51 54 Pleadings and Practice

126. G.R. No.
198356, ESPERANZA SUPAPO AND THE HEIRS OF ROMEO SUPAPO, NAMELY:

ESPERANZA, REX EDWARD, RONALD TROY, ROMEO, JR., SHEILA LORENCE, ALL SURNAMED
SUPAPO, AND SHERYL FORTUNE SUPAPO-SANDIGAN, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES ROBERTO AND
SUSAN DE JESUS, MACARIO BERNARDO, AND THOSE PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER
THEM, Respondent. April 20, 2015
FACTS:
Spouses Supapo filed a complaint for accion publiciana against Roberto and Susan de Jesus (Spouses de Jesus),
Macario Bernardo (Macario), and persons claiming rights under them before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
of Caloocan City. Said complaint sought to vacate a piece of land located in Novaliches, Quezon City covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-28441, registered and titled under the Spouses Supapo's names.
The Spouses Supapo then filed a criminal case against the respondents for violation of Presidential Decree No. 772
or the Anti-Squatting Law. The trial court later on rendered a decision finding the respondents guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violating said law. The respondents appealed their conviction to the CA. While the appeal was
pending, Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 8368, otherwise known as "An Act Repealing Presidential
Decree No. 772," which resulted to the dismissal of the criminal case.
On April 30, 1999, the CA's dismissal of the criminal case became final.
Notwithstanding the dismissal, Spouses Supapo moved for the execution of the respondents' civil liability, praying
that the latter vacate the subject lot. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the motion and issued the writ of
execution. The respondents moved for the quashal of the writ but the RTC denied the same. The RTC also denied
the respondents' motion for reconsideration.
The respondents thus filed with the CA a petition for certiorari to challenge the RTC's orders denying the quashal of
the writ and the respondent's motion for reconsideration. The CA granted the petition ruling that with the repeal of
the Anti-Squatting Law, the respondents' criminal and civil liabilities were extinguished. The CA, however,
underscored that the repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law does not mean that people now have unbridled license to
illegally occupy lands they do not own, and that it was not intended to compromise the property rights of legitimate
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landowners. In cases of violation of their property rights, the CA noted that recourse may be had in court by filing
the proper action for recovery of possession.
Going back to the accion publiciana case, the respondents filed their answer and moved to set their affirmative
defenses for preliminary hearing arguing that the action is barred by res judicata. The MeTC denied said motion
ruling that the arguments advanced by the respondents are evidentiary in nature, which at best can be utilized in the
course of the trial. The MeTC likewise denied the respondents' motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, the
respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC.
The RTC granted the petition for certiorari on two grounds, viz.: (i) the action has prescribed; and (ii) accion
publiciana falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. The RTC in turn granted the petition and dismissed the
case on the ground that the MeTC has no jurisdiction over the case. The RTC likewise denied the petitioner’s mption
for reconsideration. Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, the Spouses Supapo appealed to the CA. The CA dismissed
the appeal and held that the complaint for accion publiciana should have been lodged before the RTC and that the
period to file the action had prescribed. The Spouses Supapo moved but failed to secure a reconsideration of the CA
decision. Hence, this case.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the MetC has jurisdiction over the case;
(2) Whether the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by res judicata.
RULING:
(1) YES. Under the law, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
have exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs. In the
present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of the subject lot, located in Metro Manila, is
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P39,980.00. This is proven by the tax declaration issued by the Office of the City Assessor of Caloocan. The
respondents do not deny the genuineness and authenticity of this tax declaration. Given that the Spouses Supapo
https://cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/41537225_26347805763…a5332cb253448d23c87a2d0fdb68e683&oe=5BA34C9D&dl=1 18/09/2018, 1I45 PM

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duly complied with the jurisdictional requirements, we hold that the MeTC of Caloocan properly acquired
jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana.
(2) NO. Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of
the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c).
The requisites for res judicata under the concept of bar by prior judgment are: (1) The former judgment or order
must be final; (2) It must be a judgment on the merits;
(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) There
must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action. While requisites
one to three may be present, it is obvious that the there is no identity of subject matter, parties and causes of action
between the criminal case prosecuted under the Anti-Squatting Law and the civil action for the recovery of the
subject property.
On the other hand, the concept of "conclusiveness of judgment" does not require that there is identity of causes of
action provided that there is identity of issue and identity of parties. Even if we assume, for the sake of argument,
that there is identity of parties, "conclusiveness of judgment" still does not apply because there is no identity of
issues. The issue in the criminal case is whether the respondents committed the crime alleged in the information,
while the only issue in accion publiciana is whether the Spouses Supapo have a better right than the respondents to
possess and occupy the subject property.
127. GR no. 173351. BF Citiland Corporation vs. Marilyn Otake. July 29, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner BF Citiland Corporation is the registered owner of Lot 2, Block 101 situated in Brisbane Street, Phase III,
BF Homes Subdivision, Paranaque City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52940. Based on the tax
declaration filed in the Office of the Assessor, the lot has an assessed value of P48,000.00. On 24 February 1987,
respondent Merlinda B. Bodullo bought the adjoining Lot 1, Block 101 covered by TCT No. 77549. However,
records show respondent occupied not just the lot she purchased. She also encroached upon petitioner’s lot.
Petitioner filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court (Branch 77) of Paranaque City a complaint for accion
publiciana praying that judgment be rendered ordering respondent to vacate the subject lot. Petitioner also prayed
that respondent be ordered to pay P15,000.00 per month by way of reasonable compensation for the use of the lot.
The MeTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner ordering the respondent to vacate the land and to pay monthly
compensation to the plaintiff as well as the costs of the suit.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the MeTC. The MeTC then issued a writ of
execution. Respondent filed a motion to quash the writ of execution on the ground that the MeTC had no jurisdiction
over accion publiciana cases. The MeTC denied the motion to quash the writ of execution ruling that the MeTC had
exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions involving title to or possession of real property with assessed value
not exceeding P50,000.00.
Petitioner filed a motion for special order of demolition alleging that the lot subject of execution contained
improvements introduced by respondent. Respondent opposed the motion for being premature and moved for
reconsideration. MeTC granted petitioners motion for demolition and denied respondents motion for
reconsideration.
Respondent filed in the Regional Trial Court (Branch 257) of Paranaque City a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court seeking dismissal of the accion publiciana case for lack of jurisdiction of the MeTC. The RTC
later on ruled that the accion publiciana was within the exclusive original jurisdiction of regional trial courts.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration insisting that accion publiciana was the civil action involving title to or
possession of real property referred to in Section 33 of BP 129, as amended. Petitioner also claimed respondent was
already estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the MeTC because of respondents participation in all the
proceedings in the MeTC coupled with respondents failure to timely object to the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
Upon the RTCs denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a petition
for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court contending that the RTC erred in ruling that the MeTC had no
jurisdiction over accion publiciana cases. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition ruling that appeal by way of
petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court could be resorted to only when what was appealed from was
a decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration. Hence, the instant petition for review.

