DR.

RAM MANOHAR LOHIYA NATIONAL

LAW UNIVERSITY, LUCKNOW

2018-2019

FAMILY LAW

TITLE OF THE PROJECT:

ECONOMIC AND PROPERTY RIGHTS OF MUSLIM

WOMAN

SUBMITTED TO: SUBMITTED BY:

Mrs SAMREEN HUSSAIN SANDEEP CHOUDHARY
Assistant Professor (Law) Enrolment No. - 170101117
Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Section ‘B’
Law University, Lucknow B.A.L.L.B. (Hons.) SEMESTER IV
ACKNOWLWDGEMENT:

I, SANDEEP CHOUDHARY, hereby declare that the project titled “ECONOMIC AND
PROPERTY RIGHTS OF MUSLIM WOMAN” made under the guidance of Mrs Samreen
Hussain, is an original work. This project has been submitted as the end-term project for the
subject of Family Law-II for the fourth semester of B.A. LL.B (Hons) course. All the
information and data that has been analysed and used from various sources has been duly cited
and accredited.

Date: 26-03-2019
Signature:
(SANDEEP CHOUDHARY)
4th semester, 2nd year

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TABLE OF CONTENTS:

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 4

CONCEPT OF MEHR ............................................................................................................... 5

MAINTENANCE TO WIFE AFTER DIVORCE ..................................................................... 7

ORAL GIFT TO MARRIED WOMAN .................................................................................... 9

POLYGAMY & MAINTENANCE TO FIRST WIFE ........................................................... 10

INHERITENCE RIGHT AND MATRIMONIAL PROERTY ............................................... 11

PROPERTY RIGHTS THROUGH MARRIAGE ................................................................... 14

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................ 14

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................... 15

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 INTRODUCTION

Muslim women rights have been a topic of discussion ever since the Constitution came into
force in 1950. Islamic law (Shariah) is considered by many as patriarchal and oppressive to
women. However the Quran has addressed women’s issues fourteen hundred years ago by
creating some reforms to improve the status of women, though these reforms do not seem to
be practiced in Muslim society today. Though Islam as revealed to the prophet Mohammed is
not oppressive to women, its interpretation enacted in the family law, and every day living is
patriarchal.1

Most legal scholars concede that the Muslim law of inheritance protects women's rights better
than the Hindu law based on male coparcenaries. But in the realm of matrimonial law, it is
presumed that the Hindu law (which is a reflection of the archaic British law) will be more
favourable to women than the Muslim law which permits polygamy and triple talaq.

The matrimonial principles evolved within European feudalism reflected in Canon law. The
principle of indissolubility of marriage, which is intrinsically linked to inalienability of feudal
land, did not govern Islamic Law of marriage and divorce. The principles of governing the
marriage transactions were similar to trade contracts, with offer, acceptance, and considerations
forming its base. The principle of contractual marriage provided better scope for defining the
right of Muslim woman than marriage under the Christian laws of feudal Europe during the
corresponding period. Islam was also the first legal system to grant woman the right of
inheritance and stipulated fixed shares to woman.2

Islamic law provided for more civilised modes of dissolving marriages, either by consent or by
providing for irretrievable breakdown of marriage. Only in the latter half of 20th century the
British matrimonial jurisprudence accepted the concept of divorce by mutual consent before
this there is no such concept of divorce by mutual consent in Christian law and it was based on
only ‘fault ground’ which was tend to more favourable to male. This was incorporated into the
Hindu law in 1976. The notion of 'no fault divorce' (or irretrievable breakdown of marriage)
has not yet been accepted by the Hindu law.3

1
'Women Property Rights: A Comparative Study Of Hindu, Christian And Muslim '
<http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/8148/8/08_chapter%204.pdf> accessed 11 March 2016
2
. Flavia Agnes, Personal Laws and Women's Right (1st edn, OUP 2009) 43.
3
Ibid.

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The law governing marriage and family relationships in its essence is a law of property
settlement rather than a law governing sexual morality. All provisions of dissolving a marriage
become detrimental to women if they are not simultaneously linked to protection of economic
rights. Hence, any proposal for reform would have to necessarily redefine property rights of
women within the family.

CONCEPT OF MEHR

Mehr is a Quranic right. A specific mention of this right is made in all subsequent legal texts.
Chapter IV verse 3 of the Holy Quran stipulates: "And give women their dower freely and if
they are good, enough to remit any of it of their own free will, then enjoy it with a good
conscience".

