Case lifts
Axel Cruz
These are NOT digests! Rather, the headings contain
paragraphs directly lifted from the decision in each particular
case. These lifts consist of the doctrine of each case as they are
expressed by the Supreme Court.
(Note: For long cases, the paragraphs underlined contain the
most important parts. In the interest of clarity, I chose not to
omit the other paragraphs.)
Table of Contents
1. People v Cabugatan ...................................................... 1
2. People v Partoza ........................................................... 2
3. People v Padua ............................................................. 2
4. People v Habana ........................................................... 3
5. People v Santiago ......................................................... 4
6. People v Watamama ..................................................... 4
7. People v Ladjaalam ...................................................... 5
8. Sison v People .............................................................. 5
9. Evangelista v Sistosa .................................................... 5
10. Agote v Lorenzo ........................................................... 5
11. People v Bustinera........................................................ 6
12. People v Lagat .............................................................. 6
13. People v Nocum ........................................................... 6
14. Dimat v people ............................................................. 7
15. People v catantan.......................................................... 7
16. People v tulin ............................................................... 7
17. People v Acosta ............................................................ 8
18. People v Soriano .......................................................... 8
19. Buebos v people ........................................................... 9
20. People v baluntong ....................................................... 9
21. Amora v people ............................................................ 9
22. People v cedenio ........................................................ 10
23. Republic v cabrini ...................................................... 10
24. Republic v Glasgow ................................................... 10
25. Lim v people .............................................................. 10
26. Nierras v dacuycuy ..................................................... 11
27. Wong v ca .................................................................. 11
28. People v Gorospe ....................................................... 12
29. Llamado v ca .............................................................. 12
30. Que v people .............................................................. 13
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
By: Mark Que 2A 2019
SPL Atty.
31. Cabrera v ca ............................................................... 13
32. Svendsen v people ..................................................... 13
33. Magno v ca................................................................. 14
34. People v nitafan ......................................................... 14
35. Tan v mendez ............................................................. 15
36. Lim lao v CA ............................................................. 15
37. Bautista v CA ............................................................. 15
38. Guy v ca ..................................................................... 16
39. Catiis v ca .................................................................. 16
40. Jaravata v sb ............................................................... 16
41. Mejorada v sb............................................................. 17
42. Fonacier v sb .............................................................. 17
43. Mendoza-arce v ombudsman ..................................... 18
44. Trieste v sb ................................................................. 18
45. Alvarez v people ........................................................ 19
46. Go v SB...................................................................... 19
47. Estrada v sb ................................................................ 19
48. Gma v people ............................................................. 20
49. Villareal v people ....................................................... 22
50. Gaanan v iac............................................................... 23
51. Ramirez v ca .............................................................. 23
52. Southern hemisphere v anti terrorism council ........... 23
1. People v Cabugatan
In the prosecution of offenses involving this provision of the
statute, it is necessary that the following elements be
established: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, object, and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefore.39 What is material to the prosecution for
illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction
or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of evidence of corpus delicti.
In this jurisdiction, the conduct of buy-bust operation is a
common and accepted mode of apprehending those involved in
illegal sale of prohibited or regulated drugs. It has been proven
to be an effective way of unveiling the identities of drug dealers
and of luring them out of obscurity. Thus, unless the defense
could persuade us otherwise, we are inclined to confer full
credit and faith to the testimonies of the members of the buy-
bust team as regards the conduct of their operation.
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2. People v Partoza
Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165 mandates that the apprehending
team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
In People v. Obmiranis, appellant was acquitted due to the flaws
in the conduct of the post-seizure custody of the dangerous drug
allegedly recovered from appellant, taken together with the
failure of the key persons who handled the same to testify on
the whereabouts of the exhibit before it was offered in evidence
in court. In Bondad v. People, this Court held that the failure to
comply with the requirements of the law compromised the
identity of the items seized, which is the corpus delicti of each
of the crimes charged against appellant, hence his acquittal is in
order. And in People v. De la Cruz, the apprehending team's
omission to observe the procedure outlined by R.A. No. 9165
in the custody and disposition of the seized drugs significantly
impairs the prosecution's case.
In the instant case, it is indisputable that the procedures for the
custody and disposition of confiscated dangerous drugs in
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not complied with.
PO3 Tougan did not mark the seized drugs immediately after
he arrested appellant in the latter's presence. Neither did he
make an inventory and take a photograph of the confiscated
items in the presence of appellant. There was no representative
from the media and the Department of Justice, or any elected
public official who participated in the operation and who were
supposed to sign an inventory of seized items and be given
copies thereof. None of these statutory safeguards were
observed.
While this Court recognizes that non-compliance by the buy-
bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is a
justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending team, yet these conditions were
not met in the case at bar. No explanation was offered by PO3
Tougan for his failure to observe the rule.
Furthermore, while PO3 Tougan admitted to have in his
possession the shabu from the time appellant was apprehended
at the crime scene to the police station, records are bereft of
proof on how the seized items were handled from the time they
left the hands of PO3 Tougan. PO3 Tougan mentioned a certain
Inspector Manahan as the one who signed the request for
laboratory examination. He did not however relate to whom the
custody of the drugs was turned over. Furthermore, the
evidence of the prosecution did not reveal the identity of the
person who had the custody and safekeeping of the drugs after
its examination and pending presentation in court. The failure
of the prosecution to establish the chain of custody is fatal to its
cause.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
By: Mark Que 2A 2019
SPL Atty. Axel Cruz
All told, the identity of the corpus delicti in this case was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The courts below heavily relied on the testimony of PO3
Tougan and in the same breadth, banked on the presumption of
regularity. In People v. Garcia, we said that the presumption
only arises in the absence of contrary details in the case that
raise doubt on the regularity in the performance of official
duties. Where, as in the present case, the police officers failed
to comply with the standard procedures prescribed by law, there
is no occasion to apply the presumption.
3. People v Padua
Accused-appellant asserts that the police officers failed to
account for the chain of custody of the seized items alleged to
be shabu. He questions the non-presentation as witness of the
alleged investigator, the officer on duty who received the
specimen together with the request for laboratory examination
from PO2 Aguilar. He maintains that the specimen, which PO2
Aguilar turned over to Forensic Chemist Rivera-Dagasdas, may
no longer be the same specimen taken from him by PO2
Aguilar.
Contrary to accused-appellants claim, there is no broken chain
in the custody of the seized items, found to be shabu, from the
time PO2 Aguilar got the shabu, to the time it was turned over
to the investigating officer, and up to the time it was brought to
the forensic chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory for
laboratory examination.
The procedure for the custody and disposition of confiscated,
seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, among others, is
provided under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165, as follows:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control
of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, which implements said
provision, stipulates:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department
of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: x x x Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
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Under the same proviso, non-compliance with the stipulated
procedure, under justifiable grounds, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items, for as long
as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officers.
Clearly, the purpose of the procedure outlined in the
implementing rules is centered on the preservation of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. The
testimony of PO2 Aguilar outlines the chain of custody of the
confiscated items, i.e., sachets of shabu:
The fact that the persons who had possession or custody of the
subject drugs, such as Forensic Chemist Rivera-Dagasdas and
the alleged investigator, were not presented as witnesses to
corroborate SPO2 Aguilars testimony is of no moment. The
non-presentation as witnesses of other persons such as the
investigator and the forensic chemist, is not a crucial point
against the prosecution. The matter of presentation of witnesses
by the prosecution is not for the court to decide. The prosecution
has the discretion as to how to present its case and it has the
right to choose whom it wishes to present as witnesses.
As may be noted, the prosecution dispensed with the testimony
of Forensic Chemist Rivera-Dagasdas because the defense had
already agreed during the pre-trial in the substance of her
testimony to be given during trial
Anent the failure of the prosecution to present the testimony of
the informant, it is well-settled that the testimony of an
informant in drug-pushing cases is not essential for conviction
and may be dispensed if the poseur-buyer testified on the same.
Informants are almost always never presented in court because
of the need to preserve their invaluable service to the police.
Further, not all people who came into contact with the seized
drugs are required to testify in court. There is nothing in
Republic Act No. 9165 or in any rule implementing the same
that imposes such requirement. As long as the chain of custody
of the seized drug was clearly established not to have been
broken and that the prosecution did not fail to identify properly
the drugs seized, it is not indispensable that each and every
person who came into possession of the drugs should take the
witness stand.
On the other hand, for an accused to be convicted of illegal
possession of prohibited or regulated drugs, the following
elements must concur: (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2)
such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused
freely and consciously possesses the said drug.
A prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an
entrapment or buy-bust operation, the conduct of which has no
rigid or textbook method. Flexibility is a trait of good police
work. However the police carry out its entrapment operations,
for as long as the rights of the accused have not been violated
in the process, the courts will not pass on the wisdom thereof.
The police officers may decide that time is of the essence and
dispense with the need for prior surveillance.
4. People v Habana
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
By: Mark Que 2A 2019
SPL Atty. Axel Cruz
But no rule requires the prosecution to present as witness in a
drugs case every person who had something to do with the
arrest of the accused and the seizure of prohibited drugs from
him. The discretion on which witness to present in every case
belongs to the prosecutor.
The non-presentation of the informant cannot prejudice the
prosecution’s theory of the case. His testimony would merely
be corroborative since police officers Paras and Tayag who
witnessed everything already testified. Besides, as a rule, it is
rarely that the prosecutor would present the informant because
of the need to hide his identity and preserve his invaluable
service to the police.
In all prosecutions for the violation of The Dangerous Drugs
Act, the existence of the prohibited drug has to be proved.[24]
The chain of custody rule requires that testimony be presented
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was
seized up to the time it is offered in evidence. To this end, the
prosecution must ensure that the substance presented in court is
the same substance seized from the accused.
While this Court recognizes substantial adherence to the
requirements of R.A. 9165 and its implementing rules and
regulations, not perfect adherence, is what is demanded of
police officers attending to drugs cases, still, such officers must
present justifiable reason for their imperfect conduct and show
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items had
been preserved. Here, however, they failed to meet these
conditions. The police officers offered no explanation for their
failure to observe the chain of custody rule.
The prosecution failed to show how the seized items changed
hands, from when the police officers seized them from Habana
to the time they were presented in court as evidence. PO1 Paras
said that he turned over the sachets of shabu to the investigator
on duty. But the prosecution did not adduce evidence on what
the investigator on duty did with the seized articles, how these
got to the laboratory technician, and how they were kept before
being adduced in evidence at the trial.
Usually, the police officer who seizes the suspected substance
turns it over to a supervising officer, who would then send it by
courier to the police crime laboratory for testing. Since it is
unavoidable that possession of the substance changes hand a
number of times, it is imperative for the officer who seized the
substance from the suspect to place his marking on its plastic
container and seal the same, preferably with adhesive tape that
cannot be removed without leaving a tear on the plastic
container. At the trial, the officer can then identify the seized
substance and the procedure he observed to preserve its
integrity until it reaches the crime laboratory.
