Estafa PDF

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria C. Garcia
REVISED PENAL CODE: BOOK TWO

TITLE TEN (Articles 293-332): Crimes Against Property (Part TWO)
V. ESTAFA CASES
NENITA CARGANILLO v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 182424 | September 22, 2014
TICKLER: Buy-and-sell of palay, ahente
DOCTRINE: The Court recognizes the “perceived injustice” brought about by the
range of penalties that the courts continue to impose on crimes against property, such
as estafa, committed today based on the amount of damage measured by the value
of money eight years ago in 1932. However, the Court cannot modify these range of
penalties in their decisions, as such action would be an impermissible encroachment
upon the power of the legislative branch of government and would constitute
proscribed judicial legislation.
FACTS: On September 23, 1998, Teresita Lazaro, a rice trader in Rizal, Nueva Ecija,
gave petitioner, Nenita Carganillo, P132,000.00 for the purpose of buying palay. The
petitioner, who was alleged to be an “ahente” or agent in the buy-and-sell of palay,
agreed to deliver the palay to the Lazaro Palay Buying Station on or before November
28, 1998. According to the “Kasunduan” signed by the petitioner, the parties agreed
that for every kilo of palay bought the petitioner shall earn a commission of P0.20
centavos. But if no palay is purchased and delivered on November 28, the petitioner
must return the P132,000.00 to Teresita within 1 week after November 28.
After failing to receive any palay or the P132,000.00 on November 28 and 1 week
thereafter, Teresita made oral and written demands to the petitioner for the return of
the amount but her demands were simply ignored. She thus filed an affidavit-complaint
for estafa against the petitioner before the Fiscal’s Office.
Defense: The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime and denied that she entered
into a “principal-agent” agreement with, and received the P132,000.00 from, Teresita.
She alleged that she owed Teresita a balance of P13,704.32 for the fertilizers and rice
that she purchased from the latter in 1995 and 1996, and that, in November 1996, she
was made to sign a blank “Kasunduan” that reflected no written date and amount. She
likewise denied personally receiving any written demand letter from Teresita.
CRIME CHARGED: Estafa
CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
RTC: GUILTY as charged
Penalty imposed: imprisonment (4 years & 1 day to 20 years), indemnify Teresita the
amount of P132,000.00
CA: AFFIRMED RTC’s conviction
In debunking petitioner’s claim that her agreement with Teresita was merely a money
loan, the CA stated that:the Kasunduan which accused-appellant admittedly signed,
is clear in its tenor and the failure to comply therewith makes out a case for estafa.
The CA, however, found error in the RTC’s computation of the penalty and imposed
upon the petitioner an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months as minimum, 8
years as maximum, plus 1 year for each additional P10,000.00 (in excess of
P22,000.00), equivalent to 11 years, or a total of 19 years.
ISSUE: Did the CA err in affirming the conviction?
RULING: NO. Under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, the offense of estafa committed with abuse of confidence requires the
following elements:
(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender
in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same;
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property
by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt;
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another;
(d) there is demand by the offended party to the offender.
All the elements of estafa are present in this case: that the petitioner received in trust
the amount of P132,000.00 from Teresita for the purpose of buying palay and
misappropriated it when she failed to return the said amount to Teresita upon demand.
The SC affirmed the correctness of the penalty imposed by the CA, as it is fully in
accordance with the law. The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d)
of the RPC, when the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00, is prisión
correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum. The minimum term is taken from
the penalty next lower or anywhere within prisión correccional minimum and medium
(i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).
On the other hand, the maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty of prisión
correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum in its maximum period, adding 1
year of imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, provided that the

total penalty shall not exceed 20 years. x x x To compute the maximum period of the
prescribed penalty, prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum should
be divided into three equal portions of time each of which portion shall be deemed to
form one period in accordance with Article 65 of the RPC. Following this procedure,
the maximum period of prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum is
from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years. The incremental penalty, when proper,
shall thus be added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years, at
the discretion of the court.
In computing the incremental penalty, the amount defrauded shall be subtracted by

P22,000.00, and the difference shall be divided by P10,000.00. Any fraction of a year
shall be discarded as was done starting with the case of People v. Pabalan in
consonance with the settled rule that penal laws shall be construed liberally in favor of
the accused.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of

merit. We AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals finding petitioner Nenita
Carganillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of estafa penalized under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
NOTES: Article 315 of the RPC as amended by RA 10951:
Section 85 (RA 10951). Article 315 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act No.
4885, Presidential Decree No. 1689, and Presidential Decree No. 818, is hereby
further amended to read as follows:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).— Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prisióncorreccional in its maximum period to prisión mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over Two million four hundred thousand
pesos (₱2,400,000) but does not exceed Four million four hundred thousand pesos
(₱4,400,000), and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional Two million pesos (₱2,000,000); but the total penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be.

2nd. The penalty of prisióncorreccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the
amount of the fraud is over One million two hundred thousand pesos (₱1,200,000) but
does not exceed Two million four hundred thousand pesos (₱2,400,000).
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisióncorreccional in its
minimum period, if such amount is over Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) but does not
exceed One million two hundred thousand pesos (₱1,200,000).
4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if such amount does not
exceed Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000): Provided, That in the four cases mentioned,
the fraud be committed by any of the following means:
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
(a) altering the substance, quantity, or quality of anything of value which the
offender shall deliver by virtue of an obligation to do so, even though such
obligation be based on an immoral or illegal consideration.
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods,
or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such
money, goods, or other property.
(c) By taking undue advantage of the signature of the offended party in blank, and
by writing any document above such signature in blank, to the prejudice of the
offended party or any third person.
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,

qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or
by means of other similar deceits.
(b) By altering the quality, fineness or weight of anything pertaining to his art or
business.
(c) By pretending to have bribed any Government employee, without prejudice to
the action for calumny which the offended party may deem proper to bring
against the offender. In this case, the offender shall be punished by the
maximum period of the penalty.
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when
the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not
sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the

check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) clays
from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check
has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prime facie
evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts
as defined in paragraph 2(d) hereof shall be punished by:
1st The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, if the amount of fraud is
over Four million four hundred thousand pesos (₱4,400,000) but does not exceed
Eight million eight hundred thousand pesos (₱8,800,000). If the amount exceeds the
latter, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.
2nd. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its minimum and medium periods, if the
amount of the fraud is over Two million four hundred thousand pesos (₱2,400,000) but
does not exceed Four million four hundred thousand pesos (₱4,400,000).
3rd. The penalty of prisión mayor in its maximum period, if the amount of the fraud is
over One million two hundred thousand pesos (₱1,200,000) but does not exceed Two
million four hundred thousand pesos (₱2,400,000).
4th. The penalty of prisión mayor in its medium period, if such amount is over Forty
thousand pesos (₱40,000) but does not exceed One million two hundred thousand
pesos (₱1,200,000).
5th. By prisión mayor in its minimum period, if such amount does not exceed Forty
thousand pesos (₱40,000).
3. Through any of the following fraudulent means:
(a) By inducing another, by means of deceit, to sign any document.

(b) By resorting to some fraudulent practice to insure success in a gambling game.
(c) By removing, concealing or destroying, in whole or in part, any court record,
office files, document or any other papers.
LITO CORPUZ v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 180016 | April 29, 2014
TICKLER: P98k worth of jewelry
DOCTRINES:

1. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, par 1(b)
of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received
to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of occurrence is not a material
ingredient of the crime.
2. The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that
money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust,
or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or
denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a
demand made by the offended party on the offender.
3. With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand
under this kind of estafa need not be formal or written.
FACTS:
VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION:
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino
in Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the
business of lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that the former had
some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same
casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private
complainant agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following
items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and
another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of ₱98,000.00, as evidenced by a
receipt of even date. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the
sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period
expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of
jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the
former that he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail. Thus,
an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa. The prosecution, to
prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone testimony of Danilo Tangcoy.
The Information reads as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, after having received from one Danilo Tangcoy
(jewelry)xxx in the total amount of ₱98,000 under expressed obligation on
the part of said accused to remit the proceeds of the sale of the said items
or to return the same, if not sold, said accused, once in possession of the
said items, with intent to defraud, and with unfaithfulness and abuse of

confidence, and far from complying with his aforestated obligation, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and
convert to his own personal use and benefit the aforesaid jewelries (sic) or
the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, the
accused failed and refused to return the said items or to remit the amount
of₱98,000 to the damage and prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy in the
aforementioned amount.
VERSION OF THE DEFENSE:
The defense presented the lone testimony of petitioner summarized, as follows:
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is
engaged in the financing business of extending loans to Base employees. For every
collection made, they earn a commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any
business with private complainant.However, he admitted obtaining a loan from
Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed
that the same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence against him
for the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not even
see.
CRIME CHARGED: Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b)
RTC: Found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. No
Aggravating nor Mitigating Circumstances.
CA: AFFIRMED RTC with modification on the imposable prison term.
Petitioner, in his defense, argued against the admissibility of a mere photocopy of the
receipt; that the information was defective for it does not contain the period when the
pieces of jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the date when the crime
occurred was different from the one testified to by private complainant; Petitioner that
the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the offended party on the offender,
was not proved.
ISSUES:
1. Did the CA err in confirming the admission and appreciation by the lower court of
prosecution evidence, including its exhibits, which are mere machine copies, as this
violates the best evidence rule? NO
2. Did CA err in affirming the lower court's finding that the criminal information for
estafa was not fatally defective? NO
3. Did CA err in affirming the lower court's finding that demand to return the subject
[pieces of] jewelry, if unsold, or remit the proceeds, if sold – an element of the
offense – was proved? NO
RULING:
1. NO. The records show that petitioner never objected to the admissibility of the
said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in court by private
complainant. The CA also correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise an
objection in his Comment to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence and even
admitted having signed the said receipt. The established doctrine is that when a party
failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in
evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived.
2. NO. The CA did not err in finding that the Information was substantially complete
and in reiterating that objections as to the matters of form and substance in the
Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. Section 6, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court provides when a complaint or information is sufficient. It is true that the
gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of
the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the
prejudice of the owner and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient
of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence
of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective.
Moreover, here, the said date is also near the due date within which accused-appellant
should have delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as testified
upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance with the rules.
3. NO. The prosecution was able to prove the existence of all the elements of the
crime. It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC. The elements of estafa with abuse of
confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or other personal property is received
by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on
his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the
offender.
Petitioner argues that the last element was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his
testimony, private complainant narrated how he looked for petitioner for a week after
almost two (2) months from the time he gave the pieces of jewelry and asked petitioner
twice about the same items with the latter promising to pay them.
With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under this
kind of estafa need not be formal or written. The CA observed that the law is silent with
regard to the form of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus: When the law does
not qualify, We should not qualify.

Note: There is a lengthy discussion as regards the validity of imposing penalty
on persons convicted of crimes involving property.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5,

2007 of petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision of the
CA finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article
315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
the penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from 3
YEARS, 2 MONTHS and 11 DAYS of prision correccional, as minimum, to 15 YEARS
of reclusion temporal as maximum.
BELEN REAL v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 152065 | January 29, 2008
TICKLER: Estafa Article 315, par. 1 (b)– 7 pieces of jewelry
DOCTRINE: Disturbance of property rights is equivalent to damage and is in itself

sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC.
FACTS: Petitioner Belen Real was an agent of private complainant Benjamin Uy in his
jewelry business. On several occasions, Uy entrusted to petitioner pieces of jewelry
with the obligation on the part of the latter to remit the proceeds of the sale or to return
the pieces of jewelry if unsold within a specific period of time.
On January 10, 1989, around 8:30 a.m., petitioner arrived at Uy’s house at Nueva Villa
Subdivision, Barangay Alangilan, Batangas City and requested Uy to lend her some
pieces of jewelry as she had a buyer at that time. Because petitioner is
his kumadre, since Uy was one of the sponsors in the wedding of petitioners daughter,
and because petitioner was his agent for quite a time, Uy agreed. He showed petitioner
some pieces of jewelry and allowed the latter to select from them.
Petitioner selected seven (7) pieces of jewelry. Uy prepared a receipt for the items
selected by petitioner and handed the same to the latter. After checking the receipt,
petitioner wrote the name Benjamin Uy at the upper portion thereof and affixed her
signature at the lower portion including her address.
Ten days thereafter, Uy went to petitioner’s house at Aplaya, Bauan, Batangas and
asked about their transaction. Petitioner informed Uy that the pieces of jewelry were
already sold but the payment was in the form of check. Petitioner showed Uy five (5)
pieces of checks all dated January 31, 1989 and requested the latter to collect on said
date. Uy acceded, but when he returned on January 31, 1989, petitioner again
requested him to return the following day as she had not encashed the checks yet. Uy
again agreed but when he demanded the payment the following day, petitioner called

him makulit and could not sleep for that matter. Petitioner further remarked that the
more she would not pay Uy.
Constrained, Uy brought the matter to his lawyer, Atty. Dimayacyac, who thereafter
sent a demand letter to petitioner. Despite receipt thereof, petitioner failed to make
good her obligation. Consequently, Uy lodged a criminal complaint against petitioner
before the City Prosecutor of Batangas.
CRIME CHARGED: Estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b)
RTC: CONVICTED - penalty of imprisonment of TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion

temporal, to indemnify Benjamin Uy in the amount of P371,500.00, to pay the costs,
and to suffer all the accessories of the law.
CA: AFFIRMED
ISSUE: Was the CA correct in affirming the RTC?
RULING: The petition is partly meritorious.
The elements of estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPCare as follows: (1) that
money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of or to return the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion
of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; and (3)
that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another.
Although the trial court only mentioned in passing that damage was caused to private
complainant Uy, it cannot be denied that there exists a factual basis for holding that
petitioners refusal to account for or return the pieces of jewelry had prejudiced the rights
and interests of Uy. Certainly, disturbance of property rights is equivalent to damage
and is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of
the RPC. In this case, Uy, who is a businessman, not only failed to recover his
investment but also lost the opportunity to realize profits therefrom. Anxiety also set in
as he ran the risk of being sued by the person who likewise entrusted him the same
pieces of jewelry. To assert his legal recourse, Uy further incurred expenses in hiring a
lawyer and in litigating the case.
HOWEVER, that the penalty imposed by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals was improper.
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in
this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties
which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the
penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The penalty prescribed by Art. 315 is composed of two periods; hence, to get the
maximum period of the indeterminate sentence, the total number of years included in
the two periods should be divided into three. Article 65 of the RPC requires the division
of the time included in the prescribed penalty into three equal periods of time included
in the penalty imposed, forming one period for each of the three portions. Thus, the
maximum, medium and minimum periods of the penalty prescribed for estafa under Art.
315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC are:
Minimum 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, and 10 days

Medium 5 years, 5 months, and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, and 20 days
Maximum 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years
In the present case, as the amount involved is P371,500, which obviously

exceeds P22,000, the penalty imposable should be the maximum period of 6 years, 8
months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor. However, Art. 315 further states that
a period of one year shall be added to the penalty for every additional P10,000
defrauded in excess of P22,000 but in no case shall the total penalty which may be
imposed exceed 20 years. The amount swindled from Uy exceeds the amount
of P22,000 which, when translated to the additional penalty of one year for
every P10,000 defrauded, goes beyond 20 years (close to additional 35 years to be
exact). Hence, under the law, the maximum penalty to be imposed to petitioner should
be 20 years of reclusion temporal.
On the other hand, the minimum period of the indeterminate sentence should be within
the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the
RPC. In this case, the penalty next lower to prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor minimum is prision correccional minimum (6 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4
months) to prision correccional medium (2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4 years and
2 months). Therefore, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be
anywhere from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, the August 3, 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 13885, which affirmed the June 23, 1992 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 2, Batangas City, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as to the penalty
imposed. Petitioner is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prisin correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years
of reclusin temporalas maximum.

(Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. of the Court of Appeals is hereby required to
explain why he concurred in the decision aforementioned applying the wrong penalty,
the explanation to be submitted in thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy of this Decision,
which copy is hereby directed to be furnished upon him forthwith upon finality of this
Decision.)
PAZ CHENG y CHU v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 174113 | January 13, 2016
TICKLER: Jewelry on consignment, bouncing checks
DOCTRINE: In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal

presumption of misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds
of the sale or to return the items to be sold and fails to give an account of their
whereabouts.
FACTS:
Three (3) separate Informations where filed against Cheng for Estafa before the RTC
of Quezon City, Branch According to the prosecution, private complaint "Rowena
Rodriguez (Rodriguez) and Cheng entered into an agreement whereby Rodriguez shall
deliver pieces of jewelry to Cheng for the latter to sell on commission basis. After one
month, Cheng is obliged to either: (a) remit the proceeds of the sold jewelry; or (b)
return the unsold jewelry to the former. On different dates (i.e., July 12, 1997, July 16,
1997, and August 12, 1997), Rodriguez delivered various sets of jewelry to Cheng in
the respective amounts of P18,000.00, P36,000.00, and P257,950.00. Upon delivery
of the last batch of jewelry, Cheng issued a check worth P120,000.00 as full security
for the first two (2) deliveries and as partial security for the last. When Cheng failed to
remit the proceeds or to return the unsold jewelry on due date, Rodriguez presented
the check to the bank for encashment, but was dishonored due to insufficient funds.
Upon assurance of Cheng, Rodriguez re-deposited the check, but again, the same was
dishonored because the drawee account had been closed. Rodriguez then decided to
confront Cheng, who then uttered "Akalamo, babayaran pa kita?" Thus, Rodriguez was
constrained to file the instant charges.
In defense, Cheng denied receiving any jewelry from Rodriguez or signing any
document purporting to be contracts of sale of jewelry, asserting that Rodriguez is a
usurious moneylender. She then admitted having an unpaid loan with Rodriguez and
that she issued a check to serve as security for the same, but was nevertheless
surprised of her arrest due to the latter's filing of Estafa charges against her.
CRIME CHARGED: 3 Counts of Estafa

RTC: Guilty of 3 counts of Estafa
CA: Affirmed RTC ruling
ISSUE: Did the CA err in convicting the accused?
RULING: NO, the CA did not err in convicting the accused.
Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC states:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned herein below shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be[.]
x xxx
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
x xxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods or any

other personal property received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or
to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a
bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property;
x xxx
The elements of Estafa under this provision are as follows: (1) the offender's receipt of
money, goods, or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return,
the same; (2) misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the money or property
received, or denial of receipt of the money or property; (3) the misappropriation,
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) demand by the offended

party that the offender return the money or property received.17 In the case
of Pamintuan v. People,18 the Court had the opportunity to elucidate further on the
essence of the aforesaid crime, as well as the proof needed to sustain a conviction for
the same, to wit:
The essence of this kind of [E]stafa is the appropriation or conversion of money

or property received to the prejudice of the entity to whom a return should be
made. The words "convert" and "misappropriate" connote the act of using or disposing
of another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use
different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one's own use includes not only
conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the
property of another without right. In proving the element of conversion or
misappropriation, a legal presumption of misappropriation arises when the
accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return the items to be sold
and fails to give an account of their whereabouts.
In this case, a judicious review of the case records reveals that the elements
of Estafa, as defined and penalized by the afore-cited provision, are present,
considering that: (a) Rodriguez delivered the jewelry to Cheng for the purpose of selling
them on commission basis; (b) Cheng was required to either remit the proceeds of the
sale or to return the jewelry after one month from delivery; (c) Cheng failed to do what
was required of her despite the lapse of the aforesaid period; (d) Rodriguez attempted
to encash the check given by Cheng as security, but such check was dishonored twice
for being drawn against insufficient funds and against a closed account; (e) Rodriguez
demanded that Cheng comply with her undertaking, but the latter disregarded such
demand; (j) Cheng's acts clearly prejudiced Rodriguez who lost the jewelry and/or its
value.
In a desperate attempt to absolve herself from liability, Cheng insists that Rodriguez
admitted in her own testimony that the transaction between them is not an agency on
commission basis, but a plain sale of jewelry with Rodriguez as the seller and Cheng
as the buyer.1 As such, Cheng's non-payment of the purchase price of the jewelry
would only give rise to civil liability and not criminal liability. The pertinent portion of
Rodriguez's testimony is as follows:
Essentially, Cheng posits that since Rodriguez "admitted" in her testimony that the
check issued by the former in the amount of Pl20,000.00 constituted full payment for
the first and second batch of jewelry and partial payment for the last batch, the
transactions entered into by the parties should be deemed in the nature of a sale.

Cheng is sadly mistaken.
The foregoing "admission" on the part of Rodriguez did not change the fact that her
transactions with Cheng should be properly deemed as an agency on a commission
basis whereby Rodriguez, as the owner of the jewelry, is the principal, while Cheng is
the agent who is tasked to sell the same on commission. In the eyes of the Court,
Rodriguez merely accepted the check as full security for the first and second batches
of jewelry and as partial security for the last batch. It was only when Cheng defaulted
in her undertaking pursuant to their agreement that Rodriguez was constrained to treat
the check as the former's remittance of the proceeds of the sale of jewelry - albeit
deficient - by presenting it for encashment on October 20, 1997, or more than two (2)
months after the delivery of the last batch of jewelry. However, the check was
dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds. This notwithstanding and with
the assurance from Cheng that the check will be cleared, Rodriguez presented such
check for the second time on November 4, 1997; but it .was again dishonored - this
time for being drawn against a closed account. As such, the fact that Rodriguez loosely
used the words "payment" and "paid" should not be taken against her and should not
in any way change the nature of her transactions with Rodriguez from an agency on a
commission basis to a full-fledged sale. Moreover, even Cheng does not consider such
check as payment for the jewelry, but rather, as security for the loan she allegedly
obtained from Rodriguez.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 28,
2006 and the Resolution dated June 26, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 24871 are hereby AFFIRMED. Accused is found guilty of 3 counts of Estafa.
GRACE SAN DIEGO v PEOPLE
G.R. No.176114 | April 8, 2015
TICKLER: Accountant, reliever ng cashier
DOCTRINES:
1. When the thing is received by the offender from the offended party in trust or in
commission or for administration, the offender acquires both material or physical
possession and juridical possession of the thing received.
2. Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over
the thing transferred and this he may set up even against the owner. It was
established in the trial that petitioner never received the sum of money in trust,
or on commission or for administration.
FACTS: Petitioner Grace San Diego had been the accountant of Obando Fisherman's
Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (OFMPCI). Petitioner was in charge of accounting all
business transactions of the cooperative and performed the functions of cashier and
teller, granted loans and did check discounting and trading. Petitioner acted as cashier
when Teresita Gonzales was on maternity leave and acted as teller from January 13-
30, 1997 when Flordeliza Ocampo was on her honeymoon. She then, on both
occasions, had complete access to the cash vaults and filing cabinets of the
cooperative where its documents were kept. On March 12, 1997, petitioner stopped
reporting for work. The audited figure showed the cash on hand in bank to be
Php3,712,442.80 as of March 11, 1997.However, petitioner reported and certified the
cash on hand of the cooperative with the total amount of Php9,590,455.17 to be correct.
Dimapelis reported the said discrepancies to Correa and the Board of Directors. It was
then that they decided to file a criminal complaint against San Diego.
Contention: Petitioner insists that the prosecution was not able to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt because there was no proof in the audit that the cooperative had
really so much funds and that in consequence there was deficiency of some
Php6,000,000 when compared to pertinent bank statements. Petitioner then insists that
the proof adduced plausibly indicates commission of estafa and not qualified theft.
Petitioner argued that if the thing is not taken away, but received and then appropriated
or converted without the consent of the owner, the crime committed is estafa.
CRIME CHARGED: QUALIFIED THEFT
RTC: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. (Reclusion perpetua for
forty (40) years without pardon)
CA: affirmed the decision of the RTC, with modification that she indemnify the Obando
Fisherman's Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. in the amount of Php2,080,000.00.
ISSUE: Did the CA err in affirming the RTC that even if the thing is not taken away, but
received and then appropriated or converted without the consent of the owner it can be
considered as qualified theft?
RULING: NO, the CA did not err in doing so. One of the elements of estafa with abuse
of confidence is that the money, goods or other personal property be received by the
offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same. When the thing is received
by the offender from the offended party in trust or in commission or for administration,
the offender acquires both material or physical possession and juridical possession of
the thing received. Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee
a right over the thing transferred and this he may set up even against the owner. It was
established in the trial that petitioner never received the sum of money in trust, or on
commission or for administration.
DECISION: The petition is DENIED. Consequently, the Decision and Resolution,

respectively, of the Court of Appeals affirming with modification the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified theft under Article 310, in connection with Article 308 of the Revised· Penal
Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Grace San Diego y
Trinidad is sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
VILMA M. SULIMAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 190970 | November 24, 2014
TICKLER: 2 counts of Illegal Recruitment and 3 counts of Estafa by means of deceit;

Suliman International; South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Canada
DOCTRINE: The elements of estafa by means of deceit are the following, viz.: (a) that
there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that
such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on
the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his
money or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
FACTS: In 6 Informations, all dated June 6, 2003, Vilma Suliman and Luz Garcia (at-
large) were charged before the RTC of Manila with 2 counts of illegal recruitment under
Sec. 6, par. (a), (l) and (m) of R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995), as well as 4 counts of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC. The 6
cases were consolidated and the accused was brought to trial.
[^yan lang talaga yung facts ng case na nakalagay sa full text pero ito yung facts based
sa ruling ng Supreme Court:
In separate cases, Suliman and Garcia were charged for estafa involving private
complainants Anthony Mancera, Perlita Prudencio and Jimmy Tumabcao.
Complainants alleged that Suliman is the owner and general manager of Suliman
International (recruitment company). Allegedly, Suliman and Garcia separately charged
the complainants the amounts of ₱132,460.00, ₱120,000.00 and ₱21,400.00 as
placement fees for their deployment either in South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Canada.
However, promised employment abroad never materialized and the various amounts
of money they paid were never recovered. Hence, they filed their respective
complaints.]
CRIME CHARGED: 2 counts of Illegal Recruitment under Sec. 6, par. (a), (l) and (m)
of R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995); and 4 counts
of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC

RTC: Convicted of 2 counts of illegal recruitment and 3 counts of estafa (Suliman was
acquitted of one charge of estafa for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt)
CA: Affirmed conviction of 2 counts of illegal recruitment and 3 counts of estafa
ISSUE: Did the RTC and CA err in convicting Suliman of (a) 2 counts of illegal
recruitment; and (b) 3 counts of estafa?
RULING:
(a) NO. Sec. 6 of RA 8042 provides that illegal recruitment is committed x x x :

(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than that specified
in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than that actually
received by him as a loan or advance; x x x
(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reasons as determined by the Department
of Labor and Employment; and
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the workers in connection with his
documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the
deployment does not actually take place without the worker's fault. Illegal
recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be
considered as offense involving economic sabotage. x x x
In the present case, both the RTC and the CA found that the prosecution has
established that Suliman and Garcia committed the acts enumerated under
the provisions of Section 6 (a), (l) and (m) of RA 8042 when: (1) they
separately charged the private complainants the amounts of ₱132,460.00,
₱120,000.00 and ₱21,400.00 as placement fees; (2) they failed to actually
deploy the private complainants without valid reasons, and; (3) they failed to
reimburse the said complainants after such failure to deploy.
(b) NO. Under Art. 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC, estafa is committed by any person who
shall defraud another by false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. It is committed by using fictitious
name, or by pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
The elements of estafa by means of deceit are the following, viz.: (a) that there
must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was
made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act,
or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property; and
(d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
In the instant case, all the foregoing elements are present. Suliman and Gaarcia
misrepresented and falsely pretended that they had the capacity to deploy the
private complainants for employment either in South Korea, Saudi Arabia and
Canada. The misrepresentation was made prior to private complainants' payment
of placement fees. It was the misrepresentation and false pretenses made by
Suliman and Garcia that induced the private complainants to part with their money.
As a result of such false pretenses and misrepresentations, the private
complainants suffered damages as the promised employment abroad never
materialized and the various amounts of money they paid were never recovered.
Suliman argues that she could not be held liable because she was not privy nor
was she aware of the recruitment activities done by Garcia. Suliman avers that
when Garcia received several amounts of money from the private complainants,
she acted in her personal capacity and for her own benefit without the knowledge
and consent of petitioner. The Court is not persuaded. As owner and general
manager, Suliman was at the forefront of the recruitment activities of Suliman
International. Undoubtedly, she has control, management or direction of the
business of the said company. In any case, petitioner cannot deny participation in
the recruitment of the private complainants because the prosecution has
established that petitioner was the one who offered the private complainants an
alleged alternative employment in Ireland when their original deployment did not
materialize.
DECISION: Affirmed the CA resolution. Suliman is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt

of 2 counts of illegal recruitment and 3 counts of estafa
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANGEL MATEO Y JACINTO AND VICENTA

