OCKHAM ON THE ACTS AND FACULTIES OF THE SENSITIVE SOUL

Lydia Deni Gamboa

B. Universidad Autónoma de Puebla

Aquinas and “the Arabs” International Working Group

Mexico, September 24, 2018

Ockham’s accounts of the various sorts of intellective acts have been thoroughly studied in
the secondary literature. In contrast, there have been few analyses of the nature and
properties of the acts that can exist in the sensitive soul. More generally, there have been
very few analyses of Ockham’s theory of the nature of the sensitive soul and the sensitive
faculties. This is probably in part because Ockham did not give us a great deal of
information about these subjects. However, I think it will be worthwhile to try to
reconstruct his accounts of the sensitive soul, its faculties and acts, because such a
reconstruction will provide us with more detail about two main subjects, namely, his
account of cognition in non-human animals, and his account of some perceptual illusions.
As we will see, Ockham explains some perceptual illusions via his theory of some different
corporal impressions. As we will also see, his theory of the different faculties of the
sensitive soul and the sensitive acts that depend on these faculties gives us some insight
into the cognitive capacities of some non-human animals, including, for example, higher-
order cognitions and spatial memory.

The structure of this paper will be the following. First, I will explain Ockham’s main
argument for distinguishing the sensitive soul and the intellective soul. Second, I will
present his account of the sensitive soul. Third, I will explain his various definitions of the
term “faculty” and I will try to understand which of these definitions corresponds to the
sensitive faculties. Fourth, I will analyze Ockham’s theory of the inner senses, which
includes his theory of sensitive memory or phantasia and the common sense or sensus
communis. Finally, I will try to reconstruct part of his account of illusions.

Ockham distinguishes the sensitive soul and the intellective soul with the following
argument:

[O.1] “…in every immediate subject there are no contrary acts. But a human has
simultaneously and at one moment an act of desire in relation to some object and a

1
 contrary act […] Then, an act of desire of the will and an act of rejection of the
sensitive appetite are subjectively in different forms.” 1

Ockham’s argument is based on the idea that two contrary mental acts, such as desiring x
and rejecting x, cannot exist at the same time and in relation to the same object in the same
subject. Thus, regarding this principle, Ockham emphasizes that it is normal to experience
contrary acts of desire, as for example, when at night, one desires to see a movie and, at the
same time, one is reluctant to see that same movie because it is late at night. Then, if one
can undergo two contrary acts at the same time and in relation to the same object, that must
be because each of these acts exists in a different subject: there must exist one subject or
soul for one sort of desire and another subject or soul for another sort of desire. There must
exist a sensitive soul and an intellective soul in each human being.

In this argument, Ockham first conceives that the sensitive soul and the intellective soul are
subjects that are able to receive accidents. Since, for Ockham, only singular substances and
singular qualities really exist, it follows that the sensitive soul and the intellective soul are
substances that are able to receive qualities, which could be acts of desire. Also in this
argument, Ockham suggests that two acts of desire may be intrinsically contrary acts, since
an act of desire might correspond to some corporeal impulse and another act of desire
might correspond to some rational force. Accordingly, Ockham distinguishes these acts by
their intrinsic properties, which seem to depend on the natures of their subjects, that is to
say, on the kind of entity that a sensitive soul is, on the one hand, and on the other hand, on
the kind of entity that an intellective soul is. Consequently, this argument seems to be
circular, since it tries to prove the distinction between the sensitive soul and the intellective
soul by distinguishing between the intrinsic natures of two contrary acts, which depend on
the natures of their subjects.

Ockham clearly believed that a sensitive soul and an intellective soul are two contrary
substances, since the nature of the sensitive soul is to be an extended and material substance
[O.2],2 while the nature of the intellective soul is to be an eternal and immaterial substance
[O.3].3 The intellective soul exists as a whole in each part of a human body and as a whole
in a whole human body, while the sensitive soul is extended in parts. The sensitive soul
gives life to a body, and its extendedness explains the existence of the different senses
[O.4].4 The idea that the sensitive soul gives life and senses to a body coincides with some