If the substance is not in a plastic container, the officer should
put it in one and seal the same. In this way the substance would
assuredly reach the laboratory in the same condition it was
seized from the accused. Further, after the laboratory technician
tests and verifies the nature of the substance in the container, he
should put his own mark on the plastic container and seal it
again with a new seal since the police officers seal has been
broken. At the trial, the technician can then describe the sealed
condition of the plastic container when it was handed to him
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and testify on the procedure he took afterwards to preserve its
integrity.
If the sealing of the seized substance has not been made, the
prosecution would have to present every police officer,
messenger, laboratory technician, and storage personnel, the
entire chain of custody, no matter how briefly ones possession
has been. Each of them has to testify that the substance,
although unsealed, has not been tampered with or substituted
while in his care.
Since the failure in this case to comply with the procedure in
the custody of seized drugs compromised the identity and
integrity of the items seized, which is the corpus delicti of each
of the crimes charged against Habana, his acquittal is in order.
5. People v Santiago
Although the prosecution established through Esguerra the acts
constituting the crime charged in the drug-pushing case
(Section 5), it failed to provide proper identity of the allegedly
prohibited substance that the police seized from Roselle.
Esguerra testified that he seized a heat-sealed sachet of white
substance from Roselle and marked the sachet with RPS right
in her presence. He claimed that he then immediately submitted
the specimen to the police crime laboratory for examination.
But the request for laboratory exam reveals that it was not
Esguerra who delivered the specimen to the crime laboratory. It
appears that Esguerra gave it to a certain SPO3 Puno who in
turn forwarded it to a certain PO2 Santos. No testimony covers
the movement of the specimen among these other persons.
Consequently, the prosecution was unable to establish the chain
of custody of the seized item and its preservation from possible
tampering.
Since the seized substance was heat-sealed in plastic sachet and
properly marked by the officer who seized the same, it would
have also been sufficient, despite intervening changes in its
custody and possession, if the prosecution had presented the
forensic chemist to attest to the fact a) that the sachet of
substance was handed to him for examination in the same
condition that Esguerra last held it: still heat-sealed, marked,
and not tampered with; b) that he (the chemist) opened the
sachet and examined its content; c) that he afterwards resealed
the sachet and what is left of its content and placed his own
marking on the cover; and d) that the specimen remained in the
same condition when it is being presented in court. In this way,
the court would have been assured of the integrity of the
specimen as presented before it. If the finding of the chemist is
challenged, there may be opportunity for the court to require a
retest so long as sufficient remnants of the same are left.
What is more, the prosecution failed to account for the
whereabouts of the seized specimen after the crime laboratory
conducted its tests. This omission is fatal since the chain of
custody should be established from the time the seized drugs
were confiscated and eventually marked until the same is
presented during trial.
6. People v Watamama
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
By: Mark Que 2A 2019
SPL Atty. Axel Cruz
The chain of custody rule requires that testimony be presented
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was
seized up to the time it is offered in evidence. To this end, the
prosecution must ensure that the substance presented in court is
the same substance seized from the accused.
While this Court recognizes substantial adherence to the
requirements of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rules and
regulations, not perfect adherence, is what is demanded of
police officers attending to drugs cases, still, such officers must
present justifiable reason for their imperfect conduct and show
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items had
been preserved. Here, however, they failed to meet these
conditions.
The prosecution failed to show how the seized evidence
changed hands from the time PO1 Vargas turned it over to the
investigator up to the time they were presented in court as
evidence. The prosecution did not adduce evidence on how the
evidence was handled or stored before its presentation at the
trial. It is not enough to rely merely on the testimony of PO1
Vargas who stated that she turned the seized item over to the
investigator who then prepared the letter of request for
examination. There was no evidence on how PO2 Ortiz came
into possession of the shabu and how he delivered the seized
item for examination to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Neither was
there any evidence how it was secured from tampering.
Instructive is the case of People v. Kamad,11 where the Court
enumerated the different links that the prosecution must
endeavor to establish with respect to the chain of custody in a
buy-bust operation: first, the seizure and marking of the illegal
drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer;
second, the turn over of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turn
over by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the
turn over and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by
the forensic chemist to the court.1âwphi1
We are aware that there is no rule which requires the
prosecution to present as witness in a drugs case every person
who had something to do with the arrest of the accused and the
seizure of prohibited drugs from him. The discretion on which
witness to present in every case belongs to the prosecutor.12
Nonetheless, as a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of
custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. In
context, this would ideally include testimony about every link
in the chain, from the seizure of the prohibited drug up to the
time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that everyone who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was
received when it was and what happened to it while in the
witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received, and
the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the
chain.
In this case, the over-reliance on PO1 Vargas’ testimony and
the failure to present the investigator and PO2 Ortiz are fatal to
the prosecution’s case. Since the failure to establish every link
in the chain of custody of the drug compromised its identity and
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integrity, which is the corpus delicti of the crimes charged
against appellant, his acquittal is therefore in order.
7. People v Ladjaalam
A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is
used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate
offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the
"other crime" is murder or homicide, illegal possession of
firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a
separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted
homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer
be held liable for illegal possession of firearms.
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the
accused. In this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294’s simple
language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other
interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law
demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused.
Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two separate
offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with
attempted homicide. Moreover, since the crime committed was
direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of
firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.
The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates
appellant of illegal possession of an M-14 rifle, an offense
which normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct
assault. While the penalty for the first is prision mayor, for the
second it is only prision correccional. Indeed, the accused may
evade conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using
such weapons in committing an even lighter offense,66 like
alarm and scandal67 or slight physical injuries,68 both of which
are punishable by arresto menor.69 This consequence,
however, necessarily arises from the language of RA 8294,
whose wisdom is not subject to the Court’s review. Any
perception that the result reached here appears unwise should
be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion
to give statutes a new meaning detached from the manifest
intendment and language of the legislature. Our task is
constitutionally confined only to applying the law and
jurisprudence70 to the proven facts, and we have done so in this
case.
8. Sison v People
However, as to petitioner's conviction for illegal possession of
firearms, such judgment must be set aside. We find that he can
no longer be held liable for such offense since another crime
was committed, i.e., rape.
9. Evangelista v Sistosa
After trial, petitioner was convicted of both crimes. In Criminal
Case No. 92-109854 for illegal possession of firearms,
petitioner was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal as
minimum to reclusion perpetua as maximum. On the other
hand, the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6)
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
By: Mark Que 2A 2019
SPL Atty. Axel Cruz
years of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years of
prision mayor as maximum was imposed by the trial court upon
the petitioner in Criminal Case No. 92-109710 for robbery.
On July 6, 1997, Republic Act No. 8294 took effect. The said
law effectively reduced the imposable penalty for the offense of
illegal possession of firearms. Hence, for the illegal possession
of a low powered firearm such as that of the petitioners, the
penalty is now prision correccional in its maximum period
which has a duration of four (4) years, two (2) months, and one
day to six (6) years, and a fine of not less than Fifteen Thousand
Pesos (P15,000.00). It is the retroactive application of this
provision of law which petitioner seeks to forward his cause.
It bears reiterating that this Courts interpretation of laws are as
much a part of the law of the land as the letters of the laws
themselves. Meaning, our interpretation of Republic Act No.
8294 forms part of the said law. In view of the well-entrenched
rule that criminal laws shall be given retroactive effect if
favorable to the accused, petitioner Danilo Evangelista is
deemed to have committed only the crime of robbery for which
he has already served more than the maximum period of the
penalty imposed upon him.
10. Agote v Lorenzo
Let us take a look at the jurisprudence once again. In Cupcupin
vs. People, the accused was charged and convicted for two (2)
separate crimes of illegal possession of firearms, and illegal
possession of prohibited drugs. In the more recent case of
People vs. Almeida, however, although the accused was
acquitted of the separate charge of illegal possession of firearm
for lack of evidence, the Court nevertheless made the following
clear pronouncement:
Furthermore, in any event, the Court has ruled in previous cases
that in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 8294, there
can be no separate offense of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition if there is another crime committed such as, in this
case, that of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
In Almeida, it should be noted that the unlicensed firearm was
merely found lying around, together with the prohibited drugs,
and therefore, was not being used in the commission of an
offense.
Given this Courts aforequoted pronouncement in Almeida, can
the accused in the present case still be separately convicted of
two (2) offenses of illegal possession of firearms and violation
of gun ban, more so because as in Almeida, the unlicensed
firearm was not actually used or discharged in committing the
other offense?
The aforementioned ruling was reiterated and applied in the
subsequent cases of People vs. Garcia, where the judgment of
conviction of the accused-appellants for illegal possession of
firearms was set aside there being another crime kidnapping for
ransom which they were perpetrating at the same time; People
vs. Bernal, where the Court retroactively applied Rep. Act No.
8294 in accused-appellants favor because it would mean his
acquittal from the separate offense of illegal possession of
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firearms; and People vs. Bustamante, where, in refusing to
convict the accused-appellant of the separate offense of illegal
possession of firearms, the Court declared that insofar as it is
favorable to the appellant, the provisions of Rep. Act No. 8294
should be applied liberally and retroactively in that appellant
must be acquitted of the charge of illegal possession of firearms.
Guided by the foregoing, the Court cannot but set aside
petitioners conviction in Criminal Case No. 96-149820 for
illegal possession of firearm since another crime was
committed at the same time, i.e., violation of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2826 or the Gun Ban.
Admittedly, this ruling is not without misgivings considering
that it would mean petitioners acquittal of the more serious
offense of illegal possession of firearms which carries a much
heavier penalty than violation of the COMELEC gun-ban
resolution.
11. People v Bustinera
Carnapping is essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized
vehicle, the concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and
carnapping being the same.
In the 2000 case of People v. Tan where the accused took a
Mitsubishi Gallant and in the later case of People v. Lobitania
which involved the taking of a Yamaha motorized tricycle, this
Court held that the unlawful taking of motor vehicles is now
covered by the anti-carnapping law and not by the provisions
on qualified theft or robbery.
There is no arguing that the anti-carnapping law is a special law,
different from the crime of robbery and theft included in the
Revised Penal Code. It particularly addresses the taking, with
intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without
the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. But a
careful comparison of this special law with the crimes of
robbery and theft readily reveals their common features and
characteristics, to wit: unlawful taking, intent to gain, and that
personal property belonging to another is taken without the
latter's consent. However, the anti-carnapping law particularly
deals with the theft and robbery of motor vehicles. Hence a
motor vehicle is said to have been carnapped when it has been
taken, with intent to gain, without the owner's consent, whether
the taking was done with or without the use of force upon
things. Without the anti-carnapping law, such unlawful taking
of a motor vehicle would fall within the purview of either theft
or robbery which was certainly the case before the enactment
of said statute.
It is to be noted, however, that while the anti-carnapping law
penalizes the unlawful taking of motor vehicles, it excepts from
its coverage certain vehicles such as roadrollers, trolleys, street-
sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, amphibian trucks and
cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles which run only
on rails and tracks, and tractors, trailers and tractor engines of
all kinds and used exclusively for agricultural purposes. By
implication, the theft or robbery of the foregoing vehicles
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
By: Mark Que 2A 2019
SPL Atty. Axel Cruz
would be covered by Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended and the provisions on robbery, respectively.
