56. G.R. No. 88979. February 7, 1992.

LYDIA O. CHUA, petitioner, vs. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION,
THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.

Political Law; Constitutional Law; No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law.—The case of Fegurin, et al. v. NLRC, et al., comes to mind where, workers belonging to a work pool, hired and
re-hired continuously from one project to another were considered non-project-regular and permanent
employees. Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in four (4) successive projects during a span of fifteen (15)
years. Although no proof of the existence of a work pool can be assumed, her service record cannot be
disregarded. Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.” “x x x In
Felwa vs. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966, We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things
identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is
reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to
the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions
which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to
the same class.” Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection
clause were we to sustain respondents’ submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of
government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by said law. The maxim of Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius should not be the applicable maxim in this case but the doctrine of necessary implication.

Statutory Construction; Doctrine of Necessary Implication; What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as
that which is expressed.—“No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application.
There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment, to
be an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the future. So-called gaps
in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the
doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as
that which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be
necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which
it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its
terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental
power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the lesser, expressed in the maxim, in eo plus sit,
simper inest et minus.”

Political Law; Administrative Law; R.A. 6683; A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual and
emergency employees, R.A. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary, casual
and emergency employees.—Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who have rendered years of
continuous service should be included in the coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as long as they file their
application prior to the expiration of their term, and as long as they comply with CSC regulations promulgated for
such purpose. In this connection, Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1990 (5 March 1990) implementing Rep.
Act No. 6850, requires, as a condition to qualify for the grant of eligibility, an aggregate or total of seven (7) years
of government service which need not be continuous, in the career or non-career service, whether appointive,
elective, casual, emergency, seasonal, contractual or coterminous, including military and police service, as
evaluated and confirmed by the Civil Service Commission. A similar regulation should be promulgated for the
inclusion in Rep. Act No. 6683 of coterminous personnel who survive the test of time. This would be in keeping
with the coverage of “all social legislations enacted to promote the physical and mental well-being of public
servants.” After all, coterminous personnel are also obligated to the government for GSIS contributions, medicare
and income tax payments, with the general disadvantage of transience.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari to review the decision of the Civil Service Commission.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

PADILLA, J.:

Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, Republic Act No. 6683 was approved on 2
December 1988 providing for benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the government service
as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are those
enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act, as follows:

“Sec. 2. Coverage.—This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National Government,
including governmentowned or controlled corporations with original charters, as well as the personnel of all local
government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and
emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of
government service as of the date of separation. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act.”

Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application on
30 January 1989 with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same;
instead, she was offered separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service
commencing from 1980. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil Service Commission yielded negative result.1 Her
letter for reconsideration dated 25 April 1989 pleaded thus:

xxx

“With due respect, I think the interpretation of the Honorable Commissioner of RA 6683 does not conform with
the beneficent purpose of the law. The law merely requires that a government employee whether regular,
temporary, emergency, or casual, should have two consecutive years of government service in order to be entitled
to its benefits. I more than meet the requirement. Persons who are not entitled are consultants, experts and
contractual(s). As to the budget needed, the law provides that the Department of Budget and Management will
shoulder a certain portion of the benefits to be alloted to government corporations. Moreover, personnel of these
NIA special projects are entitled to the regular benefits, such (sic) leaves, compulsory retirement and the like.
There is no reason why we should not be entitled to RA 6683.

x x x”2

Denying the plea for reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) emphasized:

“x x x

We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted. The provision of Section 3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC
Circular Letter No. 89-1 does not only require an applicant to have two years of satisfactory service on the date of
separation/retirement but further requires said applicant to be on a casual, emergency, temporary or regular
employment status as of December 2, 1988, the date of enactment of R.A. 6683. The law does not contemplate
contractual employees in the coverage.

Inasmuch as your employment as of December 31, 1988, the date of your separation from the service, is co-
terminous with the NIA project which is contractual in nature, this Commission shall sustain its original decision.

x x x”3
In view of such denial, petitioner is before this Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari, insisting that she
is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683. Her arguments:

“It is submitted that R.A. 6683, as well as Section 3.1 of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 requires an
applicant to be on a casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment status. Likewise, the provisions of
Section 23 (sic) of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 88-1, implementing guidelines of R.A. No. 6683, provides
that:

‘2.3 Excluded from the benefits under R.A. No. 6683 are the following:

a) Experts and Consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to perform specific activities or services with a
definite expected output: i.e. membership in Task Force, Part-Time, Consultant/Employees.

b) Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the Philippine Constabulary and
Integrated National Police (PC-INP).

c) Appointive officials and employees who retire or elect to be separated from the service for optional retirement
with gratuity under R.A. No. 1616, 4968 or with pension under R.A. No. 186, as amended by R.A. No. 6680 or P.D.
No. 1146, as amended, or vice-versa.

d) Officials and employees who retired voluntarily prior to the enactment of this law and have received the
corresponding benefits of that retirement/separation.

e) Officials and employees with pending cases punishable by mandatory separation from the service under existing
civil service laws, rules and regulations; provided that if such officials and employees apply in writing within the
prescriptive period for the availment of the benefits herein authorized, shall be allowed only if acquitted or cleared
of all charges and their application accepted and approved by the head of office concerned.’

Based on the above exclusions, herein petitioner does not belong to any one of them. Ms. Chua is a full time
employee of NIA entitled to all the regular benefits provided for by the Civil Service Commission. She held a
permanent status as Personnel Assistant A, a position which belongs to the Administrative Service. x x x If casuals
and emergency employees were given the benefit of R.A. 6683 with more reason that this petitioner who was
holding a permanent status as Personnel Assistant A and has rendered almost 15 years of faithful, continuous
service in the government should be similarly rewarded by the beneficient (sic) purpose of the law.”4

The NIA and the Civil Service Commission reiterate in their comment petitioner’s exclusion from the benefits of
Republic Act No. 6683, because:

1. Petitioner’s employment is co-terminous with the project per appointment papers kept by the Administrative
Service in the head office of NIA (the service record was issued by the Watershed Management and Erosion
Control Project (WMECP), Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija). The project, funded by the World Bank, was completed as of
31 December 1988, after which petitioner’s position became functus officio.

2. Petitioner is not a regular and career employee of NIA—her position is not included in its regular plantilla. She
belongs to the non-career service (Sec. 6, P.D. No. 807) which is inherently short-lived, temporary and transient; on
the other hand, retirement presupposes employment for a long period. The most that a non-career personnel can
expect upon the expiration of his employment is financial assistance. Petitioner is not even qualified to retire
under the GSIS law.

3. Assuming arguendo that petitioner’s appointment is permanent, security of tenure is available only for the term
of office (i.e. duration of project).

4. The objective of Republic Act No. 6683 is not really to grant separation or retirement benefits but
reorganization5 to streamline government functions. The application of the law must be made consistent with the
purpose for which it was enacted. Thus, as the expressed purpose of the law is to reorganize the government, it
will not have any application to special projects such as the WMECP which exists only for a short and definite
period. This being the nature of special projects, there is no necessity for offering its personnel early retirement
benefits just to induce voluntary separation as a step to reorganization. In fact, there is even no need of
reorganizing the WMECP considering its short and limited life-span.6

5. The law applies only to employees of the national government, government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters and local government units.

Due to the impossibility of reconciling the conflicting interpretations of the parties, the Court is called upon to
define the different classes of employees in the public sector (i.e. government civil servants).

Who are regular employees? The Labor Code in Art. 280 (P.D. No. 492, as amended) deems an employment regular
where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer. No equivalent definition can be found in P.D. No. 807 (promulgated on 6
October 1975, which superseded the Civil Service Act of 1965—R.A. No. 2260) or in the Administrative Code of
1987 (Executive Order No. 292 promulgated on 25 July 1987). The Early Retirement Law itself (Rep. Act No. 6683)
merely includes such class of employees (regular employees) in its coverage, unmindful that no such specie is
employed in the public sector.

The appointment status of government employees in the career service is classified as follows:

1. permanent—one issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to which appointment is
made, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Act and the Rules and Standards promulgated in
pursuance thereof;7

2. temporary—In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes necessary in the public interest to fill a
vacancy, a temporary appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to
which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil service eligibility: Provided, That such temporary
appointment shall not exceed twelve months, but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service
eligible becomes available.8

The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizes the Career Service as:

“(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate examination is required;

(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these include the faculty and
academic staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and technical positions in scientific or research
institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit systems;

(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director,
Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other
officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed
by the President.

(4) Career Officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are appointed by the President, such as
the Foreign Service Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs;

(5) Commission officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain a separate merit system;

(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing governmental or proprietary

functions, who do not fall under the non-career service; and

(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled.”9

The Non-Career Service, on the other hand, is characterized by:

“x x x (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for the career service;
and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing
authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose
employment was made.”

Included in the non-career service are:

1. elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;

2. secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of the President and their
personal confidential staff(s);

3. Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their personal or confidential
staff;

4. contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a special contract to
undertake a specific work or job requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be
accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year and performs or accomplishes the
specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring
agency.

5. emergency and seasonal personnel.”10

There is another type of non-career employee:

“Casual—where and when employment is not permanent but occasional, unpredictable, sporadic and brief in
nature (Caro v. Rilloroza, 102 Phil. 70; Manuel v. P.P. Gocheco Lumber Co., 96 Phil. 945)”

Consider petitioner’s record of service:

“Service with the government commenced on 2 December 1974 designated as a laborer holding emergency status
with the NIA—Upper Pampanga River Project, R & R Division.11 From 24 March 1975 to 31 August 1975, she was a
research aide with temporary status on the same project. On 1 September 1975 to 31 December 1976, she was
with the NIA-FES III, R & R Division, then on 1 January 1977 to 31 May 1980, she was with NIA-UPR IIS (Upper
Pampanga River Integrated Irrigation systems) DRD. On 1 June 1980, she went to NIA-W.M.E.C.P. (Watershed
Management & Erosion Control Project) retaining the status of temporary employee. While with this project, her
designation was changed to personnel assistant on 5 November 1981, starting 9 July 1982, the status became
permanent until the completion of the project on 31 December 1988. The appointment paper12 attached to the
OSG’s comment lists her status as co-terminus with the Project.”

The employment status of personnel hired under foreign—assisted projects is considered co-terminous, that is,
they are considered employees for the duration of the project or until the completion or cessation of said project
(CSC Memorandum Circular No. 39, S. 1990, 27 June 1990).

Republic Act No. 6683 seeks to cover and benefits regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees who have
rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service. Resolution No. 87-104 of the CSC, 21
April 1987, provides:

“WHEREAS, pursuant to Executive Order No. 966 dated June 22, 1984, the Civil Service Commission is charged with
the function of determining creditable services for retiring officers and employees of the national government;

WHEREAS, Section 4 (b) of the same Executive Order No. 966 provides that all previous services by an
officer/employee pursuant to a duly approved appointment to a position in the Civil Service are considered
creditable services, while Section 6 (a) thereof states that services rendered on contractual, emergency or casual
status are non-creditable services;

WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the aforesaid provisions inasmuch as some contractual, emergency or casual
employment are covered by contracts or appointments duly approved by the Commission.

NOW, therefore, the Commission resolved that services rendered on contractual, emergency or casual status,
irrespective of the mode or manner of payment therefor shall be considered as creditable for retirement purposes
subject to the following conditions: (Italics supplied)

‘1. These services are supported by approved appointments, official records and/or other competent evidence.
Parties/agencies concerned shall submit the necessary proof of said services;

2. Said services are on full time basis and rendered prior to June 22, 1984, the effectivity date of Executive Order
No. 966; and

3. The services for the three (3) years period prior to retirement are continuous and fulfill the service requirement
for retirement.’ ”

What substantial differences exist, if any, between casual, emergency, seasonal, project, co-terminous or
contractual personnel? All are tenurial employees with no fixed term, non-career, and temporary. The 12 May
1989 CSC letter of denial13 characterized herein petitioner’s employment as co-terminous with the NIA project
which in turn was contractual in nature. The OSG says petitioner’s status is co-terminous with the Project. CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of 1991 (5 April 1991) characterizes the status of a co-terminous employee—

“(3) Co-terminous status shall be issued to a person whose entrance in the service is characterized by
confidentiality by the appointing authority or that which is subject to his pleasure or coexistent with his tenure.

The foregoing status (co-terminous) may be further classified into the following:

‘a)co-terminous with the project—When the appointment is co-existent with the duration of a particular project
for which purpose employment was made or subject to the availability of funds for the same;

b)co-terminous with the appointing authority—when appointment is co-existent with the tenure of the appointing
authority.

c)co-terminous with the incumbent—when appointment is co-existent with the appointee, in that after the
resignation, separation or termination of the services of the incumbent the position shall be deemed automatically
abolished; and

d)co-terminous with a specific period, e.g., ‘co-terminous for a period of 3 years’—the appointment is for a specific
period and upon expiration thereof, the position is deemed abolished.’

It is stressed, however, that in the last two classification (c) and

(d), what is termed co-terminous is the position, and not the appointee-employee. Further, in (c) the security of
tenure of the appointee is guaranteed during his incumbency; in (d) the security of tenure is limited to a specific
period.”

A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual and emergency employees. We see no solid
reason why the latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former are not. It will be
noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary, casual and
emergency employees. But specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including
those of the PC-INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The legislature would not have
made a specific enumeration in a statute had not the intention been to restrict its meaning and confine its terms
and benefits to those expressly mentioned14 or casus omissus pro omisso habendus est—A person, object or thing
omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.15 Yet adherence to these legal
maxims can result in incongruities and in a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

The case of Fegurin, et al. v. NLRC, et al.,16 comes to mind where, workers belonging to a work pool, hired and re-
hired continuously from one project to another were considered non-project-regular and permanent employees.

Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in four (4) successive projects during a span of fifteen (15) years.
Although no proof of the existence of a work pool can be assumed, her service record cannot be disregarded.

Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.”

