G.R. No.

185734 July 3, 2013

ALFREDO C. LIM, JR., PETITIONER,

vs.

SPOUSES TITO S. LAZARO AND CARMEN T.

LAZARO, RESPONDENTS.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

TOPIC: Provisional Remedies, Preliminary Attachment

DOCTRINE: The parties to the compromise agreement should not be

deprived of the protection provided by an attachment lien especially in
an instance where one reneges on his obligations under the
agreement, as in the case at bench, where Antonio Garcia failed to
hold up his own end of the deal, so to speak.If we were to rule
otherwise, we would in effect create a back door by which a debtor can
easily escape his creditors. The purpose of the provisional remedy of
attachment would thus be lost. It would become, in analogy, a
declawed and toothless tiger.

FACTS: Petitioner Lim Jr filed a complaint for a sum of money with a

prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the
respondent Sps Lazaro. The RTC granted the writ of preliminary
attachment application and upon the posting of the required bond
issued the corresponding writ on October 14, 2005. 3 parcels of land
owned by the respondent spouses were levied upon.

The parties later entered into a Compromise Agreement whereby Sps.

Lazaro agreed to pay Lim, Jr. the amount of P2,351,064.80 on an
installment basis, following a schedule of payments covering the
period from September 2006 until October 2013. The RTC rendered a
decision on the basis of the compromise.

Sps. Lazaro then filed an Omnibus Motion, seeking to lift the writ of
preliminary attachment annotated on the subject TCTs.

In granting the Motion, the RTC ruled that a writ of preliminary

attachment is a mere provisional or ancillary remedy, resorted to by a
litigant to protect and preserve certain rights and interests pending
final judgment. Considering that the case had already been considered
closed and terminated by the rendition of the decision based on the
compromise agreement, the writ of preliminary attachment should be
lifted and quashed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment was

properly lifted.

HELD: NO. By its nature, preliminary attachment, under Rule 57 of the

Rules of Court (Rule 57), is an ancillary remedy applied for not for its
own sake but to enable the attaching party to realize upon the relief
sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal action; it is
a measure auxiliary or incidental to the main action. As such, it is
available during its pendency which may be resorted to by a litigant to
preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the interim,
awaiting the ultimate effects of a final judgment in the case. In
addition, attachment is also availed of in order to acquire jurisdiction
over the action by actual or constructive seizure of the property in
those instances where personal or substituted service of summons on
the defendant cannot be effected.
In this relation, while the provisions of Rule 57 are silent on the length
of time within which an attachment lien shall continue to subsist after
the rendition of a final judgment, jurisprudence dictates that the said
lien continues until the debt is paid, or the sale is had under execution
issued on the judgment or until the judgment is satisfied, or the
attachment discharged or vacated in the same manner provided by
law.
Applying these principles, the Court finds that the discharge of the writ
of preliminary attachment against the properties of Sps. Lazaro was
improper.
Records indicate that while the parties have entered into a
compromise agreement which had already been approved by the RTC
in its January 5, 2007 Amended Decision, the obligations thereunder
have yet to be fully complied with – particularly, the payment of the
total compromise amount of P2,351,064.80. Hence, given that the
foregoing debt remains unpaid, the attachment of Sps. Lazaro’s
properties should have continued to subsist.
In the earlier case of Chemphil Export & Import Corporation v. CA, the
Court ruled that a writ of attachment is not extinguished by the
execution of a compromise agreement between the parties. In that
case the Court held thus:
x x x x
The case at bench admits of peculiar character in the sense that it
involves a compromise agreement. Nonetheless, x x x. The parties to
the compromise agreement should not be deprived of the protection
provided by an attachment lien especially in an instance where one
reneges on his obligations under the agreement, as in the case at
bench, where Antonio Garcia failed to hold up his own end of the deal,
so to speak.
xxxx

If we were to rule otherwise, we would in effect create a back door by

which a debtor can easily escape his creditors. Consequently, we
would be faced with an anomalous situation where a debtor, in order
to buy time to dispose of his properties, would enter into a
compromise agreement he has no intention of honoring in the first
place. The purpose of the provisional remedy of attachment would
thus be lost. It would become, in analogy, a declawed and toothless
tiger. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

In fine, the Court holds that the writ of preliminary attachment subject
of this case should be restored and its annotation revived in the
subject TCTs, re-vesting unto Lim, Jr. his preferential lien over the
properties covered by the same as it were before the cancellation of
the said writ. Lest it be misunderstood, the lien or security obtained by
an attachment even before judgment, is in the nature of a vested
interest which affords specific security for the satisfaction of the debt
put in suit. Verily, the lifting of the attachment lien would be
tantamount to an abdication of Lim, Jr.’s rights over Sps. Lazaro’s
properties which the Court, absent any justifiable ground therefor,
cannot allow.
G.R. No. 190028, February 26, 2014

LETICIA P. LIGON, Petitioner, v. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,

BRANCH 56 AT MAKATI CITY AND ITS PRESIDING JUDGE,
JUDGE REYNALDO M. LAIGO, SHERIFF IV LUCITO V. ALEJO,
ATTY. SILVERIO GARING, MR. LEONARDO J. TING, AND MR.
BENITO G. TECHICO, Respondents.