1
[O.1] “…in eodem subiecto immediato non sunt actus contrarii. Sed homo simul et semel habet actum
appetendi respectu alicuius obiecti et actum contrarium […] Igitur actus appetendi voluntatis et actus fugiendi
appetitus sensitivi sunt subiective in diversis formis.” Reportatio IV, q. 9; OTh 7: 161.
2
[O.2] “…anima sensitiva in homine est extensa et materialis…” Quodlibeta Septem II, q. 10; OTh 9: 159.
3
[O.3] “…dico quod intelligendo per ‘animam intellectivam’ formam immaterialem, incorruptibilem quae
tota est in toto corpore et tota in qualibet parte…” Quodlibeta Septem I, q. 10; OTh 9: 63.39-43.
4
[O.4] “…tota forma sensitiva in homine est una forma, licet habeat diversas partes extensas sub diversis
partibus quantitatis.” Reportatio III, q. 3; OTh 6: 124.24-125.1.

2
of Aristotle’s definitions of a soul and, accordingly, with the idea that the sensitive soul is
the form of a body which has life and certain faculties in potentiality. For Ockham, the
sensitive soul and the intellective soul are also forms, which means that they realize some
potentiality. In the case of the sensitive soul, it realizes a body’s potentiality of being alive
and of being able to have some sensitive faculties [O.5];5 in the case of the intellective soul,
it realizes a living being which is rational in potentiality.

The sensitive soul and the intellective soul are substantial forms, and Ockham really
identifies each with their faculties [O.6].6 However, Ockham claims that the term “faculty”
(potentia) may be understood in two different ways, and in Reportatio II, q. 3-4, he
proposes one version of that distinction. As he explains:

[O.7] “…[the term] ‘faculty’ is understood in two ways [for my] purpose. In one
way as that which is held in the side of the soul. And in this way, from the
diversity of operations does not follow the diversity of faculties. In another way, a
faculty is taken as that which is necessarily required so that a faculty –
understood in the first sense – produces an operation. And in this way, it is a
corporeal organ, and in this way from the diversity of operations follows the
diversity of faculties. For example, from [having] ears and eyes [follows] the faculty
of hearing and sight. If someone has the organ of hearing but lacks the organ of
sight, then in this way she has one faculty but not the other one.”7

Thus, for Ockham in Reportatio II, q. 3-4, the term “faculty” can be understood in two
different senses. In the first sense, the reference of this term is a soul itself, but in the
second, it could be the sense organs, and according to this second conception, the diversity
of acts entails the distinction between different faculties. In this second sense, having eyes
and ears indicates that one has the faculty of hearing and the faculty of sight. However, if
we think about the faculties of a soul as really being identical to that soul, as Ockham
claims in [O.6], it would follow that, in this second sense of the term “faculty”, the
sensitive soul would be identical to some sensitive organs. Ockham denies this
consequence in his Reportatio III, q. 4, where he presents a second version of the
distinction between the two senses of the term “faculty”. According to this second version:

5
[O.5] “…potentia visiva est illa pars formae quae perficit organum visus, et sic de aliis organis…”
Reportatio III, q. 4; OTh 6: 139.5-6.
6
[O.6] “…anima et potentia sunt idem realiter per eum…” Reportatio II, q. 20; OTh 5: 434.9.
7
[O.7] “…potentia dupliciter accipitur in proposito. Uno modo pro eo quod se tenet a parte animae. Et sic ex
diversitate operationum non arguitur diversitas potentiarum. […] Alio modo accipitur potentia pro illo quod
necessario coexigitur ad hoc quod potentia primo modo eliciat operationem. Et sic est aliquod organum
corporale; et sic ex diversitate operationum arguitur diversitas potentiarum. Exemplum de auditu et visu,
auditione et visione. Si enim aliquis habeat organum iuditus et non organum visus, tunc sic habet unam
potentiam et non aliam.” Reportatio II, q. 3-4; OTh 5: 58.4-14.