“x x x In Felwa vs. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966, We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons
or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a
classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these
are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to
future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to
those who belong to the same class.”17

Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause were we
to sustain respondents’ submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees
who are similarly situated as those covered by said law. The maxim of Expressio unius est exclusio alterius should
not be the applicable maxim in this case but the doctrine of necessary implication, which holds that:

“No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is always an omission
that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing
legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop
as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary
implication. The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is
expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to
effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants,
including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex
necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power,
right or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the lesser, expressed in the maxim, in eo plus sit, simper
inest et minus.”18

During the sponsorship speech of Congressman Dragon (re: Early Retirement Law), in response to Congressman
Dimaporo’s interpellation on coverage of state university employees who are extended appointments for one (1)
year, renewable for two (2) or three (3) years,19 he explained:

This Bill covers only those who would like to go on early retirement and voluntary separation. It is irrespective of
the actual status or nature of the appointment one received, but if he opts to retire under this, then he is
covered.”

It will be noted that, presently pending in Congress, is House Bill No. 33399 (a proposal to extend the scope of the
Early Retirement Law). Its wording supports the submission that Rep. Act No. 6683 indeed overlooked a qualified
group of civil servants, Sec. 3 of said House bill, on coverage of early retirement, would provide:

“Sec. 3. Coverage.—It will cover all employees of the national government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, as well as the personnel of all local government units. The benefits authorized under this
Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual, emergency and contractual employees, regardless of age, who
have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years government service as of the date of separation. The
term ‘contractual employees’ as used in this Act does not include experts and consultants hired by agencies for a
limited period to perform specific activities or services with definite expected output.

“Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the
coverage of this Act.” (emphasis supplied)

The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary Separation Law is to trim the bureaucracy, hence, vacated
positions are deemed abolished upon early/voluntary retirement of their occupants. Will the inclusion of co-
terminous personnel (like the petitioner) defeat such objective? In their case, upon termination of the project and
separation of the project personnel from the service, the term of employment is considered expired, the office
functus officio. Casual, temporary and contractual personnel serve for shorter periods, and yet, they only have to
establish two (2) years of continuous service to qualify. This, incidentally, negates the OSG’s argument that co-
terminous or project employment is inherently short-lived, temporary and transient, whereas, retirement
presupposes employment for a long period. Here, violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution
becomes glaring because casuals are not even in the plantilla, and yet, they are entitled to the benefits of early
retirement. How can the objective of the Early Retirement Law of trimming the bureaucracy be achieved by
granting early retirement benefits to a group of employees (casuals) without plantilla positions? There would, in
such a case, be no abolition of permanent positions or streamlining of functions; it would merely be a removal of
excess personnel; but the positions remain, and future appointments can be made thereto.

Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who have rendered years of continuous service should be
included in the coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as long as they file their application prior to the expiration of
their term, and as long as they comply with CSC regulations promulgated for such purpose. In this connection,
Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1990 (5 March 1990) implementing Rep. Act No. 6850,20 requires, as a
condition to qualify for the grant of eligibility, an aggregate or total of seven (7) years of government service which
need not be continuous, in the career or non-career service, whether appointive, elective, casual, emergency,
seasonal, contractual or co-terminous, including military and police service, as evaluated and confirmed by the
Civil Service Commission.21 A similar regulation should be promulgated for the inclusion in Rep. Act No. 6683 of
co-terminous personnel who survive the test of time. This would be in keeping with the coverage of “all social
legislations enacted to promote the physical and mental well-being of public servants.”22 After all, co-terminous
personnel are also obligated to the government for GSIS contributions, medicare and income tax payments, with
the general disadvantage of transience.

In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner’s application
for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner
had filed an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of
said law. While the application was filed after expiration of her term, we can give allowance for the fact that she
originally filed the application on her own without the assistance of counsel. In the interest of substantial justice,
her application must be granted; after all she served the government not only for two (2) years—the minimum
requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

Let this case be remanded to the CSC-NIA for a favorable disposition of petitioner’s application for early retirement
benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683, in accordance with the pronouncements in this decision.

SO ORDERED.
57. No. L-20390. November 29, 1968.

RAUL R. INGLES, ROALDO G. ADVIENTO, ISABEL C. CORPUS, CONSUELO M. VlLLANUEVA and ESPERANZA M.
GUTIERREZ, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. AMELITO R. MUTUC and BALDOMERO DAVOCOL, defendants-appellees.

Civil service; Officer holding position primarily confidential in nature; Removal; Suspension; Statement in De los
Santos v. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289, declared as mere obiter.—The assumption that an officer holding a position which
is primarily confidential in nature is "subject to removal at the pleasure of the appointing power," is inaccurate.
This assumption is evidently based upon a statement in De los Santos v. Mallare (87 Phil. 289) to the effect that
"three specified cases of positions—policy-determining, primarily confidential and highly technical—are excluded f
rom the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the
Constitution." This was, however, a mere obiter, because, the office involved in said case—that of City Engineer of
Baguio—did not belong to any of the excepted classes, and, hence, it was not necessary to determine whether its
incumbents were removable or not at the pleasure of the appointing power. What is more, said obiter, if detached
f rom the context of the decision of which it forms part, would be inconsistent with the constitutional command to
the effect that "no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as
provided by law" (Sec. 4, Art. XII, Phil. Constitution), and it is conceded that one holding in the Government a
primarily confidential position is "in the Civil Service." In fact, in the De los Santos case, this Court cited with
approval the view, expressed in Lacson v. Romero, 84 Phil. 740, to the effect "that officers or employees in the
unclassified, as well as those in the classified service are protected by the above cited provision of the organic
law."

Same; Meaning of "term merely expires"; Distinguished from "removal" and "dismissal."—When an incumbent of a
primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure of the appointing power, and that pleasure turns into
displeasure, the incumbent is not "removed" or "dismissed" from office—his "term" merely "expires," in much the
same way as an officer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of the fixed term for which he had been
appointed or elected, is not and can not be deemed "removed" or "dismissed" therefrom, upon the expiration of
said term. The main difference between the former—the primarily confidential officer—and the latter is that the
latter's term is fixed or definite, whereas that of the former is not pre-fixed, but indefinite, at the time of his
appointment or election, and becomes fixed and determined when the appointing power expresses its decision to
put an end to the services of the incumbent. When this event takes place, the latter is not "removed" or
"dismissed" from office—his term merely "expired".

As we had occasion to point out in Manalang v. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903, "to remove an officer is to oust him from
office before the expiration of his term." Accordingly, we held therein that the abolition of Manalang's office as
Director of the Placement Bureau by a legislation drafted by him, creating the "National Employment Service," was
not a "removal" from office and did not violate the Constitution. His right to hold said office of Director of the
Placement Bureau had merely been extinguished in consequence of its abolition, in the same manner that it could
have come to an end, without removal, through abandonment of office, retirement of the incumbent, or his
reaching the statutory limit, if any.

DIRECT APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Perez, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Jose S. Zafra and Enrique D. Tayag for plaintiffs-appellants.

Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and

Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia for defendants-appellees.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Direct appeal by the plaintiffs from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing their complaint
herein, with costs against them.

Although most of the allegations in said complaint had been denied in defendants' answer, the basic facts were
admitted in the memoranda filed by both parties with the lower court and seemingly in the course of their oral
argument therein. Hence, the case was deemed submitted to said court and the same rendered its appealed
decision, without receiving any evidence, with an opening statement to the effect that "the facts of this case are
undisputed."

Indeed, it is conceded that plaintiffs herein are civil service eligibles, holding positions, in the budget for the fiscal
year 1961-1962, under the Office of the President. Plaintiff Raul R. Ingles has a first-grade civil service eligibility,
holding a WAPCO-classified position of Senior Executive Assistant II, with a compensation of P6,888.00 a year, and
eight (8) years of service in the Government.

Plaintiff Roaldo G. Adviento is, in turn, a second-grade civil service eligible, holding a WAPCO-classified position of
Clerk I, with a compensation of P1,800.00 a year, and four (4) years of service in the Government, whereas plaintiff
Isabel C. Corpus is a third-grade civil service eligible, holding a WAPCO-classified position of Supervising Clerk I,
with a compensation of P2,544.00 a year, and eight (8) years of service in the Government. Plaintiff Consuelo M.
Villanueva is another third-grade civil service eligible, holding a WAPCO-classified position of Clerk I, with a
compensation of P1,800.00 a year, and ten (10) years of service in the Government. Upon the other hand, plaintiff
Esperanza M. Gutierrez is a third-grade civil service eligible, holding a WAPCO-classified position of Stenographer,
with a compensation of ?1,980.00 a year, and eight (8) years of service in the Government.

About the second week of January, 1962, plaintiffs received a communication of the then Executive Secretary,
Amelito R. Mutuc, advising them that their services in the Government were terminated as of January 1, 1962.
Plaintiffs appealed from this action to the President, on or about January 26, 1962. A month later, or on February
27, 1962, they received a letter of Mr. Mutuc, acting "by authority of the President," denying the reconsideration
prayed for.

Soon thereafter, or on March 24, 1962, plaintiffs commenced the present action, in the Court of First Instance of
Manila, against said Executive Secretary and the Cash Disbursing Officer in the Office of the President, alleging that
they (plaintiffs) had been removed from office without cause and without due process, and praying, accordingly,
that judgment be rendered ordering:

"(1) Defendant Executive Secretary Amelito R. Mutuc to certify the names of the petitioners in the payrolls of the
Office of the President, to be retroactive as of January 1, 1962, the effective date of petitioners' illegal termination
from employment;

"(2) Defendant Baldomero Davocol to pay the emoluments and/or salaries to which plaintiffs are entitled, effective
as of January 1, 1962, the date of their illegal termination from service;

"(3) Defendants to perform their duties as aforesaid and to continue paying plaintiffs their emoluments and/or
salaries to which said plaintiffs are entitled to in accordance with law; "(4) Defendants to allow plaintiffs to
continue in the performance of their respective duties."1

Soon thereafter, Salvador L. Mariño was substituted in lieu of Amelito R. Mutuc, as one of the defendants herein,
the former having meanwhile assumed the office of Executive Secretary, which the latter vacated upon his
appointment as Ambassador of the Philippines to the United States.
Defendants maintained that the principal issue in this case "is whether or not the plaintiffs are occupying positions
which are primarily confidential and, therefore, are subject to removal at the pleasure of the appointing power,"
and that this issue should be resolved in the affirmative. The trial court did so, with the result already adverted to.

Defendants-appellees thus assume that an officer holding a position which is primarily confidential in nature is
"subject to removal at the pleasure of the appointing power." This assumption is inaccurate. It is evidently based
upon a statement in De los Santos vs. Mallare2 to the effect that "three specif ied cases of positions—
policydetermining, primarily confidential and highly technical—are excluded from the merit system and dismissal
at pleasure of officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution."3 This was, however, a
mere obiter, because the office involved in said case—that of City Engineer of Baguio—did not belong to any of the
excepted classes, and, hence, it was not necessary to determine whether its incumbents were removable or not at
the pleasure of the appointing power. What is more, said obiter, if detached from the context of the decision of
which it forms part, would be inconsistent with the constitutional command to the effect that "no officer or
employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law,"4 and it is
conceded that one holding in the Government a primarily confidential position is "in the Civil Service." In fact, in
the De los Santos case, this Court cited with approval the view, expressed in Lacson vs. Romero5 to the effect "that
officers or employees in the unclassified"—to which plaintiffs herein admittedly belong—"as well as those in the
classified service are protected by the above cited provision of the organic law."

Again, the law alluded to in the Constitution, namely Section 32 of Republic Act No. 2260, provides:

"SEC. 32. Disciplinary Action.—No officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause as provided by law and after due process; Provided, That a transfer from one position to another without
reduction in rank or salary shall not be considered disciplinary when made in the interest of public service;
Provided, further, That no complaint against a civil service official or employee shall be given due course unless the
same is in writing and subscribed and sworn to by the complainant; And provided, finally, That the respondent
shall be entitled to a formal investigation if he so elects, in which case he shall have the right to appear and defend
himself at said investigation in person or by counsel, to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, and
to have the attendance of witnesses and production of documents in his favor by compulsory process of subpoena
or subpoena duces tecum."

This should not be misunderstood as denying that the incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at
the pleasure only of the appointing power. It should be noted, however, that when such pleasure turns into
displeasure, the incumbent is not "removed" or "dismissed" from office—his "term" merely "expires" in much the
same way as an officer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of the fixed term for which he had been
appointed or elected, is not and can not be deemed "removed" or "dismissed" therefrom, upon the expiration of
said term. The main difference between the former—the primarily confidential officer—and the latter is that the
latter's term is fixed or definite, whereas that of the former is not pre-fixed, but indefinite, at the time of his
appointment or election, and becomes fixed and determined when the appointing power expresses its decision to
put an end to the services of the incumbent. When this event takes place, the latter is not "removed" or
"dismissed" from office—his term has merely "expired".

As we had occasion to point out in Manalang vs. Quitoriano,6 "to remove an officer is to oust him from office
before the expiration of his term." Accordingly, we held therein that the abolition of Manalang's office as Director
of the Placement Bureau by a legislation drafted by him, creating the "National Employment Service," was not a
"removal" from office and did not violate the Constitution. His right to hold said office of Director of the Placement
Bureau had merely been extinguished in consequence of its abolition, in the same manner that it could have come
to an end, without removal, through abandonment of office, retirement of the incumbent, or his reaching the
statutory age limit, if any. Thus, after making the statement relied upon by respondents herein, regarding the
power to dismiss at pleasure officers holding policy-determining, primarily confidential and highly technical
positions, this Court added, in the aforementioned case of De los Santos vs. Mallare,7 that "it may truly be said
that the good of the service itself demands that appointments coming under this category be terminable at the will
of the officer that makes them."

As regards the nature of the positions held by plaintiffs herein, the lower court would seem to have been
impressed by the fact that their items form part of the budget for 1961-1962 for "The President's Private Office,"
under subdivision (a) thereof entitled "Private Secretaries"; that they handled "confidential matters"; and that,
"while plaintiffs perform purely clerical work, the papers handled by them are highly confidential in nature."

In this connection, it appears that the aforementioned subdivision (a) consisted of the following items:

"The President's Private Office

(a) Private Secretaries 4,188.00

"2. "10.

One private secretary to the President . . . . . . . One translator II . . . . . . . . . .

P9,000.00 2,808.00

"3. "11.

