姝 Academy of Management Review

2012, Vol. 37, No. 3, 396–418.

http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amr.2010.0403

CATCHING FALLING STARS: A HUMAN

RESOURCE RESPONSE TO SOCIAL CAPITAL’S
DETRIMENTAL EFFECT OF INFORMATION
OVERLOAD ON STAR EMPLOYEES
JAMES B. OLDROYD
SHAD S. MORRIS
The Ohio State University

Because star employees are more visible and productive, they are likely to be sought
out by others and develop an information advantage through their abundant social
capital. However, not all of the information effects of stardom are beneficial. We
theorize that stars’ robust social capital may produce an unintended side effect of
information overload. We highlight the role of human resource management in min-
imizing the effects of information overload for stars, and we discuss avenues for future
research.

Human resource (HR) scholars have argued
that some employees are more valuable than
others (Becker & Huselid, 2006; Hausknecht,
Rodda, & Howard, 2009; Lepak & Snell, 1999).
Consistent with a resource-based view of the
firm, the highest-performing employees create
disproportionate value, providing a rare but vi-
tal opportunity for an organization to increase
its competitive advantage through human capi-
tal (Barney, 1991; Barney & Wright, 1998; Lepak &
Snell, 2002). Alternatives such as hiring a
greater number of average performers or en-
hancing nonhuman assets are not adequate
substitutes for the value created by top perform-
ers (Eccles & Crane, 1988; Kelley & Caplan, 1993;
Lepak, Takeuchi, & Snell, 2003; Narin, 1993). For
example, in professional service industries an
organization’s top performers both generate the
bulk of that organization’s business and consti-
tute its core knowledge assets (Eccles & Crane,
1988). Studies of scientists and academic re-
searchers have consistently found that employ-
ees at the top of the performance distribution
are many times more valuable than their lower-
performing colleagues (e.g., Cole & Cole, 1973;
We gratefully acknowledge the excellent support of David
Lepak throughout the revision process and thank our anon-
ymous reviewers for their insightful comments and sugges-
tions. James Oldroyd also thanks the generous support of a
Sungkyunkwan University summer research grant in sup-
porting this project. Finally, we thank to Jay Anand, Tai-
Young Kim, and Steffanie Wilk for their helpful comments on
this work.
396
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Ernst, Leptein, & Vitt, 2000; Narin & Breitz-
man, 1995).
As a result of their uniquely valuable human
capital contributions, top performers are often
the most widely recognized employees in a
given organization (Trevor, Hausknecht, & How-
ard, 2007; Trevor & Nyberg, 2008). Top performers
are also more visible than their peers in internal
and external labor markets (Groysberg, Lee, &
Nanda, 2008), as evidenced by increased inter-
est in hiring practices regarding the highest-
performing employees (Gardner, 2005; Lazear,
1986). Research on the professional service in-
dustry has demonstrated that top performers
receive particular attention from competing
organizations, which tend to view their achieve-
ments as valuable assets ripe for acquisition
(Greenwood, Hinings, & Brown, 1990).
When top performers possess high internal
and external visibility, they are considered to be
stars. Following Groysberg and colleagues
(2008), we define “stars” as employees who (1)
demonstrate superior performance in relation to
others in their respective organizations and (2)
are highly visible in the labor market. These
unique characteristics often endow stars with
what sociologists call a “cumulative advan-
tage”—namely, their productive resources in-
crease at a rate exponentially greater than their
less visible and less valuable peers (Cole &
Cole, 1973; Zuckerman, 1977). For example, stars
in science fields find it easier to acquire the
resources necessary to facilitate research, such
2012 Oldroyd and Morris
as colleagues seeking collaboration, cadres of
highly capable students, and access to data-
bases (Zuckerman & Merton, 1972). Conse-
quently, they are likely to find themselves em-
bedded in a virtuous cycle: they meet with
increased access to information resources and
opportunities to increase their productivity,
which lead to increased visibility in the labor
market, which, in turn, results in even more re-
sources and opportunities (Allison, Long, &
Krauze, 1982).
From a relational perspective, one by-product
of stardom is the abundance of social capital,
defined here as the structure of relationship net-
works and information available to an individ-
ual (Bourdieu, 1986; Burt, 1992). In this regard, a
higher number of network connections or poten-
tial sources of information increase an individ-
ual’s social capital (Baker, 1990). Nahapiet and
Ghoshal state that “the central proposition of
social capital theory is that networks of relation-
ships constitute a valuable resource” (1998: 243).
In other words, the value of network ties, as well
as the social capital that comes with them, de-
rives primarily from privileged access to infor-
mation and opportunities (Burt, 1997). Because
star employees are highly visible in the labor
market and others are likely to seek relation-
ships with them, stars will likely develop expo-
nentially high levels of social capital that, in
turn, perpetuate and reinforce their positions
(Burkhardt & Brass, 1990; Groysberg et al., 2008;
Kang, Morris, & Snell, 2007). For instance,
through a series of studies, Groysberg (2010) has
demonstrated that one of the key factors in stars’
success is not only their unique and uniquely
valuable human capital but also their social
capital—that is, the relationships they possess
with others in the organization.
While an abundance of social capital can pos-
itively impact stars’ performance, not all of the
effects of abundant social capital are positive
(Adler & Kwon, 2002). For instance, scholars are
beginning to explore some potential limitations
of social capital due to structural challenges
(Arenas, Díaz-Guilera, & Guimerà, 2001; Burt,
1997; Dodds, Muhamad, & Watts, 2003; Guimerà,
Díaz-Guilera, Vega-Redondo, Cabrales, & Are-
nas, 2002; Watts, 2004), differential effects of spe-
cific network contexts (Cummings & Cross, 2003;
Xiao & Tsui, 2007), links to negative groups
(Lechner, Frankenberger, & Floyd, 2010), limited
control (Buskens & van der Rijt, 2008; Ryall &
397
Sorenson, 2007), and overembeddedness (Gar-
giulo & Benassi, 2000). All of these factors repre-
sent some form of structural constraint in which
ties are not as helpful as they might otherwise
be, either because they are redundant or be-
cause they offer limited access to novel informa-
tion. However, while such structural factors lim-
iting the value of social capital are important to
provide a more robust picture of organizational
trials and successes, they do not reflect a seri-
ous challenge created by the abundant social
capital amassed by star employees.
We uniquely highlight that because of their
high visibility and performance status, stars are
likely to build up an abundance of ties leading
to nonredundant information flows. But, by the
very nature of their unique positions, stars are
less likely to face structural constraints and are
more likely to amass exponentially high levels
of social capital. As a result, they are much more
susceptible to another form of constraint than
are their average-performing peers: information
overload. In a state of overload, cognitive limi-
tations may constrain the value of a star’s social
capital; if the information load goes unmanaged
for long periods of time, the star may stumble
and, ultimately, fall (Herbig & Kramer, 1994; Van
Gerven, Paas, Tuovinen, & Tabbers, 2003). Thus,
it is important to generate a greater understand-
ing of how and when social capital adversely
affects the performance of both the star em-
ployee and the organization in which he or she
is embedded. In so doing we posit that a star is
likely to fall in the absence of specific individ-
ual, organizational, and network-wide actions
that help manage the continual increase in both
the information given to and the demands made
of the star. Using a process approach to theory
development, we focus on this important but
previously unexplored boundary condition of
the value of social capital, one that applies prin-
cipally to star employees.
The conditions under which some stars shine
and others fall have long proven difficult to ex-
plain, let alone produce (cf. Groysberg, 2010). We
begin by reviewing the link between social cap-
ital and star employees, emphasizing that be-
cause of the affiliatory nature of network forma-
tion, stars are likely to have exponentially
higher levels of social capital than their less
visible and less highly performing peers. We
then discuss how this abundance of social cap-
ital may unintentionally result in information
398 Academy of Management Review
overload for star employees. We go on to explore
the implications of a curvilinear theory of social
capital on the performance of star employees
and their organizations, highlighting the bound-
ary conditions of our theory and explicating
when information overload may or may not ad-
versely affect star employees with abundant so-
cial capital. We then highlight strategic HR
management responses, targeted at the individ-
ual, organizational, and network level, that
might help mitigate the potentially negative
side effects of social capital for stars. Finally,
we conclude by outlining several ways in which
future research can link human resource man-
agement, stars, social capital, and information
overload.
STARS’ HUMAN AND SOCIAL CAPITAL
