JOSELANO GUEVARRA v ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA A.C. No. 7136.
August 1, 2007 lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law."
FACTS
Joselano Guevarra filed case for disbarment against Atty. Jose Emmanuel “Noli” Eala (6th PBA
Commissioner) for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer’s oath. In the Complaint,
Guevarra first met the respondent in January 2000 when his then fiancée Irene Moje introduced respondent
to him as her friend who was married with whom he had three children. Joselano and Irene got married on
October 7, 2000 and soon after, complainant, from January to March 2001, saw that Irene had been
receiving calls from Noli, as well as messages some of which read “I love you,” “I miss you,” or “Meet you at
Megamall.” He also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the
following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. Her excuse was that she slept at her parents’
house or she was busy with work. Joselano also saw Irene and Noli together on two occasions. On the
second occasion, he confronted them after which Irene abandoned the family house. In April 2001,
Joselano went uninvited to Irene’s birthday celebration at which he saw her and Noli celebrating with her
family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left immediately. Following that
incident, Irene went to the family house and hauled off all her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and
her share of the household appliances. Complainant later found a handwritten letter dated October 7,
2007, the day of his wedding to Irene, containing sweet words and vows from the respondent. On his
complaint, petitioner contends that: 1. Respondent and Irene were FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS
RELATIONSHIP as they attended social functions together and that adulterous conduct with his wife and his
apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him
morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar. 2. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage,
calling it a “piece of paper.” Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainant’s bride on
the very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her. 3. Respondents grossly immoral conduct
runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively
his illicit love for the complainant’s wife, he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his own family,
broke up the complainant’s marriage, commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal profession. On
the other hand, respondent denied the allegations that the complainant is accussing him. He denied that: 1.
they had ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene, the truth of the matter being that their
relationship was low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families. And his
relationship with Irene was not under scandalous circumstances 2. he has flaunted his aversion to the
institution of marriage by calling the institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his reference to
the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the formality
of the marriage contract. Meanwhile, respondent admitted The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support
the Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is
the foundation of the family.
ISSUE
WON an illicit affair between a married lawyer and a married woman constitute gross immoral conduct.
HELD
Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be
characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances." The case at bar
involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial
whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and
immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by
the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. Respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married
woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of
his profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor
and privileges which his license confers upon him. Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took
before admission to practice law. Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of
the Constitution reading: Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State. In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which
echoes this constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01
of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a
DECISION
WHEREFORE, Petition is GRANTED. Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral
conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
A.C. No. 6490 TABANG v. GACOTT July 9, 2013
FACTS:
Complainant Lilia Tabang was prohibited from acquiring vast tracts of agricultural land as she already
owned other parcels. Hence, Judge Gacott advised her to put the titles of the parcels under the names of
fictitious persons, thus she purchased 7 lands under his advice.
Later, Tabang decided to sell the seven parcels for their medication and other expenses. Atty. Glenn
Gaccot offered the parcels to prospective buyers to help her sell thus he borrowed from Tabang the TCTs.
Respondent then caused the annotation of these documents on the TCTs of the seven parcels and caused
the publication of notices where he represented himself as the owner of the parcels and announced that
these were for sale and succeeded in selling the seven parcels. He received a total of P3,773,675.00 from the
proceeds of the sales.
Hence, pettioners alleged that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit filed a case
before the IBP.
Respondent, contended that the names were not fictitious and petitioners only demanded a balato of 20%
from the proceeds which in his refusal, he was threatened to be defamed and disbarred.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct violating Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus warranting his disbarment.
RULING:
Yes, the Court concurs with and adopts the findings and recommendation of Commissioner Limpingco and
the IBP Board of Governors.
While it may be true that complainant Lilia Tabang herself engaged in illicit activities, the complainant’s own
complicity does not negate, or even mitigate, the repugnancy of respondent’s offense. Quite the contrary,
his offense is made even graver. He is a lawyer who is held to the highest standards of morality, honesty,
integrity, and fair dealing. Perverting what is expected of him, he deliberately and cunningly took
advantage of his knowledge and skill of the law to prejudice and torment other individuals. Not only did he
countenance illicit action, he instigated it. Not only did he acquiesce to injustice, he orchestrated it. Thus,
the Court imposes upon respondent the supreme penalty of disbarment.
Respondent has fallen dismally and disturbingly short of the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and
fair dealing required of him. Quite the contrary, he employed his knowledge and skill of the law as well as
took advantage of the credulity of petitioners to secure undue gains for himself and to inflict serious damage
on others. He did so over the course of several years in a sustained and unrelenting fashion and outdid his
previous wrongdoing with even greater, more detestable offenses. He has hardly shown any remorse. From
how he has conducted himself in these proceedings, he is all but averse to rectifying his ways and assuaging
complainants’ plight. Respondent even foisted upon the IBP and this Court his duplicity by repeatedly
absenting himself from the IBP’s hearings without justifiable reasons. He also vexed this Court to admit his
Appeal despite his own failure to comply with the much extended period given to him, thus inviting the
Court to be a party in delaying complainants’ cause. For all his perversity, respondent deserves none of this
Court’s clemency.
REYES V. GAA A.M. NO. 1048. JULY 14, 1995.
