2. CSC VS.
SALAS Hearing for presentation of the evidence commences and the ERB outlined the procedure to
FACTS:
On 07 Oct 1989, respondent Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR chairman as internal
security staff member and assigned to the casino at the Manila Pavilion Hotel. His
employment was terminated by the Board of Directors of PAGCOR on 03 Dec 1991, allegedly
for loss of confidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Salas is a confidential employee.
RULING:
NO. It is the nature of the position which finally determines whether a position is primarily
confidential, policy-determining or highly technical. The occupant of a particular position could
be considered a confidential employee if the predominant reason why he was chosen by the
appointing authority was the latter’s belief that he can share a close relationship with the
occupant. Where the position occupied is remote from that of the appointing authority, the
element of trust between them is no longer predominant.
3. MACEDA VS. ERB
DOCTRINE: The ERB, as an administrative body is not bound by the strict or technical rules
of evidence governing court proceedings
FACTS:
Because of the outbreak of the conflict on the Persian Gulf, private respondents oil companies
filed with the ERB their applications on oil price increases. The ERB granted provisional
increase (P1.42 per liter)
Petitioner Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition seeking to nullify this provisional increase he
claims that the increase in prices has to undergo the requirements of notice and hearing,
however in this case the requirements were not complied with, and therefore Maceda claims
he was deprived of due process.
In reaffirming the increase, the lower court ruled that Executive Order 172 does not preclude
the board from ordering ex-parte, a provisional increase. These provisional increases, however,
will be subject to final disposition of whether or not it should be made permanent, to reduce or
increase it, or to deny the application.
In fact, in the same order which authorized the provision increase, the ERB set the applications
for hearing with due notice to all interested parties. Petitioners Maceda failed to appear at said
hearing and at the second hearing. The notice of hearing was also published in newspapers of
general circulation.
be observed in the reception of evidence—That the oppositors and the board must have all the
evidence-in-chief to be places on record first then the cross-examination will come later.
Maceda claims that this order of relaxed procedure for presentation of proof resulted in a denial
of due process because it deprived him of finishing his cross-examination of the witnesses.
ISSUE:
W/N Maceda, through this relaxed procedure of presentation of evidence was deprived of due
process
RULING:
NO. The Solicitor General has pointed out that administrative bodies may relax the procedures
in the introduction of evidence in trials. It is not improper. The ERB, as an administrative body
is not bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence governing court proceedings. In fact,
Section 2, Rule I of the Rules of Procedure Governing Hearings Before the ERB provides that—
These rules shall govern pleadings, practice and procedure before the ERB in all matters of
inquiry, study, hearing, investigation and/or any other proceeding within the jurisdiction of the
Board. However, in the broader interest of justice, the Board may, in any particular matter,
except itself from these rules and apply such suitable procedure as shall promote the objectives
of the Order.
4. GARCIA VS. MOJICA
FACTS:
On May 7, 1998, petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City mayor, signed a contract with F.E.
Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to the city. The contract covers the period 1998-2001, which
period was to commence on September 1998 when the first delivery should have been made
by F.E. Zuellig. Sometime in March 1999, news reports came out regarding the alleged
anomalous purchase of asphalt by Cebu City, through the contract signed by petitioner. This
prompted the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) to conduct an inquiry into the matter.
Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special prosecution officer of the Office of the
Ombudsman, was assigned to conduct the inquiry, docketed as INQ-VIS-99-0132. After his
investigation, he recommended that the said inquiry be upgraded to criminal and administrative
cases against petitioner and the other city officials involved. Respondent Arturo C. Mojica,
Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, approved this recommendation.
ISSUES:
1. WON Garcia may be held administratively liable.
NO. In a number of cases, we have repeatedly held that a re-elected local official may not be
held administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term of office. The
rationale for this holding is that when the electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that
it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed
with such knowledge, it still re-elects him, then such re-election is considered a condonation of
his past misdeeds. However, in the present case, respondents point out that the contract
entered into by petitioner with F.E. Zuellig was signed just four days before the date of the
elections. It was not made an issue during the election, and so the electorate could not be said
to have voted for petitioner with knowledge of this particular aspect of his life and character.
For his part, petitioner contends that the only conclusive determining factor as regards the
peoples thinking on the matter is an election. On this point, we agree with petitioner. That the
people voted for an official with knowledge of his character is presumed, precisely to eliminate
the need to determine, in factual terms, the extent of this knowledge. Such an undertaking will
obviously be impossible. Our rulings on the matter do not distinguish the precise timing or
period when the misconduct was committed, reckoned from the date of the officials reelection,
except that it must be prior to said date.
