Saint-Just and the Problem of Heroism in the French Revolution

Author(s): MIGUEL ABENSOUR

Source: Social Research, Vol. 56, No. 1, The French Revolution and the Birth of Modernity
(SPRING 1989), pp. 187-211
Published by: The New School
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 and the
Saint-Just
Problemof
Heroism
inthe /
French /
Revolution / BY MIGUEL ABENSOUR

In 1947, Father Carnot, a descendantof the greatCarnot,

presented to the Bibliothèque Nationale a collection of
unknownmanuscripts,
Saint-Just's Be la naturede l'étatcivil,de
du gouvernement
la citéou les règlesde l'indépendance ("On the
Nature of Civil Society, the City, or the Rules of the
Independenceof Government"). AlbertSoboul firstpublished
them as "Un manuscritinédit de Saint-Just"in Annales
de la Révolutionfrançaise(vol. 23, 1951); a second
historiques
editionfollowedin a bilingualcollectionof Saint-Just's
writings
in
published Italy under the title Frammentisulle Istituzioni
seguitoda testiinediti(Einaudi, 1952).1 De la natureis
repubblicane
fundamental in thestrictest
senseof theterm:it is Saint-Just's
firstand incompleteexpressionof theprinciplesof hispolitical
philosophy,one in search of a foundation.These writings
thrownew light on the enigma of Saint-Just, who shines
through his myth. His intentness of mind, his dawning
philosophicaldevelopment, and his willto base revolutionary
actionon truth,demandthatwe consideran oftenoverlooked

1 All the referencesto De la naturein this articleare to this edition.

SOCIAL RESEARCH, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Spring 1989)

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188 SOCIAL RESEARCH

aspect of Saint-Justas theorist.This is importanteven though

certainfigureslike Brissot,Marat,and Dezamy, who compared
him to Billaud-Varenne, and Edgar Quinet, who compared
him to Fichte, as well as Lucien Febvre, recognized him as a
thinker. Can we still cling to the classic interpretationof
Saint-Justas embodyingthe contradictionbetween the theory
of Social Contractand revolutionarypractice? Thanks to this
discoveryof one of the mostcoherenttheoreticalformulations
ofJacobinismin the making,should we not ratherperceive the
continuitybetween Saint-Just'stheoryof nature and his action,
or better yet, by taking "the force of circumstances" into
account,inquire about the actual politicaleffectsof what seems
to be a dogmaticconceptionof nature and the stateof nature?
Up to what point may we see the failure of the Jacobins
(admitted by Saint-Justin the formula "The revolution is
frozen") as reflectingthe inadequacies, the blind spots of their
theory?Rather than takingto task the divorce of theoryfrom
practice,viewed as an irremediablefate,would it not be better
to discern what is at faultin the theory?
Firstwe need to date the manuscript.AlbertSoboul, the first
publisher, proposed several solutions as to the time of the
writing:firstaround 1790-91; then the firstfewmonthsof the
Convention,between September 1792 and April 1793; finally
between April 1792 and 9 Thermidor. Based on an internal
critique of the manuscript,we have proposed another dating
whichseems to have gained currentacceptance.2Taking as our
point of reference the issues of slavery and divorce, we
maintainthat the manuscriptmust have been writtenbetween
24 September 1791 and 20 September 1792, the date slavery
was abolished in France and divorce introduced. De la nature
would thus date frommidwaybetween L'espritde la Révolution
et de la Constitution de France (1791) and Fragmentssur les
institutions
républicaines,probablywrittenin Year II. This is an

2 du Colloque
in Actes
J.-P.Gross,"Essaide bibliographie
critique," (Paris,
Saint-Just
1968),pp. 343-463.

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 SAINT-JUST 189

important point, for as we note the repetition of certain

themes characteristicof De la nature in the Discourssur la
de la France (24 April 1793) and in the second
Constitution
Fragmentsdes institutions we can betterappreciate
républicaines,
thedistinctivenessof Saint-Just's
politicalstyle.Unlesswe take
De la natureas a philosophicalstartingpointfromwhichthe
youngrevolutionary leader'sthoughtsand actionsflowed,we
shallinevitablybe dumbfoundedby the continualinteraction
betweenhis politicaltheoryand his practice,and betweenhis
actionsand his principles,wherehis concernfocusedon not
lettingactiondistortprinciples.For the innerrhythmof this
movement dependson theperiodicrecurrence ofa philosophy
of nature,whichservesas a kindof springboardforeach new
plunge. Hence the centralrole thatDe la natureoccupiesin
Saint-Just's
development, and thus,regardingthiskernelofhis
doctrineand vital representation, our need to grasp the
modulationsof meaningthatpunctuateSaint-Just's story.

Reconstitution
oftheManuscript

For Saint-Justthestateof naturemeant,in theusage of the

politicaltheoryof the time,"the state of man before civil
governments wereinstituted." He describesthisstateas social,
forsociety,a naturalgivenand a fundamental and historically
earliestphenomenon,precedes the individualand not vice
versa. The individualappeared only when the social body
beganto disintegrate. This naturalhumansocietyaccountsfor
a universalphenomenonmanifested on everylevelof thescale
of creatures,withcertaindifferencesof intensityvaryingfrom
speciesto species,dependingon theintelligence and sensitivity
of thosesubjectedto the society.Man, the mostsensitiveand
intelligentcreature,is born foran enduringsociety,forhe is
bornto possessan ensembleof naturalrelationsoriginating in
human needs and affections.There are two kinds of

