Letting the Sunshine in: Has Analysis Made Aesthetics Clear?

Author(s): Anita Silvers

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 46, Analytic Aesthetics (1987),
pp. 137-149
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/431271
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 ANITA SILVERS

Letting the Sunshine In: Has Analysis

Made Aesthetics Clear?

IN THE MIDDLE of the twentieth century, some to make a positive impact on art studies. Nev-
analytic philosophers set out to rescue aesthet- ertheless, the failure of the analytic program to
ics from dreariness. Although it would be an influence art studies contrasts not only with the
exaggeration to think of them as a self-con- profound influence of those whom the analytic
aestheticians sought to reform-for instance,
scious movement, as were the logical positivists
of the Vienna Circle, it is not difficult to Wordsworth, Tolstoi, and Bell-but also with
reconstruct the program to which they generally
the influence attained by their programmatic
adhered in their attempt to rescue and enliven successors like Nelson Goodman (on arts edu-
aesthetics. The body of work which I take to cation), Arthur Danto (on postmodern art criti-
announce and to exemplify the program was cism), and Jacques Derrida (on literary theo-
published in a period of about fifteen years, ry)2 Nevertheless, it might be said that analytic
from 1946 through 1962, in England and Amer- aesthetics provided reforms from which more
ica.' Much fine work in philosophical aesthetics substantive developments could evolve. In this
was done subsequently, some more and some essay, I want to explore whether the reforms of
less obviously addressed to the issues raised by the analytic aestheticians were beneficial, or
the program and responsive to the program's whether their program was defective at its core.
standards and objectives. But in reconstructing Did the analytic program revive aesthetics?
the theses characteristic of the program, it is not Did it succeed on its own terms? Did it at least
necessary to examine more than a representa- initiate reforms from which more substantive
tive sample of the exemplary, influential work improvements evolved? Or was it nothing more
done during this fifteen-year post war period. than a sterile interlude? Resolving these ques-
In fact, the program succeeded in some tions is of more than mere historical interest, for
respects, and aesthetics seems less dreary to- the failure of a philosophical program can be as
day. Ironically, what dreariness remains is instructive as its success. By discovering how
blamed by some on the very techniques which such a program was meant to operate and what
the analysts promoted. When the analytic it was meant to achieve, and then by observing
aestheticians sought to cleanse their domain of what promoted and what impeded it, philoso-
obscurity, the charge goes, they failed to rec- phy gains a firmer grasp of its own purpose and
ognize that the activities they promoted were philosophers are aided in perfecting their craft.
drearier than those they sought to extirpate. To reconstruct the program of analytic aes-
With probably only one single exception, thetics, I rely on three sources3: the collection of
that being Wimsatt and Beardsley's "The essays titled Aesthetics and Language,4 the col-
Intentional Fallacy, " historians and critics of lection of essays edited by Joseph Margolis and
the arts treated the work of the analytic titled Philosophy Looks At the Arts,' and a report
aestheticians at best as irrelevent, but some- by Arnold Isenberg titled "Analytical Philoso-
times as malevolent. Of course, the concern phy and the Study of Art."6 The earliest essay
that such negative reactions provokes depends is Beardsley and Wimsatt's "The Intentional
on whether philosophical aesthetics is expected Fallacy," originally published in 1946 and in-
cluded in Margolis; the most recent is Charles
ANITA SILVERS is professor of philosophy at San Stevenson's "On the Reasons That Can Be
Francisco State University. Given for the Interpretation of a Poem," which

