Language and Nation-Building in Kurdistan-Iraq

Jaffer Sheyholislami, PhD

School of Linguistics and Language Studies, Carleton University, Canada
Paper presented at the Middle Eastern Studies Association 43th Annual Meeting,
Boston, MA, USA, November 21-24, 2009.

Please do not quote without permission

Introduction

Language has frequently been considered an integral part of nation building. If nation-building

has often meant nation destroying,1 it has also meant imposing one language while suppressing

others.2 Since the birth of the French Republic, most language policies have been informed by

the nation-state ideology (henceforth NSI), which is used here to refer to the view that a nation

must be congruent politically, culturally and linguistically. Pursuing this policy under the pretext

of preventing political disintegration, states have carried out acts of linguicide3 against non-

state/minority languages. Kurdish has been a victim of this policy even though we have noticed

some significant changes in the status of Kurdish in recent years.

In Iraq Kurdish is now an official language.4 In the Kurdish region, since 1992, Kurdish

(the Sorani variety in particular) has been the working language of the Kurdistan Regional

Government (KRG), schools and the media. In addition, languages other than Kurdish have

been taught in schools and used in the media. A recent study comparing Kurdish in Iraq and

Turkey5 view this promoting of minority languages such as Turkmani and Syriac in Kurdistan, as

1
Connor (1994).
2
Billig (1995); Bourdieu (1991).
3
Skutnabb-Kangas, T. (2000, p. 312): “Another way of reducing the number of possible nations (and thereby
nation-states) is to commit linguistic genocide. This represents (actively) killing a language without killing the
speakers (as in physical genocide) or (through passivity) letting a language die … Unsupported coexistence mostly
also leads to minority languages dying.”
4
See the Iraqi constitution (in English), article 4: http://www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi_constitution.pdf
(Retrieved August 15, 2009)
5
Skutnabb-Kangas & Fernandes (2008).
 Language and Nation‐Building in Kurdistan‐Iraq 2 

a “rare positive example” among nation-building projects in the Middle East, where states have

had abysmal records in their treatment of linguistic minorities. For this very reason, the language

situation in Kurdistan deserves a more detailed review to encourage further achievements in the

area of respect for linguistic rights, and to identify challenges and obstacles to progress in this

area.

This paper examines some of the language debates that have recently taken place in

Kurdistan-Iraq. Most of these debates have been engendered by two petitions submitted to

officials in Kurdistan, one was a petition that demanded linguistic rights for Hawrami speakers,

and the second was a petition that urged Kurdish officials to declare Sorani Kurdish as the

official language.

While theoretically informed by theories of nation and nationalism,67 national identity8,

language policy and planning9, and linguistic human rights and diversity,10 methodologically,

this paper draws on the discourse historical approach11 to analyze over 100 periodical articles,

news items, commentaries, interviews, and official documents, produced predominantly in the

6
According to Skutnabb-Kangas (2006) “All the rights that individuals, groups, organizations, and states have in
relation to languages (their own or others) are linguistic rights or language rights (LRs)” (p. 212). Linguistic rights
are basic human rights and they apply at both individual and collective levels. At an individual level LRs entail the
right to be educated in the mother tongue (MT), and the right to use MT in a variety of domains and social activities
such as home, public institutions, media and schools. At a collective level LRs means the right of the minority group
to control their education system, and the right to be represented in the political system of the state. LRs are
significant not only because they are linked to human rights but also because the recognition of such rights can
enhance the cultural well-being of a minority group, their equal access to socio-economic resources, and their ability
to maintain and preserve their endangered language. States can either deny minorities any linguistic rights (e.g. the
state of Turkey banned Kurdish in Turkey from the 1920s to 1991) or recognize language rights to various degrees.
There can be two kings of linguistic rights (Wright, 2004). A state may choose not to ban a minority language and
tolerate some limited use of it at home or even in the media and cultural activities but feel no obligation with respect
to actively supporting and promoting the language (e.g. Kurdish in Iran especially in the past few decades). In this
case the language has “negative rights” (Wright, 2004). On the other hand, a state may feel obliged, by law, to
actively promote the use and maintenance of a minority language (e.g. the case of Aboriginal languages in Canada
in the last two decades or so). In this case we say that this minority language enjoys positive rights.
77
Anderson (1991).
8
Smith (1991).
9
Cooper (1989).
10
Skutnabb-Kangas (2007, 2006, 2005).
11
Fairclough (2003); Wodak, R., de Cillia, R., Reisigl, M., & Mitten, R. (1999).
 Language and Nation‐Building in Kurdistan‐Iraq 3 

Kurdish varieties (Hewrami, Kurmanji, Sorani), concerning these debates. I will illustrate that

opposing sides of recent debates on the linguistic rights of Hawrami speakers, and the plea for

the officialization of Sorani, can be identified as linguistic ideologies that are traceable in

language issues occurring in other places and throughout the modern times. At the same time,

one can also identify some characteristics of the debates that might be unique to Kurdistan. I will

conclude that, in spite of KRG’s relatively positive attitude about language diversity and rights,

the national state ideology advocated by conservative nationalists remains a serious threat not

only to language diversity and rights but also to Kurdistanis project of nation building.

