also be one who is in possession of an office, and
LAUD V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R.
No. 199032, November 19, 2014
One liner: In order for the de facto doctrine to
apply, all of the following elements must concur:
(a) there must be a de jure office; (b) there must
be color of right or general acquiescence by the
public; and (c) there must be actual physical
possession of the office in good faith.
Facts:
The Philippine National Police (PNP), through a
certain Police Senior Superintendent, applied
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila for a
warrant to search three (3) caves located inside
the Laud Compound in Davao City where the
alleged remains of the victims summarily
executed by the so-called "Davao Death Squad"
may be found. In support of the application, a
certain individual was presented to the RTC and
there testified that he personally witnessed the
killing of six persons and was, in fact, part of the
group that buried the victims. Judge Peralta,
acting as Vice Executive Judge of the Manila-RTC,
found probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant, and thus, issued Search Warrant which
was later enforced by the elements of the
PNP-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group.
The search in the compound yielded positive
results for the presence of human remains. The
petitioner in this case then filed an Urgent Motion
to Quash and to Suppress Illegally Seized
Evidence9 premised on the ground that among
others, Judge Peralta had no authority to act on
the application for a search warrant since he had
been automatically divested of his position as
Vice Executive Judge when several administrative
penalties were imposed against him by the
Court. Manila – RTC granted the motion. The CA
granted the People’s petition and thereby
annulled and set aside the Orders of the
Manila-RTC for having been tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Peralta had no
authority to act on the application for a search
warrant since he had been automatically divested
of his position as Vice Executive Judge when
several administrative penalties were imposed
against him by the Court.
Ruling:
Judge Peralta’s issuance of search warrant is valid.
The court explained that while it agrees that the
imposition of said administrative penalties did
operate to divest Judge Peralta’s authority to act
as Vice Executive Judge, it must be qualified that
the abstraction of such authority would not, by
and of itself, result in the invalidity of Search
Warrant considering that Judge Peralta may be
considered to have made the issuance as a de
facto officer whose acts would, nonetheless,
remain valid.
A de facto officer is one who derives his
appointment from one having colorable authority
to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and
whose appointment is valid on its face. He may
is discharging [his] duties under color of authority,
by which is meant authority derived from an
appointment, however irregular or informal, so
that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer.
Consequently, the acts of the de fact officer are
just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure
officer, in so far as the public or third persons who
are interested therein are concerned.
in order for the de facto doctrine to apply, all of
the following elements must concur: (a) there
must be a de jure office; (b) there must be color
of right or general acquiescence by the public;
and (c) there must be actual physical possession
of the office in good faith.
The existence of the foregoing elements is rather
clear in this case. Undoubtedly, there is a de jure
office of a 2nd Vice-Executive Judge. Judge
Peralta also had a colorable right to the said office
as he was duly appointed to such position and
was only divested of the same by virtue of a
supervening legal technicality also, it may be said
that there was general acquiescence by the public
since the search warrant application was
regularly endorsed to the sala of Judge Peralta by
the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Manila-RTC
under his apparent authority as 2nd Vice
Executive Judge. Finally, Judge Peralta’s actual
physical possession of the said office is presumed
to being good faith, as the contrary was not
established. Accordingly, Judge Peralta can be
considered to have acted as a de facto officer
when he issued Search Warrant, hence, treated
as valid as if it was issued by a de jure officer
suffering no administrative impediment.
Distinction between De Jure & De Facto
Officers
Codilla v. Martinez November 23, 1960
One-liner: A de facto officer is one who has the
reputation or appearance of being the officer he
assumes to be, but who, in fact, under the law,
has no right or title to the office he assumes to
hold but has some color of right or title. On the
other hand, an officer de jure is an intruder to an
office who assumes its functions with legal title or
color of right.
FACTS
 The Mayor of Tagum, Davao left for Negros
Occidental to attend to a sick brother and
appointed the vice mayor to act on his place.
 However, the vice mayor got sick and
designated the highest ranking councilor to
take his place until further notice.
 Unfortunately, the highest ranking councilor
was also not in good health and hence, he
designated the THIRD ranking councilor,
Martinez to act as mayor.
 Martinez’ first official act was to separate
from service the policemen of the
municipality.
 Hence, these policemen filed a petition for
Mandamus on the following grounds:
 As civil service employees, they cannot be
terminated except for cause
 Their separation was illegal because the
designation of Martinez as acting mayor was
NOT in accordance with the provisions of the
Revised Administrative Code. Such should
only be made by the provincial governor
with the consent of the provincial board.
Issue (related to the topic)
W/N the appointment of the third ranking
councilor as acting mayor was valid
RULING
Yes because he is considered as an officer De
Facto and if his acts are made within the scope of
the authority vested by law, his acts are valid and
binding.
An officer de facto is to be distinguished from an
officer de Jure, and is someone who has the
reputation or appearance of being the officer he
assumed to be but who, in fact, unde the law, has
no right or title to the office he assumes to hold.
He is distinguished from a mere usurper or
intruder by the fact that the former holds by some
color of right or title while the latter intrudes upon
the office and assumes to exercise its functions
without either legal title or color of right to such
office.