One senior executive assistant II . . . . . . . One secretary . . . . . . . . . .

6,888.00 2,676.00

"4. "12.

One social secretary . . . . . . . . . . One secretary . . . . . . . . . .

6,240.00 2,544.00

"5. "13.

One senior executive assistant I . . . . . . . . . . Two stenographers at P1,980 . . . . . . . . . .

5,112.00 3,960.00

"6. "14.

One senior executive assistant I . . . . . . . . . . One stenographer . . . . . . . . . .

4,860.00 1,980.00

"7. "15.

One executive assistant . . . . . . . . . . One supervising clerk I . . . . . . . . . .

3,984.00 2,544.00

"8. "16.

One executive assistant . . . . . . . . . . One clerk II . . . . . . . . . .

3,984.00 2,196.00

"9. "17.

One private secretary I . . . . . . . . . . One clerk II . . . . . . . . . .

2,424.00 Two clerks I at F 1,800 . . . . . . . . . .

"18. 3,600.00

Three clerks I at P1,800 . . . . . . . . . . "20.

5,400.00 Two clerical aides at P1,440 . . . . . . . . . .

"19. 2,880.00"8

and that, presumably, Ingles held item No. 3, Gutierrez either No. 13 or No. 14, Corpus No. 15 and Adviento and
Villanueva either No. 18 or No. 19. With the exception of item No. 2, designated therein as private secretary, there
is nothing in the other items above-quoted, particularly those held by plaintiffs herein, to indicate that their
respective positions are "primarily confidential" in nature. On the contrary, the compensation attached and the
designation given thereto suggest the purely, or, at least, mainly clerical nature of their work. The fact that they, at
times, handle "confidential matters," does not suffice to characterize their "positions" as primarily confidential.
Indeed, it is admitted that plaintiffs, likewise, handle "other routine matters," and it has not even been shown that
their work is, at least, principally confidential.

Indeed, physicians handle confidential matters. Judges, fiscals and court stenographers generally handle matters of
similar nature. The Presiding and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals sometimes investigate, by designation
of the Supreme Court, administrative complaints against judges of first instance, which are confidential in nature.
Officers of the Department of Justice, likewise, investigate charges against municipal judges. Assistant Solicitors in
the Office of the Solicitor General often investigate malpractice charges against members of the Bar.

All of these are "confidential" matters, but such fact does not warrant the conclusion that the office or position of
all government physicians and all Judges, as well as the aforementioned assistant solicitors and officers of the
Department of Justice are primarily confidential in character.

Considering that plaintiffs herein are admittedly civil service eligibles, with several years of service in the
Government, and that positions which are policy determining, primarily confidential and highly technical in nature
are exceptions to the general rule governing Civil Service officers and employees, it was up to defendants-
appellees to establish that plaintiffs belong to one of these excepted classes. This, defendants-appellees have
failed to accomplish.

WHEREFORE, 'the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby reversed, and another one shall be entered
declaring that plaintiffs' removal from office was illegal and contrary to law, and that they are, accordingly, entitled
to reinstatement to their respective offices and to the payment of their corresponding emoluments, from January
1, 1962, up to their actual reinstatement. It is so ordered.
58. [No. L-3881. August 31, 1950]

EDUARDO DE LOS SANTOS, petitioner, vs. GIL R. MALLARE, LUIS P. TORRES, in his capacity as City Mayor,
PANTALEON PIMENTEL, in his capacity as City Treasurer, and RAFAEL USON, in his capacity as City Auditor,
respondents.

1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PUBLIC OFFICERS; CONFLICT BETWEEN PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
SECTION 2545 OF THE REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE; EFFECT OF.—Section 2545 of the Revised Administrative
Code, giving the Chief Executive power to remove officers at pleasure is incompatible with the constitutional
inhibition that "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as
provided by law." The two provisions are mutually repugnant and absolutely irreconcilable. One in express terms
permits what the other in similar terms prohibits. Pursuant to section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution, we
declare that this particular provision has been repealed and has ceased to be operative from the time the
Constiution went into effect.

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 2545 OF THE REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, A REPEALED LAW.—We are not declaring
any part of section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code unconstitutional. Unconstitutionality, as we
understand it. denotes life and vigor, and unconstitutional legislation presupposes posteriority in point of time to
the Constitution. It is a statute that "attempts to validate and legalize a course of conduct the effect of which the
Constitution specifically forbids." (State ex-rel. Marck vs. Guckenberger, 139 Ohio St. 273; 39 NE [2d] 840.) A law
that has been repealed is as good as if it had never been enacted, and can not, in the nature of things contravene
or pretend to contravene constitutional inhibitions. So, unlike legislation that is passed in defiance of the
Constitution, assertive and menacing, the questioned part of section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code does
not need a positive declaration of nullity by the court to put it out of the way. To all intents and purposes, it is non-
existent, outlawed and eliminated from the statute book by the Constitution itself by express mandate.

3.ID.; CIVIL SERVICE, SCOPE OF.—Article XII of the Constitution which contains the provisions on Civil 'Service
contemplates the entire Civil Service regardless of whether the employees embraced therein belong to the
classified or unclassified service with the exception of those positions "which are policydetermining, primarily
confidential or highly technical in nature." This theory is confirmed by the enactment of Commonwealth Act No.
177 on November 30, 1936, to implement article XII of the Constitution. Commonwealth Act No. 177 explains Civil
Service almost in the identical words of the Article of the organic law. As a contemporaneous construction, this Act
affords an index to the meaning of Civil Service as conceived by the framers of the Constitution.

4.ID.; ID.; POSITIONS EXCEPTED FROM MERIT SYSTEM AND REMOVAL POR CAUSE; REASON FOR THE EXCEPTION.—
Three specified classes of positions—policy-determining, primarily confidential and highly technical—are excluded
from the merit system, and dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the
Constitution. These positions involve the highest degree of confidence, or are closely bound up with and
dependent on other positions to which they are subordinate, or are temporary in nature. It may truly be said that
the good of the service itself demands that appointments coming under this category be terminable at the will of
the officers who makes them them. Every appointment implies" confidence, but much more than ordinary
confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only
confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures
freedom of intercourse without embarassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or
confidential matters of state.

5.ID.; ID.; . ID.; . OFFICE OF ClTY ENGINEER, NOT EMBRACED lN THE EXCEPTION.—The office of city engineer is
neither primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor highly technical.

6.COURTS; QUESTIONS OF EXPEDIENCY NOT TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE INTERPRETATION OF LAWS.—Attention
is drawn to supposed inconveniences of tying the hands of the appointing power in changing and shifting officers
in the unclassified service. Questions of expediency are, of course, beyond the province of the courts to take into
account in the interpretation of laws or the Constitution where the language is otherwise clear.

7.ID.; ID.; THE WORDS "FOR CAUSE" INTERPRETED.—The phrase "for cause" (sec. 4, Art. XII, Constitution) in
connection with removals of public officers has acquired a well-defined concept. "It means for reasons which the
law and sound public policy recognized as sufficient warrant for removal, that is, legal cause, and not merely
causes which the appointing power in the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient. It is implied that officers may
not be removed at the mere will of those vested with the power of removal, or without any cause. Moreover, the
cause must relate to and affect the administration of office, and must be restricted to something of a substantial
nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the public." (43 Am. Jur., 47, 48.)

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Quo warranto.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Francisco S. Reyes for petitioner.

Solicitor General Felix Bautista, Angelo and Solicitor Augusto Luciano for respondents.

Jose P. Laurel and Abelardo Subido as amici curiæ.

TUASON, J.:

This is an original action of quo warranto questioning the legality of the appointment of respondent Gil R. Mallare
to the office of city engineer for the City of Baguio which the petitioner occupied and claims to be still occupying.
The real issue however is the legality of the petitioner's removal from the same office which would be the effect of
Mallare's appointment if the same be allowed to stand. It is the petitioner's contention that under the Constitution
he can not be removed against his will and without cause. The complaint against the other respondents has to do
merely with their recognition of Mallare as the lawful holder of the disputed office and is entirely dependent upon
the result of the basic action against the last-mentioned respondent (Mallare).

Stripped of details unessential to the solution of the case, the facts are that Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner,
was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on July 16, 1946, by the President, appointment which was confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments on August 6, and on the 23rd of that month, he qualified for and began to
exercise the duties and functions of the position. On June 1, 1950, Gil R. Mallare was extended an ad interim
appointment by the President to the same position, after which, on June 3, the Undersecretary of the Department
of Public Works and Communications directed Santos to report to the Bureau of Public Works for another
assignment. Santos refused to vacate the office, and when the City Mayor and the other officials named as
Mallare's co-defendants ignored him and paid Mallare the salary corresponding to the position, he commenced
these proceedings.

The petitioner rests his' case on Article XII of the Constitution, section 4 of which reads: "No officer or employee in
the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except :for cause as provided by law."

It is admitted in respondents' answer that the City Engineer of Baguio "belongs to the unclassified service." And
this Court, in an exhaustive opinion by Mr. Justice Montemayor in the case of Lacson vs. Romero, 47 Off. Gaz.,
1778, involving the office of provincial fiscal, ruled that officers or employees in the unclassified as well as those in
the classified service are protected by the abovecited provision of the organic law. But there is this difference
between the Lacson case and the case at bar: Section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code, which falls under
Chapter 61 entitled "City of Baguio," authorizes the Governor General (now the President) to remove at pleasure
any of the officers enumerated therein, one of whom is the city engineer. The first question that presents itself is,
is this provision still in force?

Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution declares that "All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force
until the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain operative,
unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the Congress of the
Philippines, * * *."

It seems plain beyond doubt that the provision of section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code, "he
(GovernorGeneral now President) may remove at pleasure any of the said appointive officers," is incompatible
with the constitutional inhibition that "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended -
except for cause as provided by law." The two provisions are mutually repugnant and absolutely irreconcilable.
One in express terms permits what the other in similar terms prohibits.

The Constitution leaves it to the Congress to provide for the cause of removal, and it is suggested that the
President's pleasure is itself a cause. The phrase "for cause" in connection with removals of public officers has
acquired a well-defined concept. "It means for reasons which the law and sound public policy recognized as
sufficient warrant for removal, that is, legal cause, and not merely causes which the appointing power in the
exercise of discretion may deem sufficient ent. It is implied that officers may not be removed at the mere will of
those vested with the power of removal or without any cause. Moreover, the cause must relate to and affect the
administration of the office, and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the
rights and interests of the public." (43 Am. Jur., 47, 48.)

Reconsideration of the decision in Lacson vs. Romero as far as officers in the unclassified service are concerned is
urged- It is contended that only officers and employees in the classified service should be brought within the
purview of Article XII of the Constitution.

Section 1 of this article ordains: "A Civil Service embracing all branches and subdivisions .of the Government shall
be provided by law. Appointments in the Civil Service, except as to those which are policy-determining, primarily
confidential or highly technical in nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness, to be determined as
far as practicable by competitive examination." The first clause is a definition of the scope of Civil Service, the men
and women which section 4 protects. It seems obvious from that definition that the entire Civil Service is
contemplated, except positions "which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature."
This theory is confirmed by the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 177 on November 30, 1936, to implement
Article XII of the Constitution. Commonwealth Act No. 177 explains Civil Service almost in the identical words of
that article of the organic law. As a contemporaneous construction, this Act affords an index to the meaning of
Civil Service as conceived by the framers of the Constitution. "The principle of contemporaneous construction may
be applied to the construction given by the legislature to the constitutional provisions dealing with legislative
powers and procedure. Though not conclusive, such interpretation is generally conceded as being entitled to great
weight." (U. S. vs. Sprague, 282 U. S., 716; 75 L. ed., 640; 51 S. Ct., 226 71 A. L. R., 1381; Den ex dem. Murray vs.
Hoboken Land & Improv. Co., 18 How. [U. S.], 272; 15 L. ed., 372, Clark vs. Boyce, 20 Ariz., 544; 185 P., 136, citing
R. C. L.; 11 Am. Jur. 699.) The principle of express mention and implied exclusion may be made use of also to drive
home this point;

We are led to the same conclusion by the existing provisions at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. Civil
Service as embracing both classes of officers and employees possessed definite legal and statutory meaning when
the Constitution was approved. Section 670 of the Revised Administrative Code already provided that "Persons in
the Philippine civil service pertain either to the classified or unclassified service," and went on to say that "The
classified service embraces all not expressly declared to be in the unclassified service." Then section 671 described
persons in the unclassified service as "officers, other than the provincial treasurers and assistant directors of
bureaus or offices, appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly, and all other officers of the government whose appointments are by law
vested in the President of the Philippines alone."

The rules of construction inf form us that the words used in the constitution are to be given the sense they have in
common use. (Okanogan Indians vs. United States, 279, U. S., 665; 64 A. L. R., 1434; 73 Law ed., 894.) It has been
said that we must look to the history of the times, examine the state of things existing when the Constitution was
framed and adopted, (Rhode Islands vs. Massachusetts, 12 Pet., 657; 9 Law ed., 1233), and interprete it in the light
of the law then in operation. (Mattox vs. United States, 156, U. S., 237; 39 Law ed., 409.) Attention is drawn to
supposed inconveniences of tying the hands of the appointing power in changing and shifting officers in the
unclassified service. "If—it is argued—all important officers and employees of the government falling within the
unclassified service as enumerated in section 671 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 177 may not be removed by the President except for Cause as provided by law, * * * the
President would be seriously crippled in the discharge of the grave duty and responsibility laid upon him by the
Constitution to take care that the laws be faithfully executed."

Questions of expediency are, of course, beyond the province of the courts to take into account in the
interpretation of laws or the Constitution where the language is otherwise clear. But the argument is, we think,
unsound even if the case be approached from this angle. It contains its own refutation. The Constitution and the
law implementing it afford adequate safeguards against such consequences as have been painted.

The argument proceeds, contrary to its context, on the assumption that removals of civil service officers and
employees are absolutely prohibited, which is not the case. The Constitution authorizes removals and only
requires that they be for cause. And the occasions for removal would be greatly diminished if the injunction of
section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution—that appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to
merit and fitness, to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination—would be adhered to
meticulously in the first place.

