1. G.R. No. 185125 January 30, 2012 Article III of R.A.
Article III of R.A. 6425 by mere presumption that the petitioner has
Ruben Del Castillo
vs.
People of the Philippines
Facts:
Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner Del Castillo
was engaged in selling shabu, police officers headed by SPO3
Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy
operation at the house of petitioner, secured a search warrant from
the RTC. Upon arrival to the residence of Del Castillo to implement
the search warrant, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw petitioner
run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house.
Masnayon chased him but to no avail, because he and his men were
not familiar with the entrances and exits of the place. They all went
back to the residence of Del Castillo and requested his men to get a
barangay tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men returned with
two barangay tanods who searched the house of petitioner including
the nipa hut where the petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His men
who searched the residence of the petitioner found nothing, but one
of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut
several articles, including four (4) plastic packs containing white
crystalline substance.
Thus, an information was filed against Del Castillo for violation of
Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the RTC
and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner filed with the
Supreme Court the petition for certiorari contending among others
that CA erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal possession of prohibited drugs, because he could not be
presumed to be in possession of the same just because they were
found inside the nipa hut.
Issue:
Can petitioner Del Castillo be held liable for violation of Section 16,
dominion and control over the place where the shabu was found?
Held:
No. While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or
seized should be owned by the person against whom the search
warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property
is under petitioner’s control or possession. The records are void of
any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question
nor was it established that he used the said structure as a shop. The
RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the
said structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the
petitioner being an electrician by profession.
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the
existence and presence of the drugs in the place under his control and
dominion and the character of the drugs. With the prosecution’s
failure to prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner’s control and
dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In
considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law’s own
starting perspective on the status of the accused — in all criminal
prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the
contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a
moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of
those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence.

2. PEOPLE vs GO Case Digest
PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPINES v. BENNY GO
411 SCRA 81 (2003), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)
The search and seizure of articles must be limited to those which
are particularly described in the search warrant.
FACTS: A raiding team armed with a warrant entered the home of
appelant Benny Go in search of evidence for the violation of
Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), otherwise know as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 . Upon their entry,
they met Jack Go, son of the Go and restrained him. As the former
was the only one present at the time they then called on two
baranggay kagawads to act as witnesses on the said search. They
then siezed properties and objects even those which were not
included in the warrant. When they were almost finished with their
search Go arrived and immediately together with the two witnesses
was made to sign the inventory reciept.
Based on the evidence taken from the search Go was charged for
violation of R.A. 6425. Upon hearing, testimonies as well as
evidences were presented by the prosecution against Go. However,
the two witnesses questioned the validity of some of the evidence
presented such as the inventory receipt as well as the illegal drugs
said to have been seized from the search.
The Regional Trial Court of Manila convicted Go for violation of the
offense cahrged. On appeal, Go assails the decision of the RTC as
well the validity of the search performed by the raiding team and the
admissibility of the evidence taken therefrom. Go also asks for the
return of the properties seized that were not included in the search
warrant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties not included in the search
warrant may be returned to Go
HELD: It bears reiterating that the purpose of the constitutional
requirement that the articles to be seized be particularly described in
the warrant is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those,
particularly described in the search warrant - to leave the officers of
the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize.
At the same time, the raiding team characterized the seizure of the
assorted documents, passports, bankbooks, checks, check writer,
typewriter, dry seals and stamp pads as ―seizure of evidence in
plain view. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the
―plain view‖ of an officer who has a right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence.
To be sure, the policemen also filed a complaint against Go for
alleged possession of instruments or implements intended for the
commission of falsification under paragraph 2 of Article 176 of the
Revised Penal Code on the basis of dry seals and rubber stamps also
found in appellant‘s residence.
The counterfeit nature of the seals and stamps was in fact not
established until after they had been turned over to the Chinese
embassy and Bureau of Immigration and Deportation for
verification. It is, therefore, incredible that SPO1 Fernandez could
make such determination from a ―plain view‖ of the items from his
vantage point in the sala.
In sum, the circumstances attendant to the case at bar do not warrant
the application of the ―plain view‖ doctrine to justify the seizure and
retention of the questioned seized items. The things belonging to
appellant not specifically mentioned in the warrants, like those not
particularly described, must thus be ordered returned to him.
Be that as it may, considering that the two (2) dry seals and eight (8)
of the rubber stamps have been certified to be counterfeit by the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, they may not be returned
and are hereby declared confiscated in favor of the State to be
disposed of according to law.
Moreover, the various bankbooks and passports not belonging to
appellant may not be ordered returned in the instant proceedings. The
legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights
have been impaired thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search
and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties.
3. People v. Pastrana
G.R. No. 196045
Facts:
On 26 March 2001, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Special
Investigator Albert Froilan Gaerlan (SI Gaerlan) filed a Sworn
Application for a Search Warrant before the RTC, Makati City,
Branch 63, for the purpose of conducting a search of the office
premises of respondents Amador Pastrana and Rufina Abad at Room
1908, 88 Corporate Center, Valero Street, Makati City. SI Gaerlan
alleged that he received confidential information that respondents
were engaged in a scheme to defraud foreign investors. Some of their
employees would call prospective clients abroad whom they would
convince to invest in a foreign-based company by purchasing shares
of stocks. Those who agreed to buy stocks were instructed to make a
transfer for the payment thereof. No shares of stock, however, were
actually purchased. Instead, the money collected was allocated as
follows: 42% to respondent Pastrana’s personal account; 32% to the
sales office; 7% to investors-clients, who threatened respondents
with lawsuits; 10% to the cost of sales; and 8% to marketing. Special
Investigator Gaerlan averred that the scheme not only constituted
estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), but also a
violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8799 or the Securities
Regulation Code (SRC).
In support of the application for search warrant, SI Gaerlan attached
the affidavit of Rashed H. Alghurairi, one of the complainants from
Saudi Arabia; the affidavits of respondents’ former employees who
actually called clients abroad; the articles of incorporation of
domestic corporations used by respondents in their scheme; and the
sketch of the place sought to be searched.
On 26 March 2001, Judge Tranquil Salvador, Jr. (Judge Salvador, Jr.)
of the RTC, Branch 63, Makati City, issued Search Warrant No. 01-
118 for violation of Republic Act No. 8799 (The Securities
Regulation Code) and Estafa (Art. 315, RPC).
Issue:
Whether Search Warrant No. 01-118 is void for having been issued
in violation of the requirement that a search warrant must be
issued for one specific offense only.
Arguments:
The Search Warrant is not void
Violation of Section 28.1 of the Securities Regulation Code (SRC)
and estafa are so intertwined that the punishable acts defined in one
of them can be considered as including or are necessarily included in
the other; that operating and acting as stockbrokers without the
requisite license infringe Section 28.1 of the SRC; that these specific
acts of defrauding another by falsely pretending to possess power or
qualification of being a stockbroker similarly constitute estafa under
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); and that both Section
28.1 of the SRC and Article 315 of the RPC penalize the act of
misrepresentation, an element common to both offenses; thus, the
issuance of a single search warrant did not violate the “one specific
offense rule.”