To constitute a de facto officer, (1) there must be
an office having defacto existence, or at least one
recognized by law, and (2) the claimant must be
in actual possession of authority under color of
title or authority.
Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120295, 28
June 1996
One Liner: One must be a citizen upon assuming
office to be able to legitimately perform the
functions of your office.
FACTS: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was
proclaimed governor-elect and assume office in
due time. The League of Municipalities filed with
the COMELEC a petition for annulment of
Frivaldo’s election and proclamation on the
ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having
been naturalized in the United States. Frivaldo
admitted the allegation but pleaded the special
and affirmative defenses that his naturalization
was merely forced upon himself as a means of
survival against the unrelenting prosecution by
the Martial Law Dictator’s agent abroad.
ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of
the Philippines at the time of his election.
RULING: No. Section 117 of the Omnibus
Election Code provides that a qualified voter must
be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the
Philippines, this being an indispensable
requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section
1, of the Constitution.
He claims that he has reacquired Philippine
citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He
claims that by actively participating in the local
elections, he automatically forfeited American
citizenship under the laws of the United States of
America. The Court stated that that the alleged
forfeiture was between him and the US. If he
really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he
could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as
amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
MONSANTO V FACTORAN
One liner: Pardon does not erase the fact of the
commission of the crime and its conviction and it
involves forgiveness, not forgetfulness
Facts:
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner
Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer
of Calbayog City) of the crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents. She was
sentenced to jail and to indemnify the
government in the sum of P4,892.50.The SC
affirmed the decision. She then filed a motion for
reconsideration but while said motion was
pending, she was extended by then President
Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted (at
that time, the rule was that clemency could be
given even before conviction). By reason of said
pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City
treasurer requesting that she be restored to her
former post as assistant city treasurer since the
same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to
the Minister of Finance who ruled that she may be
reinstated to her position without the necessity of
a new appointment not earlier than the date she
was extended the absolute pardon.
Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the
full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the
crime which implies that her service in the
government has never been interrupted and
therefore the date of her reinstatement should
correspond to the date of her preventive
suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the
entire period of her suspension; and that she
should not be required to pay the proportionate
share of the amount of P4,892.50
The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the
President. Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran
denied Monsanto’s request averring that
Monsanto must first seek appointment and that
the pardon does not reinstate her former
position.
Issues:
1. Is Monsanto entitled to backpay?
2. Is a public officer, who has been granted an
absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled
to reinstatement to her former position without
need of a new appointment?
3. May petitioner be exempt from the payment of
the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the
sentence?
Held:
1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace,
proceeding from the power entrusted with the
execution of the laws, which exempts the
individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the
punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has
committed. It is the private, though official act of
the executive magistrate, delivered to the
individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not
communicated officially to the Court.
While a pardon has generally been regarded as
blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the
eye of the law the offender is as innocent as
though he never committed the offense, it does
not operate for all purposes. The very essence of
a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt.
Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of
the commission of the crime and the conviction
thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It
involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not
retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It
affords no relief for what has been suffered by the
offender. It does not impose upon the
government any obligation to make reparation
for what has been suffered. “Since the offense
has been established by judicial proceedings, that
which has been done or suffered while they were
in force is presumed to have been rightfully done
and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can
be required.” This would explain why petitioner,
though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive
backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
2. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted
in removing her disqualification from holding
public employment but it cannot go beyond that.
To regain her former post as assistant city
treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the
usual procedure required for a new appointment.
3. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by
the Revised Penal Code. It subsists
notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any
reason the sentence is not served by pardon,
amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's
civil liability may only be extinguished by the
same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely:
payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the
debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor,
compensation and novation.
Garcia vs Chair of Commission on Audit
One Liner: A pardon based on the innocence of a
dismissed public officer because of a criminal and
administrative charge against him, signifies that
he does not need to apply to be reinstated to his
former employment as he is restored to his office
ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.
Facts:
Garcia was a Supervising Lineman of the Bureau
of Telecommunications. He was summarily
dismissed from service on the ground of
dishonesty for the loss of several telegraph poles.
A criminal case was for qualified theft was filed
against him, but was acquitted. He sought for
reinstatement to his former position, but it was
denied by the Bureau of Telecommunications.
He pleaded to the President for executive
clemency and it was granted. He then filed with
the Commission on Audit for a claim for payment
of back salaries but it was denied as the executive
clemency granted to him did not provide for the
payment of back salaries and that he has not
been reinstated in service. He again filed for the
back salaries but it was denied again as the
executive clemency was silent on the payment of
back wages and that he had not rendered service
during the period of his claim.
He appealed in the Office of the President but was
denied as the Court is the proper forum to take
cognizance of the appeal from the decision of the
Commission on Audit.
Petitioner’s Contention/s:
The award of the back salaries is implicit in the
grant of executive clemency as the ultimate
objective of which is to accord full justice to
petitioner.
Respondent’s Contention/s:
Garcia’s acquittal in the criminal case did
not free him from administrative liability; his
unexplained failure to appeal the decision in the
administrative case was a waiver to his right to
backwages; the executive clemency was granted
for the purpose of reinstatement only since it was
silent on the matter of backwages; the
backwages is allowed only if the respondent is
exonerated from the administrative charge; and
he did not render any service during the period
before his reinstatement.