? 1987 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

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 138 S I
appeared for the first time in the Margolis
collection in 1962. The full text of the Isenberg
report has never been published, although ex-
cerpts from it appear in the posthumous collec-
tion of Isenberg's writings.7
That one of the earliest of these sources-
Isenberg's report-was influential despite never
being published in full is evidenced by the
introduction Elton wrote for his own volume.
Elton concludes a lengthy paragraph, in which
he repeats others' charges that aesthetics is
abundantly confused, barren, dull, boring,
largely bogus, and desolate, with a direct quo-
tation from Isenberg's report, which he de-
scribes as having been privately circulated in
1950 and in which Isenberg refers to the
"present stone age of aesthetics."8 The report
also is footnoted by Vincent Tomas, in an essay
first published in 1952 and subsequently in-
cluded in the Margolis collection.9
To reconstruct the program of "analytic
aesthetics" from these sources in no way is to
assess the essays collected in them as the best or
most important examples of analytic aesthetics.
Many well-known names and influential arti-
cles are not included.'0 But there is an advan-
tage in using these anthologies as sources from
which to derive the salient characteristics of the
program. The essays they contain were selected
both to exemplify and to promote the analytic
approach to aesthetics. The editors of both
collections proclaim this. Moreover, very many
of the authors of the essays in both collections
refer to what they conceived of as the work of
their programmatic predecessors, and they also
cite work written by their contemporaries which Subsequently, Isenberg analyzes a passage of
they take to be programmatically connected
with their own. Consequently, it is fair to view
these collections as the primary source books
for analytic aesthetics, which is how they were
viewed by students in the 1960s."1
In diagnosing the causes of drearinesses in
aesthetics, the source writings converge in ad-
vocating the reformation of aesthetics as guided
by three theses. Although these are related to
each other, none entails any of the others. Here
is the first and most general directive.
1. Aesthetics must be reformed by replacing
its typically obscure and confused ideas with
clear ones.
How is this thesis applied? W. B. Gallie,12
for instance, demonstrates the method he pro-
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L V E R S
poses by analyzing Wordsworth's Preface to the
1815 Edition of the Lyrical Ballards to expose
what he thinks of as contradictions and confu-
sions. Gallie assesses the Preface (and the
Essay Supplementary of the same year) as
"great"; nevertheless he applies his "logical
tools" to reveal how Wordsworth gets himself
"into a muddle." He does not, however, blame
Wordsworth as much as pity him. That is,
Gallie diagnoses the contradictions into which
he thinks Wordsworth falls as faults resulting
from Wordsworth's lack of logical sophistica-
tion in treating the complex aesthetic phenom-
ena he was aesthetically sensitive enough to
recognize. Wordsworth's observations are valu-
able, Gallie admits, but their value is obscured
by Wordsworth's apparently contradicting him-
self by suggesting both that the processes of
imaginative abstraction necessarily falsify and
also provide us with new truths.
This theme is encountered as well in "The
Intentional Fallacy."
Certainly it need not be with a derogatory purpose that
one points out personal studies, distinct from poetic
studies, in the realm of literary scholarship. Yet there is
danger of confusing personal and poetic studies.'3
Isenberg sounds a similar note by saying,
The best thing that philosophy can do for the art
studies is to bring some clarity to those issues with
which modem criticism is rife-which have arisen
"naturally," as it were, out of recent aesthetic
preoccupations. 14
criticism of Hamlet and comments:
Broad remarks about the fundamental purpose of criti-
cism, narrow rules of thumb which have been useful to
the author in his work, a few objections to prevailing
practices among contemporaries, a few intelligent sug-
gestions as to paths of thought that deserve to be
opened up, some ideas of theses that belong in the field
rather than in an essay about it, some inconclusive
examples (often minutely analyzed) which are sup-
posed to prove general principles about the distinction
between creativity and criticism or the relation of art
and knowledge or the bearing of historical erudition
upon critical judgment-all these are scrambled to-
gether with a fine disregard for logical order and
coherence. .
The same topics, in the hands of persons trained in
logical analysis, could be treated with unexampled
clarity and rigor.'
 Letting the
Deploring confusion and advocating the in-
creased clarity afforded by applying logical
tools lead analytic aesthetics to a second char-
acteristic thesis.
2. Aesthetics must be reformed by prohibit-
ing the practice of generalizing insights
gained from experience of particular art-
works and then expecting the generalizations
to function as rules in aesthetic arguments.'6
This message runs throughout. It is an out-
come of the injunction to be clear. Of the murky
phenomena of aesthetic discourse, the analytic
aestheticians find the field's unrequited en-
chantment with formulating rules among the
most obscure. Noticing that what passes for
aesthetic rules or principles systematically falls
short of success, they suspect that to argue
aesthetically by appealing to generalizations is
to masquerade.
In "Logic and Appreciation," Stuart Hamp-
shire concludes,
when in Aesthetics one moves from the particular to the
general, one is travelling in the wrong direction.'7
And, in "Arguments Used By Criticism of
the Arts," Margaret Macdonald writes:
But to attempt to legislate for art is to invite successful
infringement of any law, as the 'Unities" showed.
Criticism is, therefore, I suggest, an indefinite set of
devices for 'presenting" not "proving" the merits of
works of art. It has none of the stability of logical truth,
scientific method, legal and moral law. '
In "Critical Communication," Arnold
Isenberg writes:
Is it reasonable to expect better evaluations of art after
a thousand years of criticism than before'? . . . I think
we have already numerous passages which are not to be
corrected or improved upon. And if this opinion is
right, then it could not be the case that the validation of
critical judgments waits upon the discovery of aesthetic
laws. . . . We are not more fully convinced in our own
judgment because we know its explanation; and we
cannot hope to convince an imaginery opponent by
appeal to this explanation, which by hypothesis does
not hold for him.'9
And in "the Interpretation of a Poem,"
Charles Stevenson writes,
The inconclusiveness of the reasons mentioned (and
they are inconclusive even when used collectively)
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Sunshine In 139
suggest that they are not premises in an argument that
is strictly deductive.20
The formulations of the various versions of
this thesis are developed by the analytic
aestheticians in the process of clarifying the
way aesthetic discourse actually functions. In
his or her own way, each notes how claims
which typically might be taken as aesthetic
principles, or as resting on aesthetic principles,
never enjoy results compatible with their func-
tioning as major or minor premises in sound
arguments. Where someone proposes to gener-
alize from the properties which seem respon-
sible for value or meaning in the case of one
work or one small group of works of art, the
generalization fails to create conclusive convic-
tion when applied beyond the initial case.
Although some proportion of failure, even a
high one, could pass without remark, the cate-
gorical inability of aesthetic debate to achieve
the force of sound argument indicates to the
aesthetic analysts that aesthetics is systemati-
cally and profoundly confused.
A special source of confusion lies in what
analytic aesthetics takes as the traditional cause
of misguided generalization-the desire to be
definitive about art.2' This diagnosis leads to a
third characteristic thesis, the only one of the
three addressed not to aesthetic discourse only
but also to art itself.
3. Aesthetics must be reformed by recogniz-
ing that art admits of no essential properties.
The most influential of the essays pursuing
this thesis is Morris Weitz's "The Role of
Theory in Aesthetics." Here is a sketch of the
position to which so many of Weitz's successors
felt called upon to respond.
Theory has been central in aesthetics and is still the
preoccupation of the philosophy of art. Its main
avowed concern remains the determination of the
nature of art which can be formulated into a definition
of it. .
In this essay I want to plead for the rejection of this
problem. I want to show that theory-in the requisite
classical sense-is never forthcoming in aesthetics,
and that we would do much better as philosophers to
supplant the question, "What is the nature of art'? " by
other questions, the answers to which will provide us
with all the understanding of the arts there can be...
Aesthetic theory-all of it-is wrong in principle in
thinking that a correct theory is possible because it
radically misconstrues the logic of the concept of art.
 140 S I L V E R S

