.
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SANTOS v ARANZANSO (1966)
16 SCRA 344
- Paulina, 17 and Aurora, 8 were adopted by
spouses Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes. The
two minors were in the custody of the couple
since infancy and the whereabouts of their
biological parents are unknown since the
outbreak of the war.
- Crisanto de Mesa, the guardian ad litem gave his
written consent to the adoption. Paulina who was
over 14 years old then also put in writing her
assent to the proceeding. An adoption decree
was eventually granted
- 8 years later, Juliana died and Simplicio
commenced the settlement of her estate
declaring that he and the two adopted
daughters, are the surviving heirs
- Gregoria Aranzanso, an alleged first cousin of
Juliana opposed the settlement estate saying
that the marriage between Juliana and Simplicio
is void ab initio for being bigamous. Likewise, the
adoption is also null for want of written consent
of their parents.
- Demetria Ventura, who claims to be another
cousin of Juliana and mother of Paulina filed her
opposition in the same tenor as Gregoria’s.
ISSUE: WON the adoption decree is valid.
HELD: Yes. Consent by the parents to the adoption is
not an absolute requisite. If the natural parents have
abandoned their kids, consent by the guardian ad
litem suffices. In adoption proceedings,
abandonment imports “any conduct on the part of
the parent w/c evinces a settled purpose to forgo all
parental duties & relinquish all parental claims to the
child.” It means “neglect or refusal to perform the
natural & legal obligations of care & support which
parents owe to their kids.” Although the adoption
court did not use the term “abandonment” the
reasons propounded bear the essential elements of
abandonment. Granting arguendo that the marriage
between Juliana and Simplicio is void, the adopted
children are deemed to be adopted by Juliana as a
single person. The philosophy behind adoption
statutes is to promote welfare of the child, every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote that objective.
DSWD v BELEN (1997)
275 SCRA 645
- Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo,
naturalized US citizens, filed a petition to adopt
their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea.
- Respondent Judge Antonio Belen granted the
petition based on the findings and
recommendations of the DSWD that the
adopting parents and the adoptee have
developed emotional attachment.
- When travel clearance was being sought from
DSWD so that the child may join her adopters in
the States, it was discovered that DSWD was not
informed about the commencement of the
adoption proceedings nor was it given notice of
the petition being granted.
HELD: The DSWD has to be notified of the adoption
proceedings. A Home and Child Study Report is
mandatory before adoption is to be finalized. The
DSWD is undoubtedly has the necessary
competence, more than that possessed by the court
social welfare officer, to make the proper
recommendation. Adoption is a legal advice by which
a better future may be accorded an unfortunate
child. Judge censured and social worker
reprimanded.
D. Consent necessary for
adoption
FC, Art 188 The written consent of the following to the adoptio
1. The person to be adopted, if 10 years or older
2. The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, o
3. The legitimate and adopted children, 10 years or older,
4. The illegitimate children, 10 years or older, of the ado
latter’s spouse, if any
5. The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be ado
Art III Sec 9, RA 8662
WHOSE CONSENT IS NECESSARY
1. The adoptee if 10 years of age or over
2. the biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal
which has legal custody of the child
3. the legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, 10 years of age o
4. the illegitimate sons/daughters, 10 years of age or over of th
spouse
5. the spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted
* PD 603 and CC: The consent of the adoptee was
required only if 14 years of age or over.
DUNCAN v CFI (1976)
69 SCRA 298
- A 3-day old baby named Colin Berry Christensen
Duncan was given by his unwed mother to Atty.
Corazon Velasquez. She also instructed him to
look for a suitable couple to adopt the child.
- Atty. Velasquez then gave consent for the
Duncan spouses (Robin Francis Radley and
Maria Lucy Christensen) to adopt the child.
- Husband: British national residing in the country
for the last 17 years and wife: American citizen
born in and a resident of the Philippines
- No child of their own but previously adopted
another child
ISSUE: WON Atty. Velasquez is the proper party
required by law to give consent the adoption
HELD: Yes. She can rightfully give consent to the
adoption. The father’s consent is not necessary
because the child is illegitimate. The mother’s
consent is not necessary either because she is
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deemed to have abandoned the child and has given
the child to Atty. Velasquez for guardianship.
CANG v CLAVANO (1998)
296 SCRA 128
- Spouses Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano
(employee at the Philippine Consulate in LA)
were legally separated because the husband’s
extramarital affairs. Herbert became naturalized
US citizen and secured a divorce decree there.
- Clavano’s brother (Ronald Clavano, a wealthy
businessman) and his wife Maria Clara (a flight
stewardess) wanted to adopt the three children
(Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony) of the
spouses Cang and Clavano. The 14 yo son
signed the petition of adoption along with
Clavano.
- The mother justified the adoption with the
following statements:
o The brother had been her in taking care of
the children
o She will be going to the US and the
children would hamper her job-seeking
venture abroad
o Husband had long forfeited his parental
rights
- Herbert immediately returned home upon
learning about the adoption proceeding, which
he opposes.
- RTC and CA granted the decree of adoption
ISSUE: WON the consent of the father to the
adoption must be sought, given that he expresses
desire to retain parental authority and that he did
not abandon his children
HELD: The adoption may not be granted. Cang’s
consent as the father is necessary. Petitioner’s
conduct did not manifest relinquishment of parental
duties. Despite the fact that Cang abandoned his
children, it was proven that he continued to send
support for the family from the US. It was mere
physical estrangement that existed. Cang did not
manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental
duties and relinquish all parental claims over his
children as to constitute abandonment.
LANDINGIN v REPUBLIC (2006)
493 SCRA 415
Maria
Taruc
Diwata Manuel Amelia
Landingin Ramos Ramos
Ann, Errol, Elaine
Dennis and Elma
Ricfel Eugene
- Diwata Landingin wants to adopt the legitimate
children of her deceased brother Manuel. Since
his death, the children have been in the care of
their paternal grandmother Maria as their
biological mother left for Italy to work. Since
then, it has been the paternal relatives who give
support to the children. The mother also rarely
communicates with the children and already has
a second family in Italy.
- Petitioner is a 57 year old widow, naturalized US
citizen in Guam with four grown-up children of
her own who have their own respective families
and gainfully employed also in Guam. She lives
alone in her house and works as a part-time
waitress. Petitioner’s children executed an
affidavit of consent for the adoption proceeding
in the US. Elaine, the eldest of the three
adoptees likewise testified regarding their
consent to be adopted by their aunt.
- The DSWD social worker was able to interview
Amelia when she went home to the Philippines.
According to the mother, she is willing to let go
of her parental ties with the children since it’s
her in-laws who have been rearing them.
- RTC granted but CA reversed for absence of
consent of the petitioner’s children and the
adoptee’s biological mother.
ISSUES:
1. WON the adoption may proceed absent the
mother’s written consent
2. WON the affidavit of consent executed by
the petitioner’s children in Guam not in the
presence of a Philippine consular office is
admissible
3. WON the petitioner is financially capable of
supporting the adoptees
HELD:
1. No. The petitioner failed to present actual
evidence regarding the mother’s consent. It
cannot be said that she intends to abandon
them because she continually gives them
financial support no matter how minimal.
Also, the eldest daughter admitted that she
consults her regarding serious issues.
2. No. The authenticity of her children’s
affidavit was also not clearly established.
3. No. Her advanced age and instable source of
income puts doubt on her financial capacity
to raise the three kids in the US. That her
own children are willing the back her up is
untenable because the ability to support
must be personal to the adopter.
ADOPTION AND THE RIGHTS OF PUTATIVE
FATHERS
A Review of New York Law
Unmarried fathers should be given legal rights to
their involvement in the lives of their illegitimate
children. The New York legislature has adopted
specific statutory guidelines for identifying unwed
fathers who have a constitutionally protected
parental right which must be surrendered or
terminated before their child can be adopted.
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1. Fathers with full substantive rights – Unwed
fathers who maintained substantial and continuous
or repeated contact with the child have the same
rights as unmarried mothers with respect to their
children, and must execute a voluntary surrender
before the child can be adopted. The father has to
have a “substantial relationship” with the child, the
standards of which vary according to the age of the
child.
A. For children under six months old
i. openly lived with the child or the child’s
mother for a continuous period of six months
prior to the placement of the child for adoption
ii. openly held himself out to be the father of the
child for six months prior to the placement of
the child for adoption
iii. paid or offered to pay a fair and reasonable
sum according to his means toward the
medical expenses in connection with the
mother’s pregnancy or the birth of the child
B. For children over six months old
i. pays a reasonable sum according to his means
toward the support of the child
ii. visit the child monthly or maintain regular
communication with the child or agency that
has custody of the child
2. Fathers with due process rights – For those who do
not meet the statutory criteria which would require
their consent to adoption, they can still be entitled to
special notice which gives due process rights with
respect to voluntary surrenders and termination of
parental right. This do not include men convicted of
first degree rape when the child who is the subject of
the termination was conceived as the result of the
rape.
i. any person adjudicated to be the father of the
child by any NY court
ii. any person adjudicated to be the father of the
child by another state court when a certified
copy of the order has been filed with the NY
putative father registry
iii. any person who has filed a timely and
unrevoked notice of intent to claim paternity
iv. any person who is recorded on the child’s birth
certificate as the child’s father
v. any person who is openly lived with the child
or the child’s mother for a continuous period of
six months prior to the placement of the child
for adoption
vi. any person who has been identified as the
child’s father by the mother in a written, sworn
statement
vii. any person who was married to the child’s
mother within six months subsequent to the
birth of the child and prior to the execution of
a surrender or the initiation of a termination
proceeding
viii. any person who has filed an instrument with
the putative father registry acknowledging the
paternity of the child
3. Fathers without rights – Those who have not made
efforts to establish a relationship with a non-marital
child do not have a right to be included in a court
decision to approve a mother’s surrender, to
terminate the mother’s rights or to approve the
adoption of the child
4. Fathers unable to meet the criteria
- prevented from visiting or contacting the child
because of a court order or other actions taken
to protect the mother from domestic violence
- incarceration
- drug addiction
- father unaware of the child
- relative’s action
E. Effects of Adoption
FC, Art 189 Adoption shall have the following effects:
1. For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitim
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship
to use the surname of the adopters;
2. The parental authority of the parents by nature over the ado
except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by
adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses
3. The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and
CC, Art 365 An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter
* RA 8552 allows the adopters to give their adopted
child a name of their choice. This was previously not
available in PD603 and FC (Republic v Hernandez).
The rationale for this rule is that the given name will
be the only emotional tie the adoptive parents can
have with their adoptee.
FC, Art 190 Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted
(1) Legitimate and illegitimate children and descendants and the su
adopted, in accordance with the ordinary rules of legal or intestate suc
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate asc
shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or
(3) When the surviving spouse or the illegitimate children of the adopte
estate in equal shares, one-half to be inherited by the spouse or the ille
the adopters.
(4) When the adopters concur with the illegitimate children and the
entire estate in equal shares, one-third to be inherited by the illegitima
third by the adopters;
(5) When only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the entire estate
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then t
apply.
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PARENTAL AUTHORITY (Sec. 16)
All legal ties bet. biological parents and adoptee are severed, andlegitimate
biological parent is the spouse of the adopter.
LEGITIMACY (Sec. 17)
The adoptee shall be considered legitimate son/daughter of the- adopter
and obligations provided by law to legitimate children born to themherein
love, guidance, and support.
SUCCESSION (Sec.18)
Adopter and adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation, in legal and
intestate succession. If adoptee and his/her biological parents had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall
govern.
TAMARGO v CA (1992)
209 SCRA 518
Spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura filed a petition to
adopt the 10 yo minor Adelberto Bundoc. Before the
petition was granted, Adelberto shot and killed
Jennifer Tamargo using an air rifle. The parents of
Tamargo sued Adelberto’s natural parents for
damages. The child though was acquitted for acting
without discernment. The Bundocs claim that the
Rapisuras should be the proper parties in this suit
since parental authority shifted to the adopting
parent from the moment the petition for adoption
was filed.
ISSUE: Who between the adoptive parents and the
biological parents should be held liable for the
damages incurred by the child?
HELD: Adelberto’s natural parents are liable for the
damages. The tortuous act of the minor occurred
prior to the adoption. Adelberto was in his natural
parents’ actual custody at the time of the accident.
The effects of adoption on parental authority cannot
be given retroactive effect.
SAYSON v CA (1992)
205 SCRA 321
Rafaela ♥ Eleno
Mauricio Teodoro
Teodoro ♥ Isabel
Rosario
Basilisa
Remedi Delia (adopted)
Edmundo
(adopted)
Doribel
- The surviving brother, sisters and mother-in-law of
Teodoro filed a complaint for partition and
accounting of the intestate estate of the deceased
spouses Teodoro and Isabel, but this was resisted
by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, alleging
successional rights to the disputed estate as the
decedent’s lawful descendants
- Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed another
complaint for the accounting and partition of the
estate of their grandparents (Eleno and Rafaela)
against the 4 surviving children, alleging that Delia
and Edmundo were the adopted children of
Teodoro and Isabel, and that Doribel was a
childbe– vested
the same shall as such, they
on the were except
adopter, entitled to
if the
inherit Teodoro’s share in his parents’ estate by
right of representation
The for
lower court and
all intents decided both
purposes, andcases intofavor
entitled of
all rights
withoutrespondents
discrimination of any kind. Adoptee is entitled to
- Both decisions were based on findings evidenced
by the decree of adoption of Delia and Edmundo,
and the birth certificate of Doribel
- In the first case, it was held that the respondents,
being legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel, the
herein petitioners were excluded from sharing in
the estate of the spouses
- In the second case, it was held that Delia,
Edmundo and Doribel were entitled to inherit from
Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation (of
their father Teodoro)
- The CA, however, held that Delia and Edmundo are
NOT entitled to inherit from the estate of Eleno
and Rafaela, but affirmed the lower court’s
decision in all other respects
- Petitioners contend that:
- Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted
because Doribel had already been born when
the decree of adoption was issued. Doribel’s
birth disqualified her parents from adopting
based on Art 335 CC, which names among
those who cannot adopt those who have
legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural
children, or natural children by legal fiction.
- Doribel is not a natural child of Teodoro and
Isabel, but of Edita Abila who manifested in a
petition for guardianship of the child that she
was the mother of Doribel
1. WON Delia and Edmundo were legally adopted
children of Teodoro and Isabel - YES
- It is too late to challenge the decree of adoption. It
was issued way back in 1967, and therefore has
become final and executory
- Assuming that the petitioners were the proper
parties, they should have seasonably appealed or
assailed the decree of adoption on the basis of
Doribel’s birth before or seasonably after the
decree was issued, but they did not
- Mauricio also claims to have no personal
knowledge of Doribel’s birth
- A challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot
be made collaterally, as in petitioners’ action for
partition, but in a direct proceeding frontally
addressing the issue
- A presumption arises in such cases where the
validity of the judgment is thus attacked that the
necessary jurisdictional facts were proven
- Santos v Aranzanso – An adoption order implies
the finding of the necessary facts, and the burden
of proof is on the party attacking it
2. WON Doribel is a legitimate child - YES
- Doribel’s birth certificate is one of the prescribed
means of recognition under both Art 265 CC and
Art 172 FC. Although it is only prima facie
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evidence of filiation, which may be refuted by
evidence, such evidence is lacking in this case
- Mauricio’s testimony that he was present when
Doribel was born to Edita Abila is suspect as it
comes from an interested party
- Abila’s affidavit denying her earlier statement in
the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is
hearsay. It was also never offered in evidence in
the lower courts.
- Even without Abila’s affidavit, the birth certificate
must be upheld.
- It was held in Legaspi v CA that the evidentiary
nature of public documents must be sustained in
the absence of strong, complete, and conclusive
proof of its falsity or nullity
- Doribel’s legitimacy cannot be questioned in a
complaint for partition and accounting. It should
be questioned in a direct action seasonably filed
by the proper party
- It cannot be questioned by way of defense or as a
collateral issue in another action for a different
purpose
3. WON Delia, Edmundo and Doribel are entitled to
inherit from Teodoro and Isabel - YES
- Doribel, as the legitimate daughter, and Delia and
Edmundo, as their adopted children, are exclusive
heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased
couple, in conformity with Art 979, which states
that legitimate children, which includes adopted
children, succeed their parents
- The underlying philosophy of the article is that a
person’s love descends first to his children, and
grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and
thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives
- It is also supposed that one of a person’s purposes
in acquiring property is to leave them eventually
his children as a token of his love for them and as
a provision for their continued care after his death
4. WON Delia and Edmundo are entitled to inherit from
Eleno and Rafaela - NO
- The grandparents were total strangers to Delia and
Edmundo, as adopted children
- An adopted child is deemed to be a legitimate
child, and thus has the same rights as legitimate
child. HOWEVER, these rights do not include the
right of representation. The relationship created
by the adoption is between only the adopting
parents and the adopted child, and does not
extend to the blood relatives of either party.
* The adopted children are entitled to Teodoro’s
estate. Legally adopted children have the right to
inherit from the adoptive parents. However, the
adopted children may not represent their adoptive
parent. Adoption creates a relationship only between
the adoptive parents and the adopted. It does not
extend to the blood relatives of either party.
JOHNSTON v REPUBLIC (1963)
7 SCRA 1040
Isabel Johnston filed a petition to adopt a 2 yo
minornamed Ana Isabel Henriette Antonio
Concepcion Georgiana from Hospicio de San Jose as
she is in a childless marriage with Raymond Arthur
Johnston. The petition was granted and the child was
given Isabel’s maiden surname, Valdez. Isabel filed a
motion to change the child’s surname to Valdez-
Johnston, Isabel’s married name.
HELD: Isabel’s husband did not concur in the
adoption. Hence, the child should use Isabel’s
maiden name or it may lead to confusion.
REPUBLIC v WONG (1992)
209 SCRA 189
- Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo
Alcala Sr and Segundina Alcala. When they were
2 and 9 yo respectively, he and his sister were
legally adopted by Hoon Wong and Concepcion
Ty Wong (naturalized Filipinos who are childless
after 15 yrs of marriage.
- When he turned 22, Maximo wants to revert to
his natural parents’ real name saying that the
Chinese surname of his adoptive parents
embarrassed and isolate him in his Muslim
community. Likewise, it hampers the progress of
his business (furniture store). The adoptive mom
does not mind his action and even assured that
he will still be entitled to inherit from them
despite the name change.
- RTC granted the petition for change of name
- SG resists because change of name is an act of
ingratitude to his adoptive parents who cared for
him.
ISSUE: WON the reasons submitted by Maximo are
valid, sufficient & proper to warrant the granting of
the petition.
HELD: Yes. It was proven that the surname was
detrimental to Maximo’s business. Likewise, the
change of Maximo’s surname was not done to
defraud anyone. Use of the adoptive parents’
surname is not the main objective of adoption but
merely one of its effects.
FC echoes the same statutory right of an adopted
child to use the surname of the adopter. Thus, the
use of the surname of the adopter by the adopted
child is both an obligation and a right. SC said that
the State has an interest in the names borne by
individuals & entities for the purpose of identification
& a change of name is not a matter of right but of
sound judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light
of reasons adduced & the consequences that will
likely follow; it is a privilege w/c may be granted
upon showing of a proper or reasonable cause or
compelling reason. While it is true under the law that
an adopted child must bear the name of the adopter,
the change of the surname of the adopted child is
more an incident rather than the object of adoption
proceedings.
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REPUBLIC v CA and CARANTO ( )
255 SCRA 99
- Midael had been living with Jaime since he was 7
years old. When Jaime married Zenaida on 19
January 1986, Midael stayed under their care
and custody.
- Spouses Jaime and Zenaida Caranto filed for the
adoption of 15 yo minor Midael C. Mazon on 2
September 1988. Aside from the decree of
adoption, they also prayed for the change in the
given name birth certificate entry from Midael to
Michael.
- OSG opposed the petition insofar as it also
sought to change ‘Midael’ to ‘Michael’ in an
adoption proceeding.
- RTC dismissed OSG and rendered judgment on
30 May 1989 granting Caranto spouses’ petition.
- OSG appealed to CA, CA upheld RTC on 23
January 1992; hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
- WON RTC acquired jurisdiction on petition for
adoption
- WON RTC and CA erred in granting change of
given name from Midael to Michael
HELD:
- YES. Petitioner contends that since the name
appearing in the requisite notice by publication
did not state the true name of the child. Court
ruled that the case at bar was an obvious clerical
error in the given name of the child, and does
not confuse any identities.
- NO. The change of given name is without force
and effect. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court does
not only refer to errors concerning civil status,
but even to names as well as enumerated in
item (o) of § 2 of Rule 108. The local civil
registrar must have been made party to the
proceeding. The notice by publication also failed
to include the matter on the change of name,
depriving the local civil registrar of notice and
opportunity to be heard.
REPUBLIC v HERNANDEZ (1996)
253 SCRA 509
- Spouses Van and Regina Munson adopted an
infant who bears the name Kevin Earl Bartolome
Moran in his birth certificate. When they had him
baptized, they gave him the name Aaron Joseph,
the name by which the child is known to the
family, relatives and friends. The spouses then
instituted a joinder of the petition for adoption
and the petition for a change of name.
- The petitioner opposed the said action saying
that there is no legal basis for the change of the
adoptee’s given name.
- RTC ruled in favor changing the name of the
child ratiocinating that “as adoptive parents,
petitioner like other parents may feely select the
first name given to his/her child as it is only the
surname to which the child is entitled that is
fixed by law.”
- Further, the respondents submit that change of
name may be given liberal construction since
the object of strict implementation is to prevent
fraudulent acts, while an infant has not exercised
any of its rights.
ISSUES:
1. WON joinder of petition for adoption and
petition for a change of name is allowed by
the law
2. WON there is lawful ground for the adoptee’s
change of name
HELD:
1. No. In order for two petitions may be joined in
one proceeding, the causes of action must: (a)
not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and
joinder of parties and (b) arise out of the same
contract, transaction or relation between the
parties, or are for demands for money or are of
the same nature and character.
- There is no conceptual unity between
petition for adoption and petition for change
of name. The two actions are different and
unrelated from each other, and therefore,
two special proceedings which cannot be
joined as having one cause of action. They
must be instituted separately.
2. No. The change of surname of the adoptee as a
result of the adoption and to follow that of the
adopter does not lawfully extend to or include
the proper or given name. The birth certificate,
as it appears in the civil register, contains the
official name. It does not matter if the mother,
with all intention to abandon it later, named the
child for the sake of naming it.
- If they really want to change the name, they
institute another action under Rule 103 of
the Rules of Court.
F. Rescission
FC, Art 191 If the adopted is a minor or otherwise incapacitated, the a
any person authorized by the court or proper government instrume
prescribed for loss or suspension of parental authority. If the adopte
judicial rescission of the adoption on the same grounds prescribed for d
FC, Art 192 The adopters may petition the court for the judicial rescis
1. If the adopted has committed any act constituting a ground for d
2. When the adopted has abandoned the home of the adopters dur
acts has definitely repudiated the adoption
** Under CC, PD 603 and FC, both the adopted child
and the adopter can ask for the judicial rescission.
However, RA 8552 only allows rescission by the
adoptee.
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expenses of judicial adoption o simply

