1
Guy vs. Court of Appeals
Facts: The instant controversies arose from a family dispute. Gilbert
Guy is the son of Francisco and Simny Guy. Geraldine, Gladys and
Grace are his sisters. The family feud involves the ownership and
control of 20,160 shares of stock of Northern Islands Co., Inc. engaged
in the manufacture, distribution, and sales of various home appliances
bearing the 3-D trademark.
Northern Islands is a family-owned corporation organized by spouses
Francisco and respondent Simny Guy and incorporated in said
corporation was Lincoln Continental Development Corporation, Inc. as
a holding company of the 50% shares of stock of Northern Islands in
trust for their three (3) daughters, respondents Geraldine, Gladys and
Grace. Sometime in December 1986, upon instruction of spouses Guy,
Atty. Andres Gatmaitan, president of Lincoln Continental, indorsed in
blank Stock Certificate No. 132 (covering 8,400 shares) and Stock
Certificate No. 133 (covering 11,760 shares) and delivered them to
Simny.
Spouses Guys found that their son Gilbert has been disposing of the
assets of their corporations without authority. In order to protect such
assets, Sinmy surrendered the two stock certificates to Emilia
Tabugadir and then registered it in the names of respondent sisters.
Adding insult to injury, during a special meeting of the stockholders of
Northern Islands, everybody except Gilbert was elected as officers.
This development started the warfare between Gilbert and his sisters.
On November 18, 2004, Gilbert filed with this Court a petition for
certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 165849, alleging that the Court of
Appeals (Eighth Division), in granting an injunctive relief in favor of
respondents, committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack
or in excess of jurisdiction. The petition also alleges that respondents
resorted to forum shopping.
Issues: (1) whether respondents are guilty of forum shopping; and (2)
whether they are entitled to the injunctive relief granted in CA-G.R. SP
No. 87104.
Held: A party is guilty of forum shopping when he repetitively avails of
several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and
the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved
adversely by some other court.
In their petition, respondents prayed for the annulment of the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the RTC after the expiration of the
TRO issued by the Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals. Evidently,
this relief is not identical with the relief sought by respondents in CA-
G.R. SP No. 85069. Clearly, the second element of litis pendentia the
identity of reliefs sought - is lacking in the two petitions filed by
respondents with the appellate court. Thus, we rule that no grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction may be
attributed to the Court of Appeals for giving due course to
respondent's petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 87104.
On the second issue, for a party to be entitled to an injunctive writ, he
must show that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts
against which the injunction is directed are violative of this right. In
granting the respondent's application for injunctive relief and making
the injunction permanent, the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division)
found that they have shown their clear and established right to the
disputed 20,160 shares of stock because: (1) they have physical
possession of the two stock certificates equivalent to the said number
of shares; (2) Lincoln Continental is a mere trustee of the Guy family;
and (3) respondents constitute a majority of the board of directors of
Northern Islands, and accordingly have management and control of
the company.. The appellate court then ruled that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction in favor of Guy. The writ actually reduced the
membership of Northern Islands board to just one member - Gilbert
Guy. Moreover, he failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence
his ownership of the shares of stock in question. The Court of Appeals
then held there was an urgent necessity to issue an injunctive writ in
order to prevent serious damage to the rights of respondents and
Northern Islands.
Molina vs. Court of Appeals
The facts, as culled from the parties' pleadings, are as follows:
On May 2, 1996, the Philippine Daily Inquirer published a news item,
which reads in part:
PACC coddled GO,
2 NBI execs claim
By Teddy Molina
and Juliet Pascual
PDI Northern Luzon Bureau
xxx xxx xxx
NBI agents reportedly raided a vacation house in San
Fernando, La Union, owned by Raymundo Armovit, Go's
lawyer, in September. They missed Go, who left the
house hours before the agents came.
The source said Go was also in Vigan in November, during
which he attended the wedding anniversary of a movie
couple. . . . 3
On May 3, 1996, the same newspaper reported that:
NBI exec says Go
tipped off by PACC
By Teddy Molina
and Juliet Pascual
PDI Northern Luzon Bureau
AN OFFICIAL of the National Bureau of Investigation in
Northern Luzon accused the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission of leaking out to Rolito Go a planned raid by
NBI agents on a vacation house in San Fernando, La
Union, where the convicted killer was hiding at the time.
The raiders belonging to the NBI Special Operations
Group missed Go but found some of his personal
belongings near the house's swimming pool, the source,
who asked not to be identified said.
This happened in September at the vacation home of
Go's lawyer, Raymundo Armovit, or eight months before
the PACC arrested him on Tuesday in Lubao, Pampanga.
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"After the La Union raid, it was hard to track Go because
he was moving as if he was receiving advice," the source
further claimed. . .4
As a consequence, private respondent Raymundo Armovit filed a
complaint for libel against petitioners, alleging that they caused to be
published reports that maliciously accused him of harboring and/or
concealing a convicted murderer.
In a resolution dated October 31, 1996, the Provincial Prosecutor of
Ilocos Sur found probable cause and recommended the filing of an
Information for libel against petitioners.5 Accordingly, on November
28, 1996, two Informations for libel were filed with the RTC of Vigan,
Ilocos Sur.6
On December 12, 1996, petitioners sought a review of the resolution
dated October 31, 1996 by the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor.
The latter reversed the findings of the Provincial Prosecutor and
directed the latter to withdraw the Informations filed.
However, the RTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur denied the motion to withdraw
the indictments on the ground that there was probable cause for the
filing of the Informations. Petitioners moved to reconsider the denial,
but this motion was similarly denied.
Petitioners then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a special
civil action for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54397.
On September 30, 1999, the appellate court resolved the case as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.7
The Court of Appeals found that the copies of the assailed orders of
the trial court were purportedly certified, but there was no showing
whatsoever of the authority of the person who certified the same.
Moreover, the seal of the trial court could not be identified on the
copies of said orders. Furthermore, the petition was not accompanied
by all the pleadings and documents pertinent thereto.
Petitioners then moved for reconsideration, but this was likewise
denied.
Hence, the instant petition, grounded on the allegation that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION ON MERE
TECHNICALITIES SUCH AS: 1.) PETITIONERS FAILED TO
SHOW THE AUTHORITY OF THE PERSON WHO CERTIFIED
THE COPIES OF THE ATTACHED ORDERS; 2.) THE SEAL OF
THE TRIAL COURT COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED FROM THE
COPIES SUBMITTED; 3) PETITIONERS DID NOT ATTACH
COPIES OF ALL PLEADINGS AND DOCUMENTS; AND 4.) THE
JUDGE OF THE LOWER COURT WAS NOT IMPLEADED, AND
COMPLETELY DISREGARDING THE MERITS OF THE
PETITION.8
2
Simply stated, the issue is: Did the Court of Appeals commit a
reversible error of law in dismissing the petition? We find that it did.
Petitioners contend, firstly, that they should not be faulted for such
technical defects as the failure to indicate the authority of the
certifying officer or the inscrutable imprint of the trial court's seal
because they did not have a hand in the preparation of the
documents. After all, they only relied in good faith on the authority
and diligence of the court personnel who prepared and authenticated
the subject documents, considering that said personnel are presumed
to know the procedural and technical requirements and because of
the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
According to petitioners, it was too harsh and arbitrary for the Court
of Appeals to fault them for the oversight committed by the trial court
personnel.
Second, petitioners aver that their failure to attach the pleadings and
documents relevant to the petition is immaterial as the Supreme
Court, in a long line of cases, has given due course to similarly faulty
petitions in the interests of equity and justice and merely directed that
the lacking pleadings and documents be attached.
Lastly, petitioners claim that they did not err if they only mentioned in
the caption of the petition the trial court and not the trial court judge.
After all, it is clear from the enumeration of parties against whom or
against which a petition for certiorari may be filed, namely, any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
in Rule 65, Section 19 of the Rules of Court that they need not implead
the officer or the trial court judge who committed the grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to want or excess of jurisdiction.
Instead of addressing the issue and the petitioners' arguments, private
respondent's submission focuses on the merits of the libel case. Thus,
we are unable to agree with his contentions insofar as they lack direct
pertinence to the present petition.
A litigation is a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly
lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as
wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and
technicalities, asks that justice be done on the merits.10 Hence, Rule 1,
Section 611 of the Rules of Court mandates that rules of procedure
shall be liberally interpreted. In the instant case, we agree with
petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in stressing too much
petitioners' failure to comply with technicalities. We cannot attribute
to petitioners the perceived defects on the attached copies of the trial
court's orders because petitioners did not have control over their
preparation. Moreover, Rule 131, Section 3 (ff)12 of the Rules of Court
lays the presumption in petitioners' favor that they followed the
pertinent rules on attaching certified copies of the orders subject of
their petition below. As private respondent failed to show evidence to
rebut this presumption, the presumption must stand.
We likewise rule that in the present case, the alleged failure to attach
all pleadings and documents is not a sufficient ground to dismiss the
petition. In appropriate cases, the courts may liberally construe
procedural rules in order to meet and advance the cause of substantial
justice.13 We have held that lapses in the literal observation of a
procedural rule will be overlooked when they do not involve public
policy, when they arose from an honest mistake or unforeseen
accident, when they have not prejudiced the adverse party, nor
deprived the court of its authority.14 In the instant case, petitioners'
failure to append: (1) herein respondent's Answer to the Petition for
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Review filed on January 2, 1997; (2) petitioners' Memorandum filed on
April 28, 1997; and (3) respondent's Memorandum filed on May 16,
1997, all of which were mentioned in the petition for certiorari before
the appellate court do not touch on public policy, nor do they deprive
the appellate court of its authority. No right of respondent is
prejudiced or adversely affected.
Lastly, it is not required under Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
that the trial judge himself be impleaded in a petition for certiorari.
The rule clearly states that a petition for certiorari may be filed against
the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.15 The inclusion of the tribunal, which issued the decision, as
NYK International vs. NLRC
Facts: Publico filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner
NYK and its manager, petitioner Cathy Ng. LA rendered decision
holding the dismissal illegal, NLRC affirmed.
petitioners impugned the NLRC decision by way of a special civil action
of certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals ascribing grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to public
respondent NLRC for affirming the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. the
appellate court dismissed the petition outright for non-compliance
with Section 1 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as the
petition was merely accompanied by a certified xerox copy of the
assailed NLRC decision, instead of a certified true copy thereof as
required by the Rules of Court, as well as other pleadings and
documents. MR denied. Hence this petition for review.
ISSUE: WON CA should have given due course to the petition
HELD:
Section 1 of Rule 65,[10] 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, requires that
the petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto. the disputed
document although stamped as certified true copy is not an
authenticated original of such certified true copy, but only a xerox
copy thereof, in contravention of paragraph 3 of the above-quoted
guidelines. Hence, no error may be ascribed to the Court of Appeals in
dismissing the petition for certiorari outright. petitioners here have
not shown any compelling reason for us to relax the rule. Petitioners
are hereby reminded that the right to file a special civil action of
certiorari is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. A writ of
certiorari is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right,
never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion.[11] Hence, he
who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the manner and
strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and the Rules.
Bulawan vs. Aquende
FACTS: On 1 March 1995,Bulawan filed a complaint for annulment of
title,reconveyanceand damages against Lourdes Yap (Yap) and the
Register of Deeds before the trial court docketed as Civil Case No.
9040.Bulawan claimed that she is the owner of Lot No. 1634-B of Psd-
153847 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 13733 having
bought the property from its owners, brothers Santos and
FranciscoYaptengco(Yaptengco brothers), who claimed to have
inherited the property from Yap Chin Cun. Bulawan alleged that Yap
claimed ownership of the same property and caused the issuance of
TCT No. 40292 in Yaps name.
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nominal party, was substantially complied with. When petitioners
mentioned the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21 of Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
they also referred necessarily to the judge who issued the assailed
resolutions.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54397, dated September 30, 1999
and May 2, 2000 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Court of Appeals
is hereby directed to reinstate the petition for certiorari filed by
petitioners in CA-G.R. SP No. 54397, with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
In her Answer, Yap clarified that she asserts ownership of Lot No.
1634-A of Psd-187165, which she claimed is the controlling subdivision
survey for Lot No. 1634. Yap also mentioned that, in Civil Case No.
5064, the trial court already declared that Psd-153847 was simulated
by the Yaptengco brothers and that their claim on Lot No. 1634-B was
void. The trial court likewise adjudged Yap Chin Cunas the rightful
owner of Lot No. 1634-B. Yap also stated that Lot No. 1634-B was sold
by Yap Chin Cunto the Aquende family.
On 26 November 1996, the trial court ruled in favor of Bulawan.
Yap appealed. On 20 July 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed Yaps
appeal.
On 7 February 2002, the trial courts 26 November 2006 Decision
became final and executory per entry of judgment dated 20 July 2001.
On 19 July 2002, the trial court issued a writ of execution.
In a letter dated 24 July 2002, the Register of Deeds informed
Aquende of the trial courts writ of execution and required Aquende to
produce TCT No. 40067 so that a memorandum of the lien may be
annotated on the title. On 25 July 2002,Aquende wrote a letter to the
Register of Deeds questioning the trial courts writ of execution against
his property. Aquende alleged that he was unaware of any litigation
involving his property having received no summons or notice thereof,
nor was he aware of any adverse claim as no notice of lis pendens was
inscribed on the title.
On 2 August 2002,Aquende filed a Third Party Claim against the writ of
execution because it affected his property and, not being a party in
Civil Case No. 9040, he argued that he is not bound by the trial courts
26 November 1996 Decision. In a letter dated 5 August 2002,the Clerk
of Court said that a Third Party Claim was not the proper remedy
because the sheriff did not levy upon or seize Aquende's property.
Moreover, the property was not in the sheriffs possession and it was
not about to be sold by virtue of the writ of execution.
Aquende then filed a Notice of Appearance with Third Party Motion
and prayed for the partial annulment of the trial courts 26 November
1996 Decision, specifically the portion which ordered the cancellation
of Psd-187165 as well as any other certificate of title issued pursuant
to Psd-187165.Aquende also filed a Supplemental Motion where he
reiterated that he was not a party in Civil Case No. 9040 and that since
the action was in personam or quasi in rem, only the parties in the
case are bound by the decision.
In its 19 February 2003 Order, the trial court deniedAquendesmotions.
According to the trial court, it had lost jurisdiction to modify its 26
3