3
 [O.8] “… “faculty of a soul” may be understood in two ways: in one way as
everything that is necessarily required for any vital act as a partial cause; in another
way as precisely that which is held in part of the soul, able to produce something as
a partial principle.”8

According to this second version of the distinction between two different ways of
understanding the term “faculty”, the first definition coincides with the second definition of
the first version, and the second definition of this second version coincides with the first
definition of the first version. In other words, according to this later version, “faculty”
refers first to a partial cause or anything required for any vital act, and in the second
sense, the term “faculty” refers to a partial principle or a soul itself. But, in this second
version, Ockham includes more information:

[O.9] “…in the first way [of understanding the term ‘faculty’], I mean that the
sensitive faculties are different from the soul and between themselves… In the
second way, they are not really different, just as a thing and different essences [are
not different], neither between themselves nor in relation to the sensitive soul.”9

Therefore, when the term “faculty” means a partial cause and refers to the sensitive organs,
the sensitive soul is not identified with that partial cause or the sensitive organs. Moreover,
in this sense, the diversity of acts entails the diversity of faculties. In contrast, when the
term “faculty” means a partial principle, it refers to a soul itself. Furthermore, in this sense,
the diversity of acts does not entail the diversity of faculties. Consequently, when Ockham
says that a faculty and a soul are really the same thing, he is using the term “faculty” in this
latter sense, meaning a partial principle, not a partial cause.

Taking the term “faculty” to mean a partial cause, Ockham discusses different types of
sensitive acts, and accordingly, he admits that the different exterior senses are faculties,
which are identified with the different exterior senses that partially cause different exterior
sensitive acts. Moreover, taking the term “faculty” in this same sense, one can infer the
existence of different faculties from the existence of different acts. From this point of view,
Ockham admits the phantasia or faculty of the sensitive memory and the common sense
faculty, which are classified as interior senses. Finally, he admits the faculty of the
sensitive appetite. In what follows, I will focus on analyzing the exterior sensitive acts and
the interior sensitive acts in order to understand Ockham’s account of animal cognition and

8
[O.8] “…potentia animae potest dupliciter accipi: uno modo pro omni necessario requisito ad quemcumque
actum vitalem tanquam causa partialis; alio modo pro illo praecise quod se tenet a parte animae elicientis
tanquam principium partiale” Reportatio III, q. 4; OTh 6: 135.2-6.
9
[O.9] “…primo modo, dico quod quod potentiae sensitivae distinguuntur ab anima et inter se. … Secundo
modo non distinguuntur realiter, sicut res et essentiae distinctae, nec inter se nec ab anima sensitiva.”
Reportatio III, q. 4; OTh 6: 136.16-17.

4
his explanation of illusions. I will not consider the acts of the faculty of the sensitive
appetite. In addition, in what follows I will use the term “abstractive act” for every act that
pertains to the interior sense, that is to say, the phantasia or the common sense, since
Ockham clearly says [O.10]: “every cognition of the interior faculties in the same form is
an abstractive [cognition]”. 10

In Reportatio III, q. 4, Ockham claims that animals only have one sensitive form:

[O.11] “…in an animal there only exists one sensitive form, which elicits all these
operations [i.e. all sensitive acts], though the same form is not indivisible, but [is]
divisible in parts of the same nature…”11

Now, among all the sensitive acts, only an act of vision or a sensitive intuitive act can be
caused by an external object and can be the cause of an abstractive act. Ockham explains
this process in Reportatio III, q. 3, as follows:

[O.12] “…a partial cause [of an abstractive act] is a corporeal vision, and the other
[partial cause] is the faculty of the sensitive memory (potentia phantastica). These
two [causes], with God, sufficiently cause a first abstractive act, and the sensible
external object is not the cause of that [abstractive] act, but is only the cause of a
cause, because if God would destroy the external sensible [object] and would
conserve in the eye the intuitive cognition of it, in its absence the memory faculty
(potentia phantastica) would be able to have an abstractive act in relation to that
sensible [object]. But if the intuitive cognition is destroyed, whether the sensible
[object] rests or not, a first abstractive act would be naturally impossible. … Then, a
sensitive intuitive cognition is the partial cause of a first abstractive act, and not the
sensible external [object].”12

Thus, Ockham calls a corporeal vision a “sensitive intuitive act” or a “sensitive intuitive
cognition”. An act of this sort inheres in some part of a body. Under normal circumstances,
a corporeal vision is caused by a sensible external object, and it normally causes a first

