G.R. No.

L-40010 May 26, 1975

RUSSEL R. ENERIO, DARROW O. ENERIO, and VIRGINIA RODRIGUEZ, plaintiffs,

vs.
HON. NESTOR B. ALAMPAY, SONETRAN CO., INC., ERNESTO KHO, and MAX VILLEGAS Y
YANSON, respondents.

Jose O. Macaso, Sr., Bernardo B. Pablo and Benito C. Jalandoni, Sr. for plaintiffs.

Yulo, Sedonio, Alejano and Associates for respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

The Court sets aside respondent court's dismissal order for alleged lack of jurisdiction. The totality of
the demand in suits for recovery of sums of money between the same parties furnishes the
jurisdictional test and since petitioners' total claim for actual, moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees was clearly in excess of P10,000.00 and came close to P30,000.00, it properly fell
within the jurisdiction of respondent court of first instance.

On May 27, 1974, petitioners as plaintiffs filed with respondent court of first instance of Negros
Occidental presided by respondent Judge Nestor B. Alampay a complaint for the recovery of actual,
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs of litigation totalling close to P30,000.00
against private respondents Sonetran Co., Inc., Ernesto Kho and Max Villegas y Yanson as
defendants as a result of the physical injuries caused petitioner-minor, Russel Enerio, eight years of
age (herein represented by his parents, the co-petitioners) when bumped on the road on January 15,
1974 by a passenger bus of respondents driven allegedly "in a very reckless, negligent and imprudent
manner" by respondent Max Villegas.

Respondents filed in due course their answer with counterclaim for P20,000.-moral damages and
P2,000.-attorney's fees.

Pre-trial was held by respondent court on November 27, 1974 and on said date, without its jurisdiction
having been questioned or placed in issue by respondents, it issued moto proprio an order dismissing
the complaint on the ground that "without the claims for moral and exemplary damages, this case will
not fall within the jurisdiction, of the court of first instance," without prejudice to re-filing in the court of
proper jurisdiction and without costs, as petitioners-plaintiffs had been allowed by it to file the case as
paupers-litigants. The pertinent portion of the dismissal order reads as follows:têñ.£îhqwâ£

At the pre-trial of this case the attention of the counsel for the plaintiffs was drawn to
the allegations of the complaint which limit the claim for actual damages of the plaintiff
minor, Russel Enerio, to the amount of P478.00 corresponding to hospital and doctor's
bills and medicines and for the miscellaneous expenses attendant to his care after he
was bumped by a passenger bus of the defendant company. In same complaint,
plaintiff Darrow O. Enerio, father of said minor, claims the amount of P500.00,
representing his alleged loss of income during the period while attending to his injured
son. All such claim for actual damages would thus be in the total amount of only
P978.00. Along with these considerations, the court notes that pla intiffs seek moral
damages in the sum of P10,000.00, exemplary damages in the sum of P15,000.00
and an award for attorney's fees of P3,000.00 and expenses of litigation in the sum of
P500.00. Without the claims for moral and exemplary damages, this case will not fill
within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.

It is therefore the considered view of the court, considering the minimal amount of the
claim of the plaintiffs for actual damages, that the moral and exemplary damage recited
and claimed for in the complaint is but an obvious means taken to circumvent the
provisions of the Judiciary Act with respect to the jurisdiction of inferior courts and the
Courts of First Instance, respectively. The disproportionate and bloated claims for
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in this instance reflect that such
were merely placed in the complaint in order to shift jurisdiction to this court, but that
under the recited facts this case should not be taken cognizance of due to the limited
amount that is actually involved. To tolerate the imposition of this case on this court
 can open the floodgates to parties who may then institute slight physical injury in the
Courts of First Instance on mere assertions of clearly disproportionate and imprudent
claims for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees, with the resulting effect
of adding burden to the docket and load of the superior courts. ... .

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari of the dismissal order. Upon consideration of
respondents' comment and of petitioners' reply thereto, the Court resolved to treat the case as a
special civil action and dispense with the filing of briefs for an expeditious determination of the simple
issue of jurisdiction involved.

It is well settled and beyond question that the jurisdiction of a court over a case, is determined by the
allegations of the complaint, and since petitioners' complaint asserted a total demand, exclusive of
interest of over P10.000.00 (and sought recovery of damages of close to P30,000.00) the case clearly
falls within the original jurisdiction of respondent court of first instance as provided by section 44 of the
Judiciary Act, Republic Act 296 as amended.

The totality of the demand in suits for recovery of sums of money between the same parties, i.e. the
total or aggregate amount demanded in the complaint constitutes the basis of jurisdiction and for
determining the jurisdictional amount in civil cases.1 Here petitioners' total claim of P978.00 for actual
damages, P10,000.-moral damages, P15,000.-exemplary damages and P3,000.-attorney's fees, etc.,
was clearly in excess of P10,000.00 and therefore properly fell within the jurisdiction of respondent
court of first instance. Respondent court could not arbitrarily isolate petition lesser claim for actual
damages and without hearing and proofs rule out petitioners' other claims for moral and exemplary
damages as "bloated" and summarily dismiss motu proprio the case as not failing within its jurisdiction
contrary to the very allegations on the face of the complaint.