From the foregoing, since appellant is being accused of the
unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it is the anti-carnapping
law and not the provisions of qualified theft which would apply
as the said motor vehicle does not fall within the exceptions
mentioned in the anti-carnapping law.
The designation in the information of the offense committed by
appellant as one for qualified theft notwithstanding, appellant
may still be convicted of the crime of carnapping. For while it
is necessary that the statutory designation be stated in the
information, a mistake in the caption of an indictment in
designating the correct name of the offense is not a fatal defect
as it is not the designation that is controlling but the facts
alleged in the information which determines the real nature of
the crime.
12. People v Lagat
The elements of carnapping as defined and penalized under the
Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 are the following:
1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
2. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the
offender himself;
3. That the taking is without the consent of the owner
thereof; or that the taking was committed by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things; and
4. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the
vehicle.
The records of this case show that all the elements of
carnapping are present and were proven during trial.
Their unexplained possession raises the presumption that they
were responsible for the unlawful taking of the tricycle. Section
3(j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states that:
A person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a
recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act;
otherwise, that thing which a person possesses, or exercises acts
of ownership over, are owned by him.
In Litton Mills, Inc. v. Sales, we said that for such presumption
to arise, it must be proven that: (a) the property was stolen; (b)
it was committed recently; (c) that the stolen property was
found in the possession of the accused; and (d) the accused is
unable to explain his possession satisfactorily. As mentioned
above, all these were proven by the prosecution during trial.
Thus, it is presumed that Lagat and Palalay had unlawfully
taken Biags tricycle.
13. People v Nocum
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Section 2 of RA 6539 defines carnapping as "the taking, with
intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without
the latter’s consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things." The
crime of carnapping with homicide is punishable under Section
1461 of the said law, as amended by Section 20 of RA 7659. To
prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide,
there must be proof not only of the essential elements of
carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of
the culprit and the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof."
Thus, the prosecution in this case has the burden of proving that:
(1) Mallari took the Toyota FX taxi; (2) his original criminal
design was carnapping; (3) he killed the driver, Medel; and (4)
the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of
the carnapping or on the occasion thereof."
14. Dimat v people
Here, someone carnapped Mantequilla’s Nissan Safari on May
25, 1998. Two years later in December 2000, Dimat sold it to
Delgado for P850,000.00. Dimat’s defense is that the Nissan
Safari he bought from Tolentino and later sold to Delgado had
engine number TD42-126134 and chassis number CRGY60-
YO3553 as evidenced by the deeds of sale covering those
transactions. The Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla, on the
other hand, had engine number TD42-119136 and chassis
number CRGY60-YO3111.
But Dimat’s defense is flawed. First, the Nissan Safari Delgado
bought from him, when stopped on the road and inspected by
the police, turned out to have the engine and chassis numbers
of the Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla. This means that
the deeds of sale did not reflect the correct numbers of the
vehicle’s engine and chassis.
15. People v catantan
Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as "any attack
upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole
or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal
belongings of the complement or passengers, irrespective of the
value thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things, committed by any person,
including a passenger or member of the complement of said
vessel, in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The
offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as
hereinafter provided." And a vessel is construed in Sec. 2, par.
(b), of the same decree as "any vessel or watercraft used for
transport of passengers and cargo from one place to another
through Philippine waters. It shall include all kinds and types of
vessels or boats used in fishing (emphasis supplied).
On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art. 286 of the
Revised Penal Code is committed by "any person who, without
authority of law, shall, by means of violence, prevent another
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By: Mark Que 2A 2019
SPL Atty. Axel Cruz
from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to
do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong."
Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may be
committed it is essential that there be an attack on or seizure of
a vessel. He claims that he and his companion did not attack or
seize the fishing boat of the Pilapil brothers by using force or
intimidation but merely boarded the boat, and it was only when
they were already on board that they used force to compel the
Pilapils to take them to some other place. Appellant also insists
that he and Ursal had no intention of permanently taking
possession or depriving complainants of their boat. As a matter
of fact, when they saw another pumpboat they ordered the
brothers right away to approach that boat so they could leave
the Pilapils behind in their boat. Accordingly, appellant claims,
he simply committed grave coercion and not piracy.
We do not agree. Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532
as well as grave coercion as penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised
Penal Code, this case falls squarely within the purview of
piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan Jr. were
compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of destination,
such compulsion was obviously part of the act of seizing their
boat.
16. People v tulin
To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before
its amendment, provided that piracy must be committed on the
high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a
passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No.
7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to
include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other
hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the
coverage of the law on piracy embraces any person including
"a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in
Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of the
complement or not, any person is covered by the law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the
provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532. There
is no contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise no
ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret
the law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the
coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect the
citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against the
law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of
Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest
forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all
countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as
amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist
harmoniously as separate laws.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of accused-appellant Hiong since
the crime was committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to
state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T
Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo
were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive
vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its
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cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer
was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision.
Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack
and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in
Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel
and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the
same need not be committed in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the
Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an exception to the rule on
territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if
Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a violation of
qualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law,
Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in
Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should
be applied with more force here since its purpose is precisely to
discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v.
Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled
that regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy is a
reprehensible crime against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo,
43 Phil. 19 [1922]).
17. People v Acosta
In prosecutions for arson, proof of the crime charged is
complete where the evidence establishes (1) the corpus delicti,
that is, a fire because of criminal agency; and (2) the identity of
the defendants as the one responsible for the crime.27 Corpus
delicti means the substance of the crime, it is the fact that a
crime has actually been committed. In arson, the corpus delicti
rule is generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the
fire and of its having been intentionally caused. Even the
uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, if credible, may
be enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction.
18. People v Soriano
Arson is the malicious burning of property. Under Art. 320 of
The Revised Penal Code, as amended, and PD 1613, Arson is
classified into two kinds: (1) Destructive Arson (Art. 320) and
(2) other cases of arson (PD 1613). This classification is based
on the kind, character and location of the property burned,
regardless of the value of the damage caused.
Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA
7659, contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both
public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels,
aircraft, factories and other military, government or commercial
establishments by any person or group of persons.[13] The
classification of this type of crime is known as Destructive
Arson, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The
reason for the law is self-evident: to effectively discourage and
deter the commission of this dastardly crime, to prevent the
destruction of properties and protect the lives of innocent
people. Exposure to a brewing conflagration leaves only
destruction and despair in its wake; hence, the State mandates
greater retribution to authors of this heinous crime. The
exceptionally severe punishment imposed for this crime takes
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By: Mark Que 2A 2019
SPL Atty. Axel Cruz
into consideration the extreme danger to human lives exposed
by the malicious burning of these structures; the danger to
property resulting from the conflagration; the fact that it is
normally difficult to adopt precautions against its commission,
and the difficulty in pinpointing the perpetrators; and, the
greater impact on the social, economic, security and political
fabric of the nation.
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts
penalized under Art. 320, death should result, the mandatory
penalty of death shall be imposed.
On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321 to 326-B
of The Revised Penal Code remains the governing law for
Simple Arson. This decree contemplates the malicious burning
of public and private structures, regardless of size, not included
in Art. 320, as amended by RA 7659, and classified as other
cases of arson. These include houses, dwellings, government
buildings, farms, mills, plantations, railways, bus stations,
airports, wharves and other industrial establishments.[14]
Although the purpose of the law on Simple Arson is to prevent
the high incidence of fires and other crimes involving
destruction, protect the national economy and preserve the
social, economic and political stability of the nation, PD 1613
tempers the penalty to be meted to offenders. This separate
classification of Simple Arson recognizes the need to lessen the
severity of punishment commensurate to the act or acts
committed, depending on the particular facts and circumstances
of each case.
Under Sec. 4 of PD 1613, if special aggravating circumstances
are present in the commission of Simple Arson, the penalty
under Sec. 3 shall be imposed in its maximum period: (a) If
committed with intent to gain; (b) If committed for the benefit
of another; (c) If the offender is motivated by spite or hatred
towards the owner or occupant of the property burned; and, (d)
If committed by a syndicate, or group of three (3) or more
persons. If by reason, or on the occasion of Simple Arson death
results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be
imposed.
Although intent may be an ingredient of the crime of Arson, it
may be inferred from the acts of the accused. There is a
presumption that one intends the natural consequences of his
act; and when it is shown that one has deliberately set fire to a
building, the prosecution is not bound to produce further
evidence of his wrongful intent.[15] If there is an eyewitness to
the crime of Arson, he can give in detail the acts of the accused.
When this is done the only substantial issue is the credibility of
the witness.[16] In the crime of Arson, the prosecution may
describe the theatre of the crime and the conditions and
circumstances surrounding it. Evidence of this type is part of
the res gestae.
The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a)
there is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned
is an inhabited house or dwelling. Incidentally, these elements
concur in the case at bar.
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple
Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the criminal
offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised
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Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as
heinous crimes for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses
and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and
morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.[21] On the
other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple
Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and
viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other
words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant
social, economic, political and national security implications
than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under Simple
Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson
depending on the qualifying circumstances present.
19. Buebos v people
As previously discussed, there are two (2) categories of the
crime of arson: 1) destructive arson, under Art. 320 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659;
and 2) simple arson, under Presidential Decree No. 1613. Said
classification is based on the kind, character and location of the
property burned, regardless of the value of the damage caused,
48 to wit:
Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA
7659, contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both
public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels,
aircraft, factories and other military, government or commercial
establishments by any person or group of persons. The
classification of this type of crime is known as Destructive
Arson, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The
reason for the law is self-evident: to effectively discourage and
deter the commission of this dastardly crime, to prevent the
destruction of properties and protect the lives of innocent
people. Exposure to a brewing conflagration leaves only
destruction and despair in its wake; hence, the State mandates
greater retribution to authors of this heinous crime. The
exceptionally severe punishment imposed for this crime takes
into consideration the extreme danger to human lives exposed
by the malicious burning of these structures; the danger to
property resulting from the conflagration; the fact that it is
normally difficult to adopt precautions against its commission,
and the difficulty in pinpointing the perpetrators; and, the
greater impact on the social, economic, security and political
fabric of the nation.
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts
penalized under Art. 320, death should result, the mandatory
penalty of death shall be imposed.
On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321 to 326-B
of The Revised Penal Code remains the governing law for
Simple Arson. This decree contemplates the malicious burning
of public and private structures, regardless of size, not included
in Art. 320, as amended by RA 7659, and classified as other
cases of arson. These include houses, dwellings, government
buildings, farms, mills, plantations, railways, bus stations,
airports, wharves and other industrial establishments. Although
the purpose of the law on Simple Arson is to prevent the high
incidence of fires and other crimes involving destruction,
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By: Mark Que 2A 2019
SPL Atty. Axel Cruz
protect the national economy and preserve the social, economic
and political stability of the nation, PD 1613 tempers the
penalty to be meted to offenders. This separate classification of
Simple Arson recognizes the need to lessen the severity of
punishment commensurate to the act or acts committed,
depending on the particular facts and circumstances of each
case.
To emphasize:
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple
Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the criminal
offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of the Revised
Penal Code (as amended) constituting Destructive Arson are
characterized as heinous crimes for being grievous, odious and
hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are
repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms
of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.
