Case 57

Leouel Santos vs. CA

GR No. 112019, January 4, 1995

FACTS: Leouel, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo. The two got married
in 1986 before a municipal trial court followed shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. The couple lived
with Julia’s parents at the J. Bedia Compound. Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was named as
Leouel Santos Jr. Occasionally, the couple will quarrel over a number of things aside from the
interference of Julia’s parents into their family affairs.

Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouel’s pleas to dissuade her. Seven months
after her departure, she called her husband and promised to return home upon the expiration of her
contract in July 1989 but she never did. Leouel got a chance to visit US where he underwent a training
program under AFP, he desperately tried to locate or somehow get in touch with Julia but all his efforts
were of no avail.

Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void under Article 36 of the Family
Code. He argued that failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with him for more than 5 years
are circumstances that show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. Julia
waived her right to appear and submit evidence.

ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

HELD: The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated.

The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required
to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even
desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the
specific answers to every individual problem. Wherefore, his petition was denied.

Case 58

MARCOS V. MARCOS

G.R. No. 136490

FACTS: Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children.
After the down fall of the Marcos Regime, the respondent left the military service. Consequently, due to
respondent’s failure to engage in any gainful employment they would often quarrel. The Petitioner
alleging that the husband failed to provide material support to the family and have resorted to physical
abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage for psychological incapacity.
The plaintiff submitted herself to psychological examination while the private respondent did not.

The RTC declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36 which was however reversed by CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological
incapacity.

HELD: Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be
established by the totality of evidence presented.

There is no requirement, however that the respondent be examined by a physician or a

psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration. Although this Court is sufficiently
convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to
physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological
incapacity on his part.

There is absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already present at the inception of the
marriage or that they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that
he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this
period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the
family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the
inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is
incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.

In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of the petitioner to
show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability.

Case 59

Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano

GR No. 149498, May 20, 2004

FACTS: Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. She and
Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter,
Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on November 16,
1987.

In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their marriage,
Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his
family. Toshio sent money for two months and after that he stopped giving financial support. She
wrote him several times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned from her friend that Toshio visited
the country but did not bother to see her nor their child.

ISSUE: Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligation.
(Article 36 Family code)

HELD: No, In Republic v. Molina, this court came up with guidelines in the interpretation and
application of article 36. The guidelines incorporate three essential requisites to prove that an individual
is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability.” We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities.
 Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven
to be due to some kind of psychological illness. Although as rule, actual medical examinations are not
needed, it would have greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence that medically or clinically
identified Toshio’s illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. It is essential that a
person show incapability of doing marital obligation due to some psychological, not physical
illness. Hence, Toshio was not considered as psychologically incapacitated.

Case 60

Leni O. Choa v Alfonso C. Choa, G.R. No. 143376, November 26, 2002

Facts: The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision and interlocutory order of the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals had affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Occidental declaring the marriage of Leni O. Choa (petitioner) and Alfonso C. Choa (respondent), null
and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code.

Petitioner and respondent were married on March 15, 1981. Out of this union, two children
were born, Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. On October 27, 1993, respondent filed before the RTC of Negros
Occidental Branch 51 a complaint for the annulment of his marriage to petitioner. Afterwards he filed an
Amended Complaint for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner based on her alleged
psychological incapacity alleging: 1. numerous filing of charges by the petitioner against the respondent
constituted psychological incapacity and 2. Petitioner lacks the attention to their children, exhibits
immaturity and “lack of an intention of procreative sexuality”. The Petitioner (respondent in this case)
presented his witness, Dr. Antonio M. Guazon, to attest the psychological incapacity of the respondent
(petitioner in this case).

Issue: Whether or not the respondents’ evidences fall under Article 36 of the Family Code?

Held: The SC dismissed the case for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on the alleged
incapacity of the Petitioner. The documents presented by respondent during the trial do not in any way
show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. It is the height of absurdity and inequity to
condemn her as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations, simply because she filed
cases against him. Similarly, the evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife
could not get along with each other. There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical
antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their marital union. Evidence was obviously,
grossly and clearly insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity. Withal, it was grave abuse of discretion for the RTC to deny the Demurrer and to violate or
ignore this Court’s rulings in point.

Case 61

Leonilo Antonio v Marie Ivonne F. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006

Facts: The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null
and void.

Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent
was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the
Gospel at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding at the Sta. Rosa de Lima
Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.Out of their union, a child was born on 19
April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.