LAPIZ Y MEDINA
G.R. No. 198012 | April 22, 2015
TICKLER: Application for overseas employment

DOCTRINE: Anent the charge for estafa, "[w]ell-settled is the rule that a person
convicted for illegal recruitment under the [law] may, for the same acts, be separately
convicted for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the [Revised Penal Code].
FACTS:
Sometime during the period from January to March 1998, the five private complainants,
namely, Abe] E. Balane (Abel), Emilio A. Cariaga (Emilio), Victorio D. Flordeliza
(Victorio), Manuel Oledan (Manuel) and Virgiiio N. Concepcion (Virgiiio), met appellants
on separate occasions at Plaza Ferguzon, Malate, Manila to apply for overseas
employment. Appellant Mateo, representing himself to have a tie-up with some
Japanese firms, promised them employment in Japan as conversion mechanics,
welders, or fitters for a fee. Appellants also promised that they could facilitate private
complainants' employment as direct hires and assured their departure within three
weeks. However, after the private complainants paid the required fees ranging from
P18,555.00 to P25,000.00, appellants failed to secure any overseas employment for
them. Appellants likewise failed to return private complainants' money. This prompted
Manuel to go to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) where he
was issued a Certification3 stating that appellants are not licensed to recruit applicants
for overseas employment. Thereupon, the private complainants filed their Complaint
and executed their respective affidavits with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
The NBI referred the charges to the Department of Justice which subsequently found
probable cause against appellants for large scale illegal recruitment and estafa 4 and
accordingly filed the corresponding Informations5 for the same before the RTC of
Manila.
For their defense, appellants proffered denials. Mateo claimed that he is a legitimate
car importer and not a recruiter. Lapiz, on the other hand, denied knowing any of the
private complainants whom she claimed to have met for the first time at the Prosecutor's
Office.
CRIME CHARGED: 2 counts of Illegal Recruitment under Sec. 6, par. (a), (l) and (m)
of R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995); and 4 counts
of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC
RTC: Court finds both accused ANGEL MATEO y JACINTO and VICENTA LAPIZ y
MADINA a.k.a. "VICKY MATEO" GUILTY of illegal recruitment in large scale. This Court
finds both accused also GUILTY in Criminal Cases Nos. 99-176599, 99-176600, 99-
176601, 99-176602 and 99-176603 for five (5) counts of Estafa
CA: AFFIRMED RTC RULING.
CA: N/A

ISSUE: May a person convicted for illegal recruitment, for the same acts, be separately
convicted for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of RPC?
RULING:
YES. The offense of illegal recruitment in large scale has the following elements: (1)
the person charged undertook any recruitment activity as defined under Section 6 of
RA 8042; (2) accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the
recruitment of workers; and, (3) accused committed the same against three or more
persons individually or as a group. These elements are obtaining in this case. First, the
RTC found appellants to have undertaken a recruitment activity when they promised
private complainants employment in Japan for a fee. This factual finding was affirmed
by the CA. Second, the Certification issued by the POEA unmistakably reveals that
appellants neither have a license nor authority to recruit workers for overseas
employment. Notably, appellants never assailed this Certification. Third, it was
established that there were five complainants. Clearly, the existence of the offense of
illegal recruitment in large scale was duly proved by the prosecution.
Appellants' argument that there was no proof that they received money from the private
complainants deserves no credence. Suffice it to say that money is not material to a
prosecution for illegal recruitment considering that the definition of "illegal recruitment"
under the law includes the phrase "whether for profit or not." Besides, even if there is
no receipt for the money given by the private complainants to appellants, the former's
respective testimonies and affidavits clearly narrate the latter's involvement in the
prohibited recruitment.
Anent the charge for estafa, "[w]ell-settled is the rule that a person convicted for illegal
recruitment under the [law] may, for the same acts, be separately convicted for estafa
under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the [Revised Penal Code]. The elements of estafa are:
(1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and
(2) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation." All these elements are likewise present in this case. As aptly
held by the CA:
Here, the appellants Mateo and Lapiz committed deceit against the private
complainants by making it appear as though they had the authority and resources to
send them to Japan for employment; that there were available jobs for them in Japan
for which they would be hired although, in truth, there were none; and, that by reason
or on the strength of such assurance, the private complainants parted with their money
in payment of the placement fee, documentation and hotel accommodations. All these
representations were actually false and fraudulent and thus, the appellants must be
made liable under par 2(a), Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code.18
With this ratiocination, Lapiz's defense of not knowing any of the complainants must
necessarily fail. As noted by the RTC and the CA, she was present in all of the
transactions, serving as runner of Mateo and was even the one keeping the money
entrusted by the private complainants to appellants. She would also often pacify
the private complainants' uneasiness about the absence of receipts for each of the
amounts given and repeatedly assure them they wou2ld be deployed to Japan. In
short, she was an indispensable participant and effective collaborator of Mateo in
the illegal recruitment of the private complainants.
It must be noted, however, that both the RTC and the CA failed to award interest
on the money judgment in Criminal Case No. 99-176598 for Illegal Recruitment in
Large Scale. Following prevailing jurisprudence, the Court, therefore, imposes
interest at the rate of 6% per annum on each of the amounts awarded from the date
of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the CA

is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amounts ordered restituted in Criminal
Case No. 99-176598 shall each earn an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of
this Decision until fully paid.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v PALMY TIBAYAN AND RICO Z. PUERTO
G.R. Nos. 209655-60, January 14, 2015
TICKLER: Syndicated Estafa; Ponzi scheme
DOCTRINES: The elements of Syndicated Estafa are:
(a) Estafa or other forms of swindling, as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC,
is committed;
(b) the Estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate of five (5) or more persons; and
(c) defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders,

or members of rural banks, cooperative, “samahang nayon(s),” or farmers’
associations, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.
FACTS: Tibayan Group Investment Company, Inc. (TGICI) is an open-end investment

company registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on
September 21, 2001. Sometime in 2002, the SEC conducted an investigation on TGICI
and its subsidiaries. In the course thereof, it discovered that TGICI was selling
securities to the public without a registration statement in violation of “The Securities
Regulation Code,” and that TGICI submitted a fraudulent Treasurer’s Affidavit before

the SEC. Resultantly, on October 21, 2003, the SEC revoked TGICI’s corporate
registration for being fraudulently procured.
Private complainants Hector H. Alvarez, Milagros Alvarez, Clarita P. Gacayan,

Irma T. Ador, Emelyn Gomez, Yolanda Zimmer, Nonito Garlan, Judy C. Rillon, Leonida
D. Jarina, Reynaldo A. Dacon, Cristina Dela Peña, and Rodney E. Villareal were enticed
to invest in TGICI due to the offer of high interest rates, as well as the assurance that
they will recover their investments. After giving their money to TGICI, private
complainants received a Certificate of Share and post-dated checks, representing the
amount of the principal investment and the monthly interest earnings,
respectively. Upon encashment, the checks were dishonored, as the account was
already closed, prompting private complainants to bring the bounced checks to the
TGICI office to demand payment. At the office, the TGICI employees took the said
checks, gave private complainants acknowledgement receipts, and reassured that their
investments, as well as the interests, would be paid. However, the TGICI office closed
down without private complainants having been paid and, thus, they were constrained
to file criminal complaints against the incorporators and directors of TGICI.
In their defense, accused-appellants denied having conspired with the other

TGICI incorporators to defraud private complainants. Particularly, Puerto claimed that
his signature in the Articles of Incorporation of TGICI was forged and that since January
2002, he was no longer a director of TGICI. For her part, Tibayan also claimed that her
signature in the TGICI’s Articles of Incorporation was a forgery, as she was neither an
incorporator nor a director of TGICI.
CRIME CHARGED: multiple criminal cases for Syndicated Estafa (case did not specify
the number of cases charged) against the incorporators and directors of TGICI
RTC: The RTC issued six (6) separate decisions convicting Tibayan of 13 counts and
Puerto of 11 counts of Estafa under Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the RPC in
relation to PD 1689.
RTC convicted the accused of simple estafa only, as the prosecution failed to allege in
the informations that the accused and other directors/incorporators formed a syndicate
with the intention of defrauding the public.
CA: modified accused-appellants’ conviction to that of Syndicated Estafa, and

accordingly increased their respective penalties to life imprisonment for each count.
TGICI and its subsidiaries were engaged in a Ponzi scheme which relied on subsequent
investors to pay its earlier investors- and is what D 1689 precisely aims to punish. Since

the TGICI director/incorporators comprised more than 5 persons, accused criminal
liability should be upgraded to that of Syndicated Estafa.
*a Ponzi scheme is a type of investment fraud that involves the payment of purported returns to existing
investors from funds contributed by new investors. Its organizers often solicit new investors by promising
to invest funds in opportunities claimed to generate high returns with little or no risk.
ISSUE: Are accused-appellants guilty of Syndicated Estafa?
RULING: YES. The Court sustains the conviction of accused-appellants.
The elements of estafa by deceit are the following: (a) that there must be a false
pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false
pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property;
and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
In relation thereto, Section 1 of PD 1689 defines Syndicated Estafa as follows: Any

person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in
Articles 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life
imprisonment to death if the swindling (estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting
of five or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal
act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the
misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks,
cooperatives, “samahang nayon(s),” or farmers’ associations, or funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.
The elements of Syndicated Estafa are: (a) Estafa or other forms of swindling, as
defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed; (b) the Estafa or
swindling is committed by a syndicate of five (5) or more persons; and (c)
defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by
stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative, “samahang nayon(s),” or
farmers’ associations, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from
the general public.
In this case, a judicious review of the records reveals TGICI’s modus operandi of
inducing the public to invest in it on the undertaking that their investment would be
returned with a very high monthly interest rate ranging from 3%-5.5%. Under such
lucrative promise, the investing public are enticed to infuse funds into TGICI. However,
as the directors/incorporators of TGICI knew from the start that TGICI is operating
without any paid-up capital and has no clear trade by which it can pay the assured

profits to its investors, they cannot comply with their guarantee and had to simply
abscond with their investors’ money. Thus, the CA correctly held that accused-
appellants, along with the other accused who are still at large, used TGICI to engage
in a Ponzi scheme, resulting in the defraudation of the TGICI investors.
In this light, it is clear that all the elements of Syndicated Estafa, committed through a
Ponzi scheme,are present in this case, considering that: (a) the incorporators/directors
of TGICI comprising more than five (5) people, including herein accused-appellants,,
made false pretenses and representations to the investing public – in this case,the
private complainants – regarding a supposed lucrative investment opportunity with
TGICI in order to solicit money from them; (b) the said false pretenses and
representations were made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud; (c)
relying on the same, private complainants invested their hard earned money into TGICI;
and (d) the incorporators/directors of TGICI ended up running away with the private
complainants’ investments, obviously to the latter’s prejudice.
DECISION: the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June 28, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR Nos. 33063, 33562, 33660, 33669, 33939, and 34398 is
hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, accused-appellants Palmy Tibayan and Rico Z.
Puerto are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of 13 and 11 counts, respectively,
of Syndicated Estafa and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment for
each count.
GRACIA HAO v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 183345 | September 17, 2014
TICKLER: INVESTMENT
DOCTRINE:
1. The elements of syndicated estafa are:

a. estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the
RPC was committed;
b. the estafa or swindling was committed by a syndicate of five or more persons
c. the fraud resulted in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by
stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang
nayon[s]," or farmers associations or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.
2. Simple estafa and syndicated estafa are not two entirely different crimes. Simple
estafa is a crime necessarily included in syndicated estafa. An offense is
necessarily included in another offense when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.
FACTS: Dy alleged that he was a long-time client of Asiatrust Bank, Binondo Branch
where Ngo was the manager. Because of their good business relationship, Dy took
Ngo’s advice to deposit his money in an investment house that will give a higher rate
of return. Ngo then introduced him to Ma. Gracia Hao (Gracia) who presented herself
as an officer of various reputable companies and an incorporator of State Resources
Development Corporation (State Resources), the recommended company that can give
Dy his higher investment return.
Relying on Ngo and Gracia’s assurances, Dy initially invested in State Resources the
approximate amount of Ten Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00). This initial investment
earned the promised interests, leading Dy, at the urging of Gracia, to increase his
investment to almost One Hundred Million Pesos (₱100,000,000.00). Dy increased his
investments through several checks he issued in the name of State Resources. In
return, Gracia also issued several checks to Dy representing his earnings for his
investment. Gracia issued checks in the total amount of One Hundred Fourteen Million,
Two Hundred Eighty Six Thousand, Eighty Six Pesos and Fourteen Centavos
(₱114,286,086.14). All these checks were subsequently dishonored when Dy
deposited them.
Dy sought the assistance of Ngo for the recovery of the amount of the dishonored
checks. Ngo promised assistance, but after a few months, Dy found out that Ngo
already resigned from Asiatrust Bank and could no longer be located. Hence, he
confronted Gracia regarding the dishonored checks. He eventually learned that Gracia
invested his money in the construction and realty business of Gracia’s husband, Danny
Hao (Danny). Despite their promises to pay, the petitioners never returned Dy’s money.
A supplemental brief was filed to include Chester De Joya, Allan Roxas, Samantha
Roxas, Geraldine Chiong, and Lyn Ansuas – all incorporators and/or directors of State
Resources.
The judge issued warrants of arrest against the 6. Petitioners immediately filed a
motion to defer arraignment and motion to lift warrant of arrest. In their twin
motions, they invoked the absence of probable cause against them and the pendency
of their petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Filed w a pet. For certiorari with the CA.
CA stated that the evidence and affidavits only indicated the crime of simple estafa
since there was no evidence that State Resources was formed to defraud the public in
general or that it was used to solicit money from other persons aside from Dy, then the
offense charged should only be for simple estafa. Nevertheless there was still probably
cause to issue the warrants of arrest for simple estafa.
CRIME CHARGED: SYNDICATED ESTAFA
RTC: ISSUED WARRANTS OF ARREST AGAINST 6 PETITIONERS
CA: SIMPLE ESTAFA
ISSUE: Did the judge err in issuing a warrant of arrest?
RULING: YES, the warrant of arrest may issue because syndicated estafa is
necessarily included in estafa by means of deceit and there is probable cause to convict
petitioner of the latter.
AS TO ESTAFA BY MEANS OF DECEIT
As Dy alleged in his complaint-affidavit, Ngo and Gracia induced him to invest with
State Resources and promised him a higher rate of return. Because of his good
business relationship with Ngo and relying on Gracia’s attractive financial
representations, Dy initially invested the approximate amount of ₱10,000,000.00.
This first investment earned profits. Thus, Dy was enticed by Gracia to invest more so
that he eventually advanced almost ₱100,000,000.00 with State Resources. Gracia’s
succeeding checks representing the earnings of his investments, however, were all
dishonored upon deposit. He subsequently learned that the petitioners used his money
for Danny’s construction and realty business. Despite repeated demands and the
petitioners’ constant assurances to pay, they never returned Dy’s invested money and
its supposed earnings.
These cited factual circumstances show the elements of estafa by means of deceit. The
petitioners induced Dy to invest in State Resources promising higher returns. But
unknown to Dy, what occurred was merely a ruse to secure his money to be used in
Danny’s construction and realty business. The petitioners’ deceit became more blatant
when they admitted in their petition that as early as August 1995, State Resources had
already been dissolved. This admission strengthens the conclusion that the petitioners
misrepresented facts regarding themselves and State Resources in order to persuade
Dy to part with his money for investment with an inexistent corporation.
AS TO SYNDICATED ESTAFA
1) estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC
was committed;
2) the estafa or swindling was committed by a syndicate of five or more persons