Its main contention that "art" is amenable to real or One picture is good for one sort of thing, and another
any kind of true definition is false.22 for something quite different. . . . We praise the
brightness and clarity of an Impressionist painting, but
do not condemn a Rembrandt for lacking those quali-
And in "The Dreariness of Aesthetics,"
ties. It is clear that we look for something different in
J. A. Passmore remarks: each case. . . . And how do we praise a realistic
picture? We say that the artist has caught the exact
Woolliness of this sort seems to have a natural habitat pose, the kind of thing one might see at any moment.
in certain fields. . Why should these particular fields And the very banality of that pose (in the case of Degas)
be thus distinguished by so fine an array of empty is a merit. But we do not condemn Botticelli because
formulae? . we fail to meet his goddesses and nymphs as we walk
The woolliness of education, of sociology, of meta- through the street. On the contrary, we praise him for
physics, is understandable, then, as arising out of the imagination of the ideal. And we praise him for his
attempt to impose a spurious unity on things, the flowing rhythm, but do not condemn Byzantine art for
spuriousness being reflected in the emptiness of the being rigid, nor Cezanne for being ponderous.25
formulae in which that unity is described. We can easily
understand the passions which lie behind this anxiety to Within the program of analytic aesthetics, the
reconcile. But why should the same sort of thing futility of proposing categorical rules for judg-
happen in aesthetics?23 ing or understanding art is not explained in
terms of the nature of art, or of aesthetic
What justifies the program's directions for experience. Earlier philosophers who arrived at
reform? In general, the analysis starts with an analogous conclusions, such as Kant, Col-
observation that form apparently does not fulfill lingwood, or Dewey, were inclined to appeal to
function. The development of the second thesis, ontological or epistemological considerations to
prohibiting generalizations which take the form support and inform their opposition to aesthetic
of rules, provides a good illustration of how this rules. But, of the analytic aestheticians, it is
process works. Margaret Macdonald, I think, who forges fur-
In formulating this position, Isenberg and thest beyond appealing simply to "what we say
Macdonald contend that, although critical dis- and do" when we talk about art when she insists
course contains expressions that have the form that:
of major premises, these expressions do not
function successfully in that capacity.24 Then it It is often said that a great artist is reinterpreted in every
is assumed that the mismatch of function and age and no doubt by some of these interpretations he
form results in dysfunction, which in turn would be much astonished. Yet even the apparently
bizarre interpretations are often illuminating. It seems
explains why aesthetics seems incapable of
to follow that interpretation is partly subjective inven-
escaping dreary futility. Thus, Macdonald, tion, but about this there could be endless argument of
Isenberg, and others rely on their readers agree- the sort that would hardly be necessary about the
ing with them that not only has there never been description of a chair or horse, except perhaps in
extreme borderline cases. Certainly, the critic claims to
a successful categorical principle of art, but also
be interpreting the work, not supplying his own fan-
that no sophisticated person expects there to be cies. But the work is what it is interpreted to be, though
such. They deplore aesthetics' history of pursu- some interpretations may be rejected. There seems to
ing such principles-a kind of activity which to be no work apart from some interpretation.26
them is not merely futile, but, worse, is patently
so. Macdonald here begins by referring to the
Having noted that expressions possessing the discourse "It is often said that . . ." and
form of aesthetic rules or principles fail to "about this there could be endless argument of
perform according to form, it remains for con- the sort that would hardly be necessary about
tributors to the program both to explain why and
the description of a chair." However, she
to recommend an appropriate remedy. Different continues by making an epistemological claim
ways of accounting for this phenomenon are to the effect that we interpret artworks whereas
offered. These typically are claims about how we only describe chairs, and an ontological
critical discourse functions. For instance, in claim to the effect that artworks exist only as
"The Use of 'Good' in Aesthetic Discourse" interpretations. This is atypical for analytic
Helen Knight appeals to what we do and do not aestheticians, who characteristically operate as
say. if it is easier to substantiate claims about how

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 Letting the
critical discourse works (that is, about how we
talk) than claims about what art objects really
are (that is, about what we talk about) and how
we can know them.
Compare this with Paul Ziff's approach in
"Art and the 'Object of Art' " in the same
volume,27 wherein Ziff proposes to dissolve
such claims by showing that the seemingly
incompatible attributions which lead some phi-
losophers to accord special status to art objects
should be explained not epistemologically or
ontologically, but, instead, by noticing that we
employ these attributions in different discourses
suited for and used in quite different contexts.
Ziff proposes that so-called incompatible attri-
butions can be treated by understanding that the
discourses in which they are embedded belong
to different families that are, if not incommen-
surable, then at least disassociated from each
other. Consequently, these attributions are not
inconsistent with each other, and one need not
save appearances by explaining that art ob-
jects are illusory or otherwise ontologically
mysterious.
To what extent does the sort of account
favored by the analysts explain why aesthetic
discourse is dysfunctional? Since the most typ-
ical strategem of the analytic aestheticians is to it by imposing inappropriate models.
draw attention to actual practice and to specu-
late cautiously on what such practice can and
cannot achieve, their explanations tend to lay
the blame for confusion on the doorstep of
inflated expectations. We are tricked by attend- . . .music criticism, etc.28
ing to the form of expressions rather than to
their use, they say. As a result, we expect
aesthetic discourse to function more powerfully
than it can do.
On the program of analytic aesthetics, such
mistakes must be rectified once their cause has
been clarified. But revealing a source of an
error does not necessarily disclose its remedy.
And the technique used by the analytic
aestheticians to diagnose aesthetics' problems
creates a particular puzzle about where the
solution lies.
To dispel obscurity, we are directed to ob-
serve practice carefully, to lower our expecta-
tions, and not to seek results beyond what actual
practice has shown it can attain. On this pro-
gram, then, existing practice sets the standard.
But if existing practice is the standard, and
existing practice also is obscure, against what
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Sunshine In 141
standard should existing practice be reformed?
Here, the analytic program's most general
directive appears to take precedence. If, in
practice, aesthetic discourse is beclouded be-
cause form and function typically are mis-
matched, clarity must be imposed rigorously.
To dispel confusion, either the form of the
discourse should change to suit its functions, or
its functions must be revised to more appropri-
ately make use of its form.
But to urge such change must be to advocate
that practice be changed. That is what the theses
which constitute the analytic aestheticians' pro-
gram advise. Presumably, this advice derives
either from considerations internal to practice,
or else from grounds logically prior to, or more
fundamental than, practice itself. We also can
presume that the source of the program's direc-
tives ultimately affects how serviceable the
advice they offer turns out to be.
It is typical of analytic aesthetics that the
reasons given for reforming practice are consid-
erations drawn from practice itself. Passmore
addresses the issue characteristically. His
whistle-blowing is motivated by the suspicion
that dreariness engulfs aesthetic discourse just
when those who engage in the discourse distort
. . .it seems to me possible at least that the dullness of
aesthetics arises from the attempt to construct a subject
where there isn't one.... perhaps the truth is that there
is no aesthetics and yet there [is] . literary criticism,
But how to identify the appropriate model?
Weitz suggests that criticism works by favor-
ably recasting features which previously have
been considered either as unimportant or as
defects of the discourse.
But what makes them-these honorific definitions-
so supremely valuable is not their disguised linguistic
recommendations; rather it is the debates over the
reasons for changing the criteria of the concept of art
which are built into the definitions. In each of the great
theories of art, whether correctly understood as honor-
ific definitions or incorrectly accepted as real defini-
tions, what is of the utmost importance are the reasons
profered in the arguments for the respective theory, that
is, the reasons given for the chosen or preferred
criterion of excellence and evaluation. It is this peren-
nial debate over these criteria of evaluation which
makes the history of aesthetic theory the important
study it is. . . Thus, the role of the theory is not to
 142 S I L V
define anything but to use the definitional form, almost
epigrammatically, to pin-point a crucial recommenda-
tion to turn our attention once again to the plastic
elements in painting.29
Isenberg adopts the same approach. He tries
to explain why we think we are giving critical
reasons when we actually are not giving critical
reasons at all. He proposes that the critic uses
the locutions we call reasons to direct percep-
tion of works of art.
I have perhaps overstressed the role of the critic as
teacher, i.e. as one who affords new perceptions and
with them new values. . . it often happens that there
are qualities in a work of art which are, so to speak,
neither perceived nor ignored but felt or endured....
Suppose it is only a feeling of monotony, a slight
oppressiveness, which comes to us from the style of
some writer. A critic then refers to his "piled-up
clauses, endless sentences, repetitious diction." This
remark shifts the focus of our attention and brings
certain qualities which had been blurred and marginal
into distinct consciousness.30
In his report to the Rockefeller Foundation,
Isenberg addresses the question of reform sys-
tematically. He justifies the reform of aesthetics
and provides detailed commentary about who
should do it and how it should be done. It is
interesting that this report was submitted after So
the article "Critical Communication" was writ-
ten and published, so Isenberg was experienced
with analysis which criticizes one account of a
critical practice and then substitutes another,
more plausible account. But such an approach
is noticeably absent from the Rockefeller
report.
In the 1949 essay, Isenberg analyzes the use
of expressions which appear to be, but do not
meet the criteria for being, reasons, proposing
that these expressions function instead to direct
immediate attention to properties that are re-
warding to perceive. In fact, Isenberg's has
proven to be one of the most successful of such
alternative accounts produced by analytic aes-
thetics. It has shown itself to be much more
durable than, for example, Stevenson's analo-
gous attempt to account for the practices of
interpretation. Curiously, in contrast to the
1949 essay, in the 1950 Rockefeller Foundation
report Isenberg displays hardly any concern for
explaining critical practice. But he does not
hesitate to call vigorously for the reform of
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E R S
critical practice and to propose confidently how
improvement may be brought about.
What is to be reformed, and how is the
reform to be effected? Isenberg begins by rec-
ommending that philosophers and critics should
acquire expertise in each other's fields.
I believe we may say that the best work in the field is
to be done, if it is done at all, by young and unknown
people. These people will appear if and when graduate
students become convinced that aesthetics is worth
studying. Analytically minded students of philosophy
nowadays try to learn something about sciences such as
mathematics or psychology. When they believe that
criticism and art history also deserve their attention,
when students of literature come to feel that they must
go far into logic and philosophy, there will be some
prospect of advances in aesthetics. ... The subject,
analytical aesthetics, remains largely to be created.)3'
Nevertheless, as Isenberg's proposals unfold,
it turns out that little hope lies in expanding the
philosophical competence of even very young
and unformed historians and critics of the arts.
. . this attitude is, in my judgment, typical of the
critic or scholar turned philosopher. His reflections
upon method are struck off as by-products of his daily
occupation. They contain a mixture of considerations
of different type or level. The shop talk of the craftsman
is confused with the theory of the craft....3'
we must turn to rigorously trained philoso-
phers, whose education and interests need only
be broadened.
For logical analysts, however, the danger lies in lack of
familiarity with the concrete subject-matter and its
problems, leading to an excessive abstractness. Even
today there are some good ideas in theoretical aesthet-
ics which are ignored by critics and historians because
of their forbidding dryness, their apparent lack of
relevance to practical pursuits. A thorough acquain-
tance with the rich though incoherent reflections of men
working in the mines are the corrective to this philo-
sophical remoteness."
How expert in art studies need an analyst be?
An analysis is usually tested against the "denotation"
of the concept that is being analyzed. . . It follows
that the analyst must be at least aware of the chief
specific values that are denoted by the term or idea he
is analyzing. Now among the important concepts of the
art studies are some which have arisen in the process of
critical evaluation and which therefore denote values as
well as facts. The analyst should know these values. He
should know, for example, that Tennyson is considered
a skillful manipulator of verse rhythms and phonetic
 Letting the Sunshine In 143

