EN BANC I.
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to excess or lack
G.R. No. 102685 January 29, 1993
MIGUEL M. MEDIJA, JR., Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Caballero, Calub, Aumentado & Associates for petitioner.
MELO, J.:
Petitioner Miguel Medija was indicted for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in an Information quoted in
the decision of respondent court and which reads:
That on or about the 25th day of March, 1985, in Zamboanga City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Engr. Miguel Medija, Jr. y Minoza, a public officer
being then employed as Engineer A at the National Irrigation Administration (NIA), Regional
Office in Zamboanga City while in the exercise or performance of his official function as such,
AMONG WHICH WAS TO CERTIFY TO THE ACTUAL CONDITION OF SUPPLIES AND
EQUIPMENT DELIVERED TO AND RECEIVED BY HIM IN BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL
IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION (NIA), and taking advantage of his official position,
conspiring and confederating with the accused Rolando Manalo y Salvador, a private individual and
businessman/dealer of spare parts for light and heavy equipment, did then and there wilfully and
unlawfully cause undue injury to the government through evident bad faith, by then and there
certifying that a set (2 pcs.) of chain assembly for Fiat Allis Dozer No. 497232 supplied and
delivered by his co-accused Rolando Manalo y Salvador was brand new by certifying that the same
was "okay as to quantity and specification" when in truth and in fact said set (2 pcs.) was only a
rebuilt one, thus making the government pay the amount of P136,800.00 which is the cost of a
brand new set of chain assembly and which amount was actually paid to Rolando Manalo y
Salvador, and thereby giving unwarranted benefit and/or advantage to the latter to the prejudice of
the government.
Contrary to law. (pp. 28-29, Rollo.)
After trial, following a plea of not guilty, Medija was convicted and sentenced "to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for a minimum of nine (9) years and one (1) day to a
maximum of twelve (12) years and to suffer perpetual disqualification from public office". He was
further ordered to pay the government, by way of reimbursement of actual damage to it, the amount
of One Hundred Thirty Six Thousand Eight Hundred (P136,800.00) Pesos, and costs of suit. (p.
53, Rollo).
Medija's co-accused, Rolando Manalo, remained at large, the warrant for his arrest having been
returned unserved.
Medija has now resorted to the instant petition and seeks reversal of the judgment of conviction
upon the following grounds.
of jurisdiction -
(A) In not finding and concluding that petitioner was in good faith in the performance of his official
duties, verbally assigned to him by his superior officers - library
(B) In not finding and concluding that some other personnel/official of the Zamboanga City - virtual
law library
(C) In not finding and concluding that Rolando Manalo y Salvador the lone private respondent
should be made to answer for his indiscretions and/or offense.
II The Honorable Sandiganbayan also committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of or
excess of jurisdiction by not having excluded from the information the petitioner and/or by
acquitting him of the charges. (p. 10, Rollo)
The facts, as found by the trial court (pp. 16-17, Decision) and adopted by Medija in his petition (p.
10, Rollo) are as follows:
Accused Engr. Miguel Medija, Jr. was a Mechanical Engineer employed as Engineer "A" of the
Equipment Management Division, Region IX of the NIA. Among his duties were to conduct
inspection, undertake evaluations and recommend schedules of repairs. His duties were mainly
administrative in that he supervised the maintenance of equipment assigned to the NIA Regional
Office. His superiors, at times, instructed him to conduct the inspection of certain equipment or
spare parts delivered, considering that he was the only Mechanical Engineer in the Office. library
On March 25, 1985, Engr. Laranjo instructed him to inspect one set of a chain assembly consisting
of two pieces. He complied with the instruction by comparing the assembly to a link given by the
Supply Officer, after which he wrote down in a report the result of his inspection which is that the
assembly was "O.K. as to quantity and specification."
On the same day, Mr. Severino Labio, OIC of NIA, made a written request to the Commission on
Audit for the inspection of the subject spare parts. In response, the COA sent Engr. Charles Bulac
who made the inspection the next day. The result of his inspection was contained in a report
addressed to the Auditor, NIA Region IX, Zamboanga City, dated March 27, 1985, which
enumerated his findings and recommendations (Exhibit "F").
In the NIA office, however, the disbursement voucher had been prepared on March 25, 1985, but
the check payment was prepared, and accounting entries therefor passed, only on March 29,
1985.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The subject chain assembly was delivered to the Molave Office of the NIA on March 30, 1985 by
Mr. Pauline Castillo, a NIA driver. On April 8, 1985, Engr. Herculiano Judilla, Jr., Senior Engineer
"B" of the NIA, inspected the assembly, and made a written report thereon which he submitted to
Engr. Charlie Sabado (Exhibit "D").
The COA notified Mr. Labio (NIA-OIC) of Engr. Bulac's report. Acting on it, Mr. Labio gave
notice to the supplier Aaron Enterprises of the discrepancy found on the chain assembly purchased
from it. In response, Aaron Enterprises, through its proprietor, Mr. Manalo, undertook to replace the
1
chain assembly and requested that he be given ninety (90) days within which to do so. The supplier
failed to honor his commitment, for which reason the bulldozer, for which the chain assembly was
intended, had remained inoperative up to the time of trial (pp. 37-38, t.s.n., January 15, 1990). (pp.
43-44, Rollo)
Medija was charged under Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides -
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful.
Xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
In Ponce de Leon v. Sandiganbayan (186 SCRA 745 [1990]) the Court enumerated the elements of
this offense as follows:
(1) That the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them;
(2) That said public officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance of their official
duties or in relation to their public positions;
(3) That they cause undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private
party;chanrobles virtual law library
(4) That such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such
parties; and
(5) That the public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. (at p. 754)
It must be stressed that the information in this case charged that Medija, conspiring and
confederating with his co-accused Rolando Manalo, caused undue injury to the government through
evident bad faith by certifying that a
2-piece set of chain assembly for Fiat Allis Dozer No. 497232 supplied and delivered by his co-
accused "okay as to quantity and specification"; when in truth and in fact said set was only a rebuilt
one, thus making the government pay the amount of P136,800.00 which is the cost of a brand new
set of chain assembly. law library
While the information charged "evident bad faith", respondent court found Medija guilty of "gross
inexcusable negligence". Thus, respondent court discussed Medija's liability as follows:
Accused Medija is a licensed Mechanical Engineer (p. 39, t.s.n., Sept. 13, 1990). As such, he is
expected to be in a position to know that strict specifications are required for the equipment to suit
their intended purpose, and that the checking of whether such specifications are met is part of the
overall inspection process which he was particularly tasked to do in connection with the acceptance
of the chain assembly.
In addition, the fact was that the spare part he was to examine was of a very high cost
(P136,800.00), as indicated in the Inspection Report which he saw during, and which he signed
after, his inspection. Equally significant was the fact that the bulldozer, for which the chain
assembly was intended to be used, cost even more, and this should have, therefore, caused the
accused to assume a much more critical posture in inspecting the chain assembly set in question.
The combination of all these facts required the accused Medija to be very careful and very thorough
in the inspection of the chain assembly. However, he not only failed to exert extra effort to this end;
he dispensed with even the simple procedural requirements given for ordinary inspection. The
accused was, therefore, beyond doubt grossly negligent in his inspection of the chain assembly. "In
the case of public officials, there is negligence when there is a breach of duty, or failure to perform
an obligation, and there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable." (Juan v.
Arias, 72 SCRA 404, p. 410). The negligence of the accused in the case is unquestionably palpable.
(pp. 51-52, Rollo)
Also, the information charged conspiracy. But, significantly, the decision of respondent court is
silent on this point.
In Gomez v. Intermediate Appellate Court (135 SCRA 620 [1985]) we stated:
. . . that conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. It cannot be based on
mere conjectures but must be established as a fact. The same degree of proof required to establish
the crime is necessary to support a finding of the presence of conspiracy that is, it must be shown to
exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself.
To establish conspiracy, there must be evidence of intentional participation in the transaction with a
view to the furtherance of the common design or purpose. (People v. Agda, 111 SCRA 330 [1982]).
His knowledge of the conspiracy and his active and knowing participation therein must be proved
by positive evidence.
In the case at bar, no evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that Medija was indeed a
part of a conspiracy to defraud the government.
Apparently, the main and only reason for the judgment of conviction is the "certification" of
Medija. On the basis of this "certification", respondent court concluded that the government paid
the amount of P136,800.00 to the supplier. In other words, it was the finding of respondent court
that without the "certification" of Medija, the government would not have paid this amount or
should not have paid the supplier at all.
We are constrained to reverse respondent court's finding and to rule that this kind of evidence is too
conjectural and presumptive to establish personal culpability.
2
On the contrary, the evidence on record shows that the "certification" was not the reason for the
payment. It was established that on March 25, 1985 Medija actually saw and inspected the subject
chain assembly, but it was Orlando Villanueva, the Supply Officer, who prepared the report and
accepted the delivery of the parts. Under the heading "Findings/Recommendations", Medija wrote
the words "O.K. as to quantity and specification" which meant, according to him, that the spare
parts were intended for a Fiat-Allis bulldozer as far as the specifications were concerned, and that
they were of the correct number of pieces ("quantity"), but he told his superior officer that the chain
assembly was not "brand new". Aside from his signature on the inspection report, there was no
other paper upon which accused had affixed his signature virtual law library
It was likewise established that on March 26, 1985, OIC Severino Labio of NIA, Zamboanga City
requested Civil Engineer Charles Bulac, of the COA, Zamboanga City, Region 9 to conduct a post-
audit examination of the subject chain assembly. As the instruction was written and required Engr.
Bulac to make a report and recommendation thereon, Engr. Bulac complied and in his written report
dated March 26, 1985, he found that the delivered chain assembly is not brand new and not yet
complete. OIC Labio communicated with the supplier, accused Rolando Manalo who promised to
replace the chain assembly. Despite the findings of Engr. Bulac and the failure of Rolando Manalo
to replace the chain assembly, the check for its payment was prepared on March 29, 1985 and the
rebuilt chain assembly was delivered to Molave, Zamboanga del Sur on March 30, 1985. There is
nothing in the record to show that Medija had any participation in the preparation of the check and
in the delivery of the chain assembly. Respondent court, without any clear factual basis for doing so
has assumed that Medija was part of an illegal scheme. It could not also be said, in the light of the
evidence on record, that had Medija not made the "certification" the government would not have
been defrauded. In the first place, why did NIA pay the supplier, when it already knew beforehand
that the chain assembly delivered was not brand new? True, in making the inspection, Medija
should have been more careful. His lack of care, however may be a ground for administrative
action, but it does not give rise to criminal culpability absent more evidence against him. There
should be other grounds than the mere "certification" to sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction
thereunder. Was Medija part of the planning, preparation and perpetration of the alleged conspiracy
to defraud the government. Did Medija profit from this illegal scheme? The evidence on record is
certainly very much wanting on these points. Besides, who were Medija's co-conspirators? Why
were not the more responsible officers who had a hand in the preparation of the purchase order and
the requisition voucher, the preparation of the check and its subsequent payment, the delivery and
acceptance of the chain assembly, not indicted?
Considering all the foregoing, we feel that Medija cannot in fairness be held liable under the
indictment. The evidence on record cannot sustain a verdict of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Sandiganbayan is hereby SET ASIDE and Miguel M.
Medija, Jr. is acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 199877 August 13, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ARTURO LARA y ORBISTA, Accused-Appellant.
VILLARAMA, JR.,*
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is an automatic appeal from the Decision1 dated July 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03685. The CA affirmed the Decision 2 dated October 1, 2008 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 268, finding Arturo Lara (Lara) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of robbery with homicide.
On June 14, 2001, an Information3 charging Lara with robbery with homicide was filed with the
RTC:
On or about May 31, 2001, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, armed with a gun, conspiring and confederating together with one unidentified person who
is still at-large, and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to gain, and
by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and divest from Joselito M. Bautista cash money amounting to ₱ 230,000.00
more or less and belonging to San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc. represented by Enrique
Sumulong; that on the occasion of said robbery, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot said Joselito M. Bautista with
the said gun, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.4
Following Lara’s plea of not guilty, trial ensued. The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses:
Enrique Sumulong (Sumulong), SPO1 Bernard Cruz (SPO1 Cruz) and PO3 Efren Calix (PO3
Calix).
Sumulong testified that: (a) he was an accounting staff of San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc. (San
Sebastian); (b) on May 31, 2001 and at around 9:00 in the morning, he withdrew the amount of ₱
230,000.00 from the Metrobank-Mabini Branch, Pasig City to defray the salaries of the employees
of San Sebastian; (c) in going to the bank, he rode a pick-up and was accompanied by Virgilio
Manacob (Manacob), Jeff Atie (Atie) and Joselito Bautista (Bautista); (d) he placed the amount
withdrawn in a black bag and immediately left the bank; (e) at around 10:30 in the morning, while
they were at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City, Lara suddenly appeared
at the front passenger side of the pick-up and pointed a gun at him stating, "Akin na ang pera, iyong
bag, nasaan?"; (f) Bautista, who was seated at the back, shouted, "Wag mong ibigay"; (g) heeding
Bautista’s advice, he threw the bag in Bautista’s direction; (h) after getting hold of the bag, Bautista
alighted from the pick-up and ran; (i) seein Bautista, Lara ran after him while firing his gun; (j)
when he had the chance to get out of the pick-up, he ran towards Mercedes Plaza and called up the
office of San Sebastian to relay the incident; (k) when he went back to where the pick-up was
parked, he went to the rear portion of the vehicle and saw blood on the ground; (l) he was informed
by one bystander that Bautista was shot and the bag was taken away from him; (m) when barangay
officials and the police arrived, he and his two (2) other companions were brought to the police
3
station for investigation; (n) on June 7, 2001, while on his way to Barangay Maybunga, Pasig City,
he saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street, Barangay San Miguel, Pasig City; (o) he alerted the
police and Lara was thereafter arrested; and (p) at the police station, he, Atie and Manacob
identified Lara as the one who shot and robbed them of San Sebastian’s money. 5
SPO1 Cruz testified that: (a) he was assigned at the Follow-Up Unit of the Pasig City Police
Station; (b) at around 7:55 in the evening of June 7, 2001, Sumulong went to the police station and
informed him that he saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street; (c) four (4) police officers and
Sumulong went to Dr. Pilapil Street where they saw Lara, who Sumulong identified; (d) they then
approached Lara and invited him for questioning; (e) at the police station, Lara was placed in a line-
up where he was positively identified by Sumulong, Manacob and Atie; and (f) after being
identified, Lara was informed of his rights and subsequently detained.6
PO3 Calix testified that: (a) he was a member of the Criminal Investigation Unit of the Pasig City
Police Station; (b) on May 31, 2001, he was informed of a robbery that took place at the corner of
Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City; (c) he, together with three (3) other police officers,
proceeded to the crime scene; (d) upon arriving thereat, one of the police officers who were able to
respond ahead of them, handed to him eleven (11) pieces of empty shells and six (6) deformed slugs
of a 9mm pistol; (e) as part of his investigation, he interviewed Sumulong, Atie, Manacob at the
police station; and (f) before Bautista died, he was able to interview Bautista at the hospital where
the latter was brought after the incident.7
In his defense, Lara testified that: (a) he was a plumber who resided at Dr. Pilapil Street, San
Miguel, Pasig City; (b) on May 31, 2001, he was at his house, digging a sewer trench while his
brother, Wilfredo, was constructing a comfort room; (c) they were working from 8:00 in the
morning until 3:00 in the afternoon; (d) on June 7, 2001 and at around 7:00 in the evening, while he
was at the house of one of his cousins, police officers arrived and asked him if he was Arturo Lara;
(e) after confirming that he was Arturo Lara, the police officers asked him to go with them to the
Barangay Hall; (f) he voluntarily went with them and while inside the patrol car, one of the
policemen said, "You are lucky, we were able to caught you in your house, if in another place we
will kill you" (sic); (g) he was brought to the police station and not the barangay hall as he was
earlier told where he was investigated for robbery with homicide; (h) when he told the police that he
was at home when the subject incident took place, the police challenged him to produce witnesses;
(i) when his witnesses arrived at the station, one of the police officers told them to come back the
following day; (j) while he was at the police line-up holding a name plate, a police officer told
Sumulong and Atie, "Ituru nyo na yan at uuwi na tayo"; and (k) when his witnesses arrived the
following day, they were told that he will be subjected to an inquest. 8
To corroborate his testimony, Lara presented one of his neighbors, Simplicia Delos Reyes. She
testified that on May 31, 2001, while she was manning her store, she saw Lara working on a sewer
trench from 9:00 in the morning to 5:00 in the afternoon. 9 Lara also presented his sister, Edjosa
Manalo, who testified that he was working on a sewer line the whole day of May 31, 2001. 10
On October 1, 2008, the RTC convicted Lara of robbery with homicide in a Decision, 11 the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused ARTURO LARA Y Orbista
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, defined and penalized
under Article 294 (1) as amended by Republic Act 7659, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties prescribed by law.
Accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the sum of Php50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and Php230,000.00 representing the money carted by the said accused.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTC rejected Lara’s defense of alibi as follows:
The prosecution’s witness Enrique Sumulong positively identified accused Arturo Lara as the
person who carted away the payroll money of San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc., on May 31, 2001
at around 10:30 o’clock in the morning along the corner of Mercedez and Market Ave., Pasig City
and the one who shot Joselito Bautista which caused his instantaneous death on the same day. As
repeatedly held by the Supreme Court, "For alibi to prosper, an accused must show he was at some
other place for such a period of time that it was impossible for him to have been at the crime scene
at the time of the commission of the crime" (People versus Bano, 419 SCRA 697). Considering the
proximity of the distance between the place of the incident and the residence of the accused where
he allegedly stayed the whole day of May 31, 2001, it is not physically impossible for him to be at
the crime scene within the same barangay. The positive identification of the accused which were
categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses,
should prevail over the alibi and denial of the accused whose testimony was not substantiated by
clear and convincing evidence (People versus Aves 420 SCRA 259).13 (Emphasis supplied)
On appeal, Lara pointed out several errors that supposedly attended his conviction. First, that he
was arrested without a warrant under circumstances that do not justify a warrantless arrest rendered
void all proceedings including those that led to his conviction. Second, he was not assisted by
counsel when the police placed him in a line-up to be identified by the witnesses for the prosecution
in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. The police line-up is part of custodial
investigation and his right to counsel had already attached. Third, the prosecution failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the prosecution failed to present a witness who actually
saw him commit the alleged acts. Sumulong merely presumed that he was the one who shot
Bautista and who took the bag of money from him. The physical description of Lara that Sumulong
gave to the police was different from the one he gave during the trial, indicating that he did not have
a fair glimpse of the perpetrator. Moreover, this gives rise to the possibility that it was his
unidentified companion who shot Bautista and took possession of the money. Hence, it cannot be
reasonably claimed that his conviction was attended with moral certainty. Fourth, the trial court
erred in discounting the testimony of his witnesses. Without any showing that they were impelled
by improper motives in testifying in his favor, their testimonies should have been given the
credence they deserve. While his two (2) witnesses were his sister and neighbor, this does not by
itself suggest the existence of bias or impair their credibility.
The CA affirmed Lara’s conviction. That Lara was supposedly arrested without a warrant may not
serve as a ground to invalidate the proceedings leading to his conviction considering its belated
invocation. Any objections to the legality of the warrantless arrest should have been raised in a
motion to quash duly filed before the accused enters his plea; otherwise, it is deemed waived.
Further, that the accused was illegally arrested is not a ground to set aside conviction duly arrived at
and based on evidence that sufficiently establishes culpability:
Appellant’s avowal could hardly wash.
It is a shopworn doctrine that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the
4
objection is deemed waived. In voluntarily submitting himself to the court by entering a plea, Q What did he say?
instead of filing a motion to quash the information for lack of jurisdiction over his person, accused-
appellant is deemed to have waived his right to assail the legality of his arrest. Applying the A "Nasaan ang bag ilabas mo yung pera", sir.
foregoing jurisprudential touchstone, appellant is estopped from questioning the validity of his
arrest since he never raised this issue before arraignment or moved to quash the Information.
Q Where were you looking when this person approached you?
What is more, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error. The warrantless arrest, A I was looking at his face, sir.
even if illegal, cannot render void all other proceedings including those leading to the conviction of
the appellants and his co-accused, nor can the state be deprived of its right to convict the guilty Q And upon hearing those words, what did you do?
when all the facts on record point to their culpability.14 (Citations omitted)
A I put out the money, sir, because I got afraid at that time.
As to whether the identification of Lara during the police line-up is inadmissible as his right to
counsel was violated, the CA ruled that there was no legal compulsion to afford him a counsel Q Did you hand over the black bag containing the money to him?
during a police line-up since the latter is not part of custodial investigation.