Issue:
Whether or not Garcia is entitled for the award of
the payment of back salaries.
Rule:
YES. The Constitution vests the president the
power and the exclusive prerogative to extend
executive clemency. The clemency granted to
Garcia partakes of the nature of an executive
pardon. The very essence of pardon is
forgiveness or remission of guilt and not
forgetfulness. Pardon frees the individual from all
the penalties and legal disabilities and restores to
him all civil rights.
A pardoned offender regains his eligibility for
appointment to public office which was forfeited
by reason of the conviction of the offense. But it
does not result in automatic backwages because
the offender has to apply for reappointment.
However, if the pardon is based on the innocence
of the individual or it was given because he did
not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves
the party from all punitive consequences of the
criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean
name, good reputation, and unstained character.
Application:
Garcia was found administratively liable for
dishonesty and was dismissed. However, he was
acquitted of the criminal charge of qualified theft
based on the very same acts for which he was
dismissed. His acquittal was not on lack of proof
beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that he
did not commit the offense. His innocence is the
primary reason behind the grant of executive
clemency.
The executive clemency obliterated the adverse
effects of the administrative decisions. This can
be inferred from the executive clemency itself
exculpating Garcia from the administrative
charge and directing his reinstatement. This
signifies that he need no longer to apply to be
reinstated to his former employment as he is
restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance
of clemency.
Garcia’s automatic reinstatement entitles
him to backwages. It affords relief to him who is
innocent from the start and to make reparation of
what he has suffered of his unjust dismissal.
Backwages are afforded to those who have been
illegally dismissed and were thus ordered
reinstated or to those who were acquitted of the
charges against them.
Garcia’s dismissal was not a result of a criminal
conviction that carried forfeiture of the right to
hold public office, but as a direct consequence of
an administrative decision of the Executive
Department. The president has control over the
latter. In ordering Garcia’s pardon and
reinstatement his dismissal and administrative
liability is nullified and after being acquitted
because of his innocence of the criminal charge
he should not be considered to left his office for all
legal purposes.
Side discussion of Backwages:
Jurisprudence fixes the recovery of backwages to
a period of five years. However, the case deviated
this rule. Garcia’s reinstatement was because of
the executive clemency as he did not commit the
offense charged. Equity and justice dictates that
Garcia be afforded compassion for the
embarrassment, humiliation, and injustice
caused by the unfounded dismissal. It was fair to
grant him a full backwages from the time he was
illegally dismissed in April 1, 1975 to the time of
his reinstatement on March 12, 1984.
EFFECT OF AMNESTY
MAGDALO v. COMELEC (2012)
One liner: The COMELEC has the power to deny
registration of a political party which seeks to
achieve its goals by means of violent and unlawful
means, and such decision of denial is not affected
by a subsequent proclamation of amnesty, but
amnesty can now allow the members to
individually register as a party list, provided that
they renounce violence.
FACTS: Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago
(MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with
the COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or
accreditation as a regional political party based in
the National Capital Region (NCR) for
participation in the 10 May 2010 National and
Local Elections.
COMELEC issued its Resolution denying the
Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO where
it held that Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago should be
refused registration in accordance with Art. IX-C,
Section 2(5) of the Constitution. It is common
knowledge that the partys organizer and
Chairman, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and
some members participated in the take-over of
the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Ayala Center,
Makati City on July 27, 2003, wherein several
innocent civilian personnel were held hostage.
This and the fact that they were in full battle gear
at the time of the mutiny clearly show their
purpose in employing violence and using unlawful
means to achieve their goals in the process
defying the laws of organized societies.
MAGDALO filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc for
resolution. MAGDALO filed a Manifestation and
Motion for Early Resolution dated 23 December
2009, in which it clarified its intention to
participate in the 10 May 2010 National and Local
Elections as a party-list group. COMELEC En Banc
denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
MAGDALO.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused
its discretion when it denied the Petition for
Registration filed by MAGDALO on the ground
that the latter seeks to achieve its goals through
violent or unlawful means?

HELD: COMELECS Resolutions are sustained.
To join electoral contests, a party or organization
must undergo the two-step process of
registration and accreditation, as this Court
explained in Liberal Party v. COMELEC:
x x x Registration is the act that bestows juridical
personality for purposes of our election laws;
accreditation, on the other hand, relates to the
privileged participation that our election laws
grant to qualified registered parties.
x x x Accreditation can only be granted to a
registered political party, organization or coalition;
stated otherwise, a registration must first take
place before a request for accreditation can be
made. Once registration has been carried out,
accreditation is the next natural step to follow.
Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987
Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions
that "seek to achieve their goals through violence
or unlawful means" shall be denied registration.
This disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of
B.P. 881, which provides that "no political party
which seeks to achieve its goal through violence
shall be entitled to accreditation."
Violence is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of
force, usually with the accompaniment of
vehemence, outrage or fury. It also denotes
physical force unlawfully exercised; abuse of
force; that force which is employed against
common right, against the laws, and against
public liberty. On the other hand, an unlawful act
is one that is contrary to law and need not be a
crime, considering that the latter must still unite
with evil intent for it to exist.