Petitioners contend with reason that their complaint asserted lawful demands for the imposition of
moral and exemplary or corrective damages against respondents "to serve as deterrent against
reckless driving" on the basis of their specific allegations in their complaint that respondents' bus "was
running very fast and was being driven ... in a very reckless, negligent and imprudent manner, in utter
violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law and the traffic rules and regulations and without due regard
to life and property," and "that as a result of the injuries received by minor plaintiff, plaintiffs suffered
physically and underwent mental torture and worried, wounded feelings, serious anxiety. ..."2

Petitioners have disclaimed any "bloating" of their claim for moral and exemplary damages as merely
surmised by respondent court without having given petitioners their day in court and without having
received the proofs of the parties. Petitioners rightfully contend that it is not the lesser nature of the
injuries suffered by the minor or the relatively modest amount of actual damages incurred by them in
the hospitalization of the injured son and the father's loss of income but the gross and wanton
negligence of private respondents in the operation of their public vehicle which resulted in the injuries
inflicted upon the minor (as alleged and if proven by them at the trial) that would be decisive and
controlling on the matter of moral and exemplary damages claimed by them. Petitioners have cause
to complain, therefore, that respondent court in refusing motu proprio to take cognizance of the case
on the ground that the claims for damages were "bloated" in effect prejudged the case without hearing
and without the evidence, and wrongfully barred them from seeking moral and exemplary damages in
excess of P10,000.00 by dismissing their suit before it and requiring them to file their action in the
inferior courts, where their total claim for damages would be limited to not more P10,000.00.

There appears no valid justification in the record for respondent court's bare conclusion that petitioners'
claim for damages were "bloated" in order to shift jurisdiction to it rather than to the inferior courts and
that the filing of the case with it amounted to an "imposition of this case on this court."

Respondents' contention in their comment that "since the award of said amount (of moral and
exemplary damages) is discretionary on its (respondent court) part, it believed that plaintiffs cannot
recover a total amount in excess of P10,000.00, hence, there is basis for the court in dismissing the
complaint on ground of lack of jurisdiction" is manifestly erroneous. If such were the case, respondent
court should have narrowed down the issue at the pre-trial to the question and amount of recoverable
damages, if any, and proceeded to receive the parties' proofs thereon and thereafter rendered
judgment on the merits, even utterly refusing any award of moral or exemplary damages to petitioners
if this were its determination. This simply means that it should have properly assumed and exercised
its jurisdiction and disposed of the case on the merits rather than erroneously dismissed the complaint
for alleged lack of jurisdiction with all the attendant delay caused thereby and the remand of the case
back to it.
ACCORDINGLY, the dismissal order appealed from is hereby annulled and set aside and the case is
ordered remanded to the court a quo for trial and adjudication on the merits. Without costs.

FACTS
Flores sued the resps for the collection of sum of money with the RTC
The first cause of action alleged in the complaint was against Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay
the amount of P11,643representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from Flores on
various occasions from August to October, 1981;
The second cause of action was against resp Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the
amount of P10,212 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from pet on several
occasions from March, 1981 to January, 1982.
Ignacio Binongcal filed a MTD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the demand
against said resp was only P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of BP129 the RTC shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more than P20K.
Although another person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly indebted to pet in the amount of
P10,212.00, his obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other resp. Calion joined in
moving for the dismissal of the complaint.
RTC dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE:
WON the trial court correctly ruled on the application of the permissive joinder of parties

Ruling:

The lower court has jurisdiction over the case following the "novel" totality rule introduced in Section
33(l) of BP129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules.
Section 33(l) of BP129
That where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties,
embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in
all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or
different transactions. ...
Section 11 of the Interim Rules
Application of the totality rule. In actions where the jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the
amount involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum of all the money demands,
exclusive only of interest and costs, irrespective of WON the separate claims are owned by or due
to different parties. If any demand is for damages in a civil action, the amount thereof must be
specifically alleged.
former rule under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948
Where there are several claims or causes of action between the same parties embodied in the
same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the demand in all the causes
of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions;
but where the claims or causes of action joined in a single complaint are separately owned by
or due to different parties, each separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test. ...

Comparison of former and present rules

Present Rules Former Rules

Where a plaintiff Totality of the claims in all the causes Totality of the claims in all the causes
sues a of action irrespective of whether the of action irrespective of whether the
defendant on COA arose out of the same or diff COA arose out of the same or diff
two or more transactions. If the total demand transactions. If the total demand
separate exceeds P20K – RTC has jurisdiction exceeds P20K – RTC has jurisdiction
causes of action

If the causes of action are separate
and independent, their joinder in one
complaint is permissive and not
mandatory, and any cause of action
where the amount of the demand is
20K or less may be the subject of a
If the causes of action are separate
and independent, their joinder in one
complaint is permissive and not
mandatory, and any cause of action
where the amount of the demand is
20K or less may be the subject of a
 separate complaint filed with a separate complaint filed with a
metropolitan or MTC. metropolitan or MTC.