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ISSUES:
(1) Whether a petition for review under Rule 42 is the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65; and
(2) Whether the RTC correctly ruled that the MeTC has no jurisdiction over accion publiciana cases.
RULING:
(1) NO. In cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, appeal to the Court of Appeals
is taken by filing a notice of appeal. On the other hand, in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction, appeal to the Court of Appeals is by a petition for review under Rule 42. A
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 does not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction from further proceeding has been issued against the
public respondent. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is, without a doubt, an original action. Since the
decision of the RTC in the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was rendered in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, appeal from the said RTC decision to the Court of Appeals should have been made by filing a
notice of appeal, not a petition for review under Rule 42.
(2) NO. Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the
plenary action of accion publiciana must be brought before regional trial courts. With the modifications
introduced by Republic Act No. 7691, the jurisdiction of regional trial courts has been limited to real
actions where the assessed value exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 if the action is filed in Metro Manila. If
the assessed value is below the said amounts, the action must be brought before first level courts. In the
present case, the complaint, which was filed after the enactment of R.A. 7691, contained a statement that,
based on the tax declaration filed in the Office of the Assessor, the lot subject of the accion publiciana has
an assessed value of P48,000.00. A copy of the tax declaration was attached as Annex B of the complaint.
The subject lot, with an assessed value below the jurisdictional limit of P50,000.00 for Metro Manila,
comes within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MeTC under BP 129, as amended. Thus, the RTC
erred in holding that the MeTC had no jurisdiction in this case.
128. G.R. No. 187696, FILOMENA CABLING vs. RODRIGO DANGCALAN June 15, 2016
FACTS:
Filomena Cabling owned a 125-square-meter parcel of land located at San Vicente, Malitbog, Southern Leyte. It was
denominated as Lot No. 5056 and had an assessed value of P2,100. Adjoining her property was a parcel of land that
respondent had bought from her brother, Gerardo Montajes. Despite knowing the boundaries of their respective
properties, however, respondent constructed a perimeter fence that encroached on petitioner's land. After several
unheeded demands for respondent to remove the encroachment and a failed conference before the Lupong
Tagapamayapa, petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against the respondent before
the MCTC.l
After trial, the MCTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioner ruling that respondent's perimeter fence had indeed
encroached on some 13 square meters of petitioner's property. The court further ruled that respondent was a builder
in bad faith, because he did not verify the actual boundaries of the lot that he had purchased from petitioner's
brother. Upon appeal by respondent, however, the RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. Petitioner then filed a
Petition for Review under Rule 42 before the CA. Said petition was denied by the CA and annulled both the RTC
and MCTC decisions for lack of jurisdiction. The CA likewise denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in nullifying the RTC and the MCTC Decisions on the ground that the MCTC had no
jurisdiction over petitioner's Complaint for accion publiciana.

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RULING:
YES. The Court had already declared that all cases involving title to or possession of real property with an assessed
value of less than P20,000, if outside Metro Manila, fall under the original jurisdiction of the municipal trial court.
This pronouncement was based on Republic Act No. 7691, which was approved by Congress on 25 March 1994.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint,
as well as by the character of the reliefs sought. Once it is vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction
remains vested in the trial court irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of
the claims asserted therein. As the CA has correctly held, the allegations in the Complaint filed by petitioner
sufficiently made out a case for recovery of possession or accion publiciana.
The same cannot be said, however, of the ultimate outcome of her appeal from the RTC Decision. The MCTC
correctly exercised its exclusive and original jurisdiction in finding for petitioner as the plaintiff. On the other hand,
the appeal of respondent, as the defendant, properly fell under the appellate jurisdiction of the RTC, under Section
22 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended. Hence, neither decision can be struck down for being a total nullity.
129. G.R. No. 204970, SPOUSES CLAUDIO AND CARMENCITA TRAYVILLA vs. BERNARDO SEJAS AND
JUVY PAGLINAWAN, REPRESENTED BY JESSIE PAGLINAWAN. February 01, 2016
FACTS:
Petitioners Claudio and Carmencita Trayvilla instituted a case against respondent Bernardo Sejas before the RTC. In
their complaint for specific performance and damages, petitioners claimed among others that Sejas was the
registered owner of a 434-square meter parcel of land in Tukuran, Zamboanga del Sur covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-8,337; that by virtue of a private handwritten document, Sejas sold said parcel of land to
them in 1982; that thereafter, they took possession of the land and constructed a house thereon; that they resided
in said house and continued to reside therein; that Sejas later reasserted his ownership over said land and was
thus guilty of fraud and deceit in so doing; and that they caused the annotation of an adverse claim.
In an Amended Complaint, this time for specific performance, reconveyance, and damages, petitioners impleaded
respondent Juvy Paglinawan as additional defendant, claiming that Sejas subsequently sold the subject property to
her, after which she caused the cancellation of TCT T-8,337 and the issuance of a new title - TCT T-46,627 - in her
name. However, the additional docket fees for the moral damages prayed for in the Amended Complaint were not
paid. Likewise, for the additional causes of action, no docket fees were charged and paid.
Respondents moved for dismissal of the case, claiming lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and prescription.
The RTC then denied the motion. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the case was a
real action and not for specific performance. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that
petitioners' case was not for specific performance but was in reality a real action, in which case the value of the
property should be alleged in the complaint in order that the proper filing fee may be computed and paid; that
since the value of the land was not alleged in the Amended Complaint, the proper filing fee was not paid, and for
this reason the case should be dismissed. The RTC denied said motion contending that petitioners' case is not a
real action but indeed one for specific performance and thus one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Respondents then filed an original petition for Certiorari before the CA who in turn granted the said petition.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied. Hence, the present Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals ruled correctly when it dismissed the complaint by reason of non-payment of
the correct docket fees due to failure to alleged the fair market value or the stated value of the subject property in
the amended complaint
RULING:
NO. As correctly ruled by the CA, while petitioners' Amended Complaint was denominated as one mainly for specific
performance, they additionally prayed for reconveyance of the property, as well as the cancellation of Paglinawan's
TCT T-46,627. In other words, petitioners' aim in filing Civil Case No. 4633-2K5 was to secure their claimed
ownership and title to the subject property, which qualifies their case as a real action. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 4
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a real action is one that affects title to or possession of real property, or an
interest therein.
The CA is correct in its general observation that in the absence of the required declaration of the fair market value
as stated in the current tax declaration or zonal valuation of the property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC
or first level court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners' action, since the jurisdiction of these
courts is determined on the basis of the value of the property.
130. G.R. No. 149554. SPOUSES JORGE J. HUGUETE and YOLANDA B. HUGUETE vs. SPOUSES
TEOFEDO AMARILLO EMBUDO and MARITES HUGUETE-EMBUDO. July 1, 2003
FACTS:
Petitioner spouses Jorge and Yolanda Huguete instituted against respondent spouses Teofredo Amarillo Embudo and
Marites Huguete-Embudo a complaint for Annulment of TCT No. 99694, Tax Declaration No. 46493, and Deed of
Sale, Partition, Damages and Attorneys Fees before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7. Petitioners

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alleged that their son-in-law, respondent Teofredo, sold to them a 50-square meter portion of his 150-square meter
parcel of land, known as Lot No. 1920-F-2, situated in San Isidro, Talisay, Cebu, for a consideration of P15,000.00;
that Teofredo acquired the lot from Ma. Lourdes Villaber-Padillo by virtue of a deed of sale, after which Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 99694 was issued solely in his name; that despite demands, Teofredo refused to partition the
lot between them.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case, arguing that the total assessed value of the subject land was only P15,000.00 which falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court, pursuant to Section 33(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691.The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners filed
a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in holding that it has no jurisdiction over the case
RULING:
NO. In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this
Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
the jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the
claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money
claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions
as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively
by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
In the case at bar, the principal purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint was to secure title to the 50-square
meter portion of the property which they purchased from respondents. Petitioners cause of action is based on their
right as purchaser of the 50-square meter portion of the land from respondents. They pray that they be declared
owners of the property sold. Thus, their complaint involved title to real property or any interest therein. The alleged
value of the land which they purchased was P15,000.00, which was within the jurisdiction of Municipal Trial
Court. The annulment of the deed of sale between Ma. Lourdes Villaber-Padillo and respondents, as well as of TCT
No. 99694, were prayed for in the complaint because they were necessary before the lot may be partitioned and the
50-square meter portion subject thereof may be conveyed to petitioners.
131 G.R. No. 146744 ROBERT G. DE GALICIA vs. MELY MERCADO. March 6, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner Robert G. de Galicia was a business partner in RCL Enterprises. On or about December 15, 1997, he was
asked by his partner Carmen Arciaga to co-sign with her a Philbank check for P50,000 payable to cash. Allegedly
without his knowledge and consent, Arciaga rediscounted the check with respondent Mely Mercado at 8% interest.
Respondent gave Arciaga the sum of P46,000, representing the value of the check less 8% as interest. Later,
respondent presented the check for payment but it was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. She then filed a
complaint for estafa and for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 22 against petitioner and Carmen Arciaga.
Petitioner countered by filing in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 32, a case for the declaration of
nullity of the agreement to pay interest between respondent and his partner, Arciaga. After trial, the RTC dismissed
petitioner’s case for lack of jurisdiction. It also denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, this present case.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
(2) Whether or not the case should be dismissed for failure to implead an indispensable party.
RULING:
(1) YES. In determining whether or not the subject matter of an action is capable of pecuniary estimation, the
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Court, in the early case of Singsong v. Isabella Sawmill, laid down the following criterion: xxx this Court
has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is