Art VI Sec 19, RA 8662
register adopted child in heir names
GROUNDS FOR RESCISSION OF ADOPTION - any person who causes fictitious registration
of birth of child under name/s of person/s not
1. Repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) his/her biological parent/s
2. attempt on the life of the adoptee - punishable by prison mayor medium plus
3. sexual assault or violence P50k fine
4. abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations- includes physician/nurse/hospital personnel
who cooperated in execution of crime,
The only remedy available to the adopter is Art 919 CC which is disinheritance.
similar penalties apply plus permanent
disqualification
*Art 919 CC – causes for disinheritance - Ma’am Beth says: “The cost of adoption
1. conviction of an attempt against the life of decree is just as much as normal delivery!
the testator, his or her spouses, descendants Well, at least, that’s my rate.”
or ascendants
2. having accused the testator of a crime
punishable by imprisonment for six years or
more, if the accusation has been found
groundless
3. conviction of adultery or concubinage with
the spouse of the testator
4. having induced the testator to make a will or
to change one already made, by fraud,
violence, intimidation or undue influence
5. refusal without justifiable cause to support
the testator
6. maltreatment of the testator by word or
deed
7. living a dishonorable or disgraceful life
8. conviction of a crime which carrier the
penalty of civil interdiction

EFFECTS OF RESCISSION

FC, Art 193 If the adopted minor has not reached the age of majority at the time of the judicial rescission of the adoption, the
court in the same proceeding shall reinstate the parental authority of the parents by nature, unless the latter are disqualified
or incapacitated, in which case the court shall appoint a guardian over the person and property of the minor. If the adopted
person is physically or mentally handicapped, the court shall appoint in the same proceeding a guardian over his person or
property or both.