Two or more Where the claims or causes of action The causes of action in favor of the
plaintiffs having joined in a single complaint are two or more plaintiffs or against the
a separate separately owned by or due to two or more defendants should arise
causes of action different parties, each separate out of the same transaction or series
against a claim shall furnish the of transactions and there should be a
defendant join in jurisdictional test common question of law or fact, as
a single provided in Section 6 of Rule 3.
complaint The former rule applied only to cases
of permissive joinder of parties
plaintiff. However, it was also
applicable to cases of permissive
joinder of parties defendant.

Brillo vs. Buklatan (former rule):

Separate claims against several defendants of different amounts each of which is not more
than P2,000 and falls under the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court. The several claims do
not arise from the same transaction or series of transactions and there seem to be no questions
of law or of fact common to all the defendants as may warrant their joinder under Rule 3,
section 6.

The difference between the former and present rules in cases of permissive joinder of parties may be
illustrated by the two cases which were cited in the case of Vda. de Rosario vs. Justice of the
Peace as exceptions to the totality rule.
· Soriano y Cia vs. Jose 29 dismissed employees joined in a complaint against the defendant to
collect their respective claims, each of which was within the jurisdiction of the municipal court although
the total exceeded the jurisdictional amount, this Court held that under the law then
the municipal court had jurisdiction. Although the plaintiffs' demands were separate, distinct and
independent of one another, their joint suit was authorized under Section 6 of Rule 3 and each
separate claim furnished the jurisdictional test.
· International Colleges, Inc. vs. Argonza, 25 dismissed teachers jointly sued for unpaid salaries, the
MC had jurisdiction because the amount of each claim was within, although the total exceeded,
its jurisdiction and it was a case of permissive joinder of parties plaintiff under Section 6 of Rule
3.

Under the present law, the two cases would be under the jurisdiction of the RTC. Similarly, Brillo
vs. Buklatan and Gacula vs. Martinez, if the separate claims against the several defendants arose out
of the same transaction or series of transactions and there is a common question of law or fact, they
would now be under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of
Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state also,
if instead of joining or being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or against the parties,
the amount demanded in each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.
The lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties
pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful
scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims
against resps Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its
jurisdiction.
Manchester Development Corp. v CA

149 SCRA 562 – Remedial Law – Civil Procedure – Payment of Docket Fees – Claimed Damages
must be Stated in the BODY and PRAYER of pleadings

A complaint for specific performance was filed by Manchester Development Corporation against City
Land Development Corporation to compel the latter to execute a deed of sale in favor Manchester.
Manchester also alleged that City Land forfeited the former’s tender of payment for a certain
transaction thereby causing damages to Manchester amounting to P78,750,000.00. This amount was
alleged in the BODY of their Complaint but it was not reiterated in the PRAYER of same complaint.
Manchester paid a docket fee of P410.00 only. Said docket fee is premised on the allegation of
Manchester that their action is primarily for specific performance hence it is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. The court ruled that there is an under assessment of docket fees hence it ordered
Manchester to amend its complaint. Manchester complied but what it did was to lower the amount of
claim for damages to P10M. Said amount was however again not stated in the PRAYER.

ISSUE: Whether or not the amended complaint should be admitted.

HELD: No. The docket fee, its computation, should be based on the original complaint. A case is
deemed filed only upon payment of the appropriate docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in
court. Here, since the proper docket fee was not paid for the original complaint, it’s as if there is no
complaint to speak of. As a consequence, there is no original complaint duly filed which can be
amended. So, any subsequent proceeding taken in consideration of the amended complaint is void.

Manchester’s defense that this case is primarily an action for specific performance is not merited. The
Supreme Court ruled that based on the allegations and the prayer of the complaint, this case is an
action for damages and for specific performance. Hence, it is capable of pecuniary estimation.

Further, the amount for damages in the original complaint was already provided in the body of the
complaint. Its omission in the PRAYER clearly constitutes an attempt to evade the payment of the
proper filing fees. To stop the happenstance of similar irregularities in the future, the Supreme Court
ruled that from this case on, all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should
specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the
prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any
pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted, or shall
otherwise be expunged from the record.
Sun Insurance v Asuncion Digest

G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989

Facts:
Petitioner Sun Insurance (or SIOL) files a complaint for the annulment of a decision on the
consignation of fire insurance policy. Subsequently, the Private Respondent (PR) files a complaint for
the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in a civil case against
SIOL. In addition, PR also claims for damages, attorney’s fees, litigation costs, etc., however, the
prayer did not state the amount of damages sought although from the body of the complaint it can be
inferred to be in amount of P 50 million. Hence, PR originally paid only PhP 210.00 in docket fees.The
complaint underwent a number of amendments to make way for subsequent re-assessments of the
amount of damages sought as well as the corresponding docket fees. The respondent demonstrated
his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.