The Prophet converted the custom of bride price of tribal Arabia to Mehr, which would be a
future security to a woman. According to the Maliki School of Islamic law, a marriage without
the stipulation of mehr is invalid. According to the Hanafi School the marriage is valid but if
no mehr is stipulated or if the amount stipulated is very low, the woman is entitled to a proper
mehr. The proper mehr would have to be determined depending upon the means of the husband
and the family status of the wife.4

If the mehr is prompt, it is payable on demand. If it is deferred, it must be paid subsequently

and in any event upon dissolution of marriage either by death or divorce. If at the time of
dissolution of marriage, the mehr dues are unpaid, the woman is entitled to retain possession
of her deceased husband's property.

A woman has the right to impose conditions regarding her mehr. For instance she can stipulate
that if the husband resides in the same city as her parents then the mehr amount would be
20,000 rupees, but if he shifts to another city then the amount should be doubled. In such a case
if the husband does shift to another city then the wife is entitled to claim 2,000 rupees.

Mehr need not be stipulated only in cash. Gold ornaments valuables and other movable and
immovable property can also be settled as mehr. Mehr is the sole right of the wife and the
husband cannot have any claim over it once the marriage is consummated. The husband can
settle his share of family property or a particular house as mehr. The woman would then be

4
Ibid.

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entitled to this property or its monetary value. If the woman claims that the matrimonial
residence has been given to her in lieu of her mehr debt, it is for the husband to rebut the
presumption. If the husband refuses to pay the prompt mehr upon marriage, the woman can
refuse to fulfil her marital obligations including cohabitation. She is not bound to obey any of
his commands. The wife is entitled to live separately and claim maintenance from her husband
during this period.5

While examining the case law concerning women's economic rights within marriage one can
discern a curious trend. While judicial decisions throttled the Hindu woman's economic rights
by constraining the scope of stridhana, the Muslim woman's economic rights could not be
similarly throttled. The legal precedents also indicate that the rights of mehr and pre-marriage
agreements were not just illusory rights but were viable economic safeguards. Several
judgments upheld the woman's right to impose conditions upon their husbands through private
agreements. As per the Christian doctrine of eternal and indissoluble marriage pre-nuptial
agreements stipulating conditions of a future divorce were deemed to be against public policy.
But since divorce was not considered as against public good under Islamic law, Islamic
jurisprudence held such contracts as valid.

In Badarannissa Bibi's case6 decided by the Calcutta High Court in 1871, the husband had
entered into a pre-marriage agreement (kabin-nama) with his wife, authorising her to divorce
him if he remarried without her consent. Subsequently, the husband did remarry and the wife
approached the court for redress. The court dismissed the wife's plea on the ground that the
Mohammedan law does not permit a wife to divorce herself upon a private agreement. In
appeal, an Islamic jurist, Moulvi Mahamat Hossein, appeared for the wife and pointed out the
relevant sections from the legal texts which specifically mention the delegated power of the
wife to divorce husband and pleaded that such a provision is not repugnant to the Mohammedan
law. The court concurred with this view and ruled in the woman's favour.

Under the English law of contract a person who is not a party to a contract cannot enforce it
even when s/he is a beneficiary. Hence the Privy Council ruling of 1910 in Khwaja Mohammed
v Husseini Begum7 became an important point of departure from these established norms of
English law which took into account the cultural reality of India. The Privy council laid down

5
Ibid.
6
Badarannissa Bibi v. Mafiattala, (1871) 7 BLR 442.
7
Mohammed v Husseini Begum, 1910) 37 IA 152.

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a new precedent by upholding a minor girl’s right to enforce a contract against her father in
law, even though she was not a party to it.

In the case of Muhammad Muin-ud –Din v Jamal Fatima8, decided by the Allahabad High
Court in the 1921, the husband had married twice and had treated both wives with cruelty. The
father of the third wife entered into an agreement with the husband and his father prior to the
marriage, binding the husband to pay a sum of Rs 15 per month for life, in addition to the dower
debt, in case of divorce. The wife was subsequently divorced and she approached the court for
the enforcement of her contract. The court held that the agreement was enforceable as it was
meant to secure the wife against ill-treatment. The court countered the plea that pre-marriage
agreements are against public policy and held that agreements protecting a woman's future
rights are valid under Islamic law.