Judicial rescission of the adoption shall extinguish all reciprocal rights and obligations between the adopters and the adopted
arising from the relationship of parent and child. The adopted shall likewise lose the right to use the surnames of the adopters
and shall resume his surname prior to the adoption.

The court shall accordingly order the amendment of the records in the proper registries.

Art VI Sec 20, RA 8662

1. Restoration of parental authority to original
2. Reciprocal rights and obligation between adoptee and adopter
extinguished
3. Cancellation of amended birth certificate
4. Successional right back to before as of date of rescission
5. Vested rights acquired prior to judicial rescission shall be respected

G. Rectification of Simulated
Birth
CRIME OF SIMULATION OF BIRTH
(Art VII Sec 21, RA 8522)
- intended to curb or prevent such acts done
by people who want to avoid trouble and
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RECTIFICATION OF SIMULATION OF BIRTH
(Art VII Sec 22, RA 8522)
- Three-in-one procedure
1. Correction of Entries in Birth
certificate
2. Declaration of Abandonment
3. Adoption Decree
- Application for correction of the birth registration
shall be filed within 5 years from the effectivity
of this Act and completed thereafter
H. Adoption decree
REYES v SOTERO (2006)
482 SCRA 520
- Elena Lising died intestate. Corazon Chichioco
filed a petition for issuance of letter and
administration and settlement and estate as the
niece of the decedent with the collateral
relatives of the decedent.
- Chichioco alleged that the properties of the
decedent is with the petitioner Ana Joyce Reyes,
her grand niede and that she be appointed as
the administrator of these properties instead.
- Reyes filed an opposition to the petition,
claiming that she is in fact the adopted child of
the decedent and her husband Serafin delos
Santos and that the appointment of
administration is unnecessary since she is the
sole heir of Lising. As evidence, she provided the
following:
o Certification from the Municipal Registrar
of Paniqui, Tralac that on the Record of
Court Decrees, Reyes was adopted by
Elena Lising and Serafin delos Santos.
o Certification of the Clerk of Court of the
RTC-Tarlac City that judgment was
rendered on Dec 21, 1968 decreeing her
adoption by the spouses
o Judicial form no. 43: the adoption decree
which declares her adoption
o Decree of final distribution issued by PVAO:
benefits paid to her as “daughter” of
Serafin delos Santos.
- Chichioco filed an annulment of the adoption
decree stating that documents presented are
false and fraudulent; and that petitioner and her
mother collaborated to make it appear that
petitioner is adopted by Elena and Serafin.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner herein should prove the
validity of her adoption due to irregularities raised by
private respondent.
HELD: No. The Court ruled that the documents
presented by the petitioner sufficiently proved that
she is legally adopted by Elena and Serafin. It is
presumed that these documents are regularly issued
as they are issued under the seal of the issuing
offices and signed by the proper officers. The
adoption decree is a public document that is
required by law to be properly registered in the
official repository i.e. local civreg as well as the court
that rendered such judgment. Thus these documents
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein unless
proven contrary with proof of such alleged
irregularity be brought in a separate proceeding for
the purpose of nullifying the adoption decree as in
Santos v Aranzanso. The private respondents cannot
assail such decree to defeat the petitioners claim
that she is the sole heir of the decedent. Therefore,
the petitioner whose adoption is presumed to be
valid is the sole heir of the decedent.
I. Inter-country Adoption
* Governed by RA 8043 or the Inter-country Adoption
Act
WHO MAY BE ADOPTED – Any child:
1. has been voluntarily or involuntarily
committed to the Department as dependent,
abandoned, or neglected pursuant to the
provisions of the Child and Youth Welfare Code
may be the subject of Inter-Country Adoption;
2. Povided that in case of a child who is
voluntarily committed, the physical transfer of
said child shall be made not earlier than six (6)
months from the date the Deed of Voluntary
Commitment was executed by the child’s
biological parent/s. The prohibition against
physical transfer shall not apply to adoption by
a relative or children with special medical
conditions.
WHO MAY ADOPT
Any foreign national or a Filipino citizen permanently
residing abroad who has the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications under the Act may file an
application if he/she:
(a) is at least twenty-seven (27) years of age;
(b) is at least sixteen (16) years older than the
child to be adopted at the time of the filing
of the application, unless the applicant is the
parent by nature of the child to be adopted
or is the spouse of such parent by nature;
(c) has the capacity to act and assume all the
rights and responsibilities incident to
parental authority under his/her national law;
(d) has undergone appropriate counseling form
an accredited counselor in his/her country
(e) has not been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude;
(f) is eligible to adopt under his/her national law
(g) can provide the proper care and support and
give the necessary moral values and
example to the child and, in the proper case,
to all his/her other children;
(h) comes from a country:
a. with whom the Philippines has
diplomatic relations;
b. whose government maintains a foreign
adoption agency; and
c. whose laws allow adoption; and
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(i) files jointly with his/her spouse, if any, who

shall have the same qualifications and none
J. Adoption issues
of the disqualifications to adopt as
THE PROS AND CONS OF INTER-COUNTRY
prescribed above.
ADOPTION ACT1

Nationalistic reasons against IA

1. International pride – political pressure to upgrade
internal system of social welfare
2. An unacceptable form of international charity
3. Belief that country and heritage is special and
children would be deprived of something
valuable if removed from it
4. Waste of human resources and exploitation by
Western neighbors

Best interest of the child

1. Remain in their biological families, or at least in
their home countries
a. Deprivation of cultural identity
b. Racial discrimination
c. Unnecessary separation from family
2. IA acts as an “escape valve’ for LDC’s and a
“conscience-saving” mechanism for developed
countries, it works to the disadvantage of all
children in these nations
a. limited response to the needs of children
by benefiting only a few, leaving millions
of homeless children in need of
assistance
b. IA reduces pressure on the nations to
improve their child and family welfare
programs
3. IA is dictated by the demands of would-be
parents in developed countries, rather than the
needs of the children involved
a. incentives for child trafficking and
trading likewise increase
b. will result to increase in number of
abandoned children, it will even
encourage more mothers who want
better life for their children
c. western people are adopting for their
own selfish needs, then it is not an
altruistic activity
4. IA facilitates child trafficking

*Too lazy to include the rebuttals which is the second

part. It’s nice though. You might want to check it out
yourself.

1
Summary by Karichi Santos
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* The preferential right of fathers is for cases that

XIV. PARENTS require immediate decision and are essentially
temporary until decided by the court.

AND CHILDREN CHILDREN’S DUTY

PARENTAL AUTHORITY (patria potestas) is
defined by Manresa as “the mass of rights and
obligations which parents have in relation to the
person and property of their children until their
emancipation and even after this under certain
circumstances.”
A. Parental Authority –
1. observe respect and reverence 
permanent, lifetime of parent and child
2. obey them  temporary, only as long as
they are under parental authority
*But in the Philippines, the best way to show respect
and reverence is to obey!
FC, Art 212 In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent p
remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental aut
another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the chil

General Provisions
FC, Art 213 In case of separation of parents, parental authority shall b
Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the
FC, Art 209 Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their unemancipated children,
parent chosen is unfit.
parental authority and responsibility shall include caring for and rearing of such children for civic consciousness and
efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.
No child under 7 yo shall be separated from the mother unless the Cou
Years Presumption)
FC, Art 210 Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or transferred except in the cases authorized by law.
FC, Art 214 In case of
Parental authority is a purely personal right. It 1. death
cannot be renounced except for the following waiver 2. absence
permitted by law: 3. unsuitability of the parents
Substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandp
1. adoption the court, taking into account the same consideration mentioned in the
2. guardianship
3. surrender to an orphanage or asylum (Art
223-224) PD 603, Art 58 Damages by child are answered by
parents
Minority does not divest a parent of parental
authority. In fact, there are two kinds of parental
authority: CC, Art 2180 The father and, in case of his death or incapaci
caused by the minor children who live in their company.
1. parental authority over the person of the
child
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or inca
2. parental authority over the property of the and live in their company.
child
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades s
PARENTAL AUTHORITY PARENTAL AUTHORITY and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their cu
OVER THE PERSON OVER THE PROPERTY
  The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to preven
 
 
1. Custody
When does a parent have parental authority
over the person but not the property?
1. when the parent is a minor A. Determining the best interest of
2. when the parent is disinherited by an the child
ascendant (Grandparent  Parent  Child) i. GENDER AND TENDER YEARS PRESUMPTION

EX PARTE DEVINE (1981)

FC, Art 211 The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In
398 So. 2d 686
case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
- Alice Beth, an employee at the US Army at Fort
Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are
McMClellan obliged to obey
♥ Christoper, themteacher
a school as long 
as they
children are under parental authority. Matthew Patrick and Timothy Clark
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- Mr and Mrs Devine were divorced, the court

awarded the children to Mrs Devine, according to
the tender years presumption (if both parents
are fit, and children are at their tender years,
under 7 years, mother will take care of them,
based on instinctive role of the mother).
- Mr Devine now challenges the constitutionality
of the tender years presumption and claiming
that it is violative of the14th amendment (equal
protection)
ISSUE: WON the trial court’s reliance on tender years
presumption deprived the father of his constitutional
entitlement to the equal protection of the law
ISSUE: WON Gina has rights to the child
HELD: No. The provision that no mother shall be
separated from a child under 7 yo will not apply
when the court finds compelling reasons to do
otherwise. In this case, Gina’s situation is not
economic and moral conducing for the child.
Conrado is married to another woman, and also,
Gina has another child by another married man.
Having a sibling with a different surname will cause
confusion to the child. Angelie Anne was also legally
adopted and it dissolves the authority of the natural
parents to the child.

HELD: Yes. The tender years presumption represents
an unconstitutional gender-based classification
which discriminates between fathers and mothers in
child custody proceedings solely on the basis of sex.
It creates a presumption of fitness and suitability of
one parent without consideration of the actual
capabilities of both parties. It also imposes
unnecessary legal burden on the father. (Note: The
burden of proof that the mother is unfit. Thus, the
male can only gain custody IF the female is unfit
even if the father is fit. This violates the equal
protection clause.)
Ma’am Beth does not agree with the decision, she
says that 3 yo kids will be happy for the playmate. It
would not ask “Sino tatay mo?”
Moral of the story: Don’t use different surnames,
even if the father acknowledges the child. UNLESS
he gives support, otherwise, it’s useless!
Would it favor an adulterous mother if the
child was younger or older? Younger, because the
child does not have any opinions yet. All it wants is
milk, diaper and burp.