Effect of Amnesty given to Magdalo Members
The Court recognizes that members of the
Magdalo were given amnesty by President Aquino
and such proclamation was subsequently
concurred by Congress. In light of these events,
to still sustain the finding, based on the
participation of its members in the Oakwood
incident, that MAGDALO employs violence or
other harmful means would be inconsistent with
the legal effects of amnesty. Likewise, it would
not be in accord with the express intention of both
the Executive and the Legislative branches, in
granting the said amnesty, to promote an
atmosphere conducive to attaining peace in line
with the governments peace and reconciliation
initiatives.
Nevertheless, this Court is not unmindful of the
apprehensions of the COMELEC as regards the
use of violence. Thus, should MAGDALO decide to
file another Petition for Registration, its officers
must individually execute affidavits renouncing
the use of violence or other harmful means to
achieve the objectives of their organization.
Further, it must also be underscored that the
membership of MAGDALO cannot include
military officers and/or enlisted personnel
in active service, as this act would run counter
to the express provisions of the Constitution.
Central Bank v. Civil Service
Commission, G.R. 80455-56, April 10,
1989
ONE LINER: The appointing authority has the
management prerogative in the selection and
appointment of its employees, where the Civil
Service Commission can revoke such
appointment in light of the qualifications set by
law.
Facts:
· On October 3, 1984, the Promotions Board of
Central Bank with a representative from CSC
decided on filling up the vacant position of
Assistant Bank Physician of the Central
Bank (Salary Grade 22).
· Dr. Jordan (Coordinating Assistant – SG 20) was
the only next-in-rank employee, so the Board
certified her for promotion and submitted the
proposal to the Office of the Governor.
· However, in July, respondent Borja filed an
application for Medical Director and was
acted upon by the Promotions Board. The
proposal was approved, and Borja was issued
an appointment as physician (SG 16).
· Later on, Dr. Jordan was promoted as it was
approved by the Senior Deputy Governor and was
issued an appointment.
· Borja contested this, stating that he was more
qualified and was a next-in-rank employee.
· (BANK DECISION) Dismissed the protest
because it was filed beyond the reglementary
period, Borja is not the next-in-rank
employee, and has no legal personality.
· (MSB DECISION) An appeal was made to the
Merit Systems Board. The appeal was sustained,
stating that Borja should have been appointed.
The decision was reversed upon appeal by the
Bank.

· (CSC DECISION) The Civil Service Commission
set aside the decision of MSB, directing
appointment of Borja to the position.
· Central Bank filed a petition of
reconsideration that the department head
has discretion in choosing appointments,
where the question of competence is irrelevant
because Borja was not yet an employee at the
time Dr. Jordan was considered for promotion.
· Petition is denied for being filed after the
decision became final and executory.
Basically, it’s a contest over who is to be
appointed. Dr. Jordan says it should be her
because she was appointed. Borja says it
should be him because he’s more qualified
(in terms of positions sa rank-and-file
employees).
Issues: May the Civil Service Commission
disapprove an appointment and require the
appointment of another person whom it
believes is more qualified for the position?
Ruling:
THE APPOINTING AUTHORITY IS GIVEN
AMPLE DISCRETION IN SELECTION AND
APPOINTMENT OF QUALIFIED PERSONS TO
VACANT POSITIONS
· This is a management prerogative that is
unhampered by judicial intervention. The
right to select and appoint employees is the
prerogative of the employer which may be
exercised without being held liable AS LONG
AS it is in good faith in advancing the
employer’s interest.
· The Central Bank of the Philippines is vested
with this power under law.
· The Commissioner of Civil Service (CSC) has the
final authority, but all that has changed under the
new law PD 807 (Civil Service Decree) where the
Commission is NOT AUTHORIZED to curtail
the discretion of the appointing official. It is
limited to approving or reviewing
appointment in the light of the
requirements.
· In this case, Dr. Jordan’s qualifications were
never disputed. Even if Borja was more
qualified, the Commission has no authority to
revoke an appointment based on the ground that
the other is more qualified. It is an encroachment
of the discretionary power of whomsoever is
vested.
ALTHOUGH THE APPOINTMENT IS SUBJECT
TO CSC’S APPROVAL, IT IS LIMITED ONLY
WITH REGARD TO WHETHER OR NOT THE
AUTHORITY COMPLIED WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS OF LAW
· The power of the commission to revoke the
appointment is limited only to appointments that
were done without fulfilling requirements set by
law.
· It is true that Borja has an edge over Dr. Jordan
in educational attainment since he has a degree
in medicine from outside the country and has
experience both in the Philippines and outside.
· In selection of employees for promotion, the
only factors to be considered are educational
attainment and training experience. The other
factors are performance rating, experience,
accomplishments, physical characteristics,
personality traits, and potential.
· Dr. Jordan outranks others in terms of the above
requirements. She graduated at UP with a PhD in
Medicine. She basically passes all the
requirements.
· There is no rigid or mechanical standard on
appointing power. The appointing person
enjoys sufficient discretion to select and
appoint.
