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People v. Laoag

charge: murder and rape

victim: Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal (murder) and AAA (rape)

weapon: lead pipe and ice pick

AAA and Jennifer, friends, were walking on their way to apply for work. Suddenly, accused
who was holding a ice pick and lead pipe waylaid them and forcibly brought them to a grassy
area. Without warning, accused struck AAA in the head with the lead pipe. Accused did the
same to Jennifer. Accused then stabbed Jennifer several times with the ice pick. Accused
then turned to AAA. He hit AAA in the head several times more with the lead pipe and stabbed
her on the face. While AAA was in such defenseless position, appellant pulled down her
jogging pants, removed her panty, and pulled up her blouse and bra. He then went on top of
her, sucked her breasts and inserted his penis into her vagina.

AAA explained that she did not try to run away when appellant accosted them because she
trusted appellant who was her uncle by affinity. She said that she never thought he would
harm them.

Defense: alibi (cooking)

RTC: convicted. CA: affirmed.

SC: Affirmed. While we concur with the trial courts conclusion that appellant indeed was the
one who raped AAA and killed Jennifer, we find that appellant should not have been convicted
of the separate crimes of murder and rape. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case
for review on any question, including one not raised by the parties. The facts alleged and
proven clearly show that the crime committed by appellant is rape with homicide, a special
complex crime provided under Article 266-B, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code.

There is no doubt that appellant killed Jennifer to prevent her from aiding AAA or calling for
help once she is able to run away, and also to silence her completely so she may not witness
the rape of AAA, the original intent of appellant.

It is immaterial that the person killed in this case is someone other than the woman victim of
the rape.

In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term homicide is to be understood in
its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on
occasion of the rape. Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of
superior strength and evident premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly
established by the prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime
committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with homicide, the
aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance only.
 2 of 24
People v. Villaflores

charge: Rape with homicide

victim: Marita, 5 y.o.

Marita had been playing at the rear of their residence when her mother Julia noticed her
missing from home. Her parents tried to look for her but to no avail. Julia sought out a
clairvoyant (manghuhula) in an adjacent barangay, and the latter hinted that Marita might be
found only five houses away from their own. Following the clairvoyant’s direction, they found
Marita’s lifeless body covered with a blue and yellow sack inside the comfort room of an
abandoned house about five structures away from their own house. Her face was black and
blue, and bloody. She had been tortured and strangled till death.

There were eyewitness accounts pointing to Villaflores as the perpetrator.

Medical exam shows that Marita had deep lacerations in her hymen caused by a blunt
instrument like a penis.

Defense: alibi

RTC: convicted. CA: affirmed.

SC: Affirmed. The felony of rape with homicide is a composite crime. A composite crime, also
known as a special complex crime, is composed of two or more crimes that the law treats as
a single indivisible and unique offense for being the product of a single criminal impulse. It is a
specific crime with a specific penalty provided by law, and differs from a compound or
complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code

Composite crime:

1. Composition of offenses is fixed by law.

2. Penalty for the specified combination of crimes is specific.
3. A light felony that accompanies a composite crime is absorbed.

Complex/compound crime

1. Combination of the offenses is not specified but generalized.

2. The penalty is that corresponding to the most serious offense to be imposed in the
maximum period.
3. A light felony that accompanies the commission of a complex or compound crime may be
the subject of a separate information.

The phrases by reason of the rape and on the occasion of the rape are crucial in determining
whether the crime is a composite crime or a complex or compound crime. The phrase by
reason of the rape obviously conveys the notion that the killing is due to the rape, the offense
the offender originally designed to commit. The victim of the rape is also the victim of the
killing. The indivisibility of the homicide and the rape (attempted or consummated) is clear and
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admits of no doubt.the legislative intent on the import of the phrase on the occasion of the
rape to refer to a killing that occurs immediately before or after, or during the commission itself
of the attempted or consummated rape, where the victim of the homicide may be a person
other than the rape victim herself for as long as the killing is linked to thae rape, became
evident.

The State must thus prove the concurrence of the following facts, namely: (a) that Villaflores
had carnal knowledge of Marita; (b) that he consummated the carnal knowledge without the
consent of Marita; and (c) that he killed Marita by reason of the rape. The State had proved
the foregoing beyond reasonable through circumstantial evidence.
 4 of 24
People v. Jose Broniola

charge: Rape with homicide

victim: AAA, 13 y.o.

AAA’s body was found already dead, lying on a grassy area near a farm hut owned by
Jhonefer Darantinao. AAA’s body bore several hack wounds, blood oozed from her mouth,
her one hand and one finger were cut off.

