30 THOMAS REID Terence Cuneo and Randall Harp ‘There isa standard understanding of Thomas Reid’ views regarding the will and setion according to which Reid defends both a libertarian account of free will and an agent ‘causal theory of action. While the standard understanding of Reid’s views is probably correct, puzzles emerge when one digs deeper into what Reid says when he develops these views, In this chapter, we address three interpretive challenges that face those who wish to understand what Reid says about will and action, namely ‘The Action Challenge: Reid claims that some of our actions are free. But what behaviors belong to the category action? Reid seems to say diferent things on this issue. In some places, he endorses a broad view according to which events, such as throwing baseballs, count as actions In other places, he embraces a hartow view according co which vuily cessait Kinds of mental events coune actions. The ise presents challenge to Reid interpreters because how one fanswers it determines whether Reid’ position is subject to. familiar Frankfurestyle counterexamples. (See Frankfurt {1969] and Sortorio in the present volume [Chapter 15] fora discussion of these examples.) ‘The Motive Challenge: Reid claims that actions are ordinarily ken on the basis of motives. But Reid ako endorses two accounts of motives that appear \compatible—one of which scems to ft better with his account of free action, he other of which seems to mesh better with broadly common sense views about the motivational roles of mental stares such as desires. The fact that Reid works with ewo different accounts of motives presents challenge co Reids incerpreters because neither account of motives seems to ft well with Reis ‘The Volition Challenge: Reid claims that the agent isan efficient cause (that is, agent cause) ofher actions and that actions consist in the exertion of active power, Bur what is the relation between being an ecient cause (1. asubstance) and the ‘exertion of active power? Reid never addresses chs question, bur i presenesa chal- lenge to Reid’s interpreters, for without an account ofthis relation, Reid's agent causal view is at best obscure and at worst, incoherent (if for example, every exer- tion of active power requires a further exertion of active power). ‘We won’tattemprto resolve these interpretive isues in whar follows. Instead, our aims are to make these interpretive isues explicit, explain why Reid's commitments generate them, and introduce the real tothe available options for resolving them, THOMASREID ‘The Action Challenge Lecussay that every mental ail change in the wr prac by an agent (os ortofan agen) isthe actuation ofa beara White actuation ef behav Sate an event need bean action. Yur digsting this momings Heat, for ‘example, is the actualization of a behavior-state. In some sense, it is due to you (or some art of you), bur not an aeton that you perform In contrat, your delberating about ‘whether vist the Ty Mahal bos the actuation of behavioestate and an action that you perform, asthe deliberation is due to you in way thatthe digestion of yout Iveakfit ne: Bat what explains the dference between these ew eases? Why does the acualzation of alehaviorstate count van agent action insome casts but none! Reid has a very simple answer to hese quetone the actualation ofa behavior state counts as your action, as Red jut incase ya ae scien case (EAP Te 1) Reilsanswerto wha we might acto plan presupposes a distinction between ‘ficient and phys causality (ee BAP Lv 4; COR: 17 for hs terminology) Reid adopts the notion of an efficient cause from thinkers such as Samuel Clarke (1998/1705). “Anelicien cause what we today would call nage cae and an agent cue i ome thing endowed with what Rei eal tie Per Since ore am age, Retd hols that Youarean agent aus arenes endowed wth active power [is mportnt to emphasce that while Rei olds tht everting with active power must have wl he distinguishes active power rom wll weting ha the “fect produce, nd the wilt pracy re things diferent fom acuive power, bue we ean have no conception oft Iie, active power] burbyitsreation to then” (EAP Lv: 32) Soin Rei view ative power owe findamencal than wil andi necessary exerted when we wil "By the liter) of amoral agent, understand a power over the determination af is oun wl (EAP IV 267). Reid adopts he notion of psa ease rom Mure ore Hume 1999/1748 sect 7). Rough physical ease san even of sme type that i connected by ala of nature {oan event of some other type, When you throw a baseball aa window fo example, your throwing he bneball physi nue ofthe windows shattering since events Ofthe fis type (ve, dhrowinga bonebal ata window) are connected bya law of mature to events of mother ype (Le, a tageted window shateing upon ipa) Eien