* Remember Moe v Dinkins, a case about the ESPIRITU v CA (1995)

requirement of parental consent 246 SCRA 362
TEST PROXY - Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masauding first
met at Iligan City in 1976. In 1984, they again
MOE v DINKINS Maturity Age
met in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and began to
DEVINE Fitness Sex/Gender
maintain a common law relationship as husband
and wife.
Is there a fit between the test and the proxy? No,
- 2 years later, Rosalind was born. They then got
because even if mothers are closer than fathers
married in 1987 and later had a son, Reginald.
during infancy, it is not sufficient ground because as
Their relationship deteriorated and they
the child matures, the difference between the
separated in 1990.
parental skills of the father and the mother
- Teresita then left the children and Reynaldo and
decreases.
went back to California. Reynaldo brought the
children to the Philippines and left them to her
CERVANTES v FAJARDO (1989)
sister.
169 SCRA 575
- Teresita then filed a petition for a writ of habeas
- Angelie Anne Cervantes is the product of
corpus against the petitioners. The trial court
common-law relationship between Conrado
denied the writ, but the CA granted the petition,
Fajardo and Gina Carreon. They offered Angelie
applying Art 363 CC which states that a child
for adoption to her sister and brother in law,
below 7 yrs old shall not be separated from the
Zenaida Carreon Cervantes and Nelson
mother.
Cervantes, the petitioners in this case.
- Gina executed an affidavit of consent and an
ISSUE: WON Teresita is fit to be granted custody of
appropriate petition for adoption was filed by
the children
herein petitioners. The petition was granted.
- Petitioners received a letter from the
HELD: No. The prime consideration is the child’s best
respondents demanding to be paid 150,000, or
interest. TYP provides that if the child is under seven
else, they would get back their child. The
years of age, the mother is the best custodian.
petitioners refused.
However, the presumption is not absolute and may
- Gina took the child from their yaya at the
be overcome by compelling reasons. When a child is
petitioners’ residence. Petitioners asked for the
over seven, his or her choice of parent is paramount.
child but respondent refused, saying that she
had no desire to give up the child in the first
The testimonies of the psychologist and social
place and the affidavit that she executed wasn’t
worker showed that the children disliked their
explained fully to her. The petitioners herein filed
mother, even loves her yaya more. Their testimonies
a writ of habeas corpus.
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were given weight by the court since the interview
and the examination were done for foreign travel
and school purposes respectively, not for the
advancement of the litigation case. Also, she refuses
to talk to her in the phone and when they saw each
other in court, daughter ignored her mother and did
not show any longing.
The mother’s illicit affair with Reynaldo’s coworker
seemed to have caused emotional disturbances to
Rosalind. There is also nothing in the records which
show that Reynaldo was unfit. His assignment in the
states is just temporary, and he will be coming back
home to the Philippines permanently.
CELIS v CAFUIR (1950)
86 Phil 554
- When Ileana Celis gave birth to a boy, Joel, she
entrusted him to Soledad Cafuir because of her
father’s displeasure of the disgrace Ileana
brought to the family for having illicit relations
with a man whom she is not married with and
because of her father’s objection of having her
son stay in the paternal home.
- Ileana made two documents: 1) entrusting
Soledad her child and only Soledad can adopt
the child. 2) appointment of Soledad as the
child’s guardian.
- Ileana only came to visit the boy every Saturday
and provided some milk, food and a little money.
- She eventually married co petitioner Agustin
Rivera and then decided to get the boy back, but
Soledad refused. Ileana then filed for a writ of
habeas corpus. Soledad, in her defense, claims
that the two documents enacted by Ileana
renounced her custody of and patria potestas
over her child.
ISSUE: WON Ileana had renounced her custody of the
child in favor of Soledad.
HELD: No. The first document merely entrusted her
son to soledad. Entrusted cannot convey the idea of
permanent renunciation. Also, the clause that says
“No one has the right to claim for adoption except
Soledad” merely provides an option for Soledad,
which she didn’t take. The second document, on the
other hand, merely designated Soledad as the
guardian of the child. The designation of one as the
guardian does not mean that the guardian will
always assume and discharge the duties of the office
or position.
GAMBOA-HIRSCH v CA (2007)
527 SCRA 380
- Agnes Gamboa-Hirsh ♥ Franklin Harvey Hirsch
and a daughter was born to them named Simon
Noelle
- They were married in Bacolod but the couple
cannot agree on where they would establish
their conjugal home, whether in Boracay or in
Makati.
- They settled in Boracay but Agnes insisted on
going to Makati. She did, and took with her
Noelle with no intention of coming back.
- Husband petitions for writ of habeas corpus
which CA granted and they were given joint
custody
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in giving custody to both
the parents
HELD: Yes. Art 213 applies because the child is under
7 years old and the mother did not have the
disqualification for possessing custody.
SY v CA (2007)
GR No. 124518
- Mercedes filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus for her two minor children Vanessa and
Jeremiah.
- Her husband Wilson alleges that she is unfit for
custody because she has 1) abandoned their
family, 2) mentally unstable and 3) cannot
provide for their children
ISSUE: WON Mercedes can have custody of her
children
HELD: Yes. Because all of Wilson’s arguments, aside
from being unsubstantiated, had been refuted by
Mercedes. She left the conjugal home to work in
Taiwan and earn money to reclaim her children. Her
act of praying in the rain is a mere expression of her
faith, which is the same reason for the couple’s
separation (religious differences).
ii. PARENTAL UNFITNESS
FELDMAN v FELDMAN (1974)
358 NYS 2d 507
- Mady Feldman filed for divorce against her
husband, Philip, based upon cruel and inhuman
treatment. Pursuant to their separation
agreement, she was awarded the custody of
their 2 children.
- After the divorce, the former wife began dating a
married man. In one visit of the former husband
at her former wife’s house, he found a copy of
Screw Magazine and some letters with explicit
photographs on the dining room and kitchen
tables. The letters were in response to the ads
placed by the former wife and her male
companion regarding fun and games with other
couples or groups.
- The former husband then filed a petition for the
custody of the two children. The trial court found
that the wife was living sexually liberated
lifestyle. Based on this, the trial court granted
the custody of the two children to the former
husband.
ISSUE: WON the mother’s unusual sexual activities
makes her unsuitable for custody because of
immorality
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HELD: No. Her peculiar sexual practices do not ipso
facto constitute unfitness for custody. It was found
that she had supported her children well and has
given them a great atmosphere at home. The
unusual practices by the mother did not, in any way,
affect the children. There is no evidence also, that
the publications or pictures were ever seen by the
children. (Note: the right of a divorced woman to
engage in private sexual activities, which no way
affect her minor children, is within the penumbra of
privacy mandated by the Bill of Rights) Also, the
children were well-provided for both emotionally and
physically (doing good at school, even elected as
class officers) and that the mother’s home had a
“cheerful and happy atmosphere” (which to Ma’am
Beth’s mind was “maaliwalas”.
SANTOS v CA (1995)
242 SCRA 407
- Leouel and Julia had placed their child into the
care of the latter’s parents ever since the child
was born. The grandparents were the ones who
provided support for the child, since Leouel
cannot afford to do so. Julia then left for the
States to work. The grandparents claim that Julia
has been sending financial support to her son.
- On September 1990, Leouel abducted the child
from his grandparents. The grandparents then
filed for custody of the boy, which the trial court
granted.
- Leouel appealed, stating that the respondents
have failed to show the he is unfit to be the
father and that the substitute parental authority
granted to the boy’s grandparents was
inappropriate.
- The respondents claim that they are financially
well-off to take care of the son, while Leouel is
not. They can provide the child with an air-
conditioned room since he is asthmatic.
- Also, Julia has entrusted the boy to them.
Leouel’s use of trickery to abduct the child also
is a sign of his unfitness. They likewise claim that
they are in the best position to take care of the
child, and this should be the primary
consideration of the court.
ISSUE: WON Leouel should be awarded proper
custody
HELD: Yes. The father, Leouel was not shown to be
an unfit parent. The fact that he kidnapped his son
from the latter’s maternal grandparents does not
render him unfit. Also, disqualifying him as custodian
because of the nature of his work would mean
depriving all soldiers of their child’s company. Only in
cases of death, absence or unsuitability of parents
may substitute parental authority be exercised by
the surviving grandparents.
B. Role of the child’s preference
PIZARRO v CA & VASQUEZ (1937)
36 OG 449
- Maria and Mariano were wed in 1928 and lived
together until 1922. they have two children.
Because of Mariano’s infidelity and cruelty,
spouses agreed to live separately. They executed
a contract of separation stating that the custody
of the children will be with Maria.
- One year late, Maria gave birth to Lorenzo.
Mariano sues and wins a case for adultery.
However, since both parties had committed
adultery after such separation, the court gave
custody to the paternal grandparents.
ISSUE: WON a wife accused of adultery was entitled
to separate maintenance.
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HELD: In absence of proof of guilt, yes she is entitled
to support. The contention here is between the
wife’s affirmation against the husband’s denial of the
short-lived marital reunion. Maria said she had
briefly reconciled with her husband during a fiesta in
Cavite. He promised to behave so she was
persuaded to live with him again.
The presumption of legitimacy continues even if the
husband and wife voluntarily separate and live
apart. This presumption is one of the strongest
known in law and cannot be overthrown except by
stronger evidence to the contrary.
Considering that the reunion with the wife is not
impossible nor improbable. Mariano also asserted
the unchastity of his wife after the birth of Lorenzo,
contradicting his earlier statements and actions. He
had found out about Maria’s affair as early as March
1934 but gave her money in September and October
1934.
Maria is entitled to prima facie presumption of
innocence of the crime of adultery. A declaration of
adultery in this case affects her standing, as well as
her child. Since alleged adultery of Maria has not
been sufficiently established, Lorenzo is presumed to
be legitimate because he was born in lawful
wedlock, there having been no divorce relative or
absolute.
Maria swore that she had left her husband and the
conjugal abode because he had kept a mistress
there, and had repeatedly done her bodily harm.
These assertions were not contradicted.
Consequently, the defense of unworthiness having
failed, the innocent wife must be given separate
maintenance. She would also be given the custody
of her three children, because 1) the contract of
separation stipulated that Gloria and Julita stay with
her and 2) it was for the best interest of the children.
GOLDSTEIN v GOLDSTEIN (1975)
115 R.I. 152
- Edward Goldstein was awarded custody of a
child, Ann Robin, after a decree by the court. As
such, the child and her father lived in Israel,
while the mother, Claire, stayed in the States.
- The wife then initiated a series of proceedings to
reclaim rights over the child and she finally
succeeded in part, when her husband and child
returned to the States and appeared in court.
The trial judge found it advisable to place the
child under the mother’s custody pending the
hearing. At the hearing, both were found to be
fit.
- Ann was found to be very intelligent and suffers
no emotional damage. The wife requested for
the judge to take notice of the threat of war in
Israel, while the husband argued that the states
had more violence and engaged in much more
wars.
- The judge and Ann Robin then talked, and from
their conversation, Ann said that she loved her
father more than her mother and that she had
no desire to visit with her mother but agreed if
she was allowed to live with her father if she
visited her mother for 4 weeks during the
summer.
- The judge, taking into consideration the child’s
best interests, granted custody to the father. The
wife argued that the judge failed to consider all
circumstances and allowed the child’s choice to
control his decision.
ISSUE: WON the judge’s reliance on the child’s
preference was justifiable
HELD: Yes. The factors in awarding custody to one or
the other of the parents were equally balanced as to
make it difficult for the judge to decide between
them. That being so, it does not seem that he
abused his discretion when he gave great weight to
the child’s preference.
LAXAMANA v LAXAMANA (2002)
388 SCRA 296
- Lourdes (a degree holder in banking and finance)
♥ Raymond (graduate of LLB, buy and sell, resto
owner and fishpond)  Michael and twins Joseph
& Vincent ‘
- The family was well off until the father became
drug dependent and violent. This led the wife
and her children to abandon the petitioner
- After going in and out of the rehab and finally
being declared drug-free, Reymond then filed a
petition for habeas corpus for the custody of the
3 children
- Lourdes opposed the petition, citing the drug
dependence of the petitioner and then filed for
an annulment of their marriage
- Reymond filed in the habeas corpus case a
motion seeking visitation rights over his children.
After the parties reached an agreement, the
court granted the visitation rights and ordered
the parties to undergo psychiatric and
psychological examination.
- The results of the psychiatric evaluation were
presented to the court. The exam states that the
children were affected psychologically by the
father’s drug-related behavior, and also the
psychiatrist found that Reymond is still not
completely cured of the drug addiction.
However, the psychiatrist did not detect any
evidence that the paternal visits would be
harmful to the children. Based on this, the court
granted custody to Lourdes and visitation rights
to Reymond.
ISSUE: WON the court properly resolved the issue of
custody
HELD: No. The fundamental policy of the State to
promote and protect the welfare of the children shall
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not be disregarded by mere technicality in resolving
disputes which involve the family and the youth.
While Reymond may have a history of drug
dependence, the records are inadequate as to his
moral, financial and social well-being. Although he is
not completely cured of his drug dependence, there
is no evidence showing that he is unfit to provide the
children with adequate support, education and moral
and intellectual training and development. Moreover,
the children in this case were 14 and 15 years old at
the time of the promulgation of the decision, yet the
court did not ascertain their choice as to which
parent they wanted to live.
* Ma’am Beth does not like this decision. Why would
you risk the children staying with someone who has
propensity for drug addiction? It’s only saving grace
is that the lower court would only receive evidence.
C. Presumption for primary
caretaker
This rule is not followed in the Philippines. It’s just
included here so that we’ll know that we have other
alternatives to:
1. tender years presumption
2. best interest of the child
3. child’s preference
GARSKA v MCCOY (1981)
278 S.E. 2d 357
Michael Garska, the appellee and Gwendolyn McCoy,
the appellant, met at North Carolina. Michael got
Gwen pregnant and thus, Gwen moved back to her
grandparents. During her pregnancy, she received
no support from Michael, but after she gave birth,
Michael sent a package of food and diapers. In the
subsequent months, the baby had many
complications, and to pay for the medical bills,
Gwen’s grandfather attempted to use his medical
insurance provided by the united mine workers. But
he has been informed that they would have to adopt
the baby so they can avail of the said insurance.
Gwen then signed a consent in which she agreed
that her baby will be adopted by her grandparents.
Michael, upon learning this, visited the baby for the
1st time and sent money weekly. Gwen’s grandfather
then filed a petition for adoption. Consequently,
Michael filed a petition for write of habeas corpus to
secure custody of his son. The court denied the
petition for adoption, since the baby had not resided
with them for the requisite 6 months. The court also
awarded custody to Michael for reasons that he: is
natural father, was better educated, more intelligent,
able to provide better financial support, among
others.
ISSUE: WON Michael should be awarded custody
HELD: No. the court set forth the rule regarding the
presumption of primary caretaker. The court held
that the primary caretaker is one who performs the
following caring and nurturing duties of the parent:
1. preparing and planning of meals 2. Bathing and
grooming and dressing, 3. purchasing, cleaning and
care of clothes, 4. medical care, 5. arranging for
social interaction among peers after school, 6.
arranging alternative care, 7. putting child to bed at
night, attending to child in the middle of the night,
waking child in the morning, 8. disciplining, 9.
educating, and, 10. teaching elementary skills. Once
the primary caretaker is identified, all that need to
be determined is whether the parent is unfit or not.
In this case, it is obvious that Gwen is the primary
caretaker. There is no finding which points that Gwen
is unfit. In fact, all of the evidence indicates that she
mobilized all of the resources at her command,
namely the solicitous regard of her grandparents, in
the interest of this child and that she went to
extraordinary lengths to provide for him adequate
medical attention and financial support.
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D. Flip of the coin 2