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primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and
whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance (now RTC) would depend on
the amount involved. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this
Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms
of money, and are cognizable by the courts of first instance (RTC). Based on the foregoing criterion, the
subject of the action before the trial court was indeed incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore
cognizable by the RTC.
(2) YES. Under Rule 3, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, an indispensable party is a party-in-
interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. The interests of such indispensable
party in the subject matter of the suit and the relief are so bound with those of the other parties that his legal
presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity
In the present case, it was held that Arciaga was an indispensable party to the suit filed by petitioner against
respondent. Her interest in the suit was intertwined with the rights and interest of both petitioner and
respondent. She was as involved in the suit as petitioner and respondent, being a co-signatory of the re-
discounted check and being privy to the assailed agreement. Had the subject complaint been resolved on
the merits, any judgment made by the trial court was going to affect not only respondent but Arciaga as
well. Unfortunately, due to the failure of petitioner to implead her in the complaint, any judgment therein
could not bind her. It was as if the complaint had not been filed at all.
132. Bokingo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161739 (May 4, 2006)
Facts:
Bokingo filed an application for titling of the subject land before the DENR, which was opposed by Busa on the
ground that it was inherited by them from their late father. The Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Officer resolved the protest in favor of Busa and issued a certification stating that the order had become final and
executory. Busa requested for a land survey but this was prevented by Bokingo. Busa filed a relief of injunction
with the RTC against Bokingo. Bokingo filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the claim. Bokingo contended that it could be gleaned from the complaint that the issue between
the parties involved the possession of the land. As such, the assessed value of the land was crucial to determine the
courts jurisdiction over the subject matter. He contended that since the assessed value of the land based on his tax
declaration was P14,000, then the MTC should have jurisdiction over the case and not the RTC.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the complaint between the parties was one of possession of the land.
(2) Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
(1) NO. Busa's complaint had not sought to recover the possession or ownership of the subject land. Rather, it was
principally an action to enjoin Bokingo from committing acts that would tend to prevent the survey of the subject
land. It could not be said therefore that it is one of a possessory action.
(2) YES. The nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is
determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff, and the law in
effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted
therein. The caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature of the action. Nor does the jurisdiction of the
court depend upon the answer of the defendant or agreement of the parties, or to the waiver or acquiescence of the
parties. As such, the subject matter of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation and should be within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
133. G.R. No. 159941 HEIRS OF SPOUSES TEOFILO M. RETERTA and ELISA RETERTA, namely:
EDUARDO M. RETERTA, CONSUELO M. RETERTA, and AVELINA M. RETERTA vs.
SPOUSES LORENZO MORES and VIRGINIA LOPEZ. August 17, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title and reconveyance in the RTC in Trece Martires
averring that they were the true and real owners of the parcel of land situated in Trez Cruzes, Tanza, Cavite with area
of 47,708 square meters, having inherited the land from their deceased father who had been in open, exclusive,
notorious, and continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years. They also alleged that they had discovered

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in 1999 an affidavit dated stating that their father had purportedly executed whereby he had waived his rights,
interests, and participation in the land; that by virtue of the affidavit, Sales Certificate No. V-769 had been issued in
favor of respondent Lorenzo Mores by the then Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and that Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-64071 had later issued to the respondents.
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss, insisting that the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the said case and that the petitioners had no personality to commence the action since the land in question is
considered as a friar land.
The RTC granted the motion to dismiss, ruling that they have no jurisdiction over the case. The petitioners
then timely filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC. The petitioners elevated the case to the
CA who in turn dismissed their petition ruling that the special civil action for certiorari is an improper remedy and
cannot be used for the lost remedy to appeal. The CA likewise denied their motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari.
RULING:
YES. The settled rule precluding certiorari as a remedy against the final order when appeal is available
notwithstanding, the Court rules that the CA should have given due course to and granted the petition
for certiorari for two exceptional reasons, namely: (a) the broader interest of justice demanded that certiorari be
given due course to avoid the undeserved grossly unjust result that would befall the petitioners otherwise; and
(b) the order of the RTC granting the motion to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
evidently constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal as a remedy does not constitute sufficient ground to
prevent or preclude a party from making use of certiorari if appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an equally
beneficial, or speedy remedy. It is inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of
failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari. A remedy is plain, speedy
and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution
of the lower court or agency. It is understood, then, that a litigant need not mark time by resorting to the less speedy
remedy of appeal in order to have an order annulled and set aside for being patently void for failure of the trial court
to comply with the Rules of Court.
Nor should the petitioner be denied the recourse despite certiorari not being available as a proper remedy against an
assailed order, because it is better on balance to look beyond procedural requirements and to overcome the ordinary
disinclination to exercise supervisory powers in order that a void order of a lower court may be controlled to make it
conformable to law and justice. Verily, the instances in which certiorari will issue cannot be defined, because to do
so is to destroy the comprehensiveness and usefulness of the extraordinary writ. The wide breadth and range of the
discretion of the court are such that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either
prohibition or mandamus, and that in the exercise of superintending control over inferior courts, a superior court is
to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case as the ends of justice may require. Thus, the writ will be
granted whenever necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.
134. G.R. No. 176492 MARIETTA N. BARRIDO vs. LEONARDO V. NONATO

October 20, 2014
FACTS:
In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner Marietta N. Barrido,they were able to

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acquire a property situated in Eroreco, Bacolod City, consisting of a house and lot, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. T-140361. Their marriage was later on declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Since there was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership over the property, Nonato asked Barrido for
partition, but the latter refused. Thus, Nonato filed a Complaint for partition before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City, Branch 3.
Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject property had already been sold to their children,
Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She likewise moved for the dismissal of the complaint because the MTCC lacked
jurisdiction, the partition case being an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The Bacolod MTCC rendered a Decision ordering the conjugal property of the former Spouses Leonardo and
Marietta Nonato be adjudicated to the defendant Marietta Nonato, the spouse with whom the majority of the
common children choose to remain. Also, defendants counterclaim was granted ordering plaintiff to pay damages.
Nonato appealed the MTCC Decision before the RTC. The RTC reversed the ruling of the MTCC and ordered for
the equitable partition of the property, reimbursement for payments of debts and obligations and the delivery of the
presumptive legitimes. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. It held that since the property’s assessed
value was only ₱8,080.00, it clearly fell within the MTCC’s jurisdiction. Also, although the RTC erred in relying on
Article 129 of the FamilyCode, instead of Article 147, the dispositive portion of its decision still correctly ordered
the equitable partition of the property. Barrido filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied for
lack of merit. Hence, this case.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the MTCC had jurisdiction over the case; and
(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the lot in question is conjugal after being sold to
their children.
RULING:
(1) NO. Contrary to Barrido’s contention, the MTCC has exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the propertyor
interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00)or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691) Here, the subject
property’s assessed value was merely ₱8,080.00, an amount which certainly does not exceed the required limit of
₱20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro Manila to fall within the jurisdiction of the MTCC. Therefore, the
lower court correctly took cognizance of the instant case.
(2) NO. The records reveal that Nonatoand Barrido’s marriage had been declared void for psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. During their marriage, however, the conjugal partnership regime governed
their property relations. Although Article 129 provides for the procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal
partnership regime, Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the spouses’ property
relations. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation.
135. SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFREDO R. BAUTISTA VS. LINDO

G.R. No. 208232, March 10, 2014
Facts:
Alfredo R. Bautista (Bautista), petitioner’s predecessor, inherited in 1983 a free-patent land located in Davao
Oriental and covered by OCT No. (1572) P-6144.A few years later, he subdivided the property and sold it to several
vendees, herein respondents, via a notarized deed of absolute sale dated May 30, 1991. Two months later, OCT No.
(1572) P-6144 was canceled and Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) were issued in favor of the vendees.
On August 1994, Bautista filed a complaint for repurchase against respondents before the RTC. During the
pendency of the action, Bautista died and was substituted by petitioner, Efipania. Respondents, Sps. Lindo entered
into a compromise agreement with petitioners, whereby they agree to cede to Epifania 3,230 sq.m..portion of the
property as well as to waive, abandon, surrender, and withdraw all claims and counterclaims against each other. RTC
approve the compromise agreement on January 2011.
Other respondents, filed a Motion to Dismissed on February 2013 alleging lack of jurisdiction of the RTC on the
ground that the complaint failed to state the value of the property sought to be recovered and alleges that the total
value of the properties in issue is only P16,500 pesos. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent dismissing the case.