Medical exam shows lacerated hymen by a blunt object.

Defense: Denial and alibi (plowing the farm)

RTC: convicted. CA: affirmed.

SC: Affirmed. In rape with homicide, the following elements must concur: (1) the appellant had
carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of
force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on occasion of such carnal knowledge by
means of force, threat or intimidation, the appellant killed a woman. The State had proved the
foregoing beyond reasonable through circumstantial evidence.
 5 of 24
People v. Suansing

charge: Qualified Rape

victim: AAA, with mental disability

AAA was left with Suansing in the latter’s boarding house. Suansing pulled her inside the
room, removed her shoes and panty, told her to lie down on the floor, and inserted his penis
into her vagina without her consent. The genital examination of AAA revealed old hymenal
lacerations. Her psychiatric evaluation also disclosed that she was suffering from mild
retardation with the mental age of a 9 to 12-year old child.

Defense: denial

RTC: convicted but did not consider the allegation in the information “with mental disability”
specific enough. CA agreed.

SC: Affirmed. Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape. A mental
condition of retardation deprives the complainant of that natural instinct to resist a bestial
assault on her chastity and womanhood. For this reason, sexual intercourse with one who is
intellectually weak to the extent that she is incapable of giving consent to the carnal act
already constitutes rape, without requiring proof that the accused used force and intimidation
in committing the act. Only the facts of sexual congress between the accused and the victim
and the latter’s mental retardation need to be proved.

The State had proved the foregoing beyond reasonable doubt.

Absence of fresh lacerations does not negate sexual intercourse. In fact, rupture of the hymen
is not essential as the mere introduction of the male organ in the labia majora of the victim’s
genitalia consummates the crime.

Mental disability was sufficiently alleged in the information. Thus, the rape must be held to be
qualified.
 6 of 24
People v. Cataytay

charge: Qualified Rape (mental retardate)

victim: AAA, 19 y.o., but with a mental age of a 5 y.o.

AAA testified that she was raped by Cataytay who was then a shoe repairman and was given
money therefor. AAA’s mother also testified that AAA was previously a victim of a rape case
by another man. The defense stipulated that the medical report is consistent with a recent
sexual intercourse. DSWD and National Center for Mental Health representatives testified as
to the mental immaturity of the victim.

Defense: alibi (singing karaoke)

RTC: convicted. CA: affirmed.

SC: Affirmed. The Information, as worded, can conceivably comprehend rape under either
paragraph 1(b) or 1(d) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. The phrase deprived of
reason under paragraph 1 (b) has been interpreted to include those suffering from mental
abnormality, deficiency, or retardation. Thus, AAA, who was clinically diagnosed to be a
mental retardate, can be properly classified as a person who is “deprived of reason,” and not
one who is “demented.” In the case at bar, AAA was clinically diagnosed to have mental
retardation with the mental capacity of a seven-year old child. The prosecution and the
defense agreed to stipulate on the conclusion of the psychologist that AAA has a mental
capacity of a child.
 7 of 24
People v. Nerio, Jr.

charge: Rape

victim: AAA, 13 y/o, mental retardate

AAA went missing. She was seen ob board a minibus. Her adoptive parents looked for her.
Her adoptive mother was lead to Nerio’s house whereupon Nerio’s mother said that AAA was
sleeping upstairs. As AAA’s adoptive mother was climbing the stairs Nerio’s mother corrected
herself that AAA was sleeping at the ground floor. Still, AAA’s adoptive mother proceeded
upstairs and to her dismay saw AAA scantily clad sleeping beside a half-naked Nerio, with her
head resting on the latter’s shoulder.

Medical report: hymenal laceration at eleven (11) o’clock position, which appeared fresh and
could not have occurred more than three (3) days.

Defense: denial

RTC: convicted. CA: affirmed.

SC: Affirmed. Carnal knowledge of a woman above twelve (12) years of age but with the
mental age of a child below twelve (12) years, even if she agrees to the same, is rape
because a mental retardate cannot give a valid and intelligent consent to such act. If sexual
intercourse with a child below twelve (12) years of age is rape, then it must follow that sexual
intercourse with a thirteen-year-old girl whose mental capacity is that of a four or seven- year-
old child will likewise constitute rape. The essence of the offense is whether the alleged victim
has the ability to render an intelligent consent, and therefore, could not have been deprived of
the required reason at the time of the sexual congress. Contrary to the assertion of the
defense, the prosecution was able to establish that AAA is indeed a special child. In fact,
Nerio himself said in his direct testimony that he and his family had known from the start that
AAA is a special child.

