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Immigration Control during the Malayan Emergency: Borders, Belonging and

Citizenship, 1948–1960

Article · June 2016

DOI: 10.1353/ras.2016.0010

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 IMMIGRATION JMBrAs,
CONTROL DURING
JUNE THE89MALAYAN
2016 VoL EMERGENCY
PArt 1, NUMBEr | 35
310, pp. 35–59

Immigration Control during the

Malayan Emergency: Borders,
Belonging and Citizenship,
1948–1960

Low Choo Chin

Abstract
During the Malayan Emergency, control of Malaya’s borders and the government’s
ability to exclude undesirable elements from entering the territory were critical
to the successful prosecution of its population control policy and the overall
counter-insurgency campaign. This article examines how the British colonial
administration used immigration barriers to deter potential threats, focusing
on movement to and from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Freedom of
movement opened the Malayan door to Maoist communist infiltration, thus
impeding the anti-insurgency campaign, but the implementation of ‘exceptional’
controls over the entry and re-entry of Chinese—even covering those who were
locally born—produced a hostile public reaction within the Chinese population.

The Author
Low Choo Chin is a lecturer in the History Section, School of Distance Education,
Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM), Penang. Her research interests include
comparative citizenship, diaspora and migration studies.

Email: lowc@usm.my

Keywords
Malayan Emergency, immigration control, border, re-entry, China, citizenship
36 | LOW CHOO CHIN

Introduction
The ‘colonial emergency’ in Malaya gave rise to the unprecedented exercise of
executive power to counteract the armed struggle of the Malayan Communist Party
(MCP). Emergency Regulation (ER) 17D provided the executive institution with
almost unchecked power to order arrest and detention without trial, while ER 17C
granted executive power to order mass deportation of undesirable aliens. Termed
‘executive measures’ by David Bonner, these measures were a defining counter-
insurgency strategy in the British empire.1 Success during the Malayan Emergency
was attributed to a ‘counter-insurgency technique which placed population control
at its core’.2 According to Martin Thomas, the ‘Draconian’ emergency restriction,
if anything, was ‘colonial population control on a grand, coercive scale’.3 Wade
Markel called this population control strategy ‘draining the swamp’, effectively
isolating the insurgents from their Chinese squatter population support base.
Markel praised the physical control implemented under the Briggs Plan as the
contributory factor to British success in counteracting the communist insurgency.4
The government saw control of its borders and the ability to exclude those
it saw as potential threats—perhaps wrongly—as critical to the successful
implementation of its population control policy and the overall counter-insurgency
campaign. The civil and military control of the population was emphasized by
Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs (Director of Operations, 1952–4), General
Sir Gerald Templer (High Commissioner and Director of Operations in Malaya,
1952–4), and Oliver Lyttelton (Secretary of State for the Colonies).5 British colonial
authorities gave highest priority to ‘securing population and spatial control’ during
1950–2. Control over the internal movement of people included curfews; control of
food and shops; an identity card scheme; detention of all persons in a specified
area; mass deportation; group punishment of villages, including collective fines;
and resettlement.6 While control of internal movement has been subject to much
scholarly debate, the control on cross-border movement has yet to be studied.
Completely separating insurgents from the squatter population would not have
been possible without measures limiting the ability of communist agents to cross
borders and enter Malaya.
Control over the external movement of Chinese was crucial when Malayan
borders were vulnerable to entry and re-entry of the local Chinese temporarily
leaving Malaya for China. After the communist takeover of China, the movement
of Malayan Chinese to their home country was cause for concern among the
British colonial authorities; transnational movement of local Chinese to and
from mainland China was deemed a deadly threat to Malaya’s national security.
One of the greatest security worries for the British was communist infiltration
of the Malayan borders and the use of the alien Chinese population as the fifth
column. Pan-Malayan immigration control had been given substantial legal

1
Bonner (2007: ix).
2
Hack (2009a: 124).
3
Thomas (2014: 138).
4
Markel (2006: 37).
5
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this point. Refer to Stubbs (1989:
Chapter 6) and Ramakrishna (2002: Chapter 5).
6
Hack (2009b: 385, 388).
 IMMIGRATION CONTROL DURING THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY | 37

and administrative consideration; according to a 1950 newspaper editorial, the

Federation and Singaporean governments were ‘watching immigration with a
critical and nervous attention unknown in pre-war years’.7
This paper is an account of the major attempt made by Malayan British
authorities to protect their national security by refusing re-entry, even to local-
born residents. The Malayan Emergency gave rise to a ‘state of exception’, a phrase
coined by Giorgio Agamben, which justified the ‘exceptional’ treatment towards
non-citizens.8 Facing an insurgency war, Malayan authorities were confronted with
the need to restrict the cross-border flow of people. Accelerating the anti-terrorist
campaign required the removal, and barrier to admission, of undesirable Chinese
elements. I have discussed the movement of people out of Malaya elsewhere.9
This article deals with the movement of people into Malaya and highlights the
importance of immigration control as a major counter-insurgency strategy. It looks
at the issue of British colonial immigration control through the lens of Foreign
Office files, proceedings of the Legislative Council, council papers, legislation,
the annual report of the Immigration Department, MCA papers, Straits Times
newspapers, and a few Colonial Office files.
This paper traces the policy debates on each of the immigration control laws
enacted during the Malayan Emergency and the Chinese public reaction towards
the immigration barrier.10 First, I will examine the origins of immigration control as
a counter-insurgency strategy. Second, I will review the debates on the Emergency
(Travel Restriction) Regulations of 1949, the Passport (Amendment) Regulations
of 1950, the Emergency (Immigration Ordinance) Regulations of 1952, and the
Immigration (Prohibition of Entry Order) of 1953. Third, I will analyse the politics
of immigration and citizenship and suggest that immigration control intersects
with the broader issue of membership and belongingness. In fact, immigration
control provoked a considerable emotional reaction among the Malayan Chinese
public in the Federation of Malaya and Singapore. As such, an examination of the
entry and exit mechanism in place during the Malayan Emergency will highlight
the redefinition of aliens and citizens.11 We will see that the political parties were
divided on which categories of Chinese residents were to be subject to stricter
enforcement control.

7
The Straits Times, 13 November 1950. All sources used in this article from the Straits Times
were accessed online through NewspaperSG: http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/
default.aspx
8
Thanks to another anonymous reviewer for suggesting this reading. Agamben (2005).
9
Low (2014).
10
The organization of this paper owes much to an anonymous reviewer, who suggested
that the author trace the development of the immigration legislation and situate the
discussion according to each phase of the legislative development.
11
Purcell (1954: 116).
38 | LOW CHOO CHIN

Erecting the Immigration Barrier: Future Policy on

Chinese Immigration into the British Colonies
Three explanations were given by Malayan government authorities at the time
for the fundamental control of Chinese immigration to Malaya. First, ending the
travelling habits of overseas Chinese was particularly difficult because Chinese
migrants were very transient. The Chinese migrants were well-known ‘sojourners’.
Occasional visits home were made. Their motives for visiting China included a
desire to visit their families; Chinese familial obligations with respect to deceased
parents; a desire to marry another Chinese; a desire to re-visit the homeland; and
curiosity about conditions in New China.12 The immigration authorities believed
that ‘individuals with residence claims in Malaya might well be indoctrinated
when they visited their home’.13 Commissioner-General of the United Kingdom
in Southeast Asia, Malcolm MacDonald, believed that ‘it would be undesirable to
attempt to put an end to the peripatetic habits of the overseas Chinese’; instead,
he anticipated devising a system of exit and entry permits.14 Chinese travellers
were on the priority enforcement list of the Immigration Department. After the
communist takeover of China, the movement of Malayan Chinese to their home
country was given serious consideration by the British colonial authorities.
Second, Chinese aggression was considered an imminent danger in the near
future of 1949. Control over the physical movement of the Chinese was crucial
when Malayan borders were vulnerable to entry and re-entry of local Chinese
temporarily leaving Malaya for China. One of the greatest security worries of
the British was communist infiltration of the Malayan borders and use of the
alien Chinese population as the fifth column.15 There was a constant threat that
the Chinese community was, at best, unwilling to resist the spread of Chinese
communism or, at worst, acting directly for a communist China. The existence
of the Chinese community, according to the Foreign Office, ‘presents dangerous
possibilities for disruption from within, since all these Chinese must be regarded
as potential agents of their government’.16 Communist success in China had a
substantial effect on the security problem in Malaya. Malayan Chinese were
reluctant to ‘commit themselves to a pro-Government policy’ since ‘they were
unwilling to compromise their future and connections with that country’.17
Third, severe restriction of immigration was essential to the Malayanization
process and to eliminating communal division. In order to weld the various racial