On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting
Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and
viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other
words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant
social, economic, political and national security implications
than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under Simple
Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson
depending on the qualifying circumstances present.
Prescinding from the above clarification vis--vis the description
of the crime as stated in the accusatory portion of the
Information, it is quite evident that accused-appellant was
charged with the crime of Simple Arson for having deliberately
set fire upon the two-storey residential house of ROBERTO
SEPARA and family x x x knowing the same to be an inhabited
house and situated in a thickly populated place and as a
consequence thereof a conflagration ensued and the said
building, together with some seven (7) adjoining residential
houses, were razed by fire.
20. People v baluntong
As reflected above, as it was not shown that the main motive
was to kill the occupants of the house, the crime would only be
arson, the homicide being a mere consequence thereof, hence,
absorbed by arson.
21. Amora v people
The applicability of P.D. 1613 is beyond cavil. The facts show
that the crime was committed in a place where bakeries, barber
shops, tailoring shops and other commercial and residential
buildings were situated. In fact, other structures were razed by
the fire that originated from petitioner’s establishment. It is
clear that the place of the commission of the crime was a
residential and commercial building located in an urban and
populated area. This qualifying circumstance places the offense
squarely within the ambit of Section 2(7) of P.D. 1613, and
converts it to "destructive arson,"7 viz.:
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Section 2. Destructive Arson. The penalty of Reclusion
Temporal in its maximum period to Reclusion Perpetua shall be
imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
7. Any building, whether used as a dwelling or not, situated in
a populated or congested area.
It was also established that the subject building was insured
against fire for an amount substantially more than its market
value, a fact that has given rise to the unrebutted prima facie
evidence of arson, as provided in Section 6 of P.D. 1613:
Section 6. Prima facie evidence of Arson. Any of the following
circumstances shall constitute prima facie evidence of arson:
4. If the building or property is insured for substantially more
than its actual value at the time of the issuance of the policy.
22. People v cedenio
It is settled that there is no complex crime of arson with
homicide. The late Mr. Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino cites
Groizard —
. . . when fire is used with the intent to kill a particular person
who may be in a house and that objective is attained by burning
the house, the crime is murder only. When the Penal Code
declares that killing committed by means of fire is murder, it
intends that fire should be purposely adopted as a means to that
end. There can be no murder without a design to take life. In
other words, if the main object of the offender is to kill by
means of fire, the offense is murder. But if the main objective
is the burning of the building, the resulting homicide may be
absorbed by the crime of arson.
. . . in the classification of crimes committed by fire, attention
must be given to the intention of the author. When fire is used
with intent to kill a . . . person who may be in shelter, and that
objective is secured, the crime is . . . murder. Murder or
homicide in a juridical sense would exist if the killing were the
objective of the malefactor and the burning of the building was
resorted only as the means of accomplishing his purpose. The
rule is otherwise when arson is itself the end and death is a mere
consequence. The crime in such a case would be arson only,
absorbing the homicide.
Except for the imposable penalty, the rule has not changed.
Accordingly, if death results by reason or on the occasion of
arson, the crime is simply arson although the imposable penalty
as provided in Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 1613, which expressly
repealed Arts. 320 to 326-B of The Revised Penal Code, is now
reclusion perpetua to death. If the objective of the offender is to
kill and arson is resorted to as the means to accomplish the
crime, the offender can be charged with murder only. But if the
objective is to kill—and in fact the offender has already done
so—and arson is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing,
the offender may be convicted of two separate crimes of either
homicide or murder, and arson.
Consequently, in (People v. Paterno) where the defendants
killed a Japanese spy and his wife, and thereafter set the
victims’ house afire with their lifeless bodies inside and their
three-day old infant who perished in the fire, we found the
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By: Mark Que 2A 2019
SPL Atty. Axel Cruz
accused guilty of murder for the killing and of arson for burning
the house with the resulting death to the infant. In (People v.
Basay) we said that where the house was burned to conceal the
stabbing and hacking, separate crimes of murder and arson were
committed.
23. Republic v cabrini
The amendment by RA 9194 of RA 9160 erased any doubt on
the jurisdiction of the CA over the extension of freeze orders.
As the law now stands, it is solely the CA which has the
authority to issue a freeze order as well as to extend its
effectivity. It also has the exclusive jurisdiction to extend
existing freeze orders previously issued by the AMLC vis--vis
accounts and deposits related to money-laundering activities.
24. Republic v Glasgow
RA 9160, as amended, and its implementing rules and
regulations lay down two conditions when applying for civil
forfeiture:
(1) when there is a suspicious transaction report or a
covered transaction report deemed suspicious after
investigation by the AMLC and
(2) the court has, in a petition filed for the purpose,
ordered the seizure of any monetary instrument or property, in
whole or in part, directly or indirectly, related to said report.
It is the preliminary seizure of the property in question which
brings it within the reach of the judicial process.[16] It is
actually within the courts possession when it is submitted to the
process of the court.
A criminal conviction for an unlawful activity is not a
prerequisite for the institution of a civil forfeiture proceeding.
Stated otherwise, a finding of guilt for an unlawful activity is
not an essential element of civil forfeiture.
Section 6 of RA 9160, as amended, provides:
SEC. 6. Prosecution of Money Laundering.
(a) Any person may be charged with and convicted of
both the offense of money laundering and the unlawful activity
as herein defined.
(b) Any proceeding relating to the unlawful activity
shall be given precedence over the prosecution of any offense
or violation under this Act without prejudice to the freezing and
other remedies provided.
25. Lim v people
The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are:
"(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply
for account or for value;
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"(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the
time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and
"(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the
bank to stop payment."
Petitioner never denied issuing the two checks. She argued that
the checks were not issued to Seguan and that they had no pre-
existing transaction. The checks were issued to Aurelia Nadera
as mere guarantee and as a security arrangement to cover the
value of jewelry she was to sell on consignment basis.[18]
These defenses cannot save the day for her. The first and last
elements of the offense are admittedly present. To escape
liability, she must prove that the second element was absent,
that is, at the time of issue of the checks, she did not know that
her funds in the bank account were insufficient. She did not
prove this.
B.P. No. 22, Section 2 creates a presumption juris tantum that
the second element prima facie exists when the first and third
elements of the offense are present. If not rebutted, it suffices
to sustain a conviction.
The gravamen of B.P. No. 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or one that is dishonored upon its presentment
for payment. And the accused failed to satisfy the amount of the
check or make arrangement for its payment within five (5)
banking days from notice of dishonor. The act is malum
prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Laws are
created to achieve a goal intended and to guide and prevent
against an evil or mischief. Why and to whom the check was
issued is irrelevant in determining culpability. The terms and
conditions surrounding the issuance of the checks are also
irrelevant.
Unlike in estafa, under B. P. No. 22, one need not prove that the
check was issued in payment of an obligation, or that there was
damage. The damage done is to the banking system.
In United States v. Go Chico, we ruled that in acts mala
prohibita, the only inquiry is, "has the law been violated?"
When dealing with acts mala prohibita--
" it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with
criminal intent. In many crimes, made such by statutory
enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime
is entirely immaterial. This is necessarily so. If it were not, the
statute as a deterrent influence would be substantially
worthless. It would be impossible of execution. In many cases,
the act complained of is itself that which produces the
pernicious effect the statute seeks to avoid. In those cases the
pernicious effect is produced with precisely the same force and
result whether the intention of the person performing the act is
good or bad."
This case is a perfect example of an act mala prohibita.
Petitioner issued two checks. They were dishonored upon
presentment for payment due to the fact that the account was
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By: Mark Que 2A 2019
SPL Atty. Axel Cruz
closed. Petitioner failed to rebut the presumption that she knew
her funds were insufficient at the time of issue of the checks.
And she failed to pay the amount of the checks or make
arrangement for its payment within five (5) banking days from
receipt of notice of dishonor. B.P. No. 22 was clearly violated.
Hoc quidem per quam durum est sed ita lex scripta est. The law
may be exceedingly hard but so the law is written.
26. Nierras v dacuycuy
What petitioner failed to mention in his argument is the fact that
deceit and damage are essential elements in Article 315 (2-d)
Revised Penal Code, but are not required in Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22. Under the latter law, mere issuance of a check that
is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the
part of the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient
funds and hence punishable (People v. Veridiano, 132 SCRA
523) which is not so under the Penal Code. Other differences
between the two also include the following: (1) a drawer of a
dishonored check may be convicted under Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 even if he had issued the same for a pre-existing
obligation, while under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal
Code such circumstance negates criminal liability; (2) specific
and different penalties are imposed in each of the two offenses;
(3) estafa is essentially a crime against property, while violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is principally a crime against
public interest as it does injury to the entire banking system; (4)
violations of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are mala in
se, while those of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are mala prohibita.
27. Wong v ca
Petitioner contends that the first element does not exist because
the checks were not issued to apply for account or for value. He
attempts to distinguish his situation from the usual cut-and-
dried B.P. 22 case by claiming that the checks were issued as
guarantee and the obligations they were supposed to guarantee
were already paid. This flawed argument has no factual basis,
the RTC and CA having both ruled that the checks were in
payment for unremitted collections, and not as guarantee.
Likewise, the argument has no legal basis, for what B.P. Blg.
22 punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the
purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions
relating to its issuance.
As to the second element, B.P. Blg. 22 creates a presumption
juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the
first and third elements of the offense are present. Thus, the
maker’s knowledge is presumed from the dishonor of the check
for insufficiency of funds.
Petitioner avers that since the complainant deposited the checks
on June 5, 1986, or 157 days after the December 30, 1985
maturity date, the presumption of knowledge of lack of funds
under Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 should not apply to him. He
further claims that he should not be expected to keep his bank
account active and funded beyond the ninety-day period.
11
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Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides:
Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. -- The making,
drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused
by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with
such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the
date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge
of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or
drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or
makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such
check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that
such check has not been paid by the drawee.
An essential element of the offense is knowledge on the part of
the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his
funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its
presentment. Since this involves a state of mind difficult to
establish, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of
such knowledge where payment of the check is refused by the
drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank
when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the
check. To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application,
the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise if
within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of
dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment
of the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the
check.
Contrary to petitioners assertions, nowhere in said provision
does the law require a maker to maintain funds in his bank
account for only 90 days. Rather, the clear import of the law is
to establish a prima facie presumption of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds under the following conditions (1)
presentment within 90 days from date of the check, and (2) the
dishonor of the check and failure of the maker to make
arrangements for payment in full within 5 banking days after
notice thereof. That the check must be deposited within ninety
(90) days is simply one of the conditions for the prima facie
presumption of knowledge of lack of funds to arise. It is not an
element of the offense. Neither does it discharge petitioner from
his duty to maintain sufficient funds in the account within a
reasonable time thereof. Under Section 186 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, a check must be presented for payment within
a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be discharged
from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the
delay. By current banking practice, a check becomes stale after
more than six (6) months,[23] or 180 days. Private respondent
herein deposited the checks 157 days after the date of the check.