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190 SOCIAL RESEARCH

possession, personal possession, which originates in man's

affections-including the relations arising from the ties
between person and person- and real possession, which
originates in needs and includes relations arising from the
self's occupation, the exchange of goods, and business in
general.
Apart from this, from man to man, everythingis identity.
Identity,the affectiveand psychologicalunderpinningof social
life, has a fundamentalplace in Saint-Just'spolitical thought,
and an analysisof thisconcept helps us define the societal state
and provide a diversified picture of it. Saint-Just'sfirst
propositiondescribesthe societalstateas a harmoniousalliance
between independence and life in society. The basis of this
complementarityis membershipin a species: "Everythingthat
breathesis independent of its species, and lives in societyin its
species."3Identityof origin,the preconditionforthisstate,and
itscorollary,equality,make it possible to rid social lifeof every
instance of domination caused by some differencein power.
Unflagging vigilance is needed to preserve identity and
equality, and thus to maintain the harmony of the societal
state. Inequality of any kind destroysthe original identityand
introducesinto the species or societya heterogeneitywhich is
necessarilya catalystof dissolution,and which fracturesthe
unanimous societyinto so manydistinctand hostilegroups. As
a result,othernessis the source of an antisocial state,namely,
the "savage" or "political" state. In fact, the social state
disappears when we are thinkingnot of the relationsbetween
creaturesof the same species but the relationsbetween species,
forthe emergence of differencebreeds rivalriesand the willto
dominate. Every social body thus presents two aspects,
depending on whether it is viewed from the inside or the
outside. Withina homogeneous society,independence is allied
with sociability.But when this society confrontsa different
society,the societal state vanishes, giving way to the law of
3 De la
nature,p. 135.

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 SAINT-JUST 191

politicsor preservation, along withitscharacteristicphenom-

ena of resistanceand force. Saint-Just expressesthis in a
second proposition:"Everything that breatheshas a law of
politicsor preservationagainst what is not its societyor
species."4
Thus the two differentstatescoexist.The localizationof
each of the statesdepends upon whichgroup one envisages.
Accordingto Saint-Just, up to thelevelof thegroup"people"
(peuple), groups,family,the tribe,are recognizedas more
all
identicalthandifferent. Thus theylivein thesocietalstate.We
findthe pointof transition fromidentityto othernessat the
levelof thepeople,and thatis wherethesolutionof continuity
intervenesto create the politicalstate.Saint-Just makes the
followingterminological distinction:
"The societalstateis the
relationbetweenmen and men. The politicalstate is the
relationbetweenone people and another."5
This contrastgives rise to a fundamentalidea: force or
constraint is tobe proscribed,foritdestroyssocialunity.When
we replacea relationof identity and equalitywitha relationof
constraint or domination, thepriorunitybreaksup, givingway
to a conflictbetweenthoseusingforceand thosetheyoppress;
the binarycategoryof masterand slave appears. This is why
the definitions of the societalstateand the politicalstateare
transformed. In riddingthemselvesof any precisecontent,
they lose their originalmeaning and become general and
theoretical concepts,withthe aid of whichSaint-Just defined
relationsother than those between men and the state of
nature,or between peoples. The societal state becomes a
normativeor regulativeconcept,and the politicalstate a
descriptivecategory.Saint-Just clearlyaffirmsthe autonomy
and specificityof the social by contrastinga society,an
immanentand internally experiencedunity,withan aggregate,
whichis an apparentsocietyand a purelyformalunity,an

4 Ibid.
öIbid.

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192 SOCIAL RESEARCH

externallyimposed and not internallyexperienced cohesion.

The political state designates every relation based on force,
inequality, and constraint. And Saint-Just unhesitatingly
equates so-called civilized life with savage life. He describes
historyas the disappearance of the social under the impact of
the generalizationof the political which, not restrictedto the
relationsbetween peoples, has also ruled those between cities,
and eventuallydestroysthe relationsbetween men.
This evolutioninvolvestwo orders of causes: the theoretical
causes, and the more specificallyhistoricalcauses.
Humanity has reached the savage state because of two
fundamental errors. In the firstplace- and this is the main
cause- men have ignored the distinctionbetween the internal
and the external relations of a society, the former being
destined to unanimity,the latterto divisionand war. Men have
confused social right and political right. As a result, the city
(civitas)has been based on principles that are foreign to its
kind, and its internal structurehas approached that of the
general societyof people, separated by a quantitativediffer-
ence instead of, as in the beginning,a qualitative difference.
Ever since,men have lived among themselvesin the relationof
a people to another people. The primordial phenomenon of
participation has faded away; we see only an order of
juxtaposition. The principal manifestationof this confusion
between the social and the political is the creation of the
complex forces of government.The second and more moral
cause of this development has to do with man's increasing
estrangement from nature, first through ignorance, then
through the systematicwill to denaturalize man. The leading
role in thisdisfigurementof man's image is played by religious
law, which lent its support to all the encroachments of
dominationand bondage.
The historical description is much more concise. In the
earliest societies- Saint-Justis thinkingof the Franks and the
Teutons- the people had no magistrates;acting as both their
own princes and their own sovereigns,the people had only

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 SAINT-JUST 193

chiefs to ensure external preservation.The politicalstate

emergedwiththedivorceof therolesof princeand sovereign
fromthepeople,and withthecreationof themagistrates, who
never ceased to oppress the people. This separationcame
aboutwhenthe people losttheirpenchantforassembliesand
turnedawayfromthelifeof thecityto dedicatethemselves to
or
commerce,agriculture, conquest. It was then that the
politicalcontract,which Saint-Justconceived as a twofold
convention, intervened in history,
includinga pactof unionby
the citizensamong themselvesand a pact by the citizensto
submitto power.
Saint-Just envisagedthereconstruction of thelegitimate city
from
(civitas) a theoreticalviewpoint and a politicalviewpoint.
From a theoreticalpoint of view,we need to reversethe
course of historyand recover for the social the domain
thatrightlybelongsto it, and thus limitthe politicalto the
relationsbetween peoples. Social right must inform the
reconstruction of the "city,"basing it on nature,thatis, on
integration and participationin an organic totality,as
contrastedwithcoordinationand, a fortiori,subordination.
That is whySaint-Just denouncesthe idea of a socialcontract
at theoriginof society.Byitsverystructure, thecontractisjust
a means for achieving a compromise between various
antagonistic forces.Furthermore, to enacta contractis bad in
for
itself, it is an attemptto constrainnatureand ignorethe
naturalharmonythatrestson the reciprocity between,on the
one hand,sociability-thebasisof possessionand ownershipof
the nationalterritory- and, on the otherhand, propertyand
possession,the mostcertainguaranteesof society'spreserva-
tion.This naturalharmonyis, however,thefruitof hierarchi-
cal lawsaccordingto the relationsengenderedby the society.
At the top of the hierarchy places socialrelations-
Saint-Just
the directrelationsof men in the simple qualityof being
human- and theirmore complex relationsas citizens.The
lawsoftheserelationsare independenceand ownership, which
means thateach man is the ownerof his body,his will,and