November 1996 Decision when the Court of Appeals affirmed said
decision.
Thereafter, Aquende filed a petition for annulment of judgment
before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack
of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Aquende.
ISSUE:
Did the CA err in taking cognizance of the petition for annulment of
judgment?
HELD: In a petition for annulment of judgment, the judgment may be
annulled on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Fraud is extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from
presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon
matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in
which it is procured.The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud
is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant
prevented a party from having his day in court.On the other hand, lack
of jurisdiction refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim, and in
either case the judgment or final order and resolution are void.Where
the questioned judgment is annulled, either on the ground of extrinsic
fraud or lack of jurisdiction, the same shall be set aside and considered
void.
In his petition for annulment of judgment, Aquende alleged that there
was extrinsic fraud because he was prevented from protecting his title
when Bulawan and the trial court failed to implead him as a party.
Bulawan also maintained that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over his person and, therefore, its 26 November 1996
Decision is not binding on him. In its 26 November 2007 Decision, the
Court of Appeals found merit in Aquende's petition and declared that
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over Aquende, who was
adversely affected by its 26 November 1996 Decision. We find no error
in the findings of the Court of Appeals.
Moreover, annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of
the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.
Consequently, an action for annulment of judgment may be availed of
even if the judgment to be annulled had already been fully executed
or implemented.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err when it took cognizance of
Aquende's petition for annulment of judgment and overturned the
trial courts 26 November 1996 Decision even if another division of the
Court of Appeals had already affirmed it and it had already been
executed.
Lopez vs. Esquivel
The petitioners in G.R. No. 168734, namely, Marcelino,
Felisa, Leonardo and Zoilo, all surnamed Lopez (Lopez siblings), seek to
reverse and set aside the Decision[2] dated 14 February 2005 and
Resolution[3] dated 27 June 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 70200. In its assailed Decision, the appellate court affirmed in
toto the Decision[4] dated 11 January 2001 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 73, in Civil Case No. 96-4193, which (1)
ordered the Lopez siblings to vacate and to convey to Jose Esquivel, Jr.
(Esquivel) and Carlito Talens (Talens) a parcel of land, measuring
2.6950 hectares, situated in Barrio dela Paz, Antipolo, Rizal[5] (subject
property); and (2) directed the Register of Deeds of Marikina,
Metropolitan Manila,[6] to divest the Lopez siblings of their title over
4
the subject property and to issue title over the same property in the
names of Esquivel and Talens. In its assailed Resolution, the appellate
court denied for lack of merit the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Lopez siblings.
On the other hand, Noel Rubber and Development
Corporation (Nordec Phil.) and Dr. Potenciano Malvar (Dr. Malvar), the
petitioners in G.R. No. 170621, pray for the setting aside of the
Resolutions dated 6 October 2005[7] and 16 November 2005[8] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91428. The Court of Appeals, in its
questioned Resolution dated 6 October 2005, dismissed for
prematurity the Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by Nordec
Phil. and Dr. Malvar under Rule 47 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing the RTC Decision dated 11 January 2001 in Civil
Case No. 96-4193, as they were not impleaded in said case, neither as
indispensable nor necessary parties. The appellate court, in its other
questioned Resolution dated 16 November 2005, denied the Motion
for Amendment and/or Reconsideration of Nordec Phil. and Dr.
Malvar.
The antecedent facts of both Petitions are recounted as follows:
G.R. No. 168734
Hermogenes Lopez (Hermogenes) was the father of the Lopez
siblings. During Hermogenes lifetime, he applied with the Bureau of
Lands for a homestead patent over a parcel of land, with an area of
19.4888 hectares, located in Barrio dela Paz, Antipolo,
Rizal. Hermogenes application was docketed as Homestead Patent No.
138612. After ascertaining that the land was free from claim of any
private person, the Bureau of Lands approved Hermogenes
application. In 1939, Hermogenes submitted his final proof of
compliance with the residency and cultivation requirements of the
Public Land Act. As a matter of course, the aforesaid parcel of land was
surveyed by a government surveyor and the resulting plan H-138612
was approved by the Director of Lands on 7 February 1939. The
Director of Lands, thereafter, ordered the issuance of the homestead
patent in Hermogenes name. The patent was subsequently
transmitted to the Register of Deeds of Rizal for transcription and
issuance of the corresponding certificate of title[9] in Hermogenes
name.[10]
Unaware that he had already been awarded a homestead patent over
the 19.4888-hectare land, Hermogenes sold[11] the same to Ambrocio
Aguilar (Aguilar) by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale[12] dated 31 July
1959.
Years later, it was allegedly discovered that the subject property, with
an area of 2.6950 hectares, was erroneously included in survey plan H-
138612 of Hermogenes property. The subject property supposedly
formed part of the land owned by Lauro Hizon (Hizon), which adjoined
that of Hermogenes. Resultantly, on 29 November 1965, Hermogenes
executed a Quitclaim[13] over his rights and interests to the subject
property[14] in Hizons favor. Hizon, in turn, sold the subject property to
Esquivel and Talens, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale of
Unregistered Land[15] dated 26 August 1968.
Hermogenes died[16] on 20 August 1982. The Lopez siblings, as
Hermogenes heirs, filed an action with the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal,
Branch 71, for the cancellation of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 31
July 1959, executed between Hermogenes and Aguilar, and which
involved the entire 19.4888-hectare land. It was docketed as Civil Case
No. 463-A. In a Decision[17] dated 5 February 1985, the RTC declared
the aforesaid Deed of Absolute Sale null and void ab initio as it was
made in violation of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
4
 5

otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended. The said RTC
Decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in its
Decision[18] dated 18 August 1987 in CA-G.R. CV No. 06242. In a
Resolution[19] dated 13 April 1988, this Court denied Aguilars appeal,
docketed as G.R. No. 81092, for being filed late.
On 4 March 1993, on the basis of the Deed of Absolute Sale of
Unregistered Land dated 26 August 1968 executed by Hizon in their
favor, Esquivel and Talens filed an Application for Registration of the
subject property with the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 73. It was
docketed as LRC Case No. 93-1211. The Lopez siblings filed an
opposition to the application in LRC Case No. 93-1211, asserting,
among other grounds, that: (1) they did not know the persons and
personal circumstances of Esquivel and Talens who were not the
formers adjoining property owners; (2) the subject property, which
Esquivel and Talens sought to have registered, was already titled
under the Torrens system and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCT) No. 207990 to No. 207997[20] in the names of the Lopez siblings;
and (3) Tax Declaration No. 04-10304 of Esquivel and Talens covering
the subject property was spurious. The Lopez siblings also moved for
the dismissal of LRC Case No. 93-1211 invoking the final and executory
Decision[21] dated 5 February 1985 of the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal,
Branch 71, in Civil Case No. 463-A, which affirmed Hermogenes title to
the 19.4888-hectare land, that included the subject property.
The RTC rendered its Decision[22] on 4 April 1995 in LRC Case No. No.
93-1211, granting the Application for Registration of the subject
property filed by Esquivel and Talens. Accordingly, the Lopez siblings
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said RTC judgment. Acting on
the Motion of the Lopez siblings, the RTC issued an Order[23] dated 23
May 1996 in which it corrected several errors in its earlier
decision, i.e., a typographical error on the area of the subject property,
and a mistake in the conversion of the area of the subject property
from square meters to hectares. The RTC also stated in the same
Order that it could not direct the amendment of the TCTs in the names
of the Lopez siblings, to exclude therefrom the subject property which
was adjudged to Esquivel and Talens, as the RTC was sitting only as a
land registration court. The RTC, thus, advised Esquivel and Talens to
file an action for reconveyance of the subject property and only when
Esquivel and Tales succeed in such action can they subsequently cause
the registration of the subject property in their names.
Following the advice of the RTC, Esquivel and Talens filed with the RTC
of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 73, on 2 October 1996, a Complaint[24] for
Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession of the subject property
against the Lopez siblings. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 96-
4193.
In their Complaint, Esquivel and Talens alleged that when the Lopez
siblings had the land they inherited from Hermogenes registered, they
included the subject property, which Hermogenes already conveyed to
Hizon in the Quitclaim dated 29 November 1965. Hence, the subject
property was erroneously included in TCTs No. 207990 to No. 207997,
issued by the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila, in the
names of the Lopez siblings. The subject property is presently
occupied and in the physical possession of the Lopez siblings.[25]
validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land dated 26
August 1968, executed by Hizon in favor of Esquivel and Talens. The
Lopez siblings further averred that the cause of action of Esquivel and
Talens was already barred by the statute of limitations and laches
since they failed to assert their alleged rights to the subject property
for 25 years.[27] The Lopez siblings additionally interposed that the
Quitclaim involving the subject property, invoked by Esquivel and
Talens, was ineffective, because by the time it was executed by
Hermogenes in favor of Hizon on 29 November 1965, Hermogenes had
already sold his entire 19.4888-hectare land, of which the subject
property was part, to Aguilar on 31 July 1959. The Lopez siblings finally
argued that the said Quitclaim was a nullity as it contravened Section
17[28] of the Public Land Act, as amended.[29]
On 11 January 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision in Civil Case 96-
4193, granting the prayer of Esquivel and Talens for the reconveyance
and recovery of possession of the subject property. The RTC held that
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 31 July 1959 between Hermogenes
and Aguilar was already declared null and void ab initio by a court of
competent jurisdiction. Therefore, the Lopez siblings were estopped
from asserting said Deed to defeat the rights of Esquivel and Talens to
the subject property. The RTC also ruled that Esquivel and Talens were
not guilty of laches because as early as 1986, they had declared the
subject property in their names for taxation purposes. Moreover, in
1993, Esquivel and Talens filed before the RTC an application for
registration of the subject property, LRC Case No. 93-1222, where they
obtained a favorable judgment. The RTC lastly found that the action
for reconveyance of Esquivel and Talens was not yet barred by
prescription as it was instituted within the 30-year prescriptive period.
The Lopez siblings filed an appeal of the aforementioned
RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
70200.
In their Appellants Brief, the Lopez siblings assigned the
following errors:
1. The trial court presided by Judge
Mauricio M. Rivera erred in failing
to dismiss this case for
reconveyance on the grounds of:
(a) prescription of action; and (b)
laches;
2. [Hermogenes] was no longer the
owner of the property when he
executed the [quitclaim] dated
[29 November 1965] because of
the previous sale to third party on
[31 July 1959];
3. There was (sic) no prior records in
the Bureau of Lands or in the
assessors office that [Hizon], the
predecessor-in-interest of the
[Esquivel and Talens] is a
landholder or a previous tax
declarant;