Hence said checks cannot be considered stale. Only the
presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds was lost,
but such knowledge could still be proven by direct or
circumstantial evidence. As found by the trial court, private
respondent did not deposit the checks because of the
reassurance of petitioner that he would issue new checks. Upon
his failure to do so, LPI was constrained to deposit the said
checks. After the checks were dishonored, petitioner was duly
notified of such fact but failed to make arrangements for full
payment within five (5) banking days thereof. There is, on
record, sufficient evidence that petitioner had knowledge of the
insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the drawee bank at
the time of issuance of the checks. And despite petitioners
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
By: Mark Que 2A 2019
SPL Atty. Axel Cruz
insistent plea of innocence, we find no error in the respondent
courts affirmance of his conviction by the trial court for
violations of the Bouncing Checks Law.
28. People v Gorospe
In respect of the Bouncing Checks Case, the offense also
appears to be continuing in nature. It is true that the offense is
committed by the very fact of its performance (Colmenares vs.
Villar, No. L-27126, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 186); and that the
Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not only the fact of dishonor
of a check but also the act of making or drawing and issuance
of a bouncing check (People vs. Hon. Veridiano, II, No. L-
62243, 132 SCRA 523). The case, therefore, could have been
filed also in Bulacan. As held in Que vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. Nos. 75217-18, September 11, 1987 "the
determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the
issuance of the check". However, it is likewise true that
knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of
the insufficiency of his funds, which is an essential ingredient
of the offense is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the
accused be within one territory or another (People vs. Hon.
Manzanilla, G.R. Nos. 66003-04, December 11, 1987).
Accordingly, jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense also
lies in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga.
29. Llamado v ca
Petitioner alleges that the respondent court erred when it
convicted petitioner of violation of BP 22 when the check was
only a contingent payment for investment which had not been
proven to be successful, thus the check was not issued to apply
on account or for value within the contemplation of the batas.
This contention is untenable.
The check was issued for an actual valuable consideration of
P180,000.00, which private complainant handed to Aida Tan, a
secretary in petitioners office. In fact, petitioner admits that
private complainant made an investment in said amount with
Pan-Asia Finance Corporation. Petitioner contends that the
money which private complainant gave the corporation was
intended for investment which they agreed will be returned to
private complainant with interests, only if the project became
successful. But then, if this were true, the check need not have
been issued because a receipt and their written agreement would
have sufficed.
True, it is common practice in commercial transactions to
require debtors to issue checks on which creditors must rely as
guarantee of payment, or as evidence of indebtedness, if not a
mode of payment. But to determine the reason for which checks
are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will
greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and
commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring
about havoc in trade and in banking communities.[8] So, what
the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the
purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions
12
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relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless
check is malum prohibitum.[9]
With regard to petitioners third allegation, the novation theory
recognized by this Court in certain cases, does not apply in the
case at bar. While private complainant agreed to petitioners
offer to pay him 10% of the amount of the check on November
14 or 15, 1983 and the balance to be rolled over for 90 days,
this turned out to be only an empty promise which effectively
delayed private complainants filing of a case for Violation of
BP 22 against petitioner and his co-accused. As admitted by
petitioner in his Memorandum, private complainant was never
paid as agreed upon.
30. Que v people
It is now settled that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 applies even in
cases where dishonored checks are issued merely in the form of
a deposit or a guarantee. The enactment in question does not
make any distinction as to whether the checks within its
contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or merely
to guarantee the said obligation. In accordance with the
pertinent rule of statutory construction, inasmuch as the law has
not made any distinction in this regard, no such distinction can
be made by means of interpretation or application. Furthermore,
the history of the enactment of subject statute evinces the
definite legislative intent to make the prohibition all-
embracing, without making any exception from the operation
thereof in favor of a guarantee. This intent may be gathered
from the statement of the sponsor of the bill (Cabinet Bill No.
9) which was enacted later into Batas Pambansa Bilang 22,
when it was introduced before the Batasan Pambansa, that the
bill was introduced to discourage the issuance of bouncing
checks, to prevent checks from becoming "useless scraps of
paper" and to restore respectability to checks, all without
distinction as to the purpose of the issuance of the checks. The
legislative intent as above said is made all the more clear when
it is considered that while the original text of Cabinet Bill No.
9, supra, had contained a proviso excluding from the coverage
of the law a check issued as a mere guarantee, the final version
of the bill as approved and enacted by the Committee on the
Revision of Laws in the Batasan deleted the abovementioned
qualifying proviso deliberately for the purpose of making the
enforcement of the act more effective (Batasan Record, First
Regular Session, December 4, 1978, Volume II, pp- 1035-
1036).
Consequently, what are important are the facts that the accused
had deliberately issued the checks in question to cover accounts
and that the checks were dishonored upon presentment
regardless of whether or not the accused merely issued the
checks as a guarantee. (pp. 4-5. Dec. IAC (pp. 37-38, Rollo)
31. Cabrera v ca
In order to create the prima facie presumption, that the issuer
knew of the insufficiency of funds, it must be shown that he or
she received a notice of dishonor and within five banking days
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
By: Mark Que 2A 2019
SPL Atty. Axel Cruz
thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of the check or shall
arrange for its payment. The prosecution is burdened to prove
the acts that gave rise to the prima facie presumption. On the
other hand, the drawer has the right to adduce evidence to rebut
the same. It is important to stress that this presumption is not
conclusive, or one that forecloses or precludes the presentation
of evidence to the contrary.[18] Thus, the drawer of the check
can still overturn the prima facie presumption by proving that
the holder thereof was paid the amount due thereon, or that
arrangements were made for payment in full by the drawee of
the check within five banking days after receipt of notice that
such check has not been paid by the drawee bank.
In Lao vs. Court of Appeals,[19] this Court ruled that the full
payment of the amount of the check within five banking days
from receipt of notice of dishonor is a complete defense. Hence,
the absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives the
drawer of the check the opportunity to preclude criminal
prosecution
In Domagsang vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that a mere
oral notice or demand to pay is insufficient compliance with the
requirements of the law
It is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of
dishonor was sent to the drawee of the check. It must also show
that the drawer of the check received the said notice because the
fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt
of such notice of dishonor by the drawee of the check.
In the instant case, the prosecution did not present proof that the
demand letter was sent through registered mail, relying as it did
only on the registry return receipt. In civil cases, service made
through registered mail is proved by the registry receipt issued
by the mailing office and an affidavit of the person mailing of
facts showing compliance with Section 7 of Rule 13 (See
Section 13, Rule 13, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). If, in
addition to the registry receipt, it is required in civil cases that
an affidavit of mailing as proof of service be presented, then
with more reason should we hold in criminal cases that a
registry receipt alone is insufficient as proof of mailing. In the
instant case, the prosecution failed to present the testimony, or
at least the affidavit, of the person mailing that, indeed, the
demand letter was sent.
32. Svendsen v people
In Rico v. People of the Philippines, this Court held:
x x x [I]f x x x notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is
not sent to the maker or drawer of the bum check, or if there is
no proof as to when such notice was received by the drawer,
then the presumption of knowledge as provided in Section 2 of
B.P. 22 cannot arise, since there would simply be no way of
reckoning the crucial five-day period.
x x x In recent cases, we had the occasion to emphasize that
not only must there be a written notice of dishonor or demand
letters actually received by the drawer of a dishonored check,
but there must also be proof of receipt thereof that is properly
13
Case lifts
authenticated, and not mere registered receipt and/or return
receipt.
Thus, as held in Domagsang vs. Court of Appeals, while
Section 2 of B.P. 22 indeed does not state that the notice of
dishonor be in writing, this must be taken in conjunction with
Section 3 of the law, i.e., that where there are no sufficient funds
in or credit with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be
explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal. A mere oral
notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient for
conviction under the law. In our view, both the spirit and letter
of the Bouncing Checks Law require for the act to be punished
thereunder not only that the accused issued a check that is
dishonored, but also that the accused has actually been notified
in writing of the fact of dishonor. This is consistent with the rule
that penal statues must be construed strictly against the state and
liberally in favor of the accused. x x x
In fine, the failure of the prosecution to prove the existence and
receipt by petitioner of the requisite written notice of dishonor
and that he was given at least five banking days within which
to settle his account constitutes sufficient ground for his
acquittal.
The evidence for the prosecution failed to prove the second
element. While the registry receipt, which is said to cover the
letter-notice of dishonor and of demand sent to petitioner, was
presented, there is no proof that he or a duly authorized agent
received the same. Receipts for registered letters including
return receipts do not themselves prove receipt; they must be
properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letters.
33. Magno v ca
The crux of the matter rests upon the reason for the drawing of
the postdated checks by the petitioner, i.e., whether they were
drawn or issued "to apply on account or for value", as required
under Section 1 of B.P. Blg, 22. When viewed against the
following definitions of the catch-terms "warranty" and
"deposit", for which the postdated checks were issued or drawn,
all the more, the alleged crime could not have been committed
by petitioner:
Warranty — A promise that a proposition of fact is true. A
promise that certain facts are truly as they are represented to be
and that they will remain so: . . . (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth
Edition, (1979) p. 1423)
Deposit: — Money lodged with a person as an earnest or
security for the performance of some contract, to be forfeited if
the depositor fails in his undertaking. It may be deemed to be
part payment and to that extent may constitute the purchaser the
actual owner of the estate; To commit to custody, or to lay
down; to place; to put. To lodge for safe- keeping or as a pledge
to intrust to the care of another; The act of placing money in the
custody of a bank or banker, for safety or convenience, to be
withdrawn at the will of the depositor or under rules and
regulations agreed on. Also, the money so deposited, or the
credit which the depositor receives for it. Deposit, according to
its commonly accepted and generally understood among
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
By: Mark Que 2A 2019
SPL Atty. Axel Cruz
bankers and by the public, includes not only deposits payable
on demand and for which certificates, whether interest-bearing
or not, may be issued, payable on demand, or on certain notice
or at a fixed future time. (Ibid., pp. 394-395)
Furthermore, the element of "knowing at the time of issue that
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment,
which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored
for the same reason . . . is inversely applied in this case. From
the very beginning, petitioner never hid the fact that he did not
have the funds with which to put up the warranty deposit and as
a matter of fact, he openly intimated this to the vital conduit of
the transaction, Joey Gomez, to whom petitioner was
introduced by Mrs. Teng. It would have been different if this
predicament was not communicated to all the parties he dealt
with regarding the lease agreement the financing of which was
covered by L.S. Finance Management.
34. People v nitafan
A memorandum check is in the form of an ordinary check, with
the word "memorandum", "memo" or "mem" written across its
face, signifying that the maker or drawer engages to pay the
bona fide holder absolutely, without any condition concerning
its presentment. 6 Such a check is an evidence of debt against
the drawer, and although may not be intended to be presented,
7 has the same effect as an ordinary check, 8 and if passed to
the third person, will be valid in his hands like any other check.
From the above definition, it is clear that a memorandum check,
which is in the form of an ordinary check, is still drawn on a
bank and should therefore be distinguished from a promissory
note, which is but a mere promise to pay. If private respondent
seeks to equate memorandum check with promissory note, as
he does to skirt the provisions of B.P. 22, he could very well
have issued a promissory note, and this would be have
exempted him form the coverage of the law. In the business
community a promissory note, certainly, has less impact and
persuadability than a check.