Stars are employees who consistently and
substantially perform better than others in their
organizations and are also highly visible in
their respective labor markets (Groysberg et al.,
2008). Stars are common across industries and
are frequent topics of discussion in knowledge-
based industries where organizational value is
largely tied to employees’ individual abilities
and potential for coordination. The work differ-
ential between stars and nonstars is vast. For
example, as Groysberg notes:
The phenomenon of stardom— of performers
whose productivity massively outstrips that of
their colleagues—is well documented. One study
found that the top 1 percent of employees in
highly complex jobs outperform average perform-
ers by 127 percent. Another reported an eight-to-
one productivity difference between star com-
puter programmers and average programmers.
The top 1 percent of inventors was found to be
five to ten times as productive as average inven-
tors (2010: 616).
Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong (1998) found,
similarly, that in the biotech industry stars rep-
resent only three-quarters of 1 percent of scien-
tists, but they account for 17.3 percent of pub-
lished articles. Thus, star scientists publish
almost twenty-two times as many articles as
their average colleagues.
The value that stars create for knowledge-
based organizations determines both their hu-
man and social capital (Groysberg et al., 2008).
The rare, intangible resource of a star’s human
capital is a key source of competitive advantage
July
for his or her organization (Barney & Wright,
1998; Huselid, 1995; Lepak & Snell, 1999). A star’s
firm-specific human capital may include knowl-
edge about how to accomplish complex tasks in
a particular organization, how to develop trust
among a team of employees, and how to create
a sense of commitment to a firm’s success, along
with other vital, valuable information (Barney &
Hansen, 1994; Conner & Prahalad, 1996).
Strategic HR management researchers recog-
nize the importance of stars’ social capital in the
creation of organizational values (e.g., Dess &
Shaw, 2001; Wright, Dunford, & Snell, 2001). Be-
cause stars have greater access to information,
as well as access to avenues for sharing it, they
tend to create more value for their organizations
(Dess & Shaw, 2001). For instance, in a study of
R&D project managers, Allen and Katz (1985)
found that star employees are a key source of
technical knowledge. Because of this knowl-
edge, organizational colleagues consulted most
frequently with star employees, and stars spent
significantly more time than their colleagues
conferring with those within and outside of their
own technical specialties. Similarly, Kang et al.
(2007) have argued that top employees create
value for organizations via their social relation-
ships with colleagues across departments and
functions. These relationships provide access to
new information and opportunities that the stars
then use to create greater organizational value.
THE UPWARD SPIRAL OF STARDOM AND
INFORMATION OVERLOAD
The Affiliatory Nature of Social Capital
Recent research in physics (Barabasi & Cran-
dall, 2003), information technology (Ebel,
Mielsch, & Bornholdt, 2002), and biology (Jeong,
Tombor, Albert, Oltvai, & Barabasi, 2000) indi-
cates that network formation often follows an
affiliatory pattern. Rather than forming ran-
domly between actors, associations form by
choice, based on the actors’ preferences and
what they are searching for or hoping to gain
(Newman, 2002). Numerous studies show that af-
filiatory networks represent trends in social and
work life, in which people tend to gravitate to-
ward a few individuals who are key to achiev-
ing their objectives (e.g., Newman & Park, 2003).
The people who are the “recipients”—that is, the
key individuals to whom others gravitate—are
2012 Oldroyd and Morris
often high-performing and visible actors in
these networks.
Because of affiliation, organizational net-
works are not composed of randomly generated
connections, Rather, once stars emerge in an
organization, others will tend to gravitate to
them, and these new associations will result in
a virtuous circle that further increases stars’ im-
portance and visibility (Newman, 2002). As a re-
sult of their high visibility and strong perfor-
mance, star employees are likely to be
frequently asked for advice and to have influ-
ence over and association with others
(Burkhardt & Brass, 1990). Because this process
is an upward spiral, other employees in the or-
ganization are likely to seek out stars once they
have achieved visibility, heightening the up-
ward spiral effect. In other words, when employ-
ees seek to build new relationships, they are
most likely to build those relationships with
high-performing, highly visible stars.
Such affiliatory patterns create cumulative
advantages for stars. The stars’ prior success
increases their future endowments of social cap-
ital. This is a mechanism in which social capital
and human capital are recursive, with each re-
inforcing and increasing the other. As other em-
ployees form ties with star employees, they, too,
try to access their unique human capital or gain
access to their robust relationship; thus, the
stars’ organizational power and influence in-
crease concurrently (Emerson, 1962).
Using a social network structure approach,
Tichy and Tushman (1979) showed that stars
play a “linking pin” role since they occupy the
core of the organization’s network structure. Ad-
ditional research has shown that employees
who have the highest organizational recogni-
tion have greater access to resources, including
social prestige and knowledge, from which they
might attract others seeking status, information,
or money (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980; Foa & Foa,
1974). For instance, as Allen and Katz (1985)
noted, stars have robust connections and so can
keep up with new developments in their fields,
further increasing their human capital. As a re-
sult, stars are frequently embedded in a virtuous
cycle of social capital development, in which
higher social capital (i.e., more associations) in-
creases their appeal, causing more and more
people to gravitate toward them.
Because of the nature of affiliatory tie forma-
tion, stars are likely to be connected to many
399
more individuals than average employees; this
connection pattern follows a power-law (Pareto)
distribution of ties. Thus, rather than simply
having a few more ties than average employees,
stars are likely to have exponentially more as-
sociations and the concomitant social capital
than average employees. As a consequence,
stardom does not provide a marginal increase in
social capital over that of the average employee
but, rather, an exponential increase.
Underscoring the difference between the mar-
ginal increase and the exponential increase in
social capital is the difference between random
and affiliatory networks. This is a vital point
when investigating how social capital affects
information flow to star employees. Figure 1 il-
lustrates this point. In Figure 1 we model four
different networks of 100 people each. Two of
these networks have an average of five ties per
actor, and two have an average of ten ties per
actor. We compare the difference in both types
of network structures for networks formed in a
random versus affiliatory manner. Both the five-
tie and ten-tie networks consist of 100 people,
and each of the networks has an equal average
number of ties. However, the distribution of ties
significantly differs between the networks. On
the one hand, in the first network (which has an
average of five ties per actor) and third network
(which has an average of ten ties per actor), the
distributions follow a random pattern of rela-
tionship formation. On the other hand, in the
second network (which has five ties) and fourth
network (which has ten ties), the distributions
follow an affiliatory, or preferential, model.1 In
the affiliatory networks the majority of the rela-
tionships are linked to a small number of stars,
concentrated in the center of the network. In the
random networks the ties are more evenly dis-
persed across the network.
Figure 2 quantifies this difference between
the random and affiliatory networks. In this fig-
ure we construct a measure of “in-degree cen-
trality” for each actor. In-degree centrality is a
measure of the incoming ties directed toward an
actor. Our results show that in affiliatory net-
works the most central star employees have
more than two-and-a-half times as many asso-
1
Network theorists also refer to affiliatory networks as
scale-free networks (e.g., Barabasi & Crandall, 2003).
400 Academy of Management Review July

FIGURE 1
Random versus Affiliatory Network Graphs

Random 100-node network with average in-degree centrality of 5 Affiliatory 100-node network with average in-degree centrality of 5

Random 100-node network with average in-degree centrality of 10 Affiliatory 100-node network with average in-degree centrality of 10

FIGURE 2
Centrality in Random and Affiliatory Networks

Comparison of the in-degree centralitya for each node in the Comparison of the in-degree centralitya for each node in the

random and affiliatory network of 100 actors with an average in- random and affiliatory network of 100 actors with an average in-

degree centrality of 5 ties. The highest in-degree centrality for degree centrality of 10 ties. The highest in-degree centrality for

actors in the random network is 10, while the highest in-degree actors in the random network is 27, while the highest in-degree

centrality for actors in the affiliatory network is 26. centrality for actors in the affiliatory network is 46.