Issue: Did the Court acquire jurisdiction over the case even if private respondent did not pay the correct
or sufficient docket fees?

YES.
It was held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter
or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of
the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond
the applicable prescriptive or reglamentary period. Same rule goes for permissive counterclaims, third
party claims and similar pleadings.

In herein case, obviously, there was the intent on the part of PR to defraud the government of the
docket fee due not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended
complaint. However, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike in
Manchester, the private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
additional docket fees as required.
Where a trial court acquires jurisdiction in like manner, but subsequently, the judgment awards a claim
not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of
Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

Tacay vs RTC of Tagum GR Nos 88075-77 December 20, 1989

Tacay vs RTC of Tagum
GR Nos. 88075-77
December 20, 1989

Facts:
These were 2 separate cases originally filed by Godofredo Pineda at the RTC of Tagum for recovery
of possession (acciones publiciana) against 3 defendants, namely: Antonia Noel, Ponciano Panes,
and Maximo Tacay.

Pineda was the owner of 790 sqm land evidenced by TCT No. T-46560. The previous owner of such
land has allowed the 3 defendants to use or occupy the same by mere tolerance. Pineda, having
himself the need to used the property, has demanded the defendants to vacate the property and pay
reasonable rentals therefore, but such were refused.

The complaint was challenged in the Motions to Dismiss filed by each defendant alleging that it did
not specify the amounts of actual, nominal, and exemplary damages, nor the assessed value of the
property, that being bars the determination of the RTC’s jurisdiction in deciding the case.

The Motions to Dismiss were denied but the claims for damages in the complaint were expunged for
failure to specify the amounts. Thus, the defendants filed a Joint Petition for certiorari, mandamus,
prohibition, and temporary restraining order against the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not the amount of damages claimed and the assessed value of the property are relevant
in the determination of the court’s jurisdiction in a case for recovery of possession of property?

Decision:
Determinative of the court’s jurisdiction in a recovery of possession of property is the nature of the
action (one of accion publicaina) and not the value of the property, it may be commenced and
prosecuted without an accompanying claim for actual, nominal or exemplary damages and such action
would fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC. The court acquired jurisdiction upon the
filing of the complaint and payment of the prescribed docket fees.

LA SALETTE COLLEGE, Represented by Its President, FR. ROMEO GONZALES, MS; and JESUS
T. BAYAUA, Dean of Student Services, petitioners, vs. VICTOR C. PILOTIN, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

An appeal is not perfected by the mere filing of a Notice of Appeal that has been served on the adverse
party. The docket fees must likewise be paid within the reglementary period. Petitioners have failed to
show why they merit an exception to these stringent rules.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the
November 16, 2000[2] and the June 22, 2001 Resolutions[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR
CV UDK No. 0236C. The November 16, 2000 Resolution disposed as follows:

In view of the foregoing, Appellees Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Resolution, dated
March 14, 2000, is hereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE and the appeal is hereby DISMISSED.[4]

The June 22, 2001 Resolution denied reconsideration.

The Facts

The facts of the case are narrated by the trial court[5] as follows:

[Respondent] is a bonafide student of [petitioner] College dating back [to] the school year 1988-1989
taking up the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce. In the enrollment period for the second
semester held on October 22 to November 5, 1993, [respondent] was denied re-enrollment, despite
repeated pleas by x x x himself and by other interested parties and his lawyer.

On November 16, 1993, he filed his complaint and asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction to compel [petitioner college to] re-admit him. On December 28, 1993, an Order
was issued directing [petitioner college] to admit [respondent] for the second semester but still
[petitioner college] refused to re-admit [respondent], despite implementation of said order and the
pleas of [respondent] thru his counsel so that he could catch up with the bulk of the school days of the
semester and could graduate.

Because of the adamant refusal of [respondent] school in re-admitting him and his defiance to the
order and because the period of the second semester [was] already about to close, [respondent]
amended his complaint and concentrate[d] on damages, hence, this case.

On the other hand, the [petitioner college] alleged that it opened its enrollment period for the second
semester of school year 1993-1994 on 11 October 1993 up to 22 October, 1993 to 05 November,
1993. However, classes for the second semester of that school year commenced on 25 October, 1993.
During these periods for enrolment, [respondent] never enrolled with the x x x College and neither did
he accomplish the basic requirements for enrolment. However, on 05 November, 1993, the x x x
College was in receipt of a letter from Atty. Quirino L. Pilotin dated on that same date requesting for a
reconsideration of an alleged decision denying enrolment to the [respondent]. Upon receipt of the said
letter, it was endorsed to [Respondent] Bayaua who in turn wrote Atty. Pilotin explaining among others
that was not denied enrolment but rather [the] latter did not enroll with the said College. Considering,
however, that the x x x College started its regular classes on 25 October, 1993, in the event
[respondent] was able to enroll on 6 November, 1993, he would have then exceeded the required
absences for his supposed enrolled subjects.