The search warrant is void
The subject warrant was issued in connection with more than one
specific offense; that estafa and violation of the SRC could not be
considered as one crime because the former is punished under the
RPC while the latter is punished under a special law; that there are
many violations cited in the SRC that there can be no offense which
is simply called “violation of R.A. No. 8799;” and that, similarly,
there are three classes of estafa which could be committed through at
least 10 modes, each one of them having elements distinct from
those of the other modes.
The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches
and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and
property, and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home, by
officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to
give remedy against such usurpations when attempted...
Ruling:
Yes.
The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches
and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and
property, and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home, by
officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to
give remedy against such usurpations when attempted.
One of the constitutional requirements for the validity of a search
warrant is that it must be issued based on probable cause which,
under the Rules, must be in connection with one specific offense to
prevent the issuance of a scatter — shot warrant.
Search Warrant No. 01-118 was issued in violation of this
requirement.
First, violation of the SRC is not an offense in itself for there are
several punishable acts under the said law such as manipulation of
security prices, insider trading, acting as dealer or broker without
being registered with the SEC, use of unregistered exchange, use of
unregistered clearing agency, and violation of the restrictions on
borrowings by members, brokers, and dealers among others. Even
the charge of “estafa under Article 315 of the RPC” is vague for
there are three ways of committing the said crime: (1) with
unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence; (2) by means of false
pretenses or fraudulent acts; or (3) through fraudulent means. The
three ways of committing estafa may be reduced to two, i.e.,(1) by
means of abuse of confidence; or (2) by means of deceit. For these
reasons alone, it can be easily discerned that Search Warrant No. 01-
118 suffers a fatal defect.
Indeed, there are instances where the Court sustained the validity of
search warrants issued for violation of R.A. No. 6425 or the then
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Those cases, however, are not applicable in this case. Aside from its
failure to specify what particular provision of the SRC did
respondents allegedly violate, Search Warrant No. 01-118 also
covered estafa under the RPC.
Moreover, the SRC is not merely a special penal law. It is first and
foremost a codification of various rules and regulations governing
securities. Thus, unlike, the drugs law wherein there is a clear
delineation between use and possession of illegal drugs, the offenses
punishable under the SRC could not be lumped together in
categories. Hence, it is imperative to specify what particular
provision of the SRC was violated.
Second, to somehow remedy the defect in Search Warrant No. 01-
118, petitioner insists that the warrant was issued for violation of
Section 28.1 of the SRC, which reads, “No person shall engage in the
business of buying or selling securities in the Philippines as a broker
or dealer, or act as a salesman, or an associated person of any broker
or dealer unless registered as such with the Commission.” However,
despite this belated attempt to pinpoint a provision of the SRC which
respondents allegedly violated, Search Warrant No. 01-118 still
remains null and void. The allegations in the application for search
warrant do not indicate that respondents acted as brokers or dealers
without prior registration from the SEC which is an essential element
to be held liable for violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC. It is even
worthy to note that Section 28.1 was specified only in the SEC’s
Comment on the Motion to Quash, dated 5 April 2002.
In addition, even assuming that violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC
was specified in the application for search warrant, there could have
been no finding of probable cause in connection with that offense. In
People v. Hon. Estrada, the Court pronounced:
The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be
the best evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances.
The introduction of such evidence is necessary especially in cases
where the issue is the existence of the negative ingredient of the
offense charged — for instance, the absence of a license required by
law, as in the present case — and such evidence is within the
knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily produce the
same. But if the best evidence could not be secured at the time of
application, the applicant must show a justifiable reason therefor
during the examination by the judge. The necessity of requiring
stringent procedural safeguards before a search warrant can be issued
is to give meaning to the constitutional right of a person to the
privacy of his home and personalities.
Here, the applicant for the search warrant did not present proof that
respondents lacked the license to operate as brokers or dealers. Such
circumstance only reinforces the view that at the time of the
application, the NBI and the SEC were in a quandary as to what
offense to charge respondents with.
Third, contrary to petitioner’s claim that violation of Section 28.1 of
the SRC and estafa are so intertwined with each other that the
issuance of a single search warrant does not violate the one-specific-
offense rule, the two offenses are entirely different from each other
and neither one necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
other. An offense may be said to necessarily include another when
some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former constitute
the latter. And vice versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily
included in another when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
The elements of estafa in general are the following: (a) that an
accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence, or by means of
deceit; and (b) that damage and prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation is caused the offended party or third person.
On the other hand, Section 28.1 of the SRC penalizes the act of
performing dealer or broker functions without registration with the
SEC. For such offense, defrauding another and causing damage and
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation are not essential elements.
Thus, a person who is found liable of violation of Section 28.1 of the
SRC may, in addition, be convicted of estafa under the RPC. In the
same manner, a person acquitted of violation of Section 28.1 of the
SRC may be held liable for estafa. Double jeopardy will not set in
because violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC is malum prohibitum,in
which there is no necessity to prove criminal intent, whereas estafa is
malum in se,in the prosecution of which, proof of criminal intent is
necessary.
Finally,the Court’s rulings in Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA
(Columbia) and Laud v. People (Laud) even militate against
petitioner. In Columbia, the Court ruled that a search warrant which
covers several counts of a certain specific offense does not violate
the one-specific-offense rule, viz.:
That there were several counts of the offense of copyright
infringement and the search warrant uncovered several contraband
items in the form of pirated videotapes is not to be confused with the
number of offenses charged. The search warrant herein issued does
not violate the one-specific-offense rule.
In Laud,Search Warrant No. 09-14407 was adjudged valid as it was
issued only for one specific offense — that is, for Murder, albeit for
six (6) counts.
In this case, the core of the problem is that the subject warrant did
not state one specific offense. It included violation of the SRC
which, as previously discussed, covers several penal provisions and
estafa,which could be committed in a number of ways.
Hence, Search Warrant No. 01-118 is null and void for having
been issued for more than one specific offense.
4. PEOPLE VS. SUCRO
July 11, 2013
GR No. 93239 March 18, 1991
FACTS:
Roy Fulgencio was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station
Commander of the INP) to monitor the activities of appellant Edison
Sucro, because of information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was
selling marijuana.
Pat. Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel, taking something
which turned out later to be marijuana from the compartment of a
cart found inside the chapel, and then return to the street where he
handed the same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a while appellant
went back to the chapel and again came out with marijuana which he
gave to a group of persons. Pat. Fulgencio called up Seraspi to report
that a third buyer later Identified as Ronnie Macabante, was
transacting with appellant.
At that point, the team of P/Lt. Seraspi proceeded to the area and
while the police officers were at the Youth Hostel at Maagma St.,
Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and
appellant.
Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw something to the ground
which turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana.
When confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he bought the
same from Sucro. The police team was able to overtake and arrest
appellant and recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from
the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante
ISSUES:
Whether or not the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful
and consequently.