By far greater mischiefs would be fomented by an unbridled authority to remove. Such license would thwart the
very aims of the Constitution which are expounded by Dean Aruego, himself a member of the Constitutional
Convention, in the following remarks copied with approval in Lacson vs. Romero, supra:

"The adoption of the 'merit system' in government service has secured efficiency and social justice. It eliminates
the political factor in the selection of civil employees which is the first essential to an efficient personnel system. It
insures equality of opportunity to all deserving applicants desire vs. of a career in the public service. It advocates a
new concept of the public office as a career open to all and not the exclusive party testimony of any Party or
faction to be doled out as a reward for" every service.

"The 'merit system' was' adopted only after the nations of the world took cognizance of its merits. Political
patronage in the government service was sanctioned in 1789 by the Constitutional right of President of the United
States to act alone in the matter of removals. From the time of Andrew Jackson the principle of the 'To the victor
belongs the spoils' dominated the Federal Government. The system undermined moral values and destroyed
administrative efficiency.

"Since the establishment of the American Regime in the Philippines we have enjoyed the benefits of the 'merit
system." The Schurmann Commission advocated in its report that 'the greatest care should be taken in the
selection of the officials for administration. They should be men of the highest character and fitness, and partisan
politics should be entirely separated .from the government.' The fifth act passed by the Philippine Commission
created a Board of Civil Service. It instituted a system here that was far more radical and thorough than that in the
United States. The Governor-General after William Taft adopted the policy of appointing Filipinos in the
government regardless of their party affiliation. As the result of these the personnel of the Civil Service had
gradually come to be one of which the people of the United States could feel justly proud.
"Necessity for Constitutional provision.—The inclusion in the constitution of provisions regarding the 'merit
system' is a necessity of modern times. As its establishment secures good government the citizens have a right to
accept its guarantee as a permanent institution.

"Separation, suspension, demotions and transfers.—The 'merit system' will be ineffective if no safeguards are
placed around the separation and removal of public employees. The Committee's report requires that removals
shall be made only for 'causes and in the manner provided by law.' This means that there should be bona fide
reasons and action may be taken only after the employee shall have been given a fair hearing. This affords to
public employees reasonable security of tenure." (II Aruego's Framing of the Constitution, 886, 887, 890.)

As has been seen, three specified classes of positions—policy-determining, primarily confidential and highly
technical—are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and and employees appointed
therein is allowed by the Constitution. These positions involve the highest degree of confident - or are closely
bound up with and dependent on other positions to which they are subordinate, or are temporary in nature. It
may truly be said that the good of the service itself demands that appointments coming under this category be
terminable at the will of the officer that makes them,

The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor highly technical.

Every appointment implies confidence, but much. more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of a
position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the
appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. Nor is
the position of city engineer policy-determining. A city engineer does' not formulate a method of action for the
government or any of its subdivisions. His job is to execute policy, not to make it. With. specific reference to the
City Engineer of Baguio, his powers and duties are carefully laid down for him by section 2557 of. the Revised
Administrative Code and are essentially ministerial in character. Finally, the position of city engineer is technical
but not highly so. A city engineer is not required nor is he supposed to possess a technical skill or training in the
supreme or superior degree, which is the sense in which "highly technical" is, we believe, employed in the
Constitution. There are hundreds of technical men in the classified civil service whose technical competence is not
lower than that of a city engineer, As a matter of fact, the duties of a city engineer are eminently administrative in
character and could very well be discharged by non-technical men possessing executive ability.

Section 10 of Article VIII on the the Constitution requires that "All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty
or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court in banc" and warns that "no treaty or law may be declared
unconstitutional without the concurrence of twothirds of all the members of the Court." The question arises as to
whether this judgment operates as invalidation of section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code or a part of it
so as to need at least eight votes to make it effective. The answer should be in the negative.

We are not declaring any part of section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code unconstitutional. What we
declare is that the particular provision thereof which gave the Chief Executive power to remove officers at pleasure
has been repealed by the Constitution and ceased to be operative from the time that instrument went into effect.
Unconstitutionality, as we understand it, denotes life and vigor, and unconstitutional legislation presupposes
posteriority in point of time to the Constitution. It is a statute that "attempts to validate and legalize a course of
conduct the effect of which the Constitution specifically forbids (State ex-rel. Mack vs. Guckenberger, 139 Ohio St.,
273; 39 NE. [2d], 840.) A law that has been repealed is as good as if it had never been enacted, and can not, in the
nature of things, contravene or pretend to contravene constitutional inhibitions. So, unlike legislation that is
passed in defiance of the Constitution, assertive and menacing, the questioned part of section 2545 of the Revised
Administrative Code does not need a positive declaration of nullity by the court to put it out of the way. To all
intents and purposes, it is nonexistent, outlawed and eliminated from the statute book by the Constitution itself by
express mandate before the petitioner was appointed.
Incidentally, the last discussion answers and disposes of the proposition that in accepting appointment under
section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioner must be deemed to have accepted the conditions
and limitations attached to \he appointment. If the clause of section 2545 which authorized the President to
remove officers of the City of Baguio at pleasure had been abrogated when petitioner's appointment was issued,
the appointee can not be presumed to have abided by this condition.

We therefore hold that the petitioner is entitled to remain in office as City Engineer of Baguio with all the
emoluments, rights and privileges appurtenant thereto, until he resigns or is removed for cause, and that
respondent Mallare's appointment is ineffective in so far as it may adversely affect those emoluments, rights and
privileges. Without costs.
59. No. L-26838. May 29, 1970.

TOMAS BESA, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK; HON. ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO, President of the
Philippine National Bank; THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Philippine National Bank; HON. ANTONIO M. DIAZ,
BIENVENIDO M. JUAT, SlMEON G. MlRANDA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, ISMAEL M. REINOSO, and JUAN TRIVIÑO,
Members of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank; and HON, CONRADO E. MEDINA, Actg. Asst.
Vice-President, In-charge of the Loans Adjustment Dept., respondents.

Civil Service Law; Security of tenure; Confidential positions; Position of Chief Legal Counsel of Philippine National
Bank is both confidential and technical in nature; Rule.—The work of the Chief Legal Counsel of the Philippine
National Bank is both impressed with a highly technical aspect and confidential nature, In such a case, there can be
no insistence on a fixed or a definite term if the latter aspect .predominates. The incumbent of a primarily
confidential position should realize that at any time the appointing- power may decide that his services are no
longer needed. The bank has the right to choose who its legal counsel should be and how long he would remain as
such, just like any other client. The lawyer cannot complain; it is enough that his right to compensation earned be
duly respected.

ORIGINAL PETITION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari, prohibition and quo warranto.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Juan T. David for petitioner.

Jose L. Africa and Miguel V. Gonzales for respondents Philippine National Bank President, et al.

Conrado E. Medina for respondents Philippine National Bank and The Board of Directors.

FERNANDO, J.:

The constitutional safeguard against removal from off ice except for cause is invoked by petitioner Tomas Besa in
this proceeding for certiorari, prohibition and quo warranto.1 Appointed Chief Legal Counsel with the rank of Vice-
President of respondent Philippine National Bank in 1962, he was shifted by virtue of a resolution of respondent
Bank on October 19, 1966, to the office of its President, respondent Roberto S. Benedicto, as Consultant on Legal
Matters,2 with respondent Conrado E. Medina being assigned to his position. While petitioner would seek to
nullify the above resolution and enjoin its enforcement, his action is essentially one of quo warranto. Its success is
thus dependent on his being able to sustain the burden of demonstrating that what was done by respondent Bank,
through its Board of Directors, all of whom were likewise named respondents, could in law be characterized as
removal without cause contrary to the explicit mandate of the Constitution. That he was not able to do. The
petition must fail.

There is no dispute as to the facts. Petitioner was appointed on July 12, 1962 as Chief Legal Counsel of respondent
Bank with the rank of Vice-President. On October 20, 1966, a letter-directive was issued by the then President of
the Bank, respondent Benedicto, that he was transferred to his office as Consultant on Legal Matters. The
justification for such a move was Resolution No. 1053 of respondent Board of Directors of the Bank, wherein it was
expressly stated "that Vice President Tomas Besa be shifted to the Office of the President as Consultant on Legal
Matters, without change in salary and other privileges."

Thereafter, on October 24, 1966, petitioner, in a letter addressed to the respondent Board of Directors and
respondent President Benedicto, sought a reconsideration of the action above taken. Under date of October 27,
1966, the Secretary of respondent Board of Directors advised petitioner of the denial of his motion for
reconsideration. In the aforesaid letter-directive of October 20, 1966, respondent Conrado E. Medina was
designated Vice-President and Chief Legal Counsel effective as of that day. In its answer, respondents admitted the
above facts and stressed that respondent Medina far from usurping the position of petitioner "is Vice President
and Chief Legal Counsel of the respondent Bank who has assumed office and discharged the duties thereof starting
October 20, 1966 by virtue of a valid appointment extended to him by the respondent Board of Directors and a
letter-directive issued pursuant thereto by respondent PNB President Roberto S. Benedicto."3 The action taken in
the case of petitioner was explained thus: "The transfer of petitioner from the Legal Department is further justified
by the following facts and circumstances: a) The position of Chief Legal Counsel carries a special confidential
relationship of lawyer and client, In this regard, the Bank has the prerogative to designate or change its lawyer,
that is, to choose the lawyer, in whom it may have confidence, to head its Legal Department; b) As a matter of fact,
it was on this same principle of confidence that in 1962 the petitioner, who was then an outsider (private
practitioner), was appointed as Vice President and Chief Legal Counsel by the transfer of Atty. Ramon B. de los
Reyes, who was then head (for twenty-one years) of the Legal Department, to a new position of Technical
Assistant to the Executive Vice President, with only the rank of Assistant Vice President; e) The transfer of
petitioner from the Legal Department was made by the respondent Board, in the exercise of its powers, upon the
recommendation of their respondent PNB President The respondent Board had authorized the PNB President to
revitalize the Legal Department, x x x.”4

As was made clear at the outset, the law is not on the side of petitioner. His plea cannot be granted.

1. Petitioner's reliance on the constitutional provision against removal without cause is misplaced, It is appropriate
to invoke it when an officer or employee in the civil service enjoying a fixed term is made to lose his position
without warrant or j ustification. It certainly f finds no application when the duration of one's term depends on the
will of the appointing power. That is so where the position held is highly confidential in character. Such is the case
of the Chief Legal Counsel of respondent Philippine National Bank. That is our answer to the specific question
before us. Our decision is limited to the validity of the action taken by respondent Bank. We do not by any means
intimate an opinion as to the legal consequences attaching to an action similar in character taken by any other
office or agency of the government concerning a lawyer in its staff, especially one who was not employed precisely
because of the marked degree of confidence reposed in him, but rather because of his technical competence,

As far as the petitioner is concerned, however, it is our conclusion that he could not plausibly contend that there
was a removal in the constitutional sense as what did take place was a termination of official relation. Accepting as
he did the position of chief legal adviser, the essence of which is the utmost degree of conf idence involving such
"close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivIngs of
betrayals" whether of personal trust or official matters,5 he could not have been unaware that his term could be
cut short any time without giving rise to any alleged infringement of the above constitutional safeguard. There was
no removal which according to such a mandate is only allowable for cause. Hence the lack of persuasive character
of petitioner's plea, The matter was set forth with precision and clarity by the present Chief Justice in a recent
decision.6 Thus: "This should not be misunderstood as denying that the incumbent of a primarily confidential
position holds office at the pleasure only of the appointing power. It should be noted, however, that when such
pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not 'removed' or 'dismissed' from office—his 'term' merely
'expires,' in much the the same way as an officer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of the fixed term for
which he had been appointed or elected, is not and can not be deemed 'removed' or 'dismissed' therefrom, upon
the expiration of said term. The main difference between the former—the primarily confidential officer—and the
latter is that the latter's term is fixed or definite, whereas that of the former is not prefixed, but indefinite, at the
time of his appointment or election, and becomes fixed and determined when the appointing power expresses its
decision to put an end to the services of the incumbent. When this event takes place, the latter is not 'removed' or
'dismissed' from office—his term has merely 'expired'"

2. Petitioner in his memorandum apparently was encouraged by the long, unbroken, unquestioned course of
impressive adjudication of this Court that has given a wellnigh all-embracing scope to the mantle of protection
covering civil service personnel against removal without cause. So it has been from Lacson v. Romero7 to the
above-cited Ingles v. Mutuc decision.8 So, It is to be expected, it would continue to be. Petitioner's cause did not
thereby gain ground however. For as had just been made clear, there was in his case no question of removal. The
excerpts cited by him from a few of the authoritative precedents thus do not commend themselves for their
pertinence or relevance.9

There is a question raised by petitioner in his memorandum though, unfortunately not given the f ullness of
attention devoted to the removal aspect, which deserves to be further looked into. While the mode of inviting our
attention to it could have benefited from a more precise delineation of its implications, reference to our Corpus v.
Cuaderno10 ruling would indicate that what petitioner had in mind was the permanency of the terms of an official
whose line of work is likewise of a technical character. As was made clear by Justice J. B, L. Reyes, who penned the
opinion: "The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions (such as private secretaries of public
functionaries) ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them
endures; and thus their cessation involves no removal. But the situation is different for those holding highly
technical posts, requiring special skills and qualifications. The Constitution clearly distinguished the primarily
confidential from the highly technical, and to apply the loss of confidence rule to the latter incumbents is to ignore
and erase the differentiation expressly made by our fundamental charter/'

Petitioner did satisfy himself with citing the title of the above decision and that of two subsequent cases11 that
adhere to the above principle. It could be that he was more than persuaded that such a succinct and abbreviated
form of argumentation would suffice to carry the day. It does not, however, as a more careful analysis of the above
doctrine would indicate.

It cannot be denied of course that the work of the Chief Legal Counsel of respondent Bank, as of any lawyer for
that matter, is impressed with a highly technical aspect. As had been pointed out, however, it does not mean that
thereby a client is precluded from substituting in his stead another practitioner. That is his right; his decision to
terminate the relationship once made is impressed with the attribute of finality. The lawyer cannot be heard to
complain; it is enough that his right to compensation earned be duly respected.

