Planning of Advanced System Protections PDF

THEME [ENERGY.2012.7.1.
1] Integration of Variable Distributed

Resources in Distribution Networks
(Deliverable 4.3)
Planning and protection of flexible

distribution systems
Planning of Advanced System Protections
Lead Beneficiary:
EFACEC
Deliverable 4.3
AUTHORS:
Authors Organization Email
Nuno Silva EFACEC nuno.silva@efacec.com
Rui Dias Jorge EFACEC rdjorge@efacec.com
Vasileios Papaspiliotopoulos ICCS vpapaspi@power.ece.ntua.gr
George Korres ICCS gkorres@cs.ntua.gr
Athanasios Vassilakis ICCS avassil@mail.ntua.gr
Vasilis Kleftakis ICCS vkleft@mail.ntua.gr
Stefanos Kokkinelis HEDNO stefanos.kokkinelis@gmail.com
Kostas Kaousias HEDNO K.Kaousias@deddie.gr
Bernardo Silva INESC bernardo.a.silva@inesctec.pt
André Madureira INESC andre.g.madureira@inesctec.pt
Miguel Louro EDP Distribuição miguel.Louro@edp.pt
Andre Neves EDP Distribuição Andre.Neves@edp.pt
Access: Project Consortium
European Commission X
Public
Status: Draft version

Submission for Approval X
Final Version
2/97
Deliverable 4.3
Executive Summary
The SuSTAINABLE project, which is funded under the 7th Framework
Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP7) and connects 8
partners, will develop and demonstrate a new operation paradigm, leveraging
information from smart meters and short-term localized predictions to manage
distribution systems in a more efficient and cost-effective way, enabling a large-
scale deployment of variable distributed resources.
In this deliverable, the functionalities to be developed and implemented within
the task of planning of advanced system protections are described. These
functionalities have the goal of enabling off-the-shelf protection relays to become
adaptive to specific operational conditions that may occur in the presence of high
penetration levels of DG.
Due to the high complexity level of these functionalities and the obvious
limitation to simulate real faults on the network, proof-of-concept demonstrations
(simulations) are held at laboratory test sites in Greece (ICCS) and Portugal
(INESCP).
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Deliverable 4.3
Table of Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................. 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS................................................................................................................ 4
LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................................... 6
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................ 8
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................ 9
1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 12
2 DISTRIBUTION NETWORK: SYSTEM PROTECTION ................................................................. 13
2.1 Faults in the Distribution Network ............................................................................... 13
2.2 Medium Voltage Protection Functions ......................................................................... 14
2.2.1 Protection against phase-faults ................................................................................................ 15
2.2.2 Protection against earth-faults ................................................................................................. 16
2.2.3 Frequency Protection ............................................................................................................... 18
2.2.4 Broken Conductor .................................................................................................................... 18
2.2.5 Synchronous and Voltage Check .............................................................................................. 18
2.2.6 Reclosing ............................................................................................................................. 19
2.3 Protection Functions: Distributed Generation connection point .................................... 21
2.3.1 Under- and Overvoltage Protection ......................................................................................... 23
2.3.2 Neutral Overvoltage Protection ............................................................................................... 24
2.3.3 Under- and Overfrequency Protection ..................................................................................... 24
2.3.4 Overcurrent Protection ............................................................................................................ 24
3 DISTRIBUTION NETWORK MODELLING ................................................................................ 26
3.1 Rhodes System Modelling ............................................................................................ 26
3.2 Évora System Modelling............................................................................................... 30
4 IMPACT OF DISTRIBUTED GENERATION ON DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM PROTECTION ................. 33
4.1 Protection Blinding ...................................................................................................... 33
4.1.1 Quantitative Analysis ................................................................................................................ 34
4.2 Sympathetic Tripping ................................................................................................... 39
4.2.1 Quantitative Analysis ................................................................................................................ 41
4.2.2 Design of Adaptive Protection Scheme for Sympathetic Tripping ........................................... 43
4.2.2.1 Smart Substation Controller for Sympathetic Tripping ....................................... 45
4.3 Failed Auto-Reclosing .................................................................................................. 47
4.4 Loss-of-mains protection ............................................................................................. 50
4.4.1 Unintentional Islanding ............................................................................................................ 50
4.4.2 Islanding Detection Methods ................................................................................................... 52
4.4.2.1 Remote Techniques ............................................................................................ 52
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Deliverable 4.3
4.4.2.2 Local Techniques................................................................................................. 53

4.4.3 Assessment of Anti-Islanding Protection Methods .................................................................. 56
4.5 Fault ride-through ....................................................................................................... 57
5 PROTECTION RELAY – ADAPTIVE CHARACTERISTICS ............................................................. 62
5.1.1 TPU S220 relay main functions and applications ..................................................................... 63
5.1.2 Setting groups characteristics .................................................................................................. 64
5.1.3 Methodologies for active setting group switchover ................................................................ 65
6 TESTBED INTEGRATION ....................................................................................................... 68
6.1 Description and characterization of ICCS testbed .......................................................... 68
6.1.1 Components and interfaces ..................................................................................................... 69
6.1.1.1 Real Time Digital Simulator ................................................................................ 69
6.1.1.2 Protection Relays ................................................................................................ 71
6.1.1.3 Programmable Logic Controller .......................................................................... 72
6.1.1.4 Auxiliary Devices ................................................................................................. 73
6.1.2 Network model on RTDS .......................................................................................................... 74
6.1.3 Hardware-in-the-loop tests ...................................................................................................... 77
6.1.3.1 Functionality of the ICCS testbed ........................................................................ 78
6.2 Description and characterization of INESC testbed........................................................ 81
6.2.1 Hardware Specifications ........................................................................................................... 81
6.2.1.1 Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) .................................................................... 81
6.2.1.2 Digital Relays ...................................................................................................... 82
6.2.1.3 Interface Amplifier .............................................................................................. 82
6.2.2 Network model on RTDS .......................................................................................................... 83
6.2.3 Hardware-in-the-loop tests ...................................................................................................... 85
7 KPI ANALYSIS ...................................................................................................................... 89
8 CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................... 90
9 REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 91
APPENDIX A. TEST NETWORK DATA ....................................................................................... 95
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Deliverable 4.3
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Phase To Phase vs. Earth Faults in the MV Distribution Network (Portugal) ................................. 14
Figure 2 – Fault Clearing Time in the MV Distribution Network (Portugal)..................................................... 14
Figure 3 – Production and Transmission System of Rhodes ............................................................................ 26
Figure 4 – Substation of Gennadi .................................................................................................................... 28
Figure 5 – Feeder R-22..................................................................................................................................... 28
Figure 6 – Feeder R-26..................................................................................................................................... 29
Figure 7 – Distribution network in Évora ......................................................................................................... 30
Figure 8 – Évora Substation ............................................................................................................................. 31
Figure 9 – F3 Feeder of Évora Substation. ....................................................................................................... 31
Figure 10 – Fault current contributions in case of protection blinding ........................................................... 34
Figure 11 – Equivalent per-phase distribution system without DG connection .............................................. 35
Figure 12 – Equivalent per-phase distribution system with DG connection ................................................... 35
Figure 13 – Ratio between main grid fault current contributions, with and without DG connection ............ 37
Figure 14 – Ratio between total fault currents, with and without DG connection ......................................... 39
Figure 15 – Fault current contributions in case of sympathetic tripping ........................................................ 40
Figure 16 – Equivalent per-phase system for the sympathetic tripping case ................................................. 41
Figure 17 – Ratio of the total fault current to the DG partial contribution ..................................................... 43
Figure 18 – Adaptive Protection Scheme for Medium Voltage distribution network ..................................... 44
Figure 19 – Flowchart of Smart Substation Controller concept for sympathetic tripping .............................. 45
Figure 20 – Auto-reclosing procedure during a transient fault [9] .................................................................. 48
Figure 21 – Auto-reclosing procedure during a permanent fault [9] .............................................................. 48
Figure 22 – DG-penetrated distribution network protected by recloser ........................................................ 49
Figure 23 – The first shot of a typical reclosing sequence during a fault ........................................................ 49
Figure 24 – Islanded mode of a distribution system ....................................................................................... 51
Figure 25 – Classification of islanding detection methods .............................................................................. 52
Figure 26 – Non–Detection Zone (NDZ) .......................................................................................................... 57
Figure 27 – Portuguese Fault Ride-through Voltage versus time curve .......................................................... 57
Figure 28 – Portuguese Fault Ride-through Reactive current injection curve ................................................ 58
Figure 29 – FRT protection function flowchart................................................................................................ 60
Figure 30 – Logic diagram of FRT protection function .................................................................................... 61
Figure 31 – FRT curve programmed in the digital relay .................................................................................. 61
Figure 32 – TPU S220 protection relay ............................................................................................................ 64
Figure 33 – Changing the active setting group in the local interface of the relay ........................................... 65
Figure 34 – Example of user-defined program that changes active setting groups ........................................ 67
Figure 35 – Testbed configuration; DI: Digital Input, DO: Digital Output ........................................................ 68
Figure 36 – The developed testbed in ICCS ..................................................................................................... 69
Figure 37 – The ICCS RTDS cubicle ................................................................................................................... 70
Figure 38 – Set-up of the ICCS digital protection system ................................................................................ 71
Figure 39 – Components of the ICCS Control Unit .......................................................................................... 74
Figure 40 – The developed DG-penetrated distribution network in RSCAD ................................................... 75
Figure 41 – Control scheme of simulated DG units in RSCAD ......................................................................... 75
Figure 42 – Single-phase to symmetrical three-phase current transformation in RSCAD .............................. 76
Figure 43 – Digital input blocks in RSCAD for monitoring the status of the two simulated breakers ............. 76
Figure 44 – Control blocks for voltage zero-crossing detection & fault regulation in RSCAD ......................... 77
Figure 45 – HIL tests by means of the ICCS testbed ........................................................................................ 78
Figure 46 – Relay secondary testing by means of the RTDS ............................................................................ 79
Figure 47 – Synoptic DC Schematic of the SEL-311B protection relay ............................................................ 80
Figure 48 – Synoptic DC Schematic of the SIMATIC S7-300 PLC ...................................................................... 80
Figure 49 – Adaptive selection of the proper setting group using the AcSELarator Quickset® ....................... 81
Figure 50 – Évora – Casinha feeders’ layout.................................................................................................... 83
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Figure 51 – Simplified Distribution network modelled in RTDS ...................................................................... 84

Figure 52 – VSC-based DG unit model ............................................................................................................. 85
Figure 53 – Connection schematic of closed-loop testbed ............................................................................. 86
Figure 54 – Interconnection of components used in a closed loop test ......................................................... 86
Figure 55 – Scheme of the connection for closed loop test ............................................................................ 87
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Deliverable 4.3
List of Tables
Table 1 – Settings of phase overcurrent protection (Portugal) [62] ............................................................... 15
Table 2 – Settings of directional earth-fault overcurrent protection [62]....................................................... 17
Table 3 – Modes of operation of the auto-reclosing function [6] ................................................................... 20
Table 4 – Parameters of the rapid reclosing [1] .............................................................................................. 20
Table 5 – Parameters of the first slow reclosing [1] ........................................................................................ 21
Table 6 – Parameters of the second reclosing [1] ........................................................................................... 21
Table 7 – Protection scheme for DGs following option A [1] .......................................................................... 22
Table 8 – Protection scheme for DGs following option B [1] .......................................................................... 22
Table 9 – Installed DG per feeder of Rhodes Distribution System .................................................................. 27
Table 10 – Rhodes Wind Farms ....................................................................................................................... 27
Table 11 – Overcurrent protection relay settings of feeders R-22, R-26......................................................... 29
Table 12 – PVs found in F3 Feeder of Évora Substation. ................................................................................. 30
Table 13 – F3 Feeder protection relay settings. .............................................................................................. 32
Table 14 – Communication-based methods for LOM protection.................................................................... 52
Table 15 – Passive methods for LOM protection ............................................................................................ 54
Table 16 – Active methods for LOM protection .............................................................................................. 55
Table 17 – Specifications of the ICCS RTDS ..................................................................................................... 70
Table 18 – Specifications of the ICCS PLC ........................................................................................................ 73
Table 19 – Binary signals in the ICCS HIL testbed according to each operating state ..................................... 79
Table 20 – EFACEC TPU S220 Relay functions ................................................................................................. 82
Table 21 – Data of HV Grid .............................................................................................................................. 95
Table 22 – Data of Substation Transformer .................................................................................................... 95
Table 23 – Data of Distribution Lines .............................................................................................................. 95
Table 24 – Load Data ....................................................................................................................................... 96
Table 25 – Data of DG Interconnection Transformer ...................................................................................... 96
Table 26 – Data of DG Unit .............................................................................................................................. 96
Table 27 – Network feeder data ...................................................................................................................... 97
Table 28 – Network load ................................................................................................................................. 97
Table 29 – DG transformer data ...................................................................................................................... 97
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Deliverable 4.3
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

µG Microgeneration
4Q Four Quadrant
AFD Active Frequency Drift
AMI Advanced Metering Infrastructure
AVR Automatic Voltage Regulator
BER Bit Error Rate
CB Circuit Breaker
CHIL Controller Hardware-In-the-Loop
CHP Combined Heat and Power
COSEM Companion Specification for Energy Metering
CSMA Carrier Sense Multiple Access
CT Current Transformer
DEEPSO Differential Evolution – Evolutionary Particle Swarm Optimization
DER Distributed Energy Resources
DFIG Doubly-fed Induction Generator
DFT Discrete Fourier Transform
DG Distributed Generation
DLMS Device Language Message Specification
DoW Description of Work
DSM Demand Side Management
DSO Distribution System Operator
DTC Distribution Transformer Controller
EB Smart Meter
FE Frontend
FEC Forward Error Correction
GPRS General Packet Radio Service
HD Harmonic Detection
HI Harmonic Injection
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Deliverable 4.3
HIL Hardware-In-the-Loop
HuT Hardware under Test
HV High Voltage
KPI Key Performance Indicator
LAN Local Area Network
LLC Logical Link Control
LOM Loss Of Mains
LV Low Voltage
MAC Media Access Control
MGCC MicroGrid Central Controller
MIQCQP Mixed Integer Quadratically Constrained Quadratic problem
MV Medium Voltage
NDZ Non-Detection Zone
NI Normally Inverse
OCR Overcurrent Relay
OLTC On-Load Tap Changer
OPF Optimal Power Flow
OWL One-Way Latency
PCC Point of Common Coupling
PHIL Power Hardware-In-the-Loop
PI Proportional Integral
PLC Programmable Logic Controller
PLCC Power Line Courier Communication
PLL Phase-Locked Loop
PV Photovoltaic
RES Renewable Energy Sources
RF Radio-Frequency
ROCOF Rate Of Change Of Frequency
ROCOP Rate Of Change Of Power
RPV Reactive Power Variation
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Deliverable 4.3
RTDS Real Time Digital Simulator
RTS Real Time Simulator
RTU Remote Terminal Unit
SC Switchable Capacitor
SCADA Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
SCADA/DMS Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition / Distribution Management System
SFS Sandia Frequency Shift
SI Standard Inverse
SNR Signal to Noise Ratio
SOC State of Charge
SSC Smart Substation Controller
SVR Step Voltage Regulator
SVS Sandia Voltage Shift
TAN Transformer Area Netowrk
TCC Time Current Characteristic
THD Total Harmonic Distortion
UOF Under/Over- Frequency
UOV Under/Over- Voltage
VI Very Inverse
VS Vector Surge
VSC Voltage Source Converter
VT Voltage Transformer
WAN Wide Area Network
WF Wind Farm
WP Work Package
WT Wind Turbine
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Deliverable 4.3
1 Introduction
Description of the Task 4.3 “Planning of Advanced System Protections” from
the DoW:
Task 4.3 Planning of Advanced System Protections (Task leader: EFACEC; INESCP, ICCS, EDP, HEDNO)
Advanced protection system will be proposed by incorporating flexible schemes for distribution network protection and
grid interconnection protection of DG units, in order to minimise/avoid protection misoperation and failure. The
protection schemes will be selective to allow fault-ride-through capability to be adopted by all installed DG without
compromising selectivity in the detection of faults at the feeders where these units are installed. This will require the
identification of, and adoption of additional protection relays and protection strategies with adaptive settings, e.g.
ROCOF (Rate of change of Frequency), teleprotection, etc. In order to ensure required selectivity of different protection
relays, some of pre-defined settings may need to be changed taking into account the configuration of the network and
the presence of DG units in the grid, as well as the neutral to ground connection solution adopted in the distribution grid
(e.g., direct neutral to ground connection or connection through an impedance). The location and characteristics of
protection devices will be particularly investigated in order to assess the costs effectiveness of the advanced protection
functionalities and protection strategies. These new protection relays and protection strategies will be evaluated through
a range of characteristic tests on an RTDS (Real Time Power System Simulation) hardware / software simulation
platform where several failure conditions can be evaluated namely: unsuccessful reclosing sequences due to DG units
connected to faulted sections of the network; no operation of feeder protection due to protection blinding; loss of
directional criteria in relay coordination; change of protection reach and fault resistance coverage due to changes in
short circuit power.
The following specific protection problems will be addressed in this task:
• Failed reclosing
DG unit may interrupt the auto-reclosing sequence performed by the feeder relay. The reclosing settings used must be
coordinated with the operation of DG protection to avoid problems.
• Sympathetic tripping
It may occur when a fault is located outside the feeder including DG. In such a case, the DG unit contributes to the fault
and feeds a fault current ‘upstream’ towards the fault, which may trip the relay located at the beginning of the DG
feeder. Coordination algorithms for co-operation of feeder relays and DG protection will be developed.
• Protection blinding
The operation of feeder over current protection may become interrupted when DG unit is located between the fault point
and the feeding substation. To avoid increase of fault levels, selective coordination will be adapted.
• Loss-of-mains protection
DG units are not able to maintain an adequate level of quality in the network during unintended islanding. Islanding will
be detected by voltage and frequency relays located at the DG unit terminal. Methods based for instance on ROCOF
(rate of change of frequency) or vector surge will be developed to provide reliable islanding detection.
• Impact of fault ride-through
Because DG-units interfere with the protective system of the distribution grid, they should be immediately disconnected
in case of a fault, restoring the operation with only one source of supply and functioning the protective system as it was
designed to do. Under-voltage relay protective scheme will be proposed to detect the voltage dip propagating through
the grid and disconnect the DG-units.
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Deliverable 4.3
2 Distribution Network: System Protection
2.1 Faults in the Distribution Network

