Ejusdem Generis

“Things of the same kind or nature”

Meaning

When there are general words following an enumeration

of particular or specific or specific words; the general
words must be confined to the things of the same kind as
those specified. These general and specific words are
capable of analogous meaning and are associated
together, they take color from each other and general
words are restrained and limited to a sense analogous to
less general.
Introduction
The principle underlying ,Ejusdem Jeneris is applied when
the statutory provision concerned contains an
enumeration of specific words, the subject of the
enumeration thereby constituting a class or category but
which class of category is not exhausted at the same time
by the enumeration and the general term follows the
enumeration with no specific indication of any different
legislative intention..it has been described in the words of
LOPES LJ in SMELTING CO OF AUSTRALIA v COMMISIOMER
of inland revenue ,as meaning: ’where general words
immediately follow or are closely associated with specific
words, their meaning must be limited by reference to the
preceding words ’.Ejusdem generis is not a rule of law but
a rule of construction, which enables a court to ascertain
the intention of legislature when the intention is not clear,
and does not warrant the court in subverting or defeating
the legislative will by confining the operation of a statute
within narrower limit than intended by the law makers. it
is not one of the universal application. it is merely a rule of
construction and as such may be of no assistance when
the intention of the legislature is plain as to require no
resort to canons of construction .the rule is to be made
use of only where the language under the statute is vague
or uncertain .

General words which follow controlled

by specific words which proceed

It will not be proper to follow the rule where to do so will

defeat or impair the plain purpose of the legislature .nor it
can be impair to restrict the operation of the act within
narrower limits .It was intended by the law makers .the
rule of Ejusdem generis is that where general words follow
particular and specific words of the same nature ,the
general words must be confined to things of the same kind
as those specified’ .but is clearly decided by the laid cases
that the specific words must form a distinct class or genus
.it is not a inviolable rule of law but is only a permissible
inference in an absence of an indication to the contrary.
In THAMES AND MERSEY MARINE INSURANCE CO v
HAMILTON FRASER CO, Lord Hals bury LC ,referred to two
rules of construction now firmly established as our part of
our law is that words, however general, may be limited in
respect to the subject matter in relation to which they are
used .the other is that the general words may be restricted
to the same genus as the specific word that precede
them’.
The trade or business contemplated by the
main portion of the definition of the shop in s 2(27) of
Bombay shops and establishments act 1948,is not any
business of selling wherever and however conducted ,but
only those traders where the selling is conducted on
defined premises .the very idea of a shop in a connotation
betokens a room or a place or a building where goods are
sold .the rest of the definition merely links on the main
definition ancillary places ,such as state rooms , godowns
,work place etc. Which are mainly used in connection with
business the principle underlying the doctrine is designed
to reconcile an incompatibility between specific and
general words in view of other rules of construction ,for
instance all words ion a statute have ,if possible to be
given due effect ,the legislature does not use superfluous
words and all parts of the statute are to be considered
together .
In A L RANJANE V RAVINDRA ESHWARNATH SETHNA, the
question was whether the appellant could be granted
permission to run a tea stall in accordance with s 313of the
Bombay Municipal Corporation act 1888 ,the act states
that:
No person expect the written permission of the
commissioner-(a)place or deposit upon any street open
channel or wall on any street any stall, chair, bench, box,
ladder, bale or other things so as to form an obstruction
thereto or encroachment thereon…..
The court held thus:
The structure for which permission
to be grant shall be of the similar structure as mentioned
in the clause .permission has to be for something which
can be read as Ejusdem Jeneris with the items mentioned
in the clause (a).the items indicate that they are of
temporary nature and are easily removable as and when
required .the structure in the present case is of a size
which even if not permanently embedded on the road
cannot be said to a akin to items mentioned in clause (a).in
the present case the structure is embodied on the road. it
has water and electricity connections also has shutters
which enable locking of the stall whenever
required…..section 313 totally bars any stall or structure of
the type put up by the appellant. So permission, if any
granted by the commissioner is violative of the statute and
is therefore, illegal.’
Reason
The doctrine is an attempt to reconcile an incompatibility
between specific and general words in view of other rules
of construction that all words in a statute are to be given
effect ,if possible that part of the state are to be
constructed together ;and the legislature is presumed not
to have used superfluous words.id th3e general words are
given full and natural meaning ,that is, the meaning they
would receive in abstract ,they would include the object
designed by the specific words ,making the latter
superfluous .if on the other hand the series of specific
words is given its full and natural meaning, the general
words are redundant .the rule accomplishes the purpose
of giving effect to both the particular and general word ,by
treating the particular words as indicating the class ,and
the general words as extending the provision of the
statute to everything embraced in that class ,though not
specifically named by the particular words .the doctrine of
Ejusdem Generis was only a part of wider principle of
construction ,namely that ,where reasonably possible
,some significance and meaning should be attributed to
each and every word and phrase in a written document.
In CHERTSEY UDC V MAXNAM’S PROPITIES ,Reid J said that
the general effect of the authorities was properly stated in
Maxwell’s INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES as follows:’
general words and phrases therefore, however, wide and
comprehensive they may be in their literal sense ,must
usually be constructed as being limited to the actual
objects of the act ‘.