In 1868 in Ahmed Hosssein v. Mat Khodeja9 the Bombay High Court held that if, at the time
of the husband’s death, the widow is in possession of the property and her mehr dues are
unpaid, she has the right to dispossess her until her claim is satisfied. This is a substantial
safeguard against destitution.

MAINTENANCE TO WIFE AFTER DIVORCE

Under Sharia, maintenance is payable to wife children and parents. It is an obligation imposed
on the part of the parties to a marriage agreement which creates a familiar relationship between
the spouses. Under Muslim law the term “maintenance” is called nafaqa and it comprehends
food, raiment and lodging, though in common parlance it is limited to the first. There are three
causes for which it is incumbent on one person to maintain another 10 : a) Marriage, b)
Relationship, and, c) Property.

The highest obligation arises on marriage; the maintenance of the wife and children is a primary
obligation. Muslim wife’s claim of maintenance is divided in two different branches of law.
One under Muslim Personal Law and another under general law of maintenance as is reflected
in Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which is a secular remedy.

8
Muhammad Muin-ud –Din v Jamal Fatima, AIR 1921 All 152.
9
Ahmed Hosssein v. Mat Khodeja, (1868) 14 MLA 377.
10
Asaf A. A. Fyzee, Outlines of Muhammadan Law (5th, OUP, Oxforde 2008) 178

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The husband’s duty to maintain commences when the wife attains puberty and not before;
provided always that she is obedient and allows him free access at all lawful times. If a wife
deserts her husband she loses her right to maintenance.11 The rule that, after divorce, the wife
is entitle to maintenance during the period of Iddat and until her delivery if she is pregnant, is
clear and has been a debated provision since many years. Often judiciary encountered with the
difficulty surrounding this rule which provides a minimum right of maintenance as compared
to the Hindu divorced lady.

The Supreme Court in the Shah Bano’s12 case by setting a landmark precedent for the Courts
within the territory of India held that Section 125 of Cr. P.C., 1973 applies to all irrespective
of the religion practiced by the personal and section 125 overrides the personal law if there is
any conflict between the two. The court also held that: “It would be incorrect & unjust to
extend the rule of maintenance under Muslim Law to the cases in which the divorced wife is
unable to maintain herself, so if the divorced wife is able to maintain herself, the husband’s
liability ceases with the expiration of the period of Iddat, but if she is unable to maintain herself
after the period of Iddat, she is entitle to have recourse to Section 125 of Cr. P.C.41

So with the help of this judgment Supreme Court has set a new law applicable the case of
Muslim divorced lady that even if a Muslim woman has been divorced, she would be entitled
to claim maintenance from her husband under Section 125 of Cr. P. C. after the expiry of period
of Iddat also, as long as she does not remarry.

There were massive demonstrations by Muslims, and the Rajiv Gandhi government was
compelled to upturn the Supreme Court judgment by passing a new law known as the Muslim
Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act. The new law, drafted with the help of Muslim
clergy, was supposedly based on the Quranic verse 2:241, which says "And the divorced
women, too, shall have (a right to) maintenance in a goodly manner; this is a duty for all
who are conscious of God". This verse makes it clear that the Quran requires Muslims who
fear God to provide maintenance for their divorced wives. The 'ulema', however, argued that
this maintenance could be given only for the period of iddat.13

12
. Mohammad Ahmed khan V/s Shaha Bano Begum, (AIR 1985 SC 945).
13
. Asghar Ali Engineer, 'Muslim Women and Maintenance' [1999] 34 (1489) EPW
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4408068> 13 March 2016

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With respect to the controversial nature of this Act, a writ petition under Article 32 of the Indian
Constitution was filed challenging the constitutional validity of the Act in the case of Daniel
Latifi V/s Union of India14 by making Section 3 of the Act as the pivotal point since this
provision was interpreted restrictively. By analyzing the Preamble of the Act, Statement of
Objects and Reasons of the Act, and the judgment given by Supreme Court in Mohammad
Ahmed Khan V/s Shaha Bano Begum, Court has advocated the validity of the Act and came
to the following conclusion:

1) A Muslim husband is liable to make reasonable and fair provision for the future of the
divorced wife which obviously includes her maintenance as well. Reasonable and fair provision
extending beyond the iddat period must be made by the husband within the iddat period in
terms of Section 3(1) (a) of the Act.