(Mnookin article)

CRITICISMS AGAINST ALTERNATIVES

- TYP results to protracted litigation. However, if
we do way with no presumptions, there is the
disadvantage of moving into the facts, and what
should be the hierarchy of the facts? Each and
every case will be litigated, and we end up
spending money and destroying families when
we could have done it by being civil.
- How much weight should be given to the child’s
choice?
- When and where should we ask the child? Any
place where there are neither parents nor
lawyers like the chambers of the judge.
- When do you ask? Not during the trial of course,
when the child would be fearful of hurting the
parents.
- What is the advantage of flipping the coin? It is
perfectly random, like the way they pick people
in the draft, who will fight the war.
- BUT we cannot flip the coin because application
to the government’s capacity to decide on the
child’s best interest. It symbolically ignores the
difference between the parties. Also, people lose
the opportunity or forum to vent, to flame which
is good for the soul.
- Conclusion: accept the flaws of whatever
presumption we have.

2. Other rights and duties in

exercise of parental authority
FC, Art 220 The parents and those exercising parental authority shall
wards the following rights and duties:
1. To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruc
provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;
2. To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionsh
3. To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in
industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and insp
4. To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials,
with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them
studies and morals;
5. To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;
6. To demand from them respect and obedience;
7. To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circum
8. To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents

2
Summary by Krissy Conti
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4. fruits of all the properties of the child

RIGHTS OF PARENTS DUTIES OF PARENTS whether acquired by lucrative or onerous
1. To keep them in their All others! So in effect, title
company parents have more duties 5. insurance proceeds accruing to the child
2. To demand from them than rights
respect and obedience PURPOSES WHICH THE PARENTS MAY USE THE
FRUITS AND INCOME OF THE CHILD
1. child’s
FC, Art 221 Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall support
be civilly and
liable for theeducation
injuries and damages caused
by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their
2.company and daily
collective underneeds
their parental authority
of the family as subject
a to
the appropriate defenses provided by law. social unit

EXTINGUISHMENT OF PARENT’S USUFRUCT

FC, Art 222 The courts may appoint a guardian of the child's property or a guardian ad litem when the best interests of the
child so requires 1. emancipation of child
2. death of the child
3. loss of parental authority through judicial
FC, Art 223 The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individual, decree
entity or institution exercising parental authority,
may petition the proper court of the place where the child resides, for 4. anconsent of the parent
order providing to the child’s
for disciplinary living
measures over the
child. The child shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel, either of his choice or appointed by the court, and a summary
independently
hearing shall be conducted wherein the petitioner and the child shall be5. heard.
disinheritance and incapacity to succeed by
reason of unworthiness
However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the petitioner at fault, irrespective of the merits of the petition, or when the
circumstances so warrant, the court may also order the deprivation or suspension • Administration and usufruct
of parental authority or adoptare two
such other
measures as it may deem just and proper. distinct things. There may be
administration without usufruct or
vice versa.
FC, Art 224 The measures referred to in the preceding article may include the commitment of the child for not more than 30
days in entities or institutions engaged in child care or in children's homes duly accredited by the proper government agency.
FC, Art 227 If the parents entrust the management or administration
The parent exercising parental authority shall not interfere with thethecare
netof proceeds
the child whenever committed
of such property shall but shalltoprovide
belong for The child
the owner.
his support. Upon proper petition or at its own instance, the court mayamountterminate
not lessthe commitment
than that which of
thethe childwould
owner whenever
havejust
paid if the adm
and proper. the entire proceeds to the child. In any case, the proceeds thus give in
legitime.

FC, Art 225 The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the unemancipated
Who
common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case has authority
of disagreement, theover the
father's child’s
decision property?
shall prevail, unless
there is a judicial order to the contrary. 1. parents unless minor or disinherited by
ascendant
Where the market value of the property or the annual income of 2. parental
the child authority
exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be
required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of
the property or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligationsvprescribed
SALIENTES ABANILLA for general
(2006)guardians.
500 SCRA 128
A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if the child
resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where - theMarie Antonette
property ♥ Loran
or any part thereofisLorenzo
situated.Emmanuel
- The family lives with the wife’s parents.
The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of
the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shallHowever, Loran
be heard and cannot get along with his in-laws
resolved.
so he urges his wife to leave and transfer to their
The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory exceptownwhenplace. Marie
the child refuses
is under so Loran
substitute leaves
parental alone. or
authority,
- the
the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case Loran wasrules
ordinary prevented from seeing
on guardianship his childn. So
shall apply.
he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus for
his 2 yo child.
FC, Art 226 The property of the unemancipated child earned or acquired
- with his work
CA dismissed hisorcase
industry or by onerous
because WHC isorresorted
gratuitous
title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted exclusively to the latter's
to in cases where support
rightfuland education,
custody unless the
is withheld
title or transfer provides otherwise.
from a person entitled thereto.
The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child's property shall be limited primarily to the child's support and
secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family. ISSUE: WON a father may be deprived to see his son

HELD: No. Since they have de facto separation, the

PROPERTY OF THE CHILD
custody is yet to be settled so father retains his
1. child’s earning through his labor, work or
parental authority over the child.
industry
2. property acquired by the child by gratuitous
CABANAS v PILAPIL (1974)
title donated or inherited
58 SCRA 94
3. property acquired by the child through
- Florentino Pilapil had a child (Millian Pilipil) with the
onerous title
plaintiff, Melchora Cabanas, married to another man.
- The deceased insured himself assigning the child
as the beneficiary and his brother, respondent
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herein, Francisco Pilapil as the trustee during her
minority. Upon his deaths, the proceeds were given
to the brother.
- Mother prays for appointment as the administrator
in her capacity as the natural parent. Uncle resists
invoking the terms of the insurance policy.
ISSUE: Who between the mother and the uncle has
the right to administer the child’s property?
HELD: The mother. Art 320 and 321 of CC says that
the father, in his absence, the mother is the legal
administrator of the property of the child. There is no
ambiguity in the law, so apply it if the facts are not
disputed.
LIBI v IAC (1992)
214 SCRA 816
- Julie Ann Gotiong (18 yo, 1st year Commerce
student at University of San Carlos, Cebu) and
Wendell Libi (18-19) were sweethearts.
- Julie broke up with Wendell because he was
sadistic and irresponsible. Wendell attempts to
reconcile with her but to no avail. So he resorts
to threatening Julie who in turn, sought the help
of her best friend Malou Alfonso in whose house
she stayed to avoid her ex-bf.
- Julie and Wendell died from a single gunshot
inflicted by a revolver licensed in the name of
Wendell’s father, Cresencio Libi (the petitioner).
- No eyewitness account so the parents of the two
parties presented their own theories.
- GOTIONG VERSION OF THE STORY: Wendell killed
their daughter, the committed suicide.
- LIBI VERSION OF THE STORY: Wendell was an
informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit
(CANU), so an unknown and antagonized third
party killed him and included Julie to eliminate
any witnesses.
- The Gotiongs filed a civil case against the Libis
to recover damages for their daughter’s death
ISSUE: WON the parents of the Wendell are liable for
the damages
HELD: Yes. Parents are primary liable for damages
caused by minor children from quasi-delicts and
criminal offenses except when they exercised due
diligence. In this case, parents did not exercise due
diligence since the son gained access to the key of
the safety deposit box where gun was (mother just
kept it in her bag, to the knowledge of the son) and
their ignorance to the nature of his job as evidence
by the picture of him with a gun given to Julie Ann.
Also, the Libi’s theory is untenable because they did
not file a case against the alleged malefactor of their
son, there were only two bullets used and no paraffin
test was conducted because of the hasty interment.
* Ma’am Beth recognizes the impulse of teen-agers
to have a life unknown from their parents. Mahirap
talagang maging magulang, if you don’t know what
your child is doing, you’re a bad parent and if
something goes wrong you’re liable for it. If you get
involved too much, you’re being too intrusive and
stunts your child’s growth.
LINDAIN v CA (1992)
212 SCRA 725
- Dolores Luluquisin, acting as a guardian of her
minor children, sold a land registered in the
name of her children to the private respondents
Apolonia Valiente and Federico Ila for P2000.
- They assert that the value can be validly sold
without written court approval because the
property was less than P2000.
- Even if the sale was invalid, the petitioners’ right
to redeem has already prescribed because it is
only allowed until four years after reaching age
of majority
ISSUE: WON judicial approval was necessary for the
sale of minor’s property by the mother
HELD: Yes. Sale of minor children's property
executed by the mother is void. Judicial approval is
necessary because the powers and duties as legal
administrator are only powers of possession and
management; no power to mortgage, encumber or
dispose. Also, the action for reconveyance of
immovable prescribe only after 30 years.
PEOPLE v SILVANO (1999)
309 SCRA 362
- It is not for the humans to ravish what they
produced. Sheryl Silvano, a beautiful and tall
mestiza, 16 yo was raped by her father as a
punishment for her coming home late. She has
been raped since she was 13 yo old. And only
told her mother and grandmother about it when
she was being compelled to return to their home
(she left their home and stayed at her lola’s
house).
- Father submits many arguments like: he couldn’t
have possibly raped the child because the room
was cramped, that his wife just wants to severe
marital ties with him, that if he did rape her it
would have woke up her two brothers who are
sleeping in the same room.
- He was merely teaching her sex education.
ISSUE: WON raping is justified form of punishment
HELD: No! Sex with one's own child is per se
abhorrent and can never be justified as a form of
parental punishment. It is detrimental to the child’s
moral development and well-being. His arguments
are likewise untenable because any noise that they
would have produced is disguised as a form of
parental reproach. DEATH ROLL!
SHIELDS v GROSS (1983)
58 NY 2d 338
- Brooke Shields wants to revoke a contract entered
into by her mother when she was just 10 years old.
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The contract was for a modeling session wherein she FC, Art 216 In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, th
was made to pose nude in a bath tub. authority over the child in the order indicated.:
1. surviving grandparent, as provided in Art 214
ISSUE: WON a child upon reaching age of majority 2. oldest brother or sister, over 21 yo, unless unfit or disqualified
may disaffirm a contract entered into by her parent 3. child’s actual custodian, over 21 yo, unless unfit or disqualifie
whenever the appointment of a judicial guardian over the property
HELD: No. Neither was judicial approval of the preference shall be observed.
contract was necessary because this was only
required of child performers which by statutory SUBSTITUTE SPECIAL PARENTAL
definition excludes child models. PARENTAL AUTHORITY
AUTHORITY
The decision balanced two interests, that of: Grandparents, oldest School, administrators
1. the child: not pornographic sibling or court appoint and teachers
(????) guardian
2. stability of commercial Exercised in case of Exercised concurrently
transactions death, absence or with the exercise of
unsuitability of parents parental authority
SILVA v CA & GONZALES (1997) Subsidiarily liable for if Principally and solidarily
275 SCRA 60 damages caused by act liable for damages
- Carlitos Silva (a married businessman) cohabited or omission under the caused by act or
with Suzanne Gonzales (an actress) and begot supervision of people omission of minor under
two children, Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia with special parental their custody,
- Because the wife resumed her acting career authority supervision or
(though wife contends that she did not stop) instruction
they separated Law is silent about Cannot inflict corporal
- Mother refuses to allow father the children’s prohibition of corporal punishment on the
company on weekends and says that he is into punishment minor
gambling and womanizing which she fears might
affect the values of the children FC, Art 217 In case of foundlings, abandoned, neglected or abused ch
- RTC gave visitation rights to the father authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to he
- Mother remarries a Dutch national and goes to institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency.
Holland with kids.
- CA denies custodial rights to father and asks for
ABANDONED CHILD is one who has no parental care
self-sacrifice, saying that rotational custody is
of guardianship or whose parents or guardian have
harmful to the children, especially if they see
deserted him for at least six months
that the father has another family. If he really
loves his children, he will give them what is best
for them, even if it means he will not see them. FC, Art 218 The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individ
Besides, illegitimate children should be under special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while
the parental authority of the mother.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whe
or institution.
ISSUE: WON the father may be deprived of visitation
rights
FC, Art 219 Those given the authority and responsibility under the pre
HELD: No. Provisions on inherent and natural right is for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated
regardless of legitimacy. Besides, Art 49 FC may be exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsid
applied here (visitation rights of void ab initio
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragrap
marriages). The consequences are merely the
proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.
product of the unfounded imagination of the judge.
Besides, the RTC gave safeguards to the visitation All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be g
rights: “cannot take out children without the delicts.
mother’s consent”.