FACTS:
Wellington Reyes, complainant, reported to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that he had been the
victim of extortion by respondent Atty. Salvador Gaa, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, who was
investigating a complaint for estafa filed by complainant’s business rival. The NBI agents then apprehended
respondent in an entrapment operation set up by them.
ISSUE:
WON respondent should be disbarred on the grounds of malpractice and willful violation of lawyer’s oath.
RULING:
Yes. The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public official, which also
constitutes as a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer’s oath is a source of his obligations and its
violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment, or other disciplinary action (Agpalo, Legal Ethics 66-67
[1983]).
E. CONRAD and VIRGINIA BEWLEY GEESLIN v. ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO A.C. No. 2033 May 9, 1990
FACTS:
This unnumbered administrative case against respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro originally
stemmed from the letter of a certain Angelito B. Cayanan with his transaction with Atty Filipe Navarro. Acting
on the aforesaid letter, the Supreme Court , per Resolution dated February 14, 1975, referred the copy of Mr.
Cayanan's letter to the Solicitor General to proceed with the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro. Solicitor
General is directed to communicate in the premises with Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez of the law firm of Ortigas
& Ortigas , who on file in Administrative Case has offered to make available documents in their possession
showing other sales made by Atty. Navarro of properties titled in the name of other persons, involving a total
selling price of P75 million and down payments of almost P 0.6 million. On February 13, 1976, this Honorable
Court issued a Resolution in L-39386 and L-39620-29 (Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals,
et al.) referring the letter of Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr. dated January 13, 1976 "for investigation of the
existence of sufficient grounds for the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro for suspension or removal from
office and for appropriate action". The aforementioned letter of Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr. stated that,
Navarro continues to defy the authorities, for only after a brief lull he is now again openly selling titled
properties of other persons. From the evidence adduced by the complainants, it appears that a certain
Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal twenty-two cases for recovery
of possession of her 1.2 hectare property in Mandaluyong, Rizal titled in her name, and to eject the twenty-
two families squatting thereat. Eleven of these cases were raffled to Judge Emilio Salas, while the other
eleven cases were assigned to Judge Pedro Navarro. All the twenty-two defendants-squatters were
represented by respondent NAVARRO. On behalf of his clients, respondent NAVARRO interposed as
principal defense, the alleged nullity of the HABERER'S title, claiming that the mother title from which it
emanated actually originated from Decree No. 1425 issued in G.L.R.O. Record No. 917, which he claims to
be non-existent. The two sets of cases were decided differently. In the first set of eleven cases, Judge Salas
rendered a decision sustaining the validity of the HABERER'S title and ordering the eviction of the
defendants-squatters clients of respondent NAVARRO. In the second set of eleven cases, Judge Pedro
Navarro decided in favor of the defendants-squatters clients of respondent NAVARRO. In the decision of
Judge Navarro dated May 26, 1971, dismissed the complaints. After the rendition of the Navarro decision
which made reference to the decision rendered by Judge Vivencio Ruiz of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XV, respondent NAVARRO published in the Manila Times on July 4, 1971. Thereafter, respondent
NAVARRO claimed ownership of properties originally covered by Decree 1425 including the parcels of land
owned by Ortigas & Company, Limited and started selling them.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent Navarro omitted such acts constitute sufficient grounds for suspension
or disbarment
RULING:
In a number of cases, we have repeatedly explained and stressed that the purpose of disbarment
is not meant as a punishment to but its objectives are to compel the lawyer to deal fairly and honestly with
his client and to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proven him unfit for the duties
and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney. Respondent Navarro knew that the decision of
Judge Vivencio Ruiz declaring as null and void certificates of titles emanating from Decree No. 1425 was
reversed and set aside. He knew that Judge Pedro Navarro of the Rizal Court of First Instance exempted
Ortigas & Company from the effects of his decision. He also knew that Judge Sergio Apostol of the Rizal
Court of First Instance in Quezon City had upheld the validity of the certificates of title of Ortigas &
Company. Despite all these pronouncements and his awareness thereof, respondent NAVARRO still
continued to sell properties titled in the name of Ortigas & Company and the Madrigals. Such acts of
respondent are evidential of flouting resistance to lawful orders of constituted authority. Verily, respondent
has proven himself unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed in him by law and by this Court, through his
deliberate rejection of his oath as an officer of the court. WHEREFORE, respondent Felipe C. Navarro is
hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ATTY. FE T. TUANDA
A.M. No. 3360
January 30, 1990
FACTS:
On 17 December 1983, one Herminia Marquez gave respondent several jewelry amounting to P36,000 for
sale on a commission basis on a condition that the respondent will turn over the sale and unsold items to Ms.
Marquez on or before February 14,1984. Sometime in February 1984, instead of returning the unsold jewelry
amounting to P 26,250, the respondent issued three checks: a.) P5,400 on February 16, 1984; b.) P5,400 on
February 23, 1984; and c.) P15,450 on February 25, 1984. Upon presentment for payment within 90 days after
their issuance, all three checks were dishonored by the respondent’s bank, Traders Royal Bank, for
insufficiency of funds. Respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of checks
which had bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez. Consequently, four cases
were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, one for estafa, and three for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22. In due time, after trial, the trial court rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which,
acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all
three cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent was correctly suspended from the practice of law
RULING:
The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public.
Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been convicted of
crimes involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as
follows: A member of the bar may be removed or suspended by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice.