Faults in the grid are a major concern for any Distribution System Operator
(DSO) as they are a threat to human life or to the grid assets if the fault is not
quickly detected and cleared. A fault can occur at any time or place so the DSO
must always be prepared to respond to a power failure in order to eliminate these
threats. These faults are detected and cleared by protection relays, spread in the
network, that obey to a carefully studied group of settings that can ensure the
needed fastness and selectivity so only the faulty lines or assets are disconnected.
Other key aspect that must be taken into account when analysing the number
of power failures in the grid is the percentage of overhead lines versus
underground cables as the first ones have a higher probability of having a fault
due to being exposed to environmental threats like severe weather conditions
(heavy rain, wind gusts or thunderstorms), birds or trees contacts.
In the Portuguese case, about 80% of the total grid length are overhead lines,
normally found in rural areas, and the remaining 20% are underground cables
which are used to power the Portuguese major cities. This means that most of the
Portuguese network is exposed to the environmental threats already discussed.
Among the different types of faults it is relevant to discuss the differences
between phase to phase and earth faults, the proportion of each type in the total
amount of incidents and the typical clearance time associated to each fault.
As it can be seen in Figure 1, the most likely fault to occur in the distribution
grid is an earth fault, which can be related to the high percentage of overhead
present in the network.
The data presented in Figure 2 show the typical clearance time in the
Portuguese MV Distribution network. Analysing the data, it is possible to conclude
that more than 50% of the faults are cleared in less than 300ms, including both
phase-to-phase and earth faults. These results are archived due to fast tripping
whenever automatic reclosing is available and the premises that the majority of the
faults are non-persistent. In Figure 2 it can also be seen a second peak of trips
happening at 600ms, which are due to persistent faults or the necessity to ensure
selectivity in the grid. Nevertheless about 93% of the faults in the grid are cleared
in less than 1s.
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Deliverable 4.3
28%
72%
Earth Fault Phase to Phase Fault
Figure 1 – Phase To Phase vs. Earth Faults in the MV Distribution Network (Portugal)
3,5
Percentage of trips
3
2,5
2
1,5
1
0,5
0
150
220
290
360
430
500
570
640
710
780
850
920
990
1060
1130
1200
1270
1340
1410
1480
1550
1620
1690
1760
1830
1900
1970
10
80
Fault clearing time (ms)
Figure 2 – Fault Clearing Time in the MV Distribution Network (Portugal)
2.2 Medium Voltage Protection Functions

In the MV feeder panel at the HV/MV substation the protection system is
formed by several types of equipment. The most important are the circuit breaker
and the protective relay. The latter constitutes an Intelligent Electronic Device
(IED1) which supports several functions for the protection of the MV feeder. In
1 Term used in electrical power industry to describe a microprocessor-based controller.
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Deliverable 4.3
Portugal and according to [1], the IED protecting the MV feeder (main circuit
breaker) should have the following protection functionalities:
 Protection against phase faults (ANSI #502);

 Protection against earth-faults (ANSI #67N, ANSI #50N, ANSI #61N);
 Frequency Protection (ANSI #81);
 Broken Conductor Check (ANSI #50BF);
 Synchronism Check (ANSI #25);
 Voltage Check;
 Reclosing (ANSI #79).
Each protection function is briefly described in the next subsections.
2.2.1 Protection against phase-faults
The phase overcurrent protection (ANSI #50) is able to discriminate faults

conditions provided that the current magnitude in one or more phases exceeds a
certain threshold. This protection function is used to detect phase-to-phase faults
and three-phase symmetrical faults. According to [1], this protection function has
three levels of detection which are defined according to the value of the voltage
level. Table 1 shows the settings of this protection function and the corresponding
time of operation for each level of detection. In this work the settings used for the
protection function are according to Table 1 and for 15 kV.
Table 1 – Settings of phase overcurrent protection (Portugal) [62]
Operation Time
Level of detection 10 kV 15 kV 30 kV
– Top (s)
1ºlevel: I> (A) 1.4 × In 1.4 × In 1.4 × In 1.0
2ºlevel: I>> (A) 2 × In 2 × In 2 × In 0.5
3ºlevel: I>>> (A) 4000 2000 1500 0.1
In Table 1, 𝐼𝑁 corresponds to the maximum current handled by the conductor

in cold situation (usually the maximum capacity of the line) [1]. The operation time
2 ANSI standard device numbers to identify the features of a protective device.
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Deliverable 4.3
corresponds to the time interval between the detection of the current violation and
the transmission signal to open the circuit breaker.
The phase overcurrent protection function (I>> and I>>>) should be blocked if
the percentage of second harmonic in phase current signals is higher than a pre-
defined value. The maximum ratio between the second harmonic and the
fundamental frequency component is 15% [1]. When a load is connected to the
distribution network a transitory phenomenon that produce inrush current and may
cause instantaneous trip of phase overcurrent protection can occur [2][3].
The phase overcurrent protection should also be able to trigger the reclosing
function (see Section 2.2.6) with rapid and/or slow reclosing of the circuit breaker
[4].
2.2.2 Protection against earth-faults
To protect against earth-faults there are three functions: Large Resistance

Earth-Faults Protection (ANSI #61N); Directional Earth-Fault Overcurrent (ANSI
#67N); and Earth-Fault Overcurrent (ANSI #50N).
 High Resistance Earth-Faults:

The high resistance earth-faults protection function, as the name suggests, is
responsible for detecting earth-faults with very high resistance. It is a protection
function with very high sensitivity. According to [1], the setting of large resistance
earth-faults protection does not depend on the neutral. A curve of the type IEC 3
Long Time Inverse should be used with the following characteristics:
 𝐼𝑜𝑝 = 2 𝐴
 𝑇𝑀 = 0,4
where 𝐼𝑜𝑝 is the operational current, also designated as pick-up current, and 𝑇𝑀 is
the time multiplier. The minimum operation time of the large resistance earth-faults
protection should be limited to [1.23s; 2.53s]. According to [1] it is preferable to
use the value 1.23s.
3 IEC is the International Standards and Conformity Assessment for all electrical, electronic and
related technologies.
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 Directional Earth-Fault Overcurrent:

The directional earth-fault overcurrent protection function is responsible for
detecting earth-faults with small resistance. This protection function detects the
fault directionality. According to [1] the directionality is obtained through the
angular difference (α in Table 2) between the zero-sequence voltage and the
current.
The setting of this protection depends on the neutral and the following settings
are recommended:
Table 2 – Settings of directional earth-fault overcurrent protection [62]
Reactance Reactance
Resistance Neutral Isolated
300 A 1000 A
Iop (A) 40 40 40 2
Vh min 2%VN ⁄√3 2%VN ⁄√3 2%VN ⁄√3 5%VN ⁄√3
α (°) 10 15 45 90
top (s) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
𝑉 +𝑉 +𝑉
where 𝑉ℎ = 𝐴 𝐵 𝐶 corresponds to the zero sequence voltage and 𝑉𝑁 is the
3
maximum nominal voltage.
According to [1], for the values calculated for the reactance 300 A and 1000 A,
it was considered a relationship X/R of 3 [5]. In case of greater values, directional
earth-phase overcurrent may not detect the fault.
 Earth-Fault Overcurrent:
The earth-fault overcurrent protection function is similar to the previous
function. The difference lies on the fact that this one does not have directionality
and also the setting of this protection function does not depend on the neutral
system of the installation. According to [1], the following settings should be used:
 𝐼𝑜𝑝 = 90 𝐴,
 𝑡𝑜𝑝 = 0.15 𝑠.
If the capacitive contribution is greater than 90 A, the operational current

should be determined as follows: 𝐼𝑜𝑝 = 1,3 × 𝐼𝑐𝑎𝑝 , where 𝐼𝑐𝑎𝑝 is the maximum
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capacitive current [1]. According to [5], at a substation with a neutral reactance for
300 A, it is considered a maximum capacitive contribution of 100 A. If the
substation has isolated neutral it can also be considered the previous value. On
the other hand, if the neutral regime of the substation is limited by a reactance for
1000 A, the operational current will be three times bigger than the one presented.
2.2.3 Frequency Protection
In case there are DG units connected to the MV feeder, the frequency

protection should be activated according to the settings of the under- and over-
frequency protection defined in Section 2.3 [1].
2.2.4 Broken Conductor
The broken conductor function (ANSI #50BF) is used to detect rupture of

phase conductors. Continuous or severe overload conditions remaining
undetected by the protection system can lead to the deterioration and subsequent
rupture of phase conductors. Broken conductor, as short-circuits, are power
system fault conditions that must be handled by the protection system. Detection
of broken conductors is based on methods that allow the detection of asymmetry
by the emerging of negative sequence components.
According to [1], the broken conductor function does not provoke the trip of the
associated circuit breaker, but instead it is used for issuing an alarm to the control
centre.
2.2.5 Synchronous and Voltage Check
Before closing a circuit breaker, it must first be verified if the two network
sections that are going to be reconnected are in synchronism conditions, meaning
that the difference between the two voltage signals in terms of magnitude, phase
angle and frequency is within pre-defined tolerances. The lack of synchronism
between both sides of the circuit breaker, typically a busbar and a line (or
transformer), or two different busbars, may seriously compromise power system
stability when the circuit breaker is closed.
The synchronism detector should have the following settings [1]:
 Angle shift: 10°

 Voltage shift: 20%𝑉𝑁
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Deliverable 4.3
 Frequency shift: 0.2 Hz

 High level of voltage: 80%𝑉𝑁
 Low level of voltage: 20%𝑉𝑁
 Maximum synchronism verification time: 5s.
In case there are voltage detectors at the HV/MV substation they should have
the following settings [1]:
 Connection voltage permission: 20%𝑉𝑁

 Maximum confirmation time: 5s.
The voltage check protection function is responsible for detecting the

presence of voltage in the MV side. It is specially used when there are DG units
connected to the MV feeder. This protection function impedes the closing of the
circuit breaker when there is voltage in the feeder (due to islanding of the DG) by
an automatic or voluntary command (local or remote control).
2.2.6 Reclosing
Reclosing consists on an automatic control for closing the circuit breaker, after
a trip provoked by the actuation of any protection function. The primary objective
of this function is to eliminate the non-permanent faults (70% to 80% of the total
faults). It allows automatic service reestablishment after short time interruptions.
This way, it is possible to reduce the number of interruptions of the network,
without having to isolate the line in case of a non-permanent fault. However, in
case of a permanent fault the circuit breaker should be able to isolate the faulty
line.
According to [6], there are two types of reclosing in the distribution network:
rapid reclosing and slow reclosing. The rapid reclosing is characterised by having
a reduced time of isolation, normally not over 0.4 seconds. The slow reclosing is
characterised for having an isolation time in the order of tens of seconds and not
over 120 seconds. The same author also defines the possible modes of operation
for these types of reclosing, as presented in Table 3.
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Deliverable 4.3
Table 3 – Modes of operation of the auto-reclosing function [6]
Modes of operation Description
0 Inhibited reclosing
4 1 rapid reclosing
2 1 slow reclosing
3 2 slow reclosings
6 1 rapid reclosing + 1 slow reclosing
7 1 rapid reclosing + 2 slow reclosing
The mode of operation currently used by the Portuguese Distribution System

Operator (DSO4) to protect the MV feeders in the HV/MV substation is mode of
operation 7 [1]. This mode of operation is activated through overcurrent protection
function, directional earth-fault overcurrent protection and large resistance earth-
fault protection. After the opening of the circuit breaker, rapid reclosing is activated
depending on its time of isolation. If the fault still remains, after the fast reclosing of
the circuit breaker, two slow reclosings are performed. After this, if the fault was
not yet cleared, then the circuit breaker opens and locks out in that position. The
circuit breaker is then only closed after technical intervention (remote or manual
reset control) to clear the fault. The parameters of rapid reclosing and slow
reclosing (first and second) used in the Portuguese MV distribution network are
presented in Table 4, Table 5 and Table 6, respectively.
Table 4 – Parameters of the rapid reclosing [1]
Description Value (s)
Instantaneous time 0.05
Isolation Time 0.3
Interlock time 60
4
Distribution System Operator is responsible for ensuring the exploitation, maintenance, planning
and construction of the distribution network, among others.
20/97
Deliverable 4.3
Table 5 – Parameters of the first slow reclosing [1]
Isolation Time 15
Interlock time 60
Table 6 – Parameters of the second reclosing [1]
Isolation Time 30
Interlock time 60
2.3 Protection Functions: Distributed Generation connection

point
The integration of DG in the distribution network requires the installation of a
protection system at the point of interconnection. This makes it possible to isolate
the DG unit, in case of a fault or when the circuit breaker of the MV feeder is open.
This way the quality of service and security of the network is maintained.
According to [1], the connection between the network and the DG units should
have the following protection functions:
 Undervoltage and Overvoltage Protection (ANSI #27, ANSI #59);