In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, the Lopez siblings 4. The court a quo thru the same
denied all the allegations of Esquivel and Talens. As their special judge indiscreetly based primarily
defenses, the Lopez siblings called attention to the non-compliance by the appealed decision on its
Esquivel and Talens with Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Revised Rules of erroneous findings and
Civil Procedure, on non-forum shopping, considering that there was conclusions in LRC Case No. 93-
another case before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71,[26] also 1211 contrary to the findings and
involving the subject property and the issues on the genuineness and conclusions of this Honorable

5

Court among others in CA G.R. CV
No. 07745, entitled Ambrocio
Aguilar v. Heirs of Fernando
Gorospe, et al. promulgated on 31
August 1989; in CA G.R. CV No.
06242, entitled Marcelino Lopez,
et al. v. Sps. Ambrocio [Aguilar]
and Pelagia Viray promulgated on
18 August 1987; and the findings
and conclusions of the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. 90380
entitled Santos v. Court of
Appeals promulgated on 13
September 1990 among others.
5. Having already erred in favor of
the [Esquivel and Talens], the
same presiding judge of the trial
court erringly proceeded to
conduct hearing and to decide
this case despite the
consolidation of Civil Case No. 95-
3693 entitled Angelina Hizon, et
al. v. Carlito Talens, et al.,
involving the same subject
property and the efficacy and
validity of the [quitclaim] solely
relied upon by the [Esquivel and
Talens].[30]
On 14 February 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision
dismissing the appeal of the Lopez siblings and affirming in toto the
RTC Decision dated 11 January 2001. The appellate court ruled that
the Lopez siblings are barred by the doctrine of estoppel in pais from
challenging the Quitclaim executed by Hermogenes over the subject
property in favor of Hizon on 29 November 1965 on the ground that
Hermogenes no longer owned the subject property at that time. The
Lopez siblings themselves, as Hermogenes heirs, filed with the RTC
Civil Case No. 463-A for the cancellation of the Deed of Absolute Sale
involving the 19.4888-hectare land (which included the subject
property), executed by Hermogenes in favor of Aguilar on 31 July
1959. The Lopez siblings obtained a favorable judgment in Civil Case
No. 463-A as the RTC therein declared void ab initio the aforesaid
Deed of Absolute Sale. Hence, the Lopez siblings are now estopped
from asserting the validity of the same Deed of Absolute Sale so as to
void or nullify the Quitclaim executed by Hermogenes in favor of
Aguilar, on which Esquivel and Talens based their claim to the subject
property. Any deviation by the Lopez siblings from their previous
position would definitely cause injury and prejudice to Esquivel and
Talens, who acted relying on the knowledge that the previous sale
between Hermogenes and Aguilar of the land, which included the
subject property, was already adjudged void ab initio. The Lopez
siblings, moreover, were only subrogated to whatever rights and
interests their father Hermogenes still had over the subject property
upon the latters death in 1982. They were, thus, bound by the
Quitclaim Hermogenes executed in 1965 involving the subject
property.[31]
The Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision
filed by the Lopez siblings was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated 27 June 2005.
6
The Lopez siblings are presently before this Court seeking
the resolution of the following issues:
I. Whether or not the [Court of Appeals] erred in
applying the rule of estoppel in disregard of
the law of the case doctrine (a) in the Decision
promulgated on [13 September 1990] in G.R.
No. 90380 entitled Eduardo Santos v. The
Honorable Court of Appeals; (b) in the
Decision [E]n [B]anc promulgated on [24
September 2002] in G.R. No. 123780, entitled
In Re: Petition Seeking for Clarification as to
the Validity and Forceful Effect of Two (2) Final
and Executory but conflicting Decisions of [this
Court] Col. Pedro Cabuay, Jr. v. Marcelino
Lopez, et al; and (c) in the Decision
promulgated on [5 March 2003] in G.R. No.
127827 entitled Eleuterio Lopez, et al. v. The
Hon. Court of Appeals, Spouses Marcelino
Lopez and Cristina Lopez, et al.;
II. Whether or not the [appellate court] was
correct in applying the rule of estoppel in
pais in disregard of the peremptory and
[personal-to-the-applicants-homestead]
provisions of the Public Land Law or
Commonwealth Act 141, as amended;
III. Are the [Esquivel and Talens] and their
predecessor-in-interest barred by the statute
of limitations?
IV. Are the [Esquivel and Talens] and their
predecessor-in-interest guilty of laches?
V. The quitclaim relied upon by [Esquivel and
Talens] is intrinsically void and has violated the
provisions of the Public Land Law.[32]
The Lopez siblings aver that a deeper analysis of the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals will reveal the latters utter
disregard for or deviation from the law of the case set by this Court in
its Decisions in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[33] Group Commander,
Intelligence & Security Group, Philippine Army v. Dr.
Malvar,[34] and Lopez v. Court of Appeals,[35] where the issue on the
validity of the homestead patent granted to Hermogenes, father of
the Lopez siblings, was already passed upon. In these three Decisions,
the Court already declared the homestead patent awarded to
Hermogenes valid. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in applying
the rule on estoppel in disregard of the doctrine of law of the case.
The Lopez siblings further argue that the assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals runs counter to the personal-to-the-
homestead-applicant policy[36]provisions embodied in Sections 12, 13,
and 17 of the Public Land Act, as amended, that this Court upheld
in Santos, Cabuay, and Lopez. The Court precisely disregarded the rule
on estoppel in pais or the principle of trust in said three cases as it had
no room for application under the tenor or context of the mandatory
personal-to-the-homestead-applicant policy provisions of the Public
Land Act, as amended. It was, thus, erroneous for the appellate court
to apply estoppel in pais in ruling against the Lopez siblings in its
assailed judgment.
6

The Lopez siblings additionally avow that in the
proceedings conducted on Hermogenes homestead application by the
Bureau of Lands, it was verified that the land applied for, which
included the subject property, was disposable public land. If it was
true that the subject property was only erroneously included in the
homestead patent awarded to Hermogenes, then such an award could
only be challenged by the government in an action for reversion under
Section 101 of the Public Land Act, as amended; or objected to by a
private person under Section 102 of the same statute. Resultantly,
Esquivel and Talens could not have availed themselves of the recourse
prescribed by Section 38[37] of Act No. 496, otherwise known as the
Land Registration Act, in their action for reconveyance of the subject
property.Section 38 of the Land Registration Act may only be availed
of by an aggrieved owner whose property was fraudulently included in
a decree of registration. A decree of registration under the Land
Registration Act merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership over
private land so as to bring it under the operation of
the Torrenssystem. The remedies provided under Sections 101 and
102 of the Public Land Act, on one hand, and Section 38 of the Land
Registration Act, on the other, are exclusive of each other, considering
the basic distinction in the subject matters thereof, i.e., the award or
grant of public land in the former, and the registration of private land
in the latter.
The Lopez siblings also maintain that Hizon, predecessor-
in-interest of Esquivel and Talens, who claimed ownership over the
subject property, was duty bound to exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family by opposing or taking exception to Hermogenes
homestead application, which included said property. Even after the
homestead patent over the subject property was already awarded to
Hermogenes, Hizon still had opportunity to protest the same before
the Bureau of Lands, prior to the registration of said homestead
patent with the Register of Deeds. For failing to take appropriate
actions, Hizon, and his successors-in-interest, Esquivel and Talens, are
now barred from doing so by the statute of limitations and laches.
Finally, the Lopez siblings assert that the reliance by the
Court of Appeals on the legal efficacy of the Quitclaim involving the
subject property executed by Hermogenes in favor of Hizon is
misplaced. The reason for the renunciation, waiver, or repudiation by
Hermogenes of his rights to the subject property in Hizons favor, as
stated in the said Quitclaim, is not a recognized cause or consideration
for conveyance of a parcel of land subject of a homestead patent
under the prohibitive and mandatory provisions of the Public Land Act,
as amended. Moreover, whatever efficacy the Quitclaim had was
already barred by the ruling of this Court en bancin Cabuay and Lopez.
The instant Petition is meritorious.
Since the issues in this case are interrelated, the Court
shall discuss them concurrently.
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion
delivered on a former appeal. It is a term applied to an established
rule that when an appellate court passes on a question and remands
the case to the lower court for further proceedings, the question there
settled becomes the law of the case upon subsequent appeal. It
means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the
controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the
same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on
general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision
was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the
court.[38]Thus, the court reviewing the succeeding appeal will not re-
litigate the case but instead apply the ruling in the previous
7
appeal. This enables the appellate court to perform its duties
satisfactorily and efficiently which would be impossible if a question,
once considered and decided by it, were to be litigated anew in the
same case and upon any and subsequent appeal.[39]
Given the foregoing, it is apparent that the Decisions of
this Court in Santos, Cabuay, and Lopez, cited by the Lopez siblings in
their instant Petition, cannot be regarded as the law of the case
herein. The law of the case applies only when (1) a question is passed
upon by an appellate court, and (2) the appellate court remands the
case to the lower court for further proceedings; the lower court and
even the appellate courts on subsequent appeal of the case are, thus,
bound by how such question had been previously settled. It must be
emphasized, therefore, that the law of the case finds application
only in the same case between the same parties.
The Petition at bar is without question separate and
distinct from Santos, Cabuay, and Lopez, although they may all
involve, in varying degrees, the homestead patent granted to
Hermogenes over the 19.8222-hectare land, which included the
subject property. First, Santos, Cabuay, and Lopez, directly tackled the
validity of the homestead patent granted to Hermogenes over the
19.8222-hectare land; while, in the instant case, the validity of the
homestead patent thus granted to Hermogenes is no longer in issue,
but it is alleged herein that said patent erroneously included the
subject property. Second, to recall, the instant Petition originated
from Civil Case No. 96-4193, the Complaint for Reconveyance and
Recovery of the subject property filed by Esquivel and Talens against
the Lopez siblings before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 73. In no
instance was a question or issue in Civil Case No. 96-4193 ever been
previously raised to an appellate court. Santos, Cabuay, and Lopez, did
not pass upon any question or issue raised before this Court from Civil
Case No. 96-4193. And thirdly, despite the fact that all these cases
may have common antecedent facts and sometimes involved the
same personalities, the Lopez siblings (herein petitioners) and Esquivel
and Talens (herein respondents) were not parties in Santos, Cabuay,
and Lopez.
The Court now proceeds to resolve the issue of whether
Esquivel and Talens have a right to the reconveyance of the subject
property based on the Quitclaim executed by Hermogenes in Hizons
favor on 29 November 1965. Such determination shall be dependent
on whether the Quitclaim was executed beyond the period within
which encumbrance or alienation of the land acquired by homestead
patent is prohibited; and whether the Quitclaim effected a valid
conveyance of the subject property from Hermogenes to Hizon.
Section 118 of the Public Land Act, as amended, prohibits
any encumbrance or alienation of lands acquired under homestead
provisions from the date of the approval of application and for a term
of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or
grant. The same provision provides that no alienation, transfer, or
conveyance of any homestead after five years and before 25 years
after issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, which approval shall
not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds.
In this case, the subject property was included, whether
correctly or erroneously, in the 19.4888-hectare land awarded to
Hermogenes, by virtue of a homestead patent, issued on 7 February
1939. The Quitclaim over the subject property, a 2.6950-hectare
portion of the said 19.4888-hectare land, was executed by
Hermogenes in Hizons favor on 29 November 1965. Between the date
of issuance of the homestead patent to Hermogenes and that of the
execution of the Quitclaim, more than 26 years had passed. Therefore,
7