On 8 March 1993, petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null
and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that
respondent’s incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the
present. As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that
respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational
attainment and other events or things. In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera
Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.

Issue: Whether or not Reyes’ actions exhibited a qualifying ground for psychological incapacity?

Held: The SC affirmed. It has been shown clearly from Reyes’ actuations that she has propensity
for telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her
income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically
lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance
to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined
the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded
by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and
amounts to psychological incapacity.

Case 62

Chi Ming Tsoi v Gina Lao-Tsoi, G.R. 119190, January 26, 1997

Facts: The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals had sustained the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City (Branch 89) declaring the marriage of Chi Ming Tsoi (petitioner) and Gina Lao-Tsoi (respondent), null
and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code.

On May 22, 1988, Petitioner married the respondent. After the celebration of their marriage and
wedding reception, they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother where they slept
together as newly wedded on the same bed. Contrary to her (respondent) expectations, that as
newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, he
(petitioner) just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep. There
was no sexual intercourse between them from the first night which lasted up to 10 months of non-coitus
relationship. The petitioner, while admitted the absence of carnal knowledge with his wife, claimed that:

The Respondent avoided his successive intimate invitations due to the latter’s soft erection—
physically examined by Dr. Alteza (original size: two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters; soft erection:
penis lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter). And 2. The relationship is still young and any
differences may still be reconciled.

Issue: Whether or not absence of coitus (sexual intercourse) between spouses is a ground for
psychological incapacity of the guilty party?

Held: The SC sustained the decision of appellate court, finding the gravity of the failed
relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations. After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the
husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very
dearly, and who has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of
a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to
discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code. Further, the law
provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection
between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil.
1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another.

Case 63

Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris v Brix Ferraris, G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006

Facts: This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris
of the Resolution denying the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed
any reversible error. On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a
Decision denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix Ferraris.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order.

The petitioner claims that: 1. during a relatively short period of time (about a year or so), she
was happy and contented with her life in the company of the respondent. However, they started
fighting about the calls from women that respondent began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and
failed to perform his so-called marital obligations; and 2. Attested by Dr. Dayan, she diagnosed the
respondent as having a mixed personality disorder “schizoid” which makes him a “dependent and
avoidant type” characterized by preference of the respondent to spend more time with his bandmates
further, that respondent had extramarital affairs and occasional violent tendencies when respondent
has epileptic attacks.

Issue: Whether or not mixed personality disorder and extramarital affairs constitute a
declaration for nullity of marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code?

Held: The SC declared that in this case, mixed personality disorder “schizoid” and suspicion by a
spouse of another parties’ extramarital affairs does not fall under psychological incapacity of a person to
uphold marital obligations. Attitudes of having a mixed personality disorder “schizoid” is not rooted on
some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage “it is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities
and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due
to some psychological, not physical, illness” (Republic v CA). Moreover, held in Hernandez v. Court of
Appeals that habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity. Art. 36
of the Family Code should not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time
the causes therefor manifest themselves. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void
marriage.

Case 64

Narciso Navarro v Cynthia Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. 162490, April 13, 2007

Facts: For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the RTC declaration of nullity
of the marriage of Narciso Navarro (Petitioner) and Cynthia Cecilio-Navarro (Respondent).
Petitioner and respondent were college sweethearts. At the time they got married, both in civil and
church ceremonies, they were awaiting their first child. Since petitioner was still a medical student,
while respondent was a student of pharmacy, they lived with petitioner’s parents, on whom they were
financially dependent. Eventually, their union bore four children. Petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila
Branch 37, he sought the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent on the following
allegations: 1. respondent constantly complained that he didn’t have time for her; 2. she constantly
quarreled with him even before marriage when he could not give her the things she wanted; 3. she was
not supportive of his career; 4. she refused to have sex with him when they quarrel; and 5. he found out
their eldest daughter had been made pregnant by a man whom respondent hired to follow him.
Attested and witnessed by: 1. Abdona T. De Castro, 2. Dr. Gerardo Velasco, Lilia Tayco. Witness of
Respondent Dr. Natividad Dayan.

Issue: Whether or not frequent squabbles and respondent’s refusal to sleep with petitioner and
be supportive constitute psychological incapacity?