The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the
causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his
profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. We should add that the crimes of which
respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the CPR under both
of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude
might not relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the
good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. In (Melendrez v. Decena) this Court stressed
that the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good moral
character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law; its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. Court Resolved to DENY the
Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further
orders from this Court.
IN RE: ABESAMIS 102 PHIL. 1182
FACTS:
On April 5, 1988, the Supreme Court ordered the lower court to order the restoration of the cockpit to Flores.
Judge Abesamis of the trial court however only received the mittimus on April 13, 1988 and then the next 2
days, he received subsequent pleadings from Flores and Ligon. Considering this, Judge Abesamis was only
able to issue an order favorable Flores on April 20, 1988. But Ligon was able to secure a TRO from the Court of
Appeal enjoining Judge Abesamis from restoring the cockpit to Flores on the ground of intervening events
because apparently, Ligon was able to buy the property from Flores’s lessors. This was opposed by Flores until
it reached the Supreme Court where the Supreme Court noted that such fact [of the supervening event]
should be addressed by the trial court and not the SC.
From May 1989 to June 1989, Flores filed criminal and administrative cases against Judge Abesamis,
accusing him of partiality, evident bad faith, and gross negligence, as well as of serious misconduct,
inefficiency and ignorance of the law, in deliberately delaying action on his motions to obtain possession of
the cockpit. The cases were dismissed for lack of merit.
In November 1989, Judge Abesamis issued a writ of execution ordering the restoration of the cockpit to him
but this was again opposed by Ligon on the ground of the supervening event which should be discussed by
the trial court. Judge Abesamis ruled in favor of Ligon. It was ruled by the trial court that Ligon’s lawful
acquisition of title to the cockpit and Flores’ continuing failure to pay his debt of about P1.8 million to the
former were supervening events warranting Ligon’s retention of the cockpit and precluding its restoration to
Flores. This ruling was eventually affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
In 1993, Flores, however, again filed complaints against Abesamis for serious misconduct etc but they were
again dismissed for lack of merit.
In 1995, Flores once more filed in the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint against Judge Abesamis, he
accused Judge Abesamis of transgressing the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act “for alleged bias and
prejudice in granting a party’s motion which caused undue injury to complainant.”
The case was again dismissed. The Assistant Ombudsman however ordered Flores to explain why he should
not be cited for he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for willful disregard of the judgments and orders of
the Ombudsman and those of the Court of Appeals; abuse of the processes of the courts; and forum-
shopping.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Flores is guilty of contempt of court.
HELD:
Yes. Flores knew that Judge Abesamis cannot restore the cockpit to him because of the TRO issued by the
Court of Appeals. He also knew that that the specific Orders of Judge Abesamis upon which his criminal
complaint was grounded had already been sustained by higher courts, and consequently, his complaint
was completely devoid of merit. Flores actually resorted to administrative prosecution (or institution of
criminal actions) as a substitute for or supplement to the specific modes of appeal or review provided by law
from court judgments or orders, on the theory that the Judges’ orders had caused him “undue injury.” This is
impermissible.
Flores thus abused the processes of the court. He resorted to the administrative procedure for disciplining
Judges prescribed by law, and even to criminal prosecution, notwithstanding that determination of the
correctness of the orders of Judge Abesamis. It would appear that improper motives underlay the filing of his
complaints: either to vent his wrath against someone, anyone, because of his frustrations in his attempts to
regain possession of the cockpit, or to so intimidate the respondent Judges as to make them more malleable
in their subsequent actuations with respect to his future motions.
Finally, his initiation of the complaint was forum shopping of the most blatant sort, a clear attempt to re-
ventilate or re-litigate issues already passed upon and definitively resolved by this Court, affirming action on
those same issues by the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court. Flores is thus guilty of contempt; he
was ordered to pay a fine by the SC.
MEDINA V. BAUTISTA 12 SCRA 1
FACTS:
Loreta Bautista, respondent after agreeing with Marcos Medina, complainant to settle the case
amicably prepared a motion for extension of time to file an answer, but instead he filed a motion to declare
the latter in default. After being fully aware of the decision rendered in the civil case, respondent prepared
two fictitious deeds of sale in the sense that the consideration in either was never in fact received. Then
pretending to arrange an amicable settlement of the case, respondent received on different occasions
from complainant several sums totalling P500.00. The respondent, taking advantage of the ignorance of his
client Maria Ragsac Cabel, ask her to sign a document wherein it was made to appear that she received
P8,000.00 when in truth and in fact she did not receive said amount. Then respondent received from his
client Mrs. Cabel the amount of P800.00 with the understanding that the amount was to be deposited in
court for the repurchase of the property, but instead of depositing it he misappropriated the money.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be disbarred for constituting malpractice and conduct unbecoming a
member of the bar.
RULING:
Yes, Atty. Loreto U. Bautista with the commission of certain acts constituting malpractice and
conduct unbecoming a member of the bar. The crime of estafa is one which involves moral turpitude within
the purview of Section 27, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court. After the reception of the corresponding evidence,
the Solicitor General submitted his report to thE Court finding respondent guilty of the acts of malpractice
complained of and recommending his disbarment, formally charging respondent with acts constituting the
alleged malpractice as found in his investigation with the prayer that the name of respondent be stricken off
from the roll of attorneys.