In that sense, it is equally clear that where the position partakes of the attributes of being both technical and
confidential, there can be no insistence of a fixed or a definite term if the latter aspect predominates. To
paraphrase the language of the Chief Justice in the opinion previously cited, the incumbent of a primarily
confidential position, as was the case of petitioner, should realize that at any time the appointing power may
decide that his services are no longer needed. As thus correctly viewed, Corpus v. Cuaderno cannot be read as
lending support to petitioner's efforts to retain his position as Chief Legal Counsel of respondent Bank, contrary to
its wishes as so explicitly declared in its Resolution No, 1053.

3. It is manifest from the foregoing that we have considered the crucial issue posed from the standpoint of the
right enjoyed by respondent Bank to choose who its legal counsel should be and how long he would remain as
such, We have not seen any need to pass upon the conflicting claims raised as to the alleged failure of petitioner in
the discharge of his functions to extend the utmost protection to the interests of respondent Bank nor of the
vigorous defense of his actuations as such, which if given full credence, would erase the slightest doubt as to his
competence and proficiency. For as above noted, the decisive issue is the confidential character of petitioner's
position, which negates reliance on the removal-for-cause guarantee of the Constitution. We thus leave open for
future determination, when and if such a litigation arises, case involving the other vice-presidents of the
respondent Bank, where it would appear the overriding factor in their selection is not that degree of the utmost
confidence reposed in a lawyer but their technical skills in the performance of the duties entrusted to them.

WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari, prohibition and quo warranto is dismissed. Without pronouncement as to
costs.
60. G.R. No. 88177. December 4, 1990.*

DOLORES A. PAREDES, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND REMEDIOS A. AMOR, respondents.

G.R. No. 89530. December 4, 1990.*

DOLORES A. PAREDES, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD AND
REMEDIOS A. AMOR, respondents.

Certiorari; Grave abuse of discretion means arbitrary or despotic exercise of power, by reason of passion or
personal hostility as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
by law or to act in contemplation or within the bounds of law.—For an act of a court or tribunal to be considered
as committed in grave abuse of discretion the same must be performed in a capricious and whimsical manner as
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation and within
the bounds of law (Carson et al. v. Judge Pantamosos, Jr., G.R. No. 75934, December 13, 1989; Intestate Estate of
Carmen de Luna v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. 72424, February 13, 1989; People v. Manuel, 11 SCRA 618).
Failure on the part of the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will result in the dismissal of the petition
(Del Rosario v. Subido, 31 SCRA 382).

Civil Service; Appointments; Qualification Standard; A qualification standard must exist to guide the appointing
authority not only in extending an appointment, but also in settling contested appointments.—The absence of a
Qualification Standard does not justify the appointment of petitioner Paredes or anybody for that matter to the
contested position. Without a duly approved Qualification Standard it would be extremely difficult if not
impossible for the appointing authority to determine the qualification and fitness of the applicant for the particular
position. Without an approved Qualification Standard the appointing authority would have no basis or guide in
extending a promotional or original appointment in filling up vacant positions in its department or agency. Public
interest therefore requires that a Qualification Standard must exist to guide the appointing authority not only in
extending an appointment but also in settling contested appointments.

Appeals; Appeal, being a statutory right, must be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law.—Appeal in judicial proceedings is a statutory right that must be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of law (Ozaeta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 83281, December 4,1989; Velasco v.
Court of Appeals, 51 SCRA 439). This doctrine is also applicable in quasijudicial proceedings so that one must first
ascertain the law applicable to determine whether or not the party can appeal the order or decision.

Same; Administrative Law; Civil Service Commission; Petitioner, not being the party adversely affected by the
decision, has no legal personality to interpose an appeal to the Civil Service Commission.—Based on the above
provisions of law, appeal to the Civil Service Commission in an administrative case is extended to the party
adversely affected by the decision, that is, the person or the respondent employee who has been meted out the
penalty of suspension for more than thirty days; or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary demotion in rank
or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. The decision of the disciplining authority is even final and
not appealable to the Civil Service Commission in cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more
than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary. Appeal in cases allowed by law must be filed
within fifteen days from receipt of the decision. x x x As correctly ruled by private respondent, petitioner Paredes
the complainant is not the party adversely affected by the decision so that she has no legal personality to
interpose an appeal to the Civil Service Commission. In an administrative case, the complainant is a mere witness
(Gonzalo v. D. Roda, 64 SCRA 120). Even if she is the Head of the Administrative Services Department of the HSRC
as a complainant she is merely a witness for the government in an administrative case. No private interest is
involved in an administrative case as the offense is committed against the government.
PETITIONS for certiorari to review the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

M.N. Paredes & Associates for petitioner.

Thelma Panganiban-Gaminde, Rogelio C. Limare and Daisy

B. Garcia-Tingzon for Civil Service Commission.

Lemuel M. De Guzman for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

Submitted for decision are the separate petitions for certiorari questioning the following resolutions1 of the public
respondent Civil Service Commission, viz:

In G.R. No. 88177, petitioner Dolores Paredes assails resolution No. 89-072 dated February 6,1989, sustaining the
decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) directing the revocation of her appointment as HS Project
Coordinator in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and declaring the said position vacant.

In G.R. No. 89530, petitioner Paredes assails resolution No. 89-276 dated April 27, 1989, affirming the decision of
the Merit Systems Protection Board dated April 22,1988, dismissing all charges against Atty. Remedios A. Amor
except habitual tardiness for which the latter was reprimanded and warned that a repetition of the same in the
future would be dealt with more severely.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Paredes entered the government service in July 1950 as a public school teacher. Later she transferred to
the General Auditing Office as Auditing Clerk detailed at the Philippine Tobacco Administration. On November 16,
1977, she joined the then Human Settlements Regulatory Commission2 (HSRC for brevity) as Project Officer II. She
was promoted to H.S. Project Officer III on July 1980 then to H.S. Project Officer II on December 1,1981. On
October 1, 1985 she was extended a promotional appointment as H.S. Project Supervisor.

On December 30, 1985, private respondent Atty. Remedios A. Amor, H.S. Project Officer IV, contested the
promotional appointment of petitioner Paredes as H.S. Project Supervisor, on the ground that she is the qualified
next-in-rank pursuant to Section 9 (16) and (20) of P.D. 807 and the Qualification Standards of the HSRC. The case
was docketed as HSRC Protest Case No. 86-01.

On January 14,1986, HSRC Commissioner and Chief Executive Officer Ernesto C. Mendiola, rendered a decision
dismissing private respondent Amor's protest as it was filed five days beyond the fifteen (15) day reglementary
period provided under Section 10 of Rule IV of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Commissioner Mendiola
stated that (1) the contested appointment dated October 1, 1985 was issued and posted on the Commission's
Bulletin Board on November 13, 1985, but private respondent Amor filed her protest only on December 3, 1985;
(2) private respondent Amor is not among the top six next-in-rank candidates recommended by the Selection and
Promotion Board; and (3) pursuant to Resolution 85-132 dated April 11, 1985 of the Civil Service Commission
petitioner Paredes can be extended a promotional appointment as H.S. Project Supervisor because although she is
only a holder of a two year Elementary Teachers Certificate her educational deficiency can be substituted with her
31 years of service in the government the greater part of which has been in the supervisory level (Rollo, p. 163).
On January 21, 1986, private respondent appealed the decision of Commissioner Mendiola to the Office of the
President. In the First Indorsement dated August 12,1986, the Office of the President requested public respondent
to comment on the appeal pursuant to Section 19(6) of P.D. 807. On September 9, 1987, the MSPB requested the
Office of the President to forward the record of the case to the former pursuant to the provisions of Executive
Order 135 dated February 27, 1987, which repealed Memorandum Circular dated June 4, 1985 of the Office of the
President.

On September 21, 1987, by way of comment on the appeal, Commissioner Mendiola in his Second Indorsement
reiterated his decision dated January 14, 1986. He also opined that the appeal may be considered moot and
academic because petitioner was promoted to the position of HS Program Coordinator effective August 17, 1987
(Rollo, pp. 62-63, Annex G, Petition G.R. No. 88177).

In her letter dated October 26, 1987, private respondent Amor again protested the promotional appointment of
petitioner Paredes as HS Program Coordinator arguing that the latter is not qualified for the said position. On
January 4,1988, the MSPB rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which provides, viz:

"WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is found meritorious. The decision appealed from is hereby reversed. Protestee-
appellee Dolores A. Paredes is found not at all qualified for the contested position of HS Project Supervisor as well
as of the higher position of HS Program Coordinator which she presently occupies. Accordingly, the CSC approval
on said appointments are hereby revoked and the subject appointment is consequently considered ineffective. She
should be reverted to her former position of HS Project Officer IV, the validity of which does not have to be
decided here. Protestant-appellant Remedios A. Amor is found to be the competent and qualified next-in-rank not
only to the Project Supervisor position which she has originally protested but also to the higher and more
responsible position of HS Program Coordinator which she recently protested. It is hereby directed that Atty. Amor
be appointed to the position of HS Program Coordinator in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB),
immediately.

"Let a copy hereof be furnished the Chief Executive Officer, HLURB, the contending parties, the Commission on
Audit (COA), and the CSC Field Office, Malacañang, Manila, for their information." (Rollo, pp. 65-66)

In arriving at the above stated decision, the MSPB opined that the contested position specifically requires a lawyer,
architect, engineer or a holder of a masteral degree for appointment thereto; that petitioner's length of service in
the government cannot be used to make up for her educational deficiency; that even if the two year educational
requirement can be substituted, petitioner is only a holder of a two year elementary teachers certificate so that
she is still one year short of the minimum educational requirement of the contested position as provided in the
HSRC Qualification Standards contained in its Merit Promotion Plan and System of Ranking positions approved by
the Commission in its Resolution No. 84-215 dated June 28, 1984; that although the appointing authority has a
wide latitude of discretion the same is not absolute; that in the exercise of discretion the appointing authority
should be guided by the Civil Service Law and Rules.

In her motion for reconsideration dated January 21, 1988, petitioner alleged inter alia, that the HSRC has no
approved Qualification Standards; that the CSC Resolution No. 84-215 dated June 28, 1984 approved only the
HSRC's Merit Promotion Plan and the System of Ranking Position; that the Qualification Standards is separate from
the Merit Promotion Plan and the System of Ranking Position; that the promotional appointments of petitioner are
legal.

On April 25, 1988, the MSPB denied for lack of merit petitioner's motion for reconsideration. It noted that the
Personnel Officer III of HSRC forwarded to the Office of the President a duly certified copy of the HSRC
Qualification Standards (Rollo, pp. 80-83, G.R. No. 88177).

On appeal the Civil Service Commission ruled that although the HLURB Qualification Standards has not been
approved it can be used as a basis for recruitment and promotion in order not to jeopardize the operations of the
office. Accordingly, it issued Resolution No. 89-072 dated February 1,1989, the dispositive portion of which reads,
viz:

"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the Commission resolved to set aside, as it hereby sets aside
the MSPB decision No. 1529 directing the revocation of the appointment of Mrs. Dolores A. Paredes as H.S. Project
Coordinator and the appointment of Atty. Remedios A. Amor to the position of H.S. Program Coordinator.
Accordingly, the position of H.S. Program Coordinator in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, is declared
vacant. It must be filled in by a qualified applicant subject to the discretion of the proper appointing authority and
the requirements of the Civil Service Law and Rules." (Rollo, p, 3)

On April 1,1989, the Civil Service Commission issued Resolution No. 89-265 denying for lack of merit petitioner's
motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 161-162, G.R. No. 88177). Hence, the instant petition for certiorari which
was docketed as G.R. No. 88177.

Meanwhile, on May 7, 1986, petitioner Paredes filed a sworn complaint against private respondent Amor for
falsification of official documents, dishonesty, violation of Civil Service Law and reasonable office Rules and
Regulations, habitual tardiness, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for being notoriously
undesirable. In her complaint she alleged, among others, that as Head of the Administrative Services Department
of the HSRC it is her duty to monitor observance of Civil Service rules and regulations among the employees of
HSRC; that on October 17, 1979 private respondent Amor falsely stated in her application for the issuance of
Passport No. A-161889 that she had no occupation when at that she was already employed with the HSRC; that on
February 27, 1984, she again misrepresented and/or falsely stated in her application for the issuance of Passport
No. A-0640312 that she had no occupation when she was and still is an employee of HSRC; that on July 31, 1984
private respondent Amor secured a medical certificate issued by a government physician that she is suffering from
acute pneumonitis requiring complete rest for at least two months; that the medical certificate contained false
information as she was not ill, the fact that she reported to work from July 31, 1984 to August 3, 1984 and she
travelled to the United States from August 8,1984 to September 30, 1984; that using the medical certificate she
filed on August 3, 1984 an application for sick leave of absence for two months enabling her to collect her salary
for the said period; that private respondent Amor in a pleading she filed with the HSRC attached a certificate of
authority to travel to the United States purportedly issued on August 3, 1984 by the then Deputy Presidential
Executive Assistant Joaquin Venus, Jr.; that said authority to travel is false because there is no record on file in the
Office of the President aside from the fact that she could not have filed an application for such authority to travel
as an employee of the government because in her passport application she had no occupation; that an
examination of her daily time record will show that she was habitually tardy in reporting to work; that despite her
employment as Med-Arbiter in the Ministry of Labor and later as Project Officer II in the HSRC she appeared as
counsel de oficio before Branch XXX, RTC, Pasay City, without proper authority, in violation of Civil Service Rules
and Regulations. Accordingly, petitioner prayed for an investigation and thereafter the dismissal from the service
of private respondent Amor.

In her answer dated June 18,1986, private respondent Amor denied the charges and countered that the same is
only a retaliatory measure intended to harass and intimidate her as she protested the promotional appointment of
petitioner Paredes. She also pointed out that her passport application which is the basis of the complaint is filed by
her in her personal capacity and not in any way related to the performance of her official functions. On the medical
certificate and the Malacañang clearance she argued that they were issued by public officials so said documents
carry with them the presumption that they were regularly issued. (Rollo, p. 71, G.R. No. 89530).