BORJA IS NOT NEXT-IN-RANK FOR
APPOINTMENT, BEING IN A SALARY GRADE
16 POSITION COMPARED TO DR. JORDAN
WHO IS IN A SALARY GRADE 20 POSITION
· Commission disregarded the performance
ratings of Dr. Jordan submitted to the Central
Bank, stating that it was not signed by Dr.
Jordan’s superior – Dr. Ricarte. This is impossible
since Ricarte retired in 1984. Mr. Palanca Jr.
signed it.
· Borja is a mere Physician (SG 16) whereas Dr.
Jordan is a Coordinating Assistant (SG 20). The
Commission should have dismissed the appeal for
lacking legal personality.
LACSON v. ROMERO (1949)
One-liner: In making a valid and permanent
appointment, there must first, a nomination
made by the President, second, the
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments (COA) of that nomination, lastly,
the acceptance of the appointee to the
nomination and confirmation by assuming office.
FACTS: Petitioner Lacson was appointed by the
President as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental
which was confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments (COA). Later on, he was again
nominated by the President as a provincial fiscal
of Tarlac. Which in turn, nominated respondent
Romero as a provincial fiscal in Negros Oriental.
These two appointments made by the President
to Lacson and Romero were both affirmed by the
COA.
However, such appointment was not accepted by
the petitioner nor assumed the said office in
Tarlac, whereas, the respondent assumed office
in Negros Oriental. As he arrived in Dumaguete
City, he notified the petitioner of his intention on
taking over the office which was objected by the
latter. This lead to a case where the respondent
appeared, yet, the petitioner objected and even
asked the judge to strike out the respondent from
the record. This was denied by the said judge,
thus, recognizing the respondent as fiscal of
Negros Oriental.
Furthermore, when the petitioner asked for his
salary as provincial fiscal, the provincial treasurer
disapproved his request. The salary was then
given to the respondent pursuant to the reply of
the Sec. of Justice upon the treasurer’s query
concerning “who is the fiscal in Negros Oriental.”
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not, there was a valid appointment
made to Lacson without his consent or
acceptance?
2) Whether or not, the nomination and
confirmation of Lacson to Tarlac was equivalent
to a vaid removal from office?
3) Whether or not, the President, who is the
appointing authority, could validly remove him
from office?
RULING:
First Issue
No. There was an invalid appointment due to
Lacson’s non-acceptance. For an appointment to
be valid, the following are to be considered:
STAGES OF APPOINTMENT
1. There must first be, a NOMINATION BY THE
PRESIDENT.
2. Secondly, the nomination is to be
CONFIRMED BY THE COA of the Legislature in
order to make that appointment valid and
permanent.
(These two stages only constitute an offer for a
post. These are considered acts of the executive
and legislative departments.)
3. Lastly, there must be an ACCEPTANCE made
by the appointee by his ASSUMPTION TO
OFFICE.
Take note:
• The last stage is the necessary stage towards
making the appointment complete and effective.
• The appointee has the sole right to either accept
or reject the appointment because “there was no
power in this country which can compel a man to
accept an office,” Borromeo vs. Mariano.
Second Issue
No. It was an invalid removal. The Court ruled
that a provincial fiscal could only be removed
from office by a CAUSE PROVIDED BY LAW; thus,
the appointee enjoys security of tenure.
As to the nature of office of the provincial fiscal,
there are two types of persons in the Civil Service,
namely; Classified or Unclassified. Under Section
671 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code, a
provincial fiscal who is nominated and appointed
by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments belongs to the
UNCLASSIFIED service of the Civil Service.
Third Issue
No. The President could not validly remove him
from office. The Committee on Civil Service of the
Constitutional Convention advocated the MERIT
SYSTEM. It asserted that the adoption of said
system has secured efficiency and social justice.
It eliminates the political factors in the selection
of civil employees which is the first essential
towards an efficient personnel system. It ensures
equality of opportunity to all deserving applicants
desirous of a career in the public service.
In making the Merit System effective, the
Committee’s report requires that removals shall
be made only for causes and in the manner
provided by law. Hence, a provincial fiscal as a
civil service official may not be removed from
office even by the President who appointed him,
and even with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. By the mandate of Sections 64
and 694 of the Revised Administrative Code,
before a civil service official or employee could be
removed, there must first be an investigation at
which he must be given a fair hearing and an
opportunity to defend himself. This affords to
public employees to a reasonable Security of
Tenure.
In the case at hand, the respondent argued that
the power of removal is inherent in the power to
appoint, hence the President could remove the
petitioner and transfer him. More so, he argued
that the appointment of a provincial fiscal is not
for a fixed term and no tenure of office. To which,
granting that a provincial fiscal could only be
removed on valid cause, the law however does
not provide for any grounds constituting valid
cause.
The Court ruled that the President’s power is
QUALIFIED AND LIMITED, thus, the removal
SHOULD BE FOR A VALID CAUSE.
Also, a provincial fiscal also enjoys tenure of
office because aside from the removal only for a
valid cause, Section 1673 of the Administrative
Code likewise provided that after Dec. 31, 1932, a
provincial fiscal over 65 years of age shall vacate
his office. Thus, he shall continue to serve until
the age of 65 unless, there is a valid cause to
warrant a removal from office.
Among the valid grounds include, falsification of
daily time record, gambling, drunkenness,
dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct and
neglect in performance of duty.