The above ruling in Salalima applies to this case. Petitioner cannot anymore be held
administratively liable for an act done during his previous term, that is, his signing of the contract
with F.E. Zuellig. The agreement between petitioner (representing Cebu City) and F.E. Zuellig
was perfected on the date the contract was signed, during petitioners prior term. At that
moment, petitioner already acceded to the terms of the contract, including stipulations now
alleged to be prejudicial to the city government. Thus, any culpability petitioner may have in
signing the contract already became extant on the day the contract was signed. It hardly
matters that the deliveries under the contract are supposed to have been made months later.
While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for signing the contract with F. E.
Zuellig, however, this should not prejudice the filing of any case other than administrative
against petitioner. Our ruling in this case, may not be taken to mean the total exoneration of
petitioner for whatever wrongdoing, if any, might have been committed in signing the subject
contract. The ruling now is limited to the question of whether or not he may be held
administratively liable therefor, and it is our considered view that he may not.
2. WON the Ombudsman was stripped of its powers by virtue of the LGC.
No. Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed,
whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two
statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as
to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other. The decision of the Ombudsman (6
month suspension) will prevail over the LGC (60day suspension) if the evidence of guilt is
strong. * The power to preventively suspend is available not only to the Ombudsman but also
to the Deputy Ombudsman.
SEC. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend
any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the
evidence of guilt is strong.
5. GLORIA VS. CA
FACTS:
Abad, Bandigas, Somebang and Margallo, private respondents, are public school teachers.
Some time in September and October 1990, during the teacher’s strikes, they did not report for
work. For this reason they were administratively charged with 1) grave misconduct; 2) gross
violation of Civil Service Rules; 3) gross neglect of duty; 4) refusal to perform official duty; 5)
gross insubordination; 6) conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service and; 7) AWOL. They
were placed under preventive suspension. Investigation ended before the lapse of the 90 day
period. Margallo was dismissed from the service. The three others were suspended for 6
months. On appeal to the CA, the court mitigated the punishment to reprimand only. Hence
their reinstatement. Now the reinstated teachers are asking for back wages during the period
of their suspension and pending appeal (before the CA exonerated them).
ISSUE:
Whether the teachers are entitled to backwages for the period pending their appeal if they are
subsequently exonerated.
RULING:
YES, they are entitled to full pay pending their appeal. To justify the award of back wages, the
respondent must be exonerated from the charges and his suspension be unjust. Preventive
suspension pending appeal is actually punitive, and it is actually considered illegal if the
respondent is exonerated and the administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence
he should be reinstated with full pay for the period of the suspension. Section 47 (4) of the Civil
Service Decree states that the respondent “shall be considered as under preventive
suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins.” On the other hand if his
conviction is affirmed the period of his suspension becomes part of the final penalty of
suspension or dismissal. In the case at bar the respondents won in their appeal, therefore the
period of suspension pending their appeal would be considered as part of the preventive
suspension, entitling them to full pay because they were eventually exonerated and their
suspension was unjustified. They are still entitled to back salaries even if they were still
reprimanded.
6. BEJA SR VS. CA
FACTS:
Fidencio Beja Sr. an employee of Philippine ports authority, hired as Arrastre supervisor in
1975. and later on appointed as terminal supervisor in 1988. On October 21, 1988, the General
Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan filed administrative case against Beja Sr. and Villaluz for grave
dishonesty. Grave misconduct willful violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Consequently they were preventively suspended for the charges. After preliminary
investigation conducted by the district attorney for region X, administrative case no. 11-04-88
was considered closed for lack of merit. On December 13, 1988 another administrative case
was filed against Beja by the PPA manager also for dishonesty grave misconduct violation of
office rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for being
notoriously undesirable. Beja was also placed under preventive suspension pursuant to sec.
412 of PD No. 807.
The case was redocketed as administrative case no. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and thereafter, the
PPA indorsed it to the AAB for appropriate action. The AAB proceeded to hear the case and
gave Beja an opportunity to present evidence. However, on February 20, 1989, Beja filed
petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis
Oriental.
Two days later, he filed with the ABB a manifestation and motion to suspend the hearing of
administrative case no. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 on account of the pendency of the certiorari
proceeding before the court. AAB denied the motion and continued with the hearing of the
administrative case. Thereafter, Beja moved for the dismissal of the certiorari case and
proceeded to file before the Court for a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order.
ISSUE: Wether or not the Administrative Action Board of DOTC has jurisdiction over
administrative cases involving personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager of the
Philippine Ports Authority, an attached agency of DOTC.