2) Liability of Muslim husband to his divorced wife arising under Section 3(1)(a) of the Act to
pay maintenance is not confined to iddat period.

3) A divorced Muslim woman who has not remarried and who is not able to maintain herself
after iddat period can proceed as provided under Section 4 of the Act against her relatives who
are liable to maintain her in proportion to the properties which they inherit on her death
according to Muslim law from such divorced woman including her children and parents. If any
of the relatives being unable to pay maintenance, the Magistrate may direct the State Wakf
Board established under the Act to pay such maintenance.

ORAL GIFT TO MARRIED WOMAN

A gift is a transfer of property or right by one person to another. It is a donation conferring

right of property without exchange. Under Muslim law, to be a valid gift, three essential
requirements exist:

a) Declaration of gift by donor;

b) Acceptance of gift, express or implied, by or on behalf of the donee; and
c) Delivery of possession of the subject of the gift. 15

14
Daniel Latifi V/s Union of India, AIR 2001 SC 3958.
15
. Saumya Uma, 'Judgments on Muslim Law & Women’s Rights' (www.wragindia.org 2007)
<http://www.wragindia.org/publications/SUPREME%20COURT%20SPEAKS.pdf> accessed 13 March 2016

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The object behind complying with these three requirements is to avoid any future dispute in
respect of the property that is gifted. In the case of Gulam Hussain Kutubuddin Maner vs
Abdulrashid Abdulrajak Maner16 the Supreme Court has stated that if there is no compliance
with any of these essential conditions, the gift would be invalid.

In the case of Ram Niwas Todi and another vs Bibi Jabrunnissa and others17 a man made an
oral gift of house property including open spaces of land to his daughter-in- law, Bibi
Jabrunnissa. He also documented the gift in a written form, but did not register the document.
Subsequently, he delivered the possession of the property to Jabrunnissa. After his death, Ram
Niwas Todi and another person tried to claim the property under tenancy and land ceiling laws,
alleging that the gifted property was agricultural land. They argued in court that the gift made
to Jabrunnissa was invalid. The trial court stated that the gift was complete and valid. The High
Court came to the conclusion that the oral gift would prevail. Ram Niwas Todi and another,
aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, appealed to the Supreme Court. The main issue
before the court was that whether the gift made to Jabrunnissa was valid or not.

The court held that since the donor and donee were Muslims, an oral gift by a father-in-law to
his daughter-in-law was permissible. In this case, the gift was written but not registered. Hence
it could not, in any event, be said that there was no oral gift. Since the gift was followed by
possession, making the gift complete, the gift was valid. The Supreme Court further stated that
since the property in dispute was house property, tenancy and land ceiling laws would not be
applicable.

POLYGAMY & MAINTENANCE TO FIRST WIFE

In the case of Begum Subanu alias Saira Banu and another v. A.M. Abdul Gafoor18 the
Supreme Court ruled that husband’s second marriage confers right on first wife to live
separately and claim maintenance. In this case the petitioners married Gafoor in 1980, and had
a girl child in 1981. She filed a petition for maintenance, seeking Rs. 500 a month for herself
and Rs. 300 for her child, on the ground of Gabor’s neglect and failure to provide maintenance.
The magistrate’s court dismissed the petition, stating that Saira Banu had failed to establish an
adequate justification for living separately. Saira Banu approached the session’s court.

16
Abdulrashid Abdulrajak Maner, 2000 (8) SCC 587.
17
Ram Niwas Todi and another vs Bibi Jabrunnissa and others, (1996) 6 SCC 444.
18
Begum Subanu alias Saira Banu and another v. A.M. Abdul Gafoor, AIR 1987 SC 1103.

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Meanwhile Gafoor married again. Saira Banu then argued in court that the second marriage
itself was a ground for her to live separately and be granted maintenance. The session’s court
refused to grant her maintenance, saying Gafoor had offered to take her back even after his
second marriage and hence her living separately was not justified. She approached the High
Court, which also did not hold in her favour. Saira Banu then approached the Supreme Court
for redressal of her grievance.

Issues for Determination: a) Does the second marriage of the husband confer a right upon the
first wife to live separately and claim maintenance?

b) Is such a right curtailed in any manner since Muslim law permits polygamy for the man?