CC, Art 2180 The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the m
minor children who live in their company.

B. Substitute and Special Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitate
company.
Parental Authority
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the perso
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
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PALISOC v BRILLANTES (1971)
41 SCRA 548
While inside the laboratory room of Manila
Technological Institute, Dominador Palisoc and
Virgilio Daffon engaged in a brawl which killed the
former. Parents of Dominador claims damages from
the school, the teacher and Daffon (who is already of
legal age).
ISSUE: WON the school, its administrators, the
teacher and Daffon are liable for damages
HELD: President and instructor are jointly and
severally liable since incident could have been
prevented if they gave proper supervision. It is not
necessary that the student board in the school for
Art 2180 to apply. As long as students are in their
custody, they stand in loco parentis and must
exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of
the child.
AMADORA v CA (1988)
160 SCRA 315
- Just before their highschool graduation, Pablito
Daffon shot Alfredo Amadora which resulted to
his death. It was proven that they were only at
the school auditorium to finish their project in
Physics. Amadora’s parents claim for damages
which RTC and CA dismissed.
ISSUE: Who may be held liable for the damages?
HELD:
1) Not the school nor the administrators: Art 2180
only holds school administrators of trade and art
school liable, but not academic institutions.
2) Not the teacher in charge because it was not
show that he was not required to be there at the
time of the incident.
3) Not the school prefect because it was not proven
that the gun used by Daffon was the same gun he
had confiscated and did not report to authorities.
However, it was established that Art 2180 applies to
all schools, academic or non-academic. In academic
schools, teacher in charge is liable for student's
misconduct. In non-academic schools, the head is
liable. Custody is not coterminous with semester. As
long as student is under the control and influence of
school and within its premises in pursuance of
legitimate right, obligation or privilege, he is
considered under school custody.
* Ma’am Beth thinks Amadora was incorrectly
decided
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PALISOC AND AMADORA
PALISOC AMADORA
during school hours, not during classhours,
school liable if impleaded what mattered was the
purpose
ST. MARY’S ACADEMY v CARPITANOS (2002)
376 SCRA 473
- On 13 to 20 February 1995, St. Mary’s Academy
Dipolog conducted enrolment drive for the
school year 1995-1996. This included visiting
schools where prospective enrollees are. Among
the volunteer students are Sherwin Carpitanos
and James Daniel II.
- On one day of the campaign, James Daniel II who
was then 15 took the wheel from the grandson of
Vivencio Villanueva, the owner of the Mitsubishi
jeep, and by reckless driving caused the
overturning of the said vehicle which caused
injuries to its passengers and led to the death of
Sherwin.
- Sherwin’s parents sued James Daniel II and his
parents, Vivencio Villanueva, and the school. JD II
and Villanueva were absolved while SMA was
held to pay primary liability while James Daniel
Sr. and Guada Daniel were to pay subsidiarily.
- SMA appealed and on 29 February 2000, got
reduced damages to pay. They moved to
reconsider on the same date, but got denied on
22 May 2000. Hence they filed this appeal.
ISSUE: WON SMA is liable under Art 218 and 219 FC
HELD: NO. Even if under the aforementioned articles,
the school, its administrators and teachers, have
special parental authority over minor children (Art
218) and that they will be solidarily liable for any
damages (Art 219), it was erroneously established
that their alleged negligence of not sending a
teacher to serve as guardian was the proximate
cause of the accident that caused the death of
Sherwin. Rather, it was the reckless driving of James
II and the mechanical failure of the jeep when its
steering wheel guide got detached that caused the
jeep to lose control and turn turtle, injuring its
passengers and causing the death of herein
petitioners’ minor child. The ones liable should be
the parents of James Daniel II (JD II being in their
care and custody) and Vivencio Villanueva for his
negligence regarding the condition of his jeep and
his grandson’s allowing of James to drive the said
vehicle.
VANCIL v BELMES (2001)
358 SCRA 707
- Reeder Vancil died as a US Navy Serviceman in
1986. He is survived by his common-law wife
Helen Belmes (herein respondent) and two minor
children Valerie and Vincent. The kids were 6 and
2 years old respectively in 1987.
- Bonifacia, Reeder’s mother and a naturalized
American citizen, is the petitioner in this case.
She seeks guardianship over the persons and
properties of the two minors. RTC appointed her
as legal and judicial in 1987.
- Helen appealed to the in 1988 CA and won. CA
said that parents are the ipso facto guardian of
their minor children without the need of the
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court appointment. The grandmother did not
present any reason to contest Helen’s fitness to
hold parental authority.
- Ten years later or in 1998, Bonifacia brought the
case to SC saying that Helen is morally unfit as
guardian because her live-in partner raped
Valerie several times and that her status as an
expatriate is not a statutory requirement for
guardianship.
ISSUE: WON the grandmother may be granted
guardianship of the two children instead of the
mother.
HELD: OF COURSE NOT. As the Court held in Santos,
Sr. v CA, parents have the preferential right to the
custody of their children especially if there is
continuous parental authority. Grandparents are only
resorted to in case the parent is absent, dead or
proved to be unsuitable. Bonifacia did not present
convincing evidence showing that Helen is unfit to
be Vincent’s guardian (Valerie already turned 18 by
1998, ergo guardianship for her is moot). Also her
expatriate status disqualifies as a substitute
guardian because 1) she resides in the US (plus the
fact that her libel case here in the Philippines would
give her second thoughts on coming back) and 2)
her old age, she will merely delegate guardianship
duties to someone else who may not qualify as a
guardian. Besides, Vincent only has 2 years before
emancipation. CA DECISION AFFIRMED.
C. Suspension or Termination
of Parental Authority
FC, Art 228 Parental authority terminates permanently:
1. Upon the death of the parents;
2. Upon the death of the child; or
3. Upon emancipation of the child
FC, Art
229 Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment, parental
1. adoption
2. guardianship
3. abandonment
4. final judgment divesting parental authority
5. absence or incapacity
FC, Art
230 Parental authority is suspended upon conviction of the parent
carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction. The authority is automatically reinstated upon service of the penalty or upon
pardon or amnesty of the offender.
FC, Art 231 The court in an action filed for the purpose in a related ca
the person exercising the same:
1. Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty;
2. Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or example;
3. Compels the child to beg; or
4. Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts of lasc
The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include cases which h
the person exercising parental authority.
If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the welfare of the child s
parental authority or adopt such other measures as may be proper und
The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the parental auth
same proceeding if the court finds that the cause therefor has ceased a
FC, Art 232 If the person exercising parental authority has subjected t
abuse, such person shall be permanently deprived by the court of such
FC, Art 233 The person exercising substitute parental authority shall h
the parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher of individual engag
inflict corporal punishment upon the child.
TERMINATION – permanent
SUSPENSION – temporary
a. ipso facto if with civil interdiction (reclusion
temporal, perpetua or death)
 terminated by:
i. service of penalty
ii. amnesty or pardon
b. judicial decree
CHUA v CABANGBANG (1969)
27 SCRA 791
- CFI dismisses Pacita’s claim for her daughter.
She was a prostitute who had three children by
three men whom she lived with successively
(Chua Ben, Sy Sia Lay and Victor Tan Villareal).
- Betty Chua, 11 yo at the time of the trial, was
one of her children and is in the custody of Flora
Cabangbang.
- Cabangbang
and
authority also Chua had different stories as to
terminates:
how Betty’s custody was acquired.
- FLORA: she found the child wrapped in a bundle
in their front door
- PACITA: Villareal gave Betty to Flora as a
payment for his debts. She now claims custody
of her child after five years allegedly because
she did
notperson
or the know where to look
exercising for the
the same of achild.
crime which
ISSUE: WON Pacita may regain her child
HELD: No. There was constructive abandonment and
hence she may be deprived of parental authority.
She only wants the child back so her biological
father’s support would resume (take not that this is
still uncertain) and she was even willing to withdraw
her suit if the Cabangbangs would pay her 150 K.
She attests no genuine motherly longing. In the best
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interest of the child, Flora Cabangbang should retain Alejandro filed annulment of their wedding and
custody. brought his children to his mother.
- During the pendency of the annulment
COMPARED WITH CELIS v CAFUIR, Celis did not lose proceeding, Alejandro died as a policeman.
communication with her child during the time that
Cafuir had custody of her child. ISSUE: WON Maria Cortes may have custody of her
children?
ABIERA v ORIN (1907)
8 Phil 193 HELD: No. she had insufficient means to support the
Parents children and the fact that she had been found guilty
of adultery, she has corrupt moral values harmful to
the welfare of the minors. Grandmother retains
custody.
Miguel Vicenta Mario Petra Juan
*Cortes is a very old case and would not be the same
Sebastia if decided today. In the olden days, females are
n judged by her womb, all these laws reflect that she’s
just a wife and mother, not a person.
Vicenta, Mario and Petra were brothers and sisters.
Vicenta was married to Miguel; Petra to Juan. When
Vicenta died, Miguel, Mario and Juan entered into an
agreement covering the disposition of the properties
left by Vicenta; Mario and Juan were representing
their children, who are the heirs of Vicenta.
Sebastian, son of Petra and Juan filed a complaint as
special administrator of his deceased father, alleging
that Miguel has not complied with the said
contract/agreement.

ISSUE: WON Sebastian, being the son of the

deceased Juan Abiera has the right to ask for the
compliance with the said obligation

HELD: No. The true interested parties in the

obligation contracted by Miguel Orin are the children
of Juan Abiera, and not the latter, for the simple
reason that the obligation was executed in their
favor and not in favor of said Abiera. This being the
fact, it is evident that the plaintiff in his office as
administrator of the deceased Juan Abiera has no
right to ask for the compliance with the said
obligation. As such administrator, he has only the
right to institute such actions as correspond and
pertain to the estate which he is administering, and
no other action dealing with contracts and
obligations contracted in favor of 3rd persons or
others from whom he does not derive such right, can
be brought as such administrator. The right of Juan
Abiera to represent his children as father or guardian
of the same, and that he has not transferred nor
could he transfer to the administrator of his estate
such right from the mere fact that he was such
administrator. The said right attached to parental
authority or guardianship was extinguished when
Juan Abiera died.