Before describing the two petitions and the debates surrounding them, it is important to

revisit the importance of language in discourses of Kurdish identity. It is equally important to

problematize the myth that there is a single, unified, and standardized Kurdish language. The

myth needs to be deconstructed, otherwise its hegemonic dominance in debates over language

issues in Kurdistan-Iraq not only supports the erroneous position that Kurdish-Sorani is the only

standardized Kurdish variety but it also suppresses critical views on linguistic rights and

language diversity in Kurdistan.

Kurdish language and identity

An essentialist view of the connection between a nation and a unique language of its own is not

desirable.12 Kurdistan, as a territorial and cultural nation, has been imagined and defined in terms

of a Kurdish language. This is evident in the writings of the poet Haci Qadir Koyi of the late

1800s, to Goran’s of the 1950s and Hemin’s of the 1970s, as well as in the analysis and research

of contemporary scholars of Kurdish studies. 13 It has been suggested that the Kurdish language

is arguably the most salient symbol of Kurdish identity, both culturally and politically, because it

12
May (2001).
13
Hassanpour (2003), Vali (2003), Van Bruinessen (2000), Olson (2009).
 Language and Nation‐Building in Kurdistan‐Iraq 4 

separates the Kurds from their neighboring nations more readily than any other cultural and

physical characteristic. All identities are relational. The discursive construct of a Kurdish

language has been one of the most effective ‘othering’ tools in the hands of Kurdish

nationalism.14

Kurdish diversity

Despite the importance of language as a discursive construct in Kurdish identity, politics, and

autonomous movements, the language itself has never been a unifying force in practice. In fact,

in recent memories, we do not know of any single Kurdish language per se. What we have is the

concept, a discursive construct of such a language that at best refers to a group of speech

varieties consisting of Kurmanji (Northern Kurdish), Sorani (Central Kurdish), and Gorani,

Hawrami, and Zazaki (Southern Kurdish). These varieties are not mutually intelligible unless

there has been considerable prior contact between their speakers.15 Furthermore, the gulf

between Kurdish varieties is widened by the fact that they are written in at least three very

distinct scripts: Latin-based alphabet used by Kurds in Turkey (and some Kurds in Syria),

Arabic-based alphabet used by Kurds in Iran and Iraq weather speaking Kurdish Sorani,

Kurmanji, Gorani or Hawrami.

Despite these differences, until recently, language fragmentations did not pose any

problem for Kurdistan’s nationalist movement. Internal differences were hidden away in relation

to the sociopolitical and linguistic dominance of “Others”. In Kurdistan-Iraq, until 1992, all

14
Some Kurdish political parties have championed linguistic rights such as education in the mother tongue, not
necessarily to defend linguistic human rights or to promote language preservation but rather to appeal to the emotion
of Kurdish masses and garner greater political support. There are political parties who do insist on Kurdish linguistic
rights in their platform but they do very little to promote the use of the language within the ranks of their own
organization. Moreover, although Kurdish is one of the official languages of Iraq, the website of the Iraqi President,
who is a Kurd himself and the leader of one of the largest political organizations in Kurdistan, has a very poor
Kurdish section. Except for the Iraqi Embassy in Stockholm, which has an incomplete Kurdish section, no other
Iraqi Embassy with Kurdish ambassador uses Kurdish on its website.
15
Hassanpour (1992); Sheyholislami (2008).
 Language and Nation‐Building in Kurdistan‐Iraq 5 

Kurdish varieties were almost equally oppressed. They were similar, equal, and united in being

non-official and deprived of positive linguistic rights. Linguistic differences, however, started to

become a “problem” in Kurdistan South when the “Other,” (i.e. the Baathist regime in Baghdad)

no longer threatened the very existence of the speakers of all the Kurdish varieties. In the

absence of a common enemy, internal differences such as language diversity have started to

surface in Hawler, Sulaimaniyeh, Duhok, and Hawraman.