Whether or not the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.
HELD:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where arrest
without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states:
A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it;
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an
officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a
warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or
hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the
scene thereof. Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw Sucro
conduct his nefarious activity and the fact that Macabante, when
intercepted by the police, was caught throwing the marijuana stick
and when confronted, readily admitted that he bought the same from
accused-appellant clearly indicates that Sucro had just sold the
marijuana stick to Macabante, and therefore, had just committed an
illegal act of which the police officers had personal knowledge,
being members of the team which monitored Sucro's nefarious
activity. Police officers have personal knowledge of the actual
commission of the crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance
activities of the accused.
That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is
not an absolute rule. Among the exceptions granted by law is a
search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 13, Rule 126 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant. There is nothing unlawful about the arrest
considering its compliance with the requirements of a warrantless
arrest. Ergo, the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest are
admissible in evidence.
WAR RANTLE S S SEARCHES
1. Saluday v People
FACTS:
On 5 May 2009, Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged
down by Task Force Davao of the Philippine Army at a checkpoint
near the Tefasco Wharf in Ilang, Davao City. SCAA Junbert M. Buco
(Buco), a member of the Task Force, requested all male passengers
to disembark from the vehicle while allowing the female passengers
to remain inside. He then boarded the bus to check the presence and
intercept the entry of any contraband, illegal firearms or explosives,
and suspicious individuals.
SCAA Buco checked all the baggage and personal effects of the
passengers, but a small, gray-black pack bag on the seat at the rear of
the bus caught his attention. He lifted the bag and found it too heavy
for its small size. SCAA Buco then looked at the male passengers
lined outside and noticed that a man in a white shirt (later identified
as petitioner) kept peeping through the window towards the direction
of the bag. Afterwards, SCAA Buco asked who the owner of the bag
was, to which the bus conductor answered that petitioner and his
brother were the ones seated at the back. SCAA Buco then requested
petitioner to board the bus and open the bag. Petitioner obliged and
the bag revealed the following contents: (1) an improvised .30
caliber carbine bearing serial number 64702; (2) one magazine with
three live ammunitions; (3) one cacao-type hand grenade; and (4) a
ten-inch hunting knife. SCAA Buco then asked petitioner to produce
proof of his authority to carry firearms and explosives. Unable to
show any, petitioner was immediately arrested and informed of his
rights by SCAA Buco.
Ruling;
To emphasize, a reasonable search, on the one hand, and a
warrantless search, on the other, are mutually exclusive. While both
State intrusions are valid even without a warrant, the underlying
reasons for the absence of a warrant are different. A reasonable
search arises from a reduced expectation of privacy, for which reason
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds no application.
Examples include searches done at airports, seaports, bus terminals,
malls, and similar public ·places. In contrast, a warrantless search is
presumably an "unreasonable search," but for reasons of practicality,
a search warrant can be dispensed with. Examples include search
incidental to a lawful arrest, search of evidence in plain view,
consented search, and extensive search of a private moving vehicle.
Further, in the conduct of bus searches, the Court Jays down the
following guidelines.1âwphi1 Prior to entry, passengers and their
bags and luggages can be subjected to a routine inspection akin to
airport and seaport security protocol. In this regard, metal detectors
and x-ray scanning machines can be installed at bus terminals.
Passengers can also be frisked. In lieu of electronic scanners,
passengers can be required instead to open their bags and luggages
for inspection, which inspection must be made in the passenger's
presence. Should the passenger object, he or she can validly be
refused entry into the terminal.
While in transit, a bus can still be searched by government agents or
the security personnel of the bus owner in the following three
instances. First, upon receipt of information that a passenger carries
contraband or illegal articles, the bus where the passenger is aboard
can be stopped en route to allow for an inspection of the person and
his or her effects. This is no different from an airplane that is forced
to land upon receipt of information about the contraband or illegal
articles carried by a passenger onboard. Second, whenever a bus
picks passengers en route, the prospective passenger can be frisked
and his or her bag or luggage be subjected to the same routine
inspection by government agents or private security personnel as
though the person boarded the bus at the terminal. This is because
unlike an airplane, a bus is able to stop and pick passengers along the
way, making it possible for these passengers to evade the routine
search at the bus terminal. Third, a bus can be flagged down at
designated military or police checkpoints where State agents can
board the vehicle for a routine inspection of the passengers and their
bags or luggages.
In both situations, the inspection of passengers and their effects prior
to entry at the bus terminal and the search of the bus while in transit
must also satisfy the following conditions to qualify as a valid
reasonable search. First, as to the manner of the search, it must be the
least intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the person or persons
being searched, minimizing, if not altogether eradicating, any cause
for public embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule. Second, neither
can the search result from any discriminatory motive such as
insidious profiling, stereotyping and other similar motives. In all
instances, the fundamental rights of vulnerable identities, persons
with disabilities, children and other similar groups should be
protected. Third, as to the purpose of the search, it must be confined
to ensuring public safety. Fourth, as to the evidence seized from the
reasonable search, courts must be convinced that precautionary
measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted
against the accused.
The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of
others may be put at risk. Given the present circumstances, the Court
takes judicial notice that public transport buses and their terminals,
just like passenger ships and seaports, are in that category.
Aside from public transport buses, any moving vehicle that similarly
accepts passengers at the terminal and along its route is likewise
covered by these guidelines. Hence, whenever compliant with these
guidelines, a routine inspection at the terminal or of the vehicle itself
while in transit constitutes a reasonable search. Otherwise, the
intrusion becomes unreasonable, thereby triggering the constitutional
guarantee under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.
To emphasize, the guidelines do not apply to privately-owned cars.
Neither are they applicable to moving vehicles dedicated for private
or personal use, as in the case of taxis, which are hired by only one
or a group of passengers such that the vehicle can no longer be
flagged down by any other person unti1 the passengers on board
alight from the vehicle.
2. Veridiano v People
FACTS:
At about 7:20 a.m. an information reached P03 Esteves, informing
him that a certain alias "Baho," who was later identified as
Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs.9
The police officers at the checkpoint personally knew Veridiano.
They allowed some vehicles to pass through after checking that he
was not on board. At around 10:00 a.m., they chanced upon
Veridiano inside a passenger jeepney coming from San Pablo,
Laguna. They flagged down the jeepney and asked the passengers to
disembark. The police officers instructed the passengers to raise their
t-shirts to check for possible concealed weapons and to remove the
contents of their pockets.15
The police officers recovered from Veridiano "a tea bag containing
what appeared to be marijuana." 16 POI Cabello confiscated the tea
bag and marked it with his initials. 17 Veridiano was arrested and
apprised of his constitutional rights. 18 He was then brought to the
police station.
RTC found him guilty under DDA and CA affirmed the conviction
Issue/s:
1. WON there was a valid warrantless arrest
2. WON tthere was a valid warrantless search
Ruling;
1. No.
Pertinent to the resolution of this case is the determination of
whether the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest. The
Court of Appeals concluded that petitioner was caught in flagrante
delicto of having marijuana in his possession making the warrantless
search lawful. 77
This Court disagrees. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was unlawful.