12
Letter from R. N. Broome, Secretary for Chinese Affairs to J. F. Brewis, 30 January 1953,
United Kingdom National Archives (TNA), Foreign Office (hereafter FO) 371/105340, FC
1823/13. All FO sources used in this article from the TNA were accessed online through
Archives Direct: http://www.archivesdirect.amdigital.co.uk.ezp.lib.unimelb.edu.au.
13
Foreign Office Minute, Mr. Scarlett, 25 May 1949, FO 371/75935, F7707.
14
Ibid.
15
The United Kingdom in South-East Asia and the Far East: memorandum prepared for
Cabinet by the Permanent Under-Secretary of State’s Committee in the Foreign Office,
Oct 1949, Colonial Office (henceforth CO) 967/84, no. 69, in Stockwell (1995: 167).
16
Ibid., in Stockwell (1995: 159).
17
Security situation: despatch no. 4 from Sir H. Gurney to Mr. Creech Jones. Enclosure:
paper by Lieutenant-Colonial Gray and Major-General Boucher, 11 April 1949, CO
537/4751 in Stockwell (1995: 131).
 IMMIGRATION CONTROL DURING THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY | 39

groups together, immigration must be ‘restricted to the upmost possible limit’.18 It

would be difficult to achieve racial accord ‘as long as the door is left open for even
more raw material to come in’.19 Victor Purcell, a Malayan Civil Service Officer and
an academician, was right to point out that the British and the Rulers of the Malay
States, ‘having allowed unrestricted immigration for many years found themselves
confronted by a situation that could be justly met only by the encouragement of a
Malayan spirit and by the creation of a Malayan citizenship’.20
At the Commissioner-General’s Conference on 8 August 1948, Chinese
immigration was brought to the forefront of political debates. Problems created
by the Chinese factor in British territories in Southeast Asia and a tremendous
increase in the Chinese population in the Federation required severe control over
future immigration. In 1948, the Chinese population in the following areas was
as follows: Singapore: 78%, Federation of Malaya: 39%, Sarawak: 27%, and North
Borneo: 14%.21 The British Defence Co-ordination Committee considered that ‘the
infiltration of Chinese into British territories in South East Asia must be stemmed…
there should be a rigid control over Chinese immigration in [the] future’.22 In the
past, Chinese immigration had been motivated by economic needs; politics and
security were the main considerations in determining a new immigration policy
in the post-war context. The presence of a large Chinese alien population, who
looked to China as their homeland, would further complicate Malayan political
development and the promotion of self-government.23 In terms of security, the
government was confronted with the problem of Chinese squatters suspected of
supporting the MCP which required mass operational and financial repatriation.
Any new Chinese immigrants would render repatriation:ineffective: ‘It would in
any case be difficult to reconcile the repatriation of Chinese from one territory with
encouragement of immigration from China into another.’24
At the ninth Commissioner-General’s Conference held on 22 and 23 January
1949 at Bukit Serene, Johore, the future policy regarding Chinese immigration
was debated. The economic needs of the British territories did not call for
any further Chinese immigration. Should the need arise in the future, British
colonial authorities in Southeast Asia were advised to source from other British
territories. The security, defence, economic, and political needs required that
Chinese immigration ‘be reduced to an absolute minimum’.25 It was agreed at the
conference that ‘the policy of severe restriction of Chinese immigrants into the
Federation, Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo should be confirmed

18
Disorder and ways of enlisting Chinese support: letter from Sir F. Gimson to Sir T.
Lloyd, Annex: memorandum by T. P. F. McNeice, G. C. S. Adkins and G. W. Webb, 8 Dec
1948, CO 537/3758 in Stockwell (1995: 87).
19
Ibid.
20
The Straits Times, 5 April 1949.
21
Memorandum on the problem of Chinese Immigration, Commissioner-General’s Office,
Singapore, September 1948, Conference Paper No. 9, paragraph 3, Arkib Negara Malaysia
(ANM) CO 537/4871.
22
Ibid., paragraph 2.
23
Ibid., paragraph 14.
24
Ibid., paragraph 15.
25
Minutes of the ninth Commissioner-General’s Conference held at Bukit Serene on 22nd
and 23rd January 1949, TNA, FO 371/75934, F 3058, p. 19.
40 | LOW CHOO CHIN

and adopted’.26 A controversial resolution adopted at the conference stipulated the

‘absolute prohibition of the entry of officials and agents of foreign political parties’.
This led to the problem of applying the policy without exclusively targeting the
Chinese agents.27
However, it was difficult to refuse transit visas to Chinese diplomatic
representatives since it would be regarded as a discriminatory move against the
PRC, especially when the British were seeking to establish diplomatic relations with
the PRC.28 Another issue of concern at the Bukit Serene conference was prohibiting
re-admission to the British territories. As far as the Federation was concerned, the
practice had been to issue two-year re-entry permits. The High Commissioner,
Henry Gurney, wanted to revoke all existing re-entry permits under the Emergency
Regulations and to require the persons concerned to make a new application for
re-entry.29 Enforcement measures suffered mostly from unfeasibility. Authorities in
the British territories had taken every possible measure to check the movement to
and from mainland China, but it would have been impossible to enact legislation
which ensured that those travelling to China would never return.30
For Gurney, repatriation to China and control of immigration from China
were both necessary ingredients in the success of counter-insurgency. The Chinese
position in the Federation deteriorated when they were vulnerable to communist
terror on one hand and the intensification of Malay nationalism on the other.31 The
restriction on Chinese immigration into the Federation was gaining importance
with the failing prospect of Malaya’s repatriation programme. Repatriation of
Chinese detainees, suspected of supporting the MCP, had stopped in September
1949 due to the closure of Swatow port. After the promulgation of the Emergency
Regulations, the Chinese were repatriated at the rate of 2,000 a month.32 Hack
shows how deportation (together with detention and resettlement) shaped the
British counter-insurgency efforts against rural Chinese, who allegedly supported
the MCP. The number of repatriated Malayans, including dependants, was 380
(1948), 10,262 (1949), 2,804 (1950), 8,719 (1951), 5,575 (1952), 2,098 (1953), 915 (1954),
and 496 (1955), of whom 92.7 per cent were ethnic Chinese.33 Gurney believed the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was arranging for the infiltration of banished
Malayan deportees. It was believed that the CCP’s intention was to build up a force
of 2,500 men; in response, Gurney urged the tightening of immigration control.34
A working party—set up to provide recommendations on the sudden halt on
repatriation following the fall of China to communism—suggested that a necessary
corollary of any scheme for the repatriation of Chinese detainees is the tightening

26
Ibid., pp. 19 & 25.
27
Ibid., p. 23.
28
Minutes by P. D. Coates, 10 March 1949, TNA, FO 371/75934, F 3058.
29
Ibid., p. 22
30
Letter from J. F. Brewis to J. M. Addis, Foreign Office, 18 November 1953, TNA, FO
371/105340, FC 1823/13.
31
The Straits Times, 23 November 1948.
32
Memorandum: Repatriation to China. Note by Henry Gurney, 31 May 1950, TNA, FO
371/83542, FC 1822/22.
33
Hack (2015: 628).
34
Letter from Henry Gurney to J. J. Paskin, Colonial Office, 16 March 1950, TNA, FO
371/84549, FC 1903/41.
 IMMIGRATION CONTROL DURING THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY | 41

up of control over immigration into Malaya’.35 The Working Party was aware that
potential deportees (and their dependants) might possess a re-entry permit known
as a Certificate of Admission issued under the Aliens Ordinance. In the interest of
public security, these certificates were to be cancelled prior to their repatriation.36
Consequently, re-entry of any Chinese leaving Malaya was undertaken under the
revision of a new Immigration Control Ordinance (as well as other immigration
regulations and orders).37
Restriction on entry and re-entry of any undesirable aliens was imposed by
immigration controls during the Malayan Emergency through the legislation listed
in Table 1.38