Verily, a memorandum check comes within the meaning of Sec.
185 of the Negotiable Instruments Law which defines a check
as "a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand." A
check is also defined as " [a] written order or request to a bank
or persons carrying on the business of banking, by a party
having money in their hands, desiring them to pay, on
presentment, to a person therein named or bearer, or to such
person or order, a named sum of money," citing 2 Dan. Neg.
Inst. 528; Blair v. Wilson, 28 Gratt. (Va.) 170; Deener v.
Brown, 1 MacArth. (D.C.) 350; In re Brown, 2 Sto. 502, Fed.
Cas. No. 1,985. See Chapman v. White, 6 N.Y. 412, 57 Am.
Dec 464. 10 Another definition of check is that is "[a] draft
drawn upon a bank and payable on demand, signed by the
maker or drawer, containing an unconditional promise to pay a
sum certain in money to the order of the payee," citing State v.
Perrigoue, 81 Wash, 2d 640, 503 p. 2d 1063, 1066.
14
Case lifts
A memorandum check must therefore fall within the ambit of
B.P. 22 which does not distinguish but merely provides that
"[a]ny person who makes or draws and issues any check
knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank . . . which check is
subsequently dishonored . . . shall be punished by imprisonment
. . ." (Emphasis supplied ). 12 Ubi lex no distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemus.
35. Tan v mendez
The rationale of Adm. Circular No. 12-2000 is found in our
rulings in Eduardo Vaca vs. Court of Appeals[30] and Rosa Lim
vs. People of the Philippines.[31] We held in those cases that it
would best serve the ends of criminal justice if, in fixing the
penalty to be imposed for violation of B.P. 22, the same
philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
observed, i.e. that of redeeming valuable human material and
preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and
economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the
social order.
To be sure, it is not our intention to decriminalize violation of
B.P. 22. Neither is it our intention to delete the alternative
penalty of imprisonment. The propriety and wisdom of
decriminalizing violation of B.P. 22 is best left to the legislature
and not this Court. As clarified by Administrative Circular 13-
2001, the clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular
No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative
penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application
of the penalties provided for in B.P. 22. Where the
circumstances of the case, for instance, clearly indicate good
faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the
imposition of a fine alone may be considered as the more
appropriate penalty. This rule of preference does not foreclose
the possibility of imprisonment for violators of B.P. 22. Neither
does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law. Needless to
say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the
imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the judge. Should
the judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate
penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not to be
deemed a hindrance.
36. Lim lao v CA
Since Petitioner Lina Lim Lao signed the checks without
knowledge of the insufficiency of funds, knowledge she was
not expected or obliged to possess under the organizational
structure of the corporation, she may not be held liable under
B.P. 22. For in the final analysis, penal statutes such as B.P. 22
must be construed with such strictness as to carefully safeguard
the rights of the defendant x x x. The element of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds having been proven to be absent,
petitioner is therefore entitled to an acquittal.
This position finds support in Dingle vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court[23] where we stressed that knowledge of insufficiency of
funds at the time of the issuance of the check was an essential
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
By: Mark Que 2A 2019
SPL Atty. Axel Cruz
requisite for the offense penalized under B.P. 22. In that case,
the spouses Paz and Nestor Dingle owned a family business
known as PMD Enterprises. Nestor transacted the sale of 400
tons of silica sand to the buyer Ernesto Ang who paid for the
same. Nestor failed to deliver. Thus, he issued to Ernesto two
checks, signed by him and his wife as authorized signatories for
PMD Enterprises, to represent the value of the undelivered
silica sand. These checks were dishonored for having been
drawn against insufficient funds. Nestor thereafter issued to
Ernesto another check, signed by him and his wife Paz, which
was likewise subsequently dishonored. No payment was ever
made; hence, the spouses were charged with a violation of B.P.
22 before the trial court which found them both guilty. Paz
appealed the judgment to the then Intermediate Appellate Court
which modified the same by reducing the penalty of
imprisonment to thirty days. Not satisfied, Paz filed an appeal
to this Court insisting on her innocence and contending that she
did not incur any criminal liability under B.P. 22 because she
had no knowledge of the dishonor of the checks issued by her
husband and, for that matter, even the transaction of her
husband with Ang.
The Court ruled in Dingle as follows:
The Solicitor General in his Memorandum recommended that
petitioner be acquitted of the instant charge because from the
testimony of the sole prosecution witness Ernesto Ang, it was
established that he dealt exclusively with Nestor Dingle.
Nowhere in his testimony is the name of Paz Dingle ever
mentioned in connection with the transaction and with the
issuance of the check. In fact, Ang categorically stated that it
was Nestor Dingle who received his two (2) letters of demand.
This lends credence to the testimony of Paz Dingle that she
signed the questioned checks in blank together with her
husband without any knowledge of its issuance, much less of
the transaction and the fact of dishonor.
37. Bautista v CA
The elements of the offense under BP 22 are (a) the making,
drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for
value; (b) the maker, drawer or issuer knows at the time of issue
that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and, (c) the check is subsequently dishonored by
the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would
have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
The ninety (90)-day period is not among these elements.
Section 2 of BP 22 is clear that a dishonored check presented
within the ninety (90)-day period creates a prima facie
presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds, which is
an essential element of the offense. Since knowledge involves
a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates a
prima facie presumption of the existence of this element from
the fact of drawing, issuing or making a check, the payment of
which was subsequently refused for insufficiency of funds. The
15
Case lifts
term prima facie evidence denotes evidence which, if
unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the
proposition it supports or to establish the facts, or to
counterbalance the presumption of innocence to warrant a
conviction.
The presumption in Sec. 2 is not a conclusive presumption that
forecloses or precludes the presentation of evidence to the
contrary. Neither does the term prima facie evidence preclude
the presentation of other evidence that may sufficiently prove
the existence or knowledge of insufficiency of funds or lack of
credit.
The distinction between the elements of the offense and the
evidence of these elements is analogous or akin to the difference
between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts in civil cases.
Ultimate facts are the essential and substantial facts which
either form the basis of the primary right and duty or which
directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the
defendant, while evidentiary facts are those which tend to prove
or establish said ultimate facts. Applying this analogy to the
case at bar, knowledge of insufficiency of funds is the ultimate
fact, or element of the offense that needs to be proved, while
dishonor of the check presented within ninety (90) days is
merely the evidentiary fact of such knowledge.
38. Guy v ca
Under Section 1 of PD No. 1689, the elements of syndicated
estafa are: (a) estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in
Artilce 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code is committed;
(b) the estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate of five
or more persons; and (c) defraudation results in the
misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or
members of rural banks, cooperatives, samahang nayon[s], or
farmers associations or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.
Gilbert Guy et al. want this Court to believe that AUB, being a
commercial bank, is beyond the coverage of PD No. 1689. We
hold, however, that a bank is a corporation whose fund comes
from the general public. P.D. No. 1689 does not distinguish the
nature of the corporation. It requires, rather, that the funds of
such corporation should come from the general public. This is
bolstered by the third whereas clause of the quoted law which
states that the same also applies to other
corporations/associations operating on funds solicited from the
general public. This is precisely the very same scheme that PD
No. 1689 contemplates that this species of estafa be checked or
at least be minimized by imposing capital punishment involving
funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general
public because this erodes the confidence of the public in the
banking and cooperative system, contravenes public interest
and constitutes economic sabotage that threatens the stability of
the nation.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
By: Mark Que 2A 2019
SPL Atty. Axel Cruz
39. Catiis v ca
When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the
penalty imposable shall be reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua if the amount of the fraud exceeds 100,000 pesos.
Clearly, P.D. No. 1689 penalizes offenders with life
imprisonment to death regardless of the amount involved,
provided that a syndicate committed the crime. A syndicate is
defined in the same law as "consisting of five or more persons
formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal
act, transaction, enterprise or scheme." Under the second
paragraph, it is provided that if the offenders are not members
of a syndicate, they shall nevertheless be held liable for the acts
prohibited by the law but they shall be penalized by reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud is
more than P100,000.00.
Petitioner’s interpretation that the term "any person" in the first
paragraph of section 1 could mean that even one person can be
indicted for syndicated estafa is contrary to the provision of the
law. It bears stressing that the law must be considered as a
whole, just as it is necessary to consider a sentence in its entirety
in order to grasp its true meaning.16 It is a dangerous practice
to base construction upon only a part of a section since one
portion may be qualified by the other portion.17 In fact, there is
no need for any construction or interpretation of P. D. No. 1689
since the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity.
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1689 has defined what constitutes a
syndicate and such definition is controlling. Where a
requirement is made in explicit and unambiguous terms, no
discretion is left to the judiciary. It must see to it that its mandate
is obeyed.
In this case, the Information specifically charged only four
persons without specifying any other person who had
participated in the commission of the crime charged, thus, based
on the definition of syndicate under the law, the crime charged
was not committed by a syndicate. We find no reversible error
committed by the CA when it upheld the ruling of Judge
Bersamin that with only four persons actually charged, the
estafa charged has no relation to the crime punished with life
imprisonment to death under section 1 of P. D. No. 1689.
40. Jaravata v sb
The pivotal question, however, is whether Jaravata, an assistant
principal of a high school in the boondocks of Tubao, La Union,
"in his official capacity has to intervene under the law" in the
payment of the salary differentials for 1978 of the
complainants. It should be noted that the arrangement was "to
facilitate its [salary differential] payment accused and the
classroom teachers agreed that accused follow-up the papers in
16
Case lifts
Manila with the obligation on the part of the classroom teachers
to reimburse the accused of his expenses.
In Our opinion, Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019, refers to a public
officer whose official intervention is required by law in a
contract or transaction.
There is no law which invests the petitioner with the power to
intervene in the payment of the salary differentials of the
complainants or anyone for that matter. Far from exercising any
power, the petitioner played the humble role of a supplicant
whose mission was to expedite payment of the salary
differentials. In his official capacity as assistant principal he is
not required by law to intervene in the payment of the salary
differentials. Accordingly, he cannot be said to have violated
the law afore-cited although he exerted efforts to facilitate the
payment of the salary differentials.
41. Mejorada v sb
Petitioner enumerated three elements which, in his opinion,
constitute a violation of Section 3(e).
First, that the accused must be a public officer charged with the
duty of granting licenses or permits or other concessions.
Petitioner contends that inasmuch as he is not charged with the
duty of granting licenses, permits or other concessions, then he
is not the officer contemplated by Section 3 (e).
Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the
corrupt practices of any public officers declared unlawful. Its
reference to "any public officer" is without distinction or
qualification and it specifies the acts declared unlawful. We
agree with the view adopted by the Solicitor General that the
last sentence of paragraph (e) is intended to make clear the
inclusion of officers and employees of officers or government
corporations which, under the ordinary concept of "public
officers" may not come within the term. It is a strained
construction of the provision to read it as applying exclusively
to public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or
permits or other concessions.
The first element, therefore, of Section 3 (e) is that the accused
must be a public officer. This, the informations did not fail to
allege.