IN RE: DE LOS ANGELES 106 PHIL 1
FACTS:
Atty. Dalmacio de los Angeles was convicted of the crime of attempted bribery in a final decision
rendered by the Court of Appeals and was sentenced to two (2) years, four (40 months, and one (1) day of
destierro, and to pay a fine of P2,300, with subsidiary destierro in case of insolvency (CA-G.R. No. 11411-R),
and under section 1, Rule 128, of the Rules of Court, he was required to show cause why he should not be
disbarred from the practice of his profession.
In his written explanation he appealed to the sympathy and mercy of this Court considering that he has six
children to support the eldest being 16 years old and the youngest 4 years who will bear the stigma of
dishonor if disciplinary action be taken against him. He made manifest to this Court that if he ever
committed what is attributed to him, it was merely due to an error of judgment which he honestly and
sincerely deplores.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of moral turpitude by a lawyer should result to one`s dismissal.
RULING:
Yes, under section 25, Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed from his office as attorney if he is
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude the reason behind this rule being that the continued
possession of a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance of the lawyer in the
practice of law with the result that the loss of such qualification justifies his disbarment. The Court, much as it
sympathizes with the plight of respondent, is constrained to decree his disbarment as ordained by section 25
of Rule 127.
IN RE: PERALTA101 PHIL. 313
FACTS:
On April 16, 1939, the Hilarion Peralta, respondent was married to Rizalina E. Valdez in Rizal, Nueva
Ecija. On or before March 8, 1951, he courted the complainant who fell in love with him. To have carnal
knowledge of her, the respondent procured the preparation of a fake marriage contract which was then a
blank document. He made her sign it on March 8, 1951. A week after, the document was brought back by
the respondent to the complainant, signed by the Justice of the Peace and the Civil Registrar of San
Manuel, Tarlac, and by two witnesses. Since then the complainant and the respondent lived together as
husband and wife. Sometime later, the complainant insisted on a religious ratification of their marriage and
on July 7, 1951, the corresponding ceremony was performed in Aparri by the parish priest of said
municipality. The priest no longer required the production of a marriage license because of the civil
marriage contract shown to him. After the ceremony in Aparri, the couple returned to Manila as husband
and wife and lived with some friends. The complainant then discovered that the respondent was previously
married to someone else; whereupon, she filed the criminal action for a violation of Article 350 of the Revised
Penal Code in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan and the present complaint for immorality in this court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Peralta`s criminal case involves turpitude which leads to disbarment as a member of the bar.
RULING:
The Court finds that the respondent is immoral. He made mockery of marriage which is a sacred
institution demanding respect and dignity. His conviction in the criminal case involves moral turpitude. The
act of respondent in contracting the second marriage (even his act in making love to another woman while
his first wife is still alive and their marriage still valid and existing) is contrary to honesty, justice, decency, and
morality. Thus lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court, the respondent is hereby
declared disqualified from being admitted to the bar.
LEYNES V. VELOSO 82 SCRA 325
FACTS:
Judge Veloso, who is now sixty-eight years old and who was admitted to the bar in 1938, started his
judicial career in 1946 as a justice of the peace of Infanta, Quezon. Since 1950, he has been functioning as
the incumbent judge of General Nakar.
Apparently, Judge Veloso married Ligaya Veluz when he had already begotten three children. The
respondent admits that the thirty-seven-year old Gloria Tropicales is his mistress. Out of their union, two
children, named Juana and Paulo, were born in 1970 and 1972 when the respondent was already a sex-
agenarian. *
Respondent Judge, invoking "the interest of justice" and article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, prays for the
dismissal of the immorality charge on the ground that his wife, Rosario V. Veloso, condoned his acts of
concubinage, as shown in her affidavit of November 21, 1974. In that affidavit, she unabashedly stated that,
because her husband's thighbone was broken in a vehicular accident in 1955, she chose Gloria Tropicales to
serve her husband, like a real wife. She gave the assurance that she would not prosecute their offspring.
ISSUE:
Whether or not concubinage could lead to the disbarment from being a member of the bat.
RULING:
Yes. A judge suffers from moral obtuseness or has a weird notion of morality in public office when he labors
under the delusion that he can be a judge and at the same time have a mistress in defiance of the mores
and sense of morality of the community. The absence of criminal liability does not preclude disciplinary
action by reason of his highly unconventional and censurable behavior. Respondent and his counsel should
know that since he had admitted the commission of concubinage, that charge is conclusively established
and it does not have to be proven anymore. His admission is a confession .
The Court hold that Judge Veloso should be dismissed by reason of his immoral conduct. His moral
delinquency renders him unfit for the office of municipal judge and warrants his removal from office .A
lawyer, of course, should have good moral character. He may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct or
when he is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude such as concubinage. If good moral character is
required of a lawyer, with more reason that requirement should be exacted of a member of the judiciary
who at all times is expected to observe irreproachable behavior and is bound not to outrage public
decency .
IN RE: AVANCENA 20 SCRA 591
FACTS:
Atty. Jose Avanceña was charged with falsification of public document before the Court of First
Instance of Manila and later on was found guilty thereof. The trial court also found that he took advantage
of the law profession in committing the crime of falsification of public document to defraud his clients. The
respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals and the latter court affirmed the decision of the lower court.