harmonies, and why he is so considered-if he wishes above passages, and others, that criticism can
to clarify the critical use of the term "technique." . . .
advance toward truth, greater objectivity, pre-
But if, as often happens, he tries to explain what is
meant by "good color" in the criticism of painting by
cision, generality, and comprehensiveness. The
means of examples drawn from the worst colorists, latter objectives are noteworthy in view of the
then (at the very least) he confuses his treatment of a position he takes earlier in "Critical Com-
normative concept by raising distracting controversies munication." Complicating the puzzle is the
at the primary level.34
inclusion in the Rockefeller report of comments
such as the following:
What is it that the analyst, able to approxi-
mate if not equal the art scholar or critic in
knowledgeable perception and delicate discrim- Today we have a small body of remarks of piercing
ination, is expected to do about art studies? brilliance about the nature of poetry, bequeathed to us
by writers like Goethe, Coleridge, DeQuincey, Valery.
These insights were usually the fruits of a close
We can at once draw a conclusion for the theory and
meditation not on Poetry itself but on poems in partic-
practice of criticism. A good theory of criticism should
ular: they were flung out as a sort of generalization of
not and could not reform critical practice from the
some direct critical aperpu. Commonly, they are
ground up. But by separating out, from the welter of
backed up either by no theory at all or by a shadowy
reactions that pass for criticism, those lines of thought
metaphysic. Yet by comparison with them philosophic
which have proved fruitful, and by explaining their
concepts of poetry seem blunt and inapposite. It has
tendency, it can encourage harder and sharper attacks
seldom occurred to philosophers to use these great
in the same directions.35
critical passages as materials for analysis, striving to
bring them into connection with sound principles of
A curiosity surfaces in this remark. For the semiotic and aesthetic.
analytic aesthetician to follow this advice, that
is, to illuminate criticism without reforming it
from the ground up, it is necessary to distin- What is so curious about this latter passage is
guish fruitful critical tendencies or practices Isenberg's proposed remedy for clarifying crit-
from those which are unproductive. A few icism. In 1949, he denies that there can be
pages later, Isenberg acknowledges a program- effective theoretical generalizations of direct
matic prescription to remove impediments to critical perceptions of particular artworks. So
progress in art studies. one would expect him to urge in 1950 that
critics simply refrain from "flinging out" gen-
There is, indeed, an appearance of continuity and eralizations and thus obscuring the brilliance of
progress. . . . But when the smoke blows away, noth-
their remarks about particular works. Here,
ing solid remains: there is no real advance towards
truth. Factual study, in art history, at least makes
however, that question remains open, and the
progress towards quantitative accumulation; but literaryanswer is thought to lie in securing the gener-
theory makes no progress towards greater objectivity, alizations to a foundation of sound philosophi-
precision, generality and comprehensiveness.... cal theories. In this spirit, Isenberg calls for
Let us make it clear that the specifically critical
recognition of the methodological status of such
effort is probably not to be judged by any canons of
scientific progress. To set up the positivist ideal of generalizations, as if they could be legitimated
"getting somewhere" for the criticism of art is to just by being categorized.
impose an aim foreign to its nature-though, we must
add, an aim which many critics seem to accept when
they talk about each other's works. There is, I suggest, one standard of limited utility by
Yet none of these points impeaches the desirability of which we can try to discriminate hopeful programs in
intellectual progress.... It is these authors them- poetics from hopeless ones; and that is clarity of aim.
selves, incidentally, who set up their theoretical objec- "You say you have a theory about poetic language. To
tives.. . . Now if we ask why interesting and important what branch of knowledge or human endeavor does this
projects like these have accomplished so little, the theory belong? Empirical psychology? History of liter-
answer is fairly simple. These writers, with no lack ature? Criticism? Philosophical analysis? What method
either of brilliance or of care, are irresponsible because will you use to establish your findings and by what
there is no clear-cut subject or method to which they criteria will you want them to be judged?" Needless to
can be responsible.36 say, the application of this standard presupposes that
we have a good methodology of art study.38