SEVILLA v. SANTOS (1992)
One liner: An "acting" appointment is merely
temporary, one which is good only until another
appointment is made to take its place. Thus, the
appointee’s right to the office he/she occupies
ends when the appointing authority appoints
another person to take his/her place in an official
capacity.
FACTS:
The petitioner has been in the government
service since 1949. His last appointment was last
Assistant City Engineer of Palayan City which he
discharged until he was designated Acting City
Engineer of Cabanatuan City by President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on May 2, 1981. He
unhesitatingly assumed the latter position and
discharged its functions and responsibilities until
"People Power" and the EDSA Revolution
intervened. On August 18, 1986, the then
Officer-in charge (OIC Mayor) of Cabanatuan City,
Cesar Vergara, appointed defendant-appellant
Santos as city engineer of Cabanatuan City, and
on August 28, 1986, defendant-appellant Santos
assumed the position of city engineer. On that
very same day, a memorandum informing
petitioner-appellee Sevilla of the appointment of
defendant-appellant Santos was sent by then OIC
Mayor. As petitioner-appellee Sevilla was on
leave at the time, the memorandum was received
on his behalf by Anita de Guzman, the
administrative officer of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) Office of
Cabanatuan City, where petitioner-appellee
Sevilla also holds office. Petitioner-appellee then
returned to Cabanatuan City. On March 27, 1987,
he filed a petition for quo warranto against
defendant-appellant Santos. On January 29,
1988, the lower rendered the impugned decision
reinstating petitioner-appellee Sevilla and
entitling him payment of vacation and sick leaves
for the duration of his absence.
On August 18, 1986, the OIC Mayor of
Cabanatuan City, Cesar Vergara, appointed
Nerito L. Santos as the new city engineer of
Cabanatuan City. Santos assumed the position on
August 28 1986. On the same day, a
memorandum was addressed to Sevilla informing
him of Santos' appointment as city engineer of
Cabanatuan City. Anita de Guzman,
administrative officer of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) unit in Cabanatuan
City received the notice for Sevilla who was on
leave on that time. Sevilla filed a petition for quo
warranto against Santos, the lower court
rendered a decision reinstating Sevilla as acting
City Engineer of Cabanatuan City with right to
payment of vacation and sick leaves for the
duration of his absence.
Santos appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals. In a decision dated May 31, 1989, the
Court of Appeals set aside the lower court's
decision and entered a new one, dismissing the
petition for quo warranto. The Court of Appeals
held that by accepting another office. Sevilla in
effect voluntarily surrendered his former office,
and was thereby precluded from maintaining a
quo warranto action against Santos. When he
accepted the position in Pasay City, he lost his
right to the position in Cabanatuan City
ISSUE:
Whether an officer who was appointed to an office
in an "acting" capacity, bring a quo warranto
action against the permanent appointee to the
position?
HELD:
An "acting" appointment is merely temporary,
one which is good only until another appointment
is made to take its place. Hence, petitioner's right
to hold office as "Acting City Engineer of
Cabanatuan City" was merely temporary. It
lapsed upon the appointment of Nerito Santos as
the permanent city engineer of Cabanatuan City
on August 18, 1986.
Petitioner was the incumbent city engineer of
Palayan City when he was designated as Acting
City Engineering of Cabanatuan City. There is a
difference between an appointment an
appointment and a designation. Appointment is
the selection by the proper authority of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of an
office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes
merely the imposition of additional duties, upon a
person already in the public service by virtue of
an earlier appointment or election. the Court of
Appeals committed no reversible error in
dismissing petitioner's action for quo warranto.
Petitioner's ouster upon, and by virtue of, Santos'
appointment as City Engineer of Cabanatuan City,
was not illegal for the petitioner's right to
discharge the functions of Acting City Engineer of
Cabanatuan City was extinguished when a
permanent appointment to the same office was
made in favor of the private respondent, Engineer
Nerito L. Santos.
Santiago v. COA
One-liner: There is a legal distinction between
appointment and designation, but when these
words are used in its general sense, the
distinction disappears as in Sec.9 EO 966
Facts:
Santiago was a State Auditor IV in COA with a
monthly salary of 7.2k. He was later on
designated (thru a Resolution by the board of
directors of MIAA) as Acting Assistant General
Manager for Finance and Administration (AAGM)
of MIAA and in this capacity, he collected an
additional salary of 5.8k for a total compensation
of 13k. He served as AAGM for over 3 months.
He was basically occupying 2 positions: State
Auditor IV and Acting Assistant GM for Finance
and Admin. When he retired after 44 years in
government service, GSIS computed his
retirement benefits using the 13k as basis but
COA disagreed, arguing that the base should only
be 7.2k, his salary as State Auditor IV.
Santiago invokes Sec.9 of EO 966 as follows,
Sec. 9. Highest Basic Salary Rate.