A No, sir, because one of my companion(s) shouted not to give the money or
Appellant’s assertion that he was under custodial investigation at the time he was identified in a the bag so I immediately threw away the bag at the back seat, sir.
police line-up and therefore had the right to counsel does not hold water. Ingrained in our
jurisdiction is the rule that an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up
considering that such is usually not a part of custodial investigation. An exception to this rule is Q And how long approximately was that person standing by your car window?
when the accused had been the focus of police attention at the start of the investigation. In the case
at bench, appellant was identified in a police line-up by prosecution witnesses from a group of A Five (5) to ten (10) minutes, sir.
persons gathered for the purpose. However, there was no proof that appellant was interrogated at all
or that a statement or confession was extracted from him. A priori, We refuse to hearken to
Q And after you have thrown the black bag containing money to the back of the
appellant’s hollow cry that he was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel given the hard fact
vehicle, what did that person do?
that during the police line-up, the accusatory process had not yet commenced.

A I saw Joey alight(ed) from the vehicle carrying the bag and ran away, sir, and
Assuming ex hypothesi that appellant was subjected to interrogation sans counsel during the police
I also saw somebody shoot a gun?
line-up, it does not in any way affect his culpability. Any allegation of violation of rights during
custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or
confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their conviction. Here, appellant was Q Who was firing the gun?
convicted based on the testimony of a prosecution witness and not on his alleged uncounseled
confession or admission.15 (Citations omitted) A The one who held-up us, sir.

The CA addressed Lara’s claim that the prosecution’s failure to present a witness who actually saw Q By how, do you know his name?
him commit the crime charged as follows:
A No, sir.
Third. Appellant takes umbrage at the alleged failure of the prosecution to present an eyewitness to
prove that he shot the victim and took the money.
Q But if you can see him again, (were) you be able to recognize him?

Such posture is unpersuasive.

A Yes, sir.

Contrary to appellant’s assertion, prosecution witness Sumulong actually saw him shoot Bautista,
Q If he is in the courtroom, will you be able to recognize him?
the victim. Sumulong vividly recounted, viz:

A Yes, sir.
"Q When you said that "tinutukan ka", aside from this act was there any other
words spoken by this person?
Q Please look around and please tell this Honorable Court whether indeed the
person you saw holding you up at that time is in court?
A There was, sir.