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194 SOCIAL RESEARCH

himself.These two mostabstractlaws constitutethe fundamen-

tal norms with which all legal rules must be consistent.Thus
the civil laws governing possession must follow the rule of
equalitythat translateson the civil plane as the norm of social
right.Because of certain mattersof fact,Saint-Justgrantsthe
lawmaker a latitude in the practical arrangement of the
conformitybetween the social state and the civil state in a
somewhat more concrete manner. When this harmony is
respected,societyregeneratesand perpetuatesitself,and there
seems to be no need for external and authoritarianinterven-
tion. And Saint-Justemphasizes the possession that progres-
sively becomes the surest catalystof social spontaneityas it
reveals how decisive civil relations are in strengtheningor
crushingthe social body if theyare not based on independence
and equality. The anthropological and legal notion of
possession issues in a nonantagonistic and harmonious
solidaritywhose primarysource is affinity,and which finds
itselfconfirmedin the set of natural and necessarymediations
deriving from the needs and affections of men. From a
politicalviewpoint,the very titleof the manuscript,whatever
the grammarsuggests,indicateshow the rule of independence
from the governmentshould be based on "nature," which is
understood in the narrow Rousseauan sense.6 Saint-Just's
mistrustgives rise to a solution as direct as it is negative: the
"city"musthave no separation between the magistrateand the
sovereign; it is enough to exclude the magistratefrom the
"city"forever.This, however,is more a matterof logical and
ideal conclusions than of real political solutions. Saint-Just
formulatedother negative imperativeslike the creation of a
public forcethatis not an organ of oppression or division.The
governmentmust be limited to the exercise of one function
only: externalpreservation.Thus it involvesan ad hoc military
leader more than a genuine government.
6 The same
passive meaning is found on p. 142, where Saint-Justwrites: "The
natural pact excludes any particularforce thatis independent of the sovereign."This
should read: "withregard to the sovereign."

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 SAINT-JUST 195

From a strictlypolitical point of view, De la natureis

decidedlyunsatisfying. Positivesolutionsare lacking,and here
Saint-Just'sideas reflecttheincompleteness of themanuscript.
This incompleteness, however,is notalone responsibleforthe
lacunae.We need to reckonwiththedeeper proclivities of the
youngand doctrinaire Jacobin.Torn betweenthedemandsof
thesociallaw that"does nottolerateeithertheelevationor the
abasementof anyone"and the necessityforself-preservation,
Saint-Just affirmedhis resoluteoppositionto the domination
to which,in hisview,politicswas in themainreduced.Several
timesover,in lapidaryphrases,he condemnsthephenomenon
of power.Socialrightimposesa ban on thedistinction between
the governingand the governed,whichdamagesthe original
cohesion and builds the city on the disastrousopposition
between the weak and the strong. This radical critique,
revealingthatSaint-Just belongedto a minority in thetradition
thatknewhow to separatethe being of the social fromthe
division into masters and subjects,is not aimed at any
particularpoliticalform.Nevertheless,he absolutelyrejects
politicsas such,includingthe rule of force.Ignorantof the
creativespontaneity of thesocialstate,politicsinstitutesviolent
tiesinsteadof naturalties.Politicallaw is to be proscribed, for
withinthecityitseparates,whilesociallawunites.Surprisingly,
thereadersensesa genuinehatredof politicsin someonewho
aspiresto appear on the world'spoliticalstage,as thoughhe
werejudging politicsonly on the basis of the monarchical
experience.Saint-Just writes,"I'll speak of politicallaw no
more,I have struckit fromthestate."7

and theTheoryof Social Right

Naturalism,Primitivism,

Now that we have reconstructed his thinking,what is its

overallsignificance? uses
Saint-Just a collectivetool; he thinks
7 De la
nature,p. 156.

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196 SOCIAL RESEARCH

in terms of the idea of nature. What is his conceptual field?

What are its harmonic elements?
Saint-Justis clearlyaware of the topicalityof the theme and
its ambiguity.Rather than calling the very concept of nature
into question, however, he asserts its primacyand atemporal
character. "Sovereign nature is the chief right, it is for all
time!"8Determinedto establishthe unequivocal and ahistorical
truthof thisconcept, Saint-Justmeant by nature "the point of
exactness,justice, and truthin the relationsbetween thingsor
their morality,"which exists outside of any human interven-
tion, in contrastto the artificial.An objective moral order is
implied here into which convention does not enter. Society
should be based on nature,forit is not the product of artificial
creation,the workof man, but a natural given thatexistsprior
to man and exists independentlyof him. Saint-Justconsiders
thatthissocial order or "naturalmorality,"whichexistsparallel
to the physicalorder, is ruled by laws producing,not necessary
relations,but intelligentrelationsthat provide some purchase
for human action, even though this nonautonomous objective
order is not foreignto a divine order. Nothing,then, is more
foreignto thisidea than legal voluntarism,and it is more akin
to classical natural right than to individual or revolutionary
natural right. The human mind should content itself with
"reading" the laws of the natural order that are imposed on it
from the outside; however, the faculty is granted to it to
arrange its differentelementsand to project the arrangements
between the social law and the practicalexigencies of the civil
state.
Saint-Justpushed his social naturalism quite far; society
finds not only its basis in nature, but also a solution to the
complex relations its begets and the guarantee of its
robustness,no matterwhat its stage of historicaldevelopment.
The spontaneous harmonyof nature is the opposite of force,
the real basis of contemporarysocieties. On the note of a