30 50
45
25
40
20 35
30
15 Random 25 Random
Affiliatory 20 Affiliatory
10
15
5 10
5
0
0
15
22
29
36
43
50
57
64
71
78
85
92
99
1
8

17
25
33
41
49
57
65
73
81
89
97
1
9

a
In-degree centrality is a sum of the ties that are directed toward an actor.
2012 Oldroyd and Morris 401

ciations as those most central in random Stars and Information Flow

networks.
Recent research in the information sciences
Figure 3 takes this analysis even further, dem-
has repeatedly demonstrated that communica-
onstrating that the stars’ network ties in affilia-
tion networks follow a power-law distribution—
tory networks are often exponentially higher
namely, key actors in a given network are likely
than others’ ties in the same network. For both
to both receive and send more information than
the random and affiliatory examples, we have
nonkey actors.2 Since stars are likely to have an
calculated the percentage of all ties connected
abundance of social capital, they have access to
to each actor in the network. In our comparison,
numerous contacts, increasing the average
for instance, we found that the top 10 percent of
amount of information they receive (Groysberg
employees’ in-degree centrality in the random
& Lee, 2008; Lechner et al., 2010). As a result,
network accounts for 18 percent of the network’s
stars are not only more likely to have more as-
in-degree ties. The top 10 percent of actors in the
sociations than average employees but are
affiliatory network, however, account for over
more likely to actively communicate using these
40 percent of ties. We see that the magnitude of
ties. This may be due to their colleagues’ need to
this effect intensifies as we narrow our defini-
access their human capital, an effect demon-
tion of stars to fewer and fewer actors. For in-
strated through empirical studies of actors with
stance, the most central actor in a random net-
high human capital. For instance, Burkhardt
work receives just 2 percent of the in-degree ties,
and Brass (1990) found that experts are more
whereas in an affiliatory network the individual
likely to be sought out in organizations than
occupying that position receives 6 percent of
nonexperts.
ties, or three times the number of ties. Because
Furthermore, once a star has obtained infor-
organizational networks follow an affiliatory
mation, abundant social capital may enable
pattern and stars are likely to be key players in
these networks, we posit the following.
2
Proposition 1: Because of their high Baeza-Yates, Boldi, and Castillo (2006) have demon-
strated the affiliatory nature of web page links, showing that
performance and high visibility, star
regardless of the function used to identify page rank, the
employees are likely to have exponen- distribution is likely to follow a power-law function indicat-
tially more social capital than aver- ing that a few key nodes (or sources of information) are
age employees. exponentially more likely to be active.

FIGURE 3
Percent of Actors with Ties to Star Employees in Random and Affiliatory Network Conditions

Percent of ties in random and affiliatory networks linked to star Percent of ties in random and affiliatory networks linked to star

employees in 5 average ties network employees in 10 average ties network

0.8 0.7
0.7 0.6
0.6
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.4 Random network Random network
0.3 Affiliatory network 0.3 Affiliatory network
0.2 0.2
0.1 0.1
0 0
Top 1% Top 5% Top 10% Top 25% Top 1% Top 5% Top 10% Top 25%
402 Academy of Management Review
him or her to leverage his or her structural po-
sition, facilitating the flow of new and valuable
information across structural boundaries or
gaps in the network space. Burt notes that those
with abundant social capital often have a “say
in whose interests are served,” and such an in-
dividual will act as an “entrepreneur in the lit-
eral sense of the word—a person who adds
value by brokering the connection between oth-
ers” (1997: 342).3
Here we compare the volume of information
stars are likely to receive with the volume of
information average employees in the affilia-
tory networks are likely to receive. In this case
we hold flow constant per actor (a conservative
measure), finding that stars (who constitute the
top 1 percent of actors) have nearly nine times
as many ties as average employees. Assuming
that there is an average of five ties present in
the network, that each tie generates the same
information load, and that both incoming and
outgoing information flows emerge from each
tie, we project that stars will receive eighteen
times as much information as average employ-
ees. As the number of ties increases, this load
increases in a power-law manner. In addition, it
is likely that attention paid to a star is even
greater, because stars are not only more likely to
have more connections but are also more likely
to be involved in active ties (in the form of re-
quests, questions, etc.). This interactive effect of
combining the number and volume of flow
clearly indicates that stars are likely to receive
and send an abundance of information. Hence,
we posit the following.
Proposition 2: Because of their abun-
dant social capital, star employees
are likely to send and receive expo-
nentially more information than aver-
age employees.
3
Several studies demonstrate a strong link between per-
formance and actors who facilitate the connection of other
actors in the network. Some of these advantages include
prestige (Allen & Cohen, 1969), early job promotion for them-
selves and their subordinates (Burt, 1997; Katz & Tushman,
1983; Podolny & Baron, 1997), higher salaries (Seibert,
Kraimer, & Liden, 2001), and better job performance. Each of
these advantages is distinct to star employees (Brass,
1984, 1985).
July
Stars and Information Overload
Individuals process information, according to
Sternberg (1977: 317), by turning information into
intelligence through a process of “components.”
Component processing includes activities such
as coding, inferring, mapping, applying, and re-
sponding to information. While individuals vary
in their ability to process information owing to
their cognitive abilities (Ackerman, 1986; Kanfer
& Ackerman, 1989; Locke, 1965), instructional de-
sign scholars note that all individuals rely on
short-term or working memory to process infor-
mation on a day-to-day basis (Baddeley, 1986;
Miller, 1956). Individuals are conscious of and
can monitor only the content of their working
memories. Because information processing re-
quires working memory, information loads that
exceed its capacity may overwhelm an individ-
ual’s information processing activities. These
limitations of working memory are widely
known and accepted (Sweller, van Merrienboer,
& Paas, 1998). As stated by Sweller et al.:
Because working memory is most commonly used
to process information in the sense of organizing,
contrasting, comparing, or working on that infor-
mation in some manner, humans are probably
only able to deal with two or three items of infor-
mation simultaneously when required to process
rather than merely hold information. . . . it is this
factor that provides a central claim of cognitive
load theory (1998: 252–253).
Much of the research on social capital as-
sumes a linear relationship between informa-
tion flow and stardom or highly central posi-
tions such that the more information an
employee receives, the better his or her perfor-
mance will be (e.g., Burt, 1992, 1997). Information
processing theory further clarifies our under-
standing of the potential risks of information
overload on those employees with high levels of
social capital. This theory asserts that individu-
als benefit from the receipt of information, but
only until they reach a point at which they are
unable to process additional incoming informa-
tion (O’Reilly, 1980; Tushman & Nadler, 1978).
Beyond this point, additional information be-
comes a liability (Eppler & Mengis, 2004). In a
state of overload, an individual’s ability to per-
form rapidly declines (Chewning & Harrell,
1990). In any given context, then, if the amount of
information an individual receives exceeds his
or her information processing ability, the extra
information may harm performance (Boone, van
2012 Oldroyd and Morris 403