Nerio argues on appeal that AAA had never been put on the stand. It is true that in rape
cases, the testimony of the victim is essential. However, when the victim is a small child or, as
in this case, someone who acts like one, and thus cannot effectively testify as to the details of
the offense, AAA was not presented to testify in court because she was and there are no
other eyewitnesses, resort to circumstantial evidence becomes inevitable. declared unfit to
fully discharge the functions of a credible witness. The psychologist who examined her found
that her answers reveal a low intellectual sphere, poor insight, and lack of capacity to deal
with matters rationally.
 8 of 24
People v. Obogne

charge: Qualified Rape

victim: AAA, 12 y/o, mental retardate

AAA, while she was playing, accused saw her and asked her to go with him because he
would give her a sugar cane. Accused brought “AAA” to his house and while inside, ‘he
removed her panty, and then inserted his penis into her vagina and he got the knife and then
he took a sugar cane and then he gave it to her and then she went home.’

RTC convicted the accused. The trial court did not consider “AAA’s” mental retardation as a
qualifying circumstance considering that the Information failed to allege that appellant knew of
“AAA’s” mental disability. CA affirmed.

SC: The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found appellant guilty of simple rape
and properly imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 266-B,
par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court correctly ruled that “AAA’s” mental disability
could not be considered as a qualifying circumstance because the Information failed to allege
that appellant knew of such mental condition at the time of the commission of the crime.
 9 of 24
People v. Joson

charge: Rape in relation to R.A. 7610

victim: AAA, 14 y.o., and biological sister of the accused

AAA lives with the accused and the latter’s common-law wife. While the common-law wife
was away, AAA was awakened by the accused undressing her. She tried to struggle but the
accused tightly held her arms. After undressing her, the accused kissed and mounted her.
Accused was able to insert his penis. The accused thereafter wrote AAA an apology.

Defense: alibi (was in Alfonso and not in Dasmarinas, hometown)

RTC: convicted. CA affirmed.

SC: Affirmed. AAA gave a complete account of her ordeal in the hands of her brother.
Prosecution was able to present proof of her minority (birth certificate) at the time the crime
was committed. Her testimony has established all the elements of rape required under Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code. First, appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim. AAA
positively identified her own brother as the assailant. She was likewise unwavering in her
narration that appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. Second, appellant employed threat,
force and intimidation to satisfy his lust. force or violence that is required in rape cases is
relative; when applied, it need not be overpowering or irresistible. That it enables the offender
to consummate his purpose is enough. The parties’ relative age, size and strength should be
taken into account in evaluating the existence of the element of force in the crime of rape. The
degree of force which may not suffice when the victim is an adult may be more than enough if
employed against a person of tender age.

The accused had moral ascendancy over AAA, he being an older brother of the latter.
 10 of 24
People v. Candellada

charge: Attempted Rape and 8 counts of Rape

victim: AAA, 15 y.o., own daughter.

Impregnated AAA. From Davao, AAA and accused moved to Lanao Del Norte. Accused
represented AAA as his wife. She consistently resisted accused’s bestial acts but he
threatened to stab her with a knife. AAA’s baby died four days later after giving birth. AAA
finally mustered the courage to refuse which made the accused angry. The accused then
mauled AAA as a result which rendered the latter unconscious.

Defense: AAA was impregnated by her classmate.

RTC: Acquitted on attempted rape but convicted on the 8 counts of Rape. CA affirmed.

SC: Qualified Rape. For a conviction of qualified rape, the prosecution must allege and prove
the ordinary elements of (1) sexual congress, (2) with a woman, (3) by force and without
consent; and in order to warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the additional elements
that (4) the victim is under eighteen years of age at the time of the rape, and (5) the offender
is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim. The fourth and fifth
elements, minority and relationship, were admitted by accused-appellant during the pre-trial
conference. The existence of the first three elements was established by AAA’s testimony.

It is noteworthy to mention that even if accused-appellant did not use a knife or made threats
to AAA, accused-appellant would still be guilty of raping AAA, for in rape committed by a close
kin, such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it
is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy
takes the place of violence or intimidation.
 11 of 24
People v. Cial

charge: Qualified rape

victim: AAA, 13 y.o.

AAA is a child of BBB and CCC. After CCC died, BBB cohabited with the accused. AAA, then
13 y.o., was residing with the accused. She calls him “papa”. Accused called AAA and told her
to go to her bedroom. Then, accused took off AAA’s shorts and panty and spread her legs.
Accused pulled his pants down and inserted his penis. AAA did not struggle as accused had a
bolo on his waist. After satiating his lust, appellant threatened to kill "AAA" and her family if
she reported the incident to anyone.