causality and physical east appear to be very sfferent- Agent comes ae not afterall, events elated to other events by natural Ls they ae substances [And phyial eases ate aoc gets the re events Surprisingly hugh, Reid main: tains thatthe ae very closely linked, Holding thatthe only genuine causality inthe world consists in the exercise of agent causally. If Reid is righ, your deciding to throw ahaha aca window comes abour though an exertion of your active pose, Soar this events agen cause Bur that the ball ie thoush teat and shatters the window upon spaces, Reid sys, due tothe exertion of God active power, forthe physical laws of nature are the rules according to which the Deity commonly acts in his natural government of the world and, whatever is done according to them snot done by man, but by God, either imme, or by inet (BAP IV: 251) Reid, chen, endorses a version of quasi-occasionalism—‘quas’ because Reid allows that bouh human beings and God (and possibly other beings) are agent causes. Although 335TERENCE CUNEO AND RANDALL HARP Reidl makes no effort to define the notion of an agent cause, he does specify an array conditions that something must satisfy to be an agent cause. Among these is that agent cause has ative power, and that active power must come with options: "Power produce an effect,” Reid says, “implies power not to produce {following Yaffe 2004: Chapter 2) call this condition: Power to do Otherwise: Ifan agent has the power to actin a certain way, then he also has the power not to actin that way Power to do Otherwise affords an even clearer understanding of Reid's answer to the action problem: ie tells us that the actuaization of any behavior state of which someone is an agent cause must be such that that person had the power to not actualize that behavior state when he did. Although this is helpful, we tll don’t know exactly what sont of behavior stares, according to Reid, satisfy this condition. Do mental events such as imagining the Taj Mahal as well as bodily movements such as throwing baseballs satisfy Power to do Oxherwise and, hence, count as actions? Reid says diferent things on this matter. In some places, he acknowledges that there isanoudinary understanding of action that is broad according to which the actualization ‘of a wide array of behaviorstates such as throwing baseballs, lagging down eabs, and scratching one’s ear count as actions (see EAP IIL. .é: 97, IVa: 198). Call this the wide sunderstanding of ation. in other places, Reid acknowledges that there is ‘philosophical understanding of action according to which only the actualization of those behavior states that are the direet consequence of an exertion of active power—that is, only those behaviorstatec that ae volitions-—are actions (sve BAP Lit 13, [Vir 203}. Call this the narrow understanding of action. Sometimes Retd seems to work with the wide (ot “broad understanding; other times he appears to work with the narrow understanding, Each understanding has its pros and cons The virte of the wide unclerstanding is that i approximates our ordinary under: standing of action according to which the actualization of behaviorstates such a8 throwing baseballs and flagging down cabs are actions and, hence, behavior states for ‘which we can be held accountable. The wide interpretation, however, also has a down: sid, which is that it exposes Reids view to counterexamples that are potentially quite damaging, Reid would have been familiar with some of these counterexamples. Consider, for example, Locke's man-in-a-locked-room scenario, which is a precursor to so-called Frankfurtstyle counterexamples. In Locke’ presentation of the scenario, a man is locked ina room. Although the man decides to stay in the room, he lacks the power 0 Teave because, unbeknownst to him, the door i locked. This case provides the materials for the following objection to Reid’ views 1. The actualization of a behavior state B counts as an agent’ action at t only if B satisfies Power to do Otherwise at (From Reid’ answer to the action problem and Power ro do Otherwise) 2, Theman in the locked room's behavior of staying inthe locked room doesn satisfy Power to do Otherwise: he has the power to stay inthe room hut lacks the power t0 refrain from staying in the room. (assumption) 3. So, when the man in the locked room clecides to stay in the room, his behavior of staying in the room does not count as his action. (from 1,2) 3a THOMASREID 4. But his behavior of staying in the room does count as his ation. (assumption) F. So, (1) is false: irs not the case that the actualization of a behavior-state B counts asan agent's action atc only i B satises Power to do Otherwise att (from 1-4) Let's now add that, in Reid's view, the actualization of a behavior state counts 8 an sction