Olffen, & van Witteloostuijn, 2005; Carpenter &
Fredrickson, 2001; Wadhwa & Kotha, 2006).
While all organizational actors face some risk
of information overload, a star’s robust and con-
stantly increasing social capital places him or
her in a unique position that is likely to lead to
information overload if not carefully managed.
Moreover, a star’s robust social capital not only
likely burdens him or her with extreme levels of
information flow but also places the star in a
position where other employees are likely to
seek advice and expertise and, in so doing,
cause frequent interruptions that compromise
the star’s ability to complete tasks (Rudolph &
Repenning, 2002). Grove (1983: 67), for example,
described the constant request for information
and advice received by managers as “the
plague of managerial work.” Similarly, Perlow
(1999) showed that the frequent coworker inter-
ruptions experienced by highly visible software
engineers ultimately led to “a time famine,”
wherein engineers had too many information
requests and could not properly perform
their jobs.
Such frequent information requests require
extra information processing activity and often
necessitate immediate attention. These requests
can also interrupt information processing fo-
cused on the task at hand (Cellier & Eyrolle,
1992; Kirmeyer, 1988). In an organizational set-
ting, additional attention and visibility can in-
crease the amount of information requests, de-
creasing an employee’s attention and ability to
concentrate on the specific requests themselves
(Oldham, Kulik, & Stepina, 1991; Perlow, 1999).
Moreover, scholars such as Jett and George
(2003) have shown that information technology
has increased the number of interruptions from
information requests, with email and other
forms of electronic communication heightening
the frequency with which people can interact
and interrupt one another at work (e.g., Cutrell,
Czerwinski, & Horvitz, 2001; Speier, Valacich, &
Vessey, 1999).
In line with other studies of network structure
and load (e.g., Watts, Dodds, & Newman, 2002),4
we suggest that even when star employees have
relatively low cognitive costs associated with
processing information for each message, they
are frequently overloaded by the cumulative
burden created by their exponential amounts of
social capital. In Figure 4 we show star employ-
ees’ cumulative information burden for an infor-
mation flow of five and ten messages per net-
work contact. Because of the nature of affiliatory
networks, and assuming only five incoming and
4
Network scholars have demonstrated that affiliatory net-
works are robust against random breakdowns. However,
they are easy to disrupt with focused attacks (of overload) on
the most highly connected actors. In other words, when stars
are overloaded, their failure to process information can eas-
ily disrupt the network (Cohen, Havlin, & ben-Avra-
ham, 2002).

FIGURE 4
Information Load in an Affiliatory Network with Average Centrality of Five Actors at Five and Ten
Messages per Actor

1000
900
800
700
600
Information load 5
500 messages per tie
400 Information load 10
messages per tie
300
200
100
0
15
22
29
36
43
50
57
64
71
78
85
92
99
1
8
404 Academy of Management Review
outgoing communications per tie, we find that
stars carry an information burden of over 450
messages, as compared with 25 messages for
the average employee.
Because exponentially higher levels of social
capital are likely to burden star employees with
information, we posit the following.
Proposition 3: Because of their ex-
treme level of information flow, stars
are likely to experience information
overload.
The Individual Performance Effects of Stars’
Information Overload
A star’s performance is likely to be hindered
by this deluge of information. Information pro-
cessing studies have clearly demonstrated a
link between effective information processing
and employee performance (Eppler & Mengis,
2004). Scholars exploring information overload
have emphasized that the consequences of in-
formation overload not only act as a limit to the
employees’ performance but actually may de-
crease the overall performance of the individual
experiencing overload (e.g., Jacoby, 1977; Meier,
1963). For instance, Malhotra noted that
although consumers develop mechanisms for
limiting their intake of information, their limited
processing capacity can become cognitively
overloaded if they attempt to process “too much”
information in a limited time, and this can result
in confusion, cognitive strain, and other dysfunc-
tional consequences (1984: 437).
Similarly, in his study of library workers,
Meier (1963) found that overwhelmed individu-
als had to completely stop the information flow
they received until they could catch up on their
processing tasks. Oskamp (1965) also found that
information improves decision-making ability
up to a certain point, but when the flow of infor-
mation exceeds that point, additional informa-
tion diminishes the person’s decision outcomes.
Likewise, Connolly (1977) found that excessive
information leads to a decreased accuracy in
decision making. Schick, Gorden, and Haka
(1990) noted that the burden of information over-
load leads to confusion, an inability to set pri-
orities, and a deficit in information recall. Over-
load has also been shown to reduce decision
makers’ ability to identify relevant information
(Hodge & Reid, 1971; Streufert, 1973). Hence, we
posit the following.
July
Proposition 4: As star employees expe-
rience information overload, their per-
formance is likely to decrease.
The Organizational Performance Effects of
Stars’ Information Overload
Because stars are required to share their
knowledge with others, they are likely to receive
many requests for advice and information. Pro-
fessional service organizations often identify
stars as “thought leaders” or “knowledge ex-
perts”—people others can turn to for help. Stars
are not only identified but often actively put in
contact with others, across business and geo-
graphic lines, to ensure visibility and accessi-
bility by peers (Lorsch & Tierney, 2002). They are
likely to be singled out for formal and informal
mentoring responsibilities (Noe, 1988). In fact, as
Phillips-Jones (1983) pointed out, most mentoring
relationships are informal, incited by admira-
tion for the star or by job demands that require a
star’s expertise. Thus, the very mentoring oppor-
tunities meant to energize employees can feel
like a punishment for success if the programs
are not designed to consider the potential for
information overload in the case of stars.
Scholars have also argued that organizations
often spend the majority of their efforts provid-
ing stretch assignments, “special” projects, and
development programs solely for star players
(Huselid, Beatty, & Becker, 2005). When organi-
zations target these employees, the employees
may become overburdened with responsibili-
ties, and this may cause a decrease in their
ability to share information and mentor others.
When stars experience information overload,
they are likely to become bottlenecks in the or-
ganization (Cross & Parker, 2004). In other words,
stars who receive too much information will not
be able to share their expertise with others in
the organization. In this way, information over-
load may hinder an organization’s ability to le-
verage a star’s human capital. Consequently,
information overload may not only affect both
the star’s individual performance but also the
organization’s performance on the whole.
Studies of scale-free networks demonstrate
the effect of overload for key network nodes.
These studies note that an “attack [overwhelm-
ing the actor] on the most highly connected
nodes of the network” can result in a serious
disruption in network flow (Cohen et al., 2002:
2012 Oldroyd and Morris 405