Finding the existence of a prima facie case against private respondent Amor, Jezarene C. Aquino, Legal Officer,
HSRC, recommended that to resolve all doubts of partiality the case be forwarded to the Civil Service Commission
for trial on the merits. Pursuant to CSC Memorandum Circular No. 6, Series of 1978, implementing PD No. 1409,
then Commissioner Mendiola requested in his letter dated June 25, 1986 that the said administrative case be
taken cognizance of by the Merit System Protection Board.
After hearing and the submission of the parties' memoranda, the MSPB rendered its decisions dated April 22,1988,
absolving private respondent Amor of all charges except for habitual tardiness. Considering that habitual tardiness
is a light offense and the evidence on record does not show that she was previously warned, private respondent
Amor was only reprimanded and warned that a repetition would be dealt with more severely (Rollo, pp. 54-59,
G.R. No. 89530).

In absolving private respondent Amor of the administrative charge of falsification of official document, the MSPB
opined that no credible evidence was presented and formally offered to prove the charges. It noted that the
person who issued the certification containing the entry in private respondent Amor's passport application that
she has no occupation was not presented in the hearing; that the entry on occupation was merely typewritten and
the other entries are all printed; that the PR verification slip presented as evidence did not contain information
indicating the source thereof and the signature of person issuing it. As to the medical certificate, it noted that the
issuing physician was not presented as a witness. Thus, it ruled that the doctor's findings that private respondent
Amor is suffering from acute pneumonitis requiring her to rest for at least two months cannot be regarded as false
just because she reported to work from August 1 to 3, 1984. As regards the certificate of authority to travel the
MSPB found nothing irregular, apart from the fact that Deputy Presidential Executive Assistant Venus was not
presented to deny the genuineness of his signature.

Not satisfied with the decision of the MSPB, petitioner Paredes interposed an appeal to the Civil Service
Commission. In its Resolution No. 89-276 dated April 27, 1989, the Civil Service Commission dismissed the appeal
on the ground that petitioner Paredes is not the party adversely affected by the decision. Citing Section 39(a) of
Presidential Decree No. 807, it ruled that the parties who can appeal in an administrative case are the government
and the respondent. In its Resolution No. 89-534 dated July 28, 1989, denying petitioner Paredes' motion for
reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission stressed that the party adversely affected under Section 30(a) of P.D
807 had been consistently interpreted to refer to the respondent against whom an adverse decision had been
rendered or the Department or Agency concerned and not the complainant. The complainant after the filing of the
complaint is relegated to the status of a complaining witness as the offense is committed against the government
(Rollo, pp. 45-53, G.R. 89530). Hence, the instant petition for certiorari which was docketed as G.R. No. 89530.

In its En Banc Resolution dated September 28, 1989, this Court resolved (1) to consolidate the above entitled cases
(2) to give due course to the petitions (3) to consider the comment as answer and (4) to require the parties to file
their memoranda within twenty days from notice (Rollo, p. 76), In compliance therewith, all the parties filed their
respective memoranda. Cited as grounds for the allowance of the petition in G.R. No. 88177 are the following:

A QUALIFICATION STANDARDS NOT BROUGHT INTO EXISTENCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AS ITS WORDS
EXPLICITLY STATE CANNOT BE THE BASIS FOR ANNULLING THE PROMOTIONAL APPOINTMENTS EXTENDED TO THE
PETITIONER.

II

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AS TO AMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
IN HOLDING THAT THE APPOINTING AUTHORITY, IN EXERCISING THE WIDE LATITUDE OF DISCRETION ACCORDED
TO IT IN APPOINTMENTS, IS BOUND BY A QUALIFICATIONS STANDARD WHICH HAS NOT BEEN BROUGHT INTO
EXISTENCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.

III
THE PETITIONER IS WELL-QUALIFIED FOR THE PROMOTIONAL APPOINTMENTS AWARDED TO HER CONSIDERING
HER LONG YEARS OF PUBLIC SERVICE AND QUALIFICATIONS AS A PUBLIC SERVANT.

Likewise, in G.R. No. 89530 petitioner Paredes cited the following grounds for the allowance of her petition, viz:

THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN THE HEARINGS OUGHT TO HAVE OVERWHELMINGLY ESTABLISHED THE GUILT OF
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR THE OFFENSES IMPUTED TO HER.

II

THE RESPONDENT BOARD RENDERED AN ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE TENETS
OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

III

THE PETITIONER IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM DISPUTING THE TOTALLY BASELESS, UNLAWFUL AND PREJUDICED
DECISION RENDERED BY THE RESPONDENT BOARD.

IV

THE RESPONDENT BOARD AS WELL AS THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION HAD COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AS TO AMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION THEREBY WARRANTING THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI.

The primary issue for resolution in G.R. No. 88177 is whether or not the public respondent committed a grave
abuse of discretion when it sustained the revocation of petitioner Paredes' appointment as HS Project Coordinator
and in declaring the said position vacant.

For an act of a court or tribunal to be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion the same must be
performed in a capricious and whimsical manner as tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by law or to act in contemplation and within the bounds of law (Carson et al. v. Judge Pantamosos, Jr.,
G.R. No. 75934, December 13, 1989; Intestate Estate of Carmen de Luna v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
72424, February 13, 1989; People v. Manuel, 11 SCRA 618). Failure on the part of the petitioner to show grave
abuse of discretion will result in the dismissal of the petition (Del Rosario v. Subido, 31 SCRA 382).

It is not disputed that the Qualification Standards which the HSRC formulated sometime in February 1984 was
submitted to the public respondent and returned to the HLURB in June 1984 together with the approved Merit
Promotion Plan (Private Respondent's Comment, Rollo, p. 161, G.R. No. 88177). The absence of the approved
Qualification Standards was attested to no less by Director Antonio M. Hocan, Office of Career System and
Standards, Civil Service Commission, in his letter dated January 13, 1988 addressed to Commissioner Ernesto
Mendiola (Rollo, pp. 165, G.R. No. 88177).
Section 20 of Article III on Personnel Policies and Standards under Presidential Decree No. 807 dated October 6,
1975, expressly mandates that:

"SEC. 20. Qualification Standards.—(1) A qualification standard expresses the minimum requirements for a class of
positions in terms of education, training and experience, civil service eligibility, physical fitness, and other qualities
required for successful performance. The degree of qualifications of an officer or employee shall be determined by
the appointing authority on the basis of the qualification standard for the particular position.

"Qualification standards shall be used as basis for civil service examinations for positions in the career service, as
guides in appointment and other personnel actions, in the adjudication of protested appointments, in determining
training needs, and as aid in the inspection and audit for the agencies personnel work programs.

"It shall be administered in such manner as to continually provide incentives to officers and employees towards
professional growth and foster the career system in the government service.

"(2) The establishment, administration and maintenance of qualification standards shall be the responsibility of the
department or agency, with the assistance and approval of the Civil Service Commission and the consultation with
the Wage and Position Classification Office."

Based on the above provisions of law a Qualification Standard prescribes for the minimum qualification
requirement in terms of education, Civil Service eligibility, training, experience, physical fitness and other qualities
for appointment to a particular position as determined by the appointing authority. A Qualification Standard is to
be established or formulated by the Department or agency concerned but must be approved by the Civil Service
Commission. Approval is required by law because the Civil Service Commission is the central personnel agency of
the government entrusted with the enforcement of laws relative to the selection, promotion and discipline of civil
servants. Once approved, the Qualification Standards shall be used as guides in appointment and in the
adjudication of contested appointments.

In the case at bar, it may be conceded that in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, the public respondent Civil
Service Commission committed an error in applying the Qualification Standards which it admitted it has not
approved. Exigency of the service does not justify the use of Qualification Standard it has not approved. However,
the error is not so grave as would warrant the nullification of its resolution declaring the position of H.S. Project
Coordinator vacant. The absence of a Qualification Standard does not justify the appointment of petitioner
Paredes or any body for that matter to the contested position. Without a duly approved Qualification Standard it
would be extremely difficult if not impossible for the appointing authority to determine the qualification and
fitness of the applicant for the particular position. Without an approved Qualification Standard the appointing
authority would have no basis or guide in extending a promotional or original appointment in filling up vacant
positions in its department or agency. Public interest therefore requires that a Qualification Standard must exist to
guide the appointing authority not only in extending an appointment but also in settling contested appointments.

Here the appointing authority erroneously assumed that the Qualification Standard it had formulated in February,
1984, had been approved when it was returned in June, 1984, by public respondent together with the approved
Merit Promotion Plan. The unapproved Qualification Standard was apparently used by Commissioner Mendiola in
appointing petitioner Paredes as its Project Supervisor effective October 1, 1985, because in dismissing private
respondent Amor's protest he ruled, among others, that although petitioner Paredes is only a holder of a two year
Elementary Teacher's Certificate, her educational deficiency can be substituted with her 31 years service in the
government. His erroneous belief of the existence of an approved Qualification Standard may have prompted him
to complicate matters by promoting petitioner Paredes to the position of HS Program Coordinator effective August
17, 1987 which was likewise protested by private respondent Amor. Even the Personnel Officer III of the HSRC
entertained said belief as it forwarded to the Office of the President a certified true copy of the so-called HSRC
Qualification Standards.
In declaring the Position of HS Project Coordinator vacant; the public respondent has therefore not abused its
discretion as the Qualification Standards of the HSRC which should be the basis and guide for appointment has not
been approved by the Civil Service Commission.

As regards G.R. No. 89530, the crucial issue to be resolved is whether or not petitioner Paredes has the legal
personality to appeal the decision of the MSPB absolving private respondent Amor of all charges except for
habitual tardiness for which the latter was reprimanded.

Appeal in judicial proceedings is a statutory right that must be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of law (Ozaeta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 83281, December 4, 1989; Velasco v. Court of Appeals,
51 SCRA 439). This doctrine is also applicable in quasi-judicial proceedings so that one must first ascertain the law
applicable to determine whether or not the party can appeal the order or decision.

Section 37 of Presidential Decree No. 807 provides, viz:

"SEC. 37.—(a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the
imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer,
removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against
a government official or employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any
department or agency or official or group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation
shall be submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be
taken.

"(b) The heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have
jurisdiction to Investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under
their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty
days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head
is appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department and finally to the
Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case
the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the department head.

"(c) An investigation may be entrusted to regional director or similar officials who shall make the necessary report
and recommendation to the chief of bureau or office or department, within the period specified in Paragraph (d)
of the following Section.

"(d) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or removal,
the respondent shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension during the pendency of the
appeal in the event he wins an appeal."

Section 39 thereof also provides, viz:

"SEC. 39.—(a) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision within
fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition for reconsideration is seasonably filed, which petition
shall be decided within fifteen days. Notice of the appeal shall be filed with the disciplining office, which shall
forward the records of the case, together with the notice of appeal, to the appellate authority within fifteen days
from filing of the notice of appeal, with its comment, if any. The notice of appeal shall specifically state the date of
the decision appealed from and the date or receipt thereof. It shall also specifically set forth clearly the grounds
relied upon for excepting from the decision.

"(b) A petition for reconsideration shall be based only on any of the following grounds: (1) new evidence has been
discovered which materially affects the decision rendered; (2) the decision is not supported by the evidence on
record; or (3) errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the respondent:
Provided, That only one petition for reconsideration shall be entertained."
Based on the above provisions of law, appeal to the Civil Service Commission in an administrative case is extended
to the party adversely affected by the decision, that is, the person or the respondent employee who has been
meted out the penalty of suspension for more than thirty days; or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary
demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. The decision of the disciplining authority is
even final and not appealable to the Civil Service Commission in cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for
not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary. Appeal in cases allowed by law
must be filed within fifteen days from receipt of the decision.

Here the MSPB after hearing and the submission of memoranda exonerated private respondent Amor of all
charges except for habitual tardiness. The penalty was only a reprimand so that even private respondent Amor, the
party adversely affected by the decision, cannot even interpose an appeal to the Civil Service Commission.

As correctly ruled by private respondent, petitioner Paredes the complainant is not the party adversely affected by
the decision so that she has no legal personality to interpose an appeal to the Civil Service Commission. In an
administrative case, the complainant is a mere witness (Gonzalo v. D. Roda, 64

SCRA 120). Even if she is the Head of the Administrative Services Department of the HSRC as a complainant she is
merely a witness for the government in an administrative case. No private interest is involved in an administrative
case as the offense is committed against the government.

In view of the foregoing discussion it would be unnecessary to consider the other issues raised in these petitions.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
61. G.R. No. 99336. June 9, 1992.*

MELANIO S. TORIO, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, NATIONAL PRINTING OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS
SECRETARY and EFREN CAMACHO, respondents.

G.R. No. 100178. June 9, 1992.*

JAIME ESPANOLA, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, LETTY CANGAYDA, NATIONAL PRINTING OFFICE and
THE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, respondents.

Civil Service Law; A protest against a temporary appointment becomes moot after the lapse thereof.—Still, at the
time of the temporary appointment of petitioner Espanola, a civil service eligible who was willing to accept the
position was available in the person of private respondent Cangayda. Apparently, there was disregard of the
mandate of the law when Espanola's temporary appointment was issued. Nevertheless, the petitioner has
correctly pointed out that the protest lodged by private respondent Cangayda had become moot and academic
inasmuch as petitioner Espanola's temporary appointment had already lapsed on February 28, 1989, It is
erroneous for the CSC to treat Cangayda's protest as a continuing one. The same holds true for the protest lodged
by Camacho.

Same; Permanent appointment is not a continuation of a temporary appointment.—A permanent appointment is

not a continuation of the temporary appointment—these are two distinct acts of the appointing authority. The fact
that the appointees in the two appointments are one and the same person is purely incidental, Any irregularities in
the former appointment are not to be automatically carried over to the latter. If the protest is directed against the
temporary appointment, it would be illogical to carry-over the merits of the protest to the subsequent permanent
appointment.

Same; After lapse of temporary appointment, protestant may file a new protest against subsequent permanent
appointment of same employee.—The preceding ruling should not be construed to mean, however, that by the
mere expedient of appointing the temporary appointee to a permanent status, the appointing authority can
deprive the protestant of an opportunity to question the appointment, First, the protestant is not precluded from
filing another protest directed against the permanent appointment. Second, if it can be shown that the
appointment was purposely done to moot the protest or is characterized by malice, then corrective action can be
taken and, moreover, the erring officials can be proceeded against administratively.