fand only ft isa fee action (EAP IV: 267, Nail: 212). Given this asumption, the argument just stated also implies: 6, ‘The man in the locked room's behavior of staying in the Locked room is nota free “This appears to be a problem for the wide understanding of action. ‘What we earlier referred to as the narrow understanding of action side-steps this objection completely, as it holds that the formation of volitions is the only type of action thar che agent performs. I this is right, the correct way to describe the man- in-a-locked-toom scenatio isto focus on the man’s formation of volitions through the exertion of his active power. When the man decides to stay, his decision results from the exertion of his active power. Bur when he decides this, he could decide ‘otherwise; he could decide not to stay, OF course he would be unable to execute his decision and leave because he would discover that the door to the room in which ‘he's staying is locked. Sell, his volition to stay satisfies Power to do Otherwise. Given Reid's further claim thac the only types of actions are free ations, his decision to stay isa free action. But there isa price for accepting the natrow view of action. This account not only radically constricts the range of behavior states that can count as actions, but also “intemalize action, implying that none ofthe behaviors that we commonly call actions, sch as throwing baseballs, could be actions (compare, for example, EAP Li and Lvi: 36 with IV). Fora philosopher who prided himself in defending common sense, this would not be a welcome result Reid himself never faces the Action Challenge heaton. But he does say some things that suggest a way of blunting its foree, When Reid presents the naerow understanding fof action, he acknowledges that the actualization of many behaviorstates would not ‘count as actions only che formation ofa volition through the exertion of active power ‘would coune as an action. Nonetheless, Reid continues, agents can be held morally responsible for the actualizaion of behavior staes that are not actions in the narrow sense, such as throwing baseballs at windows, Here is what Reid says “That there is an established harmony between ou willing certain motions of cou bodies, and the operation ofthe nerves and muscles which proiuces those ‘motions, isa fact known by experience. This volition isan act ofthe ind. Bur whether this at of the mind have any physical eflece upon the nerves and muscles, or whether it be only an occasion oftheir being acted upon by some othe efiient [eause), according to the established laws of nature, ishid from ws Sul, the man who knows that such an event depends upon his will, and who delib- rately wills to produce itis, in the strictest moral sense, the cause of the event; 35TERENCE CUNBO AND RANDALL HARP and its justly impured to him, whatever physical causes may have concurred ints production, (EAP Lwii: 40) IF Reid is right ahout this, we should distinguish an agent's being the cause of the actu- alization of a behavior state from an agent's being the mora cause of an aetwalization of ‘a behavior state. An agent is the cause ofthe actualization of a behavior-state B when, and only when she isthe sole agent cause of the actualization of B (and all events that might be necessary for actualzation of B, such as the operations of nerves and muscles that are necessary for the movement of the arm). When an agent is the cause of the actualzation of a behavior state, then the actualization of that behavior-state is an faction in the narvow sense. In contrast an agent is a moral cause of the actualization of B hen and only when she is an agent cause (though not necessarily the only agent cause) of B and can tightly he held accountable forthe actualization of B, When an, agent is a moral cause of the actualization of a behavior sate, then the actualzation of that behavior state i an action in the wide sense. ‘While distinguishing diferent types of action has the disadvantage of multiplying senses of ‘action,’ the disadvantage is probably only apparent; Reid is happy c0 allow that one and the same term expresses a multiplicity of meanings provided that such an allowance is justiied. And, in this case, it looks as if itis. Given certain theoretical purposes in which we are attempting to identify in a philosophical precise way, what counts as an action (and, hence, a free action), we need to operate with the narrow understanding of action, But, given certain practical purposes in which we engage in practices of haliing each other acconntable for whar we do, we need ro employ the wide “understanding of action. IfReid is right, we need to employ multiple action concepts in corde to serve this range of purposes The Motive Challenge In his chapter “Observations