What remains unclear from this and other

comments is why Isenberg is so confident in the And:

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 144 S I L V
Now in the Introduction to Woifflin's brilliant and
influential Principles of Art History we find questions
raised that are essentially similar to those which have
been treated with such distinction by analytically
trained philosophers. The difference between the phi-
losophy of history and the philosophy of art history is
not a difference in inherent promise and potentiality; it
consists entirely in the fact that the problems of art
history have not attracted the interest of many analysts
or able ones. The thought that the ideas of a Wolfflin
should be reviewed and criticized by a philosopher with
the acumen of Hempel would cause eager anticipation
among informed scholars.39
Nothing in the report exposes Isenberg's
optimism as glaringly as this last comment.
How realistic is it to expect that scholars in
other fields will value philosophers' telling
them what to do? I think that Isenberg's expec-
tation here is mediated by his belief that analytic
philosophy does not impose prescriptions on
other disciplines but, instead, merely clarifies
those disciplines' own preferred methods. This
is the status he accords Hempel's hypothetico-
deductive model.
So the purpose of the proposed review of
Wblfflin's ideas seems to be to expose the
logical structure of the explanatory model suc-
cessful art historical research adopts, and the
purpose of the proposed criticism is to demon-
strate where scholarly progress is impeded by
departures from the model. By discovering
W6lfflin's model, philosophers would permit
art historians to progress more methodically in
consolidating Wdlfflin's gains; by revealing
Wdlfflin's lapses, philosophers could enable art
historians to surpass W61fflin's achievements. It
is important to notice that whatever recommen-
dations for reform philosophers make, on
Isenberg's view here the advice is to be drawn
from considerations internal to the structure of
critical practice itself. On its least virile inter-
pretation, the program is not to change critical
practice, but merely to aid the practitioners in
sorting their practices out.
In the Rockefeller report, Isenberg speculates
on the beneficial results which could be ex-
pected from well-trained philosophers of good
taste reviewing and criticizing key masterworks
of aesthetic discourse. To better grasp the thrust
of this program, it is illuminating to follow the
speculation through and explore what would
occur if the directives of analytic aesthetics
were implemented. Would this improve the
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E R S
discourse by rendering it less obscure? What,
for instance, would be the result of reforming
art studies as the program's second thesis di-
rects? Would eliminating the purported mis-
match between form and function eliminate
some dysfunctional dimensions of aesthetic dis-
course and make it more successful?
Suppose we erased the generalizations
"flung out" by Goethe, Coleridge, De-
Quincey, and Valery from their critical writ-
ings?40 What remains are these writers' insights
about particular works of art. Suppose, as
Urmson does, we correct A. E. Housman's
poetics by pointing out that Housman's own
examples do not support his contention that
being moved by thrilling utterances makes a
situation aesthetic?4' What remains are the
examples themselves, which Urmson appropri-
ates as confirmation of his own account of what
makes a situation aesthetic. Suppose, as Gallie
does, we explicate Wordsworth's 1815 Preface
so as to obtain a more rigorous theory of the
imagination.42 What remains of Wordsworth's
varied but perhaps inconsistent examples of
imaginative activity (subtracting properties
from an object, endowing an object with prop-
erties that do not inhere in it, consolidating
discrete entities into a unity and separating a
thing into discrete elements, framing compari-
sons of expression and effect) is Gallie's sum-
mation that, unlike mathematical abstraction,
poetic abstractions are inexplicit, indefinite,
and vague.
In all these cases, it seems to me, clarifying
criticism results only in impoverishing it.
Goethe, Coleridge, DeQuincey, Valery, and
Housman no longer have theories at all after
their work has been clarified. Their brilliance
illuminates nothing beyond the illustrations
they give. And the illustrations illustrate noth-
ing beyond themselves. On the other hand,
Wordsworth's theory no longer is illuminated
by the brilliance of the illustrations, since on
Gallie's showing these illustrations do not all
drive uniformly in the same logical direction.
To strip, or not to strip, criticism of compo-
nents which fall short of being clear. What is
gained, and what, if anything, is lost? It should
be noted that successful analysis need not make
the critical writings easier to understand, as
philosophical accounts that are clear to philos-
ophers are not necessarily clear to anyone else.
 Letting the Sunshine
Moreover, eliminating all but the critics'
discussions of individual works could restrict
interest in the criticism to those acquainted with
the particular works discussed. For example,
Reynolds's Discourses command some interest
from those unacquainted with the paintings
Reynolds names because he generalizes, and
consequently his views apply to other paint-
ings that these readers might have seen. Re-
move the theories and general remarks, inade-
quate though they may be, and one is left with
remarks one recognizes as penetrating only if
one has encountered the subjects of the re-
marks, a condition which the audience to whom
Reynolds's lectures were directed might have
found difficult to satisfy.
It is hard to see how methodological clarifi-
cation of the kind exemplified by these analyses
of Isenberg, Gallie, and Urmson advances crit-
icism intellectually, since none of the revisions
reform anything other than their immediate
object. It is also hard to see why improving
criticism logically should make it less rather
than more dreary. For instance, Wordsworth's
1800 Preface is, in his own words, supposed to
be a "systematic defense of the theory" which
informed the writing of the Lyrical Ballads. Is
it systematic, and is it a defense? Margaret
Macdonald comments:
In his Preface Wordsworth says that he would not wish
it to be supposed that he entertained the foolish hope of
reasoning the reader into an approbation of the Lyrical
Ballads.... the Preface increased the size of the
volume by more than a score of pages. Whether or not
this was argument, Wordsworth evidently did not
regard it as a complete waste of time.43
However, the lines immediately following
the words Macdonald cites make clear that
Wordsworth does think he is offering argu-
ments. He makes the disclaimer to which
Macdonald refers because he cannot hope for
complete success.
. . . adequately to display the opinions, and fully to
enforce the arguments, would require a space wholly
disproportionate to a preface. For to treat the subject
with the clearness and coherence of which it is suscep-
tible, it would be necessary to give a full account of the
public taste in this country. . . . I hope, therefore, the
reader will not censure me for attempting to state what
I have proposed to myself to perform; and also (as far
as the limits of a preface will permit) to explain some of
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In 145
the chief reasons which have determined me in the
choice of my purpose.'4
Throughout this Preface, Wordsworth offers
reasons to justify his choice of subject matter
and style, and he even goes so far as to support
and reject various canons of criticism.
. . . there is a numerous class of critics, who, when
they stumble upon these prosaisms . . . imagine that
they have made a notable discovery, and exult over the
Poet as a man ignorant of his own profession. Now
these men would establish a canon of criticism which
the Reader will conclude he must utterly reject. . . . it
would be a most easy task to prove to him that not only
the language of a large portion of every good poem . . .
must necessarily . . . in no respect differ from that of
good prose, but likewise that some of the most inter-
esting parts of the best poems will be found to be
strictly the language of prose. . . The truth of this
assertion might be demonstrated by innumerable
passages....
45
Indeed, Wordsworth apparently has so much
confidence in reasoning that the 1815 Preface is
even more lavish in using the language of
reasoning.
It is deducible from the above, that poems, apparently
miscellaneous, may with propriety be arranged either
with reference to the powers of mind predominant in
the production of them; or to the mould in which they
are cast; or, lastly, to the subjects to which they
relate.46
And in the Essay Supplementary to the Preface
he argues inductively:
Let us take a hasty retrospect of the poetical literature of
this Country for the greater part of the last two
centuries, and see if the facts support these
inferences.47
If there be one conclusion more forcibly pressed upon
us than another by the review which has been given of
the fortunes and fate of poetical Works, it is this-that
every author, as far as he is great and at the same time
original, has had the task of creating the taste by which
he is to be enjoyed. . .4X
If we accept Macdonald's view, at worst
Wordsworth contradicts himself when he uses
expressions like "the Reader will conclude"
and "the truth of this assertion might be
demonstrated." At best, he wastes his time
because, Macdonald says, no one can be argued
into admiring the Lyrical Ballads. On either the
strong or the weak ground for condemning
 146 S I L V E R S