Page 8 of 21
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the RTC erred in granting the motion for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
(2) Whether the action filed by petitioners is one involving title to or possession of real property or any interest
therein or one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
RULING:
(1) Yes. Jurisdiction of courts is granted by the Constitution and pertinent laws. Jurisdiction of RTCs, as may be
relevant to the instant petition, is provided in Sec. 19 of BP 129.
(2) It is one incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Court rules that the complaint to redeem a land subject of a free
patent is a civil action incapable of pecuniary estimation. It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. In this regard, the Court, in
Russell v. Vestil, wrote that "in determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the RTCs would depend on the amount of the
claim." But where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money
as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
136. G.R. No. 119347. EULALIA RUSSELL, RUPERTO TAUTHO, FRANCISCO TAUTHO, SUSANA T.
REALES, APITACIO TAUTHO, DANILO TAUTHO, JUDITHA PROS, GREGORIO TAUTHO, DEODITA
T. JUDILLA, AGRIPINO TAUTHO, FELIX TAUTHO, WILLIAM TAUTHO, AND MARILYN
PERALES, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL, ADRIANO TAGALOG, MARCELO
TAUTHO, JUANITA MENDOZA, DOMINGO BANTILAN, RAUL BATALUNA AND ARTEMIO
CABATINGAN, respondents. March 17, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents for Declaration of Nullity and Partition with the Regional
Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56. The complaint, in substance, alleged that petitioners are co-owners of that
parcel of land, Lot 6149 situated in Liloan, Cebu and containing an area of 56,977.40 square meters, more or
less. The land was previously owned by the spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho. Upon the death of said
spouses, the property was inherited by their legal heirs, herein petitioners and private respondents.
Private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of
the case as the total assessed value of the subject land is P5,000.00 which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Compostela.
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss saying that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over
the case since the action is one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation within the contemplation of Section 19(l)
of B.P. 129, as amended. Said motion was granted by the Court. The motion for reconsideration that was filed by the
petitioners was likewise denied by the Court. Hence, this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain the case.
RULING:
YES, the complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is doubtless one incapable of pecuniary estimation and
therefore within the jurisdiction of said court. In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, we had the occasion to rule that:
[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this
Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the
claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money
as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively
by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).

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137. GR no. 145022 ARMAND NOCUM and THE PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC vs LUCIO TAN.
September 23, 2005
FACTS:
On September 27, 1998, Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Armand Nocum, Capt. Florendo Umali,
ALPAP and Inquirer with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-2288, seeking moral
and exemplary damages for the alleged malicious and defamatory imputations contained in a news article.
Respondents filed their answer moving for the dismissal of the case. The Regional Trial Court of Makati issued an
order dismissing the complaint without prejudice on the ground of improper venue. Aggrieved by the dismissal of
the complaint, respondent Lucio Tan filed an Omnibus Motion seeking reconsideration of the dismissal and
admission of the amended complaint. The lower court, after having the case dismissed for improper venue, admitted
the amended complaint and deemed set aside the previous order of dismissal, supra, stating, inter alia, that the
mistake or deficiency in the original complaint appears now to have been cured in the Amended Complaint which
can still be properly admitted.
Dissatisfied, petitioners, together with defendants Capt. Florendo Umali and the Airline Pilots Association of the
Philippines, Inc. (ALPAP), appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rendered its
decision denying the petitions for lack of merit. The motions for reconsideration filed by petitioners and by
defendants Umali and ALPAP were likewise denied. Hence, this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court acquire jurisdiction over the civil case upon the filing of the original complaint for
damages.
RULING:
YES. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter
comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. In the case at bar,
after examining the original complaint, we find that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case when the case was
filed before it. The additional allegations in the Amended Complaint that the article and the caricature were printed
and first published in the City of Makati referred only to the question of venue and not jurisdiction. These additional
allegations would neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would respondents’ failure to include the same in the
original complaint divest the lower court of its jurisdiction over the case. Respondents failure to allege these
allegations gave the lower court the power, upon motion by a party, to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
venue was not properly laid.
Moreover, it is elementary that objections to venue in CIVIL ACTIONS arising from libel may be waived since they
do not involve a question of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating as it does
to jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. Venue relates to trial and not to
jurisdiction. It is a procedural, not a jurisdictional, matter. It relates to the place of trial or geographical location in
which an action or proceeding should be brought and not to the jurisdiction of the court. It is meant to provide
convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place of trial. In contrast,
in CRIMINAL ACTIONS, it is fundamental that venue is jurisdictional it being an essential element of jurisdiction.
138. G.R. No. L-23894 JANUARIO JALANDONI, petitioner, vs. HON. VICTORIANO H. ENDAYA, in his
capacity as Municipal Judge of the Municipal Court of Batangas, Province of Batangas, and SERAFIN D.
CRUZ, respondents. January 24, 1974
FACTS:
Petitioner instituted a criminal complaint for libel against Serafin D. Cruz before the Municipal Court of the
Municipality of Batangas presided over by the respondent Judge. After the respondent posted the corresponding bail
bond for his provisional remedy, respondent judge Petitioner moved to set the case for hearing on the merits.
Petitioner then, through counsel manifested in open court that under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code,
respondent Judge was devoid of jurisdiction to do so. There was, as noted, a negative response.

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After hearing arguments on such motion for desistance including memoranda submitted by both sides, respondent
Judge issued an order denying petitioner's verbal motion to have Criminal Case No. 801 elevated to the Court of
First Instance of Batangas. The motion for reconsideration that was filed by the petitioner was likewise denied.
Hence, this petition for prohibition arising from the insistence of respondent Judge of the Municipal Court of
Batangas to try on the merits a prosecution for libel, instead of having it elevated to the proper court of first instance
as sought by petitioner under the belief tenaciously held that he had such competence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for prohibition should be granted.
RULING:
YES. Reference to decided cases ever since effectivity of Article 360 will make clear that such an adamantine stand
is far from justified. A case where a municipal court has been sustained in its determination to go ahead and try on
the merits a prosecution for libel is to make its appearance in the judicial scene. If the law remains what it is, as
seems likely, it will be a long, long wait.
Moreover, respondent Judge was not sufficiently mindful of the legal import of such insistence on his part. As is
clear from his well-written memorandum, he did base his action on what for him was the consequence of the
Judiciary Act as amended by Republic Act No. 3828, Section 87 of which would confer concurrent jurisdiction on
municipal judges in the capital of provinces with court of first instance where the penalty provided for by law does
not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand
pesos or both. Libel is one of those offenses included in such category. He would thus conclude that as the
amendatory act came into effect on June 22, 1963, the provisions of Article 360 as last amended by Republic Act
No. 1289 conferring exclusive jurisdiction on courts of first instance, was thus repealed by implication. It has been
the constant holding of this court that repeals by implication are not favored and will not be so declared unless it be
manifest that the legislature so intended.
139. G.R. Nos. 146646-49. ROGELIO M. ESTEBAN, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. March 11, 2005
FACTS:
Anna May V. Simbajon filed a complaint for against Judge Rogelio M. Esteban before the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Cabanatuan City. In her complaint, Ana May alleged that she was a casual employee of the City
Government of Cabanatuan City. Sometime in February 1997, she was detailed with the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Cabanatuan City, upon incessant request of Presiding Judge Reogelio Esteban, herein
petitioner. Two Information for violation of R.A. 7877 (the Anti-Sexual Harassment Law of 1995) were filed against
petitioner with the Sandiganbayan, docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 24490 and 24702 while two
Information for acts of lasciviousness were filed with the same court docketed as MTCC Criminal Cases Nos.
24703-04.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the Information in the case on the ground that he has been placed four (4) times in
jeopardy for the same offense. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash but directed the prosecution to
determine if the offenses charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 were committed in relation to petitioner’s
functions as a judge. Thereafter, the prosecution filed Amended Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703 and
24704. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the Amended Information on the ground that the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over the crimes charged considering that they were not committed in relation to his office as a judge.
Before the Sandiganbayan could resolve the motion to quash, the prosecution filed a re-amended information in
Criminal Case No. 24703 which was admitted by the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan eventually denied
petitioners motion to quash the Amended Information, holding that the act of approving or indorsing the permanent
appointment of complaining witness was certainly a function of the office of the accused so that his acts are,
therefore, committed in relation to his office. Petitioner then moved for a reconsideration, but was denied by the
Sandiganbayan. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 for acts of lasciviousness
filed against petitioner
RULING:
YES. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249 states that The
Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in other offenses or felonies whether simple or