the execution of the Quitclaim was no longer within the five-year
period within which the land covered by the homestead patent issued
to Hermogenes must not be encumbered or alienated; and was also
beyond the period between five and 25 years following the issuance of
patent within which approval of the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources is still necessary to make the alienation or
encumbrance valid.[40]
Although it has been established that the Quitclaim was
executed beyond any of the prohibitive and/or restrictive periods
under the Public Land Act, as amended, the Court must next look into
whether the Quitclaim had the effect of validly conveying the subject
property to Hizon.
The pertinent portions of the Quitclaim in question read as
follows:
2. That it has come to my personal
knowledge that a boundary owner of my
above-cited parcel of land by the name of
[Hizon] has duly caused the survey of his land
bordering mine x x x; that after the actual
execution of the survey of the land of said
[Hizon], it was found out that the land which
has been in his possession for many many
years or since time immemorial is within my
plan denominated as H-138612;
xxxx
5. That in fairness and in justice to
[Hizon], I herewith renounce, repudiate and
unconditionally and irrevocably waive and
quitclaim all my rights, shares, interests or
participations on the above-described parcel
of land in favor of [Hizon], of legal age, Filipino,
married to Angelina Villarosa and a resident of
Antipolo, Rizal, and for this purpose I am
agreeable that my plan H-138612 be duly
amended so as to segregate the above-
described portion which is owned by the
aforesaid [Hizon].[41]
It can be gleaned from the afore-quoted paragraphs of the
Quitclaim that the intention of Hermogenes in executing the same was
to restore to Hizon the subject property, which Hermogenes believed
to have been mistakenly included in his homestead patent.
It is worthy to note, however, that the subject property
was part of the 19.4888-hectare land covered by the homestead
patent awarded by the Bureau of Lands to Hermogenes. The 19.4888-
hectare land was identified and measured in a survey conducted by a
government surveyor and the resulting plan H-138612 was approved
by the Director of Lands. The approval of survey plan H-138612 and
the grant of the homestead patent over the 19.4888-hectare land in
favor of Hermogenes, performed as part of the official functions of the
Director of Lands and the Bureau of Lands, enjoy the presumption of
regularity.[42] Reasonable doubt is thus cast on the supposed mistake
which resulted in the inclusion of the subject property in the 19.4888-
hectare land awarded to Hermogenes by virtue of the homestead
patent.
Even assuming that the homestead patent awarding the
19.4888-hectare land to Hermogenes did erroneously include the
8
subject property, Hermogenes could not simply convey said property
to Hizon, nor could Hizon easily recover the same, by virtue of a mere
Quitclaim. Lands acquired under homestead patents come from the
public domain. If the subject property was erroneously included in the
homestead patent awarded to Hermogenes, then the subject property
must be returned to the State and not to Hizon. Furthermore, the
survey plan conducted and homestead patent issued in Hermogenes
name covered a 19.4888-hectare land; to exclude therefrom the
2.6950-hectare subject property (since it purportedly belonged to
Hizon) would mean that Hermogenes actually acquired land with an
area less that what he was awarded under the homestead patent. This
complication reveals that any alleged mistake as regards the subject
property is not a simple and private matter between Hermogenes and
Hizon; but is primarily a problem between Hermogenes and the State,
the latter having awarded the 19.4888-hectare land to the former by
virtue of the homestead patent.
A homestead patent is one of the modes to acquire title to
public lands suitable for agricultural purposes. Under the Public Land
Act, as amended, a homestead patent is one issued to any citizen of
this country, over the age of 18 years or the head of a family, and who
is not the owner of more than 24 hectares of land in the country. To
be qualified, the applicant must show that he has resided continuously
for at least one year in the municipality where the land is situated and
must have cultivated at least one-fifth of the land applied for.[43]
In this case, the Bureau of Lands approved Hermogenes
application for homestead patent over the 19.4888-hectare land after
finding him qualified for the same.In contrast, the only evidence
supporting Hizons claim to the subject property was the
Quitclaim. There is no other proof that Hizon possessed, cultivated,
and introduced improvements on the subject property. Neither is
there any showing that after the execution of the Quitclaim, Hizon
himself applied for a homestead patent over the subject property. In
fact, it is undisputed that the subject property has always been in the
possession of Hermogenes, then the Lopez Siblings. Hizon and Esquivel
and Talens never came into the possession of the subject property
even after the execution of the supposed deeds of conveyances in
their favor.
The Court also cannot consider the subject property to have been held
in trust by Hermogenes for and on behalf of Hizon. Settled is the rule
that a homestead applicant must personally comply with the legal
requirements for a homestead grant. The homestead applicant himself
must possess the necessary qualifications, cultivate the land, and
reside thereon. It would be a circumvention of the law if an individual
were permitted to apply in behalf of another, as the latter may be
disqualified or might not comply with the residency and cultivation
requirements.[44]
In the end, the Quitclaim dated 29 November 1965 could
not have validly conveyed or transferred ownership of the subject
property from Hermogenes to Hizon. It is null and void for being
contrary to the provisions of the Public Land Act, as amended. As a
result, Hizon acquired no right over the subject property which he
could have sold to Esquivel and Talens; and the Deed of Absolute Sale
of Unregistered Land dated 26 August 1968 executed by Hizon in favor
of Esquivel and Talens, is similarly void for lack of an object.
Even granting arguendo, that the Quitclaim is valid and
transferred ownership of the subject property from Hermogenes to
Hizon, the latter and his successors-in-interest, Esquivel and Talens,
are now barred by the statute of limitations and laches from asserting
8

their rights to the subject property, after failing to exercise the same
for an unreasonable length of time.
Laches has been defined as the failure of or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to
assert a right within reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled thereto has either abandoned it or declined to
assert it. Thus, the doctrine of laches presumes that the party guilty of
negligence had the opportunity to do what should have been done,
but failed to do so.[45]
In the instant case, when Esquivel and Talens filed with the
RTC their application for registration of the subject property on 5
March 1993, 28 years had passed since the execution by Hermogenes
of the Quitclaim covering the subject property in favor of Hizon on 29
November 1965; and 25 years elapsed from the execution by Hizon of
the Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject property in favor of Esquivel
and Talens on 26 August 1968. During these periods, without
providing any reasons therefor, neither Hizon nor Esquivel and Talens
took possession of the subject property or exercised in any other way
their rights over the same.
Finally, concerning this Petition, is the issue of whether the
Lopez siblings are estopped from questioning the validity of the
Quitclaim, as ruled by the Court of Appeals? It bears to point out that
the question of estoppel is relevant only if the Lopez siblings are
challenging the validity of the Quitclaim on the ground that when
Hermogenes executed the same, he had already previously sold his
19.4888-hectare land, which included the subject property, to
Aguilar. In recollection, the Lopez siblings successfully had the said
sale of the land by Hermogenes to Aguilar nullified. Since the Court
herein refuses to give effect to the Quitclaim in question on other
grounds already discussed above, the issue of estoppel actually loses
relevance and need not be resolved anymore.
Considering the pronouncements of this Court that the
Quitclaim covering the subject property executed by Hermogenes in
favor of Hizon is null and void for being contrary to the provisions of
the Public Land Act, as amended, on homestead grants; and that the
Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject property executed by Hizon in
favor of Esquivel and Talens is null and void for lack of a proper object,
then Esquivel and Talens have no basis to ask for the reconveyance of
the subject property. Hizon never owned the subject property and
could never have sold the same to Esquivel and Talens.
G.R. No. 170621
A Petition for Annulment of Judgment was filed with the Court of
Appeals by Nordec Phil., a corporation organized and existing under
the laws of the Philippines; and Dr. Malvar, President and General
Manager of petitioner Nordec Phil., docketed as CA G.R. CV No.
91428.
The Lopez siblings, Esquivel, and Talens, were named respondents in
CA-G.R. CV No. 91428 (and also herein), being the parties in Civil Case
No. 96-4193, wherein the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 73, rendered
the Decision dated 11 January 2001, which Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar
was seeking to have annulled by the Court of Appeals. Atty. Sergio
Angeles (Atty. Angeles) and Atty. George A. Ang Cheng (Atty. Ang
Cheng) were similarly impleaded as respondents in said petition
before the appellate court on account of their involvement as counsels
for the parties in Civil Case No. 96-4193.
9
In its Decision dated 11 January 2001 in Civil Case No. 96-4193, the
RTC granted the action for reconveyance of the subject property to
Esquivel and Talens. The subject property, however, was already
supposedly sold by Lopez siblings to Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar.
Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar alleged in their Petition for Annulment of
Judgment that the Lopez siblings, the successors-in-interest of
Hermogenes, were the registered owners of 15 parcels of land
situated at Overlooking, Sumulong Highway, Barangay Sta. Cruz,
(formerly Barrio dela Paz), Antipolo City, Rizal, covered by plan (LRC)
Psd-3289610, with a total area of 19.4888 hectares.[46] Among these
parcels of land were Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8, covered by TCTs No.
207990 to No. 207997[47] of the Registry of Deeds of Marikina City,
with an aggregate area of 2.875 hectares, and which constituted the
subject property.[48]
Beginning 20 April 1994, Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar purchased the
afore-mentioned lots from the Lopez siblings and their assigns,
namely, Atty. Angeles and Rogelio Amurao (Amurao),[49] as evidenced
by several Deeds of Absolute Sale and Deeds of Conditional
Sale. Immediately after making such purchases, Nordec Phils. and Dr.
Malvar introduced large scale improvements on the subject property,
among which were several business establishments[50] with a cost of
no less than P50,000,000.
In 1996, when the subject property was involved in Civil Case No. 96-
4130 heard before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, entitled Heirs
of Elino Adia v. Heirs of Hermogenes Lopez, it was Atty. Angeles who
represented and protected the interest of Nordec Phils. and Dr.
Malvar in said case by filing a Motion to Dismiss.[51]In Cabuay, Jr.,
wherein Dr. Malvar and the Lopez siblings were named the
respondents in the Petition Seeking for Clarification as to the Validity
and Forceful Effect of the Two (2) Final and Executory but Conflicting
Decisions of this Court involving the subject property, it was also Atty.
Angeles who appeared for Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar.
Sometime after 2 August 2004, Atty. Angeles again
informed Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar that there was another case
filed against the Lopez siblings involving the subject property. The said
case was the action for reconveyance filed by Esquivel and Talens,
docketed as Civil Case No. 96-4193 before RTC of Antipolo, Rizal,
Branch 73, but which was already, by then, the subject of an appeal
before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 70200 (and
which would eventually reach this Court in G.R. No. 168734). Atty.
Angeles, however, belittled this most recent case involving the subject
property, and even showed to Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar the
Motion to Resolve Appeal dated 2 August 2004, which he filed in CA-
G.R. CV No. 70200, together with the Brief for the Lopez siblings. Yet,
Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar conducted their own inquiry, and were
surprised to discover that the Decision rendered by the RTC on 11
January 2001 in Civil Case No. 96-4193 was actually adverse to their
rights and interest; and despite this, they were neither impleaded nor
represented therein. Even Atty. Angeles, the supposed counsel for
Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar, did not lift a finger to protect their rights
in said case.
Further intensive investigation revealed to Nordec Phils. and Dr.
Malvar that the 11 January 2001 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No.
96-4193 was rendered under circumstances amounting to extrinsic
fraud and lack or denial of due process, insofar as said Decision
adversely affected their rights and interests to the subject
property. Among the circumstances which allegedly amounted to
extrinsic fraud and lack or denial of due process, were described by
Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar as follows: (1) when Esquivel and Talens
instituted Civil Case No. 96-4193, they personally and through their
9