Wordsworth's effort, the language of argument reduce. By limiting the grounds for reforming
and reasoning should be removed from the practice to considerations internal to aesthetic
Preface. But if this project were carried out it is
discourse, the analysts argued from form to
hard to see what language is available to further function, but then also from function to form.
the aim which gives the Preface its force and Consequently, they obscured their own proce-
interest. dure. They appealed to practice to demonstrate
For those who did not appreciate the Lyrical that the argument forms found in traditional
Ballads because they had been acclimated to aesthetics do not fulfill their supposed func-
language embellished by rhetorical excess, di- tions. To account for the persistence of these
recting attention to the properties of Words- forms, they offered explanations in terms of
worth's poems promises to be ineffectual. alternative functions, consistent with the con-
Wordsworth clearly indicates his concern that tinued use of the forms. Thus, the tactic they
the Lyrical Ballads will leave such persons cold adopted identified the presence of the tradi-
unless their poetic expectations are changed. tional forms as the source of confusion. But,
What Wordsworth tries to supply are reasons because form obscures function, the program's
why they should alter their expectations. He commitment to illumination required that the
points out that his style resembles the language misleading forms be cleared away.
used by Shakespeare and Milton, and he ap- Why should clearing up confusion leave
peals to passages in predecessor works to dem- aesthetics duller than before? The answer, I
onstrate the value of the characteristics of his think, is that the analysts misjudged the relation
style. He also offers some generalizations about between function and form. If form follows
moral and cognitive value which he stipulates function, it is equally so that function depends
that the reader share and he argues that his on form. There is a vast difference between
poems promote these values. being formally equipped to fulfill a function but
Despite the obscure and perhaps self-contra- regularly failing to fulfill it, and not being
dictory methodology which, on the standards of equipped to fulfill it at all. To illustrate by
the analytic program, mars Wordsworth's Pref- analogy, a student might have formal training in
ace, his poetics surely would be more rather geometry but nevertheless always encounter
than less dreary if purged of the language he defeating conditions and always flunk the
chooses to convey and instill rational convic- exam. In respect to having potential to pass the
tion. What is true of Wordsworth's Preface is exam, such a student is situated differently from
true also of the treatises of Aristotle, Reynolds, a student who never has learned geometry, even
Tolstoi, and Bell, to take some influential ex- though the two students are indistinguishable in
amples. Each provides an apologia which ex- respect to having failed the exam. Whereas in
pands appreciation of a certain sort of artwork traditional aesthetics, defeating conditions may
by arguing (whether the argument succeeds is stand between form and function, form still
not at issue here) that the distinguishing prop- may serve as an enabling condition of function.
erties of that kind of work resemble (or have If this is so, then clearing out forms that
evolved out of) those found in admired prede- provoke confusion and logical blunders cannot
cessor works. The analytic aestheticians would help but have a reductive impact on function.
have it that this form of aesthetics is illegiti- The price of eliminating confusion in aesthetics
mate. But to eliminate or radically revise art seems to be the constriction of critical force and
studies that are among the most influential in scope.
the field, and perhaps to carry out such reforms It might be objected here that this is all to the
on most instances of study in the field, comes good because practices doomed to fail to func-
perilously close to just what Isenberg warned tion should not be retained. But this objection
analytic aesthetics was unauthorized to do: conflates failing to have an orientation with
reform critical practice from the ground up. failing to meet a necessary condition. That is,
What went wrong with the program should for an activity to be functional, it need not
now be more transparent. Analytic aesthetics necessarily attain its goal; it may suffice that the
violated one of its own rules, and in doing so, activity is goal-oriented.
exacerbated the dreariness it was meant to To illustrate, suppose the function of an