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complexed with other crime committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this
section in relation to their office.
In People v. Montejo, we ruled that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if the offense
is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his
official functions. This intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties must be
alleged in the Information. This is in accordance with the rule that the factor that characterizes the charge is the
actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information. Hence, where the information is wanting in specific
factual averments to show the intimate relationship/connection between the offense charged and the discharge of
official functions, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the case. The jurisdiction of a court is determined by
the allegations in the complaint or information. The Amended Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 contain
allegations showing that the acts of lasciviousness were committed by petitioner in relation to his official function.
140. G.R. No. 154886. LUDWIG H. ADAZA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (the First DIVISION
composed of Justices GREGORIO S. ONG, CATALINO R. CASTANEDA, JR. and FRANCISCO H.
VILLARUZ, JR. and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by SPECIAL PROSECUTION
OFFICE, respondents. July 28, 2005
FACTS:
The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) of 1st District of Zamboanga del Norte awarded to Parents
and Teachers Association (PTA)of Manawan National High School (MNHS) a contract for the construction of a
school building at an agreed consideration of P111,319.50. Upon the completion of the project, PTA failed to receive
the last installment payment amounting to P20,847.17.
PTA president Felix Mejorda (Mejorda) was informed by Hazel Peñaranda, DPWH Cashier, that the check for
P20,847.17 had been released to Ludwig H. Adaza (Adaza). Subsequently, Mejorda found out that acknowledging
receipt of the check bears his name and signature which was not his. He likewise noticed that Adaza‘s signature was
affixed on the voucher. During that time, Adaza was municipal mayor of Jose Dalman. Upon examination of DBP
Check issued to payee, Mejorada noticed that there were two signatures at the dorsal portion of it, his forged
signature and another which he found to be that of Aristela Adaza (Aristela), wife of Adaza.
The Office of the Ombudsman filed two Informations against Adaza. The Sadiganbayan found Adaza guilty of
the offense charged. It thereafter issued a Bench Warrant of Arrest. Hence, the filing of this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the falsification case against Adaza which was not in relation to
his position as municipal mayor
RULING:
NO. In the instant case, there is no showing that the alleged falsification was committed by the accused, if at all, as a
consequence of, and while they were discharging, official functions. The information does not allege that there was
an intimate connection between the discharge of official duties and the commission of the offense.
Clearly therefore, as the alleged falsification was not an offense committed in relation to the office of the accused, it
did not come under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It follows that all its acts in the instant case are null and
void ab initio.
141. PEOPLE VS COSARE 95 Phil. 656

FACTS:
Valeria Pagas filed against the accused a complaint for "Abuse Against Chastity". The complaint was amended
charging the accused with "Qualified Trespass to Dwelling and Physical Injuries", and was further amended with the
same offense of "Qualified Trespass to Dwelling and Physical Injuries."
The Justice of the Peace of Tubigon, Bohol conducted the preliminary investigation having in view the second
amended complaint. Thereafter, the Justice of the Peace forwarded the case to the Court of First Instance for further
proceedings. The Provincial Fiscal filed against the accused an information charging him with the offense of "Acts

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of Lasciviousness", which was amended, charging him with the offense of "Acts of Lasciviousness Thru Qualified
Trespass to Dwelling."
In the meantime, the accused filed a motion to quash the information on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, which
motion was denied in an order of September 1, 1951. The accused was then arraigned and entered a plea of not
guilty. After the trial, the court ordered that the case be remanded to the Justice of the Peace of Tubigon in order that
a new preliminary investigation may be held in connection with the original complaint filed by the offended party.
This was done after the offended party had filed an amended complaint charging the accused with the offense of
"Acts of Lasciviousness." The case was again forwarded to the Court of First Instance and on August 25, 1952, the
Provincial Fiscal, filed against the accused an information charging him with the same crime of "Acts of
Lasciviousness."
When the case was called if or trial based on the new information, the accused again filed a motion to quash, this
time based on the ground of double jeopardy. The motion was denied, and after the parties had presented their
evidence, the court rendered decision acquitting the accused. From this decision the accused has appealed. After due
consideration, the Court of First Instance of Bohol finding the accused guilty of the crime of qualified trespass to
dwelling. Hence, this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused be convicted of a crime alleged merely in the information as an aggravating
circumstance after having been acquitted of the main charge described therein.
RULING:
YES. Apparently, the charge under which he stands indicted is that of "Acts of Lasciviousness", for that is the
designation appearing both in the complaint as well as in the information. However, upon a cursory reading of the
averment appearing in both pleading one cannot fail to note that what is charged against the accused is not only the
offense of "Acts of Lasciviousness' but that of trespass to dwelling as well. This is apparent from the allegation
appearing therein that the accused entered the dwelling house of Valeria Pagas against her will, and that "once inside
the said dwelling house the said accused, with lewd designs and by the use of force, embraced, kissed, raised the
dress and touched the breast and private part of the aforesaid Valeria Pagas against her will." There is nothing
appearing therein that trespass to dwelling is merely an aggravating circumstance. Such being the case, it is evident
that the accused can be found guilty, if proven, on both charges, in the absence of a timely objection against such
duplicity of charge.
142. PDEA v. Brodett and Jorge G.R. No. 196390, September 28, 2011
FACTS:
On April 13, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Muntinlupa charged Richard Brodett and Joseph
Jorge for violating Section 5, in relation to Section 26 (b) of RA 9165 after being caught selling and trading 9.8388
grams of methamphetamine HCL on September 19,2008. Likewise, on April 16, 2009, Brodett was charged for
violating Sec. 11 of RA 9165 for possession of various drugs in an incident on the previously noted date. On July 30,
2009, Brodett filed a Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidence, among which is a 2004Honda Accord car registered in
the name of Myra S. Brodett that PDEA refused to return as itwas used in the commission of the crime and which
was supported by the OCP, stating that such vehicle be kept during the duration of the trial to allow the prosecution
and defense to exhaust its evidentiary value. On November 4, 2009, the RTC ordered the return of the car to Myra S.
Brodett after it was duly photographed. PDEA filed a motion for reconsideration, such being denied. PDEA then
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was also denied, citing Sec. 20 of RA 9165.
ISSUE:
Can the car owned by an innocent third party not liable for the unlawful act be returned to its owner although such
car was used in the commission of a crime?
RULING:
The Court ruled that a property not found to be used in an unlawful act and taken as evidence can be returned to its
rightful owner but only when the case is finally terminated. The Court further states that the order to release the car
was premature and in contravention of Section 20, Par. 3of RA 9165 which states that property or income in custodia
legis cannot be disposed, alienated or transferred during the pendency of the case. Court resolves that all RTC’s
comply with Section 20, RA 9165 and not release articles, drugs or non-drugs, for the duration of the trial and before
rendition of judgment, even if owned by innocent third party. Respondents, having been acquitted of the crime