Table 1: Chronology of Immigration Control Legislation during the Malayan

Emergency, 1948–1960

Title
1) Emergency (Aliens
Immigration) Regulations, 1948
G.N. 3254/48
2) Emergency (Travel Restriction)
Regulations, 15 October 1948
L.N. 17/49.246/49
3) Emergency (Passengers
Restriction Ordinance Extended
Application) Regulations, 15
December 1949
Purpose
Aliens who were deemed to be illegal
immigrants were liable to deportation to
the country of their birth or citizenship
Permission required by all persons,
excluding the local-born, landing in
Malaya
Regulating the right to enter and remain
in the Federation with an entry permit
Application of the Passengers’ Restriction
Ordinance of the Straits Settlements to the
Malay States during the continuance of the
Emergency

L.N. 615/24.12.49
4) Emergency (Aliens Ordinance
Extended Application)
Regulations, 15 December 1949
L.N. 614/24.12.49
Application of sections 9 and 22A of the
Aliens Ordinance of the Straits Settlements
to the Malay States during the continuance
of the Emergency

35
Report on the disposal of Chinese detainees and banishees at present in Singapore or
the Federation, 1 June 1950, TNA, FO 371/83542, F 1822/24, paragraph 25.
36
Ibid., paragraph 26.
37
Ibid., paragraph 27.
38
An anonymous reviewer suggested constructing a table specifying a chronology of
immigration legislation. This suggestion helps greatly to better orgamize the structure
of this paper.
42 | LOW CHOO CHIN

5) The Passport Introduced the need for a re-entry visa

(Amendment) Regulations,
1 October 1950
6) Emergency (Immigration
Ordinance) Regulations, 1952,
(No. 3 of 1952)
[Hereafter the Immigration
Ordinance, 1952]
7) The Immigration (Prohibition
of Entry) Order, 1953
L.N 210/24.04.53
for those leaving Malaya and wishing
to return, whose only travel document
was a Certificate of Admission. A similar
amendment was passed in Singapore in
October 1950. Any non-British Chinese
resident of Singapore was now required to
apply for a re-entry visa. Effective 1 July
1951, the re-entry visas system applied in
the Federation and Singapore
Persons entitled to enter without Permit or
Pass:
a) Federal citizens, British subjects born
in Malaya, British subjects ordinarily
resident in Malaya, naturalised British
subjects, and the wives and children of
these categories.
b) Civil servants, members of H.M.
Forces, Commonwealth, diplomatic,
and consular representatives, and
those immunised under the Diplomatic
Privileges Ordinance.
Any person who is not specified above
is a ‘prohibited immigrant’ and an Entry
Permit is required
In the Federation and Singapore,
permanent entry and permanent residence
were given to:
a) Persons with professional and
specialist qualifications
b) Persons having contract employment
c) Skilled artisans
d) Persons whose entry is in the economic
interest of the state
e) Wives and their children under 18
years of age
f) The wives and children of persons
already resident
g) Commonwealth citizens (fulfilling
certain criteria)
h) Persons whose entry is justified on
special compassionate grounds

Sources: Compiled from the original regulations available from 1) Federation of Malaya
(1953b), 2) Federal Secretariat File RCP/FS/1606/49; 3) Federation of Malaya (1952a), 4)
Federation of Malaya (1954). For further explanation, refer to Straits Times ‘Passport Ruling
 IMMIGRATION CONTROL DURING THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY | 43

Hits Chinese’, 1 August 1949; Straits Times, ‘Reds waiting to return: Govt. defends new re-
entry Regulations’, 17 January 1951; Straits Times, ‘Stricter Travel Restrictions’, 30 June 1951.

The following sections identify the implications of a series of immigration

laws on the different groups of people granted or denied entry to Malaya and
Singapore. These laws, which sought to restrict the right of re-entry of local-born
and permanent resident aliens, generated heated debates and brought up the issue
of belongingness in both colonial territories.

The Emergency (Travel Restriction) Regulations, 1949

Two Emergency Regulations (Nos. 1 and 2 in Table 1) governing entry were
promulgated by the High Commissioner (in exercise of the powers conferred upon
him by section 4 of the Emergency Regulations Ordinance, 1948): the Emergency
(Aliens Immigration) Regulations, and the Emergency (Travel Restriction)
Regulations. According to the Emergency (Aliens Immigration) Regulations 1948,
aliens who were deemed to be illegal immigrants were liable to deportation to
the country of their birth or citizenship.39 The Emergency (Travel Restriction)
Regulations 1948, as applicable beginning 1 February 1949, prohibited entry into
the Federation to any person unless an entry permit was first obtained. The
Regulations made it compulsory for all persons, excluding the local-born, to have
an entry permit to enter and remain in the Federation.40
Amendments to the Emergency (Travel Restriction) Regulations in August
1949 restricted the entry into Malaya of residents who elected to travel on foreign
passports. It affected many local-born Chinese in the Federation and Singapore who
travelled on documents issued by the Chinese consulates and were now required
to obtain an entry permit. Four categories of persons were exempted from applying
for entry permits: 1) British subjects born in Malaya, 2) British subjects ordinarily
resident in Malaya who had not elected to travel on foreign passports, 3) persons
born in the Federation of Malaya who had not elected to travel on foreign passports,
and 4) members of the British naval, military, and air forces and their dependants.41
The people of Singapore were now treated like ‘aliens’ and ‘strangers’ under the
Federation’s travel restrictions. All British subjects born in Singapore wishing to
enter the Federation were required to have an entry permit and were otherwise
liable to arrest and deportation. A similar amendment to the Emergency (Travel
Restriction) Ordinance was passed in the Singapore Legislative Council in July 1949,
closing its door to Federation-born persons and British subjects ‘who [have] elected
to carry a foreign passport’. Holders of a Chinese passport needed to obtain a permit
to enter Singapore.42 In a May 1951 amendment to the Emergency (Travel Restriction)
Regulations, the authorities were authorized to cancel any permit entry, vary

39
Section 3 of Emergency (Aliens Immigration) Regulations 1948 available in the
Federation of Malaya, The Emergency Regulation Ordinance 1948. Amendments made
up to the 31st March 1953, p. 55.
40
Section 3 (1) of the Emergency (Travel Restriction) Regulations 1948 available in the
Federation of Malaya, The Emergency Regulation Ordinance 1948. Amendments made
up to the 31st March 1953, p. 147.
41
The Straits Times, 1 August 1949.
42
The Straits Times, 29 July 1949.
44 | LOW CHOO CHIN

conditions, and extend the period of validity of any permit entry ‘if he has reason
to believe that it is necessary in the interests of public security to do so’. The move
targeted suspicious Chinese visitors to Malaya during the ongoing Emergency.43
A main impediment to immigration control was the lack of a federal law that
applied to all of Malaya. As a result, a completely new Immigration Ordinance
was introduced into both Legislative Councils. Before the new Immigration Bill
was ready, it was an urgent security requirement that immigration control should
be tightened up. In 1949, the High Commissioner approved two Emergency
Regulations: the Emergency (Passengers Restriction Ordinance Extended
Application) Regulation and the Emergency (Aliens Ordinance Extended
Application) Regulation (Nos. 3 and 4 in Table 1).44 These regulations extended
the Straits Settlements legislation throughout the Federation of Malaya; these
included the Passengers Restriction Ordinance and the Aliens Ordinance of the
Straits Settlements (Sections 9 and 22 A). The Straits Settlements legislation was the
most comprehensive law in force in the Federation, designed to apply immigration
control to the main ports of entry into Malaya. However, authorities experienced
difficulty enforcing the laws due to deficiencies in immigration control in Kelantan,
Terengganu, and some other states. There were no adequate powers for the control
of alien seamen arriving at Federation ports other than Penang, or for the control of
British subjects (mainly Indians) applying for entry by land through immigration
control posts on the Thailand border.45

Re-entry: The Passport (Amendment) Regulations

of 1950 and the Chinese Reaction
The next legislative landmark was the Passport (Amendment) Regulations (No. 5 in
Table 1), which came into effect on 1 October 1950. The new regulations introduced
the need for a re-entry visa as a security measure for those leaving Malaya and
wishing to return. This was applicable to persons whose only travel document
was a Certificate of Admission.46 The Certificate of Admission was in effect a
certificate of residence, which allowed its holders to leave and return to the country
freely without permission or formality (prior to the introduction of new re-entry
regulations). Between 1 and 24 October 1950, all 2,700 re-entry visa applications
(1,100 visas issued in Singapore and 1,600 visas issued in the Federation) were
approved. Out of the 1,100 visas issued by Singapore, 186 were for visits to China.
The immigration authorities reiterated that the re-entry system was ‘purely a
security measure’ rather than an ‘exclusion order’.47 From April to September
1950, 11,229 Chinese arrived in Singapore and the Federation from China; of these,