Held: The SC affirmed in favor of the Court of Appeals. There was a lack of merit in the
Petitioner’s claim of psychological incapacity of respondent. Psychological incapacity must be more than
just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations, it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the
time of the celebration of the marriage. Further, petitioner failed to show that grave and incurable
incapacity existed at the time of celebration before their marriage. Thus, both petitioner and
respondent have not shown proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor, an adverse integral element
in their personality structure that effectively incapacitates them from accepting and complying with the
obligations essential to marriage. Immaturity, frequent squabbles, refusal to sleep with their spouse
does not constitute psychological incapacity.

Case 65

Te vs. Te

GR No. 161793, February 13, 2009

FACTS: Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a gathering organized by the
Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Initially, he was attracted to Rowena’s close friend but, as
the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena, which happened in January
1996. It was Rowena who asked that they elope but Edward refused bickering that he was young and
jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. They left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month;
he, providing their travel money of P80,000 and she, purchasing the boat ticket.

They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house and
Edward to his parents’ home. Eventually they got married but without a marriage license. Edward was
prohibited from getting out of the house unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena and her uncle.
After a month, Edward escaped from the house, and stayed with his parents. Edward’s parents wanted
them to stay at their house but Rowena refused and demanded that they have a separate abode. In
June 1996, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives and they then parted ways.

After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to
Rowena on the basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
 HELD: The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six months. They met in January
1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who
provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral
pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondent’s, that of the
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder

There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be

personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts
that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the
parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable
presence of psychological incapacity.

Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential
marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and
support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, and allows others to
make most of his important decisions (such as where to live). As clearly shown in this case, petitioner
followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no
sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in
life.

As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable
to assume the essential marital obligations on account for her disregard in the rights of others, her
abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, and her tendency to blame others.
Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in
manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the
precipitous marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.

Case 66

Veronico Tenebro v The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004

Facts: The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals had affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of filed by Leticia Ancajas against
Veronico Tenebro (Petitioner) of Bigamy.

Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia
Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of
Lapu-lapu City. They lived continuously until later part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas by
showing a photocopy of a previous marriage, that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda
Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro, invoking the previous marriage, left the conjugal dwelling
which he shared with Ancajas.

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda
Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15. Ancajas
learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to
petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed
her husband.
 Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. However, Petitioner plead
“not guilty” on the following claims: (1) he denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2)
argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for
validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated.

Issue: Whether or not a judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage constitute lack
of essential requisites for validity thereby acquitting him of bigamy?

Held: The SC sustained the decision of both CA and RTC with the case of bigamy against
Tenebro. In so far as the requisites for the validity of a both prior and subsequent marriages are
concerned, it was present. There is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage
that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage
that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for
bigamy is concerned.

Case 67

Lucio Morigo y Cacho v People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004

Facts: This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision of CA which affirmed
the judgment of the RTC of Bohol Branch 4 in criminal case of bigamy against the petitioner.

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at
Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for four years. A year after they lost communication with each other.
One day, Morigo was surprised by a card sent by Lucia—who was working at Canada. After several
years, Lucia came back to the Philippines and offered Morigo to join her in Canada. They both agreed to
get married, thus, they were married on August 30, 1990. A year after, when Lucia was at Canada, , Lucia
filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted
by the court.

In October 1992, Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at the Virgen sa Barangay
Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol. On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration
of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint
seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that
no marriage ceremony actually took place. On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in
an Information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.

Issue: Whether or not a pending judicial declaration of nullity of marriage ab initio constitute as
a defense to be acquitted in bigamy?

Held: The SC granted the petition, the assailed decision of CA reversed and set aside, and
acquitted the petitioner of Bigamy. When the RTC of Bohol Branch 1 handed down its decision—the
pending judicial declaration of nullity of marriage petitioned by Morigo, the trial court found that there
was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer, instead
what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two. “This simply means that there
was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first
marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the
first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was,
under the eyes of the law, never married.”
Case 72

Mercado vs Tan

337 SCRA 122

Facts: Dr. Vincent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Olivia in 1976 before he
contracted married with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did not know. Tan filed
bigamy case against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage against Olivia. The decision in 1993 declared marriage between Mercado and Olivia null and
void.

Issue: Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of the
former marriage.

Held: A judicial declaration of nullity of previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one
can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such
judicial declaration is characterized by statute as void.

In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his first marriage with Olivia
right after Tan filed bigamy case against him. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated.
He contracted second marriage without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that the first
marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in bigamy charge.

Case 73

Case 74

Case 75

Case 76

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v. GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.