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charged the Court will not annul the orders of the RTC nor reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petition is DENIED
143. G.R. No. 176405 LEO WEE, petitioner, vs. GEORGE DE CASTRO (on his behalf and as attorney-in-fact
of ANNIE DE CASTRO and FELOMINA UBAN) and MARTINIANA DE CASTRO, respondents. August 20,
2008
FACTS:
The respondents are the registered owners of the subject property, a two-storey building erected on a parcel of land
registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 16193 in the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan. They rented
out the subject property to petitioner on a month to month basis for P9,000.00 per month. Both parties agreed that
effective 1 October 2001, the rental payment shall be increased from P9,000.00 to P15,000.00. Petitioner, however,
failed or refused to pay the corresponding increase on rent when his rental obligation for the month became due.
The rental dispute was brought to the Lupon Tagapagpamayapa of Poblacion, Alaminos, Pangasinan, in an attempt
to amicably settle the matter but the parties failed to reach an agreement, resulting in the issuance by
the Barangay Lupon of a Certification to file action in court on. After quite some time, respondent George de Castro
sent a letter to petitioner terminating their lease agreement and demanding that the latter vacate and turn over the
subject property to respondents. Since petitioner stubbornly refused to comply with said demand letter, respondent
George de Castro, together with his siblings and co-respondents, Annie de Castro, Felomina de Castro Uban and
Jesus de Castro, filed the Complaint for ejectment before the MTC of Alaminos City.
After the submission of the parties of their respective Position Papers, the MTC rendered a decision dismissing
respondents' Complaint for failure to comply with the prior conciliation requirement before the Barangay Lupon. On
appeal, the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, Branch 54, promulgated its Decision affirming the dismissal of
respondents' Complaint for ejectment after finding that the appealed MTC Decision was based on facts and law on
the matter. Undaunted, respondents filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals rendered a decision granting the respondents' Petition and ordering petitioner to vacate the subject property
and turn over the same to respondents. The petitioner filed a Motion for reconsideration which was denied the
appellate court. Hence, this case.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the certification issued by the Barangay Lupon stating that no settlement was reached by the
parties on the matter of rental increase sufficient to comply with the prior conciliation requirement under
the Katarungang Pambarangay Law to authorize the respondents to institute the ejectment suit against
petitioner.
(2) Whether or not the execution of the certification against forum shopping by the attorney-in-fact in the case at
bar is not a violation of the requirement that the parties must personally sign the same.
RULING:
(1) YES. While it is true that the Certification to file action of the Barangay Lupon refers only to rental
increase and not to the ejectment of petitioner from the subject property, the submission of the same for
conciliation before the Barangay Lupon constitutes sufficient compliance with the provisions of
the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. Given the particular circumstances of the case at bar, the conciliation
proceedings for the amount of monthly rental should logically and reasonably include also the matter of the
possession of the property subject of the rental, the lease agreement, and the violation of the terms thereof.
(2) NO. The attorney-in-fact, who has authority to file, and who actually filed the complaint as the
representative of the plaintiff co-owner, pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney, is a party to the ejectment
suit. In fact, Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court includes the representative of the owner in an
ejectment suit as one of the parties authorized to institute the proceedings.
144. G.R. No. L-65629 TERESITA E. AGBAYANI and LUCAS F. AGBAYANI, petitioners, vs. THE

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HONORABLE ANTONIO M. BELEN, in his capacity as Regional Trial Judge, Branch XXXVIII, Regional
Trial Court, First Judicial Region, and SPOUSES SEVERO A. VILLAFUERTE AND ANA P.
VILLAFUERTE, respondents. November 24, 1986
FACTS:
The Regional Trial Court Branch 38 rendered a decision dismissing the case for quieting of title and damages
involving three parcels of land located in Sual, Pangasinan filed by the petitioners alleging that they have no
jurisdiction over the case based on the ground that the petitioners failed to submit the case to conciliation
proceedings. They also contend that the parties should first appear before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat of the
barangay (Tobuan, Sual, Pangasinan) where the properties are located for confrontation as mandated in Section 6 of
P.D. 1508. While it appears in the record that the parties reside in barargays of different cities or municipalities, the
real property subject matter of the case are not however located in different barangays but in one and the same
barangay, that is, Barangay Tobuan, Sual, Pangasinan.
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed an action for the nullification of the order of respondent Judge dismissing the civil
action. The CA reversed the order of the lower court. Hence, this case.
ISSUE:
Whether the "precondition," i.e., the prior submission of the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation, should
apply to actions affecting real property situated in one city or municipality although the parties actually reside in
barangays which are located in different cities or municipalities and do not adjoin each other.
RULING:
NO. The question has already been passed upon and answered by this Court. In Tavora vs. Veloso, et al., the
Court en banc held that the "precondition" had no application to cases over which the Lupon had no authority.
Specifically, the Court ruled that by express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have no jurisdiction
over disputes where the parties are not actual residents of the same city or municipality, except where the barangays
in which they actually reside adjoin each other.” In such a situation, where the Lupon is without jurisdiction of the
controversy because the parties are not actual residents of the same city or municipality or of adjoining' barangays,
the nature of the controversy is of no moment-whether or not affecting real property or interest therein, located in the
same city or municipality. And the principle is not at an altered by the proviso of Section 3 of PD 1508(governing
venue) that "disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the
real property or any part thereof is situated." The "quoted proviso should simply be deemed to restrict or vary the
rule on venue prescribed in the principal clauses of the first paragraph of Section 3,” but obviously, the rule on venue
is utterly in-consequential as regards a case over which the Barangay Lupon does not, in the first place, have any
jurisdiction.
Since the dispute between the parties in this case was never within the authority or jurisdiction of the Barangay
Lupon because the parties admittedly reside in different cities and municipalities (and not in adjoining barangays),
there was no occasion or reason to invoke or apply the rule on venue governing disputes concerning real property.
Petitioners were there-fore under no obligation to comply with the "precondition" of first referring their dispute with
private respondents to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation and amicable settlement before instituting their suit in
court. Hence, it was incorrect for the Trial Court to ascribe this obligation to them, and to dismiss their action for
omission to fulfill it.
145. GR No. L-555480 Millare vs. Hernando (151 SCRA 484)

6/30/1987
Facts:
A five-year Contract of Lease was executed between Millare as lessor and the Spouses Co as lessee. They agreed on
a monthly rental rate of P350 of the “People’s Restaurant” until May 31, 1980.
During the last week of May 1980, Millare informed the Co spouses that they could continue leasing the property so
long as they were amenable to paying P1,200 a month. The Spouses Co counter-offered with P700 a month. At this
point, Millare allegedly stated that the amount of monthly rentals could be resolved at a later time since “the matter
is simple among us”, which alleged remark was supposedly taken by the spouses Co to mean that the Contract of
Lease had been renewed, prompting them to continue occupying the subject premises and to forego their search for a
substitute place to rent. In contrast, the lessor flatly denied ever having considered, much less offered, a renewal of

Page 15 of 21
the Contract of Lease.
On July 22 and 28, 1980, Millare sent demand letters requesting them to vacate as she had no intention of renewing
the Contract of Lease, which had expired. The spouses Co signified their intention to deposit the P700 monthly
rental in court, in view of Mrs. Millare’s refusal to accept their counter-offer.
As the parties were filing suits against each other in court, the trial judge rendered a “Judgment by Default” dated 26
November 1980 ordering the renewal of the lease contract for a term of 5 years counted from the expiration date of
the original lease contract, and fixing monthly rentals thereunder at P700.00 a month, payable in arrears.
Issue:
Whether the court may order the renewal of the Contract of Lease for another five-year term at P700 a month
Held:
No, it cannot order the renewal of the Contract of Lease. It follows that the respondent judge’s decision requiring
renewal of the lease has no basis in law or in fact. Save in the limited and exceptional situations envisaged in
Articles 1197 and 1670 of the Civil Code, which do not obtain here, courts have no authority to prescribe the terms
and conditions of a contract for the parties. As pointed out by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Republic vs. Philippine
Long Distance Telephone, Co.,
“[P]arties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them as to the principal
terms and conditions of the contract. Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions is of the essence of our
contractual system, and by express provision of the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence,
intimidation or undue influence (Article 1306, 1336, 1337, Civil Code of the Philippines).
146. G.R. No. 85692 ANGELITO F. MAGLALANG, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, 11TH DIV.,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BR. 29, SAN PABLO CITY AND GIL C. MAGLALANG, respondents.
July 3l, 1989
FACTS:
The application of the principle of res judicata is the main issue in this case. The secondary issue is whether or not a
case involving the civil status of a person should first be referred to the appropriate barangay officials for possible
settlement in accordance with the barangay arbitration law.
Lourdes S. Flores is the natural mother of Angelito Maglalang who was born on July 6,1966. She filed a complaint
for support against Gil C. Maglalang in the then Court of First Instance of San Pablo City. However, the parties
eventually filed a joint motion to dismiss alleging that after pondering about the matter for a considerable length of
time, Flores now seriously doubts that the said defendant is the person with whom she had her child named Angelito
and by that reason, thereof, Article 283 of the New Civil Code is not applicable to the herein plaintiff and the
defendant and to the above-named child. The motion was granted in an order of the Regional Trial Court in San
Pablo City and the case was dismissed with prejudice.
Lourdes later on filed a motion for leave of court in the same case for Angelito Maglalang to continue and revive the
case for support in as much as he had already attained the age of majority. However, said motion was denied. Two
motions for the reconsideration of the order of denial were also denied.
Thus, Angelito filed in the same court a complaint for support and declaration of his status as natural child of Gil C.
Maglalang with hereditary rights. A motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata and for lack of
cause of action was filed by Gil. Said motion was granted by the trial court. Angelito elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals wherein in due course a decision was rendered affirming the appealed order. The motion for
reconsideration filed by Angelito was likewise denied. Hence, this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not res judicata has set in.
RULING:
YES. While it may be true that in the first case the ostensible cause of action is for support while in the second suit it
is for support and acknowledgment as a natural child, there can be no question that the causes of action in both cases