— The compensation of salary or
pay which may be used in
computing the retirement benefits
shall be limited to the highest
salary rate actually received by
an official/employee as fixed by
law and/or indicated in his duly
approved appointment. This
shall include salary adjustments
duly authorized and implemented
by the presidential issuance(s) and
budget circular(s), additional basic
compensation or salary indicated
in an appointment duly approved
as an exception to the prohibition
on additional or double
compensation, merit increases,
and compensation for
substitutionary services or in an
acting capacity. For this purpose,
all other compensation and/or
fringe benefits such as per diems,
allowances, bonuses, overtime
pay, honoraria hazard pay, flying
time fees, consultancy or
contractual fees, or fees in
correcting and/or releasing
examination papers shall not be
considered in the computation of
the retirement benefits of an
official/employee.
The Sol Gen argues that Sec. 9 does not apply
to Santiago because he was only designated,
not appointed, to MIAA.
Ruling:
Strictly speaking, there is a legal distinction
between appointment and designation. a)
However, in EO 966, the term "appointment" was
used in a general sense to include the term
"designation." In other words, no distinction
was intended between the two terms in b)
Section 9 of Executive Order No. 966.
As thus interpreted, Section 9 clearly covers
the petitioner, who was designated Acting
Assistant General Manager for Finance and
Administration in the office order issued by
Secretary Reyes on August 10, 1988. The
position was then vacant and could be filled either
by permanent appointment or by temporary
designation. It cannot be said that the second
position was only an extension of the petitioner's
office as State Auditor IV in the Commission on
Audit as otherwise there would have been no
need for his designation thereto. The second
office was distinct and separate from his position
in the Commission on Audit. For the additional
services he rendered for the MIAA, he was
entitled to additional compensation which,
following the letter and spirit of Section 9, should
be included in his highest basic salary rate.
SANTIAGO, JR. vs. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION G.R. No. 81467.
October 27, 1989.
ONE LINER:
One who is next-in-rank is entitled to
preferential consideration for promotion but
it does not necessarily follow that he and no one
else can be appointed.
FACTS:
1. In this case, petitioner Santiago Jr. received a
promotion from the Customs Commissioner from
the rank of Customs Collector I to Customs
Collector III.
2. Private respondent Jose, a Customs Collector
II, filed a protest with the Merit Systems
Promotion Board (MSPB) against the petitioner’s
promotional appointment stating that he was the
next-in-rank to the position of Collector of
Customs III.
3. This was referred by the Board to the Customs
Commissioner wherein he upheld the validity of
the promotion of petitioner Santiago Jr. on the
grounds that:
a) The next-in-rank rule is no longer
mandatory.
b) The protestee is competent and qualified
for the position.
c) Existing law and jurisprudence gives
wide latitude of discretion to the
appointing authority.
4. Private respondent Jose appealed to the Board
wherein it ruled in favor of the private
respondent and revoked petitioner’s
appointment and directed the private
respondent to be appointed.
5. Respondent Commission affirmed the Board
Resolution stating that:
SANTIAGO and JOSE are qualified for the
position of Customs Collector III, however,
respondent JOSE far better qualifications
(educational attainment, civil service eligibilities,
relevant seminars and training courses taken,
and holding a position higher-in-rank)
Commission is empowered to administer and
enforce the merit system as mandated by the
1973 and 1987 Constitutions and to approve all
appointments, whether original or promotional,
to positions in the civil service, subject to
specified exceptions.
ISSUE:
WON the next-in-rank rule is mandatory.
RULING:
NEXT-IN-RANK RULE
No. The next-in-rank rule is not mandatory.
The Court cited the ruling in Taduran v. CSC,
wherein it is stated that, “ There is no
mandatory nor peremptory requirement in
the CSC that persons next-in-rank are
entitled to preference in appointment. What
it does provide is that they would be among
the first to be considered for vacancy, if
qualified, and if the vacancy is not filled by
promotion, the same shall be filled by
transfer or other modes of appointment. “
 One who is next-in-rank is entitled to
preferential consideration for promotion but
it does not necessarily follow that he and no one
else can be appointed.
The rule neither grants a vested right to the
holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the
appointing authority to promote such person to
the next higher position.
“The appointing authority may promote an
employee who is not next-in-rank but who
possesses superior qualifications and
competence compared to a next-in-rank
employee who merely meets the minimum
requirements for the position. “
The Customs Commissioner explained the
reasons behind the petitioner’s appointment:
1. Respondent JOSE, was assigned to Camarines
Norte, however, he never assumed that position
and there is no official record of any activity that
recommends him for promotion. While Petitioner
SANTIAGO JR., was credited for being the chief of
a task force, which has been credited with the
seizure of millions of pesos worth of smuggled
shipments, which was duly recorded.
2. SANTIAGO Jr., has also been a recipient of
awards for two consecutive years for exemplary
performance of official duties, particularly
investigation and prosecution.
COMMISSION’S APPOINTING AUTHORITY
True, the Commission is empowered to approve
all appointments, whether original or promotional,
to positions in the civil service and disapprove
those where the appointees do not possess the
appropriate eligibility or required qualification
(paragraph (h), Section 9, P.D. No. 807).
However, consistent with our ruling in Luego vs.
CSC (L-69137, 5 August 1986, 143 SCRA 327),
"all the commission is actually allowed to do
is check whether or not the appointee
possesses the appropriate civil service
eligibility or the required qualifications. If
he does, his appointment is approved; if not,
it is disapproved. No other criterion is
permitted by law to be employed by the
Commission when it acts on, or as the
decree says, "approves" or "disapproves"
an appointment made by the proper
authorities. . . . To be sure, it has no
authority to revoke the said appointment
simply because it believed that the private
respondent was better qualified for that
would have constituted an encroachment on
the discretion vested solely (in the
appointing authority)."