10
[O.10] “…omnes cognitiones potentiarum interiorum eiusdem formae sunt abstractivae…”
11
[O.11] “…in animali sit tantum una forma sensitiva quae elicit omnes istas operationes, tamen ipsa forma
non est indivisibilis sed divisibilis in partes eiusdem rationis...” Reportatio III, q. 4; OTh 6: 136.22-137.3.
12
[O.12] “…una causa partialis est visio corporalis, et alia est potentia phantastica. Istae duae, cum Deo,
sufficienter causant actum primum phantasiandi, et obiectum sensibile extra non est causa illius actus, sed
tantum est causa causae, quia si Deus destrueret sensibile extra et conservaret in oculo cognitionem eius
intuitivam, adhuc posset virtus phantastica habere actum phantasiandi respectu illius sensibilis. Sed si cognitio
intuitiva destruatur, sive maneat sensibile sive non, impossibile est primum actum phantasiandi haberi
naturaliter. …Ergo cognitio intuitiva sensus est causa partialis respectu primi actus phantasiandi, et non
sensibile extra.”

5
abstractive act. But, in contrast with a first abstractive act, a second abstractive act – or, as
Ockham simply calls it, actus phantasiandi – can be caused by two different things:

[O.13] In relation to the interior sense, for example, the sensitive memory
(phantasia), there are two qualities: one impressed by an object, restorative or
debilitative of an organ, and it is of a different nature than the external object as it
certainly is in the vision; and the other generated by an abstractive act which is not
subjectively in an organ, when it is distinguished from a faculty, as the previous
quality, but it exists subjectively in a faculty, when it is distinguished from the
organ, as certainly is an abstractive act itself. And that second quality is not an
object for an act, but it is a habitus generated by an act of imagination that inclines
just as a partial cause in relation to similar acts in the absence of a sensible thing…
Thus, after the first act, if the same sensible [object] is destroyed, the faculty of
memory, by that habitus generated by a first act, is able to produce an abstractive
act terminated by the same sensible in number that was seen before.13

Here, Ockham declares that one of the interior senses is the faculty of sensitive memory
(phantasia). In addition, he holds that two different qualities might cause an abstractive act.
On the one hand, he points to the qualities that are impressed in an external sense or
external organ and he claims that these qualities might reinforce or debilitate that organ. On
the other hand, Ockham says that these qualities are generated by a first abstractive act and
that they incline this faculty to produce similar acts when the sensible thing is absent. These
latter qualities are habitus, which inhere in the sensible soul identified with the faculty of
memory and distinguished from the sense organs. Therefore, an abstractive act inheres in
the sensible soul and not in a sense organ, in contrast with a corporal vision or a sensitive
intuitive act.

Now, in [O.13] Ockham mentions some impressions that are restorative or debilitative of
an organ, and these impressions are described in [O.14]14 in relation to the visual organs.

13
[O.13] “Sed quantum ad sensum interiorem, puta phantasiam, est ibi duplex qualitas: una impressa ab
obiecto confortativa vel debilitativa organi, et illa est alterius rationis ab obiecto extra sicut illa in visu; et est
alia generata per actum imaginandi quae non est subiective in organo ut distinguitur contra potentiam, ut
praecedens qualitas, sed est subiective in potentia ut distinguitur contra organum, sicut ipse actus
phantasiandi. Et illa qualitas secunda non est obiectum alicuius actus, sed est habitus generatus per actum
phantasiandi inclinans sicut causa partialis ad actus consimiles in absentia rei sensibilis, sicut posui prius in
intellectu, ita quod post primum actum si ipsum sensibile destruatur, potest potentia phantastica eum illo
habitu generato ex primo actu elicere actum phantasiandi terminatum ad idem sensibile numero quod prius
vidi.”
14
[O.14] “…illud impressum manet quando non est lux nec sensibile praesens. Ergo est ibi aliquid impressum
quod nec est sensibile nec species nec actus, nec est sensibile a se nec ab alio, sed est quaedam qualitas
impressa in organo visus quae aliquando est confortativa, ali quando debilitativa. Et imprimitur effective a
colore et simul cum actu videndi. Nec est praevium actui sicut principium, nec generatur ab actu, sed a colore
simul cum actu videndi in organo visus imprimitur. Et manet illa qualitas aliquardo usque ad fìnem vitae
hominis, aliquando per maius spatium, aliquando per minus.”