caretakers, already knew that Nordec Phils. and Malvar already
bought and took possession of the subject property, but Esquivel and
Talens, through their counsel Atty. Ang Cheng deliberately failed to
implead Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar; and (2) Atty. Angeles, who was
supposed to protect the rights and interests of Nordec Phils. and Dr.
Malvar, as their counsel, had an adverse personal interest in the
subject property as he unconscionably taken, by way of champertous
attorneys fees, almost the whole of the 19.4888-hectare land
inherited by the Lopez siblings from Hermogenes.
Given the foregoing circumstances and the unsuccessful attempt of
Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar to intervene in CA-G.R. No. 70200, Nordec
Phil. and Dr. Malvar opted to file with the Court of Appeals a Petition
to annul the Decision dated 11 January 2001 of the RTC in Civil Case
No. 96-4193, granting the reconveyance of the subject property to
Esquivel and Talens. Their Petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
91428. Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar prayed in their Petition that the 11
January 2001 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-4193 be annulled
for the reason that they were not impleaded therein even as they
were necessary, if not indispensable, parties. Nordec Phil. and Dr.
Malvar additionally prayed that any writ of execution and other
orders, which may have been or may thereafter be issued to enforce
the said RTC decision, be declared ineffective, insofar as they and their
assigns are concerned.
On 6 October 2005, the Court of Appeals issued its assailed Resolution
in CA-G.R. SP No. 91428 dismissing the Petition of Nordec Phil. and Dr.
Malvar. According to the said Resolution, the RTC Decision dated 11
January 2001 in Civil Case No. 96-4193 could not be the proper subject
of the said Petition for Annulment of Judgment given that the very
same decision was still pending appeal before this Court in G.R. No.
168734 and, thus, was not yet final and executory. In addition, should
the Court of Appeals take cognizance of such a Petition, it could result
in contrary and inconsistent rulings by the appellate court and this
Court.
Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar asseverate that they were
not impleaded as defendants in Civil Case No. 96-4193 where the RTC
rendered its Decision dated 11 January 2001, affecting the rights and
interest of Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar to the subject property. The
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are also no longer available to Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar
because of the extrinsic fraud committed upon them by the Lopez
siblings, Esquivel, Talens, Atty. Angeles, and Atty. Ang Cheng; and of
the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC to take cognizance of
Civil Case No. 96-4193 and to render the 11 January 2001 Decision
therein. Even the Motion for Intervention of Nordec Phils. and Dr.
Malvar in CA-G.R. No. 70200, the appeal of the 11 January
2001 Decision of the RTC, was not allowed by the Court of
Appeals. Therefore, it is neither improper nor premature for Nordec
Phil. and Malvar to file a Petition for the annulment of the said 11
January 2001 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-4193, even
though the said Decision, after being affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals, is now pending appeal before this Court.
Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar additionally argue that the
Court of Appeals resolved the question of procedure in a manner that
was patently not in accordance with the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
particularly, when it held that (1) Rule 47 does not cover the judgment
of the RTC in this particular case; and (2) Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar
still had an adequate remedy in seeking intervention in G.R. No.
167834, the appeal to this Court of the RTC Decision dated 11 January
2001, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
10
Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar insist that since Rules 37, 38
and 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on motion for new trial,
petition for relief, and appeal, respectively, simply mention judgments
or final orders, without making any distinction as to whether or not
the same is final and executory; it should follow that where only the
words judgments or final orders are similarly used in Rule 47 on
annulment of judgments, then such words should be understood to
also refer to all judgments or final orders, regardless of whether they
are final and executory.
The issues and arguments raised by Nordec Phils. and Dr.
Malvar all boil down to the question of whether the Court of Appeals
erred in dismissing their Petition for Annulment of Judgment for being
premature since the judgment sought to be annulled is still the subject
of a Petition for Review before this Court, docketed as G.R. No.
168734, and is not yet final and executory.
The Court answers in the negative.
The ordinary remedies of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration and a petition for relief from judgment are remedies
available only to parties in the proceedings where the assailed
judgment is rendered. In fact, it has been held that a person who was
never a party to the case, or even summoned to appear therein,
cannot make use of a petition for relief from judgment.[52] Indubitably,
Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar cannot avail themselves of the aforesaid
ordinary remedies of motion for new trial, petition for relief from
judgment, or appeal, because they were not parties to the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 96-4193 in which the RTC Decision dated
11 January 2001 sought to be annulled was rendered. Nordec Phils.
and Dr. Malvar also cannot seek the annulment of the 11 January
2001 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-4193.
An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law
independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled
was rendered. The purpose of such action is to have the final and
executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of
litigation. It is resorted to in cases where the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner, and is based on only two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack
of jurisdiction or denial of due process. A person need not be a party
to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that he
can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of
fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected thereby.[53]
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud
lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. Fraud is
regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or
from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon
matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in
which it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud
is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant
prevented a party from having his day in court.[54]
It is, thus, settled that the purpose of a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment is to have the final and executory judgment
set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. If the judgment
sought to be annulled, like in this case, is still on appeal or under
review by a higher court, it cannot be regarded as final, and there can
be no renewal of litigation because the litigation is actually still open
and on-going. In this light, the arguments of Nordec Phil. and Dr.
Malvar that the judgments or final orders need not be final and
executory for it to be annulled must fail.
10
 11

3. Petitioners filed a petition to annule RTC’s decision

This Court, therefore, finds no error in the dismissal by the
Court of Appeals of the Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by A. CLAIM: there was a compromise agreement between
Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar, on the ground of prematurity. Given that petitioners and respondents and they learnt the probate proceeding
the 11 January 2001 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-4193 was only in July 2001
still pending appeal before this Court, the Court of Appeals could not
take cognizance of the Petition for annulment of the same judgment, B. CA’s RULING: petition dismissed
for if it had done so, then it would risk promulgating a ruling which
could be contrary to and inconsistent with the ruling of this Court on 1) no showing that petitioners failed to avail of or resort to
the appeal of the judgment. the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from
judgment, or other appropriate remedies through no fault of their
own

Alaban vs. CA ISSUE: W/N the allowance of the will to probate should be annulled
for failure to mention the petitioners as parties
FACTS:
HELD: No
1. respondent Francisco Provido filed a petition for the
probate of the Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad Provido 1. Probate of a will is considered action in rem
Elevencionado
a. Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee
A. ALLEGATION: he was the heir of the decedent and the named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate may, at
executor of her will. any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having
jurisdiction to have the will allowed.[36] Notice of the time and place
B. RTC’s RULING: allowed the probate of the will and for proving the will must be published for three (3) consecutive weeks,
directed the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent in a newspaper of general circulation in the province,[37] as well as
furnished to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and
2. Petitioners after 4 months filed a motion for the reopening devisees of the testator
of the probate proceedings
b. Petitioners became parties due to the publication of the
A. CLAIMs: notice of hearing

1) they are the intestate heirs of the decedent. 2. The filing of motion to reopen is similar to a motion for
new trial
2) RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition due to
non-payment of the correct docket fees, defective publication, and a. The ruling became final and executor because the motion
lack of notice to the other heirs. was filed out of time

3) will could not have been probated because: b. Given that they knew of the decision 4 months after they
could have filed a petition for relief from judgment after the denial of
A) the signature of the decedent was forged; their motion to reopen.

B) the will was not executed in accordance with law, that is, 3. petition for annulment of judgment must still fail for
the witnesses failed to sign below the attestation clause; failure to comply with the substantive requisites,

C) the decedent lacked testamentary capacity to execute and a. An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law
publish a will; independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled
was rendered
D) the will was executed by force and under duress and
improper pressure; b. PURPOSE: to have the final and executory judgment set
aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation.
E) the decedent had no intention to make a will at the time
of affixing of her signature; and c. 2 Grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial
of due process
F) she did not know the properties to be disposed of, having
included in the will properties which no longer belonged to her. d. An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud
lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character
B. RTC’s Ruling: denied motion
i. Extrinsic if it prevents a party from having a trial or from
1) petitioners were deemed notified of the hearing by presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon
publication and that the deficiency in the payment of docket fees is matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in
not a ground for the outright dismissal of the petition. which it is procured.

2) RTC’s Decision was already final and executory even 4. notice is required to be personally given to known heirs,
before petitioners’ filing of the motion to reopen legatees, and devisees of the testator
11

a. the will states that the respondent was instituted as the
sole heir of the decedent thus he has no legal obligation to mention
petitioners in the petition for probate or personally notify them
Triumph International vs. Apostol and Opulencia
FACTS:
Respondent Apostol was hired as assistant manager by petitioner
Triumph International (Phils.), Inc. (TIPI) in March 1991, and was
terminated by TIPI on 21 January 2000. On the other hand,
respondent Opulencia was hired as a warehouse helper by TIPI
sometime in 1990, and was the company‘s warehouse supervisor at
the time of the termination of his employment on 21 January 2000.
Apostol was the immediate superior of Opulencia. On 14 and 15
August 1999, TIPI conducted an inventory cycle count of its direct and
retail sales in its Muñoz warehouse. The inventory cycle count yielded
discrepancies between its result and the stock list balance Sugue
(TIPI‘s Marketing Services Manager) sent a ―show-cause letter‖ to
Apostol, TIPI‘s Assistant Manager-Warehouse and Distribution,
requiring him to explain in writing the negative variance based on the
inventory cycle count.
On 21 January 2000, TIPI, through Sugue, served notices to Apostol
and Opulencia, stating that their employment had been terminated
for committing infractions of the company‘s rules and regulations.
Specifically, Apostol was found to have committed Offense No. 3
(Fraud or willful breach by an employee of the trust reposed in him by
the Company) and Offense No. 25 (Using, uttering or saying profane,
indecent, abusive, derogatory and/or indecorous words or language
against the employer or supervisor), while Opulencia was found to
have committed Offense No. 3 only.
On 28 January 2000, Apostol and Opulencia filed with the Labor
Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries
and other benefits against TIPI.
Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision dismissing the Complaint for lack of
merit.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter.
On 20 February 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment,
reversing and setting aside the NLRC Decision.
MR was filed by the TIPI, but was denied, hence this appeal.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the issues raised by TIPI in this case entail an evaluation
of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, which is
proscribed in a petition for review on certiorari where only
questions of law may be raised.
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals exceeded its jurisdiction when it
reversed the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
RULING:
(1) Respondents refer to Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure
which states:
12
“Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.—A party desiring to
appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other
courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a
verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.”
Applying the above rule, respondents maintain that the instant
petition should be dismissed motu proprio by this Court.
As a general rule, petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure filed before this Court may only raise questions of law.
However, jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions to this rule.
In Almendrala v. Ngo, we have enumerated several instances when
this Court may review findings of fact of the Court of Appeals on
appeal by certiorari, to wit:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises
or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the find ings of fact are conflicting;
(6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the
issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions
of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court;
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent;
(10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence
of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or
(11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.
In this case, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are different
from those of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter. These conflicting
findings led to the setting aside
by the Court of Appeals of the decision of the NLRC which affirmed the
Labor Arbiter. In view thereof, we deem a review of the instant case
proper.
(2) The power of the Court of Appeals to review NLRC decisions via a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 has been settled as early as our
decision in St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC. In said case, we held that
the proper vehicle for such review is a Special Civil Action for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and that the case should be filed
in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine of the
hierarchy of courts. Moreover, it is already settled that under Section
9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902,
the Court of Appeals—pursuant to the exercise of its original
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari—is specifically given the power
to pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve factual
issues. Section 9 clearly states:
“x x x
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct
hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to
resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and
12

appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new
trials or further proceedings. x x x”
However, equally settled is the rule that factual findings of labor
officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within
their jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even
finality by the courts when supported by substantial evidence, i.e., the
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion. But these findings are not infallible.
When there is a showing that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in
disregard of the evidence on record, they may be examined by the
courts.
In this case, the NLRC sustained the factual findings of the Labor
Arbiter. Thus, these findings are generally binding on the appellate
court, unless there was a showing that they were arrived at arbitrarily
or in disregard of the evidence on record. Questioned in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, these factual findings were reexamined and
reversed by the Court of Appeals for being “not in accord with the
evidence on record and the applicable law or jurisprudence.” To
determine if the Court of Appeals’ eexamination of factual findings
and reversal of the NLRC decision are proper and with sufficient basis,
it is incumbent upon this Court to make its own evaluation of the
evidence on record.
Navarro vs. Executive Secretary
Facts:
In 2006, RA 9355, An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands was
passed into law. Petitioners in this case, were former political leaders
in Surigao del Norte whose land area was affected by the creation of
the new province. the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari seeking
to nullify RA 9355 for being void on the ground that the new province
did not meet the statutory requirements for population and land area.
The SC ruled in their favor and proclaimed the said law as
unconstitutional. Thereafter, the Comelec issued Resolution 8970 w/c
was about the upcoming elections. In this resolution, they had 3
scenarios, all of w/c affect the petitioners as political figures in the
region. In 2010, the SC issued an Entry for Judgment, stating that the
decision in this case had become final and executory. Petitioners then
filed an Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment.
Issue:
WON such Motion should be granted and RA 9355 is constitutional.
Held:
Yes and yes. COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 spawned the peculiar
circumstance of proper party interest for movants-intervenors only
with the specter of the decision in the main case becoming final and
executory. More importantly, if the intervention be not entertained,
the movants-intervenors would be left with no other remedy as
regards to the impending nullification of their election to their
respective positions. Thus, to the Courts mind, there is an imperative
to grant the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by movants-
intervenors.
Despite the new province not meeting the requirements for land area
and population, the SC held the creation of the same as valid since the
intention of the framers of the LGC w/c provides the aforementioned
13
requirements, the primary consideration in the creation of a province
is the annual income. Dinagat province showed an income of at
least 4 times more than the legally required 20M. The delivery of basic
services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable.
Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10,
2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot
operate in favor of Dinagats existence as a province, they must be
seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of
becoming a province. This Court should not be instrumental in
stunting such capacity.
Heirs of Maura So vs. Obliosca
FACTS:
Pantaleon Jomoc was the owner of a parcel of land in Cagayan De Oro.
The property was inherited by his heirs including the respondents
(Jomoc Heirs). Jomoc Heirs executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
settlement with Absolute Sale of Registered Land in favor of the
Petitioner (Maura So). 3 of the respondents (Lucila, Abundia and
Elvira) failed to sign the document and the document was not
notarized but, the petitioner still made partial payment for the
property. Petitioner demanded the execution of a final deed of
conveyance but the Jomoc Heirs refused. Petitioner then filed a
Complaint for specific performance against the Jomoc Heirs to execute
and deliver the deed of sale.
FIRST CASE
- A civil case was filed against the Jomoc heirs except for the 3
respondents who failed to sign.
- Jomoc heirs executed again a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with
Absolute Sale of Registered Land in
favor of sps. Lim and the latter intervened in the civil case.
- Trial Court ruled in favor of petitioner.
- CA affirmed RTC’s decision
- Heirs of Jomoc and Sps. Lim filed separate petitions for review with
SC
- SC ruled that the petitioner has better right over the property and
became final and executory on Nov. 25,
1991
- Petitioner filed a motion for execution.
- Respondents opposed because they did not participate in the sale
and are not parties to the case.
- Trial Court granted the motion for execution. Register of deeds
cancelled title of Jomoc Heirs and issued a
TCT in the name of the petitioner.
SECOND CASE
- Jomoc heirs filed a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground
that the Respondents were not parties to
13

the case and are being deprived of their right over the property.
- CA dismissed on the ground that respondents were aware of the
pendency of the case but did not intervene
and that the case is barred by res judicata.
- Respondents filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC but
was denied.
- Resolution became final and executory on June 20, 1994
- Respondents filed a complaint for legal redemption with RTC of
Misamis Oriental praying that they be allowed to exercise their right to
redeem.
- On April 27, 1994, RTC resolved the case in favor of the respondents
ordering the petitioner to allow the respondents to exercise their
substantive right of legal redemption and shares of plaintiff’s co-heirs.
- In a resolution, RTC granted petitioner’s motion of reconsideration.
Respondent moved for MR and RTC issued an order granting
respondent’s MR reinstating previous ruling.
THIRD CASE
- Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with RTC
- RTC denied for failure to show that judgment is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion and for being the
wrong remedy
- Court likewise denied petitioner’s MR
- Minute Resolution became final and executory.
- Petitioner filed with CA a petition for annulment of judgment.
- CA denied.
- CA also denied petitioner’s MR

Hence this petition.
ISSUE/S:
WON annulment of judgment is the proper remedy -- NO
HELD:
The annulment of judgment is only allowed in exceptional cases and
may not be invoked where (1) where the party has availed himself of
the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedy and lost OR (2) where he has failed to avail of
himself of those remedies through his own fault or negligence. Since
the petitioner availed of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45, the remedy of annulment of judgment is no longer available.
The present case is peculiar in the sense that it involves 3 final and
executory judgments.
14
1. This Court's Decision in which upheld the sale of the whole property
by the Jomoc heirs, including the herein
respondents, to petitioner Maura So.
2. The Court's Resolution in which sustained the order of execution of
the said decision against the herein
respondents despite the fact that they were not party-defendants in
the first case.
3. The Court's Minute Resolution which denied Maura So's petition for
review of the RTC Decision granting
respondents' right to redeem the property.
3rd judgment is in conflict with the 2 previous judgments. The ruling
that the respondents remained owners to the land is patently
erroneous because this SC had already pronounced in the first 2 cases
that the whole property had already been sold to Maura So. RTC was
barred from holding otherwise under the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment which precludes the re-litigation of a particular fact already
passed upon by a court.
It behooves the court to set things right in order to prevent a grave
injustice from being committed against Maura So who had, for 15
years since the first decision was executed, already considered herself
to be the owner of the property. The Court is not precluded from
rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to the
doctrine of immutability of final judgments would involve the sacrifice
of justice for technicality.
Petition is granted.
Magaling vs. Ong
Facts:
CA-... which made petitioner Lucia Magaling, together with her
spouse, Reynaldo Magaling,[5] and Termo[6] Loans Credit
Corporation, jointly and severally liable to respondent Peter Ong for
the corporate obligation of the aforenamed corporation as adjudged
in the RTC Decision dated 23 June 1999.
against the spouses Reynaldo Magaling and Lucila Magaling (Spouses
Magaling) and Termo Loans Credit Corporation (Termo Loans).
Complaint alleged that:
Sps. Reynaldo Magaling and Lucila Magaling are the controlling
stockholders/owners of Thermo (sic) Loans and Credit Corp. and had
used the corporation as mere alter ego or adjunct to evade the
payment of valid obligation... defendant Reynaldo Magaling, (sic)
approached plaintiff in his store at Lipa City and induced him to lend
him money and/or his company Thermo (sic) Loans and Credit Corp.
with undertaking to pay interest
Based on the assurance and representation of Reynaldo Magaling,
Peter Ong extended loan to defendants. As of September 1997, the
principal loan extended to defendants stands at P350,000.00...
postdated checks... d... dishonored... ishonored bu
Despite demands, oral and written,... , refused and neglected and still
fail
14

Issues:
From the preceding arguments and counter-arguments, the threshold
issues proper for this Court's consideration are, given the facts of the
case, whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in: 1) making the
Spouses Magaling and Termo Loans jointly and severally liable to Ong
for... the obligation incurred by the corporation;
Ruling:
The petition is not meritorious.
It is basic that a corporation is a juridical entity with legal personality
separate and distinct from those acting for and in its behalf and, in
general, from the people comprising it.
There are times, however, when solidary liabilities... s may be incurred
and the veil of corporate fiction may be pierced
Exceptional circumstances warranting such disregard of a separate
personality are summarized as follows:
When directors and trustees or, in appropriate case, the officers of a
corporation:
(a) vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation;
(b) act in bad faith or with gross negligence in directing the corporate
affairs;
(c) are guilty of conflict of interest to the prejudice of the corporation,
its stockholders or members, and other persons;[41]
When a director or officer has consented to the issuance of watered
down stocks or who, having knowledge thereof, did not forthwith file
with the corporate secretary his written objection thereto;[42]
When a director, trustee or officer has contractually agreed or
stipulated to hold himself personally and solidarily liable with the
corporation;[43] or
When a director, trustee or officer is made, by specific provision of
law, personally liable for his corporate action.[44]
In making the Spouses Magaling co-defendants of Termo Loans, Ong
alleged in his Complaint for Sum of Money filed with the RTC that the
spouses Reynaldo Magaling and Lucia Magaling were the controlling
stockholders and/or owners of Termo Loans, and that they had used
the... corporation to evade the payment of a valid obligation. The
appellate court eventually found the Spouses Magaling equally liable
with Termo Loans for the sum of money sought to be collected by
Ong.
As explained above, to hold a director, a trustee or an officer
personally liable for the debts of the corporation and, thus, pierce the
veil of corporate fiction, bad faith or gross negligence by the director,
trustee or officer in directing the corporate affairs must be...
established clearly and convincingly. Bad faith is a question of fact and
is evidentiary. Bad faith does not connote bad judgment or negligence.
It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
wrongdoing. It means breach of a known duty through some ill...
motive or interest. It partakes of the nature of fraud
In the present case, there is nothing substantial on record to show
that Reynaldo Magaling, as President of Termo Loans, has, indeed,
acted in bad faith in inviting Ong to invest in Termo Loans and/or in
obtaining a loan from Ong for said corporation in order to warrant
his... personal liability. From all indications, the proceeds of the
15
investment and/or loan were indeed utilized by Termo Loans.
Likewise, bad faith does not arise just because a corporation fails to
pay its obligations, because the inability to pay one's obligation is not
synonymous... with fraudulent intent not to honor the obligations.
The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, this Court still cannot
totally absolve Reynaldo Magaling from any liability considering his
gross negligence in directing the affairs of Termo Loans; thus, he must
be made personally liable for the debt of Termo Loans to Ong
In order to pierce the veil of corporate fiction, for reasons of
negligence by the director, trustee or officer in the conduct of the
transactions of the corporation, such negligence must be gross. Gross
negligence is one that is characterized by the want of even slight
care,... acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to
act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious
indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be
affected;[47] and must be established by clear and... convincing
evidence. Parenthetically, gross or willful negligence could amount to
bad faith.[48]
In the case at bar, in their Memorandum filed before the RTC, the
Spouses Magaling argued that "the Amended Complaint did not allege
that Reynaldo Magaling was guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in
directing the affairs of the corporation"; and that respondent
Ong was not able to adduce evidence to offset the effect of the
particular allegation. Hence, they insist that it was unfair for the
appellate court to conclude that Reynaldo Magaling failed to exercise
the necessary diligence in running Termo Loans.
We disagree.
Reynaldo Magaling's gross negligence became apparent, undeniable
and proven during the course of the proceedings in the trial court.
Reynaldo Magaling was the lone witness presented in court to belie
the claim of Ong. On cross-examination, he (Reynaldo Magaling)
clearly and... plainly shed light on how Termo Loans was run under his
aegis... businessman engaged in similar lines of lending company and
being the President, the former President of Themo (sic) Loans, you
had .... you were furnished with final.... with financial statement of the
company... was it not?
A.
I do not remember that, sir.
did not call a meeting of the Directors and other stock holders that
your company is going down?
A.
No more, Your Honor, because no Directors attended the meeting.
Where are now the financial records of the company?
Q.
How about your own personal records
A.
I do not know
Q. Where you tried to retrieve or will you try to retrieve the financial
statement of this company
15