 Neutral Overvoltage Protection (ANSI #59N);
 Underfrequency and Overfrequency Protection (ANSI #81);
 Overcurrent Protection (ANSI #50).
Depending on the topology of the connection of the DG to the network, there

are various types of special regime producers5 [1]. Within Task 4.3 of the
SuSTAINABLE project, option d) is considered: DG connected to the MV
distribution network, with point of connection on the producer’s installation and
with load associated to the branch line of connection [1].
The ownership entity of the receiving network is responsible for the setting of
the interconnection protection functions. The Portuguese DSO adopted two
5
The production of electricity of special regime producers is an activity, under special legal
regimes, of the production of electricity, namely through the use of renewable endogenous
resources or technologies that produce both heat and electricity.
21/97
Deliverable 4.3
different protection schemes for DGs. Thus, the DG developers have the
possibility to choose either one or the other protection scheme, usually designated
as option A (on Table 7) and option B (on Table 8).
Table 7 – Protection scheme for DGs following option A [1]
Protection Value Operation Time (s)
1st level of undervoltage: U < 85%VN 0.00s...0.1s
1st level of overvoltage U > 115%VN 0.00s...0.1s
1st level of neutral overvoltage6: Uo > 10%VN 0.00s...0.1s
Under frequency: f < 49.5 Hz 0.00s...0.1s
Over frequency: f > 50.5 Hz 0.00s...0.1s
1st level of overcurrent: I > 1.3 × Ilig 1.5s
2nd level of overcurrent: I ≫ 4.0 × Ilig 0.0s
Table 8 – Protection scheme for DGs following option B [1]
Protection Value Operation Time (s)
1st level of undervoltage: U < 85%VN 1.5s
2nd level of undervoltage: U ≪ 105%Vblock 0.00s...0.1s
1st level of overvoltage U > 115%VN 0.00s...0.1s
1st level of neutral overvoltage7: Uo > 10%VN 1.5s
2nd level of neutral overvoltage9: Uo ≫ 70%VN 0.00s...0.1s
Under frequency: f < 49.5 Hz 0.00s...0.1s
Over frequency: f > 50.5 Hz 0.00s...0.1s
6
In case the normal operating regime of the interconnection substation is neutral isolated then
Uo > is 50%Vn .
7
In case the normal operating regime of the interconnection substation is neutral isolated then
Uo > is 50%Vn with top=1.65s and Uo ≫ deactivated.
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Deliverable 4.3
Vblock 20%VN -
1st level of overcurrent: I > 1.3 × Ilig 8 1.5s
2nd level of overcurrent: I ≫ 4.0 × Ilig 0.0s
In case of a fault, option A isolates the DG unit instantaneously. This way the
DG is disconnected before the reclosing of the circuit breaker of the MV feeder.
This avoids a situation of parallelism, due to rapid reclosing (maximum duration of
300 ms), between the network and the DG unit, in which synchronism conditions
may not be in place. However, in case of a fault on an adjacent line to the one that
contains the DG unit, the circuit breaker at the point of interconnection may
suddenly actuate. This may happen because the protection of the DG unit sees
the voltage drop, due to the fault, provoking an unnecessary trip of the circuit
breaker.
In order to minimize the coordination problems of the protection settings of

option A, as described before, option B was created. The main differences
between option A and option B are the operation time of neutral overvoltage and
undervoltage protection which have a bigger time delayed in option B.
Consequently, option B is more adequate to avoid the disconnection of DG in case
of a fault in a parallel line to the one where the DG is connected. However if DG
developer intends to implement protection scheme on option B, it has to invest on
an extra relay for the HV/MV substation which includes synchronism or voltage
check functions, in order to avoid out-of-phase reclosing of the circuit breaker in
the utility substation. Option B (see Table 8) forces also the existence of a second
level of undervoltage detection. The regulation of this second level of detection is
made according to the voltage limit for which the frequency protection blocks
(Vblock) when voltage drops (see Table 8).
The time since the violation of the limit and the transmission of the command
signal to the circuit breaker, for the over- and underfrequency protection function is
0.07 seconds, and for the other protection functions is 0.03 seconds [7].
2.3.1 Under- and Overvoltage Protection
The voltage protection function allows the disconnection of the DG unit when
its terminal voltage exceeds the pre-defined limits. When the superior limit of the
8
Ilig (in Portuguese nomenclature) corresponds to the current at the point of interconnection
between the DG and the distribution network.
23/97
Deliverable 4.3
voltage is exceeded the overvoltage protection function actuates and the circuit
breaker at the point of interconnection of the DG to the network opens. On the
other hand, if the measured voltage drops below the inferior limit stipulated, then
the undervoltage protection function actuates and the DG unit is disconnected by
the opening of the circuit breaker.
The undervoltage protection function blocks the reconnection of the DG unit to

the network if the network voltage is not reestablished. The undervoltage
protection function is also used to detect islanding situations, disconnecting the
DG unit when such situation is unbearable.
2.3.2 Neutral Overvoltage Protection
The neutral overvoltage protection function detects overvoltages in the

network due to earth-faults, proceeding with the disconnection of the DG unit in
such cases [2].
2.3.3 Under- and Overfrequency Protection
The variation of the frequency means that the generation and consumption are
unbalanced. This variation can cause serious problems or even damage the
equipment connected to the network and the equipment of the network itself [2].
The overfrequency and underfrequency protection functions trips the circuit
breaker at the point of connection of the DG unit to the network, when the
frequency upper and lower limits are exceeded, respectively.
The frequency protection function is also used to detect islanding situations, in

which the distribution network is functioning isolated from the grid upstream and
being supported only by the DG units.
Usually, the measurement of the frequency by the frequency relays is limited

to a certain minimum voltage value. This way when the voltage drops below that
certain value, the frequency protection actuates even if the frequency limits are not
exceeded. This is necessary to prevent problems associated to incorrect
frequency measurements.
2.3.4 Overcurrent Protection
The overcurrent protection function is used to protect the DG unit and the
point of connection to the network in case of overload and emerging high currents
24/97
Deliverable 4.3
due to short-circuits. In this cases if the current is superior to the maximum limit
stipulated, the overcurrent protection function sends an order to open the circuit
breaker isolating the DG unit.
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Deliverable 4.3
3 Distribution Network Modelling
3.1 Rhodes System Modelling

The thermal power station of Rhodes System (Figure 3) has an installed
capacity of 209.40 MW with 11 generation units. The peak power consumption in
2013 was 188.5 MW. Rhodes System has 47 MV distribution lines at 15 kV and 20
kV voltage levels, and there is also a HV network at 150 kV and 66 kV. A SCADA
system is installed at the thermal power station, while there is another power
station under construction. There are a number of photovoltaic parks (PVs) and 4
wind farms (WFs) with aggregate installed capacity of 31 MW (Table 9, Table 10).
Figure 3 – Production and Transmission System of Rhodes
26/97
Deliverable 4.3
Table 9 – Installed DG per feeder of Rhodes Distribution System
SUBSTATION FEEDER
Installed Installed Installed
Number Number
Name Capacity Name Capacity Capacity
of PVs of WFs
DG (kW) PV (kW) WF (kW)
R-26 2 199.59
R-27 2 199.30
R-28 1 99.11
AFANTOU 12937.28
R-32 6 594.13
R-34 8 795.14
R-36 1 11050
R-22 20 1993.63 1 3000
R-23 8 756.51
R-24 2 199.20
GENNADIOU 11682.58 R-25 3 204.93
R-26 56 3578.31
R-28 1 4950
R-29 1* 4950
R-29 3 299.88
R-31 3 299.64
R-33 1 99.96
IALYSOU 2676.43 R-34 17 1683.86
R-35 7 218.69
R-36 3 59.40
R-37 1 15.00
R-26 2 107.82
R-28 2 119.64
RODINIOU 333.75
R-29 1 99.36
R-38 1 6.93
R-22 2 144.66
R-23 16 1515.30
R-24 27 2685.90
SORONIS 18235.14 R-25 18 1789.72
R-26 1 99.56
R-27 1** 6000
R-28 1** 6000
TOTAL 45865.18 SUBTOTALS 213 17865.18 4 31000
* Future Installation
** One WF with total installed capacity 12 MW
Table 10 – Rhodes Wind Farms
Installed Capacity
No Location Substation Feeder
(kW)
1 Archipoli, Municipality of Afantou 11050 Afantou R-36
Chalatas, Municipality of South
2 3000 Gennadiou R-22
Rhodes
6000 R-28
3 Pithanitis, Municipality of Attavirou Soronis
6000 R-27
Vigla Kattavias, Municipality of
4 4950 Gennadiou R-28
South Rhodes
27/97
Deliverable 4.3
In SuSTAINABLE project, the substation of Gennadi (Figure 4) and two

outgoing distribution feeders, R-22 (Figure 5) and R-26 (Figure 6), are studied. As
shown in Table 9, feeder R-22 has 20 PVs with installed capacity of 1993.63kW
and a WF with installed capacity of 3000kW, while feeder R-26 has 56 PVs with
installed capacity of 3578.31kW.
Figure 4 – Substation of Gennadi
Figure 5 – Feeder R-22
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Deliverable 4.3
Figure 6 – Feeder R-26
The protection of these feeders is achieved by the following protective devices:
 Overcurrent protection relays for feeder circuit breakers, including:

 Phase time overcurrent elements
 Phase instantaneous overcurrent elements
 Ground time overcurrent elements
 Ground instantaneous overcurrent elements
 Auto-reclosing function
 Reclosers,
 Fuses,
 Sectionalizers.
The protection settings of feeders R-22 and R-26 are given in Table 11.
Table 11 – Overcurrent protection relay settings of feeders R-22, R-26
PHASE INST. GROUND TIME GROUND INST.

PHASE TIME OVERCURRENT
OVERCURRENT OVERCURRENT OVERCURRENT
CT OVERCURRENT
FEEDER TIME TIME AUTORECLOSE
RATIO RELAY TIME TIME
PICKUP TIME PICKUP PICKUP TIME PICKUP
DIAL DELAY DIAL DELAY
(A) CURVE (A) (A) CURVE (A)
(sec) (ms) (sec) (ms)
R-22
600/5 ZIV / CPI – T2R 162 0.14 NI 390 100 36 0.7 VI 120 100 3
(P220)
R-26
600/5 ZIV / CPI – T2R 162 0.1 NI 360 100 36 0.7 VI 120 100 3
(P260)
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Deliverable 4.3
3.2 Évora System Modelling

In Portugal, the SuSTAINABLE project will be demonstrated in Évora. This city
is served by two HV-MV substations, and for this demonstration a feeder of the
Substation Évora (60/15kV) was chosen, which has two power transformers, 31.5
MVA each, and 12 MV feeders.
Figure 7 – Distribution network in Évora
The chosen feeder, F3, has a total length of 4.9 km, 26 MV/LV Substations
with an installed power of 14.770 kVA. Spread through the grid are 7 PVs
totalising an installed power of 23 kW.
Table 12 – PVs found in F3 Feeder of Évora Substation.
Substation Feeder Name Voltage Type of Installed

name Level Generation Generation
ÉVORA F3 PV1 15 kV Solar 3.450 kVA
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Deliverable 4.3
Figure 8 – Évora Substation
Figure 9 – F3 Feeder of Évora Substation.
31/97
Deliverable 4.3
Feeder F3 of Évora substation is equipped with the following protection

features:
 Phase overcurrent definite time function;

 Earth overcurrent definite time function;
 Sensitive earth fault current inverse time function;
 Auto – reclosing.
In the grid, mainly in MV/LV substations, we can also found:
 Fuses;
 Sectionalizers.
All protections are coordinated granting the needed selectivity.
Table 13 – F3 Feeder protection relay settings.
Phase Overcurrent Phase Overcurrent Phase Overcurrent

(I>) (I>>) (I>>)
Protection
Feeder CT Ratio
Relay
Pick Up Trip Pick Trip Pick Trip
(A) (sec) Up (A) (sec) Up (A) (sec)
EFACEC
F3 400/5 400 1,0 800 0,5 2000 0,1
TPU S220
Directional Earth Sensitive Earth

Earth Overcurrent
Overcurrent Current
Recloser
Pick Trip Pick Up Trip Pick
Curve
Up (A) (sec) (A) (sec) Up (A)
90 0,15 40 0,5 2 LTI 0
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Deliverable 4.3
4 Impact of Distributed Generation on Distribution System

Protection
Nowadays, the global demand for more “green” energy resources has led to
large integration of distributed generation into the distribution utilities, while the
concept of “smart grid” has introduced sophisticated network configurations.
Consequently, the review of long-established distribution protection practices and
strategies is critical.
Power system dependability and service continuity are directly related to the
appropriate design and setting of protective relaying schemes [8], [9]. However,
the aforementioned operational changes pose new challenging concerns to
protection engineers, including feeders protection blinding, sympathetic tripping of
adjacent relays, failed auto-reclosing and unintentional islanding. In the sequel,
these key protection issues are discussed in detail.
4.1 Protection Blinding

Traditional distribution systems have only one source contributing to a fault
incident, namely the main substation, and protective relays are set to see a certain
distance down the radial feeder. This distance is usually referred to as the reach of
the protective device, which is actually determined by the minimum fault current
that the device can detect.
On the other hand, the connection of DG units to modern distribution networks
introduces additional fault current sources, which may increase the total short-
circuit level within the network, while altering the magnitude and direction of fault
currents sensed by installed protective devices. When the DG location is between
the utility substation and the fault point, the total fault current increases due to the
DG partial contribution. However, the fault current seen by the feeder protection
relay is actually decreased for the same fault, owing to fault current division
between the sources, which may not exceed relay’s pickup current setting. This
undesirable condition leads to maloperation of the corresponding feeder relay and
is widely known as protection blinding [10]–[15]. The blinding effect may result in
delayed protection operation in case of inverse-time overcurrent relays, and even
in total desensitisation in case of definite-time relays, when a fault occurs near
their prior reach. This phenomenon is also called protection under-reach [12], [16],
since the actual reach of the feeder relay decreases as a result of the DG fault
current contribution.
The occurrence of protection blinding is explicated in Figure 10: the current
DG
I f ,gridflowing from the upstream grid considering DG is lower than current I nof ,grid
DG
without DG, while the total fault current increases ( I DG

f  I no
f
DG
) due to DG
33/97
Deliverable 4.3
contribution ( I f ,DG ). In addition, the reach of the feeder overcurrent relay