AAA’s mother did not believe her when AAA told what happened.

Defense: denial

RTC convicted the accused. CA affirmed.

SC: Affirmed but not qualified. Minority was not proved because the prosecution did not
present the child’s birth certificate during the trial although it was mentioned in the Formal
Offer of Exhibits and attached to the Folder of Exhibits. AAA also does not know her age or
birthday. Relationship was likewise not proven. There was a confusion on the part of the lower
courts if the accused is the common-law husband of AAA’s mother or AAA’s stepfather.
 12 of 24
People v. Lucena, alias “Machete”

charge: 3 counts of rape.

victim: AAA, 17 y.o.

Accused is a Barangay Tanod Volunteer at the time of the commission of the offense.

While AAA was walking and chatting with her friends along a street, two barangay tanods, one
of whom was the accused, approached and informed them that they were being arrested for
violating an ordinance imposing curfew hours. The accused told his companion tanod he will
be the one who would bring AAA to her house. But instead of escorting AAA back to her
house, He subsequently pointed a gun at AAA and commanded her to lie down and to
take off her clothes. The appellant later put the gun down on the ground and inserted his
penis into AAA’s vagina despite the latter’s plea not to rape her. Satisfied, the appellant
stopped. But, after a short while, or after about five (5) minutes, the appellant, once again,
inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina. Thereafter, he stopped. On the third time, the appellant
inserted again his penis into AAA’s vagina. Fulfilling his bestial desire, the appellant stopped
and finally ordered AAA to dress up. The appellant even threatened AAA that he would kill her
should she tell anyone about what happened between them.

RTC convicted. CA affirmed.

SC: Affirmed. Primarily, in reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided with three settled
principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is
difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to
disprove; (2) considering the intrinsic nature of the crime, only two persons being usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3)
the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.

This Court sustains the findings of both lower courts that, indeed, the three insertions into
AAA were in satiation of successive but distinct criminal carnality. Therefore, the appellant’s
conviction for three counts of rape is proper.
 13 of 24
People v. Jumawan

charge: 2 counts of rape (marital)

victim: KKK, accused’s wife

In 1997, accused started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her panties and,
sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was
physically painful for her so she would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her
into submission. In two occasions, accused forced to have sex with his wife KKK even if the
latter refused because her body hurts. Their children already got involved in trying to pacify
their father. The accused even retorted that he can have sex with KKK even in front of their
children because he is the head of the family. The children and KKK, nevertheless, could not
do anything. Accused was able to get want he wanted from KKK.

Defense: alibi; consensual sex being husband and wife; fabricated charges since KKK was
angry that the accused took over the management of the family business.

RTC convicted the accused. CA affirmed.

SC: Affirmed. Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies. Sexual
intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape. This is the clear
State policy expressly legislated in Section 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.

Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms of the
elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal
protection clause. The Constitutional right to equal protection of the laws ordains that similar
subjects should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others; no person or class of persons shall be denied the same
protection of laws, which is enjoyed, by other persons or other classes in like circumstances.
As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape,
as traditionally known; (b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the
perpetrator's own spouse. The single definition for all three forms of the crime shows that the
law does not distinguish between rape committed in wedlock and those committed without a
marriage. Hence, the law affords protection to women raped by their husband and those
raped by any other man alike.
 14 of 24

Ricalde v. People

charge: Rape through sexual assault

victim: XXX, 10 y.o. boy

XXX requested his mother to pick up Ricalde at McDonald’s Bel-Air. Ricalde was 31 y.o. and
a distant relative. After dinner, Ricalde was allowed to spend the night at the victim’s house as
it was late. XXX was awoken by what he felt (pain in his anus; something was inserted in his
anus). XXX saw Ricalde fondled his penis. XXX ran toward his mother to tell what happened.
XXX’s mother armed herself with a knife for self-defense and told Ricalde to leave the house.

RTC convicted the accused. CA affirmed.

SC: Affirmed but must relate it to R.A. 7610. Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-
A is also known as "instrument or object rape,” "gender-free rape,” or "homosexual rape.” The
gravamen of rape through sexual assault is "the insertion of the penis into another person’s
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another person’s genital or anal orifice.”
In People v. Soria, this court discussed that a victim need not identify what was inserted into
his or her genital or anal orifice for the court to find that rape through sexual assault was
committed. We affirm petitioner’s conviction but modify the penalty imposed by the lower
court to the penalty under Article III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610. The fact that XXX
was only 10 years old when the incident happened was established by his birth certificate,
and this was admitted by the defense. His age of 10 years old was alleged in the Information.
The higher penalty under Republic Act No. 7610, as discussed in People v. Chingh, applies in
this case.