On a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court, the latter Court,
dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The respondent was committed to prison at the National Penitentiary,
and later on the President of the Philippines extended conditional pardon to him. Subsequently, he was
discharged from confinement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the charges against Atty.
RULING:
Yes, Atty. Avanceña was disbarred from the practice of law, and his name was stricken out from
the roll of attorneys. There can, therefore, be no doubt, that Atty. Avanceña has committed the crime of
falsification of public document against his clients with grave abuse of confidence, having been found guilty
thereof by final judgment of competent jurisdiction. His acts amount to deceit, malpractice or misconduct in
office as an attorney, which constitute grounds for removal from office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, not to mention conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude. The fact
that the respondent was extended conditional pardon by the Chief Executive is of no moment. Such
conditional pardon merely partially relieved him of the penal consequences of his act, but did not operate
as a bar to his disbarment, especially so when he is being disbarred on the ground of professional
misconduct for which he had been convicted by final judgment.
IN RE: DEL ROSARIO 52 PHIL 399
FACTS:
Felipe Del Rosario took the bar in 1925 for the second time and he failed. He again took it in 1926
and he failed again. In 1927, he filed a motion before the Supreme Court in which he alleged that there was
a mistake in the computation of his exam results in the 1925 bar exams. He was then admitted to the bar.
HOWEVER, a subsequent investigation by the city fiscal uncovered that Del Rosario, together with one Juan
Villaflor – a former employee of the Supreme Court, falsified some documents to make it appear that Del
Rosario actually passed the 1925 bar exams. The two were subsequently charged with falsification. Villaflor
was convicted as he pleaded guilty but Del Rosario was acquitted for lack of evidence. The fiscal however
recommended Del Rosario to surrender his certificate of attorney.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the recommendation by the fiscal is correct.
HELD:
Yes. The mere fact that Villaflor was convicted proves that Del Rosario is unworthy of the certificate of
attorney. The crime which Villaflor is proven guilty of has benefited only Del Rosario and it is impossible that
the latter has no knowledge of this illegal machination.
But shouldn’t the Supreme Court just allow Del Rosario to take the bar exams again?
No. The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted everyone who demands it, but is a
privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a sound discretion. The standards of the legal
profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal
law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of
the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself out as a
duly authorized member of the bar.
IN RE: BASA 41 PHIL 275
FACTS:
Carlos Basa is a young lawyer convicted of the crime of abduction with consent. He was
sentenced to two years, eleven months, and eleven days of imprisonment. The Solicitor General asked for
Basa’s disbarment based on his commission of a crime involving moral turpitude.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime abduction with consent involves moral turpitude.
HELD:
Yes. Crimes of this character do involve moral turpitude. The inherent nature of the act is such that it is
against good morals and the accepted rule of right conduct. Moral turpitude includes everything which is
done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. Basa was declared to be suspended for one
year immediately after he finished serving his sentence.
ARCIAGA V. MANIWANG 106 SCRA 591
FACTS:
In 1970, when Maniwang was still a law student, he had a relationship with Arciga, then a medical
technology student. They started having a sexual relationship in 1971. In 1973, Arciga got pregnant. The two
then went to Arciga’s hometown to tell the latter’s parent about the pregnancy. They also made Arciga’s
parents believe that they were already married but they would have to have the church wedding in
abeyance until Maniwang passes the bar exams. Maniwang secured a copy of his birth certificate in
preparation of securing a marriage license.
In 1975, Maniwang passed the bar. But after his oath taking, he stopped communicating with Arciga. Arciga
located his whereabouts and there she found out that Maniwang married another woman. Arciga
confronted Maniwang’s wife and this irked Maniwang so he inflicted physical injuries upon Arciga.
Arciga then filed a disbarment case against Maniwang grounded on gross immoral conduct. Maniwang
admitted that he is the father of Arciga’s child; that he did promise to marry Arciga many times; that he
broke those promises because of Arciga’s shady past because apparently Arciga had an illegitimate child
even before her son with Maniwang was born.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Maniwang should be disbarred.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that Maniwang’s case is different from the cases of Mortel vs Aspiras and
Almirez vs Lopez, and other cases therein cited. Maniwang’s refusal to marry Arciga was not so corrupt nor
unprincipled as to warrant disbarment (though not much discussion was provided by the ponente as to
why). But the Supreme Court did say that it is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard
as to what is “grossly immoral conduct” or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a
lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be
unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as “that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows
a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community”.
ROYONG V. OBLENA 7 SCRA 757
FACTS:
Complainant Josefina Royong charge the respondent Ariston Oblena, a member of the bar and
bench, with rape. The Solicitor General immediately conducted an investigation and found out that there
was no rape, the carnal knowledge between complainant and respondent seems to be consensual sex.
In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit the alleged
rape, nevertheless, he was guilty of other misconduct. The Solicitor General made another complaint
charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to the bar that
he is a person of good moral character, of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time
maintaining illicit relations with the 18 year old Josefina Royong. Thus rendering him unfit to practice law,
praying that this Court render judgment ordering the permanent removal of the respondent as lawyer and
judge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the illicit relation of the respondent with Josefina Royong and the adulterous cohabitation of
respondent with Briccia Angeles warrants disbarment.
HELD:
Ariston Oblena was disbarred. The continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a
good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who
has been admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify
that as ground for disbarment.