PERLAS–BERNABE, J.:

TOPIC: Provisional Remedies, Preliminary Attachment

DOCTRINE: Case law instructs that an attachment is a proceeding in

rem, and, hence, is against the particular property, enforceable
against the whole world. Accordingly, the attaching creditor acquires a
specific lien on the attached property which nothing can subsequently
destroy except the very dissolution of the attachment or levy itself.

FACTS: Petitioner Ligon filed before the QC RTC a complaint for the
collection of a sum of money with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment against the Sps. Baladjay, a certain Olivia
Marasigan (Marasigan), Polished Arrow Holdings, Inc. (Polished
Arrow), and its incorporators. The complaint alleges among others that
the spouses Baladjay enticed her to extend a short-term loan secured
by a PDC which bounced upon presentment, and that the subject
property was transferred to respondent Polished Arrow allegedly
defendants’ dummy corporation to defraud creditors. The application
for the writ was granted so the subject property was levied upon by
annotating the writ on the dorsal portion of TCT No. 9273.

While the case was pending, a similar complaint for the sum of money
damages, and cancellation of title with prayer for issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment was lodged before the RTC Makati by the Sps
Vicente against the same respondents. During the proceedings therein,
a writ of preliminary attachment also against the subject property was
issued and annotated on the dorsal portion of TCT No. 9273.

While the case is still pending in QC, the Makati RTC rendered a
decision rescinding the transfer of the subject property to Polished
Arrow upon a finding that the same was made in fraud of creditors.
Consequently, the Makati City RTC directed the Register of Deeds of
Muntinlupa City to: (a) cancel TCT No. 9273 in the name of Polished
Arrow; and (b) restore TCT No. 8502 “in its previous condition” in the
name of Rosario Baladjay. In the subsequent execution proceedings,
the property was sold at a public auction to respondent Ting.

The RTC Makati then ordered the RD under pain of contempt to issue a
new certificate in favor of Ting free from any liens and encumbrances.
Meanwhile the QC RTC ruled in favor of Ligon who sought its execution
and discovered the earlier attachment annotation in her favor has
been deleted.

ISSUE: W/N the Makati RTC gravely abused its discretion when it
ordered the deletion of Ligon’s attachment lien

HELD: YES. Case law instructs that an attachment is a proceeding in

rem, and, hence, is against the particular property, enforceable
against the whole world. Accordingly, the attaching creditor acquires a
specific lien on the attached property which nothing can subsequently
destroy except the very dissolution of the attachment or levy itself.
Such a proceeding, in effect, means that the property attached is an
indebted thing and a virtual condemnation of it to pay the owner’s
debt. The lien continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had under
execution issued on the judgment, or until the judgment is satisfied, or
the attachment discharged or vacated in some manner provided by
law. Thus, a prior registration of an attachment lien creates a
preference, such that when an attachment has been duly levied upon a
property, a purchaser thereof subsequent to the attachment takes the
property subject to the said attachment. As provided under PD 1529,
said registration operates as a form of constructive notice to all.

Notwithstanding the subsequent cancellation of TCT No. 9273 due to

the Makati City RTC’s December 9, 2004 Decision rescinding the
transfer of the subject property from Sps. Baladjay to Polished Arrow
upon a finding that the same was made in fraud of creditors, Ligon’s
attachment lien over the subject property continued to subsist since
the attachment she had earlier secured binds the property itself, and,
hence, continues until the judgment debt of Sps. Baladjay to Ligon as
adjudged in the Quezon City Case is satisfied, or the attachment
discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law. The grave
abuse of discretion of the Makati City RTC lies with its directive to
issue a new certificate of title in the name of Ting (i.e., TCT No.
19756),47 free from any liens and encumbrances. This course of
action clearly negates the efficacy of Ligon’s attachment lien and, also,
defies the legal characterization of attachment proceedings. It bears
noting that Ligon’s claim, secured by the aforesaid attachment, is
against Sps. Baladjay whose ownership over the subject property had
been effectively restored in view of the RTC’s rescission of the
property’s previous sale to Polished Arrow. Thus, Sps. Ligon’s
attachment lien against Sps. Baladjay as well as their successors-in-
interest should have been preserved, and the annotation thereof
carried over to any subsequent certificate of title, the most recent of
which as it appears on record is TCT No. 31001 in the name of
Techico, without prejudice to the latter’s right to protect his own
ownership interest over the subject property.
G.R. No. 166759 November 25, 2009

SOFIA TORRES, FRUCTOSA TORRES, HEIRS OF MARIO TORRES

and SOLAR RESOURCES, INC.,Petitioners,
vs.
NICANOR SATSATIN, EMILINDA AUSTRIA SATSATIN, NIKKI
NORMEL SATSATIN and NIKKI NORLIN SATSATIN, Respondents.