(illustrated with dashed line) is reduced, as was explained above.
BUS MV
BUS 1 BUS 2
HV GRID If,gridDG < If,gridno DG
R1
IfDG > Ifno DG
If,DG
LOAD2
DG1 LOAD1
Figure 10 – Fault current contributions in case of protection blinding
It should be mentioned that protection blinding most likely occurs when a

synchronous-based DG plant is connected to the distribution network [14].
Inverter-interfaced DG units contribute to short circuits for only a few cycles, with
relatively small current without influencing the main grid contribution, and therefore
they are not a serious concern.
4.1.1 Quantitative Analysis
The protection blinding issue can be quantified, investigating the major factors
that affect its intensity, such as DG capacity, DG location and fault location. Short-
circuit current and voltage values at any node of the network can be calculated
using the superposition theorem, which sums the pre-fault values with the variation
of currents or voltages during the short circuit. The faulted network is assumed to
be unloaded before occurrence of the fault [17], [18], since the changes in node
voltages and branch currents are much higher than their pre-fault values. In the
absence of loads, no pre-fault (load) currents flow, and there are no voltage
differences across the branch impedances. Thus, all bus voltages throughout the
network are equal to V f , the pre-fault voltage at the fault point.
Consider the system in Figure 10 with a three-phase fault at Bus 2. To

calculate the short-circuit currents, with and without DG connection, we derive the
corresponding Thevenin equivalent circuit for each case from Figure 11 and Figure
12.
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Deliverable 4.3
BUS 1 BUS 2 Vf
ZSys ZL Vf ZTh
no DG If,gridno DG = Ifn
If,grid = Ifno DG
Figure 11 – Equivalent per-phase distribution system without DG connection
BUS 1 BUS 2
ZSys ZL Vf
If,gridDG IfDG
ZDG
If,DG
Figure 12 – Equivalent per-phase distribution system with DG connection
In Figure 11, Z Sys is the grid equivalent impedance upstream of Bus 1, Z L is

the impedance of the distribution line between Bus 1 and Bus 2, and V f is the pre-
fault voltage at Bus 2. The short-circuit current without DG connection is given by:
Vf
I no DG
 I no
f ,grid 
DG
. (1)
Z Sys  Z L
f
The short-circuit currents in case of DG connection are illustrated in Figure 12,

with Z DG representing the internal impedance of the DG unit. The total fault current
is now given by:
Vf
I DG
f  . (2)
Z Sys Z DG
ZL 
Z Sys  Z DG
Z Sys Z DG
From (1) and (2) it can be deduced that I DG  I no DG
since Z Sys  ,
Z Sys  Z DG
f f
demonstrating that the DG integration into distribution grids leads to increase of

the total fault current. It should be emphasised that this increase may exceed the
short-circuit withstand rating of installed power equipment (distribution lines,
buses, circuit breakers etc.). Therefore, it is critical to examine their adequacy
when DG units are going to be interconnected.
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Deliverable 4.3
The fault current contributions from main grid and DG plant can be calculated
as below, by means of the Kirchhoff’s current and voltage laws, considering the
main grid and DG pre-fault voltages equal to V f , as mentioned previously:
f ,grid  I f ,DG  I f ,
I DG DG
(3)
V f  Z Sys I DG
f ,grid  Z DG I f ,DG  V f  0  Z Sys I f ,grid  Z DG I f ,DG ,
DG
(4)
V f  Z L I DG
f  Z DG I f ,DG  0. (5)
Combining (3)–(5) yields:
V f  Z L I DG
I f ,DG 
f ,grid
, (6)
Z L  Z DG
Vf
f ,grid 
I DG . (7)
 Z 
Z Sys  L  1  Z L
 Z DG 
f ,grid  I f ,grid
I DG no DG
Comparing (1) and (7), it can be inferred that since
 Z 
Z Sys  L  1  Z L  Z Sys  Z L . To sum up, the previous analysis demonstrates
 Z DG 
that the total fault current increases while the mains contribution decreases, when
a conventional DG unit is connected to the distribution network, revealing the
major issue of feeders’ protection blinding.
Moreover, DG capacity and location, as well as fault location, influence the
performance of protective devices and the probability of protection blinding
occurrence. To investigate the impacts of these factors on short-circuit currents,
the DG and distribution feeder impedances are expressed in proportion to main
grid impedance [16], as below:
Z DG  mZ Sys , (8)
Z L  nZ Sys . (9)
The ratio of the mains contribution, with and without DG, is derived from (1),
(7)–(9) as follows:
Vf
 Z 
Z Sys  L  1  Z L
m  mn
DG
I f ,grid
  Z DG   . (10)
I no DG
f ,grid
Vf m  n  mn
Z Sys  Z L
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Deliverable 4.3
m  mn
Figure 13 shows the 3-D plot of ratio k (m,n)  against factors m
m  n  mn
and n.
Figure 13 – Ratio between main grid fault current contributions, with and without DG connection
As can be observed in Figure 13, when n=0 (fault at the point of common
coupling, PCC), the ratio k (m,n) is equal to 1, since the same short-circuit current
will be fed by the grid substation in both cases. Considering now the coefficient n
constant (constant value of line impedance), the ratio k (m,n) decreases with
decreasing m. Indeed, if a large DG plant with considerably low impedance is
connected to the feeder, there will be further reduction of substation fault current
contribution in comparison with the case of a smaller DG unit. Moreover, if m is
constant, it is verified that, as the line impedance or the fault distance from the
substation increases the ratio k (m,n) decreases.
The pickup current setting of existing feeder overcurrent relays is usually

adjusted to a proportion of the fault current sensed for a far-end symmetrical fault
I nof ,grid
DG
. This rule of thumb can be expressed as follows:
I no DG
I PU 
f ,grid
, (11)
N
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Deliverable 4.3
where, I PU represents the pickup current setting of the overcurrent relay, and N is
a safety factor (usually N  3 ), which corresponds to the desired protection
sensitivity.
After DG connection, the main system fault current contribution I DG

f ,grid should
be higher than I PU , to prevent blindness of protection and guarantee sensitivity.

From (10), (11) we have:
I DG m  mn
 N  slim ,
f ,grid
(12)
I PU m  n  mn
where, slim is the lower limit of protection sensitivity.

To examine the potential of protection blinding, a reasonable value 1.1 1.5
for slim is considered. The ratio between the total fault currents with and without
DG presence is derived from (1), (2) as below:
Vf
Z Sys Z DG
ZL 
I DG Z Sys  Z DG (1  m)n  m  1
 
f
. (13)
I no
f
DG
Vf (1  m)n  m
Z Sys  Z L
(1  m)n  m  1
The ratio l  m,n   is plotted against m and n in Figure 14. It is
(1  m)n  m
evident that the total fault current increases rapidly as the impedances of the DG
unit and the distribution feeder decrease. On the other hand, if m,n  1 , then l  1 ,
which means that there is no considerable variation in the fault current despite the
DG presence.
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Deliverable 4.3
Figure 14 – Ratio between total fault currents, with and without DG connection
4.2 Sympathetic Tripping

During a fault event the generators connected to the grid contribute to the fault
with short-circuit current. The rationale of the protection system consists on
isolating the fault event by disconnecting the faulted feeder at the substation. In a
classical power system, the fault current contribution comes from the upstream
grid (where generators are connected). In this case, isolating the faulted branch is
sufficient to eliminate the fault and consequently the high-level currents, which
means that the clients connected to the affected feeder are disconnected from the
grid. Nonetheless, the remaining clients and generators, connected to other
feeders, still remain connected and operating.
In contrast, with the presence of DG, fault current contributions also take place
within the distribution grid where DG is connected. Depending on the fault severity
and its proximity, DG may contribute to the fault by feeding it with high-level
currents. Bearing in mind that DG units are often equipped with overcurrent relays,
during fault events depending on the fault current and the protection settings, DG
will be disconnected from the grid. However, this situation normally named as
sympathetic tripping since the disconnection of these DG units may not be
necessary and sometimes it should even be avoided since the fault origin is not
within the feeder where the units are connected to (for instance, if it happens in a
neighbouring feeder).
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Deliverable 4.3
Considering that the relay installed at the terminals of the DG unit cannot
foresee the origin of the fault event, it becomes difficult to differentiate the situation
where the fault is located in the feeder where the DG is connected to and the
situation where the fault is located in a neighbouring feeder. The rationale behind
this task consists on creating an intelligent protection scheme in order to avoid
sympathetic tripping situations.
Sympathetic tripping refers to the undesirable operation of the feeder relay
due to unbalanced or high-load condition, which frequently follows an out-of-zone
fault [19], [20], or due to DG backfeed to a fault on an adjacent feeder [11], [12],
[16], [21] and [22]. This phenomenon is also called false tripping [11], [16], and
belongs to the wide class of nuisance tripping problems triggered by various root
causes (e.g. motor starting, magnetising inrush current during transformer
energisation, cold-load pickup, voltage sag or swell etc.). In this report, we will
focus on the sympathetic tripping scenario, encountered by the feeder relay due to
upstream DG fault current contribution for faults beyond feeder protection zone.
As it has been discussed in recent literature, DG units can cause false tripping
and undesirable disconnection of an adjacent healthy feeder. The basic principle
of sympathetic tripping can be explained in Figure 15, where a fault occurs at
Feeder 2 and the DG unit connected to Feeder 1 feeds the short-circuit through
the substation bus. If the DG contribution is particularly large, the tripping
mechanism of circuit breaker R1 may be initiated before R2 takes action and
clears the fault. This is possible when non-directional overcurrent relays are used
for feeder protection, which cannot discriminate the change to fault current
direction (reverse fault). The utilization of non-directional overcurrent relays is a
long-established protection practice for most of distribution utilities, due to their
single-fed radial nature, unlike modern multi-source distribution systems with bi-
directional current flow. Therefore, the installation of numerical directional
overcurrent relays at main feeders with embedded DG could be a cost-effective
solution to this problem.
BUS 1
R1 FEEDER 1
If,DG
HV GRID BUS MV
LOAD1
DG1
BUS 2
DG
If,grid
R2 FEEDER 2
IfDG > Ifno DG

LOAD2
Figure 15 – Fault current contributions in case of sympathetic tripping
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Similarly to protection blinding, sympathetic tripping most likely occurs in

distribution networks with conventional DG units which are capable of supplying
sustained short-circuit currents [11], [16]. In addition, this phenomenon mainly
happens when overcurrent feeder relays (e.g. R1, R2) have different inverse-time
characteristic curves, as well as pickup current and time dial setting values [14].
However, this type of malfunctioning does not arise in all likelihood, if an inverter-
interfaced DG unit is connected to the distribution network, because its fault
current contribution is limited by the inverter control scheme exceeding slightly the
nominal current.
4.2.1 Quantitative Analysis
To analyse sympathetic tripping, we investigate the influence of DG capacity

and fault location on the phenomenon intensity. Consider the system in Figure 16
and a three-phase fault at Bus 2 of Feeder 2. To calculate the short-circuit current
contributions from the main system and the DG unit, we derive the equivalent
Thevenin circuit from the network in Figure 16.
ZDG
BUS 1 If,DG
ZL1
Vf
ZSys ZL2
If,gridDG BUS MV IfDG BUS 2
Figure 16 – Equivalent per-phase system for the sympathetic tripping case
In the initial operating condition without DG presence, the total fault current,
which is fed only by the main system, is:
Vf
I no DG
 I no
f ,grid 
DG
. (14)
Z Sys  Z L 2
f
On the other hand, when a conventional DG unit is connected to Feeder 1,

there are two sources of short-circuit current, with the total fault current at Bus 2
being:
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Vf
I DG  . (15)
f
Z Sys  Z DG  Z L1 
ZL2 
Z Sys  Z DG  Z L1
When the DG unit is connected close to the substation, the impedance of

Feeder 1 is negligible ( Z L1  0 ) and (15) is simplified as:
Vf
I DG
f  . (16)
Z Sys Z DG
ZL2 
Z Sys  Z DG
The main system and DG contributions to the fault are obtained using the
Kirchhoff laws:
Vf
f ,grid 
I DG , (17)
 Z 
Z Sys  1  Sys  ZL2
 Z DG 
Vf
I f ,DG  . (18)
 Z 
Z DG  1  DG  Z L 2
 Z Sys
 
It is made clear by (17) and (18), that I DG

f ,grid and I f ,DG depend on the
impedance of Feeder 2. For example, the closer fault location to the substation the
higher fault current contributions from the main system and the DG unit.
Furthermore, the ratio of DG fault current contribution to the total fault current can
be obtained combining (8), (9), (16) and (18), as follows:
Vf
 Z 
Z DG  1  DG  Z L 2
 Z Sys  m  n  mn
I f ,DG
    . (19)
I DG
f
Vf (1  m)m  (1  m) 2 n
Z Z
Z L 2  Sys DG
Z Sys  Z DG
m  n  mn
The ratio r  m,n   is plotted in Figure 17 as a function of
(1  m)m  (1  m)2 n
factors m and n. As can be observed, a small value of m (ratio of DG to system
impedance) leads to a DG short-circuit contribution close to the total fault current,
since m  0 when r  1 , according to (19). In this case, feeder relays R1 and R2
(Figure 15) may have almost identical tripping times, if the same pickup current
and time dial settings are selected. Even worse, R1 may trip faster than R2, if
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smaller time dial setting has been chosen. Moreover, if n  0 then r  1 / (1  m) ,

which means that the DG unit contributes more to the fault when it has smaller
impedance, as expected. It should be noted that the impedance of Feeder 1 has
been taken equal to zero, considering that the DG unit is connected near the
substation. In different case, Z DG  Z L1  Z DG and m increases, thus the DG unit
contributes with a reduced current to the fault.
Figure 17 – Ratio of the total fault current to the DG partial contribution
4.2.2 Design of Adaptive Protection Scheme for Sympathetic Tripping
This chapter details the implementation of the automatic selection of the

setting group to be used within a real-time protection scheme and a commercial
protective relay and thus to avoid sympathetic tripping. This arrangement was
tested in a closed-loop test using a Real Time Digital Simulator and commercial
protective relays with specific focus of the EFACEC TPU S220.
To improve the selectivity of protection relays and prevent sympathetic

tripping, an adaptive protection scheme based on [74] is presented. This
protection scheme aims at enhancing the role and performance of Distributed
Generation. The adaptive protection scheme is coordinated by an intelligent
system designated as Smart Substation Controller (SSC) sited at the HV/MV
substation (see Figure 18). The SSC has the ability of altering the protection
setting group in use of the protective relays in order to prevent sympathetic
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tripping from happening, considering the real-time state of the network. The SSC
also interacts with the centralised SCADA/DMS9.
Figure 18 – Adaptive Protection Scheme for Medium Voltage distribution network
Figure 18 represents a Medium Voltage distribution network which is

constituted by two Medium Voltage feeders with its respective protective relays
and circuit breakers. In one of the feeders there is Distributed Generation
connected to it. The DG unit represents a wind park and its protection system was
not considered. It is also represented the HV/MV substation and a 60kV network
representation of the High Voltage network.
SCADA/DMS (Figure 18) represents the control centre that performs network
assessment tasks over the whole network. SCADA allows a utility operator to
monitor and control processes that are distributed among various remote sites.
The operational assessment carried out at the SCADA/DMS level determines in
which mode of operation the SSC will be, e.g. by having information about the
equipment status, such as circuit breakers, the network state and its configuration.
The SCADA/DMS assigns a tag to the SSC stating its mode of operation. By
receiving such tag the SSC becomes aware about is role for protection
coordination setup: disabled, enabled or advisory (see Section 4.2.2.1).
9
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition/Distribution Management System
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4.2.2.1 Smart Substation Controller for Sympathetic Tripping

The SSC determines if, with the actual state of the network, it is in place a
situation of sympathetic tripping. To know the actual state of the network and
evaluate sympathetic tripping, the SSC collects real time data from local sensors
(Figure 18). Depending on the mode of operation of the SSC, the protection
parameters of the feeder relays may be changed in order to avoid sympathetic
tripping. Figure 19 presents a flowchart representation of the SSC concept for
sympathetic tripping.
Figure 19 – Flowchart of Smart Substation Controller concept for sympathetic tripping
In a) the SSC collects certain measurements from the network. It reads the
following variables:
 A tag from SCADA/DMS stating the SSC’s mode of operation;

 Current and voltage magnitude on each MV feeder and at the wind park
terminals, send by the SCADA/DMS;
 The installed capacity and type of technologies of the machines working
in the wind park.
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The currents and voltages are necessary to determine the load in the system.
To make an accurate analysis of the short-circuit current, the actual load in the
system should be considered.
The most pertinent data for the analysis of a short-circuit is the capacity of the
DG and the technology of the machines. The higher DG capacity, the more likely it
is for sympathetic tripping to happen, due to higher current contribution from the
DG to the fault. Depending on the type of DG source which will have a smaller or
bigger contribution to the fault, being synchronous generators the ones that most
contribute to a fault. This way, it is necessary to assess the total capacity of the
machines working at the wind park and the type of technology of those machines.
These data comes from the SCADA/DMS and is only necessary to be available to
the SSC when there are changes in the number of machines working at the wind
park (dotted lines in Figure 18).
In b) the SSC performs a short-circuit analysis for the worst case scenario: a
three-phase fault at the beginning of line 2 (Figure 18). The short-circuit calculation
is made with the measurements collected by the SSC and with the rest of the
parameters of the network, e.g. line parameters, that are pre-programmed in the
SSC.
After performing a fault analysis the SSC checks if protection coordination is in

place – c). This consists in verifying if, with the actual state of the network, there is
the possibility of sympathetic tripping to happen. If with the results from c)
sympathetic tripping cannot happen, then there is no need to change the
protection parameters of the relays. On the other hand if sympathetic tripping may
occur then the SSC checks in which mode of operation it is in –e).
While enabled, the SSC is authorised to perform the adaptive protection. For
the network in Figure 18 this will consist in the changing of the setting group of
protective relay R1 or protective relay R2 or both, depending on what it is required
to prevent sympathetic tripping. While in advisory mode, and if the SSC detects a
situation of potential sympathetic tripping, then the SSC sends a signal to the
SCADA/DMS stating that the change of setting group should be performed. An
authorised user will then remotely perform, or not, that change according to the
information provided and his experience. While in disabled mode, the SSC only
reports to the SCADA/DMS the telemetry in the network. This function is also
performed in the others situations described. The SSC exchanges data with the
SCADA/DMS independently of the SSC mode of operation.
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4.3 Failed Auto-Reclosing