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession, has
nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer.
Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as
to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the
prestige of the noble profession of the law.
As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show good
moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known.
Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for admission to the
bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him sqemed to
have acuuiesced to his utatus, did noq render him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment
that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.
ALFONSO V. JUANSON 228 SCRA 239
FACTS:
The case involves a complaint filed by a doctor of medicine, Dr. Norbert L. Alfonso, charging Judge
Juanson with immorality and violation of the Code of Judicial ethics, alleging that Juanson and his wife Sol
were having an affair. The complainant has in his possession love letters written by Sol to prove his claim,
provided by Judge Juanson's wife. Sol, however, denied this claim several times. Other evidence for the
prosecution includes files of a private investigator hired by Dr. Alfonso's father showing that Sol had met with
Judge Juanson on 17 July 1992 in a condominium unit in Mandaluyong and that they stayed there for
approximately three hours. Dr. Alfonso confronted Sol about the evidence that was gathered by his father.
At first she denied the affair but later in the evening she admitted having an illicit affair with Judge Juanson.
Sol also admitted to the Complainant that when she went to Hongkong on December 26, 1989 up to
December 29, 1989 she was with Respondent Judge, and records of the Commission on Immigration for said
dates show that both Sol Alfonso and Respondent Judge Modesto Juanson departed for Hongkong via
Cathay Pacific plane on December 26, 1989 and returned to Manila on December 29, 1989 The Alfonso
spouses decided to live in separate house.
In defense, Judge Juanson claims that he first knew Sol in 1987 when she engaged his professional services in
connection with the criminal cases filed by her office. In June 1992 (while the Alfonso spouses were in the US)
he received an overseas call from Sol asking him for advice concerning her problem with her employer. They
met up after the return of Sol in the Philippines to discuss her problem. He added that it was impossible for
him to have sexual intercourse with Sol because he has been suffering from two debilitating diseases –
diabetes mellitus and prostatitis (which have seriously affected his sexual potency).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Juanson's alleged sexual impropriety is a ground for him to be dismissed from the
Judiciary
HELD:
No. There is no doubt in our minds that a very special relationship existed between the respondent and the
complainant's wife as evidenced by cards or notes (love letters). It is clear that their affair began before Sol
and Dr. Alfonso were married on 10 December 1988 and might have blossomed from the attorney-client
relationship between respondent and Sol. However, the evidence presented was insufficient to prove that
he and Sol continued their extramarital affair after Judge Juanson was appointed to the judiciary. Sol's
admission to her husband that she had carnal knowledge with the judge made no reference to specific
dates and the side of Dr. Alfonso exerted no further effort to obtain clarifications as to the dates. It cannot
be safely presumed that Juanson committed any sexual indiscretion after he became a judge. He is not
charged for immorality committed before his appointment. Accordingly, proof of prior immoral conduct
cannot be a basis for his administrative discipline in this case. Judge Juanson may have undergone moral
reformation after his appointment, or his appointment could have completely transformed him upon the
solemn realization that a public office is a public trust and public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. However, considering their prior special relationship, the
respondent and Sol's meetings could reasonably incite suspicion of either its continuance or revival and the
concomitant intimacies expressive of such relationship. Such indiscretions indubitably cast upon his conduct
an appearance of impropriety.
It is to be noted that 17 July 1992 fell on a Friday. On that date, the respondent left his office at the City Hall
of Manila at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning and arrived at Unit 412-A Citihomes thirty minutes later. It is,
therefore, clear that on 17 July 1992 the respondent had left his office during office hours and, considering
the distance between Mandaluyong and his office at the City Hall of Manila and the usual traffic condition,
it was impossible for him to have reached his office — if at all he did proceed to it — in time for the
commencement of the official session hours in the afternoon, i.e., 2:00 p.m. Thus, for purely personal sessions,
he violated the rule regarding the official sentence. Such violation amounted to neglect of duty.
It has been said that a magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such manner that his
conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the
epitome of integrity and justice. The ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the
preservation of the faith of the people in the judiciary. It is settled that immorality has not been confined to
sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude or indicative of corruption, indecency,
depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to
opinions of respectable members of the community, and as an inconsiderate attitude toward good order
and public welfare.
TOLEDO V. TOLEDO 7 SCRA 757
FACTS:
On 9 July 1956 Paz Arellano Toledo filed in this Court a sworn complaint in the form of a letter
alleging that she is the wife of Jesus B. Toledo, a member of the Bar that they were married on 27 December
1946 while he was still a second year student of law; that she supported him and spent for his studies; that
after passing the bar examination and becoming a full-fledged member of the Bar he abandoned her; that
he is at present employed in the Bureau of Mines and stationed at Cagayan de Oro City; and that he is
cohabiting with another woman who had borne him three children. She prayed that the respondent be
disbarred from the practice of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not concubinage can lead to disbarment from the bar.
RULING:
Yes, The respondent, by abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with another woman who had
borne him a child, has failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a
member of the Bar. The respondent is disbarred from the practice of law.
OBUSAN V. OBUSAN 128 SCRA 485
FACTS:
Atty. Generoso Obusan Jr., then single, had a relationship with one Natividad Estabillo. In 1972,
Estabillo begot a son with Obusan. Obusan later found out that Estabillo was at the time still validly married
with one Tony Garcia. Four days after the birth of his son with Estabillo, Obusan married Preciosa Razon. The
couple lived more than a year together until one day when Obusan left the conjugal home and never
returned.