8
Ibid.,p. 157.

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 SAINT-JUST 197

studied idyllicoptimism,and an event more rigorousand

coherentnaturalism,Saint-Just excluded reason,an artificial
faculty, from the conceptual field.At the end of De la nature,
we observea cleardropin tension;afterpittinghimselfagainst
commonconceptions,and aggressively reversingtheirusual
meaningsalmost entirely,"savage state" meaning for him
"civil"or "politicalstate,"and "socialstate"meaning"stateof
nature,"Saint-Just returnsto the standardterminology of his
time."In naturemen love each other.In sociallifetheytake
care of each other.... I have called sociallifethelifeof men
united by a writtencontract,not to be misunderstood."9
Saint-Just denied thatreasonwas a naturalfaculty, maintain-
ing that in the state of nature it virtually did not existand
emergedin history onlyas a substitute forand as a degenerate
form of the earliest intelligence.Thus reason, a mere a
posteriorito the accidentby whichhumanityproceededfrom
the social to the savage state,is the onlytool leftto man for
workingout the politicalcontractand organizingsocietyon
relationsof force.This conceptionof reason as generatorof
politicalor savage life,a tool forconstraining nature,shows
how farSaint-Just distanceshimselffromrationalism, even if
hiswritings seem notto altogetherexcludesomegood use for
reason.The precedencegivento theoriginalintelligence over
reasonbetraysa tendencytowarda quiteradicalprimitivism.
Indeed, in Saint-Just's thought,noveltyis synonymous with
error.He chosetheattitudeof regret;hismind,hisawareness,
are irresistibly turnedtowardwhat is no longer. His is an
essentiallychronologicalprimitivism:the perfectstate of
humanityexistedat the originof the human race; historyis
merelya longdecline.This is whySaint-Just for
rejectshistory,
history is evil and "alteration"(alteration)is a keywordin his
of
philosophy history.Everysociety turns corruptas it gets
away from its earlieststate.Though he professesa theoryof
decline,Saint-Just is convincedof man's natural goodness.
9
Ibid.,p. 175.

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198 SOCIAL RESEARCH

What is actualized in the change fromthe social to the savage

stateis not a defectin human nature; therewas no fallowing to
some innate corruptingpassion of human nature, but merely
an accident, for which the sole factor responsible was theo-
logicopolitical subterfuge. There is therefore an antinomy
between the deteriorationof the human soul and its original
innocence. This contradictioncan be resolved only by the
discoveryof a sociallycreated unreason at the base of contem-
porary societies. Thus a kind of temporal breach opens be-
tweenthe social and the savage states;we necessarilyrediscover
the latterifwe move in the opposite direction.The resultis the
prescriptionof static imperatives,without any search for a
dynamicmeans that would point a way to the social state. No
visionof the futureappears in De la nature.Both the word and
the idea of progressseem unknownto Saint-Just;historicaltime
seems to be unfamiliar.
Historical indeterminismat least does not preclude hope;
nature is associated with the earliest society,which does not
preventnature fromordering and ruling the currentsociety.
Nature was not createdjust for the wilderness.Cognizant of a
certaingrowingeconomic complexityin the societyof his time,
Saint-Juststillassertsthatit mustnot be concluded from"some
relations that business, agriculture,and industryhave estab-
lished among men, that theycannot be governed naturally."10
Men are thus free to return to a natural social form,and if
present societyis based on nature, "relations will arise from
each other, and business and industrywill again find laws in
nature."11A clear culturalprimitivism-the rejectionof a form
of civilization-takes on and enriches itself with Saint-Just's
social values. In the face of nascent capitalism, which he
opposes, Saint-Justexalts the earliest societywhere men did
not sufferfromgreed but achieved happiness by rest and the
meetingof primaryneeds.

10
Ibid.,p. 143.
11 Ibid.

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 SAINT-JUST 199

In the face of this radical repudiationof everyformof

power and authoritywithinthe city,are we warrantedin
thinking is arguingforanarchy?This interpretation
Saint-Just
ignoresthe still-roughidea of rightsthat permeatesDe la
natureand culminatesin the idea of a necessaryharmony
betweensocialrightand civilright.Saint-Just himselfexplicitly
deniesthechargethathe is a theoretician of anarchy:"Where
therewillbe no powers,therewillbe no anarchy."12 At first
blushthisanswerseems specious,but it puts us on the right
track;we mustdissociaterightand power,and we can conceive
of a legal order freeof constraint and authority. Saint-Just's
politicalideas belong to the stream of socialrightthat George
Gurvitchdefined as follows: "the autonomous right of
communionin whicheach active,concrete,and real totality
embodyingsome positivevalue is integratedobjectively."13
The analogy is not merelyterminological, but involvesthe
formof sociabilityand the essence of rightthat Saint-Just
advocatedas the basis of the city.This is confirmedby the
criticalaspectof Saint-Just's thought.The formof sociability
is as
Saint-Just arguingagainst the rule of politicallaw clearly
containstheobverseof theone forwhichhe was striving. The
politicaltie in
results a via
sociability interdependence where
essentiallydistinctindividualsare reciprocally delimitedand
have merelyan externalconnection.Whenpoliticallaw enters
the civil state, most natural relationsare experienced as
conflict,and relationsof union are replaced by those of
dependence. Because in this society others are seen as
impediments and one's relationsto themas antagonistic, the
citybecomesa mereassemblageof hostileand dividedcitizens,
caringforeach otherin termsof the balance of forces,and
connectedonlythroughthestate,whichsuperimposes itselfon
themfromtheoutside.
It followsthatthe legal expressiontakenby thisformof