Automatic reclosing (auto-reclosing) is an effective fault clearing technique,
which is mostly implemented in distribution systems with overhead lines. The vast
majority of line faults (approximately 80%) are temporary and self-clearing if the
line is disconnected awhile [9]. Whenever a fault is detected, the corresponding
circuit breaker is tripped, interrupting the current fed into the short-circuit, and
therefore extinguishing the arc. After a short time interval, the circuit breaker is
closed again automatically. The use of auto-reclosing aids the restoration of the
system in a timely manner, much more quickly than a local or remote manual
action.
The performance of an auto-reclosing scheme depends on the following
setting parameters.
 Number of shots (reclosing attempts): There are no definite rules for

determining the number of shots for any particular auto-reclosing application.
One or two shots are generally used in distribution networks, sometimes three
shots, and very seldom more shots. The selection of number of shots depends
on the frequency of fault occurrence, as well as on the likelihood of a
successful reclosure. The shots can be either high-speed or time-delayed.
Multiple-shot auto-reclosing schemes should be set considering several
factors, including circuit breaker limited operations, system stability, and
potential equipment damage due to excessive current.
 Dead time: A successful reclosure requires the interruption of the faulted
circuit to be followed by a time delay, long enough to permit the ionised air to
disperse and the dielectric mean to re-establish its strength. This time is
widely known as dead time and is dependent on the system voltage, the
conductor spacing, the magnitude of fault current, and the weather conditions.
Delayed auto-reclosing schemes, with dead time between 2 s and 3 min, are
mainly applied to distribution networks.
 Reset time: A timer is typically provided in a reclosing element to reset the
relay after a successful reclosure of the circuit interrupting device. If the auto-
reclosing has been achieved, the reclosing element returns to its reset state
after the reset time delay expires. Selection of the reset delay may depend on
the nature of the fault and the expected clearing time. For example, a longer
reset delay will reduce the possibility of excessive tripping and auto-reclosing
for intermittent faults. A delay shorter than the duration between intermittent
faults will allow the reclosing to reset, thereby preventing lockout. Lengthening
of the reset time prevents excessive operations but could cause undesirable
lockouts.
 Lockout: If the auto-reclosing attempts are not successful, the relay moves to
a lockout position so that the interrupting device cannot be automatically
closed. Auto-reclosing is locked out, or terminated, after the programmed
number of shots are tried and unsuccessfully completed. The lockout condition
is useful in preventing excessive wear on the interrupting device, caused by
multiple operations. Some auto-reclosing schemes can be programmed to
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provide a lockout condition, in order to avoid subsequent reclosing attempts, if

the number of faults exceeds a certain value within a window of time.
 Reclaim time: The reclaim time is the interval during which a new start of
auto-reclosing attempt is blocked. If the line is energised while all reclosing
shots have been carried out, and a new fault occurs before the reclaim time
elapsed, the auto-reclosing function is blocked and a signal for definite tripping
of the breaker is obtained. After the reclaim time has elapsed, the auto-
reclosing element returns to its initial state and a new reclosing sequence can
take place. It must be long enough to allow the protection elements to operate
when the circuit breaker is reclosed onto a permanent fault.
The auto-reclosing procedure, during transient as well as permanent faults, is
illustrated in Figure 20 and Figure 21.
Figure 20 – Auto-reclosing procedure during a transient fault [9]
Figure 21 – Auto-reclosing procedure during a permanent fault [9]
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Protection problems in distribution networks may result from the automatic

reconnection of the utility, in case of distributed generation (DG) presence.
Reclosing and most of DG types are fundamentally incompatible. As mentioned
above, a reclosing attempt is deemed to be successful when there is sufficient
time between shots for the fault arc to dissipate and clear. That means that any
DG unit must detect the presence of the fault and be disconnected early in the
reclose interval [10]. Otherwise, the DG unit will continue to supply fault current
hindering the arc extinction, and the fault that would be temporary becomes
permanent. The quality of supply deteriorates, and utility equipment will
experience prolonged arcing, which can lead to shortened life and expensive
repairs [16]. Converter-interfaced DG units are able to reduce rapidly their output
current to zero, during the period that recloser is open [10], in contrast to
synchronous-based DG which have much more inertia.
BUS
HV GRID MV
If,grid
Rec1 Rec2
If,DG
DG1
Figure 22 – DG-penetrated distribution network protected by recloser
INSTANTANEOUS RECLOSING (1st SHOT)

5
4 Reclosing Interval (dead time)
1
If (kA)
0
DG must disconnect here
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
t(sec)
Figure 23 – The first shot of a typical reclosing sequence during a fault
The potential failure of reclosing to clear the fault means that some of the
customers will now see a sustained interruption, whereas they should have been
subjected to only a momentary one. Thus, the reliability of the power delivery
system is slightly degraded. A more complicated issue is the fact that many utilities
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use “instantaneous” reclosing for power quality purposes. This reclosing interval is
nominally 0.5 s, but can be as short as 0.2 s. The utilities that use this short
interval intend to improve the power quality for their customers. However, this
practice increases the probability that the DG will not disconnect in time.
Removal of the DG plants is normally accomplished by the operation of an
underfrequency (81), undervoltage (27), or reverse power relay (32), which tends
to have longer tripping times. As the operating time for these devices may be
slower to remove the connected generator than the relays that detected and
cleared the fault, auto-reclosing times may need to be extended to allow these
devices to operate. We recommend against using instantaneous reclose on feeder
sections that contain synchronous-based DG unit. A reclosing interval of 1 s or
more would be preferable. This will dramatically reduce the chances of DG failures
to separate in time, but will also result in decreased power quality to some
customers. On the other hand, generation that is connected to the system by
means of a power electronic converter can be self-protecting. Such units can be
disconnected from the system before the re-energisation of the circuit, and
therefore an auto-reclosing process would not be a matter of concern.
Furthermore, the active power unbalance during the dead time of the reclosing
sequence, can lead to frequency variation in the islanded part of the distribution
grid, and generators may drift away from the synchronism with respect to the main
system [16], [21]. In this scenario, a reclosing attempt would couple two
asynchronously operating systems. For a rotating machine, which is the most
common type of generator, owners can expect damage to the shaft, the coupler,
and the prime mover, due to out-of-phase switching. Power electronic converters
have much less inertia and would normally be less susceptible to out-of-phase
reclosing, assuming proper protection against current surges. Moreover,
conventional reclosers are designed to reconnect the circuit only if the substation
side is energised and the opposite side is unenergised. In case of DG integration,
there would be active sources on both sides of the recloser, thus hampering its
proper operation.
4.4 Loss-of-mains protection
4.4.1 Unintentional Islanding
The growing penetration level of distributed energy resources (DER) in

electrical networks introduces a serious concern for utilities, widely known as
unintentional islanding. In this report, we focus on the distribution grids, although
the islanding issue interests also the transmission systems. The islanding
phenomenon occurs when one or more non-utility generation sources and a
portion of the distribution network still operate, while isolated from the remainder of
the main system (Figure 24). Several abnormal operating conditions can lead to
islanding occurrence, with the most common mentioned below:
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 a fault detected by the utility, which results in disconnection of some portions

and is not detected by the protection system of DG unit,
 accidental opening of the normal utility supply by equipment failure,
 unexpected changes in the distribution system configuration,
 intentional disconnection for maintenance services,
 human error or malicious mischief,
 a natural incident (force majeure).
MAIN
BUS MV
SYSTEM
OPEN
CLOSED
DG1 LOAD1 LOAD2
Figure 24 – Islanded mode of a distribution system
Available engineering recommendations and international standards, including

G59/2 [23], IEEE 1547 [24] and VDE 0126-1-1 [25], dictate that DER should be
disconnected when a loss of mains (LOM) occurs. There are many reasons that
islanding should be prevented, such as safety, legislation and maintaining high
quality of delivered power to customers. Utilities must be liable for providing high
service quality to customers, while DG owners must ensure anti-islanding
protection, for the following reasons:
 The utility might not be able to control the voltage and the frequency in the
island, causing probably damage to owner’s equipment.
 Utilities can be found liable for electrical damage to owner’s equipment
connected to their lines, which may result from voltage or frequency
excursions outside the acceptable ranges.
 Islanding may create a hazard for utility personnel or the public, since a
distribution line, assumed to be disconnected from any power source, remains
energised.
 Out-of-phase reclosing into an island may cause irreparable damage to the
owner’s property or to distribution elements.
 Islanding may interfere with the manual or automatic restoration of normal
service.
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4.4.2 Islanding Detection Methods
The basic operating principles of islanding detection techniques are, firstly, the
monitoring of main system and DG operating parameters, and secondly, the
decision on whether there is an islanding situation or not, based on the parameter
variations. Anti-islanding methods are mainly classified as remote and local, with
local methods further categorised as passive and active, as shown in Figure 25.
ISLANDING DETECTION
REMOTE TECHNIQUES LOCAL TECHNIQUES
PASSIVE ACTIVE
Figure 25 – Classification of islanding detection methods
4.4.2.1 Remote Techniques

Remote islanding detection techniques are based on the communication
between the network operator and the DG units. The most well-known methods
are given in Table 14.
Table 14 – Communication-based methods for LOM protection
METHODS OPERATING PHILOSOPHY
The PLCC method uses power lines as the medium

carrying information to the DG unit regarding the
islanding state of the system. The method includes a
Power Line Carrier Communication transmitter on the substation side, which perpetually
(PLCC) transmits a low-energy signal to the receiver on the DG
side. A communication disruption indicates the opening
of a breaker, which is translated as an islanding warning
by the DG unit.
The operating concept of anti-islanding methods based

Supervisory Control And Data on SCADA system is the monitoring of breakers, which
can cause an islanding state when opened. If such an
Acquisition (SCADA)
event is observed, a series of signals are sent to the
corresponding DG units for disconnection.
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4.4.2.2 Local Techniques

Local islanding detection techniques are implemented on the DG side, using
information gathered locally to decide on the disconnection of the DG unit. There
are two classes of local islanding detection techniques, as below:
 Passive Methods measure system operating parameters, such as voltage,

frequency, harmonic distortion, etc. The values of these parameters change
when the islanding state occurs. The discrimination between islanding and
grid-connected state depends on thresholds previously set for these
parameters. It is crucial to select proper thresholds to avoid confusion
between islanding and other disturbances, which may lead to nuisance
tripping.
 Active Methods introduce intentionally a distortion to the system. These
methods are based on the idea that such a distortion will cause a significant
change to some system parameters if islanding state, whereas negligible
change will occur if the system operates in grid-connected mode.
4.4.2.2.1 Passive Methods

The local passive protection schemes are currently the most widely applied
practices for islanding detection. Actually, they monitor the voltage and current
waveforms at the DG unit terminal, seeking for changes in operating parameters
(e.g. voltage or frequency) which could indicate the formation of an island. These
schemes are based on the principle that when there is mismatch between power
generation and load demand, the frequency or/and the voltage will vary depending
on whether the power imbalance is positive or negative. The larger the mismatch
the stronger is the impact on the operating parameters of the power system.
All grid-connected DGs, either synchronous-based or inverter-interfaced, are
protected by special elements from abnormal frequency (81) and under-/ over-
voltages (27/59) at the PCC. These two protection elements can be also used for
anti-islanding protection. However, they cannot provide sufficient protection when
applied as the only anti-islanding means. For that reason, other types of functions
have been evolved. The most common passive techniques for anti-islanding
protection, along with their basic operating principles, are summarised in Table 15.
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Table 15 – Passive methods for LOM protection
PASSIVE METHODS [26], [28]–[30] OPERATING CONCEPT
When a portion of the network with distributed generation

is cut off, it is likely that unbalance (depending on the
Under/Over- Voltage/Frequency generation and load conditions before the fault) between
the generated and the consumed power in the island will
(UOV/UOF) occur. In such a case, the under/over-voltage or
under/over-frequency protection elements may sense this
variation and trip the circuit breaker of the DG unit.
The frequency deviation from its nominal value indicates

unbalance between the generated power and the load
demand. For example, if the available generation is
Rate Of Change Of Frequency greater than the consumption in the islanded portion, then
(ROCOF) the system frequency will exceed the acceptable upper
bound. In case of large unbalance, the frequency changes
rapidly and thus the ROCOF relay is utilized to speed up
the islanding detection.
The change in DG power output, due to loss of mains,

causes a shift in the voltage phase. The Voltage VS
protection method is based on the phase displacement of
Voltage Vector Surge (VS) the voltage signal measured by the relay at the DG
terminal relative to a reference signal. This technique is
sensitive to network disturbances, such as faults on other
feeders or transmission system transients, and therefore
its coordination with other protection elements is difficult.
The monitoring of active power can be used to detect

Rate Of Change Of active Power unwanted islanding. Indeed, a quick change of active
power might be a signal of loss of the upstream network.
(ROCOP)
The ROCOP protection is frequently applied in
conjunction with the UOV and UOF protection elements.
The inverter-interfaced DG units generate voltage

harmonics. These harmonics depend on the main system
impedance, which is small, and therefore they are quite
Harmonic Detection (HD) low. However, when the DG unit is in islanding mode, the
load impedance takes the place of system impedance,
which could be significantly larger. Thus, the caused
increase in voltage harmonics can be used as an
islanding indicator.
4.4.2.2.2 Active Methods

Active islanding detection methods interact directly and continuously with the
electrical system. Network perturbations are caused by special DG control
schemes. When the DG unit operates in grid-connected mode, these methods
generate slight changes insufficient to pick up the protection relay, whereas in
case of loss of mains the changes become significant and the protection system
disconnects the unit. In fact, active methods introduce disturbances to the power
system aiming at:
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 changing the frequency so as to trigger the frequency protection (OUF), or

 changing the voltage so as to trigger the voltage protection (UOV), or
 estimating the impedance of the power system.
In general, active methods are highly effective in islanding prevention with
significantly reduced non-detection zone (NDZ) [29]. However, they have the
tendency to affect power quality, and deteriorate the transient response of the
overall power system, especially if several inverters are connected in parallel [31].
The performance of active techniques does not depend on the power mismatch
level in the island, but the additional cost for an injection system, effects on load,
and interference resulting from multiple DG sites, decreases the appeal of such
schemes [32]. The various active methods along with their operating concept are
summarised in Table 16.
Table 16 – Active methods for LOM protection
ACTIVE METHODS
OPERATING CONCEPT
[26], [27], [29]–[31]
In this method, the waveform of the current injected by the inverter is

Active Frequency Drift
slightly distorted, having a continuous trend to change the frequency.
(AFD) Thus, in islanding condition the voltage frequency at the PCC is
forced to drift up or down.
SFS is based on positive feedback. It is the voltage frequency at