Same; Petitioners already possessed the required eligibilities and qualifications when they were given permanent
appointments.—At the time petitioner Espanola was issued a permanent appointment, he was also granted
testimonial eligibility such that he is to be considered as possessing the requisite civil service eligibility for his
position. The same holds true with petitioner Torio. At the time of his permanent appointment, he was already a
career service professional, having passed the civil service examination held on July 26, 1987 and the results of
which were released on January 13, 1988. In fact, even at the time of Torio's temporary appointment on March 1,
1988, he already possessed the civil service eligibility called for by the position. The QS established for the
contested positions do not only prescribe the eligibility but also the minimum education and experience required
of the position. Even if the petitioners possess the required civil service eligibility, there would still be abuse of
discretion by the appointing authority if the other qualifications are not satisfied. Based on the QS listed above, the
records show that both petitioners possess qualifications required of the contested positions.

Same; Appointing authority has discretion to determine when education should be exchanged for experience and
vice-versa.—It would be appropriate to state at the outset that when necessary, education, experience or training
may be used interchangeably to offset deficiences (in fact, the CSC issued Memorandum Circular No. 23 series of
1991 expressly allowing the offsetting of deficiencies except the required eligibility). The necessity exists if the
appointee's training or experience is of such a level that the same would more than supplement the deficiency in
education considering the demands of the position in question. The converse holds true if the appointee's
deficiency is in the required training or experience. The decision as to when the conditions give rise to a necessity
to interchange education with experience and vice-versa rests upon the sound discretion of the appointing
authority. This is not to be viewed as an unbridled license given to the appointing authority to appoint
whomsoever be desires. This is rather a recognition of the fact that the appointing authority is in the best position
to determine the needs of his department or agency and how to satisfy those needs. Moreover, it is precisely the
province of the QS to provide the gauge by which the appointing authority shall exercise his discretion.

Same; Related work experience may be tacked to the actual printing experience required by the Qualification
Standards fixed for the position.—Although petitioner Torio majored in Political Science and not in Commerce or
Business Administration, the QS provided that the latter two are mere preferences. As to private respondent's
claim that Torio had only one year, six months and eight days of experience in printing operations at the time of his
appointment (it must be noted, however, that the private respondent was referring to Torio's government service
at the time of his temporary appointment since at the time of permanent appointment, Torio had over two years
of government service), the QS provided that the experience may be on other related work. The appointing power
may have found Torio's previous work experiences sufficient to tack to the number of years of experience in actual
printing operations coupled with the numerous seminars and trainings he had attended. There is thus, no evident
violation of the QS.

Same; Civil Service Commission has no power to overrule choice of whom to appoint.—From the foregoing, it is
established that petitioners Espanola and Torio are qualified for the positions to which they were appointed. The
appointing authority's exercise of discretion in the choice of appointees must be respected even if there are other
persons who are likewise qualified for the position such as private respondents Cangayda and Camacho. In fact,
the CSC does not have the power to overrule such discretion even if its finds that there are other persons more
qualified to the contested position.

Same; Formal and informal qualifications for the job are equally important. Hence, choice of appointee is best left
to appointing authority.—As has been held in Español v. The Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 85479, March 3,
1992, "every particular job in an office calls for both formal and informal qualifications. Formal qualifications such
as age, number of academic units in a certain course, seminars attended and so forth, may be valuable but so are
such intangibles as resourcefulness, team spirit, courtesy, initiative, loyalty, ambition, prospects for the future and
best interest of the service. Given the demands of a certain job, who can do it best should be left to the head of
the Office concerned provided the legal requirements for the office are satisfied."

Same; Constitutional Law; The Constitution allows dismissal of career employees not for cause if it is result of
reorganization done in good faith.—It is worthy to re-state that the present petitions arose due to the abolition of
the GSA and its merger with the relevant printing units of the PIA giving rise to the NPO. There is no showing that
the reorganization was undertaken for any reason other than its purpose of promoting economy, efficiency and
effectiveness in the delivery of public service. In fact, the private respondents did not put in issue the validity of
the reorganization of the offices. They questioned only their non-appointment to the contested positions. We are
constrained to assume that there was in the present case, a bona fide reorganization. Hence, private respondent
Cangayda cannot successfully impugn her alleged removal as illegal for under the facts of the case, she was not
dismissed; rather, her former position was abolished. More important, this Court has ruled in Siete v. Santos, 190
SCRA 50 [1990] that Section 16, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly authorizes the dismissal of career
civil service employees not for cause but as a result of the reorganization following the ratification of said
Constitution.

PETITIONS to review the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

 Faustino S. Tugade, Jr. for petitioners.

Ernesto M. Tomaneng for respondent Camacho.

Dioscoro T. Lachica for respondent Cangayda.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

These two consolidated petitions assail the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) revoking the
appointment of herein petitioners on the ground that they lacked the necessary civil service eligibility at the time
of the issuance of their appointments.

The same series of events gave rise to the controversy in these two petitions.

Executive Order No. 285 issued on July 25, 1987 abolished the General Services Administration (GSA) including all
offices and agencies under it. The General Printing Office (GPO) which was under the GSA was merged with the
relevant printing units of the Philippine Information Agency (PIA) and out of the merger arose the National Printing
Office (NPO) which was placed under the control and supervision of the Office of the Press Secretary (OPS). A new
plantilla of personnel for the NPO was prepared and approved and the affected officers and employees continued
to perform their respective duties and responsibilities in a hold-over capacity pending the implementation of the
reorganization.

The petitioner in G.R. No. 99336, Melanio Torio, was the Chief of the Production Staff of the Printing Division, PIA,
while the petitioner in G.R. No. 100178, Jaime Espanola, was a Bindery Foreman at the PIA. They continued
discharging their functions in a hold-over capacity after the PIA was merged with the GSA. On March 1,1988, in
accordance with the new staffing pattern of the NPO, petitioner Torio was temporarily appointed as Assistant
Operations Superintendent of Printing while petitioner Espanola was appointed as Temporary Supervising
Bookbinder. Both appointments lapsed on February 28,1989. So on March 1, 1989, petitioner Torio was extended
a renewal appointment which was likewise in a temporary capacity while petitioner Espanola was issued another
appointment as Supervising Bookbinder with a permanent status. On the same date, Espanola was granted a
testimonial eligibility.

On July 1, 1989, the positions of both petitioners were upgraded—the Assistant Operations Superintendent of
Printing was changed to Assistant Superintendent of Printing and the Supervising Bookbinder to Bookbinder IV.
This time, another appointment was issued to Torio for the upgraded position together with his change of status
from temporary to permanent. Espanola, on the other hand, was given only a notice of the upgrading of his
position inasmuch as he was already holding it in a permanent capacity.

Prior to the appointments of the petitioners to the permanent items, protests were lodged with the CSC. The
protestants were Efren Camacho and Letty Cangayda, the private respondents in G.R. No. 99336 and G.R. No.
100178, respectively. The CSC referred Camacho's protest to the NPO while Cangayda's protest was referred to the
Reorganization Appeals Board of the OPS. The offices concerned did not take any action on the referrals by the CSC
so the latter was constrained to resolve the protests based on the available documents or papers before it.

On January 7, 1991, the CSC issued a resolution in CSC Case No. 796 revoking the appointment of Torio and
ordering those qualified, including Camacho, to be evaluated for the position. Subsequently, on February 5, 1991,
the CSC rendered another resolution in CSC Case No. 832 cancelling Espanola's appointment and ordering the
reappointment of Cangayda to the position. The motions for reconsideration filed separately by the present
petitioners were denied for lack of merit. Hence, the present recourse to this Court.
As was stated earlier, the two petitions herein were consolidated in a resolution of this Court on September 3,
1991. A temporary restraining order, as prayed for by the petitioners, was issued pursuant to the Court's
resolution dated October 10, 1991.

On the basis of the pleadings before us, we give due course to the petitions and decide them on their respective
merits. The two petitions raise the following assignments of errors:

G.R. No. 99336.

THE RESPONDENT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION DID NOT CAREFULLY REVIEW THE RECORDS OF THE CASE IN
RESOLVING THE PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.

II

THE RESPONDENT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION WAS UTTERLY WRONG IN RULING THAT AT THE TIME OF THE
ISSUANCE OF HIS APPOINTMENT IN QUESTION, PETITIONER TORIO WAS NOT QUALIFIED FOR ALLEGED LACK OF
ELIGIBILITY AND THE REQUIRED EXPERIENCE THEREFOR.

III

THE RESPONDENT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION WAS UTTERLY WRONG IN RULING THAT IN THE PRESENCE OF
QUALIFIED EMPLOYEES IN THE AGENCY, THE PROPOSED PLACEMENT OR APPOINTMENT OF ONE WHO IS NOT
QUALIFIED (NOT ELIGIBLE) IS NOT IN ORDER FOR THE REASON

THAT AT THE TIME THE APPOINTMENT IN QUESTION WAS ISSUED, OTHER CONTENDERS WITH PERMANENT
APPOINTMENTS LIKE PROTESTANT SANTIAGO WERE NEVER CONSIDERED." (Rollo, G.R. No. 99336. p. 93)

G.R. No. 100178

"THAT IF THE AFORECITED RESOLUTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ARE ENFORCED,
PETITIONER, A PERMANENT CAREER CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEE WILL BE DISMISSED OR REMOVED FROM THE
SERVICE WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND WITHOUT JUST AND VALID CAUSE.

II

THAT THE RESOLUTIONS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

III

"THAT ERRORS OF LAW OR IRREGULARITIES HAVE BEEN COMMITTED WHICH ARE PREJUDICIAL TO THE INTEREST
OF THE PETITIONER." (Rollo, G.R. No. 99336, p. 93)
Petitioner Torio alleges that at the time of his appointment, he was already a civil service eligible having passed the
career service professional examination held on July 26, 1987 and the results of which were released on January
13, 1988. He further contends that Camacho's protest has become moot and academic inasmuch as the temporary
appointment against which the protest was directed has already expired. Consequently, the Commissioner has no
authority to withdraw its previous approval which has lapsed. Torio likewise stresses the fact that he has security
of tenure as provided under the Constitution such that his removal must only be for cause and after due process.

Private respondent Camacho, on the other hand, avers that the Commission has the power to review
appointments for the correction of mistakes in the approval or disapproval thereof. Moreover, at the time of
Torio's appointment, there were other qualified eligibles who were not given the chance to be considered for the
contested position through no fault of their own. Thus, the Commission did not exceed its authority when in the
exercise of its power of review, it revoked the appointment of petitioner.

The Solicitor General filed an adverse Comment stating that the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in
revoking the permanent appointment of petitioner Torio who was found to possess all the qualifications required
of the position. It added that an appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of the appointing
authority, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law.

Petitioner Espanola, for his part, contends that he possesses the qualifications for the position of Supervising
Bookbinder (now Bookbinder IV). He is a Supervising Bookbinder Eligible; he has more than ten years of service
very relevant to the duties and functions of Supervising Bookbinder; he is not facing any administrative charge; and
he possesses the minimum educational qualifications to the position for all of which his appointment has been
approved by the CSC. He further contends that inasmuch as his appointment has already been approved by the
CSC, it cannot be withdrawn, recalled or cancelled. He takes the same stand as petitioner Torio with respect to the
protest being moot and academic as well as his security of tenure under the Constitution.

Private respondent Cangayda, on the other hand, claims that the appointment of petitioner Espanola is a flagrant
violation of Republic Act 6656 entitled "An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Government Officers and
Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization." She was a Supervising Bookbinder under a
permanent status prior to the reorganization and she should, thus, thereafter, be appointed to the same item in
the same capacity pursuant to the provisions of the aforementioned Act. She contends that her protest is primarily
directed against her demotion and non-reappointment to the position of Supervising Bookbinder as well as the
consequential appointment of petitioner in her stead and not petitioner's temporary appointment. Thus,
petitioner Espanola's argument that his temporary appointment as Supervising Bookbinder cannot be the subject
of an appeal since the same has already expired is offtangent. More importantly, Espanola is not qualified for
appointment to the contested position since at the time of his appointment, he was not a civil service eligible and
there was a civil service eligible actually available and ready to accept the appointment in the person of private
respondent Cangayda. And since the appointee is not qualified, the CSC, being the central personnel agency of the
government, can look into the legality of an appointment and consequently order its revocation and cancellation.

The Solicitor General, in his comment for the public respondent, added that the subsequent acquisition of
eligibility by the petitioner is of no moment inasmuch as the reckoning point should be the time of appointment
and not any time before or after.

The CSC, in revoking the appointments of herein petitioners based its resolutions primarily on the fact that the
petitioners did not possess the civil service eligibility called for by their respective positions. The CSC ruled further,
that their subsequent acquisition of eligibility will not validate the otherwise invalid appointments inasmuch as the
material date is the date of appointment.

We first rule on the nature of the petitioner's appointments.

The foregoing pronouncements of the CSC hold true only insofar as the temporary appointment of petitioner
Espanola is concerned. However, it must be noted that under Section 25 Presidential Decree 807 otherwise known
as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, an appointee with a temporary status need not possess the civil
service eligibility required by the position provided he meets the following qualifications: (1) it is necessary in the
public interest to fill a vacancy; (2) there are no appropriate eligibles; (3) the temporary appointment shall not
exceed twelve months; and (4) he may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available.

Still, at the time of the temporary appointment of petitioner Espanola, a civil service eligible who was willing to
accept the position was available in the person of private respondent Cangayda. Apparently, there was disregard
of the mandate of the law when Espanola's temporary appointment was issued. Nevertheless, the petitioner has
correctly pointed out that the protest lodged by private respondent Cangayda had become moot and academic
inasmuch as petitioner Espanola's temporary appointment had already lapsed on February 28, 1989. It is
erroneous for the CSC to treat Cangayda's protest as a continuing one. The same holds true for the protest lodged
by Camacho.

A permanent appointment is not a continuation of the temporary appointment—these are two distinct acts of the
appointing authority. The fact that the appointees in the two appointments are one and the same person is purely
incidental. Any irregularities in the former appointment are not to be automatically carried over to the latter. If the
protest is directed against the temporary appointment, it would be illogical to carry-over the merits of the protest
to the subsequent permanent appointment.