Judgment: The court came to a conclusion that the second marriage of the husband does confer
a right upon the first wife to live separately and claim maintenance. She cannot be reasonably
expected to live in the same house. It said:

“A husband who marries again cannot compel the first wife to share the conjugal home with
the co-wife and as such, unless he offers to set up a separate residence for the first wife, any
offer to take her back cannot be considered a bona fide offer. It is therefore obvious that the
offer was only a make-believe one and not a genuine and sincere offer.”

It further said that this was the case, irrespective of the fact that Muslim law permitted
polygamy for the man. Although Muslim law permits polygamy up to four wives, there are
conditions that regulate this aspect. Separate residences for each of the wives are recognized
as a right of all the four wives and therefore this judgment is also consistent with Muslim law.

INHERITENCE RIGHT AND MATRIMONIAL PROERTY

The law of inheritance is no less inequitable. For whatever is the line of succession, the share
of male heirs at every level shall be twice that of female heirs at that level.

Muslim women, for instance, were routinely denied property inheritance and dowry
settlements, though both were provided to them under the Shariah or Islamic law. Finally, in
1937, under pressure from Muslim elites, the Shariat Law was passed, requiring Indian

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Muslims to be governed by Islamic juridical norms in family matters- that is, in marriage,
divorce, maintenance, adoption, succession, and inheritance.19

Indian Muslims are broadly divided into two schools of thoughts: the Sunnite and Shiite.

 Sunni rules only count those relatives as heirs whose relation to the deceased person
is through a male like son’s daughter, son’s son and father’s mother.
 Shia includes even those persons as heirs who are related to the deceased through a
female Eg. Daughter’s son, daughter’s daughter.

Till 1937 Muslims in India were governed by customary law which were highly unjust. After
the Shariat Act of 1937 Muslims in India came to be governed in their personal matters,
including property rights. Broadly the Islamic scheme of inheritance discloses three features,
which are markedly different from the Hindu law of inheritance:

(I) The Kuran gives specific shares to certain individuals

(II) The residue goes to the agnatic heirs and failing them to uterine heirs and

(III) Bequests are limited to one-third of the estate, i.e., maximum one-third share in the
property can be willed away by the owner.20

The main principles of Islamic inheritance law which mark an advance vis-à-vis the pre-Islamic
law of inheritance, which have significant bearing on the property rights of women, are:

(a) The husband or wife was made an heir, (b) Females and cognates were made competent to
inherit, (c) Parents and ascendants were given the right to inherit even when there were male
descendants and, (d) As a general rule, a female was given one half the share of a male.

The newly created heirs were mostly females; but where a female is equal to the customary
heir in proximity to the deceased, the Islamic law gives her half the share of a male. For
example, if a daughter co-exists with the son, or a sister with a brother, the female gets one
share and the male two shares.

19
. 'Women Property Rights: A Comparative Study Of Hindu, Christian And Muslim '
<http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/8148/8/08_chapter%204.pdf> accessed 15 March 2016
20
. Shuma Talukdar, 'Women's Property Rights in India' (socialregenerationandequity.blogspot.in 2013)
<http://socialregenerationandequity.blogspot.in/2013/10/womens-property-rights-in-india.html> accessed 15
March 2016

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The woman is given a lesser share because Quran has assured inheritance to women not only
as daughters but also as mothers and wives. Moreover, in Islam the husband had to take care
of his wife even if she is wealthy enough to maintain herself. Legally she is entitled to claim
maintenance. At the same time she is not obligated to spend any of her wealth on the household.
Again at the time of marriage, the Muslim women receive Mehr which she is free to use, spend
or invest it in any way she likes. Therefore as a wife she adds to whatever she receives through
inheritance in her capacity as daughter and that she does not have to support either herself or
her children. Therefore the position of a Muslim woman is secure as far as inheritance is
concerned. Their financial situation is completely guaranteed by the Islamic law.21

The Hanafi jurists divided heirs into seven categories: three principle and four subsidiaries.
The 3 principal heirs are Koranic heirs, Agnatic heirs and Uterine heirs. The 4 subsidiaries are
successor by contract, the acknowledge relative, the sole legatee and the state by escheat.22

Property division:

Widow: Share in her husband’s property

 Will get 1/8th share (when there are children)

 Will get 1/4th share (when there are no children)

Share of two/more widows

 Together will get 1/8th share (when there are children)

 Together will get 1/4th share (when there are no children)

Daughter: Share in father’s property

 Share of ½ (when has no brother)

 ½ of whatever shares the brother gets (when there is brother)

Mother: Share in son’s property

 Will get 1/3rd share of her son’s property (when there are no other children)
 Will get 1/6th share of her son’s property (when there are children)

21
. Paras Diwan; Muslim Law in Modern India,213 (9th edn., Allahabad Law Agency, Allahabad, 2000).
22
. Id. 25.