Sandia Frequency Shift PCC to which the positive feedback is applied. Under grid-connected
conditions, the method attempts to increase the change in frequency
(SFS) but the stability of the grid prevents any change. On the other hand,
significant frequency change occurs during islanding.
In SVS, the amplitude of voltage at PCC applies as positive feedback

to the current reference. If there is a decrease in the amplitude of the
Sandia Voltage Shift
voltage, the PV inverter reduces its current output, and thus its
(SVS) power output. If the utility is connected, there is little or no effect
when the power is reduced. When the utility is absent and there is a
reduction in voltage, there will be a further reduction in the amplitude.
The concept is to add a harmonic disturbance signal (typically low

frequency) in the reference of the reactive current. This method
Reactive Power Variation interacts with the regulation system forcing the generator to provide
a level of reactive power that can be maintained only if the
(RPV) transmission network is connected. In islanding condition the
reactive power variation increases the frequency and causes the
inverter to trip.
Harmonic Injection Typically, a small current at a certain harmonic order is injected into
the grid and the resulting voltage harmonic is measured to detect the
(HI) islanding event.
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4.4.3 Assessment of Anti-Islanding Protection Methods
The reliability of islanding detection methods is often evaluated by the NDZ

defined in the power mismatch space ( P  Q ) at the PCC, where the islanding
is not detectable. The behaviour of the system at the time of utility disconnection
depends on P and Q at the instant before the switch opens to form the island.
After the disconnection of the grid, the active power of the load is forced to be the
same with the power generated by DGs of the island. The grid voltage will change
into:
PDG
 
VPCC VPCC . (20)
PLOAD
If PDG  PLOAD , an increase in the voltage amplitude occurs, while if PDG  PLOAD the
voltage amplitude decreases. Respectively, the reactive power is given by:
 1 
   ' C  VPCC
  .
2
QLOAD  QDG   (21)
 ' L 
The following equations describe the power imbalance in the system after a
LOM event:
PLOAD  PDG  P, (22)
QLOAD  QDG  Q. (23)
The worst case for islanding detection arises when there is balance of the
active and reactive power, i.e. P  Q  0 , and thus there is no change in
voltage amplitude and frequency. It is straightforward that a small P results in an
insufficient change in voltage amplitude, whereas a small Q leads to an
inadequate change in frequency to effectively prevent islanding. It is possible to
calculate the NDZ area from the mismatches of active and reactive power, and
then to set proper threshold values for frequency and voltage elements. However,
the possibility of P and Q falling into the NDZ can be considerably high.
Consequently, the standard voltage and frequency protection elements are
generally considered to provide insufficient anti-islanding protection, and thus they
should be combined with other islanding detection methods.
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Figure 26 – Non–Detection Zone (NDZ)
4.5 Fault ride-through

The Fault Ride-through (FRT) capability is a requirement often asked by DSO
and TSO that usually consists of two major sub-requirements. The first sub-
requirements consists on the ability of a given generation unit or generation plant
to remain connected to the grid during fault events leading to the occurrence of
voltage sags on the plant/generator terminals. In this case, it is expected that the
generation/plant complies with the respective grid-code voltage versus time curve.
As an example, the FRT voltage versus time curve adopted in Portugal is shown in
Figure 27.
Figure 27 – Portuguese Fault Ride-through Voltage versus time curve
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The second sub-requirement is related to the capability of rapidly injecting

reactive current in an attempt to leverage the voltage on the neighbouring area.
Figure 28 – Portuguese Fault Ride-through Reactive current injection curve
Modern DG units are usually designed to be FRT compliant. However, the

protection systems installed at the plant level are based on undervoltage
protection relays meaning that during an event that leads to a voltage sag, if its
magnitude is lower than the protection settings, the generators/plant are
disconnected from the grid. Therefore, the protection system as a whole cannot be
considered as FRT compliant.
In order to overcome this situation, the undervoltage protection settings may
be relaxed, thus allowing FRT compliance. From the Transmission grid
perspective, considering its meshed topology, this strategy can be adopted without
any compromise for system operation. However, in distribution grids, considering
that DG are located close to consumers, the relaxation of the undervoltage
protection settings may lead to undesired situations such as the formation of
unintentional electrical islands. In order to avoid that and simultaneously in the
attempt of complying with grid-code requirements, an innovative undervoltage FRT
protection function has been developed and implemented on a commercial relay.
The rationale of this new function is to ensure that the FRT requirements are
fulfilled. Simultaneously, extended operation of the DG unit above the limits
defined by FRT curve is avoided.
Taking into consideration that there is not an available FRT function on
commercial protection relays, this new function was designed using the EFACEC
commercial relay measurements, logic and timers through the re-definition of the
undervoltage protection function.
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The flowchart of the FRT protection function is presented in Figure 29. It

consists on the illustration of the basic functionalities that were implemented. The
voltage reading function occurs in real time. Whenever the voltage becomes below
90% of the nominal voltage, the FRT function enters into operation. If the voltage
levels increase to values above 90% of nominal voltage, then the FRT protection
function is de-activated.
The FRT curve was parameterised using the available logic blocks on the
protection relay. Logic blocks are often available to program special functions
hardware blocking sequence. However, for this specific case these blocks were
used to develop the FRT protection function concept. The approach consisted on
digitalising the FRT curve through a set of comparison steps. Each comparison
step was composed by a set of voltage and time value as illustrated in Figure 30.
Whenever the voltage becomes reduced, below a threshold value, the method
enters in operation. The timers are reset and start counting until the programmed
value is reached (the correspondent FRT curve time). After reaching the pre-
settled time, a digital activation signal is sent to an “AND” gate. On the other
“AND” gate terminal, there is a signal that comes from a compassion block. This is
a block that sends an activation signal whenever the value in its input A is smaller
than the value in the input B. For this specific case, the rationale consist on
sending a positive digital output whenever the voltage measures at the DG
terminal is smaller than the correspondent voltage comparison value. With both
time and comparator signals presenting the “1” digital value, it means that the
voltage is below the minimum value for the correspondent time thus, the breaker
signal must be activated. Finally, the “OR” gate is responsible for gathering the
output signals from every voltage/time comparison step and, in case of any
activation, it immediately provokes the breaker signal activation. It is also
important to stress that the zone between 0 and 0.5 s, where the voltage cannot
assume values below 0.2 p.u., is protected by the second step minimum voltage
protection function which was parameterised with the voltage value of 20% Un and
instantaneous pick-up time.
Taking into consideration the limited amount of available logics within the
protection relay, the quantification of the FRT curve needed to be simplified. So,
without lack of completeness, the Portuguese FRT curve was described by 12
comparison points as illustrated in Figure 31.
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Figure 29 – FRT protection function flowchart
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a
voltage Reset
Comparator
a<b
b
Vpick
t1
a Breaker
voltage Tripping
Comparator AND
a<b Signal
b
V1
1
OR
n
Reset
tn
a
voltage
Comparator AND
a<b
b
Vn
Figure 30 – Logic diagram of FRT protection function
Figure 31 – FRT curve programmed in the digital relay
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5 Protection relay – adaptive characteristics

The need for new protection philosophies, different from those applied in
distribution networks until now, arises from the changes the power network is
facing in recent years due to the widespread dissemination of variable distributed
generation resources. Several problems associated with the limitations of past
protection practices in this new environment were described in the previous
section and include impacts such as protection blinding with consequent relay
failure to operate, inadvertent tripping of healthy lines or the increase of failed
reclosing attempts.
New methodologies can be accomplished by the integration of other protection
functions not typically used in distribution feeders: a simple example is the
replacement of simple overcurrent relays by a more advanced protection function
including a directional element. Another possible solution to face these new
challenges, which can successfully complement the strategy of adding new
functions, is the adoption of adaptive protection schemes – a topic debated for a
long time in the protection industry that now proves more necessary because the
network topology and characteristics are effectively changing more often
according to the profiles of distributed generation.
One straightforward way of achieving an adaptive protection scheme that can
be efficiently implemented with available technology is to change protection
function settings according to a set of specific logic conditions. The settings are
structured in groups, only one being active at a certain time instant. Each setting
group corresponds to a specific protection profile previously adjusted for a specific
scenario of application, which additionally ensures the dependability and security
of the protection schemes being deployed.
The application of adaptive protection strategies can be used to reach one or
more of the following objectives:
 Adapt the fault detection thresholds to the actual short-circuit levels in each
location, according for instance to the topology of the distribution network
and the presence of distributed generation.
 Desensitise protection functions according to the amount of distributed
generation in the same feeder, which can largely vary during a relatively
short time period.
 Adapt the protection behavior to changes in the type of neutral connection
(for example, from low-impedance to ungrounded neutral when the neutral
reactance is disconnected).
 Activate the directional element or change the direction of protection
functions according to the power flow in the feeders.
 Coordinate the protection functions of the substation relay with other
downstream devices, such as reclosers, sectionalizers or fuses, located
along the Medium Voltage lines and in the MV/LV substations, and
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optimise the global fault clearance time by adjusting protection function

parameters to the actual network configuration.
Notwithstanding this ability of dynamically changing the active setting group,
other simple strategies are available and should also be considered, such as:
 Independent blocking of specific protection function stages during specific

conditions;
 Adjustment of main protection thresholds by means of multiplying factors
depending on function inputs.
In any case, it must be guaranteed the adequate level of coordination among
all installed protection relays at any time in order to keep the necessary selectivity
of the overall protection schemes that are being implemented. For this reason it
may become necessary to change the active setting groups in several protection
relays in different locations / feeders simultaneously or at least in a coordinated
manner. The technologies applied should guarantee this requirement.
The availability of several setting groups is now a base characteristic of
modern protection relays, as it is described in the following subsection with a
concrete example used in this project.
5.1.1 TPU S220 relay main functions and applications
The TPU S220 is a compact multifunction relay developed and manufactured

by Efacec. Its main application is the protection of power system overhead lines or
underground cables, in medium voltage distribution networks, with several options
for the kind of neutral connection: directly grounded, low-impedance through a
neutral resistance or reactance, ungrounded or compensated neutral. It also fits
other applications such as: generic backup protection (transformers, generators,
etc.), as well as protection for the interconnection of distributed generation
installations with the main network.
Several protection and protection related functions are built-in in this protection
relay, including among other:
 (Directional) Phase Overcurrent (ANSI 50/51/67),

 (Directional) Earth-Fault Overcurrent (ANSI 50N/51N/67N),
 (Directional) Negative Sequence Overcurrent (ANSI 46/67),
 Broken Conductor (ANSI 46BC),
 Under/Overvoltage (27/59),
 Under/Over/Rate-of-Change of Frequency (81U/81O/81RC),
 Directional Power (32),
 Automatic Reclosing (ANSI 79),
 Synchronism and Voltage Check (ANSI 25).
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Figure 32 – TPU S220 protection relay
This extended set of functions, each one including several independent

stages, allows the application of the relay in complex protection schemes and, in
conjunction with the ability to dynamically change setting groups, enables its
application in meshed networks or in systems with significant levels of distributed
generation. The possibility of freely programming additional user-defined functions
allows further application flexibility, providing alternatives for customisation of
protection schemes and implementation of PLC (control) logic.
5.1.2 Setting groups characteristics
As mentioned above, several groups of settings are considered for all

protection and automation functions built-in in the device. In the present example,
four different configuration scenarios are available, allowing the creation of four
distinct protection profiles that can be switched to at any time. In more complex
relays, this available number of setting groups is even higher (six or eight are
typical numbers).
This characteristic is additionally extended to the user-programmable
functions, meaning that the user can associate operational settings to these
functions as well and that they can be managed exactly in the same way as the
settings of built-in protection functions. For example a timer that controls specific
logic implemented in a user function can be treated as an operational setting and
dynamically change based on the same philosophy of setting group management,
without the need for reconfiguration of the relay logic.
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As an additional feature, all functions are organised and managed in logical

devices internally to the protection relay (which is the physical device). This is valid
for both built-in functions and user-programmable functions. In the present case,
the relay supports up to four logical devices among which all functions may be
freely distributed.
The concept of logical device enables the creation of several virtual IEDs
inside the same physical device that can be managed independently. A relevant
issue for our discussion is that the switchover of the active setting group is
processed independently for each logical device, meaning that all functions
included in the same group of functions change its settings simultaneously but
asynchronously with functions in other logical devices. This preserves at the same
time the coherence among the active settings of closely related functions,
guaranteeing adequate coordination between them, and at the same time the right
degree of independence between non-related functions. It is then possible to
consider distinct logic conditions to trigger the active setting group switch in
different logical devices, thus further increasing the number of different application
possibilities.
5.1.3 Methodologies for active setting group switchover
The active setting group for each group of functions can be changed in one of
several possible ways:
 Manually by the user in the local interface of the protection relay (both the
display and the web interface).
This option should be used mainly for initialisation of the active setting
group, during testing or in case of maintenance actions or other user
intervention.
Figure 33 – Changing the active setting group in the local interface of the relay
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 By issuing a remote control from the control center, using the SCADA/DMS
system.
Besides providing remote manual control over the active setting groups,
this method also enables the automatic redefinition of protection settings
based on the network configuration and a set of relevant entities as well as
other influencing factors (for example, weather condition) that can be
accessed at the SCADA level.
 By state change of one or more dedicated binary inputs.

Setting groups can be directly interchanged according to the state of some
binary inputs. One possible application is the interaction of each relay with
a Smart Substation Controller (SSC) installed at the HV/MV substation,
which centrally coordinates the management of active settings, ensuring
the most adequate protection profiles based on the network state, the
distributed generation levels and eventually other influencing factors.
 By the reception of GOOSE signals though the communication interface.

This can provide an alternative to the previous method, with the additional
advantage of reducing the wiring connections needed. It also enables an
easier extension of these methodologies to peer-to-peer communication
applications, where the active setting group switchover can be controlled
from the interchange of information between several IEDs. This will
become more frequent as the adoption of the IEC 61850 standard is
generalised and the confidence in distributed automation schemes
increases.
 By any other user-defined logic.

The capacity of changing the active setting groups directly from a user-
defined function enables the extension of the previous methods to any
other complex logic conditions processed by the relay. The user programs
can combine nowadays Boolean, integer and floating point logic and
arithmetic, together with the full range of standard function blocks including
flip-flops, counters or timers. Since all signals, either from communications,
I/O, HMI, diagnostics or built-in functions, can be fed to the logic engine,
operational settings can be adapted according to a broad set of conditions
permanently evaluated.
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Figure 34 – Example of user-defined program that changes active setting groups
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6 Testbed integration
In recent years, modern adaptive protection schemes, capable of addressing
all the previous protection challenges, are being developed by protection
engineers and researchers. Adaptive protection has been defined in [33] as “a
protection philosophy which adjusts the settings of various protection functions in
order to make them more attuned to prevailing power system conditions”. For this
reason, the functionality of adaptive schemes is based on using multiple groups of
protection element settings, as has been described in relative literature [34]–[38].
6.1 Description and characterization of ICCS testbed

An innovative testbed has been developed in the Electric Energy Systems
Laboratory (EESL) of ICCS/NTUA, to evaluate and verify the performance of
adaptive protection schemes. This testbed is actually a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL)
infrastructure, as illustrated in Figure 35 and Figure 36, which consists of a Real
Time Digital Simulator (RTDS®), two digital protection relays, as well as a
programmable logic controller (PLC). In the sequel, the components, the
developed network model on the RDTS, and the overall functionality of this
particular testbed, are described in detail.
SIMULATED NETWORK (RDTS)

Trip/Reclose Command
Low-Level Interface
Voltage & Current Phasors
FEEDER PROTECTION RELAYS DI 48Vdc

Low-Level
Interface
Dsitribution Trip/Reclose Command
Grid CBs DO 5Vdc
status
CONTROL UNIT
DI/DO
24Vdc
AUXILIARY RELAYS
Coil +Vdc Change Setting Group

voltages Commands
COIL
5Vdc
24Vdc -Vdc
POWER SUPPLIES
24Vdc 48Vdc
ADAPTIVE LOGIC (CONTROL UNIT)
Figure 35 – Testbed configuration; DI: Digital Input, DO: Digital Output
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Figure 36 – The developed testbed in ICCS
6.1.1 Components and interfaces
In this section, the various components constituting the developed testbed are
presented, and their hardware specifications are outlined.
6.1.1.1 Real Time Digital Simulator