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According to what Ockham says in [O.13], these impressions are not corporeal visions or
sensitive intuitive acts, because they remain in the visual organs, and corporeal visions
cannot remain anywhere. An impression of this sort is apparently caused by a color and a
corporeal vision of that color, and will remain in the eyes. Afterwards, this same impression
will debilitate or restore the visual organ and will cause some abstractive acts, whose
content will probably be the distorted color that was seen before, and which is not present
any longer. It is not clear why Ockham involves this sort of impression. However, it is clear
that, for him, some corporeal qualities that can remain in the external senses are able to
cause certain abstractive acts, once they have debilitated or restored the visual organs. From
this perspective, it seems that these abstractive acts are the product of some sort of visual
disease, in contrast with the abstractive acts that are inclined by habitus, which, as we will
see, are acts of the sensitive memory, a sort of memory that is present in some animals, as
he suggests in [O.15].15 In fact, Ockham says that in the faculty of the sensitive memory
there are some habitus which incline or produce abstractive acts [O.16].16 As we have seen
in [O.13], a habitus in the sensitive soul is able to produce an abstractive act similar to a
first abstractive act that was caused by an external sense such as a corporeal vision. These
abstractive acts are, according to Ockham, simple acts, and they are not the only sort of acts
of the sensitive memory. For Ockham another sort of act of memory is found in some non-
human animals, equivalent to intellective complex acts in humans. Ockham explains this
latter idea as follows:

[O.17] “…this is plain according to experience of the prudence and caution of ants
and according to experience of the punishment of apes and dogs. Because some
abstractive [acts] (phantasiae) are inclined by uncomplex habitus generated by
precedent acts in those animals when they apprehend the same uncomplex that they
apprehended before. For example, ants apprehend a region and dogs apprehend
commands (ictum) and sentences (sentiens), that generate in them different
apprehensive habitus that incline images in those animals when they apprehend the
same [thing] that they apprehended before. And through many of these
apprehensive uncomplex habitus they can do as much as if they had complex
habitus. And for that reason, these habitus are equivalent to complex [habitus],

15
[O.15] “Et ideo animalia quae non imaginantur nisi in praesentia rerum, non habent memoria, quia in eis
non possunt tales habitus generari” Reportatio IV, q. 14: 316.2-4.
16
[O.16] “…memoria dupliciter accipitur: uno modo pro potentia habente aliquem habitum vel qualitatem
derelictam ex actu praeterito, virtute cuius potest talis potentia in aliquem consimilem actum et eiusdem
rationis cum actu praeterito…Alio modo accipitur pro potentia quae potest in actum recordandi proprie
dictum mediante habitu generato ex actibus praeteritis, non quidem incomplexis sed complexis... Memoria
reperitur in parte sensitiva et intellectiva, quia certum est quod in utraque derelinquitur aliqua qualitas
mediante qua potest in aliquem actum in quem prius son potuit et in actum consimilem primo actui…”
Reportatio IV, q. 14: 297.11-298.11.

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 because animals can do as much as we [can do] through the habitus from those
complexes.”17

Ockham attributes some other abstractive acts to some non-human animals, which are
similar to acts of intellective judgement. Thus, he declares:

[O.18] “… the sensitive [soul] has judgement. This is clear in brutes, children, fools,
etc., who judge (iudicant) [the difference] between harmful and convenient
[things]… this habitus and uncomplex act in theme is equivalent to having a
complex cognition...”18

Ockham further declares in [O.19] that dogs can create syllogisms, since they can
apprehend uncomplex cognitions that are equivalent to complex cognitions.19 Moreover, in
the same section he claims [O.20]: “… the sensations of the senses are not perceived by the
senses themselves, but by a superior sense, such as the common sense…”20 Consequently, it
seems that Ockham attributes to some non-human animals the ability to perform a sensitive
reflexive apprehension, which operates as a higher-order sensitive act, whose object is the
sensation of a sense, according to [O.18]. In the Quaestiones Variae, Ockham presents an
example of this higher-order sensitive act, but in contrast to what he declares in [O.18], in
the Quaestiones Variae [O.21] he says that through an act of the common sense an agent
apprehends a first order exterior sense with another first-order act, such as an appetitive act,
and its object:

[O.21] “…some interior sense – namely the common sense or phantasia –

apprehends an act of the exterior sense and an act of the sensitive appetite… And
the apprehensive act itself immediately causes some act of pleasure as mentioned