14). The effects of overload for stars ripple likely to decrease the amount of valu-
through the system, and a small disruption for a able information they share with
star “suffices to disrupt the net for all” (Cohen et their peers, stifling organizational
al., 2002: 14). performance.
While information flowing to stars may not be
Next, we draw further distinctions between
directly proportional to the information they
star and average employees. Research has
share with others, it is likely to be correlated. As
shown that, unlike average workers, star em-
a result, the volume of information sent out by
ployees have high external visibility, which
stars can come back to them, adding exponen-
means they are likely to be able to leave an
tially to their information load. Figure 5 shows a
organization if they feel burdened. Trevor (2001)
comparison of the difference in in-flowing, out-
emphasized this point, noting that star employ-
flowing, and total flow for actors in random ver-
ees’ high performance and visibility lead to high
sus affiliatory networks. This highlights that in
portability. Spence (1973) argued that when em-
affiliatory networks stars are likely to shoulder
ployees make investments in their organiza-
the information burden resulting from both in-
tions, they increase productivity and are visible
coming and outgoing ties; overloaded stars will
to others; thus, competitors note “signals” that
be unable to process and share information.
these employees possess skills generally appli-
Limiting stars’ ability to share information
cable across organizations, and such signals in-
also likely limits their ability to provide advice
vite competitors to attempt to hire these employ-
and mentoring to others, both of which are nec-
ees (Lazear, 1986), increasing the employees’
essary elements in fostering human capital
likelihood of leaving the organization they ini-
within an organization. For instance, DeLong,
tially worked for (Schwab, 1991). In fact, research
Gabarro, and Lees (2007) found that top perform-
suggests that star employees’ turnover rate
ers in professional service firms tend to focus
is not significantly affected by nationwide un-
too much on satisfying clients, to the point of
employment rates, when firms typically engage
neglecting their own and others’ personal skill
in only limited hiring (Lee, Gerhart, Weller, &
building. Therefore, we propose the following.
Trevor, 2008; Trevor & Nyberg, 2008)—their mo-
Proposition 5: As stars experience in- bility is robust even during economic uncer-
formation overload, they are more tainty. The “war for talent” literature shows that

FIGURE 5
In-Degree, Out-Degree, and Total Degree Centrality for Random and Affiliatory Networks