The Case of Hawrami Speakers

The first serious sign of linguistic diversity emerged in a petition submitted by Hawrami

speakers to the KRG authorities, which asked that Hawrami speech variety be recognized as a

“distinct linguistic minority.” With a population of less than 200,000, and fewer than half of

these living in Iraqi Kurdistan, there is justification, by reliable sociolinguistic standards, to

consider Hawrami an endangered language. Such a designation should entitle Hawrami to

positive linguistic rights16 from the KRG, and this means active promotion of the language

through, for example, mother tongue education, providing courses for the teaching and learning

of Hewrami, and financial support for the production of dictionaries, grammar books, and other

text types in the language.

In order to grant positive rights, however, it must be determined whether the speech

variety in question is a “language” or a “dialect” (of Kurdish).17 Non-Kurdish researchers such as

David MacKenzie18 believe that Hawrami is not Kurdish and therefore a language in its own

16
Wright (2004).
17
Language promotion and enjoying “positive rights” is often preceded by the question: what is this speech variety
that needs to be protected or promoted, language or dialect? (Wright, 2004, p. 205).
18
Mackenzie (1961, p. 86). For further on the views of several Orientalists on the matter see Hassanpour (1998).
 Language and Nation‐Building in Kurdistan‐Iraq 6 

right. However, Kurdish scholars, such as Hassanpour19, have insisted on the Kurdishness of

Hawrami not based on any linguistic evidence but rather arguing that Hawramis themselves have

considered their speech variety to be a dialect of Kurdish.20 Recently, the views of a considerable

number of Hawrami writers and educated people have changed.

In 2006, these individuals signed a petition urging the Kurdistan Parliament to recognize

Hawrami as a “distinct linguistic minority” and the medium of instruction in the first years of

school in the Hawraman region. It is quite interesting to note that although the petition insisted

on the Kurdishness of Hawramis as far as national identity was concerned, it referred to

Hawrami as a language and not a dialect of Kurdish. The petition seemed to conceive of

Kurdistan as a civic as opposed to an ethnic nation, a distinction that is more in line with the

conceptualization of those who dismissed outright the demand of Hawramis.21 Some Sorani

writers accused the people behind the petition of being non-Kurdish and un-patriotic, having

19
Hassanpour (1998).
20
“So long as people believe that their way of speaking constitutes a language in its own right, there is a real sense
in which it is a distinct language. They will probably find ways to ‘perform’ their distinctive linguistic identity for
the benefit of others, but ultimately what matters is the ‘imagined community’ of their language...” (Joseph, 2006, p.
27, emphasis in original).
21
Although the typology civic vs. ethnic nation or nationalism has been criticized on several ground (see Smith,
1998; Billig 1995) it still proves to be very useful in conceptualizing some dichotomies in the discourses of national
and nationalism. Ethnic nationalism opens membership in a nation only to those who belong ethnically, for example
linguistically or racially.21 Ethnic nationalism is said to be exclusive, emotional, and irrational. The first home for
ethnic nationalism is believed to be Germany where the Romantics such as Herder and Fichte, “argued that it was
not the state that created the nation, as the Enlightenment believed, but the nation, its people, that created the state.
What gave unity to the nation, what made it a home, a place of passionate attachment, was not the cold contrivance
of shared rights but the people’s preexisting ethnic characteristics: their language, religion, customs, and traditions
(Ignatieff, 1993, p. 7). According to Smith (1998), ethnic nationalism has been the most common type of
nationalism around the world (p. 213). Conversely, civic nationalism is said to be rational, inclusive and integrative.
Within one territory and under the same political unit (i.e. state), civic nationalism accepts everyone who want to
join the community voluntarily regardless of their ethnic characteristics (e.g. language, race, religion). This
nationalism has been labeled civic, according to Ignatieff (1993), because “it envisages the nation as a community of
equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values” (p. 4).
Most scholars, who suggest this distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism, view the French Revolution as the
prime example of civic type of nationalism. This type of nationalism is said to be dominant also in countries like
Britain, the United States, Canada and Australia. Some scholars believe that all nation-states have been ethnic at the
beginning, including France, and Britain. Some have evolves into civic nations, but some have stayed as ethnic (e.g.
Turkey). In all nations there is a constant struggle between the two civic and ethnic tendencies. Kurdistan is no
exception (for more on civic vs. ethnic nation/nationalism see Spencer & Wollman, 2002, pp. 197-217).
 Language and Nation‐Building in Kurdistan‐Iraq 7 

been encouraged by the enemies of Kurdistan to cause diversity and thus disunity among the

“Kurds.” It would be simplistic to explain these problems in terms of language diversity alone.