3) the fraud resulted in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by
stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon[s],"
or farmers associations or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from
the general public.
The factual circumstances of the present case show that the first and second elements
of syndicated estafa are present; there is probable cause for violation of Article
315(2)(a) of the RPC against the petitioners. Moreover, in Dy’s supplemental complaint-
affidavit, he alleged that the fraud perpetrated against him was committed, not only by
Ngo and the petitioners, but also by the other officers and directors of State Resources.
The number of the accused who allegedly participated in defrauding Dy exceeded five,
thus satisfying the requirement for the existence of a syndicate.
However, the third element of the crime is patently lacking. The funds fraudulently
solicited by the corporation must come from the general public. In the present case, no
evidence was presented to show that aside from Dy, the petitioners, through State
Resources, also sought investments from other people. Dy had no co-complainants
alleging that they were also deceived to entrust their money to State Resources. The
general public element was not complied with. Thus, no syndicated estafa allegedly
took place, only simple estafa by means of deceit.
Moreover, we note that simple estafa and syndicated estafa are not two entirely
different crimes. Simple estafa is a crime necessarily included in syndicated estafa. An
offense is necessarily included in another offense when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.
DECISION: Warrant of arrest may be issued.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v GILBERT REYES WAGAS
G.R. No. 157943 | September 4, 2013
TICKLER: 200 Bags of rice
DOCTRINE: In order to constitute estafa under this statutory provision, the act of
postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of
the defraudation. This means that the offender must be able to obtain money or property
from the offended party by reason of the issuance of the check, whether dated or
postdated. In other words, the Prosecution must show that the person to whom the
check was delivered would not have parted with his money or property were it not for
the issuance of the check by the offender.

The essential elements of estafa are that: (a) a check is postdated or issued in payment
of an obligation contracted at the time the check is issued; (b) lack or insufficiency of
funds to cover the check; and (c) damage to the payee thereof. It is the criminal fraud
or deceit in the issuance of a check that is punishable, not the non-payment of a
debt. Prima facie evidence of deceit exists by law upon proof that the drawer of the
check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three days from
receipt of the notice of dishonor.
FACTS: Wagas was charged with estafa. After he entered a plea of not guilty, the pre-
trial was held, during which the Defense admitted that the check alleged in the
information had been dishonored due to insufficient funds. On its part, the Prosecution
made no admission.
At the trial, Prosecution complainant Alberto Ligaray, as lone witness, testified that on
April 30, 1997, Wagas placed an order for 200 bags of rice over the telephone; that he
and his wife would not agree at first to the proposed payment of the order by postdated
check, but because of Wagas’ assurance that he would not disappoint them and that
he had the means to pay them because he had a lending business and money in the
bank, they relented and accepted the order; that he released the goods to Wagas on
April 30, 1997 directly to Robert Cañada, the brother-in-law of Wagas, who signed the
delivery receipt upon receiving the rice and at the same time received Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI) Check No. 0011003 for ₱200,000.00 payable to cash and
postdated May 8, 1997; that he later deposited the check with Solid Bank, his depository
bank, but the check was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds; that he called Wagas
about the matter, and the latter told him that he would pay upon his return to Cebu; and
that despite repeated demands, Wagas did not pay him.
In his defense, Wagas himself testified. He admitted having issued BPI Check No.
0011003 to Cañada, his brother-in-law, not to Ligaray. He denied having any telephone
conversation or any dealings with Ligaray. He explained that the check was intended
as payment for a portion of Cañada’s property that he wanted to buy, but when the sale
did not push through, he did not anymore fund the check.
On cross-examination, the Prosecution confronted Wagas with a letter dated July 3,

1997 apparently signed by him and addressed to Ligaray’s counsel, wherein he
admitted owing Ligaray ₱200,000.00 for goods received. There he promised
acknowledged his failure to make good of his obligation on or before June 15, 1997
and reasoned that he sold his real property located in Manila whose buyer likewise
failed to pay. As a resolution, Wagas promised to source funds from the same property
as collateral and funds from which shall be released within 30 days from such writing.

Wagas admitted the letter, but insisted that it was Cañada who had transacted with
Ligaray, and that he had signed the letter only because his sister and her husband
(Cañada) had begged him to assume the responsibility. Wagas declared that Cañada,
a seafarer, was then out of the country; that he signed the letter only to accommodate
the pleas of his sister and Cañada, and to avoid jeopardizing Cañada’s application for
overseas employment.
CRIME CHARGED: Estafa
RTC: CONVICTED Wagas of estafa – the Prosecution had proved beyond reasonable
doubt all the elements constituting the crime of estafa.
Wagas filed a MNT/MR, arguing that the Prosecution did not establish that it was he
who had transacted with Ligaray and who had negotiated the check to the latter; that
the records showed that Ligaray did not meet him at any time; and that Ligaray’s
testimony on their alleged telephone conversation was not reliable because it was not
shown that Ligaray had been familiar with his voice. Wagas also sought the reopening
of the case based on newly discovered evidence, specifically: (a) the testimony of
Cañada who could not testify during the trial because he was then out of the country,
and (b) Ligaray’s testimony given against Wagas in another criminal case for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. RTC deinied. Prior to the elevation of the records to the
Court, Wagas filed a petition for admission to bail pending appeal. The RTC granted
the petition and fixed Wagas’ bond at ₱40,000.00.
ISSUE: Were all the elements of Estafa established by the prosecution to warrant
conviction?
RULING: NO. In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime
itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In that regard, the
Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who
had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check.
Firstly, Ligaray expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the person with
whom he was transacting over the telephone. Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray
was made payable to cash. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, this type of check
was payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by mere delivery without the need
of an indorsement. This rendered it highly probable that Wagas had issued the check
not to Ligaray, but to somebody else like Cañada, his brother-in-law, who then
negotiated it to Ligaray. Relevantly, Ligaray confirmed that he did not himself see or
meet Wagas at the time of the transaction and thereafter, and expressly stated that the
person who signed for and received the stocks of rice was Cañada.

The accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged, must have used the check in order to
defraud the complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the mere
issuance of the worthless check. Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa simply
because he had issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt must still
clearly show that it had been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray by
means of the check.
Thirdly, Ligaray admitted that it was Cañada who received the rice from him and who
delivered the check to him. Considering that the records are bereft of any showing that
Cañada was then acting on behalf of Wagas, the RTC had no factual and legal bases
to conclude and find that Cañada had been acting for Wagas. This lack of factual and
legal bases for the RTC to infer so obtained despite Wagas being Cañada’s brother-in-
law.
Finally, Ligaray’s declaration that it was Wagas who had transacted with him over the
telephone was not reliable because he did not explain how he determined that the
person with whom he had the telephone conversation was really Wagas whom he had
not yet met or known before then.
A telephone conversation like that one Ligaray supposedly had with the buyer of rice to
be first authenticated before it could be received in evidence. Among others, the person
with whom the witness conversed by telephone should be first satisfactorily identified
by voice recognition or any other means. Without the authentication, incriminating
another person just by adverting to the telephone conversation with him would be all
too easy. In this respect, an identification based on familiarity with the voice of the caller,
or because of clearly recognizable peculiarities of the caller would have sufficed. The
identity of the caller could also be established by the caller’s self-identification, coupled
with additional evidence, like the context and timing of the telephone call, the contents
of the statement challenged, internal patterns, and other distinctive characteristics, and
disclosure of knowledge of facts known peculiarly to the caller. Verily, it is only fair that
the caller be reliably identified first before a telephone communication is accorded
probative weight. The identity of the caller may be established by direct or
circumstantial evidence.
According to one ruling of the Kansas Supreme Court:
Communications by telephone are admissible in evidence where they are relevant to

the fact or facts in issue, and admissibility is governed by the same rules of evidence
concerning face-to-face conversations except the party against whom the
conversations are sought to be used must ordinarily be identified. It is not necessary
that the witness be able, at the time of the conversation, to identify the person with
whom the conversation was had, provided subsequent identification is proved by direct

or circumstantial evidence somewhere in the development of the case. The mere
statement of his identity by the party calling is not in itself sufficient proof of such
identity, in the absence of corroborating circumstances so as to render the conversation
admissible. However, circumstances preceding or following the conversation may
serve to sufficiently identify the caller. The completeness of the identification goes to
the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility, and the responsibility lies in the
first instance with the district court to determine within its sound discretion whether the
threshold of admissibility has been met.
Yet, the Prosecution did not tender any plausible explanation or offer any proof to
definitely establish that it had been Wagas whom Ligaray had conversed with on the
telephone. The Prosecution did not show through Ligaray during the trial as to how he
had determined that his caller was Wagas. All that the Prosecution sought to elicit from
him was whether he had known and why he had known Wagas.
Ligaray’s statement that he could tell that it was Wagas who had ordered the rice
because he "know[s]" him was still vague and unreliable for not assuring the certainty
of the identification, and should not support a finding of Ligaray’s familiarity with Wagas
as the caller by his voice. It was evident from Ligaray’s answers that Wagas was not
even an acquaintance of Ligaray’s prior to the transaction. Thus, the RTC’s conclusion
that Ligaray had transacted with Wagas had no factual basis. Without that factual basis,
the RTC was speculating on a matter as decisive as the identification of the buyer to
be Wagas.
The letter of Wagas did not competently establish that he was the person who had
conversed with Ligaray by telephone to place the order for the rice. The letter was
admitted exclusively as the State’s rebuttal evidence to controvert or impeach the denial
of Wagas of entering into any transaction with Ligaray on the rice; hence, it could be
considered and appreciated only for that purpose. Under the law of evidence, the court
shall consider evidence solely for the purpose for which it is offered, not for any other
purpose. Fairness to the adverse party demands such exclusivity. Moreover, the high
plausibility of the explanation of Wagas that he had signed the letter only because his
sister and her husband had pleaded with him to do so could not be taken for granted.
Nevertheless, an accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still be held civilly liable
where the preponderance of the established facts so warrants. Wagas as the admitted
drawer of the check was legally liable to pay the amount of it to Ligaray, a holder in due
course. Consequently, we pronounce and hold him fully liable to pay the amount of the
dishonored check, plus legal interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision.
DECISION: Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision rendered on July 11,
2002 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, in Cebu City; and ACQUITS Gilbert R.

Wagas of the crime of estafa on the ground of reasonable doubt, but ORDERS him to
pay Alberto Ligaray the amount of ₱200,000.00 as actual damages, plus interest of 6%
per annum from the finality of this decision.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v JULIE GRACE VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 163662 | February 25, 2015
TICKLER: Jewelry, PNB postdated checks
DOCTRINE: The defense of Villanueva is actually anchored on the rule that estafa will
not lie when the parties waive the negotiable character of the check, and instead treat
the same as proof of an obligation. For instance, when there is an agreement between
the parties at the time of the issuance and postdating of the checks that the obligee shall
not encash or present the same to the bank, the obligor cannot be prosecuted for estafa
because the element of deceit is lacking. When the payee was informed that the checks
are not covered by adequate funds, bad faith or estafa shall not arise.
FACTS:
Prosecution: Madarang was able to sell to Villanueva five sets of jewelry worth ₱1,010,
000. 00. Villanueva made out nine checks drawn against PNB, eight of which were
postdated. Villanueva signed the receipt stating the sets of jewelry received with the
corresponding amount and the checks issued. Madarang received the checks because
of Villanueva's assurance that they would all be honored upon presentment. However,
the drawee bank paid only two (2) PNB checks, the remaining seven checks being
dishonored either by reason of Account Closed or Drawn Against Insufficient
Funds. Madarang tried to call and see Villanueva at her residence to inform her of the
dishonored checks, but Madarang was barred by security guards from reaching
Villanueva. Madarang resorted to sending demand letters, but her effort to contact
Villanueva proved futile.
Defense: Villanueva claimed that Madarang was persistent that Villanueva buy jewelry
on credit, and even assured Villanueva that she could replace the same if she was
dissatisfied with her purchase. Madarang prevailed on Villanueva to buy six pieces of
jewelry, for which she issued six checks as payment, five of which were postdated. On
August 16, 1994, Villanueva sought to have the jewelry replaced. Villanueva retrieved
the checks she had previously issued and replaced them with another set of postdated
checks that were the subject of the criminal case against her. Villanueva maintained
that the second set of checks were issued as guarantee under the agreement that

they were not to be deposited until Villanueva advised Madarang of the

sufficiency of funds in her account. Villanueva insisted that she did not receive any
notice from Madarang regarding the dishonor of the checks.
CRIME CHARGED: ESTAFA
RTC: GUILTY of the crime of estafa under Art. 315 par. 2(d) relation to PD No. 818.
Penalty: 14 y 8 m1 d to 20 y plus ₱995,000.00 plus 12% interest p.a.
CA: Affirmed with modification; penalty was erroneous. It should be: 8 y