60 In-degree
random

50 Out-degree
random

40 Total degree
Centrality

random
30
In-degree
free-scale
20
Out-degree
free-scale
10
Total degree
free-scale
0
1
8
15
22
29
36
43
50
57
64
71
78
85
92
99
406 Academy of Management Review
professional industries typically hire freely from
one another and that highly pursued employees
often have little loyalty to their employers, con-
ceptualizing loyalty instead as a duty to the
larger profession (Gardner, 2005; Greenwood,
Oliver, Sahlin, & Suddaby, 2008). Much literature
focuses on the mobility of these individuals (e.g.,
Groysberg et al., 2008; Marx, Strumsky, & Flem-
ing, 2009).
We argue here that when stars are in a state
of chronic information overload, they may notice
that their performance is suffering and may
seek to remedy the situation. With the difficulty
of single-handedly managing information over-
load and the relative ease of moving to another
organization, stars are likely to become frus-
trated and exercise their options to work for
other organizations. Moving can provide them
with the opportunity to access more resources
and face fewer demands on their time and en-
ergy.5 Stars experiencing overload and then
“shooting” to competitors is a well-understood
phenomenon. For example, Tom Rath, head of
workplace consulting for Gallup, noted that
companies that require stars to share informa-
tion “can be perceived as piling on. And that’s
the quickest way to push that person out the
door” (quoted in McGregor, 2010).
When a star employee decides to leave, the
organization suffers from the loss of valuable
human capital, as well as the loss of social
capital. Shaw, Duffy, Johnson, and Lockhart
(2005) found that the loss of both human and
social capital resulting from turnover is partic-
ularly detrimental to an organization’s perfor-
mance; even when a small number of star em-
ployees leave an organization, such a loss has a
sharp negative effect on organizational perfor-
mance. Hence, the extent to which a star’s infor-
mation load can be effectively managed re-
mains a key strategic concern. As a result, we
posit the following.
Proposition 6: When stars experience
information overload, they are more
likely to leave a given organization,
stifling organizational performance.
5
We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing us to
relevant research demonstrating that star employees have a
higher likelihood of leaving their organization when they
experience information overload.
July
MANAGING STARDOM AND
INFORMATION LOAD
Prior studies have examined how to preserve
information flow in scale-free networks; these
studies show the importance of focusing on key
actors in the networks. For instance, simulations
of immunization strategies demonstrate that
when a system of random inoculation is utilized,
a network remains contagious “even after im-
munization of most of its nodes” (Cohen et al.,
2002: 23). However, when key nodes are immu-
nized, even though only a small fraction of ac-
tors receive immunization, this strategic inocu-
lation is sufficient to dramatically halt the
spread of infection. Similarly, when HR manag-
ers focus on increasing a star’s efficiency and
effectiveness, their efforts are likely to have a
profound effect in managing the side effects of
information overload for the organization as a
whole. We suggest that because networks fol-
low a nonrandom pattern, HR strategies should
follow suit and take a nonrandom approach to
curbing information overload. These strategies
should focus on the key individuals in the orga-
nization: the stars. We further suggest that when
such strategies are absent, stars in these orga-
nizations are likely to fall.
How can HR managers reduce the information
overload side effects of amassing social capi-
tal? To reduce the liabilities of a star’s abundant
social capital, HR managers can use tactics that
increase stars’ individual processing capacity,
concentrate on the organization’s characteris-
tics with respect to information flow, and bolster
the structural foundation of the star’s network
(Eppler & Mengis, 2004). To demonstrate the ef-
fect of these practices, we turn to theories of
cognition, HR management, and social networks
to examine (1) individual, (2) organizational, and
(3) structural conditions that may influence the
degree to which stars experience information
overload. We highlight that without active man-
agement of the information load, star employees
will tend to become overloaded with informa-
tion, which will likely lead to either their fall or
their decision to shoot off to other organizations.
Individual Conditions
While information overload is a likely out-
come for employees with exponentially high so-
cial capital, it is hardly a certainty. Stars have
2012 Oldroyd and Morris
the power to increase their information process-
ing capacity.6 Instructional design scholars
have demonstrated that individuals’ ability to
process information is restricted by limitations
in short-term memory (Baddeley, 1986), which
allows individuals to process only a few ele-
ments before “overloading their capacity and
decreasing the effectiveness of processing” (Ka-
lyuga, Ayres, Chandler, & Sweller, 2003: 23). Daft
and Huber (1987), Sproull and Kiesler (1991),
Whittaker, Swanson, Kucan, and Sidner (1997),
Hansen and Haas (2001), and Kostova and Roth
(2003) have argued that knowledge sharing is
limited by an actor’s inability to act on shared
information and to distinguish between reus-
able and nonusable information.
This limitation with short-term memory can be
further mitigated by developing long-term mem-
ory, which increases information processing by
applying domain-specific knowledge that orga-
nizes and categorizes information to aid in de-
cision making. Decision criteria, also known as
schemas, increase an individual’s ability to cat-
egorize and prioritize information. Information
that does not fit into existing schemas (Rumel-
hart, 1975), scripts (Schank & Abelson, 1977),
frames (Minsky, 1975), or categories (Lakoff, 1987)
requires additional effort to process, and may
even require the adaptation of existing linguis-
tic frameworks or the creation of new ones. Once
schemas are created and understood, the infor-
mation load vastly decreases. Sweller et al.
highlight that
schemas both bring together multiple elements
that can be treated as a single element and allow
us to ignore myriads of irrelevant elements.
Working memory capacity is freed, allowing pro-
cesses to occur that otherwise would overburden
working memory. Automated schemas both allow
fluid performance on familiar aspects of tasks
and— by freeing working memory capacity—
permit levels of performance on unfamiliar as-
6
One strategy for dealing with information overload is to
simply ignore much of the information one receives. While
ignoring information flow may directly benefit the star by
reducing his or her cognitive burden, it will likely undermine
cooperation and teamwork in the organization. Groysberg,
Lee, and Abrahams note the potential problems of this strat-
egy: “To get the best of your top performers, maintain a
“no-jerks” policy: Stars who don’t play well with others won’t
benefit you in the long run” (2009). Thus, we assume that
encouraging stars to ignore the problem is not a viable
solution for the stars or the organization.
407
pects that otherwise might be quite impossible
(1998: 258).
For example, Morris et al. (2009) found that
when people lack a shared vision or a shared
framework of what is important within the orga-
nization, much of the information possessed by
employees is neither transferred nor processed.
To increase stars’ information processing capa-
bilities, then, HR managers should provide them
with the opportunity to have diverse workplace
experiences, which will enable them to quickly
understand subtle nuances of information and
share that understanding with others (Tushman
& Scanlan, 1981). Furthermore, a more robust
exposure to different experiences also increases
stars’ transactive memory, honing their ability
to locate specific information (Wegner, 1986).7
In addition to efforts to increase long-term
memory, organizations can also optimize how
stars allocate their attention capacities to im-
prove information outcomes (Kanfer & Acker-
man, 1989). By designating specific times to
check email, voicemail, and texts, organizations
may reduce the cognitive processing load for
stars. These steps standardize processing re-
quirements and reduce interruptions. For in-
stance, star employees may set aside a specific
time to check email each day, ignoring it for the
rest of the day. In this way stars can focus on
information requests and send information
when they have time to fully process the infor-
mation, replying in an efficient, effective
manner.
In addition to capability, motivation may af-
fect both information processing (LePine,
Colquitt, & Erez, 2000; Sackett, Gruys, & Elling-
son, 1998; Witt & Burke, 2002) and knowledge
sharing performance (Szulanski, 2000). This
7
Although schemas may help stars speed decision mak-
ing, they may not automatically improve decision outcomes.
For instance, Malhotra notes, “When presented with ‘too
much’ information, consumers may become confused, so that
they are unable to effectively and efficiently process the
information, and/or they may adopt some heuristic process-
ing. While consumers may employ heuristics to limit the
intake of information, these heuristics may often involve a
tradeoff between simplifying and optimizing. As the work by
Wright (1975: 62) suggests, ‘simplifying and optimizing are
likely to be antagonistic goals.’ Hence, in the context of
decision making, it is entirely possible for a consumer to
adopt a choice heuristic that may limit cognitive strain but
that may not lead to the ‘best’ or even to a satisfactory
choice” (1984: 438).
408 Academy of Management Review
proves to be a serious challenge. As Lorsch and
Tierney note:
Employing stars is necessary but insufficient.
They must also be aligned; that is, they must
behave in ways that move the firm toward its
goals. . . . Unfortunately, such behavior is usually
an unnatural act. This is particularly true in PSFs
[professional service firms], where the profes-
sionals’ natural independence is compounded by
the inherently decentralized nature of the work
(2002: 26).
In a network simulation, Tang, Xi, and Ma
(2006) showed that the star actors with the most
connected nodes who were highly motivated to
share information (and not overwhelmed) were
nearly twice as effective in facilitating informa-
tion flow than were stars with average informa-
tion-sharing aspirations. Thus, by increasing a
star’s motivation, an organization may induce
him or her to dedicate more attention to infor-
mation processing (Hwang, Kettinger, & Yi, 2010;
Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989), dramatically chang-
ing information flow in the organization.
Organizations can increase motivation by rec-
ognizing and rewarding stars for their efforts. A
star’s efforts to effectively process and share
information are often inadequately rewarded.
For example, Perrow (1999) recounted an inter-
view with a star engineer. The engineer was
seen by coworkers as highly visible and produc-
tive, and, as a result, many people went to this
engineer for help.
At one point, the engineer approached the soft-
ware manager and told him that he was having
trouble balancing all the demands for his help
and completing his own deliverables. According
to the engineer, he was told, ‘Do your own work
first, and then, if you want to help others, that is
your choice, but do it on your own time’ (Perrow,
1999: 69).
In this context the star employee was actually
discouraged from sharing information with
other employees, sending a negative message
to employees and decreasing the star’s motiva-
tion to help others.
Another way to increase a star’s motivation is
to turn over more control to the star. Scholars
argue that top performers who are included in
making strategic decisions pay more attention