Concerning the Will” Reid writes that “in all deteemina- ‘ions of the mind that are of any importance, there must be something inthe preceding state ofthe mind that disposes or inclines us to that determination.” The reason is that if the mind were always ina state of perfect indifference, without any incitement, motive, or reason, to act, oF not to act, to act one way rather than another, our active power, having no end to pursue, no rule to direct its exertions, would be (EAP Li: 51) ‘A close reading of the Active Powers reveals, however, that just as Reid operates with two different understandings of action, he also embraces two diferent accounts of tmotives that appear incompatible. The position Reid presnts in dhe erly chapter "On the Influence of Ineitements and Motives on the Will"—what wel cll the wide account of motves—says that motives come in two sorts: some oe mental states, while others ate eral in the sense of being that forthe sake of which am agent ats EAP Hii). The view ‘of motives presented inthe later chapter "Of the Inluence of Mocives"—whac well al the narrow accunt of maives—says that motives come in only one sor: those ends for the sake of which an agent acts, 336 THOMASRED Let us begin with the wide account of motives, Following Reid's terminology, call those motives that are mental states “incitements” and those that are not “ends.” Reid says incitements come in two types. There are, inthe first place, whae Reid calls the “mechanical” principles ofaction. The mechanical principles of action include instincts for self-preservation, food, procreation, and the propensity o imitate (ef. EAP IILii-it), In addition, there are those incitements which Reid labels the ‘anal’ principles of action. The animal principles of action include what Reid calls the benevolent affec- tions, such as gratitude and esteem; the malevolent affections, such as resentment and the desire to better someone else in some matter, as well asa multitude of other incite ments, such as the desires for power and knowledge. As for ends, these come in ewo differenc kinds, Call ends of the fist sort agent-reasons. ‘To acquaint yourself with this concept, think of some casein which you perform some action and the consideration in light of which you performed that action—that feature ‘of your situation that, in your estimation, made the action worth performing or recom- mended its performance. This feature is an agent-reason. Reid says agent-reasons are the “rational principles” of action, of which there are twor fst, one's "good on the ‘whote” and, second, one’s “duty” (EAP IILi). Reid calls these che rational principles of, action because they “have no existence in beings not endowed with reason, an i all their exertions, require, not only intention and will, but judgment or reason" (EAP IIL iit: 152). Call ends of the second sore end-states. These are those states chat an agent endeavors to actualize chrough the exertion of his active power. (One can think of end-states asa subset of behavior states: they are behavioe-states that an agent ‘can aim to actualice directly through the exertion of her active power). Examples of nu tates would be you kicking ballin the lefthand come ofthe zl or ening fan apple tree, Ends of both sors playa role in action. Agents act to bring about end-staes in light of agent-reasons. Somewhat more exactly, Reid's view is that, cases of indifferent action aside, an agent S acts forthe sake of an end if and only if there i some end-stare E such that S actualies E through the exertion of his active power in light of some agent-reason R. ‘What we are calling the narrow account of motives is less capacious than the wide account, For, according to the narrow account, motives are necessarily ends. What- ever role incitements play in action, according to this view, i 1s not that of being a ‘Why would Reid have offered these contlicting accounts of motives, ultimately pairing the narrow account of motives with the narrow understanding of action? Here isa hypothesis ifthe wide account of motives were correct, incitements would be physical causes of why we act. Remember, though, that Reid commits himself to the claim that all causality is agent causality. It follows that were a desire a physical cause of why you act this physical cause would be the effec of the exertion of some- cone else's active power—presumably, God's—on you. This poses a threat to Reid's account of action acconding to which when you act—and, hence, act freely—that action consists not in the exertion of some other agent’s active power but in your active power. This last claim is captured in the thesis that (following Yaffe 2004) welll call: fficient-Causal Exclusivity: Every event chathas an agent cause has one, and only one, agent cause. 3a