Having sex with a 10-year-old is child abuse and is punished by a special law (Republic Act
No. 7610). It is a progression from the Revised Penal Code to provide greater protection for
children. Justice Velasco suggests that this is not so. He anchors his view on his
interpretation that Republic Act No. 7610 requires a showing that apart from the actual
coerced sexual act on the 10-year-old, the child must also be exploited by prostitution or by
other sexual acts. This view is inaccurate on grounds of verba legis and ratione legis.

The first paragraph of Article III, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610 clearly provides that
"children . . . who . . . due to the coercion . . . of any adult . . . indulge in sexual intercourse . . .
are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse." The label
"children exploited in . . . other sexual abuse" inheres in a child who has been the subject of
coercion and sexual intercourse. Thus, paragraph (b) refers to a specification only as to who
is liable and the penalty to be imposed. The person who engages in sexual intercourse with a
child already coerced is liable.

It does not make sense for the law not to consider rape of a child as child abuse. The
proposal of Justice Velasco implies that there has to be other acts of a sexual nature other
than the rape itself that will characterize rape as child abuse. One count of rape is not
enough. Child abuse, in his view, is not yet present with one count of rape.
 15 of 24

This is a dangerous calculus which borders on judicial insensitivity to the purpose of the law. If
we adopt his view, it would amount to our collective official sanction to the idea that a single
act of rape is not debilitating to a child. That a single act of rape is not a tormenting memory
that will sear into a child’s memory, frame his or her view of the world, rob him or her of the
trust that will enable him or her to have full and diverse meaningful interactions with other
human beings. In my view, a single act of sexual abuse to a child, by law, is already
reprehensible. Our society has expressed that this is conduct which should be punishable.
The purpose and text of the law already punish that single act as child abuse.
 16 of 24

Nonito Imbo v. People

charge: Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to R.A. 7610

victim: AAA, 11 y.o., accused’s daughter.

AAA was awakened by the accused, her own father, licking her vagina and mashing her
breasts. AAA immediately shouted for her mother but to no avail.

Defense: fabricated charge of AAA’s mother as she and accused had a fight.

RTC convicted the accused. CA affirmed.

SC: Affirmed. Elements of Acts of Lasciviousness:

1. Offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness

2. Done under any of the following:

(a) by using force or intimidation;

(b) offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
(c) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority
(d) offended party is under 12 years of age

3. Offended party is another person of either sex.

The parties already stipulated on AAA’s minority that she was at the time of the assault under
12 y.o. The details of the testimony on the act establish, even dramatize, the gross incest
during the night in question. The offended daughter narrated that her lecherous father licked
her vagina and mashed her breasts.

We also affirm both lower courts’ ruling on the application of Section 5, Article III of R.A. No.
7610 for the imposable penalty on petitioner. The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5,
Article III of R.A. No. 7610 are:

1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;

2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse; and
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

That petitioner committed Acts of Lasciviousness against AAA is bolstered by Section 32,
Article XIII of the IRR of R.A. No. 7610 which defines lascivious conduct as follows: (T)he
intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast,
inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth of
any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass,
degrade or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation,
lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.
 17 of 24
Garingarao v. People

charge: Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to R.A. 7610

victim: AAA, 16 y.o.

AAA was hospitalized. During the time she was left alone in her room, accused, the nurse on
duty sexually abused her. Accused touched her breast and genitalia and inserted his finger
into her vagina. Accused only stopped when he saw that AAA really had her monthly period.

Defense: denial; fabricated charges due to heated argument between the accused and AAA’s
father.

RTC convicted the accused. CA affirmed.

SC: Affirmed. Prosecution established that the accused touched AAA’s breasts and inserted
his finger into her vagina for his sexual gratification. Accused used his influence as a nurse by
pretending that his actions were part of the physical examination he was doing. Accused
persisted on what he was doing despite AAA’s objections. AAA twice asked the accused what
he was doing and he answered that he was just examining her. The Court has ruled that a
child is deemed subject to other sexual abuse when the child is the victim of lascivious
conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. In lascivious conduct under the coercion
or influence of any adult, there must be some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation
which subdues the free exercise of the offended party’s free will. In this case, Garingarao
coerced AAA into submitting to his lascivious acts by pretending that he was examining her.

Accused insists that he should not be convicted of violating R.A. 7610 because the incident
happened only once. This argument has no legal basis. It is inconsequential that sexual
abuse under R.A. 7610 occurred only once. Section 3(b) of the law provides that the abuse
may be habitual or not.