to the information they receive from others (Mor-
ris, Alvarez, Barney, & Molloy, 2010). This specif-
ically occurs for knowledge workers in profes-
sional service industries. Furthermore,
July
Gargiulo, Ertug, and Galunic (2009) have found
that employees can more effectively process in-
formation when they are free from the control of
network ties and the compulsion to volunteer
information. In other words, when stars can
choose whether they respond to employees, they
may be more effective than their peers at pro-
cessing large amounts of information. This ar-
gument is supported by recent research demon-
strating that people who feel a diminished
sense of power and control have significantly
impaired information processing and decision-
making faculties (Smith, Jostmann, Galinsky, &
Van Dijk, 2008). According to Hallowell (2011),
when stars feel as though they have less control
over their networks, their ability to make deci-
sions will likely decrease, as will their ability to
prioritize information, plan, organize, and im-
plement new ideas. As a result, when stars are
required to share more information with others,
rather than being able to choose when they
share information, they have a decreased ability
to cope with high information loads.
In light of these methods for improving star
employees’ long-term memory, information allo-
cation skills, and motivation to share informa-
tion, we propose the following.
Proposition 7: Increasing a star’s infor-
mation processing capabilities (in-
creasing working memory, building
efficient attention allocation capabil-
ities, and increasing his or her motiva-
tion) will increase his or her ability to
manage information and prevent
overload.
Organizational Conditions
In addition to individual factors that increase
a star’s ability to manage high information
loads, HR professionals can develop organiza-
tional processes and systems to help stars ward
off overload. For example, efficient search pro-
cesses can dramatically reduce the number of
queries sent to stars. When the stars’ colleagues
know where to find information in an organiza-
tion, they are much less likely to engage in
costly and ineffective search activities (Walsh &
Ungson, 1991). These searches, in which actors
indiscriminately query others for help, are
called “greedy” searches (Huberman & Adamic,
2004). HR activities that focus on facilitating ef-
2012 Oldroyd and Morris
ficient searches rather than greedy ones will
dramatically reduce the search burden falling
on stars.
However, these efforts are likely to be partic-
ularly challenging, since the employees en-
gaged in greedy searches are likely to find such
searches personally efficient (Adamic, Lukose,
Puniyani, & Huberman, 2001). Moreover, in affil-
iatory networks indiscriminate searches “natu-
rally gravitate towards the high degree nodes”
(Adamic et al., 2001: 5). We do not suggest here
that stars should not be involved in employee
searches; efficient search does not mean that
actors should not engage stars but, rather, that
actors should engage the right stars. Efficient
searches may also cause a reduction in the over-
all network traffic by “intentionally choosing
high degree nodes” (Adamic et al., 2001: 5) if
these nodes are the right nodes. By increasing
employees’ transactive memory, employers can
increase effective searches, which allows actors
to access information directly and efficiently
(Wegner, 1986). Developing transactive memory
merely requires knowing what all individuals
know across the organization.
Efficient search can also be encouraged by
requiring those searching for information to pay
search costs. For instance, within the World
Bank Group, project leaders have reduced stars’
processing burdens by requiring project teams
and managers from other offices to pay for stars’
time. Thus, the “costs” of processing more infor-
mation are calculated into the organization and
into the employee’s work schedule (Morris et
al., 2010).
In addition to promoting efficient search, HR
professionals may also employ information fil-
tering mechanisms and information technolo-
gies (Bawden, 2001; Edmunds & Morris, 2000),
which can help stars manage their information
burdens. Grant (1996) has argued that process-
ing information for applications requires orga-
nizational processes and information systems
that enable an individual to actually use the
information coming to him or her. These systems
codify and simplify information input, capturing
knowledge in a storage system that both pre-
serves the information and shifts the burden of
sharing it from the stars to the information sys-
tems themselves. For example, organizations
may capture a star’s valuable information in
brief “lessons learned” or some other sort of
template that allows users to directly access
409
and apply the star’s knowledge in a comprehen-
sive and readily digestible format (Morris &
Oldroyd, 2009). In addition, information systems
can work to eliminate fluctuations in the infor-
mation flow. For instance, companies can de-
crease information overload (e.g., Snell, Youndt,
& Wright, 1996) with the use of specific processes
and systems consisting of set routines or guide-
lines about how information should be received
and disseminated (Hall, 1992; Itami, 1987; Subra-
maniam & Youndt, 2005; Walsh & Ungson, 1991).
These templates can aid in overcoming the com-
plexities and strains of processing information.
Through information systems and processes,
knowledge often becomes decontextualized and
articulated in databases and other codified sys-
tems; this allows employees to more easily un-
derstand which information is helpful in which
contexts. In this regard, technology provides em-
ployees with an appropriate structural mecha-
nism to receive and share information (Brock-
bank & Ulrich, 2005; Davenport & Prusak, 1998).
For example, Morris et al. (2009) found that cod-
ifying knowledge and embedding it into exist-
ing operations allows organizations to capture,
roll out, maintain, promote, and distribute infor-
mation to others in the organization. In addition
to codifying information, organizations such as
McKinsey and Company have transitioned some
of their star employees to full-time knowledge-
sharing positions. In these positions the star
employees’ incentives for information process-
ing and sharing are cleanly aligned with their
roles in the organization (Rasiel & Friga, 2002).
HR leaders can further foster trust and mean-
ingful relationships with others within the orga-
nization. By doing so they may influence stars’
ability to effectively process information (Groys-
berg & Lee, 2008). Quality social relations with
other stars can actually decrease information
overload by altering the cognitive processes of
stars. Psychiatrists argue that, aside from indi-
viduals’ actual information processing abilities,
feelings of information overload also have a
neurological basis (Hallowell, 2011). When stars
work in environments where trust and respect
for one another proliferate, the deep centers of
the brain send messages through the pleasure
center to the area that assigns resources to the
frontal lobes. Even under extreme forms of infor-
mation overload, this sense of human connec-
tion improves the functioning of top-level exec-
utives (Hallowell, 2005). In contrast, those who
410 Academy of Management Review
work in physical isolation feel more stress from
information requests (Hallowell, 2005). As a re-
sult, we propose the following.
Proposition 8: Organizational pro-
cesses and systems (effective search,
implementing information technolo-
gies, specifying information roles, and
fostering trust) will increase a star’s
ability to prevent information overload.
Structural Conditions
Not only do individual and organizational
conditions influence the likelihood that a star
will experience overload, but HR professionals
may also affect the network’s structural proper-
ties to help stars manage their information bur-
dens. One method is to provide support staff to
stars within networks; support staff can monitor
incoming requests and information solicita-
tions, acting as information gatekeepers. Gate-
keepers make initial diagnoses with respect to
the urgency or utility of the information and then
decide whether the information should be given
to a star employee (Shumsky & Pinker, 2003). If a
gatekeeper can adequately process and dissem-
inate the information offered or requested, there
is no need to send it on to the star. The gate-
keeper can also prioritize information so the star
will know which information to address first.
Gatekeepers further act as quality control mech-
anisms, ensuring that only valuable information
reaches the star. They can also ensure that po-
tentially harmful or misrepresentative informa-
tion is not presented to the star. As a result,
network filters may influence the information
load for stars.
Another way to help manage a star’s informa-
tion burden is by narrowing the breadth of the
star’s networks. Recent work in information sci-
ence has shown that stars’ ability to manage
information dramatically increases when these
individuals are focused primarily on dense re-
ciprocal interactions. For instance, Adamic and
Adar (2002) found that when employees in an HP
lab were encouraged to interact only with peo-
ple known to reciprocate knowledge sharing, a
linear, rather than power-law, distribution of in-
formation flow emerged. By taking this research
into account, HR professionals can help focus
the information flow of stars to core, reciprocal
communications.
July
Increasing the density of a star’s network may
also play a role in managing the side effects of
his or her information flow. For example, schol-
ars suggest that stars who operate in more
closed networks within a given organization, or
in networks where employees are robustly con-
nected to one another rather than just through
the stars or central nodes, will have reduced
information burdens. Noting that information
quality deteriorates as it moves through only a
few central figures, Baker (1984) argued that
markets with more dense networks, which are
similar to random networks in which everyone
is communicating freely and rapidly, result in
decreased information burdens for the central
few. This improves organizational information
sharing on the whole.
HR professionals may also manage the effects
of information overload on stars by focusing the
benefits of the stars’ social capital on status
outcomes rather than on information outcomes.
In this respect the quality of a star’s information
processing becomes less important to the suc-
cess of the organization as a whole. For exam-
ple, Groysberg et al.’s (2008) study of star stock
analysts demonstrated how star employees lev-
eraged their status and shared standard stock
opinions with all contacts, reducing their need
to share unique and customized information.
Standardized information may be highly valued
by such a network; as a result, status may en-
able stars to increase their ability to overcome
information overload. Hence, we propose the
following.
Proposition 9: Shaping network condi-
tions (increasing network filters, net-
work density, and the value of status)
will increase a star’s ability to prevent
information overload.
IMPLICATIONS
A few key theoretical implications have
emerged from our more comprehensive theory of
information overload and the high levels of so-
cial capital for star employees. First, we devel-
oped a theory that links star employees and
cognitive constraints, suggesting that informa-
tion overload is a potential reason why some
stars fall. More specifically, we have argued
that stars are likely to possess exponentially
high levels of social capital, resulting in large
2012 Oldroyd and Morris
volumes of information flow. Because they have
exponentially higher volumes than their peers,
stars are more likely to be overloaded with in-
formation. When stars are in a state of overload,
their decision quality declines and their ability
to share information grinds to a halt, crippling