Reynaldo Magaling's very own testimony gave reason for the appellate
court's finding of gross negligence on his part. Instead of the intended
effect of refuting the supposition that Termo Loans was assiduously
managed, Reynaldo Magaling's foregoing testimony only
convincingly... displayed his gross negligence in the conduct of the
affairs of Termo Loans. From our standpoint, his casual manner,
insouciance and nonchalance, nay, indifference, to the predicament of
the distressed corporation glaringly exhibited a lackadaisical attitude
from a top... office of a corporation, a conduct totally abhorrent in the
corporate world.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED.
Accordingly, the assailed 31 August 2005 Decision and 28 June 2006
Amended Decision, both of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
70954, are hereby AFFIRMED.
Valmonte vs. CA
Facts: Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a foreign resident. Petitioners
Lourdes and Alfredo are husband and wife both residents of U.S.A.
Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, who is a member of the Philippine bar,
however, practices his profession in the Philippines, commuting for
this purpose between his residence in the state of Washington and
Manila, where he holds office at Ermita, Manila.
Private respondent Rosita Dimalanta, who is the sister of petitioner
filed an action for partition of real and property and accounting of
rentals against petitioners. She alleged that, the plaintiff is of legal
age, a widow and is at present a resident of Missouri, U.S.A., while the
defendants are spouses but, for purposes of this complaint may be
served with summons at Gedisco Center, Unit 304, 1564 A. Mabini St.,
Ermita, Manila where defendant Alfredo D. Valmonte as defendant
Lourdes Arreola Valmonte’s spouse holds office and where he can be
found. He husband was also her counsel, who has a law office in the
Philippines. The summons were served on her husband.
Petitioner in a letter, referred private respondent’s counsel to her
husband as the party to whom all communications intended for her
should be sent. Service of summons was then made upon petitioner
Alfredo at his office in Manila. Alfredo D. Valmonte accepted his
summons, but not the one for Lourdes, on the ground that he was not
authorized to accept the process on her behalf. Accordingly the
process server left without leaving a copy of the summons and
complaint for petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte.
Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer with
Counterclaim. Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte, however, did not file
her Answer. For this reason private respondent moved to declare her
in default. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte entered a special
appearance in behalf of his wife and opposed the private respondent’s
motion. RTC denied the MR of respondents. CA declared petitioner
Lourdes in default. Said decision was received by Alfredo hence this
petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was validly
served with summons.
Held: NO. There was no valid service of summons on Lourdes. The
action herein is in the nature of an action quasi in rem. Such an action
is essentially for the purpose of affecting the defendant’s interest in a
specific property and not to render a judgment against him. As
petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in
the Philippines, service of summons on her must be in accordance
with Rule 14, § 17. Such service, to be effective outside the
Philippines, must be made either:
16
(1) by personal service;
(2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in
such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a
copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by
registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; or
(3) in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.
In the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte was not done by means of any of the first two modes. This
mode of service, like the first two, must be made outside the
Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign
country where the defendant resides. The service of summons on
petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte was not made upon the order of the
court as required by Rule 14, § 17 and certainly was not a mode
deemed sufficient by the court which in fact refused to consider the
service to be valid and on that basis declare petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte in default for her failure to file an answer.
Secondly, the service in the attempted manner on petitioner was not
made upon prior leave of the trial court as required also in Rule 14, §
17. As provided in § 19, such leave must be applied for by motion in
writing, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his
behalf and setting forth the grounds for the application.
Finally, because there was no order granting such leave, petitioner
Lourdes was not given ample time to file her Answer which, according
to the rules, shall be not less than sixty (60) days after notice.
Trader Royal Bank vs. IAC
Facts: RTC Pasay: Traders Royal Bank Instituted a suit against Remco
Alcohol Distillery, Inc. (REMCO) for the recovery of sum of Php
2,382,258.71 (civil case 9894) Traders obtained a writ of preliminary
attachment directed against the assets and properties of REMCO
Pursuant to the attachment, Sheriff Santiago levied 4,600 barrels of
aged alcohol found within the premises of Remco Inc. La Tondena filed
a third party claim with the Sheriff, claiming ownership over the
property. RTC Pasay: La Tondena filed a complaint-in-intervention in
civil case 9894, alleging that it made advances to REMCO amounting to
Php 3 million which remains outstanding as of date and that the
attached properties are owned by La Tondena. Without foregoing
complaint-in-intervention having passed upon by the Pasay RTC, a
“Motion to Withdraw,” praying that it be allowed to withdraw alcohol
and molasses from REMCO plant, was granted.
Pasay RTC reconsidered its order granting “motion to withdraw” and
declared the alcohol which has not been withdrawn remains in the
ownership of REMCO and denied La Tondena’s motion to intervene. La
Tondena filed a Motion for Reconsideration reiterating its request to
withdraw alcohol from Remco Distillery Plant and they prayed that the
portion of the order declaring REMCO as the owner of the alcohol be
reconsidered and stricken off said order. RTC Bulacan: La Tondena
instituted Civil Case 7003-M, in which it asserted its claim of
ownership over the properties attached in Civil Case 9894 and also
prayed for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction. Traders filed
a motion to dismiss or opposition to the application of writ of
preliminary injunction. La Tondena opposed Traders’ motion to
dismiss.
RTC Bulacan: issued an order declaring La Tondena to be the owner of
the disputed alcohol and granting their application for injunctive relief.
RTC Pasay: issued an order requiring Sheriff Santiago to : (1) enforce
16