People v. Dulay (see previous notes)

Bongalon v. People (see previous notes)

 18 of 24

Jabalde v. People

charge: violation of Section 10(a), Article VI, R.A. 7610

victim: Lin J. Bitoon, 8 y.o.

Lin was a Grade 1 student at Cawitan Elementary School of which Jabalde is a teacher. He
was playing langit lupa during recess with his classmates. During the game, he touched the
shoulder of Nova, the accused’s daughter, causing the latter to fall down and wounding her
head. He then helped Nova to stand. A classmate told Jabalde of what happened. Then,
Jabalde arrived and slapped Lin on his neck and choked him. Lin sustained abrasions: 2
linear abrasions 1 cm in length at the right lateral neck; 1 linear abrasions 1 cm in length at
the back of the neck; and 4 minute circular abrasions at the left lateral neck.

Defense: denial, Lin is Jabalde’s grandson; family grudge

RTC convicted the accused. CA affirmed.

SC: Not child abuse under R.A. 7610 but Slight Physical Injuries under Art. 266(2), RPC.

Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the
accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human
being should it be punished as child abuse, otherwise, it is punished under the RPC.

The laying of the hands on Lin was an offshoot of Jabalde’s emotional outrage after being
informed that her daughter's head was punctured, and whom she thought was already dead.
It would be unforeseeable that Jabalde acted with cruelty when prosecution’s witness herself
testified that the abrasions suffered by Lin were just “mildly inflicted.” If Jabalde indeed
intended to abuse, maltreat and injure Lin, she would have easily hurt the 7-year-old boy with
heavy blows. The spontaneity of the acts of Jabalde against Lin is just a product of the
instinctive reaction of a mother to rescue her own child from harm and danger as manifested
only by mild abrasions, scratches, or scrapes suffered by Lin, thus, negating any intention on
inflicting physical injuries.

There was dolo. The positive testimonies of the minor victim Lin that Jabalde slapped him on
his neck and choked him, and that of Ray Ann that she saw Jabalde struck Lin on his neck,
squeezed it and then shouted, "Better that you are able to free yourself because if not I
should have killed you” deserve more credit than Jabalde's own statement that she merely
held Lin still because the latter kept on jumping. The laying of the hands and the utterance of
words threatening the life of Lin established the fact that Jabalde, indeed, intended to cause
or inflict physical injuries on, much less kill, Lin.
 19 of 24
Rosaldes v. People

charge: violation of Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610

victim: Michael Ryan Gonzales, 7 y.o.

Accused is a public schoolteacher. Victim was hurriedly entering his classroon when he
accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher, the accused. who was then asleep on a bamboo
sofa. Accused pinched the victim on his thigh. Then, she held him up by his armpits and
pushed him to the floor. As he fell, victim’s body hit a desk. He lost consciousness. Accused
picked up victim by his ears and repeatedly slammed him down on the floor.

RTC convicted the accused. CA affirmed.

SC: Affirmed. Although the petitioner, as a school teacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan
as her pupil, her infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and
excessive. The boy even fainted from the violence suffered at her hands. She could not
justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment
of him was precisely prohibited by no less than the Family Code, which has expressly banned
the infliction of corporal punishment by a school administrator, teacher or individual engaged
in child care exercising special parental authority.

The CA concluded that the petitioner went overboard in disciplining Michael Ryan. The trial
judge said that the physical pain experienced by the victim had been aggravated by an
emotional trauma that caused him to stop going to school altogether out of fear of the
petitioner, compelling his parents to transfer him to another school where he had to adjust
again. Such established circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner
was guilty of child abuse by deeds that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and
dignity of Michael Ryan as a human being. It was also shown that Michael Ryan’s physical
maltreatment by the petitioner was neither her first or only maltreatment of a child.
Prosecution witness Louella Loredo revealed on cross examination that she had also
experienced the petitioner’s cruelty. The petitioner was also convicted by the RTC in Iloilo City
(Branch 39) for maltreatment of another child named Dariel Legayada. Such previous
incidents manifested that the petitioner had "a propensity for violence.”
 20 of 24
Quimvel v. People

charge: Acts of lasciviousness in relation to Sec. 5(b), Art. III, R.A. 7610

victim: AAA, 7 y/o

Accused was the caretaker of the ducks of AAA’s grandfather. He lived with AAA’s
grandparents whose house was a few meters away from AAA’s house. Accused arrived at
AAA’s house to bring some vegetable viand from AAA’s grandparents. AAA requested the
accused to accompany them for a while while their mother was away. He agreed and
accompanied them. AAA fell asleep but was later on awakened when she senses that the
accused inserted his right hand insider her panty and caressed her private part.