The preceding ruling should not be construed to mean, however, that by the mere expedient of appointing the
temporary appointee to a permanent status, the appointing authority can deprive the protestant of an opportunity
to question the appointment. First, the protestant is not precluded from filing another protest directed against the
permanent appointment. Second, if it can be shown that the appointment was purposely done to moot the protest
or is characterized by malice, then corrective action can be taken and, moreover, the erring officials can be
proceeded against administratively.

It must be emphasized that if a protest filed against a temporary appointment is carried over to the subsequent
permanent appointment to the same position of the same person, an anomalous situation will arise wherein the
permanent appointee's security to his position would be jeopardized by considerations outside of his permanent
appointment.

The chances of the occurrence of the previously described situation would be minimized if the CSC promptly acts
upon the protest. After giving the department or agency to which the protest is referred a reasonable deadline to
act, its inaction may be a basis for the CSC to give positive relief. It is worthy of note that the CSC has recognized
the importance of the speedy disposition of cases in its resolution No. 89-779, which provided for the Rules on
Protest Cases requiring the disposition of cases within 60 days from filing thereof.

The situation in the present petitions could have been prevented if the CSC did not wait for two years before
taking the appropriate action on the protests filed.

Prescinding from the foregoing discussions, it is established that the questioned resolutions of the CSC should be
declared inapplicable to the petitioners because they refer to the temporary appointments which had already
lapsed when they were issued.

At any rate, this Court deems it best to make a ruling on the validity of the permanent appointments inasmuch as
the same has already been put in issue in the present petitions. Moreover, if the present petitions be granted
without prejudice to the private respondents' right to file a protest against the permanent appointments of the
petitioners, then that would unduly prolong the resolution of who should rightfully be appointed to the contested
positions to the prejudice of the public service.
THE PERMANENT APPOINTMENTS OF PETITIONERS ESPANOLA AND TORIO

The Qualification Standard (QS) for the position of Bookbinder IV provides the following minimum requirements:

EDUCATION

Completion of Secondary School Course

EXPERIENCE

Two years of experience in bindery work

ELIGIBILITY

Bookbinder

Supervising Bookbinder

As to the QS for the position of Assistant Superintendent of Printing, the following minimum requirements are
prescribed:

EDUCATION:

Bachelor's degree preferably in Commerce or Business Administration

EXPERIENCE:

4 years of progressive responsible experience in the different technical activities of printing operations or other
related work

ELIGIBILITY:

Career service

Sub-professional

The appointing authority should, thus, appoint persons to the contested positions possessing the aforementioned
minimum qualifications so as to be within the ambits of the law. For even if the appointing authority is given a
wide latitude in the exercise of its discretion in personnel actions, the appointee must first possess the minimum
qualifications prescribed by law (Cortez v. The Civil Service Commission, 195 SCRA 216 [1991]).

At the time petitioner Espanola was issued a permanent appointment, he was also granted testimonial eligibility
such that he is to be considered as possessing the requisite civil service eligibility for his position. The same holds
true with petitioner Torio. At the time of his permanent appointment, he was already a career service professional,
having passed the civil service examination held on July 26, 1987 and the results of which were released on
January 13, 1988. In fact, even at the time of Torio's temporary appointment on March 1, 1988, he already
possessed the civil service eligibility called for by the position.

The QS established for the contested positions do not only prescribe the eligibility but also the minimum education
and experience required of the position. Even if the petitioners possess the required civil service eligibility, there
would still be abuse of discretion by the appointing authority if the other qualifications are not satisfied.

Based on the QS listed above, the records show that both petitioners possess qualifications required of the
contested positions.

Private respondent Cangayda, however, questions petitioner Espanola's non-completion of a secondary course as
prescribed by the QS.

It would be appropriate to state at the outset that when necessary, education, experience or training may be used
interchangeably to offset deficiencies (in fact, the CSC issued Memorandum Circular No. 23 series of 1991
expressly allowing the offsetting of deficiencies except the required elibility), The necessity exists if the appointee's
training or experience is of such a level that the same would more than supplement the deficiency in education
considering the demands of the position in question. The converse holds true if the appointee's deficiency is in the
required training or experience. The decision as to when the conditions give rise to a necessity to interchange
education with experience and vice-versa rests upon the sound discretion of the appointing authority. This is not
to be viewed as an unbridled license given to the appointing authority to appoint whomsoever he desires. This is
rather a recognition of the fact that the appointing authority is in the best position to determine the needs of his
department or agency and how to satisfy those needs. Moreover, it is precisely the province of the QS to provide
the gauge by which the appointing authority shall exercise his discretion. The QS has been defined in Section 20,
PD 807 as expressing the minimum requirements for a class of position in terms of education, training and
experience, civil service eligibility, physical fitness and other qualities required for successful performance. It is,
thus, the QS which provides for the considerations upon which the appointing authority decides when the levels of
education or experience may be sufficient to offset each other.

With respect to petitioner Espanola's case, the necessity to offset the deficiency in education with his training is
very apparent from his work-experience. It must be stressed that the contested position belongs to the trades and
crafts group wherein the emphasis is necessarily on the skill required by the work. There can be no doubt that
fitness for the job is developed through years of actual work. Petitioner Espanola's service record (Annex "D")
shows that from 1973 until his permanent appointment in 1989, he had continuously engaged in bindery work. It
must likewise be pointed out that he was extended a testimonial eligibility which is a confirmation by the
appointing authority of his capacity to perform the type of work which his position requires. Worthy of note is the
fact that at the time of the grant of testimonial eligibility, the QS was already being enforced such that the
appointing authority is presumed to have taken into consideration the standards prescribed by the QS. There is,
thus, no escaping the conclusion that Jaime Espanola is qualified to handle the demands of the contested position.

However, this Court does not rule on the validity of the grant of testimonial eligibility. The issue is not before us.
Private respondent Cangayda stated in her brief that an action to question the validity of such grant shall be filed
in due time. The pronouncements of this Court, then, as to the validity of thethe said action.

With respect to petitioner Torio, on the other hand, the records show that he fully qualifies for the position to
which he was appointed. The Solicitor General, in his adverse comment, aptly summarized the petitioner's
qualifications in the following manner:

"EDUCATION

1981 To 1983—"MBA" Candidate for

 Graduation, Ateneo de Manila;

1965 to 1969—"A.B. Political Science",

University of the Philippines;

1960 to 1965—"Valedictorian, High School",

Luna Colleges; and

1955 to 1960—"1st Honorable Mention,

Elementary" Grade Graduate.

ELIGIBILITY

Career Service Professional

(81.48%) July 26, 1987.

(B)

With the Government

(B-1)

Sept. 1986 to Dec. 1986-Acting Chief, Printing Division

& Ex. Asst. for Technical Services, PIA;

(B-2)

Jan. 1987 to Feb. 1988—Chief, Production Staff & Chief

Printing Div., PIA;

(B-3)

Mar. 1, 1988 to Present—Assistant Printing Operations

Supt. (now Asst. Supt. of Printing, NPO).

"Petitioner likewise participated, upon recommendation of his department head as duly authorized by the
Executive Secretary, in the UNIDO Training Programme in the Field of Printing Industry held in Karl Marx
Stadt/Dresden/Leipzig, GDR from September 30 to October 13, 1990 (Annexes "E", "E-1" to "E-5).

"On November 24 to December 5, 1986 petitioner attended and actively participated in the Evaluation Workshop
on Audiovisual Materials for the Book Publishing Course conducted by the UP Institute of Mass Communication in
cooperation with UNESCO (Paris) Annex "L-1). Later, particularly on May 28 to June 6, 1987, petitioner completed a
Seminar Workshop for Quality Printing through Better Supervision of Printing Shop, conducted by the Printing
Industry Board Foundation (Annex "L-2"). Then again on November 12 to 14, 1987 petitioner participated in the
Seminar on Promotion of PIA's Programs conducted by the Philippine Information Agency (Annex "L3"). Still
persistent with the quest for better knowledge, petitioner SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED again attended
the Seminar/Workshop on 'The Business of Book Publishing-Managing for Profit and Economic Choices" conducted
by Peter H. Neumann on November 24 to 27, 1987 sponsored by the United States Information Service and the
Book Development Association of the Philippines (Annex "L-4)." (Rollo, G.R. No. 99336, p. 93-95)

Although petitioner Torio majored in Political Science and not in Commerce or Business Administration, the QS
provided that the latter two are mere preferences. As to private respondent's claim that Torio had only one year,
six months and eight days of experience in printing operations at the time of his appointment (it must be noted,
however, that the private respondent was referring to Torio's government service at the time of his temporary
appointment since at the time of permanent appointment, Torio had over two years of government service), the
QS provided that the experience may be on other related work. The appointing power may have found Torio's
previous work experiences sufficient to tack to the number of years of experience in actual printing operations
coupled with the numerous seminars and trainings he had attended. There is thus, no evident violation of the QS.

From the foregoing, it is established that petitioners Espanola and Torio are qualified for the positions to which
they were appointed. The appointing authority's exercise of discretion in the choice of appointees must be
respected even if there are other persons who are likewise qualified for the position such as private respondents
Cangayda and Camacho. In fact, the CSC does not have the power to overrule such discretion even if its finds that
there are other persons more qualified to the contested position. (italics supplied) [De la Cruz v. The Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 88333, December 2,1991; Cortez v. The Civil Service Commission, supra; Gaspar v. Court of
Appeals, 190 SCRA 774 [1990]).

As has been held in Español v. The Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 85479, March 3, 1992, "every particular job in
an office calls for both formal and informal qualifications. Formal qualifications such as age, number of academic
units in a certain course, seminars attended and so forth, may be valuable but so are such intangibles as
resourcefulness, team spirit, courtesy, initiative. loyalty, ambition, prospects for the future and best interest of the
service. Given the demands of a certain job, who can do it best should be left to the head of the Office concerned
provided the legal requirements for the office are satisfied."
This Court does not overlook the fact that prior to the reorganization of the GSA, the petitioners were holding
contractual or casual employment. This circumstance is of utmost importance considering the provision of Section
4, Republic Act. 6656:

"SECTION 4. Officers and employees holding permanent appointments shall be given preference for appointment
to the new positions in the approved staffing pattern comparable to their former positions or in case there are not
enough comparable positions, to positions next lower in rank. x x x"

In Medenilla v. The Civil Service Commission, 194 SCRA 278 [1991], this Court stated the rationale for the
preference given to permanent employees in the following manner:

"x x x The preference given to permanent employees assumes that employees working in a Department for longer
periods have gained not only superior skills but also greater dedication to the public service. x x x"

The Court, then, continued by making the following observations:

x x x that the presumption is not always true and the law does not preclude the infusion of new blood, younger
dynamism or necessary talents into the government service. "If, after considering all the current employees, the
Department Secretary cannot find among them the person he needs to revive a moribund office or to upgrade
second rate performance, there is nothing in the Civil Service Law to prevent him from reaching out to other
Departments or to the private sector provided all his acts are bona fide and for the best interest of the public
service and the person chosen has the needed qualifications."

It is, thus, clear from the foregoing that employees or officers holding permanent appointments do not
automatically get appointed to the new positions. The appointing authority is still given latitude in making his
choice considering the duty resting on his discretion to see to it that the best interest of the public is served with
each appointment he makes. More so in cases of reorganization of offices, where in making the new
appointments, the appointing authority has also to take into consideration the purposes and objectives of the
reorganization. In the present case, the reorganization was undertaken to promote economy, efficiency and
effectiveness in the delivery of public services. The appointing authority should be given sufficient discretion to be
able to ensure that the purposes and objectives are met. It is in this light that the appointments of petitioners
Espanola and Torio should be viewed.

Petitioners Espanola and Torio were validly appointed to the questioned positions. Only the corollary issue of
whether or not private respondent Cangayda's security of tenure was violated by the appointment of petitioner
Espanola remains to be settled.

In Mendoza v. Quisumbing, 186 SCRA 108 [1990], the ruling in favor of the dismissed personnel was made in the
light of the finding that the reorganization undertaken was not in good faith. The Court even reiterated the
principles in De la Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294 [1982] and Cruz v. Primicias, 23 SCRA 998 [1968] that the abolition
of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity and a valid
abolition of office is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents.

The same principles were enunciated earlier in Dario v. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 [1989] where the Court made the
following declarations:

"x x x Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As a
general rule, a reorganization is carried out in 'good faith' if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs
because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall x x x"
(Italics supplied)
It is worthy to re-state that the present petitions arose due to the abolition of the GSA and its merger with the
relevant printing units of the PIA giving rise to the NPO. There is no showing that the reorganization was
undertaken for any reason other than its purpose of promoting economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the
delivery of public service. In fact, the private respondents did not put in issue the validity of the reorganization of
the offices. They questioned only their non-appointment to the contested positions. We are constrained to assume
that there was in the present case, a bona fide reorganization. Hence, private respondent Cangayda cannot
successfully impugn her alleged removal as illegal for under the facts of the case, she was not dismissed; rather,
her former position was abolished. More important, this Court has ruled in Siete v. Santos, 190 SCRA 50 [1990]
that Section 16, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly authorizes the dismissal of career civil service
employees not for cause but as a result of the reorganization following the ratification of said Constitution.

As to the alleged violation of Republic Act 6656, it must be emphasized that the question has to be resolved in the
light of the prevailing bona fide rule in reorganization of the public offices. The foregoing principle has been
applied in Floreza v. Ongpin, 182 SCRA 692 [1990] where the Court ruled that:

"x x x Section 2 of Republic Act 6656 entitles a victim of a removal in violation of the bona fide rule to a
reinstatement or reappointment to the position from which he was removed" (italics supplied).

There is nothing in this decision which precludes the more appropriate recourse of private respondent Cangayda
to appeal to the better judgment of the Department Head to consider her for other vacant positions more
commensurate to her qualifications.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby GRANTS the petitions in G.R. No. 99336 and G.R. No. 100178.
The assailed resolutions of the Civil Service Commission in CSC Case No. 796 and CSC Case No. 832 are set aside.
The permanent appointments of petitioners Melanio S. Torio and Jaime Espanola are declared valid. The
temporary restraining order issued pursuant to the Court's resolution dated October 10, 1991 is made permanent.

SO ORDERED