1d of prision mayor, as min, to 30 y of reclusion perpetua as max. The
Resolution granting her bail pending appeal is REVOKED and her
profferred bail bond is REJECTED.
PD No. 818 provides:
"SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses
or fraudulent acts as defined in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of reclusion temporal of the amount of fraud is over 12,000 pesos
but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the
penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding
one year for each additional 10,000 pesos but the total penalty which may be
imposed shall in no case exceed thirty years. In such cases, and in connection
with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the Revised Penal
Code, the penalty shall be termed reclusion perpetua;
x x x x."
Hence, if the amount of the fraud exceeds twenty two thousand pesos, the
penalty of reclusion temporal is imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional ten thousand (₱10,000.00) pesos but the total
penalty shall not exceed thirty (30) years, which shall be termed reclusion
perpetua. As used herein, reclusion perpetua is not the prescribed penalty for the
offense. It merely describes the penalty actually imposed on account of the amount
of the fraud involved, which exceeds twenty two thousand (₱22,000.00) pesos.
"Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by the Revised
Penal Code, such as estafa, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of
the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the
Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term of which shall be within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense." "The penalty
next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense,
without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission
of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound
discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next
lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The
modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum
term of the indeterminate sentence." Here, complainant was defrauded in the
amount of seven hundred [thousand] (₱700,000.00) pesos. The fact that the
amount involved in the instant case exceeds ₱22,000.00 should not be considered
in the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead the matter would
be so taken as analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the
maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence. This accords with the rule that
penal laws are construed in favor of the accused.
ISSUE: Was there ESTAFA?
RULING: YES. The elements of estafa were present.
There is estafa when:
(1) the offender has postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted
at the time of the postdating or issuance;
(2) at the time of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the
bank, or the funds deposited are not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; and
(3) the payee has been defrauded. The deceit should be the efficient cause of the
defraudation, and should either be prior to, or simultaneous with, the act of the fraud.
The first element was admitted by Villanueva, who confirmed that she had issued the
checks to Madarang in exchange for the jewelry she had purchased.
The second element was likewise established because the checks were dishonored
upon presentment due to insufficiency of funds or because the account was already
closed.
The third element was also proved by the showing that Madarang suffered prejudice by
her failure to collect from Villanueva the balance.
Villanueva’s defense that there was an agreement with Madarang whereby the latter
would deposit or encash the checks only after being informed of the sufficiency of funds
in Villanueva's account was not proved. Her defense was anchored on the rule that
estafa will not lie when the parties waive the negotiable character of the check, and

instead treat the same as proof of an obligation. For instance, when there is an
agreement between the parties at the time of the issuance and postdating of the checks
that the obligee shall not encash or present the same to the bank, the obligor cannot be
prosecuted for estafa because the element of deceit is lacking. When the payee was
informed that the checks are not covered by adequate funds, bad faith or estafa shall
not arise.
The receipt signed by her proved the transaction and her issuance of the postdated
checks by listing the items bought and the postdated checks issued as payment. If the
parties really agreed for Madarang to deposit the checks only after notice of the
sufficiency of funds, then such agreement should have been incorporated in the receipt
as an integral part of the transaction, or simply written in another document with
Madarang's express conformity for Villanueva's protection.
DECISION: AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the amount of ₱995,000.00 shall

earn interest 12% per annum from the filing of the information on September 4, 1995
until June 30, 2013, and interest of 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until its full
satisfaction.
MARIETA DE CASTRO v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 171672 | February 2, 2015
TICKLER: Bank teller; Passbook
DOCTRINE: The Court should prescribe the correct penalties in complex crimes in
strict observance of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code. In estafa through falsification
of commercial documents, the court should impose the penalty for the graver offense
in the maximum period. Otherwise, the penalty prescribed in invalid, and will not attain
finality.
FACTS: Amparo Matuguina (Amparo) and Milagrosa Cornejo (Milagrosa) are bank
depositors of BPI Family Savings Bank (BPI Family) at its branch in Malibay, Pasay
City. Amparo and Milagrosa left their savings account passbooks with the accused
within the space of a week in October-November 1993 when they went to the bank to
transact on their accounts. On October 29, Amparo withdrew the sum of P500 and left
her passbook with Marieta De Castro (Marieta) upon the latter’s instruction. She had to
return two more times before the branch manager Cynthia Zialcita (Cynthia) sensed
that something wrong was going on. Cynthia then reviewed Amparo’s account and
found three withdrawal slips dated October 19, 29 and November 4, 1993 containing
signatures radically different from the specimen signatures of the depositor and
covering a total of P65,000. It was apparent that Marieta had intervened in the posting
and verification of the slips because her initials were affixed thereto. Upon Cynthia’s
instruction, assistant manager Benjamin Misa (Misa) went to Amparo and it was
confirmed that it was not Amparo who affixed the signatures in the withdrawal slips. On
the same day, Misa visited another depositor, Milagrosa, whom they feared was also
victimized by the accused. Their worst expectations were confirmed. Cynthia then
reported her findings to her superiors. The accused initially denied the claims against
her but when she was asked to write her statement down, she confessed her guilt.
The employment of Marieta was ultimately terminated. The bank paid Amparo P65,000
while Cornejo got her refund directly from the accused in the amount of P2000.
CRIME CHARGED: Four counts of Estafa through Falsification of a Commercial

Document
RTC: GUILTY as charged.
CA: AFFIRMED the judgment of RTC.
Except the provision of the dispositive portion requiring accused to pay BPI Family
P2000. This must be deleted because the accused had already paid the amount to the
depositor.
ISSUE: Is Marieta de Castro guilty of the four counts of estafa through falsification of
commercial document?
RULING:
YES. The guilt of the petitioner for four counts of estafa through falsification of a
commercial document was established beyond reasonable doubt. As a bank teller, she
took advantage of the bank depositors who had trusted her enough to leave their
passbooks with her upon her instruction. Without their knowledge, however, she filled
out withdrawal slips that she signed and misrepresented to her fellow bank employees
that the signatures had been verified in due course. Her misrepresentation to her co-
employees enabled her to receive the amounts stated in the withdrawal slips. She
thereby committed two crimes, namely: estafa, by defrauding BPI Family Savings, her
employer, in the various sums withdrawn from the bank accouts of Amparo and
Milagrosa; and falsification of a commercial document, by forging the signatures of
Amparo and Milagrosa in the withdrawal slips to make it appear that the depositor
concerned had signed the respective slips in order to enable her to withdraw the
amounts. Such offenses were complex crimes, because the estafa would not have
been consummated without the falsification of the withdrawal slips.

Nonetheless, there is a need to clarify the penalties imposable.
According to Article 48 of Revised Penal Code, the penalty for a complex crime is that
corresponding to the most serious crime, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
Otherwise, the penalty will be void and ineffectual, and will not attain finality.
In the four criminal cases involved in this appeal, the falsification of commercial
documents is punished with prision correcional in its medium and maximum periods (i.e
two years, four months and one day to six years) and a fine of P5000. In contrast, the
estafa is punished according to the value of the defraudation, as follows: with the
penalty of prision correcional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period (i.e., four years, two months and one day to eight years) if the amount of the
fraud is over P12,000 but does not exceed P22,000, and if such amount exceed
P22,000 the penalty is imposed in the maximum period, adding one year for each
additional P10,000, but the total shall not exceed 20 years, in which case the penalty
shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be, in connection
with the accessory penalties that may be imposed and for the purpose of the other
provisions of the Revised Penal Code; with the penalty of prision correcional in its
minimum and medium periods if the amount of the fraud is over P6,000 but does not
exceed P12,000; with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum to prision correcional
in its minimum period if the amount of the fraud is over P200 but does not exceed
P6000; and with the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods if the
amount of the fraud does not exceed P200.
DECISION: CA Decision AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to penalty.

VI. BP 22 CASES
MA. ROSARIO P. CAMPOS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and FIRST

WOMEN'S CREDIT CORPORATION (FWCC)
G.R. No. 187401 | September 17, 2014
TICKLER: 14 counts of violation of BP 22
DOCTRINE: Court has emphasized the importance of proof of receipt of such notice of
dishonor, although not as an element of the offense, but as a means to establish that
the issuer of a check was aware of insufficiency of funds when he issued the check and
the bank dishonored it, in relation to the second element of the offense and Section 2
of BP 22. Considering that the second element involves a state of mind which is difficult
to establish, Section 2 of BP 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of
funds. Mere presentation of registry return receipts that cover registered mail was not
sufficient to establish that written notices of dishonor had been sent to or served on
issuers of checks. The authentication by affidavit of the mailers was necessary in order
for service by registered mail to be regarded as clear proof of the giving of notices of
dishonor and to predicate the existence of the second element of the offense.
FACTS: CA, in its decision, affirmed the conviction of Campos for 14 counts of violation
of BP 22. Campos obtained a loan, payable on installments, from respondent FWCC in
the amount of ₱50,000. She issued several postdated checks in favor of FWCC to cover
the agreed installment payments. Fourteen of these checks drawn against her Current
Account with BPI Family Bank. The checks, however, were dishonored when presented
for payment. The checks were declared by the drawee bank to be drawn against a
"closed account." After Campos failed to satisfy her outstanding obligation with FWCC
despite demand, she was charged before the MeTC with violations of BP 22. Campos
was tried in absentia, as she failed to attend court proceedings after being arraigned.
MeTC rendered its decision convicting the accused of 14 counts of violations of BP 22.
Campos appealed to the RTC. RTC affirmed the conviction of Campos. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by Campos, but the same was denied for lack of merit.
Unyielding, Campos appealed the RTC decision to the CA, which affirmed the ruling of
the RTC. Campos moved to reconsider, but her motion was denied. Hence, this appeal.
CRIME CHARGED: 14 counts of violation of BP 22.
MeTC: CONVICTED as charged.
RTC: AFFIRMED the judgment of MeTC.

CA: AFFIRMED the RTC ruling
ISSUES:
1. Is a demand letter that was sent through registered mail sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
BP 22 as to knowledge of the fact of the dishonor of the subject checks?
2. Are Campos' want of information of the fact of the checks' dishonor and her subsequent
arrangements for their payment tantamount to the good faith?
RULING: Campos argues that the crime’s element requiring her knowledge at the time
of the check’s issuance that she did not have sufficient funds with the drawee bank for
the payment of the check in full upon presentment was not established by the
prosecution. She denies having received a notice of dishonor from FWCC. Insisting on
an acquittal, Campos discredits the MeTC’s reliance on a supposed notice of dishonor
that was sent to her by FWCC through registered mail. She also invokes good faith as
she allegedly made arrangements with FWCC for the payment of her obligation after
the subject checks were dishonored. The petition lacks merit.
FIRST ISSUE: NO. To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements
must be present: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for
account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time
of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of
the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or creditor dishonor for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment. The presence of the first and third elements is undisputed. An issue being
advanced by Campos through the present petition concerns her alleged failure to
receive a written demand letter from FWCC. In a line of cases, the Court has
emphasized the importance of proof of receipt of such notice of dishonor, although not
as an element of the offense, but as a means to establish that the issuer of a check
was aware of insufficiency of funds when he issued the check and the bank dishonored
it, in relation to the second element of the offense and Section 2 of BP 22. Considering
that the second element involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section
2 of BP 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. In the instant
case, both the RTC and the CA affirmed the MeTC’s finding that the required notice of
dishonor from FWCC was received by Campos. Campos, nonetheless, still maintains
that her personal receipt of the notice was not sufficiently established, considering that
only a written copy of the letter and the registry return receipt covering it were presented
by the prosecution. The Court has in truth repeatedly held that the mere presentation
of registry return receipts that cover registered mail was not sufficient to establish that
written notices of dishonor had been sent to or served on issuers of checks. The
authentication by affidavit of the mailers was necessary in order for service by
registered mail to be regarded as clear proof of the giving of notices of dishonor and to
predicate the existence of the second element of the offense.
SECOND ISSUE: NO. In still finding no merit in the present petition, the Court, however,
considers Campos' defense that she exerted efforts to reach an amicable settlement
with her creditor after the checks which she issued were dishonored by the drawee
bank, BPI Family Bank. Campos categorically declared in her petition that, "[she] has
in her favor evidence to show that she was in good faith and indeed made arrangements
for the payment of her obligations subsequently after the dishonor of the checks."
Clearly, this statement was a confirmation that she actually received the required notice
of dishonor from FWCC. Campos would not have entered into the alleged
arrangements if she had not received a notice of dishonor from her creditor, and had
no knowledge of the insufficiency of her funds with the bank and the dishonor of her
checks. Campos could have avoided prosecution by paying the amounts due on the
checks or making arrangements for payment in full within 5 days after receiving notice.
Unfortunately for Campos, these circumstances were not established in the instant
case. She failed to sufficiently disclose the terms of her alleged arrangement with
FWCC, and to establish that the same had been fully complied with so as to completely
satisfy the amounts covered by the subject checks. Moreover, documents to prove such
fact should have been presented before the MeTC during the trial, yet Campos opted
to be tried in absentia, and thus waived her right to present evidence. Given the
circumstances, the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the CA which
affirmed the conviction of Campos.
DECISION: Petition DENIED. CA Decision AFFIRMED.
GEOFFREY GRIFFITH v COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 129764 | March 12, 2002
TICKLER: two checks, invalid foreclosure

DOCTRINE: The Bouncing Checks Law "was devised to safeguard the interest of the
banking system and the legitimate public checking account user." It was not designed
to favor or encourage those who seek to enrich themselves through manipulation and
circumvention of the purpose of the law. Noteworthy, in Administrative Circular No. 12-
2000, this Court has expressed a policy preference for fine as penalty in cases of B.P.
22 violations rather than imprisonment to "best serve the ends of criminal justice."
Moreover, while the philosophy underlying our penal system leans toward the classical
school that imposes penalties for retribution, such retribution should be aimed at "actual
and potential wrongdoers."