The real time simulator of ICCS/NTUA (Figure 37) is a cubicle of the
commercially available Real Time Digital Simulator RTDS® [39], composed of
several processing cards, an interface card, and various analogue and digital
inputs/outputs (I/Os). The operation of the RTDS is based on parallel processing,
using a large number of floating-point digital signal processors (DSPs) organised
into individual racks.
Specifically, the RTDS consists of 16 TPCs (Tandem Processor Card), 1 dual
3PC (Triple Processor Card), and one WIC (Workstation Interface Card) which is
responsible for the communication among all the processing cards. Moreover,
each TPC has 8 analogue output ports and 2 digital I/O ports, while the dual 3PC
card has 48 analogue outputs and 4 digital I/O ports. It is also equipped with an
OADC (optical analogue digital converter) card that provides 6 additional
optoisolated inputs to the original 3 analogue inputs.
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Figure 37 – The ICCS RTDS cubicle
In dedicated software (RSCAD), the distribution network and its various

components are simulated, with a typical time-step of 50 μsec. RSCAD also
includes libraries with a multitude of power, control, and protection equipment
models, to create simulation cases. The analogue output range is ±10V, with the
analogue input range to be ±5V. In addition, the logic value “1” of digital I/Os
corresponds to ±5V dc voltage signal. It should be noted, that the maximum
number of available nodes is 21 single-phase nodes. All RTDS specifications are
summarised in Table 17.
Table 17 – Specifications of the ICCS RTDS
16 Tandem Processor Cards (TPCs) 1 Triple Processor Card (3PC)

8 analogue output ports (±10V) 48 analogue output ports (±10V)
2 analogue input ports (±5 V) Digital input/output ports (16-bit each, 5 V)
Digital input/output ports (16-bit each, 5 V)
Inter-Rack Communication Switch (IRC) Workstation Interface Card (WIC)
Communication and completely bi-directional Communication between RTDS and PC with
interconnection among all RTDS racks in RSCAD installed, via Ethernet TCP/IP cards
simulations
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6.1.1.2 Protection Relays

Concerning the protective devices of the ICCS testbed, two digital
multifunction relays are involved in the HIL secondary tests. Specifically, the SEL-
311B and SEL-587 relays [40] of the ICCS digital protection panel [41][40] are
utilized to verify that complete protection is provided by the proposed adaptive
scheme. The ICCS digital protection panel is illustrated in Figure 38.
Figure 38 – Set-up of the ICCS digital protection system
The SEL-311B multifunction relay provides complete monitoring and

protection of power transmission and distribution lines [42], due to the large
amount of protection and logic elements available. The major protection elements
of the SEL-311B relay are the three-zone phase and ground mho distance
elements. The phase distance elements are polarised either by a positive-
sequence memory voltage or by a compensated voltage for LLG, LL and 3P faults
detection. The ground distance elements can only be polarised by a positive-
sequence memory for LG faults detection.
In addition, the SEL-311B relay provides three-level instantaneous or definite-
time phase, ground and negative-sequence overcurrent elements (50P/G/Q), as
well as inverse-time phase, ground and negative-sequence overcurrent elements
(51P/G/Q), with directional control (67). Other available features are the
overvoltage (59) and undervoltage (27) elements. Most importantly, the SEL-311B
relay offers 6 setting groups to implement different protection schemes, depending
on the prevailing operating conditions. It also has 6 optoisolated inputs, seven
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programmable output contacts, and also an alarm output contact to implement the
required control schemes.
In our application, the SEL-311B relay undertakes the supervision and
protection of a specific distribution feeder, adapting properly its setting group in
case of change in the network configuration.
The SEL-587 digital relay provides current differential protection combined
with two groups of full-featured overcurrent elements, and is commonly used to
protect two-terminal power equipment (e.g. two-winding power transformers,
generators, large motors, reactors etc.) [43]. Moreover, the SEL-587 package has
two optoisolated inputs, four programmable output contacts, and also an alarm
output contact for logic schemes. The two groups of overcurrent elements
provided by this protective device include:
 instantaneous phase (50PH) and residual (50NH) elements,

 definite-time phase (50P), negative-sequence (50Q) and residual (50N)
elements,
 inverse-time phase (51P), negative-sequence (51Q) and residual (51N)
elements.
In the proposed testbed, the SEL-587 relay provides non-directional
overcurrent protection to a specific distribution feeder of the simulated network, for
the examination of the sympathetic tripping phenomenon in DG-penetrated
distribution grids.
Moreover, a digital protective relay TPU S220 [7], supplied by the project
partner EFACEC, will be involved in the closed-loop tests for the proof of concept
(Sub-Task 5.2.3). The TPU S220 is a compact multifunction protection relay that
provides a cost-effective solution for distribution feeder protection, including a
large variety of protection, control, and recording elements. A detailed description
of relay functions and conducted secondary tests will be presented in the
Deliverable 5.3.
6.1.1.3 Programmable Logic Controller

The adaptive logic of the proposed protective scheme is running on a
SIMATIC S7-300 PLC [44], which receives the grid circuit breaker (CB) statuses
as an event table by RTDS, and then determines which relay setting group should
be active for the current operating conditions. The main components of the
SIMATIC S7-300 PLC are provided in Table 18.
The desired automation procedures are programmed and downloaded to the
PLC, making use of STEP7 software and the programming languages Ladder
Diagram (LAD) and Statement List (STL).
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Table 18 – Specifications of the ICCS PLC
Power Supply Central Processor Unit

PS 307 2A (110 ÷ 230 V AC – 24 V DC) CPU 312C
Signal Module #1 (SM #1) Signal Module #2 (SM #2)
Hybrid card with
10 Digital Inputs – 6 Digital Outputs (10D.I. – Card with 8 Analogue Inputs (8A.I.)
6D.O.)
6.1.1.4 Auxiliary Devices

In addition to the previous main equipment of the ICCS testbed, a set of
auxiliary devices for the necessary dc circuits is employed. In electrical
installations, the most critical component of the protection, control, and monitoring
systems is the auxiliary dc control power system. Failure of the dc control power
can render protective devices unable to detect faults, breakers unable to trip for
faults etc. An auxiliary dc control power system commonly consists of the battery,
the battery charger, auxiliary relay coils and contacts, breaker auxiliary contacts,
breaker trip and close coils, wiring and connections, as well as any monitoring
devices.
As far as the ICCS testbed is concerned, the auxiliary devices are installed in
the control panel along with the PLC, as shown in Figure 39. The role of battery
and battery charger is played by two AC-to-DC power supplies 24 V DC and 48 V
DC, which provide the desirable level of DC voltage to the logic circuits. These
logic circuits are very significant for the reliable operation of the adaptive
protection scheme, since they allow protection relays to receive control commands
and signals from RTDS and PLC. The necessary interfaces among RTDS, PLC,
and protection relays are established with the use of auxiliary relays, integrating
equipment with different DC logic levels (RTDS 5 V DC, PLC 24 V DC, SEL-311B
48 V DC) into a common control scheme.
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Figure 39 – Components of the ICCS Control Unit
6.1.2 Network model on RTDS
The model of the distribution network under examination was designed in the
RSCAD environment, and used in a series of simulations. It represents a simplified
single-phase configuration of the Rhodes HV/MV Substation “Gennadi”, and its
outgoing feeders R-22 and R-26. The developed distribution network consists of
two feeders, with distributed generation and loads. The network parameters can
be found in Appendix A.
The distributed generation, either synchronous-based or inverter-interfaced,
was modelled as a controllable current source. In case of synchronous-based DG
unit, a current source with equivalent short-circuit behaviour was derived, due to
the small number of single-phase nodes available. The setpoint of DG units
changes according to the state of the system (whether the fault was active or not),
employing a phase-locked loop (PLL). The bus loads were modelled as constant-
impedance lumped loads. Moreover, the option of simulating symmetrical (three-
phase) short circuits at all buses was added, as can be seen in Figure 40.
A current transformer (CT) was installed at the beginning of each feeder (CTA
and CTA2), to monitor the flowing current, and feed its corresponding hardware
protection relay. The ratios of CTA and CTA2 were taken equal to 800/5 and
800/1, respectively.
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Figure 40 – The developed DG-penetrated distribution network in RSCAD
Figure 41 shows the control scheme, which imposes the setpoint and
regulates the power production of the connected DGs. The setpoint of simulated
DG units is also used to determine their circuit breaker status, which is the main
information needed by the adaptive protection algorithm.
Figure 41 – Control scheme of simulated DG units in RSCAD
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The hardware relays of the proposed testbed are fed with three-phase current
phasors in their input, in contrast to the modelled system which is an equivalent
single-phase network, calculating and supplying only one-phase current signals.
This restriction can be overcome with the derivation of two additional current
signals delayed by 120o and 240o with reference to the calculated one, forming a
set of symmetrical current phasors, Figure 42. Thus, the simulation of three-phase
short circuits at buses and along lines, as well as the testing of hardware relays
performance under such fault conditions, is achieved.
Figure 42 – Single-phase to symmetrical three-phase current transformation in RSCAD
To attain instant response of circuit breakers to trip commands, a closed loop

connection between the hardware relays and the simulated breakers was
established. For this purpose, two digital inputs of the RTDS rack were used (one
for each simulated breaker). These digital signals (0 or 1) represent the breaker
status (open or close, respectively). Figure 43 shows the implementation of the
previous description.
Figure 43 – Digital input blocks in RSCAD for monitoring the status of the two simulated breakers
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Last but not least, the symmetrical fault conditions were modelled with
adjustable duration and time of occurrence. Hence, the user has the flexibility of
customising the nature of the fault to be simulated. Furthermore, a zero-crossing
detection method for the node voltages was implemented. Making use of this
technique, the fault was always applied to the simulated electrical network when
the voltage waveform was crossing the zero voltage value. In Figure 44, the
implemented control circuits are illustrated.
Figure 44 – Control blocks for voltage zero-crossing detection & fault regulation in RSCAD
6.1.3 Hardware-in-the-loop tests
A very promising simulation and validation technology, that is gaining interest,

is the Hardware-In-the-Loop (HIL) process, where a hardware device is tested by
means of a simulator [14]. It combines the advantages of both simulation and
hardware tests, while offering the opportunity of testing real devices under
operating conditions almost identical to the real ones. Indeed, it is a closed loop
procedure where the Hardware under Test (HuT) is affected by the simulated
system and vice versa. Moreover, it provides the capability of identifying hidden
defects of the tested device, before it causes any damage to the real system. HIL
testing can show features not visible in pure simulations, and as a result, accurate
models can be derived (e.g. tuning simulation parameters according to the HIL
results). The HIL approach has been already used in various domains, including
the power system, the automotive, as well as the automation domain.
The HΙL technique is distinguished into two main categories: the Controller
Hardware-In-the-Loop (CHIL), which tests the control logic executed in a hardware
controller (e.g. converter controller, relay) [45]–[53] , and the Power Hardware-In-
the-Loop (PHIL), where a power device is tested (e.g. PV inverter, wind energy
system) [54]–[56]. In both categories a Real-Time Simulator (RTS) is used for
designing and running the simulated system. The main difference between CHIL
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and PHIL is the power exchange between the HuT and the simulated system. As a
result, in case of PHIL, a power amplifier is required for the interconnection of the
RTS with the power equipment.
Concerning the ICCS testbed, the implemented HIL testing configuration is
illustrated in Figure 45, where the simplified distribution grid is simulated by the
RTDS and the outgoing feeders are protected by the hardware relays.
Figure 45 – HIL tests by means of the ICCS testbed
6.1.3.1 Functionality of the ICCS testbed

As already mentioned, the examined network is simulated by means of the
RTDS, while the digital relays undertake the protection of the two distribution
feeders. The PLC supervises perpetually the DG breaker statuses, and activates
the corresponding relay setting group, if necessary. Five setting groups, available
in the SEL-311B relay, are employed, with the setting values of each group pre-
calculated according to each possible operating mode of the network. More
specifically, the steps of the adaptive protection procedure are as follows:
 The RTDS injects the generated signals, which correspond to the
protected feeder three-phase currents, into the relay low-level interface by
means of a ribbon cable (Figure 46).
 The RTDS sends the status of the supervised circuit breaker to the relay
(‘52a’ to IN101), as well as the network configuration to the PLC as a 4-bit
string (DI1 to DI4). Respectively, the PLC determines which setting group
should be active for the prevailing operating state of the network, sending
to the relay a 5-bit string (IN102 to IN106). These signals are shown in
Table 19 for illustration. In case of a short circuit detected by the SEL-
311B, a tripping command is sent from the relay (OUT101) to the
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simulated circuit breaker in RTDS, in order to clear the fault. The previous
description is made clear by the schematics in Figure 47 and Figure 48.
Figure 46 – Relay secondary testing by means of the RTDS
Table 19 – Binary signals in the ICCS HIL testbed according to each operating state
PLC output signal to relay

RTDS binary string to PLC
Network Configuration (IN102-IN103-IN104-IN105-
(DI1-DI2-DI3-DI4)
IN106)
No DGs connected 0-0-0-0 1-0-0-0-0
DG1 connected to Bus 1.1 1-0-0-0 0-1-0-0-0
DG3 connected to Bus 2.1 1-0-1-0 0-0-1-0-0
DG1 & DG2 connected 1-1-0-0 0-0-0-1-0
All DGs connected 1-1-1-1 0-0-0-0-1
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+ 48 V DC
RTDS PLC PLC PLC PLC PLC

52a DO1 DO2 DO3 DO4 DO5
IN IN IN IN IN IN OUT
SEL-311B 101 102 103 104 105 106 101
- 48 V DC
RTDS
TRIP CB
Figure 47 – Synoptic DC Schematic of the SEL-311B protection relay
+ 24 V DC
RTDS OUTPUT Bit ‘1’ Bit ‘2’ Bit ‘3’ Bit ‘4’
BINARY STRING
SIMATIC DI DI DI DI DO DO DO DO DO
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 5
S7-300
- 24 V DC
SEL-311B SEL-311B SEL-311B SEL-311B SEL-311B

IN102 IN103 IN104 IN105 IN106
Figure 48 – Synoptic DC Schematic of the SIMATIC S7-300 PLC
The settings of SEL relays are configured by means of the AcSELerator

QuickSet® SEL-5030 software [57], which can also be used for deploying logic
schemes. In the proposed testbed, the activation of the proper setting group is
achieved by the logic equations shown in Figure 49. If one of SS1 to SS5 settings
becomes equal to logical ‘1’, the corresponding setting group is activated. For
example, if setting SS3 is asserted to ‘1’, Setting Group 3 becomes active with
highest priority. In other words, the Setting Group 3 remains active, regardless of
the values of settings SS1, SS2, SS4, and SS5, even if it is deasserted to logical
‘0’. If setting SS3 is deasserted to logical ‘0’ and one of the other settings is
asserted to logical ‘1’, the relay switches from Setting Group 3 to the proper setting
group, and the adaptation is accomplished.
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Figure 49 – Adaptive selection of the proper setting group using the AcSELarator Quickset®
6.2 Description and characterization of INESC testbed
6.2.1 Hardware Specifications
6.2.1.1 Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS)

The RTDS of INESC Porto is a portable cubicle version supplied by the Real
Time Digital Simulator. The cubicle is composed by processing cards,
communication cards, Digital to Analogue D/A and Analogue Digital A/D
converters [39].
Generally the RTDS is used to perform the so-called Hardware-in-Loop (HIL)
simulations. The HIL simulations consists on having the RTDS interconnected to
an external device (usually commercially available protection or control hardware)
which will operate according with user-defined settings and will provide signals to
the RTDS. These signals can be analogue or digital and will interact with the
simulation. In sum, RTDS allows to test real-world devices in simulation
framework.
The INESC Porto RTDS is composed by 1 dual 3PC (Triple Processor Card),
1 GPC (Giga Processor Card) and one WIC (Workstation Interface Card). The
dual 3PC card has 48 analogue outputs and 4 digital I/O ports while the GPC card
has 24 analogue signals output. Usually, GPC card is dedicated to small time-step
blocks where detailed model of generators are performed while the 3PC is
completely dedicated to auxiliary calculations and grid representation. The output
signals are scaled at ±10V requiring adaptation to the usual ± 48V adopted in
substation hardware [67]. To adapt the signal, voltage and current amplifiers are
used.
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6.2.1.2 Digital Relays