Preciosa searched for Obusan until she found out that the latter has been living with Natividad Estabillo.
Preciosa then filed a disbarment case against Obusan on the grounds of gross immorality and adultery.
Preciosa presented the testimonies of the neighbors of Estabillo who all testified that Estabillo and Obusan
presented themselves as husband and wife in their community.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Obusan should be disbarred.
HELD:
Yes. Obusan failed to counter the evidence presented by his wife. He even failed to file responsive
pleadings. Hence, on the strength of the evidence against him, he is guilty of grossly immoral conduct.
Abandoning one’s wife and resuming carnal relations with a former paramour, a married woman, falls within
“that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of
the good and respectable members of the community”. He failed to maintain the highest degree of
morality expected and required of a member of the bar.
DIZON V. CABUCANAN
FACTS:
Complainant alleged that he was one of the would-be-buyers of a parcel of land owned by the
heirs of the late Florentino Callangan, who were parties in Civil Case filed before the Municipal Trial Court;
that, a compromise agreement was executed by the parties in the said case and notarized before Atty.
Cabucana on the same date it was signed at the MTCC; that at the hearing conducted regarding the due
execution and the veracity of the compromise agreement, the signatories therein testified that they signed
the instrument in the court room of MTCC but not in the presence of Atty. Cabucana as Notary Public; that
because of the irregularity in the due execution of the Compromise Agreement, there was undue delay in
the resolution/decision of Civil Case which caused damage and injury to complainant; that Atty. Cabucana
violated the Notarial Law in notarizing the document in the absence of most of the signatories/affiants; and
that he should be sanctioned in accordance with Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Code and Code of
Professional Responsibility. Complainant further alleged that Atty. Cabucana uttered grave threats against
him after the hearing of the said case in MTCC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated the code of professional responsibilities
RULING:
Section 1, Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as the Notarial Law states: The acknowledgment shall be
before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of
instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the
 acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him
and that he is the same person who executed it, acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The
certificate shall be made under the official seal, if he is required by law to keep a seal, and if not, his
certificate shall so state.
The requirement of affiant’s personal appearance was further emphasized in Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the
Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004 which provides that:
A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document
(1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization; and (2) is not personally known to
the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as
defined by these Rules.
As a notary public, Atty. Cabucana should not notarize a document unless the person who signs it is the
same person executing it and personally appearing before him to attest to the truth of its contents. This is to
enable him to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the
document is the party’s free and voluntary act and deed.
IN RE SANTIAGO (1940) JUNE 21, 1940
Facts:
In this administrative case, the Solicitor General charged the respondent Atty. Roque Santiago with
malpractice and prayed that disciplinary action be taken against him.
The respondent gave legal advice to one Ernesto Baniquit who was living separately from his wife for some
nine consecutiveyears and seeking to contract a second marriage. The respondent assured Baniquit that he
could secure a separation from his wife and marry again. The lawyer prepared a document (Exhibit A)
stating that the contracting parties, husband and wife, were authorized to marry again and at the same
time giving the authorization to renounce or waive each member’s right against the party marrying.
The notary let the husband and wife execute and acknowledge the document and declared that they
were again single and as such could contract another marriage. Relying on this document, Baniquit
contracted a second marriage.
The respondent, upon realizing his mistake, sent for the parties and let them sign the deed
of cancellation (Exhibit C) a month later but after the second marriage of Baniquit.
Issue:
1. Did the lawyer commit malpractice in his acts regarding the dispensation of such advice and preparation
of document?
2. Is the document regarding separation (Exhibit A) valid?
Held:
1. Yes. The advice given by the respondent and his preparation and acknowledgment by of the contract
constitute malpractice which justifies disbarment from the practice of law.
2. No. Marriage separation should have should be sanctioned in the proper court and before the separation
(see Selanova). Apart from this, the document subverts the vital foundation of the family, marriage, and is
contrary to law, morals and public policy.
Decision:
Respondent suspended from practice of law for one year.
Dicta:
A. As a response to Baniquit’s question, Santiago remarked that he would tear the diploma off the wall if the
document did not turn out to be valid.
B. Santiago was ignorant of the applicable provision of the law or carelessly negligent in giving legal advice.
C. The admission to the practice of law dependent on a lawyer’s remaining as a fit-and-safe person to society.
Once he becomes unsafe or unfit to be entrusted with obligations, his professional privilege should be
terminated.
IN THE MATTER OF THE SUSPENSION OF HOWARD D. TERRELL FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW
Doctrine:
The promotion of an organization with the knowledge that it was createdfor the purpose of violating or
evading penal laws justifies an attorney’s removal orsuspension from the practice of law.
Facts:
An acti on for the suspensi on of attorney-a t-l aw How ard Terrell from
thep r a c t i c e o f l a w w a s f i l e d i n t h e C F I o f M a n i l a f o r a l l e g e d l y
a s s i s t i n g i n t h e organi zati on of “Centro Bellas Ar tes” and acti ng as attorney for
such associ ati on wi th full know ledge that i t w as created for the purpose of evadi ng the
law then in force in said city. The CFI of Manila held that the charges against Terrell were true and made
an order suspending hi m from hi s offi ce as a law yer i n the Philippi ne Islands. Aside from the
action for his suspension from the practice of law, Terrell w a s a l s o c h a r g e d w i t h estafa
i n a s e p a r a t e c r i m i n a l a c t i o n b u t w a s e v e n t u a l l y acquitted.