5
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please stand up and tap his shoulder to identify him?
Interpreter:
The witness tap the shoulder of a person sitting on the first bench of the
courtroom wearing yellow t-shirt and black pants who when ask identify
himself as Arturo Lara (sic).
Q And when as you said Joey got the bag. Alighted from the vehicle and ran
away with it, what did the accused do? (sic)
A He shot Joey while running around our vehicle, sir.
Q Around how many shots according to your recollection were fired?
A There were several shots, more or less nine (9) shots, sir.
x x x x x x"
"Q So, you did not personally notice what had transpired or happened after you
stepped down from the Nissan pick-up, that is correct?
A There was, sir, my companion Joselito Bautista was shot.
Q When you heard the gunfire, you were already proceeding towards that store
to call your office by phone, that is correct?
A Not yet, sir, we were still inside the vehicle.
Q And was Joselito Bautista at the rear of the Nissan Sentra when you heard
this gunfire?
A Yes, sir.
Q And so he was at the back, so the shooter was also at the back of the vehicle,
that is correct?
A Yes, sir, he went towards the rear portion of the vehicle, he followed Joselito
Bautista and shot him.
Q So, to be clear, when Joselito Bautista ran to the rear, this alleged holdup(p)er
followed him?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that was the time(,) you heard this gunfire? A Yes, sir.
Q So, you did not personally see who fired that firearm?
A Because at that time he was the one holding the gun, sir.
Q So, you are presuming that he was the one who fired the gun because he was
holding the gun, am I correct?
A Yes, sir."
xxxx
Under Section 4, Rule 133, of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if the following requisites concur:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
Here, the following circumstantial evidence are tellingly sufficient to prove that the guilt of
appellant is beyond reasonable doubt, viz:
1. While the vehicle was at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City, appellant
suddenly emerged and pointed a gun at prosecution witness Sumulong, demanding from him to
produce the bag containing the money.
2. Prosecution witness Sumulong threw the bag to the victim who was then seated at the backseat of
the vehicle.
3. The victim alighted from vehicle carrying the bag.
4. Appellant chased and fired several shots at the victim.
5. The victim sustained several gunshot wounds.
6. The police officers recovered from the scene of the crime six deformed empty shells. 16 (Citations
omitted and emphasis supplied)
Finally, the CA found that Lara’s alibi failed to convince. Specifically:
Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that positive identification of the accused, where
categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness
6
testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of appellants, whose testimonies are not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
All the more, to establish alibi the accused must prove (a) that he was present at another place at the
time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime. Physical impossibility "refers to the distance between the place where the
accused was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility
of access between the two places. Appellant miserably failed to prove the physical impossibility of
his presence at the locus criminis at the time of the perpetration of the felonious act. He himself
admitted that his house was just a stone’s throw (about three minutes away) from the crime
scene.17 (Citations omitted)
In a Resolution18 dated February 1, 2012, this Court accepted the appeal as the penalty imposed was
reclusion perpetua and the parties were afforded an opportunity to file their supplemental briefs.
Both parties waived their right to do so, stating that they would adopt the allegations in their
respective briefs that they filed with the CA.
Issues
The present review of Lara’s conviction for robbery with homicide gives rise to the following
issues:
a. whether the identification made by Sumulong, Atie and Manacob in the police line-up
is inadmissible because Lara stood therein without the assistance of counsel;
b. whether Lara’s supposedly illegal arrest may be raised for the first time on appeal for
the purpose of nullifying his conviction;
c. whether there is sufficient evidence to convict Lara; and
d. whether Lara’s alibi can be given credence so as to exonerate him from the crime
charged.
Our Ruling
This Court resolves to deny the appeal.
I
Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired through compulsory process such as a
warrant of arrest or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to
the court.19 Any objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the accused
must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. An accused
submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court upon entering a plea and participating actively in the
trial and this precludes him invoking any irregularities that may have attended his arrest. 20
Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient ground to reverse and set aside a
conviction that was arrived upon a complaint duly filed and a trial conducted without error. 21 As
Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. — The failure of the accused to
assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either
because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be
deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs
(a), (b), (g) and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule.
II
Contrary to Lara’s claim, that he was not provided with counsel when he was placed in a police
line-up did not invalidate the proceedings leading to his conviction. That he stood at the police line-
up without the assistance of counsel did not render Sumulong’s identification of Lara inadmissible.
The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial investigation begins
and being made to stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part of custodial
investigation. As this Court previously ruled in People v. Amestuzo:22
The contention is not meritorious. The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution,
or the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial
investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by
the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating
statements. Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage. This was settled in the case of
People vs. Lamsing and in the more recent case of People vs. Salvatierra. The right to be assisted by
counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during
identification in a police line-up because it is not part of the custodial investigation process. This is
because during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the
accusatory and it is usually the witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who gives a
statement in the course of the line-up.23(Citations omitted)
III
It is apparent from the assailed decision of the CA that the finding of guilt against Lara is based on
circumstantial evidence. The CA allegedly erred in this wise considering that only direct and not
circumstantial evidence can overcome the presumption of innocence.
However, well-settled is the rule that direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only
matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. Even in the absence of
direct evidence, conviction can be had if the established circumstances constitute an unbroken
chain, consistent with each other and to the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, to the exclusion of
all other hypothesis that he is not.24
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, circumstantial evidence
sufficed to convict upon the concurrence of the following requisites: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
7
It is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted of the crime for which he is
charged. Resort to circumstantial evidence is essential since to insist on direct testimony would, in
many cases, result in setting felons free and denying proper protection to the community. 25
As the CA correctly ruled, the following circumstances established by the evidence for the
prosecution strongly indicate Lara’s guilt: (a) while the vehicle Sumulong, Atie, Manacob and
Bautista were riding was at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, he appeared at the
front passenger side thereof armed with a gun; (b) while pointing the gun at Sumulong who was at
the front passenger seat, Lara demanded that Sumulong give him the bag containing the money; (c)
instead of giving the bag to Lara, Sumulong gave it to Bautista who was seated at the back of the
pick-up; (d) when Bautista got hold of the bag, he alighted and ran towards the back of the pick-up;
(e) Lara ran after Bautista and while doing so, fired his gun at Bautista’s direction; (f) Bautista
sustained several gunshot wounds; and (g) Bautista’s blood was on the crime scene and empty
shells were recovered therefrom.
Indeed, in cases of robbery with homicide, the taking of personal property with intent to gain must
itself be established beyond reasonable doubt. Conclusive evidence proving the physical act of
asportation by the accused must be presented by the prosecution. It must be shown that the original
criminal design of the culprit was robbery and the homicide was perpetrated with a view to the
consummation of the robbery by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. 26 The mere presence of
the accused at the crime scene is not enough to implicate him. It is essential to prove the intent to
rob and the use of violence was necessary to realize such intent.
In this case, Lara’s intent to gain is proven by Sumulong’s positive narration that it was Lara who
pointed the gun at him and demanded that the bag containing the money be turned over to him. That
Lara resorted to violence in order to actualize his intent to gain is proven by Sumulong’s testimony
that he saw Lara fire the gun at the direction of Bautista, who was running away from the pick-up in
order to prevent Lara from taking possession of the money.
Notably, the incident took place in broad daylight and in the middle of a street. Thus, where
considerations of visibility are favorable and the witness does not appear to be biased against the
accused, his or her assertions as to the identity of the malefactor should be normally accepted. 27
Lara did not allege, much less, convincingly demonstrate that Sumulong was impelled by improper
or malicious motives to impute upon him, however perjurious, such a serious charge. Thus, his
testimony, which the trial court found to be forthright and credible, is worthy of full faith and credit
and should not be disturbed. If an accused had nothing to do with the crime, it is against the natural
order of events and of human nature and against the presumption of good faith that a prosecution
witness would falsely testify against the former.28
IV
In view of Sumulong’s positive identification of Lara, the CA was correct in denying Lara’s alibi
outright. It is well-settled that positive identification prevails over alibi, which is inherently a weak
defense. Such is the rule, for as a defense, alibi is easy to concoct, and difficult to disapprove.29
Moreover, in order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was
somewhere else when the offense was committed, but it must likewise be demonstrated that he was
so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime
or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. Due to its doubtful nature, alibi must be
supported by clear and convincing proof.
In this case, the proximity of Lara’s house at the scene of the crime wholly negates his alibi.
Assuming as true Lara’s claim and that of his witnesses that he was digging a sewer trench on the
day of the incident, it is possible that his witnesses may not have noticed him leaving and returning
given that the distance between his house and the place where the subject incident took place can be
negotiated, even by walking, in just a matter of minutes. Simply put, Lara and his witnesses failed
to prove that it is well-nigh impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
In fine, the assailed decision of the CA is affirmed in all respects.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03685 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 209969, September 27, 2017
JOSE SANICO AND VICENTE CASTRO, Petitioners, v. WERHERLINA P.
COLIPANO, Respondent.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed
by petitioners Jose Sanico (Sanico) and Vicente Castro (Castro), assailing the Decision 2 dated
September 30, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 01889. The CA
affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated October 27, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 25, Danao City (RTC) which found Sanico and Castro liable for breach of' contract of
carriage and awarded actual and compensatory damages for loss of income in favor of respondent
Werherlina P. Colipano (Colipano). The CA reduced the compensatory damages that the RTC
awarded.
Antecedents
Colipano filed a complaint on January 7, 1997 for breach of contract of carriage and damages
against Sanico and Castro.4 In her complaint, Colipano claimed that at 4:00 P.M. more or less of
December 25, 1993, Christmas Day, she and her daughter were; paying passengers in the jeepney
operated by Sanico, which was driven by Castro.5 Colipano claimed she was made to sit on an
empty beer case at the edge of the rear entrance/exit of the jeepney with her sleeping child on her
lap.6 And, at an uphill incline in the road to Natimao-an, Carmen, Cebu, the jeepney slid backwards
because it did not have the power to reach the top.7 Colipano pushed both her feet against the step
board to prevent herself and her child from being thrown out of the exit, but because the step board
was wet, her left foot slipped and got crushed between the step board and a coconut tree which the
jeepney bumped, causing the jeepney to stop its backward movement. 8 Colipano's leg was badly
8
injured and was eventually amputated.9 Colipano prayed for actual damages, loss of income, moral
damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.10
In their answer, Sanico and Castro admitted that Colipano's leg was crushed and amputated but
claimed that it! was Colipano's fault that her leg was crushed.11 They admitted that the jeepney slid
backwards because the jeepney lost power.12 The conductor then instructed everyone not to panic
but Colipano tried to disembark and her foot got caught in between the step board and the coconut
tree.13 Sanico claimed that he paid for all the hospital and medical expenses of Colipano, 14 and that
Colipano eventually freely and voluntarily executed an Affidavit of Desistance and Release of
Claim.15
After trial, the RTC found that Sanico and Castro breached the contract of carriage between them
and Colipano but only awarded actual and compensatory damages in favor of Colipano. The
dispositive portion of the RTC Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the defendants LIABLE for breach of
contract of carriage and are solidarily liable to pay plaintiff:
1. Actual damages in the amount of P2,098.80; and
2. Compensatory damages for loss of income in the amount of P360,000.00.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.16
Only Sanico and Castro appealed to the CA, which affirmed with modification the RTC Decision.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision states:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Decision dated October 27, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Danao City, in Civil Case
No. DNA-418, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the award for compensatory damages
for loss of income in paragraph 2 of the dispositive portion of the RTC's decision, is reduced to
P200,000.00.
Here, it is beyond dispute that Colipano was injured while she was a passenger in the jeepney
owned and operated by Sanico that was being driven by Castro. Both the CA and RTC found
Sanico and Castro jointly and severally liable. This, however, is erroneous because only Sanico
was the party to the contract of carriage with Colipano.
Since the cause of action is based on a breach of a contract of carriage, the liability of Sanico is
direct as the contract is between him and Colipano. Castro, being merely the driver of Sanico's
jeepney, cannot be made liable as he is not a party to the contract of carriage.
In Soberano v. Manila Railroad Co.,18 the Court ruled that a complaint for breach of a contract
of carriage is dismissible as against the employee who was driving the bus because the parties to
the contract of carriage are only the passenger, the bus owner, and the operator, viz.:
The complaint against Caccam was therefore properly dismissed. He was not a party to the
contract; he was a mere employee of the BAL. The parties to that contract are Juana Soberano,
the passenger, and the MRR and its subsidiary, the BAL, the bus owner and operator,
respectively; and consequent to the inability of the defendant companies to carry Juana Soberano
and her baggage arid personal effects securely and safely to her destination as imposed by law
(art. 1733, in relation to arts. 1736 and 1755, N.C.C.), their liability to her becomes direct and
immediate.19
Since Castro was not a party to the contract of carriage, Colipano had no cause of action against
him and the pomplaint against him should be dismissed. Although he was driving the jeepney, he
was a mere employee of Sanico, who was the operator and owner of the jeepney. The obligation
to carry Colipano safely to her destination was with Sanico. In fact, the elements of a contract of
carriage existeid between Colipano and Sanico: consent, as shown when Castro, as employee of
Sanico, accepted Colipano as a passenger when he allowed Colipano to board the jeepney, and as
to Colipano, when she boarded the jeepney; cause or consideration, when Colipano, for her part,
paid her fare; and, object, the transportation of Colipano from the place of departure to the place
of destination.20
Having established that the contract of carriage was only between Sanico and Colipano and that
therefore Colipano had no cause of action against Castro, the Court next determines whether
Sanico breached his obligations to Colipano under the contract.

SO ORDERED.17 Sanico is liable as operator and owner of a common carrier.