PERALTA, J.:

TOPIC: Provisional Remedies, Preliminary Attachment

DOCTRINE: This Court held that the grant of the provisional remedy
of attachment involves three stages: first, the court issues the order
granting the application; second, the writ of attachment issues
pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is
implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first obtained.
However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court
must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, for without such
jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any manner
against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind
the defendant.

FACTS: On October 25, 2002, the petitioners filed a complaint for a

sum of money and damages against herein respondents.

On October 30 2002, they filed an Ex-Parte Motition for the Issuance

of a writ of preliminary attachment alleging that the respondents are
about to depart from the Philippines that there is no other sufficient
security for the claim sought to be enforced; and that they are willing
to post a bond fixed by the court to answer for all costs which may be
adjudged to the respondents and all damages which respondents may
sustain by reason of the attachment prayed for.

On October 30, 2002, the trial court issued an Order directing the
petitioners to post a bond in the amount of P7,000,000.00 before the
court issues the writ of attachment.

On November 15, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for Deputation of

Sheriff, informing the court that they have already filed an attachment
bond. They also prayed that a sheriff be deputized to serve the writ of
attachment that would be issued by the court.
In the Order dated November 15, 2002, the RTC granted the above
motion and deputized the sheriff, together with police security
assistance, to serve the writ of attachment.

Thereafter, the RTC issued a Writ of Attachment dated November 15,

2002, directing the sheriff to attach the estate, real or personal, of the
respondents.

On November 19, 2002, a copy of the writ of attachment was served

upon the respondents. On the same date, the sheriff levied the real
and personal properties of the respondent, including household
appliances, cars, and a parcel of land located at Las Piñas, Manila.

On November 21, 2002 or two days after the writ was

implemented, summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was
served upon the respondents.

Respondents argued that the subject writ was improper and irregular
having been issued and enforced without the lower court acquiring
jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents. They maintained that
the writ of attachment was implemented without serving upon them
the summons together with the complaint. They also argued that the
bond issued in favor of the petitioners was defective, because the
bonding company failed to obtain the proper clearance that it can
transact business with the RTC of Dasmariñas, Cavite. They added that
the various clearances which were issued in favor of the bonding
company were applicable only in the courts of the cities of Pasay,
Pasig, Manila, and Makati, but not in the RTC, Imus, Cavite.

ISSUE1: W/N the bond was properly issued?

HELD1: NO. The CA correctly found that there was grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction on the part
of the trial court in approving the bond posted by petitioners despite
the fact that not all the requisites for its approval were complied with.
In accepting a surety bond, it is necessary that all the requisites for its
approval are met; otherwise, the bond should be rejected.

Every bond should be accompanied by a clearance from the Supreme

Court showing that the company concerned is qualified to transact
business which is valid only for thirty (30) days from the date of
its issuance. However, it is apparent that the Certification issued by
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) at the time the bond was
issued would clearly show that the bonds offered by Western Guaranty
Corporation may be accepted only in the RTCs of the cities of Makati,
Pasay, and Pasig. Therefore, the surety bond issued by the bonding
company should not have been accepted by the RTC of Dasmariñas,
Branch 90, since the certification secured by the bonding company
from the OCA at the time of the issuance of the bond certified that it
may only be accepted in the above-mentioned cities.

ISSUE2: W/N writ was properly implemented

HELD2: NO. In Cuartero v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the
grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves three stages:
first, the court issues the order granting the application; second, the
writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and
third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not
necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first
obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences,
the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, for
without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act
in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court
will not bind the defendant.

At the time the trial court issued the writ of attachment on November
15, 2002, it can validly to do so since the motion for its issuance can
be filed “at the commencement of the action or at any time before
entry of judgment.” However, at the time the writ was implemented,
the trial court has not acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the
respondent since no summons was yet served upon them. The proper
officer should have previously or simultaneously with the
implementation of the writ of attachment, served a copy of the
summons upon the respondents in order for the trial court to have
acquired jurisdiction upon them and for the writ to have binding effect.
Consequently, even if the writ of attachment was validly issued, it was
improperly or irregularly enforced and, therefore, cannot bind and
affect the respondents.