Since plaintiff failed to enrol on the last day for enrolment, there is no reason why the x x x College
should relax its rules to accommodate [respondent]. The x x x College merely imposed its disciplining
authority when it sets dates for the period to enrol and the matter of admission of students is within
the ambit of academic freedom and beyond the province of the Courts to decide.[6]

On November 17, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondent.[7] Petitioners
received the Decision on November 26, 1998. On the same date, they filed a Notice of Appeal, which
the RTC approved on December 2, 1998.

Respondent moved for a reconsideration thereof on the ground of petitioners failure to pay the docket
fees within the reglementary period. The trial court, however, denied the Motion in its April 23, 1999
Order.[8]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its November 29, 1999 Resolution, the CA dismissed the appeal of petitioners for their failure to pay
the required docketing fee within the period for filing an appeal.[9] But, upon their motion, the CA
granted, in a Resolution dated March 14, 2000, reconsideration of their appeal, which it reinstated in
the interest of substantial justice and considering that [petitioners] already paid the docket fees.[10]
Respondent moved for a reconsideration on March 29, 2000.

After reexamining the records of the case, the CA, in the challenged November 16, 2000 Resolution,
dismissed the appeal filed by petitioners, because the docket fees were only paid after one (1) year
and eleven (11) months from the filing of the notice of appeal.[11] It deemed it imperative to reverse
the March 14, 2000 Resolution to conform with the law and long settled jurisprudence[12] on the
matter. Thus, in the June 22, 2001 Resolution, it denied their Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this Petition.[13]

Issues

Petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:

1. Whether or not the appeal was seasonably filed;

2. With all due respect, the Court of Appeals did not have the authority to dismiss the appeal.[14]

In the main, the case revolves around the timeliness of the payment of the docket fees.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Sole Issue:
Timeliness of Payment of
Appellate Court Docket Fees

The payment of docket fees is not a trivial matter. These fees are necessary to defray court expenses
in the handling of cases.[15] For this reason, and to secure a just and speedy disposition of every
action and proceeding,[16] the Rules on Civil Procedure[17] mandates the payment of docket and
other lawful fees within the prescribed period. Otherwise, the jurisdiction of the proper court to handle
a case is adversely affected.[18]

The above rule applies squarely to this case, in which the judgment issued by the RTC, in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction, was elevated to the CA for review. Rule 41 of the Rules on Civil Procedure
provides the essential requirements for making such an appeal, as follows:

SEC. 2. Modes of appeal.

(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
x x x.

xxxxxxxxx

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the judgment or final order appealed from. x x x.

SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Within the period for taking an appeal, the
appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the
full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be
transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the record on appeal.

SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. A partys appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected
as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.

x x x x x x x x x.

In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the
appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.

x x x x x x x x x.

Accordingly, in order to perfect an appeal from a decision rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, the following requirements must be complied with. First, within 15 days, a notice
of appeal must be filed with the court that rendered the judgment or final order sought to be appealed;
second, such notice must be served on the adverse party; and third, within the same 15-day period,
the full amount of appellate court docket and other legal fees must be paid to the clerk of the court that
rendered the judgment or final order.

It should be noted that full payment of the appellate docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory,[19] even jurisdictional,[20] for the perfection of the appeal. Otherwise, the appellate court
would not be able to act on the subject matter of the action,[21] and the decision or final order sought
to be appealed from would become final and executory.[22]

In the present case, petitioners insist that they seasonably paid the docket fees. After resolving thrice
the timeliness of the payment of the docket fees, the CA finally found that these had been paid one
(1) year and 11 days from the filing of their notice of appeal.

To recapitulate, on November 26, 1998, petitioners received the November 17, 1998 RTC Decision.
Consequently, they had 15 days to file their Notice of Appeal. They did so on November 26, 1998, but
failed to pay the docket fees. A review of the records shows that they paid these only on July 8,
1999,[23] or after almost seven (7) months from the mandated last day for payment, which was
December 11, 1998. Clearly, the November 17, 1998 RTC Decision, which petitioners sought to
appeal, had long become final and executory.

Relaxation of the Rule on

Nonpayment of Docket Fees

Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of appellate docket fees, we also
recognize that its strict application is qualified by the following: first, failure to pay those fees within the
reglementary period allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such power should
be used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the tenets
of justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in consideration of all attendant
circumstances.[24]

In Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Mangubat,[25] the payment of the docket fees was
delayed by six (6) days, but the late payment was accepted, because the party showed willingness to
abide by the Rules by immediately paying those fees. Yambao v. Court of Appeals[26] saw us again
relaxing the Rules when we declared therein that the appellate court may extend the time for the
payment of the docket fees if appellant is able to show that there is a justifiable reason for x x x the
failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees within the prescribed period, like fraud, accident,
mistake, excusable negligence, or a similar supervening casualty, without fault on the part of the
appellant.[27]

In the present case, petitioners have not shown any satisfactory reason to warrant the relaxation of
the Rules. In fact, the manner in which they presented their case before us leaves too much to be
desired. Indeed, we are almost tempted to say that they tried to mislead -- nay, deceive -- this Court
as well as the appellate court.