Without moving for the reconsideration of the CA Decision, Sanico and Castro filed this petition
before the Court assailing the CA Decision. Specific to a contract of carriage, ithe Civil Code requires common carriers to observe
Issues extraordinary diligence in safely transporting their passengers. Article 1733 of the Civil Code
states:
a. Whether the CA erred in finding that Sanico and Castro breached the contract ART. 1733. Common carriers, fijpm the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,
of carriage with Colipano; are bbund to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of
the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
b. Whether the Affidavit of Desistance and Release of Claim is binding on
Colipano; and Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in Articles 1734,
1735 and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers
is further set forth in Articles 1755 and 1756.
c. Whether the CA erred in the amount of damages awarded.
This extraordinary diligence, following Article 1755 of the Civil Code, means that common
carriers have the obligation to carry passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
The Court's Ruling provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances.
The Court partly grants the petition.
In case of death of or injury to their passengers, Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that
Only Sanico breached the contract of carriage. common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or negligent, and this presumption can be
overcome only by proof of the extraordinary diligence exercised to ensure the safety of the
9
passengers.21
Being an operator and owner of a common carrier, Sanico was required to observe extraordinary
diligence in safely transporting Colipano. When Colipano's leg was injured while she was a
passenger in Sanico's jeepney, the presumption of fault or negligence on Sanico's part arose and
he had the burden to prove that he exercised the extraordinary diligence required of him. He
failed to do this.
In Calalas v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court found that allowing the respondent in that case to be
seated in an extension seat, which was a wooden stool at the rear of the jeepney, "placed [the
respondent] in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed."23The Court
further ruled that the petitioner in Calalas was not only "unable to overcome the presumption of
negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by [the respondent], but also, the evidence
shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers."24
Calalas squarely applies here. Sanico failed to rebut the presumption of fault or negligence
under the Civil Code. More than this, the evidence indubitably established Sanico's negligence
when Castro made Colipano sit on an empty beer case at the edge of the rear entrance/exit of the
jeepney with her sleeping child on her lap, which put her and her child in greater peril than the
other passengers. As the CA correctly held:
For the driver, Vicente Castro, to allow a seat extension made of an empty case of beer clearly
indicates lack of prudence. Permitting Werherlina to occupy an improvised seat in the rear
portion of the jeepney, with a child on her lap to boot, exposed her and her child in a peril
greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed. The use of an improvised seat
extension is undeniable, in view of the testimony of plaintiffs witness, which is consistent with
Werherlina's testimonial assertion. Werherlina and her witness's testimony were accorded belief
by the RTC. Factual findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should
not be disturbed except for strong and valid reasons, because the trial court ip in a better position
to examine the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying.25
The CA also correctly held that the!defense of engine failure, instead of exonerating Sanico, only
aggravated his already precarious position.26 The engine failure "hinted lack of regular check
and maintenance to ensure that the engine is at its best, considering that the jeepney regularly
passes through a mountainous area."27 This failure to ensure that the jeepney can safely
transport passengers through its route which required navigation through a mountainous area is
proof of fault on Sanico's part. In the face of such evidence, there is no question as to Sanico's
fault or negligence.
Further, common carriers may also be liable for damages when they contravene the tenor of
their obligations. Article 1170 of the Civil Code states:
ART. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or
delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
In Magat v. Medialdea,28 the Court ruled: "The phrase 'in any manner contravene the tenor' of
the obligation includes any illicit act or omission which impairs the strict and faithful fulfillment
of the obligation and every kind of defective performance." 29 There is no question here that
making Colipano sit on the empty beer case was a clear showing of how Sanico contravened the
tenor of his obligation to safely transport Colipano from the place of departure to the place of
destination as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, and with due regard for all the circumstances.
Sanico's attempt to evade liability by arguing that he exercised extraordinary diligence when he
hired; Castro, who was allegedly an experienced and time-tested driver, whom he had even
accompanied on a test-drive and in whom he was personally convinced of the driving skills,30are
not enough to exonerate him from liability - because the liability of common carriers does not
cease upon p!roof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family irii the
selection. and supervision of their employees. This is the express mandate of Article 1759 of the
Civil Code:
ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted
beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
The only defenses available to common carriers are (1) proof that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in Article 1756,31 and (2) following Article 1174 of the Civil Code, proof
that the injury or death was brought about by an event which "could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, were inevitable," or a fortuitous event.
The Court finds that neither of these defenses obtain. Thus, Sanico is liable for damages to
Colipano because of the injury that Colipano suffered as a passenger of Sanico's jeepney.
The Affidavit of Desistance and Release of Claim is void.
Sanico cannot be exonerated from liability under the Affidavit of Desistance and Release of
Claim32and his payment of the hospital and medical bills of Colipano amounting to P44,900.00. 33
The RTC ruled that "the Affidavit of Desistance and Release of Claim is not binding on plaintiff
[Colipano] in the absence of proof that the contents thereof were sufficiently translated and
explained to her."34 The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC and ruled that the document was
not binding on Colipano, as follows:
Finally, We sustain the RTC's finding that the affidavit of desistance and release of claim,
offered by defendants-appellants, are not binding on Werherlina, quoting with approval its
reflection on the matter, saying:
xxx this Court finds that the Affidavit of Desistance and Release of Claim is not binding on
plaintiff in the absence of proof that the contents thereof were sufficiently explained to her. It is
clear from the plaintiffs circumstances that she is not able to understand English, more so
stipulations stated in the said Affidavit and Release. It is understandable that in her pressing
need, the plaintiff may have been easily convinced to sign the document with the promise that she
will be compensated for her injuries.35
The Court finds no reason to depart from these findings of the CA and the RTC.
For there to be a valid waiver, the following requisites are essential:
(1) that the person making the waiver possesses the right, (2) that he has the capacity and power
to dispose of the right, (3) that the waiver must be clear and unequivocal although it may be
made expressly or impliedly, and (4) that the waiver is not contrary to law, public policy, public
order, morals, good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.36
While the first two requirements can be said to exist in this case, the third and fourth
requirements are, however, lacking.
For the waiver to be clear and unequivocal, the person waiving the right should understand what
she is waiving and the effect of such waiver. Both the CA and RTC made the factual
deitermination that Colipano was not able to understand English and that there was no proof
that the documents and their contents and effects were explained to her. These findings of the
RTC, affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great weight and respect.37 As this Court held
in Philippine National Railways Corp. v. Vizcara38:
It is a well-established rule that factual fill dings by the CA are conclusive on the parties and are
not reviewable byj this Court. They are entitled to great weight and respect, even finality,
10
especially when, as in this case, the CA affirmed the factual findings arrived at by the trial
court.39
Although there are exceptions to this rule,40 the exceptions are absent here.
Colipano could not have clearly and unequivocally waived her right to claim damages when she
had no understanding of the right she was waiving and the extent of that right. Worse, she was
made to sign a document written in a language she did not understand.
The fourth requirement for a valid waiver is also lacking as the waiver, based on the attendant
facts, can only be construed as contrary to public policy. The doctrine in Gatchalian v.
Delim,41which the CA correctly cited,42 is applicable here:
Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained
by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence,
we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly against the common carrier. For a
waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or good
customs. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured passenger,
under circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard
of extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to render that
standard unenforceable. We believe such a purported waiver is offensive to public policy.43
"[P]ublic policy refers to the aims of the state to promote the social and general well-being of the
inhabitants."44 The Civil Code requires extraordinary diligence from common carriers because
the nature of their business requires the public to put their safety and lives in the hands of these
common carriers. The State imposes this extraordinary diligence to promote the well-being of the
public who avail themselves of the services of common carriers. Thus, in instances of injury or
death, a waiver of the right to claim damages is strictly construed against the common carrier so
as not to dilute or weaken the public policy behind the required standard of extraordinary
diligence.
It was for this reason that in Gatchalian, the waiver was considered offensive to public policy
because it was shown that the passenger was still in the hospital and was dizzy when she signed
the document. It was also shown that when she saw the other passengers signing the document,
she signed it without reading it. .
Similar to Gatchalian, Colipano testified that she did not understand the document she
signed.45 She also did not understand the nature and extent of her waiver as the content of the
document was not explained to her.46 The waiver is therefore void because it is contrary to public
policy.47
The Court reiterates that waivers executed under similar circumstances are indeed contrary to
public policy and are void.48 To uphold waivers taken from injured passengers who have no
knowledge of their entitlement under the law and the extent of liability of common carriers would
indeed dilute the extraordinary diligence required from common carriers, and contravene a
public policy reflected in the Civil Code.
Amount of compensatory damages granted is incorrect.
On the amount of damages, the RiTC awarded P2,098.80 as actual damages and P360,000.00 as
compensatoiy damages for loss of income, as follows:
[T]his Court can only award actual damages in the amount that is duly supported by receipts,
that is, P2,098.80 mid not P7,277.80 as prayed for by plaintiff as there is no basis for the amount
prayed for. However, considering that plaintiff has suffered the loss of one leg which has caused
her to be limited in her movement thus resulting in loss of livelihood, she is entitled to
compensatory damages for lost income at the rate of P12,000.00/year for thirty years in the
amount of P360,000.00.49
The CA, on the other hand, modified the award of the RTC by reducing the compensatory
damages from P360,000.00 to P200,000.00, thus:
By virtue of their negligence, defendants-appellants are liable to pay Werheiiina compensatory
damages for loss of earning capacity. In arriving at the proper amount, the Supremip Court has
consistently used the following formula:
Net Earning Capacity
=
Life Expectancy x [Gross Annual Income - Living Expenses (50% of gross annual income)]
where life expectancy
=
2/3 (80 - the age of the deceased).
Based on the stated formula, the damages due to Werherlina for loss of earning capacity is:
Net Earning Capacity
=
[2/3 x (80-30)] x (P12,000.00 x (50%)
=
(2/3 x 50) x P6,000.00
=
33.33 x P6,000.00
=
P200,000.00
The award of the sum of P200,000.00 as compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity is in
order, notwithstanding the objections of defendants-appellants with respect to lack of evidence on
Werherlina's age and annual income.50
Sanico argues that Colipano failed to present documentary evidence to support her age and her
income, so that her testimony is self-serving and that there was no basis for the award of
compensatory damages in her favor.51 Sanico is gravely mistaken.
The Court has held in Heirs of Pedro Clemeña y Zurbano v. Heirs of Irene B. Bien 52 that
testimonial evidence cannot be objected to on the ground of being self-serving, thus:
"Self-serving evidence" is not to be taken literally to mean any evidence that serves its
proponent's interest. The term, if used with any legal sense, refers only to acts or declarations
made by a party in his own interest at some place and time out of court, and it does not include
testimony that he gives as a witness in court. Evidence of this sort is excluded on the same
ground as any hearsay evidence, that is, lack of opportunity for cross-examination by the adverse
party and on the consideration that its admission would open the door to fraud and
fabrication. In contrast, a party's testimony in court is sworn and subject to cross-examination by
the other party, and therefore, not susceptible to an objection on the ground that it is self-
serving.53
Colipano was subjected to cross-examination and both the RTC and CA believed her testimony
on her age and annual income. In fact, as these are questions of facts, these findings of the RTC
and CA are likewise binding on the Court.54
Further, although as a general rule, documentary evidence is required to prove loss of earning
capacity, Colipano's testimony on her annual earnings of P12,000.00 is an allowed exception.
11
There are two exceptions to the general rule and Colipano's testimonial evidence falls under the Republic of the Philippines
second exception, viz.: SUPREME COURT
By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of Manila
documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-employed earning less than the minimum
wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's FIRST DIVISION
line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily
wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. 55
The CA applied the correct formula for computing the loss of Colipano's earning capacity: G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989
Net earning capacity = Life expectancy x [Gross Annual Income - Living Expenses (50% of gross
annual income)], where life expectancy = 2/3 (80-the age of the deceased).56 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
However, the CA erred when it used Colipano's age at the time she testified as basis for vs.
computing the loss of earning capacity.57 The loss of earning capacity commenced when HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON, Presiding over Branch 6, Regional Trial Court, First
Colipano's leg was crushed on December 25, 1993. Given that Colipano was 30 years old when Judicial Region, Baguio City, and FELIPE RAMOS, respondents.
she testified on October 14, 1997, she was roughly 27 years old on December 25, 1993 when the
injury was sustained. Following the foregoing formula, the net earning capacity of Colipano is Nelson Lidua for private respondent.
P212,000.00.58

Sanico is liable to pay interest.

Interest is a form of actual or compensatory damages as it belongs to Chapter 259 of Title XVIII NARVASA, J.:
on Damages of the Civil Code. Under Article 2210 of the Civil Code, "[i]nterest may, in the
discretion of the court, be allowed upon damages awarded for breach of contract." Here, given
What has given rise to the controversy at bar is the equation by the respondent Judge of the right of
the gravity of the breach of the contract of carriage causing the serious injury to the leg of
an individual not to "be compelled to be a witness against himself" accorded by Section 20, Article
Colipano that resulted in its amputation, the Court deems it just and equitable to award interest
III of the Constitution, with the right of any person "under investigation for the commission of an
from the date of the RTC decision. Since the award of damages was given by the RTC in its
offense . . . to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right," granted by the same
Decision dated October 27, 2006, the interest on the amount awarded shall be deemed to run
provision. The relevant facts are not disputed.
beginning October 27, 2006.

As to the rate of interest, in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,60 the Court ruled
that "[w]hen an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an
interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the
rate of 6% per annum."61 Further, upon finality of the judgment awarding a sum of money, the
rate of interest shall be 12% per annum from such finality until satisfaction because the interim
period is considered a forbearance of credit.62 Subsequently, in Nacar v. Gallery Frames,63 the
rate of legal interest for loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed
in judgments was lowered from 12% to 6%. Thus, the applicable rate of interest to the award of
damages to Colipano is 6%.
Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL),
assigned at its Baguio City station. It having allegedly come to light that he was involved in
irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, 1 the PAL management notified him of an investigation to
be conducted into the matter of February 9, 1986. That investigation was scheduled in accordance
with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it
with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. 2
On the day before the investigation, February 8,1986, Ramos gave to his superiors a handwritten
notes 3 reading as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. As
2-8-86
to petitioner Vicente Castro, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 30, 2013
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the complaint against him is dismissed for lack of cause of
action. As to petitioner Jose Sanico, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
with MODIFICATIONS, Petitioner Jose Sanico is liable and ordered to pay respondent
Werherlina Colipano the following amounts:Actual damages in the amount of P2,098.80; THE UNDERSIGNED WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT HE IS WILLING
TO SETTLE IRREGULARITIES ALLEGEDLY CHARGED VS. HIM IN
Compensatory damages for loss of income in the amount of P212,000.00; THE AMT. OF P 76,000 (APPROX.) SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AS MAY
BE IMPOSED BY PAL ON OR BEFORE 1700/9 FEB 86.
Interest on the total amount of the damages awarded in 1 and 2 at the rate of 6% per annum
reckoned from October 27, 2006 until finality of this Decision. The total amount of the foregoing
shall, in turn, earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from finality of this Decision until full
payment thereof.