G.R. No. 94053. March 17, 1993.

FACTS: Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman. He met Janet Parker, a British, in bar in

England. After that, Janet started living with Nolasco in his ship for six months. It lasted until the
contract of Nolasco expired then he brought her to his hometown in Antique. They got married
in January 1982. Due to another contract, Nolasco left the province. In 1983, Nolasco received a
letter from his mother informing him that his son had been born but 15 days after, Janet
left. Nolasco went home and cut short his contract to find Janet’s whereabouts. He did so by
securing another seaman’s contract going to London. He wrote several letters to the bar where
they first met but it was all returned. Gregorio petitioned in 1988 for a declaration of presumptive
death of Janet.

ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his wife, Janet, is already dead?
 HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Nolasco’s efforts to locate Janet were not persistent
to show that he has a well-founded belief that his wife was already dead because instead of
seeking assistance of local authorities and the British Embassy, he even secured another
contract. More so, while he was in London, he did not even try to solicit help of the authorities to
find his wife.

Case 77
LOURDES G. LUKBAN, petitioner vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
G.R. No. L-8492. February 29, 1956
FACTS: Lourdes Lukban and Francisco Chuidian got married in 1933 and after a violent quarrel he
left Lukban and has not been heard of since then. She diligently looked for him asking the parents and
friends but no one knew his whereabouts. She believes that husband is already dead since he was absent
for more than 20 years and because she intends to marry again, she desires to have her civil status put in
order to be relieved on any liability under the law.

ISSUE: Whether Lukban needs to secure declaration of presumptive death before she can remarry.

HELD: The court ruled that Lukban does not need to secure declaration of presumptive death of
her husband because Civil Code prevails during their marriage in 1933. It provides that “for the purposes
of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The
declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to
enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the
celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for
seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or
her former spouse to be living, that each former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse
present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

Case 78

In Re Gue G.R No. L-14058

FACTS: Petitioner Angelina Gue and William Gue were married in the City of Manila before the
parish of Tondo. William who was a Chinese citizen left for Shanghai China and was later on joined by
petitioner. Petitioner came back to the Philippines alone with her children and William Gue never returned
to the Philippines and was never heard from again. She sent him letters asking him of his whereabouts but
all these were left unheeded, she made inquiries to the Bureau of Immigration if her husband was already
in the Philippines but received no information. She asked the court for a declaration of the presumption of
death of William Gue, pursuant to the provisions of Article 390 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. After
due publication and hearing, the trial court issued the order of dismissal. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can ask for the court to judicially declare the presumption of
death of William Gue .

HELD: A judicial pronouncement, even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie
presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial
pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a
competent court has to pass. The latter must decide finally the controversy the right or status of a party or
established finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights and obligations arise or may arise; and once
such controversy is decided by a final judgment or such right or status is determined, then the judgment
on the subject of the controversy, or the decree upon the right or status of a party or upon the existence
of a particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a few rare instances
especially provided by law.

Case 79
 Armas vs Calisterio
GR No. 136467, April 6, 2000
FACTS: Teodorico Calisterio, husband of Marietta Calisterio, the respondent, died intestate in April
1992 leaving several parcel of land estimated value of P604,750.00. He was the second husband of
Marietta who was previously married with William Bounds in January 1946. The latter disappeared without
a trace in February 1947. 11 years later from the disappearance of Bounds, Marietta and Teodorico were
married in May 1958 without Marietta securing a court declaration of Bounds’ presumptive death.

Antonia Armas y Calisterio, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a petition claiming to be the sole
surviving heir of the latter and that marriage between Marietta and his brother being allegedly bigamous
is thereby null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano be appointed as administrator, without bond,
of the estate of the deceased and inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate
would have been settled.

ISSUE: Whether Marrieta and Teodorico’s marriage was void due to the absence of the declaration
of presumptive death.

HELD: The marriage between the respondent and the deceased was solemnized in May 1958 where
the law in force at that time was the Civil Code and not the Family Code which only took effect in August
1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limit its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby
would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws. Since Civil Code provides that declaration of presumptive death is not essential before contracting
marriage where at least 7 consecutive years of absence of the spouse is enough to remarry then Marrieta’s
marriage with Teodorico is valid and therefore she has a right can claim portion of the estate.