Most nations are linguistically diverse. The problem is that linguistic diversity is intolerable to

conservative Kurdish nationalists who seem to adhere to the nation state ideology similar to the

state-nations that have been straddling Kurdistan since the 1920s. Sometimes the oppressed

behaves like the oppressor. This is by no means unique to Kurdistan. It would be almost

impossible to find any nation that is not multilingual and in which one group has not made

attempts, and sometimes successfully, to impose its own language on the rest of the population.

In this day and age, however, it has become more and more difficult, for very good reasons, to

insert the hegemony of one single language over other languages or language varieties of the

same nation (more on this in my conclusion).

The Case of Sorani Officialization

The Hawrami speakers’ petition triggered the submission of a counter petition, which asked that

Sorani Kurdish be declared the official language of Iraqi Kurdistan.22 Addressed to Masoud

Barzani, the Kurdistan President, the Kurdish Parliament, and the KRG, the petition appeared in

the bi-Weekly Hawlatî, Sunday April 20, 2008, and was signed by 53 people who were among

the most well-known writers, poets, journalists, and intellectuals of Iraqi Kurdistan.

The petition caused immediate reactions from many parties. The KRG and some other

Kurdistan officials, such as Shafiq Qazaz the head of the Akadîmyay Kurdî (Kurdish Academy)

in Hewlêr, neither rejected nor endorsed the petition; however, there were other officials who

22
“To relinquish use of one’s own language to make space for the language of another group is almost always
indicative of a shift in power relations” (Wright 2007, p. 204).
 Language and Nation‐Building in Kurdistan‐Iraq 8 

supported the petition albeit on a personal level.23 Instead, they acknowledged the seriousness of

the matter and called for more expert studies and deliberation on language planning. Among the

officials, the Governor of the Duhok province, a non-Sorani speaker, dismissed the petition as

discriminatory against non-Sorani speakers.

This opposition to the official language petition received additional support from the

Union of Kurdish Writers—Duhok,24 a Kurmanji speaking body, that refused to submit to the

demands put forward by the petition.25 While the Union proposed that there should be a dialogue

with all parties concerned, 26 they insisted that children in the Badian region should continue to

study in Kurmanji and that they also should learn Sorani.27 Similar to Hawrami speakers,

Kurmanji speakers of the Badinan region seem to have a democratic and civic picture of the

Kurdistan they want to belong to. Not surprisingly, Hawrami speakers also voiced their

opposition to the petition for the officialization of Sorani and repeated their own demands for

linguistic rights and respect for language diversity in Kurdistan.

Another voice in this debate, pan-Kurdish nationalists, viewed the petition as premature

and harmful to the interests of a greater Kurdistan. Adhering to the NSI, they argued that,

although Sorani speakers are the majority in Iraqi Kurdistan, they would not be the majority in a

greater Kurdistan. The pan-Kurdish nationalists believe that the official language of Kurdistan

should be a “unified Kurdish language” based on all Kurdish varieties.

23
In an interview with the periodical Rûdaw Dilshad Abdulrahman the Minister of Education in Kurdistan at the
time said that on a personal level he would support the officialization of Sorani (Ghazi, 2009). The reasons
Abdulrahman presented at length were those that had been laid out in the petition for the officialization of Kurdish
Sorani.
24
http://www.duhokwriters.net/English-Main.htm
25
Ghazi (2009).
26
This position is evident in this statement issued by the Union: http://www.duhokwriters.net/Ziman-daxuyani-
26042008.htm
27
Ghazi (2009).
 Language and Nation‐Building in Kurdistan‐Iraq 9 

Finally, linguistic rights and diversity advocates (e.g. Amir Hassanpour) (myself

included) argued that, as it stands, there are two standardized Kurdish speech varieties: Kurmanji

and Sorani.28 Declaring only one of these varieties as official would mean empowering that

variety while disempowering the other. Such a policy would most likely further divide Kurdistan

instead of promoting unity. Therefore, rather than declare any speech variety as official, it would

be best if attempts were made to foster and celebrate linguistic diversity.

The current situation

Currently the Kurdish Academy, funded by the KRG and headed by Shefiq Qezaz, is studying

this issue. In 2008, after several meetings, the academy published the views of several well-

known linguists and Kurdish academics. However, there was no consensus on a clear language

policy. In preparation for a conference on language matters to be held in Hawler, the Kurdish

Academy has recently been encouraging various linguists and informed observers to document

their views for consideration at the conference in the hope that it will be possible to reach some

consensus on recommendations for an informed language policy for Kurdistan-Iraq.