12
Ibid.,p. 148.
1J Vidéedu droit
social(Paris,1932),p. 15.
GeorgeGurvitch,

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200 SOCIAL RESEARCH

sociabilitymust be an order of coordination,namely,the

contract,the necessarytool of mediationbetweenseparate
individuals.Conversely,the desirableformof sociabilityis
spontaneous.Itsdistinguishing signis themetwork ofunion,all
the moreintimatebecause the wholeprecedesthe parts,and
each personlives for all. Interpersonalrelationsare experi-
enced as friendship or love- becauseit is a formof sociability
by interpénétration in which,despite differences,identity
prevails and generatesa resolutelyanticontractual rightof
integration: socialright.
It thusseemsthatSaint-Just's contrastbetweensocial right
and politicalrightexactlymatchesthe contrastbetweensocial
right (rightof integration)and individualright (rightof
coordination)and, in terms of specificlegal expression,
between statutoryrightand contractualright.By placing
Saint-Justin thestreamof socialright,we geta clearerviewof
the main featuresof his thought:doctrinairenaturalism,
anti-individualism, and opposition to any theory of the
contract.
Let us pursue thisanalysisa bit furtherand get a clearer
viewof the theoryof socialright.Afterquestioningthe city's
need forcivillawsand concludingin theaffirmative, Saint-Just
writes:"The citywillthushave itslaws,so thateach,following
theruleof all, is connectedto all, and forthecitizensto have
no connectionto the state,but onlybetweenthemselves, they
formthe state,and the sourceof the laws willbe possession,
notthe princeor theconvention."14
This sentenceexpressesprinciplesessentialto the overall
interpretation of Saint-Just's thinking:first,the principleof
thedistinction betweensocietyand state,and theassertionthat
the stateis based on societyand notviceversa.The state,the
contractual mediationof wills,does notcreatesociety;society,
the relationsof affections and needs thatare concretizedin
possession,creates the state. Society is conceived as an
14De la
nature,p. 158.

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 SAINT-JUST 201

organism,an organictotality: "The socialbodyresemblesthe

humanbody,all itsmechanisms contribute to harmony."15 The
socialbodyspontaneously secretesa commonsocialright,the
end resultof the relationsof humanneeds and affections, of
Hegel's "civil "In
society." all engagements the civilrule should
be copied fromthe socialrule. Because theyare confounded,
thesocialnexusis tightened and, as I havesaid,all partsof the
thatsubsists
society ofitselfbya naturalprincipleis connected by the
civil rule."16The social order thus exists as autonomous,
independentof the statistorder whichmerelydisturbsthe
initialspontaneousorder.
Finally,and above all, the main functionof social rightis
integration.The totality,
the"socialbody"is immanent;itdoes
notexternally transcendthemembersof thecity,butemanates
fromtheexperiencedreciprocity ofneedsand affections, from
possession,whichbegets union- a concrete,dynamic,end-
lesslyrenewedparticipation fromthe whole to the partsand
fromthe partsto the whole."The rightof man to natureor
independence,therightof citizento citizen,is possession,the
rightof a people to people is force.In theserelations
and in the
correspondenceof thesethingswefind theunityof thesocial body.The
social bodypreservesitselfbecause in these relations it is united.9'17
Any individualism is thus clearlyexcluded: the man who is
bound in a networkof naturaland nonviolentbonds lives
spontaneously forall, and withall the greaterease whenthe
community to whichhe belongshas a taskto perform, thatof
itsown preservation and defensefromoutsiders.
Hence Saint-Just's radical oppositionto a contractualand
artificialistconception of society and to any theory of
individualright.In thisrespectthetheoryoflawin De la nature
is symptomatic.Any voluntaristbasis for right is to be
forsworn;thus the law expressesnot the general will but

15
Ibid., p. 152.
16 Ibid.
17
Ibid.,p. 146.

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202 SOCIAL RESEARCH

nature. And the role of expressingnature falls to the

lawmaker,sage,or philosopher, but notthe prophet.
Finally,Saint-Just conceivedof possessionas a defective
right (the jus abutendi is missing),checked, harmonized,
relative,functional-in short,a social property.It is the
prototype of the theoryof socialrightaccordingto whichthe
needs of the community guide the regulationof possession,
quite unlikethe propertyborn of Roman right.Saint-Just's
conceptionof man'sowninghimselfdoe not come under the
categoryof possessiveindividualism,for the individualis
conceivedas part of a largerwhole whose organicunityhe
muststrengthen byhis economicor affective projection.
We cannot fail to be struck by an almost systematic
anti-Rousseauism at the threesuccessivelevelsof the philoso-
phy history, theoryof society,and the basis of rights.
of the
And above all, like Billaud-Varennein his Élémentsde
républicanisme (Year I), Saint-JustcriticizesRousseau for
rejectingthethesisof naturalsociality.