Case 80
Republic vs. CA
GR No. 159614, December 9, 2005

FACTS: Alan Alegro, the petitioner, was married with Lea in January 1995. Lea arrived home late in
February 1995 and Alan told her that if she enjoys life of a single person, it will be better for her to go back
to her parents. Lea left after that fight. Allan checked if she went to her parents’ house but was not there
and even inquired to her friends. He went back to the parents-in-law’s house and learned that Lea had
been to their house but left without notice. He then sought help from the Barangay Captain. For sometime,
Alan decided to work as part-time taxi driver and during his free time he would look for Lea in the malls. In
June 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station and an alarm notice was issued.
He also reported the disappearance in NBI on July 2001. Alan filed a petition in March 2001 for the
declaration of presumptive
death of his wife.

ISSUE: Whether Alan has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

HELD: The court ruled that Alan failed to prove that he has a well-founded belief, before he filed
his petition with RTC, that his spouse was dead. He failed to present a witness other than the Barangay
Captain. He even failed to present those friends of Lea which he inquired to corroborate his testimony.
He also failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Lea’s whereabouts before filing his
petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced his credibility had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law
about Lea's whereabouts considering that Lea's father was the owner of Radio DYMS. He did report and
seek help of the local police authorities and NBI to locate Lea but he did so only after the OSG filed its
notice to dismiss his petition in RTC.

Case 81
SSS v. Jasque vs. Bailon
 GR. No 165545

FACTS: In 1955 Clemente Bailon and Alice Diaz married in Barcelona, Sorsogon. Fifteen plus years
later, Clemente filed an action to declare the presumptive death of Alice, she being an absentee. The
petition was granted in 1970.
In 1983, Clemente married Jarque. The two live together until Clemente’s death in 1998. Jarque then
sought to claim her husband’s SSS benefits and the same were granted her. On the other hand, a certain
Cecilia Bailon-Yap who claimed that she is the daughter of Bailon to a certain Elisa Jayona petitioned
before the SSS that they be given the reimbursement for the funeral spending for it was actually them
who shouldered the burial expenses of Clemente.

They further claim that Clemente contracted three marriages; one with Alice, another with Elisa
and the other with Jarque. Cecilia also averred that Alice is alive and kicking and Alice subsequently
emerged; Cecilia claimed that Clemente obtained the declaration of Alice’s presumptive death in bad
faith for he was aware of the whereabouts of Alice or if not he could have easily located her in her
parent’s place. She was in Sorsogon all along in her parents’ place. She went there upon learning that
Clemente had been having extra-marital affairs.

SSS then ruled that Jarque should reimburse what had been granted her and to return the same
to Cecilia since she shouldered the burial expenses and that the benefits should go to Alice because her
reappearance had terminated Clemente’s marriage with Harque. Further, SSS ruled that the RTC’s
decision in declaring Alice to be presumptively death is erroneous. Teresita appealed the decision of the
SSS before the Social Security Comission and the SSC affirmed SSS. The CA however ruled the contrary.

ISSUE: Whether or not the mere appearance of the absent spouse declared presumptively dead
automatically terminates the subsequent marriage.

HELD: There is no previous marriage to restore for it is terminated upon Clemente’s death.
Likewise, there is no subsequent marriage to terminate for the same is terminated upon Clemente’s
death. SSS is correct in ruling that it is inutile for Alice to pursue the recording of her reappearance before
the local civil registrar through an affidavit or a court action. But it is not correct for the SSS to rule upon
the declaration made by the RTC.
The SSC or the SSS has no judicial power to review the decision of the RTC. SSS is indeed empowered to
determine as to who should be the rightful beneficiary of the benefits obtained by a deceased member in
case of disputes but such power does not include the appellate power to review a court decision or
declaration. In the case at bar, the RTC ruling is binding and Jarque’s marriage to Clemente is still valid
because no affidavit was filed by Alice to make known her reappearance legally. Alice reappeared only
after Clemente’s death and in this case she can no longer file such an affidavit; in this case the bad faith
[or good faith] of Clemente can no longer be raised – the marriage herein is considered voidable and
must be attacked directly not collaterally – it is however impossible for a direct attack since there is no
longer a marriage to be attacked for the same has been terminated upon Clemente’s death.

Case 82
Valdez vs. Republic
GR No. 180863, September 8, 2009

FACTS: Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl
named Nancy. They argued constantly because Sofio was unemployed and did not bring home any
money. In March 1972, the latter left their house. Angelita and her child waited until in May 1972, they
decided to go back to her parent’s home. 3 years have passed without any word from Sofio until in
October 1975 when he showed up and they agreed to separate and executed a document to that
effect. It was the last time they saw each other and had never heard of ever since. Believing that Sofio
was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985. Virgilio’s application for naturalization
in US was denied because petitioner’s marriage with Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in March 2007,
petitioner filed a petition seeking declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of
presumptive death of Sofio.