43
The Straits Times, 30 May 1951; 31 May 1951.
44
The Emergency (Passengers Restriction Ordinance Extended Application) Regulation
and the Emergency (Aliens Ordinance Extended Application) Regulations, available in
ANM, RCP/FS/1606/49.
45
Letter from J. Gullick, Federal Secretariat KL to the State Secretaries on ‘Proposed
Emergency Regulations on Immigration control in the Federation’, 26 November 1949,
ANM, RCP/FS/1606/49.
46
The Straits Times, 5 October 1950.
47
The Straits Times, 24 October 1950.
 IMMIGRATION CONTROL DURING THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY | 45

10,356 were Malayan residents returning from a stay in China on a Certificate of

Admission granted before they left. Only 873 of them were new immigrants, the
majority of whom were wives of Chinese residents.48
From a legal perspective, the three-month visa was necessary since an alien
Chinese had no passport and because the Certificate of Admission he held as
a Malayan immigrant was not a travel document. However, three months was
hardly sufficient for Malayan Chinese residents to travel to Hong Kong by sea,
visit relatives in China, and return to Singapore. The Chinese Advisory Board
in Singapore recommended that the visa period be extended to six months. The
Singapore authority was urged to extend the period regardless of the Federation’s
policy, which might have assumed that any Chinese travelling to China for six
months must have been indoctrinated with Communism.49
In Singapore, Chinese public opinion was extremely critical of the new visa
regulations. Before the Emergency, 300,000 non-local-born Chinese residents
did not have a British passport but could travel with a Certificate of Admission.
This freedom of movement was a ‘great convenience’ to Singaporean Chinese
businessmen in neighbouring countries and ordinary Singapore residents who
made frequent return visits to China and Hong Kong. This right of re-entry ended
with the Emergency (Travel Restriction) Regulations, 1949. Though all non-local-
born Singapore residents were required to obtain a re-entry permit for security
reasons, the regulation did not arouse objection from the local Chinese population.
It was only when the Governor-in-Council passed the Passport (Amendment)
Regulations in October 1950 without the Legislative Council that the Chinese
protested. On 12 December 1950, 279 Chinese guilds and associations, headed by
the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce (SCCC), voiced their dissatisfaction
with the Legislative Council, sending a petition to Governor Franklin Gimson
and a separate petition to London to revoke the new Passport (Amendment)
Regulations. 50 The amendment nullified the function of the Certificate of
Admission meaning the certificate was no longer recognized as a travel document
for any non-British Chinese resident of Singapore, who was now required to apply
for a re-entry visa from the Immigration Department. These regulations, according
to the petitioners, were ‘vexing, harassing and oppressive’. The lives, business
activities, and travel of the Chinese were severely affected under the new system.51
In January 1951, the SCCC introduced a motion in the Singapore Legislative
Council to challenge the Passport (Amendment) Regulations of 1950, which
required every alien resident wishing to leave for any country to apply for a visa.
The motion, seconded by the Indian Chamber of Commerce, demanded that as of
23 September 1950, every holder of a Certificate of Admission should be allowed to
return to Malaya without being subject to restrictions imposed by the amendment
to the Passport Regulations of 1950. The motion was rejected in the Council by 13
votes to 6. The Colonial Secretary, W. L. Blythe, stated: ‘We are at present in a state

48
The Straits Times, 7 November 1950.
49
If a person travelling outside of Malaya overstayed the three months of the original
three-month visa, the person had to make a fresh application for a visa. The Straits Times,
16 November 1950.
50
The Straits Times, 10 March 1951.
51
The Straits Times, 23 December 1950.
46 | LOW CHOO CHIN

of war— there is a war in Korea and there is a war on our own doorstep in Malaya
today.’ He added that ‘there were people leaving this country for foreign countries
for indoctrination in communism’. Blythe regretted that the restrictions had to
be introduced immediately to ensure the security of the Colony, invalidating any
active Certificates of Admission.52
From the government’s perspective, the inconvenience experienced by many
alien residents of Singapore was ‘a small price to pay to ensure the security of the
Colony’. The government believed that ‘a small group of people’ were undergoing
specific courses of indoctrination in Communism to return to the Colony as agents
or propagandists. Moreover, they believed that the Peking government ensured
that every returned overseas Chinese was ‘re-educated’ before leaving China.53
Having lost the legislative battle, the SCCC petitioned the Secretary of State for
the Colonies in London, James Griffiths. The petition, dated February 1951, asked
for an exemption for those who had gone abroad before the established practice
was changed.54 The China-born community also expressed their distrust in the
colonial government: ‘The Chinese community are convinced that the reasons
stated by the Government for the introduction of the new Regulations are invalid
and unjust, and this has caused a most serious suspicion and distrust towards
Government….’55
Though the petitions to Gimson and Griffiths failed, the Singaporean Chinese
protest yielded some favourable outcomes, albeit minor. Both the Federation of
Malaya and Singaporean governments granted a ‘wise’ concession to Chinese public
opinion. In their joint announcement, it was agreed that persons who left the country
for visits to China before the regulation requiring a re-entry visa was introduced
would not have to obtain a visa if they returned by 30 June 1951. Those who returned
after the deadline would be subject to a re-entry visa in addition to standard
screening under the Emergency Travel Regulations. The Chinese opposition on
travel facilities to China and visas receded following the concession.56
On 30 June 1951, stricter controls on travel between Malaya and Communist
countries were announced. Beginning 1 July 1951, the re-entry visa system applied
to all holders of Certificates of Admission who wished to leave the country
temporarily. An estimated 15,000 to 20,000 of these certificate holders lived
outside of Malaya. Applications from youths aged 16 to 30 underwent particularly
heavy scrutiny and would only be approved if their journeys were necessary for
business or private reasons. The Director of Immigration, S. E. King, rationalized
the restriction ‘in view of the opportunities afforded by existing travel facilities
for persons, normally domiciled in Malaya, to enjoy long periods of residence in a
country where they are subject to Communist influence and are liable to become
indoctrinated with Communist ideas’.57 According to the Secretary for Chinese
Affairs of Singapore, R. N. Broome, all Chinese returning from visits to China were
examined by the Special Branch Travel Control Section. A detailed statement would

52
The Straits Times, 17 January 1951.
53
Ibid.
54
The Straits Times, 28 February 1951.
55
The Straits Times, 10 March 1951.
56
The Straits Times, 3 May 1951.
57
The Straits Times, 30 June 1951.
 IMMIGRATION CONTROL DURING THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY | 47

be recorded from any returnee who appeared willing to give factual information
on conditions in China. Further interrogation would be arranged as appropriate.58

Table 2: Arrivals from countries outside Malaya into the Federation and
Singapore, 1949–1951

Number entering or Number entering or

Total Arrivals in
Year disembarking in the disembarking in the
Malaya
Federation Colony
1949 103,057 110,815 213,872
1950 179, 968 94,712 274, 680
1951 230,196 95,769 325,965

* There was an excess of 30, 631 departures from Malaya over arrivals in Malaya for the
year 1951.
Source: Federation of Malaya, Immigration Department Annual Report, 1951.

Table 3: Arrivals and Departures by Racial Group into Malaya from Abroad,
1951

Race Singapore Federation of Malaya Total

Arrivals of Arrival Departure Excess Arrival Departure Excess Arrival Departure Excess
Passengers by (+) or (+) or (+) or
Land, Sea and Deficit Deficit Deficit
Air (-) (-) (-)
European 28,312 28,389 -77 3,725 1,930 +1,795 32,037 30,319 +1,718
Eurasian 273 146 +127 87 37 +50 360 183 +177
Chinese 40,201 65,906 -25705 37,236 47,861 -10,625 77,437 113,767 -36,330
Malaysian 4,680 8,002 -3322 135,452 134,600 +852 140,132 142, 602 -2,470
Indian and 18,609 18,940 -331 32,069 25,643 + 6,426 50,678 44,583 +6,095
Pakistani
Japanese 6 3 +3 - - - 6 3 +3
Other Races 3,688 3,480 +208 21,627 21,659 -32 25,315 25,139 +176
TOTAL 95,769 124,866 -29,097 230,196 231,730 -1,534 325,965 356,596 -30,631

Source: Federation of Malaya, Immigration Department Annual Report, 1951.