Second, that such public officer caused undue injury to any
party, including the Government, or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge
of his official administrative or judicial functions.
Petitioner denies that there was injury or damage caused the
Government because the payments were allegedly made on the
basis of a document solely made by the Highway District
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By: Mark Que 2A 2019
SPL Atty. Axel Cruz
Engineer to which petitioner had no hand in preparing. The fact,
however, is that the government suffered undue injury as a
result of the petitioner's having inflated the true claims of
complainants which became the basis of the report submitted
by the Highway District Engineer to the Regional Director of
the Department of Highways and which eventually became the
basis of payment. His contention that he had no participation is
belied by the fact that as a right-of-way-agent, his duty was
precisely to negotiate with property owners who are affected by
highway constructions for the purpose of compensating them.
On the part of the complainants, the injury caused to them
consists in their being divested of a large proportion of their
claims and receiving payment in an amount even lower than the
actual damage they incurred. They were deprived of the just
compensation to which they are entitled.
Third, the injury to any party, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference was done
through manifest, partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.
Petitioner argues that for the third element to be present, the
alleged injury or damage to the complainants and the
government must have been caused by the public officer in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions and
inasmuch as when the damage was caused to the complainants,
he was no longer discharging his official administrative
functions, therefore, he is not liable for the offense charged.
The argument is devoid of merit. The Sandiganbayan
established the fact that the petitioner took advantage of his
position as a right-of-way-agent by making the claimants sign
the aforementioned agreements to demolish and sworn
statements which contained falsified declarations of the value
of the improvements and lots. There was evident bad faith on
the part of the petitioner when he inflated the values of the true
claims and when he divested the claimants of a large share of
the amounts due them.
42. Fonacier v sb
The elements of the offense defined in this provision are that:
(1) The accused is a public officer discharging administrative,
judicial or official functions; (2) he must have acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable
negligence; and (3) his action has caused any undue injury to
any party, including the Government, or has given any party
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge
of his functions.
The second element enumerates the different modes by which
means the offense penalized in Section 3(e) may be committed.
"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a
disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for
rather than as they are." "Bad faith does not simply connote bad
17
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judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of
sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes
of the nature of fraud." "Gross negligence has been so defined
as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care,
acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to
act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally with a
conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other
persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which
even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their
own property." These definitions prove all too well that the
three modes are distinct and different from each other. Proof of
the existence of any of these modes in connection with the
prohibited acts under Section 3(e) should suffice to warrant
conviction.
The use of the three phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad
faith" and "gross inexcusable negligence" in the same
information does not mean that the indictment charges three
distinct offenses but only implies that the offense charged may
have been committed through any of the modes provided by the
law. In Criminal Case No. 010, all three modes of committing
the offense under Section 3(e) are alleged in the information.
Proof of the extent of damage sustained by the government with
respect to the supposed deliveries of Item 108 is not
indispensable for conviction. It is enough that Del Moral has
obtained large payments through, using the language of the
Sandiganbayan, "the utilization of fictitious and/or fraudulent
public documents . . . for a non-existing project . . . and non-
existing deliveries."
43. Mendoza-arce v ombudsman
SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. In addition to acts
or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing
law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: ....
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
The elements of the offense are:
1. That the accused are public officers or private persons
charged in conspiracy with them;
2. That said public officers committed the prohibited acts
during the performance of their official duties or in relation to
their public positions;
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By: Mark Que 2A 2019
SPL Atty. Axel Cruz
3. That they caused undue injury to any party, whether the
Government or a private party;
4. That such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference to such parties; and
5. That the public officers have acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
These elements must all be proven. In this case, there is no basis
for the finding that in issuing the LOA in question petitioner
acted with partiality, or bias which excites a disposition to see
and report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are,
with bad faith, which connotes not only bad judgment or
negligence but also a dishonest purpose or conscious
wrongdoing, a breach of duty amounting to fraud, nor with
gross negligence, which is negligence characterized by the want
of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where
there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences as
far as other persons are concerned.
The Manual for Clerks of Court describes the clerk of court as
an officer of the Court, a public officer, and an officer of the
law, [although] the position is not that of a judicial officer, nor
is it synonymous with the Court. . . . The office is essentially a
ministerial one.[29] Petitioner performed a ministerial duty in
preparing the letter of administration based on the dispositive
portions of the orders dated September 22, 1998 and October
12, 1998. She merely copied substantially the form for letters
of administration prescribed in the Manual for Clerks of Courts.
The LOA may not be accurate for lack of reference to the lease
agreement in favor of respondent Santiago B. Villaruz, but it
cannot be said with certainty that she acted either with gross
negligence or from some corrupt motive. The fact is that,
instead of employing her own words, she used phrases in the
Manual prescribed by this Court.
44. Trieste v sb
What is contemplated in Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is the
actual intervention in the transaction in which one has financial
or pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach. (Opinion
No. 306, Series 1961 and Opinion No. 94, Series 1972 of the
Secretary of Justice). The official need not dispose his shares in
the corporation as long as he does not do anything for the firm
in its contract with the office. For the law aims to prevent the
don-tenant use of influence, authority and power (Deliberation
on Senate Bill 293, May 6, 1959, Congressional Record, Vol.
11, page 603).
There is absolutely no evidence that petitioner had, in his
capacity as Mayor, used his influence, power, and authority in
having the transactions given to Trigen. He didn't ask anyone-
neither Treasurer Vega nor Secretary Maravilla for that matter,
to get the construction materials from Trigen.
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Case lifts
Inasmuch as Treasurer Vega signed and paid the vouchers after
the materials were delivered, petitioner's signature on the
vouchers after payment is not, we submit, the kind of
intervention contemplated under Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft
Law.
45. Alvarez v people
It bears stressing that the offense defined under Section 3 (e) of
R.A. No. 3019 may be committed even if bad faith is not
attendant. Thus, even assuming that petitioner did not act in bad
faith, his negligence under the circumstances was not only gross
but also inexcusable.
The substantial compliance rule is defined as "compliance with
the essential requirements, whether of a contract or of a statute."
Contrary to petitioner’s submission, his gross negligence in
approving API’s proposal notwithstanding its failure to comply
with the minimum legal requirements prevented the
Sangguniang Bayan from properly evaluating said proponent’s
financial and technical capabilities to undertake the BOT
project. Such gross negligence was evident from the taking of
shortcuts in the bidding process by shortening the period for
submission of comparative proposals, non-observance of
Investment Coordinating Committee of the National Economic
Development Authority approval for the Wag-wag Shopping
Mall Project, publication in a newspaper which is not of general
circulation, and accepting an incomplete proposal from API.
These forestalled a fair opportunity for other interested parties
to submit comparative proposals. Petitioner’s argument that
there was substantial compliance with the law thus fails. The
essential requirements of the BOT law were not at all satisfied
as in fact they were sidestepped to favor the lone bidder, API.
46. Go v SB
Contrary to the contention of petitioner Go, however, the fact
that he is not a public officer does not necessarily take him out
of the ambit of Section 3(g) of RA 3019. Petitioner Go’s
simplistic syllogism, i.e., he is not a public officer ergo he
cannot be charged with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019,
goes against the letter and spirit of the avowed policy of RA
3019 as embodied in Section 1 thereof:
Section 9 of RA 3019 buttresses the conclusion that the anti-
graft law’s application extends to both public officers and
private persons.
The fact that one of the elements of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is
"that the accused is a public officer" does not necessarily
preclude its application to private persons who, like petitioner
Go, are being charged with conspiring with public officers in
the commission of the offense thereunder.
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By: Mark Que 2A 2019
SPL Atty. Axel Cruz
The precept that could be drawn from Luciano, Singian and
Domingo, and which is applicable to the present case, is that
private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers,
may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent
offenses under Section 3 of RA 3019, including (g) and (h)
thereof. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the
anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and
private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act
or which may lead thereto.
Reliance by petitioner Go on Marcos v. Sandiganbayan20 is not
quite appropriate. To recall, upon her motion for
reconsideration, the Court therein acquitted former First Lady
Imelda Marcos of the charge of violation of Section 3(g) of RA
3019 in its Resolution dated October 6, 1998. Her acquittal was
based on the finding that she signed the subject lease agreement
as a private person, not as a public officer. As such, the first
element, i.e., that the accused is a public officer was wanting.
Petitioner Go, however, failed to put the Court’s ruling in
Marcos in its proper factual backdrop. The acquittal of the
former First Lady should be taken in the context of the Court’s
Decision dated January 29, 1998, in Dans, Jr. v. People,21
which the former First Lady sought to reconsider and, finding
merit in her motion, gave rise to the Court’s Resolution in
Marcos. In Dans, the Information filed against the former First
Lady and Jose P. Dans, Jr., then Minister of Transportation and
Communications, for violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019,
alleged that they were both public officers and, conspiring with
each other, entered into the subject lease agreement covering
the LRTA property with the PGHFI, a private entity, under
terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
the government.
The Court in its original decision affirmed the former First
Lady’s conviction for violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 but
acquitted her co-accused, Dans, Jr., of the said offense. As
stated earlier, upon the former First Lady’s motion for
reconsideration, the Court reversed her conviction in its
Resolution in Marcos.
It can be gleaned from the entire context of Marcos and Dans
that the reversal of the former First Lady’s conviction was
based on the fact that it was later held that she signed the subject
lease agreement as a private person, not a public officer.
However, this acquittal should also be taken in conjunction with
the fact that the public officer with whom she had supposedly
conspired, her co-accused Dans, had earlier been acquitted. In
other words, the element that the accused is a public officer,
was totally wanting in the former First Lady’s case because
Dans, the public officer with whom she had allegedly conspired
in committing Section 3(g) of RA 3019, had already been
acquitted. Obviously, the former First Lady could not be
convicted, on her own as a private person, of the said offense.
47. Estrada v sb
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Case lifts
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal
hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their
natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless
it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special
legal meaning to those words. The intention of the lawmakers -
who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers -
to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always
presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains
the following commonly accepted definition of the words
"combination" and "series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or
process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close
relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming
one after another in spatial and temporal succession.
That Congress intended the
words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their
popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative
deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or
the Plunder Law
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is
referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different
categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids
on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and
fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National
Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2)
or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category
of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation,
malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall
under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature
intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination"
and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically
providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the
Sandiganbayan[9] that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec.
4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -
x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least
a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in
subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec.
2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed
towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public
officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And
thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or
'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly
understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a
'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused
and public officer and others conniving with him follow to
achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there
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By: Mark Que 2A 2019
SPL Atty. Axel Cruz
is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods
used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must
form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in
any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the
crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution
to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element
necessary to constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every
component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of
the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to
prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts
sufficient to form a combination or series which would
constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least
P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other
act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the
accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.
To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an
Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids
on the public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these
fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least
two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that
they amounted to at least P50,000,000.00.
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the
logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy"
inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing
hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where the
prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a
by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is
consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no
other explanation for a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme
or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten
wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a
deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily
follows with the establishment of a series or combination of the
predicate acts.