HELD: The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofio’s death is necessary because
Civil Code governs during 1971 and not Family Code where at least 7 consecutive years of absence is only
needed. Thus, petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio and their marriage is legal and valid.

Case 83

Anaya vs. Palaroan

36 SCRA 97
FACTS: Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953. Palaroan filed an action for
annulment of the marriage in 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and
intimidation. The complaint was dismissed and upheld the validity of the marriage and granting Aurora’s
counterclaim. While the amount of counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando divulged to her that
several months prior to their marriage, he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of
his. According to her, the non-divulgement to her of such pre-marital secret constituted fraud in
obtaining her consent. She prayed for the annulment of her marriage with Fernando on such ground.

ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship
with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.

HELD: The concealment of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with another woman was not one
of those enumerated that would constitute fraud as ground for annulment and it is further excluded by
the last paragraph providing that “no other misrepresentation or deceit as to... chastity” shall give ground
for an action to annul a marriage. Hence, the case at bar does not constitute fraud and therefore would
not warrant an annulment of marriage.

Case 84

Buccat vs Buccat

Gr. No 47101 april 25,1941

Facts: On march 20, 1939 the plaintiff initiated the present case in which the defendant did not
appear despite having been duly summoned as a result, since the plaintiff was allowed to present his
evidence. The lower court ruled in favor of the defendant, hence this appeal applicant seeks to annul his
marriage to defendant on November 26, 1938 in the city of Baguio on the grounds that by consenting to
that marriage he did so because the defendant had assured her that she was virgin.

The complainant met the defendant in March 1938 after several interviews both were committed
on September 19 on that same year. On 26 of November of the same year the plaintiff married the
defendant in the catholic cathedral of the city of Baguio they lived together for a period of 89 days the
defendant gave birth to a none month old baby on February 23, 1939 as a result of the event the plaintiff
abandoned the defendant and did not return to martial life with her.

Issue: WON to revoke the decision of the lower court?

Held: we see no reason to revoke the judgement appealed in fact the plaintiff and appellant
allegation that the defendant that the defendant and appellant had not even suspected the defendants
pregnant state was doubtful as it is proven n very advance pregnancy. So there is no place to estimate the
fraud of which the appellant speaks. The allegation that it is not common to find people with developed
abdomen seems puerile to deserve our consideration especially since the plaintiff was a fisherman.

Case 85

Fernando Aquino vs Conchita Delizo

(109 Phil.21)

Facts: A complaint was filed against the defendant for alleged concealment from her husband
that the defendant was pregnant by another man at the date of their marriage on December 27, 1954.
Four months after their marriage the defendant answered that the child was created by her and the
plaintiff. The complaint was filed based on the grounds of fraud for that annulment of their marriage.

During trial only marriage certificate of both parties was presented without the live birth
certificate of the child born after that marriage, in result the trial court dismissed the complaint and the
plaintiff filed a petition to present additional evidence by presenting the birth certificate but it was
denied.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals the court affirmed that dismissal on the ground that the claim
of the plaintiff to not have noticed the pregnancy at time of marriage was unbelievable, the plaintiff then
filed a motion for reconsideration for a new trial. The motion was denied by court petition for certiorari
was filed.

Issue:

Held:

Case No. 86

Joel Jimenez vs Remedios Conizores

Gr. no L-12790 Aug 31, 1960

Facts: Joel filed a complaint praying for annulment of his marriage in grounds that the hole or the
point of entry of the vagina of Remedies Conizores was too small for the penetration of male organ for
copulation that condition of her genitals as described above existed at the time of marriage and
continues to exist and for that reason he left the conjugal house for two nights and 1 day after they had
been married the wife was summoned and served a copy of complaint she did not answer court order
defendant to submit to a physical examination by a competent lad physician to determine her physical
capacity for copulation(sexual Intercourse) and submit it within then days from receipt of the order a
medical certificate on the result thereof defendant is given additional 5 days to comply the order with
warning that her failure to undergo medical examination and submit the medical certificate would
deemed lack of interest on her part of the case and that judgement upon the evidence presented by her
husband would be rendered.