FACTS: In 1985, Phelps Dodge Philippines, Inc. leased its lot and factory building to
Lincoln Gerard, Inc. for a term of two years at a monthly rental of P75,000. When
Lincoln Gerard, Inc. incurred rental arrearages, Geoffrey F. Griffith, in his capacity as
president of Lincoln Gerard, Inc., issued two Far East Bank and Trust Co. checks in the
amount of P100,000.00 and P115,442.65. The voucher for these checks contained the
following instruction: “These checks are not to be presented without prior approval from
this Corporation to be given not later than May 30, 1986.” Also written on the face of
the voucher was the following note: “However, if written approval of Lincoln Gerard, Inc.
is not given before May 30, 1986, Phelps Dodge, Phils. shall present the cheques for
payment. This is final and irrevocable.”
On May 29, 1986, Griffith wrote Phelps Dodge not to present the said checks for
payment on May 30, 1986 because they could not be funded due to a four-week labor
strike that had earlier paralyzed the business operations of Lincoln Gerard. On June 2,
1986, when no further communication was received from Lincoln Gerard, Phelps Dodge
presented the two checks for payment but these were dishonored by the bank for
having been drawn against insufficient funds. Three days later, Phelps Dodge sent a
demand letter to Lincoln Gerard, apprising Griffith of the dishonor of the checks and
asking him to fund them within the time prescribed by law. Lincoln Gerard still failed to
fund the checks but Griffith sent a letter to Phelps Dodge, explaining Lincoln’s inability
to fund said checks due to the strike. Subsequently, on June 19, 1986, Phelps Dodge
notified Lincoln Gerard that its properties would be foreclosed. Phelps Dodge went
ahead with the foreclosure and auction sale on June 20, 1986, despite Lincoln Gerard’s
protest.
Petitioner’s Contentions:
1. He communicated to Phelps Dodge through a note on the voucher attached to
the checks, the fact that said checks were unfunded at the time of their issuance;
this good faith on his part negates any intent to put worthless checks in
circulation, which is what B.P. 22 seeks to penalize. As regards the second
check that was postdated, petitioner contends that there could not be any
violation of B.P. 22 with said check since the element of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds is absent. Petitioner could not have known at the time
of its issuance that the postdated check would be dishonored when presented
for payment later on.
2. His conviction in this case would be violative of the constitutional
proscription against imprisonment for failure to pay a debt, since petitioner
would be punished not for knowingly issuing an unfunded check but for failing to
pay an obligation when it fell due.
3. The payment made by Lincoln Gerard through the proceeds of the notarial
foreclosure and auction sale extinguished his criminal liability.
Private Respondent’s Contention: All the elements that comprise violation of B.P. 22
are present in this case. Moreover, the payment in this case was made beyond the five-
day period, counted from notice of dishonor, provided by the law and thus did not
extinguish petitioners criminal liability.

OSG’s Contentions:
1. B.P. 22 does not distinguish between a check that is postdated and one that is
not, for as long as the drawer issued the checks with knowledge of his insufficient
funds and the check is dishonored upon presentment.
2. There is no unconstitutional punishment for failure to pay a debt in this case,
since what B.P. 22 penalizes is the act of making and issuing a worthless check
that is dishonored upon presentation for payment, not the failure to pay a debt.
The supposed payment that resulted from Phelps Dodges notarial foreclosure of
Lincoln Gerards properties could not bar prosecution under B.P. 22, since damage or
prejudice to the payee is immaterial. Moreover, said payment was made only after the
violation of the law had already been committed. It was made beyond the five-day
period, from notice of dishonor of the checks, provided under B.P. 22.
CRIME CHARGED: Two informations for violation of B.P. 22 was filed before the RTC
RTC: Remanded to the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), in view of Republic Act No.
7691 that expanded the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
MeTC: GUILTY ON BOTH COUNTS for violation of B.P. 22, and sentenced him to
suffer imprisonment for 6 months on each count, to be served consecutively
RTC: AFFIRMED
CA: AFFIRMED
ISSUE: Did the court erroneously convicted the petitioner of violation of BP 22?
SC: Yes. The Court noted that in the two criminal cases filed by Phelps Dodge against
petitioner, the checks issued were corporate checks that Lincoln Gerard allegedly failed
to fund for a valid reason duly communicated to the payee. The Court also stressed
that by resorting to the remedy of foreclosure and auction sale, Phelps Dodge was able
to collect the face value of the two checks, totaling P215,442.65. In fact, it impounded
items owned by Lincoln Gerard valued far in excess of the debt or the checks. This was
the situation when, almost two years after the auction sale, petitioner was charged with
two counts of violation of B.P. 22. By that time, the civil obligation of Lincoln Gerard,
Inc. to Phelps Dodge Phils. Inc. was no longer subsisting, though respondent Court of
Appeals called the payment thereof as involuntary. That the money value of the two
checks signed by petitioner was already collected, however, could not be ignored in
appreciating the antecedents of the two criminal charges against petitioner. Because
of the invalid foreclosure and sale, Phelps Dodge was ordered to pay or return
P1,072,586.88 to Lincoln Gerard, per decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Branch 69, which became final after it was affirmed by the appellate court. Holding the
debtor's president to answer for a criminal offense under B.P. 22 two years after said
collection, was no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations, the

creditor having collected already more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of
the checks for payment of rentals, via auction sale.
The Bouncing Checks Law "was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking
system and the legitimate public checking account user." It was not designed to favor
or encourage those who seek to enrich themselves through manipulation and
circumvention of the purpose of the law. Noteworthy, in Administrative Circular No. 12-
2000, this Court has expressed a policy preference for fine as penalty in cases of B.P.
22 violations rather than imprisonment to "best serve the ends of criminal justice."
Moreover, while the philosophy underlying our penal system leans toward the classical
school that imposes penalties for retribution, such retribution should be aimed at "actual
and potential wrongdoers."
DECISION: ACQUITTED of the charges of violation of B.P. 22
ARIEL LIM v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 190834 | November 26, 2014
TICKLER: Campaign materials not delivered on time
DOCTRINE: The spirit of the law which, for B.P. Blg. 22, is the protection of the
credibility and stability of the banking system, would not be served by penalizing people
who have evidently made amends for their mistakes and made restitution for damages
even before charges have been filed against them. In effect, the payment of the checks
before the filing of the informations has already attained the purpose of the law and
extinguishes one’s criminal liability.
FACTS: Petitioner Lim issued two checks in the amount of P100,000 each. He gave
the checks to Mr. Willie Castor as his donation to the latter’s candidacy during the 1998
elections. Castor ordered the delivery of printing materials and used petitioner’s check
to pay for the same. Because the delivery was not made on time and was no longer
used for the campaign, Castor told petitioner to issue a Stop Payment Order for the
checks. Petitioner complied and the checks were dishonored by the bank. Private
complainant Magna Badiee (from whom Castor ordered the printing materials) sent two
demand letters to petitioner and subsequently filed a complaint with the Prosecutor.
After receiving a subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, petitoiner immediately
issued a replacement check in the amount of P200,000 which complainant was able to
encash. However, six months after making payment, two informations were charged
against petitioner for violation of BP 22.
CRIME CHARGED: 2 counts of violation of BP 22
RTC: GUILTY
CA: GUILTY
ISSUE: Did accused violate BP 22?
RULING: NO. The CA took it against petitioner that he paid the amount of the checks
only after receiving the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, which supposedly
shows that petitioner was motivated to pay not because he wanted to settle his
obligation but because he wanted to avoid prosecution. This reasoning is tenuous,
because we need not differentiate as to whether payment was made before or after the
complaint had been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor. What matters is that the
amount stated in the dishonored check had actually been paid before the Information
against the accused was filed in court.
While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is
the issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for
payment, we should not apply penal laws mechanically. We must find if the application
of the law is consistent with the purpose of and reason for the law. The elements for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are: "(1) The accused makes, draws or issues a check to apply
to account or for value; (2) The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or
she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) The check is subsequently dishonored
by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to
stop payment.” Although payment of the value of the bounced check, if made beyond
the 5-day period provided for in B.P. Blg. 22, would normally not extinguish criminal
liability, the Court cited the cases of Griffith vs. CA and Tan vs. PCIB. In both cases,
the Court acknowledges the existence of extraordinary cases where, even if all the
elements of the crime or offense are present, the conviction of the accused would prove
to be abhorrent to society's sense of justice. Just like in Griffith and in Tan, petitioner
should not be penalized although all the elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are proven
to be present. The spirit of the law which, for B.P. Blg. 22, is the protection of the
credibility and stability of the banking system, would not be served by penalizing people
who have evidently made amends for their mistakes and made restitution for damages
even before charges have been filed against them. In effect, the payment of the checks
before the filing of the informations has already attained the purpose of the law and
extinguishes one’s criminal liability.
The court further clarified that its ruling in this case should be differentiated from cases
where the accused is charged with estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised
Penal Code, where the fraud is perpetuated by postdating a check, or issuing a check
in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds
deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. In said case of
estafa, damage and deceit are the essential elements of the offense, and the check is
merely the accused's tool in committing fraud. In such a case, paying the value of the
dishonored check will not free the accused from criminal liability. It will merely satisfy
the civil liability of the crime but not the criminal liability

DECISION: Petitioner is ACQUITTED.

VII. CASE ON OTHER FORMS OF SWINDLING (ART. 316)
CLARITA ESTRELLADO-MAINAR v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 184320 | July 29, 2015
TICKLER: Charged Art 316 par 1, convicted of par 2
DOCTRINE: The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts alleged in
the Information and not by the title or designation of the offense contained in the caption
of the Information. It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is
comprised must be alleged in the Information.
FACTS:
Sometime in February 2005, the petitioner offered for sale to Eric Naval (Naval) portions
of land. During the negotiations for this sale, the petitioner told Naval that the title to the
land she was selling had no problems. The petitioner also informed Naval that the area
subject of the proposed sale would "still be segregated from the mother title."
On March 24, 2003, the parties executed an Agreement to Buy and Sell where the
petitioner agreed to sell to Naval a 200square meter portion of the land representing a
portion of the petitioner's share in the estate of her deceased father, Nicolas Estrellado.
Naval paid a down payment totaling ₱100k and then asked permission from the
petitioner if he could construct his house on the land he bought. After the petitioner
issued an Authorization, Naval built his house on the subject land.
On June 3, 2005, representatives from JS Francisco & Sons, Inc. (JS Francisco)
demolished Naval's house. It was only then that Naval discovered that the lot sold to
him had been the subject of a dispute between the petitioner's family and JS Francisco.
Naval demanded from the petitioner the return of the amount he paid for the land, as
well as to pay the value of the house demolished, but the latter refused to heed these
demands.
CRIME CHARGED: Other forms of swindling under Article 316, par. 1
Information:
That sometime in February 2005, in the city of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, with deceit and intent to defraud, pretending to be the
lawful i7i of a two hundred (200) square meters lot portion of a lot covered by TCT-19932 located at
Cogan, Matina Aplaya, this City, with deceit and intent to gain, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
succeeded in selling the same to one Eric C. Naval for which the said Eric C. Naval paid to the accused
the total amount ofl!l23,000.00, as partial payment of the said lot when in truth and in fact and despite
her knowledge that the entire property covered by TCT No. 19931 [sic] had been sold and was already

owned by JS Francisco and Sons, Inc., thereby defrauding the said Eric C. Naval in the aforesaid amount
of ₱123,000.00. CONTRARY TO LAW.
MTCC: Other forms of swindling under Article 316, par. 2
The MTCC essentially ruled that the petitioner "represented to the complainant that the
property is free from lien and encumbrance." It added that Naval relied on the first page
of the title that had been shown to him, and that the petitioner deliberately did not inform
him of the fact that she (petitioner) no longer owned the area sold.
RTC: Affirmed in toto, MR denied
CA: Dismissed petition, MR denied
ISSUE: Did the courts a quo err in convicting the Petitioner of violation of Article 316,
par. 2 where the Information charged her with violation of par. 1?
RULING:
The petitioner's improper conviction
under Article 316, paragraph 2 of the RPC
The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts alleged in the
Information and not by the title or designation of the offense contained in the caption of
the Information. It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is comprised
must be alleged in the Information.
The prosecution charged the petitioner with the crime of other forms of swindling under
Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which punishes
"[a]ny person who, pretending to be the owner of any real property, shall convey, sell,
encumber, or mortgage the same."
The trial courts, however, convicted the petitioner under Article 316, paragraph 2 which
punishes the act of any person who, knowing that real property is encumbered, shall
dispose of the same, although such encumbrance is not recorded.
The elements of other forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code are as follows: (1) that the thing disposed of be real property; (2) that the
offender knew that the real property was encumbered, whether the encumbrance is
recorded or not; (3) that there must be express representation by the offender that the
real property is free from encumbrance; and (4) that the act of disposing of the real
property be made to the damage of another.