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Grandmother: Share in grandson’s property

 Maternal grandmother will get 1/6th share (only if there is no mother or paternal
grandmother)

Paternal grandmother gets a share of total property (only if there is no mother or

grandfather)

PROPERTY RIGHTS THROUGH MARRIAGE

The nikahnama also gave the wife the right to reside in the matrimonial home with full Sharia
rights in case the husband took another wife and the husband was obliged to bear the expenses
of the children, especially girl children, after divorce even if they stayed with the wife.

The Supreme Court of India has laid down in Kapore Chand v Kadar Unnissa23: that the mahr
(dower) ranks as a debt and the widow is entitled, along with the other creditors of her deceased
husband, to have it satisfied out of his estate. Her right, however, is the right of an unsecured
creditor; she is not entitled to a charge on the husband’s property unless there be an agreement.
The Supreme Court has laid down that the widow has no priority over other creditors, but that
mahr as debt has priority over the other heir’s claims. This right is known as the widow’s right
of retention.

However in practice, the divine rules regarding women’s inheritance are violated and
overlooked by Muslim societies. Very often they are forced to give up their share for the benefit
of male members of the family. This is particularly the case where women are married to
wealthy men. Their share is automatically written off and would be absorbed by the male
relatives. If they refuse to do it they will be accused of being selfish, greedy, inconsiderate and
irresponsible.

CONCLUSION

23
Kapore Chand v Kadar Unnissa, (1950) SCR 747.

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The focus on women's status goes to the spirit of many issues raised in the age of Islamic
fundamentalism. It is often said and with considerable truth that the early Islamic movement
effected a revolution in the status of Arabian women. Muslim norms provided new rights for
women, within limits. Stipulations concerning divorce and inheritance law also make an
advance over prior practices, and even the often cited example for Muslim men to take up to
four wives is hedged with restrictions. For Islam, like all pre-modern societies, remained
patriarchal in its norms and values. Men count twice as much as women in giving legal
testimony. Also, it is incumbent on men to maintain women, and men therefore have
proportionately greater responsibilities in public matters.

The law of marriage is not a law concerning sexuality or morality. The law of marriage in its
essence, like all civil laws, is a law regulating economic transactions, and more specifically,
women's access to and control over it. The Islamic provisions of mehr and marriage agreements
and right of property management have stood Muslim women in good stead during litigation
in the last century. Hence, the decline in Muslim women right in this regard and deteriorating
condition is not a reflection of the Islamic law of marriage, but a sad comment on the
politicisation of women's rights within a communally vitiated and patriarchal tilted social
structure.

Several legal reforms and positive steps have taken place since independence in India on
equality of women when it comes to property. Yet equal status remains elusive. The theoretical
reforms so far have not been adequate to give women right to property on the same footing and
terms as to men. It varies with states, region and religion. Though law has given equal rights,
it’s the practices, customs and norms that stand as an obstacle in giving recognition to the
women. To some extent women themselves are responsible for their present condition. They
relinquish their rights as daughters, wives, daughters-in-law, mothers or sisters. This further
gets accentuated when they lose the security of the family, as a single woman, divorced or
separated or widow. Social awareness of the rights under law, attitudes of the individual and
determination to bring change can ensure social justice and equality in our society and can
improve the status of the women.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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 Bhartiya V P, Muslim Law (Lucknow Eastern Book Company 2014)

 Kohli H D, Muslim Law Cases and material (Delhi Universal Law Publication 2010)

 Diwan P, Law of Maintenance in India ( Deep Publication 1990)

 Agnes F, Personal Laws and Women’s Right (OUP 2009)

 Saumya Uma, 'Judgments on Muslim Law & Women’s Rights'

 Shuma Talukdar, 'Women's Property Rights in India'

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