CORTES v CASTILLO (1921)

41 Phil 466
- Maria Cortes ♥ Alejandro Herrera  Acardio and
Bernardo
- Maria committed adultery and was convicted but
Alejandro pardoned her and they reconciled.
However, Maria again committed adultery so
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D. Rights and Duties of
Children
Rights of Rights of
the child the parents
Duties of
Duties of
the parents
the child
CC, Art 356 Every child:
1. is entitled to parental care
2. shall receive at least elementary education
3. shall be given moral and civil training by the
guardians
4. has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to
physical, moral and intellectual development
* Rights of the child
* Compare with Art 3 of PD 603
CC, Art 357 Every child shall:
1. obey and honor parents or guardian
2. respect grandparents, old relatives and persons
holding substitute parental authority
3. exert utmost for education and training
4. cooperate with the family in all matters that
make for the good of the same
* Duties of the child
* Compare with Art 4 of PD 603
CC, Art 358 Every parent and every person holding
substitute parental authority shall see to it that the rights
of the child are respected and his duties complied with,
and shall particularly, by precept and example, imbue the
child with high-mindedness, love of country, veneration
for the national heroes, fidelity to democracy as a way of
life and attachment to the ideal of permanent world
peace.
CC, Art 359 The government promotes the full growth of
the faculties of every child. For this purpose, the
government will establish, whenever possible:
1. schools in every barrio, municipality and city
where the optional religious instruction shall be
taught as a part of the curriculum at the option
the parent or guardian
2. puericulture and similar centers
3. Council for the Protection of Children
4. juvenile courts
CC, Art 360 The Council for the Protection of Children
shall look after the welfare of children in the municipality.
It shall, among other functions:
1. foster the education of every child in the
municipality
2. encourage the cultivation of the duties of parents
3. protect and assist abandoned or mistreated
children and orphans
4. take steps to prevent juvenile delinquency
5. adopt measures for the health of children
6. promote the opening and maintenance of
CC, Art 361 Juvenile courts will be established, as far as
practicable, in every chartered city or large municipality.
CC, Art 362 Whenever a child is found delinquent by any
court, the father, mother or guardian may in a proper case
be judicially admonished.
CC, Art 363 In all questions on the care, custody,
education and property of children, the latter’s welfare
shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from
her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds
compelling reasons for such measure.
CC, Art 375 In case of identity of names and surnames
between ascendants and descendants, the word “Junior”
can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct
male descendants shall either:
1. Add a middle name or the mother’s surname
2. Add the Roman numerals II, III and so on
CC, Art 376 No person can change his name or surname
without judicial authority.
* Repealed by RA No. 9048 – Correction of clerical or
typographical error without need of judicial order
- Not allowed if it will sow confusion on paternity
and successional rights
- When father changes his name, there are no
effects on children. However, children may elect
to change their names on a separate petition
upon emancipation. The father can also include
their minor children in his petition.
- Change of name shall have no effect on: family
relations, family rights and duties, legal capacity
like civil status or citizenship.
- Change of name is done in a proceeding in rem.
FC, Art 129
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children
shall be delivered upon partition in accordance with Art
51.
FC, Art 211 Par 2 Children shall always observe respect
and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to
obey them as long as the children are under parental
authority. (17a, PD 603)
FC, Art 213 In case of separation of the parents, parental
authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by
the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant
considerations, especially the choice of the child over
seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from
the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise.
* “Separation” in this article applies both to de facto
and legal separation
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FC Art 226 The property of unemancipated child earned
or acquired with his work or industry or by onerous or
gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and
shall be devoted exclusively to the latter’s support and
education, unless the title or transfer provides otherwise.
The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the
child’s property shall be limited:
1. primarily, child’s support
2. secondarily, collective daily needs of the family
PD 603 Art 3 Rights of the Child. - All children shall be
entitled to the rights herein set forth without
distinction as to legitimacy or illegitimacy, sex, social
status, religion, political antecedents, and other
factors. Every child has the right to:
(1) is endowed with the dignity and worth of a
human being from the moment of his
conception, as generally accepted in medical
parlance, and has, therefore, the right to be born
well.
(2) a wholesome family life that will provide him
with love, care and understanding, guidance and
counseling, and moral and material security.
- Dependent or abandoned child: shall be
provided with the nearest substitute for
a home.
(3) a well-rounded development of his personality to
the end that he may become a happy, useful
and active member of society.
- Gifted child shall be given opportunity and
encouragement to develop his special
talents.
- Emotionally disturbed or socially
maladjusted child shall be treated with
sympathy and understanding, and shall be
entitled to treatment and competent care.
- Physically or mentally handicapped child
shall be given the treatment, education
and care required by his particular
condition.
(4) a balanced diet, adequate clothing, sufficient
shelter, proper medical attention, and all the
basic physical requirements of a healthy and
vigorous life.
(5) be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and
rectitude for the enrichment and the
strengthening of his character.
(6) an education commensurate with his abilities
and to the development of his skills for the
improvement of his capacity for service to
himself and to his fellowmen.
(7) full opportunities for safe and wholesome
recreation and activities, individual as well as
social, for the wholesome use of his leisure
hours.
(8) protection against exploitation, improper
influences, hazards, and other conditions or
circumstances prejudicial to his physical,
mental, emotional, social and moral
development.
(9) live in a community and a society that can offer
him an environment free from pernicious
influences and conducive to the promotion of his
health and the cultivation of his desirable traits
and attributes.
(10)the care, assistance, and protection of the State,
particularly when his parents or guardians fail or
are unable to provide him with his fundamental
needs for growth, development, and
improvement.
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PD 603 Art 4 Responsibilities of the Child. - Every child,
regardless of the circumstances of his birth, sex, religion,
social status, political antecedents and other factors shall:
(1) Strive to lead an upright and virtuous life in
accordance with the tenets of his religion, the
teachings of his elders and mentors, and the
biddings of a clean conscience;
(2) Love, respect and obey his parents, and cooperate
with them in the strengthening of the family;
(3) Extend to his brothers and sisters his love,
thoughtfulness, and helpfulness, and endeavor with
them to keep the family harmonious and united;
(4) Exert his utmost to develop his potentialities for
service, particularly by undergoing a formal
education suited to his abilities, in order that he
may become an asset to himself and to society;
(5) Respect not only his elders but also the customs
and traditions of our people, the memory of our
heroes, the duly constituted authorities, the laws of
our country, and the principles and institutions of
democracy;
(6) Participate actively in civic affairs and in the
promotion of the general welfare, always bearing in
mind that it is the youth who will eventually be
called upon to discharge the responsibility of
leadership in shaping the nation's future; and
(7) Help in the observance of individual human rights,
the strengthening of freedom everywhere, the
fostering of cooperation among nations in the
pursuit of their common aspirations for programs
and prosperity, and the furtherance of world peace.
Conventions on the Rights of the Child
Art 1 Definition of a child – A child is recognized as a
person under 18, unless national laws recognize
age of majority earlier.
Art 2 Non-discrimination – All rights apply to all children
without exception. It is the State’s obligation to
protect children from any form of discrimination
and to take positive action to promote their rights.
Art 3 Best interest of the child – All actions concerning
the child should take full account of his or her best
interest. The State shall provide the child with
adequate care when parents, or others charged
with the responsibility, fail to do so.
Art 4 Implementation of rights – The State must do all it
can to implement the rights contained in the
Convention.
Art 5 Parental guidance and the child’s evolving
capacities – The State must respect the rights and
responsibilities of parents and the extended family
to provide guidance for the child which is
appropriate to her or his evolving capacities.
Art 6 Survival and development – Every child has the
inherent right to life and the State has an obligation
to ensure the child’s survival and development.
Art 7 Name and nationality – The child has the right to a
name at birth. The child also has the right to
acquire a nationality and, as far as possible, to
know his or her parents and be cared for by them.
Art 8 Preservation of identity – The State has an
obligation to protect and if necessary, re-establish
basic aspects of the child’s identity. This includes
name, nationality and family ties.
Art 9 Separation from parents – The child has a right to
live with his or her parents unless this is deemed to
be incompatible with the child’s best interest. The
child also hast the right to maintain contact with
both parents if separated from one or both.
Art Family unification – Children and their parents have
10 the right to leave any country and to enter their
own for purposes of reunion or the maintenance of
the child-parent relationship.
Art Illicit transfer and non-return – The State has an
11 obligation to prevent and remedy the kidnapping or
retention of children abroad by a parent or third
party.
Art The child’s opinion – The child has the right to
12 express his or her opinion freely and to have that
opinion taken into account in any matter or
procedure affecting the child.
Art Freedom of expression – The child has the right to
13 express his or her views, obtain information, make
ideas or information known, regardless of frontiers.
Art Freedom of thought, conscience and religion – The
14 State shall respect the child’s right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion, subject to
appropriate parental guidance.
Art Freedom of association – Children have a right to
15 meet with others, and to join or form association.
Art Protection of privacy – Children have the right to
16 protection from interference with privacy, family,
home and correspondence and from libel or
slander.
Art Access to appropriate information – The State shall
17 ensure the accessibility to children of information
and material from a diversity of sources, and it
shall encourage the mass media to disseminate
information which is of social and cultural benefit to
the child, and take steps to protect him or her from
harmful materials.
Art Parental responsibilities – Parents have joint
18 primary responsibility for raising the child, and the
State shall support them in this. The State shall
provide appropriate assistance to parents in child-
raising.
Art Protection from abuse and neglect – The State shall
19 protect the child from forms of maltreatment by
parents others responsible for the care of child and
establish appropriate social programs for the
prevention of abuse and the treatment of victims.
Art Protection of a child without family – The State is
20 obliged to provide special protection for a child
deprived of family environment and to ensure that
appropriate alternative family care or institutional
placement is available in such causes. Efforts to
meet this obligation shall pay due regard to the
child’s cultural background.
Art Adoption – In countries where adoption is
21 recognized and/or allowed, it shall only carried out
in the interests of child, and then only with the
authorization of competent authorities and
safeguards for the child.
Art Refugee children – Special protection shall be
22 granted to a refugee child or to a child seeking
refugee status. It is the State’s obligation to co-
operate with competent organizations which
provide such protection and assistance.
Art Disabled children – A disabled child has the right to
23 special care, education and training to help him or
her enjoy a full and decent life in dignity and
achieve the greatest degree of self-reliance and
social integration possible.
Art Health and health services – The child has a right to
24 the highest standard of health and medical care
attainable. States shall place special emphasis on
the provision of primary and preventive health
care, public health education and the reduction of
infant mortality. They shall encourage international
co-operation in this regard and strive to see that no
child is deprived access to effective health services.
Art Periodic review of placement – A child who is placed
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25 by the State by reasons of care, protection or
treatment is entitled to have that placement
evaluated regularly.
Art Social security – The child has the right to benefit
26 from social security including social insurance.
Art Standard of living – Every child has the right to a
27 standard living adequate for his or her physical,
mental, moral, spiritual, and social development.
Parents have the primary responsibility to ensure
that the child has an adequate standard of living.
The State’s duty is to ensure that this responsibility
can be fulfilled and is. State responsibility can
include material assistance to parents and their
children.
Art Education – The child has a right to education and
28 the State’s duty is to ensure that primary education
is free and compulsory to encourage different forms
of secondary education accessible to every child
and to make higher education available to all on
the bases of capacity. School discipline shall be
consisted with the child’s rights and dignity. The
State shall engage in international co-operation to
implement this right.
Art Aims of education – Education shall aim at
29 developing the child’s personality, talents and
mental and physical abilities to the fullest extent.
Education shall prepare the child for an active adult
life in a free society and foster respect for the
child’s parents, his or her own cultural identity,
language and values, and for the cultural
background and values of others.
Art Children of minorities or indigenous populations –
30 Children of minority communities and indigenous
populations have the right to enjoy their own
culture and to practice their own religion and
language.
Art Leisure, recreation and cultural activities. – The