A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be
a lawful arrest before a search is made. Otherwise stated, a lawful
arrest must precede the search; "the process cannot be reversed."78
For there to be a lawful arrest, law enforcers must be armed with a
valid warrant. Nevertheless, an arrest may also be effected without a
warrant.
There are three (3) grounds that will justify a warrantless arrest. Rule
113, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. -A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The first kind of warrantless arrest is known as an in flagrante delicto
arrest. The validity of this warrantless arrest requires compliance
with the overt act test79 as explained in Cogaed:
[F]or a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two
elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he [or she] has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt
act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer."80
Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an inflagrante
delicto arrest constitutionally infirm. In Cogaed, the warrantless
arrest was invalidated as an in flagrante delicto arrest because the
accused did not exhibit an overt act within the view of the police
officers suggesting that he was in possession of illegal drugs at the
time he was apprehended. 81
The warrantless search in People v. Racho82 was also considered
unlawful.83 The police officers re ceived information that a man was
in possession of illegal drugs and was on board a Genesis bus bound
for Baler, Aurora. The informant added that the man was "wearing a
red and white striped [t]-shirt."84 The police officers waited for the
bus along the national highway.85 When the bus arrived, Jack Racho
(Racho) disembarked and waited along the highway for a tricycle.86
Suddenly, the police officers approached him and invited him to the
police station since he was suspected of having shabu in his
possession.87 As Racho pulled out his hands from his pocket, a
white envelope fell yielding a sachet of shabu.88
In holding that the warrantless search was invalid, this Court
observed that Racho was not "committing a crime in the presence of
the police officers" at the time he was apprehended.89 Moreover,
Racho's arrest was solely based on a tip.90 Although there are cases
stating that reliable information is sufficient to justify a warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest, they were covered under the
other exceptions to the rule on warrantless searches.91
Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court pertains to a hot pursuit
arrest.92 The rule requires that an offense has just been committed. It
connotes "immediacy in point of time."93 That a crime was in fact
committed does not automatically bring the case under this rule. 94
An arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court entails a
time element from the moment the crime is committed up to the
point of arrest.
Law enforcers need not personally witness the commission of a
crime. However, they must have personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances indicating that the person sought to be arrested
committed it.
People v. Gerente95 illustrates a valid arrest under Rule 113, Section
5(b) of the Rules of Court. In Gerente, the accused was convicted for
murder and for violation of Republic Act No. 6425.96 He assailed
the admissibility of dried marijuana leaves as evidence on the ground
that they were allegedly seized from him pursuant to a warrantless
arrest.97 On appeal, the accused's conviction was affirmed.98 This
Court ruled that the warrantless arrest was justified under Rule 113,
Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court. The police officers had personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances indicating that the accused
killed the victim:
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after
Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead
in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they
found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete
hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death.
The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the
policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the
killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal
knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that
Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest
Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they
could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two
companions did.99 (Emphasis supplied)
The requirement that law enforcers must have personal knowledge of
facts surrounding the commission of an offense was underscored in
In Re Saliba v. Warden. 100
In Re Saliba involved a petition for habeas corpus. The police
officers suspected Datukan Salibo (Salibo) as one (1) of the accused
in the Maguindano Massacre. 101 Salibo presented himself before
the authorities to clear his name. Despite his explanation, Salibo was
apprehended and detained. 102 In granting the petition, this Court
pointed out that Salibo was not restrained under a lawful court
process or order. 103 Furthermore, he was not arrested pursuant to a
valid warrantless arrest: 104
It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the
Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name and to prove that he is
not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in
the presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he
was neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense. The
police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he
might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee
prisoner. 105 (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an inflagrante
delicta arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He
was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was merely
a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence
of the law enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting the
warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip they
received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a
warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the person to be arrested
indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being
committed, or is about to be committed.10
The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113,
Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The law
enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance
indicating that petitioner had just committed an offense.
A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law
enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based on their
observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed
a crime. This is what gives rise to probable cause that would justify a
warrantless search under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
III
The warrantless search cannot be justified under the reasonable
suspicion requirement in "stop and frisk" searches.
A "stop and frisk" search is defined in People v. Chua 107 as "the act
of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and
pat him for weapon(s) or contraband." 108 Thus, the allowable scope
of a "stop and frisk" search is limited to a "protective search of outer
clothing for weapons."109
Although a "stop and frisk" search is a necessary law enforcement
measure specifically directed towards crime prevention, there is a
need to safeguard the right of individuals against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 110
Law enforcers do not have unbridled discretion in conducting "stop
and frisk" searches. While probable cause is not required, a "stop and
frisk" search cannot be validated on the basis of a suspicion or
hunch. 111 Law enforcers must have a genuine reason to believe,
based on their experience and the particular circumstances of each
case, that criminal activity may be afoot. 112 Reliance on one (1)
suspicious activity alone, or none at all, cannot produce a reasonable
search. 113
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals, 114 the police officers conducted
surveillance operations in Caloocan City Cemetery, a place
reportedly frequented by drug addicts.115 They chanced upon a male
person who had "reddish eyes and [was] walking in a swaying
manner."116 Suspecting that the man was high on drugs, the police
officers approached him, introduced themselves, and asked him what
he was holding.117 However, the man resisted. 118 Upon further
investigation, the police officers found marijuana in the man's
possession. 119 This Court held that the circumstances of the case
gave the police officers justifiable reason to stop the man and
investigate if he was high on drugs. 120
In People v. Solayao, 121 the police officers were conducting an
intelligence patrol to verify reports on the presence of armed persons
within Caibiran.122 They met a group of drunk men, one (1) of
whom was the accused in a camouflage uniform. 123 When the
police officers approached, his companions fled leaving behind the
accused who was told not to run away. 124 One (1) of the police
officers introduced himself and seized from the accused a firearm
wrapped in dry coconut leaves. 125 This Court likewise found
justifiable reason to stop and frisk the accused when "his companions
fled upon seeing the government agents." 126
The "stop and frisk" searches in these two (2) cases were considered
valid because the accused in both cases exhibited overt acts that gave
law enforcers genuine reason to conduct a "stop and frisk" search. In
contrast with Manalili and Solayao, the warrantless search in
Cogaed127 was considered as an invalid "stop and frisk" search
because of the absence of a single suspicious circumstance that
would justify a warrantless search.
In Cogaed, the police officers received information that a certain
Marvin Buya would be transporting marijuana. 128 A passenger
jeepney passed through the checkpoint set up by the police officers.
The driver then disembarked and signaled that two (2) male
passengers were carrying marijuana. 129 The police officers
approached the two (2) men, who were later identified as Victor
Cogaed (Cogaed) and Santiago Dayao, and inquired about the
contents of their bags. 130
Upon further investigation, the police officers discovered three (3)
bricks of marijuana in Cogaed's bag. 131 In holding that the "stop
and frisk" search was invalid, this Court reasoned that "[t]here was
not a single suspicious circumstance" that gave the police officers
genuine reason to stop the two (2) men and search their belongings.