The present case calls for the adjudication of whether petitioners paid the docket fees on time. Hence,
it is essential that they specify the exact dates when they filed their notice of appeal and paid the
corresponding docket fees. But nowhere in their pleadings did they do so. All they said was that the
appeal had been seasonably filed.

In accordance with the requisites for the perfection of an appeal as enumerated earlier, petitioners
should have (1) filed a notice of appeal with the RTC of Santiago, Isabela, within 15 days from the
issuance of the trial court Decision being appealed; (2) paid the docket fees within the same period;
and (3) served the notice to the adverse party.

True, petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal within the prescribed period, but they paid the docket fees
only seven (7) months thereafter. They adamantly insisted on page 6 of their Petition[28] that the
appeal was seasonably filed, but later said that the the appeal fee was paid immediately after 23 April
1999 when the court a quo denied the respondents motion for reconsideration and approved the
appeal. x x x. With the foregoing therefore, the notice of appeal was seasonably filed with the payment
of docket fees on time.[29]

They admitted, though, that because of the excusable negligence or mistake of their counsel, the
official receipts for the Notice of Appeal had not been attached. They reasoned that they had failed to
transmit the proof of payment of the docket fees to the CA, because such provision of civil procedure
was relatively new x x x at that time.[30] At any event, respondent denies being served such notice.[31]

Assuming arguendo that the period of appeal was interrupted by respondents motion for
reconsideration of the RTCs approval of petitioners notice of appeal, the required docket fees for the
latter were still not paid on time. From November 23, 1998, when petitioners filed their Notice of
Appeal, until April 23, 1999, when the trial court approved it with finality, they made no effort to pay
those fees. It took them more than two (2) months to immediately pay the docket fees after being
informed of the April 23, 1999 Order denying respondents motion for reconsideration of the RTC Order
approving petitioners Notice of Appeal. This lapse of time hardly reflected sincere willingness to abide
by the Rules, especially when respondent had raised the very issue of nonpayment of docket fees as
early as December 28, 1998.

On this point, petitioners counsel is reminded of the role that lawyers play in the dispensation of justice.
Bayas v. Sandiganbayan[32] held thus:

Lawyers are not merely representatives of the parties but, first and foremost, officers of the court. As
such, one of their duties -- assisting in the speedy and efficient administration of justice -- is more
significant than that of [the cause of] their client, rightly or wrongly. x x x. We stress that candor in all
dealings is the very essence of membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are obliged to observe
rules of procedure in good faith, not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.[33]

We stress that the payment of docket fees is not a mere technicality of law or procedure, but an
essential requirement for the perfection of an appeal.[34] Without such payment, the appellate court
does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, and the decision or final order sought
to be appealed from becomes final and executory.[35] As laid down in Barangay 24 of Legazpi City v.
Imperial:[36]

The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process. It is purely a statutory privilege, and
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. Well-rooted is
the principle that perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and
executory, and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less to
entertain the appeal.[37]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Heirs of the Late Ruben Reinoso Sr., v. CA (2011)

Doctrine: A reiteration of the more liberal Sun Insurance case. Where the party does not deliberately
intend to defraud the court in payment of docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the
rules by paying additional docket fees when required by the court, the liberal doctrine enunciated in
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., and not the strict regulations set in Manchester, will apply.

Facts:
• In 1979, Ruben Reinoso was a passenger in a jeepney traversing E. Rodriguez Ave. The
jeepney owned by Tapales, collided with a truck owned by Guballa.
• Reinoso died as a result of the collision. His heirs filed the instant case for Damages against
Tapales and Guballa
• IN 1988, RTC found the Truck liable and held Guballa liable for damages sustained by the
Heirs of Reinoso and the jeepney owner
• Case litigated before the RTC which rendered a decision
• In 1994, CA motu propio dismissed the petition on the ground of nonpayment of docket fees
pursuant to the 1987 Manchester ruling
• Reinoso’s defense: Manchester should not be made to apply retroactively to their case as the
case was filed prior to the promulgation of Manchester ruling

WON: The dismissal by the CA was proper due to the nonpayment of docket fees? NO!

HELD:
• The Court reiterates the ruling in Sun Insurance v. Asuncion
• the case at bench has been pending for more than 30 years and the records thereof are
already before this Court, a remand of the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) would only unnecessarily
prolong its resolution
• In Manchester v. Court of Appeals, it was held that a court acquires jurisdiction over any case
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. The strict application of this rule was, however,
relaxed two (2) years after in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion
• The Court also takes into account the fact that the case was filed before the Manchester ruling
came out. Even if said ruling could be applied retroactively, liberality should be accorded to the
petitioners in view of the recency then of the ruling. Leniency because of recency was applied to the
cases of Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals
• RTC decision was reinstated
Do-All Metal Industries v SBC

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the propriety of awarding damages based on claims embodied in the plaintiffs
supplemental complaint filed without prior payment of the corresponding filing fees.