SO ORDERED.
12

At the investigation of February 9, 1986, conducted by the PAL Branch Manager in Baguio City,
Edgardo R. Cruz, in the presence of Station Agent Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk Rodolfo
Quitasol, and PALEA Shop Steward Cristeta Domingo, Felipe Ramos was informed "of the finding
of the Audit Team." Thereafter, his answers in response to questions by Cruz, were taken down in
writing. Ramos' answers were to the effect inter alia that he had not indeed made disclosure of the
tickets mentioned in the Audit Team's findings, that the proceeds had been "misused" by him, that
although he had planned on paying back the money, he had been prevented from doing so, "perhaps
(by) shame," that he was still willing to settle his obligation, and proferred a "compromise x x to
pay on staggered basis, (and) the amount would be known in the next investigation;" that he desired
the next investigation to be at the same place, "Baguio CTO," and that he should be represented
therein by "Shop stewardees ITR Nieves Blanco;" and that he was willing to sign his statement (as
he in fact afterwards did). 4 How the investigation turned out is not dealt with the parties at all; but
it would seem that no compromise agreement was reached much less consummated.
About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos charging him with the
crime of estafa allegedly committed in Baguio City during the period from March 12, 1986 to
January 29, 1987. In that place and during that time, according to the indictment, 5 he (Ramos) —
.. with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully ...
defraud the Philippine Airlines, Inc., Baguio Branch, ... in the following
manner, to wit: said accused ... having been entrusted with and received in trust
fare tickets of passengers for one-way trip and round-trip in the total amount of
P76,700.65, with the express obligation to remit all the proceeds of the sale,
account for iteand/or to return those unsold, ... once in possession thereof and
instead of complying
l with his obligation, with intent to defraud, did then and
there ... misappropriate,
i misapply and convert the value of the tickets in the sum
of P76,700.65p and in spite of repeated demands, ... failed and refused to make
good his obligation,
e to the damage and prejudice of the offended party .. .
R
a
On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered a plea of "Not Guilty," and trial thereafter
m was undertaken by lawyers of PAL under the direction and
ensued. The prosecution of the case
supervision of the Fiscal. o
s
At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a written offer of evidence dated
June 21, 1988,6which included "the ( (above mentioned) statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos taken
on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio P City Ticket Office," which had been marked as Exhibit A, as
well as his "handwritten admission r x x given on February 8, 1986," also above referred to, which
had been marked as Exhibit K. i
n
t
The defendant's attorneys filed "Objections/Comments
e to Plaintiff s Evidence."7 Particularly as
regards the peoples' Exhibit A, the d objection was that "said document, which appears to be a
confession, was taken without the) accused being represented by a lawyer." Exhibit K was objected
to "for the same reasons interposed F under Exhibits 'A' and 'J.'
.
By Order dated August 9, 1988, 8Rthe respondent judge admitted all the exhibits "as part of the
a
testimony of the witnesses who testified in connection therewith and for whatever they are worth,"
except Exhibits A and K, which itmrejected. His Honor declared Exhibit A "inadmissible in
o statement of accused Felipe Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at
evidence, it appearing that it is the
PAL Baguio City Ticket Office, in s an investigation conducted by the Branch Manager x x since it
does not appear that the accused was reminded of this constitutional rights to remain silent and to
have counsel, and that when he waived the same and gave his statement, it was with the assistance
actually of a counsel." He also declared inadmissible "Exhibit K, the handwritten admission made
by accused Felipe J. Ramos, given on February 8, 1986 x x for the same reason stated in the
exclusion of Exhibit 'A' since it does not appear that the accused was assisted by counsel when he
made said admission."
The private prosecutors filed a motion for reconsideration. 9 It was denied, by Order dated
September 14, 1988. 10 In justification of said Order, respondent Judge invoked this Court's rulings
in Morales, Jr. v. Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., 121 SCRA 538, People v. Galit, 135 SCRA
467, People. v. Sison, 142 SCRA 219, and People v. Decierdo, 149 SCRA 496, among others, to
the effect that "in custodial investigations the right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall
not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel," and the explicit precept in the present
Constitution that the rights in custodial investigation "cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel." He pointed out that the investigation of Felipe Ramos at the PAL Baguio
Station was one "for the offense of allegedly misappropriating the proceeds of the tickets issued to
him' and therefore clearly fell "within the coverage of the constitutional provisions;" and the fact
that Ramos was not detained at the time, or the investigation was administrative in character could
not operate to except the case "from the ambit of the constitutional provision cited."
These Orders, of August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988 are now assailed in the petition for
certiorari and prohibition at bar, filed in this Court by the private prosecutors in the name of the
People of the Philippines. By Resolution dated October 26, 1988, the Court required Judge Ayson
and Felipe Ramos to comment on the petition, and directed issuance of a "TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER . . . ENJOINING the respondents from proceeding further with the trial
13
and/or hearing of Criminal Case No. 3488-R (People ... vs. Felipe Ramos), including the issuance of
any order, decision or judgment in the aforesaid case or on any matter in relation to the same case,
now pending before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Br. 6, First Judicial Region." The
Court also subsequently required the Solicitor General to comment on the petition. The comments
of Judge Ayson, Felipe Ramos, and the Solicitor General have all been filed. The Solicitor General
has made common cause with the petitioner and prays "that the petition be given due course and
thereafter judgment be rendered setting aside respondent Judge's Orders . . . and ordering him to
admit Exhibits 'A' and 'K' of the prosecution." The Solicitor General has thereby removed whatever
impropriety might have attended the institution of the instant action in the name of the People of the
Philippines by lawyers de parte of the offended party in the criminal action in question.
The Court deems that there has been full ventilation of the issue — of whether or not it was grave
abuse of discretion for respondent Judge to have excluded the People's Exhibits A and K. It will
now proceed to resolve it.
At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, 11 to which
respondent Judge has given a construction that is disputed by the People. The section reads as
follows:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will
shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section
shall be inadmissible in evidence.
It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights, dealt with in the section,
namely:
1) the right against self-incrimination — i.e., the right of a person not to be
compelled to be a witness against himself — set out in the first sentence, which
is a verbatim reproduction of Section 18, Article III of the 1935 Constitution,
and is similar to that accorded by the Fifth Amendment of the American
Constitution, 12 and
2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights of every
suspect "under investigation for the commission of an offense."
Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the individuality and
disparateness of these rights. It has placed the rights in separate sections. The right against self-
incrimination, "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself," is now embodied in
Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The lights of a person in custodial interrogation,
which have been made more explicit, are now contained in Section 12 of the same Article III.13
Right Against Self-Incrimination
The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under
compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. 14 The right is NOT to
"be compelled to be a witness against himself"
The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning. 15 It prescribes an "option of refusal
to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." 16 It simply secures to a
witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refue to answer any particular incriminatory
question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However,
the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put
to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to
disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to
testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand,
be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed to him, the answer
to which may incriminate him for some offense, that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the
constitutional guaranty.
That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does not impose on the judge,
or other officer presiding over a trial, hearing or investigation, any affirmative obligation to advise a
witness of his right against self-incrimination. It is a right that a witness knows or should know, in
accordance with the well known axiom that every one is presumed to know the law, that ignorance
of the law excuses no one. Furthermore, in the very nature of things, neither the judge nor the
witness can be expected to know in advance the character or effect of a question to be put to the
latter. 17
The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It must be
claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It
follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the
appropriate time. 18
Rights in Custodial Interrogation
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of a second right, or better said, group of
rights. These rights apply to persons "under investigation for the commission of an offense," i.e.,
"suspects" under investigation by police authorities; and this is what makes these rights different
from that embodied in the first sentence, that against self-incrimination which, as aforestated,
indiscriminately applies to any person testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or
administrative.
This provision granting explicit rights to persons under investigation for an offense was not in the
1935 Constitution. It is avowedly derived from the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda
v. Arizona, 19 a decision described as an "earthquake in the world of law enforcement." 20
Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation for the commission of an
offense"--
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right, 21
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates
the free will shall be used against him; 22 and
3) any confession obtained in violation of x x (these rights shall be inadmissible
in evidence. 23
14
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid down for a person in
police custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as the commencement of an adversary
proceeding against the suspect. 24
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he
says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he
so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the
interrogation. After such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual
may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But
unless and until such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no
evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated
atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional
rights." 25
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-custody
interrogation of accused persons." 26 And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial
interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 27 The
situation contemplated has also been more precisely described by this Court." 28
.. . After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a
confrontation arises which at best may be tanned unequal. The detainee is
brought to an army camp or police headquarters and there questioned and
"cross-examined" not only by one but as many investigators as may be
necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in strange and unfamiliar
surroundings, and every person he meets he considers hostile to him. The
investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ all the
methods and means that experience and study have taught them to extract the
truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered
and are not aware of their constitutional rights. And even if they were, the
intimidating and coercive presence of the officers of the law in such an
atmosphere overwhelms them into silence. Section 20 of the Bill of Rights
seeks to remedy this imbalance.
Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in some crime is within the scope of
the constitutional protection. If not made "under custodial interrogation," or "under investigation for
the commission of an offense," the statement is not protected. Thus, in one case, 29 where a person
went to a police precinct and before any sort of investigation could be initiated, declared that he was
giving himself up for the killing of an old woman because she was threatening to kill him by
barang, or witchcraft, this Court ruled that such a statement was admissible, compliance with the
constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation not being exigible under the circumstances.
Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case
As Regards Giving of Testimony
It is pertinent at this point to inquire whether the rights just discussed, i.e., (1) that against self-
incrimination and (2) those during custodial interrogation apply to persons under preliminary
investigation or already charged in court for a crime.
It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under
custodial interrogation. His interrogation by the police, if any there had been would already have
been ended at the time of the filing of the criminal case in court (or the public prosecutors' office).
Hence, with respect to a defendant in a criminal case already pending in court (or the public
prosecutor's office), there is no occasion to speak of his right while under "custodial interrogation"
laid down by the second and subsequent sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, for the obvious reason that he is no longer under "custodial interrogation."
But unquestionably, the accused in court (or undergoing preliminary investigation before the public
prosecutor), in common with all other persons, possesses the right against self- incrimination set out
in the first sentence of Section 20 Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, i.e., the right to refuse to
answer a specific incriminatory question at the time that it is put to him. 30
Additionally, the accused in a criminal case in court has other rights in the matter of giving
testimony or refusing to do so. An accused "occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary
witness." Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled among
others-
1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, 31 and 2) to testify as witness in his own
behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness he may be cross-examined as any other witness;
however, his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against
him. 32
The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness against himself'
signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in which he
is the accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena or other
process or order of the Court. He cannot be required to be a witness either for the prosecution, or for
a co-accused, or even for himself. 33 In other words — unlike an ordinary witness (or a party in a
civil action) who may be compelled to testify by subpoena, having only the right to refuse to answer
a particular incriminatory question at the time it is put to him-the defendant in a criminal action can
refuse to testify altogether. He can refuse to take the witness stand, be sworn, answer any
question. 34And, as the law categorically states, "his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in
any manner prejudice or be used against him." 35
If he should wish to testify in his own behalf, however, he may do so. This is his right. But if he
does testify, then he "may be cross- examined as any other witness." He may be cross-examined as
to any matters stated in his direct examination, or connected therewith . 36 He may not on cross-
examination refuse to answer any question on the ground that the answer that he will give, or the
evidence he will produce, would have a tendency to incriminate him for the crime with which he is
charged.
It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a criminal action be asked a question which
might incriminate him, not for the crime with which he is charged, but for some other crime,
distinct from that of which he is accused, he may decline to answer that specific question, on the
strength of the right against self-incrimination granted by the first sentence of Section 20, Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution (now Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution). Thus, assuming that in a
15
prosecution for murder, the accused should testify in his behalf, he may not on cross-examination
refuse to answer any question on the ground that he might be implicated in that crime of murder;
but he may decline to answer any particular question which might implicate him for a different and
distinct offense, say, estafa.
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its
commission in court, has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence,
to wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor,
for preliminary investigation), but after having been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on being
interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel,
and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat,
intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will; and to have
evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT — 37
a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by
such refusal;
c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination
by the prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific
question which tends to incriminate him for some crime
other than that for which he is then prosecuted.
It should by now be abundantly apparent that respondent Judge has misapprehended the nature and
import of the disparate rights set forth in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He has
taken them as applying to the same juridical situation, equating one with the other. In so doing, he
has grossly erred. To be sure, His Honor sought to substantiate his thesis by arguments he took to
be cogent and logical. The thesis was however so far divorced from the actual and correct state of
the constitutional and legal principles involved as to make application of said thesis to the case
before him tantamount to totally unfounded, whimsical or capricious exercise of power. His Orders
were thus rendered with grave abuse of discretion. They should be as they are hereby, annulled and
set aside.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under
custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and during the
administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have
had a hand. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the
inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the
first day of the administrative investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings
should be recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action
subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as
Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors on February 8,1986, the day before the investigation,
offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous
act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not
been accorded to Ramos.
His Honor adverts to what he perceives to be the "greater danger x x (of) the violation of the right
of any person against self-incrimination when the investigation is conducted by the complaining
parties, complaining companies, or complaining employers because being interested parties, unlike
the police agencies who have no propriety or pecuniary interest to protect, they may in their over-
eagerness or zealousness bear heavily on their hapless suspects, whether employees or not, to give
statements under an atmosphere of moral coercion, undue ascendancy and undue influence." It
suffices to draw attention to the specific and peremptory requirement of the law that disciplinary
sanctions may not be imposed on any employee by his employer until and unless the employee has
been accorded due process, by which is meant that the latter must be informed of the offenses
ascribed to him and afforded adequate time and opportunity to explain his side. The requirement
entails the making of statements, oral or written, by the employee under such administrative
investigation in his defense, with opportunity to solicit the assistance of counsel, or his colleagues
and friends. The employee may, of course, refuse to submit any statement at the investigation, that
is his privilege. But if he should opt to do so, in his defense to the accusation against him, it would
be absurd to reject his statements, whether at the administrative investigation, or at a subsequent
criminal action brought against him, because he had not been accorded, prior to his making and
presenting them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel and to be informed thereof, etc.)
which, to repeat, are relevant only in custodial investigations. Indeed, it is self-evident that the
employee's statements, whether called "position paper," "answer," etc., are submitted by him
precisely so that they may be admitted and duly considered by the investigating officer or
committee, in negation or mitigation of his liability.
Of course the possibility cannot be discounted that in certain instances the judge's expressed
apprehensions may be realized, that violence or intimidation, undue pressure or influence be
brought to bear on an employee under investigation — or for that matter, on a person being
interrogated by another whom he has supposedly offended. In such an event, any admission or
confession wrung from the person under interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence, on proof
of the vice or defect vitiating consent, not because of a violation of Section 20, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, but simply on the general, incontestable proposition that involuntary or coerced
statements may not in justice be received against the makers thereof, and really should not be
accorded any evidentiary value at all.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and setting aside the Orders of the
respondent Judge in Criminal Case No. 3488-R, dated August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988, and
he is hereby ordered to admit in evidence Exhibits "A" and "K" of the prosecution in said Criminal
Case No. 3488-R, and thereafter proceed with the trial and adjudgment thereof. The temporary
restraining order of October 26, 1988 having become functus officio, is now declared of no further
force and effect.
Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
16
G.R. No. 151258 December 1, 2014 the question of who are eligible to seek probation; and the issue of the validity of the probation
proceedings and the concomitant orders of a court that allegedly had no jurisdiction over the case.
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner,
vs. Before the Court are the respective Motions for Reconsideration or Clarification filed by petitioners
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and Gerarda H. Villa
(Villa); and by respondents Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson (collectively, Tecson et al.)
x-----------------------x concerning the Decision of this Court dated 1 February 2012. 1 The Court modified the assailed
judgments2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 15520 and found respondents Fidelito
Dizon (Dizon), Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
G.R. No. 154954 reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The modification had the effect of lowering the criminal
liability of Dizon from the crime of homicide, while aggravating the verdict against Tecson et al.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, from slight physical injuries. The CA Decision itself had modified the Decision of the Caloocan
vs. City Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 121 finding all of the accused therein guilty of the crime
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, of homicide.3
DALMACIO LIM, JR., JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO,
VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON Also, we upheld another CA Decision4 in a separate but related case docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. Nos.
VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, 89060 & 90153 and ruled that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed
VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE the criminal case against Manuel Escalona II (Escalona), Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos), Crisanto
PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN, PERCIVAL D. BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO SANTOS, Saruca, Jr. (Saruca), and Anselmo Adriano (Adriano) on the ground that their right to speedy trial
JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO, and was violated. Reproduced below is the dispositive portion of our Decision: 5
RONAN DE GUZMAN, Respondents.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgmentin G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty
x-----------------------x of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No.
154954 – finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent
G.R. No. 155101 Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries – is also MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN
PART. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr.,
FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner, and Vincent Tecson are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting
vs. in homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one
(1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny
x-----------------------x Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of 50,000, and moral damages in the amount of
1,000,000, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of the finality
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 of this Decision until satisfaction. Costs de oficio.

GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO
CRUZ SARUCA, JR., and ANSELMO ADRIANO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
We are asked to revisit our Decision in the case involving the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa due
to fraternity hazing. While there is nothing new in the arguments raised by the parties in their
respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration, we find a few remaining matters needing to
be clarified and resobed. Sorne oJ' these matters include the effect of our Decision on the finality of
the Court of Appeals judgments insofar as respondents Antonio Mariano A!meda (Almeda), June]
Anthony D. Arna (Arna), Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug), and Vincent Tecson (Tecson) are concerned;
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby AFFIRMED. The
appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1)
of the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal
case against Artemio Villareal deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the
fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as
aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.
To refresh our memories, we quote the factual antecedents surrounding the present case:6

17
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was
signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were pronounced dead on arrival.
Caesar "Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis
"Bert" Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes). Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans:

On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufo’s
Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan,
who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were informed 1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites
were scheduled to last for three days. After their "briefing," they were brought to the Almeda 2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults from the
Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota court of 4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes
were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites included the
"Indian Run," which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each 5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
row delivering blows to the neophytes; the "Bicol Express," which obliged the neophytes to sit on
the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, 6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
jumped, or ran over their legs; the "Rounds," in which the neophytes were held at the back of their
pants by the "auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or withknee
blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the "Auxies’ Privilege Round," in which the auxiliaries
were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes 8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They survived their first day of initiation.
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
On the morning of their second day – 9 February 1991 – the neophytes were made to present comic
plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila 10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms
or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
torment them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of
hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day
officially ended. 12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)

After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and 13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites,
Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, 14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal,
then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny
received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The 15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session
of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the 16. Antonio General (General)
carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating
dinner. They then slept at the carport. 17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and incoherent 18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
mumblings.1avvphi1Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he
was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the
Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to 19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)

18
 20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada) according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the following
Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants– Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi,
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero) Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza,
Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) – were acquitted,as
their individual guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
2. Four of the accused-appellants– Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez) Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) – were found guilty of the crime
of slight physical injuriesand sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They were also
25. Adel Abas (Abas) ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of ₱30,000 as indemnity.

26. Percival Brigola (Brigola) 3. Two of the accused-appellants– Fidelito Dizonand Artemio Villareal– were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised
In Criminal Case No. C-38340 Penal Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced
them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion
temporal. They were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny
1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona) Villa in the sum of ₱50,000 and to pay the additional amount of ₱1,000,000 by way of
moral damages.
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against accused
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano) Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial. Meanwhile, on different dates
between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of
accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos.
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
89060 & 90153 reversed the trial court’s Orders and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.
5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually brought
6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil) before this Court. (Citations omitted)

7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera) Motion for Partial Reconsideration

8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried. On the
other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in
abeyance due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), holding
the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion
temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. A few weeks after the trial court rendered its
judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine
accused commenced anew.
On 10 January 2002, the CAin (CA-G.R. No. 15520) set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial
court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of each of the accused
filed by Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa
Petitioner Villa filed the present Motion for Partial Reconsideration7 in connection with G.R. Nos.
178057 & 178080 (Villa v. Escalona) asserting that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
when it dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos,Saruca, and Adriano (collectively,
Escalona et al.) in its assailed Decision and Resolution.8 Villa reiterates her previous arguments that
the right to speedy trial of the accused was not violated, since they had failed to assert that right
within a reasonable period of time. She stresses that, unlike their co-accused Reynaldo Concepcion,
respondents Escalona et al.did not timely invoke their right to speedy trial during the time that the
original records and pieces of evidence were unavailable. She again emphasizes that the prosecution
cannot be faulted entirely for the lapse of 12 years from the arraignment until the initial trial, as
there were a number of incidents attributable to the accused themselves that caused the delay of the
proceedings. She then insists that we apply the balancing test in determining whether the right to
speedy trial of the accused was violated.
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG

19
The OSG, in its Motion for Reconsideration9 of G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954
(People v. Court of Appeals), agrees with the findings of this Court that accused Dizon and Tecson
et al. had neither the felonious intent to kill (animus interficendi) nor the felonious intent to injure
(animus iniuriandi) Lenny Villa. In fact, it concedes that the mode in which the accused committed
the crime was through fault (culpa). However, it contends that the penalty imposed should have
been equivalent to that for deceit (dolo) pursuant to Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal
Code. It argues that the nature and gravity of the imprudence or negligence attributable to the
accused was so gross that it shattered the fine distinction between dolo and culpaby considering the
act as one committed with malicious intent. It maintains that the accused conducted the initiation
rites in such a malevolent and merciless manner that it clearly endangered the lives of the initiates
and was thus equivalent to malice aforethought.
With respect to the 19 other accused, or Victorino et al., the OSG asserts that their acquittal may
also be reversed despite the rule on double jeopardy, as the CA also committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing its assailed Decision (CA-G.R. No. 15520). The OSG insists that Victorino et
al. should have been similarly convicted like their other co-accused Dizon, Almeda, Ama, Bantug,
and Tecson, since the former also participated in the hazing of Lenny Villa, and their actions
contributed to his death.
Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Tecson et al.
Respondents Tecson et al.,10 filed their respective motions pertaining to G.R. No. 154954 (People v.
Court of Appeals). They essentially seek a clarification as to the effect of our Decision insofar as
their criminal liability and service of sentence are concerned. According to respondents, they
immediately applied for probation after the CA rendered its Decision (CAG.R. No. 15520) lowering
their criminal liability from the crime of homicide, which carries a non-probationable sentence, to
slight physical injuries, which carries a probationable sentence. Tecson et al.contend that, as a
result, they have already been discharged from their criminal liability and the cases against them
closed and terminated. This outcome was supposedly by virtue of their Applications for Probation
on various dates in January 200211 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended, otherwise
known as the Probation Law. They argue that Branch 130 of Caloocan City Regional Trial Court
(RTC) had already granted their respective Applications for Probation on 11 October 2002 12 and,
upon their completion of the terms and conditions thereof, discharged them from probation and
declared the criminal case against them terminated on various dates in April 2003. 13
To support their claims, respondents attached14 certified true copies of their respective Applications
for Probation and the RTC Orders granting these applications, discharging them from probation,
and declaring the criminal case against them terminated. Thus, they maintain that the Decision in
CA-G.R. No. 15520 had already lapsed into finality, insofar as they were concerned, whenthey
waived their right to appeal and applied for probation.
ISSUES
I. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for
violation of their right to speedy trial
II. Whether the penalty imposed on Tecson et al. should have corresponded to that for
intentional felonies
III. Whether the completion by Tecson et al. of the terms and conditions of their probation
discharged them from their criminal liability, and closed and terminated the cases against
them DISCUSSION
Findings on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa
As regards the first issue, we take note that the factual circumstances and legal assertions raised by
petitioner Villa in her Motion for Partial Reconsideration concerning G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
have already been thoroughly considered and passed uponin our deliberations, which led to our
Decision dated 1 February 2012. We emphasize that in light of the finding of violation of the right
of Escalona et al. to speedy trial, the CA’s dismissal of the criminal case against them amounted to
an acquittal,15 and that any appeal or reconsideration thereof would result in a violation of their
right against double jeopardy.16 Though we have recognized that the acquittal of the accused may
be challenged where there has been a grave abuse of discretion, 17 certiorari would lie if it is
convincingly established that the CA’s Decision dismissing the case was attended by a whimsical or
capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be shown that the assailed
judgment constitutes "a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or toact in contemplation of law; an
exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a
blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power
to dispense justice."18 Thus, grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because
it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the evidence.19
We have taken a second look at the court records, the CA Decision, and petitioner’s arguments and
found no basis to rule that the CA gravely abused its discretion in concluding that the right to
speedy trial of the accused was violated. Its findings were sufficiently supported by the records of
the case and grounded in law. Thus, we deny the motion of petitioner Villa with finality.
Ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG
We likewise deny with finality the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG with respect to
G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals). Many of the
arguments raised therein are essentially a mere rehash of the earlier grounds alleged in its original
Petition for Certiorari.
Furthermore, we cannot subscribe to the OSG’s theory that even if the act complained of was born
of imprudence or negligence, malicious intent can still be appreciated on account of the gravity of
the actions of the accused. We emphasize that the finding of a felony committed by means of culpa
is legally inconsistent with that committed by means of dolo. Culpable felonies involve those
wrongs done as a result of an act performed without malice or criminal design. The Revised Penal
Code expresses thusly:
ARTICLE 365. Imprudence and Negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall
commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayorin its maximum period toprisión correccional in its medium period; if it
would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods shall be imposed.
20
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin its medium and maximum
periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum period shall be imposed.
xxxx
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform suchact, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and
place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage
impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest. (Emphases supplied)
On the other hand, intentional felonies concern those wrongs in which a deliberate malicious intent
to do an unlawful act is present. Below is our exhaustive discussion on the matter:20 Our Revised
Penal Code belongs tothe classical school of thought. x x x The identity of mens rea– defined as a
guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent – is the predominant consideration.
Thus, it is not enough to do what the law prohibits. In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is
necessary that the act be committed by means of doloor "malice."
The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence, and
intent. x x x x The element of intent – on which this Court shall focus – is described as the state of
mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It refers to the purpose of the mind and the
resolve with which a person proceeds.It does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act,
while intentconcerns the result of the act. While motive is the "moving power" that impels one to
action for a definite result, intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means to produce the result.
On the other hand, the term "felonious"means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding
from an evil heart or purpose.With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in
intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind
accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus
malus– that the act or omission be done "willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent," and
"with malice aforethought." The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea– a crime is not
committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent. As is required of
the other elements of a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
xxxx
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in
establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide. Being mala in se, the felony of
homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo immediately before or simultaneously with the
infliction of injuries. Intent to kill – or animus interficendi– cannot and should not be inferred,
unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent. Furthermore, the victim’s death must
not have been the product of accident, natural cause, or suicide. If death resulted from an act
executed without malice or criminal intent – but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence –
the act must be qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.
xxxx
In order to be found guilty ofany of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised
Penal Code, the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that
is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental
state of the wrongdoer – iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the
accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, incase of physical injuries under the
Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong
against the physical integrity or wellbeing of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim
of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus
iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per semerely satisfies the elements of freedom
and intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man
guilty unless his intentions are.
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances that the mere infliction of physical injuries,
absentmalicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony.x x x.
xxxx
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity
members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies
that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the
wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which an
immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of
precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it. In this case, the danger is visible
and consciously appreciated by the actor. In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises
an act done without grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a
mere lack of foresight or skill. Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not
openly visible.
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a
prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the
person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law
imposes on the doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous resultsof the act. Failure to
do so constitutes negligence.
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the degree of
precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved. If, on account of a
certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the individual who
chooses to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, inorder to prevent or
avoid damage or injury. In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required. It is thus
possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an
individual, "from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort." The duty of the person to
employ more or less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.
(Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
We thus reiterate that the law requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious
intent or dolus malus before an accused can be adjudged liable for committing an intentional felony.
21
Since the accused were found to have committed a felony by means of culpa, we cannot agree with
the argument of the OSG. It contends that the imposable penalty for intentional felony can also be
applied to the present case on the ground that the nature of the imprudence or negligence of the
accused was so gross that the felony already amounted to malice. The Revised Penal Code has
carefully delineated the imposable penalties as regards felonies committed by means of culpaon the
one hand and felonies committed by means of doloon the other in the context of the distinctions it
has drawn between them. The penalties provided in Article 365 (Imprudence and Negligence) are
mandatorily applied if the death of a person occurs as a result of the imprudence or negligence of
another. Alternatively, the penalties outlined in Articles 246 to 261 (Destruction of Life) are
automatically invoked if the death was a result of the commission of a forbidden act accompanied
by a malicious intent. These imposable penalties are statutory, mandatory, and not subjectto the
discretion of the court. We have already resolved – and the OSG agrees – that the accused Dizon
and Tecson et al. had neither animus interficendi nor animus iniuriandi in inflicting physical pain on
Lenny Villa. Hence, we rule that the imposable penalty is what is applicable to the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide as defined and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Ruling on the Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration
filed by Tecson et al.
We clarify, however, the effect of our Decision in light of the motions of respondents Tecson et al.
vis-à-vis G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals).
The finality of a CA decision will not
bar the state from seeking the
annulment of the judgment via a
Rule 65 petition.
In their separate motions,21 respondents insist that the previous verdict of the CA finding them
guilty of slight physical injuries has already lapsed into finality as a result of their respective
availments of the probation program and their ultimate discharge therefrom. Hence, they argue that
they can no longer be convicted of the heavier offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide.22 Respondents allude to our Decision in Tan v. People23 to support their contention that
the CA judgment can no longer be reversed or annulled even by this Court.
The OSG counters24 that the CA judgment could not have attained finality, as the former had timely
filed with this Court a petition for certiorari. It argues that a Rule 65 petition is analogous to an
appeal, or a motion for new trial or reconsideration, in that a petition for certiorarialso prevents the
case from becoming final and executory until after the matter is ultimately resolved.
Indeed, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the finality of a criminal judgment once the
accused applies for probation, viz:
SECTION 7. Modification of judgment. — A judgment of convictionmay, upon motion of the
accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except
where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes finalafter the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal, or whenthe sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when
the accusedhas waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a) (Emphases
supplied)
Coupled with Section 7 of Rule 11725 and Section 1 of Rule 122,26 it can be culled from the
foregoing provisions that only the accused may appeal the criminal aspect of a criminal case,
especially if the relief being sought is the correction or review of the judgment therein. This rule
was instituted in order to give life to the constitutional edict27against putting a person twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. It is beyond contention that the accused would be
exposed to double jeopardy if the state appeals the criminal judgment in order to reverse an
acquittal or even to increase criminal liability. Thus, the accused’s waiver of the right to appeal – as
when applying for probation – makes the criminal judgment immediately final and executory. Our
explanation in People v. Nazareno is worth reiterating:28
Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred because the
government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the criminal defendant’s
culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter a final judgment of conviction, the underlying
reasons supporting the constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The
reason is not only the defendant’s already established innocence at the first trial where he had been
placed in peril of conviction, but also the same untoward and prejudicial consequences of a second
trial initiated by a government who has at its disposal all the powers and resources of the State.
Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government would then be allowed
another opportunity to persuade a second trier of the defendant’s guilt while strengthening any
weaknesses that had attended the first trial, all in a process where the government’s power and
resources are once again employed against the defendant’s individual means. That the second
opportunity comesvia an appeal does not make the effects any less prejudicial by the standards of
reason, justice and conscience. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
It must be clarified, however, that the finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120 does
not confer blanket invincibility on criminal judgments. We have already explained in our Decision
that the rule on double jeopardy is not absolute, and that this rule is inapplicable to cases in which
the state assails the very jurisdiction of the court that issued the criminal judgment. 29 The reasoning
behind the exception is articulated in Nazareno, from which we quote: 30
In such instance, however, no review of facts and law on the merits, in the manner done in an
appeal, actually takes place; the focus of the review is on whether the judgment is per sevoid on
jurisdictional grounds, i.e., whether the verdict was rendered by a court that had no jurisdiction; or
where the court has appropriate jurisdiction, whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other words, the review is on the question of whether
there has been a validly rendered decision, not on the question of the decision’s error or correctness.
Under the exceptional nature of a Rule 65 petition, the burden — a very heavy one — is on the
shoulders of the party asking for the review to show the presence of a whimsical or capricious
exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or of a patent and gross abuse of discretion
amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or
to act in contemplation of law; or to an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted) While this Court’s Decision
in Tan may have created an impression of the unassailability of a criminal judgment as soon as the
accused applies for probation, we point out that what the state filed therein was a mere motion for
the modification of the penalty, and not a Rule 65 petition. A petition for certiorari is a special civil
action that is distinct and separate from the main case. While in the main case, the core issue is
whether the accused is innocent or guilty of the crime charged, the crux of a Rule 65 petition is
whether the court acted (a) without or in excess of its jurisdiction; or (b) with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, strictly speaking, there is
nomodification of judgment in a petition for certiorari, whose resolution does not call for a re-
22
evaluation of the merits of the case in order to determine the ultimate criminal responsibility of the
accused. In a Rule 65 petition, any resulting annulment of a criminal judgment is but a consequence
of the finding of lack of jurisdiction.
In view thereof, we find that the proper interpretation of Section 7 of Rule 120 must be that it is
inapplicable and irrelevant where the court’s jurisdiction is being assailed through a Rule 65
petition. Section 7 of Rule 120 bars the modification of a criminal judgment only if the appeal
brought before the court is in the nature of a regular appeal under Rule 41, or an appeal by certiorari
under Rule 45, and if that appeal would put the accused in double jeopardy. As it is, we find no
irregularity in the partial annulment of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 in spite of its
finality, as the judgment therein was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
The orders of Caloocan City RTC
Branch 130 have no legal effect, as
they were issued without jurisdiction.
First, Tecson et al. filed their Applications for Probation with the wrong court. Part and parcel of
our criminal justice system is the authority or jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate and decide the
case before it. Jurisdiction refers to the power and capacity of the tribunal to hear, try, and decide a
particular case or matter before it.31 That power and capacity includes the competence to pronounce
a judgment, impose a punishment,32 and enforce or suspend33 the execution of a sentencein
accordance with law.
The OSG questions34 the entire proceedings involving the probation applications of Tecson et al.
before Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. Allegedly, the trial court did not have competence to take
cognizance of the applications, considering that it was not the court of origin of the criminal case.
The OSG points out that the trial court that originally rendered the Decision in Criminal Case No.
C-38340(91) was Branch 121 of the Caloocan City RTC.
The pertinent provision of the Probation Law is hereby quoted for reference:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it
shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the
period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal
from the judgment of conviction. x x x x (Emphases supplied)
It is obvious from the foregoing provision that the law requires that an application for probation be
filed withthe trial court that convicted and sentenced the defendant, meaning the court of origin.
Here, the trial court that originally convicted and sentenced Tecson et al.of the crime of homicide
was Branch 121 – not Branch 130 – of the Caloocan City RTC.35 Neither the judge of Branch 130
in his Orders nor Tecson et al.in their pleadings have presented any explanation or shown any
special authority that would clarify why the Applications for Probation had not been filed with or
taken cognizance of by Caloocan City RTC Branch 121. While we take note that in a previous case,
the CA issued a Decision ordering the inhibition of Branch 121 Judge Adoracion G. Angeles from
hearing and deciding Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), the ruling was made specifically applicable
to the trial of petitioners therein, i.e. accused Concepcion, Ampil, Adriano, and S. Fernandez. 36
Tecson et al. thus committed a fatal error when they filed their probation applications with
Caloocan City RTC Branch 130, and not with Branch 121. We stress that applicants are not at
liberty to choose the forum in which they may seek probation, as the requirement under Section 4 of
the Probation law is substantive and not merely procedural. Considering, therefore, that the