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for
the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely
procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any
substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in
furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to
substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a
conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the
prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that
moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
48. Gma v people
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In her case, GMA points out that all that the State showed was
her having affixed her unqualified "OK" on the requests for the
additional CIFs by Uriarte. She argues that such act was not
even an overt act of plunder because it had no immediate and
necessary relation to plunder by virtue of her approval not being
per se illegal or irregular.
It is in this regard that the Sandigabayan gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction. To
start with, its conclusion that GMA had been the mastermind of
plunder was plainly conjectural and outrightly unfounded
considering that the information did not aver at all that she had
been the mastermind; hence, the Sandigabayan thereby acted
capriciously and arbitrarily. In the second place, the treatment
by the Sandiganbayan of her handwritten unqualified "OK" as
an overt act of plunder was absolutely unwarranted considering
that such act was a common legal and valid practice of
signifying approval of a fund release by the President. Indeed,
pursuant to People v. Lizada, supra, an act or conduct becomes
an overt act of a crime only when it evinces a causal relation to
the intended crime because the act or conduct will not be an
overt act of the crime if it does not have an immediate and
necessary relation to the offense.
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, the Court recognized two nuances
of appreciating conspiracy as a means to commit a crime, the
wheel conspiracy and the chain conspiracy.
The wheel conspiracy occurs when there is a single person or
group (the hub) dealing individually with two or more other
persons or groups (the spokes). The spoke typically interacts
with the hub rather than with another spoke. In the event that
the spoke shares a common purpose to succeed, there is a single
conspiracy. However, in the instances when each spoke is
unconcerned with the success of the other spokes, there are
multiple conspiracies.
An illustration of wheel conspiracy wherein there is only one
conspiracy involved was the conspiracy alleged in the
information for plunder filed against former President Estrada
and his co-conspirators.
Former President Estrada was the hub while the spokes were all
the other accused individuals. The rim that enclosed the spokes
was the common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the
amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
On the other hand, the American case of Kotteakos v. United
States illustrates a wheel conspiracy where multiple
conspiracies were established instead of one single conspiracy.
There, Simon Brown, the hub, assisted independent individuals
to obtain separate fraudulent loans from the US Government.
Although all the defendants were engaged in the same type of
illegal activity, there was no common purpose or overall plan
among them, and they were not liable for involvement in a
single conspiracy. Each loan was an end in itself, separate from
all others, although all were alike in having similar illegal
objects. Except for Brown, the common figure, no conspirator
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By: Mark Que 2A 2019
SPL Atty. Axel Cruz
was interested in whether any loan except his own went
through.
Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there existed 32
separate conspiracies involving Brown rather than one common
conspiracy.
The chain conspiracy recognized in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
exists when there is successive communication and cooperation
in much the same way as with legitimate business operations
between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and
retailer, and then retailer and consumer.
This involves individuals linked together in a vertical chain to
achieve a criminal objective. Illustrative of chain conspiracy
was that involved in United States v. Bruno, of the US Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. There, 88 defendants were
indicted for a conspiracy to import, sell, and possess narcotics.
This case involved several smugglers who had brought
narcotics to retailers who, in turn, had sold the narcotics to
operatives in Texas and Louisiana for distribution to addicts.
The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that what
transpired was a single chain conspiracy in which the smugglers
knew that the middlemen must sell to retailers for distribution
to addicts, and the retailers knew that the middlemen must
purchase drugs from smugglers. As reasoned by the court, "the
conspirators at one end of the chain knew that the unlawful
business would not and could not, stop with their buyers; and
those at the other end knew that it had not begun with their
sellers." Each conspirator knew that "the success of that part
with which he was immediately concerned was dependent upon
success of the whole." This means, therefore, that "every
member of the conspiracy was liable for every illegal
transaction carried out by other members of the conspiracy in
Texas and in Louisiana.
The law on plunder requires that a particular public officer must
be identified as the one who amassed, acquired or accumulated
ill-gotten wealth because it plainly states that plunder is
committed by any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in
the aggregate amount or total value of at least I!50,000,000.00
through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as
described in Section l(d) hereof. Surely, the law requires in the
criminal charge for plunder against several individuals that
there must be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who
may be members of her family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons. In other words, the allegation of the wheel conspiracy
or express conspiracy in the information was appropriate
because the main plunderer would then be identified in either
manner. Of course, implied conspiracy could also identify the
main plunderer, but that fact must be properly alleged and duly
proven by the Prosecution.
21
Case lifts
This interpretation is supported by Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,
where the Court explained the nature of the conspiracy charge
and the necessity for the main plunderer for whose benefit the
amassment, accumulation and acquisition was made.
Here, considering that 10 persons have been accused of
amassing, accumulating and/or acquiring ill-gotten wealth
aggregating 365,997,915.00, it would be improbable that the
crime charged was plunder if none of them was alleged to be
the main plunderer. As such, each of the 10 accused would
account for the aliquot amount of only 36,599,791.50, or
exactly 1110 of the alleged aggregate ill-gotten wealth, which
is far below the threshold value of ill-gotten wealth required for
plunder.
49. Villareal v people
*The Hazing Law was not yet in effect during the commission
of the acts so this case does not directly deal with the hazing
law. I just put the discussions relevant to the Hazing law and
not the ratio of the case
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the
proposed law and the core principle of mala in se adhered to
under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did not simply enact
an amendment thereto. Instead, it created a special law on
hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita. This
dilemma faced by Congress is further proof of how the nature
of hazing unique as against typical crimes cast a cloud of doubt
on whether society considered the act as an inherently wrong
conduct or mala in se at the time. It is safe to presume that
Lennys parents would not have consented to his participation in
Aquila Fraternitys initiation rites if the practice of hazing were
considered by them as mala in se.
Furthermore, in Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through
Associate Justice (now retired Chief Justice) Hilario Davide
that in our nations very recent history, the people have spoken,
through Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of hazing, [an]
act[] previously considered harmless by custom, as
criminal.[240] Although it may be regarded as a simple obiter
dictum, the statement nonetheless shows recognition that
hazing or the conduct of initiation rites through physical and/or
psychological suffering has not been traditionally criminalized.
Prior to the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law, there was to some extent a
lacuna in the law; hazing was not clearly considered an
intentional felony. And when there is doubt on the
interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of
the accused. In dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is
constrained to rule against the trial courts finding of malicious
intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no
proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious
intent to inflict physical injuries or animus iniuriandi as
required in mala in se cases, considering the contextual
background of his death, the unique nature of hazing, and
absent a law prohibiting hazing.
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By: Mark Que 2A 2019
SPL Atty. Axel Cruz
Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.
The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in 1874 in response
to hazing in the military. The hazing of recruits and plebes in
the armed services was so prevalent that Congress prohibited
all forms of military hazing, harmful or not.It was not until 1901
that Illinois passed the first state anti-hazing law, criminalizing
conduct whereby any one sustains an injury to his [or her]
person therefrom.
However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, due in large part
to the efforts of the Committee to Halt Useless College Killings
and other similar organizations, that states increasingly began
to enact legislation prohibiting and/or criminalizing hazing. As
of 2008, all but six states had enacted criminal or civil statutes
proscribing hazing. Most anti-hazing laws in the U.S. treat
hazing as a misdemeanor and carry relatively light
consequences for even the most severe situations. Only a few
states with anti-hazing laws consider hazing as a felony in case
death or great bodily harm occurs.
Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor,
except hazing that results in death or great bodily harm, which
is a Class 4 felony. In a Class 4 felony, a sentence of
imprisonment shall be for a term of not less than one year and
not more than three years. Indiana criminal law provides that a
person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally
performs hazing that results in serious bodily injury to a person
commits criminal recklessness, a Class D felony.
The offense becomes a Class C felony if committed by means
of a deadly weapon. As an element of a Class C felony criminal
recklessness resulting in serious bodily injury, death falls under
the category of serious bodily injury. A person who commits a
Class C felony is imprisoned for a fixed term of between two
(2) and eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence being four
(4) years. Pursuant to Missouri law, hazing is a Class A
misdemeanor, unless the act creates a substantial risk to the life
of the student or prospective member, in which case it becomes
a Class C felony. A Class C felony provides for an
imprisonment term not to exceed seven years.
In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another is a state jail
felony. An individual adjudged guilty of a state jail felony is
punished by confinement in a state jail for any term of not more
than two years or not less than 180 days. Under Utah law, if
hazing results in serious bodily injury, the hazer is guilty of a
third-degree felony. A person who has been convicted of a
third-degree felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for a
term not to exceed five years. West Virginia law provides that
if the act of hazing would otherwise be deemed a felony, the
hazer may be found guilty thereof and subject to penalties
provided therefor. In Wisconsin, a person is guilty of a Class G
felony if hazing results in the death of another. A Class G felony
carries a fine not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not to
exceed 10 years, or both.
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Case lifts
In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing were left with
limited remedies, as there was no hazing statute. This situation
was exemplified in Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity,
wherein Barry Ballous family resorted to a civil action for
wrongful death, since there was no anti-hazing statute in South
Carolina until 1994.
50. Gaanan v iac
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a
"device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly
overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication.
There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap
or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order
to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category
as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in
Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be
considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line.
The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that
purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It
is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the
true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases
of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. (see
Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Estandard Eastern, Inc., 66
SCRA 113,120).
Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA
No. 4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein,
should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or
similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be
tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to
instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed
by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very
nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is
precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone
conversation.
An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common
especially now when the extended unit does not have to be
connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved from
place ' to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person
should safely presume that the party he is calling at the other
end of the line probably has an extension telephone and he runs
the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line or
a telephone unit which shares its line with another. As was held
in the case of Rathbun v. United States (355, U.S. 107, 2 L Ed
2d 137-138)
51. Ramirez v ca
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it
illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
By: Mark Que 2A 2019
SPL Atty. Axel Cruz
private communication to secretly record such communication
by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to
whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to
be a party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all
persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by
the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent
Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to
a communication who records his private conversation with
another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a
violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a
violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be
specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200
penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual
made a secret recording of a private communication by means
of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under
Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in
his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the
said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a
violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its
communication to a third person should be professed."
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private
communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include
"private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the
word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word
communicate comes from the latin word communicare,
meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the "process by
which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals
through a common system of symbols (as language signs or
gestures)" These definitions are broad enough to include verbal
or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of
"meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the
emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between
petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's
office. Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the
phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by
the fact that the terms "conversation" and "communication"
were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his
Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:
52. Southern hemisphere v anti terrorism council
From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited
Section 3 of RA 9372, the following elements may be culled:
(1) the offender commits an act punishable under any of the
cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under any of the
enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the
predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3) the
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Case lifts SPL Atty. Axel Cruz
offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to
give in to an unlawful demand.

What the law seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech.

Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there

must first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the
operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of
the crime, including the coercion of the government to accede
to an unlawful demand. Given the presence of the first element,
any attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative
component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the
unprotected conduct into a protected speech.

Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected

conduct, because they merely evidence a prohibited
conduct.[80] Since speech is not involved here, the Court
cannot heed the call for a facial analysis.

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By: Mark Que 2A 2019 24