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 Letting the Sunshine In 147

apprentice's activity is to acquire his master's
skill, but the apprentice always fails to do so.
Possibly, revising the training program will
provide for success, although it is unlikely that
useful reforms can be grounded in consider-
ations internal to the inadequate practices. On
the other hand, the world may be such that no
one can ever equal the master's hand. If such is
the case, is the program a failure? Only if
drawing near to the goal has no value at all.
Only if approximating the goal is completely
insufficient. Imposition of such severe condi-
tions for retaining practices seems implicit in
the analytic aestheticians' procedures, but this
standard may be so rigorous that complex,
sophisticated human activities should not be
held to it.
To decide whether to impose such a strict
standard in aesthetics, we need to know
whether (in practice) benefits accrue from using
forms whose functions may never be fulfilled.
The question is not whether the forms them-
selves make an irreplaceable contribution to
aesthetics, but rather whether the functions
these forms serve, however unsuccessfully, are
integral to aesthetic discourse. To address this
question requires departing from the procedures
of analytic aesthetics. To decide how important
it is to retain or eliminate any function of
traditional aesthetics, we cannot restrict our-
selves, as most of the analytic aestheticians did,
to considerations internal to aesthetic discourse.
We must go further than to ask "Is the discourse
coherent and clear?" Whether or not it is useful
to retain any function as a goal, even if we are adequacy for their world.
systematically frustrated in reaching it, depends
on the benefits or drawbacks of pursuing it in
the world. Consequently, to make this decision,
we must advance beyond the analytic aes-
theticians' program and seek grounds logically
prior to aesthetic discourse.
Outside of, and prior to, aesthetics is at least statement about art. After all, an essentialist
a world, and at most a multiplicity of worlds.
This provides the subject matter of aesthetics.
To explore what methods will permit aesthetics
to function most productively demands not only There has been no revival of aesthetic essential-
views about how aesthetic discourse operates,
but also a theory of semantics, a philosophical
account of the relations between aesthetic dis-
course and its world(s).49
In addressing the prospects for reforming the
theory of art studies, Isenberg is optimistic, not ties, then postmodern art, designed to violate
to say rash, about philosophy's capacity for
supplying aesthetics with a rigorous method-
ological framework.
Now it is certainly true that no philosophical analysis
can devise methods which it imposes . . . from the
outside. Every idea of method must come from the
study of methods already employed in the field. But
those methods which have led to the best results in one
part of the field may be unrecognized, or may be
merely implicit, or may be mixed up with barren
methods, in the rest of the field. An explicit formula-
tion of method, then, can lead to a greater awareness of
direction and aim; it can eliminate waste activity; it can
increase the general efficiency of research. Such an
influence of philosophy upon science is perhaps imper-
ceptible at the present time, for the simple reason that
a highly efficient "hypothetico-deductive-experi-
mental" method has become institutionalized in the
natural sciences. . . . But if we were living in the time
of Bacon and Descartes, when the very idea of science
was in a state of confusion, such a question as whether
science concerns itself with efficient or final causes
would be rather momentous for the future of science.50
There is an instructive reason why this com-
ment sounds somewhat dated today. Approxi-
mately a decade after Isenberg wrote this,
philosophers acknowledged that the institution-
alization of a hypothetico-deductive model of
scientific explanation was more the product of
philosophy than of science. Perhaps the model
is efficient in explaining events in the world of
Newtonian physics, but the world of Darwin is
as much the subject of science as the world of
Descartes. In science as in aesthetics, method-
ologies are judged not only in respect to their
internal coherence but also in respect to the
Of the theses which constituted the program of
analytic aesthetics, only one addresses not only
the discourse but also, inadvertently, the world.
This is the thesis that art admits of no essential
properties. Although this claim concerns the
form of definition, it also, necessarily, makes a
definition of art is proper if and only if art has
an essence. Anti-essentialism has proven to be
the most durable product of analytic aesthetics.
ism. Because it is about art rather than about
discourse about art, anti-essentialism shares with
the great traditional aesthetic theories the poten-
tial to function as an apologia. If the nature of art
prohibits its being defined by essential proper-

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 148 S I L V
whatever aesthetic principles its predecessors
seem designed to confirm, can be exalted as not
only accommodating but also as celebrating art's
natural bent.
Analytic aesthetics benefited the field by
focusing on the methodology of studying art.
But the program did not acknowledge that
getting clear about methodology is not the same
as getting a methodology for studies which are
clear. If the world with which a methodology
deals is disordered and confused, then the
studies it produces should reflect this state of
affairs. If that world does not enjoy clearly
delineated entities and conclusive outcomes,
then what we learn about it is clear and conclu-
sive only at the risk of being misleading.
With a few exceptions such as Margaret
Macdonald,51 the analytic aestheticians did not
reveal what they thought the world of art was
like. Possibly, some of them avoided having
such thoughts, fearing to be drawn into specu-
lation. But in detouring around the world, they
also missed opportunities to talk about art itself
and to illustrate their work with remarks en-
lightened by the piercing brilliance Isenberg
praised.
Why this was so, I have argued, is attribut-
able to a defect in the analysts' procedure. But
considering this flaw from a historical perspec-
tive may also provide some light. An unac-
knowledged ontological boundary seems to cir-
cumscribe the thinking of most of them. As we
have seen, for instance, when Macdonald turns
from talking about aesthetic discourse to talking
about art, she is drawn to viewing the art object
as an ontological entity constituted somehow by
a collection of interpretations. As in so many
other matters, Isenberg's position resembles
Macdonald's; he says that to give a semantics of
criticism is to relate critical language to the
qualities of the reader's or critic's experience,
not directly to properties of art objects.52 In
"The Uniqueness of a Work of Art," Ruby
Meager tries to mitigate Macdonald's position
from within the framework of the analytic
program. Meager explains how the configura-
tion of features in one artwork can be aestheti-
cally relevant in the criticism of other works.
She proposes that to cite works as reasons, as
we saw Wordsworth citing passages from
Shakespeare and Milton, succeeds only if the
objects cited resemble each other closely
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E R S
enough. What counts as sufficiently close re-
semblance to sustain critical argument? Accord-
ing to Meager, we can do no more than hope
that what suffices to establish resemblance in
one beholder's eye resembles closely enough
what other eyes behold."3
What prevents these analytic aestheticians
from stepping beyond phenomenological boun-
daries to think of art not only as existing in
experience but also as situated in a world? In the
preface to his third (substantially revised) edi-
tion of Philosophy Looks At The Arts, Joseph
Margolis describes analytic aesthetics as "a
general mode of working that departed abruptly
but penetratingly from the then-dominant ideal-
ist tradition."-54 While this is so, I think it also
may be the case that analytic aesthetic's depar-
ture from idealism was not abrupt and clean
enough to impel the program to achieve its
goals.
In the mid-1960s, work in aesthetics which
directly engaged questions about worlds began
to appear. In 1964, Arthur Danto published
"The Artworld," initiating a major and influ-
ential project in which Danto tells us about how
the artworld makes art. In 1968, Nelson
Goodman published The Languages of Art,
initiating a major and influential project in
which Goodman tell us about how art makes
worlds. With their expertise in art and their
philosophical talent, Danto and Goodman fulfill
Isenberg's programmatic recommendation55 to
integrate insightful commentary on art with
rigorous philosophical argument. These con-
temporary asetheticians exemplify how aesthet-
ics has brightened up because its practitioners
turn their lights on the world.
1 Of course, any stipulation of the time period during
which a philosophical program is pursued is motivated by
considerations of convenience as well as concern for accu-
racy. This does not destroy the usefulness of examing the
program. For instance, it would be foolhardy to demand
precise dating of the Cartesian program before its strengths,
defects, and results could be examined. The dates I set here
permit inclusion of most of the philosophers usually men-
tioned in connection with analytic aesthetics.
2 One should not overlook the fact that philosophers
who are not known for their work in aesthetics also can
influence art scholarship. Wittgenstein's Philosophical In-
vestigations (not, apparently, his lectures on aesthetics)
influenced Gombrich. John Searle's work influenced the
literary theory of Stanley Fish. This listing is not intended
to be comprehensive; I merely offer a few illustrative
examples.
 Letting the Sunshine In 149