31 child has the right to leisure, play and participation
in cultural and artistic activities.
Art Child labor – The child has the right to be protected
32 from work that threatens his or her health,
education or development. The State shall set
minimum ages for employment and regulate
working conditions.
Art Drug abuse – Children have the right to protection
33 from the use of narcotic and psychotropic drugs
and from being involved in the production or
distribution.
Art Sexual exploitation – The State shall protect
34 children from sexual exploitation and abuse,
including prostitution and involvement in
pornography.
Art Sale, trafficking and abduction – It is the State’s
35 obligation to make every effort to prevent the sale,
trafficking and abduction of children.
Art Other forms of exploitation – the child has the right
36 to protection from all forms of exploitation
prejudicial to any aspects of the child’s welfare
covered in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 35.
Art Torture and deprivation of liberty – No child shall be
37 subjected to torture, cruel treatment or
punishment, unlawful arrest or deprivation of
liberty. Both capital punishment and life
imprisonment without the possibility of release are
prohibited for offenses committed by persons below
18 years. Any child deprived of liberty shall be
separated from adults unless it is considered in the
child’s best interests not to do so. A child who is
detained shall have legal and other assistance as
well as contact with the family.
Art Armed conflicts – State parties shall take all
38 feasible measures to ensure that children under 15
years of age have no direct part in hostilities. No
child below 15 shall be recruited into the armed
forces. States shall also ensure the protection and
care of children who are affected by armed conflict
as described in relevant international law.
Art Rehabilitative care – The State has an obligation to
39 ensure that child victims of armed conflicts, torture,
neglect, maltreatment or exploitation receive
appropriate treatment for their recovery and social
reintegration.
Art Administration of juvenile justice – A child in conflict
40 with the law has the right to treatment which
promotes the child’s sense of dignity and worth,
takes the child’s age into account and aims at his
or her reintegration into society. The child is
entitled to basic guarantees as well as legal or
other assistance for his or her defense. Judicial
proceedings and institutional placements shall be
avoided wherever possible.
Art Respect for higher standards – Wherever standards
41 set in applicable national and international law
relevant to the rights of the child that are higher
than those in this Convention, the higher standard
shall always apply.
Art The State’s obligation to make the rights contained
42 in this Convention widely known to both adults and
children.
The Child is Not a Person: Family Law and
other Legal Cultures (Caroline Sawyer)3
Paradigms of the Child
1. Family Law
2. Property Law
3. Children’s Obligation – Tort and Contract
Confusion between the capacity of a person to be
the subject of rights and obligations (legal
personality) and the capacity of that person to take
action which produces legal effects (legal capacity)
E. Parents versus Children –
When rights clash
STRUNK v STRUNK (1969)
445 S. W. 2d 145 | CA of Kentucky
Tommy (28) and Jerry (27) Strunk are brothers. Tom
is suffering from chronic glomerulus nephritis, a fatal
kidney disease, and requires a kidney transplant.
Jerry, an incompetent with the mind of a 6 year old
and a speech defect (severely retarded with IQ of
35), is the only viable donor for the operation. The
mother as a committee secures court consent for the
operation. Both the Department of Mental Health
and psychiatrist find Jerry is emotionally dependent
on Tom such that his death would be more
detrimental and traumatic for him than the loss of
one kidney. Guardian ad litem questions authority of
the State to approve the procedure.
3
Summary by Krissy Conti
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ISSUE: WON a court of equity may approve the
operation for the incompetent.
HELD: YES! The doctrine of substituted judgment
applies which means that where the legal disability
of the individual is shown, the jurisdiction of the
court is plenary and potent to afford whatever relief
may be necessary to protect his interests and
preserve his estates. Such rule has not only been
extended to cover matters of property but also of
personal affairs of the incompetent.
It is also important to note here the questioned
ruling of the circuit court. Therein the operation was
approved because it was held to be for the “best
interest of the incompetent.” The testimony of the
psychiatrist held that Tommy was indispensable for
the welfare of Jerry because he is the only living
sibling Jerry has. For Jerry only those who are able to
communicate intimately with him can help in his
mental treatment, and in most cases these are
members of his family. Tom is important to him in
that he can identify himself with him. Tom is his
model, his tie with his family thus his life is vital to
his improvement at the asylum. Considering that
their parents are in their fifties, it would be in the
best interest of Jerry’s welfare if Tommy were to
survive.
CONSERVATORSHIP OF VALERIE N.
aka Mildred G. v Valerie N. (1985)
707 P. 2d 760 | SC of California
Valerie N (29), is inflicted with Down Syndrome and
has an IQ of 30. She lives with her mother and her
stepfather. The mother instituted a court proceeding
for appointment as conservators and requested for
additional powers to sterilize Valerie through tubal
ligation (salpingectomy).
According to the mother, sterilization was necessary
because Valerie is sexually aggressive at the sight of
men (kiss, hug, climb and sit on their laps). Though
she is not sexually active for being under close
watch, she masturbates excessively. Her mother
fears the day when she will no longer be able to look
after her daughter. She also went through
unsuccessful behavior modification, tried to ingest
contraceptive pills but rejected it eventually and
would not cooperate in pelvic examination for intra-
uterine device.
Lower court granted conservatorship but not
authority to sterilize the incompetent.
ISSUE: WON conservators can give consent to
sterilization on behalf of their incompetent wards
HELD: No. Although the repeal of the statutes
regarding asexualization of mentally challenged
individuals have been declared unconstitutional for
violating their due process and equal protection
rights, conservators still may not be authorize to
conduct the procedure unless all means have been
exhausted. The mother also did not provide clear
and convincing evidence as to the necessity of
irreversible sterilization. That Valerie is capable of
pregnancy, that other brands of pills were
administered and that other means of administering
contraceptive pill were attempted.
JOHNSON v CALVERT (1993)
851 P. 2d 776 - SUPRA
GILLICK v WEST NORFOLK & WISBECH AREA
HEALTH AUTHORITY (1985)
3 All E. R. 402
Victoria Gillick wrote to area health authority asking
for assurance that her daughters aged 13, 12, 10
and 5 will not be given contraceptive advice and
treatment without her consent. The reply to the
letter stated that they cannot give such assurance
because the final decision must be for the doctor’s
clinical judgment.
Gillick again asked for a declaration from the office
that it will not provide minors under 16 years old
with contraceptive advice and treatment without
informing the parents but the health authority was
steadfast. They argued for the patient-doctor
confidentiality and that if this principle is abandoned,
minors might not seek professional advice at all. This
will lead to consequences such as unwanted
pregnancies, STD and high risk abortions.
She contends that permitting minors to disregard
their parent’s consent undermines parental
responsibility and family stability.
ISSUE: WON doctors can lawfully give contraceptive
advice and treatment to minors without parental
consent (the extent of a parent’s right and duties
with respect to the medical treatment of a girl under
16 years old)
HELD: NO. Girls under 16 can give no valid consent
to anything in the areas under consideration which
apart from consent would constitute an assault,
whether civil or criminal, and can impose no valid
prohibition on a doctor against seeking parental
consent.
CURTIS v SCHOOL COMMITTEE (1995)
652 N. E. 2d 580 | SC of Massachussetts
Parents contend the condom availability program in
a public school where senior and junior high school
students may obtain condoms for free in the nurse’s
office and for 75 cents in the vending machine in
their CR. Condoms are given away with counseling
from nurse and pamphlet about HIV/AIDS and STD,
with authorities stressing the importance of
abstinence as the best method to avoid STD.
The program did not provide for an “opt out” nor
parental notification wherein parents would be
notified of their children’s request for condoms.
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ISSUE:
1. WON the program violates the parents’
constitutionally protected right to familial
privacy and parental liability
2. WON the program infringes into the free
exercise clause
HELD:
1. No. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate how
condom availability constitutes
unconstitutional interference by the state.
There was no coercive burden upon the
students:
a. Students are free to decline
b. Parents are free to instruct their
children not to participate
2. No. They were unable to demonstrate
sufficient facts to support any substantial
burden to religious exercise. They merely
alleged that the program contravenes
parental teaching on premarital sex: the not
only is it permissible but can be made safe.
3. Parents have no right to tailor public school
policy to meet their individual religious and
moral preferences.
ROE v DOE (1971)
29 NY 2d 188 | CA of New York
Daughter was cut off from support by her father by
not obeying his instructions that she live in a college
dormitory while studying in college and instead took
up residence with a female classmate in an off-
campus apartment. Her father requested she come
home but instead, the daughter sold her car [a gift
from her father] and finished the school year using
the proceeds thereof. Upon returning to New York for
the summer, she further disobeyed her father by
choosing to stay with the parents of her female
classmate in Long Island. Daughter in general fares
poorly in school and has experimented with drugs.
Furthermore she has had a spotty childhood, her
mother died when she was three and her father has
repeatedly married and remarried since then his
most recent remarriage in 1970. With the help of a
guardian ad litem, she initiated this action for
support.
ISSUE: WON daughter is entitled for support in light
of her transgressions against her father.
HELD: While delinquent behavior of a child even if
unexplained or persistent does not merit the
termination of the duty of the parent to support,
voluntary abandonment by the child of the parent’s
home is tantamount to forfeiture of the claim to
support. A father in return for maintenance and
support may establish and impose reasonable
regulations on his child. Courts as much as possible
do not interfere with the parent’s prerogative in
caring, controlling and protecting the child except
only when there is a clear and obvious display of
abuse or neglect on the part of the parent. The
parent was concerned about the temptations that
abound outside of campus hence his insistence that
she live in the campus dorm. While the daughter
may be free disagree and choose to not comply, she
puts herself at risk of incurring her father’s wrath
and consequently, by abandoning her home she
forfeits her right to support.
IN RE EDWARD C. (1981)
178 Cal. Rptr. 694 | CA of California
The appeal instituted by spouses Edmond and
Deborah to regain custody of their two sons Edward
and Eric who were previously declared “dependent”
children.
Edward and Eric were removed from their parents’
home because they were maltreated and subjected
to cruel and inhuman corporal punishment by their
father. The father, supported by the mother, argues
that he is vested with divine and Biblical authority to
inflict discipline on his children. Their daughter,
Marlee, was given to her maternal grandmother for
adoption after suffering physical abuse in the hands
of her father.
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ISSUE: WON the dependency of children is a
violation of constitutional right of privacy of the
family
HELD: NO. The parental doctrine and child’s best
interest are usually compatible but when they clash,
the latter is protected by the legal system. The
finding on Marlee’s case is admissible to Eric and
Edward. The fact that the sons witnessed the vicious
beatings as command of the Lord may inhibit their
healthy emotional development. Until the parents
cooperate to counseling program, reunification of
the family will be detrimental to the welfare of the
minors.
PRINCE v MASSACHUSSETTS (1944)
321 US 158 | SC of Massachusetts
- Sarah Prince, a member of the Jehovah’s Witness
is a mother to two sons and the guardian of
minor Betty Simmons
- One night she went one to distribute Watchtower
and Consolation, fulfilling one of her religious
obligations
- She used to bring along her kids but upon
reprimand by Peskins because it violates the
statute law against child labor and employment,
she ceased to take her children with her.
However, Betty Simmons insisted to come that
particular night.
ISSUE:
1. WON the religious act of selling their
magazines violate the statute
2. WON the presence of parent will exempt
them from punishment
- However, the presiding judge went on leave
effect June 1. But the new presiding judge issued
decision in favor of the mother on May 31.
ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over habeas
corpus petitions.
HELD: Yes. RA 8369 did not divest RTC jurisdiction
over such cases.
MADRINAN v MADRINAN (2007)
527 SCRA 487
- Felipe ♥ Francisca  three sons and a daughter
Romnick, Phillip, Francis Angelo and Krizia Ann
- The couple had a quarrel so he took the sons
with him to Ligao, Albay and then to Sta. Rosa,
Laguna. Wife sought the help of the parents and
the parents in law, and even the Lupong
Tagapagpamayapa to make peace with the
husband, but to no avail.
- She alleges that the travel disrupted the
education of the children and deprived them of
maternal care.
- They accused each other that their respective
parents always meddle with their family affairs.
- Mother is unfit because she is always drunk and
would come home late at night from the
beerhouse. She neglected her duties as a
mother.
- Father, a tricycle driver, drove mother out, and a
gambler, drug addict and alcoholic himself.
ISSUE: WON CA has jurisdiction regarding writ of
habeas corpus under Sec 5 (b) of RA 8369

HELD: HELD: Yes. Concurrent jurisdictions of Family Court,

1. Yes. It does not infringe on the free exercise SC and CA so that the decision will be enforceable
clause because the burden on the religious anywhere in the Philippines. Note that he had moved
activity was merely incidental. The to two different provinces.
prohibition applies to all children.
2. No. There was clear and present danger
even though in the company of adults. The
State’s authority over children is broader
than adults especially in public activities and
employment which has crippling effects on
the child. They reserve the Parents can make
martyrs out of themselves but not of their
children.
3. Check out the dissent. Parents reserve the
right to train their children religiously.

F. Summary Procedure
REYES-TABUJARA v CA (2006)
495 SCRA 844
- Ivy Joan ♥ Ernesto  Carlos Iñigo
- The separated and custody battle ensued. Dad
initially won. Mother files a consolidated petition
for writ of habeas corpus and Anti-VAWC.