The Information in the present case, aside from expressly indicating in its caption that
it is charging the petitioner under Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code,
alleged that the petitioner "with deceit and intent to defraud," pretended to be the lawful
owner of a 200-square meter portion of a lot covered by TCT No. T-19932 despite her
knowledge that the entire property had already been sold and was owned by JS
Francisco. Notably, it had not been alleged that the petitioner expressly represented to
Naval that the subject property was free from any encumbrance.
The Information in the present case did not allege that the petitioner made an express
representation that the property sold is free from any encumbrance. This Information
was crafted in such a way that only one particular crime was charged (i.e., Article 316,
paragraph 1), and the alleged manner through which such offense was committed (that
is, by pretending to be the lawful owner x x x) did not constitute ground for conviction
under paragraph 2, which may be committed even by the owner of the property.
Significantly, the Agreement to Buy and Sell between the petitioner and Naval also did
not contain any representation by the petitioner that the property being sold was free
from any encumbrance.
At any rate, paragraph 2 of Article 316 does not prohibit the sale of an encumbered
property; the vendor must have represented to the buyer that the property was free
from encumbrance. What brings about criminal liability is the deceit in selling the
property. Corollarily, the deed must have a statement of warranty that is false in order
to commit the offense. The petitioner's passive attitude regarding the presence of an
adverse claim (she assumed that Naval became aware of this inscription after showing
to him a copy of TCT No. T-19932 and "never complained") is not sufficient to constitute
fraud within the meaning of the law. The fraud and/or deceit by misrepresentation
contemplated by law must be the result of overt acts; they cannot be implied or
presumed.
In the light of these considerations, we hold that the trial courts erroneously convicted
the petitioner of other forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code. To uphold the petitioner's conviction for an offense other than that charged
in the Information would be a violation of her right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against her.
Violation of Article 316, paragraph 1
of the Revised Penal Code not proven

The presented pieces of evidence do not also warrant a conviction for the crime for
which the petitioner had been charged, that is, Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code.
For a successful prosecution of the crime of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 1
of the Revised Penal Code, the following essential elements of this crime must be
established: (1).that the thing be immovable, such as a parcel of land or a building; (2)
that the offender who is not the owner of said property should represent that he; is the
owner thereof; (3) that the offender should have executed an act of ownership, e.g.,
selling, leasing, encumbering, or mortgaging the property; and (4) that the act be made
to the prejudice of the owner or a third person.
The presence of the first and third elements are beyond question, as the parties
admitted that the petitioner sold to Naval a 200-square meter parcel of land located in
Matina Aplaya, Davao City. The fourth element is likewise settled, as the petitioner did
not deny that Naval paid her a total of ₱123,000.00. The fact of destruction of Naval's
house by the representatives of JS Francisco is also not disputed.
With regard to the second element, we hold that the prosecution failed to prove the
allegation in the Information that the petitioner pretended to be the lawful owner of a
200-square meter portion of a lot covered by TCT No. 19932.
In Naval's own complaint-affidavit, he stated that the petitioner informed him during the
negotiations for the sale "that the area that I will buy would still be segregated from the
mother title." In this same complaint-affidavit, Naval also stated that he caused the
property to be surveyed in order to determine the boundaries of the area he bought,
and to separate it from the mother title. These statements were corroborated by Naval's
wife, Josephine, who stated in her own affidavit that the petitioner told her and Naval
that the subject property was still part of the mother title. In addition, stipulation no. 3 of
the Agreement to Buy and Sell provides that "xxx the SELLER shall cause the
subdivision of the title and take out two hundred (200) square meters portion of the
BUYER from the SELLER 's nine hundred thirty six (936) square meters share." Under
these circumstances, it is clear that the petitioner did not pretend to be the owner of the
property sold. From the very start, the petitioner made it clear to Naval that the subject
property was still under the name of her (petitioner's) father; and that the area subject
of the sale would still be segregated from the mother title. Naval also admitted that he
saw the front page of the land's title showing Nicolas to be its registered owner. The
element of deceit - central to prosecutions for swindling - is therefore wanting. We
additionally point out that Nicolas' heirs (Narcisa and his nine legitimate children)
eventually executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Renunciation of Shares,
Donation and Deed of Absolute Sale where they agreed, among others, to give a

portion (totalling 1,236-square meters) of the land covered by TCT No. T-364319 to the
petitioner.
In the light of these considerations, we cannot hold the petitioner liable for other forms
of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code absent a finding
that she employed fraud or deceit in the form of false pretenses with regard to her
ownership of the real property sold.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, in the light of these considerations, we GRANT the petition,

and SET ASIDE the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated November 28, 2007, and
July 29, 2008, respectively, in CA-G.R. CR No. 00429. Accordingly, we ACQUIT
petitioner Clarita Estrellado-Mainar of the crime of other forms of swindling under Article
316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

VIII. ARSON CASES
DANTE BUEBOS & SARMELITO BUEBOS v THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 163938 | March 28, 2008
TICKLER: Nipa hut roof on fire. Mother watching over sick child inside.
DOCTRINES:
1. There are two (2) categories of the crime of arson: 1) destructive arson, under
Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659; and
2) simple arson, under Presidential Decree No. 1613. Said classification is
based on the kind, character and location of the property burned, regardless of
the value of the damage caused.
Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, contemplates

the malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels,
buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military,
government or commercial establishments by any person or group of
persons. The classification of this type of crime is known as Destructive Arson,
which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321 to 326-B of The Revised
Penal Code remains the governing law for Simple Arson. This decree
contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless
of size, not included in Art. 320, as amended by RA 7659, and classified as other
cases of arson. These include houses, dwellings, government buildings,
farms, mills, plantations, railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and
other industrial establishments.
2. The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the

degree of perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender.
The acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code constituting
Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes for being grievous,
odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous
to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized
and ordered society.
On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson
are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law
punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates
crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national security
implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under Simple Arson
may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the
qualifying circumstances present.
FACTS:
PROSECUTION: On January 1, 1994, around 3:00 A.M., Adelina B. Borbe was in her
house at Hacienda San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay watching over her sick child when she
heard some noise around the house. She got up and looked through the window, where
Adelina saw the four accused, Rolando Buela, Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and
Antonio Cornel, Jr. congregating in front of her hut. When she went out, she saw the
roof of her nipa hut already on fire. She shouted for help, but the dour accused fled
instead of helping her.
Olipiano Berjuela, who was then drinking with Pepito Borbe in celebration of New Year’s
Eve, heard Adelina scream for help. Olipiano immediately ran to the place and saw a
number of people jumping over the fence. When he focused his flashlight on them, he
was able to identify Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio Cornel, Jr., while
Olipiano saw Rolando Buela running away.
As a result, Adelina filed a complaint against the four accused, including petitioners
Dante and Sarmelito Buebos.
DEFENSE: As a defense, the petitioners and their co-accused raised denial and alibi
as line of defense, contending that they were at different places at the time of the
incident.
1. Rolando Buela claimed to be at sitio Tugon, Malictay, San Miguel, Tabaco,

Albay as there was a novena prayer at his parents’ house on occasion of the
death anniversary of his late grandfather;
2. Dante Buebos also claimed to have been at Romeo Callejas having gone there
in the evening of December 30, 1993 and left the place at 12:00 o clock
noontime of January 1, 1994;
3. Sarmelito Buebos asserted that he was at his residence at sitio Malictay,
Hacienda, San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay on the day the incident happened and that
he never left his house;
4. Antonio Cornel, Jr. likewise claimed to be at his residence at Agas after having
visited his in-laws; that he only came to know of the accusation five (5) days
after the incident happened when he visited his parents at Malictay;
CRIME CHARGED: Arson

RTC: All four accused are GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of ARSON
CA: AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed.
IMPORTANT: In downgrading the penalty, the CA opined that the accused could only
be convicted of simple arson, punishable by prision mayor, and not for burning of
an inhabited house, which is punishable by imprisonment ranging from reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua. According to the appellate court, the information
failed to allege with specificity the actual crime committed. Hence, the accused
should be found liable only for arson in its simple form.
ISSUES:
MAIN: Did the CA err in modifying the penalty to that of simple arson and not for burning
of an inhabited house?
OTHER:
1. Did CA err in affirming the RTC decision pointing petitioners’ culpability based
on circumstantial evidence?
2. Was there conspiracy among the accused?
RULING:
MAIN: NO, it did not err in so doing.
The legal basis of the trial court in convicting petitioners of arson is Section 3, paragraph
2 of P.D. No. 1613. The elements of this form of arson are: (a) there is intentional
burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or
dwelling. Admittedly, there is a confluence of the foregoing elements here. However,
the information failed to allege that what was intentionally burned was an
inhabited house or dwelling. That is fatal.
Under Sections 8 and 9 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the information or
complaint must state the designation of the offense given by the statute and specify its
qualifying and generic aggravating circumstances. Otherwise stated, the accused will
not be convicted of the offense proved during the trial if it was not properly alleged in
the information.
Perusing the information, there was no allegation that the house intentionally
burned by petitioners and their cohorts was inhabited. Rather, the information
merely recited that accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with
intent to cause damage, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
maliciously set on fire the nipa roof of the house of ADELINA B. BORBE, to the latter’s
damage and prejudice. Such rules of criminal procedure are given retroactive
application insofar as they benefit the accused.
In fine, petitioners can be convicted only of simple arson, under Section 1,

paragraph 1 of P.D. No. 1613, punishable by prision mayor.
NOTES:
1. The SC, using as examples the cases of People v Soriano, and People v
Malngan, illustrated how RTC and CA judgments were modified for
applying the wrong law and penalty on arson.
2. The SC likewise took the opportunity to distinguish simple arson under PD

1613, and destructive arson under Article 320, par 1, RPC – based on the
degree of perversity and implications in social, economic, political and
national security. (See doctrines)
OTHER ISSUES:
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE – NO, the CA did not err.
After a careful review of the evidence presented by both parties, We find that the
circumstantial evidence extant in the records is sufficient to identify petitioners as the
authors of the burning of the hut of private complainant Adelina Borbe:
1. Private complainant heard some noise emanating from outside her house at
around 3:00 a.m.;
2. When she went out to check the disturbance, private complainant saw
petitioners, together with their two other co-accused, standing in front of the
house;
3. Moments later, the roof of her house caught fire;
4. Petitioners and their cohorts absconded while private complainant desperately

shouted for help.
The facts from which the cited circumstances arose have been proved through positive
testimony. Evidently, these circumstances form an unbroken chain of events leading to
one fair conclusion the culpability of petitioners for the burning of the hut. The Court is
convinced that the circumstances, taken together, leave no doubt that petitioner
perpetrated the arson.
CONSPIRACY – YES, there was conspiracy among the accused.

In the case at bench, conspiracy was evident from the coordinated movements of
petitioners Dante and Sarmelito Buebos. Both of them stood outside the house of
private complainant Adelina. They were part of the group making boisterous noise in
the vicinity. Petitioners also fled together while the roof of Adelinas house was
ablaze. These acts clearly show their joint purpose and design, and community of
interest.
DECISION: Petition DENIED. Appealed judgment is AFFIRMED IN FULL.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v ALAMADA MACABANDO
G.R. No. 188708 | July 31, 2013
TICKLER: MANABLA AKO SUNUGIN KO BAHAY KO.
DOCTRINE: The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by

the degree of perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender.
FACTS:
The appellant broke bottles on the road while holding a G.I. pipe, and shouted that he
wanted to get even ("manabla ko"). Afterwards, he uttered that he would burn his own
house.
At 6:35 p.m. of the same day, Cornelio Feliciano heard his neighbors shout that there
was a fire. When Cornelio went out of his house to verify, he saw smoke coming from
the appellant’s house. He got a pail of water, and poured its contents into the fire. Eric
Quilantang, a neighbor whose house was just 10 meters from that of the appellant, ran
to the barangay headquarters to get a fire extinguisher. When Eric approached the
burning house, the appellant, who was carrying a traveling bag and a gun, told him not
to interfere; the appellant then fired three (3) shots in the air. The appellant also told the
people around that whoever would put out the fire would be killed. Fire Officer (FO) II
Victor Naive and FOI Reynaldo Maliao conducted a spot investigation of the incident,
and concluded, among others, that the fire started in the appellant’s house; and that it
had been intentional. Barangay Chairman Modesto Ligtas stated that the fire gutted
many houses in his barangay, and that he assisted the City Social Welfare and
Development Department personnel in assessing the damage.
The appellant declared on the witness stand that he lived in the two-storey house in
Barangay 35, Limketkai Drive, which was owned by his sister, Madji Muslima
Edemal. He admitted that he felt angry at around 2:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001
because one of his radio cassettes for sale had been stolen. The appellant claimed that

he went to sleep after looking for his missing radio cassette, and that the fire had
already started when he woke up. He denied making a threat to burn his house, and
maintained that he did not own a gun. He added that the gunshots heard by his
neighbors came from the explosion of firecrackers that he intended to use during the
New Year celebration. His cousin attested that appellant did not carry a revolver or shot
one on the day of the incident. His brother-in-law attested that appellant was asleep at
the ground floor on the time the fire broke out.
CRIME CHARGED: Destructive Arson under Article 320 of RPC
RTC: GUILTY
CA: AFFIRMED RTC
ISSUE: Is appellant guilty of Destructive Arson? (No, Simple Arson)
RULING:
NO. The appellant is guilty of Simple Arson, not Destructive Arson. Article 320.
Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon
any person who shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning,
or as a result of simultaneous burnings, committed on several or different
occasions.
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or

where people usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but
not limited to, official governmental function or business, private transaction,
commerce, trade, workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely incidental to
a definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels, motels, transient dwellings,
public conveyances or stops or terminals, regardless of whether the offender
had knowledge that there are persons in said building or edifice at the time it is
set on fire and regardless also of whether the building is actually inhabited or
not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to

transportation or conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or leisure.1âwphi1
4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto,

which are devoted to the service of public utilities.

5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying
evidence of another violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy
or defrauding creditors or to collect from insurance.
In sum, "Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and
private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military,
government or commercial establishments by any person or group of persons.
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of
perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of
The Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous
crimes "for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant
and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,
civilized and ordered society." On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613
constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness
that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates
crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national security implications
than Destructive Arson.
The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are: (a) there is
intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or
dwelling. Both these elements have been proven in the present case. The Information
alleged that the appellant set fire to his own house, and that the fire spread to other
inhabited houses. These allegations were established during trial through the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which the trial and appellate courts found
credible and convincing, and through the report of the Bureau of Fire Protection which
stated that damaged houses were residential, and that the fire had been intentional.
Moreover, the certification from the City Social Welfare and Development Department
likewise indicated that the burned houses were used as dwellings. The appellant
likewise testified that his burnt two-story house was used as a residence. That the
appellant’s act affected many families will not convert the crime to destructive arson,
since the appellant’s act does not appear to be heinous or represents a greater degree
of perversity and viciousness when compared to those acts punished under Article 320
of the RPC. The established evidence only showed that the appellant intended to burn
his own house, but the conflagration spread to the neighboring houses.
NOTE: No one saw accused set fire to the building, but he is guilty by circumstantial
evidence. First, the appellant, while holding an iron lead pipe, acted violently and broke
bottles near his house at around 4:00 p.m. of December 21, 2001; second, while he
was still in a fit of rage, the appellant stated that he would get even, and then threatened
to burn his own house; third, Judith Quilantang saw a fire in the appellant’s room
approximately two hours after the appellant returned to his house; fourth, the appellant
prevented Cornelio, Eric, and several other people from putting out the fire in his house;
fifth, the appellant fired shots in the air, and then threatened to kill anyone who would
try to put out the fire in his house; sixth, the appellant carried a traveling bag during the
fire; and finally, the investigation conducted by the fire marshals of the Bureau of Fire
Protection revealed that the fire started in the appellant’s house, and that it had been
intentional.
DECISION: CA Decision AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the crime committed

– from Destructive Arson to SIMPLE ARSON, and the corresponding penalty to be
imposed.

IX. PERSONS EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY (ART. 332)
INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG,

represented by MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
WILLIAM SATO,
G.R. No. 181409 | February 11, 2010
TICKLER: Japanese Husband
DOCTRINES:
1. Death of one spouse does not terminate relationship by affinity.