After hearing at which defendant was not present court entered a decree annulling the marriage
between the plaintiff and the defendant the city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration of the decree
entered on the grounds the defendant’s failure to undergo examination and submit a medical certificate
since the defendant reputed to be examined. That instead annulling the marriage the court should have
punished her for contempt of the court and compelled her to undergo physical examination and submit
med. certificate He prayed that the complaint be dismissed or that the wife subject to physical
examination motion for reconsideration was denied.

Issue: Whether marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the testimony of
the husband who claimed and testified wife was and is incompetent.

Held: The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse
is insufficient to tear the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife. The decree appealed
is set aside.

Case No 87

Manuel Almelor vs RTC and Leonida almelor

Gr. no 179620 august 26, 2008

Facts: Petitioner Manuel and respondent Leonida were married on January 29,1989 at the Manila
Cathedral their union bore 3 children namely: Maria Paulina, Napoleon Manuel and Manuel Homer. Both
petitioner and respondent are medical practitioners on anesthesiologist and pediatrician.

After 11 years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Pinas City to annul their
marriage on the ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his martial obligations.

Leonida testified that she first met Manuel at San Lazaro hospital where they worked as medical
student clerks at that time she regarded Manuel as a very thoughtful person who got well with other
people. In public Manuel was a picture perfect husband and father but not the case in his private life.
Leonida defined Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous and short tempered Manuel
unreasonably way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their frequent fights as
couple. Adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his homosexually, her suspicious were first
aroused when she noticed Manuel’s peculiar closeness to his male companions for instance when she
caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller and also
found several pornographic homosexual materials in his possession and lastly when he caught Manuel
kissed Dr. Negoles lips, upon learning she confronted Manuel. Leonida together with the kids left the
conjugal house, Manuel stopped giving support to the kids then.

Dr. Valentia Garcia a clinical psychologist has presented to prove Leonidas claims was true.
Manuel countered the true cause of Leonida’s hostility against him was their professional rivalry he and
her family competing hospitals in the vicinity, pointed out that leonida was a possessive and jealous wife
which deprived him from hanging out with female companions. She also fabricated the tales about
homosexual pornographic materials his brother testified that they both went to Bicol at the time when
Leonida witnessed Manuel kissing Dr. Negoles

Issue: WON the marriage between the two can be declared as null and void because of fraud
used by Manuel to conceal his homosexuality.
 Held: The Supreme Court emphasized that homosexuality is not a ground to nullify a marriage the
lower court should not have taken the public perception against Manual’s sexuality his peculiarities must
not be ruled by the lower court as an indication of his homosexuality for this are not sufficient enough to
prove.

Case 88

Florence Malcampo Sin vs Philipp Sin

GR No. 137590, 26 March 2001

Facts: On January 4, 1987 after two years of courtship and engagement, Florence and respondent
Philip Sin a portages citizen were married at St. Jude catholic parish in san Miguel Manila.

On September 20,1994 Florence filed with the RTC branch 158 Pasig City a complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage against Philipp trial ensued and the parties presented their respective
document and testimonial evidence.

On June 16 1995 the trial court dismissed the Florence petition and throughout its trial the state
did not participate in the proceedings

Issue: Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the absence of the
participation of the state in the proceeding.

Held: Article 48 of the family code states that “ in all cases of annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage the court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it appear
on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed the trial court should have ordered the prosecuting attorney
and the solicitor general to appear as counsel of the state No decision shall be held handed down unless
the solicitor general issue certification briefly stating his reason for his agreement as the case may be to
the petition the case is remanded proper trial.

Case 89

Jose de Ocampo vs Foreciano

GR No. L- 13553

Facts: plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938 in a religious ceremony in Guimba,
Nueva Ecija and had live thereafter as husband and wife they begot several children who are now with
the plaintiff. In March 1957 plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust
by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcales, found the defendant carrying martial relations with
another man plaintiff sent her to Manila to study beauty culture where she stayed for one year again.
Plaintiff discovered that while in Manila the defendant was going out with several other men aside from
Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June 1952 defendant finished her studies and left plaintiff.

On June 18, 1955 plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another man
by name Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff filed a legal separation and defendant manifested her conformity
provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action

Issue: WON it is the obligation or duty of the husband to bring her wife home.
 Held: No. it is not the obligation of the plaintiff to search and bring her wife home because she
left the plaintiff after having sinned with arcades and after she had dates with other man. it was the
obligation of the wife to return to the husband. Legal separation was granted.