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are the same. As earlier observed, before petitioner may be afforded support, it must be established that the
petitioner is the natural child of Gil. The same evidence is required in both cases.
By the same token, even considering that the plaintiff in the first case was Lourdes, she litigated not only in her own
behalf but also in representation of her minor child, the petitioner. Obviously, there is Identity of parties in the two
cases.Thus, the questioned order of dismissal with prejudice issued by the trial court, which order had already
become final and executory, amounts to res judicata which bars the prosecution of any similar case. By virtue of the
said order, the issue of the alleged filiation of Angelito had been put to rest when Lourdes admitted that Gil is not
the father of petitioner.
147. G.R. No. 156228. MA. TERESA VIDAL, LULU MARQUEZ, and CARLOS SOBREMONTE,
petitioners, vs. MA. TERESA O. ESCUETA, represented by HERMAN O. ESCUETA, respondent.
December 10, 2003
FACTS:
When Abelardo Escueta died intestate, he was survived by his widow Remedios Escueta and their six children,
including Ma. Teresa O. Escueta and her brother Herman O. Escueta. Part of his estate was a parcel of land located
in Mandaluyong City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (77083) - 27568, and the house thereon.
The property was leased to Rainier Llanera, who sublet the same to 25 persons. The heirs executed an extra-judicial
settlement of estate over the property. They also executed a special power of attorney authorizing Ma. Teresa
Escueta to sell the said property.
Sometime in 1999, Ma. Teresa Escueta, as a co-owner of the property, filed an ejectment case against Llanera and
the sub-lessees before the Lupon of Barangay Highway Hills. In the meantime, the heirs of Abelardo Escueta
executed a deed of conditional sale over the property including the house thereon, to Mary Liza Santos
for P13,300,000.00.
Escueta and Llanera, and the sub-lessees, executed an Amicable Settlement, where they agreed that the owners of
the property would no longer collect the rentals due from the respondents therein starting May 1999, with the
concomitant obligation of the respondents to vacate the property on or before December 1999 and that consequently,
if the lessee and sub-lessees fail or refuse to vacate the property on or before December 1999, the barangay
chairman was authorized without any court order to cause the eviction and removal of all the respondents on the
property. Escueta opted not to have the sub-lessees evicted through the Punong Barangay as provided for in the
amicable settlement. Neither did she file a motion with the Punong Barangay for the enforcement of the settlement.
Instead, she filed on May 12, 2000, a verified Motion for Execution against the recalcitrant sub-lessees with the
MTC for the enforcement of the amicable settlement and the issuance of a writ of execution.
The defendants opposed the motion alleging that they were enveigled into executing the amicable settlement despite
the fact that they had not violated any of the terms and conditions of the verbal lease of the property. The court later
on issued an order denying the Motion for Execution contending that the plaintiff was not the real party-in-interest
as the subject property had already been sold and titled to Susana Lim, Johnny Lim and Mary Liza Santos.
Aggrieved, the plaintiff, now the appellant, appealed the order to the RTC who in turn rendered a decision holding
that the plaintiff-appellant was still the owner of the property when the ejectment case was filed in the office of the
barangay captain, and, as such, was the real party-in-interest as the plaintiff in the MTC. A petition for review was
filed with the Court of Appeals by three of the appellees, now petitioners Ma. Teresa Vidal, Lulu Marquez and
Carlos Sobremonte. The court, however, dismissed the petition on procedural grounds and for lack of merit. Hence,
this case.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the CA erred in not applying the rules of procedure liberally;
(2) Whether or not the real parties-in-interest as plaintiffs in the MTC were the new owners of the property; and
(3) Whether or not the Amicable Settlement was obtained by Fraud.
RULING:
(1) YES. In order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive dispensation of every action
and proceedings, the Rules are to be liberally construed. Rules of procedure are intended to promote, not to
defeat substantial justice and, therefore, should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. This Court

Page 17 of 21
ruled in Buenaflor vs. Court of Appeals, et al. that appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and trial
courts and the Court of Appeals are advised to proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to
appeal and that every party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. The Court has given due course to petitions
where to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction. In
this case, the Court opts to apply the rules liberally to enable it to delve into and resolve the cogent substantial
issues posed by the petitioners.
(2) YES. The party-in-interest applies not only to the plaintiff but also to the defendant. Interest within the meaning
of the rules means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. A real party in interest is one who has a legal right.
Since a contract may be violated only by the parties thereto as against each other, in an action upon that contract, the
real parties-in-interest, either as plaintiff or as defendant, must be parties to the said contract. The action must be
brought by the person who, by substantive law, possesses the right sought to be enforced. In this case, the respondent
was the party in the amicable settlement. She is the real party-in-interest to enforce the terms of the settlement
because unless the petitioners vacate the property, the respondent and the other vendors should not be paid the
balance of P1,000,000.00 of the purchase price of the property under the Deed of Conditional Sale.
(3) YES. The petitioners are estopped from assailing the amicable settlement on the ground of deceit and
fraud. First. The petitioners failed to repudiate the settlement within the period therefor. Second. The petitioners
were benefited by the amicable settlement. They were allowed to remain in the property without any rentals therefor
until December 1998. They were even granted extensions to continue in possession of the property. It was only
when the respondent filed the motion for execution that the petitioners alleged for the first time that the respondents
deceived them into executing the amicable settlement.
148. GR NO. 191336. CRISANTA ALCARAZ MIGUEL VS JERRY D. MONTANEZ. JANUARY 25, 2012
FACTS:
Jerry Montanez (respondent) secured a loan amounting to P143,864.00, payable in one (1) year, or until February 1,
2002, from Crisanta Alcaraz Miguel (petitioner). The respondent gave as collateral therefor his house and lot located
at Block 39 Lot 39 Phase 3, Palmera Spring, Bagumbong, Caloocan City.
Due to the respondent’s failure to pay the loan, the petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent before
the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay San Jose, Rodriguez, Rizal. The parties entered into a Kasunduang Pag-
aayos wherein the respondent agreed to pay his loan in installments in the amount of Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000.00) per month, and in the event the house and lot given as collateral is sold, the respondent would settle the
balance of the loan in full. However, the respondent still failed to pay, prompting the Lupong Tagapamayapa to issue
a certification to file action in court in favor of the petitioner. Petitioner then filed before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 66, a complaint for Collection of Sum of Money. In his Answer with
Counterclaim, the respondent raised the defense of improper venue considering that the petitioner was a resident of
Bagumbong, Caloocan City while he lived in San Mateo, Rizal.
After trial, the MeTC rendered a Decision ordering respondent to pay the petitioner. On appeal to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 146, the respondent raised the same issues cited in his Answer. The RTC later
on affirmed the decision of the lower court. Dissatisfied, the respondent appealed to the CA raising two issues,
namely, (1) whether or not venue was improperly laid, and (2) whether or not the Kasunduang Pag-aayos effectively
novated the loan agreement. The CA in turn rendered a decision granting the petition. Hence, this case.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that she should have followed the procedure for enforcement of the amicable
settlement as provided in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, instead of filing a collection case.
RULING:
(1) YES. It is true that an amicable settlement reached at the barangay conciliation proceedings, like
the Kasunduang Pag-aayos in this case, is binding between the contracting parties and, upon its perfection, is
immediately executory insofar as it is not contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public order and public policy. This is in accord with the broad precept of Article 2037 of the Civil
Code.
Being a by-product of mutual concessions and good faith of the parties, an amicable settlement has the force
and effect of res judicata even if not judicially approved. It transcends being a mere contract binding only upon
the parties thereto, and is akin to a judgment that is subject to execution in accordance with the Rules. Thus,
under Section 417 of the Local Government Code, such amicable settlement or arbitration award may be