2. The coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein.
The plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it
applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332
is complexed with another crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa
through falsification.
FACTS:
Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix of

petitioner intestate estate of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. de
Carungcong, filed a complaint-affidavit for estafa against her brother-in-law, William
Sato, a Japanese national. Her complaint-affidavit read:
I, MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG Y GONZALE[S], Filipino, of legal

age, single, and resident of Unit 1111, Prince Gregory Condominium,
105 12th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, after being duly sworn, depose
and state that:
1. I am the duly appointed Administratrix of the Intestate Estate
of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], docketed as Spec. Procs. No. [Q]-
95-23621[,] Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, being one
(1) of her surviving daughters. Copy of the Letters of Administration
dated June 22, 1995 is hereto attached as Annex A to form an integral
part hereof.
2. As such Administratrix, I am duty bound not only to preserve

the properties of the Intestate Estate of Manolita Carungcong Y
Gonzale[s], but also to recover such funds and/or properties as property
belonging to the estate but are presently in the possession or control of
other parties.

3. After my appointment as Administratrix, I was able to confer
with some of the children of my sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato[,] who
predeceased our mother Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzales, having died
in Japan in 1991.
4. In my conference with my nieces Karen Rose Sato and Wendy

Mitsuko Sato, age[d] 27 and 24 respectively, I was able to learn that prior
to the death of my mother Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s],
[s]pecifically on o[r] about November 24, 1992, their father William Sato,
through fraudulent misrepresentations, was able to secure the signature
and thumbmark of my mother on a Special Power of Attorney whereby
my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato, who was then only twenty (20) years old,
was made her attorney-in-fact, to sell and dispose four (4) valuable
pieces of land in Tagaytay City. Said Special Power of Attorney, copy of
which is attached as ANNEX A of the Affidavit of Wendy Mitsuko Sato,
was signed and thumbmark[ed] by my mother because William Sato told
her that the documents she was being made to sign involved her taxes.
At that time, my mother was completely blind, having gone blind almost
ten (10) years prior to November, 1992.
5. The aforesaid Special Power of Attorney was signed by my

mother in the presence of Wendy, my other niece Belinda Kiku Sato, our
maid Mana Tingzon, and Governor Josephine Ramirez who later
became the second wife of my sisters widower William Sato.
6. Wendy Mitsuko Sato attests to the fact that my mother signed

the document in the belief that they were in connection with her taxes,
not knowing, since she was blind, that the same was in fact a Special
Power of Attorney to sell her Tagaytay properties.
7. On the basis of the aforesaid Special Power of Attorney,

William Sato found buyers for the property and made my niece Wendy
Mitsuko Sato sign three (3) deeds of absolute sale in favor of (a) Anita
Ng (Doc. 2194, Page No. 41, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary Public
Vicente B. Custodio), (b) Anita Ng (Doc. No. 2331, Page No. 68, Book
No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio) and (c) Ruby
Lee Tsai (Doc. No. II, Page No. 65, Book No. II, Series of 1993 of Notary
Public Toribio D. Labid). x x x
8. Per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, the

considerations appearing on the deeds of absolute sale were not the true
and actual considerations received by her father William Sato from the
buyers of her grandmothers properties. She attests that Anita Ng actually
paid P7,000,000.00 for the property covered by TCT No. 3148
and P7,034,000.00 for the property covered by TCT No. 3149. All the
aforesaid proceeds were turned over to William Sato who undertook to

make the proper accounting thereof to my mother, Manolita Carungcong
Gonzale[s].
9. Again, per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, Ruby Lee

Tsai paid P8,000,000.00 for the property covered by Tax Declaration No.
GR-016-0735, and the proceeds thereof were likewise turned over to
William Sato.
10. The considerations appearing on the deeds of sale were

falsified as Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato has actual knowledge of the true
amounts paid by the buyers, as stated in her Affidavit, since she was the
signatory thereto as the attorney-in-fact of Manolita Carungcong Y
Gonzale[s].
11. Wendy was only 20 years old at the time and was not in any
position to oppose or to refuse her fathers orders.
12. After receiving the total considerations for the properties sold
under the power of attorney fraudulently secured from my mother, which
total P22,034,000.00, William Sato failed to account for the same and
never delivered the proceeds to Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] until
the latter died on June 8, 1994.
13. Demands have been made for William Sato to make an

accounting and to deliver the proceeds of the sales to me as
Administratrix of my mothers estate, but he refused and failed, and
continues to refuse and to fail to do so, to the damage and prejudice of
the estate of the deceased Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] and of
the heirs which include his six (6) children with my sister Zenaida
Carungcong Sato.
An Information was filed against Sato by the petitioner; which states the following:
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses WILLIAM SATO of the crime of ESTAFA under
Article 315[,] par. 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of November, 1992, in Quezon City,

Philippines, the above-named accused, by means of deceit, did, then and
there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud MANOLITA
GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG in the following manner, to wit:
the said accused induced said Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong[,]
who was already then blind and 79 years old[,] to sign and thumbmark a
special power of attorney dated November 24, 1992 in favor of Wendy
Mitsuko C. Sato, daughter of said accused, making her believe that said
document involved only her taxes, accused knowing fully well that said
document authorizes Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, then a minor, to sell,
assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of to any person or entity of her
properties all located at Tagaytay City, as follows:
1. One Thousand Eight Hundred Seven(ty) One (1,871) square

meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3147;
2. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and

covered by T.C.T. No. 3148 with Tax Declaration No. GR-
016-0722, Cadastral Lot No. 7106;
3. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and

covered by T.C.T. No. 3149 with Tax Declaration No. GR-
016-0721, Cadastral Lot No. 7104;
4. Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (888) square meters more or less

with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-1735, Cadastral Lot No.
7062;
registered in the name of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, and

once in the possession of the said special power of attorney and other
pertinent documents, said accused made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the
three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale covering Transfer Certificate of Title
[TCT] No. 3148 for P250,000.00, [TCT] No. 3149 for P250,000.00 and
[Tax Declaration] GR-016-0735 for P650,000.00 and once in possession
of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said accused,
misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same to his own personal
use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Manolita
Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong who died in 1994.
CRIME CHARGED: ESTAFA under Article 315, par 3(a), RPC
RTC: Granted the motion to quash filed by Sato, dismissing the case. The RTC stated
the following conclusion; “A judicious and thorough examination of Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code convinces this Court of the correctness of the contention of the
[d]efense. While it is true that the death of Zenaida Carungcong-Sato has extinguished
the marriage of accused with her, it does not erase the fact that accused and Zenaidas
mother, herein complainant, are still son[-in-law] and mother-in-law and they remained
son[-in-law] and mother-in-law even beyond the death of Zenaida.”
CA: We further agree with the submission of the [Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)]
that nothing in the law and/or existing jurisprudence supports the argument of petitioner
that the fact of death of Zenaida dissolved the relationship by affinity between Manolita
and private respondent Sato, and thus removed the protective mantle of Article 332 of
the Revised Penal Code from said private respondent; and that notwithstanding the
death of Zenaida, private respondent Sato remains to be the son-in-law of Manolita,
and a brother-in-law of petitioner administratrix. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does
not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. There should be no distinction in the
application of law where none is indicated.
ISSUES:
1. What is the effect of death on the relationship by affinity created between a
surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse; and
2. What is the extent of the coverage of Article 332?
RULING:
1. The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity
terminates with the dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce which
gave rise to the relationship of affinity between the parties.[26] Under this view,
the relationship by affinity is simply coextensive and coexistent with the marriage
that produced it. Its duration is indispensably and necessarily determined by the
marriage that created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as the marriage subsists,
such that the death of a spouse ipso facto ends the relationship by affinity of the
surviving spouse to the deceased spouses blood relatives.
The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues even
after the death of one spouse when there is a surviving issue. The rationale is
that the relationship is preserved because of the living issue of the marriage in
whose veins the blood of both parties is commingled.
The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by
affinity between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse
continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether
the marriage produced children or not. Under this view, the relationship by
affinity endures even after the dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a
result of the death of one of the parties to the said marriage. This view considers
that, where statutes have indicated an intent to benefit step-relatives or in-laws,
the tie of affinity between these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to
be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the married parties.
After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two views, we
hold that the second view is more consistent with the language and spirit of
Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
First, the terminated affinity view is generally applied in cases of jury

disqualification and incest. On the other hand, the continuing affinity view has
been applied in the interpretation of laws that intend to benefit step-relatives or
in-laws. Since the purpose of the absolutory cause in Article 332(1) is meant to

be beneficial to relatives by affinity within the degree covered under the said
provision, the continuing affinity view is more appropriate.
Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of relatives by affinity in

the same line is couched in general language. The legislative intent to make no
distinction between the spouse of ones living child and the surviving spouse of
ones deceased child (in case of a son-in-law or daughter-in-law with respect to
his or her parents-in-law) can be drawn from Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal
Code without doing violence to its language.
Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of the
family as a basic autonomous social institution are policies of the State and that
it is the duty of the State to strengthen the solidarity of the family. Congress has
also affirmed as a State and national policy that courts shall preserve the
solidarity of the family. In this connection, the spirit of Article 332 is to preserve
family harmony and obviate scandal. The view that relationship by affinity is not
affected by the death of one of the parties to the marriage that created it is more
in accord with family solidarity and harmony.
Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is

to resolve all doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt,
rule for the accused. This is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee that
the accused shall be presumed innocent unless and until his guilt is established
beyond reasonable doubt.
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity. The rule
applies when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal
statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to
him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to
the accused.
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the
lens of the basic purpose of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to preserve
family harmony by providing an absolutory cause. Since the goal of Article
332(1) is to benefit the accused, the Court should adopt an application or
interpretation that is more favorable to the accused. In this case, that
interpretation is the continuing affinity view.
Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold that the
relationship by affinity created between the surviving spouse and the blood
relatives of the deceased spouse survives the death of either party to the
marriage which created the affinity. (The same principle applies to the justifying
circumstance of defense of ones relatives under Article 11[2] of the Revised
Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of grave
offense committed against ones relatives under Article 13[5] of the same Code

and the absolutory cause of relationship in favor of accessories under Article 20
also of the same Code.)
2. The coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein.
The plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it
applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332
is complexed with another crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa
through falsification.
A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being
charged not with simple estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents. In particular, the Information states that Sato,
by means of deceit, intentionally defrauded Manolita committed as follows:
(a) Sato presented a document to Manolita (who was already blind at that time)
and induced her to sign and thumbmark the same;
(b) he made Manolita believe that the said document was in connection with her
taxes when it was in fact a special power of attorney (SPA) authorizing his
minor daughter Wendy to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of
Manolitas properties in Tagaytay City;
(c) relying on Satos inducement and representation, Manolita signed and
thumbmarked the SPA in favor of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, daughter of Sato;
(d) using the document, he sold the properties to third parties but he neither
delivered the proceeds to Manolita nor accounted for the same and
(e) despite repeated demands, he failed and refused to deliver the proceeds, to
the damage and prejudice of the estate of Manolita.
The above averments in the Information show that the estafa was committed by
attributing to Manolita (who participated in the execution of the document)
statements other than those in fact made by her. Manolitas acts of signing
the SPA and affixing her thumbmark to that document were the very expression
of her specific intention that something be done about her taxes. Her signature
and thumbmark were the affirmation of her statement on such intention as she
only signed and thumbmarked the SPA (a document which she could not have
read) because of Satos representation that the document pertained to her taxes.
In signing and thumbmarking the document, Manolita showed that she believed
and adopted the representations of Sato as to what the document was all
about, i.e., that it involved her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark, therefore,
served as her conformity to Satos proposal that she execute a document to settle
her taxes.
Thus, by inducing Manolita to sign the SPA, Sato made it appear that Manolita
granted his daughter Wendy a special power of attorney for the purpose of
selling, assigning, transferring or otherwise disposing of Manolitas Tagaytay
properties when the fact was that Manolita signed and thumbmarked the
document presented by Sato in the belief that it pertained to her taxes. Indeed,

the document itself, the SPA, and everything that it contained were falsely
attributed to Manolita when she was made to sign the SPA.
The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes
against property, namely, the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief. Thus, all other crimes, whether simple or complex, are not
affected by the absolutory cause provided by the said provision.
DECISION: Petition GRANTED. CA Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE.


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CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests

Outline by Fiscal Victoria C. Garcia

REVISED PENAL CODE: BOOK TWO

NENITA CARGANILLO v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 182424 | September 22, 2014

TICKLER: Buy-and-sell of palay, ahente

CRIME CHARGED: Estafa

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

CA: AFFIRMED RTC’s conviction

ISSUE: Did the CA err in affirming the conviction?

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

In computing the incremental penalty, the amount defrauded shall be subtracted by

DECISION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of

NOTES: Article 315 of the RPC as amended by RA 10951:

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

3. Through any of the following fraudulent means:

(a) By inducing another, by means of deceit, to sign any document.

LITO CORPUZ v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 180016 | April 29, 2014

TICKLER: P98k worth of jewelry

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION:

The Information reads as follows:

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

VERSION OF THE DEFENSE:

The defense presented the lone testimony of petitioner summarized, as follows:

CA: AFFIRMED RTC with modification on the imposable prison term.

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

DECISION: WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5,

BELEN REAL v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

TICKLER: Estafa Article 315, par. 1 (b)– 7 pieces of jewelry

DOCTRINE: Disturbance of property rights is equivalent to damage and is in itself

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

CRIME CHARGED: Estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b)

RTC: CONVICTED - penalty of imprisonment of TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion

ISSUE: Was the CA correct in affirming the RTC?

RULING: The petition is partly meritorious.

Minimum 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, and 10 days

In the present case, as the amount involved is P371,500, which obviously

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

PAZ CHENG y CHU v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE: In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal

CRIME CHARGED: 3 Counts of Estafa

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

CA: Affirmed RTC ruling

ISSUE: Did the CA err in convicting the accused?

RULING: NO, the CA did not err in convicting the accused.

Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC states:

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods or any

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

The essence of this kind of [E]stafa is the appropriation or conversion of money

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

GRACE SAN DIEGO v PEOPLE

G.R. No.176114 | April 8, 2015

TICKLER: Accountant, reliever ng cashier

DECISION: The petition is DENIED. Consequently, the Decision and Resolution,

VILMA M. SULIMAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 190970 | November 24, 2014

TICKLER: 2 counts of Illegal Recruitment and 3 counts of Estafa by means of deceit;