132 Cogaed did not exhibit any overt act indicating that he was in
possession of marijuana. 133
Similar to Cogaed, petitioner in this case was a mere passenger in a
jeepney who did not exhibit any act that would give police officers
reasonable suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his possession.
Reasonable persons will act in a nervous manner in any check point.
There was no evidence to show that the police had basis or personal
knowledge that would reasonably allow them to infer anything
suspicious.
 3. Pap v Mago
FACTS:
Petitioner Martin Alagao received information that that a certain
shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued,
would be released the following day from the customs zone of the
port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, they conducted surveillance
at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks left gate No. 1 at
about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements of the
counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them
at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila.
Mago claims that the goods were seized by members of the Manila
Police Department without search warrant issued by a competent
court
ISSUE:
WON a search warrant is needed for searches done by customs
Ruling:
The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having
been deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could,
for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws,
effect searches, seizures, and arrests, 11 and it was his duty to make
seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable
property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any
fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. 12 He could lawfully
open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container
wherever found when he had reasonable cause to suspect the
presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines
contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any
vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or
conveying such article as aforesaid. 13 It cannot be doubted,
therefore, that petitioner Ricardo G. Papa, Chief of Police of Manila,
could lawfully effect the search and seizure of the goods in question.
The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand assistance of
any police officer to effect said search and seizure, and the latter has
the legal duty to render said assistance. 14 This was what happened
precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made
the search and seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine bales of
goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by
the Chief of Police to make the interception of the cargo. 15
Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had
authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a
competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said
warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having
police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code
to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store
or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search
and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or
envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and examine
any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any
dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary
to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases.
16 But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said
"dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant
issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." 17 It is our considered
view, therefor, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling
house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law
may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the
enforcement of customs laws.
Our conclusion finds support in the case of Carroll v. United
States, 39 A.L.R., 790, 799, wherein the court, considering a legal
provision similar to Section 2211 of the Philippine Tariff and
Customs Code, said as follows:
 Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the 4th
Amendment, we find in the first Congress, and in the following
second and fourth Congresses, a difference made as to the necessity
for a search warrant between goods subject to forfeiture, when
concealed in a dwelling house of similar place, and like goods in
course of transportation and concealed in a movable vessel, where
readily they could be put out of reach of a search warrant. . . .
PEOPLE V COGAED:
FACTS
at about 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, a Police Senior Inspector
S"received a text message from an unidentified civilian informer"2
that one Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat) "[would]be
transporting marijuana"3 from Barangay LunOy, San Gabriel, La
Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union.
A passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1
Taracatac’s checkpoint.7 The jeepney driver disembarked and
signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who
were carrying marijuana.8 SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male
passengers who were later identified as Cogaed and Dayao.9 Cogaed
was carrying a blue bag and a sack while Dayao was holding a
yellow bag.10
1. SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents
of their bags.11 Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that
they did not know since they were transporting the bags as a
favor for their barriomatenamed Marvin.12 After this
exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three
bricks of what looked like marijuana.13 Cogaed then
muttered, "nagloko daytoy nga Marvinen, kastoymet gayam
ti nagyanna,"which translates to "Marvin is a fool, this is
what [is] contained in the bag."14 "SPO1 Taracatac arrested
both ot them
ISSUE:
WON what traspired was a valid stop and frisk
Ruling:
No. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determinedpersonally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
This provision requires that the court examine with care and
diligence whether searches and seizures are "reasonable." As a
general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the
requirements of this provision are reasonable. This warrant requires
the existence of probable cause that can only be determined by a
judge.56 The existence of probable cause must be established by the
judge after asking searching questions and answers.57 Probable
cause at this stage can only exist if there is an offense alleged to be
committed. Also, the warrant frames the searches done by the law
enforcers. There must be a particular description of the place and the
things to be searched.58
However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even
when warrantless.59 In the Rules of Court, searchesincidental to
lawful arrests are allowed even without a separate warrant.60 This
court has taken into account the "uniqueness of circumstances
involved including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence
or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of
the articles procured."61 The known jurisprudential instances of
reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. . . ;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," . . . ;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government,
the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy
especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;
4. Consentedwarrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.62 (Citations omitted)
III
One of these jurisprudential exceptionsto search warrants is "stop
and frisk". "Stop and frisk" searches are often confused with searches
incidental to lawful arrests under the Rules of Court.63 Searches
incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in
flagrante delicto, and the search conducted within the vicinity and
withinreach by the person arrested is done to ensure that there are no
weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence.64
On the other hand, "stop and frisk"searches are conducted to prevent
the occurrence of a crime. For instance, the search in Posadas v.
Court of Appeals65 was similar "to a ‘stop and frisk’ situation whose
object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or
to maintain the status quomomentarily while the police officer seeks
to obtain more information."66 This court stated that the "stop and
frisk" search should be used "[w]hen dealing with a rapidly
unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where
unarguably there is no time to secure . . . a search warrant."67
The search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk"
search, but it did not comply with all the requirements of
reasonability required by the Constitution.
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terrysearches68)
are necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be
given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses.
However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the
privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of"suspiciousness" present in the
situation where the police officer finds himself or herself in. This
may be undoubtedly based on the experience ofthe police officer.
Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with
criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have the ability
to discern — based on facts that they themselves observe — whether
an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic
criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal
knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an
illicit act.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals,69 the police officers were initially
informed about a place frequented by people abusing drugs.70 When
they arrived, one of the police officers saw a man with "reddish eyes
and [who was] walking in a swaying manner."71 The suspicion
increased when the man avoided the police officers.72 These
observations led the police officers to conclude that the man was
high on drugs.73 These were sufficient facts observed by the police
officers "to stop[the] petitioner [and] investigate."74

In People v. Solayao,75 police officers noticed a man who appeared
drunk.76 This man was also "wearing a camouflage uniform or a
jungle suit."77 Upon seeing the police, the man fled.78 His flight
added to the suspicion.79 After stopping him, the police officers
found an unlicensed "homemade firearm"80 in his possession.81
This court ruled that "[u]nder the circumstances, the government
agents could not possibly have procured a search warrant first."82
This was also a valid search.
In these cases, the police officers using their senses observed facts
that led to the suspicion. Seeing a man with reddish eyes and walking
in a swaying manner, based on their experience, is indicative of a
person who uses dangerous and illicit drugs. A drunk civilian in
guerrilla wear is probably hiding something as well.
The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger
carrying a bag and traveling aboarda jeepney. There was nothing
suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a
bag. The assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer
but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who signalled to the
police that Cogaed was "suspicious."
Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an
opportunity to confer with a judge to determine probable cause. In
Posadas v. Court of Appeals,86 one of the earliest cases adopting the
"stop and frisk" doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this court
approximatedthe suspicious circumstances as probable cause:
The probable causeis that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and
attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he
was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and
duty of the police officers to inspect the same.87 (Emphasis
supplied)
For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a
reasonable ground of suspicionsupported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe
that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged."88
Malacat v. Court of Appeals89 clarifies the requirement further. It
does not have to be probable cause,but it cannot be mere
suspicion.90 It has to be a "genuine reason"91 to serve the purposes
of the "stop and frisk" exception:92
Other notable points of Terryare that while probable cause is not
required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine
reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained
has weapons concealed about him.93 (Emphasis supplied, footnotes
omitted)
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People,94 Justice Bersamin reminds us
that police officers must not rely on a single suspicious
circumstance.95 There should be "presence of more than
oneseemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a
reasonable inference of criminal activity."96 The Constitution
prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures."97 Certainly, reliance
on only one suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a
reasonable search.98
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and
there was no approximation for the probable cause requirement for
warrantless arrest. The person searched was noteven the person
mentioned by the informant.
2. People vs. Tudtud
GR 144037 September 23, 2003
FACTS: Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the
Toril Police Station, Davao City received a report from a “civilian
asset” named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud.
Solier related that his neighbours have been complaining about
Tudtud, who was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of
marijuana in their area. Relating to the report, the police conducted
surveillance in Solier’s neighbourhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao City.
For 5 days, they gathered information and leared that Tudtud was
involved in illegal drugs. According to his neighbours, Tudtud was
engaged in selling marijuana.
Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and
would be back later that day with new stocks of marijuana. Solier
described Tudtud as big bodied and short, and usually wore a hat. At
around 4:00 pm that same day, a team of policemen posted
themselves at the corner of Saipon and McArthur Highway to await.
Tudtud’s arrival. All wore civilian clothes. About 8:00 pm, 2 men
disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a carton marked
“King Flakes.” Standing some 5 feet away from the men, PO1
Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed that one of the men fit Tudtud’s
description. The same man also toted a plastic bag. PO1Floreta and
PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and identified themselves
as police officers. PO1 Desierto informed them that the police had
received information that stocks of illegal drugs would be arriving
that night. The man who resembled Tudtud’s description denied that
he was carrying any drugs. PO1 Desierto asked if he could see the
contents of the box. Tudtud then said “it was alright” and let them
see the box which contained bundles of dried fish, one wrapped in a
plastic bag and another in newspapers. When the bundles were
unwrapped, there contained marijuana leaves.
The police arrested Tudtud and his comapanion. They were charged
with illegal possession of prohibited drugs before the RTC of Davao
City which convicted the accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tudtud’s implied acquiescence (Tudtud’s
statement of “it’s alright”) is considered a waiver.
RULING: NO. The right against unreasonable searched and seizures
is secured by Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Constitution. Appellants implied
acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and
is, thus, considered no consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee. Consequently, appellants lack of objection
to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his
constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless
search and seizure.
As the search of appellant’s box does not come under the recognized
exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the marijuana leaves
obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And as there is no
evidence other than the hearsay testimony of the arresting officers
and their informant, the conviction of appellants cannot be sustained.
Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures if the following requisites are present:
1. It must appear that the rights exist;
2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive,
of the existence of such right;
3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third
requisites. Records disclose that when the police officers introduced
themselves as such and requested appellant that they see the contents
of the carton box supposedly containing the marijuana, appellant
Tudtud said it was alright. He did not resist and opened the box
himself.
Acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed.
The fact that a person failed to object to a search does not amount to
permission thereto.
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED.
Appellants Noel Tudtud y Paypa and Dindo Bolong y Naret are
ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.
Held: The rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out
through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise such “search and
seizure” becomes reasonable within the meaning of the constitutional
provision, and any evidence secured thereby will be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Except with the
following instances even in the absence of a warrant: 1) Warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest, 2) Search in evidence in plain
view, 3) Search of a moving vehicle, 4) Consented warrantless
search, 5) Customs search, 6) Stop and frisk and 7) Exigent and
emergency circumstances.
The long –standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a degree of
consistency, is that, a reliable information alone is not sufficient to
justify a warrantless arrest. Hence, the items seized were held
inadmissible, having been obtained in violation of the accused’s
constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
TERRY v OHIO
FACTS:
U.S. Supreme Court
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
Terry v. Ohio
No. 67
Argued December 12, 1967
Decided June 10, 1968
392 U.S. 1
Syllabus
A Cleveland detective (McFadden), on a downtown beat which he
had been patrolling for many years, observed two strangers
(petitioner and another man, Chilton) on a street corner. He saw them
proceed alternately back and forth along an identical route, pausing
to stare in the same store window, which they did for a total of about
24 times. Each completion of the route was followed by a conference
between the two on a corner, at one of which they were joined by a
third man (Katz) who left swiftly. Suspecting the two men of "casing
a job, a stick-up," the officer followed them and saw them rejoin the
third man a couple of blocks away in front of a store. The officer
approached the three, identified himself as a policeman, and asked
their names. The men "mumbled something," whereupon McFadden
spun petitioner around, patted down his outside clothing, and found
in his overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove, a pistol. The
officer ordered the three into the store. He removed petitioner's
overcoat, took out a revolver, and ordered the three to face the wall
with their hands raised. He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton
and Katz and seized a revolver from Chilton's outside overcoat
pocket. He did not put his hands under the outer garments of Katz
(since he discovered nothing in his pat-down which might have been
a weapon), or under petitioner's or Chilton's outer garments until he
felt the guns. The three were taken to the police station. Petitioner
and Chilton were charged with carrying
Page 392 U. S. 2
concealed weapons. The defense moved to suppress the weapons.
Though the trial court rejected the prosecution theory that the guns
had been seized during a search incident to a lawful arrest, the court
denied the motion to suppress and admitted the weapons into
evidence on the ground that the officer had cause to believe that
petitioner and Chilton were acting suspiciously, that their
interrogation was warranted, and that the officer, for his own
protection, had the right to pat down their outer clothing having
reasonable cause to believe that they might be armed. The court
distinguished between an investigatory "stop" and an arrest, and
between a "frisk" of the outer clothing for weapons and a full-blown
search for evidence of crime. Petitioner and Chilton were found
guilty, an intermediate appellate court affirmed, and the State
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that "no
substantial constitutional question" was involved.
Held:
1. The Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment, "protects people, not places," and therefore applies as
much to the citizen on the streets as well as at home or elsewhere.
Pp. 392 U. S. 8-9.
2. The issue in this case is not the abstract propriety of the police
conduct, but the admissibility against petitioner of the evidence
uncovered by the search and seizure. P. 392 U. S. 12.
3. The exclusionary rule cannot properly be invoked to exclude the
products of legitimate and restrained police investigative techniques,
and this Court's approval of such techniques should not discourage
remedies other than the exclusionary rule to curtail police abuses for
which that is not an effective sanction. Pp. 392 U. S. 13-15.
4. The Fourth Amendment applies to "stop and frisk" procedures
such as those followed here. Pp. 392 U. S. 16-20.