the performance of both the stars and the orga-
nizations in which they are embedded. In other
words, stars’ abundant social capital may, if not
carefully managed, cause them to fall.
Second, even though many studies note the
high mobility of star employees (e.g., Groysberg,
2010), few have explored the intrinsic reasons
why stars leave their organizations. While their
high visibility makes stars easy targets of com-
petitive hiring practices, our theory suggests
that star employees’ turnover may actually be
partially caused by the stars’ desire to avoid
information overload. In other words, instead of
dealing with information overload, stars may
opt to become “shooting stars”—joining forces
with competitors.
Third, the implications for HR professionals
who seek to increase organizational knowledge
sharing may be even more far reaching. For
decades, organizations have sought to increase
social capital by fostering knowledge, coordina-
tion, collaboration, and information flow (e.g.,
Davenport & Prusak, 1998; Szulanski, 1996;
Thompson, 1967). The theory we have developed
here places an important caveat on these efforts,
highlighting how, because of stars’ propensity
for overload, HR professionals may be better
served by focusing on alternative strategies. We
suggest that these strategies should shift from
building links to increasing stars’ information
processing capacity, aligning organizational
processes and systems to manage stars’ infor-
mation processing burdens, using technological
and human gatekeepers to guard stars’ time and
attention, and shaping information networks to
ease stars’ responsibilities. These actions may
more effectively facilitate information flow in
the organizations. Moreover, we suggest a refo-
cusing of managerial attention on stars, who are
the key sources of information in organizations.
Without them, whole organizational knowledge
sharing will likely fail.
Fourth, our theory suggests that individual
stars may benefit by preserving the value of
robust social capital. Efforts to increase long-
term memory in the form of schemas, experi-
ence, and other strategies can increase stars’
411
ability to process information. In addition, HR
professionals can emphasize aspects of the
stars’ social capital (such as status) that do not
impose a cognitive information processing bur-
den. Because the value of status is not con-
strained by cognition, stars may be better
served by leveraging their status than by lever-
aging their information. Finally, stars may move
away from managing structural redundancies
in their network—a point emphasized and in-
vestigated previously—and begin to manage
the processes by which they gain information.
Our theoretical model representing these asso-
ciations is summarized in Figure 6.
Our theory suggests several avenues of future
research. For instance, future work could ex-
plore how stars’ efforts to build social capital
may result in different types of social capital,
such as social capital that optimizes status or
social capital that optimizes knowledge flow.8
This research could investigate the performance
effects of firms that differentiate between situa-
tions in which status or reputation is paramount.
It could also investigate situations in which in-
formation processing is more important, seeking
to deleverage the information flow associated
with their stars’ network position. And it could
explore the synergies or trade-offs that exist be-
tween the two types of social capital, along with
their respective advantages.
Future research could also examine specific
HR practices that are tied to hiring employees
with greater information processing capacities.
In addition, researchers could examine prac-
tices involving training employees to deal more
effectively with information overload and to
structure work practices so as to reduce infor-
mation burdens for star employees. In this arti-
8
Prior research has identified an additional limitation to
social networks—namely, the information redundancy that
is primarily due to structural constraints. Specifically, actors
who receive redundant information will yield less value
from their social capital than actors who have more unique
information flows (Burt, 1997; Granovetter, 1995; Uzzi, 1997).
However, since stars’ performance is primarily viewed as
the ability to utilize knowledge (rather than control knowl-
edge), and since stars reside in the center (rather than the
junction) of networks (Berman, Down, & Hill, 2002; Groysberg
et al., 2008), we believe that this type of structural constraint
is less central to our discussion of stars and how they main-
tain their information advantage. Still, while information
overload differs from our structural constraints, they may
both affect a given star, leading to a type of dual constraint.
412 Academy of Management Review
FIGURE 6
Theoretical Model
The upward spiral
+ +
Affiliatory Information
Star employee
social capital
+ performance
Individual
capabilities
cle we have discussed general strategies that
organizations can take to help employees man-
age information overload. We also suggest that
some stars may be better suited than others to
deal with exponentially high levels of social
capital. Future measures could examine the ex-
tent to which individuals possess specific capa-
bilities that allow them to deal with high levels
of information flow.
Empirical research may help us understand
specific HR practices and systems that manag-
ers can incorporate to reduce the information
burden or increase the information processing
capacity of star employees. For example, Dess
and Shaw (2001) originally proposed a theoreti-
cal link between turnover, social capital, and
organizational performance. Shaw and col-
leagues (2005) later tested and extended that
theory by examining social capital on the turn-
over-performance relationship among thirty-
eight restaurant chains. In a similar vein, this
research could be extended to include specific
July
Outcomes
Individual
performance
Turnover
flow
Organizational
Organizational
Network
processes and
properties
norms
HR management tactics
HR practices and explanations of how they re-
late to stars’ ability to deal with uncommonly
elevated levels of social capital.
Further research may also address how the
theory we have delineated can, at the outset,
differentiate star employees from their average
colleagues (e.g., Hausknecht et al., 2009). Social
network analyses could be conducted on entire
employee populations across multiple organiza-
tions; these analyses could measure the extent
to which star employees are interconnected. Fu-
ture network analyses could also consider ex-
amining stars’ level of information inflow and
outflow. Psychological measures could then be
used to examine the star employees’ feelings of
being overwhelmed. This can be a difficult task,
since much of the research on work overload
and “time famine” is qualitative (e.g., Berg,
Grant, & Johnson, 2010; Perlow, 1999). For re-
searchers to understand the network and orga-
nizational factors involved, future studies
should span organizations to ensure a sample
2012 Oldroyd and Morris
variance. Then performance measurements
could consider both individual and group per-
formance appraisals and turnover.
Finally, it would be interesting to explore how
the incessant overload of stars impacts various
aspects of their performance. Does overload
cause a decrease generally across all aspects of
performance, or does it limit only certain kinds
of performance? We posit that status will likely
be unaffected by overload, but these differences
could be fruitfully examined in future empirical
research.
This article has several important limitations
and boundary conditions. First, we have focused
on the effects of robust social capital involving
an “average” star employee. However, impor-
tant differences likely exist in the characteris-
tics of star employees, particularly regarding
their ability to manage information flow. While
we have addressed such differences when dis-
cussing the management of stars and informa-
tion overload, other factors may be beneficial to
the star but harmful to the organization. For
instance, some stars may be highly narcissistic
and unwilling to share information. As a result,
these employees may act as information black
holes, into which vast information is poured
with nothing passed on to colleagues. In these
cases the information burden that the star em-
ployee bears is reduced only by reducing the
incoming information processed. In cases such
as this, it is possible to alleviate the side effects
of social capital while heightening the negative
effects on the organization. Future research
could expound upon this important nexus be-
tween social capital, information overload, and
actor motivation.
Similarly, some stars may manage excessive
levels of information flow by simply ignoring
them. This loss of information may not be due to
narcissism but, instead, may simply be a result
of a lack of priorities. One factor that allows
employees to become stars is their dedication to
a specific vision or line of work; star employees,
then, may become so absorbed in this work that
they lose track of requests for information or
forget to ask others for information when they
need it. Owing to their singular vision, they may
fail to share information with others along the
way and so may inadvertently ease their own
information burdens.
413
CONCLUSION
In sum, this article contributes to existing dis-
cussions of star employees and how organiza-
tions manage them by drawing on the social
capital, information processing, and HR man-
agement literature. We identify a unique theo-
retical link between stars, affiliatory network
effects, and information overload, calling atten-
tion to practices that might result in a subse-
quent decline in the job performance of star em-
ployees. Exploring these unique associations,
we present a new understanding of how the
information processing constraints of stars may
influence information flow and the stars’
performance.
We also refocus scholarly attention from star
employees’ structural advantages to the poten-
tially burdensome cognitive constraints of so-
cial capital, which underscores the situational
mechanism of information flow for star employ-
ees. In so doing we attempt to develop a
midlevel theory by using an internal analysis of
system behavior (Coleman, 1990). We explore
how key HR strategies targeted at the individ-
ual, organizational, and network structure-wide
levels may determine whether stars experience
overload within and across organizations. Be-
cause of the curvilinear relationship between
information overload and performance, stars
must carefully manage the information flow re-
sulting from their social capital, rather than
merely focus on increasing their social capital.
Thus, the development of this new theory of in-
formation overload for stars highlights the im-
plicit tension between the stars’ preferred social
structures—the ones that grant information re-
sources—and their ability to utilize these re-
sources for individual and organizational
benefit.
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James B. Oldroyd (jamesoldroyd@gmail.com) is an assistant professor of management

and human resources at the Fisher College of Business, The Ohio State University. He
earned his Ph.D. at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University. His
research focuses on the performance effects of social capital in international organi-
zations, including some of the darker sides of social capital, such as information
overload, brokering negative affect, and social sanctions.

Shad S. Morris (morris@fisher.osu.edu) is an assistant professor of management and

human resources at the Fisher College of Business, The Ohio State University. He
earned his Ph.D. at Cornell University. He conducts research in the area of strategic
human resource management, particularly focusing on how international organiza-
tions create value through human and social capital.