Where meaning is plain

But if the intention of the legislature is clear, the occasion
for the introduction of the EJUSDEM GENERIS rule of
interpretation, would not arise .general and
comprehensive words should receive their full and natural
meaning unless they are clearly restrictive in their
intendment .in COMMISIONER OF INCOME TAQX v
LAXMIDAS DEVIDAS, Beaumont CJ observed:

The so called Ejusdem Generis rule which, I cannot help

thinking ,it sometimes misapplied in India –is merely a rule
of construction .when you have general words following
particular words ,the general words are limited to things
which are Ejusdem Generis which the particular words ,but
 the rule being one of construction should never be
invoked where its application appears to defeat the
general intent of the instrument to be constructed .

To ascertain intent
The rule of Ejusdem Generis, that words are to be interpreted
by the association in which they are found ,is applied as an aid
in ascertaining the intent of the legislature and not to subvert it
when ascertained ,and give no warrant of narrowing alternative
provision which the legislature has adopted with the purpose of
affording added safeguards .

Application of the doctrine

The doctrine applies where the following conditions exist:

i. The statute contains an enumeration by specific words ;

ii. The members of the enumeration constitute a class or
category ;
iii. The class is not exhausted by the enumeration;
iv. A general term follows the enumeration;
v. There is a distinct genus which comprises more than one
species;
vi. There is not clearly manifested an intent that general term
be given a broader meaning than the doctrine requires .

Lord BRANWELL GREAT WESTERN RAIL CO v SWINDON

REMARKED:

I think as a matter of ordinary construction,where several

words are followed by general expressions ,as here ,which
is as much applicable to the first and other words as to the
last ,the expression is not limited to the last ,but applies to
all. for instance ,horses ,oxen’s, pigs, sheep, from
whatever country they may come ,the latter word must
apply to horse as much as to sheep.

The rule is that when general words follow particular and

specific words of the same kind as those specified .but it is
clearly laid down by decided cases that the specific words
must form a distinct genus or category .it is not an
inviolable rule of law,but is only permissible inference in
the absenc3e of indication to the contrary.
When the doctrine does not
apply
The rule of Ejusdem Jeneris has to be applied with care
and caution;

This is not a inviolable rule of law, but it is only

permissible inference, in the absence of any indication to
the contrary .if some words are specific and general words
follow them, the general words follow them ,the general
words shall be restricted to the same genus or category as
the specific words the rule of Ejusdem generis will not
apply:
i. If the specific words does not come under a genus or
category ;
ii. Where the context of the whole scheme of the
enactment and the object and mischief of the
enactment do not require such a restricted meaning
to be attached to words of general import.
It is only when generic words follow the more specific
that the rule of Ejusdem generis comes into play and
not when specific word follow a general term.
LOKMAT NEWSPAPER PVT LTD v SHANKAR PRASAD
,illustrates this position .in this case it was held that the
principle of Ejusdem Generis cannot be invoked in
connection with item 1 of schedule 7 OF THE
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT 1947.the act provides that
during the pendency of the proceedings before the
conciliations officer, a workman cannot be discharged
and dismissed the wore discharge in a general term .it
is followed by the word dismissal which contemplate
only one category of classes or situations where penalty
is imposed by the employer on the workman concerned
.the rule would have been applied if the word’
discharge’ presented a particular species belonging to
the genus reflected by the general word dismiss. Which
is of a particular nature of pertains to a limited class or
category of penal situations .Obviously neither if the
above is a genus and none of them is a species of the
very same genus.
In RATANSI HIRJI v EMPEROR
Section 412A(b) of the Bombay city Municipal act
1888,refers to the sale of milk ,butter or other milk
products ,and if the words ‘other milk products’ are to
be used EJUSDEM JENERIS with butter, they would
include such products of milk as are the direct results of
milk ,as butter, curd, cream etc. but would not include
ghee, which is not a direct product of milk but is
prepared out of butter which a direct product of milk
.further; other milk products’, if construed strictly and
EJUSDRM GENERIS with milk and butter ,would include
such products of milk as are liable to speedy decay ,like
butter ,as for example ,whey, curd, or cream or would
not include ghee which is not liable to speedy decay .
In LE MESURIER v WAJJID HOSSAIN ,the primary
question was whether the general words of cl (f) of s
13,legal practioners act 1879,as amended by act 11 of
1896,’for any other reasonable clause ‘were to be read
,by the operation of the rule of Ejusdem generis ,as
applying only to the role of misconduct of a strictly
professional kind ,or as embracing what might be called
for the sake of convince ,disqualifying case of a different
kind .
In BHAQVANARAYANA v VENKATADU It was held that to
invoke the application of the Ejusdem generis rule,
there must be distinct genus or category. The specific
words must apply not to different objects of a widely
differencing character but to something which can be
called a class or kind of objects .where this is lacking
,the rule cannot apply .