I In her 24 See lsenberg'sto

introduction "Critical Communication"
the and
selected
Isenberg (see footnote 7), Mary Mothersill comments that Macdonald's "Some Distinctive Features of Arguments
contributions to analytical aesthetics are few and that the Used in Criticism of the Arts."
same essays reappear in each new anthology (pp. xix-xx). 2 Elton, pp. 155-56.
4 William Elton, ed., Aesthetics and Language 26 Ibid., p. 126.

(Oxford, 1954). Authors represented in this volume are W. 27 Ibid., pp. 170-86 passim.
B. Gallie, Gilbert Ryle, Beryl Lake, Arnold Isenberg, 28 Ibid., p. 50.

Stuart Hampshire, J. A. Passmore, 0. K. Bouwsma, 29 Margolis, pp. 58-59.

Margaret Macdonald, Helen Knight, and Paul Ziff. 30 Elton, p. 142.
5 Joseph Margolis, ed., Philosophy Looks At The Arts 31 Isenberg, p. II [p. 1291. Isenberg was wrong in
(New York, 1962). The authors represented in this volume supposing that the best work in the field would be done by
are Isenberg, Ziff, Macdonald, J.0. Urmson, Vincent unknown people. In this report, he cites Goodman as one of
Tomas, Morris Weitz, Frank Sibley, Wimsatt and those known philosophers whose analytic work in philoso-
Beardsley, Joseph Margolis, Charles Stevenson, John phy of science offers an excellent model for aestheticians.
Hospers, and Max Black. Of course, Isenberg was not to know that, in 1968,
6 Arnold Isenberg, 'Analytical Philosophy and the Goodman's Languages of Art would help to initiate enliv-
Study of Art: A Report to the Rockefeller Foundation," ened aesthetics.
April 1950. I am very grateful to the Rockefeller Founda- 32 Ibid., pp. 17-18 [131-32].
tion for furnishing me with a complete copy of this text. 33 Ibid., p. 18 [p. 1321. This passage focuses on that
7 William Callaghan et. al., eds., Aesthetics and the aspect of Isenberg's proposal which Mary Mothersill takes
Theory of Criticism: Selected Essays of Arnold Isenberg to be most significant. See footnotes 3 and 7.
(University of Chicago Press, 1973), pp. 285-301. How- 34 Ibid., p. 27 [p. 136]. This passage exhibits
ever, the parts of the report excerpted here include notice- Isenberg's view that the subject of analytic aesthetics is
ably less than half the report. They apparently have been criticism, not art.
selected to illustrate Isenberg's views about how philoso- 35 Ibid., p. 20 [p. 133].
phers could and should engage in art studies. 36 Ibid., pp. 22-23 [pp. 133-34].
8 Elton, p. 2. 37 Ibid., pp. 31-32.
9 Margolis, p. 43. 38 Ibid., p. 32.
10 Some which probably should be mentioned are 39 Ibid., p. 33.
collected in Cyril Barrett, ed., Collected Papers on Aes- 4" Ibid., pp. 31-32.
thetics (Oxford, 1965). This volume includes W. E. 41 Margolis, pp. 20-21.
Kennick's "Does Traditional Aesthetics Rest On a 42 Elton, pp. 30-34.
Mistake?" (first published in Mind [1958]) which provides 43 Ibid., p. 114.
one of the clearest statements of the program I describe 4 William Wordsworth, Selected Poetry (New York,
here. It also includes Ruby Meager's 'The Uniqueness of a 1950), pp. 676-77.
Work of Art" (first published in Proceedings of the Aris- 45 Ibid., p. 694.
totelian Society LIX [1958-59]: 49-70) and Morris Weitz's 46 Ibid., p. 675.
"Reasons in Criticism" (first published in Journal of 4 William Wordsworth, The Poetical Works of Words-
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 20 no. 4 [19621). worth (Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 745.
I base this claim on memory. 48 Ibid., p. 750.
2 Elton, pp. 30-5. 49 In "Critical Communication," Isenberg raises the
13 Margolis, p. 97. issue of semantics, but does not characterize it as addressing
1' Isenberg, p. 2 [See Isenberg, this issue, p. 125]. the relation between aesthetics and the world, art and the
15 Ibid., p. 18 p. 321. world, or aesthetics and art. Instead, he thinks the question
16 In the essays cited in footnote 10 above, Ruby is as follows: "What is the semantical relationship between
Meager and Morris Weitz seek to mitigate the force of this the language of criticism and the qualities of the critic's or
thesis. Meager specifically challenges Gallie, Macdonald, the reader's experience?" Elton, p. 143.
and Hampshire. Weitz specifically challenges Stevenson. 50 Isenberg, pp. 19-20 [pp. 132-331.
These discussions offer good examples of debates internal 5 Elton, pp. 114-30, passim.
to the program. 52 See footnote 49 above for citation.
17 Elton, p. 169. 53 Barrett, p. 45.
18 Ibid., p. 129. 54 Joseph Margolis, Philosophy Looks At The Arts,
'9 Ibid., p. 135. third edition (Temple University Press, 1987).
20 Margolis, p. 124. 55 While Goodman and Danto are engaged by art-
21 Of course, Weitz does accept this less sweeping
making and art studies of various sorts, it would be
thesis. misleading to think of them as accepting Isenberg's advice
22 Margolis, pp. 48-49.
to write criticism as part of doing philosophy. I think it
23 Elton, pp. 43-44. more accurate to describe them as writing philosophy and,
on occasion, writing philosophy as part of pursuing an art
study.

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