The Facts and the Case

From 1996 to 1997, Dragon Lady Industries, Inc., owned by petitioner spouses Domingo Lim and Lely
Kung Lim (the Lims) took out loans from respondent Security Bank Corporation (the Bank) that totaled
P92,454,776.45. Unable to pay the loans on time, the Lims assigned some of their real properties to
the Bank to secure the same, including a building and the lot on which it stands (the property), located
at M. de Leon St., Santolan, Pasig City.[1]

In 1998 the Bank offered to lease the property to the Lims through petitioner Do-All Metals Industries,
Inc. (DMI) primarily for business although the Lims were to use part of the property as their residence.
DMI and the Bank executed a two-year lease contract from October 1, 1998 to September 30, 2000
but the Bank retained the right to pre-terminate the lease. The contract also provided that, should the
Bank decide to sell the property, DMI shall have the right of first refusal.

On December 3, 1999, before the lease was up, the Bank gave notice to DMI that it was pre-
terminating the lease on December 31, 1999. Wanting to exercise its right of first refusal, DMI tried to
negotiate with the Bank the terms of its purchase. DMI offered to pay the Bank P8 million for the
property but the latter rejected the offer, suggesting P15 million instead. DMI made a second offer of
P10 million but the Bank declined the same.

While the negotiations were on going, the Lims claimed that they continued to use the property in their
business. But the Bank posted at the place private security guards from Philippine Industrial Security
Agency (PISA). The Lims also claimed that on several occasions in 2000, the guards, on instructions
of the Bank representatives Titolaido Payongayong and Evylene Sison, padlocked the entrances to
the place and barred the Lims as well as DMIs employees from entering the property. One of the
guards even pointed his gun at one employee and shots were fired. Because of this, DMI was unable
to close several projects and contracts with prospective clients. Further, the Lims alleged that they
were unable to retrieve assorted furniture, equipment, and personal items left at the property.
The Lims eventually filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City for damages
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) or preliminary injunction against
the Bank and its co-defendants Payongayong, Sison, PISA, and Gil Silos.[2] Answering the complaint,
the Bank pointed out that the lease contract allowed it to sell the property at any time provided only
that it gave DMI the right of first refusal. DMI had seven days from notice to exercise its option. On
September 10, 1999 the Bank gave notice to DMI that it intended to sell the property to a third party.
DMI asked for an extension of its option to buy and the Bank granted it. But the parties could not agree
on a purchase price. The Bank required DMI to vacate and turnover the property but it failed to do so.
As a result, the Banks buyer backed-out of the sale. Despite what happened, the Bank and DMI
continued negotiations for the purchase of the leased premises but they came to no agreement.

The Bank denied, on the other hand, that its guards harassed DMI and the Lims. To protect its
property, the Bank began posting guards at the building even before it leased the same to DMI. Indeed,
this arrangement benefited both parties. The Bank alleged that in October of 2000, when the parties
could not come to an agreement regarding the purchase of the property, DMI vacated the same and
peacefully turned over possession to the Bank.

The Bank offered no objection to the issuance of a TRO since it claimed that it never prevented DMI
or its employees from entering or leaving the building. For this reason, the RTC directed the Bank to
allow DMI and the Lims to enter the building and get the things they left there. The latter claimed,
however, that on entering the building, they were unable to find the movable properties they left there.
In a supplemental complaint, DMI and the Lims alleged that the Bank surreptitiously took such
properties, resulting in additional actual damages to them of over P27 million.

The RTC set the pre-trial in the case for December 4, 2001. On that date, however, counsel for the
Bank moved to reset the proceeding. The court denied the motion and allowed DMI and the Lims to
present their evidence ex parte. The court eventually reconsidered its order but only after the plaintiffs
had already presented their evidence and were about to rest their case. The RTC declined to recall
the plaintiffs witnesses for cross- examination but allowed the Bank to present its evidence.[3] This
prompted the Bank to seek relief from the Court of Appeals (CA) and eventually from this Court but to
no avail.[4]

During its turn at the trial, the Bank got to present only defendant Payongayong, a bank officer. For
repeatedly canceling the hearings and incurring delays, the RTC declared the Bank to have forfeited
its right to present additional evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision.

On September 30, 2004 the RTC rendered a decision in favor of DMI and the Lims. It ordered the
Bank to pay the plaintiffs P27,974,564.00 as actual damages, P500,000.00 as moral damages,
P500,000 as exemplary damages, and P100,000.00 as attorneys fees. But the court absolved
defendants Payongayong, Sison, Silos and PISA of any liability.

The Bank moved for reconsideration of the decision, questioning among other things the RTCs
authority to grant damages considering plaintiffs failure to pay the filing fees on their supplemental
complaint. The RTC denied the motion. On appeal to the CA, the latter found for the Bank, reversed
the RTC decision, and dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaims.[5] DMI and the Lims filed
a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same, hence this petition.