Defense: alibi (attending to ducks)

RTC convicted the accused. CA affirmed.

SC: Affirmed.

1. The elements of Section 5(b) R.A. 7610 were sufficiently alleged in the Information.
To the mind of the Court, the allegations are sufficient to classify the victim as one "exploited
in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse." This is anchored on the very definition of the
phrase in Sec. 5 of RA 7610, which encompasses children who indulge in sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group. Correlatively, Sec. 5(a) of RA 7610
punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution wherein the child is abused
primarily for profit. On the other hand, paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct committed on a child subjected to other sexual abuse. It covers not only a situation
where a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion, intimidation
or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. Hence, the law punishes
not only child prostitution but also other forms of sexual abuse against children. This is
intercourse or lascivious conduct.


This is even made clearer by the deliberations of the Senate. The term "coercion and
influence" as appearing in the law is broad enough to cover ''force and intimidation" as used
in the Information.

2. There need not be a third person subjecting the exploited child to other abuse.

It is immaterial whether or not the accused himself employed the coercion or influence to
subdue the will of the child for the latter to submit to his sexual advances for him to be
convicted under paragraph (b). Sec. 5 of RA 7610 even provides that the offense can be
committed by "any adult, syndicate or group, " without qualification. The clear language of the
special law, therefore, does not preclude the prosecution of lascivious conduct performed by
the same person who subdued the child through coercion or influence. This is, in fact, the
more common scenario of abuse that reaches this Court and it would be an embarrassment
for us to rule that such instances are outside the ambit Sec. 5(b) ofRA 7610.
 21 of 24
It is as my esteemed colleagues Associate Justices Diosdado M. Peralta and Estela M.
Perlas-Bernabe reminded the Court. Ratio legis est anima. The reason of the law is the soul
of the law. In this case, the law of providing special protection to children from all forms of
abuse if the Court were to interpret its penal provisions so as to require the additional element
of a prior or contemporaneous abuse that is different from what is complained of, and if the
Court were to require that a third person act in concert with the would have miserably failed
in fulfilling its lofty purpose accused.

3. The lower courts did not err in finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Not only was the offense committed against a child under twelve (12) years of age, it was
committed when the victim was unconscious, fast asleep in the dead of the night. AAA, then a
minor of seven (7) years, was awoken by the weight of petitioner's leg on top of her and of his
hand sliding inside her undergarment. His hand proceeded to caress her womanhood, which
harrowing experience of a traumatic torment only came to a halt when she managed to
prevent his hand from further touching her private parts.

As regards the second additional element, it is settled that the child is deemed subjected to
other sexual abuse when the child engages in lascivious conduct under the coercion or
influence of any adult. Intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. It is sufficient that
some compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of
the offended party. The law does not require physical violence on the person of the victim;
moral coercion or ascendancy is sufficient.

4. Acts of lasciviousness (Art. 336) has not been repealed by R.A. 8353 or the Anti-
Rape Law.

Sec. 4 of RA 8353 did not expressly repeal Article 336 of the RPC for if it were the intent of
Congress, it would have expressly done so. Rather, the phrase in Sec. 4 states: "deemed
amended, modified, or repealed accordingly" qualifies "Article 335 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, and all laws, acts, presidential decrees, executive orders, administrative orders,
rules and regulations inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of[RA 8353]."

As can be read, repeal is not the only fate that may befall statutory provisions that are
inconsistent with RA 8353. It may be that mere amendment or modification would suffice to
reconcile the inconsistencies resulting from the latter law's enactment. In this case, Art. 335 of
the RPC, which previously penalized rape through carnal knowledge, has been replaced by
Art. 266-A. Thus, the reference by Art. 336 of the RPC to an of the circumstances mentioned
on the erstwhile preceding article on how the crime is perpetrated should now refer to the
circumstances covered by Art. 266-A as introduced by the Anti-Rape Law

It is likewise incorrect to claim that Art. 336 had been rendered inoperative by the Anti-Rape
Law and argue in the same breath the applicability of Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610. If Art. 336 then
ceased to be a penal provision in view of its alleged incompleteness, then so too would Sec.
5(b) ofRA 7610 be ineffective since it defines and punishes the prohibited act by way of
reference to the RPC provision.
 22 of 24
Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem

charge: violation of Section 5, par. E(2), R.A. 9262 (economic abuse/non-support)

victim: Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, 14 y.o.