Page 18 of 21
enforced by execution by the Barangay Lupon within six (6) months from the date of settlement, or by filing an
action to enforce such settlement in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond the six-month period.
In the instant case, the respondent did not comply with the terms and conditions of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos.
Such non-compliance may be construed as repudiation because it denotes that the respondent did not intend to
be bound by the terms thereof, thereby negating the very purpose for which it was executed. Perforce, the
petitioner has the option either to enforce the Kasunduang Pag-aayos, or to regard it as rescinded and insist
upon his original demand, in accordance with the provision of Article 2041 of the Civil Code. Having instituted
an action for collection of sum of money, the petitioner obviously chose to rescind the Kasunduang Pag-
aayos. As such, it is error on the part of the CA to rule that enforcement by execution of said agreement is the
appropriate remedy under the circumstances.
149. GR no. 159411. TEODORO I. CHAVEZ vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JACINTO S. TRILLANA
March 18, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner Teodoro Chavez and respondent Jacinto Trillana entered into a contract of lease whereby the former
leased to the latter his fishpond at Sitio Pariahan, Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan, for a term of six (6) years commencing
from October 23, 1994 to October 23, 2000. The rental for the whole term was two million two hundred forty
thousand (P2,240,000.00) pesos, of which one million (P1,000,000.00) pesos was to be paid upon signing of the
contract. Paragraph 5 of the contract further provided that respondent shall undertake all construction and
preservation of improvements in the fishpond that may be destroyed during the period of the lease, at his expense,
without reimbursement from petitioner.
In August 1996, a powerful typhoon hit the country which damaged the subject fishpond. Respondent did not
immediately undertake the necessary repairs as the water level was still high. Three (3) weeks later, respondent was
informed by a barangay councilor that major repairs were being undertaken in the fishpond with the use of a crane.
Respondent found out that the repairs were at the instance of petitioner who had grown impatient with his delay in
commencing the work.
In September 1996, respondent filed a complaint before the Office of the Barangay Captain of Taliptip, Bulacan,
Bulacan. He complained about the unauthorized repairs undertaken by petitioner, the ouster of his personnel from
the leased premises and its unlawful taking by petitioner despite their valid and subsisting lease contract. After
conciliation proceedings, an agreement was reached. Alleging non-compliance by petitioner with their lease contract
and the foregoing Kasunduan, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner before the RTC of Valenzuela City.
Due to the failure of the petitioner to file his pre trial brief and attend the pre trial conference, the respondent was
allowed to present his evidence ex parte. On the basis thereof, a decision was rendered in favor of respondent
ordering the plaintiff to reimburse the rental payment and pay the unrealized profit as a result of the unlawful
deprivation of the subject premises. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which modified the decision of the
trial court by deleting the award of P500,000.00 for unrealized profits for lack of basis, and by reducing the award
for attorney’s fees to P50,000.00. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the RTC of Valenzuela City had jurisdiction over the action
filed by respondent
RULING:
NO. The Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides for a two-tiered mode of enforcement of an amicable
settlement, to wit: (a) by execution by the Punong Barangay which is quasi-judicial and summary in nature on mere
motion of the party entitled thereto; and (b) an action in regular form, which remedy is judicial. However, the mode
of enforcement does not rule out the right of rescission under Art. 2041 of the Civil Code. The availability of the
right of rescission is apparent from the wording of Sec. 417 itself which provides that the amicable settlement may
be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months from its date or by action in the appropriate city or
municipal court, if beyond that period.
Thus, although the Kasunduan executed by petitioner and respondent before the Office of the Barangay Captain had
the force and effect of a final judgment of a court, petitioners non-compliance paved the way for the application of
Art. 2041 under which respondent may either enforce the compromise, following the procedure laid out in the
Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand.

Page 19 of 21
150. G.R. No. 164594 MICHAEL SEBASTIAN vs ANNABEL LAGMAY NG, REPRESENTED BY HER
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, ANGELITA LAGMAY, April 22, 2015
FACTS:
Sometime in 1997, Angelita Lagmay (Angelita), acting as representative and attorney-in-fact of her daughter
Annabel Lagmay Ng (Annabel), filed a complaint for the collection of the sum of P350, 000 against Sebastian
before the Barangay Justice of Siclong, Laur, Nueva Ecija. Angelita claimed that Annabel and Michael were once
sweethearts, and that they agreed to jointly invest their financial resources to buy a truck. She alleged that while
Annabel was working in Hongkong, Annabel sent Michael the amount of P350,000.00 to purchase the truck.
However, after Annabel and Michael's relationship has ended, Michael allegedly refused to return the money to
Annabel, prompting the latter to bring the matter before the Barangay Justice.
On July 9, 1997, the parties entered into an amicable settlement, evidenced by a document denominated
as "kasunduan” wherein Michael agreed to pay Annabel the amount of P250,000.00 on specific dates. Angelita
alleged that the kasunduan was not repudiated within a period of ten (10) days from the settlement, in accordance
with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law embodied in the Local Government Code of 1991 [Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7160], and Section 14 of its Implementing Rules. When Michael failed to honor the kasunduan, Angelita
brought the matter back to the Barangay, but the Barangay Captain failed to enforce the kasunduan, and instead,
issued a Certification to File Action.
After about one and a half years from the date of the execution of the kasunduan, Angelita filed with the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Laur and Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija, a Motion for Execution of the kasunduan. Michael
moved for the dismissal of the Motion for Execution. The MCTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner.
Michael filed an appeal with the RTC arguing that the MCTC committed grave abuse of discretion in prematurely
deciding the case. Th RTC affirmed the decision of the MCTC. Michael filed a Motion for Reconsideration
contending that an amicable settlement or arbitration award can be enforced by the Lupon within six (6) months
from date of settlement or after the lapse of six (6) months, by ordinary civil action in the appropriate City or
Municipal Trial Court and not by a mere Motion for execution and that the MCTC does not have jurisdiction over
the case since the amount of P250,000.00 is in excess of MCTC's jurisdictional amount. The RTC granted Michael's
Motion for Reconsideration and dismissed Angelita's Motion for Execution, and set aside the MCTC Decision.
Angelita moved for the reconsideration but was subsequently denied. Aggrieved, she filed a Petition for Review
with the CA who also dismissed the petition. Michael moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied his
motion. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction to execute the kasunduan regardless of the
amount involved; and
(2) Whether or not the kasunduan could be given the force and effect of a final judgment.
RULING:
(1) YES. The Court finds that the CA correctly upheld the MCTC's jurisdiction to enforce any settlement or
arbitration award issued by the Lupon. Section 417 of the Local Government Code states that after the lapse of the
six (6) month period from the date of the settlement, the agreement may be enforced by action in the appropriate city
or municipal court.
(2) YES. Under Section 416 of the Local Government Code, the amicable settlement and arbitration award shall
have the force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the expiration often (10) days from the date of its
execution, unless the settlement or award has been repudiated or a petition to nullify the award has been filed before
the proper city or municipal court.
Moreover, Section 14, Rule VI of the Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing Rules states that the party's failure
to repudiate the settlement within the period often (10) days shall be deemed a waiver of the right to challenge the
settlement on the ground that his/her consent was vitiated by fraud, violence or intimidation.
In the present case, the records reveal that Michael never repudiated the kasunduan within the period prescribed by
the law. Hence, the CA correctly ruled that the kasunduan has the force and effect of a final judgment that is ripe for
execution.

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126. G.R. No.

198356, ESPERANZA SUPAPO AND THE HEIRS OF ROMEO SUPAPO, NAMELY:

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Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari.

134. G.R. No. 176492 MARIETTA N. BARRIDO vs. LEONARDO V. NONATO

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135. SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFREDO R. BAUTISTA VS. LINDO

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141. PEOPLE VS COSARE 95 Phil. 656

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145. GR No. L-555480 Millare vs. Hernando (151 SCRA 484)

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Whether or not res judicata has set in.

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