FromtheRevolutionas Restoration
The Paradoxesof Saint-Just:
to theRevolutionas Abyss

How does De la natureshed lighton Saint-Just's action,his

revolutionarydevelopment? His conversionto theTerrorand
hisanguishin thefaceof theglaciationof therevolution?
Charles Nodier, the enthusiasticpublisherof Institutions
(1831), perhaps best describedthe paradox of
républicaines
"The unfortunate
Saint-Just: Saint-Just. . . was nota heartless
man ... he had tendernessand even convictions fromwhich
recoiledin contempt
our improvedcivilization ... he believed,
whichis muchstronger, in respectforone's forebearsand in
backward
the cult of emotion . . . He was an extremely philosopher

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 SAINT-JUST 203

compared totheage we livein."18The Archangelof the Terror

made a fetish of ancestors: "Age is what our country
worships,"he wrotein Institutions Let us tryto
républicaines.
unravelthisparadox.
The first element is that this young man, the very
embodimentof the revolution, based his action,strangeas it
mayseem, on classicalnatural right.Though invokingnature
maybe in a criticalrelationto tradition, the idea of limitation
peculiar to classicalnatural right,teleologicalthought,and an
idea of rightnotbased on subjectivefoundationmakethisidea
incompatiblewiththe modernidea of revolution.Withthe
logicofa philosophy offreedomand notofvirtue,themodern
idea of revolutioninvolvesa subjectiveconceptionof right
while also aiming at an emancipation seen as infinite
movement.
Now the assertionof naturalsociality, positingan objective
ahistoricalorderin the name of nature,the declaredmistrust
of theindividualor generalwill,therepeatedrejectionof the
contractas a model, the theoryof the lawmaker-all these
featuresput Saint-Just, a crafterof the modernworld,in the
ranksof theancients.So hisappeal to virtuetakeson a certain
sense. Though Saint-Just associatedthe revolutionwiththe
people, he uncoupledthe foundingof the republicfromthe
popular will,and assignedthejob and the monopolyto the
lawmaker,the electedinterpreter of nature.This is an odd
doctrinein thatSaint-Just professedan idea of naturalright
that tended toward egalitarianismand hence was more
Christianthan classicalin inspiration.This paradox resulted
fromSaint-Just's anti-Rousseauism; claiming,unlikeRousseau,
that"theGoldenAge is behindus," and thusmakinghimself
vulnerableto Fichte'scritique,Saint-Just could nothave access
to thedialecticalviewof history in Rousseau'ssecondDiscourse;
furthermore, he alteredthe idea of naturethatin Rousseau

18
Jean Richer,"CharlesNodier et la Révolutionfrançaise,"
in Philosophies
de la
Révolution
(Paris,1984).

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204 SOCIAL RESEARCH

had servedas a criticalhypothesis in theaffirmation of a past

realitythatasserted itselfas the truth of the earliestsociety.
Dogmatizing Rousseau in this way,Saint-Just took away the
conflictualtensionbecause,for him,the return to the "city"
and thereturnto naturehad to be merged.
The revolutionis thoughtof more on the model of
astronomy-whichimpliesthe idea of a returnto an earlier
position-than withinthe strictlypoliticalfield, from the
classicalconceptof stasisor of modern thinkingabout the
upheavalsleadingto an idea of conflict and socialdivision.19
But is this idea of revolutiona modern idea? Doesn't
Saint-Justfatallylackthemuseof perfectibility? Divorcedfrom
the idea of freedomand marriedto nature,revolutionis
directedlessat liberation or theinvention ofa newsocialorder
thanat "renaturalization," the restoration of a naturalorder
effacedbycenturiesof monarchical decaythatis denouncedin
thejudgmentof thekingas "a crimeagainstnature."The aim
of therevolution is to redirectsocietyintotheorbitof nature,
returning to an order seen as natural,awayfromthenew,and
to setlimitsthatare all themoreconstraining fortheyare seen
as objective."I do not severthe bonds of society,but society
has severed all those of nature. I do not seek to institute
novelties,but to destroynovelties."20 This orientationto the
past,thishatredof novelty, this"misoneism" helpsexplainthe
fundamentalist climate of this idea, which goes alongwiththe
Jacobinpuritanism oscillating betweentheimagesof the hero
and the saint.This does not appreciablychangethe imageof
the revolutionary; he appears less possessedby a passionfor
freedomthanirresistibly attracted to thefoundingof an order
that,althoughproclaimedin the name of the revolution, still
displays all the features of a generalized codificationof the
formsof existence.21

19M.
J. Lasky, Utopiaand Revolution(Chicago, 1976), pp. 239-259.
20De la nature, 161.
p.
21 Michael Walzer, The Revolution theSaints(New York, 1976).
of

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 SAINT-JUST 205

There appears an even morestriking paradox: not content

to associate the revolutionwith a plan to restorenature,
Saint-Just calls forthe revolutionto be accomplishedwithout
politics,evento be opposed to politics."We shouldnotbe afraid
of changes,theperilis merelyin howtheyare affected, all the
world'srevolutions are partof politics.That is whytheyhave
been steeped in crimesand calamities.Revolutionsthatare
born of good laws and thatare conductedby skilledhands
would change the face of the earthwithoutshattering it."22
Good laws?He meanslawsrestingon nature.
Mustwe see in thissurprising declarationof theyoungand
doctrinaire Jacobina resurgenceof the Augustiniandoctrine
that identifiespolitics with evil? This would imply that
Christianity's hold on Jacobinism-the distinctively Christian
ways of thinking about politics-is more crucial than has
usuallybeen thought.Referring the cohabitationof men to a
spontaneity of the social a
with,moreover, placingof thepolis
beneaththesocietas, leads to thedisparagement of politics.This
lowering of the politicalsphere showshow much Saint-Just,
despite his reference to classicalnaturalright,failsboth to
acknowledge the dignityof politics and to recognize an
uncircumventable constitutive dimensionin the plural exis-
tenceof men.
As demonstrated, the contradictions are numerous,but the
essentialcontradiction involvesmakingthemodernpracticeof
revolutionservea premodernidea of rightsand society.
Can we see here one of the rootsof the Terror?The evils
ascribedto politicsmust entail a downgradingof political
mediation, evenifSaint-Just declared,in hisSurla Constitution,
that"naturalpolity"was nothis aim. Whatelse ifnota twofold
rejection
ofpolitics (therejectionof mediationor confusionwith
the logic of anotherorder) was Saint-Just assertingwhen he
wrote:"The principleofa republicangovernment is virtue;the
alternative is terror.Whatdo people wantwho wantneither

22De la
nature,p. 155.