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. 87-554 of the Civil
Service Commission is SET ASIDE and
petitioner's promotional appointment as Customs
Collector III is hereby UPHELD.
Lapinid v. CSC
ONE LINER: The CSC cannot review, revoke or
make appointments except as to its own
personnel or that of another body except only as
to qualifications of the appointee.
FACTS: Renato Lapinid was appointed by the
Philippine Ports Authority to the position of
Terminal Supervisor at the Manila International
Container Terminal. Juanito Junsay protested the
appointment before the Appeals Board of the PPA,
contending that he has a preferential right
thereto. Since PPA did not act on the protest, he
raised the matter before the Civil Service
Commission, which directed the appointment of
Junsay in place of Lapinid since the prior
evaluation shows Junsay to be the most qualified
and Lapinid only placing third.
Lapinid moved to reconsider contending he was
not informed of the appeal and was not heard
thereon. PPA also moved to reconsider. Both
were denied. A second motion to reconsider
based on the re-appreciation of Lapinid's rating
was denied.
ISSUE: W/n the Civil Service Commission
authorized to disapprove a permanent
appointment on the ground that another person is
better qualified than the appointee and, on the
basis of this finding, order his replacement by the
latter?
RULING: No.
The Civil Service Commission has no power of
appointment except over its own personnel.
Neither does it have the authority to review the
appointments made by other offices except only
to ascertain if the appointee possesses the
required qualifications. The determination of who
among aspirants with the minimum statutory
qualifications should be preferred belongs to the
appointing authority and not the Civil Service
Commission. It cannot disallow an appointment
because it believes another person is better
qualified and much less can it direct the
appointment of its own choice.
Appointment is a highly discretionary act that
even this Court cannot compel. While the act of
appointment may in proper cases be the subject
of mandamus, the selection itself of the
appointee—taking into account the totality of his
qualifications, including those abstract qualities
that define his personality—is the prerogative of
the appointing authority. This is a matter
addressed only to the discretion of the appointing
authority. It is a political question that the Civil
Service Commission has no power to review
under the Constitution and the applicable laws.
Luego v. CSC
ONE LINER: The determination of the whether the
appointment to be extended is permanent or
temporary lies in the official vested by law with
the appointing power and not the CSC such that if
an appointee is qualified, the CSC has no choice
but to attest to the appointment.
Facts:

Petitioner was appointed as Administrative
Officer II by Mayor Solon of Cebu City. The
appointment was described as “permanent” but
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) approved it
as “temporary” subject to the final action taken in
the protest filed by the private respondent and
provided there was no pending administrative
case against Luego, no pending protest against
the appointment nor any decision by competent
authority that will adversely affect the approval of
the appointment.
However, the CSC later on found the private
respondent to be better qualified than the
petitioner for the contested position and directed
that the private respondent be appointed to the
position in place of Luego whose appointment
was revoked.
Issue:
WoN CSC is authorized to disapprove a
permanent appointment on the ground that
another person is better qualified than an
appointee and order his replacement by the
latter.
OSG Argument:
Luego could be replaced because his appointment
was temporary and therefore could be withdrawn
at will, with or without cause. Having accepted
such appointment, petitioner has waived his
security of tenure and consequently ran the risk
of an abrupt separation from his office without
violation of the Constitution.
to attest to the appointment. Such attestation is
required of the CSC merely as a check to assure
compliance with the Civil Service Laws.
It is understandable if one is misled by the
language of Section 9(h) of Article V of the Civil
Service Decree which provides:
"9(h) Approve all appointments, whether original
or promotional, to positions in the civil service,
except those presidential appointees, members
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police
forces, firemen, and jailguards, and disapprove
those where the appointees do not possess
appropriate eligibility or required qualifications."
(emphasis supplied)
However, a full reading of the provision makes it
clear that all the commission is actually allowed to
do is check whether or not the appointee
possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility
or the required qualifications. If he does, his
appointment is approved, if not, it is disapproved.
The acknowledgment of the Commission that
both the petitioner and private respondent were
qualified for the position alone rendered it functus
officio in the case and prevented it from acting
further thereon except to affirm the validity of the
petitioner’s appointment.

Ruling: No, while the principle of OSG’s

argument is correct, it is not correctly applied in
this case.

The appointment of Luego was not temporary but

permanent and therefore protected by the
Constitution. The appointing authority was within
his right to indicate the petitioner’s appointment
as permanent and it was not for CSC to reverse
him and call it temporary.

The Stamping of the words “APPROVED AS

TEMPORARY” did not change the character of the
appointment. What was temporary was the
“approval” of the appointment and not the
appointment itself. And what made the approval
temporary was the fact that it was made to
depend on the condition specified therein and on
the verification of the qualification of the
appointee to the position.

The determination of the kind of appointment to

be extended lies in the official vested by law with
the appointing power and not the CSC. when an
appointee is qualified, the CSC has no choice but