17
[O.17] “…hoc patet ad experientiam de prudentia et providentia formicae et de vindicta simiae et canis.
Quia per habitus incomplexos generatos ex actibus praecedentibus inclinantur phantasiae talium animalium ad
apprehendendum eadem incomplexa quae prius apprehendebant. Puta formica apprehendens locum et canis
apprehendens ictum et sentiens, generantur in eis diversi habitus apprehensivis inclinantes phantasias talium
animalium ad apprehendendum eadem quae prius apprehendebant. Et per multus tales habitus apprehensivos
incomplexos possunt tantum facere sicut si haberent habitus complexos. Et ideo illi habitus aequivalenter sunt
complexi, quia tantum possunt bruta facere mediantibus illis habitibus sicut nos mediantibus complexis.”
Reportatio IV, q. 14; OTh 7 : 313.13-314.6.
18
[O.18] “…sensitiva habet iudicium. Patet in brutis, pueris, fatuis, etc., qui iudicant inter nociva et
convenientia…illi habitus et actus incomplei aquivalent eis ac si haberent notitiam complexi…” Reportatio
IV, q. 16; OTh 7: 314.18-315.4.
19
[O.19] “…de syllogizatione canis patet per idem, quia apprehdit incomplexa quae aequivalent notitiis
complexis…” Reportatio IV, q. 16; OTh 7: 315.5-12.
20
[O.20] “…sensationes sensuum non percipiuntur ab ipsis sensibus quorum sunt, sed vel a sensibus
superioribus, puta a sensu communi, vel ab intellectu.” Reportatio IV, q. 16; OTh 7: 314.14-17.

8
 before… in the sensitive appetite in relation to these acts as much as in relation to
the objects.” 21

Ockham is here talking about a sensitive higher-order apprehension directed at an exterior

sense and at an appetitive act. And this higher-order act will cause an act of pleasure in
relation to the appetitive act and its object. For Ockham, the object of an act can be also
accessible through a sensitive higher-order apprehension.

As we have seen, every act of the common sense and the phantasia is an abstractive act. It
follows that, the acts that are like judgments and syllogisms in animals are also abstractive
acts which inhere in the sensitive soul, understood as a faculty different from the exterior
senses. Now, in contrast with these abstractive acts, in Reportatio III, q. 3, Ockham
describes some corporeal impressions, inherent in the exterior senses, which are related to
some optical illusions and the acquisition of some corporeal skills. Thus, in relation to
optical illusions, Ockham says that they are produced by a sort of impression that exists in
the external senses [O.22]22. These impressions are not acts or species, and they are caused
by an external object together with an act of vision. As Ockham explains, this sort of
impression causes afterimage illusions:

[O.23] “…if someone sees a white color for a long time, and then she turns around
to see another color, [this thing] will be seen in the same color [white]… if someone
sees the sun or something brilliant, and afterwards she closes her eyes, first it will
appear that bright color, and then other colors and finally black, which in turn will
disappear.”23

Thus, these impressions explain why one keeps perceiving a white color or some light
when one closes one’s eyes after watching something white or brilliant. Finally, again by
means of these impressions, Ockham explains a third sort of afterimage illusion:

21
[O.21] “…sensus aliquis interior, puta sensus communis vel phantasia, apprehendit actum sensus exterioris
et actum desiderii sensitivum… Et ipse actus apprehensivus praedictorum actuum causat immediate, sine
omni actu appetitus primo vel medio, delectationem in appetitu sensitivo respectu illorum actuum tamquam
respectu obiectorum…” Quaestiones Variae Q. 6; OTh 8: 255.92-104.
22
[O.22] “Ideo dico quod in visu imprimitur a sensibili aliqua qualitas quae non est actus videndi nec species,
nec generatur ex actu videndi, sed est quaedam qualitas impressa visui simul cum actu videndi, et causatur ab
obiecto sicut actus videndi. Sed obiectum est causa totalis illius qualitatis sicut aliquid creatum potest esse
causa totalis, sed respectu actus videndi est obiectum causa partialis.” Reportatio III, q. 3; OTh 6: 111-112.
23
[O.23] “…si aliquis inspiciat colorem album longo tempore, si post convertat se ad aliud alterius coloris,
illud videbitur esse eiusdem coloris… si aliquis inspexerit solem vel aliud splendidum, et post claudat oculos,
primo apparebit color splendidus, deinde alii colores usque ad nigrum, et tunc evanescet. Reportatio III, q. 3;
OTh 6: 106.