RULING:
The PPA General Manager is the disciplining authority who may, by himself and without the
approval of the PPA Board of Directors, subject a respondent in an administrative case to
preventive suspension. His disciplining powers are sanctioned not only by Sec.8 of PD no. 857
but also by Sec. 37 of PD no. 807 granting the heads of agencies the “Jurisdiction to investigate
and decide matters involving disciplinary actions against officers and employees in the PPA.
With respect to the issue, the Court qualifiedly rules in favor of the petitioner.
The PPA was created through PD no. 505 dated July 1974. Under the Law, the corporate
powers of the PPA were vested in a governing Board of Directors known as the Philippine Ports
Authority Council. Sec. 5(i) of the same decree gave the council the power “to appoint,
discipline and remove, and determine the composition of the technical staff of the authority and
other personnel”.
On December 23, 1975, PD no. 505 was substituted by PD no. 857 sec. 4(a) thereof created
the Philippine Ports Authority which would be attached to the then Department of Public Works,
Transportation and Communication. When Executive order no. 125 dated January 30, 1987
reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communication was issued, the PPA retained
its attached status.
Administrative Code of 1987 classiffied PPA as an attached agency to the DOTC. Book IV of
the Administrative Code of 1987, the other two being supervision and control and administrative
supervision, “Attachment” is defined as the “lateral relationship between the department or its
equivalent and the attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program
coordination”.
An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department to which it is
attached than one which is under departmental supervision and control or administrative
supervision. This is borne out by the “lateral relationship” between the Department and the
attached agency. The attachment is merely for policy and program coordination.”
With respect to administrative matters, the independence of an attached agency from the
department control and supervision is furthermore reinforced by the fact that even an agency
under a Department’s administrative supervision is free from Departmental interference with
respect to appointments and other personnel actions “ in accordance with the decentralization
of personnel functions” under the administrative Code of 1987.
The Law impliedly grants the general Manager with the approval of the PPA board of Directors
the power to investigate its personnel below the rank of Assistant Manager who may be
charged with an administrative offense. During such investigation, the PPA General Manager,
may subject the employee concerned to preventive suspension. The investigation should be
conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of PD no. 807.
The Decision of the Court of Appeal is AFFIRMED as so far as it upholds the power of the PPA
General Manager to to subject petitioner to preventive suspension and REVERSED insofar as
it validates the jurisdiction of the DOTC and/or the AAB to act on administrative case no. PPA
–AAB-1-049-89. The AAB decision in said cased is hereby declared NULL and VOID and the
case is REMANDED to the PPA whose General Manager shall conduct with dispatch its
reinvestigation.
8. HON. ALMA DE LEON v. CA
FACTS:
Private respondent Atty. Jacob Montesa was appointed as Ministry Legal Counsel CESO IV in
the Ministry of Local Government, now (DILG) by then Minister Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. Inspite of
not being a Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) or a member of the Career Executive
Service (CES), private respondent's appointment was approved as permanent by the Civil
Service Commission.
Subsequently, then President Corazon Aquino promulgated Executive Order No. 262,
reorganizing the DILG. Then Secretary Luis Santos designated Nicanor Patricio as Chief of
Legal Service in place of private respondent who, in turn, was directed to report to the office of
the Secretary to perform special assignments. This prompted private respondent to file before
the Supreme Court a petition for quo warranto against Secretary Luis Santos and Nicanor
Patricio. On September 26, 1990, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of private respondent and
ordered his reinstatement to his former position.
Meanwhile,the Salary Standardization Law took effect on July 1, 1989. Pursuant thereto, the
position of Department Service Chiefs, which include the Department Legal Counsel, was
reclassified and ranked with Assistant Bureau Directors under the generic position title of
Director III. Hence, in the execution of the decision of the Supreme Court, respondent was
reinstated to the position: Department Legal Counsel and/or Director III.
Then Secretary Rafael Alunan III, issued Department Order No. 94-370 on July 26, 1994. This
order relieved private respondent of his current duties and responsibilities and reassigned him
as Director III or Assistant Regional Director of Region XI.
Private respondent, however, did not report to his new assigned position. Instead, he filed a
90-day sick leave, and upon the expiration thereof, he submitted a memorandum for then acting
Secretary Alexander Aguirre, signifying his intention to re-assume his position as Department
Legal Counsel/Chief, Legal Services.
Accordingly, private respondent was advised to report to Region XI immediately. Private
respondent wrote a memorandum requesting for reconsideration of the department order, but
to no avail.