58
Letter from R. N. Broome, Secretary for Chinese Affairs to J. F. Brewis, 30 January 1953,
TNA, FO 371/105340, FC 1823/13.
48 | LOW CHOO CHIN

Transnational Movement of Chinese

Students with Dual Nationality
Students travelling to China for educational purposes were on the priority
enforcement list of the immigration authorities. In 1953, the estimated number of
student-age Chinese returning to China was 1,030 for Singapore and the Federation
of Malaya, 375 for Sarawak, 200 for North Borneo, 800–900 for Hong Kong and
2000–3000 for Indonesia. The two-way student traffic to and from the People’s
Republic was rigorously checked. Local authorities believed that the MCP and
Chinese communists were targeting Federal citizens and encouraging them to go
to China, since ‘these would stand a better chance of getting back’.59
Immigration officers in the various British territories were trying to implement
administrative measures to ensure that Chinese youths who went back to China for
further studies would not be able to return. Except in Indonesia and Burma, where
the PRC enjoyed diplomatic representation, the People’s Republic had lost touch
with their overseas Chinese. Similar to the past practice of the former Kuomintang
(KMT) government, the PRC was actively encouraging overseas Chinese to return
to China by offering assisted passage, free education, and good jobs. The British
expected that some of these youths would be sent back to Southeast Asia for
subversive purposes, and thus ‘their return also must be considered undesirable
from the point of view of the South East Asian territories’.60 The governments of
the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo found
it objectionable to allow the freedom of movement between China and British
territories, which was ‘bound to create in time a most dangerous situation’.61
The prevention of their return, however, presented complications. Difficulties
arose as most of these Chinese students were dual nationals—they were China
nationals as well as British subjects or British protected persons—making it
legally impossible to prevent their return under immigration laws. A number of
alternatives were discussed to devise a means of barring Communist-indoctrinated
students from returning to Malaya during the Governors’ Conference held at Bukit
Serene on 22 August 1950. The recommendations that emerged from the conference
included: 1) depriving Chinese dual nationals of their British nationality if they
showed superior loyalty to the country of their second nationality; 2) amending the
Deportation Bill to include British subjects with dual nationality; 3) withholding
the issuance of British passports to persons wishing to proceed to China for
educational purposes, or at least restricting their validity to certain countries; 4)
amending the Emergency (Travel Restriction) Regulations 1948 to require every
person to have an entry permit; and 5) enabling an exclusion order to be made
against any undesirable person. The legal, political, and diplomatic complexity
of the problem begged the careful devising of the proposed legislation without
explicitly directing it against the Chinese.62

59
Letter from J. F. Brewis to J. M. Addis, Foreign Office, 18 November 1953, TNA, FO
371/105340, FC 1823/13.
60
Ibid.
61
Telegram from Acting Deputy Commissioner General South East Asia to James Griffiths,
24 September 1950, TNA, FO 371/83545, FC 1825/1.
62
Ibid.
 IMMIGRATION CONTROL DURING THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY | 49

In Malaya alone, there were about 200–300 students travelling to China a

year in 1950, not including those returning for family reasons. The next document
to attempt to restrict the movement of Chinese students was a memorandum
prepared by the Colonial Office, titled ‘Movement of Chinese students to and from
China and British territories in South East Asia’, on 8 November 1950. In it, two
lines of action were recommended to prevent the exit from and entry into Malaya
of students travelling to China. First, it was suggested that passport facilities be
withheld from those wishing to receive a Communist education in China; in
other words, the immigration authorities could be used to withhold or withdraw
passports. According to the memorandum, passport facilities should be denied on
the grounds of national security. Even if direct travel to China was prohibited, the
person could still return to China through transit countries with Chinese consuls.63
The second line of action suggested was amending the Emergency (Travel
Restrictions) Regulations 1948 to require every person (including British subjects)
to possess an entry permit for admission into the Federation and Singapore. Public
announcements on travel restrictions were made by the Malayan authorities.
Any student who failed to comply with the new exit and entry regulations was
responsible for any resulting hardship.64 A similar course of action was proposed
for the Borneo territories, although there was no declared state of emergency.
Nevertheless, the British had reason to believe that the Chinese population
was a potential target for Chinese communist imperialism to take root. The
memorandum concluded that ‘it would be criminal folly to permit the free
movement of these people between China and the homelands’.65
The Foreign Office disagreed with refusing to issue passports to Chinese
travellers of dual nationality. The national security aim was to be achieved by the
operation of administrative control rather than depriving dual-national Chinese of
their British nationality. The latter would entail a complicated and objectionable
amendment of the 1948 British Nationality Act (in the case of citizens of the U.K.
and colonies) and the amendment of an Order in Council (in the case of British
protected persons).66 An easier alternative would be to require re-entry permits and
refuse to allow entrance into Malaya if they did not comply with the regulations:
We would be most reluctant, on grounds of general passport policy, to
see the Governments of Malaya or Singapore refuse or threaten to refuse
passports to intending travellers. Although the restricted endorsement of
passports is not uncommon, the actual refusal of passports would, we feel
sure, evoke considerable criticism in this country and elsewhere.67
The urgency of the problem was outlined by the Commander-in-Chief of the Far
East Land Forces to the Ministry of Defence. An immediate entry and exit control
mechanism was decisive in the critical stage of the anti-communist campaign.
Among others, the Ministry of Defence was urged to agree to the legislation to

63
Memorandum prepared by Colonial Office: Movement of Chinese students to and from
China and British territories in South East Asia, 8 November 1950, TNA, FO 371/83545,
FC 1825/6, para 5 & 6.
64
Ibid.: para. 7.
65
Ibid.: para.15.
66
Letter from Mr. Shattock to Mr. Higham, November 1950, TNA, FO 371/83545, FC 1825/7.
67
Ibid.
50 | LOW CHOO CHIN

prohibit undesirable overseas Chinese of dual nationality who possessed British

nationality from returning to Malaya from China.68 Higham of the Colonial Office
agreed that the necessary action should be taken by amending the Emergency
(Travel Restriction) Regulations 1948 rather than restricting the endorsement of
passports to the person concerned. Communist indoctrination would be sufficient
grounds to refuse an entry permit, including to British subjects or British protected
persons of Chinese nationality whose admission would endanger national
security.69

The Politics of Immigration and the Chinese Reaction:

The Emergency (Immigration Ordinance) Regulations, 1952
The next landmark laws were the Emergency (Immigration Ordinance)
Regulations, 1952 and the Immigration (Prohibition of Entry) Order, 1953, both of
which came into effect on 1 August 1953 (Nos. 6 and 7 in Table 1).70 The Emergency
(Immigration Ordinance) Regulations (hereafter the Immigration Ordinance) was
the first national legislation to effectively control entry of both aliens and citizens
of Commonwealth countries. It affected mainly Chinese and Indian residents who
were not qualified to become Federal citizens or British subjects due to what was
largely felt to be unfair criteria, as will be discussed. Their visits to India or China
had to be accompanied by re-entry permits, whereas Federal citizens and British
subjects were free to travel without restrictions. The passing of these two pieces
of legislation was not without controversy. The process of formulating the bill
began in 1950 when the Federation Legislative Council and the select committees
Council appointed their respective Select Committees to make suggestions about
ways to regulate entry and re-entry into the two territories and to control illegal
immigration. The problematic question of the entry right of alien residents was
debated at great length, with Chinese members of the Council opposing certain
restrictions for two years during the select committees sittings.71
Chaired by Acting Chief Secretary D. C. Watherston, the Federation Select
Committee held four meetings between December 1950 and May 1951 and five joint
meetings with the Singapore Select Committee between January and June 1951.72
Stricter immigration controls were ‘inevitable’, as pointed out during debates on
the Immigration Control Bill in the Federal Legislative Council:

68
Telegram from G.H.Q. Far East Land Forces to Ministry of Defence, London, 13
November 1950, paragraph 18, TNA, FO 371/83545, FC 1835/7.
69
Telegram from James Griffiths to Malcolm MacDonald, 6 December 1950, TNA, FO
371/83545, FC 1835/9.
70
For legislative debates on the Immigration (Prohibition of Entry) Order 1953, refer to
Proceedings of the Legislative Council, 15 July 1953, p. 470-492.
71
The Straits Times, ‘Entry laws to be tightened’, 3 October 1950; The Straits Times, ‘Entry
bill explained’, 1 December 1952.
72
Report of the Select Committee appointed on the 22nd November 1950 to examine and
report to the Legislative Council on the Bill, the short title of which is Immigration
(Control) Ordinance, 1950. Federation of Malaya: Legislative Council Paper No. 3 of 1952.
 IMMIGRATION CONTROL DURING THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY | 51

[t]he problem of immigration continuously occupies the attention

of Government ever since the threat of Communist infiltration has
become apparent during the Emergency. The situation of the country
to-day demands the tightening of travel regulations for reason of public
security….73
The failure to reach a consensus on the absolute right of entry to non-citizens
among the members of the Select Committee resulted in two reports being tabled
in the Federal Legislative Council: the Majority Report and the Minority Report.
Most of the Select Committee’s representatives agreed to limit right of entry to
those who enjoyed the full status of citizenship. Only Federal citizens and British
subjects born or ordinarily residing in Malaya would have free entry into the
Federation. In determining the category of persons who should have an absolute
right of entry, the argument brought up the whole issue of belongingness in
Malaya.74
The Majority Report received negative reactions from the Chinese members of
the Federal Legislative Council, who supported the Minority Report. The Minority
Report sought to extend the entry right to non-citizens who could establish a
rightful claim of belonging to Malaya. In their report, the signatories sought to
include the following two classes of persons who would be allowed to enter the
Federation without having obtained a permit: 1) any person who was born in a
Malay state and was ordinarily resident in Malaya; and 2) any person who had
been a resident in the Federation for fifteen out of twenty years immediately
preceding re-entry into the Federation and was of good character.75 According to
the minority view, permanent residents under the two classes would have been
able to become Federal citizens if not for the stringent language criteria [had
an adequate knowledge of Malay or English] under the citizenship provisions
of the 1948 Federation of Malaya Agreement.76 It was only reasonable that the
Immigration Ordinance acknowledged the existing language hurdles, which
debarred the two classes of persons from applying for Federal citizenship and
should not ‘discriminate’ against them.77
The Minority Report argued that long-term permanent residents had a
rightful claim to their entry rights. Permanent residents were regarded as aliens
even though they were born in the Federation and intended to stay permanently.
It was estimated that about 30 per cent of the population would not be eligible
for citizenship under the new Citizenship Ordinance. According to the minority
representatives, these categories of people should have been entitled to entry rights.
For the alien residents, travelling abroad would be greatly affected as ‘they are

73
Federation of Malaya, Proceedings of the Legislative Council held on 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd
November 1952, p. 743.
74
Ibid., p. 733.
75
Minority Report. Report of the Select Committee appointed on the 22nd November 1950
to examine and report to the Legislative Council on the Bill, the short title of which is
Immigration (Control) Ordinance, 1950, paragraph 2.
76
Ibid.: paragraphs 7 and 8.
77
Ibid.: paragraph 12.
52 | LOW CHOO CHIN

not sure whether they may be allowed to return’.78 The most important concern
was removing the existing right of residence from local-born residents. Under the
Aliens Enactment of 1933, a certificate of residence could be granted indefinitely
to an alien who had resided in the country for eight years.79 The Minority Report
therefore suggested to ‘tackle the immigration problem, and stop the ingress of
undesirables without seeking to penalise those born in the States…’80
The issue played a big role in the wider Chinese politics of Malaya, with the
Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) members protesting in the Federal Legislative
Council over the right to belong and the right to entry. Initially formed as a social
organization to alleviate the suffering of the Chinese squatters, the MCA later
became politically oriented, demanding political stakes for local Chinese. The MCA
members of the Federation Select Committee proposed entry rights for Malayan
Chinese who were neither Federal citizens nor British subjects. According to the
proposal, these people deserved a residence certificate to enter the Federation
without a permit. The signatories of the Minority Report, according to a press
correspondent, were seeking a ‘special status’ for the people who could not qualify
for Federal citizenship.81 Labelling the Majority Report as ‘a boycott of the Chinese’,
Chinese guilds and associations called for a meeting on 9 March 1952 to protest.
The participants in the meeting decided to ask Tan Cheng Lock, president of the
MCA, to petition the Government. The chairman, Colonel H. S. Lee, expressed the
view that the Majority Report ‘would cause hardship to those Chinese who could
fulfil all except the language requirement for qualification as Federal citizens’.82
Subsequently, Tan Cheng Lock appealed to the representatives of the Chinese
community in the Federal Legislative Council (to be held on 19 November 1952)
to speak against the Majority Report and to give strong support to the Minority
Report. In his words.
For the sake of the Chinese community I would urge that each and
every Chinese Legislative Councilor will speak on this occasion, because
unanimous opposition by all the Chinese Councilors may open a way for
us to pursue in the matter further, even if the resolution were passed by a
majority vote in the Legislative Council.83
Leong Yew Koh, an MCA leader, reminded the Council that the right to leave and
to return had become ‘the birth right of everyone born in this country’.84 All local-
born non-Malays were British protected persons and they could leave and return
to the country freely with their British passport. The acceptance of the Majority
Report would deprive those who were born in the country—mostly non-Malays—
of their freedom of movement. Lee supported the Minority Report as a compromise

78
Federation of Malaya, Proceedings of the Legislative Council held on 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd
November 1952, p. 735.
79
Ibid.: p. 740.
80
Ibid.: p. 736.
81
The Straits Times, 31 January 1952.
82
The Straits Times, 10 March 1952.
83
Letter from Tan Cheng Lock to Tan Siew Sin, 14 November 1952, MCA/PUB/
Immigration Bill.
84
Federation of Malaya, Proceedings of the Legislative Council held on 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd
November 1952, p. 738.
 IMMIGRATION CONTROL DURING THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY | 53

to remedy the existing hurdles to citizenship. For these people, the Minority Report
proposed granting certificates of residence.85
The Minority Report argued that the government ought to nurture the co-
operation of those who ‘have made Malaya their permanent home and object of
their loyalty’ in its counter-insurgency campaign. If natural-born citizens were
to be deprived of their right to re-enter the land of their birth, it was difficult to
visualize all-round support for the government. A proponent of the Minority
Report noted that ‘the fundamental principle of the immigration policy of a
country is to keep out undesirable aliens and to control their entry and to prevent
them from becoming permanent settlers. It is rarely directed against those already
inside the country.’86
The Attorney General M. J. Hogan remarked that the Minority Report would
‘diminish to some extent the value of becoming a citizen’ if non-citizens could
enjoy the same privileged rights as citizens. Since the main principle of the
Federation was that of integration, non-Malays were encouraged to become Federal
citizens. If residence certificates were issued to non-citizens as suggested in the
Minority Report, it would only ‘encourage these people to become fence-sitters’.
The same privilege accorded to Federal citizens should not be extended to the
fence sitters. R. H. Oakley, the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, urged the Chinese
to become proper citizens instead of applying for travel certificates. Federation
citizenship, after all, was more valuable compared to a certificate of residence;
non-citizens would enjoy more rights as Federal citizens.87 The Attorney General
agreed with Oakley’s assessment.
In the closing remarks of the parliamentary debates, M. J. Hogan concluded,
‘Is it not better to-day to go and apply for citizenship and then have all the benefits
of citizenship than to have a half-way house…’ He reminded the Council that
during the period of 1948–52, only eight residence certificates were issued by
the Controller of Immigration, illustrating the extremely small number of people
making the effort to obtain such certificates. In his words, the residence certificates
were ‘of so little value that only eight people in the last five years have taken the
trouble to obtain them….’ At the end of the debate, the Immigration Bill (Majority
Report) was passed by the Federal Legislative Council by 51 votes to 12.88
Opposition was in the air. The MCA protested the resolution, labelling it
‘obnoxious’ to threaten those born in Malay states and permanent residents in
the country as aliens for the purposes of the Bill. Having lost its battle in the
Council, Tan Siew Sin, chairman of MCA’s publicity sub-committee, stated: ‘At a
time when Government leaders are appealing for the co-operation for the Chinese
vis-à-vis the Emergency, actions such as these can only succeed in alienating the
Chinese.’89 Under the new Immigration Ordinance, section 7 outlined the classes
of persons entitled to enter the Federation from any place outside Malaya without
having obtained a permit: Federal citizens, British subjects born in Malaya, British
subjects ordinarily resident in Malaya, naturalized British subjects, and the wives