Norma Del Socorro and Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem married each other. They were
blessed with a son — Roderigo Van Wilsem. But later on, they divorced. Respondent
promised to give monthly support to their son for P17,500. But this never materialzed. Ernst
Van Wilsem remarried in the Philippines. Del Socorro extrajudicially demanded Respondent
for the promised financial support, but to no avail. He was then charged under RA 9262.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss (lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged and
prescription).

RTC granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense with respect to the accused who is an alien. Direct appeal to SC.

SC: Petition meritorious. The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under
family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we
agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as
to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure
to do so.

In the present case, however, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the
Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to
support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that
he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. In view of respondent’s failure
to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual
presumption shall govern. hus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to
support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be
the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children
and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.

Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under
Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support to
petitioner’s son Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support
to the child is considered an act of violence against women and children. In addition,
considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in
petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the
New Civil Code, applies to the instant case.

Not yet presribed. The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A.
No. 9262 is a continuing offense, which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present.
Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.

REMAND to the RTC.

 23 of 24
Dinampling v. People

charge: two counts of violation of Section 5(i) in relation to Section 6(f) of RA 9262.

Dinamling and AAA were on an ongoing five-year relationship and they had 2 common
children (2 and 4). Suddenly, Dinamling started to evict AAA and the children, His reason for
the eviction was that she was allegedly using the place as a "whore house" wherein she
"brought (her) partners." In the past, there were similar incidents that happened between
Dinamling and AAA. Dinamling would hit AAA's head, pull her hair and kick her. Six days later,
another incident occurred. Dinamling punched her at the left ear, which subsequently bled.
Dinamling caught up with her and kicked her until she fell to the ground. On the road,
Dinamling pulled down AAA's pants and panty and shouted at her while people looked on.
Dinamling then threw the pants and panty back at AAA and shouted her family name. AAA
found out she was bleeding and about to miscarry so she was immediately brought to the
hospital. There, she was told that she was 19 weeks pregnant and had an incomplete
abortion. She was hospitalized for four days.

Defense: alibi (police on-duty)

RTC: guilty on both charges. CA affirmed.

SC: Affirmed. the elements of the crime are derived as follows:

1. The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

2. The woman is either the wife/former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the
offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such
offender has a common child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate
or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;
3. The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
4. The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the
children or similar such acts or omissions.

Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or
emotional anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by
the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage
sustained by the offended party. To establish psychological violence as an element of the
crime, it is necessary to show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section
5(i) or similar such acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to
present the testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party. All of this
was complied with in the case at bar.
 24 of 24

People v. Bayabos, et al.

charge: violation of the Anti-Hazing Law (as accomplices)

Balidoy, Jr. was a probationary midshipman at the Phil. Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA).
He was subjected to “indoctrination and orientation period”. He died as a result. Probable
cause was found against Alvarez, et al. for violating the Anti-Hazing Law. They were charged
as principals. The Ombudsman then filed an Information against PMMA’s school officials,
herein respondents, for violating the Anti-Hazing Law as accomplices. The RTC dismissed the
Information against Alvarez, et al. The dismissal attained finality. Now, Bayabos, et al. sought
to quash the Information. They argued that the elements were not all alleged therein. They
also argued that the case against the principal accused had already been dismissed with
finality by the RTC. There being no more principals with whom they could have cooperated in
the execution of the offense, they asserted that the case against them must be dismissed.

The Sandiganbayan agreed with Bayabos, et al. and quashed the Information.

SC: Affirmed.

1. Sandiganbayan erred when it dismissed outright the case against respondents, on the
sole ground that the case against the purported principals had already been dismissed.
The case against those charged as accomplices is not ipso facto dismissed in the
absence of trial of the purported principals; the dismissal of the case against the latter; or
even the latter’s acquittal, especially when the occurrence of the crime has in fact been
established. The corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice, and
accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be
duly established in evidence, the determination of the liability of the accomplice or
accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal.

2. Still, the Information must be quashed. Elements of Hazing:

1) A person is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situation or subjected to physical

or psychological suffering or injury; and
2) These acts were employed as a prerequisite for the person’s admission or entry into an
organization.

In the case of school authorities and faculty members they may nonetheless be charged as
accomplices if it is shown that (1) hazing, as established by the above elements, occurred; (2)
the accused are school authorities or faculty members; and (3) they consented to or failed to
take preventive action against hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof.

The indictment merely states that psychological pain and physical injuries were inflicted on
the victim. There is no allegation that the purported acts were employed as a prerequisite for
admission or entry into the organization. Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would prevent
the successful prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or
as accomplice, for the crime of hazing.