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206 SOCIAL RESEARCH

virtuenor terror."23 He calledfora returnto nature,and not

humanity, as the destinationof thecity,and hisconceptionof
therevolution as thewayto bringaboutthisreturnfostersthe
illusion in which politicsis confused with morality.It is
important notto exposepoliticsto an "overload"or to derailit
by givingit a missionbeyondits capacities-in thiscase, the
reformofconscienceor thediminution of selfishness.
This was
Kant'swarningin 1793, when he distinguished betweenthe
politicalcommunity and the ethicalcity,explicitly
describing
thedangersof a politicsof virtue:

We may call a union among men withsimplelaws of virtue

followingthese prescriptions, an ethicalsociety;and, to the
extentthattheselaws are public,we maycall it order,thatis,
an ethicalcivilsociety(in contrastto a legal civilsociety)or an
ethicalcommunity. . . . Everypoliticalstatedoubtlessdesiresto
exercisedominationovermindsaccordingto thelawsof virtue,
forin caseswhereitsmeansofcoercionare insufficient, because
the humanjudge cannotsee into the mindsof men,virtuous
intentionscould secure what is wished. But woe unto the
lawmakerwho wantsto use forceto securea constitution for
ethicalends,fornot onlywouldhe thuscreatethe oppositeof
this constitution, but he would also weaken his political
constitutionand removeall itssolidity.24

initiatedwhatseemed to us to be "a
Thus whenSaint-Just
new march" with the plan of Institutionsrépublicaines,an
outbreakof the Terror, and, one mightsay, a critiqueof
Jacobinism fromwithin,he does notelude themovementof a
return to a prepoliticalstate of nature.25The idea of
in relationto a critiqueof the law- "obeyinglaws,
institution,
thatis not clear,"wroteSaint-Just- again pointsto nature,to
thewillto reestablisha naturalorderwithaccessto objectivity.
But we cannot fail to observea hardeningin thisJacobin
lawmakerdeterminedto shape republicaninstitutions so that

23
Frammenti, p. 49.
24 Kant,
ReligionWithintheLimitsofReasonAlone(1793).
25 et du
du législateur
et les relations
MiguelAbensour,"La théoriedes institutions
du Colloque
in Actes
peupleselonSaint-Just," (Paris,1968),pp. 239-290.
Saint-Just

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 SAINT-JUST 207

an orientation to naturewouldbe combinedwithan enduring

mistrust.Hence, along with the enthusiasmfor creating
institutions, the appeal to heroism,to "the soul of the
republic.""The day whenI am convincedthatit is impossible
to givethe Frenchpeople mannersthatare gentle,energetic,
sensitive, and implacableagainsttyranny and injustice,I shall
a
plunge dagger into my heart."26The suicide of the hero
opposesthedeathof nature.
A newand paradoxicalmovement is formed:starting froma
fundamentalistplan to reestablishthe city on natural
foundations,Saint-Justcouldn't deny himself an act of
foundation or,moreprecisely, of self-foundation.The issueof
the FrenchRevolutionbecomesthe issue of heroism.Viewed
frompoliticalphilosophyand not fromromanticism, heroism
is a constitutive dimensionof the revolution.Heroismis the
revolution'smagneticfield. For want of recognizingthe
existenceof the "centralsun" (G. Büchner),of measuringits
energeticeffects, the magnetization of consciences,according
to Chateaubrianda "redoublingof life,"the interpreter may
fail to understandor even to thinkof the revolutionary. A
modernBrutus,a regicidewiththe halo of his youthand his
name, appearingsuddenlyon the public stage at the king's
trial,Saint-Just exhibitedtheheroicexperiencepar excellence,
thatof a rebirth.
JulesMichelet,whohad read his Plutarchand put Vico into
practice,had a politicalunderstandingof the revolution.
Furthermore, he did not separatethiswayof understanding
froma considerationof heroism.Thus he knewbetterthan
anyone how to uncover the logic of heroismas an active,
autonomousforcein therevolution. That is whyhe insistedon
emphasizing the incessantcommotion thatSaint-Just's inter-
ventionprovokedat the timeof the king'ssentencing."This
speechhad an enormouseffecton thetrial.. . . Immatureor
not,exaggeratedor not,itwas powerfulenoughto setthetone
26
p. 47.
Frammenti,

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208 SOCIAL RESEARCH

forthewholetrial.It determinedthe pitch;one continuedto

sing to the tune of Saint-Just."27 It was the experienceof a
beginning, thestartof therepublic,an appeal to theunknown,
but also a beginningforSaint-Just, tornfromtheobscurity of
a privatecitizenand suddenlypropelledintothelightofpublic
space. "Who was to wield the sword. ... A new man was
needed,unshackledby any philanthropical precedent,"wrote
Michelet.28
ReadingSaint-Just'sspeech,we see howthiseventindissolu-
bly mingledthe experiencesof birthand founding,both
necessarily connectedwiththe death of the king."The same
menwhowilljudge Louis havea republicto found:thosewho
attachsome importanceto thejust punishment of a kingwill
neverfounda republic.. . . For me, I see no middleway:this
manmustreignor die . . . themindthatjudges thekingwillbe
the mind that founds the republic. The theoryof your
judgmentwillbe thetheoryofyourmagistratures."29 Or again,
"The revolution beginswhenthetyrantends."30
But a questionimmediately arisesconcerningwhatMichael
Walzer,drawingon the workof E. Kantorowicz, has rightly
describedas "publicregicide,"whichhe sees has the special
featureof an attackon the inviolability of the monarchy,a
transgression of the "sacred terror" of theologicopolitical
origin that attachesto the twofold body of the king,both
mortaland immortal.31 Can we changethe face of the earth
withoutshatteringit? Doesn't revolutionary action involve
uncontrollable all
effects, themore so in
as, Saint-Just's case,it
was not a matterofjudgingthe kingbut of fighting himand
bringing him down like an enemy? Can one stillcherish the
illusionofreturning to good laws,dependenton nature?Is not
the revolutionary experienceas a beginningat the same time
27
Jules Michelet,Histoirede la Révolution française(Paris, 1952), 2: 79.
**
Ibid.,p. 73.
29 Discoursetrapports(Paris, 1957), pp. 63, 65, 67.
Saint-Just,
30Saint-Tust,Oeuvres
(Paris, 1908), 1: 398.
31 Michael Walzer,
Regicideand Revolution(Cambridge, 1974).