85
Ibid.: pp. 738–9.
86
Ibid.: pp. 743–4.
87
Ibid.: pp. 734, 740, 746.
88
Ibid.: pp. 747–9.
89
The Straits Times, 24 November 1952.
54 | LOW CHOO CHIN

and children of these categories.90 This also included civil servants, members of
H.M. Forces, Commonwealth, diplomatic and consular representatives, and those
immunised under the Diplomatic Privileges Ordinance.91 Any permanent residents
who were neither Federal citizens nor British subjects were required to apply for
a re-entry permit if they intended to leave Malaya temporarily. A re-entry permit
would be issued if their presence ‘would not be prejudicial to public security’.92
After the promulgation of the Immigration Ordinance, new immigrants were
no longer allowed to enter Singapore, the Federation, and the Borneo territories.
The passing of this ordinance signalled the end of large-scale migration of
Chinese to Southeast Asia and Malaya in particular. Indonesia allowed them in on
a restricted quota system, however; only children, wives, and parents of residents
in the territories were allowed to enter for family reunification purposes.93 In July
1953, Secretary for Chinese Affairs, Richard Broome, announced that there was no
mass movement from Malaya to China. The number of persons who left Malaya
for China between January and June 1953 was recorded at 4,882. This figure,
according to Broome, remained steady compared to 4,694 persons for the period
of July–December 1952. Thus, a return to China was not gathering ‘momentum’.94
The Singapore Legislative Council also adopted the Immigration (Control) Bill,
which controlled the entry of people into Singapore from outside Malaya. The Bill
provided that people not acceptable to the Federation—i.e., ‘prohibited immigrants’
—were not permitted to enter the Colony.95

Citizenship and the Right to Belong: The Federation

of Malaya Agreement (Amendment) Ordinance, 1952
and the State Nationality Enactments, 1952
At the outset, it should be mentioned that the Immigration Ordinance was being
discussed and debated while amendments to the citizenship provisions of the 1948
Federation of Malaya Agreement were going through the Legislative Council and
being considered by the states. As mentioned previously, many within the Chinese
community felt that the immigration restrictions were unduly harsh because
they affected people who would, in other circumstances, be considered citizens.
Citizenship and immigration were intertwined; non-Malays born in the Malay
States would have become citizens of the Federation if the Malayan citizenship law
were to recognize the international practice of birthright citizenship (jus soli).96 In

90
Section 7 (1), A Bill intituled an ordinance to consolidate the law relating to and further
to regulate immigration into the Federation (Hereafter the Immigration Ordinance, 1952)
available in Federation of Malaya, Minutes of the Legislative Council for the period February
1951 to February 1952.
91
Section 1 (2), Immigration Ordinance, 1952.
92
Section 11 (1) and (2) of the Immigration Ordinance, 1952.
93
Letter from J. F. Brewis to J. M. Addis, Foreign Office, 13 February 1953, TNA, FO
371/105340, FC 1823/13.
94
The Straits Times, 8 July 1953.
95
The Straits Times, 21 February 1952.
96
Memorandum submitted by Tan Cheng Lock to the High Commissioner, Sir Gerald
Templer, paragraph 5, 16 April 1952, MCA/PUB/Immigration Bill.
 IMMIGRATION CONTROL DURING THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY | 55

April 1952, Tan Cheng Lock submitted a memorandum to the High Commissioner,
Sir Gerald Templer, to speak against the Majority Report. His memorandum
highlighted the following:
The point at issue is not whether aliens should be allowed to enter this
country. The point at issue is whether those who were born and bred in
this country and who but for our extraordinary citizenship laws would
be natural-born citizens of this country should be treated like aliens for
the purpose of re-entry….97
Tan reminded the government that the Bill was counterproductive to its counter-
insurgency efforts. It would alienate the Chinese at a time when Government
leaders were appealing for their co-operation vis-à-vis the Emergency.98 The
majority of Chinese would be compelled to go to Communist consulates for
passports and ‘to look towards and seek the protection of Communist China
however much they may detest Communism inwardly’.99 Since the Chinese
community was largely affected, it was not surprising that the community
negatively perceived the Immigration Bill as ‘glaring discrimination’ and an ‘anti-
Chinese policy’, notwithstanding that the main intention of the Bill was to prevent
the infiltration of recruits for the Communist terrorists.100
Perceiving the Bill as ‘unnecessary’ and ‘uncalled for’, Tan Cheng Lock
believed that the purpose of excluding any undesirable person from entering this
country could be achieved with the existing Emergency Regulations.101 In his letter
dated 3 June 1952 to Sir Gerald Templer, Tan Cheng Lock strongly called for the
deferment of the Immigration Bill until ‘the citizenship issue is settled once and
for all’.102 The Immigration Bill would be a perpetual law rather than temporary
Emergency legislation. The new Immigration Bill, together with the existing
citizenship law, effectively labelled the local-born as ‘aliens’ or ‘immigrants’ even
if they had been in Malaya for two generations.103 The post-war 1948 Federation of
Malaya Agreement instituted an exclusive citizenship regime based on the concept
of ‘double jus soli’: a local-born child of an alien was entitled to the Federation
citizenship if both of his/her parents were born and had resided in the Federation
for a continuous period of at least 15 years. Only the second generation of local-
born children was eligible for Federal citizenship through operation of law.104 When
the Federation of Malaya Agreement came into force on 1 February 1949, only
350,000 Chinese and 225,000 Indians, Pakistani, and Ceylonese (less than one-third
of the local-born) became Federal citizens automatically.105
Much of Tan Cheng Lock’s letter and memorandum was directed to the
citizenship legislation, which was different from immigration. In Templer’s reply,

97
Ibid.: paragraph 13.
98
Ibid.: paragraph 10.
99
Ibid.: paragraph 15.
100
Ibid.: paragraphs 9 and 12.
101
Letter from Tan Cheng Lock to Sir Gerald Templer, 3 June 1952, ANM, MCA/PUB/
Immigration Bill.
102
Ibid.: Paragraph 9.
103
Ibid.: Paragraph 5.
104
Ratnam (1965: 76).
105
Ibid.: 84.
56 | LOW CHOO CHIN

Tan Cheng Lock was reminded to appreciate a divergence of opinion in the country
in adopting the jus soli principle in determining nationality. Though the proposed
amendments (delayed jus soli) to the Federation Agreement did not fully meet the
demand of the Chinese community, it was nevertheless a considerable step towards
birthright citizenship. Children born in the Federation to a local-born parent
became citizens of the Federation through operation of law. Any liberalization of
the 1948 citizenship legislation would have to be conceded by the majority of the
inhabitants, the Malays.106
Citizenship was a contentious and politicized communal issue. There
were strong currents of public opinion against granting birthright citizenship
based on jus soli to the non-Malays. Reconciliation of these conflicting opinions
was undertaken by the Communities Liaison Committee (CLC).107 Citizenship
concession was made after two years of inter-ethnic deliberation in the CLC. The
principle of ‘delayed jus soli’ was introduced: second-generation children would
automatically be subjects of a Malay ruler—and would be a Federal citizen—if one
of their parents was born in the Federation. On 15 September 1952, the Federation
of Malaya Agreement (Amendment) Ordinance 1952 and the State Nationality
Bill came into effect. A total of 1,157,000 Chinese, as well as 220,000 Indians and
2,727,000 Malays, became Federal citizens by operation of law.108 Though the
amendment did not adopt the universal principle of jus soli, the citizenship door
was widened.
Delayed jus soli signified the unqualified right of second-generation aliens
to Federal citizenship. Local-born children were granted access to automatic
citizenship if one of their parents was born in the Federation. This principle
was regarded as fair since the second generation could show a higher level of
assimilation than the first generation. Automatic citizenship was not applicable
to the first generation of local-born Chinese, because ‘a non-Malay of the first
generation of local birth will not be assimilated to the Federation’s way of life’.109
Unconditional jus soli was only applicable to the Malays since ‘it is reasonably
certain that these will be readily assimilated to the Federation’s way of life’.110
The existing citizenship law and immigration legislation remained in force until
national Independence. The Federal Constitution of 1957 adopted the unconditional
jus soli principle, making all local-born on or after Merdeka Day, Federal citizens
by birth alone.

