EDU VS ERICTA

G.R. No. L-32096 October 24, 1970 En Banc [Non-delegation of power; police power]

FACTS:
Judge Ericta and Teddy C. Galo filed suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
assailing the validity of enactment of the Reflector as well as Admin Order No. 2 implementing it, as an
invalid exercise of the police power for being violative of the due process clause. Galo followed with a
manifestation that in the event that Judge would uphold said statute constitutional, A.O. No. 2 of the
Land Transportation Commissioner, implementing such legislation be nullified as an undue exercise of
legislative power.

ISSUE:
Whether Reflector Law and Administrative Order is constitutional and valid.

RULING:
Yes. Reflector Law is enacted under the police power in order to promote public safety and order.

Justice Laurel identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus
"be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and
prosperity of the state." The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from
precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual
citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures
calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.

The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent Galo to impugn the validity of Administrative
Order No. 2 issued by petitioner in his official capacity, duly approved by the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, for being contrary to the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. Such
administrative order, which took effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors in effect
reproducing what was set forth in the Act.

It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not
delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception
that local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the
authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the
completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To
determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed
to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions
when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.

It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land Transportation Code.
Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on
public safety which is the prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical
affirmation Of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and
regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental purpose. His power is clear.
There has been no abuse. His Administrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack, far-from-
formidable, launched against it by respondent Galo.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V POEA

G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988 [Non delegation of legislative power; subordinate legislation]

FACTS: A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow filed a complaint for
charges against the Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued
by the POEA which stipulated death benefits and burial for the family of overseas workers. ESL
questioned the validity of the memorandum circular as violative of the principle of non-delegation of
legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said
regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative
discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation. Nevertheless, POEA assumed
jurisdiction and decided the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of
powers.

RULING: No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.

The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797.
... "The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the
Administration (POEA)."

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What
can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be.
The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be
abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar
problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative
agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the
"power of subordinate legislation."

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by
"filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This
is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the
implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have
the force and effect of law.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power:
1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is
not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
Gerochi vs. Department of Energy
G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007

Facts:
RA 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), whichsought to
impose a universal charge on all end-users of electricity for the purpose of funding NAPOCOR’s projects,
was enacted and took effect in 2001.Petitioners contest the constitutionality of the EPIRA, stating that
the imposition of the universalcharge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to
taxation withoutrepresentation for not giving the consumers a chance to be heard and be represented.

Issue:
W/N the universal charge is a tax

Ruling:
NO. The assailed universal charge is not a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the State’s
police power. That public welfare is promoted may be gleaned from Sec. 2 of the EPIRA,
whichenumerates the policies of the State regarding electrification. Moreover, the Special Trust
Fundfeature of the universal charge reasonably serves and assures the attainment and perpetuity of
the purposes for which the universal charge is imposed (e.g. to ensure the viability of the
country’selectric power industry), further boosting the position that the same is an exaction primarily
in pursuit of the State’s police objectives.If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation
is merely incidental, the impositionis a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that
revenue is incidentally raised doesnot make the imposition a tax.The taxing power may be used as an
implement of police power.The theory behind the exercise of the power to tax emanates
from necessity; without taxes,government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the general
welfare and well-being of the people.
Francisco Tatad et al vs Secretary of Energy

FACTS:
Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has always been
finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws accommodate these innovations
in the oil industry. One such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law
allows that “any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum
products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream
oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement,” subject only to
monitoring by the Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims,
among others, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined
petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff
differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors
in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source refined
petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be taxed on unrefined crude products and 7% on refined
crude products.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.
HELD:
The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the
Constitution. It violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which is contrary to free
competition. It cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an
oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in
the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell
and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works
to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts
deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players
that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own
will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will
suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an
uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective
players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and
they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to
the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream.
RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the “new players”
insofar as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the established oil companies by
requiring them to meet certain conditions already being observed by the latter.
Bai Sandra Sema vs Commission on Elections

FACTS:
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of Maguindanao
but it is not part of ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989.
Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1st legislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8
other municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM’s Organic Act and vesting it with power to create
provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly
created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the municipalities
of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is now only made of
Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo should be
retained; however, just for the purposes of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff
Kabunsuan with Cotabato City – this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as to
Cotabato’s status as a legislative district (or part of any).
Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato
(1st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and
that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen was from
there and D was winning – in fact he won). She contended that under the Constitution, upon creation of
a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative representation and since S.
Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City – so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the
HOR.
COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being
created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs.
HELD:
RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its
boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay
must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria
fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress
to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However,
under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to
create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any
provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and
municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with
the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that a
province, once created, should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that in order to
have a legislative district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City did not
meet the population requirement so Sema’s contention is untenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot
validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative district. But this can never
be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what
ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, ET AL. vs. BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, ET AL.

FACTS:
Mandaluyong and San Juan were one legislative district until the passage of the RA 7675 with title An
Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Mandaluyong." Same bill is now in question at to its constitutionality by the petitioners by invoking their
right as tax payers and residents of Mandaluyong.