The digital protective relay to be adopted on the closed-loop tests will be the
EFACEC TPU S220 [72] supplied by the project partner, EFACEC.
The main relay protective functions are listed on Table 20.
Table 20 – EFACEC TPU S220 Relay functions
Protection Function ANSI

Phase overcurrent 50/51
Directional phase overcurrent 67
Earth-fault overcurrent 50N/51N
Directional earth-fault overcurrent 67N
Cold load pickup
Blocking scheme logic 68
Thermal overload 49
Negative sequence overcurrent / phase 46
Directional balance
negative sequence 67
overcurrent
Switch-onto-fault 50HS
Directional earth-fault overcurrent for 32N
non-earthed
Directional systems
power 32
Phase undervoltage 27
Phase overvoltage 59
Residual overvoltage 59N
Negative sequence overvoltage / phase 47
balance
Underfrequency 81
Overfrequency 81
Frequency rate-of-change 81
For the sake of the closed-loop tests performed in this task only phase
overcurrent (50/5) and phase undervoltage (27) functions should be used.
6.2.1.3 Interface Amplifier

The testbed interface amplifier interfaces the RTDS voltage and current
signals with the EFACEC relay. The available amplifier is manufactured by “Doble
Engineering Company” – model DOBLE F6350e [73]. The rationale of adopting an
amplifier to interface the RTDS signals and the protection relay is related to the
fact that the RTDS signals are limited to ±10V. Thus, the amplifier is responsible
for adapting the RTDS signal to the values within the protection relay inputs range.
Considering that real-time closed-loop tests are considered, the amplifier must be
accurate and fast on reproducing the input signal.
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6.2.2 Network model on RTDS
The network used to represent typical MV Portuguese Distribution grids was

the Évora-Casinha substation which layout is illustrated in Figure 50.
Figure 50 – Évora – Casinha feeders’ layout
Considering the INESC Porto’s RTDS computational limitation, it did not

presented to be feasible to fully represent the aforementioned network in the
software/hardware. Thus, without the lack of completeness, each network feeder
has been represented by the equivalent impedance according to the schematic
illustrated in Figure 51.
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Feeder 1
DG
Load 1
Feeder 2
Load 2
Figure 51 – Simplified Distribution network modelled in RTDS
In addition to the distribution grid, two DG technologies were considered in

order to evaluate their contribution during fault events. A conventional
synchronous generator unit has been considered, representing CHP (Combined
Heat and Power) plants and mini hydro units, and an integral converter interfaced
unit representing micro turbines, solar PV panels and small-scale wind generators.
The synchronous generation unit was modelled based on the model blocks
available on the RTDS/RSCAD library. It consists of a constant torque
synchronous machine and IEEE type1 excitation system. Regarding the full-size
converter interfaced generators a user-defined model approach was considered
since the available models at the RTDS/RSCAD library are very complex from the
computational perspective (representing switching functions) and thus are not
compatible with the existing RTDS capabilities. So, in contrast and following the
trends presented in the literature, the Voltage Source Converter (VSC) main
dynamics was represented by its control loops which were responsible by setting
the voltage set-points to controllable voltage. In order to assess the real impacts
regarding the VSC-based DG during fault events, the converters’ current limiters
were also modelled and taken into consideration. The general overview of the
VSC-based model is illustrated in Figure 52.
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Vdc
Pgen
Gr
id
Vdc Id
max
Vd_ref Id_ref Vd’

PI PI
Id Id
min
Iq
max
Q_ref Iq_ref Vq’

PI PI
Qout Iq Iq
min
Figure 52 – VSC-based DG unit model
6.2.3 Hardware-in-the-loop tests
The INESC Porto RTDS testbed schematic is illustrated in Figure 53. The
network modelled case was modelled in the RTDS software, the RSCAD. Then it
is compiled and sent to the RTDS hardware simulator. Additionally to the grid
model, the user defines the outputs to be delivered to external devices, allocating
processors’ tasks to these I/O function. For this specific case, in order to
interconnect the digital protective relay, three phase voltage and current
measurements were delivered at the RTDS output socket.
The RTDS output signals come limited to ±10V. Then, the amplifier is
responsible to adapt these signals to the adequate range (according to user
adjustment) to be used as input of the EFACEC relay. The EFACEC relay was
programed accordingly to the test with the respective protection functionality and
the respective parameterisation. The relay output (tripping signal) interacts with
the simulation by controlling the position of the DG connection line breaker
(opened or closed).
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Deliverable 4.3
RTDS
Simulator
3ph voltage and Amplified voltage
current signals Voltage & Current and current signals
Amplifier
EFACEC
S220
DG
Load 1
Digital output - Tripping Signal
Load 2
Figure 53 – Connection schematic of closed-loop testbed
To test the SSC concept a real time closed-loop test with a commercial
protective relay was set. The commercial protective relay used was EFACEC TPU
S220. Figure 54 represents the interaction between the components involved in
the closed-loop test.
Figure 54 – Interconnection of components used in a closed loop test
Figure 54 shows the bidirectionality between the software and the simulator. As
mentioned before, it is possible to send command orders to the simulation and
receive the results from the simulation running in the simulator. The simulator has
an analogue connection with the relay through which it sends the required
analogue signals. It also has a digital connection with the relay that allows digital
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Deliverable 4.3
signals bidirectional communication. Figure 55 shows a schematic diagram of the

physical connections for the closed-loop test circuit.
Figure 55 – Scheme of the connection for closed loop test
There are seven conductors coming out from the simulator. Three of them
correspond to each phase voltage from the MV busbar, and the other three
correspond to each phase currents of the line protected by the corresponding
relay. These analogue signals are inputs to the digital relay, allowing it to monitor
the voltage and current in the MV feeder. The last signal coming out from the
simulator corresponds to the control digital signal that makes the change of setting
group ordered by the SSC when the conditions for that are in place (see
Section 4.2.2.1). The signal coming out from the relay corresponds to the digital
signal sent by the relay to open the circuit breaker in case there is a violation of
any limit of the protection functions. The phase overcurrent protection function was
configured to be the only one active in the commercial relay since it is the only
protection function necessary to perform the required study.
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In Figure 55 the commercial protective relay is playing the role of R2 (Figure

18) protecting line 2. A similar physical connection should be made for the
commercial protective relay play the role of R1 (Figure 18) and provide protection
for line 1, except the signal to switch setting group which is not required for R1.
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Deliverable 4.3
7 KPI Analysis
According to Deliverable 2.4 of the SuSTAINABLE Project (KPI Assessment
Methodology) the SF9 functionality has impacts on Power Quality (KPI 5),
Reduction of DER due to congestion (KPI 7) and Optimized use of assets (KPI 8).
The KPI quantitative analysis depends on the amount of unwanted trips or
undetected faults that may occur in the network. The dependence of a large
number of variables ranging from network planning procedures, type of DER
technology, inverter short-circuit behaviour lack of standardization, type of faults,
location of faults and economical drivers for DER installation does not allow for an
accurate estimation of the number of unwanted trips or undetected faults.
Regarding Power Quality impact, the loss of a large amount of DER from the
network will cause an undervoltage over the remaining network.
If issues like sympathetic tripping and protection blinding are tackled through
advanced protection system then there will be no need to limit installed DER
through planning rules. Therefore, it will contribute to KPI 7 by increasing the
amount of DER that is possible to install in the network. That will also affect KPI 8
(Optimized use of assets).
The quantification of these KPIs will be assessed on Deliverable 5.3.
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Deliverable 4.3
8 Conclusions
This deliverable presents the details about the implementation of the
functionalities that compose the advanced protection systems of the project
SuSTAINABLE. A description of the grid used to model the test systems at ICCS
and INESC were used. This limited but extremely flexible setting allows all the
functionalities to be tested, creating all the adequate scenarios for the validation of
the implementations.
After a comprehensive description of all the possible faults in MV distribution
networks and how these can be affected by the presence of high penetration
levels of DG, the protection functions adequate to tackle these challenges are
documented. Furthermore, the impact of distributed generation on the current off
the shelf protection relays is analysed specifically for the following 5 issues:
- Protection Blinding
- Sympathetic Tripping
- Failed Auto-Reclosing
- Loss-of-mains Protection
- Fault Ride-though
It is in fact demonstrated how the current protection relays can be

complemented with new functionalities in order to make them adaptive to the
operational specificities introduced by DG. This deliverable shows the
methodologies developed to achieve this objective and the test results of the
implementation of these functionalities will be show in deliverable D5.2 as a proof-
of-concept validation.
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Deliverable 4.3
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de automatismo: “religação rápida e/ou lenta de disjuntores” - Espeficação Funcional.
Available: www.edpdistribuicao.pt -> profissional -> Documentos Normativos -> DEF-
C13-551, access on 14 May
[68] A. R. Oliveira, “Validação das Funções de Proteção de uma Saída de Média Tensão com
Produção Renovável Eólica usando CAPE Software”, Master of Science, Department of
Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Porto, Porto, 2011.
[69] H. Leite, P. Ramalho, B. Silva, and R. Fiteiro, “Distributed Generation protection scheme to
permit ride-through fault”, in Electricity Distribution - Part 1, 2009. CIRED 2009. 20th
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Instalações de Produção de Energia Eléctrica em Regime Especial”, ed: Direção-Geral de
Energia, 2002.
[71] RTDS User’s Manual Set, 2005 Version, RTDS Technologies.
[72] EFACEC TPU S220 Catalog – available in:
http://www.efacec.pt/PresentationLayer/efacec_produto_01.aspx?idioma=2&area=2&idProd
uto=515
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[74] A. Bernardo, N. Silva, N. Delgado, R. Jorge, and A. Carrapatoso, “DG behaviour and
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94/97
Deliverable 4.3
Appendix A. Test Network Data

A.1 ICCS TEST NETWORK
Detailed data of the ICCS test network components are given below in tabular
form, with reference to Figure 45. The simulated network operates at 50 Hz.
A.1.1 Upstream HV Grid Equivalent
Table 21 – Data of HV Grid
Parameter Value
Short-circuit MVA, Ssc 3000 MVA
R/X 0
A.1.2 Substation Power Transformer

Table 22 – Data of Substation Transformer
Parameter Value
Voltage Ratio 150 kV/20 kV
Rated Apparent Power, SrT 40 MVA
Impedance, Z (ukr) 12.8%
Total Winding Losses, PkrT 148 kW
Vector Group Dyn1
A.1.3 MV Distribution Lines

Table 23 – Data of Distribution Lines
Parameter Lines 1.1, 2.1 Lines 1.2, 2.2

Conductor Type ACSR ACSR
Cross Section 95 mm2 35 mm2
Resistance, RL 0.215 Ω/km 0.576 Ω/km
Reactance, XL 0.334 Ω/km 0.397 Ω/km
Capacitance, CL 0.01 uF/km 0.01 uF/km
Maximum Capacity, Imax 448 A 224 A
Length 5 km 4 km
95/97
Deliverable 4.3
A.1.4 Lumped Loads

Table 24 – Load Data
Parameter Load 1.1 Load 1.2 Load 2.1 Load 2.2

Apparent Power, SLOAD 6 MVA 3 MVA 5 MVA 4 MVA
Power Factor, cosφ 0.9 ind.
A.1.5 DG Interconnection Transformer

Table 25 – Data of DG Interconnection Transformer
Parameter Value
Voltage Ratio 20 kV/0.4 kV
Rated Apparent Power, SrT 2.5 MVA
Impedance, Z (ukr) 6%
Total Winding Losses, PkrT 17 kW
Vector Group Dyn1
A.1.6 Synchronous DG Unit

Table 26 – Data of DG Unit
Parameter Value
Rated Voltage, Vr 0.4 kV
Rated Apparent Power, Sr 2.1 MVA
Power Factor, cosφ 0,85
Direct-axis Synchronous Reactance (saturated), Xd 271.3%
Direct-axis Transient Reactance (saturated), Xd’ 18.6%
Direct-axis Subtransient Reactance (saturated), Xd’’ 11.7%
Quadrature-axis Subtransient Reactance (saturated), Xq’’ 14.8%
Direct-axis Transient open circuit Time Constant, Td0’ 6.021 s
Direct-axis Transient short circuit Time Constant, Td’ 0.349 s
Direct-axis Subransient short circuit Time Constant, Td’’ 0.0291 s
96/97
Deliverable 4.3
A.2 INESCP TEST NETWORK

The data of the INESCP test network components are given below in tabular
form, with reference to Figure 51. The simulated network operates at 50 Hz.
A.2.1 MV Distribution Lines

Table 27 – Network feeder data
Parameter Value
Line 1 Resistance 3.645 Ω
Line 1 Reactance 1.628 mH
Line 2 Resistance 1.458 Ω
Line 2 Reactance 0.651 mH
A.2.2 Lumped Loads

Table 28 – Network load
Parameter Load 1 Load 2

Apparent Power, SLOAD 5 MVA 8 MVA
Power Factor, cosφ 0.9 ind.
A.2.3 DG Transformer data

Table 29 – DG transformer data
Parameter Value
Voltage Ratio 15 kV/0.69 kV
Rated Apparent Power 8 MVA
Impedance, Z (ukr) 6%
97/97

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THEME [ENERGY.2012.7.1.

1] Integration of Variable Distributed

Planning and protection of flexible

Authors Organization Email

Nuno Silva EFACEC nuno.silva@efacec.com

Rui Dias Jorge EFACEC rdjorge@efacec.com

Vasileios Papaspiliotopoulos ICCS vpapaspi@power.ece.ntua.gr

George Korres ICCS gkorres@cs.ntua.gr

Athanasios Vassilakis ICCS avassil@mail.ntua.gr

Vasilis Kleftakis ICCS vkleft@mail.ntua.gr

Stefanos Kokkinelis HEDNO stefanos.kokkinelis@gmail.com

Kostas Kaousias HEDNO K.Kaousias@deddie.gr

Bernardo Silva INESC bernardo.a.silva@inesctec.pt

André Madureira INESC andre.g.madureira@inesctec.pt

Miguel Louro EDP Distribuição miguel.Louro@edp.pt

Andre Neves EDP Distribuição Andre.Neves@edp.pt

Access: Project Consortium

Status: Draft version

4.4.2.2 Local Techniques................................................................................................. 53

Figure 51 – Simplified Distribution network modelled in RTDS ...................................................................... 84

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AFD Active Frequency Drift

AMI Advanced Metering Infrastructure

AVR Automatic Voltage Regulator

BER Bit Error Rate

CHIL Controller Hardware-In-the-Loop

CHP Combined Heat and Power

COSEM Companion Specification for Energy Metering

CSMA Carrier Sense Multiple Access

DEEPSO Differential Evolution – Evolutionary Particle Swarm Optimization

DER Distributed Energy Resources

DFIG Doubly-fed Induction Generator

DFT Discrete Fourier Transform

DLMS Device Language Message Specification

DoW Description of Work

DSM Demand Side Management

DSO Distribution System Operator

DTC Distribution Transformer Controller

FEC Forward Error Correction

GPRS General Packet Radio Service

HuT Hardware under Test

KPI Key Performance Indicator

LAN Local Area Network

LLC Logical Link Control

LOM Loss Of Mains

MAC Media Access Control

MGCC MicroGrid Central Controller

MIQCQP Mixed Integer Quadratically Constrained Quadratic problem

NDZ Non-Detection Zone

OCR Overcurrent Relay

OLTC On-Load Tap Changer

OPF Optimal Power Flow

OWL One-Way Latency

PCC Point of Common Coupling

PHIL Power Hardware-In-the-Loop

PLC Programmable Logic Controller

PLCC Power Line Courier Communication

PLL Phase-Locked Loop

RES Renewable Energy Sources

ROCOF Rate Of Change Of Frequency

ROCOP Rate Of Change Of Power

RPV Reactive Power Variation

RTDS Real Time Digital Simulator