probation proceedings were premised on an unwarranted exercise of authority, we find that
Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 never acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Second, the records of the casewere still with the CA when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 granted
the probation applications. Jurisdiction over a case is lodged with the court in which the criminal
action has been properly instituted.37 If a party appeals the trial court’s judgment or final
order,38 jurisdiction is transferred to the appellate court. The execution of the decision is thus stayed
insofar as the appealing party is concerned.39 The court of origin then loses jurisdiction over the
entire case the moment the other party’s time to appeal has expired. 40 Any residual jurisdiction of
the court of origin shall cease – including the authority to order execution pending appeal – the
moment the complete records of the case are transmitted to the appellate court. 41 Consequently, it is
the appellate court that shall have the authority to wield the power to hear, try, and decide the case
before it, as well as to enforce its decisions and resolutions appurtenant thereto. That power and
authority shall remain with the appellate court until it finally disposes of the case. Jurisdiction
cannot be ousted by any subsequent event, even if the nature of the incident would have prevented
jurisdiction from attaching in the first place.
According to Article 78 of the Revised Penal Code, "[n]o penalty shall be executed except by virtue
of a final judgment." A judgment of a court convicting or acquitting the accused of the offense
charged becomes final under any of the following conditions among others:42 after the lapse of the
period for perfecting an appeal; when the accused waives the right to appeal; upon the grant of a
withdrawal ofan appeal; when the sentence has already been partially or totally satisfied or served;
or when the accused applies for probation. When the decision attains finality, the judgment or final
order is entered in the book of entries of judgments.43 If the case was previously appealed to the
CA, a certified true copy of the judgment or final order must be attached to the original record,
which shall then be remanded to the clerk of the court from which the appeal was taken.44 The court
of origin then reacquires jurisdiction over the case for appropriate action. It is during this time that
the court of origin may settle the matter of the execution of penalty or the suspension of the
execution thereof,45 including the convicts’ applications for probation.46
A perusal of the case records reveals that the CA had not yet relinquished its jurisdiction over the
case when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 took cognizance of the Applications for Probation of
Tecson et al. It shows that the accused filed their respective applications 47 while a motion for
reconsideration was still pending before the CA48 and the records were still with that court.49 The
CA settled the motion only upon issuing the Resolution dated 30 August 2002 denying it, or about
seven months after Tecson et al. had filed their applications with the trial court. 50 In September
2002, or almost a month before the promulgation of the RTC Order dated 11 October 2002 granting
the probation applications,51 the OSG had filed Manifestations of Intent to File Petition for
Certiorari with the CA52 and this Court.53 Ultimately, the OSG assailed the CA judgments by filing
before this Court a Petition for Certiorari on 25 November 2002. 54 We noted the petition and then
required respondents to file a comment thereon.55 After their submission of further pleadings and
motions, we eventually required all parties to file their consolidated memoranda. 56 The records of
the case remained with the CA until they were elevated to this Court in 2008.57
For the foregoing reasons, we find that RTC Branch 130 had no jurisdiction to act on the probation
applications of Tecson et al. It had neither the power nor the authority to suspend their sentence,
place them on probation, order their final discharge, and eventually declare the case against them
23
terminated. This glaring jurisdictional faux pasis a clear evidence of either gross ignorance of the
law oran underhanded one-upmanship on the part of RTC Branch 130 or Tecson et al., or both – to
which this Court cannot give a judicial imprimatur.
In any event, Tecson et al. were ineligible to seek probation at the time they applied for it.
Probation58 is a special privilege granted by the state to penitent qualified offenders who
immediately admit their liability and thus renounce their right to appeal. In view of their acceptance
of their fate and willingness to be reformed, the state affords them a chance to avoid the stigma of
an incarceration recordby making them undergo rehabilitation outside of prison. Some of the major
purposes of the law are to help offenders to eventually develop themselves into law-abiding and self
respecting individuals, as well as to assist them in their reintegration with the community.
It must be reiterated that probation is not a right enjoyed by the accused. Rather, it is an act of grace
orclemency conferred by the state. In Francisco v. Court of Appeals, 59 this Court explained thus:
It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by others or
by all. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court which is to
be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of
the accused. The Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its
government of any of the latter’s prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of the
legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the law
who is not clearly within them. (Emphases supplied)
The OSG questions the validity of the grant of the probation applications of Tecson et al. 60 It points
out that when they appealed to the CA their homicide conviction by the RTC, they thereby made
themselves ineligible to seek probation pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (the
Probation Law).
We refer again to the full text ofSection 4 of the Probation Law as follows:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it
shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the
period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal
from the judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An
application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphases supplied)
Indeed, one of the legal prerequisites of probation is that the offender must not have appealed the
conviction.61 In the 2003 case Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals,62 this Court was faced with the issue of
whether a convict may still apply for probation even after the trial court has imposed a non
probationable verdict, provided that the CA later on lowers the original penalty to a sentence within
the probationable limit. In that case, the trial court sentenced the accused to a maximum term of
eight years of prisión mayor, which was beyond the coverage of the Probation Law. They only
became eligible for probation after the CA reduced the maximum term of the penalty imposed to 1
year, 8 months and 21 days of prisión correccional.
In deciding the case, this Court invoked the reasoning in Francisco and ruled that the accused was
ineligiblefor probation, since they had filed an appeal with the CA. In Francisco, we emphasized
that Section 4 of the Probation Law offers no ambiguity and does not provide for any distinction,
qualification, or exception. What is clearis that all offenders who previously appealed their cases,
regardless of their reason for appealing, are disqualified by the law from seeking probation.
Accordingly, this Court enunciated in Lagrosathat the accused are disallowed from availing
themselves of the benefits of probation if they obtain a genuine opportunity to apply for probation
only on appeal as a result of the downgrading of their sentence from non-probationable to
probationable.
While Lagrosa was promulgated three months after Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 issued its
various Orders discharging Tecson et al. from probation, the ruling in Lagrosa, however, was a
mere reiteration of the reasoning of this Court since the 1989 case Llamado v. Court of
Appeals63 and Francisco. The Applications for Probation of Tecson et al., therefore, should not have
been granted by RTC Branch 130, as they had appealed their conviction to the CA. We recall that
respondents were originally found guilty of homicide and sentenced to suffer 14 years, 8 months,
and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Accordingly, even if the CA later downgraded their
conviction to slight physical injuries and sentenced them to 20 days of arresto menor, which made
the sentence fall within probationable limits for the first time, the RTC should have nonetheless
found them ineligible for probation at the time.
The actions of the trial court must thus be adjudged as an arbitrary and despotic use of authority, so
gross that it divested the court of its very power to dispense justice. As a consequence, the RTC
Orders granting the Applications for Probation of Tecson et al. and thereafter discharging them
from their criminal liability must be deemed to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Whether for lack of jurisdiction orfor grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, we declare all orders, resolutions, and judgments of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in
relation to the probation applications of Tecson et al. null and void for having been issued without
jurisdiction. We find our pronouncement in Galman v. Sandiganbayan 64 applicable, viz:
A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. Through it, no
rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It
neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void.
(Emphasis supplied)
The ultimate discharge of Tecson et
al. from probation did not totally
extinguish their criminal liability.
Accused Bantug asserts65 that, in any event, their criminal liability has already been extinguished as
a result of their discharge from probation and the eventual termination of the criminal case against
them by Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. To support his argument, he cites the following provision
of the Revised Penal Code:
24
ARTICLE 89. How Criminal Liability is Totally Extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment.
2. By service of the sentence.
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
4. By absolute pardon.
5. By prescription of the crime.
6. By prescription of the penalty.
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in article 344 of this Code.
(Emphasis supplied)
As previously discussed, a void judgment cannot be the source of legal rights; legally speaking, it is
as if no judgment had been rendered at all. Considering our annulment of the Orders of Caloocan
City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation proceedings, respondents cannot claim benefits
that technically do not exist.
In any event, Tecson et al.cannot invoke Article89 of the Revised Penal Code, as we find it
inapplicable to this case. One of the hallmarks of the Probation Law is precisely to "suspend the
execution of the sentence,"66 and not to replace the original sentence with another, as we pointed
out in our discussion in Baclayon v. Mutia:67
An order placing defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence" but is rather in effect a suspension of
the imposition of sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an "interlocutory judgment"in the
nature of a conditional order placing the convicted defendant under the supervision of the court for
his reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation
are complied with, or by a final judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated. (Emphases
supplied)
Correspondingly, the criminal liability of Tecson et al.remains.
In light of our recent Decision in
Colinares v. People, Tecson et al.
may now reapply for probation.
Very recently, in Colinares v. People,68 we revisited our ruling in Franciscoand modified our
pronouncements insofar as the eligibility for probation of those who appeal their conviction is
concerned. Through a majority vote of 9-6, the Court En Bancin effect abandoned Lagrosaand
settled the following once and for all:69
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from the judgment of
conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens,
two judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated
homicide by the regional trial court,now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by
the Supreme Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it will apply the probation law
on Arnel based on the trial court’s annulled judgment against him. He will not be entitled to
probation because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme
Court’s judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over
to the trial court’s judgment — even if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now
also be made to pay for the trial court’s erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply
for probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw(the horse errs, the carabao
gets the whip). Where is justice there?
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for probation
would dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appealsthat the probation law requires
that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. But
there is a huge difference between Franciscoand this case.
xxxx
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for
probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. Hewas not in a position to say,
"By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court
imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek
probation under this Court’s greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in
Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the
option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
xxxx
In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of
attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable
penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct
offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would
have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his.
The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is
not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. As Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere
privilege to be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so
would be to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor
of the accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.
xxxx
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel the
correct penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would havehad the right to apply for
25
probation. No one could say with certainty that he would have availed himself of the right had the
RTC doneright by him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he
got was not probationable.
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness.1âwphi1 Is it fair to deny Arnel the right to
apply for probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike the one
erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject to probation? (Emphases supplied)
In our Decision, we set aside the RTC and the CA judgments and found Tecson et al.ultimately
liable for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Pursuant to Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, the offense is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period (from 4
months and 1 day to 6 months) to prisión correccional in its medium period (from 2 years, 4
months, and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Considering that the new ruling in Colinares is more
favorable to Tecson et al., we rule that they are now eligible to apply for probation. Since Fidelito
Dizon (Dizon) was convicted of the same crime, we hereby clarify that Dizon is also eligible for
probation.
While we cannot recognize the validityof the Orders of RTC Branch 130, which granted the
Applications for Probation, we cannot disregard the fact that Tecson et al. have fulfilled the terms
and conditions of their previous probation program and have eventually been discharged therefrom.
Thus, should they reapply for probation, the trial court may, at its discretion, consider their
antecedent probation service in resolving whether to place them under probation at this time and in
determining the terms, conditions, and period thereof.
Final clarificatory matters
We now take this opportunity to correct an unintentional typographical error in the minimum term
of the penalty imposed on the accused Dizon and Tecson et al. While this issue was not raised by
any of the parties before us, this Court deems it proper to discuss the matter ex proprio motuin the
interest of justice. In the first paragraph of the dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1 February
2012, the fourth sentence reads as follows:
They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as
maximum.
As we had intended to impose on the accused the maximum term of the "penalty next lower" than
that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide, in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), 70 the phrase "and one (1)
day," which had been inadvertently added, must be removed. Consequently, in the first paragraph of
the dispositive portion, the fourth sentence should now read as follows:
They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as maximum. In
this instance, we further find it important to clarify the accessory penalties inherent to the principal
penalty imposed on Dizon and Tecson et al.
By operation of Articles 40 to 45 and 73 of the Revised Penal Code, a corresponding accessory
penalty automatically attaches every time a court lays down a principal penalty outlined in Articles
25 and 27 thereof.71 The applicable accessory penalty is determined by using as reference the
principal penaltyimposed by the court before the prison sentence is computed in accordance with
the ISL.72 This determination is made in spite of the two classes ofpenalties mentioned in an
indeterminate sentence. It must be emphasized that the provisions on the inclusion of accessory
penalties specifically allude to the actual "penalty"73 imposed, not to the "prison sentence"74 set by a
court. We believe that the ISL did not intend to have the effect of imposing on the convict two
distinct sets of accessory penalties for the same offense.75 The two penalties are only relevant
insofar as setting the minimum imprisonment period is concerned, after which the convict may
apply for parole and eventually seek the shortening of the prison term. 76
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty for the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccionalin
its medium period. As this provision grants courts the discretion tolay down a penalty without
regard to the presence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the imposable penaltymust also
be within the aforementioned range.77 Hence, before applying the ISL, we ultimately imposed on
Dizon and Tecson et al. the actual (straight) penalty78 of four years and two months of prisión
correccional.79 Pursuant to Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of prisión correccional
automatically carries with it80 the following accessory penalties: ARTICLE 43. Prisión
Correccional— Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prisión correccional shall carry with it
that of suspension from public office, from the right tofollow a profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment
shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article
although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in
the pardon.
The duration of their suspension shall be the same as that of their principal penalty sans the ISL;
that is, for four years and two months81 or until they have served their sentence in accordance with
law. Their suspension takes effect immediately, once the judgment of conviction becomes final. 82
We further point out that if the length of their imprisonment exceeds 18 months, they shall
furthermore suffer a perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. Under Article 32
of the RevisedPenal Code, if this accessory penalty attaches, it shall forever deprive them of the
exercise of their right (a) to vote in any popular election for any public office; (b) to be elected to
that office; and (c) to hold any public office.83 Any public office that they may be holding becomes
vacant upon finality of the judgment.84 The aforementioned accessory penalties can only be wiped
out if expressly remitted in a pardon.85
Of course, the aforementioned accessory penalties are without prejudice to a grant of probation,
shouldthe trial court find them eligible therefor. As we explained in Baclayon,86 the grant of
probation suspends the execution of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as that of the
accessory penalties. We have reiterated this point in Moreno v. Commission on Elections:87
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is not a
sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held that the grant
of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as
well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the right to follow a
profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. We
thus deleted from the order granting probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain
from continuing with her teaching profession.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from public office,
from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from
26
the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period imposed upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant
of probation.

It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from
running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on
hold for the duration of the probation. x x x x. During the period of probation, the probationer does
not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the
conditions prescribed in the probation order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of petitioner Gerarda
H. Villa in connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 is hereby DENIED. The Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General concerning G.R. Nos. 155101 and
154954 is also DENIED.

The respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel
Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are likewise DENIED. In light of the
finding that Caloocan City Regional Trial Court Branch 130 acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the aforementioned Applications for Probation, we hereby
ANNUL the entire probation proceedings and SET ASIDE all orders, resolutions, or judgments
issued in connection thereto. We, however, CLARIFY that Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel
Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., Vincent Tecson, and Fidelito Dizon are eligible to apply or
reapply for probation in view of our recent ruling in Colinares v. People of the
Philippines,88 without prejudice to their remaining civil liability, if any.

Furthermore, we issue a CORRECTION of the dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1 February
2012 and hereby delete the phrase "and one (1) day" located in the fourth sentence of the first
paragraph thereof. The sentence shall now read as follows: "They are hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and
two (2) months of prisi6n correccional, as maximum."

SO ORDERED.

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