(a) Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his
freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that person within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. P. 392 U. S. 16.
(b) A careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing
in an attempt to find weapons is a "search" under that Amendment. P.
392 U. S. 16.
5. Where a reasonably prudent officer is warranted in the
circumstances of a given case in believing that his safety or that of
others is endangered, he may make a reasonable search for weapons
of the person believed by him to be armed and dangerous
Page 392 U. S. 3
regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest that individual
for crime or the absolute certainty that the individual is armed. Pp.
392 U. S. 20-27.
(a) Though the police must, whenever practicable, secure a warrant
to make a search and seizure, that procedure cannot be followed
where swift action based upon on-the-spot observations of the officer
on the beat is required. P. 392 U. S. 20.
(b) The reasonableness of any particular search and seizure must be
assessed in light of the particular circumstances against the standard
of whether a man of reasonable caution is warranted in believing that
the action taken was appropriate. Pp. 392 U. S. 21-22.
(c) The officer here was performing a legitimate function of
investigating suspicious conduct when he decided to approach
petitioner and his companions. P. 392 U. S. 22.
(d) An officer justified in believing that an individual whose
suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed may,
to neutralize the threat of physical harm, take necessary measures to
determine whether that person is carrying a weapon. P. 392 U. S. 24.
(e) A search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest
must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies of the situation. Pp.
392 U. S. 25-26.
(f) An officer may make an intrusion short of arrest where he has
reasonable apprehension of danger before being possessed of
information justifying arrest. Pp. 392 U. S. 26-27.
6. The officer's protective seizure of petitioner and his companions
and the limited search which he made were reasonable, both at their
inception and as conducted. Pp. 392 U. S. 27-30.
(a) The actions of petitioner and his companions were consistent with
the officer's hypothesis that they were contemplating a daylight
robbery and were armed. P. 392 U. S. 28.
(b) The officer's search was confined to what was minimally
necessary to determine whether the men were armed, and the
intrusion, which was made for the sole purpose of protecting himself
and others nearby, was confined to ascertaining the presence of
weapons. Pp. 392 U. S. 29-30.
7. The revolver seized from petitioner was properly admitted into
evidence against him, since the search which led to its seizure was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 392 U. S. 30-31.
Affirmed.
PEOPLE v AMMINUDIN
FACTS:
PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that
the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City
and was carrying marijuana. 7 He was Identified by name. 8 Acting
on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and
approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the
informer had pointed to him. 9 They detained him and inspected the
bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were
later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, 10
who testified that she conducted microscopic, chemical and
chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the
corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all
he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts
and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested
and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a
search warrant.
ISSUE:
WON there search conducted was valid.
RULING:
No. Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant
issued by a judge after personal determination by him of the
existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the
government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor
was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to
justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the
obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for
example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to
warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law
because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting
declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two
days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and
search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9.
His name was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its
arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they
could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed,
to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort
was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored
altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the
arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search
warrant was not necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless
arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been
shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of what are
popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25
Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest
the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of
his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to
do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending
the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward
indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like
any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel.
It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the
marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to
apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The
Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined
by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
PEOPLE v MENGOTE
FACTS:
The incident occurred shortly before noon of August 8, 1987, after
the Western Police District received a telephone call from an
informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the
corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A
surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the
place. As later narrated at the trial by Patrolmen Rolando Mercado
and Alberto Juan, 1 they there saw two men "looking from side to
side," one of whom was holding his abdomen. They approached
these persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the
two tried to run away but were unable to escape because the other
lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One
of them, who turned out to be the accused-appellant, was found with
a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the
chamber. His companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a
fan knife secreted in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were
taken from them. Mengote and Morellos were then turned over to
police headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence Division.
ISSUE:
WON the search was valid
RULING:
No. Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person
who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an
offense must have personal knowledge of the fact. The offense must
also be committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief
of Police, 80 Phil. 859). (Emphasis supplied)
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not
enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to
be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually
have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed
is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime
may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense
must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the
identity of the perpetrator.
PEOPLE v MALMSTED
FACTS:
At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went
to the Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada to catch the first available trip
to Baguio City. From Baguio City, accused planned to take a late
afternoon trip to Angeles City, then proceed to Manila to catch his
flight out of the country, scheduled on 13 May 1989. From Sagada,
accused took a Skyline bus with body number 8005 and Plate
number AVC 902.1
At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May
1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First
Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa,
ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14,
Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all
vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a
checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that
vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other
prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the
Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited
drugs.2
The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in
coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a checkpoint at the
designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected
all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.
At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was
riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and
announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they
would conduct an inspection. The two (2) NARCOM officers started
their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus.
Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the
rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's
waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the
officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers.
When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out
whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object
turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag,
as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects
wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of
the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain
hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But
before he alighted from the bus, accused stopped to get two (2)
travelling bags from the luggage carrier.
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened
them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears,
the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did
not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened
the bags that accused finally presented his passport.
ISSUE:
WON the search conducted was valid
Ruling:
Yes. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures.5 However, where the search is made pursuant
to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A
lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a
private person under the following circumstances.6
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a 17a).
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited
drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the
accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search
made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of
the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest.7
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a
search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects
of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was
sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was
then and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances
which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.8
The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and
seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is resolved
according to the facts of each case.9
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been
declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of probable
cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag
owned by the accused,10 or where the accused was acting
suspiciously,11 and attempted to flee.12
Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that
vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other
prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received
information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular
day had prohibited drugs in his possession. Said information was
received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same
morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to
Baguio City.
When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the
apprehension of herein accused, that a Caucasian travelling from
Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there
was no time to obtain a search warrant.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely
conducted a routine check of the bus (where accused was riding) and
the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made. It
was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of
accused, during the course of the inspection, that accused was
required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his
identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse
the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his
identity. The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian
coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the
suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken
together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe
that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the
authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which
justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects
of the accused.
ESPANO v CA
FACTS:
on July 14, 1991, at about 12:30 a.m., he and other police officers,
namely, Pat. Wilfredo Aquino, Simplicio Rivera, and Erlindo
Lumboy of the Western Police District (WPD), Narcotics Division
went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of
drug pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling "something" to
another person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached
petitioner, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The
search yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When
asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that there was more in his
house. The policemen went to his residence where they found ten
more cellophane tea bags of marijuana.
ISSUE:
WON the items seized are admissible in evidence
Ruling:
issue on the admissibility of the marijuana seized should likewise be
ruled upon. Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court provides:
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
a. when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner's arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He was
caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by
police officers on the basis of information received regarding the
illegal trade of drugs within the area of Zamora and Pandacan
Streets, Manila. The police officer saw petitioner handing over
something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched
him and discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was,
therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized
were admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime.
As for the ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at petitioner's
residence, however, the same are inadmissible in evidence.
The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against unreasonable
searches and seizures under Article III, Section 2 which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.