With a plebiscite held on April 10, 1994, people of Mandaluyong voted to for the the conversion of
Mandaluyong to a highly urbanized city ratifying RA 7675 and making it in effect.

ISSUES:
WON RA 7675 is in:

1. Violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution regarding 'one subject one bill rule".

2. Violation of Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) as to the number of members of the Congress to 250 and
reappropriating the legislative districts.

HELD:
Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court dismissed the contention of constitutionality pertaining
to Art VI 26(1) saying "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be
sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions are germane to that general subject."

As to Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" was enforced justifying the act of
the legislature to increase the number of the members of the congress.

Article VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was the Congress itself which drafted the bill reapportioning
the legislative district.

In view of the foregoing facts, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
Mariano v COMELEC

G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995, 242 SCRA 211

FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S.
Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina
Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a
resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers,
they assail sections 2, 51, and 52 of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the constitutionality of one of the
questioned sections of R.A. No. 7854.

HELD:
The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They
are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised
by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case
itself.

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence
of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that
he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the
1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a
hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents
of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper partiesto raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist
this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
Quinto V. COMELEC

FACTS:
COMELEC issued a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso
facto resigned from their positions. Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive
officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions. In this
defense, the COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.

HELD:
NO.

In the Fariñas case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with appointive officials.
Incidentally, the Court upheld the substantial distinctions between the two and pronounced that there
was no violation of the equal protection clause.

However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion on the equal protection clause was an
obiter dictum since the issue raised therein was against the repealing clause. It didn’t squarely challenge
Sec. 66.

Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials. Applying the 4 requisites of a
valid classification, the proviso does not comply with the second requirement – that it must be germane
to the purpose of the law.

The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to
promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate. The
measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by
eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations
rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of
civil servants to the electorate arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the
performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office
work.

Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to
whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government
will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his certificate of candidacy for the election.
This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to
wield influence in the political world.

The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or non
partisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or brgy. level. Congress has not shown
a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale.
Aquino III V. Comelec

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners Senator
Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the nullification as unconstitutional of
Republic Act No. 9716, entitled “An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second
(2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative
District From Such Reapportionment.”

Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009 creating an additional
legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second
legislative districts of the province.

The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2 distributed among
four (4) legislative districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second
districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the
province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San
Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new
second legislative district.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the
explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard. The provision reads:
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have
at least one representative.

The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts
of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of
less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

Issue:
w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
legislative district in a province?
HELD:
We deny the petition.

RULING:
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must
compose a legislative district.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase “each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand” from the phrase “or each province” point to no other conclusion than
that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province.26
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province
which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the
Local Government Code states:

Requisites for Creation. –

(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and
either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office.

Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an

alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.
Aldaba vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010

FACTS:
This case is an original action for Prohibition to declareunconstitutional, R.A. 9591 which creates a
legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly, the R.A. violates the minimum population
requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of
Bulacan was represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts. Before the passage of the Act
through House Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill 1986, Malolos City had a
population of 223, 069 in 2007.

House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor Domingo (then
Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the population of Malolos will be as
projected, 254,030 by the year 2010.

Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population
threshold of 250,000 for a city to meritrepresentative in Congress.

ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. 9591, “Án act creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan”
is unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City of Malolos has at least 250,000 actual or
projected.

HELD:
It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 isunconstitutional for being violative of Section
5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution on the grounds that, as required by the 1987 Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000
population. In relation with this, Regional Director Miranda issued a Certification which is based on the
demographic projections, was declared without legal effect because the Regional Director has no basis
and no authority to issue the Certification based on the following statements supported by Section 6 of
E.O. 135 as signed by President Fidel V. Ramos, which provides:

The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are declared official by the Nat’l
Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated whether the document have been
declared official by the NSCB.

The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer,
in which case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is unauthorized.

The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case, the Certification
issued by Director Miranda was undated.

It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if compounded, the Malolos
population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010.

It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of legislative
reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power among districts.
ANG LADLAD PARTLYLIST VS. COMELEC

FACTS:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It
filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent. However, due to moral
grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and
quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public
policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal
Code in its Article 201.

A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari under Rule
65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious
dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also
claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech
and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’
international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national
political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It
also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged
its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.

ISSUE:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.

HELD:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only
those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and
under-represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically
enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution
and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental
reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was
grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection
is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s
admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of
society.

We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best;
disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as “any act, omission,
establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local
ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a
mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings
and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to
justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s
registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec

FACTS:
There are 4 parameters to determine the winners in a party-list election under RA 7941:
1. 20% allocation 3. 3-seat limit
2. 2% threshold 4. Proportional representation

The Congress enacted RA 7941 on Mar. 3, 1995 which states that the State shall “promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which
will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation
and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of
the House of Representatives. The State shall also develop the simplest scheme possible to guarantee a
full, free and open party system by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature.”

ISSUES:
1. Is the 20% allocation mandatory? Should the 20% allocation for party-list be filled up completely all
the time?
2. Are the 2% threshold and the 3-seat limit constitutional?
3. How should the additional seats be determined?