What will the Kurdish Academy recommend? It is doubtful that the Academy or the

KRG will find the submissions by pan-Kurdish nationalists realistic, that a language policy

should not be designed for only one part but all parts of Kurdistan. The officials in Hewlêr have

demonstrated that the interests of Hewlêr and nation-building in Iraqi Kurdistan take precedence

over concerns for a greater Kurdistan.

Moving beyond the pan-nationalist submissions, there are two possibilities. One is that

the Academy may accept the petition for the officialization of Sorani. In this case the Academy

will be following in the footsteps of the Ankara and Tehran of the 1920s, pursuing the myth that
28
http://www.kurdistanan.net/cat200.php?sid=9231
 Language and Nation‐Building in Kurdistan‐Iraq 10 

one nation must have only one official language. The second possibility, which is much more

realistic and should be welcomed, is that the Academy may suggest that there is no need to

declare any Kurdish variety as the official language for at least two reasons. First, Kurdistan does

have a relatively common code of communication which satisfies, to some extent, the

instrumental function that Ernest Gellner29 perceived for language in the life of a modern nation.

Sorani, for various historical and political reasons, has become that common code without being

explicitly and forcefully imposed by KRG. The Academy may realize that the absence of an

official language does not make a people less of a nation or political unity less possible (as is the

case with the United States). Secondly, they may remind themselves and the KRG that

recognizing positive linguistic rights could only strengthen Kurdistan and look to places like

Canada where the recognition of linguistic rights of French speakers and Aboriginal peoples (and

even new immigrants) have only made the country stronger as a multicultural, multilingual, and

civic nation.30 Finally, the Academy may also realize that, if the first instances of nation-

building, such as France and Britain, were successful in ignoring the linguistic rights of

minorities, such a strategy is no longer feasible in the age of satellite TV and the Internet.. Words

of wisdom, freedom, and resistance have never travelled faster than these days.31

29
Gellner (1983).
30
In the case of Canada, Monica Heller (1999) has observed: “linguistic minorities are created by nationalisms
which exclude them” (p. 7).
31
In the Hawrami petition to the Kurdish Parliament there are explicit references made to minorities’ linguistic
rights in Europe and the fact that such rights are enshrined in the EU documents implying that they expect the same
thing in Kurdistan. Minorities are much more informed and educated about their collective identities and its various
components among which language occupies a prominent position. Kurds living in diaspora are well informed about
these issues in addition to a great number of Hawrami speakers in Kurdistan. The two groups are well connected
thanks to digital media. The Hawrami petition reached concerned audiences, Hawrami or otherwise, within hours.
Today’s local nationalism can no longer exist without immediate influence from long-distance nationalism. If the
Kurds of the 1980s in Iraq had the mountains as their best friends, Hawrami and Behdinani (Badinani) speakers have
diasporas and the new communication technologies as their best friends.
 Language and Nation‐Building in Kurdistan‐Iraq 11 

Conclusion

In conclusion, the KRG has respected the rights of Syriac and Turkomani languages. However,

they seem to be reluctant to do the same for other language varieties that have been traditionally

called Kurdish. They fear that once Kurdish is considered a group of languages rather than

several dialects, the Kurdish people will be divided into different linguistic groups, and the

Kurdish nation, as they know it, will no longer exist. This, of course, is not true. First, these

language groups have always been separate. Secondly, there is hardly any nation in the world

that is culturally and linguistically homogeneous. The concept of homogeneity is, in fact, better

suited to ethnic groups than nations. All nations are heterogeneous. Kurdistan is not, and should

not be, an exception. Kurdistan has never been a linguistic nation in the sense of German

Romantics.32 Rather, it is a nation built on shared oppression and the will to live together, to

borrow from Ernest Renan.33 As Renan observed, it is the will and desire to live together that

keeps the past and shared memories alive. Once this desire is gone, so will the nation.

To continue a successful nation-building project, it would be in the best interest of

Kurdistan and its citizens if the officials respected the rights of all citizens and groups in

Kurdistan-Iraq regardless of how the conservative nationalism defines them (i.e. as Kurdish or

non-Kurdish). The recognition of Hewrami speakers’ linguistic rights and the refusal of

declaring Sorani as the only official language of Kurdistan-Iraq will be another important factor

making the Herêm a truly “rare positive example” in the region where nation-building does also

mean nation destroying. This may only happen if the KRG and the rest of Kurdistan citizens

make serious efforts to disassociate themselves from the nation state ideology and instead

embrace linguistic diversity.

32
Fishman (1989).
33
Renan (1990 [1882]).
Language and Nation‐Building in Kurdistan‐Iraq 12 
 Language and Nation‐Building in Kurdistan‐Iraq 13 

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