9
 [O.24] “…if someone sees something that moves rapidly, [and] then sees something
that is not moving, this thing will appear as moving, just as the first one. This is
only because some impression…”24

Thus, according to these descriptions, an impression that is involved in an afterimage

illusion is different from a corporeal vision because an impression will remain in an
exterior sense even when the original object is no longer participating as a total cause, and
it seems that this permanence would depend on the sort of quality present in an object, and
on the time of exposure of the external sense in relation to that quality. If that quality is a
brightness or a white color or an object that is moving, and an external sense is exposed to
one of those things, the impression will remain. It seems, in addition, that such an
impression is a representation of those qualities, but only when “…a sense is understood as
the composition of an organ and a faculty…”

Ockham also proposed another sort of quality inherent in the exterior senses. These
qualities are not impressions and do not cause any sort of illusion, but rather incline the
body to perform in a certain skilled way, such as the way copyists or singers perform. As
Ockham puts it:

[O.25] “…it does not seem more inconvenient to put something that inclines in the
interior sense than in an exterior [sense]. But in an exterior sense there can be
present some quality that inclines, as is manifest in copyists, singers and in anyone
who performs manually. And still [that quality] does not incline one only to
[perform] something of the same nature, but to [make] the same judgment in
number. [For example] one frequently returns to the same place where a front door
used to be, even after having changed [the place] of that front door… Then that
quality which inclines one to walk through the [place where] the first door was
[open], inclines one to make the same judgment in number, not only in species.”25

Thus, for Ockham, we have spatial memory due to some sort of quality. These qualities
also explain how we learn some manual skills. Since this memory and these manual skills
are corporeal, Ockham assumes that these qualities are inherent in the external senses, such
as the impressions that cause some afterimage illusions.

24
[O.24] …si aliquis inspiciat rem velociter motam, si post inspiciat rem quiescentem, illa res apparebit sibi
moveri et prius non. Hoc non est nisi propter aliquid impressum…
25
[O.25] “… non videtur magis inconveniens ponere aliquid inclinativum in potencia interiori quam exteriori.
Sed in organo exteriori potest poni talis qualitas inclinans, sicut patet in scriptoribus, cantoribus et omnibus
operantibus manualiter. Et tamen non tantum inclinant illae qualitates ad aliquid eiusdem rationis, sed ad idem
iudicium numero. Patet in aliquo inclinato ad transeundum per certum locum et ostium in certa parte parietis
domus. Si post mutetur ostium adhuc frequenter redit ad locum ubi fuit primum ostium… Igitur illa qualitas
inclinans ad transeundum per primum ostium inclinat ad idem iudicium numero non tantum specie.”

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So, in conclusion, Ockham presents two different definitions of the term “faculty”, one of
these definitions is particularly important for his account of some sensitive acts, such as
corporeal visions or sensitive intuitive acts. Second, Ockham calls an act of the interior
sense “an abstractive act”. These abstractive acts can be caused by corporeal impressions or
by habitus. In addition, some abstractive acts are higher-order acts, and some others are
sensitive acts of judgment, which are uncomplex acts. Finally, Ockham explains afterimage
illusions by his account of a sort of corporeal impressions. Here, then, we have some details
about Ockham’s account of non-human animals’ cognition, memory and some perceptual
illusions. THANK YOU
24 de agosto del 2018
México

In the prologue to the Ordinatio, Ockham claims that every intellective cognition
presupposes a sensitive cognition, either from the exterior senses or from the interior sense,
that is either a sensitive intuitive cognition caused through an external sense or a sensitive
abstractive cognition caused by an impression or by a habitus or by different sensations of
the senses.

[O.26] “…nothing is thought without an image (phantasmate), because every

intellective cognition necessarily presupposes in this life a sensitive cognition of the
exterior senses, just as of the interior [senses].”26

26
[O.26] “…nihil est intelligere sine phantasmate, quia omnis notitia intellectiva praesupponit pro statu isto
necessario cognitionem sensitivam tam sensus exterioris quam interioris.” Prologus Ordinatio q. 1, OTh 1: 67,
7-10.

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