An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used
as proof of the commission of an offense.11 It may extend beyond
the person of the one arrested to include the premises or
surroundings under his immediate control. In this case, the ten
cellophane bags of marijuana seized at petitioner's house after his
arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do not fall under the said
exceptions.
In the case of People v. Lua,12 this Court held:
As regards the brick of marijuana found inside the appellant's house,
the trial court correctly ignored it apparently in view of its
inadmissibility. While initially the arrest as well as the body search
was lawful, the warrantless search made inside the appellant's house
became unlawful since the police operatives were not armed with a
search warrant. Such search cannot fall under "search made
incidental to a lawful arrest," the same being limited to body search
and to that point within reach or control of the person arrested, or
that which may furnish him with the means of committing violence
or of escaping. In the case at bar, appellant was admittedly outside
his house when he was arrested. Hence, it can hardly be said that the
inner portion of his house was within his reach or control.
The articles seized from petitioner during his arrest were valid under
the doctrine of search made incidental to a lawful arrest. The
warrantless search made in his house, however, which yielded ten
cellophane bags of marijuana became unlawful since the police
officers were not armed with a search warrant at the time. Moreover,
it was beyond the reach and control of petitioner.
HOMAR v PEOPLE
FACTS:
At around 8:50 in the evening, their Chief, P/Chief Supt. Alfredo C.
Valdez, ordered him and civilian agent (C/A) Ronald Tangcoy
(Tangcoy) to go to the South Wing, Roxas Boulevard. While
proceeding to the area onboard a mobile hunter, they saw the
petitioner crossing a "No Jaywalking" portion of Roxas Boulevard.
They immediately accosted him and told him to cross at the
pedestrian crossing area.
The petitioner picked up something from the ground, prompting
Tangcoy to frisk him resulting in the recovery of a knife. Thereafter,
Tangcoy conducted a thorough search on the petitioner’s body and
found and confiscated a plastic sachet containing what he suspected
as shabu. Tangcoy and Tan executed a sinumpaang salaysay on the
incident.4
The petitioner was the sole witness for the defense.5 He testified that
on August 20, 2002, he was going home at around 6:30 p.m. after
selling imitation sunglasses and other accessories at the BERMA
Shopping Center.
After crossing the overpass, a policeman and a civilian stopped and
frisked him despite his refusal. They poked a gun at him, accused
him of being a holdupper, and forced him to go with them. They also
confiscated the kitchen knife, which he carried to cut cords. He was
likewise investigated for alleged possession of shabu and detained
for one day. He was criminally charged before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Parañaque City, Branch 77 for the possession of the kitchen
knife but he was eventually acquitted
HELD:
Clearly, no arrest preceded the search on the person of the petitioner.
When Tan and Tangcoy allegedly saw the petitioner jaywalking, they
did not arrest him but accosted him and pointed to him the right
place for crossing. In fact, according to the RTC, Tan and Tangcoy
"immediately accosted him and told him to cross [at] the designated
area."29
Tan and Tangcoy did not intend to bring the petitioner under custody
or to restrain his liberty. This lack of intent to arrest him was
bolstered by the fact that there was no criminal charge that was filed
against the petitioner for crossing a "no jaywalking" area.
From Tan’s testimony, the intent to arrest the petitioner only came
after they allegedly confiscated the shabu from the petitioner, for
which they informed him of his constitutional rights and brought him
to the police station.
The indispensability of the intent to arrest an accused in a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest was emphasized in Luz
vs. People of the Philippines.30 The Court held that the shabu
confiscated from the accused in that case was inadmissible as
evidence when the police officer who flagged him for traffic
violation had no intent to arrest him. According to the Court, due to
the lack of intent to arrest, the subsequent search was unlawful.
This is notwithstanding the fact that the accused, being caught in
flagrante delicto for violating an ordinance, could have been
therefore lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers
LUZ v PEOPLE
FACTS:
round 3:00 o’clock in the morning, he saw the accused, who was
coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to
Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet;
that this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a
municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear
helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that he invited the
accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he
flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station;
that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation
ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the
accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket;
that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the
contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon
inside it; that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of
the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal
container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2)
cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that
upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that
after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover
and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused
spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out
to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while
the other two (2) contained suspected shabu
ISSUE:
WON there was a valid arrest and search
Ruling:
No. First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was
flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso
facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she
may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.10 It is
effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that
person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the
arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the
body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is
required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of
the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part
of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary.11
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the
general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest
of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver’s license of the
latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. — Law enforcement
and peace officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director
shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any
regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and
regulations not contrary to any provisions of this Act, confiscate the
license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and
issued by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to
operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours
from the time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in
the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter.
Failure of the driver to settle his case within fifteen days from the
date of apprehension will be a ground for the suspension and/or
revocation of his license.
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations
Manual12 provides the following procedure for flagging down
vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints:
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles
While in Mobile Car. This rule is a general concept and will not
apply in hot pursuit operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake
the following, when applicable: x x x
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic
Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR). Never
indulge in prolonged, unnecessary conversation or argument with the
driver or any of the vehicle’s occupants;
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation
ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been "under arrest." There
was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him
of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the
ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station
may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the
trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they
went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged
down "almost in front" of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake
of convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention
to take petitioner into custody.
In Berkemer v. McCarty,13 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court
discussed at length whether the roadside questioning of a motorist
detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered
custodial interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning does
not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a
formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the
expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length of time
the procedure is conducted. It ruled as follows:
It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly
curtails the "freedom of action" of the driver and the passengers, if
any, of the detained vehicle. Under the law of most States, it is a
crime either to ignore a policeman’s signal to stop one’s car or, once
having stopped, to drive away without permission. x x x
However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the
Miranda opinion emphasized by respondent. Fidelity to the doctrine
announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in
those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the
decision are implicated. Thus, we must decide whether a traffic stop
exerts upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his
free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that
he be warned of his constitutional rights.
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a
person questioned will be induced "to speak where he would not
otherwise do so freely," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 467. First,
detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively
temporary and brief. The vast majority of roadside detentions last
only a few minutes. A motorist’s expectations, when he sees a
policeman’s light flashing behind him, are that he will be obliged to
spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while
the officer checks his license and registration, that he may then be
given a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be allowed to
continue on his way. In this respect, questioning incident to an
ordinary traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse
interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and in which the
detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he
provides his interrogators the answers they seek. See id., at 451.
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not
such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police. To
be sure, the aura of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed
officer and the knowledge that the officer has some discretion in
deciding whether to issue a citation, in combination, exert some
pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But other aspects of
the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most
importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree.
hether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of
fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.
Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the
person giving consent and the environment in which consent is
given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in
a public or a secluded location; (3) whether the defendant objected to
the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence
of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6)
the defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence would be
found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment
in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable
subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that has the
burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary
consent was obtained, and was freely and voluntarily given.19 In this
case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police
station at three in the morning, accompanied by several police
officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of
valid consent to a warrantless search.