HELD:
(1) NO. Sec. 5(2) Art. 6 merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress. The Congress has
prerogative to determine whether to adjust or change this percentage requirement, and the mechanics
by which it is to be filled up.

(2) YES. The 2% threshold and the 3-seat limit are consistent with the very essence of “representation.”
The 3-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the legislative. Thus, no single
group would dominate.

(3) To determine the additional seats, 3 steps will be followed:

a. rank the highest to lowest. The highest is called the “first” party.

b. determine the seats the “first” party will have. For the “first” party, it will have a 6% benchmark.
Every succeeding additional 2% of votes from the first 2% requirement will constitute 1 additional seat.
If the “first” party gets 2 additional seats, then the next in rank will get less.

c. to solve for the additional seats of other qualified parties, the formula provided below will be used:

additional seats no. of votes no. of

for the = of the party x additional
concerned no. of votes of seats of the
party the “first” party “first” party
Bagong Bayani-OFW vs. COMELEC

FACTS:
Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the participation of 154
organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners
sought the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to
benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized
or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners
elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner’s recourse to the Court was proper.
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785.

HELD:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other remedies "where the
issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." The facts
attendant to the case rendered it justiciable.

2. Political parties – even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject to the
requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the
Party List System.

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list
elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations” . It is however, incumbent upon the
Comelec to determine proportional representation of the “marginalized and underrepresented”, the
criteria for participation, in relation to the cause of the party list applicants so as to avoid desecration of
the noble purpose of the party-list system.

3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents in the Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was beyond the pale of the
Court. The Court not being a trier of facts.

However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the
Constitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the Constitution, to
assist the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the petition be remanded in the Comelec to
determine compliance by the party lists.
Bantay vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 177271
May 4, 2007

FACTS: Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set
aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which
have manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.

A number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and subsequently were accredited by
the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections. Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor
for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, seeking to disqualify
the nominees of certain party-list organizations. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this
urgent petition has yet to be resolved.
Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed 2 letters to the Director of the Comelec’s
Law Department requesting a list of that groups’ nominees. Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales,
et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3, 2007 virtually
declaring the nominees’ names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales’ basic disclosure
request. Comelec’s reason for keeping the names of the party list nominees away from the public is
deducible from the excerpts of the news report appearing in the April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila
Bulletin, is that there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the names of
nominees, and that party list elections must not be personality oriented according to Chairman Abalos.
In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR assail the Comelec resolutions accrediting
private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list elections without
simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess the requisite
qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented sector each seeks to.

In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and
Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution dated April 3, 2007.

While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the
nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have the
additional prayers that the 33 private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to
participate in the party-list elections and that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups
from participating in the elections.

ISSUES:
1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups
named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not appear to
be qualified.
2. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various party-
list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the
Constitution; and
3. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the names of
said nominees.
HELD:

The 1st petition is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation of the respondents named
therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the
nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007
elections, the 2 petitions are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately
disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups,

1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of
accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. The exercise would require the Court to
make a factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by way of special
civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to decide factual issues
and the case must be decided on the undisputed facts on record. The sole function of a writ of certiorari
is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of
the tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence. (note that nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement
that the qualification of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an
organization. )

2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:

Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

COMELEC’s basis of its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of subject party-list groups,
Section 7 of R.A. 7941,which last sentence reads: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be
shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested
disclosure. There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or
even publishing through mediums other than the "Certified List" of the names.

It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their
representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a
vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases,
would eventually sit in the House of Representatives. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the
law or rules that would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election
3. COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list
groups named in the herein petitions. The right to information is a public right where the real parties in
interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise, but like all constitutional guarantees, however, the
right to information and its companion right of access to official records are not absolute. The people’s
right to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is further subject to such limitation as may be
provided by law. But no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of
the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-
list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.
BANAT v COMELEC G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009
FACTS:

On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives
Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition
because "the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have recently been quoted in the national
papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply
the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."

BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.

On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to
reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because
the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the
same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.

ISSUES:

Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we defined
the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat
constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections?
If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?

HELD:
WHEREFORE we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC
dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-
60. We declareunconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats.

Ratio: Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of
party-list representatives found in the Constitution. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of
a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a
qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from
dominating the party-list elections.

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent
threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A.
No. 7941 isunconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically
impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available
party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the
additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional
seats to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at
by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for
party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is
multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats
reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole
integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s
share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in
rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the
second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats
each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the
party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political
parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the
Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the
reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a "party" that participates in party-list
elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major
political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list
elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No.
7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of
major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs Commission on Elections

This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT vs COMELEC.
FACTS:
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May
2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for
marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists.
HELD:
No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT.
However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now
provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases.
The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations,
(2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or
not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only
through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by
itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in
“well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and
overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political
constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who
lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have
a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from
participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional prohibition nor a
statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the party-list system provided that
they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when
they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated
that it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political
system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of
the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the
1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the
“marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. It is
also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who
lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common denominator however is that all of them
cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in
the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the
party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly
excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include
only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society. It
should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral
representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still
qualified as “marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies” as
they are ideologically marginalized.