106
Letter from G. Templer to Tan Cheng Lock, 7 July 1952, ANM, MCA/PUB/Immigration
Bill.
107
Letter from Acting Chief Secretary to Tan Siew Sin, 30 June 1952, ANM MCA/PUB/
Immigration Bill.
108
Stubbs (1989: 185).
109
Report of the Select Committee appointed on the 11 July 1951 to examine and report to
the Legislative Council on the Bill, the short title of which is the Federation of Malaya
Agreement (Amendment) Ordinance: A Bill entitled An Ordinance to re-enact with
amendments Part XII of the Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1948, p. 15.
110
Ibid.
 IMMIGRATION CONTROL DURING THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY | 57

Conclusion
The immigration legislation enacted during the Malayan Emergency left an
enduring legacy to the nation-building efforts of the country. It highlighted the
discrepancy between citizens and aliens; non-citizens continued to be subject
to mass deportation and strict entry requirements. Since its inception, the
implementation of immigration controls suffered from strong opposition from the
local Chinese community due to the negatively perceived unfair treatment of local-
born Chinese in the Federation and Singapore. As the new immigration legislation
mainly affected the Chinese, who formed the largest category of immigrants,
the local-born Chinese leaders interpreted it as racial discrimination legislation.
As far as the Federation and the majority of the population were concerned,
the citizenship door was widened in 1952 with the implementation of the State
Nationality enactments and, subsequently, the number of aliens who qualified for
citizenship was significant. It was left to the Chinese community to legalize their
‘aliens’ status and enjoy unrestricted entry rights into Malaya.
In conclusion, this article is in substantial agreement with Markel that
‘the main lesson to be drawn from the British practice of counterinsurgency is
that physical control of the contested segment of the population is essential’.111
Immigration control, which was introduced during the Emergency, contributed
to the development of a Malayan consciousness in a democratic nation-state.
Immigration control prevented the influx of undesirable elements and enabled
the government to transform the existing transient Chinese population into civic
citizens. As the discussion above shows, establishing a control mechanism for
physical movement intersected with the broader issue of belongingness in Malaya.
The discussion on the entry and exit mechanism during the Malayan
Emergency shows the importance of the status of local citizenship. As long-
term residents, the local-born Chinese needed to make a fateful choice of either
becoming Federal citizens or continuing as Chinese nationals, which subjected
them to deportation and refusal of re-entry. On the positive side, the physical
control of the Chinese population during the Malayan Emergency served as a
constant reminder of the importance of identifying oneself by one’s country of
residence. The immigration and citizenship discourses in the 1950s—which were
dominated by the topic of Chinese migration—ended the mass influx of Chinese
immigrants into Malaya that had been ongoing since the era of British colonization.

111
Markel (2006: 36).
58 | LOW CHOO CHIN

References
Archival Records

United Kingdom National Archive (TNA), British Foreign Office Files China,
1949–1980, available online at Archives Direct:
FO 371/75934,
FO 371/75935,
FO 371/83542,
FO 371/83545,
FO 371/84549,
FO 371/105340

Arkib Negara Malaysia (ANM):

‘Control of Immigration, 1949’, CO 537/4871.
‘Proposed Emergency Regulations on Immigration control in the Federation’, 26
November 1949, RCP/FS/1606/49.
Federation of Malaya, Immigration Department Annual Report, 1951.
‘Immigration Bill’, 26 February 1952, MCA/PUB/Immigration Bill.

Books and Articles

Agamben, Giorgio (2005), State of Exception, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bonner, David (2007), Executive Measures, Terrorism and National Security, Aldershot:
Ashgate.
Federation of Malaya (1951), Report of the Select Committee appointed on the 11th Day
of July 1951 to examine and report to the Legislative Council on the Bill, the short title
of which is the Federation of Malaya Agreement (Amendment) Ordinance.
——— (1952a), Council Paper No. 3 of 1952, ‘Report of the Select Committee appointed on the
22nd November 1950 to examine and report to the Legislative Council on the Bill, the short title
of which is Immigration (Control) Ordinance, 1950’. Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer.
——— (1952b), Proceedings of the Legislative Council for the period February 1951–
February 1952 (Fourth Session), Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer .
——— (1953a), A Bill intituled an ordinance to consolidate the law relating to and further
to regulate immigration into the Federation.
——— (1953b), The Emergency Regulation Ordinance 1948. Amendments made up to the
31st March 1953, Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer.
——— (1953c), Proceedings of the Legislative Council for the period March 1952–February
1953 (Fifth Session), Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer.
——— (1954), Proceedings of the Legislative Council for the period March 1953–January
1954 (Sixth Session), Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer.
Hack, Karl (2009a), ‘British intelligence and counter-insurgency in the era of
decolonisation: The example of Malaya’, Intelligence and National Security, 14/2: 124–55.
——— (2009b), ‘The Malayan Emergency as counter-insurgency paradigm’, Journal
of Strategic Studies, 32/3: 383–414.
——— (2015), ‘Detention, Deportation and Resettlement: British Counterinsurgency
and Malaya’s Rural Chinese, 1948–60’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth
History, 43/4: 611–40.
 IMMIGRATION CONTROL DURING THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY | 59

Low Choo Chin (2014), ‘The repatriation of the Chinese as a counter-insurgency

policy during the Malayan Emergency’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 45/3:
363–92.
Markel, Wade (2006), ‘Draining the swamp: The British strategy of population
control’, Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College, 36/1: 35–49.
Purcell, Victor (1954), Malaya: Communist or Free? Stanford, Stanford University Press.
Ramakhrisna, L. (2002), Emergency Propaganda: The Winning of Malayan Hearts and
Minds, 1948–1958, Surrey: Curzon Press.
Ratnam, K. J. (1965), Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya, Singapore:
University of Malaya Press.
Stockwell, Allen J. (1995), British Documents on the End of Empire, Series B, Vol. 3.
Malaya, Part II: The Communist Insurrection, 1948–1953, London: HMSO.
Stubbs, Richard (1989), Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency
1948–1960, Singapore: Oxford University Press.
Thomas, Martin (2014), Fight or Flight: Britain, France, and their Roads from Empire,
Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Newspaper articles

The Straits Times, ‘The Chinese position’, 23 November 1948.

The Straits Times, ‘Closer Sino-Malay relations’, 5 April 1949.
The Straits Times, ‘S’pore Passes Tit-for-tat Travel Bar’, 29 July 1949.
The Straits Times, ‘Passport Ruling Hits Chinese’, 1 August 1949.
The Straits Times, ‘Entry laws to be tightened’, 3 October 1950.
The Straits Times, ‘1,800 Rush For Re-entry Visas’, 5 October 1950.
The Straits Times, ‘All Got Re-entry Visas’, 24 October 1950.
The Straits Times, ‘A ship from China’, 7 November 1950.
The Straits Times, ‘Immigrants again’, 13 November 1950.
The Straits Times, ‘Malayan Visas for China’, 16 November 1950.
The Straits Times, ‘Scrap New Passport Rules Chinese Plea to Governor’, 23
December 1950.
The Straits Times, ‘Reds waiting to return: Govt. defends new re-entry Regulations
– War on doorstep’, 17 January 1951.
The Straits Times, ‘The Unhappy Traveller’, 17 January 1951.
The Straits Times, ‘S’pore Chinese Send Petition to Griffiths on Re-entry’, 28
February 1951.
The Straits Times, ‘Petition to London’, 10 March 1951.
The Straits Times, ‘Return to Malaya’, 3 May 1951.
The Straits Times, ‘Entry Permit Amendment’, 30 May 1951.
The Straits Times, ‘Chinese Hail New Law’, 31 May 1951.
The Straits Times, ‘Stricter Travel Restrictions’, 30 June 1951.
The Straits Times, ‘They ask for a special status’, 31 January 1952.
The Straits Times, ‘Immigration: New control is approved’, 21 February 1952.
The Straits Times, ‘Immigration bill protest: Resign call to Dato Onn quit IMP or
govt post, say miners’, 10 March 1952.
The Straits Times, ‘Mockery of citizenship, says MCA’, 24 November 1952.
The Straits Times, ‘Entry bill explained’, 1 December 1952.
The Straits Times, ‘No mass movement to Red China’, 8 July 1953.

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