Issue:
W/N Terrell should be suspended from the practice of law
Held/Ratio:
Yes, he should be suspended. Malpractice or gross misconduct in his office warrants a lawyer’s removal or
suspension from the practice of law. Assisting a client i n a scheme w hi ch the attorney know s to be
di shonest or conni vi ng at a violation of law are acts which are enough to justify disbarment. However,
Terrell’s acquittal on the charge of estafa serves to lower his sanction to suspension from the practi ce of l aw in the
Philippine I sl ands for the term of one year from February 7,1903.
RODOLFO MILLARE vs. ATTY. EUSTAQUIO Z. MONTERO
FACTS:
Complainant obtained a favorable judgment from the MTC which ordered respondent’s client to vacate
the premises subject of the ejectment case. Respondent as counsel, appealed the decision. CA dismissed
Co's appeal from the decision of the RTC for failure to comply with the proper procedures.
Respondent thereafter resorted to devious and underhanded means to delay the execution of the
judgment rendered by the MTC adverse to his client.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility?
RULING:
Atty. Eustaquio Montero is suspended for (1) year.
Rule 12.02. — A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
Rule 12.04. — A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court
processes.
Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to represent his client "within
the bounds of the law." The Code enjoins a lawyer to employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client (Rule 19.01) and warns him not to allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling
the case (Rule 19.03). In short, a lawyer is not a gun for hire.
It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial process, like the filing of dilatory motions,
repetitious litigation and frivolous appeals for the sole purpose of frustrating and delaying the
HELD:
execution of a judgment.
It is plain and clear that no error of law, much less any grave abuse of discretion, was committed by
Judging from the number of actions filed by respondent to forestall the execution of the same judgment,
respondent judge in denying appellant's motion for a bill of particulars in the collection case instituted in the
respondent is also guilty of forum shopping. Forum shopping exists when, by reason of an adverse decision in
Municipal Court of Manila by private respondent-appellee for the recovery of her indebtedness of P 354.85
one forum, defendant ventures to another for a more favorable resolution of his case.
representing the overdue balance of her account for ready-made goods ordered by and delivered to her in
1961. Appellee’s complaint precisely and concisely informed appellant of the ultimate or essential facts
constituting the cause of action against her, in accordance with the requirement of the Rules of Court. It
DE YSASI v NLRC G.R. No. 104599. March 11, 1994
was therefore improper for appellant, through her counsel, to insist on her motion that appellee as plaintiff
FACTS: “submit a bill of particulars, specifying therein in detail the goods represented by the alleged amount of P
Atty. De Ysasi and De Ysasi III are father and sons respectively. The father owns a hacienda in Negros 354.85, giving the dates and invoice numbers on which they were delivered to the defendant, the amount
Occidental. Son is employed in the hacienda as the farm administrator. Son III underwent surgery and so he due on each such invoice and by whom they were received.|” These particulars sought all concerned
missed work. He was confined and while he’s nursing from his infections he was terminated, without due evidentiary matters and do not come within the scope of Rule 12, Section 1 of the Rules of Court which
process, by his father. Son filed against his father for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. His father invoked that permits a party “to move for a definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred
his son actually abandoned his work. with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for
trial.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not De Ysasi III abandoned his work.
Whether they failed to settle without resorting to the courts.
HELD:
No. His absence from work does not constitute abandonment. To constitute abandonment, there must be
a.) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and b.) a clear intention to sever
the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being
manifested by some overt acts. No such intent was proven in this case.
Yes. Once again, we reiterate that the useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to
avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. Their relationship allows them to settle
the case even without resorting to the court.

PAJARES VS. ABAD SANTOS 30 SCRA 748

FACTS:
Udharam Bazar & Co., sued Gloria Pajares before the Municipal Court of Manila for recovery of a certain
sum of money. (Php 354.85). The complaint averred that defendant ordered from the plaintiff quantities of
ready made goods and delivered to her in good condition and same were already sold, but did not make
the full payment up to the present time. Instead of answering the complaint, Gloria moved for a bill of
particulars praying that Udharam Bazar itemize the kinds of goods which she supposedly purchased from the
said company, the respective dates they were taken and by whom they were received as well as their
purchase prices, alleging that without this bill she would not be able to meet the issues raised in the
complaint.
The court , through Judge Estrella Abad Santos, denied the motion for a bill of particulars. When her motion
for reconsideration was denied, Gloria filed a petition for certiorari in the CFI of Manila alleging that
respondent Judge acted in grave abuse of discretion in denying her motion for a bill of particulars. Udharam
Bazar filed a motion to dismiss the petition for the reasons that the allegations of the complaint are clear,
specific and sufficiently appraise the defendant of the nature of the case of action against her and that the
things asked for in the motion for a bill of particulars are evidentiary matters
which are beyond the pale of such bill. The lower court dismissed the petition also a motion for
reconsideration. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Are the allegations of the complaint sufficient to appraise Gloria Pajares of the nature of the cause of action
against her?