The Issues Presented

The issues presented in this case are:

1. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate plaintiffs supplemental
complaint against the Bank considering their failure to pay the filing fees on the amounts of damages
they claim in it;

2. Whether or not the Bank is liable for the intimidation and harassment committed against DMI and
its representatives; and

3. Whether or not the Bank is liable to DMI and the Lims for the machineries, equipment, and other
properties they allegedly lost after they were barred from the property.
The Courts Rulings

One. On the issue of jurisdiction, respondent Bank argues that plaintiffs failure to pay the filing fees
on their supplemental complaint is fatal to their action.

But what the plaintiffs failed to pay was merely the filing fees for their Supplemental Complaint. The
RTC acquired jurisdiction over plaintiffs action from the moment they filed their original complaint
accompanied by the payment of the filing fees due on the same. The plaintiffs non-payment of the
additional filing fees due on their additional claims did not divest the RTC of the jurisdiction it already
had over the case.[6]

Two. As to the claim that Banks representatives and retained guards harassed and intimidated DMIs
employees and the Lims, the RTC found ample proof of such wrongdoings and accordingly awarded
damages to the plaintiffs. But the CA disagreed, discounting the testimony of the police officers
regarding their investigations of the incidents since such officers were not present when they
happened. The CA may be correct in a way but the plaintiffs presented eyewitnesses who testified out
of personal knowledge. The police officers testified merely to point out that there had been trouble at
the place and their investigations yielded their findings.

The Bank belittles the testimonies of the petitioners witnesses for having been presented ex parte
before the clerk of court. But the ex parte hearing, having been properly authorized, cannot be assailed
as less credible. It was the Banks fault that it was unable to attend the hearing. It cannot profit from its
lack of diligence.

Domingo Lim and some employees of DMI testified regarding the Bank guards unmitigated use of
their superior strength and firepower. Their testimonies were never refuted. Police Inspector Priscillo
dela Paz testified that he responded to several complaints regarding shooting incidents at the leased
premises and on one occasion, he found Domingo Lim was locked in the building. When he asked
why Lim had been locked in, a Bank representative told him that they had instructions to prevent
anyone from taking any property out of the premises. It was only after Dela Paz talked to the Bank
representative that they let Lim out.[7]

Payongayong, the Banks sole witness, denied charges of harassment against the Banks
representatives and the guards. But his denial came merely from reports relayed to him. They were
not based on personal knowledge.

While the lease may have already lapsed, the Bank had no business harassing and intimidating the
Lims and their employees. The RTC was therefore correct in adjudging moral damages, exemplary
damages, and attorneys fees against the Bank for the acts of their representatives and building guards.

Three. As to the damages that plaintiffs claim under their supplemental complaint, their stand is that
the RTC committed no error in admitting the complaint even if they had not paid the filing fees due on
it since such fees constituted a lien anyway on the judgment award. But this after-judgment lien, which
implies that payment depends on a successful execution of the judgment, applies to cases where the
filing fees were incorrectly assessed or paid or where the court has discretion to fix the amount of the
award.[8] None of these circumstances obtain in this case.

Here, the supplemental complaint specified from the beginning the actual damages that the plaintiffs
sought against the Bank. Still plaintiffs paid no filing fees on the same. And, while petitioners claim
that they were willing to pay the additional fees, they gave no reason for their omission nor offered to
pay the same. They merely said that they did not yet pay the fees because the RTC had not assessed
them for it. But a supplemental complaint is like any complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due
on a complaint need to be paid upon its filing.[9] The rules do not require the court to make special
assessments in cases of supplemental complaints.

To aggravate plaintiffs omission, although the Bank brought up the question of their failure to pay
additional filing fees in its motion for reconsideration, plaintiffs made no effort to make at least a late
payment before the case could be submitted for decision, assuming of course that the prescription of
their action had not then set it in. Clearly, plaintiffs have no excuse for their continuous failure to pay
the fees they owed the court. Consequently, the trial court should have treated their Supplemental
Complaint as not filed.

Plaintiffs of course point out that the Bank itself raised the issue of non-payment of additional filing
fees only after the RTC had rendered its decision in the case. The implication is that the Bank should
be deemed to have waived its objection to such omission. But it is not for a party to the case or even
for the trial court to waive the payment of the additional filing fees due on the supplemental complaint.
Only the Supreme Court can grant exemptions to the payment of the fees due the courts and these
exemptions are embodied in its rules.

Besides, as correctly pointed out by the CA, plaintiffs had the burden of proving that the movable
properties in question had remained in the premises and that the bank was responsible for their loss.
The only evidence offered to prove the loss was Domingo Lims testimony and some undated and
unsigned inventories. These were self-serving and uncorroborated.

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition and REINSTATES with modification the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in Civil Case 68184. The Court DIRECTS respondent
Security Bank Corporation to pay petitioners DMI and spouses Domingo and Lely Kung Lim damages
in the following amounts: P500,000.00 as moral damages, P500,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
P100,000.00 for attorneys fees. The Court DELETES the award of actual damages of P27,974,564.00.

SO ORDERED.