the writ of preliminary attachment previously issued by the court and
(2) prevent respondent Sheriff and La Tondena from withdrawing
disputed alcohol and (3) to require them to explain and show cause
why they should not be cited for contempt for withdrawing attached
alcohol. Intermediate Appellate Court: Traders bank filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with application for writ of preliminary
injunction to set aside the order by RTC Bulacan in Civil Case 7003-M
and to compel La Tondena to return the alcohol to their original
location.
IAC dismissed the petition for lack of legal and factual basis, holding
that the Judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
order and the writ of preliminary injunction. Appeal to SC.
Issue/s: Whether or not the Judge of RTC Bulacan acted without
jurisdiction in entertaining Civil Case 7003-M and in authorizing the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction – No
Whether or not the order of the Bulacan court constitutes undue and
illegal interference with the exercise by the Pasay court of its
coordinate and co-equal authority on matters properly brought before
it. –No
Held: The instant petition is hereby dismissed and the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. SP-01860 is affirmed, with
costs against petitioner Traders Royal Bank. The applicable provision is
Section 14, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. The foregoing rule explicitly
sets forth the remedy that may be availed of by a person who claims
to be the owner of property levied upon by attachment which is:
(1) To lodge a third- party claim with the sheriff,
(2) And if the attaching creditor posts an indemnity bond in
favor of the sheriff, to file a separate and independent action to
vindicate his claim (Abiera vs. Court of Appeals, 45 SCRA 314).
This precisely was the remedy resorted to by private respondent La
Tondeñ a when it filed the vindicatory action before the Bulacan Court.
The issue in this case was already decided in Manila Herald Publishing
Inc. vs Ramos which states:
The judge trying such action may render judgment ordering the sheriff
of whoever has in possession the attached property to deliver it to the
plaintiff-claimant or desist from seizing it. It follows further that the
court may make an interlocutory order, upon the filing of such bond as
may be necessary, to release the property pending final adjudication
of the title. Jurisdiction over an action includes jurisdiction over an
interlocutory matter incidental to the cause and deemed necessary to
preserve the subject matter of the suit or protect the parties'
interests.
The rule that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with
the judgments or decrees of a concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction
having equal power to grant the injunctive relief sought by injunction,
is applied in cases where no third-party claimant is involved, in order
to prevent one court from nullifying the judgment or process of
another court of the same rank or category, a power which devolves
upon the proper appellate court . The purpose of the rule is to avoid
conflict of power between different courts of coordinate jurisdiction
and to bring about a harmonious and smooth functioning of their
proceedings
17
Strategic Alliance Development Corp vs. Star Infrastructure
Development Corp.
Petitioner Strategic Alliance Development Corporation (STRADEC) is a
domestic corporation primarily engaged in the business of a
development with principal place of business at Bayambang,
Pangasinan t. Along with five individuals4 and three other
corporations,5 STRADEC incorporated respondent Star Infrastructure
Development Corporation (SIDC) for the purpose of engaging in the
general construction business with the original principal place of
business at Pasig City, then moved to Poblacion Sur, Bayambang,
Pangasinan7 and, later, to Lipa, Batangas. STRADEC fully paid and
owned 49% of the 5,000,000 shares of stock into which SIDC’s
authorized capital stock.
In 2004, respondents Yujuico and Sumbilla, in their
respective capacities as then President and Treasurer of STRADEC,
executed a Promissory Note for and in consideration of a loan in the
sum ofP10,000,000.00 ostensibly extended in favor of said corporation
by respondent Robert L. Wong, one of the incorporators of SIDC.9 As
security for the payment of the principal as well as the stipulated
interests thereon, a pledge constituted over STRADEC’s entire
shareholdings in SIDC was executed by respondent Yujuico on 1 April
2005.10
In view of STRADEC’s repeated default on its
obligations,11 however, the shares thus pledged were sold by way of
the 26 April 2005 notarial sale conducted in Makati City by respondent
Raymond M. Caraos. Having tendered the sole bid of
P11,800,000.00,12 respondent Wong was issued the corresponding
certificates of stocks by respondent Bede S. Tabalingcos, SIDC’s
Corporate Secretary for the years 2004 and 2005, after the transfer
was recorded in the corporation’s stock and transfer book.13
In 2006,Quiambao, in his capacity as President and
Chairman of the Board of Directors of STRADEC, commenced the
instant suit with the filing of the petition before a commercial court in
Batangas City alleging four causes of action, to wit: that respondents
Yujuico and Sumbilla were not authorized to enter into any loan
agreement with respondent Wong, that the auction sale was held in a
wrong venue, that the transfer of STRADED shares in SIDC was made
fraudulently and that the 30 July 2005 annual stockholders meeting
and 20 July 2006 special stockholder’s meeting of SIDC where the
change of principal place of business was approved is invalid pending
determination of the legitimate Board of Directors for STRADEC.
Issue: Whether or not the cause of action of petitioners is an intra-
corporate dispute.
Ruling:
Meritorious.
An intra-corporate dispute is understood as a suit arising
from intra-corporate relations or between or among stockholders or
between any or all of them and the corporation. Applying what has
come to be known as the relationship test, it has been held that the
types of actions embraced by the foregoing definition include the
following suits: (a) between the corporation, partnership or
association and the public; (b) between the corporation, partnership
or association and its stockholders, partners, members, or officers; (c)
between the corporation, partnership or association and the State
insofar as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; and,
(d) among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves. As the
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definition is broad enough to cover all kinds of controversies between
stockholders and corporations, the traditional interpretation was to
the effect that the relationship test brooked no distinction,
qualification or any exemption whatsoever.
However, the unqualified application of the relationship
test has been modified on the ground that the same effectively divests
regular courts of jurisdiction over cases for the sole reason that the
suit is between the corporation and/or its corporators. It was held that
the better policy in determining which body has jurisdiction over a
case would be to consider not only the status or relationship of the
parties but also the nature of the question that is the subject of their
controversy.33 Under the nature of the controversy test, the dispute
must not only be rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate
relationship, but must also refer to the enforcement of the parties'
correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation Code as well
as the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the
corporation.34 The combined application of the relationship test and
the nature of the controversy test has, consequently, become the
norm in determining whether a case is an intra-corporate controversy
or is purely civil in character.
In the case at bench, STRADEC’s first and second causes of
action seek the nullification of the loan and pledge over its SIDC
shareholding contracted by respondents Yujuico, Sumbilla and Wong
as well the avoidance of the notarial sale of said shares conducted by
respondent Caraos.
Applying the relationship test, we find that STRADEC’s first
and second causes of action qualify as intra-corporate disputes since
said corporation and respondent Wong are incorporators and/or
stockholders of SIDC. Having acquired STRADEC’s shares thru the
impugned notarial sale conducted by respondent Caraos, respondent
Wong appears to have further transferred said shares in favor of CTCII,
a corporation he allegedly formed with members of his own family. By
reason of said transfer, CTCII became a stockholder of SIDC and was, in
fact, alleged to have been recognized as such by the latter and its
corporate officers.
Considering that they fundamentally relate to STRADEC’s
status as a stockholder and the alleged fraudulent divestment of its
stockholding in SIDC, the same causes of action also qualify as intra-
corporate disputes under the nature of the controversy test. As part of
the fraud which attended the transfer of its shares, STRADEC distinctly
averred, among other matters, that respondents Yujuico and Sumbilla
had no authority to contract a loan with respondent Wong; that the
pledge executed by respondent Yujuico was simulated since it did not
receive the proceeds of the loan for which its shares in SIDC were set
up as security; that irregularities attended the notarial sale conducted
by respondent Caraos who sold said shares to respondent Wong; that
the latter unlawfully transferred the same shares in favor of CTCII;
and, that SIDC and its officers recognized and validated said transfers
despite being alerted about their defects. Ultimately, the foregoing
circumstances were alleged to have combined to rid STRADEC of its
shares in SIDC and its right as a stockholder to participate in the
latter’s corporate affairs.
Moreover, pursuant to Section 5.2 of Republic Act No.
8799,41 otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code, the
jurisdiction of the SEC over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A has been transferred to RTCs
designated by this Court as SCCs42 pursuant to A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC
promulgated on 21 November 2000.
18
On the issue of venue and jurisdiction, unlike the SEC
which is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, special commercial courts
(SCC) like the RTC are still competent to tackle civil law issues
incidental to intra-corporate disputes filed before them.
Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799 directs merely the Supreme
Court's designation of RTC branches that shall exercise jurisdiction
over intra-corporate disputes. Nothing in the language of the law
suggests the diminution of jurisdiction of those RTCs to be designated
as SCCs. The assignment of intra-corporate disputes to SCCs is only for
the purpose of streamlining the workload of the RTCs so that certain
branches thereof like the SCCs can focus only on a particular subject
matter.
The RTC exercising jurisdiction over an intra-corporate
dispute can be likened to an RTC exercising its probate jurisdiction or
sitting as a special agrarian court. The designation of the SCCs as such
has not in any way limited their jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
of all nature, whether civil, criminal or special proceedings.
At any rate, it cannot be gainsaid that STRADEC correctly
commenced its petition before the RTC exercising jurisdiction over
SIDC’s principal place of business which was alleged to have been
transferred from Bayambang, Pangasinan to Lipa, Batangas.51 It
matters little that STRADEC, as pointed out by respondents, also
questions the validity of the 30 July 2005 SIDC stockholders’ annual
meeting where the aforesaid change in the address of its principal
place of business was allegedly approved. Said matter should be
properly threshed out in the proceedings before the RTC alongside
such issues as the validity of the transfers of STRADEC’s shares to
respondents Wong and CTCII, the propriety of the recording of said
transfers in SIDC’s books, STRADEC’s status as a stockholder of SIDC,
the legality of the 20 July 2006 SIDC stockholders’ special meeting or,
for that matter, Cezar T. Quiambao’s authority to represent STRADEC
in the case at bench.1avvphi1
On the principle that a corporation is a legal entity with a personality
separate and distinct from its individual stockholders or members and
from that of its officers who manage and run its affairs,56 we find that
the other pending actions have little or no bearing to the issues set
forth in STRADEC’spetition which, at bottom, involve the transfer of its
own shareholding in SIDC and its status and rights as such stockholder
Australian Professional Realty vs. Municipality of Padre Garcia
Facts: Fire razed to the ground the old public market of respondent
Municipality of Padre Garcia, Batangas. The municipal government,
invited petitioner Australian Professional Realty, Inc. (APRI) to rebuild
the public market and construct a shopping center. A Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA)2 was executed between petitioner APRI and
respondent, represented by Mayor Gutierrez.
Victor Reyes was elected as municipal mayor of respondent.
Respondent, through Mayor Reyes, initiated a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Memorandum of Agreement with Damages
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosario, Batangas.
The RTC issued an Order declaring petitioners in default and allowing
respondent to present evidence ex parte. The RTC ruled that the
Memorandum of Agreement is hereby declared null and void for being
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contrary to law and public policy and the structures found within the
unfinished PADRE GARCIA SHOPPING CENTER are hereby declared
forfeited in favor of the Municipality of Padre Garcia.
After learning of the adverse judgment, petitioners filed a Petition for
Relief from Judgment. This Petition was denied by the RTC. Petitioners
later filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. Also,
petitioners filed before the CA a Motion for the Issuance of Status Quo
Order and Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The CA issued a Resolution denying the
said motion.
Issue: Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners’ Motion for the Issuance of Status Quo Order and Motion
for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction (Motion for Injunction).
Ruling: NO. The CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Essential
to granting the injunctive relief is the existence of an urgent necessity
for the writ in order to prevent serious damage. A TRO issues only if
the matter is of such extreme urgency that grave injustice and
irreparable injury would arise unless it is issued immediately. Thus, to
be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioners must show that (1) there
exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right is
directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of
the right is material and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable
damage.
In this case, no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the
CA. This is so because APRI has no clear legal right. A perusal of the
Motion for Injunction and its accompanying Affidavit filed before the
CA shows that petitioners rely on their alleged right to the full and
faithful execution of the MOA. However, their rights under the MOA
have already been declared inferior or inexistent in relation to
respondent in the RTC case, under a judgment that has become final
and executory.23 At the very least, their rights under the MOA are
precisely disputed by respondent. Hence, there can be no "clear and
unmistakable" right in favor of petitioners to warrant the issuance of a
writ of injunction. Where the complainant’s right or title is doubtful or
disputed, injunction is not proper.2
Allgemeine-Bau-Chemie Phils. Vs. Metropolitan Bank
Allgemein filed before Muntinlupa Regional Trial Court a motion for
intervention, with prayer for the annulment of the extra-judicial
foreclosure sale, delivery of title, and damages and for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. (Metrobank) to
consolidate its title and take possession of its properties. The RTC,
however, denied the same.
Hence, Allgemein filed a separate petition for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction with
the Court of Appeals. The CA denied Allgemein‘s prayer for
19
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction for failure to establish a
clear and unmistakable right to the subject properties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court committed grave error in denying
Allgemein‘s prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
HELD:
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action and
hence, the jurisdiction of a court, are the allegations of the complaint
and the character of the relief sought. Allgemein‘s only prayer in CA-
G.R. No. 71217 is “for the preservation of the status quo, that is,
Allgemein, having in possession over the subject properties for several
years, shall retain such possession until the controversy before the
said trial court has been finally resolved and Metrobank be prevented
from taking over such possession.”
Clearly, what Allgemein filed with the appellate court was an original
action for preliminary injunction which is a provisional and extra-
ordinary remedy calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of
things and is availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the
merits of the case can be heard.
An original action for injunction is outside the jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals, however. Under B.P. 129, the appellate court has original
jurisdiction only over actions for annulment of judgments of the RTCs
and has original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, habeas corpus and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or
processes whether or not they are in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Thus, for want of jurisdiction, the petition before the appellate court
should have been dismissed outright.
Cabili vs.Balindog
Facts:
-Complainant Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili (Atty. Cabili) was counsel of the
Heirs of Jesus Ledesma in the latter’s action for damages against the
Mindanao State University (MSU) and others arising from the death of
the late Jesus Ledesma in Civil Case 06-254 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Iligan City, Branch 6.
-The RTC rendered judgment against the defendants, including MSU,
ordering them to pay damages to the Heirs. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision which became final and
executory.
- March 6, 2009 the RTC Branch 6 caused the issuance of a writ of
execution against the defendants. The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) belatedly filed an opposition to the issuance of the writ,
resulting in its denial on the ground of mootness of the motion.
- Meantime, the Sheriff of Branch 6, Sheriff Gerard Peter Gaje, served
a notice of garnishment on MSUs funds with the Land Bank of the
Philippines Marawi City Branch by reason of MSUs failure to obey the
writ.
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- On April 1, 2009, to prevent seizure of its Land Bank deposits that it in the resolution of incidents arising in execution proceedings. Splitting
needed for operations, MSU filed a special civil action of prohibition of jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.
and mandamus with application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and, subsequently, a preliminary injunction - Jurisprudence shows that a violation of this rule warrants the
before the RTC Branch 8, presided over by respondent acting presiding imposition of administrative sanctions.
judge, Judge Rasad G. Balindong, against Land Bank and Sheriff Gaje
- If Sheriff Gaje committed any irregularity or exceeded his authority in
- In its petition, MSU averred that it is a state university, funded by the enforcement of the writ, the proper recourse for MSU was to file a
appropriations law enacted by Congress; that despite OSG opposition motion with, or an application for relief from, the same court which
to the issuance of a writ of execution against it, such writ was issued issued the decision, not from any other court, or to elevate the matter
and Sheriff Gaje garnished upon MSUs deposits with Land Bank, who to the CA on a petition for certiorari. In this case, MSU filed the
in turn gave notice to MSU that it was putting on hold the sum proper motion with the Iligan City RTC (the issuing court), but, upon
ofP2,726,189.90 on its deposit, that this money being government denial, proceeded to seek recourse through another co-equal court
funds, Sheriff Gaje was executing on the same in violation of presided over by the respondent Judge.
Commission on Audit (COA) Circular 2001-002 dated July 31, 2001 and
SC Administrative Circular 10-2000; and that unless restrained, the - It is not a viable legal position to claim that a TRO against a writ of
garnishment of government fund would disrupt MSUs operations. execution is issued against an erring sheriff, not against the issuing
Judge. A TRO enjoining the enforceability of a writ addresses the writ
-After due hearing, Judge Balindong issued a TRO, enjoining Land Bank itself, not merely the executing sheriff. The duty of a sheriff in
and Sheriff Gaje from proceeding with the garnishment of the MSU enforcing writs is ministerial and not discretionary.
deposit with Land Bank. To determine whether the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction was warranted, Judge Balindong heard the
parties and required them to submit memoranda. Instead of
submitting a memorandum, Sheriff Gaje filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that RTC Branch 8 had no jurisdiction to issue an injunction
order against another court of equal rank. Finding merit, on April 28,
2009 Judge Balindong issued an Order, dismissing the petition.
- For having initially taken cognizance of the case and issuing a TRO,
Atty. Cabili filed the present administrative action Judge Balindong for
gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, abuse of
discretion and/or grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of the
judicial service. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found
ground to hold Judge Balindong guilty of gross ignorance of the law for
interfering with the judgment of a co-equal court. It recommended
the imposition of a fine of P40,000.00 on Judge Balindong with a stern
warning against a future offense.

Issue:
WON not Judge Balindong of RTC Branch 8 acted with gross ignorance
of the law when he issued the TRO, pending hearing on the application
for preliminary injunction that enjoined Sheriff Gaje from garnishing
MSUs Congress-appropriated operating funds for the satisfaction of
the judgment of RTC Branch 6 – in effect, violating the Doctrine of
Judicial Stability or Non-Interference

Ruling:
-The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular
orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in
the administration of justice: No court can interfere by injunction with
the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent
jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the
injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of
jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and
renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the
exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all
its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of
ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.

-Where an execution order has been issued is considered as still

pending, so that all the proceedings on the execution are still
proceedings in the suit. A court which issued a writ of execution has
the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors
of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes. To hold
otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction of the appropriate forum

20