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 SAINT-JUST 209

an exposureto unpredictability? himselfdid notfail

Saint-Just
to comparethe revolutionto birth:"We have opposed sword
to sword,and freedomis founded;it has emergedfromchaos
and withman who criesat birth. . . Everything beginsthus
underthesun."32
Did not the public regicide,an unprecedentedrupture
owing to the radicalnessit required,ruin the veryidea of
nature?The revolution wouldleavethecomforting shoresof a
returnto thenaturalorderand bravethetempestsof freedom
to take on the unknownof a new experienceof freedom,as
freedomto do good and evil. This is the change froma
revolutionof restoration to a revolutionof the abyss.At the
same time Saint-Justwas seeking the point where the
revolutionmuststop,"at the perfectionof happinessand of
public freedomby law." He voices his anxietyabout the
identity of the revolutionwhichfromnow on is problematic,
that is, disguised,and about the vertiginousmovementof
freedom,forit is a movementtowardthe infinite. "We speak
of theheightof therevolution, whowillfixit?It is movable."33
Proofof theimpossible?
In the face of this gap, heroism in turn becomes a
paradoxicalexperience.Though Saint-Just gazes withmelan-
choly at "the beautythat is no longer"(Rome,Sparta),he still
confessesto a metamorphosis of heroism,and veryconsciously
draws on what P. Lacoue-Labarthedescribed concerning
Hölderinas a generalcrisisof imitatio,
followingthecollapseof
a tradition."The disappearanceofeveryruleand everymodel,
of everycodification in art."34And the poet, no strangerto
revolutionary disorder,consumeshimself"in thepractically ex
nihilocreationof a pure workor of a new art."On 25 April
1794,Saint-Just announced,"Have no doubtof it,everything
around us mustchangeand end, foreverything around us is

32
Saint-Just,Discours,pp. 186-187.
33
Frammenti, p. 52.
M
Hölderlin, Hymns,Elegiesand OtherPoems(Paris, 1983), p. 8.

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210 SOCIAL RESEARCH

unjust; victoryand freedom will cover the world. Scorn

nothing,but imitatenothingof what has gone before us.
Heroism hasnomodels. It is thus,I repeat,thatyou willfounda
powerfulempire with theboldnessof geniusand thepowerof
justiceand truth."35
In exactlythe same speech,"Sur la police générale,sur la
justice,le commerce,la législationet les crimesdes factions,"
Saint-Justlimnsthe portrait,the model of the revolutionary
man, "the hero of good sense and honesty,"meaningthe
privilegedinterpreter, perhaps even the guardian of the
revolution."As hisgoal is to see therevolution triumph, he will
neverfindfaultwithit,but he condemnshis enemies without
involvinghimselfwiththem,he does notviolatetherevolution
butilluminates it,andjealous of itspurity, he is circumspect in
speakingofit,outofrespect."36 Withfuriousspeed thecutting
edge of the word "regicide"is followedby an homage to
revolutionary exemplariness.This change of tempo displays
the paradoxical trajectoryof heroism; the energy of the
beginning, propelledbytheinitium, reversesitselfand becomes
testimony and forceforstopping,becomesa limitimposedon
revolutionary elan. A new imageis drawnof thecustodianof
the criteriafor good and evil,thejudge of moderationand
exaggeration.Heroismhas no models; when the groundof
natureis revealed,exposed to thisvacuity,the hero immedi-
ately transformshimselfinto a model, into a force of
impossible"modeling."
Atthisnodalpoint,thelogicofheroismencountersthelogic
of democratic invention so wellelucidatedbyClaude Lefort.37
Deprived of the canon of nature,howcan we thendetermine
thelinebetweenlibertyand license?Aftertheunprecedented
dismemberment of the social in and by the king'sdeath, a
proofofthevertigovis-à-vis theunknownofa societywhichno

35 Discours,p. 196.
Saint-Just,
36
Ibid.,p. 183.
37Claude Lefort,L'invention (Paris, 1981).
démocratique

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 SAINT-JUST 211

longerturnedto naturebutwas confronted by the new,after

the loss of referencepoints,how to recodify,remake the
criteriaof the reference,redraw the identifying framesof
reference, remakethebody,ifnotbyoffering thebodyof the
revolutionary hero as the incarnationof a new sacred,as the
supportforan identification,ifnotbyconnecting thepowerto
an exemplarybody?
The moreAthenianthanSpartanCamilleDesmoulins,who
lovedto chortleat thegods and idols,said of Saint-Justthathe
"carriedhishead liketheBlessedSacrament."The echo comes
backto us of LucilleDesmoulins'cryin Dantoris Death,"Vivele
roi!" hailedas the wordof freedomby Paul Celan, who grew
up with the writingsof Pierre Kroptkineand Gustave
Landauer.38Though Saint-Just, by creatinghis own myth,
took part in the inventionof what Stendhal called the
"beautifulmodern,"and at thisdistancestillexertsfascination,
we should keep in mind the finallines of Michelet's1869
prefaceto Le Tyran:"Happily,timepasses. We are a bit less
dim-witted.The rage for incarnation,carefullyinculcated
throughChristianeducation,messianism, passes.At lengthwe
understandthe counselAnacharsisClootzleftwhenhe died:
"
Trance,curedof individuals.'
38Le méridien
(Mercurede France,1971).

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