On appeal to the CSC by private respondent, the former issued a resolution which sustained
the latter’s reassignment. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied
by the CSC.
The DILG directed private respondent to report to his new assigned post in Region XI, stressing
that his continued non-compliance with the department order is prejudicial to the interest of
public service. Private respondent was also warned that upon his failure to comply, the DILG
shall be constrained to consider him on absence without leave and as a consequence, drop
him from the rolls of public service. Instead of complying therewith, private respondent filed
with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction but the issuance of the same was denied by the
court.
Upon the recommendation of the DILG, President Fidel Ramos, issued Administrative Order
No. 235, dropping private respondent from the roster of public servants for serious neglect of
duty and absences without leave.
Later, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision on the petition in favor of private respondent
and rendered as null and void Department Order No. 94370. The Court of Appeals ordered that
private respondent be retained in his position as Chief, Legal Service or Department Legal
Counsel in the DILG, without loss of seniority, rank, emolument and privileges.
The DILG Secretary was ordered to release to petitioner his withheld salaries and his back
salaries, if also withheld.
Both petitioners and private respondent moved for reconsideration. In his Motion for
Clarification and/or Partial Motion for Reconsideration, private respondent prayed for
backwages and his salary that was illegally withheld from the time the resolution of the CSC
was issued up to his actual reinstatement to office.
Petitioners, on the other hand, posited that the decision of the Court of Appeals is not confluent
with Administrative Order No. 235 issued by President Ramos which dropped petitioner from
the roster of public servants. They further argued that until and unless the said order is declared
invalid, the presumption is in favor of its validity and it is incumbent upon private respondent to
comply therewith so as not to prejudice the public service.
The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by public respondents for lack
of merit and granted petitioner's Motion for Clarification and/or Partial Motion for
Reconsideration. It modified its earlier decision by ordering the DILG Secretary to release to
petitioner his withheld salaries and backwages, including allowances or RATA and other
benefits, to which petitioner would have been entitled had he not been illegally removed.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not an individual who lacks the necessary qualifications for a public position
can be appointed to it in a permanent capacity.
RULING:
No. The position of Ministry Legal Counsel – CESO IV is embraced in the Career Executive
Service.
Under the Integrated Reorganization Plan, appointment thereto shall be made by the President
from a list of career executive eligible recommended by the Board. Such appointments shall be
made on the basis of rank; provided that appointments to the higher ranks which qualify the
incumbents to assignments as undersecretary and heads of bureaus and offices and equivalent
positions shall be with the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
The President may, however, in exceptional cases, appoint any person who is not a CES
eligible; provided that such appointee shall subsequently take the required CES examination
and that he shall not be promoted to a higher class until qualifies in such examination.
Passing the CES examination entitles the examinee to a conferment of a CES eligibility and
the inclusion of his name in the roster of CES eligible. Conferment of CES eligibility is done by
the Board through a formal Board Resolution after an evaluation of the examinee's performance
in the four stages of the CES eligibility examinations.
In the case of Achacoso v. Macaraig, et al., the Court held that: a permanent appointment can
be issued only to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being
appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed. If not, the appointment could be
regarded only as temporary. And being so, it could be withdrawn at will by the appointing
authority and at a moment's notice.
The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer
security or tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such
right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his
eligibility or lack of it.

A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to
it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting
capacity in the absence of appropriate eligible. The appointment extended to him cannot be
regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated.

In the present case, private respondent does not have the required Career Executive Service
eligibility as evidenced by his admission in his Comment that he is not a Career Executive
Service Officer or a member of the Career Executive Service. Hence, private respondent's
appointment did not attain permanency.

Not having taken the necessary Career Executive Service examination to obtain requisite
eligibility, he did not at the time of his appointment and up to the present, possess the needed
eligibility for a position in the Career Executive Service. Consequently, his appointment as
Ministry Legal Counsel – CESO IV/ Department Legal Counsel and/or Director III, was merely
temporary.

The cases on unconsented transfer invoked by private respondent find no application in the
present case. As his appointment was merely temporary, he could be transferred or reassigned
without violating the constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure.

Private respondent’s contention, that the mobility and flexibility concepts in the assignment of
personnel under the Career Executive Service do not apply to him because he is not a Career
Executive Service Officer, is without merit. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
non-eligible holding permanent appointments to CES positions were never meant to remain
immobile in their status. Otherwise, their lack of eligibility would be a premium vesting them
with permanency in the CES positions, a privilege even their eligible counterparts do not enjoy.
Hence, the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals were reversed and set
aside and the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were reinstated.